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Indian Armed Forces

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PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

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Wars – As Seen Through Soldiers' Eyes (Based on their personal experiences)

JULY-SEPTEMBER 2013

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The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)

Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057

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Website : www.usiofindia.org

Vol CXLIII

July-September 2013

No 593

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January. Subscription per annum w.e.f. Jan 2012 : In India Rs. 700.00. Postage extra (Rs 80 for four issues). Subscription should be sent through Bank Draft/Local/Multicity Cheque in favour of Director USI of India. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution in India. Articles, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries should be addressed to the Deputy Director (Adm).

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FOR 01 JAN 2014 – 31 DEC 2016

The following officers, names listed in alphabetical order, have been elected to the USI Council for the period 01 Jan 2014 to 31 Dec 2016 :-

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● ** Comprehensive National Power USI Team	Rs 995	2013
● ** Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region Edited by Maj Gen YK Gera (Retd)	Rs 795	2013
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2. Membership of the USI is mandatory to join any correspondence course.
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Courses	Commencement of Course	Date of Exam	Cost All Subjects	Cost Per Subject
(a) DSSC (Army)	3 rd Week of Nov 2013	Sep 2014	Rs 4300/-	Rs 1000/- each for Tac B & MH Rs 800/- for CA Rs 700/- each for Tac A, Adm & ML and SMT
(b) TSOC (Army)	3 rd Week of Nov 2013	Sep 2014	Rs 3500/-	Rs 1000/- for MH Rs 800/- for CA Rs 700/- each for Tac A, Adm & ML and SMT
(c) DSSC (Navy)	3 rd Week of Dec 2013	Jun 2014	Rs 700/-	Rs 700/-
(d) Part B	1 st Week of Dec 2013	Jun 2014	Rs 2300/-	Rs 700/- for MH Rs 600/- each for Tac and CA Rs 500/- each for Adm & ML
(e) Part D	2 nd Week of Apr 2014	Oct 2014	Rs 2700/-	Rs 900/- for MH Rs 700/- for CA Rs 600/- each for Tac, Adm and ML

4. **Contact Programmes.** Three contact programmes for DSSC/TSOC-2014 will be run at USI from 30 Jun to 05 Jul, 14 to 19 Jul and 28 Jul to 02 Aug 2014. Separate test papers will be set for each programme. Fees – Rs 3000/- per contact programme.
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11. Prospectus : Available from Course Section and on Website.

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2. Ordinary Membership (For 3 years as per FY at a time commencing 01 Apr)		
(a) Entrance	600	700
(b) Subscription/Renewal Fee	2,400	3,300
Total	<u>3,000</u>	<u>4,000</u>
3. Membership forms available at the USI with Deputy Director (Adm).		

FORTHCOMING EVENTS AT USI*

Date	Time	Events	Subjects and Speakers
07 Nov 2013 Thursday and 08 Nov 2013 Friday	0900–1700 0930–1700	USI National Security Seminar 2013	Perspectives of the Indo-Pacific Region – Aspirations, Challenges and Strategy
27 Nov 2013 Wednesday	1100	Talk and Rendition of the Ballad	Alha - Udal Ballad Rendition of Western UP Dr Amit Pathak Recipient of Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair Fellowship at USI*
06 Dec 2013 Friday	1100	29 th USI National Security Lecture	Civil - Military Relations : Opportunities and Challenges Shri NN Vohra, IAS (Retd), Governor J & K Chair : General Shankar Roychowdhury, PVSM (Retd), former Chief of Army Staff
18 Dec 2013 Wednesday	1100	Talk	Battle of Chhamb, 1971 Maj Gen AJS Sandhu, VSM (Retd) Recipient of Maharana Pratap Chair Fellowship at USI

- Notes :** 1. Please see USI website: www.usiofindia.org, for details and any changes.
2. Unless specified otherwise, events are open for USI members, all serving Indian Armed Forces Officers and invitees only.

* CAFHR CHHATRAPATI SHIVAJI CHAIR 2013-14

Description of the Project: “Alha-Udal Ballad Rendition of Western Uttar Pradesh”

The Alha – Udal Ballad was one of the most widespread sung oral rendition of war between the various Rajput clans of northern and central India. It was sung through vast tracts of India in all the various languages and dialects that were prevalent in this region including Bundeli, Kanauji, Bhojpuri etc.

There is a separate Alha rendition of Western Uttar Pradesh, sung in the local dialect which is variously called Kauravi or Khari Boli. Till a few years ago, Alha was sung in nearly every village of this region, but at present this ancient form of war rendition is completely lost and in danger forever. In 2012, only one or two people could be found who could sing these renditions in their original format. Due to the rapid transition in the patterns of entertainment and the advance of being modern mass media, this Western UP rendition of Alha, which has never ever been documented, is nearly extinct.

There have been studies on the Alha renditions of other regions, but there has never been any formal study of the Alha rendition of Western Uttar Pradesh. In most formal studies of Alha, rendition in the dialect of West UP is not even mentioned.

The project seeks to document, record, analyse and publish details of this ancient but fast getting extinct source of Indian military history.

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Subject : JOINT USI-MEA GREAT WAR (1914-18) COMMEMORATION PROJECT

Dear Member,

Please refer to USI Journal Apr-Jun 2013, no 592, page Nos 309-10.

With reference to the Joint USI-MEA Great War Commemoration project, if any USI member is a descendant of a soldier who served in the First World War, we would be grateful if they could contribute information about their ancestor for the project.

Details can be sent to Secretary, CAFHR at cafhr@usiofindia.org.

Errata

Please refer to USI Journal Vol CXLIII, Apr-June 2013, No 592.

In line three of second paragraph on page 284, after 1st Battalion please add :—

“reinforced by No. 8 Company”.

Editorial

The Seventeenth Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture on 'Revitalising the Image of the Indian Armed Forces' was delivered by Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd), former Vice Chief of Army Staff on 04 Sep 2013 and a text of the same is being carried as the lead article in this Issue of the Journal. Lieutenant General Oberoi covered a very wide canvas bringing out both the systemic and non-systemic aspects of the subject which is very close to the heart of every member of the Service fraternity. Lieutenant General SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd) who chaired the event added a lot of value to the talk quoting from his personal experiences during the concluding remarks. Mr and Mrs SL Agarwal (Colonel Pyara Lal's brother and his wife) also graced the occasion. The lecture was well attended and as expected, generated a number of questions and comments.

The next article is the first prize winning essay of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2012 – Group B, on the subject of 'Geostrategic Importance of India's Island Territories and Implications for National Security' by Captain Balamurugan R Subbu. Captain Subbu after a geostrategic survey of the Indian Ocean Region has very clearly brought to fore the importance of island territories and the need to develop them as a 'strategic strongpoint' to safeguard India's national interests in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Continuing in the same vein, the next two articles also deal with different aspects of national security. Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) in his article 'Military Diplomacy and National Security' has highlighted the importance of military diplomacy in the conduct of international relations in today's world and the need to synchronise the same with Country's foreign policy. Captain JC Sharma, SM, IFS (Retd) had delivered a talk at USI on the subject 'Diaspora, Foreign Policy and National Security' on

13 Aug 2013. A text of his talk is being carried in this Issue of the Journal. Based on his personal experience, he has analysed the role played by the diaspora in furthering the interests of their country of origin and how at times their actions and interests can also become a major strategic liability. In today's globalised and interconnected world, diaspora is playing an ever increasing role in international relations; hence it is equally important to have an active diaspora policy for a mutually beneficial engagement.

The next article 'The Afghan National Solidarity Programme : A Grassroot Development and Governance Model' by Ms Swati Kundra deals with an aspect of life in war torn Afghanistan which has not received much attention in the media but is playing an important role in bringing about a change at the grassroots level. She takes stock of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) which was started in 2003 and has been making a 'sure and gradual progress' behind the scenes in transforming lives of the common Afghan people.

Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Vashishta in his article 'Service Jurisprudence in the Defence Forces : A Conceptual Approach – An Overview' has critically looked at the Defence Services Jurisprudence in India as it has evolved and has been practised since Independence, including the establishment of the Armed Forces Tribunals. He argues that Jurisprudence relating to Defence Forces in India is in a state of evolution and is a subject for research and innovation.

Health Care is an important aspect of human life, even so for the veterans who move into civilian life after years of hazardous military service. Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) which came into being in 2003 has been a major step in providing health care to the veterans after retirement; yet even after a decade, the level of satisfaction remains low. Brigadier Amarjit Singh Randwal

(Retd) in his article 'ECHS – Needs Restructuring' has analysed the scheme in its functioning, identified major lacunae and made far reaching recommendations for its restructuring. The article definitely provides a food for thought for the policy makers!

Indianisation of the Armed Forces during the British rule was a subject which came up often enough during the early part of the 20th Century; yet it made only a halting progress, till the beginning of the Second World War which necessitated large scale induction of Indians into the officer cadre. In the next article 'Indianisation Process and Creation of an All India Brigade', Mr Narender Yadav traces the chequered history of Indianisation through early years leading to the formation of an All India Brigade (51st Indian Brigade) which came into being towards the end of 1944 and fought its maiden battle "The Battle of Kangaw" against the Japanese in Jan-Feb 1945 and acquitted itself creditably. The process of Indianisation was neither easy, nor smooth and the author captures its ups and downs as also various forces at work to stall the same with remarkable insight.

Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd), Secretary and Editor of CAFHR at USI was called upon to deliver a talk on All India Radio on the subject of 'Documenting of Indian Defence History' on 27 Aug 2013. A text of his talk is the next piece in this Issue of the Journal. Apart from many other issues, he particularly brings out the inadequacies in our system which prevents historical documents coming into the public domain.

Encouraged by the response from our readers about the earlier two articles on 1962 War in the Kameng Frontier Division, I was motivated to undertake research into the War in Ladakh of which not much has been written about or known. It was a revealing as well as a humbling experience. I have once again taken the liberty to pen down an account of the '1962 War in the Western Sector (Ladakh)' which has primarily

been put together from Chinese sources. Due to the constraints of space it is an abridged version and there may appear some gaps in the narrative. My apologies for the same. We do plan to carry a fuller version in a book on the same subject which is a work in progress.

In continuation of the ongoing series, the last section of the Journal carries four personal experiences of 'Wars – As Seen Through Soldiers' Eyes'. These are: 'My Experience of the Retreat From Tiddim During World War II : Feb to Apr 1944' by Late Lieutenant Colonel RK Duleep Singh (Retd); 'First Hand Account of Delhi During Partition in 1947' by Major General SS Chhachhi, SM (Retd); 'Battle of Naushera – 1948' by Major General Lachman Singh Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd); and '1962-63 : The United Nations Operations in the Congo' by Major General SP Mahadevan, AVSM (Retd). If you have an experience to share, please do pen it down and send it to us. However, please keep in mind that this is not an attempt to produce a history of various battles, nor is it meant to eulogise oneself, justify one's actions, run someone else down or even to draw lessons, **but a personal experience which captures the heat and dust of the battle in all frankness and humility.**

STOP PRESS

Reference Page 458, sub-para (d) of this Issue of the Journal.

Please also see Page 523 of the Journal for some details regarding the airlift and use of tanks by India in the Chushul Sub-sector.

Editor

Revitalising the Image of the Indian Armed Forces*

Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)**

Introduction

There are many meanings of the word 'image' in the dictionary, but in the context of the subject I am going to talk about, it means *"the character or reputation of a person or thing as generally perceived"*. This is as good a definition as any for the word 'Image'. However, an essential feature of 'image' is its transitory nature.

The second aspect of 'image' is that it differs from person to person and from one group to another. Therefore, one needs to be clear as to 'whose perception' we are referring to when we talk of this nebulous 'image': Is it the public; the intelligentsia; the media; the belligerent militaries of our neighbours; the military itself i.e. our officers and soldiers; our units and formations; and of course the veterans, who are usually most vocal and cynical? The third aspect is comparative; in both time and space, when people, especially old timers, begin their monologues with the phrase, 'it did not happen in our time; what has become of this army!' My aim of highlighting these aspects is that the setting or the scenario is important, when we talk about, discuss or pass judgment on any issue.

Images are made or broken by actions of people and groups. In this respect the Indian Military is no different. Therefore, the adage "it is 'you' who make your image – good or bad" is true to a great degree. However, in this era of information revolution and intrusive media of today, the process is hastened and at times becomes lopsided by the stances adopted both by the media and those who have an agenda of their own.

*A slightly edited text of the talk delivered by Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) on 4 Sep 2013 at USI, with Lieutenant General SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd), former Vice Chief of the Army Staff and Governor of Assam and J&K, in the Chair.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIII, No. 593, July-September 2013.

I would be dealing with the subject in two parts as follows:—

- (a) Part I – The Extent and Degree of Dilution in the Image of the Indian Military.
- (b) Part II – Reasons for the Perceived Dilution and what needs to be done to ensure that the Image gets restored.

Part I

The Extent and Degree of Dilution in the Image of the Indian Military

Let me first take you back in time, precisely to 01 February 1986, when the newly appointed Chief of Army Staff, General K Sundarji assumed the command of the Indian Army and wrote a personal letter to all officers then serving in the Army. The main issues highlighted by him in that missive show what was bothering the Army Chief and consequently the Army at that time.

General Sundarji had begun by stating that “As a whole, the **Corps of Officers** has **lost** much of its **self-esteem, pride and élan**; it is becoming increasingly **careerist, opportunist and sycophantic**; standards of **integrity** have fallen and **honour and patriotism** are becoming unfashionable. **Our young officers** have proved in every action which they have fought, that they are **brave and lead from the front** – our officer casualty ratio in every action testifies to this. **Senior officers** have obviously **not** set the right example.” He amplifies this by the following :—

- (a) Many of us have not professionally kept ourselves up to date, doctrinally or technologically; we feel that as we have ‘got it made’, we can rest on our oars; we do not read enough; we do not think enough, and some of course, have been promoted well beyond their capability!
- (b) In the practice of our profession, we have not insisted on standards being maintained and we turn our eyes away from irregularities.
- (c) We have not been tolerant of dissent during discussions and encourage sycophancy (is it a result of our having ‘switched off’ professionally?)
- (d) We have not been accepting any mistakes (due to hankering after personal advancement?), thus encouraging

our juniors to either do nothing worthwhile or to over supervise their juniors, who in turn are not allowed to develop professionally or mature as men. This leads to frustration.

(e) Some have perhaps unthinkingly developed a yen for Five Star culture and ostentation which flows from new-rich values in our society, where money is the prime indicator of success and social position. This adoption of mercenary values in an organisation like the Army, which depends for its **élan** on values like **honour, duty and country above self**, is disastrous for the self-esteem of the individual in it.

(f) *Once we start thinking of ourselves as third class citizens, it is not long before our civilian brethren take us at our own valuation, and some of them perhaps not without a touch of glee!*

Although our pay and poor compensation packages are woefully inadequate for hard and turbulent service conditions, which force us to live in austerity with a poor quality of life, this should not **prevent** the development of **élan** and **self-esteem**. The bedrock of **élan** is the **professional competence of individuals and leaders**, and the **faith, confidence and pride** in the **effectiveness of the group** – from the section upwards, to the Army as a whole.

All of us talk about '**Officer Like Qualities**' and about '**Being Officers and Gentlemen**'. Being a gentlemen does not mean westernisation and becoming a poor imitation of a 'White Sahib'; it does not mean a tie and a jacket or the ability to handle a knife and fork just so! It refers to the '**Sharafat**' that is ingrained in the **best of Indian culture**; of **honour and integrity**; of putting the interests of the Country, the Army, the unit and one's subordinates before one's own; of doggedness in defeat; of magnanimity in victory; of sympathy for the underdog; of a certain standard of behaviour and personal conduct in all circumstances; of behaving correctly towards one's seniors, juniors and equals.

