

The

Journal

of the

United Service Institution

of

India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057
Telephone No. 6146755, 6146490 Fax : 6149773

e-mail : dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in

ciusi@vsnl.net

usilib@vsnl.net

Website - www.usiofindia.org

Vol CXXXI

July-September 2001

No 545

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 250.00. Subscription should be sent to the Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution.

Articles, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be addressed to the Director.

For overseas subscriptions, trade enquiries and advertisements write to : Spantech & Lancer, Spantech House, Lagham Road, South Godstone, Surrey RH9 8HB, UK.

Overseas annual subscription (By Air Mail) - £ 40 or \$ 65

Tel : +44 1342 893239 Fax : +44 1342 892584

**UNITED
SERVICE
INSTITUTION
OF INDIA**

for

*the furtherance of
interest and know-
ledge in the art,
science, and literature
of National Security
in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular*

Director

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar
PVSM, AVSM, VrC
(Retd)

Dy Director & Editor

Maj Gen Y K Gera (Retd)

Patron

Shri K R Narayanan, Hon'ble President of India.

Vice-Patron

Admiral Sushil Kumar, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, NM, ADC
Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee.
General S Padmanabhan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC
Chief of the Army Staff.
Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC
Chief of the Air Staff.

President - USI Council

Vice Admiral Madhvendra Singh, PVSM, AVSM, ADC
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

Vice Presidents

Lt Gen N C Vij, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM
Vice Chief of the Army Staff.
Air Marshal S Krishnaswamy, PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR, ADC
Vice Chief of the Air Staff.

Ex-Officio Members

Shri Yogendra Narain, Secretary, Ministry of Defence.
Maj Gen Ashok Vasudeva
Officiating Director General Military Training.
Cmde A S Bajwa, Director Naval Training.
Air Vice Mshl AK Singh, AVSM, VM, VSM
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Training).

Elected Members of the Council

Vice Adm Inderjit Bedi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).
Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd).
Air Mshl K C Cariappa, PVSM, VM (Retd).
Lt Gen R S Dayal, PVSM, MVC (Retd).
Shri J N Dixit, IFS (Retd).
Air Mshl C V Gole, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).
Lt Gen A S Kalkat, SYSM, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd).
Maj Gen D K Palit, VrC (Retd).
Lt Gen V R Raghavan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd).
Admiral L Ramdas, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM (Retd).
Lt Gen R K Jasbir Singh, PVSM (Retd).
Maj Gen S C Sinha, PVSM (Retd).
Lt Gen M Thomas, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd).
Shri N N Vohra, IAS (Retd).

Executive Committee

Maj Gen Ashok Vasudeva
Officiating Director General Military Training and Chairman.
Cmde A S Bajwa, Director Naval Training.
Air Vice Mshl A K Singh, AVSM, VM, VSM
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Training).
Vice Adm Inderjit Bedi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).
Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd).
Shri J N Dixit, IFS (Retd).
Air Mshl C V Gole, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).
Lt Gen A S Kalkat, SYSM, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd).
Maj Gen D K Palit, VrC (Retd).
Lt Gen V R Raghavan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd).
Maj Gen S C Sinha, PVSM (Retd).
Shri N N Vohra, IAS (Retd).

CONTENTS

July-September 2001

Editorial	311
Security Perspective and Geo Strategic Realities in the Indian Context Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).....	313
Evolving Pakistan-Iran Relations SK Singh, IFS (Retd).....	322
India's Security Concerns and Nepal Maj Gen Ashok Mehta, AVSM (Retd).....	333
Panel Discussion : Agra Summit : A Way Ahead	344
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) B Raman.....	360
Welfare Battle Casualties (Part II) Lt Gen C R Sampath Kumar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd).....	371
Changing Goalposts : A Revamped Military Strategy Maj Gen E D' Souza, PVSM (Retd).....	386
Is India E-Ready? Maj Gen Yashwant Deva, AVSM (Retd).....	392
Reminiscences Allotment of Gorkha Regiments to the British Army in 1947 Maj Gen D K Palit, VrC (Retd).....	406
The Middle Sector of the Sino-Indian Border Sahdev Vohra, ICS (Retd).....	411
Letters to the Editor	414
Review Articles	417
Short Reviews of Recent Books	424
Additions to the USI Library	448

NOTE

The views expressed in the Journal are not official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA CENTRE FOR RESEARCH BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

Lt Gen K K Hazari, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	<i>Chairman.</i>
Comde A S Bajwa, Director Naval Training	<i>Member.</i>
Shri J N Dixit, IFS (Retd)	"
Shri M Guruswamy	"
Vice Adm Yashwant Prasad, AVSM, VSM Commandant, NDC	"
Vice Adm M K Roy, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	"
Dr K Santhanam Director, IDSA	"
Air Vice Mshl A K Singh, AVSM, VM, VSM ACAS (Trg)	"
Shri K Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd)	"
Maj Gen Ashok Vasudeva Offg DGMT Army HQ and Chairman JTC	"
Shri N N Vohra, IAS (Retd) Director, IIC	"
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) Director, USI	<i>Member Secretary.</i>

USI STAFF APPOINTMENTS

Director and Secretary to the Council

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

<i>Dy Director & Editor</i>	<i>Chief Instructor</i>	<i>Dy Director (Adm)</i>	<i>Secretary, CAFHR</i>	<i>Co-ordinator, CUNP</i>
Maj Gen Y K Gera (Retd)	Brig M S Chowdhury VSM (Retd)	Col V K Singh VSM (Retd)	Col Mahinder Kumar	Col M K Mehta
<i>Asst Director (P&P)</i>	<i>D S Coord</i>	<i>Sr. Accountant</i>		
Cdr Vijay Dalal	Lt Col A K Rawal	Shri R C Mittal		
<i>Librarian</i>	<i>Office Supdt</i>	<i>Estate Manager</i>		
Shri I R Kumar	<i>Courses Section</i>	Shri H M Robertson		
	Shri B David			
<i>Research Assistant</i>				
Dr Sudha Raman				
<i>Editorial Assistant</i>				
Shanthie D'Souza				

EDITORIAL

The highlight of events at the USI during the quarter July-September 2001 was the conduct of the first UN Military Contingent Junior Officers Capsule (UNMCJOC-1) by the United Service Institution of India – Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (USI-CUNPK). The course was conducted from 20 August 2001 to 07 September 2001. The training capsule focussed on preparing officers for effective execution of tasks for UN Peacekeeping Operations and equip them for training their soldiers for specialised duties in Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations. 38 officers including 11 participants from friendly foreign countries namely Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela and Zambia attended the training capsule. The Indian participants included officers from the Army contingents earmarked for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). The USI-CUNPK will be conducting a United Nations Military Observers and Staff Officers Capsule (UNMOSOC-1) from 29 October to 09 November 2001.

Policy formulation is a very complex task requiring deep understanding of issues involved and harmonisation of many contradictory factors that have a bearing on decision making. Peace and stability is essential for nation building, and sustained development for improving the standard of living of our countrymen. For ensuring peace there is a need to maintain a highly effective conventional military capability to raise the threshold of outbreak of conventional military conflict, as well as that of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The lead article in this issue on "Security Perspective and Geo-Strategic Realities in the Indian Context" by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, is a perceptive analysis in a holistic framework of international arena. The author has brought out that India's strategic vision must be backed by long-term plans, adequate financial resources and military capabilities to guard our national interests. India must use its economic and military resources and strength of its deeply rooted democracy to emerge as a strong nation and make positive contributions in international affairs. To deter external threats the Armed Forces must be modernised, develop capability in all types of missiles, space based

assets, information systems, and have a credible operational nuclear strike capability supported by a strong scientific, technological and industrial base.

Iran and Pakistan are Islamic nations vying for commercial advantage through political influence in Central Asia. However, for Pakistan access to Central Asia is through Afghanistan which necessitates that Pakistan has a favourable regime there. Currently the Taliban regime is heavily dependent on Pakistan. Shri SK Singh, a former Foreign Secretary of India, spoke on "Evolving Pakistan - Iran Relations" at the USI on 01 August 2001. Excerpts of his talk have been published as an article. According to the author the largest Islamic minority in Afghanistan and Pakistan are the Shias, and Iran is concerned about the well being of this section. The harsh treatment meted out to the Shias in Afghanistan is a matter of concern to Iran and Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan upsets them. Most of the terrorist organisations are of Sunni persuasion. The problems caused by the Afghan factor with the additive of an ambiguous American approach to Taliban's Afghanistan have cast a spectre of doubt regarding the Pak-Iran relations. The economic aspects are affected by Pakistan's economy, which is under strain, and the emerging oil picture. The political upheavals and expansion of narcotics economy in Pakistan have, in fact, a negative impact on economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan-Iran relations are convoluted by factors of Islam, oil, an interest in the Central Asian Republics, the events in Afghanistan, pressures of the US in West Asia and Pakistan's involvement in Jammu and Kashmir.

India has always regarded the Himalayas as an impregnable barrier in her northern flank and Nepal as the strategic gateway to the Indo-Gangetic plains. This area has been looked at with more thoroughness in view of growing presence of the underworld and fundamentalist elements under the influence of the ISI of Pakistan. Major General Ashok Mehta, in his article "India's Security Concerns and Nepal", chronicles the continuities in Indo-Nepal relations and discerns the threat to India through the presence of subversive forces in Nepal. The author feels that if approached, India should help Nepal fight the Maoist insurgency politically, diplomatically and militarily.

Security Perspective and GeoStrategic Realities in the Indian Context

LT GEN CHANDRA SHEKHAR, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Introduction

After 50 years of Independence, as we emerge a strong and resilient nation, it is inevitable that we seek to consolidate on our national goals, core values and vital interests. Our strategic priority should continue to be the socio-economic development, as in the ultimate analysis India's prestige and status will be decided by the way we solve our problems and conduct ourselves in the face of evolving geo-strategic and geo-economic realities. The Indian strategic compass today extends from the Straits of Hormuz to the Indonesian archipelago.

India's primary objective should be to become a strong, modernised, unified and wealthy nation. India should strive to become a pre-eminent global power by the middle of the Twenty First Century. A developing nation of India's size, rich in natural resources, manpower that is 1/6th of humanity, a growing economy and nuclear weapons status give it the attributes of being a great power. It should strive to acquire frontier technologies, and matching economic and military power.

Towards the ultimate goal of a global power, in the next 25 years, at a minimum, India must achieve the status of a pre-eminent regional power. For the next decade or so, India shall have to consolidate its economy and bring about domestic stability by successfully bringing to an end insurgencies and proxy war in J and K addressing the varying problems of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. This then would set the stage for India emerging as a global power. The creation of comprehensive national strength is essential if India has to achieve such a power status

Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

and its long-term goals. And for that a well-defined developmental strategy is inevitable.

The most important and essential factor in development of national power is 'economic power', which needs a peaceful environment for sustained development. The country's focus, therefore, must be to promote rapid and sustained economic growth, to raise technology levels, to explore and develop land and sea based natural resources and to secure access to global resources. Equally important is the development of military capability, which will allow economic power to rise, and which is absolutely essential for protection of national security interests. To achieve this, India needs to establish strong strategic linkages with the US, Russia, Israel, Japan and other developed countries, besides economic relationship with ASEAN, APEC, EU and WTO.

Geostrategic Environment

Although the contours of 'new world order' are yet to emerge clearly, what has become abundantly clear is that:-

- (a) Unipolar world is likely to give way to a multi-polar world (US, Japan, EU, China, Russia and India).
- (b) Economic interests of nations and peoples have become predominant over all other interests.
- (c) Globalisation has made geographic borders transparent to the flow of ideas, people and also turmoil and insecurity.
- (d) Technology continues to be the engine of change and is slowly becoming the currency of power.
- (e) The 'hot spots' around our subcontinent, which may impinge on our security, are West Asia including the Gulf, the Central Asian Republics and the Asia Pacific.
- (f) The increasing presence of the super power naval forces in the Indian Ocean impacts on India's southern flank.

Regional Strategic Environment

China

China, is currently focussed on economic development since it believes that economy is essential to build a strong military machine. At present its growth rate is better than ours. China is also advancing rapidly in computer, missile, military and space exploration technology. It perceives manned space flight as key to securing its international stature. China thus is well on the road to modernising its Armed Forces. The gap between us in overall military potential, particularly in strategic weapons, is increasing steadily in China's favour. Adverse nuclear asymmetry with China restrains our options. China is also aiming for 'unification'.

The future shall see India and China as economic rivals vying for the markets in South East, South and West Asia, and a military clash is not improbable. It is, therefore, important for India to establish strategic linkages with the US, Russia and other states in the Asia Pacific to counter-balance China's growing power and influence.

Pakistan

Pakistan's military strategy has been, and is likely to remain, Indo-centric. It has been following a policy of force accretion and modernisation of its Armed Forces to maintain a dissuasive capability against us. This capability is sought at two levels – for conventional warfare and NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) warfare. Alongside, it has included development and feathering of insurgency and terrorism in India as part of its politico-military policy. However, at present its economy is under severe strain.

Pakistan may be tempted to take advantage if we appear weak or unprepared. What is also more than likely is that it would carry on exercising a low cost option through proxy war. We would, therefore, need to maintain an effective deterrence in conventional as well as in counter proxy war operations.

Other Neighbours

India has good relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. With Bangladesh there are some differences, mainly with regard to illegal immigration and aid to insurgents. These are resolvable in the spirit of accommodation and goodwill. The manifestations of the LTTE on Indian soil continue to cause concern in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Our relations with Myanmar are gradually improving. Instability in the immediate neighbourhood can directly or indirectly impinge upon India's security concerns (whether it was in the form of the massive influx of refugees in 1971 or interests of their legitimate Government being threatened in Maldives in 1989). There is thus a need to be alert to happenings in our neighbourhood, and also enhance our relationship with our neighbours.

The Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean region is an important element in India's security concerns. Apart from the long coastline and far-flung island territories, which have security implications, India's trade is considerable and is poised for further growth. Almost all of India's oil imports come from the Gulf, and if their supply is hindered the country's interests will be seriously jeopardised. Yet, littoral states of the 'North' Indian Ocean are the very areas of potential instability and the possibility of these escalating to regional conflict is considerable. Freedom of the seas is, therefore, a vital need.

Domestic Environment

India's internal security situation has become explosive due to rising social tensions, ethnic problems and the ever-present external involvement, such as of the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan especially in the North and the North East. The large-scale migration from Bangladesh into the North Eastern states is an important cause of unrest and agitation in Assam and Tripura. A gradual change in the religious and ethnic complexion of the population has been taking place, which could have far-reaching consequences for internal and external security.

With issues like demand for Bodoland and Gorkhaland, the Naxalite problem and so on, it is likely that the nation may have to face an increasing number of internal disturbances. Our endeavour should be to employ minimum regular forces in such situations of 'proxy war', so that our deterrent posture is not diluted, and improve the capabilities of the Para Military and the Police.

STRATEGIC REALITIES AND INTERESTS

Strategic Realities

The exact size and shape of Forces needed to provide the security environment is for the Military planners to work out. The "unique strategic realities" that need to be considered are :-

- (a) Consolidation of our nation is still underway.
- (b) India's size, location and potential obliges it to function as a stabilising force in the region.
- (c) Situated between Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle, heavy influx of drugs and arms is a cause of concern.
- (d) Gateway to emerging markets of Southern and South East Asia.
- (e) A sea border of 7683 Kms, through which 97 per cent of India's overseas trade and 80 per cent of oil transit.
- (f) Basic market economic infrastructure exists and is eminently competitive.
- (g) Unresolved border with China (5852 Kms), which happens to be a nuclear power with high economic growth rate.
- (h) A hostile nuclear Pakistan has part of J and K under its occupation and a land border of 3431 Kms.
- (i) Status-quo power as against an ideological power – no aggressive export of ideas.

Strategic Interests and Objectives

Our defence policy is derived from our national objectives, core values and vital interests. These will include :-

- (a) Consolidation as a secular, federal and a democratic state.
- (b) Protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation.
- (c) Promoting socio-economic growth and development of India in a secure and stable, external and internal environment.
- (d) Safeguarding vital national interests viz. maritime interests, economic installations, energy security, information security.
- (e) Contributing our share in international affairs and commitments.

Financial Constraints

For the last seven years, India's defence spending has been hovering below 2.5 per cent of the GDP. Even though India's economy has grown by an average of about 6 per cent in the 1990s, our real defence spending has declined in this decade. Capabilities are built not in days but over the years. And in the past decade, there has been little military capability-building.

At the current defence spending level of 2.28 per cent of the GDP, it is questionable whether India can effectively defend its vital interests or build "zero tolerance" against the forces of terrorism. How low this level of spending is can be seen from the fact that China and Pakistan spend 5.7 per cent and 5.8 per cent of their GDP on defence respectively (*Military Balance 1998-99*). Hence, there is a compelling need to enhance the defence budget to approx 3 per cent of the GDP, at the minimum.

CREATING A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CAPABILITY

Military Capability

(a) Throughout India's history right upto Pakistan's Kargil adventure, our enemies have caught us unprepared. Being surrounded by two overweening, adversarial neighbours, it is incumbent on India, if it wishes to pursue its development process in un-interrupted peace, to build a comprehensive, deterrent military capability, both conventional and nuclear.

(b) Our armed forces must possess greatly enhanced, more alert and better-coordinated intelligence capabilities, modern arms, training and equipment necessary for information warfare and an appropriate higher defence management structure particularly relevant to the nuclear scenario.

(c) The Defence Ministry is in need of a major re-organisation by which the Services could be a part of the policy making process. Its civilian wing has to be more responsive to the Armed Forces' needs; and its senior levels better aware of developments and trends in international relations. The recent move towards integration of the Services HQs with the MoD is a step in the right direction.

Maritime Dimension. To play its legitimate role as a major regional power and to safeguard its economic and other interests in the Indian Ocean, India has to be strong at Sea. This will, of necessity, be a long-term project in a comprehensive Indian Ocean policy.

Defence Infrastructure. The modernisation and corporatisation of public sector defence production and research facilities is urgently required. The productivity of public investment in organisations like DRDO, DMRL, HAL, HSL must be increased. Private sector participation in defence production and privatisation of some non-strategic defence production activities should be encouraged.

Technology Issues. The increasing pace of technological change is bound to have a bearing on India's security. Therefore, our existing nuclear, missile and space technology programmes will have to be stepped up. Necessary action should be taken to reduce

the country's vulnerability to technology denial regimes in lasers, computers, communications and related hardware.

Human Resource Development. Human security, signifying the assurance of the fulfillment of basic needs such as food, shelter, education and health is a basic ingredient of national security. In the 50 years since Independence, India's population has grown three-fold exerting almost unbearable pressure on natural and financial resources and acting as a major constraint on growth. Government must devise a comprehensive strategy of educating the public on the benefits of a slower population growth rate that would help build a healthier, happier and a more secure nation. Demographic displacement and illegal immigration further compounds the problem as observed in Tripura and Assam.

Energy Security. India faces a serious shortage of energy resources. The contemplated increase in economic growth to 7 or 8 per cent, or more, will further aggravate the energy shortages. Options for augmenting energy supply are available and should be explored. 80 per cent of our energy needs are thermal, 17.5 per cent are hydro and only 2.5 per cent are nuclear.

Strategic Goals. India's strategic objectives are to deter armed aggression, protect its decision-making autonomy and vital national interests. Effective conventional and nuclear deterrent forces are an essential part of India's strategic posture. Our conventional forces must have the technological edge to perform their core tasks of fighting and defeating any aggressor, and to safeguard vital national interests. Without defending peace, India cannot fully concentrate on achieving economic modernisation and social justice. With missiles having become a central instrument in modern warfare, our conventional and nuclear deterrence requires advanced ballistic and cruise missiles deliverable from land, sea and air.

To be a 'global player', we have to have a long-term coherent thinking and planning to overcome the challenges ahead. We have to :

- (a) Ensure coordinated application of political, diplomatic, military and technological resources to protect and promote national security objectives.

- (b) Evolve a comprehensive strategy to tackle 'proxy wars', an effective intelligence agency and a higher defence control set up.
- (c) We need to be able to project our credible nuclear deterrence, backed by delivery systems, command and control structure, as also a visible dissuasive conventional capability.
- (d) In addition to existing energy dependencies, we need to pursue alternative energy sources of 'nuclear' and solar energy.

Conclusion

India cannot overlook the fact that it has been a victim of aggression committed by its two principal neighbours. It has also been subjected to unwarranted threats and pressures from others. Its role for stability and progress in the region and as a factor for peace and harmony in the world has not been given due regard. Its conciliatory approaches and its emphasis on the non-use of force in its security and foreign policies have been misconstrued as a sign of weakness.

To play its due role in regional and global security, India's strategic vision must be backed by long-term plans, adequate financial resources and the requisite conventional and non-conventional military capabilities to obviate any possibility of aggression or threat to our vital interests. India must use its economic and military resources and the strength of its deep rooted democracy to emerge as a strong nation making positive contribution in international affairs.

To deter external threats, India's military strength should be underpinned by the necessary concomitants of modern-day power, including a national capability in all types of missiles, space-based assets, information systems integrating civil and military needs, a credible, operational nuclear strike capability and modern high-quality armed forces supported by a strong scientific, technological and industrial base.

Evolving Pakistan-Iran Relations

Shri SK SINGH, IFS (RETD)

As long as international politics was controlled and governed by the Cold War dynamics, the orientation of relations between Iran and Pakistan was comparatively simple and straightforward. Both are Islamic countries; Iran is 100 per cent Shia, while Pakistan has only 1/5th of its population of Shia persuasion. Both perceived Afghanistan as a recalcitrant and somewhat unreliable neighbour and most often, difficult to manage. Both had to also keep in mind Soviet Union's more generous feelings for Afghanistan, than for either of them. In the overall context of the Cold War, they accepted this situation as both were conscious of being US protégés, members of the CENTO and, therefore, anti-Communist. The American administrations in that era did not make a practice of pushing other countries towards democracy, human rights, open market and globalisation.

The Islamic lands of the Soviet Central Asia were then (as now) Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Now these are separate and sovereign Republics; all endowed with oil and gas reserves. Pakistan, Iran, as also Turkey have lately been vying for political influence and commercial advantages in Central Asia. Historically, culturally, and in terms of linguistic ties, Iran has over the centuries acquired overwhelming influence in this region. Pakistan's contacts with these Republics are new, but on the basis of Islam these tend to be assertive and aggressive. It is Iran, and not Pakistan that has direct land access to these Republics. Geography requires Pakistan to use Afghanistan as the corridor for its land access to these Republics. Pakistan, therefore, has to have a favourable regime in Kabul. This motivated Pakistan to create the Taliban regime, and to help them control Afghanistan. In the initial stages, for this reason, the US too felt compelled to provide its blessings for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and they were assured that it would be amenable to their interests.

Shri SK Singh is a former Foreign Secretary.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

The Iran-Pak-US Triangle

Once the military campaign of the Taliban to occupy and control Afghanistan commenced in 1994, the US was prompt in giving its approval. For several years US officials were indicating that they saw "nothing objectionable" about the kind of Islamic laws the Taliban had been imposing on areas under their control. At an earlier stage, the USA had averred that the Taliban could be "acknowledged as an indigenous movement which has demonstrated staying power". Occasionally, American observers had also asserted that when one gets to know the Taliban, one could discover their lively sense of humour. This makes some people wonder whether they recognise the National Unity Government of President Rabbani any longer. By implication, some observers suggest that this may be their oblique way of providing a conditional recognition to the Taliban regime. Lately, the unwillingness of Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban) to apprehend Osama Bin Laden has irritated the Americans against this regime. The former US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright reportedly went to the extent of stating frankly that if the Taliban cooperated with Washington on handing over Bin Laden, it would facilitate US recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. The Taliban have so far refused to do so. Pakistan has argued with the Americans that in these matters of interpretation of Islamic duties, they (Pakistan) are not able to mould Taliban's decision-making.

Students of international law and international affairs suggest that the *de facto* US-Taliban relations at present bear a certain resemblance to the *de facto* recognition which the Americans had provided to the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. The Taliban have shrewdly ensured a continuous flow of humanitarian relief and aid from the international community for the disadvantaged segments of the Afghan population and some of their specific regions. All this is a clear, even astute, pragmatic move. Another clever move of theirs is to spread the propaganda about destroying all their poppy cultivation. They fail to reveal that they are continuing to maintain their major stocks of narcotics without permitting any depletion. Through all this, the Taliban are shrewdly trying to attract

favourable attention of America. In this game Pakistan's support and help to them is given a low profile; somewhat quiescent. Pakistan emphasises her principled stand against narcotics, and that they try to fulfil their commitments in this regard to the international community.

Iran, Pakistan and India

Another factor that keeps Pakistan and Afghanistan close to one another is their joint opposition to India and their collaboration for recruiting Pushtoon mujahideen from Afghanistan to fight in Jammu and Kashmir. Iran's attitude in this context, in earlier years, was somewhat ambiguous. Being themselves a state that promoted the spread of Islamic influence around the world, Iran had to appear interested in Kashmir, specially in its Shia population such as those from the Kargil region. However, Iranians were quick to recognise that both Pakistan and its Afghan – Taliban clients were systematically reducing and then eliminating the influence and prowess of Hizb-i-Wahdat and the Hazaras of Afghanistan. It was this issue that made Iran suspicious to begin with. They could see that Pakistan was definitely hostile to the idea of any accretion of power for the Shias of Afghanistan.

The Afghan-Pak Angle

There were growing number of incidents inside Pakistan in which the cadres of Sipah Sahaba and other Tanzeems and violent militias of Hanafi Sunnis of Pakistan wilfully targeted and killed Shias inside their Mosques, specially during Namaz. This caused great anger within Iran. There were also instances of either Pakistani Shias or travelling Iranians, some visiting Karachi for various kinds of professional training, getting killed. Gradually the impression spread in Iran about the connivance of the Pakistani Government machinery in all this violence and misdeeds.

The largest Islamic minority in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan being that of Shias, they are both conscious of the Islamic Republic of Iran which maintains an anxious lookout for its own kind abroad. The emergence of the Central Asian Republics and the role of Pakistan's fundamentalist activists in these countries are confusing the picture even more.

Iran under the rule of its clergy has been primarily concerned about the harsh treatment meted out to Shia minorities and the execution of Iranian diplomats by the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this context Iran blames Pakistan as the back-up country for Taliban. Several countries have at different times, and in different ways, protested to Pakistan against Pak-originated terrorist activities spilling over into their territories. That Pakistan is running on its own soil, as also on Afghan soil, several training camps and academies for terrorism and for religious theological, motivational work is by now well acknowledged. The proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and the continuing violence in Afghanistan twelve years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country, has resulted in small arms trafficking which quite clearly reveals Pakistan's direct involvement. Iran has been concerned about all these things. Clearly, by now, certain amount of small weapons like assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, surface and air missiles and landmines have reached the hands of non-state actors: criminals, terrorists and separatists. It is estimated that in this area, over 500 million small arms are outside Government control. Iran is concerned about the Kalashnikov culture knocking at its door. They are also sensitive to the fact that most of the terrorist organisations in Pakistan are of Sunni persuasion, and some of these have their outreach in the high echelons of Pakistan's Armed Forces. There are numerous senior Pakistani officers who are Tablighis, some of them even at General Officer level. During the Iran-Iraq War many of them did not make any secret of their being Iraq sympathisers. When the UN imposed sanctions against Iraq, the former Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Aslam Beg, was openly critical of it.

Ironically, Pakistan's entry into the United Nations was challenged by Afghanistan. It was Iran which first recognised the newly independent Pakistan. All through the Shah's period, relations between Pakistan and Iran remained close and mutually cooperative. Often this cooperation was greater and more purposeful on Iran's part. Even so, time and again Pakistan complained that the economic and trade cooperation between Iran and India was outpacing cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. During the first phase of the Khomeini Revolution, certain utterances

in Iran were found attractive by the people of Pakistan. This was the period when even though Iran was somewhat enfeebled it tried to indulge in exporting Islamic revolution. At the beginning of the Khomeini era they also expressed their anti-monarchic and anti-secular feelings. This made them unpopular in the Gulf especially in Saudi Arabia. The USA and its allies felt threatened and they feared interruption in the flow of oil. They also feared more aggressive and activist policies against Israel by the Islamic Republic. However, they knew that the Khomeini revolutionaries were not likely to allow any expansion of Soviet influence in the region. This affected Pakistani thinking rather sharply, due to the coincidental fall of the Shah in 1979 and the entry of Soviet Union into Afghanistan around the same time. The eight-year Iran-Iraq War and the death of Ayotullah Khomeini instilled in Iran a rethink on the need to return to their original national interest theme for the formulation of their foreign, economic and oil policies.

Iran and the Middle East

Iran is an important player in the Middle-East, particularly in the Persian Gulf. In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, Israel and the USA see them as doggedly pushing and backing the Hizbollah fighters, especially in the Beka'a Valley and on the northern frontier of Israel. In so far as the US feels committed to the security of Israel against the Palestinians and Hizbollah, and to protecting its Arab allies in the Gulf and elsewhere, the picture by now has become messy and complex. Clearly no settlement seems possible as long as Iran remains alienated. A glimmer of hope in this context has appeared in the gradual improvement of direct relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The problems caused by the Afghanistan factor and the ambiguity in the American approach to Talibanised Afghanistan continue to produce a shadow of doubts on Pakistan-Iran relations.

Pak-Afghan Trade

On Christmas eve of 1979, when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, the USA and its European allies had all spontaneously and readily committed resources to resisting the Soviet military might on Afghan

territory. In this effort and process they structured, armed, trained and motivated ten major and several minor Mujahideen groups to fight in and around Afghanistan against Soviet forces. Only one of these, the Hizb-e-Wahdat, was a Shia group. Three million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan. Two million, most of them Shias, sought shelter in Iran. Those in Pakistan received all kinds of largesse from the West, as also from the world of Sunni Islam. Iran had to look after the two million refugees it had accepted, without much help from elsewhere. As Pushtoos of Pakistan were the dominant ethnic-linguistic group in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan and Baluchistan, the Pushtoos uprooted from Afghanistan were provided refuge in Pakistan. They quite easily mingled with their brethren – the Pakistani Pushtoos – in all respects, including the country's internal politics and economy. This was quite deliberately facilitated by a conscious decision of the Government of Pakistan to allow Afghan Pushtoon refugees to take charge of transportation and truck haulage work between Peshawar and Karachi. At a later stage this spawned two elements which had a profound impact on the regional situation. One was the transport mafia that could, and still dominates, the roads of Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP in Pakistan, as also some road routes in the Punjab and in proper Afghanistan – both via Peshawar, Khyber and Jalalabad; and via Quetta, Chaman, Kandahar and Herat. These mafias have over the years enhanced narcotics smuggling, as well as normal and generalised smuggling of all kinds of items permitted under the Pak-Afghan Trade Agreements, into a craft and an art. All this has spread narcotics trade, corruption and criminality in the body politic and economy of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has ruined Pakistan's economy and sustained Afghanistan's revenue viability at a certain minimal level.

