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EDITORIAL

Economic Growth and National Security

“Wealth is usually needed to underpin military power,” says Paul Kennedy.* “and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth.” This was clearly proved in the case of the Soviet Union. Its economic strength was seriously weakened by the 40-year long nuclear arms race with the United States, and its 10-year military involvement in Afghanistan. The collapse of the economic system led to the breakup of the political system and its power base. Its transformation from a super power to a chaotic conundrum was accomplished in a few short steps.

In the past also, the primary cause of the decline and fall of the Roman, Ottoman, Mughal, and British empires was the loss of economic strength of the state. In the final analysis, the soldiers have to be fed, clothed, housed, armed and trained; this requires a lot of money. Ships and aircraft are even more expensive to procure, maintain, and operate, thus making the maintenance of a modern military machine a most expensive business. But for the sake of the security of state such expenditure is always justified. Because only in conditions of external and internal peace and stability guaranteed by the armed forces, it is possible to engage in activities for creation of national wealth. Therefore, there is a significant correlation, in the long term, between economic growth activities on the one hand, and military strength needed for national security on the other.

In this issue of the Journal, the future of economic growth in India, in the background of the emerging international political and economic order, and the impact of new technologies, is presented by Shri K.C. Pant, Chairman Finance Commission, and former Defence Minister, and by Prof Yoginder K Alagh, Vice-Chancellor Jawaharlal Nehru University in the two lead papers. With critical insight and clear perception, they look into the future of India’s economic growth and related challenges to national security in the sub-continental complications.

* Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House) p. xvi.

The New World Order and India's Place in it

K C PANT

It is hard to imagine that only a few years ago the hardnosed French philosopher, Revel, impressed by the supposed internal strength of the Soviet system despite his allergy for Communism, prophesied the end of democracy in the world. In his book, *How Democracies Perish*, Revel wrote, as if for an obituary, that democracy "would have endured had it been the only type of political organisation in the world" but that it was defenceless against the Soviet form of totalitarianism.

How strange that sounds today! The Soviet Union is no more; with it has gone a whole universe of thought and action, world-views and mindsets and, of course, the geopolitical map of the world Moscow had so painstakingly worked to realise since before the 1917 Revolution.

These sweeping changes have completely altered the landscape of power in the world. The armada of Marxist-Leninist States, including its Flagship, has been grounded. China is virtually the last bastion of Communism, but considering that Chairman(senior leader) Deng Ziao-ping is even now persuading the rest of China to follow the example of the free-market policies being pursued in Southern China and the provinces bordering Hongkong, the Maoist veneer is wearing thin. Vietnam, renowned for giving the Americans a bloody nose, now seeks to emulate the little dragons of the ASEAN and fashion an export-oriented economy. So what remains of that tremendous rivalry that fueled the Cold War?

The answer in a phrase is: very little. One of the troubles is that no country, whatever its beliefs, knows exactly what the shape of the new international order in the making will be. So everybody is busy hedging their bets. Thus, at the recently concluded Non-aligned Summit in Jakarta, China sat in as an observer, and having taken part from the sidelines in the proceedings, pronounced that it was not for "democratisation" of the United Nations Organisation. Meaning, that it would not like to share the monopoly it enjoys along with the United States, Russia, Britain and France, as veto-wielding Members of the Security Council, with any other country of the Third World.

Several former Soviet republics and East European nations also attended the summit with no clear purpose other than, perhaps, to scout out this grouping. Yugoslavia, a founding Member of the Non-aligned Movement, in the meanwhile, barely succeeded in keeping the mention of the Bosnian crisis out of the final declaration.

Elsewhere, the Russian and the East European contingents have forcefully begun to make their presence felt in the Bretton-Woods organisations, even as the former main beneficiaries of easy credit from the World bank and the International Monetary Fund, like India, are struggling to keep their shares at reasonable levels.

In all this shuffling and reshuffling of the deck of nation States, the really helpless countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are literally being wasted out of existence. Somalians are dying by the thousands, Ethiopians have virtually given up hope for peace in their land and are trekking southwards to unwelcoming havens, Tanzania is struggling with its economy. And in South Africa, the ruling Whites hold on tenaciously to power, not even now forsaking the ultimate card of seeding tribal dissension to postpone the inevitability of majority rule.

What should be a matter of concern to all of us is not just the human toll of the tragedy unfolding in the deserts of Somalia, but that it has been more or less ignored by the rest of the world at the supposedly enlightened end of the Twentieth Century. This is symptomatic of the growing indifference to human suffering. Compare, for instance, the shock and outrage at the Sharpeville massacre in the early 1960s to the almost muted reaction to everyday atrocities in Soweto in the last few years or the recent Ciskei Killings.

The conscience of people relatively better off everywhere has become calloused. What sparked a feeling of guilt in the more fortunate in an earlier time, now only spawns relief that it is not they, but someone else, at the receiving end. Western sociologists and Press talk of this development in terms of do-gooding fatigue which combined with an almost obsessive pursuit of material riches, has resulted in a dog-eat-dog milieu and the-devil-take-the-hindmost attitude that is truly disturbing. Disturbing because the poorer countries are, in effect, being told to swim or sink. Even the instinct to throw the sinking a lifeline is not in evidence. The disaster and development aid quantum of the donor countries has steadily declined. Worse, no excuses are offered; indeed, the isolationist impulse in the West of barricading against the rising tide from the Third World, is now well advanced. Refugees and all immigrants from the poorer States who are driven by economic necessity, are being actively dissuaded from putting down roots in the prosperous West or

even reaching it. Haitians are being intercepted on the high seas by the US Navy and Coast Guard cutters and turned back. Non-white people generally are being put upon by the neo-Nazis in united Germany. Is there much of a difference between the US Government setting out to turn back the Haitian boats, and the German Government sitting on its hands, doing little to arrest the xenophobic wave among the natives? Both actions send out the same message: Enough of Christian charity!

On the other hand, if you have a skill, the money, or a product people in the West simply must have, the red carpet is rolled out, and the welcoming stance is justified on the basis of an international market system that respects no borders. While brain drain from the Third World is thereby rationalised, there is no ignoring the statistics which suggest that the only two areas which the Third World is rich in -- labour and natural resources -- are decreasing in value. Thus the Third World loses on both counts in a situation in which high technology makes labour, unless highly trained, a liability; and advances in physical sciences produce substitutes for natural resources.

The fact is that we are entering upon a demanding & difficult age. For the poorer nations there is simply no safety net. There are three dominant economic blocs. The Dollar bloc led by the United States, with the trading strength of the new North American Free Market zone involving Canada and Mexico behind it. There is the ECU (European currency) zone comprising the West European group of countries, and then there is the most energetic of the lot, the so-called Yen-bloc, headed by Japan and including the improbably successful small and big dragons of South East Asia - South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Hongkong, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines. Each of these blocs has a trade volume in excess of three trillion dollars.

Other than a few States of the Yen bloc, supported by oil from Brunei and Indonesia to further their modernization plans, the fact is that most of the nations of these three blocs are dependent centrally on West Asia petroleum resources. But insofar as the Arab oil producers have willy-nilly accepted Western protection in the wake of the War for Kuwait, they will have to follow through on the *quo* for the *quid* and supply oil without demur.

This leaves a large number of countries outside the three big trading Blocs. Leaving aside for the moment the weakest economies, like some in Africa, that still means some 80-odd countries (not counting nations in South America, many of whom are part of a fairly cohesive common market system, like the *Pacto Andino* which, in turn, is plugged into the US-dominated hemispheric market). These countries have to fend for themselves in an increasingly desperate search for means of survival in a trading order that the

three Blocs are in the process of putting together. Because of their clout, persistent pressure will be exerted to subordinate the global purpose of such international trade regimes as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff to the interests of the Blocs which lie mainly in opening up markets, whatever it takes.

The climate sought to be generated is: accept the terms and give in gracefully or have the terms imposed on you. At another level, international financial institutions are becoming less sensitive to the apprehension of countries, with historical memories of colonial exploitation, about strings being attached to loans.

The only country that looks less vulnerable to the pressures from these largely Western and West-ward looking trading blocs, is China. Most of its economic drive and thrust is generated by the southern Chinese provinces like Guangdong which, with an annual growth rate of 15 percent are proving to be the engines of economic upliftment. Chairman Deng has provided the motive force and, hiccups aside, is pushing the generally backward State he heads into the 21st century. However, China still retains the Communist system. It has moved far more cautiously with the spread of market-oriented economic reforms than the USSR did. Nevertheless the biggest problem in China is to reconcile the market economy -for, unlike India, it has no experience of managing a mixed economy - with a one party Communist State. That this is not going to prevent Beijing from flexing its military *qua* economic muscle, is evident from China's activity in the Spratly Island-territories to stake out its oil interests, and Beijing's exchanging of shrill ultimatums with Washington over the sale of American F-16 combat aircraft to Taiwan.

India, too, must concentrate on building up its economic strength as a sine *qua* non for securing its rightful place in this changing scenario. We need time to raise the level of performance of the Indian economy. To gain time on acceptable terms, we must negotiate with skill and nerve. Fortunately, in the hard parleys ahead, there is still a negotiating chip or two up our sleeve, for example, the promise of the large Indian market in exchange for favourable policies.

Moreover, India is endowed with several attributes necessary for the country to hold its own in the hurly-burly of the international marketplace. One, a burgeoning entrepreneurial class. Until recently, most entrepreneurs were content to sell their wares in the protected domestic market and did not need to venture out abroad. Or, they had become skilled in getting the best out of the licence-control regime at the expense of producing quality goods and services which could compete in the world bazaar. The economic

reforms being undertaken will test their mettle by exposing them to competition, at home and abroad.

Secondly, there is a sophisticated trading and money-market system in place, which should facilitate the eventual intermeshing of the Indian economy with the world economy with least possible dislocation or disorientation and at the least cost.

Thirdly, there is a fully developed share market, together with a high savings habit (a savings rate of 22 per cent compared to, say, 23 per cent in Japan).

And lastly and most importantly, there is now a seachange in the attitude of the common man, who is beginning to look to the promotion of the free market system for offering him a wider variety of better quality goods. I am told, for example, that the success of the private sector Titan watches has all but done away with the market for imported quartz watches.

It is precisely the volume of sales and the growth graph of the consumer products and services industries that make foreign companies seriously consider entering this country. As expected at the time the new economic policy was inaugurated, multinational corporations are not only drawn by the vast market for their products, but are also growingly aware of the comparative advantages of having India as a manufacturing and export base that can feed and service the arc of countries neighbouring India in the ocean littoral and markets farther afield.

The signs are encouraging. Foreign investment proposals cleared by the Government from August 1991 to July 1992 amounted to some one thousand nine hundred and sixty crore rupees. This was twelve times the figure approved in the preceding one year and more than the total investment from abroad over the last decade. In the current year, the approval rate is about Rs. 250 crores per month. This would suggest that India has started out well in attracting capital in the form of equity for the purposes of further industrialisation of the country.

However, certain deficiencies need to be corrected. One of the main reasons for a less than rapid process of industrialisation is the weaknesses in the infrastructure. Large parts of this country have minimal levels of infrastructural facilities. Transport and telecommunications networks need a great deal of beefing up. In many areas, Power is distinguished mostly by its absence. Small surprise then that industry isn't breaking out into the virgin hinterlands where the comparative advantage of cheap construction and other labour

could be utilised. Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Delhi are still the industrial nodes in a country with vast mineral and manpower resources, mostly under-exploited.

So the build-up of the infrastructure areas of power, transport and telecommunications will have to be given top priority. The idea being that if these basic support structures are in place, industry will naturally follow. The other way around, where tried, has not worked.

Other than infrastructure, agriculture will have to be accorded high priority for the simple reason that with 70-odd percent of the population still residing in the rural areas, ultimately it is their advancement which will secure for India its place in the sun.

Agraria-based industries and appropriate technology may lift the poverty-stricken subsistence agriculture into something resembling an economically viable enterprise. It is exciting to visualise India as a food surplus nation built on the strength of prosperous farmers by multiplying the visage of prosperity and self-fulfilment to be found in the Punjab and Haryana villages. Should this happen, the hope many agricultural economists have held out of the Indo-Gangatic Plain for one, turning into an international bread basket will be nearer realisation.

But the good of the countryside and peasantry depends centrally on progress on two key fronts -- population control and female literacy. Literacy in India at 52 per cent is nothing to be proud about, but female literacy is much less. However, the success of the Green Revolution type of programmes will ensure that prosperity will also awaken in those enjoying it, the desire for education and the small family norm. In other words, we will have to go back to the emphasis on agriculture as in the First 5 year Plan. The well being of the peasant and the health of the agricultural sector, will have to be the primary focus of the Government.

That said, the question still looms: How will India manage in the short term -- before it is plugged fully into the international economy -- and in the long term, when as a mature democracy and a matching open economic system, it will have to go head-on against the already powerful trading nations either individually or comprising Big Blocs?

It is clear that the world is entering a trading era, different from the mercantilist age in that military force will not be able to be used quite as freely. In the place of incessant warfare, sea-raiding and such activities that marked the 15th and 16th Centuries, will be a peaceful, if vicious, competi-

tion for economic advantage between the three trading blocs with the non-bloc countries making do with what they can get from dealing on a bilateral basis with the various Bloc States. This trend is clearly visible. What then should be the strategy to safeguard our national interests in this scenario?

In the short term, the answer is apparently having to make do on the margins the best we can. In a longer time frame, there is no escaping a mini-trade bloc of our own, made up of the South Asian countries. SAARC is a readymade organisation that is malleable enough to become a vehicle for the economic integration of the region. Indian coal, Pakistani cotton and Bangladeshi jute, for example, can become the bedrock of the cooperative economy, subcontinent-wise, that may be fashioned if there is political will on all sides.

Then again, the subcontinent-sized market -- homogenous in its reach and market tastes, etc., will become the lodestar for the rival trade blocs. Should SAARC develop into a strong, fairly cohesive body, it can deal with and secure very good terms for allowing multinationals and trading countries penetration of the larger market. In the short term, this will require a growing mesh of the infrastructure for a start, and a certain market standardisation in the form of money transaction norms, share market rules and regulations, etc. Whether this is immediately realisable or not, it should be the aim, otherwise there is every chance of relatively weak economies like those in South Asia getting squeezed between the actions of competing trade blocs.

If the huge trading blocs indeed merge their markets and cross border movements of labour become as common as the movement of money transactions - i.e. if the Maastricht Treaty overcomes the hurdles and brings about an integrated Europe, as expected by 1997 - what will be the effect on the rest of the world of nation states? International relations are today being exposed to two opposing trends - of countries coming together to form powerful economic blocs on the one hand; and of others torn apart by sub-nationalism on the other.

The rise of subnationalist sentiment has taken hold of many heretofore stable polities, including India and not excluding China, where Tibetan nationalism has survived the colonialism of the Han Chinese. Should the former Central Asian republics become missionary in their Islamic zeal, then there is a danger that China will unravel, at least in its Western and North-Western parts - Xingjiang and Tibet. Can India fight off the centrifugal forces set free in its neighbourhood? Can it continue to remain, in the midst of all its diversities, a cohesive and coherent socio-political whole? The answer, to my mind, is an unequivocal Yes, if it chooses to remain secular. Here the experience of erstwhile Yugoslavia is illustrative. As long as the Central

authority in Belgrade was strong and was able to impose a secular outlook and prevent the surfacing of ethnic tensions, the country fared well. The moment the centre collapsed along with the tolerance inherent in secularism, so did Yugoslavia.

Secularism is the glue that cements the diverse components of a heterogeneous society. The principle of keeping the State and Church entirely separate in the affairs of the country or in the business of running the country, is based on the simple observation that religious prescription often arouses passion and zeal, and because faith is not amenable to reason, effective governance and good Government is best accomplished if religion is kept out of it.

In theory, religion is a harmonising element. In practice, no religion is bereft of divisions and sects, each of which claims ownership of that religion's truth and wisdom. For instance, you have a Pakistan - a nation founded on Islam. If previously, the society was rent by Hindu-Muslim clashes, that country is now being rent by Shia-Sunni conflict, and by such oddities as whole Muslim communities being declared un-Islamic as happened with the Qadarians because they do not conform to the majoritarian Sunni precepts. Somewhat unexpectedly, a common religion has become the seedbed for the deepest divisions within Pakistani society. If India becomes a Hindu state, a similar denouement will await this country, which will become fractionated, because the pantheon of the Hindu faith is unimaginably more diverse and differentiated.

Religion, however, is not the only basis for sub-nationalism. Czechoslovakia is on the brink of partition, with the people in the less developed Slovak-region having voted to separate. Russia is in such a state of disorder that very little can be expected of that country by way of providing ballast to the international situation.

But whether things get much worse in that country or turn for the better, Russia is too large and too powerful militarily and potentially economically, given its store of natural resources, including oil, not to play a critical role for the future of peace in the world. For India, the thinking of the Government in Moscow will be crucial, because shared interests and perceptions have forged strong ties between the two countries, which should be nursed and preserved during the present difficult period in Russia. Moreover, geo-politically, no two large countries on the Eurasian landmass share so much in common with regard to threats, both of the external military kind and from dissatisfied elements within their heterogeneous societies.

Long range thinking has apparently been going on in the Indian and the Russian Governments, and the consensus view is reflected in the outcome of Defence Minister Sharad Pawar's visit to Moscow recently. Both sides, in effect, decided to continue their intimate military supply relationship and the Russians, significantly, also acceded to the request for sale on rupee payment terms of one million tonnes of oil. President Boris Yeltsin's State visit to India later this year or early next year may witness the signing of a new follow-on treaty to the one signed in August 1971, which promises to cement the close relations between the two countries based on permanent interests.

Trade-wise too, this partnership will be mutually beneficial. Russia's command economy is encountering enormous difficulties in switching from the production of military goods to consumer durables and light industrial products, which are the thrust area for most of the prospering economies. Until the Russians decentralise and the private sector takes off, that country will feel the need for a reliable source of precisely the sort of goods that Russians express interest in, and whose lack makes them dissatisfied with the authorities struggling with the intricacies of the free market system. Access to Indian goods of the popular and desired type will provide Russia's rulers with the gift of time during which to configure a more responsive and responsible economy. For India, continued availability of capital military equipment and oil, even if on slightly dearer terms, will still make for a better deal than expending our limited hard currency reserves. Like Russia, India too will thereby be granted the time to become internationally competitive in the economic and trading sphere.

Military capabilities alone cannot sustain a big power; it has to have the economic heft. By this reckoning, the US is today the only genuine world power -- it has military reach backed by a four trillion dollar economy. And its Atlantic alliance system is not only intact, in West Asia it has active new partners willing to conform to American policies for the region.

While the Dollar, Yen and Ecu Blocs are competitors in the trading arena, in security matters the three Blocs comprise an overwhelming military group. There is a large area of agreement between the Atlantic allies about stopping nuclear proliferation, limiting the ability of the present Third World countries to achieve missile-capable status, and restricting military supply relationships with the developing world to terms and conditions that promote the sellers' interests more than the buyers'.

Non-aligned States like India which in the Cold War-era benefitted from the competing attentions of both the Super powers, now discover that a dissident Russia has ceded the initiative to the Americans and the West

Europeans, and has, it seems, purposely relegated itself to the international security backwaters. In one sense, the new unitary international order is inherently more peaceful and peacable. No more will there be ideological wars or clashes of economic systems. The US and the European Community will doubtless seek to shape a commercial-cum-military order supportive of their collective and, as far as possible, their separate national interests. That is the outlook in the short run. In the long term, if and when Russia regains its confidence, it may be another story.

For the present, India's options are relatively limited. Its bigness, its complexity, and, perhaps, its over-sensitive national ego, make India an unwieldy puppet on the string. The likelihood is that we will be left alone to muddle along as we always have if we indicate our willingness to play by the changing rules of the international game. The question is: Should we? And, if the answer is no, are we willing to pay the price, whatever it is?

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Strategic Dimensions of the Changing Global Economic Order

YOGINDER K ALAGH

This is a difficult subject. We discuss selectively three aspects which may be of interest to India. The first is the basic instability of the emerging new international economic order, although its dominating contours are clear enough. The second is the whole question of technology and its global impacts and the third is the question of paradigms inherent in current developments for the growth of nations. In this aspect we discuss in particular the question of environment issues in the development debate. Our plea is that it is possible to follow enlightened national interest as a part of a more complex and aggressive economic world and the search for autonomous development as a part of a global view is still as possible today as it was earlier, provided the country gets its own perspectives in order and learns to respond to increasingly complex relations.

NEW GLOBAL DOMINATING PATTERNS

A triadic pattern of trade and investment flows is very much in evidence towards the end of 1980s and from all accounts is expected to strengthen in the 1990s. The main regions around which these flows revolve are North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim. The Pacific Rim is the largest exporter of capital but technological superiority of North America still remains as a major building bloc. There is considerable instability in the economic arrangements that have emerged. Such instability arises from the uni-directional nature of investment flows. This is the difficulty of sustaining US imports of capital from the Pacific Rim. Emmanuel Castells the American policy analyst of Spanish origin has described the reverberations of this pattern vividly. Although it is fair to accept that given its basic difficulties the system has worked fairly until now.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE NATION-STATE

The fact that social organization for fast changing technology is creating a major challenge for views that depend on the view of the dominance of the nation-state is not being clearly understood and this leads to considerable confusion in international relations (as relations between nations).

Text of a talk delivered by Prof. Y. K. Alagh, Vice Chancellor Jawaharlal Nehru University, to the members of the USI on August 4, 1993. Prof. Alagh is also Vice Chairman, State Planning Commission Gujarat in the rank of Minister, and Special Adviser to the Secretary General of the U.N. Conference on Environment Development.

The statement that the post-industrial revolution technology has great application possibilities is a somewhat trite statement these days. However, like all commonplace facts, the full implications of the statement are not fully realized. There are at least six major implications of the new technology which are only now being dimly appreciated at least in the developing world. It may be useful to begin by noting them since in a new field like post-industrial technology a certain account of wishful thinking is there, given the great technological potential of the breakthroughs in sight, societal aspects are ignored. There is by now considerable empirical research on these aspects and number of global research studies and networks have highlighted these. We would rely on the multimillion EEC research of the Forecasting and Assessment of Science and Technology (FAST) group of the European Economic Community, (EEC, 1990, Petrella, 1990 and Petrella and Granut 1992). My familiarity with this is through the work of their chief Dr. Ricardo Petrella who is a colleague in an EEC sponsored project on Technology Network in Different Continents. There are six implications of the new technologies, I would like to highlight.

The first aspect to note is that the scientific breakthrough of an application kind in many cases are of a genuinely inter-disciplinary nature. Research in genetics, communication, computers and diverse fields like agriculture and public health, impact on it. Petrella distinguishes this feature as the central characteristic of the technologies of the post mass production industrial society. In genetic mapping for example, for the optimal planning of scarce funds for biotechnology research, parallel computing and data systems, genetic codes are both required in equal measure, as also highly decentralized information on genetic characteristics spread on a diversified commodity-spatial link.

The second characteristic of this new technology is that given that pre-conditions are there of the required infrastructure, it spreads very fast. This is true both in terms of sectors and regions. The cost effectiveness of the technologies is so great that when the initial break through is made it diffuses very rapidly. U.K. Srivastava's (1992) recent paper documents annual capital raising efforts running at 1.7 billion dollars by 49 companies in 1991 only in the United States for bio-technology. In terms of sectors the technologies cut across seeds, agro processing, animal husbandry and agriculture, environmentally friendly products in rural and urban localities, public health and education and research applications.

The third major feature of this technological phase is its self destructive nature. The research breakthroughs in terms of technological history sweep are at a preliminary stage and the product and process cycles are short. Inter

disciplinary work builds on the available findings to quickly develop newer processes and products. Obsolescence is high. Flexible organizational mechanisms which are able to respond quickly to new ideas and breakthroughs and newer demands seem more successful rather than large Corporations or Parastatal organizations which do not seem to succeed as much.

The fourth aspect is paradoxical in the sense that despite of its fast spread when the infrastructure is available, the character of the new technology is that its impact can be unequal. The FAST groups, best assessment is that the new techniques will spread unevenly. For if the required infrastructure is not available both in terms of scientific and commercial skills and the level of general training and scientific culture, the diffusion process stops. The FAST Group for example, identifies the lack of a common European Scientific language as an obstruction in diffusion. Not only are some countries predicted to have only minor advantages of the new technology like for example, even in Europe, Greece, Turkey and Portugal. But also within the advanced countries pockets of backwardness may remain for example, in Southern France, or in parts of Germany. The FAST groups informed projections show very limited share of the new technology in the third world with possibilities of only enclave kind of development. The technology Networks in different continents sponsored by the EEC are derived from these concerns.

Fifth, the potential possibilities in terms of the new technologies are very high. Once the research breakthrough is made the programme costs are low, particularly if the application infrastructure is available. The technologies have also beneficial environment consequences and this is particularly true of the biotic pesticides and the new seeds which save land and water. The vast possibilities in energy and material saving, new environmentally friendly products applications in non crop agriculture like animal husbandry and newer possibilities of agro processing and waste recycling are important.

Finally, the Nation State seems to be playing a much smaller role in the new developments as compared to earlier technological revolutions. This seems to emerge from the requirements of flexibility and fast change in the technology itself. Small and medium corporations with flexible research organisation styles with knowledge based groups and research establishments seems to work better. At the level of public bodies the interaction of such groups is seen more with cities, research groups, professional organizations and local governments from such a perspective.

THE PARADIGM QUESTION

An interesting aspect of contemporary development however has been

that fast growing areas are in fact a part of regional groupings. While some of the earlier regional efforts like the Andean Pact did not show large promise, the OPEC and the European Free Trade Area became important actors in the international economy in the Seventies. The European Common Market developed into a major economic entity and the ASEAN also became another pole of economic promise. The Pacific Rim countries in fact grew very fast and perceptive Asian observers were building up theories of regional groupings with geese flying in formation.

The concept of a world of multi-polar regional groupings does not rest lightly on the conventional theory of international trade. In fact in the late fifties, the Theory of Customs Union was developed by the Prophets of the Second Best. Trade diversification could easily counterbalance trade creation and the proponents of the theory of the best of all possible world always looked jaundicedly at regional groupings. Yet regional groupings have come to stay and individual countries have to see themselves as actors in a multi-polar world rather than uncritically accepting the small country assumption which free marketeers preach to them and based on which they are forced to adjust when they go in for structural adjustment loans from international financial institutions. This is a world of gains accruing to strategy-based interventions rather than to those who docilely follow the rules only of unregulated international markets. In fact Lance Taylor shows that those who uncritically accept the rules and framework set by others go to the wall. Mohsin Khan, the Chief Economist of the IMF showed the countries integrating with the international economy more often than not had price stability and balance of payments surpluses, but their growth rates fell. For sixty-nine countries which implemented IMF extended fund facility and standby arrangements for the period 1973-1988, rigorous econometric analysis showed that:

"If one were to take the signs of the coefficients into account, one would conclude from the before-after tests that programmes led to improvements in the balance of payments and the current account balance, a reduction in inflation and a decline in the growth rate."

Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was also the then Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission, showed a highly sophisticated appreciation of the strategic nature of international economic policy in his concluding paragraph to the speech that he gave at the meeting of the Planning Commission which approved his Government's approach to the Eighth Plan in October 1989 in the following words :

"The international backdrop to the Eighth Plan is one of flux. The aid

environment is uncertain and biased. Trade prospects will be influenced by a number of political shifts taking place on the world scene. Traditional relationships can no longer be taken for granted. Our political stances will need to keep in view the change in economic imperatives and technological compulsions of India's accelerated growth. A more flexible handling of India's role in the world economy given the multi-polar nature of the emerging international economy and polity needs to be emphasised. The fast growing Pacific Rim countries, the emerging power of the ASEAN economies, the Soviet Union still the second largest economy of the world undergoing rapid transition, fortress Europe and an increasingly nationalistic US system, are all examples of trends which India will have to take into account in developing its response to the rest of the world and plan its role amongst the non-aligned developing world. This may sometimes require allocation of resources, the derivation of special policies, and a more alert approach towards international developments. The plan must reflect an awareness of these trends and that they will be woven into economic and social policy making."

While a multi-polar nature of the world in the approximate future is a certainty, there is less clarity on the nature of the groups that will emerge and the major problems they will face. Historical and political factors play an important role and shape outcomes. The framework is more like the terrain of game theory models and oligopoly-markets that economists learn from the Thirties. The major characteristics of this model was instability and conceptual search for the conditions which could 'explain' the emergence of the market outcomes in terms of prices, capacity utilization and quantities. Outcomes were perceived as a search for fragile non-negative solutions rather than stable equilibrium.

The experience of the NIEs is also of relevance to other countries considering the overall similarities of both long-standing and more recent historical experience. In any discussion of economic growth, history is mainly of significance for the deeper background it provides. But contemporary experience is perhaps more relevant; the successful and rapid economic progress of the NIEs manifests a level of achievement which for the other developing economies of the region remained merely an objective. Four main aspects of Japan's and NIE experience are of particular interest.

The first is the design of development. Even though the development process may not always have been conceived as a complete paradigm, the leaders in society must, to some extent, have conceptualized some vision of development and the pace of its progress. The second relates to the identification of strategies, opportunities and constraints; potential leadership groups; ways of overcoming bottlenecks; global and regional strategies, and domestic

initiatives. The third concerns the nature of the institutions involved in the development process, and this raises important operational questions. Many countries have elaborate development plans and strategies. But how are they put into operation? How are incentives and penalties designed and administered? How are market and public initiatives combined to advance growth objectives? How do institutions support such designs? What are the methods of correcting errors? The fourth aspect is that of bilateral or multilateral opportunities for cooperation between the NIEs and the developing economies of the region. In particular, how can the growth experience, technological cooperation and investment of the developing economies be shared?

THE NATURE OF NIE GROWTH

In spite of a rash of literature, the paradigm inherent in the growth performance of the NIEs is not really clear. Much is said about the virtues of the empirical approach, and there are many generalizations. There are, of course, also a number of "I told you so" homilies. Many experts adopting the empirical approach refer to the "factor of growth" they had discovered in their heyday. Conventional growth theory 'explaining' development by capital, labour and savings is clearly not relevant. The grafting of state of the art trade theory or technology onto this framework is much too stultifying. Economists are, in any case, good at explaining the "source of growth" retrospectively.

Only the inspired economist can anticipate how to trigger off that elusive response called cumulative self-sustaining development. The question of the paradigm remains, and there are no illusions that it can be answered here. Yet the growth experience of the NIEs is relevant to the Third World; the successful paradigm must be understood to know the manner in which it was put into operation and to further the art of "growthmanship".

In one view the NIEs are an application of static neo-classical theory to economic policy. While a concern for dynamic efficiency and for the possibilities of trade have dominated NIE practice, many of the rules of neo-classical theory were, and still are, violated.

In another view, NIE practice is a successful application of economic planning. If such planning is the application of the set of propositions many of the us learnt in graduate schools in the early 1960s, then successful practice in the NIEs is markedly different from the world of multicommodity growth and programming models, surplus labour theories, optimal economic policy matrices and golden age economies.

WHAT IS THE NIE PARADIGM OF GROWTH?

There is no satisfactory answer to this question. However, it may be posed in the context of available descriptions and studies. Successful growth, in the light of the experience of NIEs, is probably selectively interventionist at the level of the sector and the firm. It is concerned with efficiency, and with the gains to be derived from technology and trade. It is structured on the use of domestic competition to release the sources of growth and, wherever necessary the use of regulated competition from abroad to foster efficiency. It is an integration of policies with planning. This can be contrasted with the mechanical application of neo-classical static adjustment rules. We state first such an "adjustment policy set" and then show that an alternative set of policies can be developed, which takes into account successful growth experience.

The point being made would not have been necessary, if influential alternative views were not being advocated. One view for India is that if allocative decisions by the State in the production economy are abandoned, the economy is moved to tariff or tax based rules, the spread and level of tariff rates is reduced, the value of the domestic currency is linked to international money markets and policies which aim at regional spread of industry, employment generation and special efforts at technology development are abandoned, the economy would develop fast (World Bank, 1985). Intervention policies are therefore in the main sub-optimal in relation to market based solutions and mobilizational policies infructuous, in this view since private savings cannot be raised and given the natural propensity to save the economy would achieve its optimal growth rates if Government intervention is abolished. (In 1989-90, both the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the IMF argued that private savings rates in India are high and do not need to be raised. They also argued very correctly at that time that Government savings have to be increased). This view of policy follows from a theoretically consistent set of economic propositions if the nature of working of commodity and factor markets underlying it is accepted as realistic. Its ideological premises may be unacceptable to some, since apart from abolishing any perverse distributional consequences of bad Government policies, it has a hands off approach to existing income distributions, both within a country and between countries. However, the real difficulty with this approach lies elsewhere. The carefully cultivated media message that this approach of unstructured simple rule based liberalization is efficient and successful, is simply put, incorrect. There are at least four major international network studies, in some of which the present author has participated which contradict this view. These studies all international in the sense of cross country in scope, knowledge based, in the sense of deriving from alternative

theoretical constructions and are empirically validated in the sense of scientific testing of hypothesis. They all show that simple rule based liberalization theories are invalid in the sense of being unsuccessful in the experience based context and insufficient in terms of explaining success stories. In the fundamental sense of relevant social knowledge alternative models exist on a global plane and the real question is whether India and its institutions have the wisdom and the flexibility to adapt them in a relevant quest of globalization in the Nineties. All the alternative approaches rely on unleashing the power of market based development, but as a part of policy systems which use strategic intervention and planning as a framework. The trend towards market based development is universal, and so is the decline of allocative control allocation systems. Yet the serious agenda is the nature of strategic policy making and intervention which uses market friendly instruments, to the extent feasible, rather than "hands off-come what may" policies.