I am very concerned about the increasing **sycophancy** towards seniors which unless checked will corrode the entire system. On the symbolic and psychological plane, I would like to see much less of obsequious and compulsive 'sirring'. **On the part of the seniors, there is an unfortunate tendency today of more or less sticking to one's own rank level even in social**

intercourse and not mixing adequately with junior officers. This must be put right. We cannot afford to have a ***caste-system within the Officer Corps.***

There has been a regrettable communication gap developing between officers and men. I attribute this primarily to selfishness on the part of the officers and not caring enough about the men. This must be corrected. At all levels, we must insist that we live up to the Chetwode motto.

I must mention that by custom and usage of service, some privileges do go with added responsibility and senior rank, and I am sure that none would grudge these if used sensibly. However, in some cases senior officers tend to get 'delusions of grandeur' and overdo their privileges on a Moghul style. This is bad and must stop. In dealings with peers and juniors also, courtesy, consideration and good manners are equally essential. ***There is none as disgusting as a person who bootlicks the senior, boots the junior and cuts the throats of his peers.***

The crimes, misdemeanours and acts of corruption that are supposedly tarnishing the image of the Indian Military today did exist even earlier. This is not a recent phenomenon, as the media would have us believe, as there have always been a few bad hats in the military, as is true for any other organisation. If we go back nearly to the time when we became Independent, you will find that even at that time, some soldiers and even officers of the Indian Military did not behave any differently. Let me draw your attention to only a few instances briefly.

As young officers in our battalions and regiments during that era, we heard how when the General Transport (GT) Companies and other Third Line transport went in long convoys in J& K and other operational areas for winter stocking of forward posts, the drivers used to sell petrol on the way, if they got a chance to do so, without being caught. Many were brought to book after being nabbed by the Military Police and personnel from the Field Security (FS) Sections of the formations; but, such misdemeanours did take place.

Similarly, in somewhat lighter vein, I recall that when my battalion was in Ladakh in the early 1960's, we used to get airdrops for supplies. By happenstance, it was always the Rum airdrops

where the parachutes failed to open or they landed in valleys from where they could not be retrieved! An organisation known as Forward Air Support Organisation (FASO) responsible for handling all airdrops of supplies, was always suspected of purloining the Rum! Such misdemeanours and petty crimes did take place and were well known. I am sure you all are aware of the 'Rum Currency' that was widely used to 'oil ones way' in various facets of our existence.

Then there were cases of misuse of Regimental Funds. Many, including flag officers were punished by Courts Martial or were forced to put in their papers. Maybe, the number of such cases have increased in recent years, but then the strength of the military has also increased, or they have decreased as today's criminals do not take major risks for small change. It also needs to be stated that action against the culprits in the military is swift, unlike what happens in all other institutions of the state, where cases are either not initiated or they are never brought to a conclusion!

It may be quite wrong to come to a conclusion that suddenly the Indian Military has become corrupt and dishonest and to say that soldiers have lost their élan; values like honour, duty and country above self; and the ethos and culture that have always been so dear to them.

Part II

Reasons for a Perceived Dilution in the Image of the Indian Military and Measures Needed to Restore the Declining Image

In recent years, the Indian Military has been in the limelight for all the wrong reasons. An Institution that was always looked up to with respect and even awe by practically the entire nation, seems to have suddenly developed feet of clay; and the media, as well as a segment of the public, seem to have become disillusioned with the military. Why has this happened? Is it symptomatic of what is happening to other institutions of the nation, both government and non-government? Has the military fallen off its lofty pedestal genuinely or is it the victim of conscious actions on the part of some entities, who, in their wisdom, feel that their personal and/or institutional agendas would be better served if the Indian Military is also dragged down to the levels of most other institutions? Whether it is the former or the latter, we must not

permit it to happen, as it will signify the end of the India we all are so proud of.

The Army is such a large organisation that it is inevitable that despite all the checks and balances there always are a few bad hats. There have been cases in the past where even flag officers were forced to go home in disgrace. This was done by the Army hierarchy to save personal embarrassment to the accused, while still punishing them and also not disturbing the equilibrium of the Army.

The Armed Forces have always dealt severely with crimes committed by senior officers, as they are role models; while junior officers, who get involved in wrongdoings, are usually given the benefit of doubt. A paternal view is taken of the misdemeanours of youngsters, unless the crimes are of a highly serious nature. After all, junior officers and indeed the rank and file, on account of their young age, exuberance and energy commit acts without realising the import of their actions. In such cases, it is correction, advice, encouragement, and sticking to norms, ethos and culture of the Army that take precedence over punishment. Most youngsters do change with this approach and many have risen to dizzy heights, notwithstanding what they did at a young and impressionable age.

Soldiers dedication to duty, loyalty to the nation and willingness for the supreme sacrifice are driven less by material considerations and more by an overwhelming urge to earn love and respect of their countrymen. A grateful nation's recognition of their contribution to national security acts as a strong motivator. Unfortunately, this aspect has not been understood by the Indian polity and especially by our Government.

The standing of the military depends on a number of factors. In our Country, the bulk of the public continues to hold the military in high esteem. However, this is not always the case and the image tends to fluctuate from event to event. To a large extent this depends on the interplay of a number of dynamic factors, which can be placed in two categories – 'Systemic or Strategic' and 'Non-Systemic or Tactical'.

In my view, the Systemic reasons are:—

- (a) Continuing to keep the military out of the Government.

- (b) Heavy and continuing burden of prolonged counter-insurgency operations.
- (c) Deliberate downgrading of the military as an institution.
- (d) The burgeoning shortage of officers.
- (e) Military-Media Relations.

The Non-Systemic reasons are changes in character and conduct of military personnel, especially officers; increasing stress and strain of military life without sufficient compensation; societal changes; material considerations upstaging moral values; lack of recognition; falling standards of discipline; and declining faith in authority.

Systemic Factors

Keeping Military Out of the Government. The Political Leadership of India is generally blasé about the military. They tend to view the military as a necessary evil, which is best kept as far away as possible. Additionally, failure of Indian political leaders to identify themselves with the soldiers stems from two distressing realities. Firstly, soldiers do not count as a meaningful vote bank and in the wisdom of the politicians, can be ignored as they carry little political relevance. Secondly, political leaders have no progeny in the Services. Therefore, they can neither relate to the military nor empathise with them. In the history of Independent India, I can recall only one political leader who had sent his progeny to the military and that was in the early 1960s.

Effective civilian leadership is central to desired civil-military rapport. Civilian leadership implies elected representatives and not the bureaucracy. In democracies the world over, the political leadership makes national policy and the national security strategy, with the active participation of civil and military officials. In India, the military has been deliberately kept out of the policy formulation loop and even after over six decades of loyal, patriotic and dedicated service to the Nation, it is obvious that it is still not trusted! Nothing else explains the reasons for its exclusion from the Government; the inability to evolve a viable and comprehensive structure for Higher Defence Organisation; the non-integration of Service HQ with the Ministry of Defence (MoD); the non-articulation of a national security strategy since Independence; and not the least, the

muzzling of the three Chiefs, even when they speak on professional matters.

Indian Military prides itself in its professionalism and being apolitical. It is fully convinced that a politicised military is the worst thing that can happen to a country, as no country has ever prospered under military control. It entertains no political ambitions whatsoever. During India's long history, there has been only one instance when the military had grabbed power, and that happened way back in 185 BC when Pushyamitra dethroned the last Mauryan emperor.

Political Leadership is highly uncomfortable in dealing with military officers and prefers to let the bureaucracy handle them. However, it does not hesitate to tick off the top military leadership in public. Recent public criticism by the Defence Minister of the Naval Chief for accusing Russia of reneging on contractual terms of a ship is a good example. Another political leader publicly criticised the Army Chief for the latter's comments on China's incursions in Ladakh. There is obviously a total disconnect between the political leadership and the military.

The Services blame the bureaucracy, for lowering their standing in public eyes. Soon after Independence, exploiting the inexperience and gullibility of the then military leadership, the bureaucracy had taken two major steps - firstly, they managed to place the military out of the governance regime, by making Service Headquarters as attached offices of the MoD; and secondly, it perpetuated the notion that civilian control of the military is synonymous with control through the bureaucracy. Indian military has not been able to recover from this body blow to date, and worse, there has been a continuous flow of policy changes which have further reduced the status of the military.