Iran-Pak Economic Relations

The economic aspects of Pakistan-Iran relations are naturally affected by the state of Pakistani economy and the way the global oil picture is emerging, especially as it affects the economic situation and policies of Iran. Pakistan's economy seems to be emerging somewhat from the doldrums of the last five or six years. The growth rate of Pakistan economy had declined from 4.3 per cent in 1998 to 3.1 per cent in 1999. For an entire decade of the 90s

the country had an average GDP growth of 3.7 per cent. By the year 2000 the highest contributor to growth of real GDP in Pakistan was the services sector, which provided 50 per cent of the value-added to GDP. 26 per cent came from agriculture and 23 per cent from manufacturing. The inflation rate in Pakistan has been reduced from 7.8 per cent in 1998 to 3.6 per cent in 2000. However, the fiscal balance which was minus 7.7 per cent in 1998 has improved and risen to minus 6.5 per cent in 2000. In 2000 the aggregate revenue collections in Pakistan were 17.2 per cent of the GDP while their aggregate expense was 23.4 per cent of the GDP. Interest payments on accumulated debt (34 per cent of the total expenditure) continue to cause anxiety and the fiscal situation has remained a major source of worry for the entire economy. Public debt has accounted for 92 per cent of the GDP in 2000 and two-thirds of the budget deficit is being financed domestically. Debt service ratio remains uncomfortably high. This situation coupled with the political upheavals and the expansion of the country's narcotics economy have had a negative impact on meaningful economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan.

The Taliban Movement

Another and a more deadly consequence of this situation was the birth of the Taliban movement, through the Madrassas on Pakistani soil, catering particularly for boys from Afghan refugee camps. The Pakistani Ulema as also the Pushtoon political groups, both in NWFP and Sind, found it easy and profitable to foment gun culture, Shia-Sunni violence, and widespread sale of small arms all over the Pakistani countryside. The socio-political, socio-economic and theological differences between Shias and Sunnis within Pakistan, both of Pakistani and Afghan extractions have by now created a complex and bizarre picture of mutual antipathy, suspicion and violence. And its impact on Iran has been to lay most of the blame on Pakistan and to adopt measures to prevent spread of violence into Iran from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan's desire to make India bleed through a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir is beginning to be seen as part of the major cause for deterioration in the situation in this entire region.

Violence in Talibanised Afghanistan is spreading into Pakistan.

The involvement of Afghanistan and Pakistani Pushtoons in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir continues unabated. The Tajiks and Uzbeks are gravely apprehensive about the kind of nemesis that may overwhelm them via Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are apprehensive of the lull before the storm that could soon engulf them. Turkmenistan is trying to curry favour with both the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan's military. The UN is unable to even reach the disadvantaged in Afghanistan who they wish to help.

Afghanistan, which was earlier not particularly friendly towards Pakistan, has transformed into a Pak protégé, even a dependent. The Taliban philosophy and practice is a product of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and the teachings in the madrassas of Pakistan. However, the philosophy of hate and intolerance resulted in their attempt to push contemporary Islam, through their interpretation of the Faith, back into an aggressive faith of the Seventh Century. All this has made the Taliban model difficult to be followed in contemporary Pakistan. Large segments of Pakistanis dread the prospect of Talibanisation of their country, if their administration does not remain vigilant. Iran originally generous, understanding and supportive of Pakistan has in the meanwhile seen how deep the anti-Shia sentiment runs amongst the people who run that country. Iran itself has undergone several rapid changes: from the Shah's Imperial and pro-American philosophy, to becoming a profoundly anti-West, quasi-theocracy. It is making serious efforts despite opposition and heavy odds, to resume the status of an industrialised, oil-rich, modernising nation of West Asia. The USA's continuing hostility against Iran, however, has not made things easier.

The Central Asian Republics, which during the Soviet era were neither seen nor heard easily, are now a major factor in our projections of the future economics of oil production and consumption. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have oil and gas reserves worth anything between three to eight trillion dollars, at today's prices. It would cost an investment of US\$ 70 billion, in the next few decades, merely to commence exploiting these reserves. These countries are landlocked, and the investors, other energy producing countries, and indeed the energy

consuming world, all have to assess whether export of oil and gas would be cheaper and safer through the Iranian route or the Turkish one, or indeed through the Afghan-Pak route. Everyone, other than the policy makers in Washington agree, irrespective of their politics, that the Iranian route would be the safest and shortest and, therefore, the most economic. Washington, however, has so far been averse to permitting this.

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban rulers were able to promise the USA that they would be able to organise construction of gas and oil pipelines through Afghanistan right up to Karachi port. This resulted in the efforts by an American-Saudi coalition, of UNOCAL and Delta Oil companies, to translate this into action. It was perhaps for this reason that the USA briefly showed a certain tolerance for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, the rights groups in the West, continued insisting that the Taliban's interpretation of the Islamic society was an excessively oppressive one for the Afghan people. As a result, the Clinton administration shied away from an early recognition of the Taliban regime. Thereafter the UNOCAL-Delta combine were unable to survive for long. Academicians, oil experts, financiers and the States of the Western world in general estimate that a peaceful regime in Afghanistan cannot be envisaged as feasible for a long time to come.

Despite this realisation or determination in the West, Pakistan and the Central Asian Countries have not been able to ensure that the Iranian route becomes a reality for this pipeline. And, this is despite the re-election of the moderate President of Iran, Mohammed Khatami, for his second tenure. Iran does find that by now the countries of the EU have taken a more positive view of the future of Iran than even some of the Islamic countries.

A full-scale hot war between Iran and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan was averted in September 1998. However, by now Iran recognises that it has certain assets not available either to Afghanistan or to Pakistan. Iran will continue to play an important role in the internal political evolution of Afghanistan, and perhaps to a certain extent also in Pakistan.

Iran's Diplomacy

President Khatami is persistent in his focus on the theme of

"Dialogue Between Civilisations". In geopolitical terms he understands plainly that a peaceful Afghanistan is essential for Iran pursuing its own economic and political progress and liberalisation. This is one aspect which must also affect Iran's civilisational, denominational and cultural relationship with Pakistan. It is believed that Iran in recent months has reminded Pakistan of the Zahidan Agreement of the 1950s between the two countries, concerning the Baluchistan-Iran border, after Pakistan had emerged as an independent and sovereign nation. Iranians have always lauded Pakistan's foresight of the 1950-58 period in handling Iran's sensitivities during that era. Afghanistan, under King Zahir Shah, entirely failed to understand Iran's sensitivities. As a result the Helmand-Arghandab problems continued unattended for decades between Iran and Afghanistan.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have, in recent years, tried to understand and accommodate one another politically and economically. But Iran is aware of the impact of Saudi investment of US \$ 4 billion during the 1980-90 period for popularising Wahabi Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This did have a civilisational impact which caused some warpage in a religious, cultural and civilisational sense, specially in the context of status of women and implementation of Sharia law. It also unfortunately impacted on inter-sectarian relations both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, that in turn had an adverse impact on the Shias. Saudis, during that period, got used to providing considerable funding, clandestinely, to Pakistan's ISI.

In 1991-92, when Pakistan wished to ensure the structuring of a composite Government consisting of all elements in Afghanistan including Mujahideen, Iran had suggested that such a composite government should be structured on a proportional basis with 25 per cent share for Hazaras and Hizb-e-Wahdat. This did not happen. Iran and the Shias, therefore, feel that Pakistani-backed Sunnis amongst the Afghan Mujahideen backed by Saudi money, and Pakistani military support and training were not likely to look at their claims and demands for their share in influence in Afghanistan.

Despite its disappointment and chagrin, Iran sought neither

overt nor behind-the-scenes help from Russia to correct this situation. During this period Iran also declined to support Azerbaijan, and preferred to cooperate with the non-Muslim Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine.

In the meanwhile there were concerns all over the region about Pakistan backed forces which created insurgency in Tajikistan. The joint efforts of the UN and the Russian Federation succeeded in squeezing these forces out of Tajikistan. Iran did not hesitate in cooperating with the UN and Russian forces. In this entire region the Taliban-Pashtoon aggressiveness is disapproved of by Iran and encouraged and backed by Pakistan. And that causes a great deal of suspicion, trouble and occasional violence.

Iran has taken note of the fact that the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan have been providing covert assistance and encouragement to Iranian Sunnis in Khorasan to turn against their government. This, Iran is convinced, could not be attempted by Afghanistan without support and encouragement from Pakistan.

Iran's assets are its history, culture, ethnic, philosophical (Sufi) and religious (Shia) elements. Many in Pakistan understand this as they are aware of Iran's contribution to their own history; but Pakistan's military and military-dominated governments are unable to think in terms of the disastrous economic and budgetary problems that have overtaken the people of Pakistan during the last half the century. They appear helpless when they face the barrel of the gun and the culture of hand-cuffs. This cannot change as long as they continue to see their relationship with India and their cupidity for the territory of Jammu and Kashmir through anything but a prism of permanent hatred and total enmity. As long as an assertive, aggressive, unthinking military rules over the people of Pakistan, the situation in this region will continue to be warped.

India's Security Concerns and Nepal

MAJ GEN ASHOK MEHTA, AVSM (RETD)

Background

Although for centuries India has been invaded from the West across the rivers and plains of Punjab, the Nepal Himalayas are fixated in the Indian security psyche as an impregnable barrier. Indian leaders have regarded the Himalayan divide as India's security frontier and Nepal as the strategic gateway to the Indo-Gangetic plains. The seeds of such a strategic perspective sown first by the British, were cultivated later through the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the letters exchanged with it. The Treaty is a scaled down version of a similar line between Nepal and British India in 1923 which itself was derived from the Treaty of Segowli (1815), a product of war between Nepal and British East India Company. This tacitly recognised British dominance over a defeated Nepal. In 1919, a British Foreign Office document noted: "Nepal is in a position to exercise powerful influence on India's internal stability and if it were disaffected, the anarchy would spill over. Nepal is also a very valuable counterpoise to Afghan and Muslim movements to the West and North of Afghanistan". Eighty years on, this threat forecast is turning into reality, for its breach and fulfilment. It was Tibet, not Nepal that Britain wanted as a buffer with China. But the Great Game being played between these countries, including Russia, was regulated by the power each exercised at any time.

Although the British did not conquer Nepal for strategic and logistic reasons, it conferred on Nepal all the trappings of an independent country while treating it like other princely states of India. The price Nepal paid for its independence was isolation and lack of development. Nepal is certainly the oldest nation state of South Asia. The degree of independence and autonomy enjoyed by Nepal – the extent she leaned towards the North or South – varied with the power exercised by its giant neighbours.

Maj Gen Ashok Mehta, AVSM is a former GOC of a division. Currently he is a journalist and a strategic analyst

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

On its part, Nepal tried to follow the advice of its founding father, King Prithvinarayan Shah to tread carefully between its two giant neighbours, China and India. However, some of his descendants used the China card against India, especially after India acquiesced to Tibet's annexation in 1950 and its military defeat in 1962 by China. In Nepalese eyes, India was a soft state. Although India inherited Britain's imperial legacy on the subcontinent there was unfortunately no military power to back it. Yet Nepal feared India. Nepalese security thinking was conditioned by the expansionist ways of the British East India Company. Their strategic culture had made state security synonymous with security of the institution of monarchy (and national unity) and security policy was fashioned by the Palace-Monarchy-Army trio. Much of this security psyche is still preserved despite the advent of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. India's security concerns were encapsulated in the 1950 Treaty which was signed shortly before the Chinese takeover of Tibet in October 1950. The text of the articles and letter accompanying the Treaty related to threats from a foreign aggressor (read China) and the joint response mechanism. The hidden threat was from a direct takeover of Nepal and/or a Communist-led/inspired insurgency. In 1959, Nehru told Parliament that any aggression on Nepal and Bhutan would be treated as aggression on India. Surprisingly, the Nepalese feared an invasion from the Indian side. Therefore, bulk of their Army was deployed in the Terai, but according to Nepalese, more for ease of logistics and training.

Nepal's perception of India as a weak and indecisive country changed after India's 1971 military victory in East Pakistan, the peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974, unification of Sikkim in 1975, the economic blockade of Nepal in 1988, the restoration of democracy there in 1990, the 1998 nuclear tests and the Kargil conflict. Meanwhile, the China card was no longer usable. Old external threats were giving way to new internal challenges. Nationalism found new voice leading many Nepalese to finding provisions of the 1950 Treaty dated and restricting their sovereignty. Nepal's Zone of Peace (1975) proposal was aimed at diluting the offending Treaty. Further, Nepalese nationalism acquired an anti-India colouring and articulation following the advent of democracy.

This is likely to get shriller if either of the two institutions of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy get weaker.

The Gurkha Connection

Drowned in the cacophony of anti-India rhetoric is the traditional resonance from the Gurkha soldiers of Nepal in the Indian Army. The military relations between the two countries go back to the times of the great Sikh warrior, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, when the Nepalese first joined the Punjab Army in Lahore, much before the British recruited them in 1815. To this day, anyone who becomes a soldier outside Nepal is called 'Lahure'. 51 Gurkha battalions fought in World War II under the British flag. Today they are down to two battalions. But in India, they number 40,000 in 38 battalions. Nepalese are recruited in Britain and India as part of the tripartite agreement of 1947. They have won hundreds of gallantry awards including two PVCs (one in Kargil) and 13 VCs. Indian soldiers were deployed inside Nepal (as they are still in Bhutan) from 1950 to 1970. At the time of Nepal's first revolution in 1950, two companies of the Indian Army were ready to be flown into Kathmandu to stabilise the situation but the help was called off at the last minute. Later, in 1952, Nepal requested for a training team to help reorganise the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). This team was called the Indian Military Mission. Six years later the mission was renamed as the Indian Military Training and Advisory Group. In Nepal's first general elections held in February 1959, Indian Army signallers were sent to assist in this shortlived experiment with democracy. Next year, around 21 joint border checkpoints were established in the North of the country.

In 1965, India accepted a request from Nepal to undertake supply of arms, ammunition and equipment for the entire Royal Nepal Army (RNA) of 17,000 men in four brigades. This request was made again in the 1990s to re-equip the six brigades. In 1966, the Indian military training and advisory group was redesignated as Indian Military Liaison Group and its scope was scaled down. By 1969, this group had been turned into a Stores Liaison Group for receipt of military equipment for the RNA. Finally, on 18 August 1970, under pressure from the Communist lobby in the Palace,

both the military assistant group and checkpoints were withdrawn. Thus ended the period of a special military relationship between the two countries. India's Gurkha connection is rich and extensive. More than one lakh Gurkha pensioners are cared for inside Nepal and some of them enjoy welfare facilities not available to their Indian counterparts. After tourism and trade, Gurkhas are Nepal's third largest earners of foreign exchange. They are also the strongest trademark of Indo-Nepalese relations. Gurkhas have fought valiantly for India's independence and territorial integrity. So how can Nepal be anti-India and at the same time its Gurkhas lay down their lives in Kargil ?

The Royal Nepal Army

The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) takes its order from the King. There is traditionally a symbiotic relationship between the two. The King is the supreme commander of the armed forces and is responsible for the operations and deployment of the Army on the advice of the National Defence Council chaired by the Prime Minister. In practice, the King need not heed such advice. The entire personal staff of the King in the Palace is all serving and retired Army officers, mainly Shahs and Ranas, mostly relatives of the Royal family. A crack Army brigade, its battalions especially chosen by the King is deployed inside the Palace. The King regularly attends military functions commemorating RNA history. The last time the forebears of the 50,000 strong RNA were involved in combat operations was against the British in 1814-16 and against Tibet in 1892. Other than that they have been engaged, at the behest of the Chinese, in quelling the Khampa Revolt led by their leader Wangdi in the very area where the Maoists are active today, in the late 1970s. The RNA has a proud record in peacekeeping operations and has not missed a single UN mission since 1975. The RNA though short of experience, is a highly disciplined force, fiercely loyal to the King. It is also no secret that it is reluctant to be employed in counter insurgency operations against the Maoists. Every senior officer has a portrait of Their Majesties the King and Queen, in their homes. Some of these officers, used to the panchayat raj, have never accepted multiparty democracy and look down on the new breed of politicians. The RNA is organised

in seven infantry brigades, one Palace Guard brigade and seven special brigades which include Parachute and Special Forces, Aviation, Artillery, Engineers, Signals and two Logistics brigades. An eighth counterinsurgency brigade is under raising at Kathmandu. In addition there are 43 independent Rifle companies (Himal). The Army wants to increase their number to 75, one for each district. India is helping in the modernisation of the RNA. But given their 50-million dollar defence budget (from a GDP of 4 billion dollars) to support an Army of 50,000 soldiers, Nepal's reluctant show of force is at best a token deployment. It does not have the military capability to deal with external threats. Surprisingly, the Army has not been employed to combat the emerging internal threats, including the Maoist insurgency.

The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship

The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by the Rana rulers of Nepal with India has always been the bone of contention. Opinions on its review in Nepal range from "it is an insult" to "let sleeping dogs lie" as it is both a source of comfort and an irritant. Both these comments were made in the last four years by distinguished ministers of the Nepalese cabinet. Although this Treaty has been breached by both sides and overtaken by events, it defines in philosophic terms, the broad spectrum of relationship – political, economic, people-to-people and security – between the two countries. Underpinning the Treaty are India's security concerns and Nepal's compliance – or non compliance – with these and also India's non-adherence. In view of the latest developments in Nepal and changed nature of threats, a review of the Treaty is necessary.

The Treaty is unique. It is more a set of guidelines regulating relations between two countries. It is set out in four parts. Articles 2 and 5 relate to security while 6 and 7 deal with social and economic development and reciprocity in privileges in matters of trade, commerce, vocation and so on. Article 1 agrees to respect each others' territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. The 1950 Treaty cancels all previous treaties and stipulates that either side can terminate it by giving one year's notice. The

letters exchanged with the Treaty elaborate articles of the Treaty in respect of import of weapons by Nepal and evolving a joint response mechanism in case of foreign aggression.

The Nepalese say the Treaty is unequal, imperialistic and forced on the Ranas. This, however, is not the whole truth. In fact, the security obligations of Nepal are handsomely balanced by the economic spinoffs. Interestingly, the first official objection to the Treaty was raised by the Communist Party leader and Prime Minister, late Manmohan Adhikari. India on its part has been willing to discuss all aspects of the Treaty. After the last visit of Prime Minister GP Koirala, India once again agreed to review the Treaty but it is Nepal that is unable to forge a consensus. So far, a foreign secretary level meeting has taken place this year. The Nepalese foreign office is known to have set up an independent study group to examine all aspects of the Treaty but even this has made no headway. The ball is in Nepal's court: to decide whether to review, revise, scrap or sign a fresh Treaty. Obtaining parliamentary approval for a new Treaty according to the 1990 Constitution will be very difficult as it requires two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament.

The Kalapani Dispute

Like most territorial disputes, the Tinker post or Kalapani issue, located near the India-Nepal-Tibet trijunction has many versions. River Mahakali which marks the western borders of Nepal following the Segowli Treaty has its source near Tinker. The popular Nepalese interpretation is that India occupied Tinker in 1962 prior to the war with China but King Mahendra did not wish to raise the issue at the time. Inevitably, Kalapani became an officially disputed territory when the Communist Party of Nepal, the Marxist-Leninist faction led by Bamdev Gautam brought it centrestage after the signing of the historic Mahakali Treaty in 1996. The second Nepalese version sourced to former foreign minister Rishikesh Shah, claims that Prime Minister, Maharaja Chandra Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana ceded the Tinker area to the British in 1923. He has maps to support this theory. As can be seen, it is the Communists who revive old issues – the 1950 Treaty and Kalapani – to embarrass

India. Both countries have set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) to ascertain the claims of both the sides to the disputed post.

Emerging Internal Threats

The 1919 threat document came alive in 1990. It coincided with the start of the fourth proxy war in J and K, influx of Kashmiri Muslims in Nepal and the restoration of democracy in the Himalayan Kingdom. Sources of internal instability and strife are identified as lack of governance, social tensions and disorder, migration, presence of the underworld, access to narcotics and small arms, the increasing influence of the ISI and Islamic fundamentalism. And the very latest – the Maoist insurgency. Many of the underprivileged ethnic tribes like Magars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Rais and Limbus have made official their dislike of the traditional domination in government and administration by the upper caste Brahmins, Chhetris and Newars. There is pent up frustration amongst Nepalese because they have undergone a hundred years of Rana oligarchy, 40 years of monarchical dictatorship and ten years of a non performing democracy which held out promises but failed to deliver. Criminal gangs owing allegiance to Dawood Ibrahim and Chhota Rajan thrive in Kathmandu.

But from the security angle, it is the ISI and its expanding network in Nepal that is the source of worry. The hijack of IC 814 and the Hrithik Roshan non event reflect the power of the ISI. The anti-India phenomenon is partly the result of the nexus between the Leftists and the ISI. Muslims living in the Terai are constantly increasing in size and influence. According to one estimate, their number is roughly one million in a population of 20 million. For Nepal, they are both a vote bank and a source of foreign funds from Islamic institutions and countries. Internal strife and disorder are a post democracy phenomenon and would probably never have happened under absolute monarchy and panchayat raj.

The ISI in Nepal

Pakistan established diplomatic relations with Nepal in 1961. The ISI foundation was laid in the early 1990s around the Pakistani Embassy in Kathmandu. It cultivated lower-level bureaucracy in

the police and the government. Their tentacles spread through business ventures, Islamic organisation, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and non governmental organisations. In addition, field bases were set up in Nepalgunj, Kishan Nagar, Bhairwaha, Raxaul, Biratnagar and Dharan which is the drug centre. They have cultivated Muslims in Terai and even tried to subvert Gurkha soldiers. Soon after Kargil, they tried to reach out to families of those killed in Kargil.

The ISI network was exposed in 1994 after a raid on a Kathmandu hotel called Karnali. The Nepalese police recovered secret documents including one relating to Operation Tufail which had spelt out the ISI design for anti-India operations in and through Nepal. Recently, the Nepalese police caught Pakistani Embassy staff redhanded. They were in possession of RDX, counterfeit Indian Rs 500 notes and other military devices. The hijack of IC 814 was traced to the Pak Embassy in Kathmandu and the enquiry that followed showed Nepalese officials' involvement in the incident. In fact, so alarmed was our Government that the President of India had to refer to the issue in his address to the Joint Houses of Parliament. Nepalese officials say that it is clearly also a case of negligence on the part of Indian intelligence deployed in Nepal.

Maoist Insurgency

It was unthinkable even a few years ago that insurgency and a peoples' war would sprout in – of all places – Nepal. Without going into the history of the Communist movement in Nepal beginning in 1949, the present Maoist revolutionaries are part of the extreme Left United People's Front which had won nine seats in the 1991 elections. The Communists in Nepal were generally identified as anti-monarchy or pro-democracy. They waged the first insurgency in East Nepal which was called the Jhapa movement. It has links with the Naxalites bordering their territory in West Bengal in the late 1960s. The CPN-Maoist under their leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal split from the United People's Front in 1994, boycotted the elections and formed the Prachanda Unity Centre in March 1995.

The decision to start a Peoples' War was taken in September 1995. The area chosen was the impoverished and underdeveloped Bheri and Rapti anchals, the regions of historical neglect in Nepal. Magars constitute the largest ethnic group in the epicentre of this movement which is inspired by Peru's Shining Path guerillas. As in Peru, the peasants here are isolated from the social mainstream, deprived of reforms and development, and have suffered police brutalities and corrupt officials. The Maoists promise there will be no rich, no poor, no upper caste or lower caste. All will be equal.

Once it was the Marxist-Leninists who tried capturing the East. Now it is the Maoists who have won over parts of West Nepal. A force of nearly 2000 hardcore Maoists are in the forefront of this People's War. But women are increasingly taking over key positions and will soon constitute 35 per cent of the Army. Their social reforms include arrest of decadence, ie gambling, drinking, polygamy, child marriage, flesh trade and corruption. The Maoists have chased out the police and corrupt officials. Their weapons are mainly .22 and 12 bore rifles, local guns and .303 rifles captured from the police. Police repression has led to spurt in support for the Maoists. In six years, nearly 2000 people, mostly policemen and civilians have been killed. Successive governments, which included communists, have failed to arrest the march of the Maoists. For a long time, insurgency was treated as a mere law and order problem. Attempts have been made to negotiate with underground leaders, but these have been only partially successful. The Maoists have made 43 demands, some relating to land reforms, social restructuring and developmental strategy which are eminently implementable. But the demand for abolition of monarchy and the establishment of a communist republic are highly ambitious. The most curious part of this episode is the non-use of the Army. Maoists have ruthlessly wiped out police posts and taken control of nearly 25 of the 75 districts in the country. Their operational strategy is to capture the mountainside and then address the urban centres. They avoid contact with the Army at all costs but at the same time do not spare the police. They have set up a parallel administration in areas 'liberated' by them.

Maoists have expanded their network beyond the Maoist

Communist Centre and People's War Group in India and other terrorist groups, the LTTE included. The ISI is known to be helping them. There are reports that the Chinese are also providing material assistance. Other countries mentioned are North Korea and India. At one time, there was even talk of the Palace backing the insurgency. The greater expansion of the People's War to the Terai can have a greatly destabilising effect in the contiguous regions of UP, Bihar and West Bengal. The Maoists are growing politically as well. They have captured enormous ground from the United Marxist Leninists, the main opposition in Nepal. They are believed to be running their own website. If there were an election today, some estimates claim Maoists would sweep the polls at least in much of the West of the country.

Surprisingly, the RNA, after much prodding, has lately been deployed in five districts on what is called an integrated social and developmental campaign to win back the hearts and minds lost to the Maoists. It is state violence and police excesses that have forced the people into the arms of the Maoists. They are paying a war tax of five to 10 per cent of their monthly earnings happily, instead of suffering indignity at the hands of the police. Video copies of a film 'Aago' on the People's War, initially banned by the government, is now doing the rounds of the villages.

While the government is keen to use the Army in combat operations, the King has so far not authorised its use in an offensive role. There are certain constitutional difficulties. According to Article 119, the King is the supreme commander of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). According to Article 118, His Majesty shall perform the operation and deployment of RNA on the recommendation of the National Defence Council which is chaired by the Prime Minister. At least on two occasions, late King Birendra did not accept the advice of his Prime Minister. The task is clearly beyond the demoralised police. The raising of a 35,000 strong interim force called the armed police may not foot the bill, especially after the series of coordinated attacks against police posts in April and July 2001.

After the Royal massacre, Maoists have made inflammatory calls for the RNA not to take orders from the new King who they

say is a usurper and murderer. King Gyanendra has already made an appeal to the Maoists to come to the negotiating table but this may not bear fruit. He has two choices: either to let the Maoists capture greater influence and territory or release the RNA for combat to bring the Maoists to heel while keeping the door open for talks. Six weeks after the Royal massacre, the Maoists are making incendiary statements against the King and the government. They may unwittingly bring monarchy and democracy closer together in taking sterner action against them.

Conclusion

As one can see, the threat envisioned in the British Foreign Office document of 1919 is turning into reality. The spillover phenomenon has become real. While a review of irritants like the 1950 Treaty is necessary, a fresh security framework addressing the emerging threats in a spirit of sovereign equality and reciprocity is vital. Not only is Nepal economically integrated with India, its security challenges have a direct bearing on India's security.

Next to the tragedy faced by the Royal family of Nepal and a jolt to the monarchy is the tragic failure of democracy to take root in the country. Flirting with Leftists and even Maoists, some say to discredit democracy, may have cost the monarchy dear. The biggest challenge to Nepal after the destabilisation of monarchy therefore comes from the Maoists and their threat to seize power by violent means. At a time of the worldwide decline of communism, in Nepal the movement has made impressive gains, including ruling the country.

In case India's help is sought by Nepal to deal with the Maoist challenge, it should be provided politically, diplomatically and even militarily, short of direct involvement. It is time to start erecting new joint mechanisms to deal with the internal security threats emanating from the Himalayan kingdom. Nepal need not see any sinister design in this.

Agra Summit : A Way Ahead

Introduction

The high-expectation mercurial meeting between India's Prime Minister and Pakistan's President concluded in a stalemate. The summit at Agra on the 14 and 15 of July 2001 appears to have collapsed over the Kashmir issue and cross border terrorism that were matters of immediate concern. Despite a pessimistic prognosis that the summit would not go beyond the reiteration of old positions, attempts to break the impasse have been made and the foundation has been laid for tough bargaining for the future to "reach somewhere in the mid-ground". To examine the Agra Summit in its entirety – the reasons for the impasse – and unravel what holds for the future of Indo-Pak relations, a panel discussion was held at the USI on 27 July 2001. Shri SK Singh IFS (Retd) chaired it. Shri K Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd), Lt Gen KK Hazari, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) and Shri KN Daruwalla, IPS (Retd) were the panelists.

Salient Features of the Presentation by Shri K N Daruwalla.

It has been said that it is terrible to desire and not to possess and it is terrible to possess and not desire. Pakistan would fall in the former category regarding Kashmir. It is only to be hoped that India does not fall in the second category, in the near future. The more than five decades old debates, rhetoric, prejudices, different perceptions and positions between India and Pakistan were so entrenched that it would be too idealistic to have expected concrete results from the very first summit, post-Kargil. A beginning had to be made. However, it should not have been combined with a State visit by General Pervez Musharraf; on the contrary, it should have been kept on a low key – as a first working visit – with no media hype. It is now not even clear whether the Breakfast Meeting between President Musharraf and some senior editors was riposted or preplanned. Unfortunately, the Indian editors failed to stand up to his articulation of Pakistan's point of view - especially where he

Based on the panel discussion held at the USI on 27 July 2001.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

kept referring to "freedom fighters"; and someone should have questioned him on terrorism or even confronted him with facts regarding atrocities committed by Pakistani troops on Bangladeshis in 1970-71. Here was a man who was not willing to stand by the Lahore or Shimla Agreements. A more unsettling fact was the concern for semantics. Words were substituting reality and became reality.