Let us consider some of the international studies first. Following the work of Enrico Brusco, the M.I.T. economists M Piore and O. Sabel, in their classic book, *The Second Industrial Divide* have shown that small and medium enterprises are becoming a larger part of advanced economies in the post "mass manufacturing based on scale economy" era. The activist economist Enrico Brusco designed and participated in continuous study of the industrial district of Emilia Romagna. (See Pyke and Sengenberger, 1990). The typical model of such industrial district Post-Fordist success stories is a base of artisan or skill based development of thousands of small firms, mobility between workers and entrepreneurs, intense competition in concentrated areas (15,000 plus enterprises in areas of 25 Kms² or so), but also detailed cooperation and networking for technological innovation and support, training, standardisation and quality control and continuous search for global market trends and adaptation to them. Sengenberger and Pyke (1992) have documented such success stories in Denmark (work of Neilson in Copenhagen), Spain (IMPIVA in Valencia) and Japan (Shimada and the concept of "lean production"). All these case studies show reliance on markets for demand and yet are based on substantial technological and support planning and strategic industrial policy interventions. Information Networks and technology support systems are subsidized for varying periods of time. These include for example, continuous studies of changes in global demand patterns of the product (garments in the case of Emilia Romagna) and quick dissemination through modern informatics, interdisciplinary research on technology support, for example computer aided design and multi-disciplinary search for technological solutions to problems (bio-medical engineering for orthopedic and sportswear in Valencia for example). Industry run systems were publicly supported. Pyke shows that the development of small and medium enterprise based industrial district growth as a trend, is a mobilization of local latent energy and enterprise

for regional development, in the context of internationalization and globalization of the economy, (F. Pyke, 1992), instead of adjustment of all economic activity to the uniformity of globalization through world prices. In India of course the fact that small industry is a major source of existing exports and that there are a large number of existing concentrations of artisan based small industry centres is seen as a sign of weakness to be remedied, by making conditions ripe for large houses and multi-nationals to export. That small enterprises can link with world markets and that industrial policies must design to do so occurs only to a few. (For such exceptions see SP Kashyap, 1992, and Government of Gujarat, 1992)¹¹

The M.I.T. economist Lance Taylor has since the mid-Eighties conducted a set of 18 country studies as a part of a global network on structural adjustment of the type recommended by international financial institutions. These country groups first studied the problem of stabilization and subsequently the problem of growth in each country. The networks results are extensively documented in a series of WIDER studies. (Taylor 1988, 1990). A recent conclusion by Lance Taylor himself would suffice for our purposes:

"The WIDER country papers emphasize the potential gains from directed interventions, import quotas, export subsidies and quotas. Export subsidies and a differential policy regimes all abound. Quotas may be expansionary (as for example in Colombia and Kenya). They give quick responses, which can be administratively advantageous in many situations. Subsidies may be necessary to make exports flow and are likely to be less disruptive macro-economically than maxi-devaluations. Such policies are widely pursued in practice, and seem unlikely to be abandoned. The sensible course might be to think about how to make them more effective in stimulating production and satisfying consumer desire. If undertaken, liberalization exercises should proceed along lines of common sense." (Taylor, 1988, pp 50-51).

Taylor has recently in a review of the post socialist transition from a global development economics point of view argued that the Indians have from the mid-Eighties followed a policy of switching industry from firm level controls to an industry level strategy integrated with a plan. He discusses the present author's description of industry level policies like dual pricing, threat

¹¹Kashyap's study at the Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social Research, was done for the global network of Sengenberger. Gujarat's Eighth Five year Plan states this objective as internationalization through support systems of 8 artisan based centres like Copper Valves at Junagadh and electronic wall clocks at Morbi. Annual Plan for 1993-94 states that "A scheme for development of global technology and marketing units for small scale and artisan industries in Gujarat is proposed... The Government will provide active cooperation to the local industries associations in availing of the latest technology. The proposed outlay is Rs.1000 lakhs for this scheme." (Government of Gujarat 1992, p.144)

of imports through tariff policies and export set-offs as "The Theory of a Multi-Faceted Price System" and argues that such marketization systems work more often than not as compared to simple globalization models.^[2]

The third set of studies now available is the Directorate General of Forecasting and Assessment of Science and Technology of the EEC, which has in its multi-million dollar research efforts in FAST I and FAST II systematically documented the strategic planning role often played at the level of regions, cities and large transnational groups in new era technology planning solutions (Pettella, 1992). We discussed this aspect in detail earlier.

The fourth example we have of analytical studies of simple liberalization models is from the serious work by IMF economists. Mohsin Khan, the Chief Economist of the IMF rigorously tested the growth experience of 69 countries which implemented IMF extended fund facility and standby arrangements for the period 1973-1988. This rigorous econometric analysis of around 700 annual observations showed:

"If one were to take only the signs of the coefficients into account, one would conclude from the before-after tests that programmes led to improvements in the balance of payments and the current account balance, a reduction in inflation and a decline in the growth rate" (M Khan, 1990).

Thus simple adjustment models do lead to price stability and balance of payments improvement (a drastic reduction in domestic demand would lead to this in a tautological sense) *but economic growth declined*.

A similar example of the consequences of such mindless reform is from Latin America and now the very painful experience of Sahelian Africa. Inspite of some recovery in the northern region of Mexico, bordering the US and on account of the NAFTA, the Latin American experience as a whole continues as that of serious social disruption, by now impacting on a generation of the unemployed and stulting of a generation of children as UNICEF brings out. The first para of Executive Secretary Gert Rosenthal's overview of the economy of Latin America and the Caribbean reads as follows:

"However the region's recovery of the path to development still remains an elusive goal. The burden of the debt overhang and the transfer of resources is still excessive: investment processes are taking a long time to renew themselves; the purchasing power of broad segment of the population is depressed; fiscal structures remain fragile and the degrees of freedom for

^[2]See Lance Taylor, 1992 ff.7. The reference here is to Poland and India. The Indian examples of econometric studies used to design industry policies as a part of a plan is to Alagh, 1991, Ch.3.

economic policy are limited. Stagnation, inflation and the severe cumulative deterioration in living conditions bear witness to the difficulty with which the processes of structural change are advancing the time they will require in order to crystallize the magnitude of obstacles they will face. These problems are exacerbated by an insufficiency of foreign capital, a weakness in the market for major exports, and trade restrictions. In 1990, the region's level of economic activity fell slightly. With this the long term growth rate, between 1980 and 1990 - dropped to barely 1.2 percent a year and per capita output continued to decline and now stands at a level 10 percent lower than that of a decade ago." (ECLA, 1991)

In Africa the structure of self sufficient peasant agriculture has been systematically eroded by misguided policies of internationalization and globalization of agriculture pursued now over a decade and a half (See Helleiner, 1986). The serious consequences of such advice on countries like Somalia is now there for everyone to see.

THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF INDIAN DEBATE

India has been lucky in this context. The ability of its leadership to pursue national goals under adverse conditions needs to be appreciated more widely, as also the open nature of its society which keeps the development debate alive. Inspite of considerable pressures to the contrary, the Prime Minister's directive to the Planning Commission to increase public sector outlay on the agriculture and rural development sectors by Rs. 40,000 crores, a day before the Plan was to be finalized, keeps the option of a development strategy for the Nineties open. This stands even though many questions of policies and implementation still remain. Unlike an earlier view, this directive has required the Finance Ministry to make a categorical statement that the reduction in priority sector lending by the banking sector as recommended by the Narasimhan Committee will not be accepted. Notice reform will not be stopped for the agricultural sector and is primarily market based, but the country will not give up priorities and strategic interventions. An incidental fall out of the Prime Minister's directive is that while the government deficit reduction targets agreed to with the IMF will need to be very sensibly stuck to, the restriction on borrowing by the public sector for productive investment say in infrastructure and rural development cannot be agreed to. It is quite clear that the Eighth Plan's published financial projections (GOI, 1992, Vol I, pp 53-58) are totally at variance with the three year Public Sector Borrowing Rate (PSBR) target agreed to by the Finance Ministry with the IMF as reported to Parliament. Obviously serious economic policy debate is open in India. Alternatively take the fact that the Finance Minister continuously threatens rapid reduction, in dispersion and level of tariff rates but the Eighth

Plan as approved by the Union Cabinet and the NDC accepts only:

"a gradual reduction in both the level and dispersion of tariff rates" (GOI, 1992, p. 86).

Similar examples can be given from agricultural, educational and technology policy. The need for a coherent and non-trivial discussion of development alternative is therefore critical at the present phase.

THE ENVIRONMENT ASPECT

The intellectual preparation for the Environment Conference included initiatives by many groups in different countries, a number of international meetings which preceded the Rio meeting and the various national position papers. However, by far the two most interesting perspectives were from the United Nations itself and from the World Bank. The World Bank views were contained in the World Development Report 1992 on "Development and the Environment". This was preceded by a set of reports by Herman Daly and his colleagues which are fairly detailed and have been widely discussed. The summary of the UN's view is in "Guide to Agenda 21: A Global Partnership" released by the Secretariat of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in March 1992. An interesting parallel exercise to this by the UNCED which contained some of the intellectual back up for Agenda 21 and complementary to it was the Hague Report on "Sustainable Development: From Concept to Action". The Netherlands Finance Minister Jan Pronk and the Pakistani economist Mahabubul Haq currently with the UNDP, released the Hague Report based on their understanding of the Hague Symposium held in November 1991 "attended by about forty leading thinkers from all over the world". The experts at the Hague Symposium included Maurice Strong, Kazuji Auchi, former Japanese Minister of Global Environmental Problems, Nazli Choucri of M.I.T., Gamman Correa, Herman Daly, Taghi Faroof of Iran, Gilbert Gillopin of IASA, Kalloutai of USSR., I. Sachs, Gus Speth, President of the World Resources Institute, John Sewell, Overseas Development Council of US, Carl Tharn of SIDA, Alvaro Umana, former Natural Resources Minister of Costa Rica, Kirit Parikh and Yoginder K. Alagh were included from India. Also Nitin Desai represented UNCED. There were officials from FAO, IFAD, UNEP, UNDP, etc. Pronk and Haq introduced the Hague Report by saying that the Hague Report was to Rio what the FOUNEX Report was to Stockholm "a seminal document" and exercised a major influence on global thinking on these issues.

'Agenda 21', the Hague Report and the World Development Report are all in agreement that environmental concerns have to be introduced in

the core of economic and social policy making. In fact the major thrust has to be on the concrete policies which make individuals and groups acting as consumers and producers to pay the price for environmental costs, incentive mechanisms with which they are rewarded for benign environmental action and sustainable outcomes on land and water conservation, introduction of eco-friendly products, energy efficiency, recycling and so on.

The World Development Report sees environmental issues in a technological paradigm. There is a major emphasis on supply orientation and on the role of markets. It is not that institutions are excluded but the major focus is on economic reform, on simple and direct rule based intervention in markets and that too only if absolutely necessary, and on the role of improved price signalers. The World Bank emphasizes the "need to rely on the use of prices and taxes to encourage conservation. Often simple but blunt policies may be preferable". The methodological stance is that of supply economics or at most neo-classical economic policy stances. However, specific limitations of received economic theory are recognized, particularly with regard to the well known environmental problems i.e. externalities, dynamics of technological change particularly for introduction of new products and pricing of non-renewable resources.

UN studies also endorsed the need for market reform and liberalisation, particularly trade reform and the removal of oligarchic controls. The environmental problem however is also squarely placed within the context of uneven global development and the need to remove poverty and hasten growth in poor countries. The question of a sustainable style of consumption which can be maintained given available real resources is seen as fundamental. The problem is seen as requiring intervention at different levels, global, regional, national and local, in addition to improved supply and the management of markets. The approach is that of the received theory of economic policy. In this approach policy interventions at different levels or sectors can determine the realization of desired objectives, given the structure of the problem. In fact there is an emphasis on institution building for designing sustainable development programmes and policies and implementation machineries. Agenda 21 sees the distinction between the international aspects of environmental problems and local and national aspects as faulty and as such squarely places the problem of the design of development of focus, instead only of the application of simple rules for the solution of partial problems.

On land and water and the problems of ecologically fragile areas, Agenda 21 seeks a comprehensive approach and asks for the implementation of sustainable development investment and strategies and plans at the national level through international cooperation. The Technical Annex to the Hague

Meeting Pronk-Mahabubul Haq paper is by Ignacy Sachs and commends the Indian agroclimatic approach to land and water development costs in the following words:

"Alagh (1991) gives many examples of watershed development projects with a short pay-back period. The techniques for such projects are well-known and their impact at community level would be very favourable. Yet they need public funding for the front-up costs. Alagh argues in favour of an agro-climatic planning in terms of alternative agricultural and farming systems in order to overcome the shortcomings of a favoured crop/region approach."

The World Bank also commends the watershed development approach, although their cost estimates are much higher than the 'front up costs' of the Indian case. The World Bank estimates of such costs are per hectare. Indian estimates are however around Rs. 4000 per hectare for land and water development costs for agro-forestry purposes and around Rs. 9000 per hectare for such costs for agricultural land for crop purposes at 1987 prices. They also argue for policy reform for land and capital markets in rural areas and a vigorous policy of internationalization of the agricultural economy of poor countries.

On industrial technology, 'Agenda 21' and the Hague meeting far more directly argue for the induction of energy efficient technologies, in the development process, particularly in the Third World. The United Nations note commends the kind of proposal made by Rajiv Gandhi at the Non-aligned Summit in Yugoslavia in 1989 to have an international mechanism which makes environmental friendly technology available to the Third World. The technical annex to the Hague Meeting commends this proposal as follows:

"The proposal made at by the Indian Prime Minister at the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in September 1989 deserves a careful examination. It called for setting up of a one per thousand tax on the Gross World Product for a Fund of Sustainable Development that would finance the research, development and production of environmentally friendly technologies to all those who need them. This proposal combines the principle of automatic financing with the treatment of science and technology as part of the common linkage of mankind."

In this area the World Bank's approach is to rely on "marked based incentives" and the need to avoid those regulations which cannot be implemented.

The investment requirement estimates of a sizeable programme by the United Nations at \$ 125 billion are much higher than the World Bank estimate of \$75 billion. Both, however argue that these requirements are in addition to the current level of international aid. The United Nations discussion is more innovative and the Hague Report talks of funding mechanisms like emission taxes and entitlements and the like. No wonder the final Rio declaration literally lifts paragraphs from the Hague Report.

The press in India has generally been concentrating on the North's contribution, but since these are matters of great importance to the country, on account of its population density impacting on limited real resources, a more informed debate would be useful. The beginnings of a debate are already there if one juxtaposes the writings of say Doiroy de Monte with those of Swaminathan A. Aiyar, both interestingly writing provocatively in the same newspaper. Also in the sub-continent the debate is heating up. Pakistan had interestingly taken major initiatives for the Environment Conference. Its country paper reflected the kind of analytical inputs which Mahabubul Haq had published in the Hague Report. Pakistan's paper played an important role at the New York precom meeting for Rio. Sartaz Aziz, the Pakistan Finance Minister was present at the Geneva Meeting which was preparatory to the Hague Report. There was no Indian representation although the present author was there as an individual expert. India's country paper hardly saw the light of the day. India has a major tradition of contribution to the environmental debate. Unfortunately like the global level (World Bank vs. UNDP), our official levels sometimes speak with a Janus face. However, one of my earlier memory was going through the very interesting documentation produced by the Late Pitambar Pant for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's famous speech at the Stockholm Conference, when I formed the Planning Commission in 1974 in its PPD. India was one of the major contributors to the concepts that poverty removal and therefore development and environmental concerns go together. "Poverty is the greatest pollutor." Rio is just the beginning of the debate and it is good to hear that India is also getting its act together. Contributions of experts like the non-nonsense Anil Agarwal could lead to a major role for the country in the months to come. The Eighth Five Year Plan, with the credible investment package put in with the Prime Minister's intervention provides the logical framework for India to get its environmental act together, as Shri Narasimha Rao said at Rio.

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Growing Deployment of the Armed Forces in Aid to Civil Authorities*

LT J AJIT KUMAR IN

INTRODUCTION

Most changes in human affairs have come about through Wars, rebellions and other forms of armed conflict. Mankind's desire to live in peace has proved to be an illusion rather than a reality. In the past 5000 years of recorded human history, there have been over 14,550 wars which works out to an astonishing average of one war every four months. Mankind has known only about 290 years of peace. Since the end of World War II, many countries of the world including India, have been facing insurgency and terrorist problems. Almost half the world population has been involved in such struggles. Millions of lives have been sacrificed and billions of dollars spent world wide, in combating insurgency and terrorism. Historical development and the prevailing political, ethnic, religious and economic conditions have significantly influenced insurgency and terrorism in our country. Differing ethnological and social systems, massive migrations of populations, religious fundamentalism and the isolated and inert nature of large groups only generate or inflame social, religious, cultural, regional, linguistic and other contradictions.

There has been considerable deterioration in our internal security environment since independence in 1947, and therefore, the employment of the Army on internal security duties has increased considerably. The persistent insurgency problems in the North Eastern region (particularly Manipur and Tripura), in the Hill Districts of North Bengal (especially Darjeeling, Kurseong and Kalimpong areas), in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Assam has required large scale intervention by the Army, particularly in the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, and Tripura. The Army's presence in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and North East continues on a large scale. The socio-political currents which promote regionalism, religious fundamentalism and subnational identities are a fact of life today, and are likely to continue to be so in the foreseeable future. Coupled with alien interests, the dynamics of these can threaten national unity, if not suitably countered in the early stages of their manifestation and on a continuing basis.

* This essay has won the first prize in group "B" of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1992.
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AIM

The aim of this article is to :

- (a) throw some light on the growing deployment of Armed Forces in aid to civil authorities,
- (b) discuss civil-military relations in relation to their responsibilities to each other,
- (c) discuss the merits and demerits (particularly in using Armed Forces for civil disturbances,
- (d) discuss the mode of usage of Army when required and policy making for the same,
- (e) discuss how we can strengthen our police/paramilitary forces to cope with future challenges, so that the use of the Army is genuine,
- (f) discuss how to tackle urban counter-insurgency which is the present major regional issue, and
- (g) discuss disaster-relief organisation.

THE CIVIL AND MILITARY-HOW THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE

Civil power is the ultimate authority charged with the governance of the State. The executive, the legislature and the judiciary, functioning in their respective spheres and in the prescribed manner, are the various elements that constitute Civil Power. Civil Administration and the Army are the two instruments available to Civil Power to execute its decisions. In this scheme of things, the Army must always remain subordinate to Civil Power no matter what the form of Government. The Army is here referred to in its generic sense, meaning the military and stands for the Defence Services as a whole.

In socialist/communist countries the Army remains totally aligned with the party. In democracies, the Army is not required to be committed to any party. In fact the emphasis is on the Army remaining apolitical. At the national level, full control is exercised by Civil Power over the Army which is required to function in accordance with its directions. At other levels there is to be no interference or interaction by political leaders with the functioning of the Army.

The primary role of the Army is to defend the country against external

aggression. Its secondary role is to assist the civil administration when called upon to do so. Some people tend to consider Civil Power and the civil administration as synonymous but in reality, they are two separate entities. Whereas the Army is subordinate to the Civil Power, it is not subordinate to the civil administration. The latter, like the military, is an instrument at the disposal of the Civil Power. An important consideration in our case is that our constitution provides for law and order as a State subject and not as the responsibility of the Centre. The Army being a force of the Centre cannot be made subordinate to the State Administration. When called upon to assist the civil administration, the Army is not required to replace the latter. The day the Army replaces the civil administration, we will have martial law and martial law is something not envisaged in our constitution.

The bed rock of sound civil-military relation in a modern state must be the supremacy of civil power over the Army, duly accepted and respected by the latter at all times. The soldier must be subordinate to civil power but should never be subservient to it. The statesman in authority must have all the resources of the state, both civil and military, at his call to discharge his onerous responsibilities. The soldier must be scrupulously loyal to him, but this does not mean blind obedience as romanticised by Tennyson: " Theirs not to reason why, but to do and die". Such an attitude may be very commendable on the battlefield but it can hardly be the basis of civil-military relations at the national level. At that level the soldier is an essential part of the decision-making process for the formulation of defence policy. He must freely and frankly render his professional advice, even if it is not palatable to his political masters. Nearly two centuries ago Napoleon wrote, " Every General-in-Chief who executes a plan which he finds bad has his guilty. He should represent and insist that the plan be changed. If he is unable to get this done, he must resign rather than be the instrument for the ruination of his troops." That advice is equally valid today for Generals functioning at the national level. They cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that their loyalty to the nation and the constitution transcends their loyalty to any individual who may, for the time being, occupy the seat of power. In the event of a serious conflict between his two loyalties, it is incumbent upon the General to resign so that the issue gets placed before the nation and is resolved in a democratic manner.

Whereas, the above mentioned may be the principles underlining the responsibilities and positions of the civil power and The Army and their relations, in reality, it was breached many a times by the civil, if we take the examples of how the Army is being used to deal with internal violence.

DANGERS INHERENT IN THE FREQUENT USE OF THE ARMED FORCES TO CARRY OUT THE TASK OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

As mentioned earlier, the secondary role of the Armed Forces is to assist the civil administration when called upon to do so. The Army may be required to assist the civil administration in a host of ways. Assistance may be required during natural calamities like floods, earthquakes, drought and so on. Army assistance may also be called for during strikes by workers to maintain essential services for the well being of the community. Another area in which Army assistance may have to be given is in any major development work or a task of national importance such as the Asian Games. In addition to natural-disaster relief operations the task confined to the Navy is search and rescue, antismuggling and salvage operations. The Airforce is mainly concerned with evacuation/airliftings.

The most common type of assistance to the civil administration by the Army is combating violence during internal disorders. With increasing violence in our society this type of military assistance has unfortunately become very frequent. Over 90 per cent of the cases in which the Army has been called out to assist the civil administration falls in this category.

In the 1983-86 period alone, there has been 369 occasions in which the Army was called out by the civil administration to restore law and order. It is an unfortunate fact that during these four years the Army has been employed on these duties many times more than during two centuries of British rule in this country. It is also a lamentable fact that in these four years many more Indian citizens have died as a result of Army and Police firings than during the two centuries of foreign rule. The dimensions, in terms of the number of times the Army has been called out, and number of lives lost must be much more in the period 1987-92 since violence has increased, as well as the number of issues. There are various reasons, for this. Violence in our society has increased considerably and society has become afflicted with rampant corruption and debasement of values. These evils cast their shadow on the functioning of Government at all levels. All this has led to the erosion of the moral authority of the state. In the event, the state has to increasingly rely on force to maintain its authority. The two instruments of force available to the state are the Police and the Army. Due to increasing political interference in the functioning of the Police at all levels, the Police has become both politicised and demoralised. Often one sees a nexus between the politician, criminal and the policeman. It is no wonder the Police is now not a very effective instrument for maintaining order and that the administration has to seek Army Assistance frequently to combat internal disorders.

There are mainly four dangers inherent in the frequent use of the Army to carry out the tasks of the civil administration. First, modern wars are complex, and modern weapons highly sophisticated. This requires the Army to remain fully preoccupied with training for war and with maintaining expensive and complicated modern equipment. It can ill-afford to spare much time from its primary task for the secondary role of assisting the civil administration. To keep the Army committed on secondary tasks for a prolonged period will inevitably be detrimental to its operational preparedness. In 1947 when the Indian Army was widely committed in maintaining order during the partition riots, Pakistan invaded Kashmir with Lashkars in the first instance. The Pakistani General Staff felt that with the Indian Army being so preoccupied in dealing with internal violence and with Kashmir isolated from the rest of India due to poor communications, the capture of Srinagar would be a cake walk. Jinnah was all set to make his victorious entry into Srinagar. The fact that the Indian Army successfully met the challenge despite heavy odds speaks volumes for its professionalism and devotion. On the contrary, if the Armed Forces are left free to do their primary role, we have the examples of the 1971 victory or more recently, the freeing of Maldives. However, precedence demands that we should not allow the combat effectiveness of the Army to be eroded on account of it being embroiled in internal security duties. The Army must always be kept in a state of training and readiness to enable it to give a fitting reply to any one who commits aggression against us. If that be so, there is tremendous and unnecessary pressure on the Armed Forces.

Secondly, the frequent and prolonged use of the Army on these duties can prove a great strain on its discipline. The Army has been an island of discipline in a rising sea of indiscipline in our country. The soldier living in the seclusion of his barrack can remain better disciplined than the soldier constantly exposed to our indisciplined society while carrying out policing duties. It may be recalled that due to such prolonged exposure during the partition riots, cracks started appearing in the discipline of the Punjab Boundary Force. This force had to be wound up in September 1947. More recently, the unfortunate mutiny of the Sikh soldiers showed how discipline can break-down if effective steps are not taken to guard against this risk while employing troops on sensitive tasks in aid of the civil administration.

Thirdly, the deterrent effect of the Army becomes eroded if it is frequently employed in dealing with civil disturbances. Troops are then compelled to use more force thereby causing greater casualties than would otherwise have been necessary. It is pertinent to mention that after World War II, Field Marshall Auchinleck decided that the Indian Army should not revert to its pre-war Khaki uniform. The Army continued to wear the olive green uniform

which was introduced during the war for reasons of camouflage in the jungles of Burma. Auchinleck took this decision because he anticipated increasing violence in the country with troops being called out frequently to combat violent disorders. He wanted the Army to look strikingly different from the Police, who wear khaki, so that its arrival at the scene of trouble has a deterrent effect. Today the Indian Army continues to wear olive green except for troops earmarked for operational tasks in the deserts. It is interesting that a few years back, when the troops were called out in aid of the civil administration in Ahmedabad they temporarily switched over from khaki, which they normally wear because of their role in the desert, to olive green for carrying out internal security duties.

Lastly if the civil administration is seen to collapse repeatedly in the face of internal violence and becomes incapable of functioning without using the Army as a crutch, its credibility and authority will be seriously eroded. This may give the wrong signals both to the people and the soldiers. The former may begin to feel that Army rule is unavoidable and the latter may begin to think that instead of repeatedly helping the civil administration they might as well replace it. A civil administration relying solely on the Army to maintain its authority may, in the long run, find itself in the position of the young lady of Niger who could not resist the temptation of riding a tiger. As we all know, the young lady ended up inside the stomach of the tiger.

Apart from the reasons given above, this constant exposure to civil can even change a soldier's thinking. It is quite likely that his thinking gets politicised and smitten by religious fervour as well.

The continuous Army actions can whip up anti-Army frenzies among the public as happened after Operation Blue Star.

The frequent Army and civil contacts can downgrade the value of Army in the eyes of the common man since, "Familiarity breeds contempt."

MODE OF USAGE OF THE ARMY AND RELATED POLICY MAKINGS

While highlighting the drawbacks inherent in the frequent use of the Army for civil duties, it is not for a moment suggested that the Army should never be used for these duties. During these grave crises the State may have no other option but to use the Army to restore order. However, for the reasons as elaborated above, every effort must be made to ensure that the employment of the Army on such tasks be an exception and not be allowed to become a routine affair.

When faced with insurgency or large scale terrorism the State must use

the Army to deal with this extreme manifestation of violence. Counter-insurgency operations require special techniques. While so employed troops act in aid of the civil administration but these operations are different from the aid usually rendered to the civil authorities during internal disorders. Troops have to learn the technique of dealing with guerrilla warfare and at the same time endeavour to win the confidence of the people so that the insurgents are isolated. The British evolved a good organisational pattern for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations in Malaya which may be worth analysing for the policy makers of the country. A unified command of security forces were setup under a senior military officer, designated as Director of Operations, who functioned directly under the Head of Government. The functioning of intelligence agencies was fully coordinated. The military and the civil officials dovetailed their work through joint committees at various levels thus ensuring fully integrated utilisation of the resources of the state in combating insurgency.

From the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the frequent exposure of the Army to internal duties not only means the misuse of a fine force, trained and disciplined for an entirely different purpose but also causes an alienation between the civil population and military personnel and also renders both the Army and the para military forces inefficient in their respective specialization since both are not doing what they are actually supposed to do.

At this juncture, two options/needs clearly standout. They are :

- (a) Rationalisation and refurbishment of the existing para-military forces
- or
- (b) Creation of another special paramilitary force under the Army Command to preserve law and order.

RATIONALISATION OF PARAMILITARY FORCES

Since the attainment of independence a large variety of forces, loosely termed as paramilitary forces, have been raised in the country. Whenever a requirement arose, a force was raised to meet it.

There has not been an overall assessment or a design and some of their forces continue to exist. With the Army on one end and the police at the other, there used to be as many as fifteen forces of various types. After the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi we have added one more called the National Security Guard. Almost everyone is now adding a commando wing to its organisation. Obviously there is no scope for getting better value from these forces for national security.

The point is that it is not possible to develop their full potential if the large variety of forces with different organisations, personnel policies, officering pattern and ethos continue even when their basic role is same. Therefore rationalization of the para military forces is the solution.

The first purpose of rationalization of the forces should be to give correct emphasis to the role of the various forces. If an attempt is to be made to categorize these forces according to their broad roles, then essentially they fall into three groups.

(a) *Forces for guarding the borders.* The forces whose primary duty is on the border and who are expected, in a limited way, to fight against an enemy, are the Border Security Force(BSF), the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Uttar Pradesh Special Security Police Force(UPSPF), Special Frontier Force, Special Security Bureau and the Coast Guard for our sea frontiers. These could appropriately be termed as para military forces.


(b) *Forces meant for law and order.* The forces that primarily have a role in the interior of the country are the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Railway Protection Force (RPF), the State Armed Police (SAP), the Home Guards(HG), the Village Guards(VG) in Nagaland, the Village Volunteers Force(VVF) in Manipur, the Central Industrial Security Force(CISF), the Defence Security Corps(DSC) and now the National Security Guard. Some of these forces are often, and more appropriately, referred to as para police force.

(c) *Forces meant for the Country's development.* Included under this category is basically the Border Roads Organisation which has been created for the construction and maintenance of roads in selected border regions. The Land Army Schemes in Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh may also be considered under this category.

The border-guarding forces should have a military oriented role whereas the forces for internal law and order should be police-oriented. While certain amount of overlap will always be there, just as even the Army has a role to play in the internal security, the present omnibus employment could be considerably reduced. This would ensure that recruitment organisations, officering, equipping and training of these forces are oriented to their basic roles and that would be a step in the right direction.

Border Guarding Forces. The option, as far as rationalising the border-guarding para military forces are concerned, is quite clear. All these forces should be merged as a composite group which could well be named the Border Guard, very much on the lines of the Coast guard, so that this force

acts as a complementary asset to the Army. The force could take the shape indicated in Fig 1. The Border Guard should be officered by Army and like Coast Guard, placed under the Ministry of Defence, thereby achieving unity of command and less expenditure in terms of training, communication, administration etc.



The advantages of rationalising in this way are obvious. For example, we started with the armed police battalions of different states being used by the Central Government for various purposes and rationalised the set up to form the BSF and to enlarge the CRPF. As a result things are much better today than they were in the early 1960's. Merging the forces which have a common role will cut out duplication, give flexibility in turn over and will result in better personnel and equipment management. The main benefit, of course, would be that the effectiveness of the resultant force would improve and that too at a lesser cost.

Law and Order Forces. The options for rationalising the para military forces meant for internal law and order are not so easy and clear cut. To a large extent, these are related to the urgently needed reforms in the normal police. The very existence of para police force on the pay roll of the union govt. and organised on a national basis explains the poor state of efficiency of the state cadres of the police. A good police system is vital for a society. Instead of bringing about the much needed reforms in the basic police system we have, in the last 40 years, resorted to merely symptomatic treatment and added a variety of para military forces. The CRPF which has emerged as the main instrument in the hands of the central govt. for assisting states, in the maintenance of law and order has shaped up as a good force for this purpose and should consolidate on this role. In order to enhance its capability in the field, we should be most reluctant to employ it in roles where it is required to directly confront an organised enemy in a war situation or even on active counter insurgency operations except in a truly police role. This would assist the force in developing police skills which take time and effort to acquire. During a war situation, it could be called upon to assist the Army only in the rear areas to guard our vital installations and communications against sabotage and perform other similar protective duties. All other forces for internal security should become an adjunct of CRPF.

A SPECIAL PARA MILITARY FORCE FOR LAW AND ORDER

While rationalisation of the country's paramilitary force, may be one of the solution to keep the Army away, the second solution is the creation of a special paramilitary force for preserving law and order alone. This special paramilitary force should be under the Army command, unlike the other paramilitary forces, which are under the home ministry. A proposal for the creation of such a paramilitary force called the Rashtrastra Rifles would mean that the civilian authorities might not have to call in the Army as frequently as now.

While rationalization of paramilitary force or creation of a separate force for preserving law and order may be the long term solution in keeping the Army away from dealing with civil disturbances, it will take some time to shape up things like that. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to ponder how urban insurgencies can be combatted since, this is the main thing for which, the Army is called out frequently.

COMBATING URBAN INSURGENCY

The fight against insurgency, particularly the urban variety, is made more difficult in a democratic society than in one under a military dictatorship. A ruthless fight against insurgents inevitably means curbing civil liberties, which in turn may generate, or accentuate, popular discontent. Moreover democratic societies with their attendant free press and parliamentary practices means exposure of Government operations to critical public scrutiny, often to the Government's disadvantage. Ideologies, concepts, strategies and techniques of response to the emergency have to be circulated in a manner consistent with the traditions of the country concerned.