Prolonged Employment in Counter-Insurgency Operations.

While providing aid to the civil authorities is a secondary task of the armed forces, the two major caveats are that it must be employed as a last resort and such employment must be for the minimum period. However, the reality is that because the Army delivers efficiently and with alacrity, both these caveats are being ignored.

In the Indian Military's involvement in counter-insurgency operations there appears to be no end state! The military has

been operating for prolonged periods of 55, 35 and 25 years in Nagaland, Assam and J&K respectively. Such long deployments on secondary roles adversely affect the combat potential of the army ethos and work culture, alienate the populace and lower the morale of the troops.

There has been no insurgency in the northeastern states for many years now, but neither the states concerned nor the Central Government want to release the Army. In J&K, the situation has improved vastly, but the Police forces are not ready to assume responsibility. The Army's reasoning that the situation will deteriorate rapidly if the army is de-inducted is sound, but why are the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF's) not being made capable, especially when new CAPF units are continuously being raised?

The prolonged employment in fighting insurgents and terrorists over decades has taken stress and fatigue of the military personnel to extremely high levels. These operations are extremely difficult and full of stress, especially on account of scrupulously adhering to Human Rights norms. While the Government must take the blame for this state of affairs, the military hierarchy also needs to be blamed for not insisting on de-induction repeatedly.

Downgrading of Military. The next systemic issue is the deliberate downgrading of the military as an Institution. For this, I would place the blame squarely on the bureaucracy. Dislike of the military stems from the bureaucracy's acute desire to ensure perpetuation of its stranglehold over governance. Exploiting its power, it keeps lowering the status of the Services through periodic revision of pay-parity and changes in the Order of Precedence. There is no denying that the bureaucracy has been responsible for continued damage to the esteem of the Armed Forces. It appears to be least interested in the well-being of the soldiers and their morale. Every proposal to curtail powers of the military is instantly approved.

In a nation where scandals have dulled sensitivities, the real issues are rarely addressed. Since Independence, the Indian political leadership has been terrified of its Armed Forces. Playing on this insecurity, the bureaucratic establishment has created a web of '*babudom*' to ensure that it effectively calls the shots. Resultantly, we have the most lopsided civil-military 'command and control' structure anywhere in the world, where policy makers

are not accountable at all, while the military that is kept out of policy making is accountable for everything.

Shortage of Officers. The next point I have listed as a Systemic factor is the burgeoning shortage of officers. The Army is functioning with a shortage of nearly 14,000 officers. This has resulted in gradual over-burdening of the officer cadre, at every level, although the maximum impact is at the cutting edge, i.e. in combat units. Despite such a high level of shortages, it is nothing short of a miracle that the Army continues to deliver, and in such an efficient manner. On the other hand, our political leadership and their bureaucratic advisers have failed to do anything to ameliorate this problem, despite numerous recommendations – from restoring the esteem and “izzat” of the soldier, to lateral entry; and making a career in the Army an attractive proposition.

Although one reads about increase in the intakes at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), I am of the view that this is a wrong way of trying to reduce the shortage of officers. The reason is that there are too many adverse effects of increasing the intake of Regular Cadre of officers, which manifest themselves at later stages of the career of officers. No military can hope to have a smooth management of the officers' cadre if the bulk of the officers serve for the full term.

Most militaries have approximately one third regular and two thirds support cadre of officers. The latter leave the service at regular intervals, viz. at five, ten and fifteen years of service, while the Regular Cadre continues to serve till superannuation. The result is promotions at young ages; no bulges of stagnating officers at the middle or other levels; viable tenures at successive ranks, especially at flag ranks; and weeding out of not up to the mark regular officers. This profile is dependent on giving a handsome package to non-regular officers as an incentive to leave the military and have a second career in a chosen profession.

It was also suggested by the MoD, on more than one occasion, that we should lower our standards of selection, but the military had vehemently opposed it. We need to make all efforts to increase the intake of the Short Service Commissioned Officers, as the shortage of officers is a major reason for available officers being unable to devote sufficient time to their professional duties, which include the important aspect of bonding with the soldiers, a major

problem faced by the Armed Forces. There are many other negatives too, which are adding to the problems of the Armed Forces due to shortage of officers, but these are well known and the need for brevity precludes me from highlighting them.

Military-Media Relations. Both print and electronic media have seen unprecedented growth and proliferation over the last decade or so. In recent years the media has been showing the Defence Forces in poor light, while reporting on the misdemeanours or crimes of a few. They do so with impunity. The Government and the Press Council watch helplessly as young reporters, as well as, a few anchors keep repeating the same news over and over again, without any fresh or important inputs.

It would seem that for our electronic media, the TRPs God is "Breaking News", while the print media at least reports events somewhat calmly without sensationalising or lampooning to the same degree. Perhaps, the media does not realise that when character assassination of the defence leadership takes place in public, it does incalculable harm to the only instrument of the Nation that works and works efficiently and with alacrity. Both serving personnel and veterans do want factual news, but are really sickened by sensationalism, innuendos and imaginary news. Unfortunately, all three have been used with impunity and what emerges is a willful and mischievous maligning of the Defence Forces.

With this type of coverage, the common person concludes that the entire military consists of criminals who are scheming to line their pockets? They seem to forget that, notwithstanding a few black sheep, they are talking about an Institution that is known for its honesty, probity and discipline, and which has secured the Nation externally and internally and even has been called for tasks which directly fall in the ambit of other instruments of the state. I sometimes wonder whether some in the media work overtime at the behest of powerful groups or individuals who want the Defence Forces to be willfully and mischievously maligned for their own agendas.

False and unsubstantiated character assassination of senior military officers has a deleterious effect on the psyche of the entire military. The political leadership, bureaucracy and media must realise that through their ill-conceived campaign of denigrating the

armed forces they are causing irretrievable damage to its morale and degrading its fighting potential. It does not augur well for the Nation and is a highly dangerous agenda.

Over the past few years, the media has also commented adversely on cases of suicides, fragging and incidents of indiscipline involving officers and men, but without probing the issues deeply. These are serious issues that need to be validated with genuine statistics available in the public domain, lest we get alarmed and come to wrong conclusions. The Army hierarchy has always been sensitive to cases of suicide. Many measures have been taken in the past to minimise such incidents. Today, the Indian Military is probably focusing even more on this aspect. But, we do need to accept that cases of suicides cannot be completely eradicated. In the last ten years there were 80 cases of fratricide in the Army or an average of eight in a year. Fratricide is a greater cause for worry, as it is usually accompanied by collective insubordination and it reflects on poor command and control.

Our media is afflicted with commercialisation of intellectual honesty and craving for official patronage. As per reports appearing in the media, a committee appointed by the Press Council of India has found that both print and electronic media have been resorting to unscrupulous and dishonorable practice of presenting 'paid for' material as editorial or independent content, thereby misleading the gullible public. Most abhorrently, many media personalities distort facts and present them in a manner favourable to the officials. They covet official rewards (Padma Shri to Rajya Sabha nomination) through such subjective reporting. As the Armed Forces cannot oblige them in any manner, the media has no hesitation in targeting them.

Some think that earlier the Army was considered 'a holy cow' and hence such incidents were not reported. This is not a correct assumption. The truth is that the media did report them but did not sensationalise them. It is being advocated that the Indian military should not be subjected to scrutiny. Not at all. However, criticism should be balanced and objective. It should also be appreciated that like other organisations the military consists of human beings with their normal share of problems, failings and idiosyncrasies. It is unfair to expect that there would be no aberrations at all. However, what is of importance is the efficacy of the organisation's self-correcting mechanism.

Having highlighted the Systemic reasons that are adversely affecting military personnel individually and as a group, we need to focus on other issues too, as they also have a profound effect on the behavior of our officers and soldiers.

