


U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



PRINCIPAL CONTENTS


- | | |
|--|--|
| Global Flux and Dilemmas in United Nations Peace Keeping | - <i>Lt Gen JM Sanderson, AC</i> |
| United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - A Perspective | - <i>Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)</i> |
| The Foreign Policy of China | - <i>Sahdev Vohra, ICS</i> |
| Human Rights and the Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict Operations | - <i>Maj Harcharan Singh</i> |
| India and Pakistan : A Troubled Relationship | - <i>Andrea Benvenuti</i> |
| Sino-Myanmar Military Ties : Implications for India's Security | - <i>Swaran Singh</i> |

JULY-SEPTEMBER 1995


ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © Rs. 30.00 PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

Towards National Growth and Self Reliance

As a defence shipyard, GRSE is currently engaged in the construction of a series of various types of Ships/Craft for the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.



GRSE has the capacity to design and build ocean going ships up to 27000 DWT. Presently building Frigates, Corvettes, Fleet Tanker, Landing Ship Tank, Survey Vessels and Inland Patrol Vessels. GRSE also produces a variety of ship board equipment.





GRSE builds a range of diesel engines for marine propulsion and for power generation—the most efficient in the country.

Portable steel bridges built by GRSE are the best product of its type.

GRSE also manufactures submersible/turbine pumps for agriculturists.

The list of GRSE products is endless and GRSE's pursuit of progress is matchless.



ISSN 0041-770X

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110 011

Telephone No. 3015828

Vol CXXV

July-September 1995

No. 521

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 120.00 Foreign £18.00 or \$ 33.00 by Air
Mail £14.00 or \$ 26.00 by Sea Mail. Subscription should be sent to the
Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution. Articles,
Correspondence and Books for Review should be sent to the Editor.
Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be sent to the Director.

**UNITED
SERVICE
INSTITUTION
OF INDIA**

for

*the furtherance of
interest and know-
ledge in the art,
science, and literature
of National Security
in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular*

Director

**Maj Gen SC Sinha,
PVSM (Retd)**

Dy Director & Editor

**Air Cmde N B Singh,
MA, M.Phil, Ph.D. (Retd)**

Dy Director (Admin)

**Brig G L Sachdeva
(Retd)**

Chief Instructor

Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

DS (Coord.)

Col V K Singh, VSM

Librarian

Mr O S Sachdeva

Accountant

Mr R C Mittal

Patron

Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, Hon'ble President of India

Vice-Patron

**Air Chief Marshal S K Kaul, PVSM, MVC, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff and Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee**

Admiral V S Shekhawat, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff

General S Roychowdhury, PVSM, ADC, Chief of the Army Staff

President - USI Council

Vice Admiral S K Chand, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

Vice Presidents

Lt Gen Moti Dar, PVSM, AVSM, Vice Chief of the Army Staff

Air Marshal S K Sareen, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, Vice Chief of the Air Staff

Ex-Officio Members

Shri K A Nambiar, Secretary, Ministry of Defence

Maj Gen R.P.R.C. Naidu, VSM, Officiating Director General Military Training

Air Vice-Marshal R K Malhotra, AVSM, VM, Director Training, Air HQ

Commodore Ravinder Singh, YSM, Director Naval Training

Elected Members of the Council

Lt Gen V P Airy, MVC (Retd)

Lt Gen K Balam, PVSM (Retd)

Air Vice Marshal M Banerji, MVC, VM (Retd)

Vice Admiral SC Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)

Lt Gen IS Gill, PVSM, MC (Retd)

Vice Admiral SP Govil, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Brigadier NB Grant, AVSM (Retd)

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM

Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, AVSM (Retd)

General VN Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

Professor M L Sondhi

Lt Gen MA Zaki, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

Co-opted Member

Lt Gen SN Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Executive Committee

Maj Gen R.P.R.C. Naidu, VSM, Officiating Director General Military Training

Air Vice-Marshal R K Malhotra, AVSM, VM, Director Training, Air HQ

Commodore Ravinder Singh, YSM, Director Naval Training

Lt Gen K Balam, PVSM (Retd)

Air Vice Marshal M Banerji, MVC, VM (Retd)

Vice Admiral S.C. Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)

Vice Admiral S.P. Govil PVSM, AVSM, (Retd)

Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, AVSM (Retd)

Lt Gen SN Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Professor M.L. Sondhi

CONTENTS

July-September 1995

Editorial.....	288
MAIN ARTICLES	
Global Flux and Dilemmas in United Nations Peace Keeping	
Lt Gen J M Sanderson, AC.....	289
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - A Perspective	
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd).....	312
The Foreign Policy of China	
Sahdev Vohra, ICS.....	317
Human Rights and the Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict Operations	
Major Harcharan Singh.....	323
India and Pakistan : A Troubled Relationship	
Andrea Benvenuti.....	335
Sino-Myanmar Military Ties : Implications for India's Security	
Swaran Singh.....	348
One Rank One Pension	
Lt Gen K K Nanda, PVSM (Retd).....	358
Florence Nightingales of Our Armed Forces	
Brigadier A S Apte (Retd).....	364
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.....	376
REVIEW ARTICLES	
National Integration & Character Building	
by Lt Gen A M Vohra, PVSM, IA (Retd).....	380
Engineers' Contribution to Victory	
by Lt Gen S L Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd).....	382
Inside Story of Soviet Politics	
by Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd).....	384
Defence and Development Debate	
by Lt Gen V R Raghavan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd).....	387
SHORT REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS.....	390
Additions to the USI Library.....	423

NOTE

The views expressed in the Journal are in no sense official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

EDITORIAL

Living in the Global Village

The end of the Great War saw the creation of the League of Nations under the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919. It was the result of President Wilson's fourteen points which contained the provision for the establishment of an international organisation to prevent wars and to maintain peace and security.

The League, however, failed in its primary objectives because it had no teeth to enforce peace in conflict situations. The League was not the first attempt of the international community to form a collective security system. Earlier, after the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna (1815) had attempted to establish a balance of power on the European continent. The Treaty of 1815 provided Europe with a hundred years of peace. Finally, however, neither the Congress of Vienna, nor the League of Nations, formed a century later, could prevent Europe sliding into the great wars of the twentieth century.

The successor to the League of Nations, the United Nations, established soon after the Second World War, and now in its fiftieth year, finds itself in a similar situation as its earlier incarnations. It neither has the economic strength nor the military force to effectively implement the policies formulated at the UN.

Today, the challenges to the United Nations are vastly different. The conflicts between States have given way to conflicts within States as witnessed in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia and in many others. In these internal conflicts the objectives of the United Nations cannot be clearly defined since these situations come within the sovereign jurisdiction of the nation State. And according to Albert Einstein, unless every nation unconditionally surrenders, in a certain measure, its liberty of action, and its sovereignty, the quest for international security cannot succeed.

In addition to the changes in the nature of conflict, there is also a revolution in communications technology leading to information explosion and the death of distance. However, we must ensure that the rapid transformation of the international system of states into a global village does not lead to Hobbes' vision of an uncivilized society where there is "continued fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".

How to make the global village into a civilized society entering the twenty-first century with the wisdom received during the five thousand years of historical evolution? This is the critical question. The United Nations, and its peace-keeping efforts during the last 50 years, provide one answer. In this context, the two lead articles in this issue of the Journal, one by Lt Gen JM Sanderson, and the other by Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, critically examine with deep insight based on personal experience, the problems facing the United Nations peace keeping operations today and their possible solution.

Global Flux and Dilemmas in United Nations Peace Keeping

LT GENERAL J M SANDERSON, A C

THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT

The resolution of conflict is one of the most immediate international issues of our time. We are living in a period of great change. Around us, we see brutality and suffering on a scale unprecedented since the major conflicts of this century. The cost in lives and infrastructure, along with the diversion of finances to arms and military capabilities, continues to detract from prosperity and the social progress needed to alleviate the causes of conflict. Our common humanity demands that we find an escape from this vicious cycle of violence.

While the recent strategic shifts have seen the threat of global nuclear war recede, the end of the Cold War has also removed the restraining hands of the Superpowers on their client states and proxies, which, for most of the fifty years since the end of the Second World War, seemed to contain many of the deep ethnic, religious and cultural tensions which have plagued modern history.

The collapse of the Soviet Union's capacity to pursue a global strategy led to the tearing down of the political and ideological barrier, called an 'Iron Curtain' by Churchill, which, in 1945, had 'descended across the continent of Europe'. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc led to the fragmentation of the Soviet Union itself. Even the cohesion of the Russian Federation, the heritage passed down from the theocratically sanctioned Romanoff Empire, appears uncertain as it suffers the strains of political and economic readjustment.

The World's remaining Superpower, relieved of the security burdens imposed by its former adversary and denied the crystalline certainty of its role as the defender of freedom, is itself divided. It moves toward a new role only with uncertainty, while burgeoning domestic problems cast a shadow over its ability to sustain a coherent international commitment.

In many respects, the post-Cold War world is an extension of the post-

Text based on the talk given by Lt. General J.M. Sanderson A.C. to the members of the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on April 5, 1995.

Lt. General J.M. Sanderson is a former Force Commander United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1992-1993, and at present, Chief of the General Staff Australian Army.

colonial world. The Cold War froze the problems associated with colonial frontiers, often drawn for political or administrative expedience, or as trade-offs in nineteenth century diplomacy in European imperial capitals. The problems of divided ethnic, cultural, religious and economic groups have thus been transported to another age, and are now emerging anew, to challenge international conflict resolution machinery designed for the essential, but very different purpose of preventing a repetition of the two disastrous World Wars of this century. The need for leadership is clear, but, confronted with these crises, the United Nations, itself still in the process of emerging from its Cold War torpor, has been found wanting in its capacity to assume the full moral authority established in its origins.

THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION DILEMMA

Technology has brought the international community closer together, giving us unprecedented opportunities for cooperation and consensus. While even the most pessimistic observer would have to admit that international cooperation has made significant advances in the last fifty years, the issues of national and individual security legitimately remain of fundamental concern to all peoples, and the primary responsibility of their governments.

The spectre of war is the major challenge to our capacity for international collective action. Despite the advances in cooperation, the very nature of conflict makes it inherently difficult to resolve. While the international community gives preference to conflict resolution by peaceful means, such as negotiation and mediation, peaceful approaches often seem a weak weapon against the political forces which have led to the conflict. The effectiveness of our international efforts largely depends on the leadership of the combatant parties and of those nations which sense real or potential prejudice to their security interests. The ability to generate confidence in and commitment to international conflict resolution processes depends on their willingness to compromise entrenched positions in the interests of the greater good.

We are also dependent on the extent of the control they exercise over their followers. In some circumstances (such as in many guerrilla or terrorist organisations), control is loose. In these situations, much of the decision-making is left to commanders or individuals who are not ready to accept constraints on their operations. Problems also arise with armed groups of civilians who operate outside an identifiable command framework. In Rwanda for example, the worst excesses of the conflict were not perpetrated by professional soldiers, but by macheté and club wielding civilians, drafted into militias and driven by the ethnic passions of generations.

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Fifty years ago, at the end of the most disastrous war the World has known, the representatives of fifty nations signed the Charter of the United Nations. Those representatives were also able to recall the devastating effects of the earlier Great War. They were resolved that the United Nations would transcend the incapacity of the League of Nations to prevent conflict during the inter-war years.

The United Nations Charter is a mighty document, which does great credit to those who drafted it. Its spirit is reflected in its opening statement that:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom;...

The Charter is a framework for reconciliation. Its drafters sought to use the wartime cooperation to build confidence between nations. Through the united strength of Member States they hoped to provide defence against threats to the concepts of sovereignty within recognised frontiers, fundamental rights and the rule of international law.

But in many parts of the globe, these concepts are not well understood, or if understood, are an incitement to action to gain, for particular groups, the benefits which accrue to nation-state status. Recent experiences have shown yet again that the line between civilisation and barbarism is thin. What is certain is that the massive human rights violations, hunger, disease and refugee flows, caused by conflicts and friction, cannot be ignored. The central issue is how to intervene in a way which holds the prospect of resolution of a crisis, while remaining within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

If there is to be any chance of arriving at comprehensive solutions, it is essential to view the World in the light of the emerging global flux, rather than simply the past. Importantly, the approaches taken to resolve these crises can set in train dynamics which could establish a pattern for successful international conflict resolution, and cooperation generally, in the next century and perhaps even the centuries to follow.

One means of directing these dynamics towards a civilised course is through the Charter itself. Its strength comes from its moral authority, the source of which lies in the obligation of its signatories to serve the peoples of the United Nations.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVITY

In the contemporary World, the deployment of peacekeeping forces has become the most visible face of the United Nations. Peacekeeping operations were never envisaged in the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, they are an appropriate mechanism within the framework of Chapter VI, *The Pacific Settlement of Disputes*. Specifically, they come under Article 33, which provides for "other peaceful means" among a range of peaceful options.

Operations which come under Article 42 in Chapter VII of the Charter, *Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression*, are not peacekeeping. The purpose of Chapter VII is, in essence, collective defence against an expansionist military power, such as the Axis forces of the Second World War. Article 42 legitimises international violence to this end (which is otherwise proscribed by Article 2). The Korean War of 1950 to 1953 and the Gulf War of 1991 provide the only clear examples of Article 42 action. These were conducted by war-fighting international coalitions led by the United States and sanctioned by the Security Council.

The United States-led intervention in Somalia in 1992 and the French intervention in southern Rwanda in 1994, are both also ostensibly Chapter VII actions sanctioned by Security Council resolutions. Both, however, introduced the contradictory state, which plagues modern international policy-making, of having Chapter VI and Chapter VII actions in parallel in an internal conflict. While not unfamiliar to former colonial powers, this contradiction is at odds with the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

On the other hand, pure peacekeeping operations seek to resolve lesser disputes without being judgemental about the rights and wrongs of the parties, any international backers they might have, or other states that perceive they have interests at stake. The fundamental building block for diplomatic responses (outlined under Article 33) which can be most readily agreed is the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Article 2 obliges this and Chapter VI provides the framework for United Nations action.

With the extension of United Nations intervention into the area of peace building, peacekeeping operations have become finely balanced affairs, involving the need for harmonisation of widely diverse activities and interests in

environments of an increasingly dynamic nature. It is now, more than ever, essential that United Nations forces maintain their peacekeeping *bona fides* throughout.

THE DYNAMICS OF FORCE

In an environment of excesses and obstacles, the use of force as a preventative measure, to impose a settlement on recalcitrant parties, or to establish order over lawless groups, emerges as an apparent necessity. Experiences in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and more recent public commentary suggests that, to many, enforcement by peacekeepers is an option. The issues involved are not well understood, and in many peacekeeping operations, this confusion over the necessary constraints on the use of force can make effective command impossible. From the perspective of a military commander, the use of force is essentially a command and control problem.

Force creates its own dynamics and has to be controlled. Unlike the laws of physics, in which every action has an equal and opposite reaction, actions in war are likely to be magnified several-fold as passions are compounded by the fatal consequences of conflict. In these circumstances, an escape from the vicious cycle of violence is likely to remain distant until one or more sides bleed themselves to exhaustion. This terrible reality seems to be little understood in many quarters.

This is why the essence of a successful conflict resolution strategy includes, at its core, absolute discrimination in the use of force. It should not occur haphazardly in a climate of passion and raw politics. Nor should it occur as a result of decisions made purely in the glow of television screens. It needs to be borne in mind that enforcement implies that someone does not agree to the role of the enforcer and is, therefore, likely to resist in a way which quickly moves affairs into a state of reciprocating violence.

THE PEACEKEEPING ETHOS

Peacekeeping is based on consent of all the parties involved, including that of the peacekeepers. This requires, for their own protection, an overt display of impartiality to establish their credentials as 'honest brokers' in the process. This display is totally different to the display required for enforcement, which is warlike and concentrated to establish seriousness of intent.

In true peacekeeping, member states deploy an international force to facilitate a settlement, or to inhibit escalation of a conflict. It matters little

whether the agreement of the parties in conflict is due to diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or exhaustion. The opposing factions want either resolution of the conflict, or at least its suspension while diplomacy proceeds. The peacekeepers are legally protected by the agreement; their legitimate purpose is confidence-building and there are clear limits to what they can do while retaining the consent of the parties.

A peacekeeping force gains and retains its acceptability, both internationally and among the parties to the dispute, because it is impartial. The peacekeepers' neutrality gives them their unity and their strength. They are constrained to limit the use of force to self-defence. If peacekeepers move beyond their inherent right of self-defence, experience shows us that they will almost inevitably compromise their neutrality and become another party to the conflict. When this occurs, their unity is shattered, they are stripped of their strength and, because of their nature, are without the protection of the array of mechanical resources that any able commander will seek to support his combat forces in the achievement of their assigned military objectives.

Anyone who joins a conflict without the means or the intention of winning is betraying those who will be called on to make the sacrifices. In the case of United Nations peacekeeping, they are also likely to compromise the neutrality of the United Nations and with it, undermine its capacity to act as an honest broker in other conflicts.

SELF-DEFENCE IN PEACEKEEPING

Regrettably, the confusion is exacerbated by a wide interpretation of the meaning of self-defence among contributing countries and analysts. For example, in UNTAC, interpretations covered the full spectrum, despite clear definitions in Standing Operating Procedures and continuous briefings. Initially, responses among UNTAC contingents ranged from some troops allowing themselves to be disarmed when threatened to others opening fire with all available weapons at the slightest provocation.

The Cambodian operation was conducted in a country which had suffered a quarter of a century of civil war, genocide and more civil war. Despite the pledges of the Parties to the Paris Agreements, the UNTAC peacekeepers and civilian components eventually deployed into a climate of escalating violence, demanding 'go' or 'no go' decisions.

From the point of view of the UNTAC Force Commander, self-defence meant defence of any one going about their legitimate business under the Paris Agreements - nothing more. In this context, self-defence is passive-it does not

actively seek combat. In UNTAC, activity only extended to the use of minimum force and proportionate response in defence of the mandated political objective - the conduct of an election for a constituent assembly in as neutral an environment as could be created by these means.

At the same time, self-defence not only meant an individual's defence of himself alone-it meant collective action. In some instances, company-level defensive battles had to be fought, but it is important to understand that in these engagements, the use of force by peacekeepers was never offensive - only those actually using force against mandated activities were engaged, and then only engaged to the extent necessary to provide protection. While the majority of the military units were eventually mentally and physically prepared to do this, it was important that their operations were seen to be conducted strictly within these constraints.

DEFENDING THE MANDATE

In Cambodia, the fundamental act of the mandate was the Cambodian election. The key element in its success was the readiness of the people to vote. This depended in a large part on the perceived commitment of the United Nations to that end, and the Cambodian conviction of that commitment. At the outset, the delayed start by UNTAC eroded much of the hard won opportunities provided by the Paris Agreements, opening a new set of conflicting dynamics.

The Khmer Rouge claimed that UNTAC was not implementing the Agreements fairly and that the people would reject the UNTAC process. They said that the violence in the countryside, including the massacres of innocent civilians, was a manifestation of the people's anger. On the other hand, the Phnom Penh faction claimed that UNTAC lacked the will to prevent the Khmer Rouge from subverting the peace process. How to respond was the dilemma the United Nations faced.

On a number of occasions, in response to atrocities, the Force Commander was called on, by people both within and outside the United Nations, to use the peacekeeping force for the conduct of operations against the Khmer Rouge. These would have been offensive operations - no one could draw any other interpretation. But what was most astonishing was the passion with which the use of force was espoused. Often, the most fervent advocates of violence were those who would otherwise declare their total opposition to war!

Enforcement would have required a force several times larger than the one provided by the United Nations, one structured and equipped for a pro-

tracted conflict, and at a significantly greater cost. Such a mission would have spelt doom for the Cambodian peace process, even if it had been given wide international support. The many years of diplomatic effort and a huge expenditure of international funds would have been wasted.

Enforcement is, after all, war by another name. It is only if there is almost universal consent that a particular party is in the wrong that international support for enforcement will follow. Universal consent does not simply mean the views of some journalists or commentators. Often these are encumbered by baggage from the past or are obscured by the horror and passion of more immediate events. There has to be interests of severe magnitude at stake before the consensus within the contributing countries will reach the necessary fervour to provide the forces and funds for war-fighting, and possibly to accept casualties on a significant scale! A critical issue in such considerations is that of sustainment. Can a coalition response be sustained once it comes under stress?

Anyone who thinks they can bluff their way through these things with a mandate and troops designed for peacekeeping has little understanding of the nature of conflict and the consequences of the use of force. There are those of course who are prepared to make bold suggestions about enforcement, but often there is not even domestic consensus for it in their own nation, let alone in the multi-national array of countries which contribute to a modern day peacekeeping force.

It is easy to understand the frustration of people when they cannot achieve the results they aspire to, or when they see atrocities committed within their reach and vision. But it is also deeply disturbing when they are moved to publicly exhort the transition to enforcement by peacekeepers in the face of this. Such exhortations are not only very dangerous, but are often counter-productive to the outcome of the mission.

THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE

If the mission in Cambodia was to proceed, it was critical for UNTAC to retain the peacekeeping ethos under the prevailing circumstances. There were strong strategic reasons why enforcement was never an option. While the Khmer Rouge was usually seen as the recalcitrant party, there were deep divisions internationally, within the Security Council and within UNTAC, about where the guilt lay. There was no broad consensus within UNTAC, or among the international supporters of the operation for offensive action against any party. Both UNTAC and the essential international unity which had been built up behind the Cambodian peace process and scrupulously guarded would very likely have been shattered had it been tested with enforcement.

The difficulty here lies in ensuring that everyone understands the purpose of peacekeeping operations, why the peacekeepers are deployed to these volatile areas in the first place, their objectives and what they are legally entitled to do. The issue of consent and jurisdiction are the key themes here. The only way to avoid the need to consider peace enforcement, with all its consequences, is to generate and maintain consensus on the steps for peaceful resolution of the conflict.

To do this, everyone has to have something at stake, and the benefit of complying with an agreement has to exceed the consequences of not complying. In this process, leaders have to be forced into considering the needs of their followers. Their actual leadership may have to be put at stake. There has to be an element of coercion in this, but there sometimes seems to be an almost complete comprehension gap on the dynamic nature and the effect of the use of force at the international level. Closely related to this is the need to understand the effects of the use of force by peacekeepers on the credibility of United Nations peacekeeping generally, as well as on the activities of all United Nations personnel and non-government organisations in the mission area.

In Cambodia, the command assessment had to be that, although there was a climate of violence, it was manageable, provided UNTAC did nothing to contribute to it, while containing it to the extent possible through negotiations and moderating its effects through diplomatic efforts. The long term objective of the mandate had to be the focus.

The civilian components had their mandated responsibilities, and humanitarian agencies and non-government organisations had their programs aimed at alleviating the suffering of the people. For most, this included extensive field work. In their interests, UNTAC had to avoid conflict as much as was reasonably possible. But at a critical point, UNTAC had to stay and defend the essential element of the mandate—the electoral process. The Cambodian people expected this of UNTAC and only the Military Component could provide it for them. It was a case of bluff in which the risks could only be taken where UNTAC could be relatively sure of its support and the commitment of its own people.

It was only in the context of self-defence that this outcome could be reasonably certain. Self-defence in support of the mandate was only possible with cohesion in the Security Council and consensus in the countries contributing troops to the peacekeeping mission. The two issues are synergistic; each depends on the other. When they are drawn together, diplomacy is concentrated to support action. This emphasises the need for absolute discrimination in the use of force.

JURISDICTION

Even if the agreement is broken, or in the case of some humanitarian missions, where peacekeepers might be deployed without a formal agreement being reached between recognisable political authorities, it is difficult to argue that anyone had the right to kill or injure people in their own country without proper sanction under either international or domestic law. How can a mandate which draws its authority from a Charter designed to defend the sovereignty of states, and to promote and encourage respect for human rights, authorise hostile intervention against any party within a state?

And if responses are not firmly based within the framework of the Charter, how can the United Nations Commander issue lawful and sustainable orders to soldiers of another member state, or indeed, of his own country? Where does that leave the soldier who might have to make the choice between obeying or disobeying those orders, and bearing the consequences?

In Cambodia, there was no legitimate authority to engage in offensive operations, since all the Parties to the Paris Agreements had not acceded to it. The appropriate response was the one taken, namely, to fulfil the mandated responsibility of establishing a recognisable legitimate authority which was capable of exercising sovereign jurisdiction.

*

This is not to suggest that there are no enforcement options. But force has to be lawful, and the significantly greater demands it imposes planned for and resourced. Moreover, the pressure on a Force Commander in an environment where there is active debate about transition from Chapter VI peacekeeping to Chapter VII enforcement operations very quickly raises the conclusions that most of the force is neither equipped nor trained for such a transition, and the wavering international support for whatever new objectives are chosen will make the command weak and vulnerable. It is no way to go to war!

The requirement for discrimination is more so in the case of enforcement action. Force has to be directed only towards the achievement of the legitimate political objective. Where the control is loose, it is free to generate its own dynamic.

STANDING ARMED FORCES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

If it is accepted that peacekeepers are the preferred diplomatic instrument and they are to be constrained accordingly to the use of force only in self-defence, ready sources of suitably qualified troops need to be assured. Various options have been suggested over the years to strengthen the United Nations

capacities, including standing armed forces. In his book, *Cooperating for Peace*, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, when writing of the concept of *Cooperative Security*, stated as follows:

"Cooperative security has been usefully described as a broad approach to security which is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating habits of dialogue on a multilateral basis."

It is important to maintain this strategic view. Any military response by the United Nations can only be a **part** of the solution, within the broader context of cooperative security. Moreover, the idea of standing armed forces for the United Nations is **one** option in a range of civil-military options.

Of course, the idea of a standing United Nations force is not new and suggestions to this effect were made as early as 1948 by Trygve Lie, the First Secretary General of the United Nations. It has been raised on numerous occasions since, and, in 1990, member states were requested to indicate what military personnel they were, in principle, prepared to make available for United Nations service. In his *An Agenda for Peace* of June 1992, the Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali stated that:

Stand-by arrangements should be confirmed, as appropriate, through exchanges of letters between the Secretariat and Member States concerning the kind and number of skilled personnel they will be prepared to offer the United Nations as the needs of new operations arise.

In his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* at the beginning of this year, the Secretary-General took this further to propose the formation of a "rapid reaction force", which would be under his "executive direction and command", and which would act as the Security Council's "strategic reserve" for emergency intervention in crises. Studies to this effect are being undertaken by a number of Member States.

Against the background of the tragedies we have witnessed in Bosnia and Rwanda, and the difficulties in obtaining sufficient forces for the tasks envisaged, this proposal has received support from some quarters. But the major difficulty lies in generating support among Member States generally, for the

creation of such a force, and agreement on the framework for its employment. This is new ground for the Member States of the United Nations. The Charter never envisaged such a force being made available to the United Nations Secretariat, which is essentially a bureaucracy designed to support the various international forums the Charter created.

Instead, the Charter provides for the great powers to form coalitions in response to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression". Under these arrangements, strategic direction of response forces should be exercised by the Military Staff Committee, made up of the Chiefs of the armed forces of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, or their representatives. While it is envisaged that the Chiefs or their representatives would cooperate together, they would still be answerable to their own governments, which themselves would have agreed to cooperate.

The Cold War made almost any form of military cooperation between the 'Permanent Five' impossible including the empowerment of the Military Staff Committee. But, we should be very clear in our minds that the United Nations Secretariat cannot act as a substitute. It is neither structured nor equipped to act as a strategic headquarters and it is quite unable to cope with the complexity of military operations.

In particular, the United Nations Secretariat lacks the institutionalised military advice of the type available to sovereign governments. Many of the difficulties experienced in places such as Somalia and Rwanda can be attributed to this fact. Effective operations require clearly defined and achievable objectives, which are properly planned for and resourced. Decisions on any use of military forces must be made in the light of detailed and carefully considered military advice which enables the full implications and risks to be assessed.

OBJECTIVITY AND COMMAND

The capacity of peacekeepers to effect their mandate impartially is sometimes constrained from the outset. This is often the result of a fundamental contradiction between the diplomatic compromises needed to gain a mandate, and the essential requirement for objectivity in the development of effective military operations.

In all of this, it must be recognised that military operations cannot be an end in themselves. Commanders will always be confronted with circumstances which require action, which will in turn generate a reaction. Without objective direction, there is a strong probability that those actions will disconnect from diplomatic action, thereby corrupting the mission and causing its failure. The

resulting tendency of the involved actors then to blame each other will affect the credibility of the structures provided by the United Nations, causing an erosion of confidence in the Organisation. Money and troops will be difficult to find.

The critical issue here is not who might be to blame, but that peacekeepers need to be actively supported by diplomacy, that diplomatic support is likely to be gravely weakened if strategic objectivity is lacking in the initial resolution.

It is also critical that objective decisions are passed to those charged with their implementation in a way which focuses their actions. This requires an effective command structure. The military doctrine of most countries identifies three levels for command; strategic, operational and tactical. These have different functions and nature, but all three have the common purpose of passing objective directions to their subordinates, and ensuring that they are empowered and resourced to do the tasks.

If one of these levels is deficient, or their roles become merged, the capacity of the others to function effectively is severely limited. If the strategic level becomes involved with tactics, it is likely to lose its broad perspective and diminish the power of commanders on the ground. At one and the same time, tactical actions which are not focused can impact adversely on the strategic plan. The operational level both separates and binds the strategic and tactical levels, ensuring that tactical actions are coordinated to achieve strategic objectives.

For example, these levels of command were represented in the United Nation's Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), from 1992 to 1993, as follows :

- The strategic level was the United Nations Security Council in New York, supported by the United Nations Secretariat and the state structures of Security Council members, with their links to the national capitals of interested states and the highest level headquarters of involved agencies of the United Nations or non-government organisations.
- The operational level was the United Nations Headquarters in Phnom Penh, with its links to the leadership of the Cambodian Parties, the diplomatic community and the most senior authorities of the various agencies in-country.
- The tactical level was the military units, civilian groups and elements in the field, coordinated by regional headquarters, normally located in provincial capitals.

The key issue is that the three levels are mutually supporting and are complementary elements which form an effective whole. Each functions in the light of the realities of the others. Much of the success achieved in Cambodia was due to the operational level, despite all sorts of interventions, being able to achieve an effective harmony between all levels and to maintain it up to the end of the mandate.

STRATEGIC

Within a nation state, the strategic level is where decisions are made about enduring relationships between elements of society, between the people and the state and between the state, other nations and international organisations, multi-nationals and the like. The central issues involve adjustment of national priorities in response to changing circumstances. It is a continuum in peace and war. However, in war, the military dimension assumes higher prominence.

Because of the essentially political nature of this activity, the processes are more dialectic and less direct than those normally associated with the exercise of military command. For this reason, it is at the strategic level that the ambiguities of the political nuances have to be absorbed and focussed into directives to the next level, which are at once designed to provide clarity, flexibility and inspiration to action. This is a hugely demanding task.

In the case of the United Nations Organisation, the strategic focus must be even broader, involving issues of ongoing harmony between member states, groupings and international bodies. Decisions made by member states are collective, but the purpose of pursuing and balancing the objectives of the Charter must be paramount.

The central task would seem to lie in determining the international will on issues which are raised within the context of the Charter. While the Security Council is in a position to provide a lead, its capacity for action will be limited without broad international commitment. This is especially so in peacekeeping which requires substantial international representation. Achieving a consensus which is, at the same time, objective is clearly very difficult - more so, because objectivity has many dimensions.

A central issue is the ongoing viability and credibility of the Organisation itself. It is critical that the interests of individual states, or even groups of states, do not subvert the Charter if the existence of the Organisation is not to be brought into question. This can occur both in the formulation of resolutions, and in the conduct of operations on the ground, if those resolutions are not sufficiently objective and binding.

OPERATIONAL

The operational level of command is that level at which field elements are orchestrated to achieve the objectives of strategy. In military terminology, the operational level is sometimes referred to as campaign strategy, identifying the distinction between the tactical and operational levels as the responsibility of the operational level commander for the overall outcome of the military campaign.

The key determinant of success at this level of command is the military principle of the selection and maintenance of the aim. This is the principle that connects the strategic level to the operational level of command and should, therefore, emerge from a strategic level appreciation to which the operational level commander must be a contributor. Key to the derivation of, and successful conclusion to, a campaign strategy is timely and accurate intelligence in all its forms. A combination of insight and superior knowledge is most conducive to the achievement of the desired psychological effects.

At the operational level, it is unity of command which provides strength and cohesion. While the complexity of many post Cold-War peacekeeping operations usually means that they are civil-military affairs, it nevertheless remains critical that all elements engaged come under one common authority. Somebody has to be responsible for issuing clear, unambiguous directives, and looking the commanders, troops and civilian field staff in the eye before, during and after they have committed themselves to their assigned objectives. Leadership of missions must reflect this essential requirement.

TACTICAL

The tactical level is more finite, with objectives being defined in the more material terms of boundaries, time, numbers and resources. This is not to say that leaders at this level do not have to contend in a dynamic environment which will test their powers to bring complex factors into harmony. It is simply that they are responsible for specified outcomes in a given area rather than the overall outcome of the campaign.

In peacekeeping operations, the tactical level involves much more than military units and, in some circumstances, such as humanitarian relief which is not subject to dispute or exploitation, military forces might only be in a supporting role. It could, for example, involve electoral teams, human rights monitors, police and monitors of the Parties administrations, as it did in Cambodia. Each had to be harmonised with the others, across the chains-of-command reaching up to the operational level in Phnom Penh.

No tactical level leader can change his objectives without referral to the next higher level. In the ultimate, to do so would be to unravel the overall strategy, risking a significant shift in the relative strength of the contending factions and prejudicing the entire mission.

For this reason, it is of particular importance that tactical units do not respond to national or other chains of command on operational matters. Nor can they be allowed to develop their own interpretations, outside the operational level commander's intent, especially on critical issues such as the use of force.

COOPERATING FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA

The earliest forms of United Nations peacekeeping were observer missions. These were begun by the United Nations shortly after the end of the Second World War and were relatively simple affairs. At the other end of the peacekeeping spectrum, complex post-Cold War operations, like UNTAC, have to be approached and managed like major operations, with the levels of command functioning in the relationship described here.

Although the Cambodian operation is acknowledged as a United Nations success, it was clear that all three levels were deficient in some way. From the outset, there was no strategic coordination in UNTAC. Each component survey team developed its own plan in isolation, lacking the benefit of even a coordinating conference beforehand to determine the strategic direction. The bringing together of these plans only occurred when the Secretary-General's report was prepared for the Security Council in the period January to February 1992. Few component leaders participated in this process.

The first coordination at the operational level between those component heads who were available, occurred en route to Phnom Penh from Bangkok the day UNTAC was established. Some component heads were not available to the mission until five months later. Among them all, only the Force Commander had participated in the preparation of his component's plan. None of them had participated in the negotiations which had preceded those Paris Agreements on which the strategy for the United Nations mission in Cambodia was based. The initial strategic disconnect was severe.