A second aspect is that of international criticism. International pressure groups, which often act as proxies to further super-power interests, are often vociferous in the criticism of the Government. Hence, in a democratic society combating insurgents is at best a fine balance between the level of response to the insurgency and the preservation of the values which the Government is trying to uphold.

POLITICAL RESPONSE

Combating insurgency is primarily a political task. Hence basic response has to be political, translated into ideological, rather than a military response. It has to be remembered that the insurgent is attempting to provoke over-reaction and, thus, make the Government appear repressive. This does not mean catering to the insurgents wants but means adopting a calm

and measured response to fight the terrorists on all fronts - political, military and international, if need be.

The government must examine and deal with those grievances upon which the insurgent is trying to capitalise. Often it may not be possible for a democratic Government to wholly eliminate the grievances, particularly if the insurgents are say of the anarchist, Maoist or Trotskyist variety whose aim is to dismember the existing system itself. Hence use of force to crush the insurgents is an option that the Government should be ready to adopt. At the same time, the Government must be prepared to negotiate with those elements which seek the alleviation of the same grievances but in a constitutional manner. Taking the public into confidence is essential and yet tricky. However, one thing must be remembered that decision making must not be delayed, and appeasement is no answer to a permanent solution.

CONCEPT OF RESPONSE

Over reaction by the government to an insurgent situation is the biggest pitfall in a democratic society. mere use of force will not win the 'Hearts and Minds' of the people. Involvement of the Army in the fight against insurgents is more often than not, adopted even in the initial stages of an insurgency, but this has unfortunate repercussions.

The Army cannot continue to act as an anti-urban terrorist force over a long period without repurcussion on its training, efficiency and political outlook nor is conventional warfare training necessarily appropriate. Any such employment should involve specialised training in counter-insurgency techniques, in anti-riot and anti-terrorist techniques. It would also mean the role of the Army getting politicised because the troops could be involved in the 'for' and 'against' role in the political polemics of the situation. Being essentially an internal disorder, prolonged use of troops tends to give the urban insurgent a kind of "Combatant status", as Burton calls it. Moreover, Army involvement tends to reinforce a feeling of a situation "Getting out of hand". The solutions for this are creation of special force for law and order, as rationalization of paramilitary forces. It could perhaps be best to create a new Ministry of National Security and leave local police with the Home ministry.

Burton has visualised in the British context, four levels of response to the urban insurgency threat to prevent over reaction by the Govt. These could be applied in our case, too, with certain modifications.

- (a) *Level 1.* Would involve the terrorist with the police. Use would be made of anti terrorist techniques, such as the use of helicopters, armoured cars, water dousers, gas shells and tranquilizer guns, to meet

short term terrorist threats, i.e. possible attacks on airports, hotels, police and military headquarters, radio and TV transmitters and studios etc.

(b) *Level 2.* Would commit Army personnel in order to release the police for more specialized duties such as cordon and search operation. The Army might man road blocks or take over traffic control duties using the Military police in the first instance.

(c) *Level 3.* Would mean a more serious situation of direct military involvement, if necessary with weapons, in crowd dispersal and the assumption of many other police duties probably under the unified and overall command of a military Director of Operations.

(d) *Level 4.* Would only be reached in the case of 'Limited war' and would involve what would, in effect, be a period of military government with the imposition of curfew, identity checks, etc.

In our context, due to the high exposure the urban terrorist gets in cities than in the rural areas, these levels of reaction assume importances. At each level the endeavour should be two-fold; to contain insurgency at that level and crush it. The use of force (Army) should be to get insurgents to the negotiating table and thereafter the politician should take over to resolve the problem. Therefore there is a need to have a permanent organisation which meets, coordinates and oversees the implementation of agreements reached, since no accord can be fool-proof. Besides, care must be taken to block opportunists who exist in all parties and would try to exploit loop holes for their personal gains.

An understanding of the vulnerabilities of insurgency groups can go a long way in planning operations against the insurgents. Broadly speaking the areas where these vulnerabilities can be isolated are the ideological base, the small size of the group and inherent soft spots of insurgency.

An ideological base is the bed-rock of insurgency. Ideological motivation causes members to fight for the insurgent cause. On the political plane, therefore, the development of an alternate ideology or plan invariably tempts some members of the insurgent organisation and opens a debate within the organisation. Similarly, within the insurgent groups, differences always exist between the popular supporters and the terrorist segment which can be exploited by planned provocation. This is what we need to do in Punjab. The clandestine character and the narrow ideological base together indicate that an insurgent organisation will have a small command, staff and rank and file structure, particularly in urban area. Hence specialist force staff, operations,

sabotage and communication work are few. The loss of any key member will cause delay or often terminate the progress of an operation and assist in disintegration. We need to exploit these weaknesses.

A number of soft spots are inherent in an insurgency movement. These include heavy dependence on a small number of key leaders, personal corruption (either real or 'framed') of key members and inadequate support services. These are vulnerable to penetration or disintegration by intelligence operations.

The response to terrorism should be aimed at exploiting these weaknesses of insurgents rather than using blanket military operations which should properly be carried out against a conventional enemy only.

INTELLIGENCE - THE KEY TO SUCCESS

As an insurgent is often an invisible enemy, good intelligence undoubtedly is one of the greatest battle winning factor in counter insurgency warfare. Some essential aspects of gaining in counter insurgency operations are:

- (a) Intelligence effort directed to gain information prior to the onset of insurgency is not only effective but points out specific channels of response.
- (b) An integrated intelligence organisation with civil, military and police agencies with a lateral communication network is a must.
- (c) Intelligence acquisition should be planned and information actively sought rather than to wait passively to receive it. Intelligence acquisition should be the task of all forces involved and not confined merely to intelligence agencies. All intelligence should be stored in a computer and should be easily and quickly available to all concerned. There is a need to have a high level organisation that directs, collects, sifts, and disseminates intelligence and not merely information to the people concerned. It should work in close cooperation with the ministry of national security but not under them.
- (d) Interrogation is a great asset in the acquisition of intelligence.
- (e) Counter-intelligence operations, like penetration, assume greater significance in counter insurgency than in conventional warfare.

INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

As counter insurgency operations are carried out on a number of planes,

an integrated civil-military command structure with clearly defined goal and responsibilities is essential. Close liaison at local levels can avoid many a shoot-out within the govt. forces especially where sections of the forces operate in civilian clothes. The presence of police officials with troops can help overcome misunderstandings between the troops and local population. For this it is imperative that the Armed forces should be considered like any other service and be kept informed at all times of the internal situation within the country.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

With the powerful influence of modern communication media, psychological warfare has assumed great importance in counter-insurgency operations. Psychological warfare expertise has been used unsuccessfully combatting a number of terrorist and insurgent movements. The aim is to hit insurgency at the most vulnerable spot-motivation of its members and the readiness of others to join its ranks or to remain and operate within its framework. General Shlomo Gazit and Michael Handel have suggested some of the possible targets for psychological operations as under.

- Undermine internal cohesion by stories of traitors/spies informers within.
- Undermine the credibility of leadership and command.
- Create friction and internal rivalry among top leaders of the organisations.
- Promote conflicts between different terrorist organisations.
- Drive a wedge between the organisation and its supportive civilian infrastructure.

DISASTER RELIEF

One of the roles assigned to armed forces is to assist the civil government during natural and other calamities. Their participation is not likely to diminish in the future as they are a national asset and provide a disciplined, efficient and well equipped force which is readily available. The cardinal principle of involvement of Service should be that they are called in during absolute emergency and in exceptional circumstance were civil resources in men and material are inadequate. Disaster Relief Operations are similar to any Military Operations. The involvement of Service should be controlled by Service Headquarters. The respective Service Headquarters should be responsible to augment resources at national level. They should function under

the directions of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A section in respective Military Operations Directorates should be totally dedicated to disaster relief operations. In our context seldom will active Formation Headquarters be involved directly. The Service involvement will be through Static Headquarters of service concerned (Area and Subarea). The three services could provide tangible assistance.

The Army could provide assistance by way of provision of boats, establishment of camps, medical supplies, food and manpower oriented tasks.

The Navy could render aid by way of rescue, salvage and sea lift where applicable.

The Air Force is best suited for provision of helicopters and aircraft for supply drop, rescue missions and transportation, assist in assessing chemical and nuclear fall out and monitoring the fall out by over flying over the area.

To ensure effective assistance the Service should be familiar with likely problems they will face based on lessons learnt during earlier operations and take timely action to overcome these problems.

There can be no question that both the frequency and intensity of natural and man made disasters are on the increase. That there is now an awareness, world wide, of the need for a coordinated approach to the problem of relief is no longer in question as was evident from the international assistance provided during Gulf evacuation. Based on the analysis of approach to Disaster Relief in the various countries of the world, the points that merit attention in planning of disaster relief in India can be summarised as under:-

- (a) The responsibility for organisation of relief measures should rest with civil authorities at all levels and the function of various civilian agencies integrated.
- (b) At each level there must be a single coordinator and he must have the authority to control all relief agencies.
- (c) Warning system, both local and national, are essential and must be integrated and updated.
- (d) The community must be educated to play its part in relief operations as self-help, more often than not, turns out to be the best help.


The services should only be involved after civil sources have proved inadequate for the task.

ORGANISATION FOR RELIEF IN INDIA

Based on the study of some of the disaster stricken countries, we must achieve better preparedness to deal with disasters and following is recommended:-

- (a) The appointment of a single national coordinator to coordinate and facilitate the receipt of international aid. Projection of conflicting aid requirement by diverse national agencies will thus be avoided.
- (b) The incorporation of legislative or other measures to facilitate the receipt of international aid. These measures refer to agreements regarding overflights, landing rights and privileges of personnel involved in aid distribution and customs clearance.
- (c) An improved warning system. This includes not only warning of the impending disasters where applicable but also the efficient triggering off the entire mechanism of the disaster relief organisation. We do have a fairly comprehensive meteorological system in our country.
- (d) The establishment of contingency plans with the assistance of UNDRO; as also those for transportation and communication systems.
- (e) The training of relief personnel.

Some progress has been made in the implementation of these measures, however they have not yet been fully implemented. A suggested organisation for disaster relief is given in Fig 2.



CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to analyse the growing deployment of Armed Forces in aid to civil authorities and to suggest solutions to the related problems. The article also has briefly dwelt upon the disaster relief organisation in India.

Based on this article, we can arrive at the following conclusions:

- (a) While the Army can give temporary protection in a limited way, the maintenance of law and order and protection to public can only be provided by an effective police force. Therefore, the emphasis should be to make them effective and functional irrespective of constraints.
- (b) It is necessary to rationalise the numerous para military forces which have come into existence in the forty years since independence and functionally group them into Border Guards, forces meant for law and order and forces meant for country's development.
- (c) The integration of people in the north-east and a part of the population of the north-west and west with the rest of the country is a paramount task facing the country. What is needed to achieve this is the evolution of a well defined and consistent policy and its execution with vigour and determination.
- (d) The police needs to be more alert, conscious, inquisitive, apolitical, and non religious. They need to be modernised and made more mobile rather than have their numbers increased.

Approach to National Security : The Indian Case Study

LT GEN VIJAY MADAN, PVSM, VSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of India's security concerns must take cognizance of the fact that the historical context to fall back upon, so essential to such discussions, is very limited. Even that is so obviously skewed that whatever lessons one may draw from the past are neither based on any depth of experience, nor tested against unassailable decisions taken earlier. The past inevitably determines the present, as indeed the present will determine the future. In all national affairs, lessons of history can only be ignored at a nation's peril. It is for the leaders, the policy makers, to decide how such lessons of their nation's historical experience are to be used. For instance, after the fall of France, Hitler convinced himself that given the right conditions and appropriate terms, Great Britain could be brought around to agree to a truce. Speaking at a conference he is believed to have remarked that having seen the behaviour of the British at Munich, they would have no hesitancy in accepting his terms, more so because of the military disaster that had over-taken them. The assault on Dunkirk was therefore stopped in its tracks to create the right psychological conditions. As Chester Wilmot observes in his classic, *The Struggle for Europe*, Hitler forgot that British policy for centuries had been one of ensuring that the balance in Europe was never tilted in favour of any one single continental power. That had been the basis of all British efforts in the past for ensuring Britain's security. Hitler also over-looked the coincidence that he was at that particular moment dealing with the indomitable Winston Churchill, whose equally indomitable ancestor, that other Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough had helped fashion this policy and enforced it even by war.

In the euphoria of freedom, Indian leaders failed to take cognizance of the Indian historical experience. This experience amply suggested that one of the prime reasons for India, unitedly or in its various parts, going under foreign domination over and over again was the absence of an organised military machine, with matching military expertise in the arts of warfare, technology and leadership. Yet, defence affairs were considered as a necessary evil, to be kept on the margin of the nation's activities. A drain on time, money and effort, the country could do without, if it was possible. This was and to a great extent remains India's outlook even today.

THE RULES AND THEIR APPLICATION

THE RULES

What is national security? A very simple question to ask, a very complex one to answer. The complexity arises out of any number of answers that can be given, each partially right, most wholly wrong. What constitutes security in both real and abstract terms, how it is achieved and what does it achieve in turn, are each a facet of a nation's security which need to be addressed separately and together, in order to arrive at an answer complete within itself. Since this is not often done the resultant separate, incomplete replies are confused with the whole answer. Walter Lippmann believed that "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able if challenged to maintain them by war". This could be termed as a militaristic approach to national security. Moreover, it is an external threat oriented view of security, since exercising the option of war to protect national interests is the suggested linchpin of this view. It assumes that what a nation declares to be its legitimate national interests, are accepted by others to be indeed so. There is also the hidden implication that a nation's military power must remain in direct proportion to the number of legitimate interests it decides to pursue and protect. Since a lengthening list of legitimate interests requires a proportional increase in military power to protect them, then conversely, it is possible that an increase in military power would automatically whet the appetite of a nation to declare more and more of its pursuits, some of which may be at the expense of other nations, to be its legitimate interests. A first class recipe for wars which have occurred in the past and will certainly happen in the future.

There are, however, nationally and internationally imposed limits to a spiral of legitimate interest requiring proportional military force to protect them - an increased list of interests leading to more force accretion and so on. Limits set, by the internal resources available to a nation for sustaining such a spiral and the pecking order that it seeks in the international community. According to the 19th century Austrian political thinker, Helmut von Treitschke "The real test of a state's power status was its ability to decide, on its own, whether it would engage in warfare". It, therefore, follows that a nation should limit its legitimate interests to the level upto which it can take independent decision to use force for protecting and pursuing them. Every nation tries to be as sovereign in this regard as possible but autarchy is a mirage which even the most powerful of nations dare not chase.

Robert McNamara, with the benefit of his experience as one of the world's top managers, administrators, Defence Secretary of the USA at a

very crucial time, and then the President of the World Bank, looked upon national security, or security per-se, in developmental or economic terms. He observed that "Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security. A developing nation which does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure, for the intractable reason that its citizenry cannot shed its human nature". The McNamara view will perhaps not be challenged by many. Most will also find in it the suggestion that development is the basis for economic security which is more important than military security. Implicit in this view is the warning that a developing nation which does not in fact develop is threatened more from within by its citizens than from without by inimical powers. Dramatically put, one can say that the citizens of India would be impressed by vehicles loaded with food, rather than by massed military ceremony and borrowed military might rolling down the Rajpath on a Republic day parade. The greater danger to a developing country which does not develop, however, lies in the state ie, essentially the ruling establishment, turning its armed forces or para-military forces or state sponsored vigilante' squads on its own people.

McNamara's view of security was obviously propounded with an eye on developing third world countries rather than the economically strong and militarily secure nations. For them Walter Lippmann's concept of security is more relevant. To infer from McNamara's observation however, that legitimate military expenditure is wasteful is as faulty an inference as to believe that security is directly proportional to military strength alone. Can a nation undertake economic development to the complete exclusion of a matching military development where threats to its interests exist? It can but only if it is prepared to curtail its sovereign right to militarily defend them and concedes this right to a powerful Godfather prepared to under-write its military security for a consideration; political, economic or both. Such was the relationship between the USA and Japan for instance.

Perhaps the views expressed could be amalgamated to signify the progression by a nation towards true security; starting from economic security with matching military security (McNamara's view) - leading to forging the military ability for defending national including economic interests (Lippmann's view) to finally achieving as near a state of autarchy as possible in war making decisions, (Von Treitschke's view).

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

The founding fathers of modern India obviously thought on lines similar

to those which were articulated by McNamara much later, ie, economic security first, even without concomitant military security. Mr Nehru specially, was at the same time, however, keen to make India a player in the global arena, seeking an international status well beyond India's intrinsic economic, political and military power stature. Having climbed up, what they believed to be the moral high ground between the two power blocs, Indian leaders basked in the glow of an illusory security, cast by the approbation of acolyte nations, who themselves weak found in India the voice they were seeking. Thus we had the phenomenon of an economically weak and a militarily insignificant country trying to organise the world according to India. Let it be stated at once that Nehru the architect and executor of this policy was entirely motivated by the desire to protect India's national interests. He wanted to keep the world from overheating to the point of an open war between the then Soviet bloc and the western nations. A war that could and would have dragged India, along with its economic efforts, into the conflict. He had seen two world wars, three revolutions, and the rise and fall of empires. National security was, therefore, hopefully sought by keeping the international situation cool using diplomatic efforts, while intense economic development was pursued to provide security within. Since the external environment appeared to have been suitably managed by non-aligned diplomacy, military aspects were largely ignored. What was not fully appreciated was that initially it was the pressure of a world, exhausted by the Second World War and a Europe completely devastated and in no mood to become another battle field, that had kept the peace, not so much the go between efforts of India & others. Later, the dialectics of the nuclear balance of terror kept the cold war from growing hot. Although, India's efforts, both individually and collectively as a leading partner of the non-aligned movement, in this regard should not be minimised, yet it is obvious that too much was made of them, lulling the nation into a false sense of security. Since India believed that the international cold war situation in so far as she was concerned was apparently well managed by diplomacy, she considered Pakistan to be the only possible military threat and that too not a significant one. Besides, her international poseur demanded that she be never seen as an initiator of a military conflict; consequently, a status quo oriented or defensive military outlook came into being.

There was a glaring hiatus, however, between India's perception of herself, the national interest complementary to this perception, and the preparations she made to protect and project them. The desire to build India as a successor state of the great empires, Mauryan, Gupta, Mughal and most definitely the British-Indian was a major motivating factor for the Indian leadership. Although, Gandhian tradition forbade such greatness being achieved by the force of arms never-the-less such ambition was there in Gandhian

thought too. Otherwise, what else can explain the pre-partition dream of a united India from the Khyber to the Chindwin and the Karakorams to Kanyakumari. As a presumptive successor to the British Indian Empire, India regarded Pakistan as a seceding state. If this view is true, then it follows that inherent in such a presumption was the implication that what did not belong to Pakistan territorially or otherwise *ipso facto* belonged to India. In the short term and the then fore-seeable future therefore, India had a very important action to carry out in order to rightfully claim the inheritance of the British Indian Empire or even what actually came its way after partition. This was the task of territorial staking. India failed to do so with disastrous results. This failure was the direct result of following what can be termed as the earlier version of the McNamara model but without the moderating or the "shoring up" influence of a godfather power.

The task of bringing border areas upto the recognised or claimed boundaries can be termed as territorial staking, which ensures territorial integrity. Territorial staking is a military-cum-administrative activity. It gets an over-riding priority over all other national activities including economic ie developmental activity. This is especially important in the case of countries with undelineated boundaries and non-homogenous, and unabsoberd border populations. Development is an endo-centric activity for the obvious reason that political and administrative stability so essential to any economic activity is found in heartland areas. Territorial staking is on the other hand an exo-centric activity, since it is the peripheral areas which have to be brought under control. India's priorities in this regard were completely wrong. For instance, although having had a start over China in this respect, India failed to carry out territorial staking in Ladakh, and the North-East, while China set about in earnest its territorial staking in Tibet, Sinkiang, Inner-Mongolia and Manchuria. Its territorial staking is not yet complete. Taiwan is yet to be got hold of, Hong-Kong is on its way in. Paracel and other islands are very much on the agenda. What could be physically absorbed at once was absorbed.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF SECURITY

Where did India reach economically by sticking to the purely economic development model as suggested by McNamara? The economic dimension of our national security is so feeble and well known to be feeble, that nothing more need be added. What is bewildering of late however, is the overt and covert belief that it is the military establishment which has been one of the major causes, if not the only reason for our economic insecurity. Such a belief is but only a step removed from the next enlightened view that avoidance of all military expenditure would to a large extent improve our well being. Even

senior military officers have started giving voice to such un-informed thoughts; perhaps out of a desire to please powers that be or out of ignorance of the actual facts. For instance, the Times of India, giving a PTI news item of March 7, 1993, regarding a passing-out parade reported the reviewing officer to have urged the cadets to ensure they gave their best to the nation for the money that was spent on them, particularly in view of the economic constraints the country was facing. "If we get the money, remember it means tightening of belts elsewhere", he said. If the report is correct then it makes sad reading. The cadets should have been greeted with more stirring words on their entry into the Army. The reviewing officer's admonishment was more like the one given while hiring a chowkidar to do the night-watchman's job. The second part of the urging makes even stranger reading. "If", the report quotes him, "if we get the money, remember it means tightening of belts elsewhere". Again sounds like suggesting sacrifice on part of the nation to keep the white elephant of the Army going. If the nation needs the armed forces it is because it perceives a use for them. If it perceives a role for them then they must be prepared for executing such a role successfully. If the nation believes that its armed forces will be required to enter into an armed conflict to protect its interests, they must be kept in trim for such a purpose, no matter how many belts have to be tightened for the purpose. The size, weapons & equipment of the armed forces have to be in consonance with the type of threats to our legitimate interests; threats, where the use of force or the display of capability to do so may become essential. To suggest that the armed forces are in reality a major drain on the nation is to suggest that they exist for themselves and are an embarrassment. The truth is that but for the armed forces the country would have been in a much dire state than it is in now. The truth also is that it is the mismanaged economic efforts rather than the expenditures on the armed forces, well managed or not, which have been the cause of our lack of security, economic & otherwise. What is then the truth:-

(a) Of the gross domestic product since 1980-81 for instance the defence forces were given the following share, which included defence pension. This has presumably now been taken away from defence allotments:-

1980-81	2.6% of GDP	
1982-83	2.7% "	
1983-84	2.7% "	
1984-85	2.8% "	Source-Economic
1985-86	2.9% "	Survey of India 1990-91
1986-87	3.00% "	
1987-88	3.00% "	
1988-89	2.9% "	
1989-90	2.7% "	

1990-91	2.4% "
1991-92	2.5% "
1992-93	2.5% " Estimated. Not available
1993-94	2.4% " at the time of writing.

(b) The annual budgetary allotments in crores since 89-90 till date for defence are as follows:-

1989-90	14,146 crores
1990-91	15,426 crores
1991-92	16,347 crores
1992-93	17,500 crores
1993-94	19,180 crores

Source-Hindustan Times,
New Delhi 01 Mar 93

(c) Allowing for normal inflation, there has therefore, been hardly any increase in the allotment from 1989-90 to 1993-94. That means modernisation and major acquisition plans are on paper only. In reality there has been a minus 2.5 per cent reduction, rather than a growth rate in defence allotments.

Some other representative samplings will bring out well known, but hardly ever mentioned facts, specially by military officers who, as said earlier, seem to accept that a very important reason for the nation's economic plight is the military. Taking 1989-90 as the representative year, because this year had shown the best results in a long time, the profile of the public sector undertakings makes a revealing study. There were 233 running enterprises with a capital investment of Rupees 84,437 crores. Their net profit after paying tax was only Rs. 3782 crores or 4.5 per cent of the capital employed. A pathetic commentary. (Source-Economic Survey 1990-91).

In 1990-91 the financial results of departmental and commercial undertakings of states & union territories showed that the profit making undertakings made a profit of 594.08 crores. Of this, the Forest Department alone made a profit of 536.49 crores. The other undertakings like power, transport, industries, dairy development and so on made a handsome loss of 1928.02 crores. (Source-Economic Survey 1990-91).

To quote directly from the Economic Survey of 1990-91, "At the end of Dec 1988, the latest period for which data are available, there were more than 2.4 lakh identified sick industrial units (including weak units) on the rolls of All India financial institutions and commercial banks, involving an outstanding bank credit of Rs.7,705 crores which was about 9.8 per cent of the total outstanding banking credit. Between end Dec 1987 and end Dec

1988 the number of sick units had gone up by 17.7 per cent and the outstanding bank credit against these units, by 23.2 per cent". Why such dire sickness in our industry? Amongst other reasons, to again quote from the same Economic Survey, "29.10 million mandays were lost for 1988-89 due to industrial disputes and strikes. The figures have presumably been declining".

The most rabid supporter of guns versus butter school in India should get a fair idea that it is not the "Indian guns" that have reduced the production of "Indian butter", but the Indian butter makers who have wasted all the cream to the extent that there is not enough money to buy guns to stop India's enemies, both outside and within the country, from sequestering the Indian dairy.

One has to accept, however, with great regret that the funds allotted to the Indian armed forces have often not been wisely used. That considerable wastage has occurred and continues to occur. The use of term "to economise" can only be made once it is established that funds have been properly utilised to draw the maximum benefit out of the monetary efforts put in. And that even then there is some scope for economising by curtailing the not so high priority, albeit never-the-less equally legitimate activities. We cannot make that claim because when we use the term "economise" we are really talking of curbing wasteful expenditure, as against temporarily stopping low priority expenditure. The exercise to cut out wasteful expenditure should be an ongoing process even when the country is flush with funds. The armed forces cannot claim that they have been not wasteful. How to stop this waste is of course another matter and a separate subject.

It will thus be obvious that examined against any of the rules suggested for measuring national security, whether Walter Lippmann's defence oriented model, suitably limited by Von Treitschke's views or McNamara's economic development model which appears to have been India's chosen path, India has been unable to achieve even a satisfactory level of national security. India today has neither the economic strength nor the military clout to protect or project her national interests. It cannot go to war to protect them because of economic constraints and consequent military inability to do so, although the provocations have been many and grave. These provocations continue. To that extent and perhaps more, Indian sovereignty stands diminished.

THE INDIAN POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS

Although it would be unfair to say that the Indian political leadership

at the time of independence had no concept of national security, it would be equally wrong however, to claim for them or their successors a knowledge of the appropriate and legitimate role that the armed forces should play in the national security arena. Though visibly obvious to Indian as well as foreign military analysts, this lacuna has eluded Indian policy makers. Both actual ignorance and a lack of effort to overcome such ignorance has its roots in our historical inexperience in security affairs.

If one considers the fact that immediately after the 1914-18 war, eminent Indian leaders had pressed for the entry of Indians into the officer's cadre of the Army, one would have assumed that the Indian leadership was fully seized of defence matters. Both Motilal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, amongst others, had been members of the committee set up for this purpose under General Sir Andrew Skeen. This committee after deep deliberations asked for a number of vacancies, initially at Sandhurst, to be followed by the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst-the Indian Military Academy. These proposals were accepted in toto, infact more. The Indian political establishment appeared to have thus set in motion a process by which a truly "Indian" Army would be available to take on its appropriate responsibility to defend and project free India's interests. Strangely enough, Moti Lal Nehru's son, Jawahar Lal Nehru, the future Prime Minister, appears to have been less than enthusiastic about matters military, perhaps also ignorant about the legitimate role of the armed forces in the larger national security arena. Writing in the Indo-British review of March 1989, the theme of which issue is the Indian Armed Forces, Hugh Tinker quotes Jawaharlal Nehru's view on the Indian Army as set down in Mr Nehru's autobiography as follows:-

"In the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru references to the Army are scanty. In his autobiography (written in 1936) he makes a passing reference to the Indian Military Academy (IMA) which had been actively advocated by his father. He says of the cadets (without going to see them) "They are very smart on parade, we are told and they will no doubt make admirable officers". He observes caustically, that after thirty years an Indian General, "Might even appear". The Infantry are dismissed as being "as much use today as the Roman Phalanx" and the rifle as "little better than a bow and arrow". He concludes pointedly "No doubt their trainers and mentors realise this". The Discovery of India also has scattered military observations, he criticises the policy of balance and counterpoise (which) was deliberately furthered in the Indian Army. Various groups were so arranged as to prevent any sentiment of national unity growing amongst them and tribal and communal loyalties and slogans were encouraged". He reserves his praise for the Indian National Army (INA)", the symbol of unity among the various religious groups in India, for Hindu and Muslim, Sikh and Christian were all

represented in that Army. They had solved the communal problem amongst themselves, so why should we not do so"?

To the extent that Mr Nehru was aware of the efficacy or otherwise of the infantry and the type of ancient weapons it was saddled with, he was better informed than many of his colleagues, some of whom were to adorn the defence portfolio under him, and yet by and large remain ignorant of the armed forces in particular and military affairs in general, considering such ignorance to be a Gandhian badge of honour. The government of independent India, however, did precious little to change the Indian Army into a modern well armed mechanized force. Exactly a decade and a half after India became free, her soldiers went into battle against the Chinese, armed with the same rifle decried almost three decades earlier by her Prime Minister. No INA personnel, at least, at the officers level, were rehabilitated in the Army. The class and ethnic based regiments were continued with.

The post independence senior leadership of the armed forces, more so the Army, was equally responsible for this state of affairs. They were more concerned with ensuring that old traditions, ceremonies and customs were preserved, rather than that new organisations, systems and working relationships evolved. Even in the appreciation of threats and the consequent need for restructuring of force levels and organisations to meet the new ones which were looming over the horizon, there was no interface between the political and the military leadership, even if the latter were themselves clear about these issues, which appears to be doubtful. As early as 1953, the Commandant of the Staff College, Maj Gen WDA Lentaigne, an illustrious predecessor of mine as commanding officer of 1/4 Gorkha Rifles many years earlier, observed during one of his lectures that, "there is the older and yet now the most recent route, ie, that through Burma and possibly Tibet into Assam. Quite different terrain calling for different technique. Armour of little use and the emphasis on light equipment, jungle and hill warfare and mobile infantry. In this theatre I see the brigade group as the basic formation, a very highly organised information set-up amongst our border tribes and above all, close integration with the IAF in regard to direct air support directed against enemy communications and with (ensuring) air supply".

General Lentaigne was a professional held in high esteem, a man who took over the Chindit operations on the death of General Wingate. He must have shared his views with his colleagues in the Indian military hierarchy, who often turned to him for advice. A proposal on similar lines suggested later by Gen Thorat, when the Chinese threat became evident was obviously based on Gen Lentaigne's prescient observation. Why were such views not taken note of? If they were why was no appropriate action taken. There has

been a lot of criticism of political and bureaucratic leadership with regard to India-China conflict. The military leadership as many have observed, was equally at fault. The reason was the constraint on the politico-bureaucratic and the military hierarchies, imposed by the compartmentalization of national efforts, including in the field of national security. The restricted role of the armed forces even in the latter arena is bewildering. In his book "The Masks of War", Carl H. Builder holds the view that:-

- (a) The most powerful institution in the American national security arena are the military services - the Army, Navy and the Air Force, not the department of Defence or Congress or even their Commander-in-Chief, the President.
- (b) To understand the distinct personalities of the Army, Navy and the Air Force is to understand much that has happened and will happen in the American military and security arenas.

The wisdom revealed to Indian ruling elite is that in democracies the armed forces are only to execute policy, not help formulate it, even in the national security matters. The following item which appeared in the Bombay edition of the Times of India dated 27 Feb 93, however, only confirms Carl Builder's contention. Quoting a PTI report, date - lined New York 26 Feb, it reproduces a news item which appeared in the New York Times:-

"US scientists are testing computer models that would help aim nuclear weapons at third world countries like Iraq, Iran and Libya, the New York times quoted military officials as saying
 The Times said, the US President Mr Bill Clinton and the Defence Secretary, Mr Les Aspin have not been advised yet but Gen Lee Butler and his planners at the nerve centre of America's nuclear strike force are going ahead. The development assumes importance as Gen Butler has been mentioned as the leading candidate to replace Gen Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one of the most powerful positions in the administration."

The 53 year old Gen Butler told New York Times, "Our focus now is not just the former Soviet Union but any potentially hostile country that has or is seeking weapons of mass destruction". (Emphasis added by author).

What the reaction of the President, the Secretary for Defence, the leaders of various groups, including in the Congress and others has been to this major policy statement from a serving General is, till the time of writing, unavailable. It could be that the General's statement was kite flying at the

informal suggestion of the administration; highly unlikely though. No country, specially the USA, would set-up their future top military man as a "fall guy". The portions underlined clearly show, and this is the point being made, that the armed forces are a part of the administration. This is the case in all the countries except India, where the military chiefs and the service headquarters are NOT part of the Government of India.

There is an often ignored but a glaringly obvious, though an opposite effect of this intentional disconnective relationship between the armed forces and the politico-bureaucratic decision makers of the government. The armed forces have got themselves into a number of problematical situations rather often enough in recent times, specially over personnel management matters. In any other country, not only the state machinery but the representative institutions like the Parliament, would have questioned such happenings. Not so in India. Why? The Indian armed forces played no part in the Indian freedom struggle. Nor were they encouraged to do so by the leaders of the freedom movement. The thrust of the movement being non-violent, this may have been one reason. The fear that in an armed struggle for freedom, power would finally be wrested by a revolutionary military leadership, the others being eventually side-lined, was perhaps the basis for this discouragement.