Non Systemic Reasons

It was Lord Wavell who had outlined the centrality of the Indian Army to the Indian nation-state in his farewell speech on 21 March 1947, by saying *"I believe that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be the deciding factor in the future of India"*.

Despite deterioration in governance and indeed in every field of endeavour in our Country, nothing drastic has transpired since 1947 that has changed the status of the Indian Military and its contribution to Indian nationhood. If one were to ask the man or woman on the street about the Indian Military, the unhesitant response would be that *"the Indian Army is the last bastion of the state, a paragon of virtue, honesty and integrity, a glamorous and resilient organisation"* and so on.

The malaise of *corruption* is deep rooted and of very long standing. It is, however, not confined to any particular level. We have been only brushing it under the carpet and not eradicating it ruthlessly. I believe that it is better to accept its existence and expose it even at the cost of loss of prestige, because eventually it will come out in public. It is the hierarchy of the Armed Forces that must carry the maximum blame for this state of affairs, as the top leadership has shied away from making tough choices in this respect. With a view to eradicate corruption, all defence procurements should be open to scrutiny. The fiscal management of public and non-public funds, stores and inventory needs to be streamlined across the board. Penal retribution for offenders should be severe and the sincere and scrupulous should be motivated and rewarded.

Status and standing have always been important to the military. Notions of *izzat* and honour are the backbone of the military and our officers and soldiers must be above the general rot that afflicts the police, the bureaucracy and the other arms of the state. The gradual erosion of the military in the pecking order of official India has been on for decades, but has been reluctantly accepted. Now with greater integration and much more openness of information,

such disparities are leading to a general sense of discontent and malaise.

Take for example, the anomalies in the Sixth Pay Commission which have created real disparities between the Army and other civil services. The most glaring of these is the grant of what bureaucrats call non-functional upgradation to officers in Group A organised services under the Central government. In simple terms this means that Group A officers can now be awarded the grade pay and allowances of IAS officers with a two-year delay. However, the military is excluded on the grounds that military officers do not fall under the category of Group 'A' Officers. This is yet another example of 'baiting' the military and trying to show that it is, not rank or number of years of service that determine seniority; but the amount of pay one receives, whether by hook or by crook.

The image of the Armed Forces also depends upon the confidence and satisfaction radiated by its personnel. What matters is the contentment of those who have voluntarily preferred the service in uniform. A variety of factors leave many personnel disillusioned. Their opinions and impressions based on personal experiences, when expressed by word of mouth, do not exactly enhance the military's 'good image'.

Pride in value-based culture and society is part of our ethics. Be it the Army Chief's 'Ten Commandments' or the IAF's *'Code of Air Warriors'* or the navy's acronym PRIDE, which stands for *'Patriotism and Loyalty'*; *'Resolve and Fighting Spirit'*; *'Integrity and Honesty'*; *'Duty and Commitment'*; and *'Example and Honour'*. Value systems thus need to be reinforced. Effective system of positive feedback; officer-man relationship rooted in trust and loyalty has to be the basis.

The secret of the efficiency of the Armed Forces lies in their professionalism, discipline, hierarchical command structure and fairness. These attributes give the military that decisive edge, which makes them different and creates a halo around them, raising expectations in terms of conduct, efficiency, loyalty, probity and transparency. The military has to live up to such high standards. It needs to be pointed out that an extremely positive attribute that some of our leaders give short shrift to is 'intellectual honesty', which really must be eradicated in the military. Lack of 'intellectual

honesty', whereby some leaders think that they can hoodwink their seniors needs to be banished. Hiding behind a façade of 'make believe' can never pass muster amongst subordinates, peers and seniors.

The aspiration levels of the rank and file are also rising higher. Men are increasingly perceptive about dignity and self-esteem. Deep rooted culture of menial employment of men needs to be replaced by automation and there is a need to discard the baggage of redundant practices and red tape.

Changes in environment around the Armed Forces have also adversely affected the outlook of the soldiers. The information revolution and the mobile phone have changed the way soldiers communicate with their families. This has resulted in soldiers now being much more connected to the outside world, their families and the pressures and pulls of society than was the case earlier. In this milieu, the military faces the unhappy prospect of witnessing their credibility being dented due to a variety of factors like growing media activism and public sensitivity to lapses. A fine balance in management of technology is needed. Onus for changing and adapting also lies on the leaders.

Nowadays when the joint family concept is on the wane and the nuclear families are common across all ranks, the separated wife of a soldier or even an officer does not get any balanced and mature advice from the relatives. Military personnel, with the means of modern communications available, are in constant touch with their wives who are separated from them on account of being in field areas. Even routine family activities, in isolated conditions, become extremely important and result in immediate requests for leave or other demands. This may not be possible every time. Here, the role of leaders assumes great importance and a great deal of tact and advice are needed to calm frayed nerves.

The military, which bears the brunt of false allegations of alleged Human Rights violations, already has a formidable record in managing this sensitive issue. Establishment of 'Human Rights Cells', issue of the Ten Commandments and systematic sensitisation of personnel being inducted in counter-insurgency areas are some of the measures that have been in place for a long time now. In addition, speedy trials leading to exemplary

punishment to the guilty is a feature, which is unique to the Armed Forces. The statistics relating to alleged human rights cases are revealing. Of the nearly 3000 cases registered since 2000, only four per cent were proven and offenders cashiered, jailed or "disciplined" within months compared to decades taken in civil courts. The Armed Forces need to give wide publicity to their fair and just policies and low tolerance to indiscipline in matters of human rights violations.

The somewhat adversarial relationship between the military and the media needs to be improved. The Services have already taken concrete initiatives in conducting seminars and workshops to promote interaction with the media. However, the process cannot be a one-way street. The media too must have a correct and unprejudiced perception about the Armed Forces, their work culture, traditions and command structure. A standing body could be formed with representatives from the media houses and the Armed Forces to enunciate a military-media policy that should address the question of how the Indian public can be kept informed about the facts regarding military operations and other activities, while ensuring the safety of own forces and confidentiality of the military missions.

As part of its social responsibility, the Armed Forces have been organising events like health camps; environmental protection drives; introduction to military equipment; band displays at public places; charity programmes; veteran melas; and rehabilitation and literacy programmes that have mass appeal and wide reach. Such initiatives bring out the human face of the military and need to be enhanced. The success of Operation *Sadbhavana* in J & K and in the northeastern states is having a positive influence on the populace and has a positive impact on reducing social strife, thus lending the much needed healing touch to the people.

Welfare of the soldier is important, but there should be no pampering or paternalistic largesse. What is needed is good standard of living, amenities, rehabilitation and resettlement, in addition to stress reduction techniques and other innovative family support measures. The changing social matrix demands higher and more sophisticated levels of leadership. The traditional authoritarian system of leadership must give way to supportive and inspirational leadership.

The role of Veterans in projecting a positive image of the Armed Forces is extremely important. The Veterans have found both the central and state governments wanting in meeting their aspirations. A number of committees, including KP Singh Deo Committee, the Sharad Pawar Committee and the Khurana Committee have submitted detailed recommendations towards improving their lot, but most of these recommendations remain unimplemented. The Government needs to view the Veterans, not as '*spent cartridges*' but as a trained pool of skilled and productive manpower, which is available for a second innings in the service of the Nation. The Veterans have immense potential for shaping public opinion through their post retirement pursuits such as writing, interaction with students, training activities etc.

Apart from technical jobs, the Veterans can contribute to a variety of fields like vigilance, health, education, sports, physical training, adventure activities, training of CAPFs, environmental activities and so on. The long pending demand of '*one rank – one pension*' needs to be implemented and not perpetually stalled on financial and other specious grounds. Many pledges and promises have been made, but nothing has been done about it. Till recently, even the Service Headquarters took no interest in the problems of the Veterans, which exacerbated matters even more.

Let me in the end again quote from General Sundarji's letter by listing what needs to be done to improve the image of the military officers:—

- (a) Shed the dead weight of mediocrity and strive for excellence, each one in his own sphere.
- (b) Hold fast to all that is best in our traditions and the finest in values, while doing away with the useless and meaningless.
- (c) Avoid ostentation.
- (d) Not sell our souls for a good 'Annual Confidential Report' and promotion.
- (e) Constantly enhance and update our professional competence.
- (f) Sensibly decentralise authority and responsibility.