Within the mission, harmonising the activities of the various elements of UNTAC was always problematic. Senior staff meetings were held regularly, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), or his deputy, and attended by component heads and other key senior staff. But there was a tendency for meetings to become bogged down in matters of detail

which were more appropriately the concerns of the tactical level. This was almost certainly contributed to by the lack of formalised coordinating structures at lower levels. Rather than being solved where they belonged, problems were often simply passed upwards, where the operational level was already too busy to perform its own role effectively. In many cases, the problems were not solved at all.

In the execution, coordination was achieved through component heads networking as problems arose. There was no UNTAC-wide operations centre. To some extent, the civilian logistics organisation assumed a directing role in the early period of the United Nations presence. But the logistics staff, being constrained by United Nations procedural matters, were, for the most part, deterred from focussing on outcomes. By the end of 1992, the Military Component's Plans Branch became the focal point for a planning and control alliance between the Military and Electoral Components, and Information and Education Division, for the critical voter registration and electoral phases.

At the same time, at the tactical level, the Military Component's ten Sector Headquarters, spread throughout Cambodia, adopted the coordinating role. This eventually drew in the liaison mechanism put in place to work with the Cambodian military and police of the Parties supporting the UNTAC-sponsored elections, as well as the UNTAC Civilian Police and the other civilian components. These cooperative arrangements were sufficient to see the UNTAC-sponsored elections of May 1993 through to their successful conclusion.

These observations are not intended to denigrate the United Nations effort in Cambodia, nor to suggest that such shortfalls are not being addressed. Rather, they are intended to highlight the systemic problems of command and control, which appear to plague all United Nations missions.

In fact, success in UNTAC could not have been achieved if there had not been unity at and with the strategic level. The Paris Agreements, upon which the Cambodian operation was based, were an objective document which had been long in gestation. Following their signature in October 1991, by the four Cambodian Parties and eighteen interested countries, including the Parties' main backers, they defined the legal relationship between the signatories and the United Nations.

In the initial absence of a comprehensive and authoritative United Nations presence, a diplomatic body, the Expanded Permanent Five (EP5), had been set up in Phnom Penh soon after the signing of the Paris Agreements. This grouping drew around the Ambassadors of the Permanent Five members

of the Security Council, those of Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand. India and Malaysia joined subsequently. The EP5 served to remind the Cambodian parties of their obligations under the Paris Agreements, during the five months between their signing and the establishment of UNTAC, as the Parties, and some countries, sought to exploit the new dynamics created by the Agreements. It continued to support UNTAC throughout the mandate. The EP5's relationship with the SRSG and the Force Commander was a corporate one. They met regularly and the EP5 was briefed often.

The EP5 mirrored a grouping in New York known as the "Core Group". Contact between these two groupings ensured coordination between the operational and strategic levels, through the policy processes in the capitals of the nations concerned. This meant that Security Council resolutions on Cambodia, drafted in the face of major obstacles as the mission progressed, were achievable and reflected the realities on the ground. UNTAC could then proceed to implement its mandated responsibilities, confident of its jurisdiction.

The obstacles were overcome politically by the operational level generating new dynamics both at the diplomatic level and in the field. This allowed the Cambodian people to be made sovereign by the electoral process, despite the conflicts between and within the Cambodian factions. This cohesion weakened after the election, but adhered for long enough to conclude the UNTAC mandate. With the United Nations' moral authority progressively diminishing as the mandate reached its culminating point, it was a race against time.

The strategic level grouping was essential to unify and focus the diplomatic support. At the same time the operational level needed structures to concentrate its efforts on its important task of defining and refining a policy framework for the implementation of the mandate laid down by the Security Council and adjusted by subsequent resolutions according to emerging circumstances. But rather than the ad hoc arrangements in UNTAC, it would have been better if structures had been planned for and put in place at the outset.

COMMAND, CONTROL AND THE CHARTER

In multi-national operations of the complexity of the one in Cambodia, nothing is set piece. International sentiment, generated by media coverage, will ensure that those responsible cannot wait for everything to be put in place. The situation will always be reactive and dynamic. Decision-makers must be able and prepared to act in pursuit of the defined objectives and to account for their actions.

To discriminate in this requires a highly responsive command and con-

trol system. And there is the dilemma for the United Nations. It does not have a responsive command and control system. It is a simple fact that deployed operational level commanders do not have a superior headquarters. To have one, the structure and workings of the Organisation have to be addressed in a fundamental way.

Responsiveness at the highest level requires a strategic headquarters which is purpose designed to be responsive. Among other things, it requires a deep intelligence process in order to be able to make valid judgements in the light of all the issues involved. Unbiased and independent analysis is the key here. Dependence on any individual national intelligence system is likely to involve some bias which will confuse the response.

The problem experienced by the United Nations in Rwanda is a case in point. Setting aside the issues of legitimacy and preventative action, the response to events lacked strategic objectivity. Enforcement action on a large scale was required to stop the genocide. Enforcement was still required to stop the consequences of the genocide. But the force was capped at 5,500 and given a peacekeeping mandate in response to expectations which were well beyond it as a result. A brief foray into enforcement was endorsed by the Security Council to stabilise the mass movement of refugees into Zaire, but even this action contributed to an impression of crisis decision-making rather than strategic objectivity. While a glowing example of humanitarian mobilisation, Rwanda has done nothing to contribute to the credibility of United Nations peacekeeping.

No one should be surprised when contributing countries find difficulty reconciling contributions to such missions with their existing policy. Placed on the horns of a dilemma, they are called on to accept the consequences without being able to effect a solution. Responsible national political authorities cannot function in this way. They are unlikely to commit forces in the face of such decision-making.

REINFORCING THE CHARTER THROUGH ENHANCED COMMAND AND CONTROL

Under Article 43, all Members States undertake to make armed forces available to the Security Council for operations within the framework of the Charter. In recent times, Governments of many Members States have issued policy directives or guidance defining the circumstances under which they will commit forces to United Nations operations. In essence, the purpose of these have been twofold:

- to reassure their own people that any national commitment will be justified by the realistic prospects of the potential ends justifying the risks; and
- to signal to the United Nations Organisation that it must get its house in order if it expects Governments to be able to generate support from their domestic constituencies.

Apart from protecting the interests of the states concerned, the definition of a framework for involvement reflects a demand for strategic objectivity on the part of the United Nations which includes a requirement for morally sustainable responses.

Mandates which are framed with objectivity and aimed at the accomplishment of realistic goals are more likely to generate sustained consensus, confidence and commitment to provide resources, including forces. The settlement of the dispute, in a way consistent with the objectives of the Charter, must be the aim.

The structures supporting complex operations need to be at least the equivalent of those of a relatively advanced Member State, or alternatively, allow formalised access to the structures of Member States in a way which does not compromise the essential need for objectivity in United Nations decision making.

The best start point in reforming these processes is the United Nations Charter itself, which has already been agreed by the Member States of the United Nations. The Security Council has specific responsibilities under both Chapters VI and Chapter VII and its central role as the strategic authority designated by the Charter must not be eroded. In this regard, it is critical that risks of perceived bias in Security Council decisions are avoided. The United Nations Secretariat has the critical role of ensuring that the deliberations of the Security Council members maintain their objectivity. Often it is only the Secretariat which can gain the necessary access to trouble spots to determine the viability of strategic options. This places the Secretary-General and his staff in an onerous position of responsibility. Regardless of this essential role for the Secretariat, it has always been recognised that it would not be capable of providing comprehensive military advice, nor of controlling complex military operations. This is why the role of the Military Staff Committee was established in Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter (see Appendix). Again, Security Council resolutions must be informed by institutionalised military advice and this advice should emerge from the structures responsible for the implementation of those operations mandated by that advice.

If the Military Staff Committee was to be empowered to perform these responsibilities for Chapter VI as well as Chapter VII operations, it would require discrete secretariat services to enable it to coordinate the separate national military advice to form agreed collective advice, plans and directions. Broader representation would probably be needed to generate the necessary climate of trust in these extended activities of the Military Staff Committee.

Most proposals aimed at improving the United Nations response capability focus on the dedication of military forces. It might also prove appropriate to focus on staff support, analytical capacity and command support systems to assist the Military Staff Committee in the exercise of its functions and those of subordinate headquarters.

CONCLUSION

Reconciliation is the basis of all successful strategies. This is the underlying theme of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations brings together most of the sovereign states on earth which, by their ratification of the Charter, establish the moral authority of the Organisation.

When a United Nations mission is mandated, it thereby assumes a measure of the moral authority from the Charter, the extent depending on the purpose of the mission, the objectivity with which the mandate is framed and the consensus upon which it is based. Throughout the mission, successes consistent with the mandate can contribute to that moral authority, while failures will erode it. If the initial mandate is flawed, the erosion can be rapid.

In a media environment, where the membrane between the past and the future becomes thin, and the passion of the moment becomes a marketable product to be flashed around the world as events unfold, successes are likely to be less obvious than failures. Sustaining an international commitment in the light of this reality requires a comprehensive public relations strategy based on a firm understanding of the moral authority of the United Nations.

Moral authority resides in the great ideals of the Charter, and is generated through the belief which the peoples of the United Nations have in it. That belief is variable and is the sum total of the perception of successes and failures of the United Nations at any point in time. Where the perception of success is high, so is the faith in the Organisation. The commitment to both its principles and activities is, therefore, likely to be strengthened.

The future of the United Nations depends on its capacity to seize the full weight of the moral authority enshrined in its own Charter, and to bring it to

bear in the interests of its peoples. The processes for mandating and directing operations must be reinforced to this end.

EPILOGUE

Over one hundred and seventy years ago, Carl von Clausewitz, the renowned Prussian military theorist, in his treatise on *Absolute War and Real War*, stated that:

"No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout, down to the smallest operational detail."

This principle applies equally to peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations. Proposals to support conflict resolution, including those for standby forces or a United Nations "Army", must be cognisant of this fundamental fact. For the United Nations to lose a war, which would surely be the case if its Member States were unable to sustain a commitment, or if its command and control systems were ineffective, would spell doom for the Organisation for many years to come. Its moral authority might be destroyed forever.

Appendix

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

ARTICLES 46 AND 47

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee with the authorisation of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - A Perspective

LT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (RETD)

Till very recently, United Nations peacekeeping operations were based on the experiences of the four decades preceding the termination of the animosities generated by the Cold War. As such, the concept that prevailed was that a cease fire was first negotiated with nation states at war, and a United Nations force was put in place to monitor the maintenance of the cease fire, and to provide good offices to the belligerents to resolve the problem. Actually, there is no specific provision for peacekeeping in the Charter of the United Nations; it is an invention of the United Nations Secretariat, and evolved as a non-coercive instrument of conflict control, at a time when Cold War constraints precluded the more forceful steps permitted by the Charter. As it fully evolved over the years, peacekeeping was based on a triad of principles that gave it credibility; namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force only in self-defence; in fact, in a large number of missions, only unarmed military observers were deployed.

Since the end of the Cold War, United Nations activities in maintenance of peace and security have dramatically increased, the impact being both, quantitative and, more significantly, qualitative. In 1988, the United Nations was actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping, in eleven disputes or confrontations; in 1992, the number was thirteen; in early 1995, the number was thirty. In 1988, the United Nations had five peacekeeping operations deployed; in 1992, the number was eleven; in early 1995, the number was sixteen. Over the same period, the number of military personnel deployed had risen from 9570 to 62000. The number of civilian police deployed had risen from 35 to 1169. The number of countries contributing military and police personnel had risen from 26 to 74, and the United Nations budget for peacekeeping had risen from \$230 million to \$ 3.6 billion.

The qualitative change is however, more significant. Most of today's conflicts take place within states, not between them. Such conflicts are not always fought by armies, but by irregular forces. Civilians are the main victims. Humanitarian emergencies are proliferating, and very often, State institutions have collapsed. This is why the demands on the United Nations go beyond traditional peacekeeping. Many of the recent operations have involved

Lt General Satish Nambiar, a former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, was the First Commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia during 1992-1993.

demobilisation of troops or armed para-militaries, promotion of national reconciliation, restoration of effective governments, and the organisation and monitoring of elections. In other words, United Nations peacekeeping operations have become more expensive, more complex and more dangerous.

Obviously, all this brings with it a host of operational and organisational problems. One requirement is that of restructuring the United Nations Organisation to cope with the new challenges. Apparently, some efforts are under way in this context. However, considering the pace at which any bureaucracy moves, and more particularly, the United Nations bureaucracy, some radical measures may well be required.

There will always be a problem finding troops for an operation within a reasonably acceptable time-frame unless some institutionalised arrangements are put in place. The old method of requesting, earmarking and moving contingents to a mission area, needs total overhaul; waiting for three months for troops to arrive in an area of operations, as was the experience with some of the contingents in former Yugoslavia, is too ridiculous to be funny. The Rwanda experience is even more depressing. The ground situation, (and the political situation, in many cases), changes from week to week, if not from day to day. Hence, there has to be some ready availability of troops with appropriate equipment; and the means to transport them to the mission area, soon after the Security Council takes a decision on deployment. Action has already been initiated to seek "stand-by" forces earmarked by member states for United Nations deployment when required. However, any member state can decide, even before the onset of an operation, to change its mind for political reasons, not to send troops. Problems may also arise after incidents occur on the ground, and Governments decide to withdraw their troops. They can give the United Nations notice that they will withdraw their troops within a short period of time, by simply announcing that they intend to withdraw such troops. Their presence in a mission area is purely voluntary. Thus, the United Nations may, in future, be compelled to curtail or terminate an operation because member states, on a purely unilateral basis and without needing agreement from the Security Council, decide to withdraw their troops.

Withdrawal of troops from a mission area may become necessary because the United Nations does not receive the requisite financial resources. This situation could be precipitated by the attempt in the United States Congress to reduce American contribution for peacekeeping; other countries may also then decide to reduce their contributions because of financial problems. In effect, what is happening is that the United Nations is not paying on time, member states who are contributing contingents for peacekeeping operations, leading apparently, to many states declining to send troops for an operation till outstanding payments have been made.

A new difficulty that has arisen recently, is that of withdrawing forces from a mission area while confrontation between belligerents is still going on; namely, the security of peacekeepers under such conditions. Such withdrawal may well necessitate the deployment of additional forces to protect those who are to be withdrawn, leading to greater costs and dangers. The consequence of course, is that it will become more difficult to obtain troop contributions in future.

There is also the ethical aspect of ending a peacekeeping operation before peace has been established. The pragmatic view is that if there is no political will on the part of the protagonists to solve the problem, the United Nations cannot impose peace; the United Nations does not have the capacity to conduct real "enforcement" operations. A related ethical aspect is that of spending huge sums of money on large-scale peacekeeping operations as in former Yugoslavia, without any end in sight, which may be considered by many to be at the expense of operating in other places where United Nations troops may be required, and where some scope for more effective utilisation is perceived.

In some recent operations, more specifically Somalia, there have been problems with aspects of command and control of contingents made available for United Nations operations. It cannot be over-emphasised that all personnel and contingents placed at the disposal of the United Nations for an operation must be under the operational control of the Force Commander/Special Representative, acting on behalf of the Secretary General, who in turn, is acting on behalf of the Security Council. Only then can an operation be conducted with any degree of credibility and effectiveness. This not only relates to the day-to-day control of the operation, but also in regard to re-deployment within a mission area to meet operational contingencies. However, the latter aspect is best dealt with discreetly, and, to the extent feasible, in consultation with and the acquiescence of, the national authorities concerned. In this context, it is of primary importance to stress that such provisions are applied strictly across the board. There cannot be any exceptions in that the more powerful countries are permitted to exercise their own discretion, while the lesser ones are expected to conform.

With the ending of the Cold War, the consequent euphoria of setting up a new World order that can ensure international peace and security, and the sort of situations the international community has come up against in the recent past, there has been a great deal of theoretical activity on what needs to be done and how. Some of the terms that have now become common usage - "peace enforcement", "safe havens" or "safe areas", and so on - lend themselves to many interpretations; there is, therefore, some degree of confusion

in various analyses of the subject. This in turn, if not rectified may be reflected (in fact, in some measure it already has), in the mandate given to United Nations peacekeeping missions on deployment. Unless a United Nations or multi-lateral operation under United Nations auspices, is clearly set up to deal with a development, as was the case with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, where a Chapter VII enforcement action is well defined, certain basic principles must apply.

There should not be any interference with the internal affairs of a nation state on the premise that what is happening there could endanger international peace and security; this is a matter of perception, and the track record of many of the powers who have tried to pursue goals on the basis of their perceptions, has not always been without blemish.

Other than in a clear case of a Chapter VII enforcement action, impartiality of the United Nations mission must never be compromised. No United Nations operation can retain its credibility if this cardinal principle is diluted. This is not to suggest that in pursuance of this principle, United Nations peacekeepers should allow themselves to be threatened, bullied, or targetted, without responding appropriately. Where Governmental authority and institutions have collapsed, and a civil war situation prevails, in the first place, member states on the Security Council should not allow themselves to become victims of media pressure in deciding on deployment of United Nations forces. Every effort must be made to negotiate with the leaders of the warring parties, and only if there is consensus and consent, should United Nations forces be deployed. Such forces must have more "muscle" than for traditional peacekeeping operations, be prepared to use this "muscle" for their own security, and where feasible, in the execution of the mandate, and must have the total, unreserved backing of at least the members of the Security Council, who would have deployed them in the first place. This political support and backing is one of the most crucial deficiencies of current United Nations peacekeeping operations. It is unbelievable that the very member states who pass the resolution in the Security Council, bestow a mandate, and set up a United Nations mission, find it expedient, for domestic reasons (or whatever), to criticise the conduct of the operation, instead of giving the people who are doing a thankless job as it is, their unqualified support.

There have been suggestions in some discussions and analyses, that peacekeeping operations could, if suitably strengthened, undertake "peace enforcement" operations (whatever that means) when required. It may be advisable in the light of recent experiences to ensure that, notwithstanding the expenditure involved, where United Nations troops are to be deployed in a civil war type situation, they be equipped with heavy weaponry that would

enable them to protect themselves more effectively than otherwise, or use some form of limited enforcement action to ensure implementation of a given mandate. Any enforcement action envisaged under Chapter VII, must clearly define who it is directed against, be desirably undertaken by a multi-national force authorised by the Security Council, and pursued till the aggressor is totally defeated, or accepts peace terms laid down. No half-way or half-hearted efforts can work, nor can such operations be undertaken by a United Nations force that is expected to revert to peacekeeping, since it would have lost its cloak of impartiality. What is subsequently required in such cases, is peace-building, under United Nations auspices, by forces and agencies other than those that conducted the enforcement operation.

There can be no two opinions on the fact that regional groupings or organisations have an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security; the United Nations Charter does envisage such a role. However, what is absolutely essential, in the light of recent experiences is, that there must be a clear division of responsibility for the stages at which each element is expected to operate, and most importantly, the command structure for the operation, or for various stages of it, must be clearly laid down and accepted. Any attempt at shared responsibility would be a recipe for disaster.

As we look into the future therefore, it could be suggested that traditional peacekeeping will continue to be required, but there will be greater demands on the United Nations to undertake operations in civil war type situations. One cannot see the United Nations as a body, or the Security Council however, easily accepting large-scale commitments of the type undertaken in former Yugoslavia or Somalia; there will be great reluctance to be drawn into such type of operations, for a host of reasons. Even so, it may not be out of place to reiterate, that except in the case of traditional unarmed military observer type missions, whenever United Nations troops are to be deployed as armed contingents, it may be prudent to ensure that they are "over-armed" rather than "under-armed"; that is, we cater for a "worst-case" scenario.

For all the adverse criticism that the United Nations has been subjected to for what are perceived as failures or inadequacies in peacekeeping operations undertaken in former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, it is more than likely that when the next crisis surfaces, the belligerents, and the members of the international community, will again look to the United Nations to undertake peace operations of one form or another.

The Foreign Policy of China

SAHDEV VOHRA

China's history provides clues to her foreign policy attitudes. China has a long history of rise and fall of empires and dynasties that have flourished and have been followed by disorder and chaotic interludes. New empires have risen embracing the vast homogeneous Han lands stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the hinterlands of Central Asia. It is built into the Chinese psyche that they form the centre of the world and that other lands and peoples on their periphery are barbarians who have to be kept under strict order. (This is still reflected in the strongly worded, sometimes harsh tone of China's foreign policy statements). Lands like Vietnam to the south and Mongolia in the north are regarded as irredenta on which China has ancient claims of overlordship. Tibet and Xinjiang have already been incorporated into the Chinese empire and have been given the status of autonomous regions. It is the security of these areas that led China to refix her boundary with India unilaterally after the Communist takeover in 1949.

This Chinese world view received a shock when the European powers after the so-called opium wars of the mid-nineteenth century forced China to agree to their setting up free ports on the Pacific coast. The Western powers thus established a commercial strangle-hold on the Chinese economy. China has never forgotten this humiliation and the foreign policy of China has an anti-western bias since then. The Christian missions that came with the coming in of the Western powers had an indirect and unexpected result by way of the Taiping revolution. The ruling Chi'ng dynasty was from Manchuria and their rule had over the years deteriorated and unrest and banditry were rampant. The plight of the Han people and the impact of Christian teachings produced a mixture combining into a Chinese interpretation and an unknown individual led a successful revolt in 1853-54 against the Manchus. It spread across the country and nearly brought down the Manchus. The success of the rebellion frightened the foreign powers because the Taipings were anti-foreign. They combined with the Manchus and organised their forces under General Gordon who successfully defended Shanghai and the Taipings were suppressed.

Another revolution against the foreigners was the Boxer revolution at the end of the nineteenth century. Like the Taipings, the Boxers were led by a lowly, unknown person who inspired the people's revolt. Ultimately, the Manchu dynasty was brought to an end in 1911. The xenophobic character of the

Mr. Sahdev Vohra is a former member of the Indian Civil Service and writes frequently on national and international issues.

Chinese people was reinforced by the Boxer rebellion and remains a part of their foreign relations. The Chinese view of the world was inward - looking but was perforce modified by the western intrusions.

In its period of vigour and expansion, Chinese expanded towards the west. The windows to the sea were once opened in the tenth century when China sailed its ships to Burma, Bengal, and East Africa for trade but this was not followed up. The forcible opening up to the world beyond the sea came only in the nineteenth century. Another traumatic experience was at the hands of a rising and aggressive Japan. In 1894 Japan occupied Korea and a war followed between Russia and Japan for annexation of the north-eastern territories of China. The Russians were defeated by Japan at sea in 1905. Japan continued her policy of annexing the mainland of Asia. China was in one of her declining phase and after the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the failure of Sun Yat Sen, the country was ravaged by the warlords. The Japanese occupied large parts of China after the great war of 1914-18. Their behaviour in China displayed a ferocious and brutal side of their national character and they ruthlessly ravaged the Chinese land and people. Coming on top of the bitter experience at the hands of the western occupying powers, the Japanese invasion was another blow to the Chinese self-esteem, but it made them all the more resolved to revive their ancient glories. Unfortunately, the above is not a complete catalogue of China's losses at the hands of foreign powers. Russia as has been mentioned was also expanding at the expense of China and took Manchuria and after the communists took over in Russia, outer Mongolia, was formed into a satellite of the Soviet Union. Like the Bourbons, the Chinese have never forgotten these disposessions of their once-omnipotent empire-the Chinese have long memories. The upshot is that they have developed a hard streak of realism in their foreign policy, and can be patient. Often baulked of territories which they once possessed they have learnt to wait for the opportune time to strike back to claim what they once controlled. Russia in its Communist *avatar* interfered actively in the turmoil of civil war between the two world wars. Chiang Kai-Shek struck back at the communists and Russians in China. During the Second World War China was wooed by the Allies and Chiang Kai Shek became one of the "big four" along with Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. This restored China's prestige and morale. After the war, the Chinese Communist party came into power in 1949 and a resurgent China took up once again the threads of the age-long policy of imperial China.

The post-war world has nevertheless forced China to add some significant features to cope with the demands of the new world order which China has perforce joined instead of retiring into a shell of an unreal world view as she had tended to do in the nineteenth century. Under Mao tse-tung China was, however, belligerent and took on all comers, so to speak.

When the Americans invaded North Korea in 1950 they had to contend with the Chinese. The war bogged down the Americans and it was only covert threat of the use of an atomic bomb that forced China to make peace with the Americans. This also made them determined to themselves possess nuclear capability, in which they eventually succeeded. By 1954 the Chinese had suffered a million casualties in the Korean war. These horrendous losses have to be borne in mind when we seek to understand the Chinese will power that made them undergo such a sacrifice when we interpret China's impulses. When the Geneva Convention was signed in 1954 over Vietnam, the main purpose of Chou En-lai was to ensure that the Americans do not come into Vietnam in place of the French. The Korean war had nearly spilt over into China proper and he did not want this to happen in Vietnam. During the sixties the main aim of Chinese foreign policy was to keep America stay out and go out of Vietnam. Like Korea, Vietnam was within what China regarded as its zone of influence. Apart from the direct Chinese rule of northern Vietnam at one time in the first century B.C., under the Han dynasty, Chinese civilisation - in particular the mandarin system of administration had left its firm imprint. But the Vietnamese had a long history of opposition to the Chinese so much so that Ho Chi minh had said that he preferred French rule to Chinese interference. He argued that the French would have to leave one day, but the Chinese would not once they came in.

As it happened the US came into Vietnam in the sixties out of the then prevailing domino-theory, that if U.S. did not resist communism in one country it would lead to the fall of one neighbouring country after the other to the dreaded Communists. China and Vietnam were now allies and China kept Vietnam supplied with rice while Russia supplied heavy weapons and equipment. The Chinese were loath to interfere directly in Vietnam, after the heavy losses suffered in Korea. But they rivalled the Russians in keeping Vietnam fully supplied with their needs in the long and relentless war with the Americans. Part of the reason why China helped Vietnam was to seek to ensure that the Russians did not establish themselves as the only proteges of Vietnam. The Americans were not fighting a united communist front nor, as they thought, to keep the world safe from communism. Whereas the Chinese, Russians and Vietnamese were in it together, each for its own national ends, only the Americans were fighting an illusory foe, the myth of a world Communism.

The Vietnamese losses in the war were enormous, perhaps more than what the Chinese suffered in Korea. The Americans lost heavily also. By the time Nixon became President of the USA, some 30,000 Americans had been killed and another 10,000 died in the first year of his presidency. By early 1972, Nixon had withdrawn more than 400,000 Americans. He then negotiated peace by visiting China and then Russia in 1972. In 1974 the Chinese took the

Paracel Islands from South Vietnam by force, a price they think they may have earned for their help to Vietnam.

The Chinese have since laid claim to the whole of the Spratlys & Paracel Islands archipelago. The former consist of some 400 reefs, atolls, islands and sand bank spread over roughly one-third of the South China Sea, and rumoured to have oil and gas deposits. The archipelago is surrounded by the south-east Asian nations besides Vietnam and are a fertile source of controversy & conflict among them. China has laid a cartographic claim to them and recently has occupied some reef leading to confrontation with the Philippines.

Facing a hostile international environment, China had welcomed the rapprochement with China initiated by Nixon's visit. Russia & China had fallen out since 1965, and were more foes than friends with a border dispute burning up over the Mongolian and Sinkiang borders involving massing of troops by both on their frontiers. In Taiwan, the USA was helping the military and economic strength of the Chiang-Kai-Shek regime. The Chinese had a visceral feeling about Taiwan, Hongkong, and other parts of mainland China not under their control. Japan was emerging once more as a nation with renewed and added economic strength.

China, therefore, became a more cooperative and participative member of the world community. Her admission into the Security Council gave her a front-rank position. Mao tse-tung left foreign negotiations to Chou Enlai and the latter had won laurels already as a member of the non-aligned nations beginning with Bandung as early as in 1955. Chou had won over the non-aligned by aid to Third World countries in Africa and Asia. Countries like Indonesia which had large populations of Chinese-origin were reassured of non-interference. By the time Chou Enlai died in 1976 (Mao had died earlier in the year), China had become a major world power in the international arena, and emerged from and shed its earlier stance of being outside the community of nations.

Under Deng Xiaoping China made a U-turn from the policy of a rigid, controlled Communist economy, and opened China to foreign investment. This had the effect of greater cooperation in the political field also. The eighties were a decade of economic liberalisation and political acceptability in the west. The opening up of the economy was accompanied by greater individual freedom.

With Vietnam, however, the Chinese had continued hostile relationship after the dispute over Paracel Islands. In Cambodia, China helped the Pol Pot regime and supported the demand for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In 1979 China invaded Vietnam to "teach them a lesson" as Deng

put it. (The Indian Foreign Minister then on a goodwill mission to China had to cut short his visit.) China had to make peace with Vietnam without achieving its objective.

The eighties were otherwise a successful decade for China, but they ended up in an unfortunate denouement. The students of Beijing University on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary in May 1989 of the Chinese communist Government, staged a sit-down in Tiananmen Square. The crowd was originally in a good mood but gradually the demonstration was taken over by liberal hardliners demanding greater individual freedom and freedom of communication through anti-Government posters and banners. At this juncture, the army was called in and tanks rolled down the Tiananmen Square to disperse the crowds. Ring leaders were arrested. The repressive measures that followed were severe because the army had at first fraternised with the crowds. The episode revealed the yearning of the people for a freer society, and revealed that when the chips were down the party rule was a clique that had an iron hand. The Prime Minister was dismissed and censorship made strict. There was a world-wide outcry against the repressive measures. This led to the later campaign waged by the USA and by non-official organisations for greater human rights in China.

The Tiananmen Square crack-down left a scar on the memory of those who lived through it - both those who were crushed by the tanks and those who were in power. The army gained in status because it was realised that they were vital in an emergency. In external relations, China made up with Saudia Arabia, Singapore, South Korea and India. In trying to make up with the rest of the world, China wanted to make sure that it did not depend solely on the USA, but developed its own links and alliances.

There were many other uncertainties before China after 1989. The question of succession loomed large before the leadership. Those who are in power from Deng to the Yangs are all old. Li-Peng the Prime Minister is young but he has many rivals. In the field of foreign affairs, the rapprochement between the USA and Russia has shifted the power balance. The new upsurge in economy has created many opportunities but also many difficulties with the Americans. The Afghan invasion by Russia in 1979, and the Gulf War in 1991 were danger signals for the Chinese outlook in Central Asia. This was accentuated by the new Central Asian Republics and a new relationship had to be established with them by China.

At the same time China had to be inward-looking on account of major internal problems, like regional imbalances. The coastal regions have benefitted from the new industrialisation but central and western China is backward still.

Agriculture is receiving a second best treatment and the farmers are discontented as was revealed by the recent revolt by farmers in Szechwan province against poor farm prices.

The profile of the Chinese army has risen. At the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992 it was decided to stress the subservience of the army to the political leadership. But the military is a state within the state. The emphasis is now on modernisation and an "out of area" contingencies which require a growing navy including nuclear power for submarines, the creation of a rapid deployment force and the preparation for low-intensity conflicts. At the same time the army has a direct role in industrial development. In Anhui province the army took part not only in relief measures against flood but were running factories, hotels, stores so much so that in one city "tens of thousands" of militia men and reservists had their own jobs but would be mobilised in case of war.

A major question in China's international relations is its attitude to nuclear power. China has been conducting fresh nuclear tests at Lop Nor even after signing the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT) in 1992. China had five different nuclear weapon designs already and four to five hundred warheads. In December 1993 it tested a warhead for a new submarine launched missile. China is known to have assisted Iran and Pakistan in their nuclear weapons programmes.

A significant development in China's foreign policy relations is its entry into the world arms market. China helped Iran & Pakistan to build nuclear capacity and reactors for arms. The sales of tanks, aircraft and other weapons including submarines is an established channel of supply of arms by China to the Middle East and Pakistan. Assiduously China has built up this lucrative trade in competition with established suppliers as it has a potential both for earning foreign exchange and of winning friends and influencing countries, which are barred from getting such supplies from the West.

Domestic problems like corruption, inflation, and the need to improve the undeveloped hinterland will keep China engaged and keep her away from adventures abroad. But we must keep in view that China is strengthening her naval forces including submarines; that China is staking her claim for the South China Sea including the Spratlys Islands. The trade and naval routes are being developed with Myanmar, and arms supplies are part of the strategy to win influence and alliances. It is to be hoped that the two - the internal problems and the claims for expansion-will balance each other and keep China on the road to a responsible partnership with the rest of the world.

Human Rights and the Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict Operations

MAJOR HARCHARAN SINGH

INTRODUCTION

“The killing of one who is without arms or asleep or is unprepared or is an onlooker (non combatant) is prohibited” so goes the teaching in Manu Smriti, an old book of the Hindus. Great Indian epics describe the rules and regulations prohibiting mass destruction and unethical wars. For the rest of the world, active awareness about the sufferings of mankind dawned after it witnessed the sufferings of human race during the two world wars. Till then, to a large extent, the treatment and rights enjoyed by the citizens of a country were considered the prerogative of its elected government or rulers.

Though efforts were on to save man from horrors of war, the 1940s saw a new angle being added to the human rights. International relations took a new meaning with interaction between two nations being decided on how a country treats its own citizens and its view on Human Rights in general. United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was followed by a large number of Non Government Organisations (NGOs) taking shape in all the continents in response to specific conditions and crises. Basic theme followed and propagated by these organisations was “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.¹

The concern for human sufferings made the world sit together and in 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by UN General Assembly without a dissenting vote; which was adopted in 1976 as a covenant, thus giving it a legal touch. It was the political philosophy generated by the UN Charter, affirming the dignity of man and futility of wars that led to the proper formulation and enunciation of Human rights. Human rights broadly cover what are the rights of man and what the state should provide to the citizens.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Army is being increasingly used in low intensity conflict (LIC) and

Edited text of the essay which won the First Prize in Group B of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition, 1994.

Major Harcharan Singh is with 3 MADRAS.

Counter Insurgency (CI) operations, hence bringing it in the lime light of the media. As a part of their strategy, hostile neighbours indulge in proxy war by dissidents of other nation. Certain restrictions have to be imposed on basic rights of people to combat terrorism but those restrictions have some norms to be followed. In the near future some changes are expected to occur in the functioning and general attitude of army personnel due to their employment in a new environment. In this study, this new environment of the future has been kept at the back of the mind while evaluating the Human Rights issue in case of the armed forces:-²

- (a) Continued political turmoil, electoral exploitation and regional autonomous, secessionist struggle among population segment.
- (b) Perpetuation of caste, class, religious and ethnic turmoil resulting in frequent break down of law and order.
- (c) Growing politicisation and ineffectiveness of police and Para military forces even as their numbers rise enormously.
- (d) Gathering violence in the form of insurgency, terrorism, communal riots, disruptive civil disturbances, sabotage and sponsored armed uprising i.e. a mix of political, social, economic and religious issues.
- (e) Mounting possibility of doubling of national security threat, compounded by internal disruption.
- (f) Growing alienation of people, loss of confidence in armed forces, as use of force against people increases.

PREVIEW

The subject will be covered in six parts as under:-

- (a) Part 1 - Evolution of Human Rights.
- (b) Part 2 - Human Rights organisations.
- (c) Part 3 - Legal Aspects.
- (d) Part 4 - Army in LIC and CI Ops.
- (e) Part 5 - Media and Public Relations (PR).
- (f) Part 6 - A new approach by the Army.

PART 1 - EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

GENERAL

The essence of the Netherlands Act of Adjuration, 1581, to as late as Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, can be summarized as "All

Human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.