In any case, except for Netaji Subash Chandra Bose, most senior Indian leaders were not militant activists in the mould of Mao or Tito. Consequently, the Indian Army which was the only force of any consequence then and the trend setter later for the other two fledgeling services, remained aloof and the political leaders liked it that way. This aloofness continued even when the pre-Second World War Indianisation of the Army, albeit at a tardy pace, was on. It is amazing to find an utter lack of concern amongst the leadership on the type of Army they were going to inherit. Such was not the case in their attitudes towards the civil services and the police. There were a number of leaders who had started careers in the Indian Civil Service before opting out to join the freedom movement. Netaji Bose was one such person. Close personal friendships existed between both British & Indian members of the Indian Civil Service and the Police with many Indian political leaders. Thereby, an understanding of and with these services developed and formed the basis of post-independence relationships. The top level politicians like Sardar Patel went out of their way to protect the Civil Service from the lower rung of political leaders who had only seen the oppressive side of them during the British rule. No such relationship existed between the Indian military leadership and the political leaders. Again, the Indian members of the Civil services and the Police had reasonable experience at the higher levels of administration. The senior Indian military officers had not been so fortunate. Only a couple and that too not the senior-most had operational

experience at the brigade level. This was a handicap held against them, although to some extent they proved their worth immediately after independence in handling refugee problems, Kashmir operations and the Hyderabad police action; even so, the priorities of these officers, as has been mentioned earlier, were more to keep the Army and as such the armed forces on the track laid down by the British rather than change to a direction more in consonance with a free India. Besides, the Indian leaders at the same time developed an unwarranted phobia of military take over. Writing in the Indo-British Review, already referred to earlier, under, the heading 'Indian Armed Forces: Its Ethos and Traditions; Mr K Subrahmanyam writes that:

"In the fifties the Indian political leadership was at the zenith of its popularity at home and prestige abroad. The stability of the political structure and leadership was unchallengeable. Yet by the second half of the fifties there was some talk in Delhi of fear of a military coup. This was triggered mostly by events in Pakistan followed by U Nu voluntarily handing over power to General Ne Win".

Whether stated or unstated, this unfortunate doubt about the armed forces seems to have persisted and even encouraged in certain quarters. It resulted in a number of undesirable and negative attitudes which continue even today. To start with the very essential requirement of integrating the functioning of the three armed forces, so essential to fighting a successful modern war, has been given the go by. The remarkable initiative and foresight shown by planners in this regard by establishing the two joint service institutions, the National Defence Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, has by and large remained restricted to these and some other efforts, no more. By making most policy making ultra-vires of the Service Headquarters, delays, cost-overruns, unnecessary bickerings and an in-house uncongeniality have resulted, which does good to no one, least of all the nation at large. Above all, keeping the armed forces on the fringe of national security policy making arena has made of the nation's Army, Navy and the Airforce a fire-brigade for fighting fires, not a part of the overall system, which ensures that fires are prevented in the first place! An essential component of any national security policy making and its subsequent execution, is to prevent any threats to national interests from arising and if inspite of best efforts some still do manifest themselves, then to fight them by use of force and fight them with the almost complete assurance of the outcome being in one's favour. This has not been the Indian approach.

THE INSTITUTION

The doubts and hesitations regarding the armed forces that may have

troubled the Indian leadership at the time of Independence were not unique to them alone. Britain, France, the USA, all have had their fears about another Cromwell or Bonaparte, the man on the horse back emerging and taking over power. These countries and others have, however, not found the exiling of the armed forces beyond the pale of the administration but the creation of institution which ensure that the armed forces play their legitimate role in the national security affairs as the rightful answer. The creation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Great Britain in 1923 was a step forward in ensuring that the creation of a higher staff echelon, with an appropriate role in national security affairs was pursued. Although there was considerable resistance at various levels, the constitution of the Committee for Imperial Defence earlier on had paved the way. The three Chiefs of Staff were to become the main advisers and executors of the Cabinet on military matters. The Salisbury Commission on the setting up of the Chiefs of Staff Committee reported that :-

"Each of the three chiefs of staff will have an individual and collective responsibility advising on defence policy as a whole, the three constituting, as it were, a Super Chief of a War Staff Commission."

The Commission further enjoined that the Chiefs of Staff were to keep:-

"The defence situation as a whole constantly under review so as to ensure that defence preparations and plans and the expenditure there-upon are coordinated and framed to meet policy, that full information as to changing naval, military and air situation may always be available to the Committee of Imperial Defence and that resolutions as to the requisite action there-upon may be submitted for consideration."

The Chiefs of Staff Committee met on 17 Jul 1923 for the first time. Of course it took a few years to settle down but after a while Lord Ismay was to record that "for the first time in our history, we had recognised machinery for close and continuous consultation between the fighting services, for tendering of collective advice to the Cabinet on defence problem as a whole, for the preparation of long term plans in time of peace; and in time of war, for acting as battle headquarters." It is highly improbable that Lord Ismay would have made a similar observation about the functioning of the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee and their standing jointly as far as tendering advice to the cabinet is concerned. The more the pity; since it was Lord Ismay who had at the time of independence proposed the Higher Defence Control Organisation for India, at the request of the new Indian Government.

Lord Ismay proposed a Cabinet Committee for Defence, the Defence

Ministers Committee, a Chiefs of Staff Committee and various other Committees and Sub Committees. One need not go into the details of the higher defence control and the national security policy framing organisations as proposed by him and accepted by the Indian Government, except to say that the Defence Committee of the Cabinet where the three Chiefs were to be present by right, along with the Defence Secretary and the Adviser Finance (Defence) was in due course to become moribund. Having first met under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister Mr Nehru in Sep 1947 with such stalwarts as Sardar Patel as one of the members, Indian genius later found a way to pull the shutters down on this most important apparatus of national security formulation. Amongst the reasons given was that since the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs (CCPA) was similarly composed as the Defence Committee of the Cabinet there was no need to duplicate the efforts. So it is reported. What was unstated however, was the fact that the professional heads of the three armed forces were denied the right of jointly presenting their views directly to the main political policy makers sitting together at definite periodic intervals, that too when these policy makers would be devoting themselves entirely to issues connected with national security i.e. threat assessments, financial resources, economic security, diplomatic efforts, internal and external situations, intelligence and so on. To say that the Defence Minister could convey the views of the Chiefs or that the Chief could be called when required introduces adhocism, avoiding which is the main purpose of institutionalising various activities. Neither can the Chiefs of Staff Committee claim for itself jointly, the iconic role envisaged by the Salisbury Commission for the Combined British Chiefs of Staff way back in 1923; "....the three constituting, as it were a super Chief of War Staff Commission". Nor can many Indian Chiefs of Staff of any of the services be seen in the mould of the wartime Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General (later Field Marshal) Alan Brooke who even as C-in-C Home Forces made Prime Minister Churchill remark of him: "when I thump the table and push my face towards him what does he do? Thumps the table harder and glares back at me....."

That Lord Ismay's proposals would get subverted let alone diluted and the Indian military establishment kept as mere tools of the Government and not part of it was but natural. Apart from the uncertain approach of the politicians towards the military, the other important facts are the absence of an establishment amongst the Indian ruling elite and the dyarchy of two "generalists" that administer India; the "generalist" politician and the "generalist" civil administrator. This is unique to India. In Britain the establishment is drawn from the old school tie, the "Ox-Bridge" & other universities, and even their common clubs. The men in uniform, the civil servants, captains of industry and commerce, scientists and academicians all can get together on the basis of any one of these shared commonalities. So in America with its

Ivy league and establishment culture, so also with France with its various common academic institutions. Not so in India. There are no meeting grounds except the formal confines of the offices and conference rooms. What can be discussed and decided informally without any official or particular organisational positions to defend, are largely the best decisions. There is no forum in India for such interaction.

The "double generalists" push down the professional into the third place in any case. When they develop a symbiotic relationship as has happened in India then matters become even more complicated. The Railways have succeeded in avoiding this situation. The Police have also managed to get over it to some extent by becoming directly useful to the politicians without the civil servant acting as a go between. Only the armed forces plough their lonely furrows and will continue to do so unless a military disaster or Parliamentary and public pressure or economic requirements force us to either revive the moribund parts of our apparatus dealing with national security or to create more energetic and responsive ones as is happening in other countries. In the interim, which could become indefinite, the services must get their act together and combined ensure that:-

- (a) All operational plans above a divisional and equivalent levels are combined bi-service plans, and where required tri-service plans.
- (b) Explore all areas and departments which can be combined together to reduce expenditure and increase efficiency. Heads of these departments to report directly to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
- (c) A joint manpower utilization board under the Cabinet Secretary be suggested to the Government to coordinate all man-power enrolment, training and deployment activities by the para-military forces and central police forces. It should also comment on additional raisings from the proposed utilization point of view. The Defence Secretary or any appropriate officer as a member should project views of the Defence Ministry on these matters.
- (d) No major induction of new equipment and new raising by any service be accepted, unless discussed and agreed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Where no agreement is forthcoming, the views of all the three services be heard before a decision is given by the Government.

It will be obvious that adhocism paraded as policy, procrastination concealed as examination in detail and decisions forced by the pace of events and not arrived at by objective deliberations have been the hallmark of what passes for our national security decisions and policies. Various experts committees have of course been ordered. These have undoubtedly done some excellent

work but then again they have been part of these lonely furrows and not a well coordinated holistic activity which the Government should have ordered in the first place.

EMERGING WORLD ORDER AND INDIA'S SECURITY

It has been argued so far that the Indian experience in the field of national security has been one of violating most accepted parameters. Economically wobbly, militarily unsteady, politically shaky, and institutional-wise debilitated, it would be patently untrue to state that India will be able to stand various pressures with equanimity. Certainly, she cannot claim the independent ability to go to war in order not to compromise her national interests. This has automatically reduced her status in the roster of nations. In the meantime the entire geo-political map of the world has changed and had its impact on the region, where India had come to be regarded by many, besides herself, as a major power. Apart from the extra-regional pressures, the political dynamics within the region itself are making their own demands on the security of India. The first and perhaps the most important challenge India faces is that while seeking economic integration with the world economy, which in reality means Western, including Japanese oriented economy, can India remain outside a security system basically designed to protect Western interests, which are largely Western economic interests. In case she joins, overtly or covertly such a security system, from which nations or groups of nations is she likely to be threatened? If by some miracle India succeeds in being part of the western dominated world economy without any concurrent security obligations will it still not face threats to its own interests from the very same quarters the Western nations expect their threats to arise from, but without the benefit of their support? In case the latter alternative is adopted, will India be again following the old unsuccessful route it did in the fifties; economic development without concomitant military security? Is this route open to her at all now? More so, since there is no moral high ground left to occupy and perceive the world according to India.

UNITED STATES - THE SUPER POWER

The United States has always had a demonology from which to take out its favourite whipping boy of the moment and get its people to support the interests of the ruling establishment of the day. Either that particular demon is demolished or put away into the cupboard, to be brought out again if so required. Studs Terkel, the grass-roots American historian noted that the greatest disaster that befell the US this century so far was not the first or the second world wars or even the Vietnam War. It was the great depression which brought the US to its knees. By the time the Second World War appeared on the horizon, President Roosevelt's New Deal had run out of

steam. The war was godsend for the USA. With no damage inflicted on the continental United States, and only three hundred thousand casualties as opposed to millions dead globally, the US got in return the most powerful economy and an American middle class which became the largest segment of the American society, fully equipped materially to indulge in the greatest of hedonistic pursuits the world has ever known and also the military power unknown in history. That economic surge has been on the downside for sometime. Japan and Germany, and indeed Western Europe as a whole, though themselves part of the US dominated Western economic system and very much a part of the US led Western security system, are not going to be "yes men" anymore. Yet they are not going to either rock the American economic boat or military security arrangements. With the evil empire of the Soviet demon having collapsed on itself the US has to look for other demons, Islamic fundamentalism, drugs, human rights and so on. Finally could it be China? Where does India fit into this game? Can Islamic fundamentalism be a viable target for India? Which Islamic fundamentalist wind-mill is India going to tilt at, that too with the world's second largest Muslim population in tow? What human rights issues is India going to selectively fight for?

CHINA

China poses a conundrum to the world, most certainly to India and neither knows how to set about dealing with it. China was well ahead in early seventeenth century in technology, administration, warfare and influence over a large land and population mass. In a manner of speaking she was a super-power. The reasons for China's decline to a marginal power, beset by European predators by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are well known. Till the Communists finally wrested power from the Koumintang in 1949, China had gone through various travails and setbacks, each one of which could have shattered a nation. After the Communist take-over the very process of determining the agenda and executing it to make China great power was bitter, treacherous and even bloody. The great leaps forward and their greatest failures, droughts, the cultural revolution; each one would have wreaked havoc with any nation as indeed it did with China. But such has been the quality of its single minded leadership and the resilience of its people that the Chinese leaders have to assure their people today that a twelve per cent annual growth rate although high is manageable. The Chinese are also setting aside 12.5 per cent of their GDP for defence. If the Chinese rate of growth continues as it is or is even lowered by two per cent or so, China will, growth-wise speaking, become the only true super-power by 2030 AD. If we take 1980 as the year when the present Chinese policies were first implemented, then in a matter of fifty years China would have reversed the decline and reached back to the position she occupied in the year 1550 AD. Fifty years

to overcome the set back of nearly five hundred years, each year an effort of ten years. By any reckoning, unbelievable. Of course, anything can happen from now till 2030 AD. The Chinese plan, therefore, will naturally require that anything "unmanageable" should not be allowed to happen. It will require going along with the Western powers in matters which do not effect her too adversely. In the case of Japan, China will seek to involve her as intimately as possible and through her the Japanese economic network in South-East Asia so that Chinese interests become synonymous with their interests. A neat turn-about on Japanese Greater Asia Co-prosperity sphere of the thirties. Where does India fit into this aspect of East-Asian or Asia-Pacific politics?

China will continue to modernise its strategic nuclear forces including making them submarine based and arm its conventional forces with tactical nuclear and chemical weapons besides their general modernisation. The former will give China the ability to inflict some damage on the United States in case the latter adopts a military option to check China's progress to the super power status. No American or Western ground forces are going to set foot on mainland China. However, surrogates like Taiwan and perhaps in the Chinese perception, now Vietnam and India could initiate local border conflicts on a variety of excuses eg, Paracel islands, Tibetan human rights, Indo-Chinese border dispute and so on at the behest of the USA. To deal with them, the already mentioned conventional forces would be suitably employed. Could a fundamentalist Islamic effort from Central Asian Muslim countries and Afghanistan, backed by inimical powers be launched against China? Possible but a bit far fetched, keeping in mind the minuscule population of Muslims in China. To safeguard the strategic area of Sinkiang, China would plan to economically absorb these Central Asian republics; use Pakistan as a conduit to any Islamic combine that may take shape and be militarily prepared in the conventional sense to deal with a military threat. China will keep modernising her conventional forces and keep them far ahead of any of her possible detractors. How is India going to fit herself into this most likely jig-saw. By opting out? Non-alignment to the fore! Who in the Indian establishment is dealing with this problem?

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) presents a confused picture. It is neither reassuring for those who had gained from a bi-polar world nor those who would have it be unipolar or multipolar. It may well be that the entire area of what was once the Soviet Union will further dissolve into chaos, economic ruin and de-industrialization, finally collapsing into the same geo-political patchwork of weak-states which Czarist Russia absorbed. There is another likely prospect, that of the former Soviet Union metamorphosing itself into a militarily and economically viable and vibrant state.

Interestingly enough, the catalyst for such a situation could well be the common desire of the constituents not to compromise their national security in military terms. The agent for such an occurrence, again significantly, could be the combined armed forces of the CIS. The recent signing of the defence treaty between the two largest republics of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Kazakhstan is a pointer. This treaty is hoped to be a model for the others. Military integration is as strong a binding factor as economic integration. It is too early to venture even a guess on how things will turn out in this region, but both Western powers, China and Japan can be expected not to view with pleasure the resurrection of the former Soviet Union or even Russia itself as a contender for power sharing. There is however, a very important possibility that the western powers may like to balance China with a matching power on its highly accessible northern land frontiers. How does India cope with this challenge?

REGIONAL MATTERS

India does not have much of a political clout in the Arab countries or an economic stake they could not do without. India has been completely marginalized in Afghanistan. In Tibet, like Peter at the trial of Jesus, India has publicly and repeatedly denied being interested in the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan hopes he represents. India has repeatedly again, accepted Tibet being a part of China. All this perhaps in the hope that Chinese support on similar lines will be forthcoming in the case of Kashmir or perhaps out of fear of a Chinese military attack in the high Himalayas, if it suits China. For the moment, China has no military interest on the Indo-Tibetan border other than to make it more and more accessible to its military, for rapid deployment of larger forces than possible at present. India poses no military threat now or even in the foreseeable future. India's military postures vis-a-vis China, will not be determined by India but by others who may require India to play a military role against China; this could be the Chinese perception.

Burma is rapidly getting under Chinese influence. Others, e.g. Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are such marginal cases that as and when Western powers or China want these can be manipulated. Pakistan has always desired that it be equated with India. In many ways China is to India as India is to Pakistan. Will India be able to draw as far ahead of Pakistan as China is of India, in the military field, because that is the only field which will impress Pakistan. How is India going to meet the nuclear challenge? Hasn't Pakistan already brought about a strategic stalemate while at the same time heating up the tactical confrontation by proxy war while India has compromised its ability for independent military action? Will India have to, as appears to be the case, depend upon others to keep Pakistan in check? At what price?

We thus see that the global and regional security environment for India is not a very positive one. It is not going to be responsive either to Indian economic abilities or military capabilities at least in the foreseeable future. India has to go a very long way to be able to even influence matters in the region to its satisfaction. Such a situation has been brought about both by events beyond India's control as well as opportunities India let slip because of neglect and delays in decision making and, of course, by taking positively wrong decisions due to the fractious nature of the approach to national security. Will diplomacy, bereft of any economic strength, internal political stability, and viable military capability, carry the day? Our experience is not re-assuring in this regard. Will the World wait till we become economically strong? When will that be? And the World will wait for what. For an India asking for her slice of the shrinking cake? Where is the institutional support for examining, analysing, formulating and executing integrated policies, available in India? None what-so-ever.

CONCLUSION

The Indian experience in the field of national security, even in the understanding of the subject has been flawed by personal prejudices and ill-informed decision making. We have also to face the reality that till the governmental structure does not so desire, the present approach to dealing with the security matters will continue as hitherto-force. Sadly, there is nothing to suggest that this will develop into a holistic and balanced one. What is national security? This was the question posed at the beginning. Has the Indian nation been able to provide the security to its national interests? The reply to this question, in the context of what has been said, is unfortunately, if not a resounding 'No', then a highly conditional 'Yes'. This may please some but most will be greatly disappointed.

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Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia

PROF. ZAFAR IQBAL CHEEMA

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE POST-COLD-WAR ERA

The collapse of the former Soviet Union and end of the cold-war has engendered profound structural changes in the international political system. Russian Federation, the principal legatee of the former Soviet Union, though still possesses a strategic capability of global dimensions but of no match to the United States. The Soviet collapse has resulted into a decisive shift in the international power equilibrium in favour of the U.S. and the West. The Russian renunciation of communism has eliminated the ideological conflict underlying the cold-war bipolarity. The new international order is, more or less, based upon the congruity of great-powers' perception of their interests and policies pursued within and outside the United Nations framework. The great-powers have also been saved from the enormous burden of military expenditure incurred to sustain a strategic arms race propelled by the dynamics of cold-war politics. End of the cold-war has generated a far more conducive environment and greater impetus for international disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. The U.S. and the former Soviet Union signed START agreement on 31st July 1991 to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 35 per cent. That was a significant step forward from the INF treaty. START II was signed in January 1993 between the Russian Federation and the United States. It is expected to result in profound reductions in the two states' strategic weapon systems, especially heavy and multiple warhead ICBMs, and land-based MIRVed missiles. Once the START II is fully implemented,¹ it will substantially reduce the nuclear arsenals of America and Russia, bringing the overall reductions up to two-thirds of the current levels. The states which were embroiled into the vortex of cold-war are now free to concentrate on development oriented activities. They can save stupendous funds on arms expenditure by adhering to various arms control and disarmament measures.

The post-cold-war environment is not only more favourable for global arms limitations and reductions but also for regional arms control and disarmament. France and China have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which indicates their willingness to join international efforts to contain, at least, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Approximately

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145 states are now members of the NPT, with South Africa as a significant addition to the list of signatories.² The present size of the NPT membership indicates that a vast majority of nations view the spread of nuclear weapons as detrimental to international peace and security; notwithstanding a handful of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) which have legitimized the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and a few Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) which are aspiring to join that exclusive nuclear club for various reasons. There is a fundamental policy difference between the NWS and the NNWS on how to resolve the problem of vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The central objective of the policies of the NWS is that their own nuclear weapons capabilities (vertical proliferation) cannot be subjected to any limitations within the framework of the NPT. The NNWS, especially non-signatories to the NPT, insist that both forms of nuclear proliferation, vertical as well as horizontal, be contained through the same institutional framework. This policy difference was the primary reason for the lack of consensus at the 1992 NPT Review Conference between the NWS and NNWS. Many Non-aligned NNWS demanded that the extension of the NPT be formally linked with the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was unacceptable to the NWS. The lack of consensus blocked the issuance of joint final declaration. The NPT is likely to be renewed in the 1995 Review Conference but not without resistance from the NNWS that the negotiations for the CTB Treaty be institutionally linked with the NPT renewal.

The Soviet collapse has left behind a dangerous legacy as well. Among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), there are countries which either possess nuclear weapons or have such weapons deployed on their soil under their indirect control, e.g. Ukraine and Kazakhstan. There is a great uncertainty about the precise status of these states, whether they are to be treated as NWS or not and which process of arms control and disarmament they would prefer to join, if at all they so decide. After Russia, Ukraine is the largest inheritor of a nuclear weapons capability with ready modes of delivery under its direct control. In principle, it proclaims unequivocal support to arms control and disarmament but in reality it has yet to manifest such a support in concrete policy terms. It seems ambivalent to join the START process and Russia has made it clear that it would not deposit the instrument of ratification to START unless Ukraine signed START agreements and the NPT. If Ukraine did not sign START agreements, it will be world's third largest nuclear weapon state, a development that will have serious repercussions for nuclear non-proliferation. Kazakhstan has nuclear weapons deployed on its soil largely under the Russian control. The present regime in Kazakhstan has not questioned the legitimacy of Russian control but given the fragile nature of its governmental set up, there is no definite assurance that situation will remain the same in future as well. Any radical

change might sweep away the incumbent restraint. North Korea's intended withdrawal from the NPT is a serious setback to the efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Israel, India and Pakistan have continuously refused to sign the NPT, each with its own reasons for refusal. Israel is internationally acknowledged to possess about 200 nuclear warheads equipped with both, aircraft as well as missile based delivery systems. Most elements of its nuclear weapons capability are developed with apparent connivance of the Western states, particularly France and the U.S. The proclaimed rationale for the development of Israeli nuclear weapons capability has been the larger territorial, economic and conventional military capabilities of all the Arab states put together, although the overall military balance in qualitative terms has always been in Israel's favour. Even that rationale is no more tenable. The military capabilities of Israel's principal adversaries, i.e. Iraq, Syria and Libya have been seriously undermined in the aftermath of the Gulf war and the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Iraq's military strength has been reduced to negligible as a result of the Gulf War. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Syria and Libya have lost their sources of military supplies. These states no more constitute any serious military threat to Israel. None of these or any other among the Arab states possesses a semblance of a nuclear weapons capability which can pose a nuclear threat to Israel. At no stage in its post-WW II history, Israel has enjoyed greater sense of security than at present. In the contemporary regional environment, Israel's persistent refusal to sign the NPT is potentially destabilizing for the regional peace and stability in the Middle East in the sense that sooner or later it will engender an aspiration among its Arab rivals to counterpose its nuclear weapons capability. An end to the Western policies of discrimination towards Israel will go a long way to encourage it to sign the NPT.

THE SOUTH ASIAN SCENARIO

The contemporary regional scenario in South Asia is more complicated where the sources of hostility have endured the end of cold-war rivalry. Despite the Soviet collapse, cold-war paradigm seems still operative in South Asia so far as India-Pakistan relations are concerned. India and Pakistan are locked into a serious conflict-situation. Both the states have lost their strategic value based upon cold-war politics and the contingent economic and military advantages received from either of the cold-warriors, i.e. Pakistan from the United States and India from the former U.S.S.R. Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan perceives security threats in an exclusively Indo-centric sense and it also remains the focus of India's security decision-making process despite attempts to shift the emphasis away

from it. Presently, India-Pakistan relations are once again at their lowest ebb due to the outstanding Kashmir dispute whose genesis dates back to the 1947 declaration of independence. Since then, the two countries have fought three wars; two on Kashmir and one on Bangla Desh but the hopes of a durable peace visualized in the Simla Agreement of 1972 have remained unfulfilled. The Agreement states that the two have resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.³ Article 6 of the Agreement stresses that both Governments seek a final settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute through negotiations in the future.⁴ However, there is no progress on the issue since 1972. India prefers to interpret Kashmir dispute in the overall context of its geo-strategic environment whereas Pakistan seeks a solution on the intrinsic merits of the case within the U.N. framework.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

INDIA

The genesis of South Asia's nuclearization dates back to the 1950s when under Nehru's government, India kept open its nuclear option. Nehru supported general and complete disarmament as essential instrument for peace, security and development.⁵ He often spoke very strongly against the development of nuclear weapons by the great-powers as detrimental to international peace and security.⁶ In 1956, under direct instructions from Nehru, Indian government published a book which highlighted the devastating consequences of the proliferation of nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.⁷ However, Nehru categorically rejected unilateral nuclear disarmament for India.⁸ Nehru's government opposed the application of IAEA safeguards on its nuclear programme terming them as discriminatory and went ahead with the development of safeguards-free nuclear facilities. His government accorded top priority to the establishment of two safeguards-free nuclear facilities, CIRUS in 1960 (40 MW research-cum-power) reactor with 9.4 kg plutonium production capacity per year and Trombay Nuclear Reprocessing Plant (with 30 ton production capacity per year) in 1963-64.⁹ Both the facilities had an immediate military oriented potential and could be employed for civilian uses only after a long time when the related civilian infrastructure for their use could be ready. While India regarded them essentially R & D facilities, both were dual-purpose. Their development added technological dimension to India's nuclear option. Both the facilities were pivotal for carrying out the 1974 nuclear test.

China's nuclear test in October 1964 served as a catalyst to accelerate the development of a dual-purpose nuclear capability by India; a capability

which had obvious civilian uses but could be diverted towards military employment if required. In November 1964, just a month after the Chinese nuclear test, the Indian government under P.M. Lal Bahadur Shastri sanctioned work on the development of a SNE (Subterranean Nuclear Explosion) project.¹⁰ According to Dhirendra Sharma, Shastri's SNE decision provided Bhabha (the architect of India's nuclear programme) the latitude to conduct R & D on the bomb design and its non-nuclear components.¹¹ India's nuclear test in May 1974 was a logical, albeit delayed, outcome of the SNE project. The nuclear device tested in 1974 had two remarkable military oriented features; its design was based upon the implosion technique which is considered suitable for a weapon test than for a PNE and its triggering package had a military connotation.¹²

No Indian government has ever acknowledged the initiation or existence of a nuclear weapons programme. However, with the continual growth of a sizeable nuclear weapons capability, the gap between evident military dimensions of the Indian nuclear programme and the official denials about its existence became much wider and highlighted the underlying contradictions. India's denials that it has never initiated a nuclear weapons programme appear more diplomatic than real in the light of its sizeable nuclear weapons capability. In fact, a rapidly increasing volume of evidence substantiates the view that India has been developing nuclear weapons. Press reports citing U.S. officials and intelligence sources disclosed that India has been producing nuclear weapons since late 1986.¹³ In March 1988, a British newspaper, *The Independent*, quoting the U.S. National Security Council officials, reported that, 'India has built several highly sophisticated low-yield atomic bombs, which could be used with combat aircraft'.¹⁴ In April 1989, another report disclosed from a source close to the late P.M. Rajiv Gandhi that India could produce a nuclear bomb "overnight".¹⁵ It pointed out that 'India has nuclear-weapons components on the shelf and a special team ready to assemble them'.¹⁶ The question one cannot escape is that from where such a capability came if India had never ever initiated a nuclear weapons programme as all the Indian governments have professed? Is it an inescapable by-product of its civilian nuclear programme or it has been specifically designed within it as a result of a cost-benefit analysis of an open versus a secret nuclear weapons capability?

The evidence about India's development of nuclear weapons is gradually increasing. In May 1989, the Director of CIA, Mr. William Webster, disclosed to the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations that there were 'several indicators' about India's development of enhanced nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.¹⁷ He told the Committee that India is working on the separation and purification of Lithium-6, which can either be

used in thermonuclear weapons or in the production of tritium to enhance the yield of nuclear weapons.¹⁸ Webster's testimony confirmed the previously available evidence about India's involvement in developing nuclear weapons. In November 1990, a former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General (retd.) K. Sundarji stated that, 'The Indian citizen has every right to expect that India, having mastered the technology in 1974, is in the year of grace, 1990', and 'he would expect India, very short order, to have usable nuclear weapons also, if required'.¹⁹ Given the fact that General Sundarji was the Chief of Staff of Indian Army in 1986-87, the period when first reports of India's development of nuclear weapons components began to come out, his assertions cannot be ruled out. More recently, a Carnegie study suggested that India has produced a limited number of nuclear weapons based upon an aircraft delivery system and likely to deploy an IRBM capability in the immediate future.²⁰ It further indicated that the Indian nuclear force would consist of 40 to 60 weapons which could be deliverable by any of the 200 advanced aircraft in the Indian Air Force.²¹

Whether India has actually integrated nuclear weapons into its armed forces at this stage is not known. There is no public evidence as yet to identify the support mechanism for their immediate assembly in crisis situations, deployment strategy or target acquisition alternatives. All this requires elaborate procedures, and a command, control and communication infrastructure (C3) which may not escape international scrutiny in an era of satellite reconnaissance. On the other hand, it is also difficult to dismiss the possibility that, given its oft-repeated fears of a Pakistani nuclear bomb and the intensity of hostile relationship between the two, India would not have taken necessary measures to cope with an extreme eventuality.

PAKISTAN

Contrary to India which initiated its nuclear programme immediately after independence, Pakistan could not begin a well organized nuclear programme until the mid-1960s. The genesis of Pakistani aspirations for a nuclear weapons capability also dates back to mid-1960s when Z.A. Bhutto for the first time in 1965 stated: "If India developed an atomic bomb, we will too develop one even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry because there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb".²² Many analysts have usually detached Bhutto's statement from its original context of responding to India's quest for a nuclear weapons capability after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Bhutto believed that India would follow China and detonate a nuclear device sooner or later.²³ It is noteworthy that all the nuclear facilities of Pakistan were under IAEA safeguards until 1972 when Bhutto had taken over as President of Pakistan, including KANUPP (Karachi

Nuclear Power Project). It was only after becoming the President that Bhutto considered to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Like China's nuclear test served as a catalyst to accelerate the development of Indian nuclear weapons capability, India's 1974 nuclear test performed the same function for Pakistan's development of a nuclear weapons capability. Bhutto's government swiftly moved to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. By the time his government was overthrown in 1977, the complete blue-print and technological infrastructure for a nuclear weapons capability, the backbone of which is Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Plant, was in place. Once started, Pakistan developed a nuclear weapons capability more rapidly than India.