Reportedly, the Indian Prime Minister has had to contact General Musharraf and request him to scale down the rhetoric on both sides. According to reliable source, the day Musharraf stepped on Indian soil, the Pakistanis opened fire across LoC at 30 different places. During Vajpayee's Lahore visit, they killed 19; when Clinton arrived in India, they killed 36 at Chittisinghpura. A summit cannot begin that way and no agreement would make sense. General Musharraf spoke of CBMs at Agra, but for this the Pakistani Army and the ISI must share the same sentiments.

It is generally felt that one cannot come to terms with the military establishment in Pakistan. That should stand to logic. Nevertheless sometimes, in certain matters, logic does not hold. We almost arrived at an agreement with Zia. If that was possible, then one could come to terms with Musharraf also. It must be realised that we will have to deal with the military in one way or the other – whether they be in saddle or otherwise. Moreover, too much emphasis should not be placed on the reasoning that Musharraf is cornered by the Jehadis and that he has to play to the galleries. He did play to them for reasons unknown. No military dictator in Pakistan has ever been driven to the corner by the extreme right wing in Pakistan.

The most attractive option regarding Kashmir is to be a pessimist. But some optimism is the call of the day as a process has begun. Agra summit could have concluded the other way. The meeting between Hurriyat and Musharraf should not have been made much of, either. The Hurriyat will toe the line that Pakistan ask them to take, hence our protestation to the invitation to Hurriyat to Musharraf's tea party need not have been so shrill. The stalemate need not have occurred in the summit.

The only fact that must be clearly stated is that India will never go beyond the *status-quo* position on Jammu and Kashmir, unless the Indian psyche changes. Pakistan's psyche being what it is, they would never rest content with such a *status quo*. Small gains could have accrued from this summit, such as troop withdrawals, scaling down of help to terrorists, the Wular Barrage problem and so on. Ironically, the Partition and the bloodbath that went with it seems to have died in Musharraf's memory.

Salient Features of the Presentation

by Lieutenant General KK Hazari, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

If there was a mistaken notion in this country that Musharraf's clamour for talks "anytime, anywhere" was a genuine desire for a negotiated settlement on the Kashmir issue then we are now confident where such misconceptions can lead. First of all there was his personal commitment to avenge the 1971 War, and Siachen. Secondly, there is his oft-repeated statement "Kashmir is not the end of the story" and that low intensity and proxy war will endure. His personal commitment thus is to cut India to size. The Summit was okayed to gain legitimacy in the international field and build up his image in the domestic scene. It would also have helped Pakistan to get over international pressure in the political and economic domain and on the question of terrorism. He had to show himself as a legitimate ruler of Pakistan, reasonable and willing to discuss thorny issues; he wanted to give the image of a person who had achieved *something* on Kashmir. There is material to show that he had a well prepared clear-cut strategy. The team he put together including the thoroughly briefed and carefully selected media – all had a common purpose.

As things stand, there is no meeting ground between the two sides. Pakistan will not compromise on its demand for accession of the Valley to Pakistan. India cannot accept that. Only minor adjustments can be made or else there would be major repercussions amongst India's multi religious, multi ethnic populace. Hence the process is going to be long haul. The matter of how we shall proceed in order to get the best bargain is yet to be fashioned. A matter of concern for the establishment and on which we must train the media and public opinion is to design a consistent, clear

long-term strategy that would persevere till our aim is achieved. This is where the Chinese are one-up on us. If only we stick to these objectives, and learn from others. The following steps are relevant :-

(a) A clear strategy of containing and defeating the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir by building up forces, and their capabilities. Our current system is inadequate to meet the demands of proxy war in J and K.

(b) Simultaneously, increasing the cost of proxy war in Pak by carrying out hot pursuit strikes on and across LoC, for which proper capabilities must be worked out.

(c) Enhance India's economic and defence capability so as to widen the gap between the two countries, thus forcing Pakistan to incur heavy defence expenditure to such an extent that it realises the futility of carrying out the proxy war.

(d) Bring international pressure on Pakistan for supporting trans-border terrorism. Engage Pakistan diplomatically on a well chalked out and synergised diplomatic, military and economic strategy. Diplomacy must be a means to our end.

All in all, 'good governance' is essential for weaning away the people of Jammu and Kashmir from militants. In this cause, the electronic media's 'information warfare' could play a significant role in winning over the people.

Salient Features of the Presentation

by Shri K Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd)

Summit was held without full preparation or purpose. The invitation sent by our Prime Minister to General Musharraf after 19 months of his taking over as the CEO is truly laudable, but the first meeting should have been only to 'know each other'.

Summits are meant for long term or tactical purposes. In the nuclear age, one has to be in communication with friends and foes, especially foes with nuclear capability. Hence despite any misgivings that might have been there regarding the installation of Musharraf as the Chief Executive of Pakistan, it was right on the part of the

Indian Government to invite him for talks. The unanswered question is – what was the purpose of the invitation? It would have been ideal to first find out what kind of person he is. There is a previous record of summits between the Prime Ministers of India and Presidents of Pakistan that culminated in declaration of sorts. Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration even while his men were moving into Kargil. This is the outcome of having dealt with a man who was seven summits old! In an earlier case, even as an agreement was in progress and was being signed on the Runn of Kutch arbitration, Pakistan was preparing its Gibraltar Force to move into Kashmir. Such examples abound in the international arena also. When Ambassador Krushchev was negotiating in Washington, the Japanese Imperial Navy was steaming towards Pearl Harbour to bomb it. To expect any joint agreement from a person you are meeting for the first time, especially a man we suspect of having engineered Kargil, and to have an agreement with a country with the kind of history it has, is incredible. Also, it is well neigh impossible to have a joint agreement or declaration for sure at every summit.

We were expecting too much in the first meeting and media hype had been created. While the Prime Minister should visit Pakistan, no declaration should be made or agreements arrived at unless there is a breakthrough. If Pakistan had been clear that there would be no declaration, any emphasis on the semantics would have been absent. They too would have toned down their expectations. We did not handle it diplomatically.

Unlike Shimla and Tashkent, where the only source of information was the Government spokesperson, in today's environment, the electronic media relays the happenings to the entire world. Media exists to serve its interests and our objective should be how to make use of that media. This is where the *correct* information should come from us first. Secrecy in diplomacy is a necessity but it is vital to know how to use the international media network to one's advantage. Pakistan came well prepared with their objectives – of extracting a confirmation from India on their stand, that “Kashmir is the core-issue” – and handled the media well to put across their point.

The Foreign Minister had earlier stated India's stand when he said "***Kashmir is not the core issue, Kashmir is the core of Indian nation***". The focus should have centred around this alone and avoided any discussion on whether it is or not a core issue. The discussion should have highlighted the basis of claim on Kashmir being the two-nation theory (TNT), which we dispute. In the international politics, the two-nation theory of Pakistan, and the 'clash of civilisations' thesis challenge the very existence of the United States of America, the idea of European Union, Russia, China and India. This theory thus is a challenge to international security. The rationale of two-nation theory in the 21st Century is inexplicable. This is the sort of argument that should have been put forth to Pak President and pursued throughout. The Americans are against division of Bosnia on the basis of the TNT. They are against independence of Kosovo on this very basis from Serbia. Macedonia, Chechnya and the Chinese in Xinjiang face the same challenge. Pakistan thus cannot obtain support for its cause on the basis of TNT. This should have been our focus rather than the nitty gritty of whether the term should be Kashmir *issue* or *dispute*. It seemed as though we were not well versed with the UN Resolutions. In Dr Joseph Goldblat's letter dated 25 August 1948, to Nehru, after 13 August 1948 Resolution, Goldblat has accepted that Pakistan would have no role to play in the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.

Talks with Pakistan are welcome. But the issue that we must raise is the viability of the two-nation theory. They need to be reminded of the half a million Pakistani nationals still languishing in Bangladesh since 1971. Consequently, Pakistan should be more concerned with their own citizens than refer to Kashmiri people. They must also be questioned on the representative character of the Hurriyat.

Further all Musharraf's replies should be given maximum publicity. Diplomacy is all about reaching a solution. What we witnessed was a one-sided information war of sorts launched by General Musharraf at Agra.

Just as Deng Xiaoping was praising Mao while he dismantled Maoism, Musharraf could praise *Jehadis*, refer to Kashmir

as belonging to Pakistan, provided he begins to dismantle things inside his country. We need evidence of that. It is only then that there could be a good case for conducting serious secret diplomacy to arrive at an agreement. Should that not be the case, then we should be prepared for a multi-range information warfare effort.

Observations by Shri SK Singh, IFS (Retd)

The Agra Summit went on to prove that "it takes two to get one into trouble". We have always witnessed Pakistan climbing out of the commitments made by it. After signing an agreement or treaty with India, Pakistan has never hesitated to make an attempt to disavow or denounce the agreement and disregard the commitments under it.

At the Agra Summit General Musharraf and his delegation insisted on making India accept what they called "the centrality of the Kashmir issue". India did not deny them satisfaction on this, but insisted that there should be a prior discussion of the cross border terrorism, which in reality has been keeping Jammu and Kashmir in turmoil and strife. They claimed later that suitable wording in respect of both these points had been accepted jointly. Pakistan asserted that we had backed out of a near-commitment. We explained that until *all* was agreed to nothing could be considered *agreed*; and that since they had refused to pay heed to find a way out of the problems created by cross border terrorism, we felt that they were not serious about discussing Kashmir or indeed anything else.

After General Musharraf's abrupt departure from Agra, the two Foreign Ministers were prompt in giving two separate press conferences. Each one separately claimed that the Summit had not been a failure; that Agra had been a "getting-to-know one another" experience; and that the two leaders may pick up threads again when they get together either on the side-lines of the U.N. General Assembly or at the SAARC Summit or on both these occasions. The General addressed his own press conference a few hours after returning to Pakistan. He exhibited mild disappointment at having returned 'empty-handed' and put up plenty of self-congratulatory hype claiming that he had been able to

establish Jammu and Kashmir as an issue that shall remain firmly etched in Indian minds. He also did a certain amount of play-acting for the purpose of giving the impression of a senior, superior, statesman in Agra, during the Summit.

Our leaders, however, tended to criticise General Musharraf personally, and Pakistan generally, in a somewhat mocking tone. Our own public opinion reacted by finding this as somewhat un-Indian behaviour .

However, in both countries, and around the world, it was noted that the General was way out of his depth in Agra, and had failed to appreciate or comprehend the shorthand of specific words, phrases and expressions. At the same time it became clear to every observer that the General's real forte lay in managing the media. He did so through his breakfast meeting with the Indian Editors on his last day in Agra, even getting the entire meeting clandestinely recorded on a TV film. This effort was followed by the General's lengthy, meandering, somewhat non-committal press conference held on Pakistani soil immediately after his return. Each leader indicated to the other, what their respective core interests in this regard were, and that it was not feasible for them to give up the original claims with which they had commenced negotiating. All this needed to be said, as neither leader was able any longer to face his own constituency in an un-troubled, un-ruffled and self-assured manner.

General Musharraf has to worry about the Tabligi amongst his Corps Commanders. They have, until now, been his most ardent supporters. But in the matter of backing Jihadis and sectarian killings, they may or may not be able to back him up. General Musharraf is aware of the danger of Shias and Sunnis killing one another in each other's mosques on Fridays. In addition such sectarian groups have also developed a major capability of distributing small arms around the countryside. He knows too that the ISI has been deeply involved with sectarian killings, in collaboration with the *Jihadis* and the Lashkiris in his own country, and that all these in turn are connected with Taliban elements in Afghanistan. One should not be surprised if General Musharraf sees all this as a circuit, which could viciously terrorise him and

his government moving towards objectives, which are not seen by him as desirable.

Pakistan is also finding it difficult to maintain its coordination with its earlier situation as the "most allied ally" of the USA, along with its all-weather seamless friendship with China. He has reasons to be anxious about Pakistan's present parlous economic situation. The Americans and the OECD countries in general, may be expected to bail Pakistan out of her present economic predicament. But will they do this without insisting on certain conditionalities of their own? And would he be in a position to fulfill those?

In India too, the Prime Minister is facing the impossible task of coordinating the two coalitions, impeding the speed of reforms and other actions he needs to take. These two coalitions are the National Democratic Alliance on the one hand and the Sangh Parivar on the other. He has to worry also about the forthcoming and imminent elections in UP followed later by those in Bihar.

The country expects him to build an infrastructure to speed up the process of reforms and further liberalise the country's economy. India has been aware for some time now that it is not Pakistan by itself that we have to deal with. China and Pakistan have structured, planned and fuelled anti-India approaches and tried to demonstrate to us their perspective and leverage vis-a-vis South Asia. Occasionally both these societies tend to congratulate themselves for their capacity to force India into a situation of democratic disarray, which suits both of them. It is by now clear that the two leaders, Vajpayee and General Musharraf, are to meet in New York during the UN General Assembly session and will thereafter also have some interaction at the SAARC Summit. Gradually Pakistan will need to learn the impossibility of getting its own way in respect of Kashmir in a great hurry.

Three different sets of arguments have emerged during the deliberations. Two more sets of arguments could be put forth. One is the nuclear dimension between India and Pakistan. As Lt Gen Hazari says, there is a need to create capability to increase the cost of Pakistan's proxy war against India. When we are strong, a punishment could be meted out. The second fundamental aspect

is that, the progress in India should be seen as a tale of two coalitions. The Prime Minister has to coordinate the views of coalition partners. It becomes difficult for the coordinator to take a well thought out futuristic line in political, diplomatic, military and strategic matters. No such constraints have been observed in China. Diplomacy is the science and art of bringing to the discussion point anything that appears totally insoluble.

I am in agreement with K Subrahmanyam that enough time was not set aside to work out the thrust and direction of the summit. There were even doubts as to whether it was a summit, station or a retreat. The Kashmir problem as such has only two peers – the Irish problem and the Israeli-Palestinian problem. All such problems have a long and tortuous history. The other element of commonality is that they have aspects of national constitutional laws. They have aspects of evolution of national politics affecting perceptions of sovereignty in each state. Religion, ethnicity and language in each of these countries too have a role to play in the conflict. Reportedly, some groups in India did consider trifurcating J and K since 1959. This could be a weak point for those politicians, strategists and military men who think on these terms rather than the modern concept of autonomy. There are lessons to be learnt. Territory is perhaps the most difficult aspect of any settlement. Then there are problems of economy. Is Pakistan capable of pumping crores of rupees into Kashmir?

We have promised issue of a 'white paper' on ISI; we have promised at different stages, a paper on the different areas and regions of Kashmir. Yet nothing has come till date. This has led to an absence of collation and dissemination of information on Kashmir. On the contrary Pakistan has its people down to the children in school informed with their version on Kashmir. Earlier, a far greater level of awareness on the different aspects of Kashmir problem was perceivable amongst the top Indian leadership. Today, even the Kashmiri leaders lack comprehension of the problem's backdrop. The immediacy of a solution insisted upon by Pakistan has not been countered. The areas of differences and convergence of opinion have not been analysed for our leadership. Thinking needs to be coordinated right till the highest apex level in the government.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

General V N Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The general impression was that Musharraf had won the publicity and diplomatic war, which India was not fully prepared for. He was emphatic as regards the importance of the media though he felt that the press should not be used for diplomatic parleys. The summit had reinforced the prevailing feeling in Pakistan that "Hindu Raj is cowardly" and that the Pakistanis and not the Indians know how to rule. He stressed on the need to rectify this wrong intellection.

He has always been in favour of India going nuclear – with the necessary credibility and the 'will' to use nuclear weapons. The organisation to exercise that 'will' would take some time. Nuclearisation has given Pakistan immense self-capacity to take us on. They have the option to cross *ad lib* the Line of Control fully aware that the military response that India had in 1965 and 1971 Wars with Pakistan, is no more feasible, with Pakistan being a nuclear attack capable state and the threat of its use in case we cross the line. He cautioned against lack of 'will' on our part if a Kargil-like situation is to be avoided in the future. For the sake of diplomatic victory; so many lives cannot be lost again. Had the military failed, what would have happened to this diplomatic victory? For dealing with Pakistan, he recommended domination by offensive and effective patrolling along the LoC, to attain moral ascendancy.

Lieutenant General A M Vohra, PVSM (Retd)

He focussed on the statement made by Musharraf that there could be no military solution to the Kashmir issue. However, for more than five decades, Pakistan has thrived on hatred for India and an obsession with territory. He observed that though many in Pakistan were reconciled to the *status quo* at the LoC, it does not find open expression. Views to the contrary are there from the likes of Ershad Ahmed, a former Minister and senior editor of *Jung* who stated that the LoC was unacceptable as the International Border.

Lt Gen Vohra suggested following a diplomatic course instead

of indulging in bravados. India has accepted that there is a 'Kashmir issue'. It is, however, difficult to get Pakistan to sign an international statement that they are responsible for cross border terrorism. Pakistan and India need to reconcile the problem of militancy and create an atmosphere conducive for a solution. Allotting primacy to Kashmir does not, however, necessarily imply an instant solution.

Major General R C Chopra, AVSM (Retd)

He was of the opinion that we might have to change our mindset and be prepared to face the consequences. We need to be proactive and not react all the time. He was emphatic regarding no role for Pakistan in Kashmir as it is an internal matter to be sorted out by India. We may talk about this pertaining to the POK. Suggestions, he stated, were many; what was lacking was their implementation.

Brigadier K N Singh (Retd)

He informed the audience that, according to many writers in Pakistan, India would never permit a fourth war. Highly critical of the government's hue and cry over the invitation to Hurriyat, he strongly recommended reinstating the seven lakh Pundits expelled from Kashmir, and ensuring better administration. He pointed out that according to Huntington, the Pakistan border from Kutch to Kashmir is not a dividing line between the two states but a *civilisational faultline* symbolising competing visions and conflicting worldviews. To live with it would require giving open help to the anti Taliban forces and pursual of a proactive strategic and diplomatic policy as far as Central Asian states are concerned instead of giving leeway to Pakistan to develop inroads there. He advocated taking recourse to the International Court of Justice and demanding Kargil War compensation, as Kargil was a breach of agreement between our two countries. He suggested that India should engage Pakistan in an arms race to the extent that it causes excessive strain on her economy.

Major General I J Rikhye (Retd)

He appreciated the unprecedented balanced reporting on the Summit by the media in the USA and mentioned that some other

'think tanks' were also involved in searching for a solution to remove the impasse between the two countries.

Major General LS Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd)

He was critical of India's reactive attitude and its defensiveness regarding the nuclear status. He felt that a forceful dialogue was possible only if we have an integrated national plan and make Pakistan realise that their game will not last on their terms. A positive aspect was the feeling of 'enough is enough' on Kashmir among the new generation of Pakistanis.

Commander PP Batra (Retd)

He commented on the successful application of the Principal of War regarding "Selection and Maintenance of aim" by Musharraf. He expressed his disappointment with our editors who failed to raise any worthwhile questions and wondered why the Americans, or the Russians, or the Chinese were more than interested in the Summit.

Major General Y K Gera (Retd), Dy Dir & Editor, USI

He accentuated that certain utterances by the Prime Minister, such as – India can handle cross border terrorism should Pakistan insist on it, and that if Kashmir is the core issue with Pakistan, we will tackle the core of the core issue, that is the POK – convey certain messages making it our duty to generate the wherewithal – diplomatic, economic and military – to carry through what he has said. This would ensure our credibility.

Lieutenant General V K Singh, PVSM (Retd)

He emphasised the need to brief our media before the next round of talks and ensure that the world opinion is created in our favour. For him the bottomline is "We will not give up Kashmir" and we will be prepared for a long drawn out confrontation and proxy war. He wondered whether we were succumbing to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail especially when India's nuclear forces have much wider reach. He also challenged the allegations that the Indian Army was a tired Army.

Lieutenant General P K Pahwa, PVSM (Retd)

According to him the problem was not Pakistan but Kashmir. It is the unrest there that must be dealt with to neutralise Pakistans hankerings. He pointed out that a solution to Kashmir must be from within.

Vice Admiral Inderjit Bedi, PVSM AVSM (Retd)

There was a need to analyse Musharraf in the correct perspective. Prior to the next round of talks, we require clarity in our objectives and prepare the people. The media too ought to be suitably briefed to ensure the right coverage of events.

Major General Samay Ram, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Our objectives in Kashmir were not clear. Our eloquence was from a position of weakness. In fact, India offered CBMs and Musharraf took advantage of them. He suggested that proper avenues should be created for removing the grievances of local Kashmiris to wean them away from the militants.

Comments by Shri K N Daruwalla

It must be noted that the POK is not as disturbed as the Kashmir Valley. The Agra Summit has totally neglected to highlight certain valid statements as the one made by Farooq Abdullah when he introduced himself to President Musharraf as the *elected Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir*. In the next meeting perhaps India could be in an advantageous position as in Winter, the military gets to control the Valley better. In such talks, it is vital that the Central Government is stable and negotiates from a position of strength. Pakistan would always take care while negotiating with a strong government.

Comments by Lieutenant General K K Hazari, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Whenever a reference is made to Kashmir and different options including trifurcation and so on are discussed, the geo-strategic importance of Kashmir must be remembered. It is a matter of vital importance for the country's future.

Comments by Shri K Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd)

We are as yet unclear in our minds about Kashmir. This could be blamed on a lack of knowledge of the history of Kashmir. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as in 1947 is hardly 60 to 70 years old. It came into being in 1870-1880. Gulab Singh was sold the area upto Kishanganga River and thereafter he and his successor's armed forces, between 1840-1870, occupied the rest of the area. The sole unifying factor for this area was the Maharaja. When a reference is made to Kashmir, it refers to the Valley inhabited by people who speak Kashmiri. There are other areas such as Gilgit, Baltistan, Ladakh, Jammu and Poonch. The raiders, led by Maj Gen Akbar Khan, came in from Pakistan with the intention of seizing Kashmir Valley. They did not face any resistance in Gilgit, Baltistan, nor in Poonch or Mirpur. They did not come into Jammu. The only area where they met resistance was the Kashmir Valley. The Army went in to rescue that area. The troops moved by air and landed at Srinagar airfield.

In fact Sheikh Abdullah requested Nehru to stop the Armed Forces where they were as on 1 January 1949. The reason mentioned was that he was a popular leader of the Kashmiris but did not have a following in Mirpur, Poonch, Gilgit, etc., which were dominated by the 'Muslim Conference'. He had mentioned to Dr Joseph Goldblat that a permanent solution to Kashmir lay in its division. The LoC is the ethnic dividing line. Interestingly, all of the Kashmiris are in India and none are in POK. Legally, due to the Instrument of Accession, the entire princely State of Jammu and Kashmir has been accepted by the UN. However, it is on the advice of Sheikh that Nehru allowed for the division of Kashmir, as it is today, at the LoC. Hence, we legally claim the whole of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The objective of India is to ensure that Pakistan does not use Kashmir to disintegrate India as a Union. Even Musharraf is said to have expressed these very sentiments.

India needs to be clear about the enemy's objective, which, as regards to Pakistan is not just Kashmir. Hence I have always maintained we should never accept Kashmir as an 'issue'. When Jaswant rightly maintained that Kashmir is the core of our

nationhood, this is what he meant. Hence the answer is that Kashmir will never be settled as a Kashmir issue. The real matter is the two-nation theory and Pakistan's perception. The general perception is that if Mahmud Ghori could invade India 14 times and proved successful in his 14th attempt, then Pakistan could follow the same principle. If this view persists in Pakistan, peace in the subcontinent is a long way ahead. This is something we must accept and counter. Pakistan must be portrayed to the international world as a threat to international peace and security – when they challenge the two-nation theory they are challenging the very existence of other major nations in the world. It is being done through the likes of Shanghai Six, which includes China and Russia. Their prime concern is Islamic terrorism based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran too is worried about Pakistan, so too are the Gulf States. Hence we are not viewing matters from a weak position but from a strong position. The Cold War relationships are no more there. Pressure has to be maintained on Pakistan. There is no question of discussing Kashmir resolution. We are a Nation of a billion and more and we have our problems in the North East, in Kashmir and in some other places. Also, the politicians should avoid getting into issues that they should not get into. When the *body politik* is infected by mercenaries, it has to be fought against. And, the infecting portion is Pakistan. This has to be dealt with. The crux of the problem is economic development. The problem is also with no two people having a consensus of opinion. This is confusing rather than enlightening the nation regarding the problem.

Shri S K Singh, IFS (Retd)

The infection that is referred to has been more or less cured at the time of creation of Bangladesh as a separate entity.

The Chairman concluded the discussions with an appreciation of the participation by the panelists and the audience in the task of assessing the future of Indo-Pak relations.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

Shri B RAMAN

The intelligence community of Pakistan, which was once described by the *Frontier Post* of Peshawar (18 May 1994) as its "invisible government" and by the *Dawn* of Karachi (25 April 1994) as "our secret godfathers" consists of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the ISI. While the IB comes under the Interior Minister, the ISI is part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Each wing of the Armed Forces has also its own intelligence directorate for tactical Military Intelligence (MI).

The IB is the oldest dating from Pakistan's creation in 1947. It was formed by the division of the pre-partition IB of British India. Its unsatisfactory Military Intelligence (MI) performance in the first Indo-Pak War of 1947-48 over Jammu and Kashmir (J and K) led to the decision in 1948 to create the ISI, manned by officers from the three Services, to specialise in the collection, analysis and assessment of external intelligence, military and non-military, with the main focus on India.

Initially, the ISI had no role in the collection of internal political intelligence except in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas (NA—Gilgit and Baltistan). Ayub Khan, suspecting the loyalty and objectivity of the Bengali police officers in the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) of the IB in Dacca, the capital of the then East Pakistan, entrusted the ISI with the responsibility for the collection of internal political intelligence in East Pakistan.

Similarly, Z.A. Bhutto, when faced with a revolt by Balochi nationalists in Balochistan after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, suspected the loyalty of the Balochi police officers of the SIB in Quetta and made the military officers of the ISI responsible for internal intelligence in Balochistan.

Shri B Raman is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

Zia-ul-Haq expanded the internal intelligence responsibilities of the ISI by making it responsible not only for the collection of intelligence about the activities of the Sindhi nationalist elements in Sindh and for monitoring the activities of Shia organisations all over the country after the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, but also for keeping surveillance on the leaders of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Mrs Benazir Bhutto and its allies, which had started the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in the early 1980s. In mid 1985, the ISI's Internal Political Division had Shah Nawaz Bhutto, one of the two brothers of Mrs Benazir Bhutto, assassinated through poisoning in the French Riviera in an attempt to intimidate her into not returning to Pakistan for directing the movement against Zia, but she refused to be intimidated and returned to Pakistan.

Even in the 1950s, Ayub Khan had created in the ISI a Covert Action Division for assisting the insurgents in India's North-East and its role was expanded in the late 1960s to assist the Sikh Home Rule Movement of London-based Charan Singh Panchi, which was subsequently transformed into the so-called Khalistan Movement, headed by Jagjit Singh Chauhan. A myriad of organisations operating amongst the members of the Sikh diaspora in Europe, the US and Canada joined the movement at the instigation and with the assistance of the ISI.

During the Nixon Administration in the US, when Dr Henry Kissinger was the National Security Adviser, the intelligence community of the US and the ISI worked in tandem in guiding and assisting the so-called Khalistan movement in the Punjab. The visits of prominent Sikh Home Rule personalities to the US before Bangladesh's Liberation War in December 1971, to counter Indian allegations of violations of the human rights of the Bengalis of East Pakistan through counter-allegations of violations of the human rights of the Sikhs in Punjab were jointly orchestrated by the ISI, the US intelligence and some officials of the US National Security Council (NSC) Secretariat, then headed by Dr Kissinger.

This covert collaboration between the ISI and the US intelligence community was also directed at discrediting Mrs Indira

Gandhi's international stature by spreading disinformation about alleged naval base facilities granted by her to the USSR in Vizag and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the alleged attachment of KGB advisers to the then Lt Gen Sunderji during *Operation Bluestar* in the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984, and so on. This collaboration petered out after her assassination in October 1984.

The Afghan war of the 1980s saw the enhancement of the covert action capabilities of the ISI by the CIA. A number of officers from the ISI's Covert Action Division received training in the US and many covert action experts of the CIA were attached to the ISI to guide it in its operations against the Soviet troops by using the Afghan Mujahideen, Islamic fundamentalists of Pakistan and Arab volunteers. Osama bin Laden, Mir Aimal Kansi, who assassinated two CIA officers outside their office in Langley, US, in 1993, Ramzi Yousef and his accomplices involved in the New York World Trade Centre explosion in February 1993, the leaders of the Muslim separatist movement in southern Philippines and even many of the narcotics smugglers of Pakistan were products of the ISI-CIA collaboration in Afghanistan.

The encouragement given to opium cultivation, heroin production and smuggling was also an offshoot of this co-operation. The CIA, through the ISI, promoted the smuggling of heroin into Afghanistan in order to make the Soviet troops heroin addicts. Once the Soviet troops withdrew in 1988, these heroin smugglers started smuggling the drugs to the West, with the complicity of the ISI. The heroin dollars have largely contributed to preventing the Pakistani economy from collapsing and enabling the ISI to divert the *jehadi* hordes from Afghanistan to J and K after 1989 and keeping them well-motivated and well-equipped.

Even before India's Pokhran I nuclear test of 1974, the ISI had set up a division for the clandestine procurement of military nuclear technology from abroad and, subsequently, for the clandestine purchase and shipment of missiles and missile technology from China and North Korea. This division, which was funded partly by donations from Saudi Arabia and Libya, partly by concealed allocations in Pakistan's State budget and partly by heroin dollars, was instrumental in helping Pakistan achieve a

military nuclear and delivery capability despite its lack of adequate human resources with the required expertise.