UN DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

On December 10, 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved and accepted by the UN General Assembly as a “Common standard of achievement for all people and all nations”. On 16 Dec, 1966 two covenants were approved by UN Gen Assy on “Economy, Social and Cultural Rights” and on ‘Civil and Political Rights’. Covenants are legally binding and came into force in 1976. Important aspects of UN Declarations consisting of 30 Articles are:-

- (a) Right to life, liberty and security of person (Art 3).
- (b) Right against slavery or servitude (Art 4).
- (c) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art 5).
- (d) Equality before law and equal protection of law (Art 6 and 7).
- (e) Right to effective remedy against violation of Fundamental Rights (Art 8).
- (f) Right against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art 9).
- (g) Right against interference with privacy etc (Art 10 and 11).
- (h) Right to a fair trial and to be presumed innocent unless proved otherwise (Art 12).
- (j) Right to freedom of movement, residence and nationality and to seek asylum in other countries (Art 13, 14 and 15).
- (k) Right to marry and form a family (Art 16).
- (l) Right to property (Art 17).
- (m) Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom of opinion and expression (Art 18 and 19).
- (n) Right to work, reasonable working conditions and to receive equal pay for equal work (Art 23 and 24).
- (o) Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and to be a member of a society (Art 20 and 22).

- (p) Right to a standard of living, adequate for the health and well being and social protection (Art 25).
- (q) Right to education (Art 26).
- (r) Right of participation in cultural life of community (Art 27).
- (s) Right to a social and international order in which the right and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully exercised (Art 28).

INDIAN SCENARIO

India is a signatory to various conventions proclaimed by the UN. Our country had rich traditions of observance of human rights dating back to Vedic era. Our founders have given due prominence to Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. Important parts are:-

- (a) Right to equality (Art 14).
- (b) No discrimination against any citizen based on religion, race, caste, sex, etc. (Art 15).
- (c) Right against untouchability (Art 17).
- (d) *Right to Freedom*
 - (i) Right to freedom of speech and expression (19(i) (a)).
 - (ii) Freedom to assemble peacefully without arms (Art 19 (i)).
 - (iii) Freedom to form associations (Art 19 (i) (c)).
 - (iv) Freedom to move freely in the territory of India (Art 19 (i) (o)).
 - (v) Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country (Art 19 (i) (e)).
 - (vi) Freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
 - (vii) Freedom to practice any profession and business (Art 19 (i) (f)).
- (e) Right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself (Art 20 (2)).
- (f) Protection of life and personal Liberty (Art 21).
- (g) Preventive Detention (Art 22).
- (h) Right to freedom of Religion (Art 25 to 28).

(j) Right to Constitutional Remedies (Art 22 and 226).

Art 141 gives ultimate authority to the Supreme Court to interpret and make laws from the clauses of the Constitution. Any ruling by the court will be treated as a guideline for future reference.

PART 2 - HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS

Globally UN is acting as watchdog on human rights. Various Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have also come up to cater for growing human rights violations by various states. These are group of volunteers who are voicing their protest against the atrocities committed by groups of people, government or government sponsored and government backed organisations. Without any legal strings attached, world media gives a lot of credibility to these NGOs. However, in certain cases their reports are biased in case of localised issues and may be due to funds problems.

Amnesty International. It is a London based group, set up to promote Western cause against socialist countries. It is biased in its views on Northern Ireland and violation by Western nations on human rights.

Asia Watch. Basically a New York based organisation. It has a publication which gives out weekly supplements on Asian countries with analysis. This organisation was instrumental in giving exaggerated report on alleged rapes committed by Indian soldiers in Kashmir.

National Human Rights Commission. President of India promulgated an ordinance on 29 Sep 1993 for setting up a National Commission on Human Rights. Its jurisdiction ranges from inquiry into excesses by Public servants, armed forces and para military forces (with limited powers).

Comments. It will have eight members, atleast one member each from IAS, IPS and secretary level officers from legal affairs ministry. Two members will be experts on human rights. Chair-persons of various statutory National Commissions eg, National Commission for minorities, schedule caste/tribe and National Commission for women will form part of it.

State Human Rights Commission. A smaller body headed by the Chief Justice of High Court and special courts at district level to ensure speedy trial will be set up. Appointments will be made by a special committee consisting of the chief minister, the speaker and the leader of the opposition.

Army Human Rights Cells. Apart from the USA, India is the only country

to constitute a Human Rights Cell in the Army. It will be located at Army HQs. It includes setting up training facilities on Human Rights awareness and will work towards cordial relations with own population. To counter the propaganda by pro-Pak Muslim groups to malign Indian Security Forces, Human Rights Violation Monitoring Cells have been established in Jammu and Kashmir by the Army, from Command to Brigade level to check indiscipline. On 29 July 1994, two soldiers were sentenced to 12 years RI each by an army court for alleged rape in Srinagar.⁴ Within a matter of six weeks the punishments were given. It clearly shows concern of army towards preserving human rights of the locals. In Jammu and Kashmir, Police has also set up human rights cells.

NGOs. There are a number of NGOs basically to fight for a local cause or limited area of human rights concern. 'Chipko Movement' is still fresh in our mind. 'Narmada Bachao' is another example of local bodies on human rights. Other agencies are 'Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL), People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre', all located at Delhi.

PART 3 - LEGAL ASPECTS

USE OF ARMY

Various Central Police Organisations are responsible to contain internal disturbances. Vide Entry 1 of List II of Seventh Schedule, public order is a state subject, but the Union Government is expected to use armed forces to restore the situation if beyond control. Hence army is legally bound to fight both external and internal disturbances.

The Armed Forces (Special Power) Ordinance, 1942.

- (a) Extends to the whole of India.
- (b) Special protection to guards who are guarding government installations and property.
- (c) Sentry can arrest or even kill an intruder. Authority to Sentry given by officer holding rank of Capt and above.

Armed Forces (Spl Power) Act. Union government may notify an affected part of a state as 'Disturbed Area' and may invoke provision of this article. Presently, it can be invoked in Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal, Tripura, Punjab, Chandigarh and J and K. The powers, upto the rank of NCO and above in a disturbed area are:-

- (a) Use force/fire, even causing death, after due warning against any

person acting in contravention of any law and order in disturbed area, prohibiting assembly of 5 or more persons or carriage of weapons ammunition, explosives or any thing capable of being used as such.

(b) If necessary, destroy any arms dump, prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed attacks are made or likely to be made or any structure used as training camp or utilised as a hideout by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence.

(c) Arrest any person without warrant who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use force as necessary to effect the arrest.

(d) Enter and search without warrant any premises, to make any arrest as foresaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to be stolen or any arms, ammunition or explosive substance unlawfully kept in premises and use force as necessary for that purpose.

(e) Stop/Search any vehicle (Not in Spl Act of 1958).

Handing Over. With least possible delay, such arrested person should be handed over to the nearest police station (sec 5).

Armed Forces personnel are protected against prosecutions, except with the previous sanction of central government, in respect of any thing done in exercise of powers conferred by this act (sec 6).

PROBLEM AREAS

The Army is called in very late. To deal with the situation at a delayed stage, army has to face an unwilling civil administration and demoralised police force. The initial combating of insurgency and enacting of special power act raises lot of hue and cry from the insurgents/sympathisers. This aspect will be deliberated upon later in the paper.

PART 4 - ARMY IN LIC AND CI OPERATIONS

NATIONAL SECURITY

Every nation state is responsible for protection of the lives of its citizens and of the economic resources on that territory, all of which are being destroyed or being threatened by military action. The mixture of external and internal threat can be seen in LIC/CI Ops where a proxy war is waged by the adversary, taking advantage of local problems.

In the Indian context, the army is summoned in aid to civil authority or to handle insurgency problem. The scenario in which the Indian army has to operate in the future has been covered earlier. Employment of the Army and other para military forces and police results in curbing of some of the human rights. As is said 'You cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs'. To deal with the LIC situation all these forces have been provided with some special powers. These restrictions are overplayed by insurgents and a lot of hue and cry is raised as these restrictions do not allow the insurgents to operate as per their wish.

MILITANT'S MODUS OPERANDI

Factors. Topography, proximity to the line of control and degree of support offered, organisation, state of insurgency are some of the factors dictating modus operandi of militants.

Tactics. Militants establish launch pads across LC or International Border, where they enjoy support of locals. Villages, jungles and religious places are used as catches and nerve centres for various activities. Small groups infiltrate taking best advantage of weather, terrain and deployment pattern. Militants select a soft target and after infiltration and a strike, they merge with the locals.

Where Armed Forces Go Wrong. It is now evident that the whole problem is intensified due to proximity of civilians to the area of operations. The following issues are forming part of the media campaign and cause concern to various Human Rights Organisations:-

- (a) *Curbing of Fundamental Rights.* Operation of cordon and search, vehicle checking, etc, cause unnecessary harassment to people. As these are desirable, requirement exists to carryout swift operations on definite intelligence. A cordon operation by BSF in Srinagar ended up in raising of slogans by the locals only because operations were unnecessarily prolonged.
- (b) *Rape/Molestation.* Reports appearing in the media are a mix of actuals and propaganda warfare launched by militants. To check reoccurrences, few points should be kept in mind:-

- (i) Education of all ranks.
- (ii) Enforcement of discipline.
- (iii) Liberal leave policy.
- (iv) Effective media management.

- (v) *Establishment of Human Rights Cell.* Establishment of human rights cells at various formation HQs, speedy trials of all discipline cases and compensation to the victims will generate tremendous goodwill and positive media response.
- (vi) *Mass Contact.* Commanders at all levels must meet the locals at regular intervals and listen to their grievances on the spot.
- (c) *Illegal Detention.* Any militant/offender should be handed over to the police within 24 hours or earliest for filing of a case. Problem arises when due to mistaken identity an innocent citizen is detained by an enthusiastic unit/subunit and legal formalities, delay occur due to efforts of that unit/subunit to extract information out of the innocent citizens.
- (d) *Fake Encounters.* Stage managed encounters in the vicinity of the population centre come to the knowledge of the Human Rights Organisations.
- (e) *Attack on Civilians.* Bomb blasts, proxy actions across the border and intentional killing of civilian population in hostile territory becomes a media headline. Some of these actions are desirable basically to destroy the launch pads of the insurgents in hostile country. Due care should be taken to avoid casualty to civilians.
- (f) *Custody Deaths.* In a bid to extract information, no suspect should be tortured. Army should hand over a detainee only after proper medical check up, otherwise death in police custody can conveniently be attributed to alleged torture by the army before handing over.
- (g) *Compensation.* All victims should be compensated at the earliest. Rules should be framed on various contingencies and offenders should be made to pay compensation or part of it and awarded punishment as well, as per the law.
- (h) *Special Powers to the Army.* Special powers conferred on the armed forces should be understood in its totality. Legal constraints like carrying police person for cordon/search operations, frisking of women by women police, where feasible, signing of 'No Claim' certificate etc, can get the army personnel into trouble if due care is not exercised.
- (j) *Cross Fire Tactics.* It is a favourite tactics employed by militants to fire from a crowd or to put civilians in front as a shield. Before setting out for a task, such contingencies should be thought of. Own media coverage of such events will expose and will give out the nefarious designs of the militants.

PART 5 - MEDIA AND P R

The fourth estate is a potent weapon which in the present scenario, is not being used by us as a tool to enhance our own cause. The tools of media include papers, periodicals, radio, TV and telephone. In the past, the operations in Punjab projected own security forces as violators of all norms of human rights. Such criticism was remarkably replaced by praise for security forces during 'BLACK THUNDER'. It became a reality because media was allowed to come to the scene of action and nothing was hidden. Restrictions on passage of information results in spreading of rumours. Local vernacular press is vulnerable to threat of the terrorists. It should be used to the advantage of armed forces under a well thought out action plan.

LIC operations are aimed at militants and not at local civilian population. Hence use of media should aim at an effective psychological Warfare. The purpose of the psy ops being:-

- (a) Highlighting futility of militants demands and actions.
- (b) Highlighting partisan motives and fallacy of militants ideology.
- (c) Emphasizing just, fair and effective role played by security forces and inevitability of certain curbs on human rights due to operations against militants.
- (d) Civic and social development activities by civilians aided by the army.
- (e) Keeping troops informed and maintenance of high degree of discipline.

PR

It is imperative that Army's authentic version of events is promptly given to the media, rather than they depend on half truths and concocted versions readily given by the militants. Rejoinders and rebuttals, issued after militants version is not going to correct the tarnished image.

P R should aim to:-

- (a) *Safeguard image of security forces.* By forestalling militants propaganda by giving factual data to counter militant's claim.
- (b) *Project Image of Security Forces.* By exhibiting own success, civic actions and by propagating militant's failure.
- (c) *Expose Militants.* By showing proof of their nefarious activities through confessions, surrenders and narrative interviews.

The authority to give press release should be lowered down to Brigade. Commanders, who can give away authentic version of events related to their areas of jurisdiction.

PART 6 - A NEW APPROACH BY THE ARMY

The Army has to fight external aggression and it has to help the Civil administration in combating internal disturbances. In discharging its duty in CI environment, all ranks, under able leadership have set an example on upholding human rights. As stated earlier, certain curbs are inherent in fighting terrorism, but these are meant to protect these very citizens from the terrorists.

The institution of Army inculcates discipline of the highest order. Soldier is not politically aligned to any ideology or party. Mostly army comes out of an area earning lot of goodwill and appreciation.

With above-mentioned virtues inherent in a soldier, the need of the hour is to educate the junior leadership on the issue of human rights. It should be included as a subject in various courses for leaders of appropriate rank and service. BSF Academy has already included it as a subject for its young officers.

Human Rights Cells. Human rights cell has been created at the Army HQ in August 1993. A Human Rights Violation Monitoring Cell established at various HQs in J&K has already started bringing the offenders to law court of the army. The aim is to counter the baseless propaganda appearing in the media and punish the guilty as per the service norms. This will definitely check indiscipline among soldiers.

CONCLUSION

The changing educational standards have made people aware of their rights. The communication revolution had made it possible to flash news across the globe in real time making media a weapon which if ignored can cause nothing but embarrassment. In recent years, terrorists have started using it to propagate their cause and to draw world attention. The policy of keeping media at bay nicely suits the propaganda machine of the terrorists. Not only this, hostile neighbours find it a good tool for proxy war and to propagate their theories.

In this world where economic interests are supreme today what is bothering developing countries is the double standard adopted by the North in applying human rights issues. NGOs like Amnesty International and Asia Watch are biased in reporting. Excesses on Muslims of Bosnia is a live example, where these organisations have not given any prominence to this issue.

These developments should make us sit and think. At the national level,

we have constituted Human Rights Commission, but without teeth. It is even being dubbed as a crude attempt by the government to deflect public scrutiny of human rights violation. A commission with more teeth and reliability is desirable.

Investigative journalism and communications revolution will be able to flash news across the globe within no time. We should educate our soldiers and junior leaders of the army and then use media as an offensive weapon against the militants and their wrongdoing. In addition, false propaganda by hostile neighbour has to be countered aggressively.

Contiguous borders with other nations are giving us a peculiar problem. Insurgency thrives very well in such states on the border. The Army steps in, to crush militancy. The battle is of hearts and minds and the army must create goodwill amongst the locals. A good unit will be able to build these principles in its ethos. But education and awareness training to troops should be continuous, progressive and keeping in view the environment of operations.

To sum up, it would be relevant to mention the remarks of the Secretary General of the UN in his Annual Report on the working of the UN for 1975-76.

"The reconciliation of the principles of national sovereignty with the ideal expressed in the universal declaration of Human Rights will inevitably remain a complex and delicate problem, for the fact is that Governments view issue of human rights in a different way".

NOTES

1. UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
2. Lt Gen SC Serdeshpande, UYSM, AVSM (Retd), The Inf, Dec 93, pp 1-2.
3. Upendra Baxi, VC, Delhi University, Liberal Times, 1/93.
4. All India Radio, 29 July 94, News Bulletin - 1600 h.

India and Pakistan : A Troubled Relationship

ANDREA BENVENUTI

INTRODUCTION

In the Indian subcontinent the rivalry existing between India and Pakistan since the Partition of British India, is of great significance. Due to their demographic and geographic characteristics, their economic weight, their military might, India and Pakistan are in a position of influencing and greatly affecting the dynamics of South Asia. With the exception of the short period following the Third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, the relations between these two countries have been marked by a deep hostility, the causes of which date back to the struggle between Hindus and Muslims during the British rule over the Subcontinent. After the Partition the communal clash, which had become particularly violent in the last days of the British presence in India, developed into an extremely inimical relationship between two sovereign states. The complexity of this relationship lies not only in its two-fold character of animosity between two different communities and then between two states, but also in the dazzling cultural, linguistic, anthropological affinities between two communities that had been living together for a very long time. Given the circumstances, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry cannot only be pictured as a hostile relationship between two nations with clashing national interests or with two incompatible foreign policies, but also as a very particular affair that has to deal with certain psychological, cultural and historical factors.

The aim of this article is to analyse such a troubled relationship and to contribute to the interpretation of the events that took place over the last four decades between the two "heavy-weights" of the Subcontinent. In this article we intend to omit the reasons that led to the rise of the religious communalism and communal violence before 1947, in the belief that the Indian readers are very much aware of events concerning the pre-Partition era.

Though Indo-Pakistani relations have extensively been scrutinized by many authoritative scholars, we nevertheless hold the opinion that the European point of view of the author might be of some interest to the Indian reader, providing a different perspective of a highly controversial subject of International Relations

Andrea Benvenuti, a research scholar from the University of Florence, Italy, was in India for three months in 1991 to study security issues in South Asia.

INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FROM 1947 TO THE BEGINNING OF 1960s

During this period the Indo-Pakistani relations were marked by the outbreak of the First Indo-Pakistani War in 1947, the spreading of the Cold War in Asia, Pakistan's participation in the Asian alliance-network of the United States and the Indian "non-alignment" policy.

After the creation of Pakistan by Partition of India, the tension provoked by the continuing misunderstanding between Hindus and Muslims and by the hasty implementation of the Partition, resulted in the First Indo-Pakistani war: the conflict that broke out in October 1947 and came to an end on 1 January 1949, when a truce between the two warring camps was declared, took place in Kashmir and determined the provisional division of this region along the cease-fire line, on the grounds of which two thirds of Kashmir remained in Indian hands, whilst one third was taken by Pakistan.

Since, then, Kashmir became the "apple of discord" between the two neighbours. Not only were strategic issues involved, but more so an ideological one. Infact, for India - a state created upon the principle of laicism and multi-ethnicity - Kashmir, a region with a Muslim majority, meant the testing bench of its capability of ruling over different communities. On the contrary, Pakistan, founded as the homeland of the Muslims of the Subcontinent, could not accept the fact that a region with a Muslim majority and territorially contiguous, formed part of Hindu-dominated India. This led New Delhi to feel threatened by a state who not only did not recognize its sovereignty over Kashmir, but who, on the contrary, had sought to take it back by starting the first Indo-Pakistani war and by initiating to rearm¹. On the other side of the Indo-Pakistani border, the government of Pakistan was convinced that India was ready to divide the country in order to undermine the outcome of the Partition, the idea of which, according to the Pakistani elite, the Indians had never come to terms with².

Apart from these different perceptions, there was a certain geopolitical, strategic and ideological asymmetry. Geographically speaking, India was three times as large as Pakistan and was located between East and West Pakistan. From a strategic point of view, in the wake of the Partition, the British Indian Army was divided between India and Pakistan according to a 2 : 1 ratio in favour of New Delhi and, moreover, the economic and commercial centres of British India (i.e. Calcutta and Bombay) became part of the new Indian state.

Ideologically speaking, Delhi seemed to be the natural heir of the British Raj and the Indian civilisation. On the contrary, Pakistan came into light without a strong identity and a well-established tradition.

The Cold War, marked by the formation of two opposing blocs, gradually began to penetrate the Subcontinent's regional dynamics: in other words, the bipolar logic of the international system started to be superimposed upon the dynamics of the South Asian sub-system. It was Pakistan who, feeling particularly insecure and incapable of taking Kashmir back without the help of an "extra-systemic" power, sought to take advantage of the "containment" policy of the United States in order to grow stronger *vis-a-vis* India. Furthermore, the United States, in the eyes of the Pakistani government, had to be acting as a counterpoise for India, the great South Asian power, in order to balance the Indo-Pakistani asymmetry so adverse to Pakistan. Pakistan's foreign policy was crowned with success in 1954 when Karachi signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the USA and joined the SEATO. The following year, it became a member of the Pact of Baghdad (later known as CENTO). In 1959, the USA and Pakistan signed the Cooperation Agreement, according to which Washington engaged itself to protect the independence and the integrity of its South Asian ally¹.

India strongly opposed the involvement of an "extra-systemic" power in the Subcontinent's activities. We hold the opinion that this did not depend upon India's alleged hegemonic designs in South Asia, but upon Nehru's sincere concern of being "trapped" in the bipolar logic of the Cold War, which would have strongly undermined New Delhi's freedom of action both at global and regional levels. The "non-alignment" policy was the Indian response to the Cold War and the attempt to formulate an independent foreign policy. This policy, however, had some implications as far as the regional subsystem was concerned: by keeping the Subcontinent under shelter from the bipolar dynamics of the global systems, India, who felt threatened by Pakistan, would have been able to face the latter from a position of strength. Moreover, given that Nehru's foreign policy assigned a global role to the country, the Pakistani enemy was the disturbing element in the ambitious plans of the Indian prime minister. Whilst for Nehru Pakistan was one of the many dangers (together with the Cold War, the colonialism) to the security of the country, for the Pakistani leadership, India obsessively symbolised its sole threat.

INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS IN THE 1960s

The sixties saw an improvement in the USA-USSR relationship. This meant a more relaxed political climate between the two superpowers and a less conflictual bipolar system. These changes, occurring outside the Subcontinent, modified to a certain extent, the pattern of Indo-Pakistani relations, without altering their hostile nature. In other words, the mutual enmity and the reciprocal perception of risk and fear, continued to form the heart of the Indo-

Pakistani affair. Nevertheless, the "extra-systemic" changes contributed to alter the strategic scenario in which this conflictual relationship took place. In brief, at the beginning of the 1960s India and China fought a war that meant the final worsening of the Sino-Indian relations and Peking's intrusion in South Asia's activities. China and Pakistan allied themselves against India and in 1963 signed an agreement in which Pakistan handed over a small part of Kashmir to China. Furthermore, the friendly relations existing between India and the USSR since the mid-1950s consolidated in this decade and assumed an anti-Chinese tone. As far as the superpowers were concerned, the sixties witnessed both an ever-increasing involvement of the Soviet Union in the Subcontinent and reduced presence of the United States in the region, which determined an American loss of interest in Pakistan.

The most significant event in Indo-Pakistani relations was the Second Indo-Pakistani war. Pakistan's military junta, headed by Ayoob Khan, decided to take India by surprise, by attacking in Kashmir in the hope of conquering the part of Kashmir still in Indian hands. Ayoob Khan and his foreign minister, Z.A. Bhutto, believed that, because India found itself in a situation of political and military weakness (India's defeat in the 1962 war had taken place only three years earlier and in 1964 India had lost its most prominent leader of all times, Nehru), the time had come to take back Kashmir from India before the latter grew stronger as a result of the serious programme of military enhancement (started after 1962). Relying perhaps on a concrete Chinese support which never came, Pakistan attacked, but India managed to drive back the enemy. For Pakistan it was a clear failure. In the eyes of the Indian elite the war confirmed that Pakistan was in favour of a radical change of the *status quo* in South Asia. The war also signalled that the Chinese-Pakistani axis bore no benefit to Pakistan. The worst fears created by the *entente cordiale* between Pakistan and China turned out to be groundless, though the danger of a war on two fronts could not be ruled out.

During the post-war period, following the Tashkent Agreement, there was the American arms embargo to India and Pakistan of which Pakistan was worse-hit and the Soviet attempt to play the mediator's role between the two South Asian powers.

In conclusion, the sixties were difficult years for New Delhi. As a result of the events which took place in this decade, the Indian role on the international scene was downgraded. From the attempt to act as a great power, India was forced to redirect its foreign policy and to focus its attentions on the regional sub-system in which the danger of Pakistan had to be dealt with very carefully.

INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS IN THE 1970s

In the Subcontinent, the 1970s were marked by the outcomes of the Third Indo-Pakistani War, i.e. the dismemberment of Pakistan (and the creation of Bangladesh) and the Indian victory which put Delhi in a strong position *vis-a-vis* Islamabad. This situation was sanctioned by the Simla conference in which India did not look for a punitive peace but hoped to initiate a new policy towards Pakistan, based upon a more relaxed and understanding approach. Pakistan, however, which had lost its eastern part and which was passing through a complex internal situation (a new democratic government led by Z.A. Bhutto was established in Islamabad), clearly realised how much its destiny was dangerously in India's control. By the Simla Agreement, Islamabad sought to gain time in order to make the strategic asymmetry between India and Pakistan less worrying than it in fact was. This asymmetry looked even more dangerous for Islamabad in 1974 when India successfully exploded a nuclear device in Rajasthan. India's nuclear test no doubt contributed to hasten Pakistan's nuclear program.

At the end of the 1970s it was clear that Pakistan had no intention to abide by the "*Pax Indica*". Infact Islamabad had continued rearming over the entire decade. At the same time it was believed in India that the strong and advantageous position the country had maintained after the Third Indo-Pakistani war, was being put to risk. Nevertheless, at the end of the decade India undoubtedly was still militarily stronger than Pakistan. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided a new opportunity to alter the Indo-Pakistani military balance and became a new source of worry for India, in consideration of the military help given by Washington to Islamabad.

INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS IN THE 1980s

In 1981 Islamabad obtained US \$ 3.2 billion military aid from Washington for the 1981-87 period⁴. This decision taken by the Reagan administration was the American answer to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore, following the Pakistani rearmament, India was in turn forced to rearm. A new age of military build-up was affecting South Asia. However, the Afghan crisis and its international implications proved to be more favourable to India than to Pakistan because, for the first time in its history, the latter felt endangered both on the country's western and eastern borders. Nevertheless, Pakistan continued to keep the bulk of its troops on the Indo-Pakistani border. In spite of the fact that Pakistan found itself in a dangerous position and did not look capable of posing a serious threat to India in these circumstances, Delhi was nevertheless worried about the Pakistani military build-up, which was rightly perceived as exclusively anti-Indian and not anti-Soviet. At the beginning of

the 1980s the tense state of relations between the two South Asian enemies greatly worsened as result of the nuclear issue. New Delhi held the opinion that Islamabad had obtained or was on the verge of obtaining nuclear capability. Furthermore, in 1984 a dispute for the possession of the Siachen glacier, a mountainous area in Kashmir of very dubious strategic value, began. This dispute is still continuing and has at times transformed itself into a limited war between these two countries. In the second half of the decade, specially during the period in which Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto were in power in their countries, the Indo-Pakistani relations experienced a rather relaxed ambience. The impression that all was only temporary, however, was confirmed when the National Front government came into power in Delhi in 1989 and Benazir Bhutto was ousted from power in Islamabad. The worsening of the political situation in Punjab and Kashmir, and Pakistani support for the Kashmiri and Sikh Militant's cause, led India to feel particularly threatened. The result was that tension between the two neighbours mounted once again.

THE DIMENSIONS OF A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP

Following this historical introduction, we now intend to analyse the Indo-Pakistani relationship in the framework of six dimensions. These are :

- 1) the general dimension;
- 2) the ideological dimension;
- 3) the diplomatic dimension;
- 4) the perceptive dimension;
- 5) the strategic dimension; and
- 6) the nuclear dimension.

THE GENERAL DIMENSION

India and Pakistan are two very different realities. India, with its three million square kilometers of territory, is nearly four times larger than Pakistan. Its population is eight times more numerous than Pakistan's⁵. Its GDP is US \$ 238 billion, whereas Pakistan's US \$ 38 billion: an amount seven times greater than Pakistan's⁶. India's armed forces number 1.2 million troops, while Pakistan's slightly more than half a million⁷. India's military arsenal is better equipped than Pakistan's. Even in terms of technology, India is better placed than its neighbour: it has an advanced nuclear program, it has nearly acquired the capability of making ballistic missiles and it is able to produce a considerable amount of defence-related items. Pakistan, in spite of its efforts, lags well behind.

Moreover, India has a well-established and resilient democratic system,

in spite of the endemic political instability. The same cannot be said of Pakistan, where military juntas have been the rule and the democratic governments the exception. Today's India is dangerously shaken by separatist violence, but Pakistan is not totally immune to this either.

These facts lead us to the conclusion that India is stronger than its rival. This important factor cannot be overlooked in analysing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry.

THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Pakistan, born as the homeland for the Muslims of the Subcontinent, still represents an ideological threat to New Delhi because of Islamabad's endeavours to show itself as the defender of the South Asian Muslims. This fact is particularly visible in the Pakistani involvement in the Jammu and Kashmir's troubled situation. Infact Pakistan's role as defender of the South Asian Muslims questions India's viability as a secular and multi-ethnic state and challenges New Delhi's capability of ruling over different minorities (and, among them, the numerous Muslim community).

On the other hand, New Delhi represents a certain psychological threat for Pakistan given that India is the natural heir of the Indian civilisation and culture. At the time of the Partition, while India was founded upon a strong tradition, Pakistan came into light without any firm cultural identity. That lack of a strong identity has always imposed serious problems to Pakistan's self-image.

THE DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

Given the fact that India and Pakistan have been enemies since the Partition, the foreign policies of both states have been aimed at neutralising and controlling the rival's manoeuvres.

In spite of the fact that it was Nehru who first submitted the Kashmir question to the United Nations, it was Pakistan who stubbornly persisted in trying to "internationalise" the issue through its membership of the USA-inspired systems of alliances, its links with the Islamic world, who verbally supported Islamabad's stance on Kashmir, and its signing of the Sino-Pakistani Treaty of 1963. India replied by establishing concrete relations with the West Asian states, by its *entente cordiale* with the Soviet Union and by taking advantage of its prestige in the Third World and among the non-aligned nations.

Moreover, Pakistan sought to balance the strategic and geopolitical asymmetry existing with India by involving "extra-systemic" powers in the activities of the Subcontinent. India, on the contrary, attempted to prevent the "extra-systemic" powers from meddling in the course of South Asia's affairs and from aiding Pakistan. Delhi also endeavored to keep its relations with Islamabad out of the great powers' game and to deal with its neighbour bilaterally in order to "localise" and "neutralise" the Indo-Pakistani rivalry.

In conclusion, the very different behaviours of the two South Asian enemies were, determined, in our eyes, by the simple fact that whilst India could be regarded as a "pro-status quo" power, Pakistan was forcefully opposed to post-Partition order as a result of the unsatisfactory settlement of the Kashmir issue.

THE PERCEPTIVE DIMENSION

India's and Pakistan's behaviours towards each other were also greatly influenced by a well-established pattern of negative mirror-perceptions.

India always viewed its neighbour as a revisionist power, eager to obtain the military parity with Delhi and ready to go to war in order to seize Kashmir. On the contrary, Pakistan was always convinced that one of the main scopes of the Indian foreign policy was to dismember Pakistan and to alter the outcome of the Partition. In the minds of the Pakistani elite any Indian enhancement of its military capabilities was seen as aimed at dominating over its neighbour, dictating its terms to him and, eventually, destroying him.

THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION

India and Pakistan stand up to each other along a frontier which goes from the heights of Karakoram to the Indian Ocean. This simple geographical fact does bear a great deal on the matter of Indo-Pakistani rivalry because, in the case of a new war between the two countries, the nature of the battle would be based upon aerial and land operations.

Along the border Delhi and Islamabad line up the bulk of their divisions. India has 33 divisions of which 9-10 are assigned to front the Chinese threat along the Sino-Indian border⁸. However, if China refrains from menacing India as it seems likely today, New Delhi could transfer some of its mountain divisions from the Sino-Indian border to the western front against Pakistan. This shift could be accomplished in a short time as a result of the airlifting capabilities of the IAF⁹. In winter there is no constraint whatsoever against such a move given the fact that the Himalayan passes are closed for snow

conditions and a Chinese large-scale attack must be ruled out¹⁰. If we take into account that India is required to maintain a certain amount of troops in Kashmir and Punjab for internal security purposes¹¹, it is clear that India normally assigns no more than 18-19 divisions along the Indo - Pakistani border.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Islamabad deploys almost all of its forces (18-19 of its 21 divisions) on its eastern border¹². This was also true during the days of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, when the Pakistani leadership, despite its declarations that the country was seriously endangered by the USSR along the "Durand line", continued to keep the bulk of its troops lined up against India.

Unless India moves its mountain troops from the Sino-Indian border to the western front, both countries possess a substantial parity in terms of manpower. Nevertheless, India has a clear edge over Pakistan in terms of armaments¹³.

India's military superiority *vis-a-vis* Pakistan could become more evident if an Indo-Pakistani conflict resulted in an all-out war: in this case India, being the more industrialised, more technologically advanced, richer in terms of natural resources than Pakistan, would be more capable of standing up to a prolonged war effort. But such a scenario could hardly happen: firstly because the economic resources of both states are limited and secondly because the international community would not tolerate a protracted conflict¹⁴.

We hold the opinion that, being an "anti-status quo" power, Pakistan could be more likely to start a conflict than India for seizing the Indian-held Kashmir and for pre-emptively attacking India in case Islamabad felt particularly threatened by Delhi.

On the contrary, India, being a "*pro-status quo*" power, aims to hold its positions along the frontier and, eventually, to counter-attack.

Therefore, the most likely scenario is a short and limited war. In such a situation Pakistan could seize parts of Indian territory and hold them in possession till the UNO or the international community obtain the cease-fire. That is precisely what India fears, given the length of the Indo-Pakistani border and the impossibility of defending it far and wide. India's military plans are, in our opinion, clearly defensive and foresee the possibility of launching a counter-attack in areas not concerned by the Pakistani attack¹⁵. Nevertheless, because of the poor mechanisation of both armies, the attacks and counter-attacks carried out by the mechanised divisions are likely to concentrate on certain strategic points of the border, while on the rest of the front the two

armies are likely to wage a trench warfare. Moreover, both states are short of a numerical superiority in terms of manpower and weapon systems, necessary to achieve a decisive breakthrough in a war against the enemy.

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

The nuclear dimension in the Indo-Pakistani relationship is still of a hypothetical nature. Infact India does not have, at least officially, any nuclear weapon. It has, however, acquired the necessary scientific and technical know-how to produce nuclear weapons. For New Delhi nuclearisation is a political choice, not a technical one: if the Indian government decided to nuclearise itself, India would be able to produce several bombs in a short time.

Pakistan has never undertaken a nuclear test as did India at Pokhran in 1974. Nevertheless, today it is no longer necessary to carry out nuclear tests to achieve constructing atomic bombs. It is, however, suspected that Pakistan has been assisted by China to carry out nuclear tests on Chinese soil¹⁶. It is still uncertain if Pakistan has fully developed a nuclear weapon, but if it is not so, Pakistan seems to be very close to acquiring the nuclear capability.