- (g) Permit maximum initiative to our subordinates, and accept a fair quota of honest mistakes as necessary payment for their professional growth and maturity.
- (h) Encourage dissent and new ideas at the policy formulation and discussion stage and insist on implicit obedience in the right spirit, post-decision, at the execution stage.
- (j) Cultivate a justifiable pride in ourselves, our units, formations, the Army and the Country.
- (k) And finally, live up to the Chetwode motto:

"The safety, honour and welfare of your Country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last always and every time".

We have everything – the brains, the bravery, the technology, the skills, the ability – all we have to do is to get YOU moving and 'Get our Act together' and there is no stopping us!"

Conclusion

The reasons for the dilution in the image of the Indian Armed Forces are multifarious and complex. Notwithstanding the unjust criticism and propaganda by vested interests, the Armed Forces need to have a positive social status in the Country. While the society has to be appreciative of the intricacies of the soldier's task, armed forces personnel also need to be alive to the sensitivities of the society and need to demonstrate their dexterity and flexibility in evolving with the changing times. Internal reforms, mutually beneficial partnerships with external agencies and unflinching support from the Government are the basic pre-requisites for preserving the image of the Armed Forces, which thrive on public confidence and adherence to the values of democracy.

The military hierarchy needs to fully understand that restoring the pristine image of the military is a life and death case for its future. If honour is sacrificed for personal gains then there is no difference between the military and others. The Chiefs, the C's-in-C Commands, the Principal Staff Officers and the Heads of all Arms and Corps have to set personal examples of probity, financial

management and total curb on ostentation. They need to convince their commands that they would come down heavily on those not falling in line.

The senior officers of the military must also understand that where discipline, probity and personal example are likely to be compromised, they have to shed their regimental affiliations, personal equations and even friendship for the larger good of the Indian Military, for it is the institution that is important and not individuals.

I understand that the Defence Forces are seized of the problem and have already commenced a process of reforms to ensure that misdemeanours and criminal offences by officers and men are reduced to miniscule levels. For the professional growth of the Armed Forces and for the good of the Nation, they must succeed. Honour and impeccable character must get pride of place, as it was earlier.

Cultural change has to be actively sought to bring about greater organisational effectiveness in the Indian Military. It is obvious that changing the military culture will be a long-term project against deeply embedded interests of the top hierarchy. It is a process that can be implemented bottom-up or from the middle but ultimately its effectiveness will depend on the top military leadership and the political leadership.

Geostrategic Importance of India's Island Territories and Implications for National Security*

Captain Balamurugan R Subbu**

Introduction

Possession of islands away from the mainland provides a strategic and political advantage to a country. The security and preservation of island territories from state and non-state actors is vital. It is like a game of 'Chess'.¹ All major powers of the world are competing to show their presence militarily, diplomatically and politically to gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The Indian Sub-continent is located in the IOR and its maritime security perimeter extends from Aden in the West and South China Sea and Western Pacific in the East. In the IOR, India is endowed with the Lakshadweep islands in the West and Andaman and Nicobar Islands (A&N) in the East. These islands are the squares held by India for the oceanic chess game and might play a pivotal role in India's economy and overall development in the region.² The geographical location of these islands provides strategic advantage to India. This essay analyses the geo-strategic importance, challenges and the opportunities and their implications for India's national security.

Genesis of Island Territories

A & N Islands. These Islands comprise about 572 Islands extending from Arakkan Yoma in the North to Sumatra in the South. The territory is 100 kms north of Aceh in Indonesia and is separated from Thailand and Burma by Andaman Sea in the East and bounded by the Bay of Bengal in the West. This Union Territory consists of two island groups, namely A & N Islands, which are separated

*This is a slightly edited version of the essay which won the First Prize in USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2012 – Group 'B' open to officers upto 10 yrs of service.

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by the 10 Degree North Parallel. Total length of the islands from North to South is 700 kms. These islands occupy an area of about 8,249 sq kms in the Bay of Bengal. The shortest distance from the Indian mainland is 1200 km. Of the total islands, only 38 are inhabited—11 in Andaman group and rest in the Nicobar group with a total population of 3,79,944 as per 2011 Census.³

A&N Islands have been inhabited for several thousand years. The population of these islands is divided into distinct linguistic, cultural and territorial groups. In 1750, they first came into contact with European traders and became a colony of Dutch East India Company. In 1809, it came under the British possession. During the Second World War, the Indian National Army, with assistance from Japanese troops, took over these islands. Later in 1943-1944, it was regained by the British troops. In 1946, the British announced their intention to resettle all Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmese on these islands to form part of their own nation. However, the initiative failed with the Independence of India and Burma in 1947.⁴

Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands. Lakshadweep are the northernmost islands among the Lakshadweep-Maldives-Chagos group. These islands are actually the tops of a vast undersea mountain (Chagos-Laccadive) Range in the Indian Ocean. Lakshadweep is an archipelago of 12 atolls, three reefs and five submerged banks, with a total of about 39 islands and islets. These islands lie from 200 to 440 kms off the South West coast of India and are divided into three groups. The North and South group is separated by the 11 Degree North Parallel. The North group consists of few islands like Amindivi Islands and the Southern group known as Laccadive/Cannonore Islands. Both groups have a submarine connection between them. The third group Minicoy Islands are located in the southern end of the Nine Degree channel. The land area of Lakshadweep Island is 32 sq kms and it was inhabited by 64400 people in 2011.

Post-Independence. In 1956, both the Island groups were declared as Union Territories. In the early years after Independence these islands received low priority in total Indian perspective planning. During this period, even complete hydrographic survey and navigational charts of these islands were not available with India. The expedition 'Survival' in 1960 exposed these isolated islands to

the world and in 1980 the strategic importance of these islands emerged when the pirates attacked the merchant vessels in sectors adjacent to these territories. In the past two decades these islands have taken a centre stage in national and international forums.

Geo-Strategic Importance

Lakshadweep and A&N Islands are strategically important due to following reasons:-

(a) They can be used as a launch pad during symmetric and asymmetric conflicts.

(b) A&N Islands are the 'entry' and 'exit' points to the Pacific Ocean from the Indian Ocean. Lakshadweep Islands can be used as a vantage point to monitor any movement of vessels in the Arabian Sea.

(c) Provide a large area of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with reserves of natural resources which will boost the economy of India.

(d) These Islands would play a key role in controlling the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) during conflicts/crisis due to their close proximity to following choke points.⁵

(i) **The Six Degree Channel.** The primary passage from the A&N Islands to the Strait of Malacca is through the Six Degree Channel — stretching from Indira Point on Great Nicobar Island to the modern tip of Aceh on the Indonesian Island of Sumatra.

(ii) **The Nine Degree Channel.** The Nine Degree Channel, located near Lakshadweep islands, is the most direct route for ships sailing from the Persian Gulf bound for East Asia.

(ii) **Strait of Malacca.** Strait of Malacca links the Indian and Pacific Oceans and is located close to A&N Islands. It is one of the critical choke points. Its closure may lead to imbalancing of the world economy.

Apart from the above, consequential effects of possessing these islands and principal issues concerning national security,

military strategy, economy and development are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. In 1956, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) replaced the 17th Century concept of determining the jurisdiction of the country specific seas by firing a cannon ball from the coast i.e. 3 nautical miles (nm). After the UNCLOS II, in 1960 the UNO held the third round of conferences from 1973 to 1982 to amend the existing Treaty and also to obtain consensus solution among the members. The Convention came into force on 16 Nov 1994, duly ratified by 60 nations – India being one of the prominent members of the UNO treaty on inception. The implications and advantages for India on ratifying the Convention are as follows.⁶

(a) Territorial waters of India have been extended up to 22 kms from baseline/coastline in and around the Island territories and the Indian mainland. In this part of the waters, India is free to set laws to regulate the use of any resources.