Thus, the ISI, which was originally started as essentially an agency for the collection of external intelligence, has developed into an agency adept in covert actions and clandestine procurement of denied technologies as well. The IB, which was patterned after the IB of British India, used to be a largely police organisation, but the post of Director-General (DG), IB, is no longer tenable only by police officers as it was in the past. Serving and retired military officers are being appointed in increasing numbers to senior posts in the IB, including to the post of DG.

In recent years, there has been a controversy in Pakistan as to who really controls the ISI and when was its internal Political Division set up. Testifying before the Supreme Court on 16 June 1997, in a petition filed by Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd), former Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, challenging the legality of the ISI's Political Division of accepting a donation of Rs 140 million from a bank for use against PPP candidates during elections, General Mirza Aslam Beg (Retd), former Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), claimed that though the ISI was manned by serving Army officers and was part of the MoD, it reported to the Prime Minister and not to the COAS and that its internal Political Division was actually set up by the late ZA Bhutto in 1975.

Many Pakistani analysts have challenged this claim and said that the ISI, though *de jure* under the Prime Minister, had always been controlled *de facto* by the COAS and that its internal Political Division had been in existence at least since the days of Ayub Khan, if not earlier. The ISI is always headed by an Army officer of the rank of Lt Gen, who is designated as the Director-General (DG). The present DG is Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed. He is assisted by three Deputy Directors-General (DDGs), designated as DDG (Political), DDG-I (External) and DDG-II (Administration). It is divided into the following divisions:

- The Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) : Responsible for all Open Sources Intelligence (OSINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection inside Pakistan as well as abroad.

- The Joint Counter-intelligence (CI) Bureau: Responsible for CI inside Pakistan as well as abroad.
- The Joint Signals Intelligence Bureau (JSIB): Responsible for all communications intelligence inside Pakistan and abroad.
- Joint Intelligence North (JIN): Responsible for the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and the control of Afghanistan through the Taliban. It controls the Army of Islam, consisting of organisations such as Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Al Badr and Maulana Masood Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, presently a Corps Commander at Lahore, is the clandestine Chief of Staff of the Army of Islam. It also controls all opium cultivation and heroin refining and smuggling from Pakistani and Afghan territory.
- Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) : Responsible for covert actions in other parts of the world and for the clandestine procurement of nuclear and missile technologies. Maj Gen Sultan Habib (Retd), an operative of this Division, who had distinguished himself in the clandestine procurement and theft of nuclear material while posted as the Defence Attaché in the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow from 1991 to 1993, with concurrent accreditation to the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Poland and Czechoslovakia, has recently been posted as Ambassador to North Korea to oversee the clandestine nuclear and missile co-operation between North Korea and Pakistan. After completing his tenure in Moscow, he had coordinated the clandestine shipping of missiles from North Korea, the training of Pakistani experts in missile production and testing facilities of North Korea and training of North Korean scientists in the nuclear establishments of Pakistan through Capt Shafquat Cheema (Retd), Third Secretary and acting head of mission, in the Pakistani Embassy in North Korea, from 1992 to 1996. Before Maj Gen Sultan Habib's transfer to ISI headquarters from Moscow, the North Korean missile and nuclear co-operation project was handled by Maj Gen Shujjat from the Baluch Regiment, who worked in the clandestine procurement division of the ISI for five years. On Capt Cheema's return to headquarters in 1996, the ISI discovered that in addition to acting as the liaison officer of the

ISI with the nuclear and missile establishments in North Korea, he was also earning money from the Iranian and the Iraqi intelligence by helping them in their clandestine nuclear and missile technology and material procurement not only from North Korea, but also from Russia and the CARs. On coming to know of the ISI enquiry into his clandestine assistance to Iran and Iraq, he fled to Xinjiang and sought political asylum there, but the Chinese arrested him and handed him over to the ISI. What happened to him subsequently is not known. Capt Cheema initially got into the ISI and got himself posted to the Pakistani Embassy in North Korea with the help of Col Ghulam Sarwar Cheema (Retd) of the PPP.

- Joint Intelligence X (JIX): Responsible for administration and accounts.
- Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT): Responsible for the collection of all Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) other than communications intelligence and for research and development in gadgetry.
- The Special Wing: Responsible for all intelligence training in the Armed Forces in the Defence Services Intelligence Academy and for liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies.

Since 1948, there have been three instances when the DG, ISI, was at daggers drawn with the COAS. The first instance was during the first tenure of Mrs Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister (1988-1990). To reduce the powers of the ISI, to re-organise the intelligence community and to enhance the powers of the police officers in the IB, she discontinued the practice of appointing a serving Lt Gen recommended by the COAS, as the DG ISI, and instead appointed Maj Gen Shamsur Rahman Kallue (Retd), an officer close to her father, as the DG in replacement of Lt Gen Hamid Gul in 1989 and entrusted him with the task of winding up the internal intelligence collection role of the ISI and civilianising the IB and the ISI. Writing in the *Nation* of 31 July 1997, Brig A R Siddiqui, who had served as the Press Relations Officer in the Army Headquarters in the 1970s, said that this action of hers marked the beginning of her trouble with General Beg, the then COAS, which ultimately led to her dismissal in August 1990. Gen Beg made Maj Gen Kallue *persona non grata*, stopped inviting him to the Corps Commanders conferences and transferred the responsibility for the proxy war in J and K and for assisting the

Sikh extremists in the Punjab from the ISI to the Army intelligence directorate working under the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).

The second instance was during the first tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1990-93), who appointed Lt Gen Javed Nasir as DG, ISI – a fundamentalist Kashmiri officer, though he was not recommended by the COAS for the post. General Asif Nawaz Janjua, the then COAS, made Lt Gen Nasir persona non grata and stopped inviting him to the Corps Commanders conferences. Despite this, General Janjua returned to the ISI the responsibility for the proxy war in J and K and for assisting the Sikh extremists.

During her second tenure (1993-96), Mrs Bhutto avoided any conflict with General Abdul Waheed Kakkar and General Jehangir Karamat, the Chiefs of the Army Staff in succession, on the appointment of the DG ISI. Her action in transferring part of the responsibility for the operations in Afghanistan, including the creation and the handling of the Taliban, from the ISI to the Interior Ministry headed by Maj Gen Nasirullah Babar (Retd), who handled Afghan operations in the ISI during the tenure of her father, did not create any friction with the Army since she had ordered that Lt Gen Pervez Musharraf, then Director-General of Military Operations, should be closely associated with Maj Gen Babar in the Afghan operations.

However, sections of the ISI, close to Farooq Leghari, the then President of Pakistan, had Murtaza Bhutto, the surviving brother of Mrs Benazir, assassinated outside his house in Karachi in September 1996, with the complicity of some local police officers and started a disinformation campaign in the media blaming her and her husband, Asif Zardari, for the murder. This campaign paved the way for her dismissal by Leghari in November 1996.

The third instance was during the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1997-99) when his action in appointing Lt Gen Ziauddin, an engineer, as the DG ISI, over-riding the objection of General Musharraf led to the first friction between the two. General Musharraf transferred Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, the then DDG, ISI, on his promotion as Lt Gen to the GHQ as the CGS and transferred the entire Joint Intelligence North (JIN), responsible for covert actions in India and Afghanistan to the Directorate-General of Military

Intelligence (DGMI) to be supervised by Lt Gen Aziz. It is believed that the JIN continues to function under the DGMI even after the appointment of Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed as the DG ISI, after the overthrow of Sharif on 12 October 1999. General Musharraf, as the COAS, made Lt Gen Ziauddin persona non grata and stopped inviting him to the Corps Commanders conferences. He kept Lt Gen Ziauddin totally out of the picture in the planning and implementation of the Kargil operations. After the Kargil War, Nawaz Sharif had sent Lt Gen Ziauddin to Washington on a secret visit to inform the Clinton Administration officials of his concerns over the continued loyalty of General Musharraf. On his return from the US, Lt Gen Ziauddin went to Kandahar, as ordered by Sharif, to pressurise Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, to stop assisting the anti-Shia Sipah Sahaba Pakistan and to co-operate with the US in the arrest and deportation of bin Laden. On coming to know of this, General Musharraf sent Lt Gen Aziz to Kandahar to tell the Amir that he should not carry out the instructions of Lt Gen Ziauddin and that he should follow only his (Lt Gen Aziz) instructions.

These instances would show that whenever an elected Prime Minister was in power, the COAS saw to it he or she did not have effective control over the ISI and that the ISI was marginalised if its head showed any loyalty to the elected Prime Minister.

In their efforts to maintain law and order in Pakistan and weaken nationalist and religious elements and political parties disliked by the Army, the ISI and the Army followed a policy of divide and rule. After the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, to keep the Shias of Pakistan under control, the ISI encouraged the formation of anti-Shia Sunni extremist organisations such as the Sipah Sahaba. When the Shias of Gilgit rose in revolt in 1988, Musharraf used bin Laden and his tribal hordes from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to brutally suppress them. When the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM – now called the Muttahida Qaumi Movement) of Altaf Hussain rose in revolt in the late 1980s in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur in Sindh, the ISI armed sections of the Sindhi nationalist elements to kill the Mohajirs. It then created a split between Mohajirs of Uttar Pradesh origin (in Altaf Hussain's

MQM) and those of Bihar origin in the splinter anti-Altaf Hussain group called MQM (Haqiqi – meaning real). In Altaf Hussain's MQM itself, the ISI unsuccessfully tried to create a wedge between the Sunni and Shia migrants from Uttar Pradesh.

Having failed in his efforts to weaken the PPP by taking advantage of the exile of Mrs Benazir and faced with growing unity of action between Altaf Hussain's MQM and sections of Sindhi nationalist elements, Musharraf has constituted a secret task force in the ISI headed by Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed, the DG, and consisting of Lt Gen Moinuddin Haider (Retd), Interior Minister, and Lt Gen Musaffar Usmani, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, to break the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists.

This task force has encouraged not only religious political organisations such as the Jamaat-e-islami (JEI) of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the Jamat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rahman etc, but also sectarian organisations such as the Sipah Sahaba and the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi of Riaz Basra, living under the protection of the Taliban and bin Laden in Kandahar in Afghanistan, to extend their activities to Sindh. These organisations have now practically got out of the control of the ISI. Instead of attacking the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists and bringing them to heel as Musharraf had hoped they would, they have taken their anti-Shia *jihad* to Sindh and have been recruiting a large number of unemployed Sindhi rural youth for service with the Taliban. Sindh, which was known for its Sufi traditions of religious tolerance, has seen under Musharraf a resurgence of the street power of the JEI and the JUI, which had been practically driven out of the province in the 1980s, by the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists, and has witnessed in recent months anti-Shia massacres of the kind used by Musharraf in Gilgit in 1988. Over 200 Shias have been gunned down, including 30 doctors of Karachi. The latest victims of the sectarian Frankenstein let loose by Musharraf in Sindh have been Shaukat Mirza, the Managing Director of Pakistan State Oil, and Syed Zafar Hussain Zaidi, a Director in the Research Laboratories of the Ministry of Defence, located in Karachi, who were gunned down on 28 and 30 July 2001, respectively. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has claimed responsibility for both these assassinations.

As a result of the policy of divide and rule followed in Sindh by the ISI under Musharraf, one is seeing in Pakistan for the first time sectarian violence inside the Sunni community between the Sunnis of the Deobandi faith belonging to the Sipah Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Sunnis of the more tolerant Barelvi faith belonging to the Sunni Tehrik formed in the early 1990s to counter the growing Wahabi influence on Islam in Pakistan and the Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat formed in 1998 by Pir Afzal Qadri of Mararian Sharif in Gujrat, Punjab, to counter the activities of the Deobandi Army of Islam headed by Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, Corps Commander, Lahore.

The Tanzeem has been criticising not only the Army of Islam for injecting what it considers the Wahabi poison into the Pakistan society, but also the Army of the State headed by Musharraf for misleading the Sunni youth into joining the *jehad* against the Indian Army in J and K and getting killed there in order to avoid the Pakistani Army officers getting killed in the *jehad* for achieving its strategic objective. The ISI, which is afraid of a direct confrontation with the Barelvi organisations, has been inciting the Sipah Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to counter their activities. This has led to frequent armed clashes between rival Sunni groups in Sindh, the most sensational of the incidents being the gunning down of Maulana Salim Qadri of the Sunni Tehrik and five of his followers in Karachi on 18 May 2001, by the Sipah Sahaba, which led to a major breakdown of law and order in certain areas of Karachi for a few days.

General Musharraf believes in achieving his objective at any cost without worrying about the means used. In his anxiety to bring Sindh under control and to weaken the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists, he has, through the ISI, created new Frankensteins which might one day lead to the Talibanisation of Sindh, a province always known for its Sufi traditions of religious tolerance and for its empathy with India. Musharraf is under pressure from sections of senior Army officers concerned over these developments to suppress the Sipah Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. He and Lt Gen Haider have been making the pretence of planning to do so. It is to be seen whether they really would and,

even if they did, whether they would or could effectively enforce the ban on them.

In India, there is a point of view in some circles that the only way to effectively counter the ISI activities against India is to have an Indian version of the ISI, with extensive powers for clandestine intelligence collection, technology procurement and covert actions and that the proposed Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be patterned after Pakistan's ISI rather than after the DIA of the US and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) of the UK, which are essentially agencies for the analysis and assessment of military intelligence in a holistic manner, with powers for clandestine collection only during times of war or when deployed in areas of conflict and with no powers for covert action.

The principle of civilian primacy in the intelligence community is widely accepted in all successful democracies and the discarding of this principle in Pakistan sowed the seeds for the present state of affairs there. In our anxiety for quick results against the ISI, we should not sacrifice time-tested principles as to how intelligence agencies should function in a democratic society. In the 1970s, Indian policy-makers wisely decided that the Indian intelligence should not get involved in clandestine procurement of denied technologies since the exposure of any such procurement could damage the credibility and trustworthiness of the Indian scientific and technological community in the eyes of other countries.

This is what has happened to Pakistan. Its intelligence community did some spectacular work in clandestine procurement and theft of technologies abroad. But once the details of this network were exposed, post-graduate students of Pakistan in scientific subjects, its academics, research scholars and scientists are looked upon with suspicion in Western countries and find it difficult to enter universities and research laboratories for higher studies and research or get jobs in establishments dealing in sensitive technologies. They are less frequently invited to seminars and so on than in the past. In its anxiety to catch up with India in the short term, Pakistan has damaged its long-term potential in science and technology, too.

Welfare : Battle Casualties (Part-II)

LT GEN C R SAMPATH KUMAR, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

BENEFITS FROM STATE GOVERNMENTS FOR BATTLE CASUALTIES

S. No.	State Governments	Ex Gratia	Employment	Education	House	Misc Benefits Remarks
1.	Andhra Pradesh	Rs 5 lakhs (Killed). Rs.1 lakh (Disabled).	Job to NOK (next of kin) of killed soldier and disabled soldier/his NOK.	Admission and free education in residential schools	House site 300 Sq Yards in rural/urban area. House/ Flt in urban area on cost basis out of turn.	Applicable to all battle casualties of OP Vijay in J & K, belonging to AP.
2.	Assam	Rs 5 lakhs (killed)	-	-	-	Sainik Welfare Fund
3.	Arunachal Pradesh	-	-	-	-	-
4.	Andaman & Nicobar Island	-	-	-	-	-
5.	Bihar	Rs 10 lakhs (killed)	Job to one member of family of deceased	-	-	-
6.	Delhi	Rs 7 lakhs (Killed) Rs 4 lakhs (Disabled and boarded out). Rs 2 lakhs (Disabled but	Job to one member of killed and permanent disabled boarded out	Free education to all dependents up to graduation for killed and permanent disabled	-	For those disabled the Government will give grants to meet the expenditure for mechanical aids/ equipment required

		allowed to continue in service).		boarded out. This will include technical education in all Government institutions.			to overcome the disability.
7.	Dadar, Nagar Havile, Daman and Diu	-	-	-	-	-	-
8.	Goa	-	-	-	-	-	-
9.	Gujarat	Killed (NOK) and 100% Disabled Offrs - 7 lakhs JCOs - 6 lakhs OR - 5 lakhs Parents - 1 lakh Disabled More than 60% disability - Rs 3 lakhs. 1% to 60% partial disability - Rs 2000/- for every percentage point of disability.	One dependent of the martyrs will be provided government employment on merit as an alternative to allotment of agricultural land.	Free education upto the age of 27 years for two children. The income from a deposit of Rs 1 lakh per child will be used for their education upto the age of 27 years.	(a) Plot of land in urban areas in lieu of agricultural land. (b) House worth Rs 2 lakhs for NOK of martyred soldiers. In case of officers, the family will be provided Rs 2 lakhs in cash.	Agriculture Land The widow of the martyred soldier will be allotted upto 16 acres of agriculture land irrespective of income limit in case the widow is interested in agriculture, in addition to ex gratia payment. Ex-Gratia to Fatal Casualties in Operations between 1971 and 1999 - Rs 2 lakhs.	

10.	Haryana	<p>Killed Rs 10 lakhs for (Rs 5 lakhs for widow of the martyr and Rs 5 lakhs for parents.)</p> <p>Disabled Disabled 70% and above – Rs 6 lakhs. Disabled 50% but below 70% – Rs 4.50 lakhs. Disabled less than 50% – Rs 3 lakhs. PoW/Missing – Rs 10,000/- plus Rs 1,000/- per child.</p>	A suitable job including Class - II & I to one family member of the martyrs	Free education upto Graduation level	-	<p>Ex gratia to be shared equally by widow, parents & children of martyr.</p> <p>For Operations other than OP Vijay (Kargil) Ex Gratia Killed or more than 50% disability Offrs - 25,000/- JCOs - 15,000/-.</p>
11.	Himachal Pradesh	<p>Rs 5 lakhs to Fatal Casualty of OP Vijay (Kargil).</p> <p>Rs 2.5 lakhs for more than 50% disability.</p> <p>Rs 1 lakh for less than 50% disability.</p>	<p>Job to one family member of martyr.</p> <p>Job to disabled soldier person boarded out from service.</p>	Free education to all children upto graduation level in Himachal Pradesh	-	

							ORs - 10,000/-. <u>Disability less than 50%</u> Offrs - 12,500/-. JCOs - 7,500/-. ORs - 5,000/-.
12.	Jammu & Kashmir	Rs 5 lakhs (Killed)* Rs 2 lakhs (killed) #	Job to one family member of martyr	-	-	* Applicable for permanent residents of J & K only. # To all persons who are killed during operations in J&K.	
13.	Karnataka	Rs 2 lakhs (killed & over 50% disability). Rs 0.50 lakh (wounded/missing).	Dependents of deceased considered on priority for government employment	Scholarship for children of martyrs and reservation for admission to schools/colleges	A house for Officers/JCOs and other ranks built on site measuring 60' x 40' and 30' x 40', respectively	2 acres of wet land/4 acres of garden land/8 acres of dry land or Rs 25,000/- in lieu of land	
14.	Kerala	Rs 5 lakhs (killed). Rs 1 lakh (seriously injured).	Job to one member of killed/missing/ disabled in action in State Government Service	Scholarship scheme to children of War Widows and dependents of ex-servicemen	Allotment of land and financial assistance for construction of dwelling house in deserving cases, to the dependent of deceased jawans	-	

15.	Lakshdweep	-	-	-	-	-	-
16.	Madhya Pradesh	Rs 10 lakhs for killed persons	Job to one family member of the martyr	-	-	-	-
17.	Maharashtra	Rs 5 lakhs (Killed). Rs 1 lakh in cash and remaining 4 lakhs as fixed deposit). Rs 25,000/- (20% to 49% disability). Rs 50,000/- more than 50% disability.	Job to one family member of disabled/medically boarded out	-	-	-	-
18.	Manipur	2 lakhs (killed)	Job to one member of the family	-	-	-	-
19.	Meghalaya	Rs 2 lakhs for killed persons. Rs 50,000/- for permanently disabled persons.	-	-	-	-	-
20.	Mizoram	-	-	-	-	-	-
21.	Nagaland	Killed Rs 5 lakhs for killed Officer. Rs 3 lakhs for	Immediate appointment to Class III/IV posts to one of the dependents of those	Free education including books, uniform and full hostel charges to the children of	-	-	Applicable to OP Vijay (Kargil) only

	Killed JCOs/OR. Disabled Rs 3 lakhs for disabled Officers. Rs 1.50 lakhs for disabled JCOs/OR.	killed and permanently disabled persons	those killed and permanently disabled persons studying within the state from class I to XII		
22. Orissa	Rs 2 lakhs for killed persons	Suitable employment to one family member as per their qualifications	-	Residential plot to NOK of deceased in New Capital Bhubaneswar	-
23. Pondicherry	Rs 5 lakhs to killed persons. Rs 1 lakh to disabled persons.	Job to one of the dependent members of martyrs' family	Free education for children	-	-
24. Punjab	Rs 2 lakhs for killed and for 75% to 100% disability. Rs 2 lakhs for 50% to 75% disability. Rs 50,000/- for 20% to 50% disability.	Job to one family member of the deceased or disabled with more than 50% disability	Free education for children	A plot at reserve price less Rs 5 lakhs	Applicable for all casualties

25.	Rajasthan	Widows of martyrs Rs 5 lakhs or Rs 1 lakh + land or Rs 1 lakh + MIG House. Parents of Martyr Rs 1 lakh in Fixed Deposit. Disabled Rs 25000/- + 25 bighas of land.	Job to widow/son/ unmarried daughter of the deceased and job to dependent of permanently disabled	Free education in Government Schools, College, Technical Education, Medical, Engineering Scholarship School going Rs 1800/- per year. Colleges & professional College Rs 3600/- per year.	-	Out of turn agriculture electric connection by RSEB for a land in the name of the widows and free road ways pass for widow and dependent children. Note : Applicable for all military operations wef 01 April 1999.
26.	Sikkim	Rs 2 lakhs (killed)	Government job to one family member	Admission in professional courses in State Government Educational Institutions	Allotment of a housing site	Applicable for all military operations
27.	Tamilnadu	Rs 5 lakhs (killed) for Op Vijay (Kargil). Rs 20,000/- for other operations.	Government job to one family member	Free education upto Graduation level and reservation of seats in professional colleges	HIG Flat/House worth Rs 7 lakhs to 11 lakhs. Other Operations Rs 10,000/-.	Marriage Assistance - Rs 5000/-. Annual Maintenance Grant – Rs 1000/- (One time grant - Rs 15,000/- for all Operations)

28.	Tripura	Rs 2 lakhs (killed) Rs 1 lakh (disabled/ boarded out)	Job to NOK of killed & disabled or boarded out	Free education up to College level with suitable stipend	A house and homestead land to families of killed/ disabled who are homeless	-
29.	Uttar Pradesh	Rs 10 lakhs (killed). Rs 2500/- per month pension to parents of martyr.	Government job to widow of deceased or Pension of Rs 5,000/- per month, if job not required	Free education to children upto graduation level Scholarships Rs 100/- pm upto 8th standard. Rs 200/- pm upto 12th standard. Rs 300/- pm upto Graduation.	3% of houses reserved by UP Housing Board and Development Authority	-
30.	West Bengal	Rs 2 lakhs for killed persons	-	-	-	-

MAJOR OFFERS FOR OP VIJAY (KARGIL) BATTLE CASUALTIES

Vijay Veer Awas Yojna Scheme. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA), Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India has announced the scheme under which they are providing 400 flats at Dwarka, Delhi, at subsidised rates to widows/NOK of soldiers killed and those permanently disabled and boarded out of service during various military operations since 01 May 1999. Details are as under.

(a) Eligibility.

- (i) NOK of deceased.
- (ii) Permanently disabled/invalided out of service.
- (iii) He/she should have completed 18 years of age on 30 November 1999.

(b) Mode of Payment.

- (i) 10 per cent of estimated cost with application form.
- (ii) 80 per cent of estimated cost after application is accepted.
- (iii) 10 per cent when construction has reached the roof level.

Sl No	Type of flat	Approx area	No of Flats	Approx cost	Applications Processed	Allotments Finalised
1.	Type "A" (JCOs/ORs)	90 sq mtrs	350	Rs 3.98 lakhs	135	117
2.	Type "B" (Officers)	135 sq mtrs	50	Rs 5.93 lakhs	17	17

- Note :**
1. All applications are being processed through the Regimental Centres and AG's Branch, Army HQ and forwarded to DDA for issue of allotment letter.
 2. In the case of battle casualties of OP Vijay (Kargil), who are eligible for the dwelling unit grant of Rs 5 lakhs out of NDF, the cost of the flat (in instalments) is being paid by the respective Regimental Centre to whom the grants have been released.

3. Persons who have been provided with a dwelling unit by any other agency are not eligible to apply for this scheme.

LPG Agencies/petroleum outlets. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has specially released 500 LPG distributorships and petroleum outlets for allotment to widows and NOK of persons killed in OP *Vijay* (Kargil) between 01 May 1999 and 31 October 1999. The allotments are being controlled by Directorate General of Resettlement (DGR). The DGR processes the applications received from the eligible beneficiaries and forwards the list to the ministry for issue of the Letter of Intent. The details are as under.

- (a) 500 Retail outlet/LPG Distributorship.
- (b) Eligibility - Widows/NOKs of OP *Vijay* (Kargil).
- (c) Age - 18 to 60 years.
- (d) Priority.
 - (i) Priority-I - Widows/NOK of Service personnel killed in combat with enemy.
 - (ii) Priority-II - Widows/NOK of Service personnel killed in combat zone due to enemy action.
- (e) Allotment. Selection committees (DGR & Representative of Service HQs) will recommend to MoD for vetting.

ONGC (50 Job Vacancies)

- (a) 30 for disabled soldiers.
- (b) 20 for war widows.
- (c) Can be employed at 18 work centres.
- (d) **Level of Recruitment**

Level of Employment	Pay Scale	Qualifications
CI IV	2282	Matriculation
CI III	2370/2802	Graduate/Post Graduate Diploma
CI II	4500/5000	Post Graduate

MAJOR OFFERS FOR ALL BATTLE CASUALTIES

PepsiCo India Holding Ltd.

- (a) 500 Kiosks.
- (b) Put up and maintained at their cost.
- (c) Cooling equipment may be provided free of cost (special cases).
- (d) Company to service Kiosks on a bi-weekly basis.
- (e) Some other companies products can also be sold in these Kiosks.

Sponsorship to Various Sponsors.

(a) Education.

- (i) Upto class XII - 527
- (ii) Higher Education - 27
- (iii) Vocational Training/Coaching - 278

- (b) Adoption of families - 39

(c) Employment/Rehabilitation and Vocational Training to War Widows.

- (i) Employment - 166
- (ii) Vocational Training - 32

STD/ISD PCOs. Liberal allotment to :-

- (a) Widows or dependents.
- (b) Disabled or one of their dependents.
- (c) Dependents of soldiers in captivity or missing.
- (d) Educational qualification reduced to 5th standard from 8th in case of War Widows.

ARMY OFFICERS' BENEVOLENT FUND

Army Officers' Benevolent Fund (AOBF) is a contributory fund instituted in 1951 for regular officers and made applicable to non-regular officers with effect from 1964. This fund is mandatory for all regular/non-regular commissioned officers including re-employed officers. Details of AOBF are given in Special Army Order 2/S/98. The Army Officer's Benevolent Fund is a contributory fund for commissioned officers to provide following grant/financial

assistance to the officer/the nominee/legal heir of the subscribers:-

(a) **Demise Grant.** On demise of officer (subscriber), to his NOK or legal heir.

(b) **Platinum Grant.** Retired officers (subscriber only) presently, on attaining the age of 76 years and thereafter 75 years with effect from January 2002.

(c) The Platinum/Demise grant is based on the subscriber's commissioned service, as under with effect from 01 August 1998 :-

- (i) Below 5 years service - Nil.
- (ii) 5 to below 10 years service - 12,500.00.
- (iii) 10 to below 15 years service - 25,000.00.
- (iv) 15 to below 20 years service - 38,000.00.
- (v) 20 years service and more - 50,000.00.
- (vi) Death in harness and on being
invalided out (irrespective of length
of service) - 50,000.00.

(d) Earlier cases with applicability date prior to 01 August 1997, who have not been given the grant as yet will be eligible for grant as per earlier conditions and rates. Subscriber/NOK will be eligible for one time grant out of Platinum/Octogenarian or demise whichever is earlier.

(e) This grant is automatic hence no formal application is required. However, the retired officers/NOKs are requested to intimate their postal address and Bank Account Number for updating the record and processing grants as and when due to :-

Joint Secretary AOBF
Ceremonial & Welfare Directorate (CW-8)
Adjutant General's Branch
Army Headquarters
West Block III, Room No - 76
RK Puram, New Delhi-110066.
Tel - 6196217.

ADDITIONAL WELFARE PACKAGE - PROPOSALS

Increase in Central Ex-Gratia Grant. The Central Government had sanctioned ex-gratia grant of Rs 10.00 lakhs to the NOK of Kargil martyrs, while the NOK of all other battle casualties (other than OP Vijay (Kargil)) are being paid Rs 7.50 lakhs. A large number of petitions/representations have been received from the NOK on this anomaly and other special schemes. Accordingly, ADG PS has taken up a case with the MoD for increase of ex-gratia grant from existing Rs 7.50 lakhs to Rs 10.00 lakhs for all battle casualties with effect from 01 May 1999. This will remove the anomaly in ex-gratia for OP Vijay (Kargil) and other operation battle casualties. The case is still pending with the MoD.

National Defence Fund (NDF) Package. A case was taken up with the MoD for provision of similar NDF package to all the NOK of battle casualties with effect from 01 May 1999, as was provided for next of kin of OP Vijay (Kargil) battle casualties to remove the anomaly in the financial benefits. The Government has not agreed to our proposal. However, the Army HQ has paid Rs 50,000/- as one time grant from ACWF to each eligible NOK of BCs of period 15 August 1947 to 30 April 1999 and Rs 30,000/- each to NOK of BCs after 01 May 1999. Another grant of Rs 50,000/- each sanctioned from NDF is being disbursed to the eligible NOK of BCs prior to 01 May 1999.