In spite of the secrecy hanging over the nuclear programmes of both countries, Delhi nevertheless seems to be well ahead of Pakistan. India also maintains a critical edge over its neighbour in terms of delivery systems: while India is able to hit any corner of Pakistan with its Migs, Jaguars and Mirages, Pakistan is only capable of striking a very limited area of the Indian soil; secondly, while Delhi has tested two ballistic missiles (Prithvi and Agni), Islamabad is still lagging well behind¹⁷.

In conclusion it must be noted that India and Pakistan are entering, and to a certain extent, have already entered a new era based upon nuclear deterrence. Islamabad, rightly feeling militarily inferior to India, sees in the development of its nuclear programme the opportunity of neutralising the existing asymmetry in the conventional area and the possibility of using the "bomb" as an extreme measure in the event of the very existence of Pakistan being severely endangered by India's actions.

Today, New Delhi, which began developing its nuclear programme as a response, among other reasons¹⁸, to the Chinese nuclear threat, finds it compelling to link itself with Pakistan's nuclear moves. Given the fact that Pakistan's nuclear programme is in turn linked with India's the nuclearisation of the Subcontinent appears to be inevitable. Such a situation is further complicated by the fact that India is required to take into account both China's and Pakistan's nuclear moves and rightly rejects any bilateral solution which does not include one of the two powers.

CONCLUSION: THE INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS IN THE NEXT YEARS

The relations between India and Pakistan, which have been marked by a serious enmity for forty years, do not foreshadow anything good principally because the reasons of such a rivalry have never been resolved. Nevertheless, there is some positiveness in the fact that the last Indo-Pakistani war took place more than twenty years ago. This is extremely important given that during the period 1948-71 the two nations had gone to war three times. The two countries' more reasonable behaviour may be due to the fact that the price of fighting a new war is too high today. Infact, both India and Pakistan enhanced their military capabilities in the 1980s as a result of an arms race between them. India is today militarily stronger than in 1965 or 1971 and Pakistan is aware of this. Islamabad will hardly put its existence at risk by attacking India and New Delhi, being a "pro-status quo" power has no reason to go to war with Pakistan, which is capable of inflicting serious losses on India.

Moreover, India and Pakistan are at the moment passing through a very difficult economic situation. Both nations suffer from internal instability and violence. It must also be noted that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, with a more balanced approach of the USA to South Asia's affairs (and, therefore, a reduced importance of Pakistan for Washington) and with a more sober Chinese attitude towards the Subcontinent, India and Pakistan can no longer rely on an outside great power's help to pursue the conflicting foreign policies in their region.

In conclusion, Indo-Pakistani relations remain characterized by a dangerous hostility and remarkable precariousness: for instance, in 1987 and in 1990 the two countries came very close to a new conflict¹⁹. The relaxed political climate of the post-Cold War period seems not to have yet influenced the relationship between the two South Asian arch-rivals. A set of confidence building measures are very much needed in order to improve the Indo-Pakistani relationship; however, the political premise to establish such measures are still out of the reach.

NOTES

1. Pakistan's military spending increased from PRs. 154 million in the 1947-48 financial year to PRs. 1044 million in 1959-60.

See Economic Advisor's Wing, *Pakistan Economic Survey*, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (quoted from Sen Gupta B. et al. (eds.), *Regional cooperation and development in South Asia: perceptonal, military and nuclear arms are problems*, New Delhi, South Asian , 1986, p. 205)

According to Sipri, Pakistan's military expenditure as proportion of GDP averaged around

3% in the 1950s. See SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: Sipri Yearbook 1975*, Stockholm, Almquist & Wicksell, 1975, pp. 32-33.

It must not be forgotten that between 1953 and 1961 Pakistan received US \$ 507 million military aid from the USA.

See Singh K.R., "US relations with India in a strategic and security perspective", in Rajan M.S. and Ganguly S. (eds.), *Great Powers relations, World Order and Third World*, New Delhi, Vikas, 1981, pp. 185-188.

2. See Naqvi M.B., "The peace option for Pakistan ?", in Cohen S. (ed.), *The security of South Asia*, New Delhi, Vistaar, 1988, p. 107.
3. See Barnds W., *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 83-105.
4. See Zubeida M., "Pakistan-US relations: the latest phase", *The World Today*, vol. 37, no. 12, 1981, p. 469.
5. World Bank, *World Development Report*, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 178.
6. Ibid, p. 182.
7. IISS, *Military Balance 1990-91*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990, pp. 160 and 171.
8. Ibid, p.161.
9. "...the Indian Air Force has the third largest airlift capability in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union. This was effectively demonstrated in Indian operations in Sri Lanka and the Maldives".

See Naidu. G.V.C., "The Indian navy and southeast Asia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 13, no. 1, 1991, p. 80.

According to Air Cmde N.B. Singh (interviewed by us in August 1991). India's airlift capability is limited.
10. See Rose L., "India", in Wilcox W., Rose L. Boydge (Mass.) Winthrop, 1971, p.78.
11. See Kulkarni V.G., "Of brinkmanship and limited deterrence", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 April 1987. p.37.
12. See Singh J., "India's strategic and security perspectives", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 13, no. 5, 1990, p. 494.

See also IISS, *op. cit.*, p. 173
13. Ibid, pp. 161-162 and 173-174.
14. The United Nations intervened in all of the three Indo-Pakistani wars. But it was only in 1971 that UNO was unable to mediate effectively because of the Soviet veto.
15. This is exactly what happened in the Second Indo-Pakistani war when Pakistan attacked India in Kashmir and India counter-attacked in Punjab.

See Ganguly S., *The origins of war in South Asia*, Lahore, Vanguard, 1988, pp. 85-93.

According to Chandran S., "[India] plans have revolved around styming the [Pakistan's] offensive and launching the counter offensive...".

See Chandran S., "Indo-Pak relations" measures to reduce tension and normalise relations", *USI Journal*, vol.121, no.505, 1991, p.337.

16. See Subramanian R.R., *India, Pakistan and China: defence and nuclear tangle in South Asia*, New Delhi, ABC, 1989, p.75.
17. See Naim R., "Asia's day after:nuclear war between India and Pakistan ?", in Cohen S. (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 258-259.
18. India's decision to acquire the nuclear capability can be attributed to several factors: 1) India's aim to pressurise the nuclear haves in order to urge them to reduce their nuclear arsenals, 2) New Delhi's intention to show the world its scientific and technological achievements, 3) international prestige, 4) the Chinese threat.

For a very good study on India's nuclear program see Thomas R., "India's nuclear and space programs: defence or development ?", *World Politics*, vol. 38, no.2, 1986, pp. 315-342.

19. At the end of 1986 India held a large-scale military exercise, known as "Operation Brasstack", which took place very close to the Indo-Pakistani border in the desert of Rajasthan. 200,000 Indian troops were involved in the "Operation Brasstack". The scale of Indian troops concentration frightened Pakistan which started to move its troops to the border. The result of such actions and counter-actions was a climate of mounting tension between Islamabad and New Delhi. The risk of a new war defused when the Pakistani leader, Zia-ul-Haq went to Delhi for talks with the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.

See Samina Y., "India and Pakistan: why the latest exercise in brinkmanship", *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 34, n. 1, 1988, pp. 64-71.

In early 1990, a new confrontation between India and Pakistan built up over Kashmir and the two countries risked to go to war once again.

See McDonald H., "Destroyer of world", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1992, p. 23.

Sino-Myanmar Military Ties: Implications for India's Security

SWARAN SINGH

The year 1994 proved to be a watershed year for Sino-Myanmar military ties. Apart from building roads and bridges, opening new border posts and signing new deals for supplying of arms, the year ended with Prime Minister Li Peng paying a three-day "goodwill" visit to Yangon. On his part, Li Peng not only gave a clean chit to the functioning of military junta's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) but he was, in fact, full of glorious compliments to military's spirit of justice and fairplay.¹ But more than providing this moral and political support, the year 1994 also saw China signing another pact with SLORC for supplying more weapons, worth \$ 400 million, having already completed their deliveries for \$ 1.4 billion as had been envisaged under an earlier such pact that was signed in late 1990.²

In their last 44 years of diplomatic ties with this complicated country, the Chinese leaders had never been so generous to any of those successive ruling regimes in Myanmar. Before Li Peng, China's foreign minister Qian Qichen was another important foreign official to visit Myanmar in February 1993. Then, as a follow-up of his visit, China had signed six new agreements with SLORC, in July 1993, involving trade, transportation and other infrastructure. Myanmar watchers had then reported of Qian Qichen offering additional military aid to SLORC in exchange for access to the Indian Ocean through their naval and other port facilities.³ And generally this is what is believed to be China's central motive behind its so generous dealings with Myanmar's present military regime.

As for Myanmar, after decades of neutrality and a strictly non-aligned foreign policy, it has today emerged as China's principal military ally in Asia, rivalling even China's infamous "Special Relationship" with Pakistan.⁴ So also China, that for long years had continued supporting Myanmar's communist rebels trying to defy and destroy the governments in Yangon, has now clearly emerged as the most important military ally of SLORC. So much so that this increasing Chinese indulgence there has already touched off debates regarding the sinonisation of Myanmar. And it is in this context of China's changing policies and priorities that the present paper tries to examine these expanding Sino-Myanmar military ties and their implications for India's security.

Dr. Swaran Singh is a Research Associate with the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

THE RATIONALE

Undertaking a fundamental shift in its foreign policy, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) was the first country to officially recognize military's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) after it seized power in a bloody coup in September 1988 by killing thousands of protestors against General Ne Win's 26-year totalitarian military rule in Myanmar. In fact on August 5, 1988, three days before the infamous 8/8/88 massacre by the army, the vice-governor of Yunnan Province, Zhu Kui, had signed a border trade agreement with the Burmese military.⁵ But a more detailed foundation of their eco-strategic relationship was laid later during a twelve-day visit by a 24-member SLORC military team to China. The team was led by the then Lt.General (later General) Than Shwe and included Khin Nyunt who was then the director of procurement and, in that capacity, was the real force behind the signing of their historic \$ 1.4 billion weapons acquisition deal.

In contrast, during the previous 16 years of Ne Win's rule, Beijing had most actively supported the rebels instead. China had poured in more arms and ammunition in Myanmar than in any other Communist movement in Asia, outside Indo-China. In fact, before this present phase since the coming of the SLORC, China had always dealt with this country through Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and other left leaning rebels. A number of factors can be cited that were responsible for this U-turn in China's foreign policy. Firstly, until 1988 large tracts of Burmese territory bordering China had always remained virtually outside Rangoon's control. And all these years, Communists and other ethnic rebels had not only operated from these regions with comparative ease but were carrying out large-scale lucrative cross-border trade which had the blessings of Beijing's authorities. Thus, with the recapture of these sanctuaries, China had no options other than dealing directly with SLORC.

This change can, of course, also be partly explained in terms of China's changing post-Cold War strategic thinking and priorities though there is always more to it than meets our eyes. In short, therefore, the following can be described as the four major reasons for China's change of heart leading to its building strong military ties with the post- 1988 military junta in Myanmar.

- * As China successfully carries out its 'Four Modernisations' programme and perceives itself as ordained to become a major world actor in the twenty-first century, its main motive behind cultivating military ties with SLORC has been to further facilitate its expansionism in Asia. Thus to the military leadership in PRC, Myanmar seems to be a vital link and a significant strategic foothold in their overall maritime strategy for controlling the Malacca straits and for having an operational reach into the Indian Ocean.

- * Secondly, since Deng's military modernisation has been intrinsically intertwined with China's overall industrial and economic growth, China's military ties with Myanmar has also been guided by their desire for seeking economic development for China's backward bordering regions and for encouraging free trade between, for instance, Yunnan and its southern neighbours. It is also aimed at facilitating China's access to the rest of South and Southeast Asia using Myanmar's roads, railways and sea ports.
- * Thirdly, in the face of western proscription following the Tiananmen Square incident, Myanmar's military junta also appeared to have impressed Chinese leaders as a perfect partner since both these countries, having soiled their hands with the blood of their own countrymen, were fighting hard for re-establishing rapport with the rest of the world. Thus it was inevitable for these two neighbouring regimes to move closer.⁶
- * And finally, apart from sharing these strategic and economic complementarities, China and Myanmar also share more than 2,000 kms long common border. Besides, Myanmar has also been historically viewed as a buffer state between China and India. Thus, for reasons of geographical proximity, history and security, China has been going overboard trying to sweep Myanmar into its sphere of influence with a combination of economic, diplomatic and military ties.⁷

DUBIOUS DEALS

Working for its aforementioned motives, China has recently built two important bridges across Shweli River linking its Muse and Wantin towns with Yangon's strategic outpost at Ruili. Dubbed by locals as China's "Gun Bridge" these two bridges have been the essential linkage for most of Chinese arms deliveries to SLORC. In October (1994), for instance, the entire area was cordoned off and at night more than 500 army trucks had crossed over from China to Myanmar.⁸ Similarly in January 1993, a series of Chinese arms shipments had reportedly crossed over to Myanmar: the deliveries included light infantry weapons, rocket launchers, mortars, recoilless rifles, and armored personnel carriers.⁹ Also apart from these hundreds of trucks and thousands of tons of ammunition, the Chinese had reportedly provided SLORC with 16 warplanes (F-6), over 100 T-69 II and T-63 amphibious tanks, 160 armored vehicles, 25 anti-tank guns, and 6 Heian type cruisers during 1990-1992.¹⁰

The SLORC, on the other hand, which has been technically short of funds and foreign exchange for all these years has obtained these weapons

surely on some highly favorable yet undisclosed and dubious terms. Granting access to its naval ports and other facilities is generally believed to be the most possible one.¹¹ Such major arms acquisitions are also believed to have been funded from Myanmar's illicit drug trade that has been conservatively estimated to be over \$ 1 billion per annum. Controlled mainly by Kokang and Wa ethnic Chinese in Upper Myanmar, it has particularly flourished following the formal legalization of their border trade since 1989. This expanding drug trade has also, as a consequence, led to spread of small arms, rise in mafia power and crime rates and has created a powerful parallel economy in Myanmar's bordering China areas.

But whatever be its sources or implications, these six years of military alliance have, at the least, resulted in an unprecedented weaponisation of Myanmar. Also, with a stronger regime in Yangon, it has virtually spelled terror for all rebel movements, with Karens having fled to Thailand and over 170,000 Rohingyas being refugees in Bangladesh. According to *Military Balance* (London), there have been shocking increases in SLORC's defence expenditures much of which has apparently gone towards large-scale arms acquisitions from China. (See Table 1)

Table 1 : Militarising Myanmar

	1987-88	1994-95	%age increase
Myanmar's GDP	\$ 8.2 bn	\$ 13.0 bn	54 per cent
Defence Budget	\$ 0.283 bn	\$ 1.4 bn	400 per cent
Armed Forces	186,000	286,000	58.5 per cent

Thus, whereas over the last seven years Myanmar's defence expenditures have increased by over 400 percent, its armed forces manpower and its Gross Domestic Production during the same period have increased only by 58.5 and 54 per cent. This means that much of these additional defence allocations have been made for purchasing of large-scale Chinese weapons. But analysts also like to emphasise that Myanmar's dependence on China goes far beyond these arms acquisitions. They believe that SLORC also depends on China for advice on diplomacy and internal security as well. And this has far more dubious implications than what has been generally highlighted by various studies.

CHINA'S MONROE DOCTRINE FOR ASIA

Today, there is greater documentary evidence available to support these debates about the possibilities of Myanmar emerging as China's strategic outpost obtaining it access and operational reach into the Indian Ocean thereby

facilitating China's control over the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea and enhancing its power projections in whole of southern Asia in the years to come. Keeping in mind the relative uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific, there have even been talks about how these expansionist policies of China might eventually give birth to a new Chinese Monroe doctrine for Asia.

As far back as on September 2, 1985 *Beijing Review* had published an article entitled "Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion". Written by former Vice-Minister for Communications Pan Qi, the article had outlined the possibilities for using Myanmar as an outlet into the Indian Ocean.¹² This was soon followed by China's intrusion into the Spratly group of islands and China's presence there has continued to be a major irritant till date. But most important of all, on February 25, 1992 the National Peoples' Congress passed the Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone formally legalizing China's sovereignty over a waterbody of about 3 million sq.kms extending its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to cover whole of the South China Sea. No doubt, therefore, that contrary to the general post-Cold War trends of disarmament and arms control, this region shows a sharp increase in its rate of weapons acquisitions.

Similarly, in July 1994 another article in a semi-official magazine called *Shindian* claimed that over 800,000 sq.kms of China's maritime territory has been illegally delineated by countries like Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam into their own respective domains. Entitled, "The Aviation Dream of the Chinese People", the article accused these countries of drilling over 120 wells within Chinese territory and presented half-a-dozen justifications making out a strong case for China building its own aircraft carriers.¹³ More recently, in October (1994), the US aircraft Carrier USS Kitty Hawk was involved in a three-day encounter with a Chinese *Han* class submarine in the Yellow Sea which Pentagon regards to be a clear indicator of China's expansionist ambitions.¹⁴ And it is in this context that China's military ties with and activities in Myanmar assume such great strategic significance.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

According to available indicators, having lost its 'China Card' of the Cold War years, the pragmatic leadership today seems actively involved in building China first as a regional power in Asia. Not for nothing Australia's national security White Paper for year 1994, entitled *Defending Australia*, describes not Russia, Japan, India or Indonesia but China as "the most powerful new influence" in Asia.¹⁵

Neighbouring countries have been watching this Chinese inserted

uncertainties with fear and unease. Through Myanmar, China has also been accused of attempting to revive the famous "Golden Triangle" that accounts for roughly 60 per cent of world's opium trade.¹⁶ But more than these arms supplies and drug trafficking, it is China's naval build-up in this area that has been a greater cause for alarm. Five new ports have been constructed along Myanmar's coast, from Victoria Point in the south to Sittwe in the northern Arakan state, all using Chinese participation and aid.¹⁷ Moreover, apart from these dredging of port and expanding dockyards, China has often been accused of building a major naval base off the southern Myanmar coast.¹⁸

In late 1992, a western spy satellite had detected a new, 150 feet antenna used for signals intelligence at a naval base on Cocos Island, next to India's Andamans island chain. Suspicion that this equipment was being operated by Chinese technicians has led to angry protests. Myanmar, it is believed, allows China to monitor this sensitive maritime region which apart from its sea-bed resources also constitutes a major waterway for much of Asia's sea-borne trade.¹⁹ More recently, intelligence reports indicate that China is pressing Myanmar to allow it access to not just to Cocos island but also to two other strategically located listening posts: Ramree island south of Sittwe off the coast of the Arakan state; and, an island off Tenasserin state in south.²⁰ Viewed in this context of China's post-Deng transition being far from certain all this has a direct bearing on the security and peace of this entire region, including India.

INDIA'S SECURITY

Spread of small arms, menace of drug trade infiltrating across our borders, onslaught of refugees, insurgencies, and fear of foreign naval build-up in the Bay of Bengal are the five primary threats that emanate from this increasing Chinese indulgence with Myanmar. And this has the potential to affect peace and stability of not only India, but of the entire Southern Asian region as well. At the least, this Sino-Myanmar axis is bound to lead to military build-up amongst other regional powers like Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, or Indonesia which again portends only more uncertainty and tension in this area.

As regards India, for reasons of geography and history, New Delhi has been traditionally preoccupied with defending its northwestern borders and has been generally criticised for neglecting much of its northeast beyond Assam. India shares long and mountainous borders with both China and Myanmar and from time to time insurgents from India's northeast states have been operating from across these countries. Secondly, having been formulated under the Nehruvian influence, India's foreign policy has been guided, all these years by high moral principles rather than narrow national security considerations. As

a result, for month after month, when in Yangon the domestic democratic forces were themselves gearing up for conciliation, Indian government had continued to neglect ground realities in Myanmar. But gradually, this security consideration has finally started making an impact on our foreign policy makers and a pragmatic approach can already be seen on our Sino-Indian front. But much will also depend on China's own post-Deng transition and for many, the hawkish nationalist forces, especially in the military, have already emerged far too influential in the decision making in China.

Last August (1994), Indian Coast Guards had intercepted and captured three mysterious Chinese trawlers namely DA YUAN-111, 112 and 114 with 55 crew members on board near southeast of Norcondam island in the Andaman seas. On being intercepted the trawlers first made an abortive attempt to escape but surrendered when challenged by the Coast Guard ship which opened fire. What raised suspicions was the fact that the weather was not at all rough during that time and there was no reason for these trawlers to have strayed into unknown waters and yet that was how the Chinese explained their position. It was also later reported that one of these ships, Yan See Han 014, was equipped with modern electronic monitoring gear but nothing on this was reported in Indian press.²¹ Despite apparent media attention that this incident had attracted, the Government of India decided to play it down and in keeping with the spirit of improving Sino-Indian ties these trawlers and their crews were silently released on November 20, 1994.

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

'Constructive Engagement' has clearly emerged as the post-Cold War *mantra* for improving bi-lateral relations and India has made its own share of efforts towards building stronger ties with both China and Myanmar. Starting with Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to Beijing our relations with China have steadily improved and apart from signing a pact on "the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control" in October 1993 the two countries have now started cooperating even in sensitive areas and China has recently agreed to a "commercial contract" for supplying enriched uranium fuel for our Tarapur Atomic Power station.²²

With Myanmar, for long time India had continued to stand by its support to democratic movements which was fine as a moral policy but did not have much to offer in terms of India's security interests. For long, many pragmatic studies also continued to argue against any "constructive engagement" with Myanmar saying that any such attempts will only further allow the military junta to continue with their repressive policies and only further delay democracy in Myanmar. But considering that SLORC was there to stay and that it was not the first neighbouring country to be so ruled by a military regime, there

has taken place a gradual shift in the thinking of India's foreign policy circles.

In March 1993, following the then foreign secretary J.N. Dixit's visit to Yangon serious attempts have been made from both sides at improving relations between these two countries. August 1993 saw a visit by the Director-General of their foreign ministry and visits of the inter-ministerial delegations.²³ Keeping in the same spirit, a three-member delegation from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, led by its Director, visited Myanmar in November 1994. After their week-long visit, the team came to the conclusions that through Myanmar, China was fast emerging as an active player in the Indian Ocean and, in the least, China can be expected to have "a permanent presence" in the Bay of Bengal in the next ten years. The team suggested that constructive engagement was the best option available to India for improving its relations with both China and Myanmar.²⁴

CONCLUSION

Contrary to popular interpretations, with the end of the Cold War era, the significance of oceans, both in terms of security strategies and economic interdependence, has heightened.²⁵ Following the agreements on strategic nuclear stockpiles (START I and II), by the year 2003, 60 per cent of world's strategic nuclear arsenals will be sea based. Also the focus of the post-Cold War maritime activity has shifted from the Atlantic-Pacific to the Pacific-Indian Ocean, that is from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to the northern tip of Japan. And this makes India's security sphere as the center of gravity where in future all these great powers, including China, will be vying to consolidate their reach and influence.

Now with these clear indicators of China's expanding navy being in position of obtaining access to the Indian Ocean, both from our west and from our east, the Sino-Pak-Myanmar axis shall continue to be an area of great concern. Considering that China also has a foothold in Sri Lanka and that Beijing's new "offshore" defence strategies are aimed at building China as a great military power by the middle of twenty-first century, India is likely to find itself encircled, though such projections may not seem very impressive unless seen in a long-term perspective. But isn't it about time when India should finally be preparing for itself a long-term national security policy perspective?


NOTES

1. Li Peng has the distinction of being only the fourth head of state/government to visit SLORC in its last six years' of military rule apart from being the highest Chinese official so far to visit Myanmar. Making an important statement on this occasion, Li declined to make any

comment on Aung San Suu Kyi and said that China regards this as an "internal affair" of Myanmar and that it was for the SLORC to decide the matter. He was also critical of western campaign on Yangon's human rights record and declared that "It is not permissible for any one to use human rights issues to interfere in another country's internal affairs." *Times of India*, 29 December, 1994.

2. Myanmar turns to China for Arms Buys and Embargo", *Defence News*, December 20, 1993; "Myanmar signs another pact for \$ 400 million with China", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 20, 1994, p.3.
3. *Thailand and Burma, Country Report No.1, 1993*, (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), p.31.
4. Bertil Lintner, "Burma and its neighbours", *China Report*, Vol.28 No.3 (July-September 1992), p.227.
5. Mya Maung, "On the Road to Mandalay: A Cast Study of the Sinonisation of Upper Burma". *Asian Survey*, Vol.xxxiv No.5 (May 1994), p.448.
6. Baladas Ghoshal, "Trends in China-Burma Relations", *China Report*, Vol.30 No.2 (April-June, 1994), p.187.
7. Ross H. Munro, "The Asian Interior: China's Waxing Spheres of Influence", *Orbis*, Fall 1994, p.589.
8. Bertil Lintner, "Enter the Dragon", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 22, 1994, p.23.
9. Bertil Lintner, "Rangoon's Rubicon: Infrastructure aid tightens Peking's Control", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 11, 1993, p.28.
10. Andre Et Louis Boucaud, "Pekin-Rangoun, nouvel axe asiatique", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, (Paris), 16 May, 1993.
11. William Ashton, "Chinese Naval Base: Many Rumours, Few Facts", *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, June-July, 1993, p.25.
12. n.7, p.590.
13. Nayan Chanda, "China: Aiming High", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 20, 1994, p.14.
14. Barbara Starr, "Han Incident proof of China's naval ambitions", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 7, 1995, p.5.
15. John McBeth, "Friend or Foe: Australia now sees Indonesia as ally, China as threat", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 15, 1994, p.18.
16. Mya Maung, "On the Road to Mandalay: A case study of the Sinonisation of Upper Burma". *Asian Survey*, Vol.xxxiv No.5 (May 1994), p.450.
17. John Badgley, "Myanmar in 1993: A Watershed Year", *Asian Survey*, Vol.xxxiv No.2 (February 1994), p.158.
18. "Li denies China's plans on expansion", *Times of India*, 29 December, 1994.
19. n.8, p.23.

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. "India buys enriched uranium from China", *Financial Times*, 6 January, 1995.
23. Rita Manchanda, "Reasons of State", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 6, 1993, p.12.
24. "Myanmar for closer interaction with India", *Indian Express*, 5 December, 1994.
25. C Uday Bhaskar, "Chinese Maritime Resurgence & India", *Times of India*, 20 December, 1994.



One Rank One Pension

LT GEN K K NANDA, PVSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

The officers who retired after the award of the Fourth Pay Commission have been getting half of their last pay drawn (average of last 10 months pay) as pension which is very substantially higher than their predecessors in the same rank. In fact this gap keeps increasing as we go back in time and compare it with the pensioners of the early eighties or seventies vintage. This disparity in pension is totally iniquitous.

With the Fifth Pay Commission's award on pensions coming out soon the officers who retired after January 1986 (Post Fourth Pay Commission) would also join their predecessors and will realise soon that this is very unfair and its perpetuation cannot be accepted by the retired community any more.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After Independence the Armed Forces Pay Revision Committee (AFPRC) revised the pays and pensions and drastically reduced both. There was a considerable difference of opinion among the Chairman, the Finance Minister and the Service members and it was left to the Govt. of India to decide. The rates of pensions which they accepted, w.e.f. 01 June 1953, varied from 78.5% of pay in respect of subalterns to 32.7% of pay in respect of a General.

The Third Pay Commission undertook a detailed examination, for the first time, of the pensionary benefits to the Armed Forces personnel. They suggested that the pensions must be such that they provide effective means to a serviceman to re-settle in the civilian life on retirement. But they put a rider that in view of the Government's efforts to provide alternative jobs to all retiring personnel till the age of 55, the pensions should be kept depressed. By and large nobody got an alternative job and yet the pensions were not revised. The pensioners, thus, continued to suffer hardships because of low pensions.

To solve this anomalous situation an Inter-Service Study Group named, "Study Group of Pensionary and other Terminal Benefits - Armed Forces Personnel 1982" was formed to go into the shortcomings of the then existing pensionary entitlements. They recommended many measures to alleviate

Lt General K. K. Nanda is a former Chief of Staff of Central Army Command, and has written extensively on Kashmir and other security issues.

hardships of the pensioners. In the meantime, the Fourth Pay Commission was ordered and the Govt. directed that the recommendations of the Inter-Service Study Group along with the anomalies which became evident while implementing the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission on Pensions, be examined by the Fourth Pay Commission in detail and a suitable structure suggested. They had directed that this be done for the past pensioners as well.

The Service Headquarters also recommended that the past pensioners, who retired in the same rank and had the same length of service, must get the same pension as applicable to his counter part who would retire later after January 1986 and get an enhanced pension under the new rules as accepted by the Fourth Pay Commission. The Commission did not accept this recommendation as they thought that, "it would amount to retrospective application of the revised scales of pay".

ONE RANK & ONE PENSION

The old pensioners were very unhappy with the award of the Fourth Pay Commission and started demanding 'One Rank One Pension' through their Associations. Shri V.P. Singh had also promised that if he came to power he would ensure that this was accepted. Accordingly when the National Front took over the reins of the Central Govt., he appointed a committee in 1990, the Jafa Committee, with the task of suggesting suitable norms to implement the 'One Rank One Pension' formula, but instead they found all arguments against the scheme. In fact it went, "hammer and tongs to scuttle the concept by trotting out lies like old records not available etc." They, however, recommended an adhoc, one time increase in pensions for the men. A similar scheme was also in the offing for the officers but it was forgotten with the ouster of the National Front Government.

With the continuing agitation by Ex-Servicemen, the Central Government was forced to appoint another Committee in 1991 under the Chairmanship of the erstwhile Defence Minister, Shri Sharad Pawar. It also did not accept parity in pensions between different retirees for the following reasons:-

- (a) The financial burden which would accrue was beyond the paying capacity of the Govt. of India (the Employer).
- (b) With the pensioner's ranks swelling every year and the higher expectancy of life, in due course it would be impossible to find necessary resources to meet this commitment
- (c) This would certainly have its fall out on civilian pensioners and they would, in due course, start demanding parity with the Defence pensioners.

They also felt that in view of the enormity of the financial commitment, the Government may hesitate to order future revisions of pay. This was a fairly ridiculous deduction. It could also mean that a Government under the pretext of enormous financial burden, was within its powers to freeze all wages of all its employees during its term in office. In a democratic set up no Government could dare do it for other employees because of the vote bank.

It is the job of a functioning Government to manage its resource, the financial as well as the others, in such a manner that it is in a position to meet all the legitimate commitments of its employees; past and present. 'One Rank One Pension' for the Defence Services Pensioners, because of the peculiar circumstances which have been accepted by most of the Committees, is a must and the Government has no choice but to accept it at the earliest for the reasons discussed subsequently.

ONE TIME INCREASE (OTI)

The 1991 Committee accepted that there were considerable disparities between the Defence Pensioners who retired before 1973 and those who retired afterwards. It also accepted that there was a definite requirement of special dispensation in pensions to the past retirees. Accordingly, the Government of India ordered the grant of OTI by a Government order issued on 16th March 1992, thus accepting the recommendation of the Committee. This grant of OTI was further revised on 25th February, 1994.

OTI, based on a complex formula, brought in the inevitable anomalies. It, however, was certainly a step forward and reduced the disparity to some extent but it in no way was a substitute for 'One Rank One Pension'. This has rightly been rejected by all Ex-Servicemen, individually and jointly through their Association.

SHORTAGES IN THE ARMED FORCES

The Armed Forces have been facing shortages in its officers rank for a long time in spite of the rampant unemployment in the country. The Army alone is short of 12000 officers. It is because the Services are way down on the list of choices of young men today. In the report submitted by the Armed Forces (Pay Commission) Cell to the Fifth Pay Commission, as reported in the *Hindustan Times* of 14th May 1995, it says that, "unless present policies with regard to recruitment, career span, retirement age, special benefits and compensation packages are reviewed 'only simians will find the Services attractive'."

Other than poor remunerations as compared to IAS/IFS within the Central Government Services, the poor prospects of promotions with inherent loss of prestige and power and perks which go with the status, the early retirement and with almost total absence of re-settlement facilities and poor pensions are the main factors which dissuade the young men from opting for a career in the Defence Services. The number applying for commissions in the Services is, no doubt, very large but only a very small number meets the minimum standards required to join the Services. This has naturally been worrying the concerned authorities and they have carried out a number of studies to find out the causes of this unattractiveness. It is indeed vital that the Service Headquarters, for the security of the country, bring about the right psyche, with attractive terms, to attract the young men with the right calibre and necessary potential in the leadership qualities for their officer cadre. George Washington rightly said that, "there must be some other stimulus, besides love for their country, to make men fond of the Services".

Other than the general awareness of the college students today and their clear perception of the opportunities available in different professions, there are many other factors which are beyond the scope of this Paper. The one which is a very important factor to highlight, is the attitude of the Ex-Service Officers and men towards the Army (and other Services) to which they gave their youth and the best part of their lives. Earlier in my time, before joining the IMA and soon after, the retired community always talked very proudly of the prestige they had in Service. They were a dedicated lot and invariably mentioned about their commitment to the Service and the country. They always said that you would not get the kind of pay you could get outside but recommended the Services saying that the JOY it would give you, you would not get anywhere else. While saying this they would push their chests out in pride and patriotic fervour would ooze out of their eyes appearing as a bright glow on their faces. Alas, it is not there any more.

Earlier, there was no problem of re-settlement. The ex-service community was small, the officers generally belonged to rich families and the men went back to their joint families in the villages and settled on the family land. The retirement did not bring down their living standards. This is not so now. Generally, the officers are from the middle class and those who retire early will need work to sustain themselves and to meet the educational and other needs of their growing children. The state of retired men is worse. Their ability to survive, for a short period, even in a small town without a job is very limited. A big town or a metropolis would be out of question. If they do get a job in a big place, they would be required to run two establishments; for themselves in the place of work and for their family in a small town till they are allotted a house by their employer in the Company's residential complex

which generally does not come by for most. Except the very few who manage to retire in comfort or pick up decent jobs, the rest are discouraging their children and the children of their friends etc, to join the Services. The older retirees who are now senior citizens and are without a job in any case, generally have been reduced to a state of penury. In their present state of frustration and unhappiness they will dissuade every young man to stay away from the Services. The general advice given by all and sundry is that join the Services only if you can't get in anywhere else! According to a national newspaper, "No country can afford to make its armed forces a vocation for those who seek a career elsewhere. We must attract the right quality of material to our Armed Forces because the nation cannot take the risk of handing over its security and integrity to those who are the rejects of other professions".

The Service Headquarters engaged MARG (Marketing and Research Group Private Ltd., New Delhi) to assess career preferences of young students, bright and the others, and the reasons for their choices. The results as reported in various English daily newspapers amount to:-

- (a) The Armed Forces appear seventh in the list of priority of the young students.
- (b) Only less than 10 per cent of the parents of the students would like them to join the Services.
- (c) Almost 75 per cent of the serving community would not like their wards to join the Services.
- (d) The young Girls who in the fifties would love to marry the smart, and handsome men in uniform, would not, except for very few, want to go anywhere near them now. Most of the parents of these few even would not want the uniformed men as their sons-in-law.

The main reasons of this unattractiveness of the Services in the order of priority are, low pay and allowances, limited chances of promotion, extremely hard life, frequent postings resulting in uprooting of the family, early retirement with low pensions and no guarantee by the Government for alternative employment.