In the backdrop of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, General Zia-Ul-Haq skillfully exploited the international environment for Pakistan's nuclear pursuits. He synchronized the advancement of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability under a posture of deliberate ambiguity. According to Leonard S. Spector, there was a growing support in the U.S. official sources for "all components available characterization" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability in the mid-1986.²⁴ He further stated that by late 1986, Pakistan has acquired "the essentials of a rudimentary nuclear deterrent of perhaps three to six nuclear devices".²⁵ In March 1987, Zia himself proclaimed: "Pakistan has the capability of building the bomb. You can write today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes".²⁶ In Spector's assessment, Pakistan's nuclear force would "probably comprise only five (5) to ten (10) bombs" deliverable by the U.S. supplied F-16s.²⁷

SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

An elementary form of implicit nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan is virtually operative since 1988 on the basis of the level of nuclear capabilities of both the countries. From 1988 onwards, General Zia quite often insinuated the existence of such a nuclear deterrence. Talking to the participants of International Conference on Regional Security and stability in South Asia, jointly organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in Late June 1988, Zia claimed the existence of an undeclared state of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan.²⁸ India's response to Zia's posturing has been less than explicit. Without clearly stating that India possessed nuclear weapons, Indian government alluded to the advancement and sophistication of its nuclear weapons capability and seemed prepared as a matter of contingency to counter the nuclear threat from Pakistan.²⁹ In response to the Pakistani nuclear threat, the former Indian Prime Minister, Late Rajiv Gandhi stated that India has the capability (nuclear) to meet the Pakistani nuclear threat in case its national security is threatened.³⁰ Mr. Gandhi reiterated that position on 27 April 1987 during a Lok Sabha debate.³¹

The dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia may be characteristically different than its parallels among the nuclear weapon states. In the first place, there is no public evidence that India and Pakistan have integrated nuclear weapons into their armed forces, developed the command, control and communication (C³) networks, and formulated nuclear military strategies or explicit doctrines about their possible deployment and use. But such undertakings may be in the offing due to both countries acting on a worst-case scenario. Such a possibility is more likely due to the mutually distorted perceptions and persistent hostility. The South Asian nuclear scenario does not fulfil the essential pre-requisites of deterrence in the sense that the parties concerned have not made explicit statements of the strategic posture and behaviour they are likely to adhere in case of deterioration of their normal relationship. The absence of explicit strategic doctrines in South Asia make the task of developing a plausible hypothesis about the dynamics of nuclear deterrence all the more arduous. Pakistan seems to develop the essentials of minimum deterrence while India might be aiming at sufficient deterrence against Pakistan and minimum deterrence against China. However, the most crucial determinant is the economic one. Should India and Pakistan squander away massive resources direly needed for socio-economic development on the evolution of nuclear deterrence.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS IN SOUTH ASIA

There was no significant interaction between India and Pakistan in the field of nuclear arms control until the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Both countries had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 immediately after its conclusion but Pakistan did not ratify it until 1988.³² No official explanation has been offered by Pakistan for withholding ratification for such a long time. Most probably, it was due to the future uncertainties in view of India's lead in the field of underground nuclear explosion technology and its interest in carrying out such explosions. A fundamental difference between India and Pakistan on the issue of a PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion) is that while India consistently argued in favour of the peaceful applications of a nuclear explosion, Pakistan considered it indistinguishable from a weapon test.³³ General Zia-Ul-Haq, however, departed to some extent from this traditional Pakistani viewpoint by indicating to carry out a PNE and stating that a peaceful nuclear programme was convertible into a nuclear weapons programme.³⁴

India and Pakistan adopted different approaches to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968), although neither signed it. India and Pakistan actively participated in the NPT negotiations but unlike India, Pakistan hailed its conclusion and expressed the hope that all the potential nuclear-weapon states would join it as members.³⁵ In response to the Indian objections against

the NPT that it was a "discriminatory" treaty, Pakistan took the position that it was not "realistic to impose obligations on the NWS similar in all respects to those which the treaty placed on the non-nuclear weapons states" (NNWS).³⁶ However, despite its general support for the NPT and its associated objectives, Pakistan did not sign it because of India's refusal.³⁷ The official explanation offered by Pakistan for not signing was stated as follows :

In the final analysis, the position of Pakistan with regard to signing the treaty will turn on considerations of its enlightened national interest and national security in the geo-political context of the region in which Pakistan is situated.³⁸

As stated earlier, Pakistan accepted international safeguards on all its nuclear installations until 1974 when India carried out its test. All of its three nuclear installations by then, PARR-1 and KANUPP and the controversial reprocessing plant to be installed under the Franco-Pakistan agreement of 1976 were under safeguards. It was only after the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion that Pakistan decided to develop a nuclear weapons capability and refused to accept full-scope safeguards. India on the other hand, had sought nuclear technology from Canada and the U.S. in the 1950s under ambiguous terms and refused to accept international safeguards on most of its nuclear installations because it considered them 'discriminatory'.

Immediately after India's nuclear test, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto sought a nuclear security guarantee against the Indian nuclear threat and blackmail. He directed the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmad, to explore that possibility with the U.S. officials at the CENTO Ministerial Meeting at Washington which was coincidentally scheduled immediately after the Indian test.³⁹ Reportedly, the U.S. was not inclined to provide such a guarantee. Bhutto visited Moscow in early October 1974 to enlist Soviet support for his proposal to declare South Asia as a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) but the Soviet Leaders showed a lack of support for his fears about the Indian nuclear threat and did not endorse the proposal.⁴⁰ In the absence of a security guarantee, the lack of support for his nuclear-weapons free-zone proposal, and Pakistan's relatively small conventional military capability against India, Bhutto's alternatives were indeed limited. He was desperate to find viable security options despite the above impediments. At the U.N. General Assembly session on 28 October 1974, Pakistan proposed that South Asia be declared a nuclear-weapons free-zone.⁴¹ The Political Committee of the General Assembly endorsed the Pakistani proposal by 82 votes in favour to 2 against (India and Bhutan) with 36 abstentions.⁴² India opposed the proposal on the plea that the initiative for the proposal should come from the countries of the region and not the U.N.⁴³

However, despite the endorsement of Pakistan's proposal, there was a general skepticism about its eventual success in view of India's opposition. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union showed any enthusiasm.⁴⁴ India remained opposed to the proposal for a NWFZ in South Asia. In August 1980, Mr. Swaran Singh as India's chief delegate to 23rd Session of the General Conference of the IAEA again rejected Pakistan's proposal.⁴⁵ In the following General conference of the IAEA, Dr Sethna stated the Indian view that the non-proliferation regime was discriminatory, and that 'vertical and horizontal proliferation should be approached simultaneously and in the same way'.⁴⁶

During General Zia's regime, Pakistan offered India a wide range of nuclear arms control proposals such as: the creation of a nuclear-weapons free-zone in South Asia; simultaneous signatures to the NPT by India and Pakistan; mutual acceptance of the IAEA safeguards; bilateral inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; joint declarations to renounce the development of nuclear weapons; and signing a regional test ban treaty.⁴⁷ The NWFZ proposal was carried forward from the Bhutto era while the remaining five originated during Zia's rule. In 1981, Zia offered Mrs. Indira Gandhi a proposal for mutual inspection of each other's nuclear installations but she never responded to that proposal.⁴⁸ After the inception of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's government in October 1984, Zia launched his so-called "peace offensive" to improve Indo-Pakistani relations and resolve the nuclear issue. He reiterated his proposal of mutual inspections to Mr. Gandhi in November 1984 at a press conference in New Delhi and complained about the lack of Indian response despite three years of consideration.⁴⁹ This time, he received a response from Mr. Gandhi, who promised to pursue nuclear negotiations with Pakistan.⁵⁰ The Zia-Gandhi initiative provided a temporary relief in the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. In a joint communique on 17 December 1985, they announced a verbal understanding that India and Pakistan would not attack each other's nuclear installations.⁵¹ However, the understanding could not be formalized into a written agreement in Zia's lifetime due to deterioration in the Indo-Pakistan relations under allegations of interference in each other's internal affairs.

Pakistan's nuclear arms control proposals were reiterated by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1986. He offered to accept binding obligations if India reciprocated.⁵² In September 1987, while addressing the UN General Assembly, Junejo not only repeated the earlier offers but also proposed that India and Pakistan should have a mutual agreement on a regional test ban.⁵³ India rejected these proposals on the plea that they fail to address its perception of a Chinese nuclear threat and treat India and Pakistan as relative equals, thereby, elevating Pakistan's importance despite India's far greater size and economic-cum-military power.⁵⁴ India also

rejected the proposed regional test ban by saying that it could wait until the adoption of a comprehensive test ban by the NWS.⁵⁵ India believed that Pakistan's proposals were meant to isolate it in non-proliferation forums and therefore, lacked credibility. Indian decision-makers considered these proposals as part of an "insincere diplomatic offensive" by Pakistan.⁵⁶

Indian refusal to put the Pakistani non-proliferation initiatives to test marred the progress in nuclear arms control between the two states. In October 1987, during his visit to Washington, Mr. Gandhi rejected an appeal from the U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, that India enter into a dialogue with Pakistan on the nuclear issue.⁵⁷ On the contrary, Gandhi stated that the U.S. should apply pressure on Pakistan to stop the advancement of its nuclear weapons programme.⁵⁸ Since the inception of Gandhi's government in 1984 Indian nuclear diplomacy focused upon containing the further development of Pakistan's nuclear programme through extra-regional pressure from the West, particularly the U.S. and refused to negotiate on a bilateral basis. It was obvious that accepting the Pakistani proposals or any similar measures based upon a regional arms control approach would lead to reciprocal limits on the Indian nuclear weapons capability. It was not acceptable to India. Relying on the U.S. pressure meant that India would not have to make reciprocal concessions through bilateral negotiations with Pakistan.

During his Washington visit, Mr. Gandhi also proposed a three-tier approach to nuclear disarmament. This approach categorized three types of states: (i) the superpowers (the United States and the former Soviet Union) (ii) the great-powers (China, France, and U.K.); and (iii) the near-nuclear nations (India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa).⁵⁹ According to the proposed approach, each tier would have different obligations toward nuclear disarmament. The superpowers were obliged to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In this connection, the INF Treaty and any such prospective agreements were viewed by India as an improvement in the international non-proliferation environment.⁶⁰ The second-rank nuclear powers, China, U.K. and France would be obliged to freeze their nuclear arsenals at the then existing levels. However, for Britain and France, such a freeze would be accompanied by an agreement to redress the East-West imbalance of conventional forces in the European theatre. Finally, the near-nuclear states would agree to remain non-nuclear.⁶¹

Although three-tier approach appeared a positive step, there is no evidence of any interest shown by the states mentioned in the proposed approach except India. However, its basic assumption of three categories of nuclear states contradicted India's traditional NPT policy, which according to India, arbitrarily divided the world into nuclear and non-nuclear weapon

states. India therefore, rejected the NPT as "iniquitous" and "discriminatory". The proposal also lacked any institutional framework to translate the recommendations into practice. No provisions for verification and inspection arrangements were suggested. However, despite these fundamental flaws, the three-tier approach deserved to be further explored. It appeared as a fundamental departure from India's traditional nuclear policy on nuclear proliferation. However, viewed in the light of other determinants of Indian nuclear weapons capability, it appeared that India might be buying time through such proposals to ward off pressure for adhering to some form of non-proliferation. There is no further evidence of India's interest in the three-tier approach after Mr. Gandhi's tenure of government ended in 1989.

Instead of addressing the regional nuclear issue at a bilateral level with Pakistan, India continued to advocate comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In the late 1980s, Indian nuclear diplomacy focussed upon drawing global attention on the issues of nuclear proliferation through a Five Continent Peace Initiative.⁶² This initiative was jointly proposed by India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, and Greece.⁶³ The Five Continent Peace Initiative entailed periodic summits, expert's meetings, and publicity efforts. Its primary focus was upon general and complete disarmament. The initiative was ignored by the Western arms control experts but viewed favourably by many Third World countries.⁶⁴ Those who did not appreciate the initiative believed that it could not be taken seriously unless countries like India were not willing to address their own nuclear weapons programme.⁶⁵ Until then, it would be regarded as "an eye-wash in the nuclear diplomacy".⁶⁶

Another proposal discussed by the Indian, Pakistani and the U.S. non-proliferation experts was a Greater South Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone.⁶⁷ This proposal was a response to the Indian objections against the Pakistani proposal for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. India opposed Pakistan's NWFZ proposal because it did not incorporate Indian concerns about the nuclear threat it perceived from China and the U.S. deployment in the Indian Ocean.⁶⁸ The Greater South Asian NWFZ proposal sought an agreement to ban nuclear weapons from the Indian Sub-continent, their deployment in Tibet and other parts of China adjacent to India, and from the Indian Ocean.⁶⁹ It was a comprehensive proposal that took into account the entire spectrum of nuclear threat to India and met the requirements of Pakistani South Asian NWFZ proposal. However, discussions remained confined to diplomatic circles and no public information could be available. The official responses of China, India, Pakistan and the superpowers could not be available for analysis. Nonetheless, some of the likely responses can be speculated. China's nuclear threat to India had always been of low intensity because Chinese nuclear weapons capability was primarily directed against

the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The non-deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons in Tibet could certainly minimize the nuclear threat perceived by India. On the other hand, it might be potentially attractive for China to assure the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in Tibet as a *quid pro quo* for a non-nuclear India on its southern borders. It would also not entail any major reorientation of its strategic policy, because China had already made a "no-first use" declaration against the NNWS including India. However, India might not be willing to foreswear its nuclear deterrent for any such assurances against a nuclear threat.

India rejected renewed pressure from the U.S. to sign the NPT and accept full-scope safeguards reiterated by the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholomew, during his visit to New Delhi in November 1991.⁷⁰ India has opposed the NPT since its inception in 1967 as a 'discriminatory' treaty because it imposed limits on the NNWS not to go nuclear but left the NWS free to develop and deploy nuclear weapon systems. Instead, India insists that vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation of nuclear weapons be addressed as one problem, and resolved through an identical approach like a comprehensive test ban leading to general and complete disarmament. At the fourth SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Summit in Islamabad, India elicited a call from the SAARC Leaders for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty to be proposed at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.⁷¹ However, India's incessant linkage of general nuclear disarmament with regional nuclear non-proliferation, no matter how principled, has thwarted progress on a mutually acceptable solution to any proposal aimed at the denuclearization of South Asia. Bartholomew's visit was followed by Larry Presslar who generated more controversy by singling out Pakistan than help resolve the problem.⁷² The Indian policy towards every meaningful regional nuclear arms control solution in the 1980s reflected an inextricable linkage to its claim for general and complete nuclear disarmament. A U.S. expert believed that because of the elusiveness of general and complete disarmament as an attainable objective, India's linkage of non-proliferation to disarmament has been a "smokescreen for inaction on the nuclear issue".⁷³

Recently, Pakistan proposed a five nations conference to resolve the issue of nuclearization of South Asia in which the United States, Russia and China have been asked to participate in addition to India and Pakistan.⁷⁴ Pakistan's Prime Minister impressed upon the three great-powers to sponsor urgent negotiations between the two South Asian rivals on the nuclear issue. The U.S., Russia and China have supported the Pakistani proposal but India rejected it initially by saying: "We find nothing new in these suggestions."⁷⁵ The U.S. has attempted to persuade India to respond positively to the five

power proposal initiated by Pakistan. The Bush administration reiterated its commitment to pursue the proposal in order to seek a nuclear weapons free South Asia. President Bush personally sought cooperation from India's Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, to hold the five power summit during the U.N. Security Council Summit in January 1992.⁷⁶ The U.S. diplomacy contributed to the likelihood of a meeting between India's Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Sheharyar Khan, in February 1992 at Washington under the U.S. auspices.⁷⁷ However, India managed to wriggle out of the proposed trilateral meeting in Washington on an apparently unconvincing plea that its Foreign Secretary, Dixit, would not be able to visit Washington due to other pressing commitments.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Sheharyar Khan, visited Washington on schedule and claimed at the conclusion of his dialogue with the U.S. officials that the U.S. - Pakistan differences of the nuclear issue have narrowed down considerably.⁷⁸ At the same time, he admitted that the U.S. could not be convinced about Pakistan's claim that its nuclear programme was frozen at the 1989 level and reiterated Pakistan's opposition to unilaterally sign the NPT.⁷⁹ This belied his own claim of an improved understanding on the nuclear issue. He also expressed his apparently unwarranted optimism that President Bush would hopefully issue a favourable certificate in October 1992 with regard to Pakistan nuclear programme, opening way for the renewed U.S. aid.⁸⁰ However, a more significant aspect of Sheharyar Khan's visit was his interview to the *WASHINGTON POST* in which he reportedly conceded that Pakistan possessed "nuclear weapons components for at least one device", before it "last year permanently froze the production of highly-enriched uranium and weapons cores". Quite expectedly, Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman contradicted the *WASHINGTON POST*'s version by highlighting the four main points in the interview: a) Pakistan has given assurances that its nuclear programme is not oriented towards nuclear weapons; b) Pakistan would not explode a nuclear device; c) Sensitive nuclear technology would not be transferred to third countries; d) Pakistan's nuclear programme was frozen at the 1989 level.⁸¹ The spokesman continued that through the acquisition of nuclear technology, Pakistan has acquired a certain level of capability in the field which has not been employed for the production of nuclear weapons.⁸² Sheharyar Khan's acknowledgement of at least one nuclear device and Foreign Office's qualified denial was a continuation of Pakistan's projection of calculated ambiguity to emphasize the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability but not the actual production of nuclear weapons. The policy appeared deliberately formulated to simultaneously indicate to the U.S. that a rollback of Pakistan's nuclear programme was not possible and to India that Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability was now more readily convertible into deployment under the exigencies of national security.

Immediately after Sheharyar, India's Secretary for External Affairs, J.N. Dixit, visited Washington. During his visit, Dixit insisted that India would first like to discuss its security concerns with U.S. on a bilateral basis before it would seriously consider joining the conference.⁸³ Despite the U.S. warning that Indian refusal, no matter how polite, would be prejudicial to better Indo-U.S. relations, Dixit not only conveyed to the U.S. India's reluctance to participate in the five nation's conference but also its continued opposition to the NPT and fullscope safeguards.⁸⁴ The Indian stance was also in line with its nuclear policy in the recent past which highlighted that its nuclear-weapons capability stood at a relatively advanced stage as compared with Pakistan.

India pursues a policy of nuclear ambiguity which is considered the best strategy until India is able to develop a strategic triad like the superpower model, i.e. long-range ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-based ballistic missiles. Nuclear ambiguity allows time for enlarging its existing capability. According to the *TIME MAGAZINE*, a top Indian official conceded that India deliberately fosters ambiguity about its nuclear capabilities, but off-hand remarks suggest that 'India has nuclear-weapons components on the shelf and a special team ready to assemble them'.⁸⁵ An open declaration of a nuclear deterrent would be the next inevitable step once the nuclear weapons capability has advanced to a stage from where nuclear weapons could be fully integrated into the armed forces and military doctrines developed for their use. Sclig Harrison of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that Indian scientists are facing problems in developing IRBM nose cones and guidance systems but added: 'When they overcome the technical problems and are in a position to deploy IRBMs, they'll be looking for ways of going nuclear in a public way'.⁸⁶ India's pursuit of strategic power indicates that a nuclear weapons capability would be an integral component of its force posture in the long-term future. An Indian specialist in nuclear science policy, Dr. Sharma, anticipates that given its stockpiles of plutonium and 'massive investment in IRBMs', India would publicly turn to the nuclear deterrent option within the next five years, thereby proclaiming its great power status.⁸⁷ Most probably, India would wait to develop various ingredients of a strategic triad before declaring its nuclear weapons capability.

This policy also seems to be based upon certain perceived advantages. India can continue to claim itself as a non-nuclear weapon state and thereby, derive benefits from that ambiguity, like the receipt of sophisticated technological assistance from the West. The loss of such assistance would seriously undermine the momentum of India's technological and industrial development. Overt nuclearization might activate the deployment of China's nuclear weapons against India, for which there is no credible evidence so far. China might also consider withdrawing its 'no-first use of nuclear weapons' offer

once India declared its nuclear weapons capability. In that case, India would have to incur the economic cost of sustaining a nuclear arms race with China which it might not win in the immediate future. It also provides a deterrent against a nuclear threat from Pakistan. In a future conflict-situation, Pakistani military planners, even by conservative assumptions, would have to assume that given its present state of nuclear advancement, India can deploy nuclear weapons as a retaliatory measure. It equally helps to avoid further exacerbation of bilateral nuclear tensions and restrain an open ended nuclear arms race. Even if India would lead such an arms race against Pakistan because of its large economic, industrial and technological base, it would be impossible for India to escape a Pakistani nuclear deterrent of some size.

However, the policy of nuclear ambiguity failed to cope with the nuclear arms control issues in South Asia discussed above, without offering any viable alternative. Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy appeared comprehensive enough to incorporate any regional as well as international non-proliferation proposals. It seeks a regional solution to nuclear arms control in South Asia while hoping that general and complete nuclear disarmament, whenever it comes, would be compatible with any regional framework. The U.N. General Assembly in its 47th Session endorsed by 168 votes the "Regional Approach" to Nuclear Non-proliferation through a resolution co-sponsored by 80 countries including Pakistan.⁸⁸ India was the only country which abstained. India demanded first and foremost, international nuclear disarmament, and unless that is achieved, it rejected regional disarmament. This (Regional) Approach was also endorsed at the 1992 Non-Aligned Summit at Jakarta. The underlying rationale for increasing emphasis on regional approach to nuclear arms control is that it complements global approaches to maintain international peace and security.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

Despite the lack of success in various proposals for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, India and Pakistan have started moving towards different confidence building measures (CBMs). In December 1988, an extremely promising development for nuclear restraint in South Asia was undertaken by India and Pakistan. Both countries formalized a verbal understanding reached between General Zia and P.M. Rajiv Gandhi in 1985 not to attack each other's nuclear installations into a written agreement.⁸⁹ This development became possible due to a better personal rapport between P.M. Benazir Bhutto, who came to power in December 1988 and Mr. Gandhi. The main provision of the agreement is as follows :

Each Party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating

in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.⁹⁰

The agreement proved a significant step towards further confidence building measures between the two countries. In order to avoid the possibility of any accidental strike, both countries agreed to exchange the list of their nuclear facilities. After about two years of bureaucratic procrastination, India and Pakistan have recently exchanged lists of their nuclear facilities in compliance with the agreement. It is a positive step towards further confidence building measures in the region which may gradually lead to the development of a conducive environment for nuclear arms control in South Asia. On 6 June 1992, Pakistan's Prime Minister, while reiterating the five nations conference proposal on the nuclear issue, called for a regional regime for the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons in South Asia.

In view of the incumbent difficulties of implementing a NWFZ or other denuclearization proposals in South Asia, the concept of a Nuclear Safe Zone (NSZ) is being gradually endorsed by the Strategic elite in India and Pakistan.⁹¹ The fundamental premise of the concept originates from the reality born out by a wide range of collateral evidence that India and Pakistan both possess nuclear weapons components, if not assembled weapons, and have formatted, at least, aircraft-based, delivery systems. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to denuclearize nations which have acquired nuclear weapons capabilities unless a mutually acceptable multilateral or regional agreement is concluded. As stated earlier, India is not willing to work out a regional understanding with Pakistan because of its security concern about China and its traditional stance that nuclear proliferation is not a regional but global issue. The U.S. and Russia have made historic progress in nuclear disarmament in the form of START but have not shown an inclination as yet to accept a linkage between great-power nuclear disarmament and horizontal non-proliferation symbolized in the NPT. In fact, as mentioned above, there was a lack of consensus at the 1992 NPT Review Conference among the NWS and NNWS on a demand from the Non-aligned states to create an institutional linkage between extension of the NPT and negotiations for a CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The acceptance of a linkage of their own nuclear disarmament by the great-powers with horizontal nuclear non-proliferation is therefore, unlikely. In the present impasse, the concept of NSZ in South Asia appears a realistic interim arrangement which, if adequately formulated, would not only impose a restraint on further advancement of India-Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities but institute an important confidence building measure (CBM).

However, before going too far about the NSZ proposal, it needs to be

underlined that there is no definite format or a blueprint agreed upon by the India-Pakistan strategic elite on this issue. General (retd) Arif from Pakistan has proposed some kind of legitimization of the existing nuclear weapons capabilities of India and Pakistan by each other as well as by the great-powers before instituting a mutually acceptable restraint regime.² General Arif's proposal has been endorsed, more or less, by K. Subrahmanyam from India. He believes that NSZ in South Asia is not only feasible but would be a stepping stone to 'confidence building nuclear restraint' and subsequently to arms control and capping.³ General (retd) K. Sundarji, former Chief of Army Staff (India), believes that it is no longer a question of keeping South Asia nuclear weapons free, but nuclear weapon safe.⁴ According to him a declared nuclear weapon status would help prevent nuclear war between India and Pakistan through miscalculation and possibly lead to a 'no-first use' policy.⁵ Much more important than any of the above outlined constituent elements of a NSZ would be that India and Pakistan both undertake not to assemble their nuclear components into deployable weapons.

India and Pakistan have already adopted few confidence building measures in the conventional military field which are significant to minimize the likelihood of a conflict between the two adversaries. Both countries have agreed to give an advanced warning of their military exercises to each other. A hot-line between Directors of Military Operations in their respective GHQs is already operational to eliminate the chances of misunderstanding of each others military intentions and manoeuvre. An agreement not to violate each others airspace is also functional. In August 1992, both countries renounced the use of chemical weapons through a joint declaration. Various proposals from both sides to cut down military expenditure and, initiate mutual and balanced force reductions are in circulation. Such measure will go a long way to promote a congenial atmosphere for elimination of regional tension and pave way for nuclear arms control in South Asia.

To conclude, one must recognize that the contemporary international environment has never been so conducive at any time in the post-WW II order than now for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. South Asian states, especially India and Pakistan, must seize upon this opportunity to save their present and succeeding generations from not only the scourge of a nuclear but also a conventional war. They must save their people from the enormous economic burden of developing military capabilities, nuclear as well as conventional. It is imperative not to repeat the blunders which the nuclear weapon states committed in the heydays of cold-war. The modalities about which approach to adopt first, whether regional or global are frivolous because both complement each other. Public declaration about the existing nuclear weapons capabilities, a freeze on the

further advancement of nuclear weapons capabilities, non-assembly of nuclear components into weapons with credible degree of transparency, non-production of fissionable material, no-first use declarations and a moratorium on nuclear testing would go a long way to institute a NSZ in South Asia. The great-powers must also realize that so long as they continue to employ nuclear weapons as a currency of international power, it is not only unjust but also impracticable to enforce a nuclear non-proliferation regime, at least, in South Asia where India and Pakistan have acquired a certain level of capabilities in the nuclear field. The ideal way to achieve the goals of international nuclear disarmament and arms control would be to integrate the regional and global approaches into a cohesive and comprehensive institutional framework.

NOTES :

1. START II will be implemented in two phases. First phase will be completed seven years after entry-into-force of the START Treaty whereas phase two will be completed by the year 2003 or the end of the year 2000 if the U.S. helped finance the elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms of Russia.
2. According to the Third World perspective, South Africa has been forced to sign the NPT because of the possibility of black majority rule in that state in the near future.
3. Text of the Simla Agreement of 2nd July 1972 signed between India and Pakistan. See article 1.
4. *Ibid*, article 6.
5. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches : 1963-1964*, Vol. V, (New Delhi, GOI, 1968), pp. 202-203.
6. *Ibid*.
7. *Nuclear Explosions and their Effects* (New Delhi, GOI, 1956).
8. Nehru, op. cit. pp. 204-205.
9. Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Training Aid in Indian A-Blast Cited", *The Washington Post*, 19 July 1976, p. A1.
10. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Bhudha Smiles : Absent-Minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb*, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Monograph 3, (49-1), 10 April 1977, p. 109.
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14. "India has a nuclear arsenal", *The Independent*, 22 March 1988.

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21. *Ibid.*
22. Z.A. Bhutto, *Awakening the People: Speeches of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1966-1969*, (Rawalpindi, Pakistan Publications, 1970), p. 21.
23. Z.A. Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 152-156.
24. Leonard S. Spector, *Going Nuclear*, (Cambridge Mass: Bollinger Publishing Company 1987), p. 101.
25. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, p. 88.
26. 'Knocking at the Nuclear Door', *Time Magazine*, 30 March 1987, pp. 42-44.
27. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions*, p.79.
28. This author was personally present on the occasion as a conference participant.
29. *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security* : A report of the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988), pp. 7-9 and "Shadow of An Indian II-Bomb", *Foreign Report*, 27 June 1987.
30. The former P.M. Rajiv Gandhi's interview to *Le Monde*, 5 June 1985, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service/South Asia, 5 June 1985, p. E-1.
31. *Reuters*, 27 April 1987, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service/South Asia, 27 April 1987, p. E-1.
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33. *The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT* (Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1972), pp. 25-26.
34. *Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Proliferation*, No. 20, December 1979, p. 15.
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37. *The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT*, p. 26.
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62. *Ibid.* p. 21.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*
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67. *Ibid.* p. 24.
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72. *The News* (Islamabad), 9 January 1992, p. 1.
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75. 'Pakistan's atomic plan rejected', *The Independent*, 8 June 1991.
76. *The News* (Islamabad), 11 February 1992, p. 1.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *The News* (Islamabad), 15 February 1992, p. 1.
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*
81. *The News*, (Islamabad), 10 February 1992, p. 1.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
83. *The News* (Islamabd), 14 March 1992, p. 1.
84. *The News* (Islamabad), 18 March 1992, pp. 1 & 5.
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86. *Ibid.*
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88. Report of the Disarmament Commission, General Assembly, Official Records, Forty-seventh Session, United Nations, New York, 1992.
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Remembering Field Marshal Cariappa

LT GEN S K SINHA, PVSM (RETD)

Field Marshal K M Cariappa is no more. Loaded with honours, he has passed into history. The befitting military funeral at Mercara in Coorg and the rich tributes paid to him as the father of the modern Indian Army, mark the end of a legend.

He was the senior most Indian officer of the British Indian Army. As young officers, we looked up to him with awe. He had the reputation of being more British than the British. A great stickler for details, he was known to be a hard taskmaster and a strict disciplinarian. I was serving as an Operations staff officer in the rank of Major in the newly raised DEP (Delhi & East Punjab) Command at Delhi. The Command had a skeleton staff. On 19 January 1948, Lt Gen Sir Dudley Russell bade us farewell. The following day Lt Gen Cariappa succeeded him as our Army Commander.

We had spruced up our offices for the occasion. We were located in F Block hutments, close to South Block in New Delhi. Those hutments disappeared long ago and the present Sena Bhavan has come up at that site. Lt Gen Cariappa arrived immaculately dressed in his uniform with a maroon silk hankerchief tucked in his Left sleeve. He always had this distinctive feature in his uniform. After formal introductions, he was conducted to his new office. A little later he sent for me. Apart from Operations staff work, I also looked after the secretariat of the Army Commander. As I entered his office, I noticed that he was smoking a black cigarette, his favourite Balkan Sobran. The first thing he asked was my age. I told him that I had just turned 22. He smiled and said that he had quite a few years more of military service than my age. He added that I was lucky to be a Major at such a young age. He had taken 16 years to attain that rank. I did not have to tell him that I had got early promotion on account of the vacuum created by the sudden departure of British officers. I just muttered that I had a lot to learn and I looked forward to doing so while serving under him. He said that I had better do so otherwise I would lose my job. He then gave me a whole lot of points, on which I had to take immediate action. He wanted DEP Command redesignated as Western Command. His office and the corridor leading to it had to be given a face lift. The walls had to be colour washed, new furniture had to be brought, carpets had to be changed, new writing material had to be

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provided, stationery of a new design had to be printed and so on. It was quite a formidable list. He asked me how long I would take to get all the work completed. I replied that it would take a week. He asked me to complete it in half that time. As I was leaving his room, he told me that I had to accompany him in the evening to sign the Visitor's Books of the Governor General and the Prime Minister.

I held an emergency meeting of concerned officers in my room to mobilise our resources and carry out the directions of the Army Commander. Within an hour, people were rushing to Delhi Cantonment and to Connaught Place to locate the required items. Engineers got into motion to carry out the tasks assigned to them. I also had a temporary office organised for the Army Commander from where he could function while his office was being done up. No sooner had I finished doing all this, I had to rush to the Operations Room where I had to give a briefing to the Army Commander and the senior staff officers with him on the operational situation in Kashmir. This took nearly an hour and I did the briefing without any notes. He complimented me for the briefing and asked a lot of searching questions. He was satisfied with the replies I gave him. He then asked which was the most threatened spot in Kashmir. I replied that it was Naushera. Three weeks earlier, we had suffered a reverse at Jhangar and we had been forced to withdraw to Naushera. The enemy had concentrated a large force in the vicinity of Naushera with the obvious intention of attacking our brigade at that location. Brigadier Muhammad Usman was commanding this brigade. The General said decisively "That settles it. Arrange for me to go to Naushera tomorrow".

As we came out of the Operation Room, I guided the General to his hurriedly prepared temporary office. He was happy at our being so quick off the mark in carrying out his directions. In the evening, I accompanied him to the Governor General's House (present Rashtrapati Bhavan) and the Prime Minister's House (present Teen Murti Bhavan). In both cases the Visitor's Book was in a small room near the gate. The arrangements at the Prime Minister's House were not too satisfactory. The ink in the inkpot was dry and the pen holder had a broken nib. The General was annoyed and said that he would apprise the Prime Minister of the sorry state of affairs. I believe he did so when he met him and the Prime Minister admonished his staff. This did not endear the General to the Prime Minister's staff.

Having worked till late at night to get the Army Commander's office organised, early next morning I accompanied him to Naushera. We travelled in a special aircraft to Jammu and from there in an Auster (light aircraft) to Naushera. There were no helicopters in those days. Naushera had a small

landing strip, a little bigger than a football ground. Usman received us at the airstrip and took the General round his brigade defences. After carefully examining the ground, he asked Usman for a present. We wondered as to what he was driving at. Pointing to a high feature in the distance called Kot, he said that he would like that feature, then held by the enemy, as a present. With his long years of service in NWFP and experience of mountain warfare, he was quick to appreciate the importance of Kot. Orders were issued for its capture. In a couple of days the Marathas launched a silent night attack, taking the enemy by surprise and secured Kot. Usman appropriately named this operation, Kipper, after the Army Commander. Our having Kot in our hands was of critical importance in the battle of Naushera that took place a few days later.

We returned to Delhi after two days. I dropped the Army Commander at his house and proceeded to the headquarters to see what progress had been made in doing up his office. I was happy to find that the progress had been remarkably good. The next day was a Sunday and we managed to have everything completed by Monday morning, working day and night. When the General came to his office, he was delighted to find that all his directions had been fully complied with in such a short time. He wanted to meet all the officers and men who had worked so hard to make that possible. He thanked them for a job well done and shook hands with each one of them.