Monitoring of Benefits. R&W Section has now been established under AG's Branch for monitoring receipt of financial/welfare benefits from various sources by the war widows/dependents of battle casualties. This section will work as a single window and is in the process of compiling data of all battle casualties with effect from 01 January 1990 along with compensation received by their NOK. Apart from R&W Section, we have also requested AWWA to ask unit commanders' wives to monitor the welfare benefits in respect of the war widows/NOK of the BCs belonging to their unit. This will facilitate better co-ordination between the unit, Centre/Records and the widows/NOK in amicable resolving of family disputes over benefits and receipt of their entitlements from all sources.

BADGE OF SACRIFICE AND CERTIFICATE OF HONOUR

Badge of Sacrifice and Certificate of Honour has been instituted in 1999 for presentation to the war widows/ next of kin of all soldiers who have laid down their lives during various military operations since 15 August 1947. The Area HQs/Sub Area HQs and respective Regimental Centres have been asked to organise central functions for presentation of the same to the widows/NOK of Officers and PBOR, respectively. The State Governments have been approached to recognise the Badges and Certificates and accord a special priority to the holders when they interact with various government agencies for their essential requirements like allotment of land, educational and medical facilities, etc. Some of the State Governments have already issued instructions to all their concerned departments to honour the holders of the Badges of Sacrifice and Certificates of Honour and provide necessary assistance on priority.

ADVICE TO WAR WIDOWS ON FINANCIAL SECURITY

Guidelines have been issued by the AG to all the Colonels of the Regiments and to the widows/NOK by the AGI on financial management of the benefits received by them. Suggested guidelines for investment by the NOK encompass :-

- (a) Post Office Monthly Income Scheme.
- (b) National Saving Certificates (VIII Issue).
- (c) Fixed Deposits in nationalised banks and selected private sector banks.
- (d) LIC Annuity Scheme.
- (e) Public Provident Fund Scheme.
- (f) Investment in private companies.

Security of Financial Package. The widows/NOK of soldiers killed in ongoing military operations are receiving substantial financial assistance apart from liberalised special family pension and grant from ACWF, Regimental Fund/unit. To ensure safety of the terminal benefits, it was proposed that except for pensionary benefits and

other one time grants from ACWF, Regimental Fund, Formation HQ/Unit, which the widow/family members of the martyr may require for meeting initial expenditure at home, all other major terminal benefits be disbursed after three months of the occurrence of casualty. During this initial period of three months, the widows/NOK are still in a state of mourning/shock and are in no position to receive and invest the huge amounts released to them from various sources. Moreover, in a number of cases the widows are exploited, and without an understanding of long-term implications are forced to sign certain financial/legal documents thereby depriving them of their entitlements. We need to work out a comprehensive policy keeping in view the long and short term welfare plans of the widows/NOK in mind, while ensuring correct investment/utilisation of the financial package. The period of initial three months can be gainfully utilised by the Army authorities for correct documentation, financial guidance to the widows/NOK and amicably resolving family disputes, if any.

ARTICLES FOR THE USI JOURNAL

1. Members are welcome to forward articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. Articles should preferably be around 2,500 words. These should be forwarded in duplicate in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a floppy disk (1.44 MB diskette), IBM Compatible, on MS Word for Windows 97. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternately, articles may be sent through e-mail on dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations.
2. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers should enclose no-objection certificate signed by their immediate superior for publication of their articles.
3. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

Changing Goalposts : A Revamped Military Strategy

MAJ GEN E D' SOUZA, PVSM (RETD)

Introduction

George W Bush's decision to pursue the development, production and introduction of the Nuclear Missile Defence (NMD) system is well known. India was one of the few nations to give its tacit support. This decision caused many eyebrows to be raised, drawing initial criticism, until India clarified that the NMD is a defensive system and would result in a proportionate decrease in nuclear arsenals hopefully leading to total nuclear disarmament.

NMD is really an extension of Reagan's Star Wars. There have been strong reactions from nuclear powers such as Russia and China, with faint rumblings of dissent from the UK as well. The uncertainty about success of NMD and its prohibitive cost continue to raise strong protests. Most Americans have expressed concern that the odd tests undertaken have been inconclusive and the cost is anticipated to run into billions of dollars. Many Americans with military background believe that these funds could be better utilised for education and health care. Many have been openly critical of the ultimate benefits of this system if the success against a first strike nuclear attack by the 'rogue states', North Korea, Iraq and Libya, is not assured. Bush in his meeting with Putin went to the extent of suggesting an amendment to the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to enable the US to conduct its NMD tests, under the tenuous argument that it is a defensive weapon. Though the

This article is based on discussions with retired US Military Officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, concerned individuals in the USA and the UK, and articles in the mainline media by knowledgeable correspondents in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the International Herald Tribune and the Manchester Guardian during author's visits to the USA and the UK.

Maj Gen E D' Souza, PVSM is the Indian representative of the World Association of Retired Generals and Admirals (and Air Marshals) - WCARGA. He has contributed substantially to bring about awareness of environmental protection.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

US Senate has yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), its stance on NMD may well throw this treaty overboard. Bush's much touted argument is that he is pursuing NMD because of his overriding concern for the security of the USA against a first strike nuclear attack by a 'rogue' state. Yet, it was the US leading the international community that came down heavily on India for going nuclear, conveniently ignoring the fact that India has two nuclear armed detractors on its borders.

China's concern to the proposed NMD became manifest when this writer was visited by a Beijing based Deputy Secretary involved with international peace, at his residence in Mumbai, who had met him at a seminar in Manipal in November 2000 regarding need for better relations between India and China. Predictably the very first question posed was the justification of NMD! China as a nuclear power understands the attendant security and deterrent benefits. Both Russia and China are aware of the enormous costs involved to replicate such a system implying thus that the USA with the means at its disposal will have a clear advantage over other nuclear powered nations. The danger lies in the spiralling affect it will have on such nations hoping to keep up with the USA to the extent that it may well ruin their economies. The Russian economy was driven to face the spiralling challenge of a nuclear arms race with the US and its allies during Cold War when it could ill afford to do so.

Aim

The aim of this article is to ponder over the British reaction to NMD as described by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and top military brass apropos of the UK's current military thinking; the impact of NMD on the US strategic concepts and revamped roles for the military; the importance of the need for advanced strategic thinking by our National Security Council (NSC) on various threats, internal and external, being treated in an ad hoc manner on a contingency basis; and the need to hasten the appointment of the proposed CDS system.

The British View

Admiral Boyce admits being caught in a vice, between the UK's post War ally – the US, and Europe. He says, "There is the

probability of countries being able to achieve a ballistic missile system that could be fired at us. It would be irresponsible for us not to explore what is the art of the possible in dealing with this". He believes that the UK need not obtain US missile defence technology which is far from proven. NMD needs to be considered at a political level obviously referring to the ABM Treaty, which is considered the cornerstone of international strategic stability. He voices his pragmatic objection to the implications of spending billions of pounds on such a system when the existing defence budget prevents the Ministry of Defence (MoD) from attracting sufficient pilots and other skilled personnel and to provide decent barracks to the ordinary soldier.

In his opinion rather than invest in an untried and expensive defence shield, governments should engage in constructive talks with the so called 'rogue states' whose alleged threat is the rationale behind America's NMD project, such as in the case of Iraq against which the UK's ire is currently directed. He adds in this context that there is rarely if ever a military solution to problems, supporting this view based on the happenings in Macedonia. Admiral Boyce expresses his serious doubts that if NATO sends troops into Macedonia that would involve a brigade's worth of troops after a peace deal, what would happen if a civil war breaks out? The involvement of thousands of British military troops in such an eventuality would mean abandoning Exercise Saif Sareea II (Swift Sword II), planned for the Autumn of this year in Oman involving the largest gathering of British Armed Forces overseas since the Falklands War. If jettisoned, it would mean affecting the primary role of maintaining operational capability and the deployment of rapid reaction force (RRF) – the Labour Party's central feature of strategic review which is at the opposite end of the military spectrum of NMD. Interestingly, Britain's commitment to RRF was discussed at a meeting of academics in London on what comprises "Just Defence". The proponents for RRF made it abundantly clear that Britain's participation in this Euro Force, as opposed to NATO, would be to provide the command and control set-up and half the force reducing if not eliminating Europe's over dependence on the US to resolve issues affecting Europe. When questioned, he mentioned that the main component would be two armoured

divisions. What then would be the strategic use of this force? In view of the distances involved would it need to be moved by air? If so how many transport aircraft would it need to move two armoured divisions within Europe? Would the European Union (EU) have the type of aircraft like the USC5 in sufficient numbers to do so? Would the British taxpayer accept such expenditure to move RRF to areas that are of no consequence to Britain? Such a force should be prepared to move by air possibly as far East as Azerbaijan, a source of oil! Admiral Boyce comments, "I don't have a problem with the European Defence initiative. The European Union will take on relatively low level operations when NATO does not want to get engaged". On the question of the widening technological gap between the US and the Europeans, there could be serious implications in the field of military communications ending up in a possible scenario where the NATO allies cannot talk to anyone. He confirmed his rock-like support to the decision to build two aircraft carriers due to be commissioned into service in 2012 and 2015 at an estimated cost of £ 8 billion, including aircraft. There is the fear, however, that Britain would find it economically difficult to support such expenditure and in any case some felt that such a move is unnecessary. Interestingly, Admiral Boyce stated in categorical terms that Britain sees no hard evidence that the NMD technology will work and warned of the potentially devastating effect it could have on Britain's military capabilities. He insisted that both Russia and China must be included in negotiations on any new international strategic framework. In this context India must insist on the inclusion of China whenever South Asian security concerns are being discussed, a step the Western Allies, led by the USA, appear to be reluctant to take. There are clear signs that the US is now veering to the reality that China poses a significant threat not only to the USA but India as well.

The US Strategic Rethinking

The existing US strategic thinking is based on the premise of the ability to fight two major wars simultaneously for which it is geared and equipped. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) studies point to a post Cold War threat in the next decade from smaller nations that have acquired missile technology and sophisticated computers, not to mention chemical and biological

weapons. The thinking is that the next world power will be a large Asian country. In the opinion of Andrew W Marshall, father figure of RMA and head of Pentagon's office of Net Assessment, rather than attacking traditional military targets, these "street fighter states" will aim at water supplies, oil wells or even forests, ie the very basics for human survival. The US Forces should be in a position to respond instantaneously, the direction and no-warning notwithstanding. The US Armed Forces have supported the existing concept of America being able to fight two "major theatre wars" simultaneously. The Marshall recommendations will be resisted by the US Military. This sea change in strategic posture emerges from the Citadel speech where Bush said, "Our Military is still reorganized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of the new century. I am committed to building a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more on stealth, precision weaponry, and information technologies". America, he added, will never be able to mount another Desert Storm because there will probably be no time and so he recommends the need for unmanned aircraft, "arsenal" naval ship bristling with long range missiles as opposed to aircraft carriers, and land forces smaller in size but more agile and capable of rapid action.

One needs to recall the comments of Admiral Crowe, the outspoken erstwhile Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now a resource person at the US Naval Academy; Annapolis that it would not be possible to change the culture of the military overnight. Whereas he credits Marshall with being bright, his major failing and those of intellectuals of the R M A is that they have never seen a shot fired in anger and never served in the military. This is yet another lesson for India where our National Security Council (NSC) "intellectuals" lack the raw knowledge of war in all its manifestations. About the need to discard aircraft carriers, and there are many in India who think so, Admiral Arleigh Burke, erstwhile Chief of Naval Operations opines that the answer would emerge when it fails in war. Admiral Boyce on the contrary seems to think that the days of the aircraft carrier have not reached such a stage as yet.

The proposed moving of American strategic goalposts now under consideration, and strongly being recommended by Donald

Rumsfeld are :-

- (a) To win a single conflict decisively by fighting on only one front.
- (b) To defend US territory.
- (c) To deter hostilities through global deployment (a flawed concept, which would tantamount to acknowledging the US's right to be the world's policeman).
- (d) To conduct small-scale actions of limited duration (it does not specify where troops to implement such tasks should come from: the strategic reserve; or those deployed globally).

This revised strategic thinking in terms of military and budgeting, would mean a marked reduction in expenditure permitting Bush to earmark funds for the NMD system. Bush's plan to restructure the nuclear balance of power with a massive NMD has raised fundamental questions of security and defence. Many of them are technological, political and even psychological.

Lessons for India

The new US military strategic thinking has lessons for India in that focus should be on strategic concepts and not contingency planning. In the Indian context it cannot be done in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) headed by Brajesh Mishra wearing three caps, but by a well structured National Security Council (NSC) embodying an intelligent mix of intellectuals from academia, defence and similar fields who will be in a position to create scenarios of possible threats both externally and internally based on hard ground realities and relate them to a well defined and realistic strategic platform so that our Armed Forces are structured and equipped accordingly, supported by a strong economy.

In doing so we need to encompass in our strategic thinking relations with our immediate neighbours, our known nuclear adversaries and our own capability.

This leads one on to the simple conclusion that there should be no further delay in appointing a CDS to better coordinate inputs from the three Services and to render sage advice to the non-military background NSC.

Is India E-Ready?

MAJ GEN YASHWANT DEVA, AVSM (RETD)

Inspiration to write on this subject, came from two sources, viz. a report published by McConnell International, *Risk E-Business Siezing the Opportunity of Global E-Readiness*¹ in August last year and a book written by N Vittal and co-authored by S Mahalingam titled, *Information Technology : India's Tomorrow*.² Both are relevant in answering the question, "Is India e-Ready"; the former of what others think of us, and the latter what we think of ourselves, or more precisely what our vision is, what our goals are, and what our efforts are to that end.

The acme and final test of e-readiness is e-survival, how we gird up to face crises. Therefore this subject has become all the more weighty in the shadow of the horrendous calamity that has befallen Gujarat; and the human suffering in its wake, worse, the ambience of helplessness, apathy, indifference and lack of concern that prevailed. It is but appropriate that we critically look at India's resolve to become a super power in information technology (IT) and software development (SD) in the light of recent happenings. And pose the inevitable supplementaries – has *electrotechnology* the solution for crisis management; is India ready to face crises and disasters, and if so where does it figure amongst the comity of nations?

Of certain, *Electrotechnology* has the answer to all our ills. It has not only spawned digitization, networking, cybernetics and lately given us the convergence *mantra*, but also shown us new ways of doing business, conducting governance, imparting education, improving quality of life, socialising, and of significance managing crises and disasters, provided we have the will to do so.

In August last year, McConnell International in collaboration with WITSA published an e-readiness report analysing 42 critical economies for what it called "their capacity to participate in the

Maj Gen Yashwant Deva, AVSM is the author of *Secure or Perish*, a book on emerging global and national information infrastructures and their security implications.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 545, July-September 2001.

global digital economy."³ Others are either way up the ladder, or way down. India is amongst the reckoned with a mix of complements and criticism; less of the former and a good measure of the latter. McConnell report claims that the 42 critical economies it picked on "have recognised the potential of information communication technology (ICT)."⁴ They are also cognisant of the fact that they represent the source of the next phase of world economic growth. The potential competitors consist of 17 countries of Europe, 8 of Americas, 6 of Middle East/Africa and 10 of Asia Pacific.⁵ In the last mentioned, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam figure besides India.⁶ These countries comprise nearly three quarters of the world's population and a quarter of the world's GDP."⁷

The Report rates these countries on the basis of five criteria, viz. connectivity, e-leadership, information security, human capital and e-business climate.⁸ India is rated amber in four attributes and red in the fifth, i.e. connectivity, our greatest failing, ignominy of which we share with eight of the ten other Asian economies on the upswing.

There is a need to analyse the findings of McConnell Report in the broader setting of emergence of the New World Information Order, the taxonomy of digital Mall, the dot com culture, the cyber scams and other connected issues that have recently hogged the headlines. These are relevant to e-business, as indeed to challenges posed by e-governance, e-education, e-convergence, e-security and e-survival. Besides these e-parameters, a discussion is also called for on e-connectivity or e-infrastructure embracing backbone, networks, and support infrastructure.

E-Connectivity

Broadly the following are the parameters for appraisal of connectivity:

- (a) Availability of bandwidth embracing, both wireline and wireless communication services.
- (b) Network access and cost of service.
- (c) Availability of support infrastructure, e.g. power supply, ease of importing and exporting hardware and transportation.

(d) Whether regulatory mechanisms are in position and are effective?

E-backbone or availability of bandwidth is our greatest failing. The McConell Report states that even with "its reputation of a software powerhouse, India has one of the lowest tele-densities in the world, standing at 1.5 lines per 100, PC penetration is considerably lower at approximately 0.2 per 100."⁹ These figures are firstly, dated and secondly, disputable. Nevertheless, the point is made. Shri N Vittal, too, refers to absence of adequate bandwidth as our Achilles Heel. He further says that in a network the basic ingredients are connectivity, accessibility, affordability and reliability.¹⁰ It is not enough to have connectivity but the networks must also be reliable. Reliability in networks can be built by redundancy.¹¹

E-Business

E-Business is a manifestation of the network economy. E does not stand for "easy" and contrary to popular perceptions, it certainly is not an easy way of making money. E-business demands more of the professional, the technology suave and the venturesome, and less of the Smart Alec. It is capable of generating a new level of economy, both global and national. It will, of certain, raise productivity, increase incomes, and create more jobs. It calls for partnership with both the developed and the developing economies, recognition of the prevailing ambience of competitiveness, and a changed perspective on economic growth. This changed perspective is reflected in Prime Minister's address to the US-India Business Summit on 13 September 2000 at New York. He said in that gathering, "In the new dispensation, private enterprise is given maximum encouragement by the State that limits its own role to that of a facilitator and impartial regulator."¹²

A new business culture is emerging, where rules of the game are not the same as we have been accustomed to. India's worry is drift of the business environment room from an equitable, technology-driven entrepreneurship to a new variety of cyber capitalism. It is apparent from the buzz expressions that underscore the business strategies. It pioneered with B to C (business to consumer); graduated to B to B (business to business), then the

progression P to P (path to profitability); the latest is R to R (return to rationality). It is the venture capital that settles the perch. Earlier it sought ideas from the technology wizards; now it is back to Keynesian philosophy basing decisions on the rationale of infrastructure, and what is commonly referred to as "bricks and mortar" with a view to taking the plunge. According to Internet research firm e Marketer, more than 93 per cent of business-to-business e-commerce is transacted through private or proprietary exchanges.¹³ With waning of the Web euphoria, small is losing out to the large because there are no takers. Public Internet marketplaces are yielding to private sites for select groups that adhere to pre-negotiated contracts. This may well be India's impediment and anxiety.

There will be no greater folly than to venture gown-less on to the Web, hoping for others to lend us the towel. There are no friends out there, no laws either; the setting is reminiscent of the days of the gold rush. Dotcom has taken a beating; today money is in e-learning, who knows what would be in store or in vogue tomorrow.

Things are no better nearer home. One needs to study the battle royal between the fixed service providers (FSPs) and the Cellular Operators Association of India over Wireless Local Loop (WLL)-based limited mobility versus the Global Mobile Service (GSM)-based cellular services, to appreciate how money can hold back technology.

E-Governance

The parameters to assess readiness for e-governance are:

- (a) Promotion of development of e-society at a national level.
- (b) Demonstrated progress on e-government, including efforts to automate processes.
- (c) Partnerships between the industry and the government.
- (d) Level of effort to promote access for all citizens.
- (e) Efforts to bridge cyber divide.
- (f) Disturbing moves to govern the Global Information Infrastructure (GII).

A significant aspect of e-society in making is approach at policy-making level to tackle the problems that the country faces. Shri N Vittal identifies three ways that we have experimented with, viz. political, economic and social.¹⁴ The reorganisation of states, the distribution of power between the Centre and States, and the setting up of the third tier of the *panchayat raj* were the attempts at solving our problems through political means.¹⁵ The second was the Mahalanobis model with the dominance of the Nehruvian socialism, of which the whole focus was on developing a command economy with the state controlling the commanding heights.¹⁶ The third approach is through focusing on areas of social justice based on the principles of sociology.¹⁷ All these have produced mixed results.

It is only now that a venture has been made towards a new approach of seeking solutions through *electrotechnology* and *infotechnology*. The government has realised that the new approach is the instrument or facilitator of convergence of all the aforesaid approaches. It holds a greater promise in solving the problems of the country.

Information is the *raison d'être* and source-code of governance. It qualifies e-leadership, underscores what the e-society constructs, lends order and provides cohesion. The other responsibilities; e.g. national security, law and order and economic growth emanate and draw sustenance from it.

Over the last several years, a fight has been raging over the future of Internet. It seeks establishment of a global Internet governance hierarchy. Internet has become a worldwide frontier of freedom, of ideas, education, entertainment and commerce. Currently anarchy prevails and there is no one in charge. The informal processes are under pressure. There could be two alternatives; viz. either get legislation passed in over 200 countries throughout the world or let the super cop handle it. The first alternative is neither likely nor practical and the second not desirable.

The Clinton administration proposed a US based, non-profit corporation to assume the management. The corporation they picked on is called – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). It was expected that this organisation would

use "flow down" contracts that would specify every right and obligation.¹⁸

According to the US Commerce Department, ICANN was to be a globally and functionally representative organisation; to be operated on the basis of sound and transparent processes to ensure that it is not captured by self-interested factions, and provides robust, professional management. ICANN's processes were expected to be fair, open, and pro-competition. It was claimed that ICANN would have a mechanism for evolving changes in the constituency of Internet stakeholders.¹⁹

Instead of these lofty ideals, ICANN has devolved into the worst kind of power grab. The evidence is already before us. They have proposed a fee for allotment of domain names – that is a hefty sum of \$50,000 upfront for new top-level domain (TLD) aspirants.²⁰ Should this come through, it would weed out emerging companies and effectively skew the competition towards large corporations.

Antitrust laws, entrenched interests, monopolies, buy-outs, alliances and mergers further conflicted by domain wars, commercial spying, usurping intellectual property, trademarks and patents (even meditation), reflect the prevailing ambience. The Internet is unregulated, the dotcom highly competitive, and the world beset by the cyber divide, fast deepening into unbridgeable chasm. The challenge is intense; so are satisfaction levels and the reward if one makes it.

E-Security

It would be wrong to suggest that the digital economy of which every one sings paeans is a bed of roses. We now face the menace of domain wars, portal wars, content wars, hacker wars and cyber wars. These have sharpened the bite of the familiar conventional, unconventional and proxy wars, and not so familiar, nuclear wars. Then there are the Ess-abuses of the likes of spying, spoofing, sniffing, spinning (spin doctoring), spamming, stalking, sleazing and so on. The technologies are converging and unifying the techniques and the artifacts; the societies are diverging and dividing the humans; herein lies the rub.

There is delicate balance between giving free rein to the market's driving power and the demands of national security; and the Chinese manage it pragmatically. Information networks are so planned that they serve both the 'market' and the 'battlefield'. It is this convergence that lends a multiplier effect on both, the growth of the national economy and the building of national resilience. China's 'Three Golden Networks' have begun to take shape. These are:

- (a) Public Communications Network.
- (b) Economic Information Network.
- (c) China Education and Research Network (CERNET).²¹

India can boast of only Education and Research Net (ERNET),²² an equivalent of CERNET; the other two types are conspicuous by their absence. Besides the Golden Networks, China awarded a California-based Bay Networks Inc. a contract for a multimillion-dollar joint venture with the Chinese Government to build a countrywide Intranet called China Wide Web. Five cities, ie Beijing, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenyang and Guangzhou were initially connected; 50 more are planned to be connected.²³

We are one amongst the "digital dozens"²⁴ who have enacted cyber laws. India and Malaysia are cited as two significant examples of countries that have been particularly forward-looking in the realm of information technology legislation. Both are notable for the comprehensiveness of recently enacted legal frameworks designed to create predictability about information security.²⁵

E-Education

Atruism that often escapes us, is that most learning is incidental not deliberately planned – people learn without being aware of what is being learned and learn without being taught.

Most of the learning comes from data fusion. When the sensors capture data, an Analog (A) to Digital (D) conversion takes place at the myriad of processors that the body is endowed with. The data travels digitally from neuron to neuron to the highest seat of learning, the cerebrum where there is convergence. Take vision for instance. Philippe Boumard in his famous essay, "From Info

War to Knowledge Warfare : Preparing for the Paradigm Shift" writes that "neurons that participate in the building of vision only account for 20 % from the eyes' retinas, whereas 80 % of them come from other parts of the brain. In other words, 80 % of our vision is internally constructed. Vision is mostly knowledge, not information. Furthermore, this knowledge is mostly tacit; it escapes our individual or collective awareness."²⁶ He further states that "mapping, as an act of vision, is mostly derived from these 80 % of neurons, in our brains and not in our retinas, that participate in the construction of images, and help us to transform noticed and unnoticed stimuli into sense-making."²⁷ Self learning and distant learning are trendy and decidedly more attractive than the classroom for the following reasons:

- (a) Organisations are becoming flatter, leaner, and increasingly spread out, even going global. It is not possible to pull out working hands for traditional classroom instruction. This is particularly true of the defence forces.
- (b) E-learning has wider reach and can cover remote areas.
- (c) In IT, the skill obsolescence is very high and formal education just cannot keep pace with it.
- (d) The teacher to student ratio in a classroom is 1 to 30, over mass electronic media 1 to 100, whereas over interactive web, it is 1 to 200.
- (e) E-learning is for anyone, anytime, anywhere and that makes it highly cognitive, acutely current and intensely competitive.
- (f) The falling cost of computing infrastructure and rising cost of physical infrastructure gives e-learning a distinct edge. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the acclaimed bastion of academic excellence is offering free courseware on the web, an unprecedented step in education.²⁸ This may be a trend setter for others to follow.

Technologies that help in e-learning are based on three operatives, that of multimedia content, interactivity and "knowledge on demand." Convergence directs panorama of 'collective knowledge drills' and 'matches of wits'.

Estimates by the National Association of Computer Trainers (NACT) peg the overall e-learning market in India to be a whopping 3,000 crores.²⁹ No wonder everyone aspires to be on the bandwagon.

E-Convergence

E-convergence or *e-sangam* is a philosophy, a concept, and a basketful of emerging technologies all rolled in one. It has different facets. A speaker at an IETE seminar 'Convergence 2001' at Mhow mentioned that he had come across more than thirty definitions and technological expletives of the term while surfing on the Internet. It is a confluence of audio, video and text; PC, telephone and TV; wireless and wireline; networks, systems and service providers; telecommunications, IT and broadcasting. It is engineering, structuring, provisioning and vending of multi-service content. A significant example of convergence is what the Defence Services refer to as C3I, which *ipso facto* purveys synergisation, synchronisation and harmonisation of functions of command, control, communications and intelligence. Another example is Star Plus, the television programme, "Kaun Banega Crorepati" (who will become a millionaire) which is a content mix of information, communication and entertainment.

Of interest and quest are home networking, smaller and more powerful palm-sized devices, digital cameras and camcorders, MP3 devices, satellite and Internet radio, intelligent robot pets, high-speed, multi-protocol processors targeted at systems with throughput of 3G, even 4G³⁰ bps and more. There would be a paradigm shift, dramatically changing the terminal equipment, access network, core transport network and application services domains. This calls for technology wizardry, an innovative ambience, entrepreneurial disposition, a spirit of grabbing opportunity, and customer orientation; summed up as synergy between technology and the market.

In the networked or cybernetic world, systems, structures and typologies retain their identities. It is only when they converge and get diffused that true merit of a system of systems, a network of networks or a highway of highways is realised. However, the mindset is a drag and often fails to envision the whole, trained and

initiated as the mind is to doing things the hierarchical and piecemeal ways. How else can one explain the existence of three Ministries of Communications, Information and Broadcasting, and Information Technology? The Convergence Bill has created yet another hierarchy, the Communication Commission of India (CCI).

E-Survival

One thought that the days of the hierarchies, which in the past relied on structured information flow and preened on tight control of operations, are over. But Gujarat has belied all that. Disaster Management Committee is a glaring example, so is the local administration. Look at the problems that these hierarchies wrought in the wake of destruction – alarm, dread, worry and loss of self-confidence. Prediction and divination were favourite pastimes. Rumour mill was working overtime. The clairvoyance vendors were having a hay day. Gujarat is negation of the very ideation of e-civilisation.

The Times of India in its editorial on 30 January 2001, aptly titled, "Information Stone Age" mounted a scathing indictment on the tardy ways of the Disaster Management Committee and the dismal performance of the state owned AIR and Doordarshan.³¹ It opined, "The key word then is communication. The quicker the news travels, the greater the chance of saving human lives as well as restoring order. But so used is the government in taking its own time that this rarely if at all happens. We saw the same failure during the Orissa cyclone and in the aftermath of the Kandahar hijack. That this should be the state of affairs at a time India is believed to have moved firmly into the Information Age underscores the gap between reality and rhetoric."³²

The Gujarat tragedy has brought home a number of imperatives, that may yield viable technological missions and thrust areas:

(a) **Sensor Endowed Rescue.** The imperative that rescuers will be more valuable when they are equipped with sensors that sense through water, concrete, and debris in the devastated areas.

(b) **Information Carousel.** The imperative that information is the main ingredient of rescue work for survival, succour,

medical help, and sustaining morale and national pride. The information should not only be available gratis and on demand, but also be open, widely disseminated to all in real time and voluntarily contributed by all, that too in real time.

(c) **Networking.** The imperative that a network solution ensures economy of effort and concentration of work force and resources at the point of impact. The network that is visualised is between sensing, monitoring, tracking, damage control and rescuing.

(d) **Franchised Rescue Units.** The imperative that communications permit creation of an efficient organisation of smaller more numerous and autonomous rescue, relief and rehabilitation units, each with a span of activity and control defined by its role and optimal utilisation.

Of the emerging technologies, it is the seamless integration of wireless and wireline, the mobile Internet or the wireless Internet that offer immense possibilities. *Bluetooth*, for instance, supports non-line of sight transmissions, which can penetrate through concrete. It is an open specification for wireless communication of data and voice over short-range radio. It is hoped that the technologies mature and time is not far when:

(a) Calamity prediction will grow into a precise science.

(b) *Bluetooth* and Wireless in Local Loop (WLL) will replace the crisscrossing cables in the buildings, time consuming as the process is in laying, ugly spectacle that these present, and highly damage prone and vulnerable as they are.

(c) The rescue operators would voice and robot control the operations with a full-range of video conferencing from a tiny cellular or mobile in his pocket and that too much beyond the ranges that could ever be imagined.