CONCLUSION

Soon after Independence the Armed Forces had an edge over the other Central Government Services both in pay and allowances and pensions which has since been fully reversed. This has to be restored immediately. This edge exists in the British as well as U.S. Defence Forces as also in most other nations' Defence Services.

'One Rank One Pension' is the minimum acceptable requirement of the Ex-Service Community now and after the acceptance of the Fifth Pay Commission's Report. There would be a financial constraint but money for the enhanced Pensions has to be found from the kitty even if it means depressing the pays of the serving community a little, from the scales which Government would be ready to accept after the submission of the Report of the Fifth Pay Commission.

The retired men and officers are the best resource available to the Services to do their public relations (PR) work. If they are happy and content and showed pride in their past association with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, they will be able to revive the interest of the young men, in uniform again and the Services will benefit by getting the right number of men, with the desired qualities and necessary potential of a good leader.

ADVERTISEMENT RATES IN THE USI JOURNAL

Outer Cover Page (per issue)	Rs. 3,500/-
Four consecutive outer covers (four issues)	Rs. 12,000/-
Inner Cover Page (per issue)	Rs. 3,000/-
Four consecutive inner covers (four issues)	Rs. 10,000/-
Full Page (inside) per issue	Rs. 2,500/-
Full Page (inside) four issues	Rs. 8,000/-
Half Page (inside) per issue	Rs. 1,500/-
Half Page (inside) four issues	Rs. 5,000/-

Type size of advertisement page

11.5 cm X 20 cm

Screen for half tones

80

Published quarterly in April, July, October and January

Florence Nightingales of Our Armed Forces

BRIGADIER A S APTE (RETD)

This is the story of Archana, Benzy, Karmina, Paramjit, Ruma, Saroj, Usha... and hundreds more tending to the sick and the wounded in the hospitals of our Armed Forces from Kutch to Kohima and Lakshadweep to Leh, where they can be seen going about their myriad duties silently, efficiently and with total dedication, making no distinction between jawan and general; everyone under their care is a VIP - Very Important Patient. That is the impression I have been carrying ever since I got to know some of them for the first time ever, and, incredibly, some thirteen years after my retirement! Having never been sick throughout my soldiering days and even several years thereafter, I had, till then, known next to nothing about these Florence Nightingales of the Military Nursing Service (MNS), an indispensable limb of our Armed Forces whose motto is 'Service with a smile'. Hopefully, that mental picture I have been carrying, will remain unchanged always.

I don't think I am alone in my earlier ignorance of these female soldiers in uniform. Indeed, most servicemen neither have any opportunity nor any particular reason to go out of their way to acquaint themselves with these back-stage members of the MNS. After all, only the healthy and physically fit can enter the armed forces, and once there, the active military routine keeps them that way, and hence, away from hospitals till wounded in war or injured in peace. Not unexpectedly, therefore, a great majority of indoor patients are mostly either the aged ex-servicemen, their families or the aged parents of the servicemen. No wonder then that I took no notice of the MNS till Dame Destiny decreed that age had finally overtaken me and it was time I got acquainted with the 'hospitality' of these unarmed soldiers.

Did I say 'unarmed'? Wrong! Though not trained in the use of weapons, no one need think that they are unarmed. No, it's not the sharp needle of the 'Needle Brigade' I am talking about but the human touch - so rare in today's world - which they direct not at the enemy but at our own troops, not to kill, but to cure! That, indeed, is the charm of their 'arm'. I sincerely hope that they will never forsake their weapon.

Whether the members of the MNS are nurses first and ladies afterwards

Brigadier A.S. Apte writes frequently in newspapers, magazines, and professional journals on issues concerning defence forces.

or the other way round, they are all soldiers nevertheless as was brought home in an amusing incident to which I was a witness some 27 years ago while posted at Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw's Eastern Army Headquarters at Calcutta. It was his practice to address all new arrivals in the Eastern Theatre within a couple of months of their reporting so as to convey his mind directly. Soon, I too found myself in his audience. Though his down-to-earth pep-talk concerned itself primarily with the serious business of soldiering under his command, it was also liberally sprinkled with spicy 'soldierly' humour as was his wont. Presently, about to conclude, he stopped abruptly, appearing as if he did not believe in what he saw, looked mischievously deep into the eyes of the MNS colonel in the front row, and boomed, tongue-in-cheek, "I just realised that I have a lady officer in my audience this morning and I should not have said a lot many things,... but ...but ... Miss MacGregor! I am afraid you are a soldier first!". Through these words, the Field Marshal, in his usual inimitable manner, had stressed the letter 'M' in the MNS!

His expectations were not misplaced, for, just four years ago, I was a witness to a smart passing-out parade of the MNS probationers, followed by an extremely delightful evening at their mess to celebrate the Silver Jubilee of their Training School. Both the functions were organised and executed with perfect military precision and efficiency which did credit not only to the students but more so to the 'soldierly' administration of the school's staff.

Initially, from the young probationers, subalterns and captains who had taken care of me both in the ICU and the Ward, and later from some serving and retired captains, majors and colonels, I was able to build a fuller picture of the MNS. I learnt a lot about their personal lives, daily routine and the excellent training imparted in the dozen nursing schools attached to different military hospitals in the country. Since everything has two sides and the MNS is no exception, I also learnt about some of their problems arising, in my view, from some lacunae somewhere in the chain of administration. Later, I was able to spot some through the tales of woe narrated to me by some members of the MNS. Apart from the bureaucratic attitudes which caused these problems, I also got the impression that some of the blame would have to go to the hospital authorities and to the apathy and/or weakness/disinterest of some of their own officers who, after rising above the rank of major, forever bid good-bye to active nursing and switch over to desk work to become pen-pushing female 'babus'! This apathy, I have no doubt, springs mainly from the quest of some of them for personal advancement in their military rank which results in own welfare before that of the juniors they boss over - Yes! That's the right word, for, 'command' has sacred connotation in the armed forces.

But more about this later; for the present, I would like to dwell on the

brighter aspects of the MNS based entirely on my personal experience through some true human interest episodes, which, I have no doubts, are representative of the noble side of the members of the MNS. I could narrate many but, for brevity, I shall confine only to a few that stand out in my mind.

After a chat with the Principal Tutor of the Nursing School attached to a military hospital as also with some of her students who were on duty in the ICU and the Ward, it was evident that their devotion to duty sprang from their excellent training not only in their professional skills in nursing but also in their human side which must form an inseparable aspect of a nurse's being. Patience, for instance, was one quality which I happened to notice quite often. I remember one instance when a particularly mild subaltern in whom I had found an 'attentive' audience for my dreary discourse on the apparant paradox of simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Almighty. She was polite enough to feign interest while at the same time mentally planning her escape! Confined to bed all the time, I suppose it was natural for me to grab every opportunity to hold on to anyone who came near me and keep him/her engaged in an unending chat!

Then there was that one with a delightful sense of humour. One day, the injection she gave me in my already prick-riddled buttock, caused much pain right down the length of my leg. "You are hurting me, Beti!", I wailed. Noticing my agony, she murmured : "That's surprising! The needle was nowhere near your sciatica!" When I wanted to know what that was supposed to mean, she massaged the spot vigorously and said: "Never mind, Sir! But I do think you must be my first patient with two sciatic nerves in each leg!". Her effort to keep a straight face hardly succeeded, for, the mischief behind that mask was all too visible.

On the bed next to mine in the ICU was a jawan with a head injury. He was getting frequent bouts of vomiting during one of which he mucked up the uniform of the attending probationer. Without batting an eyelid and managing all by herself, the youngster continued to nurse him with soothing words and generally 'mothering' him while cleaning him up till he fell asleep. When I expressed my appreciation at her competence as also my distress at the sight of her soiled uniform, she summed up her noble work in these terse but cogent words : "Yes Sir! The job, at times, can indeed be dirty, but, it's a clean profession!". The original Florence Nightingale would be mighty pleased if she could hear her profound philosophy. So would Mother Teresa.

The MNS youngsters see only misery and pain all the time. Yet, in return, they offer cheer and comfort. This one single aspect of their dreary routine calls for a well-deserved pat on their backs. Having said the foregoing in their praise, I would now like to spotlight a bit of the other side of the picture which did not escape my eye.

"MNS officers are commissioned officers and are entitled to salutes in terms of Army Orders 501/63 in the same manner as other commissioned officers. In uniform they are required to salute service officers senior to them and return the salute of junior officers and soldiers at all levels. All ranks are encouraged to pay formal courtesies as per Regulations of Service". This I quote from a D.O. letter addressed to me from a Lieutenant General, who, in June 1989, was the DG (Org & Pers) in the Army Headquarters. His letter was in response to mine in which I had conveyed my observation that I had never seen any junior male serviceman saluting an MNS officer even at the first encounter in the morning! Not even a sepoy! My observation was confirmed by all the MNS officers I spoke to. No one is unreasonable so as to expect saluting and counter-saluting every few minutes, but why forget this basic courtesy at least at the beginning of the day with the prescribed greeting? Non-observance of it strikes at the very root of the foundation of the Armed Forces discipline! Obviously, there is a big chasm between the precept and the practice, the reason for which could be summed up in just two words: 'Male chauvinism' traditionally ingrained in our men. Even the lady doctors of the Army Medical Corps, I observe, are saluted by the other ranks with much reluctance. Our men must be made to realise that it is not the man or the woman but the officer whom they salute. The ideal point for this indoctrination is the training centres of the units of the three services. Now that the doors of the armed forces have been thrown open to women in spheres other than medicine and nursing, this matter assumes even greater importance.

Members of the MNS were granted commissioned rank in 1958. I do not know the precise reason for this but it is not difficult to guess it either. I believe that this highly thoughtful measure could have been introduced mainly to accord a status to this noble profession, which, at least in India, is still looked down upon as something inferior and not to be taken up by girls from 'good families', and also to thwart the possibility of undesirable advances and improper behaviour by male patients as well as male staff of the hospital. Both reasons are laudable.

No one can deny that these back-stage girls of the MNS are as valuable to the armed forces as the frontline soldiers, no less. And yet, unfair and unjust disparity exists in the payscales of the officers of the MNS in relation to those of the officers of the rest of the armed forces. Is not meticulous implementation, follow-up and after-care by the nursing officers as important as the work of the doctors who examine, diagnose and prescribe the treatment? Yet, rank for rank, the MNS officers' salary, perks and working schedules are inferior to those of the other officers including those of the AMC. A captain is a captain is a captain, whether from the armoured corps, the education corps, the supply corps, the accounts branch of the air force, the medical corps or the nursing

service. If that is not to be so, then the government should create a new nomenclature for the MNS rank structure, but then will it not defeat the very purpose for which the MNS were granted commissioned ranks as mentioned earlier?

Our armed forces consist of soldiers who fight as well as those who provide support to the 'fighters' in a variety of ways. Indeed, in the modern warfare, the frontline soldier will not last even a day if this support is withdrawn. These supporting personnel, although miles behind the battle line, get exactly the same pay and allowances, rank for rank as the frontline infantrymen who face the enemy's bullets and bayonets. Even the officers of the non-combatant static establishments such as the Defence R&D and Quality Control, wear exactly the same uniform, badges of rank and even the medal ribbons like the rest of the armed forces officers and enjoy the same pay and even better perks! Yet, they never ever see a battle-field in their lifetime, always live in large towns or cities, enjoy long tenures - sometimes longer than five years - at each station, face far fewer transfers and associated problems, never face separation from their families, have continuity in their children's education and can rise right upto the rank of lieutenant general. I personally know of at least one officer of one such establishment who lived in the same house in the same station from the time he was a captain till he retired as a brigadier! Indeed, these officers get the best of both the worlds; for all appearances, they are uniformed officers (though they wear their uniforms only once a week so as to remind themselves that they too are 'soldiers'! Ha!) but in actual practice they are nothing but civilians. But more about this in a separate article, later.

Why then did the Third and the Fourth Pay Commissions single out only the MNS for discrimination in pay and perks? The girls who join the MNS have as good an educational background as the boys who join the NDA (10+2 with physics, chemistry, biology and maths) and they too undergo a three-year professional diploma course at one of the dozen military schools of nursing (or a four-year degree course at the College of Military Nursing at Pune). There is absolutely no reason why they should be subject to discrimination. The Third Pay Commission had unfairly related the service conditions and the salary scales of the MNS to those of the civilian nurses! This kind of mindless comparison deserved nothing but outright condemnation on several counts: Firstly, the military nurses are under the Army Act and cannot form a union and indulge in strikes; secondly, unlike their civilian counterparts, they are constantly transferred throughout the length and the breadth of the country just like the rest of the officers of our armed forces. We find them even in Ladakh! Thirdly, the military nurses have a longer workday, fewer off days (only three in a month inclusive of sundays and holidays) and no overtime pay like the civilian nurses. They also do not get any special allowance for night duties (12

hours at a stretch). Strangely, it never occurred to that Pay Commission to compare the disproportionately smaller earnings of the AMC doctors with the enormous income of the civilian medicos!

The Fourth Pay Commission's view that the entry qualification, training, duties and responsibilities of the MNS officers do not justify parity with the General List officers is utterly illogical and altogether unjust. The MNS officers have also been denied the so-called 'rank pay' (whatever that means) to which the other officers are entitled. This has caused a disparity in the basic salary to the extent of Rs 300 pm at the level of captain and Rs 1300 pm at the level of brigadier. 'Same rank, same pay' is what is needed.

The same is the case with the allowances. Outfit allowance for the MNS is Rs 1000 as against Rs 3000 for the others even though the MNS too have to maintain eight types of uniforms of which the white ones need frequent replacement. Ironically, the non-combatant officers of the Defence Research & Development Organization and the Defence Quality Control Organization, who, as mentioned earlier, wear their working uniform only once a week (so that the CDA does not forget them?), and perhaps never have to wear their other types of uniforms, enjoy the same scale of the outfit allowance as the rest of the service officers! The Kit Maintenance Allowance for the MNS is Rs 50 - half of what the others get. Has anyone gone into how much it costs to make new uniforms on transfer from one service to another? Strangely, irrespective of rank (ie Lt to maj gen), the transfer grant for the MNS is at the scale granted to the juniormost rank of the other officers i.e. those drawing Rs 2800 pm. Married MNS officers are denied the Separation Allowance (Rs 140 pm) to which all the others - even the lady officers of the AMC - are entitled. Only 30 per cent of the married nurses are allowed married accommodation whereas the scale for the others is 100 per cent. Why?

Undoubtedly, 'nursing' is the trade of the MNS officers just like supplying rations is the trade of the ASC officers or keeping accounts is the trade of the Accounts Branch officers of the IAF or treating patients is the trade of the AMC doctors, but why single out the MNS by stressing their trade and underplaying the fact that they are officers too? High time the Army HQ told the civilian agencies like the railways and the airlines to correct their military tariff manuals which speak of them as nurses instead of nursing officers. There is a good reason why. The other day, a MNS major called on me to narrate her distressing story in this regard. So what if the military travel regulations grant the families of the MNS officers certain travel concessions? The Railways could n't care less; they would only abide by what their own manuals say in this regard, would n't they? The South Central Railway clerk brusquely dismissed the major by telling her that Army's TR 181(b) & 182(b) notwithstanding, he would only adhere to his railway's Military Tariff No. 6, Vol I, Appx 11/2,

page 59, Item 17, in force from 1 Aug 1986, which refers to the members of the MNS as nurses and not as nursing officers.

If the MNS officers are gazetted officers in the true sense, for, a gazette notification is indeed issued in respect of their commissioning, promotion, extension of service as also release and retirement like the rest of the armed forces officers, then why is it that like the other Class I officers, they are not authorised to attest/countersign documents such as certificates? I understand that even a major general of the MNS has no such power while a newly commissioned second lieutenant has! And yet, no one seems to know the written rule for this discrimination!

I discovered that the MNS officers have no power to punish anyone. As a result of this, perhaps, the MNS officers - whatever their rank - seem to have developed an apathy towards certain aspects of administration. Strangely, by and large, most of them - even colonels and brigadiers - do not seem to know that they ARE indeed subject to the Army Act; otherwise, why should they make statements like: 'it would be in the interest of the MNS if the Service were brought under the Army Act'? Since every offence is so 'manoeuvred' as to be covered under Section 39 (absence without leave) or Section 63 (violation of good order and military discipline), they seem to have formed the impression that only these two sections are 'informally' applicable to them! If there is no problem in applying the Army Act wholly to the lady officers of the AMC there is no reason why the MNS should be made an exception, especially now that the doors of the armed forces have been thrown open to women in the general category.

Having got to know some 20-25 youngsters - some of them quite well - on account of my hospitalisation in 1989 as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this article, I chanced meeting many of them during my subsequent monthly visits to the hospital for periodical check-ups. I had attended their passing out parade in February that year and so I was surprised to see them still in the same hospital. Their posting orders had not come even after as long as six months! After much prodding, some of the youngsters tearfully opened up: "We don't know what is going on, Sir! No one tells us anything. It is rumoured that we are 'surplus'!". What do you mean?", I asked, "How can such a thing ever happen? Are you at least getting your salary?". I was shocked to hear their reply: "No Sir! We don't. Our Probationer's stipend too has been stopped as we are now officers. We have been shifted from the Probationers' Mess to the Nursing Officers' Mess and we have to pay for everything. We don't know how to cope up!".

"But how do you manage?", I asked, "Our parents, Sir, are now

maintaining us!". That did it! These youngsters had looked after me well. Should n't I reciprocate in return? The School's Principal, a lieutenant colonel, simply shrugged her shoulders and wailed: "After their commissioning they are no longer under me, Sir! Officially, I cannot do anything for them although I have all my sympathy for them". The Principal Matron under whose charge they were now, made a long face and expressed her sorrow. She regretted that the matter was beyond her. The hospital commandant, a brigadier, informed me that this was a matter concerning MNS administration; he had nothing to do with it. I felt very angry. If these people in power could do nothing, what could I - a chairless, powerless, obscure ex-serviceman - do?

By now eight months had passed since the girls had become 'commissioned' officers - in name only! Their morale, I could see, was zero, to put it mildly. I thought I should apprise the Supreme Commander (The President of India), for the matter concerned all the three services, although, of course, it is the Army HQ (AG's Branch) that deals with everything concerning the MNS - recruitment, training, commissioning, postings, promotions, discipline, release, retirement, ... et al. The MNS has no 'Godfather' ie, the institution of the Colonel Commandant to whom the MNS officers may approach informally when in distress. Not unexpectedly, the Supreme Commander did not even see my letter and his secretariat simply 'post-officed' it to the Defence Ministry, not right away, but four months later, as I observed from a shabbily typed acknowledgement on stationery unworthy of the President's office. The Defence Ministry, in turn, routed it to the MNS HQ - the very office which had defaulted in committing the monumental blunder in the intake-wastage equation for the year! the circle was now complete.

I had, of course, anticipated that writing to the Supreme Commander would be futile, for, his interest in the men and women he 'commands' (!) or once commanded, ends at the ceremonial level. For this reason, I had also written simultaneously to one of my course mates (IMA, 1946 batch), who, after his retirement as an army commander, was, at that time, gracing a gubernatorial throne.

In my letter, I wrote "Just imagine how you and I would have felt had we been told soon after our commissioning ceremony that we were surplus?" I wrote a similar letter to the Defence Secretary a product of the IAS Training establishment at Mussouri. No reply was expected from the worthy bureaucrat and none came but my coursemate did not let me down. Without going into all the details, suffice it to say that within a fortnight, not only the commissioning notification was issued by the Government but the Adjutant General wrote to me informing me about it and also telling me that he had released a few lakh rupees for the interest-free loan to the girls to tide them over the interim period

as the CDA would take 3-4 months before commencement of their monthly salaries. I had never felt happier as I did that day, for, I had now paid back my debt to those youngsters for all they had done for me while I was under their care.

The poor arithmetic at the MNS HQ and the callous attitude of the concerned Defence Ministry officials had caused a surplus of almost 300 nurses in that year! Naturally, the next year had to be a non-recruitment year with the consequence that each of the dozen schools which ordinarily had a hundred or so students on their rolls at any given time, now had as few as half-a-dozen! One is expected to learn from the past mistakes but, astonishingly, the MNS now found itself deficient of some 400 nurses which resulted in stopping of all releases, much to the anguish of some nurses who had applied for release on compassionate grounds. I would not have known this but for the fact that one such nursing officer who was serving in a far off air force hospital came to meet me one day, I had never met her but she had heard about me. I felt flattered but I told her that my kind-hearted coursemate who had helped the young nursing officers on an earlier occasion was out of the country and, as for myself, I knew no one who would listen to me and added that I had retired 18 years ago. But her story sounded true and moved me enough to promise her that I would at least make a try. I was lucky once again, for in General Rodrigues, the then Army Chief, to whom I had sent an S-O-S on behalf of this young mother of two tiny tots, I found another kind-hearted person. It was solely on account of him that her release, which was hanging fire for nearly two years, came within six weeks of my request.

I mention this episode for a good reason: it highlights a couple of sordid facts about the mindless, or, shall I say, mean-minded procedures adopted by the Defence Ministry with regard to the continuance of the MNS officers in service after their marriage. To be eligible for this privilege, the MNS officers, quite unlike the lady officers of the AMC, are required to apply for extension - two years at a time. This condition intrinsically and unambiguously implies their services officially cease on the date of their marriage. If that be so, the question of keeping them guessing endlessly by neither giving them the extension in time nor issuing their release/retirement orders forthwith should not arise as actually happened in the instance just cited. Let me add that it was not an exception, for, there are many others too in the same boat. To me, the basic reason for this state of affairs seems to be the lack of will at the level of the MNS Chief and the DGMS (Army) to question or challenge the indecision on the part of the Defence Ministry officials.

In the absence of timely action with regard to further extension, the CDA stops the salary of those who are thus affected. Ironically, even while the

official extension (which may or may not come) is awaited, they are forced to continue unofficially but to be eligible for salary, they must certify month after month that they actually served during the preceding month after which the CDA takes no less than three months to release the salary for the due month! As mentioned earlier, this certificate cannot be attested by the Matron but by the OC Hospital! This strange rule is nothing short of humiliation and insult as it reduces a commissioned officer to a 'bonded' daily wage earner! The effect of such treatment on the morale and, hence, the quality of work of the affected MNS officers can well be imagined. In his reply to my D.O. letter, the Adjutant General wrote on 12 March 92: "You have, no doubt, raised certain general issues regarding terms and service conditions of the MNS officers. I have discussed this aspect with the COAS and would get at them at the earliest to give the MNS officers their due redress. Undoubtedly, interests of both individuals and service have to be catered for ... Interest being taken by you in matters regarding the service and allied matters is indeed laudable ... I would welcome any suggestions or observations for attention". I wrote back saying that I would send him a copy of my article when it is ready; it would be a comprehensive article.

There is an urgent need to frame rules regarding marriage of MNS officers to JCOs and ORs. Absence of these gives rise to practical problems as well as highly embarrassing situations. Such husbands cannot obviously be invited to an officers' mess or such MNS officers cannot be allotted married accommodation either in the officers' enclave or other ranks' family quarters for obvious reasons. In the grand old days, a young officer had not only to seek his commanding officer's permission before he could marry but the prospective bride had to be 'approved' by him. Today, no one goes to that extent but there is no doubt that this golden rule needs to be applied to the MNS officers who must be asked to retire if they marry any serviceman or an ex-serviceman who is/was not a commissioned officer, or marry a civilian whose status is doubtful. However, having said this, I would like to spotlight a paradox in this regard. A male service officer's wife can be an unsophisticated or illiterate villager, a steno-typist, a receptionist, a movie extra, a teacher, a telephone operator or whatever; she is accepted in his social circle including the mess. Therefore, the question arises as to why the MNS officer's civilian spouse of undefinable status (eg: a small businessman or a shopkeeper) or a clerk should not be acceptable in the officers' mess. This matter deserves serious attention and strict rules regarding it need to be framed right away.

Theoretically, the MNS officers are on par with the other officers in so far as the type of accommodation is concerned, but the practice is very different, for, irrespective of their rank (Lt to Lt col) they get the same type of accommodation and that too inferior to that of the other officers. The married captain from the

Air Force hospital I mentioned earlier rightly declined the warrant officers' accommodation offered to her (and her colleague). She was curtly told : "Commissioned or not, gazetted or not, you are inferior even to our warrant officers and lower in status...". Most AMC officers too harbour similar thoughts about the MNS and that is shameful, I think. It is exceptional for the AMC officers' Mess to invite the MNS officers to their social gatherings and parties. I was surprised to learn that a principal matron - a full colonel - has to go abegging for suitable transport to perform an official duty while some senior AMC officers' wives merrily use their husband's staff cars for their kitty parties and shopping sprees; the MNS colonel has to make do with a Shaktiman lorry which any self-respecting colonel, MNS or AMC, would indignantly refuse.

Such incidents bring to my mind the need for introducing the institution of the 'Colonel Commandant' for the MNS. I am one of those who is not overly enamoured by some of our ancient traditions which, having served their purpose, have now outlived their utility. Indeed, one such tradition - that of the Colonel Commandant - has its utility confined only to the holder of that decoration (as brought out by me in my article on the subject in the USI Journal Jul-Sep 1987 issue). Sadly, however, the Air Force and the Navy too have blindly aped the Army in this respect without any justification. Therefore, if the institution must continue, why not give the 'benefit' to the MNS too? In his D.O. reply to my letter, the then Adjutant General wrote: "Your suggestion regarding appointment of a colonel commandant for the MNS is a very good idea. However, I do not know whether an outsider would be appropriate. It may unnecessarily alienate the Medical hierarchy and thereby erode the beneficial impact. However, this is purely an initial reaction and we would examine all the pros and cons". That was three years ago when after much thought, I had suggested that a retired Adjutant General should be appointed as a colonel commandant of the MNS. I had very good reason to add that a retired DGMNS or DGAFMS or DGMS (Army) should not be considered for such an appointment. Any one from the Air Force or the Navy is out of the question, for, they have shown little interest in the MNS administration. Some MNS officers serving in the Air Force hospitals tell me that they face fewer and less serious problems in the Army hospitals, may be because they are better aware of the rules governing the MNS. One captain told me that in her experience the Air Force personnel - officers and men alike - do not much care to treat the MNS officers with due respect. In her station, there was no separate mess for the few MNS officers, who, therefore, had to become members of the male officers' mess. Soon she found out that whenever the mess was closed down for some reason for any period, the MNS members had to make their own arrangements, and yet the mess did not close down even if just one IAF officer was present!

From what I have seen and heard, I find that after the age of 35, the 'career' element in the nurse's being tends to get the better of the 'nursing' element. Consequently, efficiency in active nursing declines at that age sharply. I therefore hold the view that a commission in the MNS should initially be only for five years (with a bond) and renewable thereafter for three years at a time till the age of 35 is reached. An aptitude test should be held at the age of 34 for those who wish to continue in service beyond 35 in order to select suitable majors for a six-month intensive course in all aspects of administration, accounts, military law, welfare and man management (now 'personnel management' would be a more suitable term). The aim of this course should be to make them fit to hold 'desk' ranks of Lt col and above at hospitals and other HQs. Those not selected for the 'desk' rank should be compulsorily retired at 35. Unlike now, active nurses must never be used (ie misused) in administration; their administrative duties should be confined to their wards only. All 'desk' officers should wear Olive Green uniforms. This one single measure will do wonders in eliminating the indifference of the other officers & ORs who will automatically begin to respect the uniform if not the wearer and that too because of the 'psychology of uniform'.

* * *

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

JUST PUBLISHED

**MOST DETAILED AND IN-DEPTH STUDY
OF
INDIAN ARMED FORCES
BY**

GENERAL V.N. SHARMA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)
Former Chief of the Army Staff

**INDIA'S DEFENCE FORCES :
BUILDING THE SINEWS OF A NATION**
(USI National Security Paper No. 13) Price Rs. 50 : 00

Ask for Your Copy from :

Director, United Service Institution of India
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg
New Delhi - 110011

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Dear Sir,

"CONCENTRATION : THE FORGOTTEN PRINCIPLE"

I fully agree with Brig. RD Law's views on "Concentration" as expressed in his article in the Oct-Dec 93 issue of the USI journal. I was a tank squadron commander with my regiment as part of 7 Inf Div during the 1965 Indo Pak war, and Brigade Major of 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade as part of 1st Corps in 1971. Based on my experience of our employment of armour in these two wars, I had written an article entitled "Quo Vadis Independent Armoured Brigade" in similar vein as Brig. Law's piece which was published in the USI Journal some 16 odd years ago. Needless to say, this article drew heavy flak! However, I have some other suggestions to offer in this context.

We need to introduce a Division Commander's course in our army's training curriculum at the earliest. The Division is the most important field command yet we do not have a regular course for it. Officially, training for higher command finishes at the rank of Lt. Col. It is unrealistic to expect an officer of this rank to comprehend the key doctrinal aspects of the arms or services at Division level particularly since this is a critical requirement at this level.

The viability of the Corps in our army's organisation has become severely suspect. Like Brig. Law's remark on the RAPID, the Corps too is neither fish nor fowl - it was all right as an operational formation during the Second World War but is a misfit in today's short duration, high intensity conflict scene. We should, therefore, apply the currently germane military organisational matrix of having only one intermediary control between the supreme HQ (in our case Army HQ) and the standard battle formation (in our case the Division.) We should retain just the cardinal Commands e.g. Eastern, Western etc. and totally remove the Corps. A Command should directly control 5 to 6 divisions with no subordinate HQ in between. Along with the Corps, we should also scrap the independent armoured brigade - again neither fish nor fowl !

Having decided on the requisite number of armoured divisions for our

army, we should raise them in full strength and then concentrate on other facets of anti-tank warfare. We need to re-activate the self propelled anti-tank (SPAT) gun of yore as the anti-tank weapon system at the division level instead of the tank. The Vijayanta tank has always been below par as a MBT and this was the prime reason why it was not committed to battle in 1971. This tank has been variously described as "a tank carrying one of the best tank guns in the world mounted on one of the worst designed chassis in the world". "We should, therefore, modify the Vijayanta into the SPAT and issue it to all divisions, both infantry and armoured. Additionally, each infantry division slated for plains warfare should be allotted an armoured regiment, either T-55/105 mm or T-72.

Conceptually, the SPAT will help in providing considerable flexibility at division level for offensive or defensive operations, something which is badly lacking at present. Also, the SPAT regiment parented by the artillery, can be distributed at will in the division's sector without jeopardising the principle of concentration as applicable to armour. For example, an infantry division in defence can use the SPAT to hold the line of acceptable penetration and then employ its complete armoured regiment for an effective counter attack.

Yours truly

2 Gariahat Road
Calcutta - 700 068

Lt Col J K Dutt (Retd)

II

Dear Sir,

TRADITION OR RANK

The letter written by Brig NB Grant (Retd) on the above subject made an interesting reading. He is an Honourable Man, who has rendered acumen service to all ages, and in particular to the present generation of which I am a part and parcel, through his articles on issues concerning the Indian Army, for which he is held in high esteem. But, in this particular instance that he has quoted, I have my views, which I would like to share with him and others through the media of your esteemed Journal.

The scope of the Institution of the Colonel of The Regiment, has, no doubt been enhanced to a great extent; whether for good or worst one cannot comment. So much so that all Corps and Departments which do not even perform any Regimental Service have adopted a Colonel of The Regiment, like the Judge Advocate General Branch, Corps of Military Police, Army Postal

Service and so on. How has this come about, I am NOT competent enough to comment upon. But the very fact, that the Adjutant General has accepted and approved of such Institutions, these will continue to play their part with discretion. So how can one question the role played by the Colonel of The Regiment of the Corps of ENGINEERS and others? I do agree with Brig Grant, when he says that the invitation cards should have been sent on behalf of the Commandant, College of Military Engineering for the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the Institution, as that Institution does NOT have any Colonel Commandant nor does it form part of any particular Engineer Group. But if it was done, there must have been some compelling reason; and that to my mind must have been of propriety, since the Institution too is commanded by a Lieutenant General and comes directly under the Engineer-in-Chief. However, for the Regimental functions organised at the Regimental Centres, like the Presentation of Colours by The President of India or by the Chief of Army Staff etc, have to be on the behalf of the Colonel of The Regiment as the event may concern more than one unit at that particular time. In any case all Regimental Centres function under the overall guidance of the Colonel of The Regiment since it's policy concerns the whole of the Regiment and the Centre Commandant is the Executive Head only. If some one has accorded him a cold shoulder during Regimental Functions, it is too sad and should not happen. Perhaps the Centre Commandant himself is to be blamed if he has NOT catered for himself a front row middle seat. However, it might have so happened that as a matter of courtesy, he vacated his seat for someone important who might have been ignored or NOT thought of at the planning stage.

To say that the Colonel of The Regiment is like a grand father is nothing but childish. Indeed, he is a father figure for the whole Regiment and he occupies this status NOT by design or any pressure but by choice and this choice is of the officers and representative of the men (Subedar Major); and must be honoured. Now if someone adopts 'Postures' then what can one do? However the situation is NOT hopeless and is always retrievable.

I do agree with Brig Grant about the aspect of Ethos. It is a nebulous term and beyond the comprehension of most of us. In this personality oriented Army, there can be no regards for traditions and customs and one shouldn't be too sentimental about these at all. What one can expect is a functional environment - you are happy I am happy 'syndrome'. Dual standards and dubious behaviours are the norms of day to day life. Surely these were there in the times of Brig Grant and his clan; may be that they did not surface as much as they are surfacing now. This may be because of the fact that there is a class amongst officers class which is elite and superior and hence the lime light must be stolen by that lot and that lot alone. Everyone is vying for it and the result is undue sycophancy - a dreaded disease but all are infected.

All institutions inclusive that of the Colonel of The Regiment seem to be on the decline; in any case these are NOT what they used to be yesterday. Today when the Centre Commandant is appointed by due consent of the Colonel of The Regiment, then where is the doubt that he is to hold office at the pleasure of the Colonel of The Regiment. In fact, there are live examples galore, where the Centres are kept vacant for longer durations or Brigadiers are removed and Colonels are appointed in officiating capacity. The least said the better.

I do not believe it to be factually correct, what Brig Grant says in regard to the distribution of prizes by the Commanding Officer, even when a senior regimental or Formation Commander is present. On purely Regimental Functions, while it is the Privilege of the Commanding Officer, there may be occasions, when present the Senior Regimental Officer like the Colonel of The Regiment or the ex Commanding Officer are requested to distribute the prizes; but ipso facto it is the privilege of the Formation Commander if invited to do so. There should be no doubt in this regard. But what one witnesses today is the Commanding Officer or the Formation Commander receiving prize or a trophy when their respective teams win any professional or sports competition. It is always the privilege of the team captain to receive such an honour but sadly it is NOT done, except in rare cases. Who is to educate whom on such ethics. Why can't we learn from international institutions where it is the team captain who receives the award and NOT the team manager or anybody else.

When no unit commander himself follows the traditions of his predecessor how can he expect his successor to do so. No one denies him his status; in fact it is he himself who behaves like a chameleon and the 'cry' like that of Brig Grant gets lost in this turbulent wilderness.