I have described the General's first few days as Army Commander to give a feel of the tempo and style of his functioning. No detail was too small for him and he drove himself and his staff hard, in pursuit of excellence. Within a fortnight of his taking over as Army Commander, the much anticipated attack on Naushera materialised. 15,000 raiders attacked from three directions. Their repeated attacks were beaten back and heavy casualties inflicted on them. Our forces suffered minimum casualties. The raiders retreated taking many of their dead with them. After the battle, our forces picked up 974 dead bodies left behind by the enemy. Naushera was the biggest single battle fought by our forces in Kashmir and it made Usman into a national hero overnight. The General decided to visit Naushera again to give the troops a pat on the back. He was shown the Taindar feature held by a battalion of the Rajput Regiment. The heaviest fighting in this battle had taken place here. Naik Yadunath Singh had displayed exemplary gallantry in defending Taindar. Despite being hopelessly outnumbered and repeatedly wounded, he kept fighting till the end, when reinforcements arrived and the raiders were driven back. He was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. The General was from the Rajput Regiment and I could see his heart swell with pride when the details of the fighting at Taindar were being put across to him. Usman told him that his brigade was keen to advance to

Jhangar and recapture the lost ground. General Cariappa replied that he would explain matters to the troops. I knew that he spoke Hindi like an Englishman and I was interested to hear how he addressed the troops. Standing on the bonnet of a Jeep at the Naushera airstrip, he spoke, "50 Para Brigade ke officeran, Sahiban our Jawanan. Is waqt mulk muft, ap muft, hum muft, sab kuchh muft hai. Ap ka Brigade Commander Saheb ne bola kih ap age jana mangta. Main pahele ap ko tasveer ke andar dalna mangta. Abhi ap age jana sakta nahin kionkih hamara bandobast ka dum bahut pichche hai. Ap is waqt sirf dushtman ki ankh maro." He had made a literal word for word translation from English to Hindi and in the process the meaning of what he wanted to say got lost. He meant to say, "Officers, JCOs and men of 50 Para Brigade. Our country is now free and we are a free people. Your Brigade Commander tells me that you want to advance to Jhangar but I first want to put you in the picture. At present you cannot go forward because our administrative tail is far behind. For the present, keep an eye on the enemy."

On return to Delhi we drove from Palam to his residence at 4 King George's Avenue (now Rajaji Marg). On his becoming the Chief the following year, this house became the Army House. Successive Army Chiefs have been living at this house. As we entered the gate we saw the General's two children, Nanda and Nalini, alighting with their school bags from another staff car. He became furious on seeing this and asked his ADC as to why a Government staff car had been used for private work. The ADC said that the children had missed the school bus and he had sent the staff car to fetch them. He reprimanded him for misuse of Government vehicle and said that what he had done amounted to theft of Government petrol. He directed me to take disciplinary action against the ADC. The next morning I sent for the ADC in my office. He told me that as there was no lady in the house, he had to look after the running of the General's household which included keeping an eye on the children. When the children had not come back from school, he had sent the staff car to fetch them and had waited at the house to receive the General as he was expected at that time. I advised him that knowing the General's views in the matter he must never again use Government transport for private duty except when inescapable and in that event the use of the transport should be paid for at the prescribed rates. Soon after, the General sent for me and inquired what I had done about the misuse of the staff car for his children. I told him that I had spoken to the ADC and warned him about not repeating his mistake again in the future and he had assured me that he would not do so. The General inquired about what I had done regarding the loss suffered by the Government on account of petrol. I said that the staff car had been used for some 6 miles and the amount for use of Government transport at the prescribed rates was being deposited in the Treasury. He was satisfied with what I told him. He, however, told me to

ensure that the amount deposited in the Treasury be debited to his account.

The General decided to establish his Tactical Headquarters at Jammu. He flew to Amritsar and I took the road convoy to join him at Amritsar from where we were to proceed together to Jammu. We arrived at the Amritsar Circuit House late on a cold night when the Army commander had already retired. Next morning the Army Commander was to travel in the staff car of the local divisional commander from Amritsar to Pathankot and from thence in his own jeep to Jammu as Pathankot-Jammu road in those days was not fit for staff cars. It so happened that the Divisional Commander's staff car would not start after the two Generals had got into it. The Army Commander came out of the car very annoyed and told the Division Commander that the standard of vehicle maintenance in his division did not appear to be too good. He asked me to get his Jeep. As his Jeep came up, he gave me a stern look. The Jeep had not been washed and there was dust on it. He drew a line with his finger through the dust on the mudguard and said, "Do you expect an Army Commander to travel in a dirty vehicle like this? I expect my staff officers to be more alive to their responsibilities". I felt mortified at the ticking off I received. The Jeep was immediately cleaned. This was the first and the last time that I was ticked off by the General during the one year that I served on his staff. Hereafter, I invariably got his vehicle washed and scrubbed at the end of the day's journey, no matter what time of the day or night that be. During severe winter in Kashmir, his vehicle used to be washed with hot water and I insisted that hot water for the Jeep took precedence over hot water for my bath.

The Army Commander toured extensively in Kashmir for ten to fifteen days every month. I invariably accompanied him on these tours. We were once travelling in a Jeep from Srinagar to Uri. As we approached the road bend near Heman Buniyar, the enemy started sniping from a distance. The Brigade Commander was driving the Jeep. He suggested that we stop for a while to remove the flag from the Jeep and the Army Commander might remove his peak cap with the red band as these would attract enemy fire. He asked him to drive fast through the patch of the road exposed to enemy fire and added that he wanted to test the standard of marksmanship of the enemy. The Pathans he knew on the North West Frontier used to be very good marksmen. He wanted to find out whether the enemy firing at us were genuine Pathans. We drove through the road while the enemy continued his sniping with no untoward incident. On another occasion in Tithwal, I had climbed a steep hill with him to an open patch. I was in my early twenties and the Army Commander was nearly 30 years older than me. He took the climb as well, if not better than me. We stood in an open patch on the top with the Army Commander in his peak cap with red band. The local Commander

mentioned that the place was under observation of the enemy and his artillery had been quite active in the area. He suggested that the Army Commander took off his peak cap which attracted unnecessary attention and observe the area from a covered spot. The General replied that he wanted the enemy to know that he was there and for his own troops to realise that he was not bothered about enemy fire. He spent a few minutes closely observing the area and after that we all moved down the slope. We had barely gone a couple of hundred yards when an enemy shell landed where we had stood. Unperturbed he continued moving down. Whereas in the forward areas he showed disregard for personal safety, in the rear areas, he showed great concern for the welfare of the local people. Salt used to be in short supply. We used to carry plentiful of salt which the Army Commander would distribute to the local people. We also used to carry toffees which he would give to the poor children. His tours used to be very hectic with a tight programme. As the staff officer accompanying him, I had to jot down the points he would give during these tours. He used to give a whole lot of them as no point, no matter how minor, would escape his attention. At night he would work till late hours, replying to the numerous letters that he used to receive from retired soldiers who had worked under him and who needed his help. He was generous with his money and often sent financial assistance to ex-Servicemen in distress.

General Sir Roy Bucher, the then Army Chief did not appear too well disposed towards General Cariappa. Possibly, he wanted to get him discredited so that he himself could stay on longer in India, on the plea that there was no suitable senior Indian officer available to replace him. The Army Commander used to ignore the frequent pinpricks we used to get from Army Headquarters. We on the staff used to joke about it and used to say that in Western Command we were fighting on two fronts, against Pakistan in Kashmir and against Army Headquarters in Delhi. Our first two attacks against Zojila, ominously named Operation Duck, had failed. The second failure was galling. We had arranged for massive artillery support for this attack. After a heavy plastering of the objectives, the infantry had launched the assault but the attack got stalled due to withering enemy fire. Forward observation Officers had not gone with the assaulting infantry due to some misunderstanding and accurate artillery support could not be provided. The Army Commander removed the defaulting battalion commander from the command of his battalion. He often took recourse to this when commanders had failed in battle. He now ordered a third attempt with more preparations including bringing up tanks to that altitude. The codename of the operation was changed from Duck to Bison. General Bucher directed that the third attempt be launched only if the Army Commander was 70 percent sure of success. General Cariappa replied that he was 100 percent sure of success. The third attempt under

very difficult climatic and terrain conditions turned out to be a resounding success. Never in the history of warfare had tanks been used at the altitude at which we had used them in the battle of Zojila. Our success in this battle helped in saving Ladakh. With the approach of winter the pass would get blocked with snow and we now launched an all out effort to stock up our troops across the pass for the winter months. A few days later all our vehicles engaged in stocking got caught in a severe snow blizzard. A very large number of vehicles got buried in snow and quite a few of the soldiers suffered from frostbite. We had not received any word of appreciation from the Army Chief for the remarkable success in the battle of Zojila but he sent General Cariappa a highly critical letter for the administrative setback on account of the blizzard, emphasising the importance for senior commanders to weigh up the administrative consequences of an operation. As usual, the General ignored this letter and asked me to just file it. About this time we achieved an equally spectacular success in the South. Overcoming the opposition put up by an enemy division, our forces established a ground link with Punch, which had remained isolated for a year. Pakistan now agreed to abide by the UN resolution already accepted by India, four months earlier. A Cease Fire came about and thus ended the first Indo-Pak War.

Soon after the Cease Fire on January 1, 1949, General Cariappa was promoted and appointed the first Indian Commander-in-Chief of the Army. When I went to congratulate him, he told me that if it was alright by me, he would like me to be his Military Assistant, in his new appointment. I replied that it would be a great honour and I felt overwhelmed at his reposing such confidence in me. This would have meant my promotion to the rank of Lt Col. I had never in my wildest of dreams thought that I would get promoted to that rank so early. Three days later, the General told me that the Military Secretary had pointed out that as per the rules, the minimum service prescribed for an officer to officiate as Lt Col was 6½ years and I had less than 5 years service. As the Army Chief, he could give a special dispensation and sanction my promotion. He told me that when he had offered the appointment to me he did not realise that I was not eligible for it. He could waive the rules for me but he did not wish to convey a wrong message to the Army that he was doing so for a favourite. Even the Army Chief must conform to the rules. He was sorry that he could not take me with him as his Military Assistant. He asked me if I wanted any other appointment in the rank of Major. I replied that I was happy in my appointment and would like to continue as long as I was required. I added that I fully appreciated why I could not go with him on his staff and that I considered it a singular honour that he had thought of taking me with him. It so happened that having missed getting promoted to the rank of Lt Col in 1949, I had to wait for 13 long years before I could attain that rank.

General Cariappa was the Commander-in-Chief for a full term of 4 years. During this period, I hardly ever met him but I along with the rest of the Army could feel the impact of his leadership. Looking back to those days, I can unhesitatingly say that the Indian Army was extremely fortunate to have him as its Chief, at that period of transition. He functioned with a crusader's zeal, always scrupulously practising what he preached. He enforced the highest standards of discipline and professionalism in the Army.

A few years after his retirement and after his return from his diplomatic assignment in Australia, I was posted as Lt Col on the instructional staff at our Staff College in Wellington, not far from Coorg. I had occasion to visit him at his house, Roshnara, in Mercara. He was ageing gracefully and was still very fit physically. Standing erect like a ramrod and impeccably dressed, he greeted me warmly. He told me that he kept himself busy helping ex-Servicemen and teaching young boys military discipline and drill movements. He readily agreed to write a foreword to my book, *Operation Rescue*, on the first Indo-Pak War in Kashmir. His generous foreword was of great help and this book ran into several editions. He was very upset about the 1962 debacle. He recalled how in 1950 when China moved into Tibet, he had spoken to Nehru about the threat from the Himalayas and was virtually told that that was none of his business. He was asked to keep his attention confined to Pakistan. He had felt so agitated at what had happened in 1962 that he had gone to the Recruiting Officer for being enlisted as a soldier in the Army. He toured the country extensively, addressing numerous public meetings to raise the Nation's morale. He also wrote a pamphlet, *Let us Wake Up*, addressed to the youth.

I met him again after the 1965 war at Delhi. He confirmed what I had heard from other sources. His son, Nanda, now a pilot in the Air Force had been shot down over Lahore and taken a prisoner. President Ayub had served with General Cariappa in the undivided Indian Army for many years and had been very junior to him. He had high regard for the General and sent him a message that he could have Nanda released and sent to India as a special case. General Cariappa's reply was that he had many sons in the Army and the Air Force who had been taken prisoners and Nanda could return only when the others were repatriated.

In 1981, I took over as Army Commander of Western Command. I received a charming letter of congratulations from my erstwhile Army Commander, recalling my service under him as a Major at the same Headquarters, 33 years earlier. In 1983 when I resigned or being superseded for the appointment of Army Chief, he was on a visit to his daughter in Delhi. He telephoned me and said, "I am proud of you. Drop in for a cup of tea

in the afternoon, whenever convenient to you. I want to talk to you." I went over to him the next day and found him as gracious as ever. He was happy that in my Press statement on my resignation, I had shown no bitterness nor had I criticised anyone. A few years later, I met him again during one of my visits to Bangalore. His health had begun to give way but his spirit was still indomitable. He asked me for my drink and I requested for a whisky with soda. He got up with difficulty to go to the trolley on which the drinks were laid. I offered to pour a drink for him and also myself. He replied, "You sit where you are. You are my guest and it is my job to pour you a drink". We spent a pleasant evening together talking of the old days and I found him mentally alert. As I got up to leave, he came to the verandah to see me off. His gait was unsteady and he shuffled as he walked. As I said good-bye to him that evening, something within me made me feel that that was our last meeting. Unfortunately, this foreboding turned out to be true.

Field Marshal Cariappa's passing away signifies the end of an era. Many obituaries have appeared covering his long and brilliant career. Present and future generations will learn about him from history books and biographies. I have recounted my personal association with this great man, as my humble tribute to him. I hope these recollections provide a glimpse of Cariappa the Man and Cariappa the General. He was a true embodiment of values - patriotism, integrity, discipline, diligence, generosity and courage, both physical and moral. He was an officer and a gentleman to the core, who practised what he preached. He was always correct in everything, almost to the point that correctness was his fault. The like of him is not born in every generation. I was singularly fortunate in having come in close contact with this towering personality and I shall always cherish that memory.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Sir,

SOLDIERING - CAREER OR A CALLING

Gen B C Joshi on taking over as the new COAS, when asked at a press interview as to why he joined the army, he said that, Quote, "In the flush of Independence, many families patronised the army as a good career for their progeny" Unquote. What the General has stated still holds good even today, specially when compared to all the other central government services, a career in the army is still the most lucrative and satisfying.

However, having said this, it is pertinent to point out that, in the pre-Independence days, specially during the World War II period, a man joined the army, not so much as a career but as a mission or a calling. This was even more so in the officer class, where the man had to have an adequate private income to supplement his meagre army pay.

I was in the United States last month, when I happened to be present at a press interview given by Gen Norman Schwarzkopf, I requested a press reporter sitting besides me, to ask the General, as to what motivated him to join the army, which he obliged. I give below Schwarzkopf's reply --

Quote: "When I began as a plebe, 'Duty, Honor, Country' was just a motto I'd heard. By the time I left, those values had become my fixed stars. It was a tremendous liberation. The Army with its emphasis on rank and medals and efficiency reports, is the easiest institution in the world in which to get consumed with ambition. Some officers spend all their time currying favor and worrying about the next promotion -- a miserable way to live. But the Army's motto saved me from that by instilling the ideal of service above self - to do my duty for my country even if it brought no gain or promotion at all. It gave me far more than military career - it gave me a calling." Unquote.

In our army the question today is, how to reorient the officer corps to the traditional value of a mission or calling, when, at the outset they have been conditioned to the fact that, the very success of their careers depends on their ability to conform to the existing norms of career behaviour, even at the expense of being dubbed as opportunist and sycophants.

As quite rightly brought out by Gen Joshi that, our army, and its officer corps, is professionally very sound and well equipped. I am sure that, in case of a conflict, it will give a very good account of itself, provided the war is of a short duration. However, in case of a long drawn out conflict, the outcome will depend not so much on professional efficiency, but on the sustained maintenance of morale, ensured on the values of mission or a calling. It is the latter factor which is today posing a problem, and which the new COAS will have to grapple with.

II

UN'S ROLE IN BOSNIA

Dear Sir,

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar in his talk on UNPROFOR (April-June 93 issue) focusses rightly on the cynosure of the UN's actions, namely, they must be "balanced and impartial." Unfortunately, it is apparent now that this desirable characteristic of this august organisation is highly suspect.

There have been several reports in the media that the Christian elements of UNPROFOR are turning a blind eye to the systematic slaughter of the Bosnian Muslims by the Bosnian Serbs. To quote one such report, "...with a benign tolerance that might reflect hatreds going back many centuries, UK, France and Germany - nations which produced the original Crusaders - have allowed the Bosnian Serbs to kill, rape and annihilate Bosnia's Muslims with a freedom that would shock the most cynical of temperaments..." There are marked comparisons between the UN operations in Somalia where the UN soldiery are hounding Gen. Aidid because he is a Muslim. Even the vociferous Human Rights outfits of the world are quiet on Bosnia. The present UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo Lt Gen Francis Briquement is nothing more than a passenger.

President Clinton's order for NATO air strikes in Bosnia coupled with his appointing Gen John Shalikashvili, originally from East Europe, as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff after Gen Colin Powell retires, has given some hope to the hapless Bosnian Muslims. Notwithstanding the UN's good offices, there is a definite requirement for a parallel body comprising primarily Third World countries in this context. Ideally, the Organisation of Islamic Countries should take the initiative with adequate cause-building by India and Pakistan.

Review Article I

Use and Misuse of History - The Choice between Land and Sea Forces*

VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) MIHIR ROY, PVSM, AVSM

Michael Hobkirk analyses the war strategies of ancient Persia, Greece and the Ottoman empires together with the military priorities that swayed Britain, France, Russia and Germany in their choice of overall strategies which impinged on the size of their armies and navies. The author then poses the question whether these nations had made the right choice in the allocation of money and manpower to their land or sea forces?

He briefly refers to air power during the Second World War by pointing out the inadequate numbers of long range maritime aircraft available to close the 'escort gap' during the Battle of the Atlantic; the lack of precision bombing by the RAF and the service rivalries in the United States which resulted in prosecuting two major campaigns simultaneously against Japan in the Pacific.

His observations that Russia, Germany and China (Mongolia) were land powers and hence the diversion of resources to their navies were a strategic error contributing to their ultimate defeat revives the age old controversy between Mackinder's thesis of heartland powers and Spykman's prognosis of rimland supremacy. This use or misuse of history has however been overtaken by military technology which renders such dissertations irrelevant.

On the other hand, one can conversely argue that Czarist Russia and Kaiser's Germany were defeated owing to their having inadequate navies in their confrontation with Japan and Britain respectively. Further it will not be out of context to remind military pundits of the fate of large developed countries in Asia which were conquered by much smaller nations albeit with adequate sea forces. Mughal India was perhaps the most significant example of such sea blindness which unfortunately is still glaringly visible in the asymmetry of our current defence budgets.

Hobkirk extends this logic to the build up of the Soviet surface fleet after the Cuban crisis which investment, he contends was unwarranted in view of Russia's land dominated strategy. His reasoning is intriguingly supported by Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnel in his cryptic forward. But in the

* Land, Sea or Air? : Military Priorities: Historical Choices. By Michael D Hobkirk, London, Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 205, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-333-53638-X.

exhaustive bibliography which includes Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Roskill, Paul Kennedy and a host of distinguished maritime thinkers, there is no mention of Admiral Gorshkov who was acknowledged as the Mahan of the 21st century as a result of his thought provoking treatises on *The Sea Power of the State*, despite the break up of the Soviet Union. This was the raison d'être for the build up of the Soviet Navy after Krushchev was forced to climb down when confronted by US Warships during the Cuban missile crisis. And it was this policy that catapulted USSR into the Super Power league along with America because of the global reach provided by their respective navies in their world wide confrontation.

The author briefly touches on the 'age of the Defence Staff Officer and the need for him to interact with politicians, bureaucrats, scientists as also with the military - industrial complex which is already a well established democratic process which does not need further elaboration. Michael Hobkirk's first and last chapters on 'Strategic Choices' and 'the Cold War and After' (which he dismisses in one page) are the only sections of contemporary interest.

RUSI's publication on 'Military Priorities and Historical Choices' is part of their defence series and should be read along with other similar studies such as "The Politics of Defence Budgeting", 'The Military and the Government' and so on in order to put some spice into this thoughtful but pedestrian analysis which has been largely overtaken by nuclear, ballistic and precision guided missiles which tempts one to conclude by quoting Akbar's advise to Raja Toder Mal - It is good history but what we need should be relevant to the present times'.

Review Article-2

Early History of the CIA*

AIR MARSHAL H.K. OBERAI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

For the common man, CIA spells intrigue and chicanery where spies, counter spies and master spies are forever engaged in a game of deceit and duplicity and any form of guile that aids in prying out even the most guarded secrets of other nations. Those who are looking for such excitement would find the book uninteresting if not disappointing.

The book is about the early history of the CIA and its laborious growth from its inception in 1946 to 1950. It is based on official papers declassified by the US Govt and interviews with those who played a leading role in its formation as an instrument of Govt. It has been indicated that history of latter years will be written as more papers and information is released by US authorities.

There is nothing stirring in the narrative. It is history told plainly and sedately. It may sound surprising, but prior to World War II no central agency for synthesizing intelligence collected by various departments existed in USA. It was only in 1941, that the Office of Strategic Information later to be redesignated as Office of Strategic Services, was formed. The Office proved its utility particularly in the conduct of special operations during the War. Immediately after the war the office was disbanded, but soon enough, with the emergence of the iron curtain across Europe and the ensuing cold war, the need for a central agency for processing information in to hard intelligence for formulation of policy and strategy became even more pressing.

In 1946, President Truman accepted the proposal for a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) comprising Secretaries of State, War and the Navy and also designated a personal representative. The authority was supported by a Central Intelligence Agency headed by a Director who was a non-voting member of the NIA. The CIA was proportionally funded by the several departments and depended upon them for information and manning. This however, proved to be a serious constraint in its smooth functioning and was overcome by the National Security Act of 1947, and the CIA Act of 1969. Under the 1947 Act, a National Security Council comprising Secretaries of State, Defence and other departments and appointees of the President was formed and a Central Intelligence Agency headed by Director (DCI) was established under it. The CIA had its own budget and was assigned the mission of co-ordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments

* The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950. By Arthur B. Darling, London, Pennsylvania, State University Press, 1990, p. 509, \$ 17.50, ISBN 0-271-00717-6.

and agencies in the interest of national security. DCI is responsible for advising the NSC on intelligence and security matters. Intelligence estimates are prepared under his personal supervision. Provision exists for accommodating dissent. As per current practice, all views are put in the main text and footnotes indicate which agency supports a particular assessment.

The author laments, that despite the legislative and other measures, the CIA is still handicapped by lack of support from departments who actually gather the basic information. He observes that, "for the most part not only have the issues remained the same; the position argued by each of the players has remained remarkably constant as well". But then, such is the complaint of every organisation that is serviced by other agencies for its basic inputs.

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Book Reviews

Technology in War. By Kenneth Macksey, *Arms and Armour Press 2-6 Homestead High Street, London, NW31QQ, 1986, Pages 224, Price £12.95.*

This excellent book on the impact of science on weapon development and modern battles, written by a former Royal Tank Corps officer, who had seen active service from 1944 in Europe, India and the Far east, is well worth reading.

The author recounts the development of technology starting in the 18th century, with the production of the first economical steam engine in 1763, which led to the replacement of muscle power by machines. It mentions the use of rockets by Haider Ali in 1780; which were later used by Col. Congreve against the French at Boulogne. Development of steam powered paddle steamers; man - powered submarine proposed in the American civil war to break the British blockade and the Gatling gun.

Future prospects mentioned include; expanding space technology, limited Nuclear wars with low yield strikes, manned orbital weapon systems. A photograph of the latest MX, (Orbitting space?) missile capable of releasing a number of accurately guided missiles at land targets; and a diagrammatic expose' of combat tiers of the war in 1990's are included.

— Partap Narain
(Maj General Retd MA Cantab)

Rethinking Nuclear Strategy. By Stephen J. Cimbala, *Delaware, Scholarly Resources, 1988, p.278, \$ 40.00. ISBN 0-8420-2294-5.*

This book has, to a degree, been overtaken by events. It was written prior to the war in the Gulf, where state of the art weapons technology came into its own, suggesting radical doctrinal changes in future war fighting concepts; the disintegration of the USSR, when ongoing Cold War nuclear strategies were being reviewed to meet the imperatives of defensive technologies: disclosures of the Israeli nuclear capabilities and its extra regional potential; and, when the fundamental break through in disarmament negotiations as epitomised in the INF and START II were nowhere in sight.

Despite the phenomenal changes in the global security environment, this book has significant relevance to researchers, analysts and policy makers attempting to come to grips with the essentials of nuclear strategy formulation and disarmament negotiations. Its major contribution lies in the insight it provides into the rationale of American disarmament negotiations and their acceptance of START II.

— Brig VK, Nair, VSM(Rtd) PhD

A Short History of Air Power. By James J. Stokesbury, *New York, William Morrow, 1986, p. 313, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-688-05061-1..*

The effectiveness of Air Power was established without doubt in 1992 by the Allied Air Forces - mainly the USAAF during the Gulf War against Iraq, militarily a very much weaker power. The Allied Air Forces had Air supremacy and the Air strikes virtually won the war. However, even against balanced Armed Forces, Air Power will continue to play a dominant role.

The author has already written short histories of World Wars I & II. In this book he gives a clear insight into the history of how the Aeroplane came to fly and developed into a weapon platform from the 1st World War to the present day sophisticated aircraft with vastly improved technological advances into weapons and weapon delivery systems. Today when we have moved into space age, the technological and firepower capabilities have ensured that Air Power is a factor that no country dare ignore, and if it does it will be at its own peril.

— Gp Capt Dalbir Yadav, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defence 1914-1973. By John F Kreis, *Washington DC, Office of Air Force History, 1988, p. 407, ISBN 0-912799-49-8.*

This is a well-researched study of the defence of air bases against attack from the air. There are four facets of air base defence. Firstly, active defence which means protection of a specific site with the employment of AA guns, SAMs and fighter aircraft. Secondly, passive defence which involves camouflage, construction of revetments; use of decoys like dummy aircraft. Thirdly, dispersal of aircraft, fuel and spares to increase the enemy's targeting problems. Lastly, the ability to repair the damage to keep the base operational. RAF's performance during Battle of Britain, Malta and north Africa has been discussed in detail. RAF had a distinct edge over the Luftwaffe since RAF had the ability to intercept and decode German radio messages through the German ENIGMA Encryption machine obtained secretly. Two incidents make interesting and useful reading. During the raid on Biggin Hill base by the Luftwaffe on 18 Aug 40, One British Home Guard shot down one German Dornier 215 with his .303 rifle. During the Arab-Israel War 1967, Israeli pilots were not duped by the dummy aircraft deployed by the Egyptians since these aircraft had no tell-tale fuel and exhaust stains.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh, M.Sc

Radar. By P S Hall, T K Garland Collins & others. *Oxford, Brassey's (UK), 1991, p. 170, £ 24.00, ISBN-0 080377114.*

Messers P S Hall, T K Garland Collins, R S Picton and R G Lee, all of the Royal Military College of Science Shrirenham, UK are to be congratulated for bringing out a book on Radar which can be easily understood by any body without a detailed knowledge of electronics and radar systems.

The Radar and ASDICS, the two inventions which came about in the early stage of World War II changed the entire concept of the warfare. Originally, radar was only a range and bearing device but the technology has been so advanced that it is now used in all the weapons including missiles. Its application in forecasting the weather is also of much importance particularly for flying operations.

The book covers in a lucid manner the Principles of Radar Operation, Radar Techniques, Radar Technology, Battlefield Surveillance Radars and Electronic Warfare.

— Captain RP Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Gandhian Model of Development and World Peace. ed by R.P. Misra, *New Delhi; Concept*, p. 283, Rs.200/- ISBN 81-7022-2273.

The author is to be congratulated for putting together 22 papers presented by various scholars at the conference on the Gandhian Model of Development held on 29-31 January, 1988.

These papers though they cover variety of subjects main ones being Arms Race, Poverty and Political Instability, Gandhian Approach to Disarmament and Peace, Technology and Dispersal of Economy: A Gandhian Perspective and Search for Unity in Diversity: Gandhian Model; one message which is conveyed clearly is that there is need for every body to work with true dedication to the principles that Gandhi cherished and always valued.

— Captain RP Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

LIC 2010 : Special Operations and Unconventional warfare in the Next Century. By Rod Paschall, *Washington Brassey's (US)* 1990, p.165, \$ 23.00.

Military thinking today is influenced by Clausewitz philosophy who propagated the defeat of enemy forces as the major dictum in military strategy. The emerging world today sees, greater threat from guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists. Since it is not possible to defeat all the combined strength of anti establishment elements the philosophy propagated by Sun Tzu attains importance. He recommended the defeat of the enemy's alliance as the preferred strategy failing which defeat the enemy's strategy.

The vast technological revolution sweeping the world and concentration of economic gains with few nations of the world is fast changing the demographic pattern and social balances in the world. These shifts in the social structure will definitely affect the power equations and balances and also the type of struggle for equalisation of vast increasing gaps between countries.

The book in effect deals with the emerging political and economic trends which are likely to influence the military warfare techniques and the role Special Forces will assume in the changed scenario. The basic theme of the book is therefore concentrated on the type of role, Special Operations are likely to assume, and the requirement of re-modelling these forces to improve its effectiveness to match the changing scenario in the battle field.

— Col C Abraham

Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. By Robert Powell, Cambridge, University Press, 1990, p.230, £ 27.50, ISBN 0-521-37527-4.

The concept of deterrence in strategy dates back atleast to the warring states of Greece and the term itself appears in the 1820 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning, "to frighten from". Yet the emergence of nuclear weapons have given a new meaning and dimension to deterrence. "What was distinctly new" about deterrence in the atomic age, according to Bernard Brodie, "was the degree to which it was intolerable that it should fail."

Robert Powell's book examines this question from a very interesting and important dimension. For over a decade now the "use" of nuclear weapons in war fighting was effectively debunked. Robert Mc Namara wrote in the New York Times on 15 Sep 1983, that, "Having spent seven years as Secretary of Defence.... I do not believe we can avoid serious and unacceptable risk of nuclear war until we recognise... that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever.... that they are totally useless... except only to deter one's opponent from using them." What Powell does is to make a most comprehensive use of game theory in exploring this crucial yet elusive aspect of the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

The advent of second strike nuclear weapon capability did not rule out the use of force in pursuance of state policies. Yet nuclear weapons have changed the relation between the use of force and merely its threat. Deterrence theory attempts to explain this. By examining the concept and credibility of nuclear deterrence and nuclear brinkmanship, Powell has examined crisis stability, control and the strategy of limited retaliation through mathematical models based on game theory.

Those specialising in game theory will find the work fascinating and highly illuminating.

— Maj Gen D Banerjee, AVSM

Tactical Concepts and Fire Power in 21st Century. By Maj Gen P C Jerath, Noida, Trishul, 1992, p.186, Rs.150.00, ISBN 81-83384-09-6.

The book under review is a gallant venture by the author to place Artillery in its prime position in the battlefield" of the future, because as he contends, "MOBILITY", the other factor of modern war, can only be achieved and progressed by the

accuracy, long reach and massive weight of Fire Power. Indeed, modern technology has placed nearly fail-proof capability in the hands of the generals to achieve all these.

He has therefore projected his model of an Institute of Fire Power Management The IFPOM, encompassing not only the battlefield, but also reaching back to the inception, Research & Development of weaponry and other ancillary hardware, as also the tactical doctrine. It cannot be denied that since the mid-twentieth century, the artillery had been relegated to a mere supporting role. In India and other developing nations this was due to lack of viable punch in their main Fire Power arm and their understandable preference to building up of Armoured and Mechanised forces. The advanced nations, on the other hand, were caught up in the nuclear war psychosis, which again demanded fast moving armoured follow-up forces.

Overall the book is thought provoking-boldly so, although its readability and flow is somewhat marred by a proliferation of clichés, catchwords and categoric proclamations.

— Maj Gen SK Talwar

The Power of the Machine: The Impact of Technology from 1700 to the Present. By R A Buchanan, London, Viking, Penguin Books, 1992, p.299, £ 20.00 ISBN 0-670-836567-7.

After centuries of natural development, human society came to the age of technology and industrialisation. Rapid, profound, and often unexpected, change has affected individuals, communities, states to a degree where progress seems to have gone beyond human control. This book discusses the history of technology, the human ways of doing and making things. It explains the revolution of accelerating invention, the when, where, how, and whys of industrialisation, the impact on rural and urban people, and on their way of thinking. The unprecedented dependence on technology in the 20th century has brought with it extraordinary capacity for self destruction. The author feels there is hope and capacity to control its potential for social and environmental benefit. However this record of two centuries bristles with self interest, nationalism, and individual greed at the cost of others. One way well have doubts about our future world.

— Tindi

The Wings of Democracy :The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1941: By Jeffery S. Underwood, Texas A&M University 1991, p. 234, \$ 39.50, ISBN 0-89096-388-6.

Today, viewers tuning into CNN or BBC Cable TV can get ringside view of the awesome results of aerial warfare. In the recent Kuwaiti conflict, it was even possible to see precision bombing of vital targets by guided weapons via video cameras

installed in the aircraft. The current generation of officers who can thus see the destructive effect of attacks into the enemy's heartland, must find it difficult therefore to conceive that in the years before World War II, it was an uphill struggle for air forces to convince their establishments that an independent third arm was needed in the services to fight wars jointly with armies and navies. The author of this interesting book, Jeffrey Underwood, has done a good job of researching into the story of such a struggle as applicable to the United States Air Force from 1933 to 1941. He relates events and methods used by Generals Mitchell, Fullois, Andrews and Hap Arnold to convince politicians that aircraft were not extensions of artillery and that strategic bombers of an independent air force would change the nature of warfare when utilised on industrial and military targets; they preached that such targeting would beat an enemy into submission before the ground and naval forces intervened thus saving the lives of soldiers and sailors.