(d) A rescue operator would have a Local Area Network (LAN) on his vest, integrating night vision, *Bluetooth*, laser range finder, video camera, Global Positioning System (GPS) and communication.

(e) Every child would sport an electronic leash.

(f) News will reach kith and kin of the disaster victims on demand and in real time – that is information and not disinformation.

As 3G approaches, the all-rolled-in-one mobile device will become a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) for the executive to manage business, for the commander to manage battle – a C2 facilitator, for a rescue leader to provide relief, for a scientist at remote sensing centre to reach out to the farmer. It was Victor Hugo who said that nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time had come. The time for 3G has come and so has it for 4G, the former to adopt, and the latter to conceptualise.

The converging technologies will push solutions, and inevitably some problems too, e.g. spectrum management and Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI). One year ago, a passenger plane crashed in Switzerland and ten people died. Investigators opine that the most likely cause was a call from a mobile phone. Imagine that phone to be WAP enabled or the Japanese i-mode or the Ericson's tiny GPRF designed to trigger a logic pulse. It makes the question, do we allow cell phones in the Valley, sound dumb.

Conclusion

The commanding influence of information revolution and the next generation technologies is perceived in weakening of hierarchies and strengthening of networks. Networking is the blueprint of the day. Networks are scientific, more democratic by persuasion, in harmony with cultural diversity and societal pluralism, and what is abundantly apparent now, the panacea for managing disasters, resolving crises, and compounding conflicts. Institutions and enterprises that work like consortiums, alliances and confederations, keep their communication channels open and take to distributed-decision-making, have greater cohesion; and survivability. It is because their structures defy rigidity and uniformity; instead they are receptive and adaptable to fresh ideas. Their information channels are kept unclogged and exploit full potential of the available information.

This then is a paradigm change sired by technology - *infotechnology*, *electrotechnology* and broadcasting and their convergence which now sits at the driver's seat. It is unlikely that it will be edged out. Jay Fenelo writes, "Remember we can't win the war if we don't control the high ground - the Internet is the high ground" This message though meant for the Americans should be equally loud and clear to us. We have to fight for these commanding heights of Internet and create our own through Intranets and then defend them. And we must resist attempts at imposition of another dubious hierarchy to control them; be it a super power, be it a meta corporation.

We have the capacity to achieve the coveted super power status in IT and SD, provided we have the will to do great things together.

Notes

¹ See report published by McConnell International conjointly with WITSA, *Risk E-Readiness: Seizing the Opportunity of Global E-Readiness*.

² N Vittal and S Mahalingam, *Information Technology, India's Tomorrow* (New Delhi : Manas Publications, 2001).

³ n. 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ n. 2, p. 39.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See PMO Press Release, dated 13 September 2000.

¹³ Elise Ackerman, "The art of the B to B deal," *San Jose Mercury News*, 4 September 2000.

¹⁴ n. 2, p. 21.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See Domain Name handbook of ICANN at <http://www.domainhandbook.com.icann.html>.

¹⁹ John Fensterwold, "Dot-helpful descriptive domain names," *San Jose Mercury News*, 24 August 2000.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Wang Xusheng, Su Jinhai and Zang Hong, "China's Information Revolution, Defence Security," *Beijing Jisuanji Shijie (China Computerworld)* in Chinese, 11 August 1997. The authors are from the PLA Academy of Electronic Technology. Also see Yashwant Deva, *Secure or Perish* (New Delhi : Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd, 2001), p. 193.

²² Ibid, p. 60.

²³ Gary Chapman, "China Represents Ethical Quagmire in High Tech Age," *The Los Angeles Times*, 30 January 1997. Also see Yashwant Deva, Ibid, p. 194.

²⁴ n. 2, p. 162.

²⁵ n. 1.

²⁶ Philippe Boumard, "From InfoWar To Knowledge Warfare : Preparing for the Paradigm Shift."

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ "MIT courses go online - for free," *The Times of India*, 5 April 2001.

²⁹ See Tina Chopra Karkarkhanla, "After dotcoms, entrepreneurs eye e-learning," *The Times of India*, 15 January 2001.

³⁰ 3G and 4G stand for third generation and fourth generation wireless technologies.

³¹ "Information Stone Age," *The Times of India*, 30 January 2001.

³² Ibid.

Allotment of Gorkha Regiments to the British Army in 1947

MAJ GEN D K PALIT, VrC (RETD)

It is sometimes asserted by former British Officers of pre-war "Gurkha"* Regiments of the Indian Army that at the time of handing over to the successor governments in 1947, the British had hoped to transfer all their regiments of "Gurkhas" to the British Army; what had stood in the way was Nehru's (and his Government's) reluctance to permit any such move. There is no substance in this assertion. It is a convenient hindsight reconstruction as a cover-up for the awful and unacceptable truth that, given the option, the Indian Army's "Gurkhas" refused to transfer to the British Service. Furthermore, the fact is that Independent India did not need Gorkhas* or any other foreigners in her Army; our only reason for continuing to recruit them was to help Nepal, which benefited economically (and have continued so to benefit) by our decision.

It is nowadays conveniently forgotten that prior to 1947, Indians – civilian or military – knew little about Gorkhas. As a matter of imperial policy they were never allowed any contact with the Indian Army's exclusively British-officered "Gurkha" Regiments, who were kept totally segregated from other units; and, of course, they were never "Indianised". Till the departure of the British in 1947 no Indian officer was ever given the opportunity of getting to know Gorkhas, let alone officer them. Indeed, there was very little occasion to do so, because in the normal course of duties and postings before World War II, "Gurkha" Regiments (unlike all other units of the Army) were never stationed in any of the normal cantonments in India. They served either in their isolated and privately owned "regimental estates" in the Kangra Hills, Dehra Dun or Almora (which were allotted to them as their private property - by Royal Warrants issued during Victoria's reign for their pro-British services

*The British persistently mis-spelt and mis-pronounced the word as "Gurkha"

Major General D K Palit, VrC is a former DMO. A strategist and analyst of repute, he has authored a number of books pertaining to defence.

in the Mutiny); or the only place to which they were sent for active service – the North-west Frontier and Baluchistan. As a result, the British-officered "Gurkha" Regiments never met any serving Indians. The desire to keep the Gorkha people politically "untainted" by contact with Indians was so obsessive that (in total reversal of logical selection of recruits such as we follow in Indian regiments) British officers of the "Gurkhas" would not permit sons of their Jemadars, Subedars or NCOs born in the regimental lines (or in Gorkha settlements around their home stations) to be recruited because they mixed with Indian boys of the cantonment or in the local schools. Such children were termed "Line Boys" – used as a derogatory term, amounting almost to abuse. The British restricted their intake of recruits almost exclusively to the gauche and illiterate hill-billies from the remote fastnesses of Nepal.

While in service, Gorkhas were encouraged to interact only with British troops who gradually built up a comradeship with these cheerful hillmen from Nepal, addressing them fondly as "Johnny Gurkhas". It was inevitable in these circumstances that, taking their cue from BORs, the Gorkhas also affected to look down on the "natives". Furthermore, after the Mutiny of 1857, the British were determined to use their "Gurkhas" in preference to British troops to shoot down recalcitrant Indians, a task they performed efficiently and unquestioningly - as at Jhallianwala Bagh in 1919.

India has never had any shortage of recruits for her Armed Forces. On the contrary, for every man the Army takes in, it has to turn five away disappointed; and much of the material we thus turn away when later recruited still constitute some of the most disciplined, hard-living and contented soldiers in the world. Admittedly the Gorkha fits in well with this community; but let it not be thought that he is the best that we have. Unbiased opinion today holds that, all things considered, the Gorkha comes about half-way up the ladder of desirable material for regimental soldiering - below the Maratha and the Dogras, for example, but ahead of some of the other classes.

In 1947 we did not need Gorkhas or any other foreign troops, because the Government had earmarked the Army for a drastic

reduction in strength. It had been planned to reduce the post-Partition strength of the Army from about 600,000 to 150,000 – the last thing we needed was to have to take foreign mercenaries. Nehru was quite certain that independent India had no enemies and would not need a large army; indeed, he is reported as having expressed the view that India really did not require an army at all – the police were all that we needed for our security! In fact it was the 1948 War with Pakistan that saved the Indian Army from virtual extinction.

At the Indo-Nepal-British negotiations held in Kathmandu in the Spring of 1947 (to decide on future allocation of Gorkhas) the Indians agreed to let Britain have four Gorkha regiments, each consisting of two regular battalions – a total of eight; whereas India retained not only all the regular and war-raised battalions of the other six regiments (some forty altogether) but also absorbed the surplus Gorkha troops thrown up from non-optees of the British regiments, nearly all of whom (over 90 per cent), when given the option, refused to transfer to the British Army – greatly to the surprise and chagrin of the Brits.

The British could probably have negotiated a larger allotment of Gorkha units were it not for the lack of subtlety displayed by the War Office team under General Lines, who came to negotiate the transfer. He grossly overplayed his hand. When they arrived in Nepal, the Brits took the two Indian negotiators to stay with them at the British Embassy in Kathmandu (India having no Embassy of her own at that time); and once there, they kept them virtual prisoners, not permitting them to go into Kathmandu – in case they tried to make contact with the Nepal Government. Clearly, it was this high handedness that led Mr GS Bajpai, Indian Foreign Secretary and leader of the Indian delegation, and Major General AA Rudra, his co-member, to teach the British team a lesson. One day, escaping from their "guards" under the pretext of making a pilgrimage to the sacred Hindu shrine of Pashupatinath (where the Brits could not accompany them) they went into town, made contact with the ruling Rana clan and instantly established a strong rapport. When finally the Cabinet of Ranas, the two Indians and the British War Office representatives met to discuss the transfer

of Gorkha units to Britain, the Maharaja Prime Minister of Nepal, Padma Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, sensitive to the winds of change in the subcontinent, went out of his way to welcome Bajpai in an informal, friendly manner – while keeping the British team at a polite but formal distance.

The British in their presentation to the Nepal Cabinet mindlessly kept harping on the "goodies" they would offer their Gurkhas when they joined the British Army – air travel to and from Nepal, and luxury living in post-war Malaya and Singapore barracks. The Indian team very simply offered the Gorkhas what they really wanted – total equality with Indians, including status as commissioned officers for qualified personnel – something the British had not even dreamt of doing. It was this all-important psychological factor, combined perhaps with reluctance to go back overseas after five years of active service in World War II, that led over 90 per cent of Gorkha personnel of the units earmarked for the British Army to turn down the offer and opt to remain with the Indian Army.

The Government of India agreed to permit eight battalions (of the fifty-six war-time Gorkha units) to transfer to the British service; but the Nepalese Prime Minister insisted on laying down the condition that no Gorkha soldier would be made to leave the Indian Army if he did not wish to do so. This is why referendums were subsequently held in every battalion chosen to transfer to the British service – with disastrous results for the British. Thus, the "battalions" that went to Malaya and Singapore were just skeleton cadres – each with a few officers and a handful of GOs and non commissioned officers (NCOs). These cadres were eventually made up to strength and, together with newly-raised support units of all arms and services, were later formed into a Gurkha Division with much fanfare and publicity. But a post-War Britain, greatly reduced in power and with diminishing influence on the international scene, had gradually to cut down its armed forces. In the process the British Army shed most of the components of its Gorkha element. By the 1990s, it was reduced to just two battalions of infantry, which is the British Gurkha strength today (not counting the battalion of British-officered Gurkha troops in the service of the Sultan of Brunei). It is likely that soon after the turn of the century

even this last vestige of interaction with Nepal will be abandoned. In contrast, the number of Nepalese citizens we recruit in our Army has kept steadily increasing. From the 28 battalions in the Indian Army in 1947, the present strength is 40 battalions and four Regimental Centres, not to mention Gorkha elements in the thirty battalions of Assam Rifles and in our Corps and Services, stationed all over India. Pay and allowances of these personnel make a significant contribution to the economy of Nepal today.

The Gorkha battalions in the Indian Army serve with total equality and under the same terms and conditions as other units. They are sent to locations throughout the country and to operational areas in Kashmir and on the borders. There are no reservations whatsoever; and they are given no special treatment. Nepal's Gorkhas have served with distinction in all our wars and they have formed parts of the Indian Army contingents sent to foreign countries on United Nations or other international duties. Many battalions have been commanded by ethnic Gorkha officers. They have blended completely into the Indian Army culture and while in Service integration with Indian and Indian-domicile Gorkha troops is absolute.

RECENT USI PUBLICATIONS

1. **Low Intensity Conflicts in India**
by Lt Gen VK Nayar, PVSM, VM (Retd). Rs. 275.00
2. **Joint USI – CISS Seminar**
*Asian Security and Role of
Outside Powers in the Region.* Rs. 75.00
3. **USI NATIONAL SECURITY SERIES-2000** Rs. 250.00
A bound book containing the following:
 - (a) *Lecture* – Sino-Indian Relations
in the New Millennium : Challenges and Prospects.
by Ambassador C V Ranganathan, IFS (Retd).
 - (b) *Seminar* – Effectiveness of the
National Security Council and Associated Bodies like
the National Security Advisory Board.
 - (c) *Paper* – Rising Fundamentalism :
Implications for National Security.
by Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM (Retd).
4. **USI Digest – Mar 2001 – Aug 2001** Rs. 75.00

The Middle Sector of the Sino-Indian Border

Shri SAHDEV VOHRA, ICS (RETD)

The Sino-Indian border has for purposes of discussion been divided into three Sectors. The Western Sector lies in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Eastern Sector lies on either side of Bhutan. The Middle Sector relates to the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. When India and China signed the Treaty of 1954 regarding border trade with Tibet, the Treaty named six passes as specified for the border trade and for pilgrim traffic. Of these one, Shipki, relates to Himachal Pradesh, and the other five, Mana, Niti, Kingri-Bingri, Darma and the Lipu Lekh – lie in Uttar Pradesh. The area of major difference lies in Ladakh-Aksai Chin, and in the Eastern Sector vis à vis the McMahon Line. However, it is reported that the Sino-Indian Border Commission has exchanged maps on the Middle Sector alone. The rationale for making a beginning with the Middle Sector may be that the line is for the most part undisputed and there are only small pockets of territory on which China has laid claims in the past. Moreover, in the period since the border War of 1962, there have been statements of the two sides “accommodating” each other in a border settlement in respect of the other two sectors.

It should *prima facie* be easier to come to terms with regard to the Middle Sector. For one thing, the watershed here is clear and formed by one of the Himalayan ranges. In the discussions held in 1960 between the officials of the two countries, however, the Chinese side departed from the water-shed principle in such pockets as Chuje in Spiti which refer to Kowrik and Gyu. They also raised the issue with regard to Bara Hoti South of the Niti Pass in Uttar Pradesh, which in fact was intruded upon by China in 1954 soon after the signing of the Treaty of 1954. Another area which China had intruded into was the Hupsong Khad South of the

Shri Sahdev Vohra served in the ICS. He is the author of *The Northern Frontier of India – The Border Dispute with China*.

Shipki Pass on the Himachal Pradesh road called the Hindustan-Tibet Road. This intrusion took place soon after the one into Bara Hoti.

The Indian side had offered a joint visit to Bara Hoti to show it was located in the area south of the Niti Pass. Such a visit should now be arranged to prove the Indian case. Likewise, in the case of the Shipki Pass, a visit should convince the Chinese that it lies South of that Pass. The records available with the Government of India show that in 1888 some Tibetans came to Bara Hoti and were chased by Indian troops. Thereafter the Tibetan district magistrate (Dzong Pon) barred Indian (Bhotiya) traders from going to Takikot. But the matter was settled amicably. According to Tibetan records also it is claimed that Winje, Sangcha, and Lepthal are within Daba dzong "which continually, sent people to Niti, to Jonam, etc., South of Wuje, Sangcha and Lepthal to inspect the persons and cattle going to enter Tibet". This cannot be construed as a claim that it was part of China.

The rest of the Chinese claims in the Middle Sector relate to Uttarakhand district which was formerly the State of Tehri Garhwal, and the area called Chuje in Kausik and Gya of Spiti in Kulu subdivision of Himachal Pradesh. The claim in respect of former Tehri Garhwal relates to Nilang-Jadhang villages and the market Puling Sumdo. These areas are also referred to by the Chinese as Tsingsha.

The Tehri Garhwal State kept detailed records for revenue regarding their areas and these included records of Nilang-Jadhang showing village boundaries and all other relevant data, and describing the boundaries of the villages. "The revenue records cited for Nilang-Jadhang were of a very detailed character, covering the years 1868-1951". These records provide a list of camping grounds of Taknore Patti, of which Pulam Sumdo is one.

In case of Chuje in Spiti where the Chinese claimed that the boundary should be at the junction of the rivers Spiti and Para, the records maintained of successive revenue settlements deal with Chuje Kothi from 1847 onward and are detailed in the Kulu settlement report of 1913. Subsequent revenue records also show regular revenue collections from Chuje.

The Chinese allege that Chuje was occupied by India in 1958. Yet they never lodged any protest about it. The fact of the matter is that the British were lenient in respect of such border disputes and believed in settling them at the officers' level in the border region. It was in that spirit that when, for instance, in 1926 negotiations regarding Nilang-Jadhang took place, even though both sides recognised the traditional alignment, both sides were amicable.

There is a good case for setting the boundary in the Middle Sector therefore on the principle of the watershed. Such a principle cannot be accepted in case of the Brahmaputra because it turns into India after taking a bend, nor can it be applicable so clearly in case of Ladakh, where the disputed territory provides the source of rivers flowing South to join the Indus, as well as rivers going north into Sinkiang. In case of the Middle Sector, the normal principle of the watershed is eminently operative.

There is good scope for increased border trade along the routes defined by the six passes enumerated in the 1954 treaty. It will increase prosperity and normal relations among the Bhotiyas of India and the Tibetan people. Moreover, it will be a good augury for a suitable political settlement of the border in the other two sectors. As Chou En Lai wrote in 1959 to Nehru, "The Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line, and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter". This was written in January 1960. While the Middle Sector is up for settlement, the real issue is the political one of a *quid pro quo* between the two countries over Aksai Chin and the McMahon Line.

Letters to the Editor

INDIGENISATION OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Kindly refer to article on "Indigenisation of Defence Industry" written by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) in the *USIJ* of April-June 2001. At the time of independence all the 19 OFs were located in India. Even though we have doubled this infrastructure, the overall efficiency of these factories is far from satisfactory. These cannot be termed as 'sound' infrastructure for our defence requirements. These factories need to absorb latest technology to meet the futuristic targets in time. Better management at the senior level and discipline in the work force is essential. Pakistan's ordnance factories headed by a Lt Gen and comprising as much as 30 per cent of uniformed personnel in key manufacturing units have managed to export military hardware worth US\$ 30 million last year.

The monopolistic tendencies of the defence PSUs need to be curbed if the private sector is to be encouraged to participate in defence production. The MoD should ensure a level playing field to build the confidence of the private industry. The defence PSUs need to evolve a strategy to 'share' with private industry rather than fear their dominance.

If the goal towards indigenisation is to be made realistic there is a need to invest substantially in defence related R and D. It is a sad state of affairs that even profit earning defence PSUs are investing less than five per cent of their turnover in R and D related activities. Production dependent on transfer of technology (ToT) from friendly countries is a short term solution for a developing country. Indigenous defence R and D related activities need a boost if we are to become self reliant in defence production in the time frame visualised in the paper.

Major AS Grewal

II

PROCUREMENT OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT

With reference to Admiral Tahiliani's article on Tehlka Tapes in the April-June 2001 issue of *USIJ*. There has hardly ever been acquisition of a major weapon system without raising the allegation of kick-back. Bofors was not the first such deal. Bofors became a unique issue due to a fall-out within the Congress ranks and a stout denial by Rajiv Gandhi. His predecessors had deflected such allegations by appointing an Enquiry Committee. By the time the Enquiry Report was received and studied by the Government, everybody had forgotten about it. Since all the political parties were sailing in the same boat, there was no worthwhile attempt to follow up the allegations. There has been a welcome change in acceptance of corruption by the political parties. Prosecution of the former Prime Minister and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister might bring in some caution and improvement in the degree of corruption.

Even if we assure a corruption free environment, difficulties in Arms acquisition process arise due to -

- (a) Change in threat perception.
- (b) Bureaucratic delays, during which period new technologies emerge. This might render the Project obsolete even before launch.
- (c) Production delays.
- (d) Limited R and D resources.

The first step in the programme is to finalise a Qualitative Requirement (QR) which defines the specifications. These are based on a copy of the equipment available in the West and the information comes to the Services in bits and pieces through magazines or brochures from foreign manufacturers. The Services require the equipment by a certain date. The R and D and production agencies accept the commitment and promise the moon even when they know the task to be beyond their capability. This

is done to block any attempt to import or to float enquiry to the private sector. The promised date keeps on being pushed forward with no sense of accountability and responsibility. That is how the MBT 80 became MBT 90. We are not sure today about its effectiveness against the Al-Khalid tanks of Pakistan, which has perhaps been pioneered with assistance from China. The major objective is to aim for indigenous production. In order to save time, there should be no bar on acquiring patents from abroad and concentrate own R and D efforts on critical technology which is not available from the foreign countries.

Brigadier A Thyagarajan (Retd)

III

WOMEN IN UNIFORM

This is with reference to Dr Anita N Arya's article "Women in uniform : Gender Dialectics in the Indian Armed Forces" (Part-II) in the April-June 2001 issue of the *USI Journal*.

I am totally outraged with her recommendations in the article. She is a non-combatant civilian who is making all these recommendations on the basis of her knowledge which she has gained from papers. She has no experience of combat situation.

The chunk of cushy postings, which these lady officers have taken, has definitely affected the morale of male officers because these lady officers are not sent to remote field stations whereas male officers after hectic and physically demanding field tenure, look forward to cushy postings to rest and to catch up on their family life. These cushy postings in fact are good motivations which are no longer there for male officers.

A fresh insight is required to analyse whether we still require lady officers in the Army.

Captain S Marwaha

Reflections on Kargil*

LT GEN AM VOHRA, PVSM, (RETD)**

Pakistan finds it difficult to accept the fact that the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, with a Muslim majority, should have acceded to India. It, therefore, organised and launched the tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947 which later turned into a direct conflict between the armies of India and Pakistan. The 'stalemate' has continued since the ceasefire of 01 January 1949 with periodic Wars in 1965 and 1971. A proxy war has been waged since 1989 and in 1999, Pakistani forces crossed the LoC and occupied important heights in the Dras-Kargil-Batalik-Turtok area with a view to cut off the Ladakh division. *Kargil : The Tables Turned* covers this War of 1999.

"The Kargil conflict", Chari observes "marked a qualitative difference in the pattern of hostilities; surreptitious intrusion of regular Pakistani troops across the LoC... occupying and fortifying a large number of posts on the Indian side of the LoC" Ashok Krishna quotes Altaf Gauhar to point out that this intrusion was 'scripted in 1987' and opposed by Sahibzada Yakub Khan at the formal war committee meeting. As per Nawai-waqt story, this plan was revived for Nawaz Sharif's consideration when the Army Chief, General Jahangir Karamat, declined to endorse it. However General Pervez Musharraf decided to implement it in 1999.

Suba Chandran raises the issue of whether the Kargil War was an independent initiative by the Pakistan Army and quotes Musharraf to the effect that Sharif "had full details of what was happening on the LoC – from the very start" and had approved the Army's operations "absolutely". This statement was published in the *News* of 17 July 1999 well before the October 1999 coup. In this chapter, a number of pertinent issues are raised but not

**Kargil : The Tables Turned*. Edited by Major General Ashok Krishna and PR Chari (New Delhi : Manohar, 2001), pp 341, Rs. 700.00, ISBN 81-7304-366-X.

** Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM, is the former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.

answered convincingly. Chandran is justified in observing that as per the Lahore Declaration both governments agreed to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. He observes that "Inside Pakistan, there was a view that 'if the Vajpayee government had not been unseated, negotiations between India and Pakistan would have commenced under the Lahore process and, in that case, the Kargil operations might not have taken place".

In his preliminary observations Chari raises the issue whether two nuclear weapon states can fight a conventional weapon war without crossing the nuclear threshold. Ashok Krishna refers to Western analysts predicting Islamabad considering the nuclear option; should India open another front, lest it be put in a 'use it or lose it' situation. These views ignore the nature and role of nuclear weapons. Without getting involved in the behavior of a "rogue" state, suffice it to say that neither Pakistan nor India are ignorant of the rationale of nuclear deterrence which permits a conventional war between two nuclear weapon states. The palliative statements made by the leaders in India and Pakistan deserve to be taken seriously. This issue is referred to again in chapter 4; and certain rational conclusions rubbish the theory of South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint.

Ashok Krishna gives a useful backdrop of the topography of the J and K as also of the three wars of 1947/48, 1965 and 1971. He observes that the 1972 Simla Agreement may have served India better, "had tacit understanding been recorded in definitive terms". He draws attention to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Machiavellian objective of keeping India on the defensive and destabilising it; and goes into India's political miscalculations in the 1980s; which abetted Zia's plan of insurgency and proxy war. The Pakistan Army's plan for Kargil intrusions, *Operation Badr*, is dealt with in some detail. He surmises that Pakistan's "strategic and diplomatic aim was to bring back the J and K issue into focus because global attention had been flagging". His analysis of the Pakistani Plan covers the strengths and troops earmarked including the SSG (Special Services Group) and eighteen to twenty batteries of artillery as also the mode of infiltration. Underestimating one's foe is a failing that Pakistan indulged in 1965 and again in 1999 as can be perceived

from certain utterances of General Musharraf in his address to the Kharian Mangla garrisons on 29 October 1998: "Do not be carried away by the rhetoric of the Indians, whose armed forces are totally exhausted and whose morale is at its lowest".

The intrusion achieved surprise and, on 9 May 1999, accurate artillery fire was directed by the observation posts established by the intruders on the Srinagar-Leh highway and settlements around Kargil and Dras. Day to day developments and actions from 3 May 1999 onwards make an interesting and gripping reading. The gallant and heroic deeds of the officers and men of our Army are well captured.

The 4th chapter records valuable lessons. "India's strategic intelligence failed"; Pakistan's war like activities in the Northern Area; Skardu and Astor either went undetected or correct deductions were not drawn. Critical shortages including vital spares and ammunition for 'Bofors' and procrastination over import of night vision devices, thermal imagers and snow goggles are other points made. The question of manning high altitude posts, use of monitoring and surveillance systems as also the need for a 'National Manpower Policy' are useful issues discussed. Pertinent issues are raised and suggestions made. In the ultimate, there is a limit beyond which India cannot tolerate Pakistan's antics or allow Pakistan to carry out its proxy war unhindered. Dimensions varying from stoicism, passive defence to proactive response comprising of reprisals, pre-emption and retribution must be considered. Such views are indeed held by many thinking people. Is the price being paid by "stoicism and passive defence" more acceptable than the consequences of pre-emption and retribution? A good case is made for hiking defence expenditure to 3 per cent of the GDP.

Arpit Rajain considers 'India's Political and Diplomatic Response to the Kargil Crisis' and Suba Chandran depicts the 'Role of the United States', who left no doubt in the mind of Pakistan that "the Indians are not going to cede this territory", and urged talks "as soon as possible". The Zinni mission's main task was to ask Pakistan to withdraw the infiltration from the Indian side of the LoC. According to Jaswant Singh, the US support to India on Kargil was "both a recognition of the correctness of India's case and the folly of Pakistan's misadventure."

"Contextualizing Kargil within China's Security Paradigms", Bhartendu Kumar Singh and Satyajit Mohanty observe that China adopted a balanced and neutral stand. Unlike the 68 countries (excluding Japan), China did not blame Pakistan for the infiltration of militants across the LoC : it pleaded with both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint. Li Peng firmly told Sartaz Aziz on 11 June 1999 during his visit to Beijing to settle the dispute with "India peacefully through dialogue and negotiations". An important and interesting point made in this chapter is that "the Chinese leadership is totally averse to the idea of self-determination". Similar demands could be made in respect of Tibet or Taiwan.

Malika Joseph looks into the G-8 stand and examines the Cologne communique of 20 June 1999. These countries expressed concern over military confrontations following infiltrations which violated the Line of Control, and regarded military action to change the status quo as irresponsible. It called for the restoration of the Line of Control and resumption of talks in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration.

India perforce has to deal with its nuclear neighbour. Chari concedes the centrality of the Kashmir issue and suggests CBMs being emplaced between the two countries. In the last chapter, A number of constructive suggestions are made. However, it will be necessary to agree on some initial measures, for instance a tacit agreement to control insurgency and a corresponding decrease of forces in the J and K.

A very well researched and analytical account of the Kargil War.

Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan*

LT GEN R SHARMA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)**

This compilation of essays authored by Maroof Raza and other eminent scholars is thematic of the emerging South Asian nuclear scenario, perceived in the military take-over in Pakistan by General Pervez Musharraf. Extensively researched, the book chronologically analyses the divergent civil-military equations that have evolved in Pakistan and India, though both inherited the legacies of the 'British Raj'. Maroof covers the main theme in the opening chapter titled "Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan" and writes that "the cumulative bitterness, frustration and pain that accompanied Pakistan's creation, and the continued threat to its existence from neighbouring India has conditioned much of its history since 1947.

Pakistan came into being with major contradictions – an Islamic Republic yet irreconciled with its ethnic, sectarian diversities; a parliamentary democracy run by autocratic Governor Generals and Presidents. Thus Pakistan drifted into praetorianism from its constitutional instabilities and as a prop for Punjabi hegemony; much less for animosity towards India. Raza rightly refers to the missed opportunities when firm democratic rule could have been established in Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972-77) and Nawaz Sharif (1996-1999) were both elected with massive mandates, but they over-reached themselves by ruling through an autocratic, corrupt oligarchy.

Raza highlights the stable civil-military relationship in India, rooted in the professionalism and loyalty of the Armed Forces to a mature parliamentary democracy. No doubt Pandit Nehru and

***Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan.** Edited by Maroof Raza (New Delhi : Har Anand Publications, 2001), pp. 150, Rs 250.00 (hb) ISBN 81-241-0762-9.