So, 'Salute the Rank Tradition' seems to have been well established!

Composite Trg Bn
The Mechanised Infantry
Regimental Centre
Ahmedabad - 414110

Yours faithfully
M C Chadha
Colonel

Review Article 1

National Integration & Character Building

LT GEN A M VOHRA, PVSM IA (RETD)

There are indeed many facets of unity in diversity that one can enumerate in regard to India. Equally, the need to foster, nurture and strengthen national integration is self evident. This is more so when politics appears to be becoming more and more divisive.

Apart from serving this very important objective of national integration, national service would help the task of character building. General Chibber aptly quotes William James, an American visionary, who wrote in 1910 of “drafting off” the gilded youth to get their childishness knocked out of them and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas.

That these two fundamental purposes would be served by National Service (NS) has never been questioned seriously. However, as the author puts it, proposals to implement it have been shelved for two basic reasons; largeness of numbers and the cost of the programme. These are indeed very pertinent considerations and necessitate certain limitations which his proposals also accept.

A suitable year for NS is discussed in some detail and it is suggested that around 18 when the youth are still near the peak of idealism would be best. As about 10 million youth achieve this age every year, and the number will increase progressively, NS for all has to be replaced by a somewhat selective programme. “First of all, National Service should be rendered by those who derive the maximum benefit from the society”. It is suggested that a balanced and dispassionate consideration would put the government employees and university students as the two such groups as they are “supported, sustained and subsidised by every citizen of India”. (Not so the creamy layers, the politicians or businessmen). The number of these two groups is itself very large; 10 lakh students enter colleges every year and there are 6.3 lakh entrants into government jobs.

Chibber analyses the implementation of the Kothari Committee (1964-66) Report which strongly recommended that NS should be obligatory and an integral part of education at all stages. He discusses the present National Service Scheme as well as the NCC, which cover 11 lakh students each. However, the primary purpose here is to develop the character of the youth.

National Service For Defence, Development and National Integration of India. By Lt Gen ML Chibber PVSM, AVSM, Ph D, Meerut, Kartikaya Publications, 1995, pp 272, Rs. 350, ISBN : 81-85823-07-3.

Lt. General A.M. Vohra is a former Vice-Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and a defence analyst.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 521, July-September, 1995.

The NCC also sets itself the aim of creating a human resource to provide leadership in all walks of life available for the service of the nation. These programmes do not entail full time undertaking of public duties by the young, which the author rightly suggests is the true meaning of NS.

He points out that our Constitution has a provision, viz, "It is obligatory for every citizen to defend the country and render National Service when called upon to do so", and laments the fact that India, like the USA is rapidly moving towards a "rights only concept of citizenship". He emphasises the public duty aspect of NS which provides opportunities for service, throws up leaders and helps the development of cohesive and well integrated society.

Areas where the nation needs NS are discussed and defence, primary education and environment in the way of afforestation are picked out. It is proposed that out of 6.3 lakh average intake into government jobs 1.6 lakhs should be drafted into defence services each year for a 5-year tenure. 4.7 lakh each year should be required to render 3 years NS in development programmes covering primary education and environment. College students rendering NS for one year should be employed entirely on development programmes; this will provide a work force of 22.1 lakh ($4.7 \times 3 + 10$), 15 lakhs of which could be used for primary education and the remainder for environment/afforestation.

A two track manning of defence services is recommended with 40 per cent careerists and 60 per cent short term national service who will come from entrants to central and state police as well as para military forces who would be required to serve with the Army for 5 to 9 years before they commence their tenure with the services for which they have been selected. Personnel selected for Coast Guard, Ports and Airports would render service with the Navy and Air Force for prescribed periods. Personnel selected for other government jobs would render NS with the defence services or with development programmes as per their choice.

At present the manpower related costs add upto 65 per cent of the defence budget and may go upto 70 per cent as the number of pensioners increases. In 1972 the colour service (active service) in the army was increased from 7 to 17 years to ensure that everyone was entitled to a pension. It was an ill considered welfare measure to ameliorate the hardship of early termination of service. However, it has resulted in an "aging" army. Its youthful profile has gone by the board.

The author rationally suggests that national security should be achieved at the minimum cost. The two track approach under which 60 per cent of the manpower would be short term national servicemen would restore the youthful profile and bring down man power related costs.

A well researched book which advocates a constructive NS programme for development and national integration.

Review Article 2

Engineers' Contribution to Victory

LT GEN S L MENEZES, PVSM, SC (RETD)

This is a splendidly encapsulated account of the achievements of the regiments of the Corps of Engineers in the 1971 Conflict. This short and sharp conflict ended in a decisive victory for India. As Lt Gen BN Das, the Engineer-in-Chief in 1971 has stated, "that it has rightly been acclaimed that the Army operations for the liberation of Bangladesh were indeed a battle of the Engineers. In the riverine terrain of Bangladesh, the entire course of the campaign depended on the Engineers' capability to ensure the mobility of the advancing forces and their subsequent maintenance. Indeed, it has been an Engineers' war from the time the operations were conceived and launched, to the 'runaway' victory and speedy establishment of normalcy in Bangladesh".

The then outstanding Army Chief, Field Marshal S H F J Manekshaw, the unquestioned architect of India's ground victory in 1971, succinctly postulates, "It is indeed to the credit of the Sappers, that mobility, matching the operational requirements, was provided despite odds like obsolete World War II vintage equipment in our inventory, and the difficult nature of the terrain".

Lt Gen KP Candeth, the brilliant GOC-in-C, Western Command had already recorded in his earlier book *The Western Front: Indo-Pak War 1971*, opining, "The more I see of the Engineers the more is my admiration for them. They never really get the credit which is their due.....They are a very versatile lot of men always willing to try their hand at anything. They are also the last men to leave, for when the battle is over they remain to lift the mines, both the enemy's and our own, delouse booby traps and destroy defence works not wanted in peace-time. Further, they do all these without fuss or complaint, accepting the attendant risks as a normal commitment".

The credit, therefore, for providing the Army with the necessary mobility over obstacle - riven terrain must go to the Corps of Engineers, who delivered the goods, through their ingenuity and improvisation. This book thus offers the reader an insight to the employment of Engineers in battle, the detailed and meticulous planning, the conduct of operations and the speedy response to

1971 : The Sappers War. Compiled by Col RB Khanna, New Delhi Army HQ, E-IN-C's Branch, 1995, p. 293, Rs. 250/-.

Lt General S.L. Menezes is a former Vice-Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, and author of the recently published book *Fidelity and Honour : Indian Army from the Seventeenth to Twenty-First Century*.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 521, July-September, 1995.

changing situations, which made the most of fleeting opportunities. Set in the tactical perspectives prevailing in 1971, this graphic account is interspersed with personal narrations, lending a human touch to the grim realities of War. Lt Gen Jagdish Narain, the Engineer-in-Chief, who retired on 31 May emphasises that the lessons learnt from these operations have brought about organisational and doctrinal changes in the employment of the Engineers.

Many of the gallantry awards earned by the Engineers are sadly posthumous. Whereas the Engineers did get a certain number of gallantry awards in 1971, they deserved many more. This is due to the non-initiation of some gallantry award recommendations due to the circumstances in which the Sappers are employed. One is reminded of what Lt Gen Sir George MacMunn wrote in World War I of a Madras Sapper in a river crossing operation in Mesopotamia, "swimming repeatedly across the river, with the boat rope in his mouth under a constant hail of bullets, till he eventually bobbed up no more". In MacMunn's opinion if an individual ever deserved the immediate award of a Victoria Cross, it was this Madras Sapper who died unrecognised, unknown and unrewarded. That is also the fate of the many unrewarded Sappers who have often deserved gallantry awards in the three earlier conflicts since Independence.

One shortcoming in a very good compilation, of interest to both the lay and military reader, is the need for greater mention of the very substantial contribution that the Border Roads Organisation and the Military Engineering Services made to the Corps of Engineers in 1971.

ADVERTISE
in the
JOURNAL
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Review Article 3

Inside Story of Soviet Politics

AIR MARSHAL H K OBERAI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

After the October 1917 revolution an impenetrable mist of secrecy had descended upon the Soviet state. Travel to the Soviet Union was severely restricted and security was menacingly strict. Barring official propaganda, little else was allowed to reach the people or the world outside. The working of its political establishments and institutions remained a mystery. Even the collective mood of its people could not be judged easily.

The Second World War and the subsequent emergence of the "IRON CURTAIN" made information gathering about the Soviet Union even more difficult. The Soviet Union was now a super power but how did the state function as a system remained indeterminate. How was state policy formulated remained an enigma. The method of decision making at the higher echelons was another grey area. The rules if any for transition of power also attracted speculation. In short, how did the party and government apparatus get to formulate and execute policy and programmes? The information provided by defecting spies and counter agents could not be treated as authoritative and the conclusions of think tanks and specialists remained tentative as no test of accuracy could be devised. "The System" written by Georgi Arbatov provides answers to these questions and Arbatov possesses the credentials for this exercise.

Georgi Arbatov is a well known Russian scholar of international affairs. As a young man he had seen action in World War - II and was commended for bravery. Later, he graduated in international affairs and his work as an analyst of the world political scene was appreciated by his superiors. He rose quickly and became a member of the Academy of Sciences. He was also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Supreme Soviet. In 1967, he was appointed the director of USA Institute of Academy of Sciences. His studies and analysis brought him close to many top Soviet leaders particularly Andropov and Brezhnev. He also came in close contact with Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and dealt at some distance with Khrushchev and Chernenko. With such rich scholastic background and experience of Russian polity, Georgi Arbatov can be considered an authority on Soviet affairs and post World War II Soviet political scene. His description of the Soviet "System" is from personal knowledge and experience. He gives clear answers to questions that had defied precise answers for decades.

The System : An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics. By Georgi Arbatov, New York, Times Books, 1992, p. 380, \$ 25.00, ISBN 0-8129-1970-X.

Air Marshal H.K. Oberai is a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of an Air Operational Command and also served as a Principal Staff Officer at Air HQ New Delhi.

The author believes that communism as practiced in the USSR was self destructive. The system was dictatorial and dictators are afraid of strong people who are seen as potential rivals. Thus erudite and accomplished members of the party with a strong sense of conviction were sidelined fairly early in their careers. Those who reached the top were mostly sycophants or at best "yes men". They had perfected the art of survival and this remained their main occupation. Formulation of policy and decision making had thus become irretrievable casualties. Honest advice was at a discount. Ideological rhetoric fetched hefty premium. New ideas that lay outside the self imposed ideological reference were suspect. There was no systematic approach to the cold war as also domestic problems. Ideological purity was considered a panacea. Diplomatic options for cold war and other international disputes were disregarded and increase in military capability even where it had already achieved "overkill status" became the accepted sovereign remedy. This ultimately proved to be the Soviet Union's Achilles heel. Interests of the military industrial complex began to clash glaringly with interests of an already crippled economy. Reagan and his advisors had judged the situation correctly when they launched the SDI. This was the last straw on the camel's back. The Soviet Union just did not have the resources and technological capability to meet the American challenge. Reconciliation was the only solution but vested interests tried to thwart Gorbachev's overtures to the West and his efforts at *GLASNOST* and *PERESTROIKA*. The results of putsch are too well known to be recapitulated.

The author brings out that 20th Party Congress of 1956, where the cult of personality was deprecated and Stalin's brutalities against his own people were disclosed by Khrushchev for the first time marks a watershed in the post-war history of his nation. He observes that under Stalin, "the power of the leader was determined not by the success of the economy, the peoples standard of living, the popularities of the policies of the leadership or favourable public opinion, but by force-real, brute, physical compulsion". With destalinisation, a Soviet citizen who for years had remained obedient and fearful became a citizen and a rebel. He thought and wrote what he thought. This newly acquired vitality could not be quashed even when the system lapsed back into neo-stalinism. As per Arbatov this really was the beginning of *GLASNOST* and *PERESTROIKA*.

The author is extremely critical of Russian defence establishment. He bemoans that they were a law unto themselves. Military policy and armament industry escaped political control. Even when the military were arming themselves like addicts, the leadership failed to appreciate the colossal defence burden. Those who proposed some control over military expenditure were considered insufficiently revolutionary. It was not appreciated that socialism cannot be exported under the force of a bayonet and national solidarity was a greater rallying point than class solidarity. Even an ethnically disparate

population in Afghanistan compelled the Russian military establishment to eat a humble pie. The author confirms that much remains undocumented regarding the decision to despatch troops to Afghanistan, but has reasons to believe, that the military which was a state within a state led by the defence minister Ustinov played a crucial role, if not the decisive one, for intervention in Afghanistan.

A system is as good as the people who work it. The stability of the Soviet system did not depend upon the collective will of its people but on the collective power of the ruling coterie. Even amongst the coterie the boss enjoyed the major share of the power if not absolute power. There were no institutionalised rules of succession. Self preservation and self perpetuation was the primary pursuit of the leadership. People's welfare had to occupy a lower priority. That such a flawed system survived for almost seven decades needs some explanation. The author contends that "HOSTILE ENCIRCLEMENT" was for a long time much more than a propaganda slogan or an obsessive idea of Soviet leaders. The leadership distrusted the West and genuinely believed that threat of war emanated from the West. The regime had succeeded in encouraging "seige mentality". Besides, the system itself was tyrannical and oppressive. After Stalin's purges the whole nation appeared to be in a trauma. Fear was all pervasive. Dread and fright had reached a stage where parents were hesitant to discuss political matters with their children. Most people as the author himself, opted to battle the system in their own little way from within the system rather than confront it head-on from outside. Exceptions like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov were few. It is only after the 20th Party Congress that the system became somewhat tolerant even though it continued to lapse into its old despotic ways on many occasions.

Georgi Arbatov has passed judgment on many events and personalities. It must be said to his credit that this is based mostly on supportive evidence, but his criticism of Gorbachev who he claims vacillated at crucial moments and did not opt for quick changes in the system, appears unjustified. Change has to be managed. It should have broad support of the people. The results of a quick change attempted by Yeltsin and his deputy Gaidar were catastrophic and the insurrection lead by Rutskoi and Khasbulatov almost precipitated a civil war. Gorbachev had endeavoured to take all sections of the Soviet society with him. He wanted to avoid disorder and bloodshed but the putschists thwarted him. None-the-less, he put an end to the cold war and initiated steps which ultimately released the Soviet people from state bondage. It is too early to appraise Gorbachev's place in history. Posterity would be a better judge.

Georgi Arbatov's description of the Soviet "system" is lucid. It bears the stamp of authenticity, coming as it does from a person who for a long time held high rank and status in the Russian "nomenklatura". It is an eminently readable book.

Review Article 4

Defence and Development Debate

LT GEN V R RAGHAVAN, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (RETD)

The demands of security and the economic needs of countries have always competed for primacy. The debate on guns and butter has had a long history. The question to be resolved was not so much of a choice between one or the other but of finding the right mix of both. Social and economic growth are the main reasons for the existence of nation states and neither can be had without security. A nation state must first assure itself of security, before it can strive for the economic well being of its people. Since security and military capability are two faces of the same coin, nations must continually find the means to maintain the military force they need. Even those nations which after the Second World War, had the assured military protection of super powers, eg; Japan, now find it necessary to spend large amounts on defence. The burden of security is heavier on the developing states but they have tightened their belts, and if necessary slowed economic growth, to ensure security for themselves.

Since technology and modern industrial capacity are the underpinnings of military capability, developing states have to depend on the developed states for military hardware. The latter have created a vast armament industry which must sell weapons in large numbers to be able to compete in the armament market. In the cycle of an existential need for security and its means, development cannot but be affected. The right balance between security and development has consequently been the subject of extensive studies over the last two decades. One more attempt in the continuing analysis is the book under review.

The book is a compilation of workshops held at the Michigan State University. Its advantage rests on the cross sectional research involving different disciplines involving security. The book starts with a chapter on, "Security in the Third World : Searching for the Core Variables". The burden of Mohammed Ayoob's essay, summarising his writings elsewhere¹ is that the security problematic of the Third World states is like a "multi layered cake" comprising the present international system, the regional dimension and the internal dimension of security. He lays emphasis on the last, involving the state making activity of states in conflict with secessionist and other rebellious elements within the state. This places a much needed perspective on security often lacking in western writings on the subject. In India, the overwhelming focus

Seeking Security and Development : The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers. Edited by Norman A. Graham, Boulder, Lynne, Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 295, ISBN 1-55587-416-9.

Lt. General V.R. Raghavan is a former Director General Military Operations, Army Headquarters, New Delhi.

on external threats has blinded policy makers to the serious threats to security within the national polity. These have been neglected, for reasons of political expediency, and have grown in strength. Ayoob also argues that, concepts of threats and security are important and, if not pragmatically applied, can lead to flawed economic investments and thrusts.

As is to be expected, the thrust of the book is towards identifying a relationship between defence expenditure and development. It is not untraversed ground and excellent studies have earlier made a mark in the area. Emile Benoit² has effectively argued about the benefits of military culture in a disorganised state. His study of over forty states showed a positive relationship between defence and development. Later studies showed a negative relationship, and the debate has continued unabated. In India there have been the studies by Raju Thomas³ and a well researched one by Khanna-Mehrotra.⁴ The evidence of studies undertaken in different countries and by different experts can at best be termed ambiguous. Let us look at the figures : for the first fifteen years after 1947, India spent 1.6 percent of the GDP on defence. After and as a consequence of 1962, the percentage went up to 3.84 and stabilised at an average of 3.48 percent for another twenty five years. Currently it is below three percent. Empirical studies indicate that defence investments and expenditures have had beneficial impact in stable states and adversely affected the unstable polities. There would also appear to be a resistance level of six percent of GDP which if crossed leads to adverse impact on economies in unstable states.⁵ In terms of stability and percentage of GDP spent on defence, India has done well in combining the dual demands of development and defence. Its defence expenditure has never been the cause of adverse balance of payments or shortage of foreign currency reserves.

Another interesting chapter in the book is by Amit Gupta on "Building an Arsenal : The Indian Experience" in which he questions the approach of attributing a threat value to the production or acquisition of weapon systems by developing states. His argument is that developing states can only have lopsided military growth due to their economic constraints. Their armed forces cannot possess the balanced distribution of armaments, eg; missiles, naval fleets, strategic air forces and so on. There will be gaps in force structures that cannot be filled due to inadequate technology or funds. Gupta feels, therefore, that India cannot emerge as a major military power. It is not clear if he thinks India wishes to be a major military power, when the Indian debate has always been on what is to be adequate defence. His conclusions after a useful analysis, detract rather than defend his earlier contention that developing nations' force levels need not be seen as a threat. The conclusion that India went in for large scale military growth when it had a favourable trade balance and the added advantage of rupee payment Russian purchases, ignores the geopolitical realities of the sub-continent in the 1970s and the Cold War spillover on developing

states. Gupta's parting comment that when there is no money there are fewer threats, reflects the predicament of theoreticians. When facts and data do not match dearly held prejudices, recourse is taken to reiteration to defend the dogma. Norman Graham, the editor of the book introduces the needed balance, by confirming that such studies should explore the way the international system and external security impinge on Third World states. While agreeing that there are no easy answers to the many variables that must be taken into account, he emphasises the need to identify the specific channels by which military spending has an impact on development before a behavioural model is attempted.

India is the largest democratic and developing nation. Its open systems permit the kind of analysis the book has undertaken which also has chapters on Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. One rarely comes across studies of this kind on China, whose defence modernisation and aggressive policies in the Asia-Pacific region are the cause of much anxiety. There is a need for Indian economists and defence analysts to present an Indian perspective on the subject. The Indian experience can be a paradigm which would be relevant to many amongst the developing nations.

NOTES

1. Security Predicament of the Third World State, in the *Insecurity Dilemma : National Security of the Third World States*, ed. Brian Job, 1992.
2. E. Benoit, *Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*, 1973.
3. R Thomas, *Defence of India in a Budgetary Perspective*, 1978
4. Khanna and Mehrotra, *Defence vs Development*, 1993.
5. Loony and Winterford, *Economic Causes and Consequences of Defence Expenditure in the Middle East and South Asia*, 1995.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues and Defence and Security forces, for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed and stamped envelope.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Bridging the Gap : Theory & Practice in Foreign Policy. By Alexander L. George, Washington, D.C., *United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 170, \$ 24.95, ISBN 1-878379-22-4*

As the title implies, the book deals in depth on the subject of foreign policy - how it should be evolved at the theoretical plane, the formulation of the policy by the policy makers and finally its implementation. The reading is like that of a text book and relates to the United States of America. With so many people involved in the process of formulating and implementing the policy, there are bound to be communication or interpretation gaps and that's what the book is all about. It takes into account all the factors and possible solutions for the policies that should be adopted.

The military arms when used, is an extension of a foreign policy and to that extent this is a useful book to read. It will give an understanding of the roles played by each segment of the authority - the theoreticians, the policy makers and the executives. All in all, this book certainly makes one more knowledgeable on the subject of foreign policy and Diplomacy. Various principles could be utilised by any country.

— Group Capt D Yadav, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Flights to Hell: The Investigation of Flying Accidents and the Development of Air Safety; By Allan Edwards; *Scotland, Thomas & Lochar, £ 18.95, ISBN 0 946537 81 X.*

'Flights to Hell' is a book that contains details about flying accidents, painstakingly researched and selectively compiled, with the finesse which only a professional journalist with personal experience, committed and dedicated to the cause of promoting air safety can ensure. Since the book is a 'classic' of its own kind, its review must naturally deviate somewhat from the standard format - more so as viewed by a professional pilot.

This book has three distinct features, viz, authenticated evolutionary/historical data; incisive analytical approach to come to irrefutable logical conclusions; and use of pictures, captions and maps to bring the book within easy grasp of a 'layman'. Since the 'risk' in air travel concerns more number of air travellers i.e passengers, in my opinion, all air travellers should be able to derive solace, sooth their nerves and overcome their fears merely by reading its introduction. In fact every airline should reproduce it in the form of a pamphlet & issue it to every passenger - a first time traveller. This by itself will promote air safety and will reduce the casualties due to panic in the event of a 'mishap' and may even prevent 'mishaps' induced by panic. Surely the air traveller would love to know that the airborne journey is many times safer than the drive to the airport and the chances of their getting killed in an aircrash, which is an inconceivable event, are only one in a life span of 1000 years. The extent of 'air safety' can be gauged by statistical comparison of about 1000 deaths per year

in air disasters all over the world versus over 50,000 deaths in road traffic accidents per year in Europe alone!

— AVM S S Malhotra, AVSM, VM

The Guinness Book of Naval Blunders. By Geoffrey Regan, *Middlesex, Guinness*, p. 186, £ 12.99, ISBN 0-85112-713-4

Naval Blunders is different than the run of other books of this nature which often describe the achievements of an officer commanding a ship or fleet in that it gives blunders committed by naval officers between thirteenth and twentieth century showing their mismanagement, misjudgement, casualness and incompetence.

While the book gives a full coverage of the personal disasters suffered by an individual Captain or Admiral, the details of the sinking of the American cruiser on 30th July, 1945 during the last stages of World War II is a classic example of the casualness of all officers from the junior most - the Operation Room Officer in Leyte to Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. No body even bothered to find out the fate of the ship when it did not arrive in Leyte after 36 hours of her ETA. Also ships and aircraft in the area took no action on hearing the distress signal sent by the ship presuming that either another ship would have reported the same or the operation room in Leyte would have picked up the SOS.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Religion in Third World Politics. By Jeff Haynes, *Boulder, Lynne Rienner*, 1994, p. 166, \$ 18.95, ISBN 1-55587-456-8.

In a thematic review of internal and external pressures in the Third World countries the author has analytically examined the growth and political impact of the global religions - Christianity and Islam, their internal dissents in the interplay of traditionalism versus modernism, hardening up of religious ethos consequent to the challenge of state liberalism or, in some regions, to Marxist invasion.

He has given an enlightening exposition of the evolution of regional cults and churches in neo-Christian societies of the Americas and central African countries. Islamic nations and societies had their own dissenters and moderates, which on the contrary led to a thrust towards fundamentalism, and the call for Shariat rule in many countries.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

Security Without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security. By Regina Cowen Karp, *Oxford, Oxford Univ*, 1992, p. 296, £ 30.00, ISBN 0-19-829143-4

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the whole world was divided into

two power blocks led by the USA and USSR. They were accorded the status of the world's two super powers and rivalry amongst them led to an era of cold war. Both tried to outwit each other to enhance their military power. This led to an arms race especially deployment of nuclear weapons.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and collapse of the Soviet economy has put an end to the cold war confrontation between the USA and Russia. This book, therefore, examines the question: is the elimination of nuclear weapons politically feasible and technically practical?

With the end of the cold war, a re-thinking of "international security" based on nuclear weapons is imperative. During the past 40 years or so, nuclear disarmament has often been called wishful thinking, because the proposals for achieving it generally have ignored the rightful security interests of states. This book represents a departure from this traditional approach. Its aim is to explore how states might be able to move progressively to fewer and perhaps even zero nuclear weapons without sacrificing security.

There are political, moral and military imperatives to seek security without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons clearly belong to the past concept of security. The conclusions and findings brought out in the book are commended not only to the students of politics but also to politicians who must take bold decisions which will shape the security of tomorrow.

— Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Fundamentalism Observed. Ed By Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, *Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1991, p. 870, £ 21.95, ISBN 0-226-50878-1*

This is the first of the six volumes of a comprehensive study of this subject planned by The American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Fourteen monographs included in this volume deal with the fundamentalist Protestant and Catholic movements in North and South America, Jewish movements in Israel, Sunni and Shia movements in the Middle East, and Islamic, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist movements in South and Southeast Asia. The Confucian and the religious revival in Japan and in East Asia is also examined. The writers have adopted a historical-cum-phenomenological approach. Each monograph stands by itself and is aimed at an "informed" reader. The editors hope that this encyclopaedic approach will lead to sharper conceptualisation and analysis of the phenomenon.

After reading these monographs, one is unable to conclude that the characteristics of the phenomenon outweigh the historical circumstance. The editors recognise that the movements are political in nature and seek total change (political, economic, social and cultural) so that the society is in accord with an idealised and selective version of the past derived from the sacred religious texts. The editors accept that the sacred texts in the South and East Asian religions, do not play the same role as the Bible and the Quran do in Christianity and Islam: the texts do not provide the same authoritative

view of a glorious past, and especially of the opportunities of the future, which can bind the individual to the will of God as manifested in the sacred texts. Crisis of identity rather than a parallel search for an idealised past, would appear to be the Common factor between the religious fundamentalist movements of the East and of the West.

In a project of this nature and scope, a diversity of views is inevitable and should be welcomed. The project and this volume are a timely and valuable contribution to an understanding of the fundamentalist movements, which have come to occupy centre stage with the decline of communism in this decade.

— Ambassador S. K. Bhutani
Indian Foreign Service

The Guinness Book of Historical Blunders. By Geoffrey Regan, *Middlesex, Guinness* 1994, p. 186, £ 12.99, ISBN 0-85112-785-1

Following up on his excellent contribution to the History of Warfare through his series on Military Blunders, the author has tackled the expansive horizon of human activity in this book, -- through the ages and across the globe. Inadvertantly or through design and manipulation, these events either inflicted suffering on unsuspecting and gullible humanity or had deplorable consequences.

Starting with fashion and dietary fads of the elite classes of the western world or in China, and medications of quacks and self-appointed medical entrepreneurs, the reader learns about socio-economic impositions - to vet, Khrushchev's Kazakhstan experiment, Mao Zedong's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and a horde of political gambles by individuals and monarchs. The fare is indeed mind boggling.

As a dedicated historian Geoffrey Regan has picked out, deeply researched and narrated the amusing, tragic and the bizarre in the games people played through the wide span of world history in a prolific literary style to offer many sessions of enjoyable reading.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar

Foreign Affairs Agenda 1995 : Critical Issues in Foreign Policy, *New York, Council on Foreign Relations*, 1995, p. 256, \$ 9.95, ISBN 0-87609-176-1.

There are those who believe that American foreign policy stands in disarray and confusion today. The flips and flops of policy, towards Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, North Korea and China, are the more prominent examples, quoted by the critics.

This book is a collection of current articles from the pages of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, authored by respected authorities in their fields. These essays explore a wide range of subjects. Of special interest are topics like US-RUSSIAN relations, Peace keeping in the world, the Palestinian problem and Islamic fundamentalism.

The book deals with topics vital to the world today. The student of international affairs will find this book useful.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath SM (Retd)

War and the 20th Century: The Impact of War on the Modern Consciousness. By Christopher Coker, *London, Brassey's, 1994, p. 304, £ 25.00, ISBN 1-85753-055-1*

This disturbing book discusses the philosophy, thought, politics, and motivations which lie behind the wars of the 20th Century. Western civilisation expanded war to an industrial process of such efficiency that the next "war to end all wars" may well be the end of mankind itself. Coker presents an inductive and impressionistic interpretation of hearts and minds in this complex society, which "destroys cities to save them", and "kills for peace". He draws from history, philosophy, factual and fictional writings, analysed to reach conclusions very different to the high moral, religious, rational and constructive facade of world leaders, but uncomfortably close to the demonstrated facts of deliberate and wanton killing. War seems to have outgrown the understanding of those who studied it. We have "savage" wars of colonisation, the Holocaust, Atoms on Japan, the Cold War, and its aftermath; and finally, the ultimate challenge to reason, blindly ruthless terrorism, which blames the other side for its own actions.

In feudal Europe war never was that gloriously chivalrous and patriotic sacrifice for "God King and Country: it was inhumanely brutal on populations, which suffered more than combatants fighting in self-interest. Industrialised war in colonies treated Black, Brown, Dirty White, and Yellow peoples as "of no more consequence than the savage scenery being rolled back", all for the uplifting benefits of "civilisation" being thrust on them for their own good, even if they died in the process. (Besides, it was good for the colonisers' economy and the Church). The USA broke away from Europe as champion of Individual Freedom. Benjamin Franklin wrote "only a Virtuous Republic is capable of Freedom", which perhaps justified the extension virtue to native Indians (with devastating effect) and to a civil war to free the South from itself. More followed, in the Americas, the Philippines, and later all over the world including Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. All this with missionary zeal to extend freedom to all peoples, but always with that hidden colonist ethos that, in the balance, one industrialised "white" is more valuable than any number of "savages" yearning for the virtues of western civilisation. Values have changed. Mass destruction from a distance has become "ethical", but face to face killing is not so. The unthinking cruelty of the Cossacks was "barbaric", but the thoughtful wiping out of children in a Vietcong Village or in a bombshelter in Iraq is only "co-lateral damage", unavoidable and acceptable in a just war to save the victims from their ungodly rulers.

Yet there is hope. Coker describes how in the West there "is a growing disbelief in its own Virtue". History tells us that the massive surge for individual freedom and Human Rights arising from the USA has never been matched in intensity and practical achievement in any past civilisation, something new in this world for present and future rulers. Some day survivors (?)/successors(?) may benefit in a changed universal

civilisation where peace is legally enforced. This book can be a difficult "read", but well worth the effort for those interested in the "whys" and "wherefores" of war.

-- Tindi

Nuclear Madness: What You Can Do. By Helen Caldicott, *New York: Norton, 1994, Revised ed., pp. 240, \$ 10.95, ISBN 0393-31011-6*

The book about dangers of nuclear power was first written in 1978. A lot has happened since then; the cold war is over, decrease in nuclear weapons production, and a marked growth in environmental awareness after the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island disasters. The book defines for the 1990s the dangers of nuclear power industry, including waste dumping and medical experiments using nuclear materials.

Ms. Caldicott, a leading paediatrician from Australia, has devoted herself to the cause of nuclear disarmament and environment. Her remark that polluted air, water and food pose greater health hazard than any plague humanity has ever experienced, deserves to be taken seriously.

-- K Kumar

An Intellectual History of Liberalism. By Pierre Manent, *Princeton, Princeton Univ 1994, p. 128, \$ 19.95, ISBN 0-691-03437-0*

Pierre Manent looks with critical eye at the content of European Liberalism which, in his view, is based on the assumption that political life in modern societies with its excessive emphasis on secularism and individual rights does not serve any higher purpose, nor does it seek any moral good. Through a review of the progress of liberal thinking - from Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu to Rousseau, Constant, Guizot to Tocqueville - Manent explores the development of European Liberal thought in terms of a single theme - the decline of theological politics and freedom from the pervasive influence of the Catholic church.

What emerges from this critical review is a spectacle of the Hobbesian individual with no goals outside the confines of the self and a secular, liberal democratic state with no purpose other than preventing individuals from dominating one another. Manent makes a valid and relevant point, namely, the desirability of a government system which is neutral about religion but not about public morals. His real target is not liberal political thought per se but political life and the practice of politics. The object of political action, he argues, should not be the survival of the morally impoverished individuals. The founding impulse behind liberal politics, in Manent's view, is the revolt against religious authority and that is why liberal thinkers have banished moral good or purpose from politics.

Manent's argument - the so called 'New French Thought' - may not be acceptable to all, but he succeeds in focussing attention on one important aspect of modern societies modelled on European Liberal traditions - namely, the rejection of religious and moral values by secular liberal democracies obsessed with the rights of the individual,

freedom of conscience and sovereignty of the people - principles forged during centuries of war against the authority of the Catholic church. It can, however, be argued with equal force that the Enlightenment's battle was not directed against Christianity or Christian values, but against the political power of organized religion. But none will disagree with Manent that the goal of political life ought to go beyond securing individual rights or pursuit of happiness. Civic life must eventually be shaped by certain moral values. Manent brings out this dilemma of liberal politics admirably well. No serious student of political thought should miss this book.

-- K K Mitra

Former Principal Director
Directorate General of Security

The World in Conflict: War Annual 6: - Contemporary Warfare Described and Analysed. By John Laffin, *London, Brassey's 1994, p. 233, £ 30.00, ISBN 0-08-041330-7*

The author has described and analysed the intra-national conflicts, internal rebellions, insurgencies, and sponsored terrorism, ravaging societies and nations across the globe. His horizon covers the Central Americas, the strategic hub circumscribing eastern Mediterranean and the South Asian expanse including Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir and the Philippines.

An interesting feature of this survey is the subtle change in context consequent to the elimination of erstwhile super power USSR, and international communism as a factor - whether in the Iraq War of 1990's or the newly emerged Baltic republics. The author has also focussed on ethnic and religious fundamentalism which has assumed dangerous dimensions.

Supported by appropriate maps and tabulated force-levels/latest weaponry, the book makes a useful and informative reference work, besides up-dating contemporary history of warfare.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar

Forging the Military Industrial Complex: World War II's Battle of the Potomac. By Gregory Hooks, *Urbana, Univ of Illinois, 1991, p. 303, \$ 39.95, ISBN 0-252-01750-1*

Whilst the WWII battles were fought overseas, an equally critical battle was fought at the PENTAGON, for industrial mobilisation. This had a decisive influence on the war, and the economy of the U.S. The mobilisation was impressive, manufacturing industries trebled their product. Raw material production went up by 60%. From 1939-42, new construction of factories doubled, and millions of workers who were unemployed, found employment.

Towards the end of the war, the need for reconstruction led to the requirement of materials for civil projects. The military blamed lack of supplies for Germany's

successes. General Clay was brought in to the office of War mobilisation and Conversion, under senator Brynes.