(b) Part IV of the UNCLOS defines how the *Archipelagic State* can draw its territorial borders — also in respect of *Archipelagic Waters*. It elucidates full sovereignty of the waters of these islands to India.

(c) This Convention conferred India with 200 nm in and around the Island territories as EEZ which can be explored for natural resources. In the East, EEZ is 75 times bigger than the A&N islands and in West it is 400,000 sq kms.

(d) This Convention facilitated ownership of continental shelves upto 350 nm (650kms) from the baseline to India to explore natural resources and the right to harvest minerals.

(e) Further, the UNCLOS-III also clarifies that the Median Line is the limit of the EEZ between two bordering maritime states. These guidelines are agreed to by most of the Indian neighbours and littoral states. But, it is unclear with Pakistan and Bangladesh — with whom India has initiated diplomatic measures to resolve the issue.

EEZ of India. (Refer to **Figure 1**). EEZ of these Island territories adds up overall upto 30 per cent value to the country's EEZ. India has been conferred with sovereign rights and entitlement of its

seabed resources upto 1,50,000 sq kms in high seas. A&N and Lakshadweep Islands and adjacent areas are rich in natural resources, have reserves in Oil and Natural Gas and are also a great source of marine life. Oil and Gas have been discovered in the seabed on the Burmese side, but similar discoveries are yet to be made on the Indian side. Since 2009, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited is exploring these Islands under a new Exploration Licensing Policy. These Islands are the supporting pillars of the growing Indian economy and can prove to be a gold mine for India.




Figure 1 : Exclusive Economic Zone of India⁷

Sea Lines of Communication and Anti-Piracy Operations.

India's expanding economy and concurrent share of maritime trade underlines the need of safeguarding SLOCs and carrying out anti-piracy operations (ops) in the IOR. The islands enable India to play a key role in safeguarding chokepoints and SLOCs. Presence of Armed Forces in these Islands deters pirate attacks in the Indian maritime domain. Joint exercises with foreign navies are being conducted from these islands to improve the security of maritime assets of India.

A&N Islands Effects on Look East Policy

The Look East Policy was initiated by the Indian Government in 1990s to exploit the growing markets of the Asia-Pacific region. As part of Look East Policy, India is expanding and reinforcing its earlier initiatives in building defence and economic ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Its proximity to Southeast Asia makes India as much part of that region as that of Asia.

Presently, the only communication line to the South East nations is via the sea route – until the proposed road network project through Myanmar becomes operational. These Islands would play a pivotal role in increasing the transport network 'to and fro' from East Asia and to act as a projection point for India in furtherance of its Look East Policy. Presence of the Indian security forces in these islands enhances the stability and security of this region. It is an additional stake for pursuing Look East Policy.⁸

India's Relations with Indian Ocean Rim Countries

India with its strong maritime capability has attempted to play a key role in establishing stability and peace in the region. The IOR has become ripe for geostrategic rivalry due to mutual distrust between the rim countries who have prevented the creation of an overall security architecture in the region – despite identical priorities and converging interest in maritime affairs. India therefore needs to develop binding relations with rim countries. Multilateral forum like the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (ARC), formed in March 1997, is presently considered as moribund. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), formed in 2008, has still not achieved the ultimate aim. Both, South and South East Asian countries, formed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to improve regional, bilateral level engagement along with subregional initiatives for revitalising joint ventures. India is the flag bearer in various sectors of BIMSTEC.

India is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy which seeks to neutralise other powers in this region. Simultaneously, India is also attempting to strengthen her bilateral relations by improving economic and politico-military relations with countries like Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines and Myanmar. The Government of India has initiated diplomatic process in various forms with Bangladesh, along with South East Asian nations. Moving further westward, India has also been strengthening its economic, security and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Arabian countries, with tacit agreement for forming-up various task forces to safeguard the region from piracy threat. The ongoing strategic ethos of India is to collaborate with other important nations like Australia, South Africa and Indonesia in the IOR for greater development of the region.

Interests of Other Powers in IOR

The demise of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and shrinking of Europe's geo-political significance have diverted everyone's attention to IOR. As appreciated by Admiral AT Mahan in 19th century, this region has emerged as the centre of future power dynamics, conflicts, military and trade activity in 21st century.⁹ All major powers are striving to mark their presence in the IOR. Extra regional powers like the United States of America, Europe, Israel and West Asian countries are taking measures to link-up with this region. Important inter/intra-regional states playing a key role in this region with their interests are enumerated below.

The United States of America (US). The US is a key external actor in the IOR. It has a more significant military presence in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Pakistan, East and Northeast Africa, Singapore and Diego Garcia. The US concern in this region is international terrorism, religious extremism, energy security and also the expansion of Chinese influence in this region. Presently, the US has established a major military base in Diego Garcia. It is also developing a "Unified Command" plan in Indian Ocean.¹⁰ The prime importance for the US now is to protect the SLOCs through the Strait of Malacca. The US has also developed a healthier relationship with India and Indian Ocean littorals. In spite of denial of membership in IONS in 2008; the US Navy participated in 'Malabar' series of naval exercises with the Indian Navy. The main objective of these exercises is to increase the 'interoperability' between the two Navies.

People's Republic of China (PRC). PRC is carrying out various activities at the military and diplomatic levels to secure its interests in the IOR. China has established a complex 'soft power' web of diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, arms sales, port construction, and even strategic partnerships with many countries in the region. It is setting up a series of ports (String of Pearls) in the IOR. The Chinese government is also envisioning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, which links the Indian Ocean to China's Pacific coast. The overstated belief is that the 'String of Pearls' would encircle the Indian influence in this region. But the actual purpose of this strategy is to maximise access to resource inputs and trade during peacetime; while raising the political costs of seaborne energy supplies by severing of SLOC's in times of crisis.

Pakistan. Pakistan's coastline in the Indian Ocean is a vital access point for trade and energy supply. Pakistan's major interest in the IOR is preventing India from dominating the areas closer to Pakistan. Strategic balancers are the more important part of Pakistan's Indian Ocean strategy. Pakistan is also an active participant in the multilateral anti-piracy task force.

Japan. Japan is very keen to secure the SLOCs, since it relies heavily on free flow of oil supplies from the IOR. In this respect Japan has initiated diplomatic talks with littorals of the IOR to develop cordial relations. Recently in mid-2012, Japan participated in Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) 12 with the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.

Israel. Israel is also navigating through turbulent waters of the IOR and showing their presence in this region by establishing a secret logistic naval base in the island of Dhalak, Eritrea, which is close to Bab-e-Mendel in the Red Sea.¹¹ From this island, no vessel can traverse the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea undetected by Israel. Other countries like Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and South African nations are more inward-looking, but for them the major significance of the Indian Ocean is economy related.

Threat to National Security,

The prevailing situation in the IOR poses following challenges to our National Security :—

(a) **Rivalry for Natural Resources.** The continued growth of all nations may create an increasing rivalry for resources, which would force the nations to claim sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean waterways and natural resources. The recession and globalisation are other factors which may result in conflict. India's vast ownership of high seas in this region may lure neighbours / littorals to claim part of it. The isolated island territories would be soft targets in case of conflict in this region.

(b) **Religious Fanaticism.** These islands are prone to religious fanaticism due to the long distances from the mainland and their lack of exposure to mainstream population. The local inimical elements are active and willing partners in religious fanaticism. Many sponsoring states provide all around

assistance to the local organisations. Such forces are establishing their operating base in and around these islands like Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives and Thailand.

(c) **Terrorism and Nuclear Threat.** The epicentre of world terrorism and nuclear proliferation lies in this region. Regional states in the IOR are aiding and abetting subversive elements. In the coming decades, use of sea routes by terrorist organisations is likely to increase due to effectiveness of counter measures on the mainland.

(d) **Development.** Underdevelopment of these islands and alienation from the mainland would lead the population to get influenced by non-state actors. Presently, adequate resources are not being allocated for development programmes. The youth of these underdeveloped islands may either be coerced or motivated to pose a security threat to the Indian establishment.