** Lt Gen R Sharma, PVSM, AVSM is a former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.

Indira Gandhi provided a durable democratic platform to India, but both shared a sense of suspicion of the Generals. Their divide and rule policies towards the military establishment created rumblings and resentment in the Armed Forces. And the civil-military relations reached a nadir during Krishna Menon - General Kaul's era, which led to the military disaster in the 1962 operations. The country survived from the brink of praetorianism because of the professionalism, integrity and idealism of India's Generals and much less from Nehru's charisma.

An interesting sequel to Raza's curtain-raiser is provided by Sumona Dasgupta in her essay on the " Militarization of the Indian State". This essay brings out how during the 1980s, our Armed Forces utterly avowed to the constitution, have been exploited by the Government for political ends with internal and external dimensions. The Armed Forces have been extensively used to quell insurgencies in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir, which had aggravated to a large extent by mis-governance and bad politics. In the external dimensions of the theme, the author questions the wisdom and legality of using the Armed Forces in the government's ambitions to project India as a regional power – as in the Maldives and Sri Lanka. But no mention has been made of the Government's impetuosity in sending troops for UN missions in failed states, as in Somalia and Sierra Leone, which quagmired our Army in undesirable political minefields. Though the Indian Army never failed in its duty; the failure of the political objectives amply highlighted the weaknesses in India's decision-making in military matters, which remains a preserve of the bureaucrats and the politicians.

And keeping the reader engrossed is Smruti Pattanaik's essay on "Military Decision-Making in Pakistan" which describes how Pakistan's military establishment has attained complete autonomy and a permanent stake in the country's governance, with a major say in the foreign policy too. The essay aptly covers the ascendancy of Pakistan's military establishment under General Ayub Khan with the US support as Pakistan joined the CENTO Pact in mid 1950. And Zia-ul-Haq's military rule (1977-1988) strengthened by the 8th Amendment to the Constitution, which provided absolute powers to the President and consequently the Army. Pattanaik's detailed essay also gives an interesting insight into the history of Pakistan's

National Security Council and how it was made and dismantled during the Zia-Junejo wrangles. Yet the military establishment retained a strong stake in the country's governance in collision with the President, much to the discomfiture of the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

Sanjay Dasgupta's essay on "Command and Control in the Nuclear Era" highlights the indisputable role of the Pakistan's military establishment in the absolute control of its nuclear arsenal through the "National Control Authority", recently constituted by General Musharraf. The author, however, avers that this nuclear control by the Pakistani Generals is no cause for concern. This is predicated on the assumption that both India and Pakistan do not have advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and that their strategy will be confined to "counter-value" strikes, considered suicidal by both sides. However it is now known that Pakistan's nuclear capability is in a fairly advanced stage and that they would have "counter force" capability as well.

Dasgupta's other essay "Of Militarymen and Politicians" is an appropriate epilogue to the book's main theme. The author draws a distinction between "apolitical" and "non-partisan", role of the armed forces in a country's governance. He avers that the armed forces, who are entrusted with the country's security, must have a say in the military decision making. Examples are cited of countries where armed forces are permitted political affiliations – as in erstwhile Soviet Union, China, Israel and Nazi Germany – and yet their Armies remain highly professional and loyal to their civil government. India's Armed Forces symbolise genuine professionalism and have accepted the supremacy of the civil authorities in matters of governance. This is laudable. But there is indeed a thin line between loyalty to the "Country" and loyalty to the governing "Polity". The country's governance cannot remain a narrow preserve of the politicians alone. In matters of national security, our military establishment has a rightful place.

The book is of great value and substance; it is relevant in understanding matters of national security.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Civilian Control of the Military : The Changing Security Environment. By Michael C Desch (Baltimore : The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 184, price not indicated, ISBN 0-8018-6059-8.

The author acknowledges that John Mearsheimer planted the seeds of the book under review with an interesting anecdote. He describes Mearsheimer as dividing the field of security studies into three subfields. The first deals with nuclear strategy; the second with grand strategy and conventional forces; and the last with military-society issues. The impression he left was that specialists had treated the first two exhaustively, whereas the last, by far the more interesting subfield, was the least studied. This is relevant in our context as well, for there is indeed a striking dearth of specialists looking at the 'soft' underside of the military profession. Recently, some work in this direction has come out of Rajasthan University.

The book explores the impact of the changing security environment, post-cold war, on civilian control of the military. It advances a structural theory on civil-military relations, as against the existing ones based on the personalities, organisational characteristics, and the nature of the civil authority. He basically wishes to resolve the debate between two points of view on the impact of external threat environment on civil-military relations. His case studies include the US and Russian militaries; the Latin American militaries and the French and German cases.

The view is that good civil-military relations are likely in high external and low internal threat environments. With respect to low external and high internal threat environments, as obtain in our case, his theory predicts poor civil-military relations. Given this, the reader can judge the veracity of Desch's theory on his own. Since most commentaries on the ongoing systemic re-engineering of our security structure deal with its efficiency and effectiveness, a look at the same from what it implies for democratic control will be instructive – a look that can only be facilitated by military sociology.

Major Ali Ahmed

Innovation in Diplomatic Practice. Edited by Jan Melissen (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), pp. 246, price not indicated, ISBN 0-333-69122-9.

This volume is one in a general series on studies in diplomacy and provides an overview of evolution of diplomacy in the post Second World War years. With an introductory essay by Melissen on the growth of diplomacy over the ages, the main innovations in diplomacy have been discussed in four parts. Part I on Diplomacy in a World of Change reviews trends as catalytic diplomacy or conduct of foreign relations in an era of flux with multiplicity of state and non state actors acting in concert to achieve national objectives and conduct of diplomatic relations by states which have undergone revolution and reintegration. Part II provides an overview of employment of multiple tracks in diplomatic negotiations, identifying changes in negotiations caused by diplomatic and non diplomatic measures simultaneously influencing interest groups, multilateral diplomacy between states, coalition of states and contact groups and unofficial intervention or Track II diplomacy. Part III examines the changes wrought by proliferation of media and IT and trends such as constructive ambiguity and integrated diplomatic systems enabled by the Internet. The final part on unorthodox diplomacy reviews conduct of diplomatic relations between estranged states such as US and Vietnam and US and North Korea and the uneasy relationship of Taiwan with the world, which could provide us fresh insights into the conduct of Indo-Pak relations.

The book however has failed to examine effects of globalisation on diplomacy as a medium of contact between global citizens. In the networked world, diplomacy will perform the role of facilitating contact between nations rather than being a sole medium of contact. A must read for all external affairs specialists which should hopefully jettison them out of the diplomatic strait jacket to use more creative means in conduct of inter state dialogue.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle, SM

Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace. By Gregory J Rattray
(London : The MIT Press, 2001), pp 517, Price not indicated
ISBN 0-262-18209-2.

This book is a comprehensive exploration of the strategic significance of information systems and their vulnerabilities. The author highlights that with explosion in the field of information technology, strategic information warfare is likely to be launched by an adversary with information infrastructures as targets. The analysis focuses on salient features of information infrastructures such as complexity of interconnections; civil sector technologies, global internet connections, its operation and so on for conduct of information warfare. For success, accurate intelligence gathering is important, which has to be backed up by organisational structure and technological mastery. Tools for digital warfare may be easy to acquire and unleash but establishing offensive capability requires expertise in selection of targets and assessment of consequences of disruption. Crucial policy trade-offs for the USA involve economic competitiveness and individual human rights. Non-state organisations have advantages in minimising their vulnerabilities to digital attack. The book concludes with recommendations for strengthening the US strategic information warfare defences.

The author has brought out clearly the danger to information infrastructures from information warfare. Measures that can and should be adopted to minimise vulnerabilities have also been discussed.

An analytical and thorough book on information warfare in cyberspace. A must read for anyone trying to understand the full potential of strategic warfare in cyberspace.

Major General Y K Gera (Retd)

Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.
By Ahmad Rashid (London : Yale University Press, 2001), pp 279,
\$ 14.95, ISBN 0-300-08902-3.

Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani correspondent working for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Daily Telegraph* under the editorial board comprising Nayan Chanda and VG Kulkarni among

others, has summed up his 21 years' knowledge of Afghanistan in this book to detail the Taliban factor, and the underlying cauldron of international intrigue and manipulation floating on the vast oil and gas reservoirs of Central Asia. Coming from a Pakistani correspondent one could expect some embellishments to downplay the insidious role of the Pakistani establishment and the ISI in exacerbating the Afghan tragedy, but his account comes across with a refreshing frankness, with an honesty and an unbiased candour.

This is a complete and authentic narrative presented in an interesting and information-packed manner. Details about the genesis of the Taliban, their present state and their likely fate, along with thoughtful analyses of the role and effect of regional and global powers, is bound to excite all Afghanistan and Central Asia watchers around the world. Lack of any serious reference to India in the whole narrative does rankle, but it could be reflective of a wider perception that India does not have a stake or is unwilling to play its rightful role of an affected regional power in this matter or in the initiation of a peace-building process in this beleaguered nation.

Colonel J M Singh

Chinese Perspectives on International Relations : A Framework for Analysis. By Gerald Chan (London : Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 201, price not indicated, ISBN 0-333-73418-1.

Ever since the Chinese Communist Party's determined crushing of the pro-democracy demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's likely future has received great attention. The remarkable performance of the Chinese economy and consequent iterations about the looming dragon further intensified this focus. One set of questions repeatedly posed has been: What are the likely consequences of China's rise (economic and military) to the international order of the 21st Century? Would it lead to confrontation with the reigning superpower, the USA? Answers are premised on the all-important question: what is the Chinese view of the international system? The book focuses on this issue with the aim of drawing out the Chinese perspectives on international relations (IR).

Part I of the book deals with study of international relations in China and discusses the definitions used by Chinese scholars, the different understandings they have about theory, and how they conceive of the relationship between theory and practice. Part II focuses on the Chinese perspective on international relations, which rests on four bases: power, Marxist ideology, cultural values that date back roughly five millennia, and the quest for modernisation. The third part of the book deals with the units and levels of analysis in Chinese IR studies. The subject matter of this study is divided into the *international system*, the *international pattern*, and the *international order*. Chinese scholars regard the international system as the historical product of the capitalist mode of production, with its base resting in the world economic system. The international pattern flows from the political interactions among the major powers in international society; it could be unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. International order is a normative construct desired by various countries, each of which may be distinct.

IR or IP(International Politics) as a discipline is a recent phenomenon in China. It was only after the adoption of the open door policy initiated in 1978 that Chinese universities began to offer courses on IR in a systematic manner. Gerald Chan is of the view that a lot of work needs to be done before a distinctively Chinese school of IR thinking can emerge.

S Kalyanaraman

Executive Protection. Volume-II. By S. Subramaniam (New Delhi : Manas Publication, 1998), pp. 182, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-103-7

0190

Diplomats, Business Executives, Industrialists and other affluent sections of our society are increasingly becoming victims of attacks and kidnappings from adverse criminal elements for hefty ransom or in order to influence political decisions. Most of the executives are either unaware of the danger or do not take adequate precautions to protect themselves.

Hence, the frequency of kidnappings and extortions have increased manifold.

This book is a mission to create awareness and provide basic knowledge about how such miscreants operate and to highlight the point that these attacks are neither arbitrary nor the result of angry reaction to events but are well planned, directed and executed operations. It also provides information on executives creating personal protection arrangements at homes, offices and while on the move.

Colonel PK Vasudeva (Retd)

Nuclear Subcontinent : Calling for a Confederative Remaking of United Nations on the Millennium Charter of Human Unity. By Asiananda and Hakemulder (New Delhi : Minerva Press, 2000 in association with Sri Aurobindo Centre for Human Unity, New Delhi), pp. 459, Rs. 400.00 (Pb), Rs. 600.00 (Hb), ISBN 81-7662-181-1.

The co-authors timed the release of the book to coincide with the Millennium UN General Assembly in September 2000. Its lofty aim was to show that the Millennium Report operates on a crisis management, minimalist or reduced view of our human situation. The targets it seeks are immediate and materialistic. It does not enhance civilisational and metahistorical goals.

The book is on a higher psychological plane. It is not a discourse on South Asian geopolitics but delves deep into the creative potential of our ancient Indian civilisation in solving the emerging world problems. An attempt is made for a change from global security to world peace in an era of ecological pressure, demographic growth and massive poverty.

This conceptual book is demanding as Asiananda himself admits. Yet it is another compendium of fresh, though idealist, Indo-centric perspectives. The thick paperback edition does not have an index and bibliography that are so important for scholars.

Colonel PK Gautam (Retd)

Nuclear Defence : Shaping the Arsenal. By Gurmeet Kanwal
(New Delhi : Knowledge World, 2001), pp. 246, Rs. 750.00,
ISBN 81-87966-00-9.

This book is important in two respects: one, it represents the result of a formalised interface between the defence forces and the 'strategic community', and second, more importantly, is the insight the informed citizenry can glean on the direction and nuances of strategic thought within the military in a nuclear age. The author has the credentials to attempt the onerous task of examining the post-weaponisation force structure for he has headed an in-house think tank in the South Block. His findings are presented in a nutshell in the concluding chapter.

His argument is that, for our 'no first use' policy and intent of inflicting 'unacceptable damage' in retaliation to be credible, we need to opt for 'megaton monsters', numbering about 200 based on a triad of delivery systems under strict political control. The author insists that even a defensive use of nuclear weapons on military targets by Pakistan as per its deterrence policy of possible 'first use' should be met with a retaliatory strike by India on its population and industrial centres. Given this certainty, he feels 'they will, quite naturally, sue for peace'. This is even more dangerous when the author recommends that India 'call the Pakistan bluff' by deep penetrations by its strike formations in pursuit of the 'marginalisation' of the Pakistani military as a 'force majeure' in Pakistan. Unfortunately, such conventional mode of thinking has not appreciably changed post Pokhran II.

Brodie's point that the sole purpose of militaries in the nuclear age is not to fight wars but to deter them has not been registered sufficiently; we believe that the purpose of nuclear weapons is merely to deter nuclear use by the adversary and not to deter war itself.

Major Ali Ahmed

Security in South Asia. Edited by Major General Dipanker Banerjee (Colombo : Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 214, Rs. 375.00, ISBN 81-7304-363-9.

Papers were presented by different speakers from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal at a Seminar held at Aghungalla in Sri Lanka in July 1998 with the aim of exchanging views on the nature and state of security studies in South Asia. The book explores various avenues of national security and the need to study them. Many issues were raised such as : what is most important for a nation to protect and evolve a strategy for it? Are borders and frontiers most important for which citizens are prepared to lay down their lives?

The aspects of national security outlined in the book have a lot of relevance in our context. The essentials in these papers presented may enable us to fashion a comprehensive doctrine to suit our needs and in the interests of the nation as a whole.

Major General Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Restructuring South Asian Security. By Major General Vinod Saighal (New Delhi : Manas, 2000), pp. 304, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-125-5.

Vinod Saighal laments India not keeping its tryst with destiny of his dreams in this book – a collation of musings, confabulations, articles and compositions by an independent-minded "thinking" General of the Indian Cavalry. By and large he has done well as many of the chapters are original formulations that are said to have had impact on policy making, here and abroad. However, let it be said that though his views on security matters are masterly and having the benefit of his vast and varied experiences in the Olive Greens, it seems to divert more in the realm of the utopian.

The book is organised into six sections : International Affairs, Sub-continental Affairs, Ecology, Demography, Constitutional Reforms, and Trauma and Critical Care. The author advocates recourse to the subcontinental methodology in policy forging to enable the country to become more answerable to its people. A pleasantly puzzling proposal for treating Tibet like a bridge between India, China and the West is mooted too for whatever its worth.

Whilst propounding on ecological matters, the General makes out a strong case for the cleaning up of the Himalayas – a region where the delicate ecosystem is being shattered by military dynamics and lop-sided developmental concerns of the 'rim' nations, and of course, by the numerous mountaineering expeditions. The ineptness in implementation of family welfare programmes, despite an infrastructure that permeates right down to the very grass-roots level in India, are brought under a harsh spotlight. He discusses his accepted model for universal good governance and bemoans the total absence of any institutionalised trauma and critical-care in the country with particular reference to accidents resulting from mechanical motor transport in the Indian metros.

His writing style could be more amenable to easy reading, otherwise his excellent ideas are bound to remain restricted to study by some serious scholars pouring over his works in only certain libraries.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia : Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. By Robert W Stern (Westport : Praeger Publishers, 2001), pp. x+194, \$65.95, ISBN 0-275-97041-8.

The author is an avid 'South Asia watcher' – a tribe to which scholarly India owes much. Their importance is that the mirror they raise to our faces helps reduce the blind-spots we fondly carry of ourselves as political entities. In this club exist both India baiters and friends of India. Dr Stern can be ranked amidst the latter on account of this dispassionate account of India in contrast with her significant neighbours.

The argument in the book is a difficult one to follow for those who are not habituated to think in terms of classes. That is not reason enough not to persist with the book for it does have a worthwhile perspective to present – one that gets more interesting as the narrative moves closer to us in time. He delineates two 'communalisms' of the pre-independence era to which he attributes the partition and the evolution of the three (initially two) political

systems subsequently. Whereas the Westminster model found root in India under the tutelage of a single party system, the imbalance between the two wings of Pakistan prevented its emergence with any degree of certainty and depth there. While East Pakistan was predisposed to it, owing to its pre-partition tradition of mediated politics, it was not so in West Pakistan dominated as it is by the landlord class. This accounts for the second partition. The book brings us up to date with the internal politics of all three countries.

Though we are familiar with the details, a sophisticated understanding of the same is often elusive. The book is therefore a useful addition to the literature on the contrast between democracy and dictatorship in South Asia.

Major Ali Ahmed

People to People Contact in South Asia. By Navnita Chadha Behera, Victor Gunawardena, Shahid Kardar and Raisul Awal Mahmood (New Delhi : Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2000), pp. 143, Rs. 270.00, ISBN 81-7304-350-7.

The book narrates the tardy interaction between the members of SAARC and its impact on mutual collaboration and trade. This is a region of friendship, militancy, hostility, rivalry and suspicion. It is a cautious practitioner of free flow of information and people, which adversely affects well-being of the region. Four experts, one each from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, give an objective account of the state of relationship between their compatriots and the other members of the SAARC.

The authors have offered workable suggestions to improve matters in the overall interest of the people. A good book which can be read with benefit by the political leaders, bureaucrats and the elite to improve understanding of the hurdles to good relations and their removal in the overall interest of the people of the region.

Major General L S Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd)

India and Pakistan : The Cost of Conflict and the Benefit of Peace. By Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. xxii+96, Rs. 195.00, ISBN 0-19-579603-9.

This book is a copy of the report produced by the author for the Indo-Pak Track II initiative – the Balusa Group. With a brief background of the reasons for distrust and conflicts between Pakistan and India, highlighting the Kashmir issue, the author lays emphasis on the great strain the Wars forced on the economies of the two countries.

With the help of World Bank and SIPRI reports, and charts, he highlights the impact of defence expenditure on economies of the two countries and makes a case for friendly relations between the two countries to improve the lot of the people. Confidence Building Measures at various levels are suggested. The author has advised step-by-step re-engagement between the two countries starting from preliminary secret contacts, secret meetings, to a summit and follow-up meeting. This is a book for the optimist and those who would like to be one in the interest of both countries.

Lieutenant General Y M Bammi, ADC (Retd)

Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations. By Colonel Ravi Nanda (New Delhi : Lancer's Books, 2001), pp. 232, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-7095-082-1.

This book is an exhaustive study of the Kashmir problem and its effect on Indo-Pak relations. The problem is traced through a study of Kashmir's historical background and the British colonial days, with their policy of divide and rule, which brought about the partition of India on religious grounds. He further brings out how in their efforts to keep Pakistan favourably disposed to them, the British refused to accept Kashmir's accession to India inspite of the instrument legally conforming to the India Independence Act, which was passed by the British Parliament. They further persuaded the United States of America from not accepting the legality of Kashmir's accession when India took the matter of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir to the United Nations. It is this breach of faith by both UK

and the USA that is at the root of this Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir, over the past five decades.

The book goes on to narrate General Zia's plans to achieve the Kashmir objective through a low cost proxy war by infiltrating militants and terrorists into Kashmir. He hoped to wear down India by this low intensity conflict. After defeat in the Kargil War, which was another desperate effort to grab Kashmir by military means, Pakistan has reverted to its proxy war. The author is of the opinion that fortunately all insurgencies and proxy wars have a limited life. The insurgents become battle weary. The local population gets tired of living in fear and insecurity. Chapter XI is an interesting compendium of advice on what India needs to do to solve what Pakistan claims to be the 'core problem' in Indo-Pak relations.

A well researched work but with a few errors of facts that need to be corrected. The author incorrectly states that in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistan captured Akhnoor. They captured Chhamb and not Akhnoor. He makes a rather debatable statement that "Muslim population centres in UP, MP and Bihar became dens of ISI activity. ISI had been able to purchase the loyalty of the Muslim population and motivated them to perform anti-national activities in the name of religion". This, to say the least, seems to be an unfair generalisation in spite of the anti-national activities of fanatical religious organisations like the Deendar Anjuman. Recent incidents have shown that the ISI agents have been able to operate in the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal and have been able to, with money, buy over many Hindus to carry out their nefarious activities.

Major General Samir Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

Inside Indian Army. By Brigadier Trigunesh Mukherjee (New Delhi : Manas, 2000), pp. 228, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-073-1.

All in all a good read. The author makes many pertinent observations regarding combat, training, welfare, post retirement prospects, and matters of attitude pertaining to the Army. All these will go a long way in demystifying the Army for the lay-man. Where Mukherjee really excels himself is in his analysis from the micro level to the macro. He covers much ground and leaves it littered with his conclusions and recommendations that straggle both the

sublime and the ridiculous, all to the amusement of the reader; who is left with just that much leeway that will help him or her make-up his or her own mind as well.

His range is truly amazing. He examines the Indian Army in its totality; as a unique institution, its role, organisational structure, handling by the powers that be in the South Block, indifference of the bureaucrats and so on. Starting with the miniscule building block of the infantry section, the writer goes all the way up to the Army Headquarters (AHQ) level; matters discussed relate from the manpower policies to the funny business or honey-traps in which some general officers; madly lost in the supposed power they wield over all around them with their charisma; get caught up in, in their halcyon years, from time to time.

Mukherjee has been very objective right through; and these are his own unique perceptions, which he puts across in his inimitable style; his resort to the military lexicon notwithstanding. He has been fair despite his calling a spade a spade just like a die hard infantry officer would.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

Military Operations in Kashmir – Insurgency at Charar-e-Sharief. By GN Gauhar and Shahwar Gowhar (New Delhi : Manas Publication, 2001), pp. 400, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-7049-112-6.

This book traces the life history of Saint Noor-ud-Din and his disciples leading to the construction of the shrine in 1438. Pilgrims from far and near would visit the shrine to offer prayers and on weekly Urs days (Thursdays and Fridays), the people of the town especially Khadims of the Durgah would receive and entertain thousands of guests. On annual "Urs" held in autumn on the 26th day of Ramzan, the town would play host to pilgrims.

From 1989 onwards on every Thursday groups of militants would also come to Charar along with pilgrims and spend the night there in meditation. They would leave after the Friday prayers. Among these was Mast Gul and his group.

He utilised these visits for interaction with different militant groups. In January 1995 taking a cue from the stalemate of

Hazratbal, Mast Gul and 22 militants came to Charar and established themselves in the town. They were joined by 31 militants of another group, thus making a total of 54 militants hiding in the town. Local youth also joined this group in the name of freedom struggle. The security forces laid siege to the town in March 1995. Locals tried to persuade these militants to vacate the town but as they would not relent, the local population started leaving the town once the exchange of fire between the security forces and the militants commenced. The town was set on fire on the night of 9 May 1995 and on 10 May the town was gutted including a major portion of the Shrine. On 12 May, the town had fallen.

The book is at times critical of the actions of the Security Forces which should be taken with reservations for whatever it is worth. A book for those who are interested in the history of Charar-e-Sharief and militancy.

Major General Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Information Technology – the Future Warfare Weapon. A USI Project. By Lieutenant Commander A Anand (New Delhi : Ocean Books, 2000), Rs150.00, pp. 103, ISBN 81-87100-47-8.

As in other fields, proliferation of Information Technology (IT) and growth of the computer has spawned its malicious usage in the field of crime and warfare. While the West has fully recognised the potential dangers of IT related information warfare, in India the realisation has only lately set in. To focus our attention on the information warfare dimension of IT, Anand has undertaken a pioneering effort under the aegis of the United Service Institution of India (USI).

Beginning with the emergence of information as a force multiplier, during the Gulf War, the author examines its impact on military operations and the principles of war. A survey of the threats to the Indian information environment and implications of information operations thereafter provides the backdrop for the necessity to adapt to information warfare. The organisation and training needed for conducting information operations, measures to achieve synergy and the way ahead in IT and IW for the Indian Navy are also

summarised. This is a bird's eye view of the precepts of IT, Command, Control and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Anand thus has provided us a useful insight into a subject of increasing interest and relevance to the military specialists the world over and to which we need to devote greater attention in our Armed Forces.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle, SM

The Indian Ocean : Images and Realities. By SZ Qasim (New Delhi : Oxford & IBH Publishing Co Pvt. Ltd., 1999), pp 348, Rs 650.00, ISBN 81-204-1380-6.

The Indian Ocean has so far not been studied in as much details as the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. Higher level Indian students of Marine Sciences, Oceanography or Fisheries Sciences have long felt a void in terms of an authentic work which could provide details of the Indian Ocean in one book. Dr Syed Zahoor Qasim, well known for his pioneering work in initiating the Indian Antarctic expeditions and setting up of permanent research station on the icy continent, took it upon himself to compile a study on the Indian Ocean in his first book, *Glimpses of the Indian Ocean*. This book is a complementary sequel and contains important findings of research carried out at the National Institute of Oceanography, Goa, during the last 30 years.

This book would be of immense interest to the scientific community and students alike. An interesting chapter on Sunken Treasures contains details of the submerged city of Dwarka and the prehistoric remains of Somnath which would be of interest to the marine archaeologists involved in reconstructing the maritime history of India. The details about sandy beaches and coastal erosion could be of interest to the Indian Navy and the Indian Amphibious Forces to build on the data for their on-shore as well as off-shore operations.

Colonel Jagmohan Singh (Retd)

Intersections : Socio-Cultural Trends in Maharashtra.
Edited by Meera Kosambi (New Delhi : Orient Longman Limited, 2000), pp. 220, Rs 475.00, ISBN 81-250-1878-6.

Defence officers need to have an intimate knowledge of the culture and customs of the areas their troops hail from. Army Regiments like the Maratha Light Infantry and the Mahar have bulk of the troops from Maharashtra. A sizeable proportion are in other arms and Services as well. Our knowledge is derived from the Indian Army handbooks authored by the Britishers based on the Gazetteer written by their officers. The regimental histories have further improved upon them.

Now, Maharashtra has been put on the world map by a series of eight conferences of international scholars from 1984 to 1999. The book is a compilation of papers presented there. The editor had the privilege of attending all the conferences. Divided into four sections, on Religious Thought and Practice, Social Reform and Reformers, Colonial Impact and Socio Economic Change, and Literary and Artistic Expression, like mythology of the Godavari River, tales of Shivaji, Varkari, each section is a window to the diverse and rich culture of this state. Regimental officers will find it useful and may get motivated to research on some similar themes. No good library would be complete without this book.

Colonel P K Gautam (Retd)

Into the Crucible : Making Marines for the 21st Century. By James B Woulfe (Novato : Presidio Press, 1998), pp. 180, \$14.95, ISBN 0-89141-707-9.

Elitism is an essential attribute of developing excellence in military organisations. However individuals who join the military are ordinary folks. Creating military elites out of plain city and towns men is a prime challenge for military establishments such as the Marine Corps Recruit Depot. An event such as the Crucible, a 54 hours gruel, as a culmination of training of marines is a benchmark to separate the men from the boys. These also contribute to establish the code of honour of the US Marine; honour, courage and commitment.

Through a tour of the Crucible, the author, an ex marine, takes the reader on a journey of some of the stirring tales from the history of the US Marine Corps and lets the reader realise its contribution to American military history. The US Marine Corps continues to train in the old mould of initiation through sustained physical and mental stress rather than gradual socialisation as envisaged by modern military managers, a lesson which needs to be emulated by our training establishments as well. This paperback is a must read for all young soldiers and leaders alike.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle, SM

Bhutan - Towards a Grass-root Participatory Polity. By Bhabani Sen Gupta (New Delhi : Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2000), pp. 197, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-220-0547-0.

This book is possibly the first attempt at understanding and explaining the *raison de etre* of the Bhutanese style of democracy.

A comprehensive study on grass-root participatory polity, the author highlights that *Participation* and not *Representation* is the key to democracy. An immensely readable book. The Author deserves kudos for an analytical and thought-provoking study.

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

Imperial China : 900-1800. By FW Mote (Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 1107, \$39.95, ISBN 0-674-44515-5.

The history of Imperial China under a succession of dynastic rulers spreading over nearly a thousand years, has been projected by the Author in this extensive study. The underlying thrust of this well documented book – with chronological dynastic charts and detailed accounts of the governance style – is to bring out salient contributions of the successive regimes to the nature and content of Chinese culture and philosophy of modern ages. Chapter by chapter, the author describes the rise and ultimate decline of Imperial dynastic regimes of the Tanguts, Lins, Jurachins, the Mongol Khans during AD 900-1300, and those of the Ling Dynasty and Qing rulers of 17th and 18th Centuries.

The book lays stress on the importance of history of Imperial China. Professor Mote has concerned himself with many correctives to the existing literature on China's history. This is indeed a valuable historiography for those eager to understand modern China.

Major General SK Talwar (Retd)

Civilising Chengdu : Chinese Urban Reform, 1895-1937. By Kristin Stapleton (Cambridge MA : Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), pp 352, £ 640.00, ISBN 0-674-00246-6.

This book, based on a monograph by the author explains the urban reform movements in China, which was the main challenge before the Chinese State during the period 1895-1937. The Japanese reform in this area during the Meiji period had long attracted the attention of many Chinese social scientists and political activists. Thousands of Chinese travelled to Tokyo to learn how the Japanese had become so powerful to defeat their Chinese neighbours in the War of 1894-1895 and were even threatening Russia in North East Asia. It was because of the widespread Chinese belief that the power of a nation depended on attainment of essential attributes of modern 'civilisation', such as administrative and civic reform, urban sanitation and so on. It has been brought out in great detail as to how the Chinese social thinkers of that period were obsessed with this idea that they were not averse to even borrowing the ideas on 'civilisation' (*bunmei* in Japanese and *wenming* in Chinese) of their opponents, the Japanese, and quickly assimilate them in their own system. The level of success achieved by these reforms is not lost on anyone when modern China is compared to other great Asian civilisations of that period including India.