This theory formulated by the leaders of the American Army Air Corps and the highs and the lows the Commanders suffered when they tried to convince their Commander-in-Chief, President Franklin Roosevelt is the main theme spelt out by Underwood. At the same time, the author also gives insights into reasons for the failures of early demonstrations such as Gen. Mitchell's bombing of warships and the 1934 attempt by the Army Air Corps to fly the night air mail service with untrained pilots and aircraft, ill-equipped for the task.

-- Group Capt K Advani (Retd)

The Challenge of the Skies. By Air Marshal R.D. Sahni, *New Delhi, The Author, 1992, p. 295, Rs.380.*

The Challenge of the Skies, is a very well written record of progress of aviation ever since the known quest of man to fly like the birds to the present day state of development and achievements in the field of aviation and space.

The contents provide a handy, encyclopediac & authentic source of information, in brief plain language. The book is extremely useful for the students and younger generation and a must for experienced aviators to remove their persistent veil of ignorance.

Perhaps it is only a person of Air Marshal Sahni's experience and qualifications who could compile this information in the form & style it has been presented in.

-- Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra, AVSM, VM

The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics. By Alexis Heraclides, *London, Frank Cass, 1991, p. 291, £ 16.00. ISBN 0-7146-3384-4.*

Self determination is essentially the ideological expression of the violent move towards cartographic revision in the borders are made to conform to the cultural or ethnic spread of the affected people. The quantum of power that is sought to be

wrested varies from autonomy to sovereignty. This eminently unexceptionable quest is pregnant with distressing possibilities for multiethnic states with cultural plurality. And therein is the compelling imperative to study and comprehend this force of contemporary significance.

The book under review is a fair beginning to such an effort. Written by a Greek, Alexis Heraclides, it is the abridged version of his doctoral thesis. Its theoretical section comprises of the etiology of secession and its international implications and provides the normative framework for the seven case studies. Of the latter on account of empirical relevance the ones on Bangladesh, Iraqi Kurdistan and Eritrea are worth perusing. Since the Cold War forms the backdrop, extrapolation to ongoing conflict zones requires appropriate modifications for pertinence.

The reading helps put our experience in the North East, Punjab, Kashmir and Sri Lanka in a correct perspective. Further it explains the propensity of South Asian governments to fuel the others fires. The most perspicacious message remains that 'prevention is better than cure' especially because even after the 'cure' all the measures for prevention would still have to be administered.

— Capt Ali Ahmed

Star Wars: The Economic Fallout. By Nimrody, *Singapore, Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988, p. 234, \$ 53.78, ISBN 0-297-78464-7.*

Book - 'STAR WARS' - The Economic Fallout makes a major contribution towards the ongoing cost benefit debate. Mr Rosy Nimrody, senior Project Director, 'The Council on Economic Priorities in USA has vividly brought out economic realities of the SDI project and its ramifications on the global economics in general and of the USA in particular. A very readable treatise.

— Lt. General MM Walia, SM

US Foreign Policy and the USSR, China and India: Economic Reform in three Giants. By Richard E. Feinberg and others, *New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1990, p.247 0-88738-820-5.*

The three giants referred are Russia, China and India. The essays in the book are a strong case by the US Overseas Development, justifying US assistance for economic reforms and development in these countries.

The authors argue that India's transitional economy poses both opportunities as well as challenges to the United States. The latter arise mainly from India's increasing reliance on export-led growth and international competitiveness in certain sectors. On the question of India's weak protection of Intellectual Property Rights, it is felt that the US should stop over-estimating its leverage. Instead it should take into account India's domestic policies.

By assisting in India's economic growth the US has a lot to gain. It has a key

role to play in peace and regional stability. And in the long run, once India's economy gets underway, all minor irritants between the two countries are likely to get resolved.

The essays do not offer any fresh ideas. Moreover statistically the book is outdated, and most of the forecasts are well known. The bottom line message is that, it is in US interest to support the economic reforms in the Giants.

— Brigadier Arjun Ray

We shall return: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan 1942-45. Ed By William M Leary. *Kentucky, Univ Press, 1988. p.305, \$ 25.00, ISBN 0-8131-1654-6.*

The book has been able to fill the void that existed by bringing out the achievements of the field commanders of the region as compared to Patton and Bradley who had become familiar names for the American people because of their achievements in Europe.

Throughout the book, prominence has been given to MacArthur who "symbolised the US fears, hopes and expectations about the war". Like all field Commanders, he had his likes and dislikes. His main conflict was with General Sir Thomas Albert Blamey, the Australian Field Commander and whom MacArthur described as "a non-professional Australian drunk". Blamey however proved an able Field Commander and in my opinion at times better than MacArthur in making crucial decisions. This aspect is well covered in the book and is a lesson for future Field Commanders, specially those who have to deal with strong personalities. It goes to both their credits, that despite the underlying distrust from the beginning, Blamey and MacArthur cooperated closely in organising the Defence of Australia.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

War in Korea 1950-1953: By D.M. Giangreco, *California, Presidio, 1990. p. 330, \$ 40.00, ISBN. 0-89141-379-0.*

In the book "War in Korea" the author has dealt with all the features of this classic war in a direct and concise manner, without commentaries and critiques. The narrative brings out, in a subtle manner, the error or inadequacy of the strategic aim by the UN command due to an underlying fear of sparking off another World War, and the mis-reading of the Chinese challenge, about consequences of crossing North of 38th Parallel.

At the same time, the Author has interposed about 500 photographs concerning both, the men and machines who fought the war and the people they fought for. The acquisition, selection and sifting of this pictorial essay must have been a labour of love. Unlike the run of the mill war albums, the overall product offers an exhilarating study.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

America's Small Wars. Lessons for the Future, By John M. Collins and others. *Virginia, Brassey's (US) 1991, p. 287, \$ 18.75.*

A matter of fact publication; which while delving into the low intensity conflict (not only combat) aspect of America's involvement into the affairs of other nations, does conjure up, the shape of things to come possibly in a much bigger way, in these days of 'pax-American' as such, it should be an eye-opener to politicians and strategists alike, who, I am sure, will, now having witnessed the eventful Desert Storm, be wary of the will of the Power, would therefore, be able to draw important lessons, on the best ways to cope with it, should mutual interests be conflicting.

Undoubtedly, a thoroughly researched treatise, which, whatever merit it may hold for the US Congressmen, for whom it was compiled, will be a definitive reference work for the soldier, statesman and scholar, embroiled in low intensity conflict, now vitiating the socio-political environment the world over. I for one, will always recall with relish the masterly dessicated analysis of America's small wars, that have been covered in the first few chapters, and of course, the case summaries which are very informative as well as concise and clear.

— Lt Col AK Sharma

Military Lessons of the Gulf War: Edited By Bruce W. Watson and others, *New Delhi, Lancer International, 1991, p. 272, Rs. 200/- ISBN 81-7062-158-5.*

To the one and half million coalition forces the Gulf War cost over 200 killed and over 600 wounded. The Iraqi losses were between 60,000 to 1,00,000 killed/wounded among its military personnel. The Iraqi war machine ruined. The significance of War was in its tremendous scientific, technical, military and political effects. Many lessons were relearnt: meshing of technology, the fog of diplomacy and national rhetoric, the weakness of advanced war systems backed by money/talent-short third world economies and countering of war systems used by the opponents.

The book is researched by experts from ten nations and presents, with rare economy, the dynamics of war bridged with civilian aspects such as freedom of Press, the danger of terrorism and moral issues of making war. Underlying the discussion of the military aspects is a penetrative look at the 'iron mongery', that many a weapon shopper will find useful.

Supportive appendices, photographs, maps and illustrations add punch to the individual chapter summaries. These are later concluded as political lessons and military lessons. A most comprehensive overview of the conflict particularly for a sharp study of the Campaign.

— Col Balwant Sandhu, FRGS

Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro, By George Anne Geyer. *Boston Little Brown, 1991, p. 445, \$ 22.95, ISBN 0-316-30893-5.*

Fidel Castro is undoubtedly the most successful revolutionary leader of the

century. He was not only successful as a revolutionary in his own country but also managed to export revolution to many parts of the world. He is perhaps the last of the diehard communists.

Georgie Anne Geyer is a well known journalist and author of many books. Based on 300 interviews in 28 countries including four personal interviews, study of 600 books and 700 periodicals, present work is historically, politically and psychologically definitive and consummate account of the secretive Cuban leader. This book assists in understanding as to why Fidel behaves in the manner he does. His outstanding qualities as an orator and charismatic leadership and handling of crisis as well as his weaknesses in handling his close associates and utter disregard to human life have been well brought out. The book also brings out the genesis of Cuba's relationship with US and USSR. Fidel's lack of understanding of economic realities have been well covered. His actual handling, training and employment of guerrilla forces have not been well covered.

-- Col JS Grewal, SM, M Phil, MSc

The \$ 36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel.
By AFK ORGANSKI, New York, Columbia University, 1990, p315, \$ 17.50, ISBN 0-231-07197-3.

The relationship between the USA and Israel, has been close, although there have been occasions when the former did not wholly support the latter's actions in dealing with her Arab and Palestinian neighbours. Given the fact that a nation's support to another is never wholly altruistic, USA's interest in the well being of Israel has largely been conditioned by its perception of its own interests in the region and of its need for an ally who can be depended upon not to do anything that would adversely affect its interests. For its part, Israel needed and still needs a powerful ally to enable it to survive and develop on its own in an environment where it can coexist with not very friendly neighbours.

The author describes the evolution of the US-Israeli strategic cooperation in the Middle East, to contain the twin threats of increasing Soviet influence in the oil-rich region and growth of pan Arabism which would have had an adverse impact on the security concerns of Israel.

-- Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

The Vietnam Wars. By Justin Wintle, London, Weidenfeld, 1991, p 202. £ 8.99, ISBN 0-297-82095-8.

This book is one of the series on 'War of the Modern Era' which gives out views on military conflicts that have shaped the twentieth-century history. This one focuses on the Vietnam Wars fought since 1945: an anticolonial war against the French and the War waged by the North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese

for unification of the divided Vietnam. The later is narrated in the backdrop of the American involvement, which ended with the fall of Saigon in 1973.

— Lt Col AK Sharma

The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983: By Donald R. Baucom, *Kansas University Press, 1992*, p. 276, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-7006-0531-2.

The author highlights, that search for a strategic defence system or BMD as it was initially termed commenced in the USA when USAAF developed military characteristics for an anti missile missile in February, 1946. The events thereafter including the development of hardware and the protracted debate which continues even till today about the efficacy of the system and its utility as a deterrent for strategic stability during the cold war, have been described in great detail. Those who canvassed for the system, emerge quite favourably, if not as heroes. Those who felt that technology was still not ripe for the systems fruition and instead supported the strengthening of offensive forces have attracted considerable flak. The USAF and the erstwhile defence secretary Robert McNamara have been singled out in this regard.

The high point of the book however, is the conduct of open political and strategic debate before formulation of policy in the USA. As a result, SDI was finally mounted when the opportunity was ripe and most of the necessary technological capabilities were at hand. Success did not prove elusive.

— Air Marshal HK Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Making Peace: The United States and Conflict Resolution, Ed by Allan E. Goodman and Sandra Clemens Bogart, *Boulder, Press Westview, 1992*, p. 132, \$ 41.50, ISBN 0-8133-8267-X.

Making Peace forms a part of the Westview Series "Case Studies in International Affairs" promoted by Pew Charitable Trusts. The book under review presents a set of cases selected for the purpose of illustrating negotiations involved in either maintaining an existing state of peace or negotiations in the aftermath of outbreak of hostilities for the restoration of peace. The aim is to provide both students and teachers with materials relevant to the conduct of diplomacy in the context of peace-making. The importance of the subject is self-evident because peace continues to be fragile even after the Cold-War tensions have come to an end.

Once the hostilities have broken out, what it is that can bring and does bring the belligerents to negotiations forms the most valuable part of the book. The dynamics of peace negotiations have been presented in the first two chapters, and the specific cases thereafter, illustrate the actual process and mechanics of conflict resolution with its attendant difficulties in a narrative mode of commendable clarity, which should be of help to students of diplomacy. The view of US peace-initiatives and conduct of negotiations following it is of special interest to Asian students as it

may help them to understand the abiding American priorities. The book should be of considerable interest to students of international relation and diplomacy.

— Maj Sunil Chandra, JNU

Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, By Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, *California, University of California, 1991, p. 279, \$ 13.00, ISBN 0-520-07781-4.*

Peter Dale Scott is a Professor in English University of California Berkeley, and has authored two books; Jonathan Marshall is the Economics Editor of the San Francisco Chronicle and has written two books on subjects similar to the present one.

The book is an exposé about the involvement of the American Government in drug-running and promoting narcoterrorism as an adjunct to its overseas policies with special reference to Central American countries viz Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, Panama and others. The authors regard this book as a gauntlet thrown to the Federal Government - which they claim 'has not been challenged'.

The authors view "drug traffic, not as a horizontal line between producers and consumers - but a triangle with the government at the apex, whose civil and military intelligence agencies recurrently afford protection to drug kingpins beneath them".

The book may be of use to our associated agencies dealing with this topic.

— Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi, *AVSM and Bar (Reid)*

The Gulf War Assessed. Edited By John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *London, Arms and Armour, 1992, p. 287, £ 16.99, ISBN 1-85409-146-8.*

The book 'The Gulf War Assessed' puts the War in correct perspective. It has been authored by members of the War Studies Department at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, who have each contributed a self sustained analysis on a particular strand of War Study. The credit for coherence in narrative must go to the editors - John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey. Written to accommodate the fallout within a year after the unilateral Bush declared ceasefire to end the one sided 100 hour Ground War, the book is a timely backgrounder on current history. Due to lack of historical perspective which only the distance in time can provide the book is not complete nor authoritative - as is wisely admitted to by the editors.

The book covers a wide spectrum of subjects as historical setting, the buildup, the fighting, the international response and media involvement. It thereby provides an overview for readers. The deliberate shallowness in detail helps retain interest which in perusing through other similar texts gets distracted by intricacies and a profusion of facts that go to impart scholarly value to a book.

— Capt Ali Ahmed

The Need to Know: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy. By Allan Goodman and Bruce D. Berkowitz, New York, the Twentieth Century, 1992, p. 148m £ 9.95, ISBN 0-87078-331-9.

The book provides a comprehensive discussion of covert actions by the US Government in furtherance of its policy aims. The debate on the necessity of covert actions hotted up in the U.S.A. in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair. There have been persistent tussles between successive US Presidents and the Congress the former trying to justify covert actions as a presidential privilege for safeguarding national security and the latter permitting it only in exceptional circumstances provided there is accountability and minimum possible time lag between authorisation of a covert action and intimation to congress.

While US perceptions of covert action in all its shades are given, it has lessons for all sovereign states.

U.S. presidents have effectively argued that in situations where diplomatic efforts prove inadequate and military actions carry grave risks, the expediency of the "middle-option" of covert action is opportune and effective. Advocates of covert action justify this on grounds of being more speedy as these are free from bureaucratic controls and wide debatability, easily fundable, and cost effective.

Arguments against covert actions are based on: a) lack of accountability which goes against the grain of democratic processes, b) excessive secrecy of operations over long periods often detracts from the original objectives, c) Association of agencies outside the government gives them too wide powers to prevent misuse, d) exposures and leaks cause immense harm not only to the cause pursued but also hurt the credibility of the state as a whole. It is further argued that the basic objectives of any covert action can well be fulfilled if there is independent oversight (in the case of USA, by a select committee of the Congress) and earliest possible intimation to the prime intelligence agency and the security apparatus for a critical examination of the pros and cons.

It is finally acknowledged that covert actions will continue to be important tools for preserving and protecting national security against threats like terrorism, clandestine development of nuclear capability/biological warfare, dissemination of drugs/narcotics, aid to secessionists by hostile states or groups and organisations within and without a country.

— Vishwa Pal Singh, Former Add Secretary GOI

Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941-1945, Edited By Donald M.Goldstein and Katherine V Oiliou, London, University of Pittsburg, 1991 p.731, £ 15.95, ISBN 0-8229-3665-8.

Admiral Ugaki was the Chief of Staff to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto who was the architect of the strike on Pearl Harbour. He miraculously survived his Chief when

their aircraft was dramatically shot down by the Americans over Bougainville Island on 18 April 1943. He then took command of the First Battleship Division and witnessed the sinking of the Battleship Musashi in the Battle of Leyte Gulf which reduced the powerful Japanese Navy to a 'fishpond fleet'. His final command was the Fifth Air Fleet on Kyushu which was the southern outpost of the Japanese homeland. Although not an aviator, he organized the famous Kamikaze Special Attack Corps (Tokkotai) in a mystical attempt to stem the American tide in the Pacific. When he heard the 'hateful news' of surrender on 15 August, 1945, he chose to die as a Samurai, in a Kamikaze attack (as a passenger) as 'he could not bear to see his beloved homeland under enemy occupation.'

The diaries of this man of iron with a burning pride and fierce determination were first published in Japanese in 1953. The English translation which deliberately reflects the Admiral's terse entries in his voluminous diaries gives the reader an intimate glimpse of the mindset of high ranking Japanese leaders as also an appraisal of the American thinking including their weaknesses and strength together with valuable comments on Japan's conduct of the war albeit fought 50 years ago which nevertheless continues to be of interest to maritime historians and research scholars rather than to the current practitioners of a changing environment of conflict at sea.

-- Vice Admiral M K Roy, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Japan Through American Eyes 1859-1866: The Journal of Francis Hall Kanagawa and Yokohama: Edited and Annotated By F.G. Notchelfer, *Princeton, Princeton University, 1992 p.652 ISBN 0-691-03181-9.*

The second half of the nineteenth century was a momentous period in the history of Japan. It was during this period that the Americans effected a forcible opening up of Japan to the West by Perry in 1853 after a self-imposed seclusion of nearly two hundred years. The Meiji Restoration in 1867 was to transform Japan into a modern, industrialised and militarised power by the turn of the nineteenth century leading the Western powers to grudgingly accept this newly emerged only Asian power as an equal.

The book under review covers a personal record of first hand glimpses of an American business pioneer during the years 1859-1866 when Japan was involved in the momentous domestic debate and struggle as to what its future course should be. This book provides very perceptively recorded vignettes of this interesting period.

A useful work for any scholar of Japanese history.

-- Brig Subhash Kapila

The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet (Fifteenth Edition). By Norman Polmar, *Annapolis, Naval Institute, 1993, p. 639, \$ 56.95, ISBN 1-55750-675-2.*

This completely revised and updated edition provides the reader with the most

thorough appraisal available of today's US Fleet offering a very comprehensive description and analysis of navy's changing inventory. The author explains the current budget and consequently programme and manpower cuts in the US Navy resulting from the collapse of the Soviet threat and the new emphasis on littoral operations.

This edition gives an expanded coverage of the Military Sealift Command and includes a discussion of the US Navy's and Marine operations in the Gulf War and an appraisal of their performance. It looks at the Navy's effort to achieve a new level of fleet standardization and the effects on future tactics and operations. It provides a detailed coverage of the massive reorganisation in 1992 in the office of the CNO leading to a tighter and leaner headquarters organisation better tailored and coordinated to deal with the Department of Defence/Joint chiefs of Staff as well as operational staffs. "Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet" is an indispensable reference for naval professionals, enthusiasts and defence journalists.

— Vice Admiral S P Govil, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Planethood: The Key to Your Future, By Benjamin B. Ferencz and Ken Keyes, Jr. *CoosBay; Love Line, 1991, p. 196, \$ 7.95, ISBN 0-915972-21-2.*

This book highlights the atmosphere of international anarchy. Many nations are arming themselves with all the killing machines they can afford. The human race today faces extinction. There are two ways in which humanity can be wiped off this planet - the fast way through nuclear war which can kill millions of innocent people and the slow way through environmental ruin of our planet. The capacity to kill great masses of people cannot resolve problems; it can only intensify the human needs that still plague this planet. Some of the main enemies faced by the world like lawlessness, poverty, drug abuse, environmental pollution, illiteracy, population growth, AIDS and cost of armaments can only be resolved by cooperative management on a planetary scale.

The authors provide a rationale and a programme of action for meeting the greatest challenge of mankind: the choice between nuclear war and planetary suicide, or world-wide peace and growing prosperity.

— Maj Gen Amarjit Singh (Retd)

Battle for Stalingrad: The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study: By Louis Rotundo, *Washington, Pergamon Brassey, 1989, p. 340, ISBN 0-08-035974-4.*

Of the major battles of the German Soviet War of 1941-45, perhaps the most renowned and certainly the most decisive, was the struggle for the city of Stalingrad. It was a turning point in the course of World War II.

The lessons learnt during the battle have been analysed in depth and clearly brought out in this book. These are of great relevance, even today, in any conventional War. The quantum of forces employed by both sides, i.e. of staggering proportion, compared to force levels available in our context. The book has gone into great

details and there is a separate chapter on employment of Armour, Artillery, Air, Bugbeers and Anti-Aircraft Artillery.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam. By Ramesh Thakur, and Carlyle A Thayer
Hampshire Macmillan, 1992, p 315, \$ 45.00, ISBN 0-333-43751-9.

The Pivotal fulcrum of the foreign policy of the erstwhile USSR had been the development of relations with North Vietnam in the East to counter China; India in the Asian continent in its quest for influence in the peninsula; Iraq in the Middle East against the Sheikhs, and Cuba in the western hemisphere against the U.S.A. Allied Vietnam and friendly India occupied a very sensitive place in its foreign policy decisions.

The political, economic, military and geographic implications of Soviet policy towards India & Vietnam are well researched, analysed, and tabulated in a crystal clear manner by the authors. This book will prove to be only of historical and reference value now after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. How far and who all from the fifteen independent republics which constituted the former Soviet Union follow the old policies towards India and Vietnam will remain a speculative question for sometime.

-- Maj Gen JN Goel (Retd)

Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat. By John Morrison, *New York, Penguin, 1991, p. 303, \$ 20.00, ISBN 0-525-93431-6.*

In the real classic sense, this book is not a biography of Boris Yeltsin depicting his rise from rags to riches, from powerlessness to the most powerful, from meek acceptance of the prevailing harsh measures before & during Brezhnev's times to a defiant attitude, when on 19 Aug 1991, he stood on a tank outside the Russian Parliament and challenged the usurpers of Kremlin power. The book perforce, has to have Mikhail Gorbachev as the central figure because if Gorbachev had not instituted glasnost and perestroika, Yeltsin could not have emerged as a leader. However, if Yeltsin had not existed, Gorbachev's future might have been in jeopardy after Aug 91 coup.

Yeltsin has been described variably as a politician, a leader, a Hitler, a Mussolini, a Trotsky, a Pol Pot, a Mao-Tse-Tung or a political adventurer. Is he an enigma? Is he a Bolshevik, a converted democrat or a benevolent dictator? Only time will tell. This book has been written rather too near the times and resultant biases and prejudices which are inherent may have crept in. However, the value of the book increases manifold as first hand comments are available from living personalities.

A brilliantly researched and documented book which will act as a reference book for further research on the times and roles of Gorbachev and Yeltsin in demolishing the Seventy Three year old Communist Empire.

-- Maj Gen JN Goel (Retd)

Battle for Moscow: The 1942 Soviet General Staff Study: By Michael Parrish, *London, Pergamon-Brassey's (UK), 1989, 208 ISBN 0-08-035977-9.*

The title of the book 'Battle for Moscow-The 1942 Soviet General Staff Study' is a bit of a misnomer. The only portion describing the Battle, and that too in brief outline, will be found by the reader in the Editor's Introduction. This book is primarily a study of Soviet tactics and lessons learned from fighting in winter conditions of 1941-42. It does not limit itself to only the fighting around Moscow but covers other Russian theatres of operations as well.

To examine and bring out the lessons of the Battle of Moscow, the Soviet General Headquarters and the General Staff appointed in May 1942 a group in the Operations Section of the General Staff headed by Maj Gen PP Vechnyi. This group produced a number of studies during the war devoted to various campaigns. One of the first studies was called 'Operational and Tactical Lessons of the Winter Campaign of 1941-42', which is the subject of this book. As the Editor states - "This study was a Soviet scrutiny of a part of their own war effort and not meant for mass consumption - and thus not distorted by propaganda and imbalance - but as a guide to how battles were fought and why their results were not always satisfactory". The original Russian language edition somehow came into US possession, probably from captured documents and the English translation was first prepared by the US Army.

It is strange and difficult to believe that as late as in 1942 the Russians had in combat employment large horsed cavalry formations. A considerable amount of space in the study is devoted to the employment of this arm, which at that period of time, must have been of doubtful value. The reader of today will find it difficult to go along with the conclusions made in the chapter dealing with Cavalry Operations that "formations of Cavalry are ideally used in warfare for actions in the enemy rear and against his lines of communications". One would have thought that the death knell of the horsed cavalry had been sounded in the early months of the Great War of 1914-18. With the phenomenal sophistication of weapons most of the lessons even in the other chapters of this study, though very perceptive and interesting, are dated and of historical interest.

— Maj Gen SC Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

The Lost Empire: Perceptions Of Soviet Policy Shifts in the 1990s, By John Hemmings, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1991, p. 289, £ 36.00, ISBN 0-08040981-4.*

The transformation of the Soviet Union, and Soviet controlled Eastern Europe, under Gorbachev was so remarkable as to be beyond the vision of even the most prophetic futurologist. The change continues after his departure from his chair of office, and it is difficult to foresee where and when it will end. The economic situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the successor patch work of the old Soviet Union, is precarious. It is only when this has stabilised perhaps will some form of balance in Inter-State and international relationships, emerge. Already we see what ethnic tension has caused to what was once the Republic of Yugoslavia.

The purpose of this book is to look at the way the former USSR is likely to develop over the next ten years or so. It is a courageous attempt in a collection of fifteen essays, by individual authors, each of whom is an acknowledged specialist in his field. The work has been presented in three main sections. The first investigates Soviet Security concerns, economic strategies and political forecasts, resulting from the effects of perestroika and glasnost. Much of this investigation has already been overtaken by events; nevertheless it provides background material of great erudition, for study. The second part examines a range of issues involving the potential of the Union for self-defence, as well as options for the exercise of its military power on the international stage. The third part sets out the immense damage which has been caused by environmental pollution, to ecology in the former union's efforts to keep abreast, or ahead in the arms race, and discusses what are the prospects for arms control in the light of a new European security structure.

In a discussion on the future of Soviet Military Doctrine, there is recorded an interesting comment by a major general Kirilenko, on a theme provided by Alexi Arbator, "reasonable defence sufficiency". Kirilenko put the matter succinctly, "I altogether dislike the phrase reasonable defence sufficiency... I cannot conceive of unreasonable sufficiency 'for all practical purposes' defence sufficiency, according to the General, is the capacity to inflict on any aggressor damage which is unacceptable to him.

Our own defence planners should take serious note of this cardinal truth. A work of great scholarship, which needs to be digested chapter by chapter.

— Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany, By Jeffrey Gedmin, Washington DC AEI Press, 1992, p. 169, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-8447-3794-1.

The book has very dexterously brought out the withering away of the two nation theory with respect to the two Germanys, East & West, purported to have been propounded on the ideologies of Socialism/Communism and free market economy/capitalism respectively. The book is an interesting account of the demise of Communism in German Democratic Republic besides giving a chronological description of how Gorbachev strived in vain to preserve and reform the Soviet State and Satellites. The Soviet reformer's miscalculation that the Soviet System could be democratised, controlled economy could be turned into free market economy and the monopolistic Communist Party could transform into a multi party system, turned out to be the biggest blunder towards the collapse of Communism. The pulling down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 became the harbinger of the dissolution of the Soviet East European empire.

The author has lucidly, logically and chronologically brought out the various steps in the collapse of Communism and reunification of Germany.

— Air Cmdr S K Bhardwaj

Birth of a Legend: The Spitfire, By Jeffrey Quill, London, Quiller Press, 1986, p. 160, £ 9.95. ISBN 0907-621-64-3.

The Battle of Britain saw the Spitfire emerge as a legend. The RAF fought the Air Battle and averted defeat against heavy odds. Not for nothing was it said that so many who owed so much to so few. Today the Spitfire, a legend of distant past, has been consigned to museums and is a nostalgic memory to some. This book will be of interest to those who flew this superb fighter and to those who wish to know how this aircraft came into being, the men and the industry, the designers who made it a reality to be just about in time for the Battle of Britain. The book brings out the historical sequence of events, the technological developments and the men behind the scenes who ultimately made this aircraft.

— Group Capt Dalbir Yadav, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Truth about Hollis : an Investigation, By W.J. West, London, Duckworth, 1989, p. 230, £ 14.95. ISBN 07156 2286 2.

Since the defection of Burgess and Maclean and subsequently that of Kim Philby, there has been a spate of investigative books indicating presence of Russian moles embedded within the British Security Services MI 5 and MI 6 and also of British Govt's involvement in massive cover ups.

The book "The Truth About Hollis" is yet another attempt to suggest that Sir Roger Hollis, Director General MI 5 was in fact a Communist agent of influence entrenched within the very service entrusted with the task of hunting foreign agents.

The author analyses afresh, the documents now made public by British Ministry of Information/BBC, and the source material from British American Tobacco Company which were not available to Fluency Committee.

The main thrust of the book is that Hollis was a left leaning intellectual at Oxford; in China he became a Committed leftist, sympathetic to Chinese Communists.

The book no doubt throws fresh light, yet the truth about Hollis probably would never be known.

— Lt Col Y P Gupta (Retd)

The Pursuit of Greatness - Britain and the World Role, 1900 - 1970, By Robert Holland, London, Fontana Press, an Imprint of Harper Collins, 1991, p. 405 £ 6.99. ISBN 0-00-686110-5.

The book traces out the changing strategic proclivities of United Kingdom in the last seven decades. It begins with United Kingdom's imperial entanglements during Anglo-Boer War in South Africa and ends with description of Sterling crises

of November 1967 and its aftermath which finally delivered the coup-de-grace to those ideas and ideals of British greatness which lie at the heart of this book.

The book tends to overestimate Britain's capabilities and play down the fact that when nationalism was imbibed in their colonies, the days of governance were numbered. The book has exhaustive bibliography and excellent index. The book is recommended for general reading and those interested in British empire's history of byegone greatness.

— Col B K Khanna, SM

First In, Last Out: An Unconventional British Officer In Indo-China (1945-46 and 1972-76), By J P Cross, *London Brassey's (UK), 1992, p. 223, £ 27.50, ISBN 0-08-041787-6.*

The author is a remarkable British Officer who spent all his carrier in the hostile environment of South East Asia ie, from the time he was commissioned from IMA, Dehra Dun in the Gorkhas at the tail end of World War II, till his retirement as Defence Attaché in Laos.

The book mainly deals with his personal exploits and experiences in Laos during the period 1972-76. He cleverly and clearly described the complicated political and military situation in Laos during the period governed by the Royal Lao Government and then under the Lao Patriotic Front supported by North Vietnamese Pathet Lao. The poor political and military leadership of the Royal Lao Government is highlighted, as also the ruthless manner in which the communists govern after overthrowing the Royal Government. In the ultimate analysis, it is the people and the development of the country which suffers due to the corrupt, selfish and power hungry people who are at the helm of affairs.

The book is interesting and absorbing to read, except that the author has unduly indulged in self praise and is heavily biased against the French.

— Maj Gen S C Suri (Retd)

Ten Years On: The British Army in the Falklands War, Edited By Linda Washington, *London, National Army Museum, 1992, p. 112, £ 5.00, ISBN 0901721247.*

This glossy well illustrated book was published in 1992 to record the recollections of key commanders in the operations and to present the history in a chronological story. It succeeds admirably in combining a lively narrative, excellent photographs and mature comment evolved ten years after the events. The editor closes after reviewing Argentine writings on the war, and listing literature, statistics of resources deployed. This is an easy to read book for those interested in war history as well as a sound base with further references for those studying this particular campaign professionally.

— Tindi

Conspirator : The Untold Story of Churchill, Roosevelt and Tyler Kent, Spy.
By Ray Bearse and Anthony Read, *London Macmillan, 1991, p. 331, £ 17.50, ISBN 0-333-56707-2.*

This book contains the story of one Mr Tyler Kent, an American, working as a cipher clerk, during World War II & posted in numerous embassies abroad, including Moscow, Berlin & London.

It is a spy story, Kent passed on the text of confidential communication to the enemy including the telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, requesting for American intervention.

Both the authors are historians and journalists, who have other books to their credit.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

In the Name of God, Go : Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill, By WM Roger Louis, *New York WW Norton, 1992, p. 199, £ 12.95. ISBN 039303393-7.*

Leo Amery, a leading British Tory politician in the earlier half of this century, played a major role in the eclipse of Chamberlain and the rise of Churchill. The title of the book is his well known Cromwellian exhortation to Chamberlain which led to the latter's exit from British politics, in 1940. Amery, a close associate of Churchill from their student days, had wide differences with the latter, particularly with regard to the evolution of a constructive policy towards India and other dominions. Amery believed that the British Empire could survive only as an association of free peoples on the basis of genuine free will. He was thus one of the main architects of the transformation of a crumbling empire into a vibrant commonwealth.

Amery assumed the office of the Secretary of State for India in May 1940 and in charge for the entire duration of the War. He came into direct conflict with Churchill because of his radical view of fully independent India within the commonwealth and the Indians drafting their own constitution after the War. Churchill and the Right Wing Tories visualised India remaining, one way or the other, permanently under British sway. Amery came to be well known in India.