This book goes into the various alternatives tried in the U.S., and is essential reading for our Mobilisation planners.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia. By Ronald L McGlothlen, *New York, WW Norton, 1993, p. 320, £ 19.95, ISBN 0-393-03520-4*

This very interesting book is about the problems of the reconstruction of the economies in the war ravaged South East Asia—with particular reference to Japan, Korea Taiwan, China and Vietnam, and the part played by Dean Acheson, first as a Under Secretary (45-47), and finally as Secretary of State (1949-53), during Truman's Presidency.

A very interesting part of the book relates the story of the American commitment in Vietnam, where they were all for the rights of the colonial people.

Dean Acheson did not care a damn about the little red-yellow-black people in the various parts of the world. With his vision he recreated an edifice, to enable the U.S to control every wave in the Pacific Ocean!

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab)

Coastal Forces. By Barry Clarke and Others, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1994, p. 162, ISBN 0-08-040986-5*

With the end of the Cold War, most navies of the world are more concerned about protection of local waters and are occupied in the security of harbours, ports and their approaches, offshore installations, fishery protection, anti smuggling, oil pollution, piracy, illegal immigration etc.

The book Coastal Forces with essays by three authors contains valuable information about various types of patrol vessels, offshore patrolling both in peace and war, history of mine warfare, the mines, mining and mine laying, and the evolution of mine counter measures. This is followed by the Fast Patrol Boats operations, the post war developments in the FPB's warfare, command and control and the future trends in coastal operations.

A well researched concise book with the detailed information about the FPB's, their operation and recommendations regarding equipment and weapon systems which may be fitted in these boats. Photographs of various types of patrol vessels, mines and navigational equipment is a welcome addition.

— Capt R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Maximum Effort: The B-29's Against Japan. By Kevin Herbert, *Kansas, Sunflower University, 1983, p. 102, \$ 17.00, ISBN 0-89745-036-1*

The B-29 strategic bomber when it came into mass production in 1944, had no rivals. It had a service ceiling of close to 40,000 feet and with a bombload of ten tons, commanded a radius of action of over 1500 n.m. The aircraft was fitted with autonomous navigation and bomb aiming systems giving it, unmatched accuracy and lethality. Its five gun turrets (four remotely operated and one electrically controlled) and armour plating for aircrew provided reassuring protection and survivability. That it was called a "Super Fortress" is not surprising.

Since it came into service a little late, the B-29 was not deployed against Germany. In any case, the B-17 and B-26 were considered adequate for this task. While the efficacy or the true value of strategic bombing of Germany has remained a matter of considerable debate, the strategic bombing of metropolitan Japan with incendiary devices which virtually wiped out its industrial capability is considered a great military success. A total of 33041 sorties were flown in which 1,70,000 tons of incendiaries and other armaments were dropped. The fires caused by these devices destroyed approximately 170 sq. kms of important Japanese towns including Tokyo.

The author opines that by July, 1945 barring the diehard militarists, most other Japanese had veered around to the idea of a negotiated surrender and the use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki could have been avoided. A demonstrative explosion in an uninhabited area of Japan would have convinced the die-hard elements about the hopelessness of their situation. In any case, if they had continued to wage war, after the demo, the moral responsibility for the sufferings of their people would have squarely rested with them. There can be no exception to this well judged argument.

The author served as gunner in a B-29 during World War II. He flew over 30 missions but alongside, remained a keen observer of the war on both fronts. His description, particularly of the nuclear attacks over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and how these two cities came to be selected as targets keeps the reader spell-bound. Bomber aircrew of yester-years would find the book gripping. It is likely to rekindle old memories.

— Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

A Breakfast for Bonaparte: U.S. National Security Interests from the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age. By Eugene V. Rostow, *Washington, National Defense Univ 1992, p. 507, ISBN 0-16-035969-4*

This book covers the US perception of everlasting peace amongst nation states under UN and guaranteed by the sole super power at present i.e. USA. It does not propagate USA to be a policeman around the world. The state system must be transformed into a system of peace under a World body. The US should refrain from thinking "America First and Alone" in its concept of formulation of foreign policy. The evolution of US foreign policy from isolationism, to neutrality, to involvement, to intervention, to domination, are well documented.

The author argues convincingly and conclusively that the basic US national security interests could be achieved by peace throughout the world and also to prevent emergence of Soviet hegemonic power in Europe. The USA must also ensure and maintain a reasonably stable balance of power amongst nation states and in the long run convert this balance of power into a concert of power.

The sovereign right of any nation to develop, possess and use nuclear weapons for self defence is to say the least, prejudiced in favour of those nations who already possess such weapons. A philosophic dissertation ending in mostly practical and realistic deductions which would require a devoted executive to understand and implement these conclusions.

— Maj Gen J N Goel

America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. By Tony Smith, *Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 455, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-691-03784-1.*

Tony Smith's account of U.S. striving for liberal democracies after momentous events of decolonization, the two great wars and emergence of international communism is thought-provoking and interesting reading. America's two-track approach of social reform and military intervention was a legacy of its past presidents - Monroe and Wilson. The author admits that U.S. policy was also based on commercial considerations but a stable world order was more conducive to democratic governments. With the Marshall Plan America hoped, and did achieve to a large extent an open and interdependent world economic order free of communist control. The communist threat led it to engineer coups and support dictatorial regimes. A new dimension was added in the foreign policy formulated by Henry Kissinger who relegated idealism and based international relations on purely national interests, acting "in terms of the law of the jungle, cooperating with whom it had to cooperate to preserve the substantial interests that it had at stake". United States' mute opposition, tolerance and support of military takeovers in Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador and Brazil are classic examples of change in policy to serve national interests.

The Vietnam experience imposed a certain caution in direct involvement. A policy of constructive engagement was practised with the aim of creating a climate of confidence and American commitment in transition to democracy. There were, however, glaring failures to support democratic movements in China, Yugoslavia, Somalia, the Soviet republics, Iran, of permanently settling the Arab-Israeli conflict and of toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The author rightly points out the problem America is facing after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. Will the European allies continue looking to their "big brother" once the Axis threat has been removed? Any single doctrine for an ever-changing and dangerous environment would be misplaced and self-defeating. A well-researched book which is a landmark study in international relations.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd)

About Face? : The United States and the United Nations. By Robert W. Gregg, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 181, \$ 16.95, ISBN 1-55587-406-1

Nobody can doubt that relations between the United Nations and its richest and most powerful member state, the United States, is of vital importance. But opinions differ on what the UN is and how it should function. Is it a "concert of great powers" meant to further their interests and uphold the post-World War II status quo? Is it a democratic gathering of all sovereign states meant to promote "equitable" reforms in the international system? The clash between these opposite viewpoints largely accounts for the problems faced by the UN over decades.

Robert Gregg analyses American expectations of the UN as an instrument of American global policy in the context of American national characteristics, including impatience. He traces American disenchantment with the UN to a perception that it "catered uncritically to Third World" (p. 81) majoritarianism and financial profligacy. He discusses the UN financial crisis of the 1980s—when the US refused to pay its assessed share—at length, illuminating too domestic political tussles. By the end of the decade Reaganite "UN bashing" had triumphed and Third World demands were in retreat. Gregg then examines the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 as a success story of US "leadership" through a spectacular war, postulating rapprochement in US-UN relations. His well documented narrative paints victory, shortlived, for both President Bush and the UN in global management.

Gregg's final chapter "Back to the Future" is a sober assessment of continuing incongruity between American expectations and international reality. He outlines four major problems likely to affect the UN adversely. The majority of members are frustrated by marginalization of the General Assembly, UN bureaucracy, humanitarian intervention as in Bosnia and Somalia, and shortage of funds intensifying all. The present Republican majority in the US Congress augurs ill for US financial cooperation and, therefore, for the United Nations.

-- Surjit Mansingh
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War. Ed. By Young Whan Kihl, Boulder, Westview, 1994, p. 371, \$ 64.00 ISBN 0-8133-1929-3

During the Cold War era, Korea's security agenda was defined largely by superpower rivalry. The goal of US strategy, as reflected in the Truman Doctrine was to stem the tide of Communist expansionism and contain Soviet power within the USSR's existing borders. Korea was cast as a crucial buffer and fulcrum in the balance of power among the major powers surrounding the peninsula, and North Korea's invasion in 1950 of its southern neighbour was seen as a key test of containment policy.

With the end of the cold war, re-unification of Germany and breakup of the Soviet Union, it is time to reconsider the Korean peninsula's strategic role in global

and regional politics. In this book, leading scholars and experts provides new perspectives on Korea's changing role in the new world order. What are the implications of the dramatic end of the cold war for East Asia and Korean peninsula? Will peace and prosperity return to the region, followed by the re-unification of divided Korea? The two factions have been having a series of negotiations towards achieving that goal. Or will history repeat itself in the form of violent conflict and rivalry? The contributors consider these questions in the context of major power's policies towards Korean peninsula, inter-Korean relations and revived prospects for Korean re-unification.

We must understand that the Korean people - though long divided by contending ideologies-view themselves as a single culture. They share a common thirst for re-unification. Thus if there is to be an enduring peace on the peninsula, it must be grounded on Korean values.

— Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. By George C. Herring, *Austin, University of Texas*, 1994, p. 228, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-292-73085-3

Historically, the USA was used to "taking success for granted". LB Johnson, president of this "most powerful nation of the world" confidently and deliberately led his country into a limited war against expansion by a backward underdeveloped Communist North Vietnam. It ended in American humiliation, and a "major national crisis", highly competent and a reputed leaders finished as men broken in spirit, while LBJ himself withdrew from the presidential elections. This book, on "presidential management of the policy-making and implementation process", investigates the political, military and civilian conduct of the war, showing how it became a "bureaucratic strategic deadlock", through which LBJ and his team could see no victory ahead, but only ever increasing casualties, and opposition of the American people.

LBJ was a "thoroughly political, profoundly insecure man", who placed personal loyalty to himself above all else. His style was "compromise and unanimity", evading constructive criticism and dissension within his team; he preferred "stealth and subterfuge to implement his policies". He and his administration handled the war as peace-time routine. His team-mates were "certainly not yes men", but they gave their personal loyalty at "huge cost to themselves, and specially to the nation". LBJ oriented the war to internal American politics; attempts to personally "micro-manage" operations from Washington added to operational frustrations; industrial style peacetime efficiency by McNamara sometimes led to critical shortages of ammunition and rations, "even in this age of abundance". This highly complex international conflict needed well evolved strategy, clear objectives, and directions, with total integration and coordination of implementation by political, military, and civilian agencies, both in Washington and in Vietnam. There were partially successful initiatives, such as "CORDS", and General Abrams "One-War" policy, but these were too late in the face of aroused anti-war public opinion. As events got beyond them LBJ and McNamara are described as "men in torment with themselves"; it was not just miscalculation, but functioning in a style which "refused to change, or even have a systematic discussion for change."

No two situations are historically the same. But there is much to learn here about higher political and military command in "battles for hearts and minds". The essentials for success are well developed consistent political strategy, clear objectives, integration of military security and civilian pacification, coordination implementation, and, above all, public support. We Indians can learn from this experience.

-- Tindi

De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal. Ed. By Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, *Oxford, Berg, 1994, p. 433, £ 19.95, ISBN 1 85973 066 3*

Few leaders have caught the world's imagination as Charles de Gaulle, the undisputed French nationalist with a flair for grandeur, charisma and political acumen. Paxton and Wahl have brought together views of both French and American leaders and bureaucrats regarding interaction of de Gaulle with his American counterparts. His vision of international order comprised of three fundamental elements - struggle to realize a nation's potential, strong leadership and a certain balance in national policies governed by measure and self-restraint. De Gaulle was a consummate player of balance-of-power politics. To him the American social system, in which material profit was the motivation of all activity, had to be replaced by concepts of thrift, duty and equality. De Gaulle deplored American recognition of the Vichy regime, perceived a threat to the French colonial empire, demolished U.S. designs for NATO, and disliked Roosevelt's hegemonistic attitude towards Europe. Yet, he continued to seek U.S. nuclear umbrella against Soviet threat. Roosevelt, on his part, saw de Gaulle as a potential military dictator. De Gaulle's determination to safeguard French interests was a source of bewilderment to American leaders who could never understand how an individual could embody a nation. Jean Lacouture, in his comments, expressed surprise over the mistrust towards de Gaulle when several of the greatest American presidents were ex-generals. Dulles enumerates the issues in Franco-American relations during the Kennedy-Johnson era - control of nuclear weapons on French soil, French dissatisfaction with the structure and functioning of NATO, and de Gaulle's insistence that France be recognized and treated as a world power.

De Gaulle's vision of Europe was "one in which France, as one of the two nuclear powers and the only not tied to American apron strings, would be the leader". Kissinger in his critique says "He was a man who detested communism, but he was also not a man given to crusades. He was a leader of a country that had suffered centuries of upheaval and decades of unfulfilled aspirations. He had to restore its sense of identity in order to make it meaningful to others. I believe he will go down as one of the great men of this century". A delightful book, absorbing, full of anecdotes and insights of the man who was Charles de Gaulle.

-- Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd)

Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics & Civil Society. By Kirk J. Beattie, *Boulder, Westview 1994, p. 260, \$ 60.00 ISBN 0-8133-8454-0*

The history of the world has shaped by two revolutions; first a French political

one heralding a secular nation state and the second English industrial revolution. In Egypt anti-imperialist - nationalist forces revolution was led by a small group of Free Officers on 22 July 1952 who firmly believed that military transitional authoritarianism would accelerate the establishment of political, ideological and economic stability, and development and not the democratic processes.

How Nasser controlled the political parties, the press, the lawyer's syndicate, the intelligentsia in the universities and the students makes a fascinating reading. Nasser's vision of Egypt was to take it "from camel to the rocket".

Removal of debauched monarch, rule by "native sons", land reforms, better employment opportunities, withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian soil, nationalization of Suez Canal, an independent foreign policy, creation of Pan - Arab nationalism were some of the achievements of Nasser's regime. An absorbing book.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present. By Charles-Robert Ageron, London, Hurst & Company, 1991, p. 166, £ 19.00, ISBN 1850650276

This book is a translation from the original French and covers the history of Algeria from the French conquest in 1830 to the present day. In 1848, Algeria was declared a province of France and over the years, a large number of French settled down in Algeria - called *colons*. Algerians struggled for independence under Front de Liberation National (FLN) and on 1 Nov 1954, Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) unfurled the flag of revolt. After a bloody struggle, Gen Charles de Gaulle, decided to grant freedom to Algeria. This was fiercely resisted by the *colons*' Organisation de l'armee Secrete (OAS). However, by the Evian Agreement, Algeria joined the comity of free nations. New Algeria is faced with an internal threat by the Islamic Fundamentalists. If Algeria breaks the shackles of fundamentalism, a new chapter will be added to the history of Algeria.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

The Clandestine Building of Libya's Chemical Weapons Factory : A Study in International Collusion. By Thomas C. Wiegale, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois Univ Press, 1992, p. 199, ISBN 0-8093-1775-3

Libya has been in the news since 1980, because of the manufacture of chemical weapons clandestinely. From 1980 to 1989, Libya acquired the components and the material to construct elaborate chemical weapons system. Although USA and the other western countries opposed the construction of the Libyan chemical weapons factory, yet the Middle Eastern neighbours like West Germany supported it and allowed the assembly of the chemical weapons. The production of the chemical weapons has now disturbed the peace of the whole world.

The book has given a detailed account of how various events have led to the formation of chemical weapons with the support of West Germans. Initially USA tried

its best to find out if Libya was manufacturing any chemical weapons, and Libya had been continuously denying its adventurism. It was after lot of deliberations and continuous pressure on Germany that it came out with a paper that was officially supported saying that it was involved with Libya.

The author feels that the proliferation of chemical weapons cannot be easily stopped, because the material used in their assembly is easily available as it is used for manufacture of non-military commodities like pharmaceutical, fertilizer, petrochemical, and pesticide products.

The author feels, that it is a serious matter which needs to be tackled at the international level. He observes that the chemical weapons in the hands of a country like Libya could pose a direct challenge to the security of any nation.

— Col P K Vasudeva (Retd)

Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War. Ed By Phebe Marr and William Lewis, *Boulder, Westview, 1993, p. 253, \$ 55.00, ISBN 0-8133-8663-2*

Watching the Middle East scene in 1992 must have pleased American observers. The rival superpower of yesteryears had ceased to be either a superpower or a rival. Of the two possible regional troublemakers neither Iran nor Iraq would be able to threaten US interests for several years. The strident opposition of Arab clients of the former Soviet Union had given way to more pragmatic policies. In the Gulf War of 1991 US Weapons technology and US diplomacy had scored spectacular successes.

What opportunities did this situation offer to the USA? Could this scenario be altered negatively during the decade, what options did the USA have for dealing with the challenges which may arise? In the essays compiled in this volume a group of strategists and academics associated with the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defence University of the USA have attempted to answer these questions.

As the repository of 66 per cent of the world's oil the Middle East is of crucial importance to the industrialized west whose dependence on Gulf oil is going to increase even further in the foreseeable future. Availability of Gulf oil at "stable and reasonable" prices is naturally on top of US priorities. Following closely is the protection of the strategic ally Israel. Both these objectives could be threatened by eruption of violent conflicts in the region. While the collapse of the Soviet Union has improved the prospects of resolution of the Arab Israeli dispute the advantage may be lost if the dispute is allowed to linger. The birth of eight weak republics in Central Asia with ethnic, religious and cultural overlappings relating to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan has added to the potential for ethnic and sectarian conflict already existing in Turkey, Syria Lebanon, Iraq & Iran. Location of nuclear weapons and associated research and development centres in several of the new republics has given rise to fears of advanced nuclear weapon technology becoming available to states seeking power to back their aspirations. Economic scarcity, population growth, maldistribution of resources and extremist ideologies are among the other factors which can threaten peace. Water scarcity in the Jordan river basin is most likely to lead to a conflict unless a solution

to the problem is found in time. To a lesser degree, sharing of the Euphrates waters can also cause tensions among the upper and lower riparians.

The contributing scholars have presented some illuminating and balanced studies of the problems and issues which will have to be addressed by the governments of the Middle East countries and the USA and its friends, if peace and stability are to be maintained in the region.

— J P Sharma
Former Additional Secretary
Government of India

Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East : Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement. By Juan R.I. Cole, *Princeton, Princeton University, 1993, p. 341, £ 33.00, ISBN 0-691-05683-8*

In its long history Egypt has repeatedly experienced foreign domination. After the end of the brief French occupation, it became in 1885, a vassal state of the Ottoman empire, obliged to pay tribute and to provide troops to Istanbul, but enjoying considerable administrative autonomy. The Viceroyalty became hereditary in one family and in 1867 the Viceroy assumed the title of Khedive.

Egypt experienced a cotton boom in the 1860s and 1870s accompanied by a large European immigration. While the revenues increased, Egypt contracted huge debts from Europeans largely for infrastructure development, which it soon found impossible to repay. The declaration of bankruptcy in 1876 resulted in the setting up of a Franco British Dual Control, with half of Egypt's budget being reserved for debt servicing. While the European immigrants gained privileges and opportunities for getting rich, the Egyptian Military and bureaucracy suffered and the local population was subjected to heavy taxation. Popular opposition to foreign domination and economic misery gradually created a revolutionary situation. On 29 July 1882 the National Congress decided to depose the Khedive and a "Common Law" cabinet governed the country till the British occupation of Cairo on 15 Sept. 1882. Col. Ahmad Urabi was the central figure of this short lived revolution.

Using material from a variety of sources including some unused documents from Egyptian archives, the author traces the changes from 1858 onwards, in the various social strata of Egypt - the guilds, the intelligentsia, the rural notables, middle classes and peasants which contributed to the development of a revolutionary situation. He examines the theses propounded by other scholars and compares the Urabi Revolution with the Boxer rebellian in China and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978-79.

While making a useful addition to the literature on the subject of causes and conditions of Revolutions, this highly readable book provides valuable insight into the society and institutions of Egypt in the latter half of the 19th Century.

— J P Sharma
Former Additional Secretary
Government of India

Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan. By Aryeh Shalev Jerusalem, *Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies*, 1994, p. 228 (*Study No 24*), \$ 24.00, ISBN 965-459-008-5.

The strategic area of Golan Heights was seized by Israel from Syria during the 1967 war. The chances of progress in the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria have considerably improved today. For concluding a peace treaty with Israel Syria wants the Golan Heights to be restored to Syrian sovereignty. What would Israel want in return?

According to the author, Israel wants a genuine peace but fears that even after concluding a peace treaty it will remain exposed to the risk of attack. Real peace will be possible only when a West European like understanding develops among the states and peoples of the Middle East. Till then Israel's security must be ensured by safeguards to be built into the Peace Treaty. Such safeguards could include:-

1. Superpower guarantees of Israel's security.
2. Deployment of American troops in a demilitarized zone on the Golan Heights.
3. Provision of Israeli manned early warning and observation equipment and deployment of elements of Israeli Defence Forces at suitable locations/areas in Golan Heights.
4. Limitations on the size and deployment of Syria's armed forces and on use of Syrian territory by armed forces of other countries.
5. Equitable shifting of the international boundary between Israel & Syria.

It would be wrong to expect objectivity in a work of this nature. Obviously Israel is not an innocent victim of undeserved Arab hostility. The merit of this book lies in the lucid and precise analysis of the problems to be sorted out from Israel's point of view and its enunciation of the position that the Israelis will probably take when they enter into peace negotiations with Syria.

— J P Sharma
Former Additional Secretary
Government of India

Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned. By Michael J. Mazarr and Others, *Boulder, Westview*, 1993, p. 207, ISBN 0-8133-1598-0.

Studies of a particular war in its unique dimensions and the political and military lessons derived from it are important inputs in weighing foreign and defence policy alternatives. When a vague concept of new world order tends to defy proper understanding of prevalent power equations, such studies acquire greater relevance. Every war has a few new lessons to offer, not only to the parties involved but also to the ringside viewers, which may lead to adaptations and adjustments in foreign policies and defence strategy.

The authors of the book chronicled and analysed the origin and progress of the Iraq-Coalition clash of 1991 and in the light of their explorations, prescribed a few guiding principles for US defence policy. The emphasis is on contingency strategy that protects American global interests through operations of short duration with minimum casualties.

The book is a fine example of competent work and may prove to be a valuable acquisition for students of war and the strategists alike.

— Anindyo J Majumdar
J.N.U.

Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East. Ed By Shai Feldman, *Jerusalem, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994, p. 255, \$ 24.50 (Study No 25), ISBN 965-459-014-X*

An edited work of Shai Feldman, a Senior Research Associate at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, the book under review is a collection of papers delivered at the Second Ginosar Conference on Security and Arms Control in the Middle East. The work is divided into seven parts and each part logically leads to issues which concern security. It enables the reader to know the security concern in the Post Cold-War era and attempts to explain the concept of confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and the negotiation pattern of CBMs, be it at sea or land. The book narrates the European experience of CBMs and leads the reader to know about verification measures including the Satellite Verification. Verification measures taken in the Middle East and Europe are well covered. Part Six of the book deals with Arabs' Strategic Environment, Israel's Security concerns and the implication for Arms Control in the Israeli's Changing Environment. The book ends with the discussion on CBMs in the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Security concerns and the role and prospects of peace keeping forces in the Middle East. Though little out of context, yet very well covered, the feasibility and desirability of US Peace-keeping forces has also been discussed.

The book is well researched and should be read by all those who are interested to know about CBMs and how to take advantage of other's experience on CBMs.

— Maj Dr Sunil Chandra

The Superpowers and the Middle East : Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967. By Fawaz A. Gerges, *Boulder, Westview, 1994, p. 274, \$ 18.95 (PB), ISBN 0-8133-8697-7.*

The book focuses on the complexity and ambiguity of relations between Arab States and Superpowers from 1955 through 1967 including such major events as Baghdad Pact, the Egyptian - Soviet Arms Deal, the Suez Crisis, US intervention in Lebanon and the June 1967 Arab - Israeli War. The rivalries of then Superpowers (USA and USSR) who were seeking political, economic and ideological domination in Middle East were deftly manipulated by playing one against the other by Arab States. The

book also explodes the myth that existence of and war with Israel provided a platform of unity for Arab States, whereas in reality it divided them and thus affected their bargaining position with the Superpowers.

The USA and USSR both failed to appreciate the overwhelming sense of nationalism, Pan-Arabism and desire to pursue an independent foreign policy by the Arab States and thus missed various discernible opportunities to bring them in their respective folds. In addition both looked at their Middle East policy through the prism of Cold War rather than in terms of Middle Eastern internal dynamics. An original and absorbing work.

— Maj Gen J.N. Goel (Retd)

The Gulf Conflict and International Relations. By Ken Matthews, *London, Routledge, 1993, p. 339, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-415-07519-X.*

The author has analytically, systematically and chronologically put across in a vivid; lucid and simple yet forceful style the ideas and insights to highlight the multifarious aspects of the Gulf conflict from the point of view of International Relations. The book is a veritable ocean of resources in this regard.

Of the ten chapters that the book has been divided into the first, the genesis of crisis, describes end of European imperial intervention, the development of Cold War antagonism & the creation of Israeli State; second, the crisis, as the politico-economic restructuring, expansionist ambitions & Iraqi strategic interest despite trodding on the well-known western economic and security interests in the area and, threatening Saudi Arabia; third, the UN success in the 'make or break issue' in this conflict and creating a precedent; fourth, the diplomacy of crisis, as President's Bush's 'second term' 'wimp factor', 'Vietnam factor' and President Saddam's 'irrational over confidence in his crisis policies'; fifth, the Gulf conflict and International Law, clearly bring out the Anti-Iraqi sentiments of the UN members kicked by the contemptuous attitude of the Iraqi President towards the world body and the intelligent and apt handling with which the UN coalition was put together by the major Security Council members - the US, Britain & France; sixth, the non observance by Iraq of the 'laws of war - *jus and bellum* and *jus in bello* and the inability of the coalition partners to book the Iraqi leaders for the war crimes due to "stopping the war short of unconditional surrender and occupation of Iraq" and "a political disincentive to press war crimes charges"; seventh, morality in the Gulf-conflict stands justified as per the code of *just* war from Western standards and President Saddam's invoking of *Jehad*; eight, the economic dimensions of the conflict - political economy of the oil, costing of war and its impact on the domestic economics of the major actors and global economy as a whole; ninth, war strategy being Iraqi military victory - Iraqi presence in Kuwait under UN sanctions - Iraqi defeat - Iraq quitting Kuwait without fight matrix; and finally the tenth and the last chapter, the aftermath, elaborates the Gulf war as a manifestation of political, economic and security importance of Middle East. No war - cold or shooting - could diminish the importance of the Middle East and will continue to involve the core powers.

Gazetteer of participating states, conflict chronology cartographic displays, UN resolutions and Gulf statistics have added to the utility and completeness of the treatise. The book is a single authentic and objective source of information on the Gulf conflict and is recommended to all those who are interested in geo-politics and oil politics.

— Air Commodore S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

The Victorian Soldier, Studies in the History of the British Army 1816-1914, Ed. by Marion Harding, *London National Army Museum, 1993, p. 247, ISBN 0-901721-28-X.*

Studies in the history of British Army covering a period of nearly one century, is a compilation of interesting & important facts concerning the organisational/operational aspects of the British Army. Even though the text is absorbing yet the reader is constantly wondering at the perfect team work achieved by the Editor, the Designer, the Producer, the curator of the National Army Museum. The size, the paper, the print, the artwork; the photographs, the original letters/notings/decisions, the regimental diaries/re-equipping; their equipment and their records; the campaigns and their medals, the honours & awards and their descriptions with evolutionary/revolutionary/historical background make the volume simply unique.

The progressive centralised, unified, command structure since the days of fragmentation to mergers & amalgamation has been brought out comprehensively, concisely and cogently. The readers in the age group of 50-75 years will find it particularly interesting and nostalgic since they would find a bit of their own past in some form or the other. Despite the weight of this volume, one is not in a position to put it down half way through. Such books are not merely military books; they have a special message for de-colonised, erstwhile dominions, developing nations and nations in search of identities i.e. the importance of record keeping - correctly & carefully, if for nothing else, just to enthrall the posterity - and also the importance of creating and sustaining outfits like the National Army Museum.

— AVM S S Malhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Lonely Leader : Monty 1944-1945. By Alistair Horne and David Montgomery, *London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 381, £ 17.50, ISBN 0-333-58708-1.*

The higher you go, the colder it is; and lonelier. In Montgomery's case, however, it was by conscious choice. He isolated himself from his kith and kin, his peers, his subordinates and even his staff! It was only with his very young and junior band of liaison officers at the 'Tac Hq', that he developed any close relationship. Uncharacteristic though it was, it bordered almost on the filial. By nature egocentric, assured victories in ponderous set-piece battles appear to have bolstered his vainglorious psyche. He became progressively more ruthless, acerbic and caustic. He spared no one, not even Eisenhower, his immediate boss! Even Church got the occasional rub, suffering him but barely. That he found himself lonesome and out of place even at the mighty and lofty perch of the imperial British military hierarchy, was his very own doing.

Essentially an anecdotal account of Montgomery, the legendary war-time military leader, this book is also a very lucid tale of the Fall of France and the reconquest of most of western Europe subsequent to the D-Day landings in Normandy in 1945. The authors, one of whom happens to be Monty's only son; retread the hops of the 'Tac Hq' of the 21 Army Group plodding away on left flank of the Allied thrust; with nostalgic pride. They acquaint the reader with Monty's singularly insular style of command and the influence of his overwhelmingly overbearing, strong and spartan character on the course of great battles. Recounted with much compassion and understanding, David Montgomery and Alistare Horne, also bring forth Monty — the man — warts and all, in sharp focus. Whether he emerges as 'a tired little fart' (Patton), or as a Cromwellian colossus of all times, is for the lay reader to surmise.

— Lt Col A K Sharma

Belgrade : Among the Serbs. By Florence Hamlish Levinsohn, *Chicago, Ivan R. DEE, 1994, p. 337, \$ 27.50, ISBN 1-56663-061-4.*

Based on interviews carried out in the autumn of 1993 of Serb academics, journalists, writers and other artistes, and politicians, "Belgrade - Among The Serbs" records their views, as also of some of the ordinary people the author met, on recent events in former Yugoslavia: the causes of the conflict, President Slobodan Milosevic's role, the role of the West (particularly Germany and the USA) and the Vatican, the effects of the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, and so on.

Whereas the book is a welcome relief from the mass of anti-Serb literature and media coverage of the last few years, it only records views of Serbs in and around Belgrade. Even so, it is remarkable for the wide range of expression and the apparent freedom with which views have been stated; from extreme nationalism and support for President Milosevic, to more objectivity and outright condemnation of him and his policies. There is, however, a certain undercurrent of "victim mentality" which the author has dwelt on at some length, as much because it exists, as because she had already convinced herself of its presence.

Some of the aspects that are highlighted in the book and are of specific relevance to those who are following events in the region, are the deliberate anti-Serb bias of Western Governments and their punishment of the people of Serbia and Montenegro by imposition of sanctions, the culpability of all three parties to the conflict (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) in igniting the conflict, and continuing to fan the flames, the clever use of "public relations" experts and paid propagandists in the West, particularly the USA, by the Croats and the Muslims, as against the defiant acceptance of their lot by the Serbs, and the unequivocal determination of Serbs of all categories that Kosovo shall remain in Serbia.

The book is rather sedate in its pace and its accounts for the most part, but explodes into life in the last twenty pages, when the author recounts details of her interviews with an objective economist, and with Dobrica Cosic who was the Federal President during a crucial period in 1992-93; as also in the epilogue, where she makes

some startling revelations, which though suspected for long, are being aired publicly, by an eminent American writer at that, for probably the first time.

Comfortable reading, the book is recommended for those interested in the history of the Balkans, and others who are attempting to follow the kaleidoscope of events taking place in that region.

— Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, VrC (Retd)

Constitutional Relations between Britain & Burma. Burma, the Struggle for Independence 1944-1948; Documents from official and private sources, Volume I From Military Occupation to Civil Government, 1 January 1944 to 31 August 1946. Ed. by *Hugh Tinker, Assisted by Andrew Griffin, London HMSO, 1983, pp 1078, £ 95.00*

Like the several volumes of the official History of the Transfer of Power to India, this Volume is a masterly compilation of documents, both official and private, preserved in British records, relating to the Transfer process in Burma. Of necessity, a starting date had to be determined; to have gone back to before the Japanese invasion in December 1941 would have entailed several discontinuities. An arbitrary date was chosen - 1 January 1944 - when a British military Administration of those parts of Burma under Allied control, was set up under the Supreme Allied Commander, Lord Louis Mountbatten. In the words of the Editor, Lord Mountbatten was to have a dynamic influence on the course of political events in Burma. He adopted a policy of leniency and conciliation, and, against much opposition, took a personal decision to deal with Aung San as leader of the Burmese nationalists.

The 'independence' granted by the Japanese to Burma was illusory; two resistance movements began after the Japanese occupation. One was led by Aung San and Thakin Than Tun, the other was organised separately by the Karens. This volume covers the last year and a half of the Japanese occupation of Burma; the period of British military administration, and the first year of the restored British civil government. In the course of this period, the exiled Government of Burma in Simla, under the Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman Smith, planned for the return and discussed this subject with the War Cabinet. L.S. Amery, Clement Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps evolved a cautious programme of constitutional advance towards self-government; Churchill deplored any policy leading to destruction of the Empire. The rapid reoccupation of Burma by the 14th Army and the subsequent chain of events, till the appointment of Major General Sir Hubert Rance, Mountbatten's former Chief Civil Affairs Officer, as Governor, end the story covered in this volume.

A factual historical record such as this is difficult of review. It has been painstakingly put together by an eminent scholar, ably assisted by an archivist of repute. The volume of messages exchanged between the Governor of Burma, his officers, Aung San, the Supreme Allied Commander, the Chiefs of Staffs, members of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom and other personalities, is colossal. Nevertheless, they are worth glancing through, for their forthrightness and felicity of expression. To the military reader, the exchanges of thought between Mountbatten, his formation

Commanders and political personalities are an education, as to how civil-military relations ought to be conducted when military operations are in progress, or when a country is under military occupational rule.

A massive tome, a labour of love, which is beyond doubt, authoritative history.

— Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow. Ed. By Teresa Pelton Johnson and others, *Washington, Brassey's (US), 1994, p. 208, £ 12.95, ISBN 0-02-881088-0*

These essays were written or revised sometime in 1993. Russia has seen swift changes in the last four years, which renders most writing on Russia out of date even before it is in print. However, these essays are not without interest. Authored by influential policymakers and analysts in the field of security and foreign relations, the essays deal with issues which still confront Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Alexie Arbatov takes an overall view of the limited options available to a weakened Russia in a multipolar world. He recommends a multipolar balance of power with Russia cooperating with the United States and Europe, to thwart the expansionist policies of regional or subregional states. The key relationship with the United States is examined at length by Sergei Rogov. He concentrates on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles and goes on to suggest a framework of "cooperative security" between Russia and the United States in the first instance. Ruslan Khasbulatov examines the complexities of relations within CIS. Evgeni Shaposhnikov deals with the changes required in the defence organisation consequent to the emergence of CIS. While Andrei Kokoshin concerns himself with demilitarisation of the industrial economy and suggests a concrete programme of conversion of the defence industry to civilian use, V.N. Lobov deals with various aspects of military reform in the changed political context. He recommends that Russia should focus on prevention of military conflicts wherever they occur. He visualises global strategic stability characterised by maintenance of mutually acceptable levels of weapons and forces coupled with a firm response to destabilising factors. Rurikov deals with the emergence of Russian foreign policy even before the breakup of the Soviet Union.