The students and researchers of East Asian cultures will find this book particularly useful and should feel heartened by the fact that this book is the culmination of one of about 190 East Asia related research projects, funded and administered by Harvard University Asia Center, which regularly promotes East Asian studies relating to Japan, China, Korea, Vietnam and so on.

Colonel Jagmohan Singh

+ **China Joins the World : Progress and Prospects.** Edited by Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg (New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 359, \$ 22.50, ISBN 0-87609-225-3.

This book is an exceptional exposure of US policy towards China for the last 25 years. It documents the US expectations and manoeuvres to integrate China with the world on US's terms and how, with exceptional dexterity, China outmanoeuvred US taking into consideration own supreme interests as a sovereign country. Here is an exceptional feast for the diplomats as well as serious students of international diplomacy. It delves on the continuously changing contours of diplomatic battle between two most powerful countries, each bent on imposing its will on the other. The book swings between the periods of triumph and hopelessness for the US and suggests ways to effectively tackle seemingly intractable diplomatic problems. There is a lot one can learn from this book, specifically so when China still remains an enigma for the world and in particular, for India. China gives importance to its survival and its interests; and the leaders that control China shall remain an unsolved puzzle for a long time to come.

Captain Rajiv Ojha

✓ **The Ottoman Gulf : The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.** By Fredrick F Anscombe (New York : Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 270, ISBN 0-231-10838-9

Interests of the Western writers in the Ottoman period has been very limited. It is only after the discovery of oil that the Gulf has attained strategic importance.

The sudden eruption of War between Iraq and Kuwait can be a definite reason for the interest and involvement in this region, notably if the involvement of US supported multinational force is to be justified to the world. To lay the foundation for justification it is imperative to prove that Iraq and Kuwait have been uneasy neighbours. Iraq invaded Kuwait and justified its invasion on the basis of its historical links with Kuwait.

The Western countries decided to highlight that the two Arab States that share centuries long cultural, religious and ethnic association are totally different. This book is an effort in the same direction. It will stimulate the reader who wants to embark on a similar exercise.

Captain Rajiv Ojha

National Security-The Israeli Experience. By Israel Tal (Westpoint, CT : Trans by Martin Kett, Praeger Publishers, 2000), pp 248, \$ 55.00, ISBN 0-275-96812-X.

Israel came into existence in 1948 surrounded on all sides by hostile Arab neighbours. She has been fighting battles for national survival, lacking depth to repulse surprise attacks. The book explores various avenues of "National Security" available to Israel. Israel cannot maintain a large standing Army and as such is based on reserves who are called up for service on declaration of National Emergency. These reserves cannot be deployed for long periods of time as it would paralyse life in the country and weaken Israel's deterrence image. This system is enhanced by the superior mobilisation capabilities resting on a three-tiered structure: a professional Army, a fully trained conscription force and a reserve force available for deployment in national emergency.

National Security as outlined in the book has a lot of relevance for adoption in the Indian context. All students of military studies could perhaps study the Israeli concepts for greater understanding.

Major General Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Southern Africa Into The Next Millennium. Edited by Greg Mills (Johannesberg : The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 76, price not indicated, ISBN 1-874890-85-4.

In the foreword to this booklet, Dr Nelson Mandela stresses the need of essentials of development, the phenomena of globalisation, and South Africa's consanguinity with the rest of the African States, principally those in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), thereby setting the most appropriate tone for the ensuing conference. The conference was held in the Jan Smuts House in Johannesburg and arranged by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAHA) and United

World College (UWC) on 19 March 1998. The papers presented elaborate on Dr Mandela's vision.

Between them the Speakers have covered topics ranging from South Africa's attitude to global development to the purpose of the development organisations in Africa in this century. The initiation of democracy in South Africa, its security affairs and the inter se relationship with the European Union are also discussed. Regional economic coherence is expected to lay the groundwork for political unanimity, which in turn is expected to bolster confidence amongst the various countries of the region and its emergence as a unified whole. These views go on to reinforce what Mills states, "In the face of globalization, for developing countries their future prosperity will depend on their ability to trade and attract investment." In its totality, therefore, whether in respect to the increased opportunity or significant challenges; globalisation is the answer to greater prosperity.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

Disaster in the Air : The Crash of the Kashmir Princess, 1955.
By Colonel A K Mitra (New Delhi : Reliance Publishing House 2001), pp 123, Rs. 195.00, ISBN 81-7510-123-7.

The book is an account of the sabotage of an Air India super-constellation aircraft named the 'Kashmir Princess', carrying persons for the first Non-Aligned Summit Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1944. Its authenticity is unquestionable because it is authored by none other than a member of the Inquiry Commission, Colonel AK Mitra, the then Military Attaché in the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.

In the 1950s, this Non-Aligned concept was an anathema to the West. The USA, in those days, maintained that those who were not with them were against them. Their suspicions increased when Indonesian President Sukarno, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Egyptian President Nasser, who were the important leaders of the Non-Aligned, decided to invite Communist China to the Bandung Conference. Consequently, the West considered the Non-Aligned Group as another front of the Communist bloc. The intelligence agencies of the West then were

bent upon spoiling the Bandung meet and the conspiracy was hatched to sabotage the chartered Air India plane carrying the delegation to Bandung. A bomb was planted in the aircraft when it was in Hongkong from where the Chinese were to be picked up. The time bomb exploded when the aircraft was over Indonesian waters on 11 April 1955, killing all the passengers. Only three crew members out of eight escaped and they were picked up from the sea. The Government of Indonesia appointed a Commission of Inquiry to go into the crash of *The Kashmir Princess*.

The book is not merely an inquiry report, but an exciting account of the incidents in Bandung where the author interacted with the Afro-Asian leaders. Colonel Mitra has done a commendable work in meticulously noting down the day to day happenings in his diary. The generous grant from General Palit Military Trust enabled Colonel Mitra to undertake the project

Subedar Major N Kunju (Retd)

Tin Can Sailor : Life Aboard the USS-Sterett, 1939-1945. By C Raymond Calhoun (Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 198, \$15.95, ISBN 1-55750-228-5.

This is the story of a destroyer of the US Navy, which had a short but eventful life from 1939 to 1945. The ship was commissioned on 15 August 1939, just before the outbreak of the Second World War, and put through its paces on a shakedown cruise of three months. It was deployed on a neutrality patrol in the first half of 1940 and later dispatched to Pearl Harbour for duty as a unit of the Pacific Fleet. The ship then formed part of a carrier group and saw action in support of the Guadalcanal landings mid-1942 and subsequently in support of US marines ashore. Numerous actions came *Sterett's* way but the final one was on 9 April 1945 when the ship was subjected to a Kamikaze attack by 4 Japanese aircraft. Ironically, only the medical officer suffered injuries of any consequence and there were no casualties. The ship was repaired but her fighting days were over and it was decommissioned on 2 November 1945.

The book is a labour of love of the ship by CR Calhoun, who joined the ship as an Ensign in August 1939 and left it in April 1943

as a Lieutenant. Apart from his own experiences, Calhoun has incorporated anecdotes and narratives of more than 50 *Sterett* veterans to make it a comprehensive account of the life of the ship. By so doing he has immortalised a small ship that would otherwise have joined those that have passed into oblivion. For those interested in understanding what life would be on a small warship during operations, this book is highly recommended. Here is a true account, worth relishing.

Commodore R N Sharma (Retd)

Making Use : Scenario-Based Design of Human-Computer Interactions. By John M Carroll (Cambridge : The MIT Press, 2000), pp. xiv + 368, price not indicated, ISBN 0-262-03279-1.

The book is a vivid portrayal of how a pervasive but underused element of design practice, the scenario, can transfer information systems design. It is a stimulating and thoughtful examination of the complexities underlying the design process. Traditional textbook approaches manage the complexity of the design process via abstraction, treating design problems as if they were composites of puzzles. Scenario-based design uses concretisation; scenarios are concrete stories about use. A busy reader could turn to Chapter Three and decide whether scenario-based design offers the integrated approach to the central challenges of design that the author thinks it does. One could also read Chapter Four to see this argument through an example, Chapter Eleven for suggestions about a scenario-based development process, or Chapter Twelve for a survey of current scenario-based design work in human-computer interaction and software engineering. This book is a technical monograph that simplifies and integrates a series of projects around a set of methodological themes. An exhaustive list of references is appended at the end. An interesting and well written monograph.

I R Kumar

The Glass Palace. By Amitav Ghosh (London : Harper Collins, 2000), pp 552, £ 16.99, ISBN 0-00-226102-2.

This extraordinary and exceptionally fine novel at first sight is intimidating, after all the intertwining stories of Dolly and Rajkumar,

narrated in some 547 pages, spread over India, Burma and Malaya, and across three generations. However, in the hands of a master craftsman your attention remains riveted on the travails of Rajkumar, Queen Supayalat's struggle to maintain the standard of a vanished court, World War-II and the attendant effect on soldiers and civilians alike resulting in an *en masse* migration of refugees to India to escape the wrath of the Japanese. The book is an amalgamation of history, travelogue and fiction. Ghosh is philosophical in that nothing really changes and the more it changes, more it is the same. Success, failure, happiness, misery, life and death come in cycles. The violence of war brings sweeping changes in the lives of characters and countries alike. The handling of INA's ideology is excellent. The most moving account is of the exodus of refugees and stragglers along the Irrawady.

Ghosh credits his father and his uncle for the 'seed' of the story—though he hastens to add that time blurred the original idea. Incidentally, his father was Lieutenant Colonel S C Ghosh of 12 Frontier Force Regiment, Fourteenth Army (Burma Campaign 1945). Small wonder then the writer's depiction of the military and soldiering is authentic. Amitav Ghosh is a unique blend of a historian and a romantic. Here is an immensely talented writer. A polished, poignant and fascinating novel which will be found irresistible by the connoisseur and layman alike.

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

VISIT USI HOMEPAGE

at

www.usiofindia.org

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending June 2001

(The books reviewed in April-June 2001 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report 2000-2001. Government of India, Department of Space. Bangalore, 2000, Pp 88

Annual Report 2000-2001. Government of India, Ministry of Defence. New Delhi, 2000, Pp 128

Annual Report 2000-2001. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs. New Delhi, 2000, Pp 191

Annual Report 2000-2001. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. New Delhi, 2000, Pp 157

ARMED CONFLICTS

Managing Armed Conflicts in 21st Century. Edited by Adeyeye Adebajo & Chandra Lekha Sriram, London, Frank Cass, 2001, Pp. 221, £ 17.50, ISBN 0-7146-8136-9

ASIA

Asia's Deadly Triangle : How Arms Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia Pacific. By Kant E Calder, London, Nicholas Brealey, 1996, Pp 253, £ 16.99, ISBN 1-85788-160-5

India and Asia : The Politics of India's Look East Policy. Edited by Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo, New Delhi, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2001, Pp 248, Rs. 500.00, ISBN 81-7304-330-2

Reshaping Asian Security. Edited by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2001, Pp 365, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-87966-03-3

Reorienting India: The New Geo-Politics of Asia By B G Verghese
Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001, Pp 303, Rs. 500.00, ISBN 81-220-0611-6

Subregionalism in Asia. By Abul Kalam, New Delhi, UBS Publishers' Distributors Ltd., 2001, Pp254, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-7476-357-0

BIOGRAPHY/MEMOIRS

Field Marshal KM Cariappa. By Director General of Infantry, New Delhi, Sona Printers Pvt. Ltd., 2001, Pp 200, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81 7062 19 4

Jinnah: Man of Destiny. By Prakash Almeida, Delhi, Kalpaz Publications, 2001, Pp292, Rs. 690.00, ISBN 81-7835-016-5

My Years at Sea. By Vice Admiral (Retd) SH Sarma, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2001, Pp 252, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 81 7062 121 6

Netaji, Subhas Bose : The Great Revolutionary. By VR Adiraju, Hyderabad, Om See Satya Publications, 2001, Pp 624, Rs. 975.00, ISBN 81-900165-9-8

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The New Biological Weapons : Threat Proliferation and Control. By Malcolin Dando, London, Lynne Rienner, 2001, Pp 181, ISBN 1-55587-924-1

Rites of Passage: Border Crossings, Imagined Homelands, India's East and Bangladesh. By Sanjoy Hazarika, New Delhi, Penguin Books India (p) Ltd., 2000, Pp 347, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 0-14-100422-3

BURMA

Burma: Political Economy Under Military Rule. By Stagan Collignon, London Hurst Co. 2001, Pp 168, £ 14.95, ISBN 85-065-547-2

CHINA

China Perspectives. By Pradeep Putatunda & Prof. Stewart MacPherson, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. 2001, Pp. 249, Rs. 500.00 , ISBN 81-207-2359-7

History of China. By N Jayapalan, New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2000, Pp. 196 Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-7156-860-2

50 Years of China : Crossing a Bridge of Dreams. Ed. By G P Despande, Alka Acharya, New Delhi, Tulika, 2001, Pp. 538 Rs.750.00, ISBN 81-85229-40-6

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Soldiers and Politicians. By Brig. PN Khanduri and Brig. CB Khanduri FICHR, FABI, New Delhi, Om Publications, 2001, Pp. 175, Rs. 400.00, ISBN 81-86867-47-3

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

The Pain and Horror : Gujrat Earthquake. By L R Reddy, New Delhi, APH Pub. Co., 2001, Pp 297, Rs. 500.00, ISBN 81-7648-252-8

ECONOMY

Economics : Making Sense of the Modern Economy. By The Economist, London, Profile Books, 2001, Pp 356, Rs.295.00, ISBN 1-86197-199-0

World Economic Outlook May 2001 : Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stability. Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 2001, Pp244, ISBN 1-58906-032-6

ETHNIC CONFLICT

International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict : A Case Study – Kashmir and North Ireland. By Madhumita Srivastava, New Delhi, Bhavana Books & Prints, 2001, Pp212, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-86505-54-7

ENVIRONMENT

Ecological Politics : Different Dimension. By Gopal Bhargava, New Delhi, Kalpaz Publications, 2001, Pp. 359.00, Rs. 875.00, ISBN 81-7835-019-X

FIJI

Fiji : A Precarious Coalition. By Shubha Singh, New Delhi, Har Anand Pub., 2001, Pp 183, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 81-241-0745

FOREIGN POLICY

Cooperation on the Eastern Himalayan Rivers : Opportunities and Challenges. Edited By K D Adikary, Khalilur Rahman, Q K Ahmad, R Rangachari, S K Malla, K B Sajjadur Rasheed, BB Pradhan, B G Verghese, Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2000, Pp 240, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-220-0571-3

FUNDAMENTALISM

The Jihad Fixation : Agenda, Strategy, Portents. By A Worldsmith Compilation, Delhi, Worldsmith, 2001, Pp 424, \$ 40.00, ISBN 81 87412 03 8

GLOBALISATION

Asia Pacific: Security Globalisation and Development. Edited by M L Sondhi & KG Tyagi, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2001, Pp. 384, Rs. 695.00 ,ISBN 81-7049-129-0

Meanings of Globalisation: Indian and French Perspectives. Edited by Rama S Melkote, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 2001, Pp. 272 Rs.600.00, ISBN 81-207-2375-9

INDIA - DEFENCE

Defence Challenges and Strategy: Encyclopaedia of Indian Government Series edited By Satish Tiwari, New Delhi, Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2000, Pp 320, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-261-0579-8

Indian Defence Yearbook 2001. By Lt. Col. Jasbir Singh, Dehradun: Natraj Pub., 2001, Pp 611, Rs. 950.00, ISBN 81-86857-02-8

The Indian Navy, By Rear Admiral (Retd) Raja Menon, New Delhi, Naval Headquarters, 2000, Pp 210

Manual of Para Military Forces in India By Rekha Chaturvedi, Delhi, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2001, Pp. 1026, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-7534-229-X

Saga of the Corps of Signals: The Corps of Signals, New Delhi, The Corps of Signals, 2001, Pp. 142, Rs. 800.00

INDIA - FOREIGN POLICY

India's China Perspectives. By Subramaniam Swamy, New Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001, Pp187, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-220-0606-X

India - Pakistan Insight: Basics and Cosmetics in Human Affairs. By Dr Azimushshan Haider, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 2001 Pp. 95, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 969-407-258-1

United Nations and India : Saga of Cooperation. By Dr Usha Sud, New Delhi, Vikash Pub. House, 1996, Pp 239, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-259-0220-1

INDIA - NUCLEAR

Nuclear Deference. By Gurmeet Kanwal, New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2001, Pp 246, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-87966-00-9

Pokhran and Beyond : India's Nuclear Behavior. By Ashok Kapur, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp 264, Rs. 545.00, ISBN 019564943-5

Riding the Nuclear Tiger. By N Ram, New Delhi, LeftWord, 1999, Pp 120, Rs. 175.00, ISBN 81- 87496-03-7

INDO - PAK WAR

The Battles of Zojila, 1948. By Dr Sudhir S Bloeria, New Delhi, Har Anand Publications Pvt, Ltd. 1997, Pp.247, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 241-0509-X

INFANTRY - WEAPONS

Jane's Infantry Weapons 2000-2001. Edited by Terry J Gander, Surrey: Jane's Infantry Group, 2000

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Cyber Millennium: Challenges and Opportunities. By S K Bansal, New Delhi, New APH Publishing Corporation, 2001, Pp. 320.00, Rs. 600.00, ISBN 81-7648-255-2

Government @Net: New Governance Opportunity for India. By Kiran Bedi, Parminder Jeet Singh, Sandeep Srivastava, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2001, Pp. 374, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 7619-9569-2

Odyssey 2001: Exploring the Internet. By Ankur Gupta, Mumbai, Proman Associates, 2001, Pp255, Rs. 290.00

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Just War or Just Peace? : Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. By Simon Chestermen, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp. 295, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-19-924337-9

INTELLIGENCE

The ISI Connection. By R Shekhar, New Delhi, Minerva Press, 2000, Pp283, Rs.250.00, ISBN 81 7662 076 9 3

The Serpent Strikes (Vol. I - IV). By Thakur Kuldip S Ludra (Lt. Col.), Chandigarh, Lt. Col. Thakur Kuldip S Ludra, 1999, Pp 395, Rs. 1600.00 ISBN 81-901218-9-8

KOSOVO HISTORY

Kosovo and the Challenges of Humanitarian. Tokyo, United Nation University Press, 2000, Pp. 536 , Rs. 18.8, ISBN 92-808-1050-2

Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion. Edited by Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov and Bulent Gokay, London. Frank Cass, 2001, Pp. 190, £ 17.50, ISBN 0-7146-8176-8

LEADERSHIP

Leadership and Power : Ethical Explorations. Edited by SK Chakraborty & Pradip Bhattacharya, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp. 452, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 0-19-565591-5

MARINE – ENVIRONMENT

Marine Ecosystem. Edited By Gopal Bhargava , Delhi, Kalpaz Publications, 2001, Pp 337, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-7835-059-9

NATIONAL SECURITY

Dynamics of National Security: Essential Dimensions and Perspectives. By Col. NM Verma, Delhi, Jaico Publishing , 2001, Pp 490 Rs. 295.00, ISBN 81-7224-856-3

Home Affairs and National Security : Encyclopaedia of Indian Government Series. Edited By Satish Tiwari, New Delhi, Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2000, Pp 260, Rs. 700.00, ISBN 81-261-0604-2

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Selected Documents on Nuclear Disarmament Vol. III. Edited by K R Gupta, New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2001, Pp 478, ISBN 81-269-0022-9

Selected Documents on Nuclear Disarmament Vol. IV. Edited By K R Gupta, New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2001, Pp 478, Rs. 1,980.00 (Set), ISBN 81-269-0023-7

PAKISTAN

Pakistan: Almanac 200-2001 – Essential Data on Pakistan. Karachi, Royal Book Company, 2001, Pp. 536, Rs. 1295.00, ISBN 969-404-257-3

Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup 1979-99. By Ayesha Siddiqi – Agha, Gwiltshire, Palgrave, 2001, Pp 231, Rs. 1295.00, ISBN 0-333-73172-7

The Pakistan Army 1966-71. By Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza, Dehradun, Natraj Pub. 1997, Pp 240, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 81-8501-961-4

Pakistan's Downfall Kashmir : The Three Indo-Pak Wars. By Col M N Gulati, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2001, Pp 336, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7049-127-4

Pakistan Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities. Edited by Hafeez Malik, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp 469, Rs 595.00, ISBN 0 19 579333 1

The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, 1971-1977. By Sayyid AS Pirzada, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, Pp 335, Rs 595.00, ISBN 0-19-579302-1

Reassessing Pakistan : Role of Two Nation Theory. By Anand K Verma, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2001, Pp 278, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7062-287-5

Storms and Rainbows: Challenges of Change: Pakistan and South Asia 1995-2000. By Javed Jabbar, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 2001, Pp. 332, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 969-407-260-3

PEACEKEEPING

Aspects of Peacekeeping. By D S Gurdon, FH Toase, London, Frank Cass, 2001, Pp 256, £ 18.50, ISBN 0741468101-6

REFERENCE BOOK

SP's Military YearBook : Thirty First Year of Issue. Edited By Jaysant Baranwal, New Delhi, Guide Pub., 2001, Pp 324, Rs. 1725.00

REGIMENTAL HISTORY

Portrait of Courage : Century of the 5th Battalion, the Sikh Regiment ZLVII(DOC) Sikh. By Maj. Gen. Prem K Khanna MVC & Pushpinder Singh Chopra, New Delhi, Military Studies Convention, 2001, Pp 279, Rs. 750.00

SOUTH ASIA

Globalization and the South Asian State. Edited by B Ramesh Babu, New Delhi, South Asia Publication, 1998, Pp 271, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-7003-232-6

Governance : South Asian Perspective. Edited By Hasnat Abdul Hye, New Delhi, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2000, Pp552, ISBN 81-7304-399-X

Foreign Relations of Bangladesh. By Harun ur Rashid, Varanasi, Rishi Publications, 2001, Pp. 314, Rs. 600.00, ISBN 81-85193-25-8

The IPKF in Srilanka. By Lieutenant General Dipender Singh PVSM, VSM, Noida, Trishul Publications, 2001, Pp 211, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-85384-85-1

Nepal: An Exotic Tourist Destination. By Yajna Raj Satyal, Delhi, Adroit Publishers, 2001, Pp 161 Rs. 275.00 , ISBN 81-87392-12-6

Refugee Problems in South Asia. By Satish Kanitkar, Delhi, Rajat Publications 2000, Pp 307, Rs. 550.00, ISBN 81-87317-90-6

TERRORISM

Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. Edited by KPS Gill & Ajay Sahani; New Delhi, Bulwark Books & The institute for conflict management Pp. 148, 2001, Rs. 250.00, ISBN 81-87553-07-3

Fighting the New Evil War – Terrorism. By Surinder Singh, Jammu, Trituta Raidiant Pub. 2001, Pp 316, Rs. 395.00

Kohima to Kashmir : On the Terrorist Trail. By Prakash Singh, New Delhi, Rupa & Co., 2001, Pp235, Rs. 195.00, ISBN 81-7167-251-2

TALIBAN

Reaping the Whirlwind : The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan. By Michael Griffin, London, Pluto Press, 2001, Pp 283, £ 19.99 , ISBN 0-7453-1274-8

WAR

War Aggression and Self Defence. By Yoram Dinstein, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, Pp. 300, Rs 1400.00, ISBN 0-521-79758-6

AWARD OF FELLOWSHIPS FOR RESEARCH FOR THE YEAR 2001-2002

- (a) Field Mshl KM Cariappa Chair *Emerging Modes of Conflict and Asymmetrical Challenges to India's National Security*
Col R K Bhonsle, SM.
- (b) Air Mshl S Mukherjee Chair *Human Resources Management in the IAF*
Air Mshl S Kulkarni, PVSM, VM (Retd).
- (c) Prof D S Kothari Chair *Environmental Security Internal and External Dimensions and Response*
Col P K Gautam (Retd).
- (d) M E A Chair *Enhancing Security Understanding Between India and ASEAN Countries*
Lt Gen YM Bammi (Retd).
- (e) Additional Project *Fourth Estate : A Force Multiplier for the Indian Army with the Specific Backdrop of Kargil Battle*
Col SC Tyagi.

In Pursuit Of Excellence



Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) proudly supports an ancient Indian seafaring tradition. Over the years, the Company has designed and built a range of sophisticated vessels for both defence as well as commercial sectors.

GSL has developed the expertise in design & construction of vessels from 20m to 100 m in length and has now entered the market with two new high speed crafts, the 35 knots Fast Patrol Vessel and the Extra Fast Attack Craft. These vessels are designed for optimum performance in the most trying circumstances.

Continuously upgrading and expanding its infrastructure for new constructions as well as repairs, the shipyard has today built a reputation for zealous commitment to quality & reliability among its impressive roster of clients which include the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, Port Trust & Administrations, private industries and of course clients abroad



102 M Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel



35 Knots Fast Patrol Vessel




45 Knots Extra Fast Attack Craft



GOA SHIPYARD LIMITED

(An ISO 9001 Company)
SHIPBUILDERS, SHIPREPAIRERS & ENGINEERS (A GOVT. OF INDIA UNDERTAKING)
VASCO-DA-GAMA, GOA-403 802, INDIA.,
PH: +91(832) 512152 (5 LINES) / 513954 / 512359, FAX: +91(832) 513260 / 513943 / 512148
E-MAIL : gsl@gosteletcom.com, Visit us at www.goashipyard.com



Talk to India's leading
Express Distribution Company
You'll find we speak your language



WORLDWIDE EXPRESS LTD.

Corporate Office :

3, Victoria Road, Bangalore - 560 047.

Tel : 5365032/39, 5544127/36

Fax : 080-5514461. E-mail : dtdcho@vsnl.com

Regional Offices :

Ahmedabad - Tel : 079-6583581, 6581476 Fax : 6581167 E-mail :
dtdcahm@satyam.net.in • Bangalore - Tel : 080-5543414, 5543420
Fax : 5512236 E-mail : dtdcrobl@vsnl.com • Calcutta -
Tel : 033-2456869, 2456710 Fax : 2454866 E-mail : dtdccal@vsnl.com
• Chennai - Tel : 044-8216976, 8251065 Fax : 8218045 E-mail :
dtdcmaa@vsnl.com • Delhi - Tel : 011-5713243, 5713242
Fax : 5750524 E-mail : dtdcdcl@vsnl.com • Hyderabad -
Tel : 040-7897254, 7897250 Fax : 7844158 E-mail :
dtdchyd@hdl.vsnl.net.in • Mumbai - Tel : 022-6191552, 6191553
Fax : 6191556 E-mail : dtdcmum@vsnl.com • Nagpur -
Tel : 0712-561168, 561259 Fax : 528145 E-mail :
dtdcngp@nagpur.dot.net.in • Pune - Tel : 020-6331141, 6331145
Fax : 6347949 E-mail : dtdcpnq@satyam.net.in

R

Residency Resorts (P) Ltd.

We are a company providing Residential and Restaurant services to the United Service Institution of India.

These include :-

Accommodation (Residency)

30 single/double rooms in the Hostel Block and 5 fully appointed service flats in the Apartment Block. These are well furnished, spacious, air-conditioned and have attached baths. Professionally managed and supported by services like housekeeping, laundry, security, car park, travel desk, telephone with zero-dial, internet etc.

Restaurant (Retreat)

A Multi-cuisine air conditioned restaurant with a distinct Services decor.

Banquet Hall (Pavilion)

It offers a cheerful atmosphere and informal seating with buffet service in air conditioned comfort for private parties and seminar groups.

Coffee Shop

Located in the hostel block, offers refreshments round the clock.

Member's Concessions

Accommodation & Restaurant facilities are open to non-members also, on proper reference, however, members of the USI are eligible for special concessions.

For details contact

Residency Resorts Pvt. Ltd.,

USI Premises,

Tel. : 6151228/29/30, 614 6492 Fax : 614 4140

E-mail : sudhir1@ndf.vsnl.net.in

Website : <http://www.residencyresorts.com>

US! Correspondence Courses

Courses	Tuition Fees			
	Commencement of Course	Date of Exam	All Subjects (Rs.)	Each Subject (Rs.)
1. DSSC Entrance Examination (Army)	Nov 2001	Sep 2002	1200	275
2. DSSC Entrance Examination (Navy)	Dec 2001	Jun 2002	350	—
3. DSSC Entrance Examination (Air)	Jan 2002	Jul 2002	600	325
4. TSC Entrance Examination	Nov 2001	Sep 2002	750	275
5. Promotion Examination Part D	Apr 2001	Oct 2001	1000	225
6. Promotion Examination Part B	Dec 2001	Jul 2002	600	175

Note : Tuition fees are under revision. For further information please contact Chief Instructor.

Membership of the USI is compulsory for all courses. Fees given above do not include membership fees.

Membership Fees

Life Membership		Entrance	Subscription	Total
(a)	Defence Personnel	Rs. 1000/-	Rs. 4000/-	Rs. 5000/-
(b)	Entitled Civilians	Rs. 1000/-	Rs. 6000/-	Rs. 7000/-

Ordinary Membership (1 April 31 March)

(a)	Defence Personnel	Rs. 300/-	Rs. 300/-	Rs. 600/-
(b)	Entitled Civilians	Rs. 300/-	Rs. 450/-	Rs. 750/-

Please obtain membership form from the USI.

Bank drafts/Postal orders and Local cheques or Cash only will be accepted.
(These may be made out in the name of Director USI of India)

USI CONTACT PROGRAMME FOR DSSC/TSC (ARMY) STUDENTS

For subscribers to our correspondence course which will commence in November 2001, two contact programmes for the DSSC/TSC (Army) Entrance Examination are being conducted at the USI from 24 to 29 Jun 2002 and from 08 to 13 Jul 2002.

email : ciusi@vsnl.net

Website : www.usiofindia.org

Visiting hours : 1000 hr to 1230 hr } Monday to Friday
: 1400 hr to 1630 hr }