WM. Roger Louis, a fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford University also holds the Kerr Chair in English history and Culture at the Texas University. His other publications include, 'Imperialism at Bay', 'The British Empire in the Middle East' and 'Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 and with Robert Blake, 'Churchill'.

The book under review is a vivid and clear assessment of the part played by Amery in British conservative politics.

— Lt General P E Menon, PVSM, (Retd)

Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia: Regional issues and Realignments, Edited By Gary Clintworth, *Canberra Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1990*, p. 140, ISBN 07315-08939.

The book is a collection of essays analysing the power struggle in the region, in which the USA, USSR, China and Vietnam all have a stake. The essays would be of interest to Indian readers because of the growing importance of Asian-Pacific region in the area's strategic equation.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Israel and the World After 40 Years, By Aaron S Kileman, *Mclean, Pergamon-Brassey, 1990*, p. 275, \$ 24.95. ISBN 0-08-034942-0.

The author Aaron S. Kileman, professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University has written several books including Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, Soviet Russia and the Middle-East, and Israel's Global Reach.

In his book, he brings out several lessons for the Indian defence readers. His quotation "Small nations do not have a foreign policy. They have a defence policy". Moshe Dayan 1975: is extremely apt. Moshe Dayan as a military leader and defence minister, guided the country's policy during the years 1967-73. The Prime Minister Golda Meir accepted it. The foreign ministry was not always consulted - two examples are given; the decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear establishment in 1981 and the decision to invade Lebanon in 1982; were both not known to the foreign ministry.

The aspect of arms diplomacy preceding the normal channels of diplomatic relations has been featured. In 1959, it was disclosed that the Germans had for sometime been buying Uzi submachine guns and other light weapons made in Israel. Formal relations were established only in 1965. Similarly the relations with China started with arms and technology exports. Exports to Iran, South-Africa and Central American Republics had to be regulated owing to US pressure.

An excellent readable book highly recommended.

— Maj Gen Pratap Narain (Retd)

Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions, Edited By Kathleen Hartford and Steven M Goldstein, *Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1989*, p. 216, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-87332-753-5.

The book consists of six chapters; the first is an introduction by the authors wherein they discuss in fair detail the broad perspectives of the Chinese communist revolution. In the second Chapter, William Wei examines Law and Order problems and in particular, the role of the Guomindong Security forces in the "Suppression of the Communist Bases during the Soviet Period". George Benton in the Third Chapter provides a detailed account of Communist Guerrilla Bases in South-east China after the 'Start of the Long March'.

In the Fourth Chapter Katherine Hartford, the Editor, elaborates on the factors that contributed to the success of the Communist Revolution in China. The Fifth Chapter by David M Paulson, on "Nationalist Guerrillas in the Sino-Japanese War: The 'Die-Hards' of Shandong Province" elaborates on the activities of Chinese communist guerrillas in resisting the Japanese during the period 1937-1945.

The Sixth and last Chapter in this useful book deals with Manchuria and is by Steven I Levine. It provides a quick but penetrating glance at the developments in Manchuria during the late Thirties and Forties, which were in a way very trying for Manchurians but made them aware of themselves and the rest of the world aware of Manchuria.

Taken together, the Six Chapters of the book although by different authors provide a good overview of China's rural revolution which has shaped the destiny of China as well as to some extent at least, of those of China's neighbours.

The book will be useful to all students of current affairs.

— Col R. Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

Voices From The Whirlwind: An Oral History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,
By Feng Jicai, *New York Pantheon books, 1991, p. 252, \$ 22.00. ISBN 0-394-58645-X.*

Presented as an oral history of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, this is a book of personal stories as told by individuals. They are interesting, typical of the view that the Western media, and many of us, have of Chinese Communist Society, and are offered as the basic truth. Startingly simple in language and ideas, they are consistently effective in putting across their message, which makes one suspect that this collection is only part of the whole truth. Whatever the reality these well crafted stories are worth reading in their own right as skilled writing of human interest.

— Tindi

A Chinese Mirror: Moral Reflections on Political Economy, By Henry Rosemont, Jr, *Illinois, Open Court, 1991, p. 130, \$ 9.95, ISBN 0-8126-9161-X.*

The author a philosophy teacher in the U.S.A. has also lived and taught in China.

He does not perceive any major difference between the so called liberals (Zhao, Hu Dili) and the Conservatives (Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shang Kun). It is only a difference of degree as policies of both call for moral compromises which tend to increase the miseries of the people.

With uncanny skill and clarity the possible consequences of China's reform process of entering the "international market place" for globalising its economy are analysed. As China competes for the widely sought after and scarce capital of the

developed countries, it lands in what is not a "level playing field", where the rules of the game are framed by the donors. Recipients like China, India and black Africa always end up getting hurt, when interests clash, as they often do.

The concept of human rights was first proclaimed by the victorious allies after World War II, as given in the U.N. Declaration. Human Rights. Human beings viewed as autonomous, freely choosing, rights bearing individual is thus a model essentially of the western civilization; Imposing this model in any part of the world has enabled the powerful nations to take military actions sovereign states, cause destruction of natural habitats, economic exploitation and human deaths, all in the name of violation of human rights. The author goes on to demonstrate that the Confucian concept of a flesh and blood human being as the product of a family, tradition culture etc. provides a far more convincing model which conforms to the views of three-fourths of the world and which allows "a full condemnation of government suppression, hostage takings, acts of torture, terrorism etc. without invoking the dubious violation of human rights.

Finally under the chapter "Tomorrow", the author projects the view that with the passing away of all the leaders associated with the Long March and no identifiable enemy to confront like western imperialism, revisionism, Guomindang) a strong central rule will not only be repressive but also impossible to sustain. In a vast country having wide cultural diversity, variable rates of economic growth of far flung provinces, and no single entity capable of universal acceptance, the emergence of several "Small Chinas" which are largely autonomous and under loose federal control may be inescapable. The scenario would be far less repressive and sustainable.

The author best sums up his philosophical discourse in the concluding paragraph, ".....the Chinese peoples should no longer have, and do not need, a strong monolithic Communist Party and Central government.....should not have and do not need, Western industrial Capitalism either. Neither does anyone else."

On the whole thought provoking, stimulating, and educative both to the novice and the community of professional China watchers.

— Vishwa Pal Singh,
Former Additional Secretary, GOI

China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations, Ed. By Samuel S. Kim, 2nd Ed, Rev, Boulder, Westview, 1989, p. 339, \$ 18.95. ISBN 0-8133-0619-1.

Ever since the PRC was established in Beijing in 1949, China has occupied the centre stage in world politics. Internal events in China, like the 'great leap forward' and 'cultural revolution' followed by the 'four modernisations' and then the virtual acceptance of 'one country two systems' with a parallel 'socialist market economy' have attracted as much and perhaps on some occasions even greater attention than the now defunct 'cold war'. China's forays into international politics, particularly the initial 'lean to one side' and later the emphasis on 'self reliance' followed by the short

honeymoon with the USA to isolate USSR and now a studied neutral stance, have kept observers of international scene occupied and guessing. This book on China's relations with the World and New Directions in its Foreign Policy (2nd edition) which is a collaborative effort of twelve well recognised China watchers is a welcome addition to the existing literature on the subject, even though, it covers events mainly of the post Mao decade i.e. till 1988 and the impact of later developments like 'Tiananmen' the collapse of the Soviet Union and the virtual demise of communism is not available and some of the forecasts particularly China's future relations with USSR do not match with prevailing actualities. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the book is thought provoking and offers scintillating reading. It provides a deep insight into formulation of Chinese foreign policy and the nexus between internal events and international developments has been well established.

— Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

China Briefing, 1992. Edited By William A. Joseph - Boulder, *Westview 1993, p. 198*
ISBN 0-8133-1602-2.

An extremely interesting and engaging review. Its authors have in a crisp, substantive and very readable style surveyed the recent developments in China's politics, economics and foreign relations and provided longer term analyses of their legal systems, public health and film industry (the latter being an accurate barometer for gauging "the cultural climate, political control, and level of economic development"). The authors have aimed at further understanding of what has happened in the PRC in the recent past and by probing some of the important contradictions present in the Chinese society attempted to help making sense of future events as they unfold.

Learning from the Soviet collapse, the Chinese leadership is keen to maintain the economic vibrancy and go slow in liberalizing the political system. It is their hope that political discontent can be overcome by economic boom as the nation and its people go about the business of getting rich.

In the foreign policy field the authors see much of China's initiatives having been geared to new post Cold War realities with the collapse of the Soviet Union and potential danger of US Global dominance. The CCP likes to quote the example of the NICs of East Asia to bolster the argument that economic progress requires political stability and that can only be assured by authoritarian rule.

Published on the eve of 14th Congress the authors offer an array of scenarios in regard to the leadership and succession issue.

This book is an important starting point in a capsulated form for any one, including specialists on recent developments in China.

— Vice Admiral S P Govil, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The Modern History of Iraq, By Phebe Marr, *Colorado Westview*, 1985, p. 382, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-8133-1328-7.

This is an authoritative account of modern Iraq, giving a comprehensive view of how the country became what it was in 1985. Events after that have wrought rapid and drastic changes, reading this book one can understand the hold Saddam still has over his country in spite of the hopes of his western enemies. This book has much valid interpretation and comment on events, put across with a balanced and fair judgement, which makes it more worthwhile than a mere historical listing of facts. The end result is a picture of the people as they actually were before the gulf war. One hopes that Phebe Marr will add to this book, using her exceptional understanding of Iraq with the same even-handed and effective skill.

This is a book for serious study and reference worth reading by those interested in the middle East.

— Tindi

Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from her Father's Harem through the Islamic Revolution, By Sattarch Farman Farmaian, *London, Bantam Press*, p.404, £ 16.99, ISBN 0593026624.

A personalised account of a high born Persian woman's journey from her princely father's herem, through the Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic revolution of Iran that is clinical as history and exciting as fiction.

Raised in 1920-30, the author broke tradition amongst her numerous mothers, sisters and brothers to journey alone through Iran, India and then to USA during WW II to graduate in Social work.

She returned to Iran and with stars in her eyes started the Tehran School of Social work to tackle problems of massive poverty, disease and ignorance across the grain of a corrupt and indifferent social system. With matching heroism she got over a broken marriage and threat of an execution at the hands of the ayatollahs.

No one interested in the enigmatic history of 20th century Iran should miss reading this compelling story rendered with great sensitivity with help of author's admirer, Dona Munker.

— Col Balwant Sandhu

A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society - 1550-1800, By Jeremy Black, *Hampshire Macmillan*, 1991, p. 109, £ 5.75, ISBN 0-333-51906-X.

An indicated by the Editor the 'main purpose of this book is to make available to teachers and students alike developments in the field of history'. Since the changes, both in European society & military power have been dramatic since 1800 the book

is only of an academic interest. A very wide spectrum of diversity in all aspects (political, economic, geographical, and technical) of countries of Europe does not even permit establishment of relationship between society and war that can be universally applied. Of great importance, however, is author's contention that military change arose from absolutist state rather than causing it. Another interesting development covered is gradual opening up of officer's entry, in the armed forces, to the common man as against the elite as was practiced earlier.

— Col R N Khanna (Retd)

NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, Edited By Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, London, Macmillan, 1992, p. 470, £ 45.00, ISBN 0-333-57981-X.

Alliances are smaller international communities within the great world community of nations and they repeatedly prove themselves to be vital to the national survival of many states. An alliance presupposes setting up a formal arrangement where the constituent states are required to act in concert with one another for mutual benefit in managing national security of all the members. This cooperative aspect, however, is limited by conflicts and clash of interests among the allies themselves.

The basic distinguishing features of alliances are:

The formality of relationship among members and the military focus of the mutual effort. Still, an alliance can become an instrument of community-link to help flourish the common values shared alongwith development of other spheres of non-military collaboration - which smoothens the path of regional integration.

The book under review goes deep into the womb of time to investigate NATO's birth and its role in the initial years in establishing a stable security pattern and catalyzing regional integration in Europe. Thoroughly researched essays will surely benefit the readers who are especially interested in alliance politics or more specifically, in NATO.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar, JNU

The Super-Powers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry 1960-1990, By Zaki Laidi, London, University of Chicago, 1990, p. 232, £ 14.95, ISBN 0-226-46782-1.

This book by Zaki Laidi, (original in French) was basically his thesis for a doctorate when he was studying at the graduate school of the Institute for Policy Studies in Paris. The original thesis, as noted by the author, was revised and further developed by him while at the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI) of the National Foundations for Political Science.

Zaki Laidi has dealt with the problems faced by people when they seek to secure freedom from colonial rule as well as the problems that the people concerned

have to contend with, after securing freedom. Local feuds as well as the not so friendly attitudes of some neighbouring countries do prevent people who manage to free themselves from achieving rapid economic growth. African countries provide excellent material for study in this context.

Zaki Laidi's book deals comprehensively with the problems faced by African States and the attitudes of western powers towards the progress of the former. The book deserves to be studied carefully by students of African affairs.

— Col R Rama Rao

SDI: A view from Europe, By Robert C. Hughes, *Washington DC, National Defence University, 1990, p. 255, \$ 17.50.*

The Europeans expressed grave reservations about the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) as this book clearly brings out. They felt that the Americans were reverting to isolationism by being more concerned about the defense of their own country, and that, this programme would disturb the existing Extended Nuclear Deterrence arrangements without a predictable strategy in place, though not averse to benefiting from the technological spin offs generated by research and development in the new space weapons required to put the SDI in place, they were not willing, however, to provide any funding. Some nations had apprehensions about contaminating Outer Space with military weapons as well.

Though topical when published (1990), this book is now dated by the recent announcement by Les Aspin, the US Defence Secretary, that the 'Star Wars' programme was being replaced by a land based Ballistic Missile Defence Programme.

Written by Col Robert Hughes, US Air Force, the book covers the subject in comprehensive detail and gives both the American and the European view points. The author is eminently qualified, having served on Joint Staff, NATO staffs, and is presently the associate Dean of Faculty and Academic Programme at the National War College, Washington DC.

Recommended reading for the student of SDI and related matters.

— Maj Gen Jasbir Singh (Retd)

New Thinking and Old Realities: America, Europe and Russia: Ed By Michael T Clark and Simon Serfaty, *Washington, Seven Locks, 1991, p. 232, \$ 13.95, ISBN 0-932020-89-5.*

The title 'New Thinking and Old Realities' of the book edited by Michael Clark and Simon Serfaty is appropriate for setting into context the events of 1990. The New Thinking unleashed by Gorbachev in order to give the Old Reality a humane face was carried to its logical conclusion by Yeltsin who heralded the New Reality from atop a tank in front of Moscow's White House.

This New Reality therefore renders the book an academic reading for its fine analysis of the demise of the Cold War and blueprint for a transition into a New World Order in which the assumptions of the Old Reality were accommodated but not demolished. Had Saddam and the drunken dozen of putschists not intervened this might well have been the course of History.

— Capt Ali Ahmed

The Fall of Yugoslavia - the Third Balkan War: By Misha Glenny, London, Penguin Books, 1992, p. 194, \$ 10.00, ISBN 0-14-017288-2.

The author has worked for the *Guardian*, been the Central Europe Correspondent of the BBC's World Service, based in Vienna and has studied central and south-eastern Europe for over a decade. A speaker of German, Czech and Serbo-Croat, he has a deep insight of these countries and in a manner had predicted the breakup of the state of Yugoslavia in his various articles.

It may be a truism to say that the present tragedy in the Balkans could be traced in political terms to the Congress of Berlin of 1878. It was then too, as now, that the vexing question of Herzegovina and Bosnia precluded an easy answer for settlement. The states in Yugoslavia have been ruled by the Greeks, Serbs, Ottomans, Hapsburgs and finally a communist regime and with the resultant changes in rule, it is small wonder that memories are fraught with prejudices that have remained ingrained in the peoples.

This book is a most detailed and exhaustive coverage of the events in Yugoslavia from August 1990 till May 1992. The result is a revealing and chilling account about the re-emergence of past feuds and rivalries which are now being played out in a civil war without let, manipulation and deviousness.

— Maj Gen MS Shergill

History of Jammu & Kashmir Rifles 1820-1956: The States Force Background, By Maj K Brahma Singh, New Delhi, Lancer International 1990, p. 323, Rs 400, ISBN 81-7062-091-0.

In this well-researched book, author has recorded the history of J&K Rifles from 1820 to 1956. For this 135 years of comprehensive history, the author has been served well from the great mass of recorded historical data particularly National Archives, Jammu Repository and a number of Regimental War Diaries. The author has knitted the regimental history well and the author takes you through the time capsule of history of the State too. While the author has chronicled the origins of the Regiment with its saga of bravery, he has recorded the treachery of some of its personnel.

This book covers regimental history upto 1956. Like Oliver Twist, readers can ask for more, suggests of regimental history from 1956 to date.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh

Operation Shanti: Indian Army on Peace Mission in Egypt 1956-1967, By Dr. J. Sundaram, *New Delhi, Historical Section, 1990, p. 192, Rs. 139.00.*

India's role in peace-keeping in this conflict-ridden world is in keeping with our concept of *Vasudhaiva Kuumbakam* - entire world is a family. We have spared no effort in this direction whether it be in Korea, Indo-China, Congo or Egypt. The UN has always looked to India and the warring nations to have willingly accepted Indian troops in this role.

Operation Shanti is an official account of one of these missions and is a welcome addition to literature on the subject. Much valuable information on the birth of Israel in 1948, the cause of much tension and blood-shed ever since, UN peace keeping initiatives, induction of Indian troops, their actual deployment and then withdrawal have been covered in much detail. It would seem that efforts of 12 years came to nought as the two warring sides which were separated, again started firing at each other and hostilities started. This brought an end to the UN mission in which atleast ten of our infantry battalions gained rich experience in carrying out this mission and inter-acting with troops of other nations of the world.

Books of this nature are valuable as reference works. The production could have been improved and the price suitably fixed.

— Lt Col Gautam Sharma

Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics 1757-1773, By H.V. Bowen, *Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 204, £ 27.50, ISBN 0-521-40316-2.*

Covering a period of just 16 years, the book, which has been developed from a doctoral thesis, is a very detailed exposition of the place given to Indian issues in British politics in the years 1757-1773. Though the battle of Plassey was won in 1757 more by deceit than by force of arms, it did mark a 'revolution' in the fortunes of the British in India. Henceforward they were the power brokers and king-makers in Bengal. In the prevailing political situation in eastern India, the Company found it essential to acquire decided superiority over the native and foreign powers around.

The book bears the clear imprint of an able and thorough and painstaking researcher. It provides lengthy details of the discussions in the House of Commons and the Court of Directors. The select Bibliography will be found very useful by scholars intending to undertake research in allied fields.

— Dr K M L Saxena

Selfless Soldiering: By Maj D S Bisht, *Dehradun Trishul, 1985, p. 180, Rs. 35.00.*

The author, a retired infantry officer (The JAT Regiment) had written this book as early as 1984 as a post retirement sequel. The book is very appropriately, dedicated to two officers from the author's battalion who had made the supreme sacrifice - late Capt R.P. Gaur and late Capt H.P.S. Ahluwalia KC (posthumous).

The author has endeavoured to epitomise the aspect of "Selfless Soldiering" by quoting extensively from speeches of past British and Senior Indian Officers and

high civilian officials. Some of the speeches (of erstwhile British Officers, circa 1940 or so) are anachronistic in context, referring to ICOs and VCOs, and fail to highlight the title.

In summation, the author, while bidding "Farewell to Soldiering" has given a resume of his own service career with references "en passant" of his not having been nominated to attend the DSSC or not given a gallantry award, for an action which was commended by his superiors. This may be the possible "leit motif" for the book and its present title.

However, to make the book more interestingly readable, it may have been more appropriate to mention only extracts from speeches relevant to the issue and include real life episodes to highlight this important aspect of soldiering.

— Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi, AVSM and Bar (Retd)

Behind the Scene: By Maj Gen (Retd) Joginder Singh, VSM, *New Delhi*, 1993, p. 268, Rs. 300, ISBN 1-897829-20-5.

The 1965 Indo-Pak war ended with a victory for neither. A number of accounts on the war appeared soon thereafter but the senior participants on the Indian side generally kept conspicuously silent till recently. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, VrC, GOC-in-C, Western Command, wrote his 'War Despatches' soon after the termination of the war but failed to get these published officially despite his persistent efforts. Finally he has recently published these privately.

Maj Gen Joginder Singh, VSM, has now given an interesting and critical account of the War. In writing the book 'Behind the Scene' he has relied upon the official documents and records kept by him and has tinged his account with the first hand knowledge of the events as observed by him as the Chief of Staff, Western Command. The accounts of General Harbaksh Singh and General Joginder Singh supplement each other and where they differ, their differing views help the reader to get a better and a more balanced view of the major events of the war.

The book is well written and the sketches help considerably in an easy understanding of the major battles. The author has brought out the major controversies, so inevitable at this level in a war. He has been forthright in his opinions and criticism. He has commented on the indifferent performance of the higher commanders even though these officers had tried to achieve the tasks against forbidding odds. The author has given us an insight into the campaign and the personality traits of the main characters. I feel that no study of the 1965 Indo-Pak War will be complete without reference to this excellent book.

— Maj Gen L S Lehl, PVSM, VRC (Retd)

National Security Doctrine: An Indian Imperative, By Aditya Chibber, *New Delhi*, Lancer International, 1990, p. 146, Rs. 160/. ISBN 81-7062-093-7.

The author is to be congratulated on producing this comprehensive study on national security doctrine which is so relevant in our present context. It should be

minutely and thoroughly studied by all students of military history and officers of our Armed Forces. Only when they have grasped all essentials brought out in the book, will they be able to work on laying down a comprehensive doctrine for the Armed Forces to follow.

— Maj Gen Prem Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Strategic Defences in the 1990s : Criteria for Deployment: By Ivo H. Daalder, London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 162, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-333-53202-3.

The book though written in 1989 is already outdated in its analysis of nuclear threat to USA, as geo-political events overtook its publication in 1991, at over-riding pace. The chapter on 'An Accidental Launch Protection System' (ALPS) is relevant due to possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result of balkanisation of erstwhile Soviet Union and their likely possession by the 'threshold' countries.

The author has delved on the strategic defence options, that could be deployed in the late 1990s. He has examined three deployment options for the USA; an ALPS, a Ground Based Defence of Military Targets and a Phase I Strategic System. He goes on to analyse each option from strategic, technical and economic point of view with suitable illustrations and figures. At the end of each option he derives a clear cut conclusion, negating the deployment option. In conclusion he unambiguously rejects each option by stating, 'No SDS deployed before the end of the century will be able to meet the necessary deployment criteria'. He recommends that research should continue in a number of fields with one aim: to deter Soviet defensive deployment, whether it is still relevant is questionable. In Chapter 3 and 4 he does prefer deployment of Midgetman, which is feasible and affordable than deployment of ground based strategic defences.

The reading does get heavy at times but the intricacies of the nuclear weapons philosophy have been made simpler with tables and figures for a layman to understand. The bibliography is extensive and compliments the book. The book is recommended for professional libraries to treasure.

— Col B K Khanna, SM

Israel's Nuclear Weaponry: A New Arms Race in the Middle East, By Honore M. Catudal, London, Grey Seal Books 1991, p. 152, £ 19.95. ISBN 3-87061-066-2.

An excellent, well researched book on the new Arm's race in the Middle East, it deals with the development of Israel as a Nuclear power, with ballistic missiles and space probing capability, which gives it reconnaissance ability.

The Atomic programme was initiated by the Israeli P.M. Ben Gurion. He approached the French in 1949, it was not a one way street, a Professor at Weizmann Institute had developed an economical process for manufacture of Heavy Water. USA, did not wish to expose the Israel nuclear programme, and at a much later stage when it provided F-16 aircraft capable of delivery, it overlooked the removal of the bombracks in the planes.

The programme received considerable help from South Africa; not only in the shape of Uranium packets, but in the testing of the devices. The author also goes into details of the attack and destruction of the Iraqi reactor Osiraq in 1981.

The development by Iraq and other M.E countries of production capacity for chemical weapons and the threat by Saddam Hussain to obliterate half of Israel, led to the Minister of Science being authorised in August 1990 to make a statement on Israel's chemical weapons capability.

Finally the argument whether the proliferation of Nuclear weapons would lead to a stabilizing influence, by reducing likelihood of war in the middle East? Whatever else, it appears that perhaps the Arabs were restrained from all out attack on Israel in 1973, because of the knowledge of the bomb in their basement.

In 1986 when an ex worker Vanunu, first publicised the possession of Nuclear facilities, he displayed a component made of Lithium deuteride, which gives rise to the belief that Israel also has the "H" bomb-but no Arab city is large enough to require it.

A book well worth reading.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, By Col John A Warden III, New York
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989, \$ 18.95. ISBN 0-08-036735-6.

Planning air operations is a complex and demanding process which requires skilful and adroit exploitation of air resources. These are invariably short of multifold demands of air superiority, interdiction, close air support and strategic operations. The air Commander has to ensure judicious distribution of available air effort to attain the objectives necessary to win a war. The emphasis given to various operational tasks would vary as the campaign progresses. However, the first and foremost task is to attain air superiority. The Air Campaign Planning for Combat by Col John A. Warden III is an excellent attempt to bring this aspect home to air planners. He has explained the complexity of air operations and shown how air superiority is a prerequisite for all operations. He has devoted almost half of the book to achievement of air superiority in varying operational conditions. It would help not only air staff but also their counterparts in sister services who frequently fail to appreciate that presence of aircraft overhead in direct support is often the most inefficient utilization of air power.

The author has restricted his analysis to employment of conventional air forces in a theatre of war. No mention has been made of aircraft-carrier based air power as in his view "the theory at the operational level should be the same regardless of the point from which aircraft or missiles launch". His analysis is clear concise and competent. He has rightly aversed that the principles of war are equally applicable to air operations. Air power must be employed through mass, concentration and economy of forces. Maximum use must be made of flexibility which is inherent quality of air power. The book is replete with examples to prove the theoretical framework

propounded by Col Warden. Reference to examples quoted earlier is slightly distracting but generally the book is well arranged and highly readable. It is recommended to be added to the libraries of all units dealing with planning of air operations - Army and the Navy would find it equally useful.

— Air Marshal M L Sethi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Diplomacy: Nuclear Power Programmes in the Third World, By K.D. Kapur, *New Delhi, Lancers Books, 1993, p. 394, Rs. 380, ISBN 81-7095-036-8.*

The aim of the book, as set by the author, in the Preface, is to 'analyse major aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its impact on India and other developing countries'.

The book peeps into the case of Argentina-Brazil which initially took confrontational stances in their nuclear programmes but soon cooperated and eventually signed the NPT. Several people feel that this example could serve the Indo-Pak nuclear environment. Kapur, on examination, finds it as "wrong parallel". The twain hardly meet here in the South Asia.

The crux of the problem-and hence the book's thrust line-revolves around the theme of India signing the NPT. Dr Kapur offers several options (more of variants) and the one he suggests is that India declare its nuclear status and future strategy in unambiguous terms and proceed from there. Perhaps no. A status - quo, on the other hand is a better course which would provide more flexibility and hence be more prudent.

The author's deep insight and profound scholarship are clearly evident in the mass of factual material and a thorough analysis of a subject which is on the top of the national security agenda.

— Chandra B Khanduri

Generals and Strategists from Kautilya to Thimayya, By CB Khanduri, *New Delhi, Patriot, 1992, p. 197, Rs 200/-, ISBN 81-7050-147-4.*

Libraries are full of biographies of politicians and other great men. Although there are biographies of famous generals of other countries, this is perhaps the first book which gives the biographies of the Indian Generals.

Brigadier Khanduri is to be complimented for his deep and detailed research into the lives of great soldiers like Kautilya, Sun Tzu, Zorawar Singh, Rommel, Montgomery, Vo Nguyen Giap, Moshe Dayan, Sadat, Maitra, Thimayya and Carappe who for their leadership, devotion to duty, tacticians and strategists left an impression on all the people particularly those who were directly or indirectly involved with them.

Two things which the book has clearly brought out are that the Principles of War advocated by Kautilya in 300 BC and other Generals of earlier period are almost

the same as today. Also, inspite of highly advanced technical equipment, it is the man behind the machine which matters.

— Captain RP Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

The History of the First Gorkha Rifles: The Malaun Regiment. Vol III: 1946-1990. By Brig C B Khanduri, *Delhi, Vanity Books, 1992, P 406, Rs. 300/-.*

A well researched and chronicled history of the Regiment, a useful study for officers who join the Regiment. The book is well illustrated with colour plates of its officers and events and sketches of battle in which the Regiment took part since 1948.

As histories go, the first few chapters make dull reading to a lay reader, till we come to chapters dealing with battles and special tasks assigned to the Regiments. Since some of the battles have been discussed in detail, the information gleaned from it and their overall effect could be useful for an analysis of a particular campaign by students of military history.

The book gives us an insight into how the Gorkhas were accepted as a special force into the Indian Army to be officered by the British only till 15 August 1947; when the Nepal Government agreed to the change.

— Brig YP Dev (Retd)

The End of History and the Last Man. By Francis Fukuyama, *New York: The Free Press, 1992, 418 pp. \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-02-910975-2.*

In a scholarly work of seminal value, Francis Fukuyama, a consultant at the RAND Corporation, covers a vast canvas, from an individual, and a nation, to the global society, with a thesis that the primary motivating force for all human endeavour is the 'desire for recognition', or 'Thymos' in the words of Plato. He contends that the evolution of the historical process in search of good governance seems to have ended as the present political system of liberal democracy provides each individual with the opportunity to achieve his 'desire for recognition'.

The author divides the world into two parts: a post-historical part, in which the economic competition would be the main feature, and an historical part which would continue to struggle with religious, national, and ideological conflicts. According to him, "the last man at the end of history knows better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognises that history was full of pointless battles in which men fought over whether they should be Christians or Muslims, Protestants or Catholic, German or French."

A work of deep political insight and strategic grasp which explores the mysteries of mind and the first causes of political evolution in history. However, the fundamental question remains: Has the collective wisdom of mankind searching, in the natural evolutionary process, for a better social and political organization, reached its limits?

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending September 1993

(The books reviewed in April-June 1993 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list.)

Africa

1. Davidson, Basil The Black Man's Burden: Africa & the Curse of the Nation - State 1992

Arms Control

2. Streator, Edward J. Arms Control and the Third World 1989

Assam

3. Rai, Baljit Demographic Aggression against India: Muslim Avalanche from Bangladesh 1993

Biography

4. Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad Flames of the Chinar : An autobiography 1993

5. Alam, Asadollah The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977 1991

6. John, Charmley Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biography 1993

7. Greacen, Lavinia Chink: A Biography 1989

8. Mookerjee, Syama Prasad Leaves from a Diary 1993

9. Qasim, Mir My Life and Times 1992

10. Subramanian, C Hand of Destiny: Memories-Vol I The Turning Point 1993

Disarmament

11. Bhargava, Mahesh Kumar Disarmament from Versailles to Test Ban Treaty 1979

Gulf War

12. Witherow, John & Sullivan, Aidan War in the Gulf: A Pictorial History 1991

India - Defence

13. India, Lok Sabha Secretariat Ministry of Defence: Defence Force Levels, Manpower, Management and Policy - Estimates Committee-1992-1993 (Report No. 19) 1992

India - History

14. Anthony, Frank Britain's Betrayal in India: The Story of the Anglo-Indian Community 1969

15. Pande, Badri Datt History of Kumaun: English Version of Kumaun Ka Itihas - 2 Vols. 1993

16. Singh, Bhai Nahar Rebels Against the British Rule: Guru Ram Singh and the Kuka Sikhs 1989

17. Singh, Anita Inder The Origins of the Partition of India 1990.

India - Politics

18. Saksena, N.S. India: Towards Anarchy 1967-1992 1993

19. Yadav, A.S. Changing Political Boundaries in India: From the Ashoka Period to the Recent Times 1986

Indian Army

20. Kaul, Vivien Ashima The Bengal Army 1858-1895: Recruitment Compositions and Discipline (Dissertation for M.Phil, J.N. University) 1990

Indo - Bhutan Relations

21. Kohli, Manorama From Dependency to Interdependence: A Study of Indo-Bhutan Relations 1993

Indo - Pak Relations

22. Sundarji, K (Gen) Bindmen of Hindoostan : Indo-Pak Nuclear War 1993

International Relations

23. Holsti, K.J. (Kalevi Jacque) Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order: 1648-1989 1991

24. Gould, Harold A. **The Hope and the Reality: US - Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan** 1993
New World Order

25. Dobbs Higginson, Michael S. **Asia Pacific: A View on its Role in the New World Order** 1993
Nuclear Weapons

26. Arora, Vishambher Nath **Nuclear Weapons : A Changing Facade of War** 1993
Pakistan - Economy

27. Nasim, Anjum (ed) **Financing Pakistan's Development in the 1990s** 1992
South Africa

28. United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research **Regional Security and Confidence Building Processes: The Case of Southern Africa in the 1990s By Solomon M Nkiwane Research Paper No.1** 1993
Sri Lanka - Politics

29. McGowan, William **Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka** 1992
Third World

30. Rudebeck, Lars (ed) **When Democracy Makes Sense: Studies in the Democratic Potential of Third World Popular Movements** 1992
Terrorism

31. Murray, Gary **Enemies of the State** 1993

32. Wilkinson, Paul **The Fight Against Terrorism** 1987
Reference Books

33. Choudhary, Valmiki **Dr. Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents.**
Vol 18 - Jan 1956 to Dec 1957
Vol 19 - Jan 1958 to Dec 1959 1993

34. **Manorama Year Book, 1993; 50 years of Science** 1993

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