An analysis of the Russian public and parliamentary response to the policy options considered in these essays, would have been a welcome addition to the Seven Views from Moscow.

— Ambassador S K Bhutani
Indian Foreign Service

Unchained Reactions: Chernobyl, Glasnost, and Nuclear Deterrence. By Arthur T. Hopkins, *Washington, DC, National Defence University, 1993, p. 151, ISBN 0-16-035970-8*

Lt. Col. Arthur T. Hopkins of USAF in his doctoral thesis, has simply yet

effectively brought out the change in the attitude of the Soviet people in the post-Chernobyl era because of the advent of the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika in the Russian political firmament. The changed environment enabled the assertion of the "will of the people" of USSR as Chernobyl acting a catalyst in influencing the attitudes of the political leaders and people; and changing their intentions to sufficiently strengthen the nuclear deterrence.

Of the six chapters that the thesis has been divided into, the first - Ukrainian syndrome - describes Chernobyl's catastrophicity and its sanitising cost; second - the strained evolution of the glasnost - bringing out the real facts casting away the negative publicity of the Communists; third - openness and Soviet attitude - affecting the people's attitude for and against deterrence; fourth - weaker deterrence - highlighting the shortfalls in their Civil Defence System, and example of the after effects of Chernobyl and the difficult recovery; fifth - stronger deterrence - narrates the 'dread factor', and lastly - after Chernobyl - clearly demonstrates the strength of nuclear deterrence to the Soviet citizenry and national authorities alike.

The book is recommended to all those who want to acquaint themselves with the effects of nuclear holocaust (not necessarily from the nuclear bombs) and its avoidance and disaster response planning.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Signals Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region. By Desmond Ball, *Singapore, Institute of South East Asian Studies, 1993, p. 144, \$ 25.00, ISBN 981-3016-36-1*

This book is a useful study of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) which is the collection of intelligence by the interception of communications or monitoring of other electronic signals. This book reveals two major SIGINT Chinese stations against India at Chengdu and Dayi - both in Sichuan Province besides other stations all along Indo-Tibet border; exposes the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operating its SIGINT system and inclusion of SIGINT Battalions and EW (Early Warning Brigades) in each Corps; also USA-controlled SIGINT base at Bada Bier near Peshawar; it also divulges India's RAW operating SIGINT through ETS (Electronic Technical Section) and ARC (Aviation Research Centre); Indian Navy and IAF making very useful contribution to SIGINT.

A very informative book.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie 1911-1937. By Marie-Claire Bergere, *Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 356, \$ 59.50*

Ms. Marie Claire Bergere has shed light on the remarkable phenomenon of the excellent period of the Chinese bourgeoisie which emerged due to the peculiar situation occurring as a result of the First World War. The West like industrial boom took place

in central east coast region in general and Shanghai in particular on account of the initiative taken by the business/entrepreneurial families. The book brings out the state of relations that subsisted among the bourgeoisie, the state, the revolution and the West at that point of time. During this period even though the state authority was at the lowest ebb yet the bourgeoisie could not assert themselves against Kuomintang's centralised authority. Paradoxically, on the communist take over the state adopted many ideas and procedures of the erstwhile bourgeoisie in the industrial sphere.

All-in-all the book makes a good reading and effectively brings out the interaction of the industrial, financial and institutional forces during 1911-1907.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy. By Michael D. Swaine with Donald P. Henry, *Santa Monica, Rand, 1995, p. 144, ISBN 0-8330-1659-8*

Foreign policy grows out of the interaction of internal and external environment; Chinese foreign policy is no exception to this generalization. But it becomes difficult to analyse when profound changes are taking place both within China and throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This slim volume, written for the United States Secretary for Defence, focusses on China's domestic trends in order to assess China's probable stances in foreign affairs over the next 10-15 years. Indians concerned with national security matters should profit from this clear and concise presentation with its excellent bibliography.

The authors identify important politico-military, social-intellectual and economic developments taking place inside China, discuss various specialist views on the trends indicated, and draw corresponding (alternate) implications for Chinese foreign policy in general and US interests in particular. Assuming basic continuity in China, they postulate increased economic and military growth posing "manageable" problems for China's neighbours. More dangerous consequences would follow from the emergence of an assertively anti-West, and possibly military dominated China. A weak, insecure and defensive China fearing foreign intervention or social chaos may also prove to be destabilizing for the entire region.

The authors consider it unlikely that in the next 15 years China will become democratic or that it will collapse. In short, the sooner the world learns to integrate a powerful China into normal interchanges, the better for everyone.

— Surjit Mansingh
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas. By M R Narayan Swamy, *Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1994, p. 348, Rs. 350/-, ISBN 81-220-0386-9*

A well researched and documented account of the growth of militants for Tamil

Eelam. The author gradually takes the reader to the dynamics of Velupillai Prabhakaran becoming the most dreaded guerrilla leader of modern times. The book gives a telling account of Tamil military training in the hands of Indians at Madras, Dehradun and Madurai. It also traces the training links of LTTE and TELO with Palestinians and groups like Al-Fatah. The rise and fall of the militant groups is also given in a narrative manner.

The second part of the book deals with Tamil groups engaging the Sri-Lankan Army and Indian - army into a war. The author spells out in detail the activity which had taken place before the Indo-Srilanka accord. The culmination of the book is aftermath of the accord, its failure, and the subsequent pull out of the Indian army. To sum up, a valuable addition to the existing literature of material available on growth of militants and their resolve for a separate Eelam.

— Maj Sunil Chandra

Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka. By Dennis Austin, *New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995, p. 101, \$ 14.95, ISBN 0-87609-174-5.*

Dennis Austin's book is a summary of political events of India and Sri Lanka after independence from colonial rule. The author brings out the reasons for violence in a democracy, where, rightly so, such a phenomenon should be non-existent in countries where the people elect their representatives for governance. He deals in great detail about India, its parliamentary system, elections and the political process. Caste, class, community, territorial allegiance and religion have contributed to violence but the main divide has been Islamic fundamentalism and a resurgence of Hindu militancy. In the same vein, Sri Lanka's problems have their roots in a clash of Buddhist chauvinism and Sinhala stridency on the one hand and Tamil alienation and struggle for survival on the other. The book has a number of factual and typographical errors - Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is called Bahadur Sapru, Laloo Prasad Yadav stated to belong to the low caste, the sentence "Patels fought against the lower caste Kshatriyas (Kshatriyas are not low caste), L.K. Advani called Dr. L.K. Advani, Table 5 showing BJP and Congress figures above the total number of seats for Madhya Pradesh, thanedar being called the village headman (in fact he is the officer incharge of a police station) and the sentence "Rajiv Gandhi...injured when attacked by a local naval rating using his rifle as a club".

As far as India is concerned, the author is of the view that democracy and violence will co-exist, but for how long is anybody's guess. For Sri Lanka he has predicted a bleak future.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd.)

Namibia-India; Five Decades of Solidarity. Ed By TG Ramamurthi, *New Delhi, New Age International, 1995, p. 134, ISBN 81-224-07772-2.*

South Africa-India : Partnership in Freedom and Development. Ed By TG Ramamurthi, *New Delhi, New Age International, 1995, p. 200, ISBN 81-224-0777-3.*

India's consistent and principled support for the liberation of Namibia (formerly known as South West Africa) and the rebirth of South Africa as a non-racial, egalitarian democracy is very well known. South Africa has indeed been the birth-place of India's own freedom struggle as Gandhiji discovered his novel and potent weapon of non-violent mass resistance during his struggle for equality in that country. Not so well-known, however, is the up-hill task India had to undertake to bring world attention to the situation in Southern Africa, thanks to cold-war politics and the general antipathy of the developed world to freedom movements and non-violent resistance in the developing world. The two books under review present documents recording India's efforts in various international fora, principally the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Non-aligned Movement. The documents presented in the two books also bear witness to India's bilateral assistance and encouragement to the resistance struggles in Namibia and South Africa. The documents, some of them rare and not easily available to student and scholars, go back to 1946.

However, the significance of the two books lie in their futurist outlook. The past solidarity is recalled only to provide backdrop to the emerging relations of cooperation and collaboration in mutual development. Covering the most recent developments, including the visit of President Nelson Mandela to India in 1995, these books bring the picture uptodate.

Both these books are library editions of the Special Issues of the *Africa Quarterly*, the oldest Journal in India, perhaps Asia too, devoted exclusively to African affairs, published since 1961. Under its current Editor, Dr. Ramamurthi, the *Africa Quarterly* has been focussing on India's relations with individual as well as groups of African states, like Post-Apartheid South Africa, Francophone Africa and the Horn of Africa. The Journal with an annual subscription of Rs. 100 (Inland) and \$ 40 (Foreign) deserves to be more widely circulated than it is at present.

— Lt Col Gautam Sharma (Retd)

Tomorrow is another Country : The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Revolution. By Allister Sparks, *London, Heinemann, 1995, p. 254, £ 7.99, ISBN 0-434-00127-9.*

It is a story of the old guard's persecution, the young 'Turks showing accommodation to blacks and the tenacity of the natives to get freedom from white shackles in South Africa. It is a tale of personal freedom....for Blacks, freedom from oppression; for Whites, freedom from guilt.

At times truth is stranger than fiction and this book written in the style of a best selling spy thriller conclusively and convincingly proves the above saying. It is a description of how initially covert talks from 1985 to 1990 and later overt ones from 1990 to 1993 fructified between members of Afrikaners (whites propagating apartheid) and African National Congress both seized with a desire to herald peace through democracy in South Africa based on conflicting perceptions of sharing power; and also without violence, prejudice to colour, race or religion. The tenuous process of

negotiations went on for eight years prior to and after release of Nelson Mandela, a fitness fanatic, from prison in February 1990 by president De Klerk. How Mac Maharaj, an Indian, a member of ANC national executive committee, played a crucial part between Tambo, the ANC President in exile at Lusaka and Nelson Mandela in and out of prison makes a fascinating reading.

The mutual suspicion between Afrikaners and ANC together with White regime's trickery is well documented. An interesting and gripping book.

— Maj Gen JN Goel (Retd)

Low Intensity Conflict : The New Dimensions of India's Military Commitment. By Maroof Raza, Meerut, Kartikeya Publications, 1995, p. 92, Rs. 150/-, ISBN 81-85-823-08-1.

The monograph authored by Maroof Raza contains the distilled wisdom of his military service and studies in London and Cambridge, while on sabbatical. His thesis is that the proliferation of tasks for the military in the past decade indicates a trend that shall persist into the next century. Recognising this, he recommends the adoption of the appropriate doctrine with the necessary modification in organisation and training. He bases his arguments on the Army's learning experience in the North East, Punjab, Sri Lanka and Kashmir and draws on the lessons of the Army's involvement to present his recommendations for the direction of change.

The author in commenting on the higher plane of the political-military management deems prevention as better than cure. For prevention his recipe relies in the unity in diversity formula with emphasis on constitutional federalism. For the cure, he propagates Civil-Military Fusionism. This concept entails the direct professional input of military expertise to the political decision-maker.

He also urges the adoption of a declaratory policy of nuclear possession to deter inadvertent escalation of 'proxy war' to war. A reconfiguration of the CI formations in the pattern of the American Light Infantry Division is suggested with its integral complement of light armoured vehicles, a limited air mobile component, hi-tech weaponry, communication and surveillance devices. These formations supplemented by special force units should be dedicated to combat in LIC. The model he advocates may have relevance for restructuring the presently evolving RR. The financing of the force could be catered by a reduced emphasis on the formations with offensive capability, rendered less pertinent given the reliance on nuclear deterrence.

This kind of assessment of the future of war being in unconventional LIC is gaining credibility today, not the least because the doyen of military futurologists Van Creveld advocates it. Even the American Army has recognised the further development of warfighting capability as superfluous given that a Kuwait type conflict is less plausible while a future Mogadishu is virtually certain. Not all of the inherited Soviet weaponry could benefit the Russians in Chechenya.

The monograph is therefore timely. It reinforces the prevalent thought in the

Army and has policy and doctrinal recommendations that could reinforce it. The Army has understood that doing the nation's 'dirty business' is part of its job, distasteful though it initially appeared to have been. This is evident from its activation of the RR, a manner of institutionalising its involvement in IS duty. Therefore, the monograph could prove a valuable input for both, those of us paid to think and those paid to implement - the author's intended audience, his erstwhile comrades in arms.

— Captain Ali Ahmed

India and the Bomb : Public Opinion and Nuclear Options. Ed. By David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, *Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, 1995, p. 147*

An Academic Exercise in eliciting opinion pertaining to the vexed question of whether India should go nuclear or remain non-nuclear was conducted by Joan B Kroc. The aim of the exercise was to "democratise" this strategic issue. An elaborate and deliberate questionnaire was sent to a wide spectrum of opinion makers. The feed-back enabled the authors to conclude:... "the most important considerations that would permit India to renounce the nuclear options are a time-bound (plan for) global nuclear disarmament and a verifiable renunciation of Pakistan's nuclear options". Interestingly, it added to its finding that the Chinese nuclear capabilities either in Tibet or the mainland did not much bother these opinion makers. Of the two, a nuclear Pakistan and a confirmed nuclear power China, the trust seems to weigh in favour of Beijing not resorting to a nuclear black-mail!

The choice of the opinion makers is the first thing that strikes the eye. They include: civil servants, academics, scientists, politicians, lawyers, journalists, doctors, service officers, policemen, sportsmen, and even artists. That, not all really could have a considered view on this issue is vindicated by the fact that the opinion poll gave a blinkered outcome on the Chinese nuclear capability. The opinion makers, no doubt, had to see over and beyond the horizon.

The White Paper of MOD India for 1994 categorically states that Pakistan is in possession of nuclear weapon capability. This has been confirmed by the CIA and its own erstwhile Army Chief and the erstwhile PM. So India already acknowledges the nuclear threat from Pakistan. China is now competing with the US and Russia to achieve nuclear parity. Though way below, it is a strong contender to replace Russia as a super power. Its threat to India, despite the LAC Accord and recent reduction of four posts in Arunachal, remains. So does its position on Sikkim and Arunachal. One wonders, therefore, if these "assumptions" were ignored?

The question of the "nuclear umbrella" agitates the mind. Will any such guarantee, except in a total state of dependence, if not surrender, be given or accepted by a country like India? Obviously, not. Those who want to renounce the nuclear option in favour of a conventional defence against its two nuclear adversaries forget the lessons of the VJ Day!

The book (skeleton form) is painstakingly researched and is a valuable asset

even in its present form. Yet it would do better if a chapter on Myths & Actualities of India's Nuclear Programme is added to clear the fog that otherwise lingers on.

— Brig C B Khanduri

Sea Power and Indian Security. By Rahul Roy-Chaudhary *London, Brassey's, 1995, p. 222, £ 29.95 (HC), ISBN 1-85753-050-0*

This is a comprehensive and well researched book which covers the growth of the Indian Navy and associated infrastructure from Independence to the current period in an easy and readable style. Not many of us understand the imperatives of the maritime security, let alone the influence that sea power or lack of it has exerted on the course of Indian history. The battles of Panipat are still read more avidly than the battle of Plassey - the former dealt with cross-border raids in which the victors were eventually got assimilated into the vastness of the vanquished-but when they came via the sea, total capitulation was the seeming result.

The wind-down of the Royal Indian Navy from 400 ships and 30,500 officers and ratings, after the War, to a Post partition size of mere 30 ships and 4,659 men was a truly traumatic experience. It took a series of dedicated leaders like Admirals JTS Hall, Parry, Mark Pizey and Stephen Carlill to propose, persuade and implement an expansion plan which took nearly 40 years to fructify into a 100 ships navy with 48,000 officers and sailors by mid-eighties. The only agonising part of the story is that the successive Governments, which were so willing to listen to the British naval chiefs did not show as much faith in the plans produced by equally capable Indian chiefs that followed. The Naval budgets of the last 40 years which followed a sine curve, in which the highs were low and lows were deep, were indicative of this unfortunate trend.

What comes out very clearly is that "the flexibility and mobility of naval forces and the unique nature of the medium upon which they traverse, necessitates a perspective on maritime affairs broader than simply one of rigid threat perceptions from neighbouring countries". Our dependence on sea with its multifarious resources and long lead-time required to build a navy are reasons enough to allocate adequate funds annually for its growth and maintenance. The author also highlights other areas of continued maritime interest in the Indian Ocean like prevention of smuggling, narcotics trade, elimination of piracy, environmental pollution, search and rescue operations, plan and promote secure environment for deep sea mining, co-operate in newly emerging ship designs, shipbuilding, hydrography, training, standardisation of equipment and procedures for greater inter-operatability and lastly form joint task forces for quick response to natural calamities and disasters in the Indian Ocean littoral. A carrier-centered naval force could support the legitimate governments in strife ridden countries within the Indian Ocean rim thereby turning the area from Zone of Peace to Zone of Maritime Co-operation. Indian Navy's advocacy and implementation of activities related to joint plans and actions can emerge as a critical instrument of our foreign policy.

An extremely good book for those who know nothing about maritime affairs and want it in an instant capsule.

— Vice Admiral S C Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)

The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828-1928. By Bernd Langensiepen & Ahmet Guleryuz. London, Conway Maritime 1995, p. 202, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-85177-610-8

A very neatly printed book in which the story of Ottoman's Steam Navy is presented in a style more reminiscent of a Ship's Log. It gives a faithful record of the happenings during the Ottoman Navy's switch over from sail to steam but without any specific comment. The mad scramble by western shipyards to get a piece of the cake is also listed in a more or less bland fashion.

Whilst the Ottomans were not new to seafaring their success with steam powered ships does not come out as well as the sail. No nation can build an Empire as big and powerful as the Ottomans without controlling the seas of interest to it, yet it needs to be said that their's was an empire built more on the skills and strength of their army than the navy.

The exploits of the British, French and a lone Australian submarine in the narrow stretches of the Dardenelles and Sea of Marmara during the first World War makes interesting reading. It also emphasizes the sheer incompetence of the not so inconsiderable Ottoman Navy, which while playing second fiddle to the land forces, failed to make any impact on the course of war being fought at their doorstep. It must have been a disheartening experience for a Navy whose Admiral Mir Hassan fought the Portugese as far away as Diuhead in 1507 in the days of sail, to prevent the take over of the spice trade by the European adventurers. The photographs and ship data make up half the pages of the book, making it a good reference book of the time.

— Vice Admiral S C Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)

Apartheid and Indian South Africans : A Study of the Role of Ethnic Indians in the Struggle Against Apartheid in South Africa. By TG Ramamurthi, New Delhi. Reliance, 1995, p. 287, Rs. 350/-, ISBN 81-85972-87-7

One of the latterday miracles witnessed by this generation is the transition in South Africa from a skewed-up democracy to genuine rule of 'one man, one vote, one value'. For all intents and purposes, the smooth transition was the result of an understanding between the former ruling class, the whites, and the majority community among the formerly excluded groups - the black South Africans. But behind the transition which was hammered out over a period of three years, from the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, there is a long and arduous struggle that began in 1893. That was the demand for franchise for the excluded non-white groups put forward by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, then an unknown barrister who came to South Africa to make a success of his profession. No less than a person than Nelson Mandela himself has acknowledged on several occasions, both within and outside South Africa, that the struggle was indeed begun by Gandhi and the Indians.

In this context, the book under review is not only a timely but also a valuable reminder of the heroic role of the ethnic Indians in the long struggle against apartheid. The author recalls the 'legacy of resistance' from Gandhi and traces its rebirth after 1946 in the form of joint mass campaigns of non-violent resistance by Africans and

Indians. While recalling the contribution of Indians to the joint struggle, the author brings out the sagacity and statesmanship of the African leadership in forging a united front across barriers of class, colour and race. Meticulously researched and copiously documented, the book is bound to be useful to the scholar and the general reader alike.

-- Lt Col Gautam Sharma (Retd)

A Soldier's Voyage of Self Discovery. By Maj Gen KK Tewari (Retd), PVSM, AVSM, Pondicherry, Auroville, (1995), p. 169, Rs. 95/-.

Maj Gen Tewari was Commander Signals 4 Inf Div in 1962 when destiny took him to the most forward area exactly when the Chinese attacked and he was taken PW. Subsequently he was CSO Eastern Command during 1971 Operations. He was deeply influenced by Sri Aurobindo's teachings and 'Mother' midway in his life and ever since his retirement has been living at Auroville.

In this auto-biography he has described his life and career. The book does not cover or analyse various wars/operations in detail but gives his reflections on various aspects. His observations on lack of preparations for 1962 war, life as PW, Chinese character, treatment of PWs by India on return from China, system of awards and general tendencies in the Army make interesting reading.

-- VKS

Pakistan's Politics : The Zia Years. By Mushahid Hussain, New Delhi, Konark 1991, p. 205, Rs. 100/-, ISBN 81-220-0217-X

Mr Mushaid Hussain, a career Journalist, does an analysis of the national politics of Pakistan and the political role of the army under Field Marshal Zia who had a long spell as the military dictator of Pakistan. The book also discusses the reasons for Sind crisis as also the Afghan issue.

The author has stated that the creation of Pakistan by Mohd Ali Jinnah though opposed by Hindu and Muslim intellectuals was the right move. Whether the partition of India was a right decision is a very debatable point as most people in India and some in Pakistan feel that a united India would have been much stronger both militarily and economically as the two countries would not have fought three wars. Also there would have been no emergence of Bangladesh.

A good book which would be of interest to students of political history.

-- Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Bangladesh : Problems of Governance. By Rehman Sobhan, Delhi, Konark 1993, p 293, Rs 300/-, ISBN 81-220-0302-8.

This book written by an eminent economist, reviews the denial of democratic rights to the people of Bangladesh; struggle to achieve these rights and the impact of this struggle on the governance of Bangladesh. Bangladesh suffers from too many

people; too heavy monsoons; too much corruption, and too frequent student agitations and too murky politics. Elections of 1991 and installation of democratic government augurs well for the country.

-- Lt Col Daljeet Singh MSc (Retd)

Round The Clock : The Experience of the Allied Bomber Crews Who Flew By Day and By Night From England in the Second World War. By Philip Kaplan and Jack Currie, *London, Cassell, 1993, p. 234, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-304-34370-6*

"Round the Clock" is the story of the strategic bombing campaign launched jointly by USAAF and RAF under General Ira C Eaker and Air Chief Marshal Arthur T Harris respectively from England against Nazi Germany during world war II. The phrase "Round the Clock" was used extensively by General Eaker while arguing his case for assigning top priority to strategic bombing of German military, industrial and economic system at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, which was attended by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. Eaker's reference to bombing "Round the Clock" had found favour with Churchill who thereafter rolled the words in his mouth on numerous occasions to emphasise the importance of the campaign.

There is a plethora of literature available on strategic bombing during World War II, but this book tells its story differently. It focusses on human aspects i.e. the role played by the air crew and ground crew through the written word as also in pictures. The book is replete with their experiences. Their achievements and frustrations, trepidations coupled with resolute determination to complete their missions and their moments of joy and sorrow are well recorded. They are the heroes of the book and their machines, their comrades in arms.

-- Air Marshal H K Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Air Power : A Centennial Appraisal. By Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1994, p 320, £ 30.00, ISBN 1-85753-069-1.*

Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason has written several books and a large number of articles on air power; the present volume is a critical assessment of the role of modern air power in regional conflicts in the context of the new technology weapons used in the Gulf War of 1990-91.

The book contains a brief history of the evolution of air power during early years of this century, its employment during the two world wars, the development of the doctrinal framework and strategic and organisational thinking based on technological advances and mission capabilities. His thesis that force multipliers like the Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), AWACS, C³I, in-flight refuelling, satellite based space systems, and electronic warfare capability, make air-power a predominant and cost-effective instrument of war in the modern battlefield, is well supported by skillful analysis of air operations in recent conflicts.

A seminal work in which the author's critical insight and deep scholarship on the subject are clearly evident. The book will be a very valuable addition to all defence libraries and of interest to all who deal with national security issues.

-- N.B.S.

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending September 1995

*(The books reviewed in April-June 1995 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list).*

<i>Ser No.</i>	<i>Author's Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Biography			
1.	Srivastava, Harindra	The Epic Sweep of VD Savarkar: An Analytical Study of the Epic Sweep in the Life and Literature of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar	1993
2.	Dangwal, Parmesh	"I Dare!" Kiran Bedi : A Biography	1995
3.	Gordievsky, Oleg	Next Stop Execution : The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky	1995
4.	Thatcher, Margaret	The Path to Power	1995
Economic-History			
5.	Roll, Eric	A History of Economic Thought	1993
Egypt			
6.	Jackson, William	The Pomp of Yesterday : The Defence of India and Suez Canal 1798-1918	1995
Gulf War			
7.	Bellamy, Christopher	Expert Witness : A Defence Correspondent Gulf War 1990-91	1993
India- Defence			
8.	Smith, Chris	India's Adhoc Arsenal : Direction or Drift in Defence Policy?	1994
India - History			
9.	Ravi Dayal, (Ed)	We fought together for Freedom : Chapters from the Indian National Movement	1995

10. Vohra, Gautam The Central Himalayas : Social - 1995
Economic Profile of Garhwal and Kumaon

India - Politics

11. Gould, Harold A. Grass Roots Politics in India : 1994
A Century of Political Evolution in
Faizabad District

International Relations

12. Sahadevan, P. India and Overseas India's : 1995
The Case of Sri Lanka
13. Neeraj Gopal India and the Small Powers in 1995
South Asia : A Study in Indo
Nepalese Relations
14. Sondhi, ML and A Peace Agenda for 1995
Paranjpe, Shrikant Indian Foreign Policy

Kashmir

15. Sharma, Dharendra (ed) India's Commitment to Kashmir 1994
Political Analysis with Documents
16. Bhatt, S (ed) Kashmiri Pandits : A Cultural Heritage 1995

Kuwait

17. Pasha, AK Kuwait : Strategies of Survival 1995

Law

18. Ran Vir Kumar Defence Forces : Law and the Courts 1995
(Air Cmde)

Low Intensity Conflict

19. Raza, Maroof Low Intensity Conflicts : The New 1995
Dimension to India's Military
Commitments

Nepal

20. Hamel, Lakshman B. Military History of Nepal 1995

Non - Alignment

21. Rajan, MS United Nations and World Politics: 1995
Essays from a Nonaligned Perspective

North - East India

22. Datta, PS North- East and the Indian State : 1995
Paradoxes of a Periphery

Police

23. Jha, Sudhir Kumar Raj to Swaraj : 1995
Changing Contours of Police

Russia

24. Imam, Zafar New Russia : Disintegration and 1995
Crisis - A Contemporary Chronicle
1988-1994

25. Naik, JA Russia's Policy Towards India : 1995
From Stalin to Yeltsin

Sri - Lanka

26. Werake, Mahinda (*ed*) Security Dilemma of a Small State 1995

Tibet

27. Anand Kumar (*ed*) Tibet : A Source Book 1995


US-History

28. Parkes, Henry Bomford The United States of America 1986
A History

World War - II

29. Great Britain War with Japan, 6 Vols. 1995
Min of Defence (Navy)

Towards new frontiers in aviation and space technology



Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is India's premier aerospace industry. HAL has manufacturing facilities for production of airframes, aero engines, avionics, communication equipment, accessories and space components.

HAL's indigenously developed Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) took to the skies on 30 August 1992, representing a milestone in Indian aviation history. The ALH incorporates advanced technologies and multiple

features that make it highly versatile and suitable for both military and civil applications. ALH is designed and developed to cater to both domestic and international markets. Flight testing is in progress on three prototypes for certification.

HAL has also diversified into civil aircraft maintenance by undertaking inspections/servicing on Boeing 737 and Fokker turbo prop aircraft.



Hindustan Aeronautics Limited

Corporate Office, 15/1, Cubbon Road, Bangalore 560 001.







Visual Comm. HAL/395/95

Our products speak for themselves... and for us. Pioneers and leaders in professional electronics in India. Meeting the critical needs of Defence and other core sectors, for nearly four decades now. Through our equipment, systems and components.

With an infrastructural strength of 9 factories, advanced production and quality assurance facilities, skilled workforce of 20,000 people and over 2000 engineers including 650 engineers in Research & Development, Bharat Electronics manufactures a broad spectrum of hi-tech products.

The comprehensive electronics range for your professional needs



Product range

- Defence communication equipment in HF, UHF, VHF microwave bands
- Telecommunication networks, radio, multiplexing and switching equipment and antennae
- Broadcast and TV transmitters and studio equipment

Satcom terminals for Communication and TV Networking

- Radars for Defence and Meteorology
- Optical and opto-electronic equipment
- Simulators and software
- Semiconductors, ICs, crystals, LCDs and electron tubes - microwave, transmitting tubes, X-ray, TV & monitor tubes

For more details, write to:

Bharat Electronics Limited

(A Government of India Enterprise)

Regd. Office: 'Trade Centre'

116/2, Race Course Road, Bangalore-560 001

Phone : (812) 267322, Telex : (845) 8650 BE IN

Fax : (812) 268410

BHARAT ELECTRONICS
QUALITY, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION.

USI PUBLICATIONS

USI NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS

Para Military Forces by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM	Price: Rs. 25.00
Defence Budgeting in India by Shri DS Nakra (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Possible Counter Measures against Satellite Reconnaissance by Air Marshal IW Sabhaney, AVSM	Price: Rs. 25.00
Higher Defence Organisation by Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Leadership in the Indian Army During Eighties and Nineties by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM	Price: Rs. 25.00
China's Strategic Posture in the 1980's (Revised) by Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM	Price: Rs. 35.00
Intra-Regional Interventions in South Asia by Prof KR Singh	Price: Rs. 50.00
A Profile of Terrorism by Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
National Security : Integrated Approach to Policy Making by Lt Gen Hridaya Kaul, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
India's Defence Forces : Building the Sinews of a Nation by Gen V N Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00

USI SEMINARS

Report on Armoured Personnel Carriers Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on the Imposition of a Manpower Ceiling on the Army Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on Recruitment into the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on a Seminar on Cooperation in Defence Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on a Seminar on Review of the Organisation Pattern of the Indian Army Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Report on the Military Threat in the Nineteen Eighties Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 30.00
Report on Nuclear Shadow over the Sub-Continent Chairman Maj Gen DK Palit, VrC	Price: Rs. 25.00
Relationship of Military Law and Discipline with the Judicial System of the Country Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 35.00
Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean by Admiral S. Prakash	Price: Rs. 30.00
Report on Military and Society Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Report on Foreign and Defence Policies for India in the 1990s	Price: Rs. 50.00
The Impact of the Gulf Crisis and the New World Order on South Asia	Price: Rs. 75.00
Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Impact Upon the International Political System with Special Reference to South Asian Security	Price: Rs. 75.00
Challenges to India's National Interests in 1995-2010 and Indian Response	Price: Rs. 75.00

USI NATIONAL SECURITY LECTURES

India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies by Gen JN Chaudhuri	Price: Rs. 50.00
India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since Independence by Shri PVR Rao, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Some Problems of India's Defence by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, DFC (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Defence and Development by Shri HC Sarin, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
The Indian Ocean & India's Maritime Security by Adm SN Kohli, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Internal Threats and National Security by Shri Govind Narain, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
National Security and Modern Technology by Dr Raja Ramanna	Price: Rs. 50.00
India, Pakistan and the USA by Shri S Nihal Singh	Price: Rs. 50.00
Higher Defence Organisation by Lt. Gen S K Sinha, PVSM	Price: Rs. 50.00
The World Power Structure in Transition by General K Sundarji PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Affordable Defence In the 1990s by Abid Hussain	Price: Rs. 50.00
USI JOURNAL CENTENARY NUMBER (OCT-DEC 1970) Contains informative and authoritative articles	Price: Rs. 50.00 (Postage & Packing extra)

JOIN USI Correspondence Courses And Plan Your Career

Courses Run by the USI

Courses	Dates		Tuition Fees*	
	Course commencement	Examination	All subjects (Rs.)	Each subject (Rs.)
1. DSSC Entrance Examination (Army)	Nov	Sep	900	200
2. DSSC Entrance Examination (Navy)	Jan	Jul	—	275
3. DSSC Entrance Examination (Air)	Jan	Jul	450	250
4. TSC Entrance Examination	Nov	Sep	500	200
5. Promotion Examination Part D	Jun	Jan	700 [†]	150 [†]
6. Promotion Examination Part B	Sep	Apr	450	125

[†](Applicable From June 1996)

*Membership of the USI is compulsory for all Courses. The fees given above do not include membership fees which are as follows :-

- Membership Fees

	<i>Life</i> (Rs.)	<i>Ordinary</i> (Rs.)
Entrance	100	100
Subscription	900	100(annual - 1 Apr to 31 Mar)

Bank Drafts/Postal Orders and Local Cheques ONLY will be accepted.

(These may be made out in the name of Director USI)

For further details write to the Chief Instructor.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi - 110 011 (Tele 3015828)

USI

(Estd. 1870)

OUR ACTIVITIES

Library Service

One of the oldest and finest military libraries in India, today it has over 50,000 books, and journals on its shelves, including books published in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different facets of Indian life, as well as on other countries. It is a store house of rare books and manuscripts for scholars and research workers devoted to political and military study.

Correspondence Courses

The introduction of Correspondence Courses for promotion and Defence Service Staff College examinations some years ago found ready response and today the Institution has 1,500 members who participate in the Training Courses annually. Material is despatched to them regularly wherever they may be.

The students have undoubtedly profited by these courses, as evidenced by the success achieved by them in these Examinations. Popularity apart, the courses contribute substantially to the revenue of the USI.

USI Journal

Oldest Defence Journal in India, it contains proceedings of lectures and discussions, prize essays, original articles, book reviews, etc.

It is published quarterly in April, July, October and January each year (the first issue being Jan-Mar each year). The Journal is supplied free to members. It provides a forum for the most junior officer to express his opinions relating to his profession.

Gold Medal Essay Competitions

The gold medal essay competition is held every year. The subject for essay is announced during the month of March each year. On the occasion of the Centenary, an additional Gold Medal Essay Competition has been instituted for Junior Officers of not more than ten year's service.

Lectures and Discussions

A series of lectures by outstanding experts on service, international affairs and topics of general interest to the Services are organised for the benefit of Local Members in Delhi.

Mac Gregor Medal

This medal is awarded every year to officers for any valuable reconnaissance they may have undertaken.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services and all Central Services Gazetted officers Class I (including Retired), Cadets from NDA, other Services' Academies and Midshipmen shall be entitled to become members on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.
2. Life Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of Rs. 1000/- which sum includes entrance fee.
3. Ordinary Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee of Rs. 100/- on joining and an annual subscription of Rs. 100/- to be paid in advance.
4. The period of subscription commences on 1 April each year and shall be operative till 31 March of the following year.

For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi - 110011.