Role of the Indian Armed Forces. The Indian Armed Forces established a Joint Services Command i.e. Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) in 2001 in Port Blair to ensure "impregnable surveillance and security of land, water and air space of Andaman Nicobar region as a whole". Since then India has taken requisite steps to strengthen ANC. In the Lakshadweep Islands till 2012, only a small detachment of our Armed Forces was operating from Kavaratti. On 30 April 2012, the Indian Navy commissioned INS *Dweeprakshak* to maintain effective coastal surveillance and defence capability.

Recommendations

The following measures are recommended to safeguard the security of these islands :-

(a) **Combat Efficiency of ANC.** India needs to exploit the full military potential of these islands by taking following actions:-

(i) Positioning a fleet of naval warships with Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) in the ANC by 2020.

(ii) Ship based nuclear arsenal and missile defence system needs to be placed at these islands for deterrence.

(iii) A joint brigade sized force, with amphibious capability and Special Forces, needs to be permanently stationed on INS Dweepakshak in the Lakshwadeep Islands.

(iv) These island territories need to be included in the 'Inner Ring' of maritime security perimeter of India.

(b) The overall increase in allocation of resources to facilitate faster development and exposure of the population of these islands to the mainland would deter the non-state actors' influence. Major infrastructural developments may get hindered by the constantly shifting continental shelves of the A&N Islands, but alternative measures need to be initiated by the Government.

Maritime Surveillance Grid. India needs to develop a strong surveillance grid in and around these island territories to preserve the security and stability of this region. The satellite launched in 2012, which was dedicated to maritime surveillance by the Indian Navy, is an additional asset to this grid. It would be in India's interest to press for a maritime intelligence sharing agreement in this region, especially in the Arabian Sea. These measures would cover the gap; meanwhile, India's own satellite based surveillance system would attain the capability to cover the entire region in real time.

Indian Maritime Diplomacy. Diplomatic initiatives with neighbouring countries around these islands would act as a strategic deterrence for extra regional powers. It would create a perception in the minds of adversaries that initiation of conflicts at any level in the region would be unacceptable.

Need to Reorient Our Thinking

Ownership of these islands has been challenged by several regional and extra regional powers in different periods of India's post-Independence existence. In 1965, during Indo-Pak War, Indonesia contested the status of A&N Islands and claimed it as their territory. Keeping the past history and prevailing condition of littoral states in mind, India needs to play a safe "oceanic chess game in IOR". In this game India needs to reorient her thinking on these islands. These islands are not merely to be defended but India needs to develop these islands as a 'strategic strongpoint.' The geographical location of these islands provides a tactical

advantage to India during conflicts. If the need arises, these islands can be used as a springboard to project military power directly against the adversaries or to the South China Sea-Pacific Ocean region. Therefore India needs to change the existing frames of references on these islands with the above discussed facets.

Conclusion

India needs to exploit the geo-strategic advantages of A&N and Lakshadweep Islands to enable her to play a pivotal role in the Asian strategic setting. India can ill afford to ignore the lessons of history and contemporary strategic imperatives because doing so would severely limit the space for political, diplomatic and military manoeuvre in this region. A well-orchestrated use of these islands, to further the Nation's foreign and strategic policy, is the present requirement of India. Secure and stable Island territories would be the staging post for India to start looking at and rediscovering its great maritime and political influence in this region.

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Military Diplomacy and National Security

**Lieutenant General PC Katoch,
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"India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities ... throughout history, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives".

- Dr Marc Faber,
author of *'Gloom, Boom and Doom'*

Introduction

In the above quote, Dr Marc Faber was obviously referring to the overall employment of the military instrument by India, of which military diplomacy is just one but vital part. When John F Kennedy said "diplomacy and defence are not substitutes for one another, either alone would fail",¹ this covered the necessity to synergise national security and military diplomacy as well. This article primarily addresses military diplomacy or lack thereof in the Indian context.

National Security

National security is the requirement to maintain State survival through application of economic, diplomatic, military and political power.² Post World War II, military diplomacy was based primarily on military power. Today national security, besides military might, is dependent on factors like economic security, energy security and environmental security. Top threats to national security for the US perhaps are in domains of chemical, biological, nuclear, cyber attacks and climate change³ but we in India should be looking at the entire spectrum of conflict i.e. nuclear, conventional, sub-conventional and cyber attacks et al. Asymmetric threats to national security include irregular forces, proxies, drug cartels, environmental

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disasters etc. Measures necessary for national security include: diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats marshalling economic power to facilitate or compel cooperation; maintaining effective armed forces; implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness measures (including anti-terrorism legislation); ensuring resilience and redundancy of critical infrastructure; intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage; and to protect information using counterintelligence services to protect the nation from internal and external threats.

Military Diplomacy

Military diplomacy can be defined as *'using the resources of the Armed Forces of a nation to promote its national security interests.'* This implies peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence, to achieve positive outcomes in the development of a country's bilateral and multilateral relationships. Viewing military diplomacy only in terms of defence attaches, personnel exchanges, ship/ aircraft visits, meetings / forums, training / exercises would not address the issue holistically. Military diplomacy is developed and implemented conjointly by the foreign and defence ministries and is often associated with conflict prevention and application of the military. It is distinct from the concept of 'coercive diplomacy' which is generally motivated by desire to intimidate potential adversaries.⁴

While application of national power should be through domains of diplomacy, information operations, military and economic prowess; military diplomacy can contribute in all the four. Nitin Pai of Takshila Institution justifies participation of the Indian Military in diplomacy, drawing example from the US saying, "Chairman of the JCSand four star generals that head the Theatre Commands are important players in operationalising Washington's foreign policy..... Pentagon's foreign policy resources are comparable to the State Department's."⁵ In India's neighbourhood, Armed Forces are key players in politics and security policies. However, civilian bureaucracy and political leadership in our Ministry of Defence (MoD) constrains military's engagement with the world.⁶ In sharp contrast, China employs military diplomacy at global level proactively in order to secure every possible advantage.

Chinese Military Diplomacy

China defines military diplomacy as *"all diplomatic activity relating*

to national security and military diplomatic activities", differentiating it from routine 'political diplomacy' conducted by military officials like military exchanges. China's military diplomacy is based on security and geopolitical interests and calculation, which are driving the modernisation of the PLA in an effort to improve the international security environment.⁷ Objectives of Chinese military diplomacy include : strengthening own military relationships and infusing new technologies; converging China's position on security of foreign countries (Taiwan, Asia Pacific, India, IOR, North Korea) through manipulative discussion; and gain comprehensive information on foreign militaries for subsequent exploitation to China's advantage.

Total synergy between PLA and Chinese political authority facilitates systemic application of military diplomacy. China has military attaches in 109 countries operating directly under Ministry of National Defence. High level visits cover most countries big and small. Large numbers of observers attend major exercises abroad. China's 19 military colleges and universities have student exchanges with 30 countries. On annual average, 1000 military students study abroad. In addition 800 are studying annually in Russia under a 15 year military cooperation agreement signed in 2005. Think Tanks functioning directly under Liaison Department of General Political Department mould perceptions in China's favour, nurture pro-China individuals / factions and asphyxiate anti-China thoughts. Then there is participation in Peacekeeping operations, Military Observers under UN, Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), joint exercises, Track II exchanges, arms exports and technology exchange / acquisition (overt and covert) directed by General Logistics Department of the government; COSTIND (Commission for Science & Technology and Industry National Defence) under General Staff HQ overseeing expert technological group exchanges, plus undercover operations enabling leapfrogging of technology. The PLA spearheads China's cyber warfare capacity development and oversees defence and masterminds R&D espionage. The latest embellishment to the external assertiveness of the Chinese military diplomacy is the 'charm offensive' in order to convince contesting powers that China's rise continues to be peaceful.⁸

Chinese military development projects world over have serving and veteran PLA personnel in garb of workers and technicians. If Hambantota (Sri Lanka) reportedly has company strength of PLA,

the Gwadar (Pakistan) and Sittwe and Kyaukpu (both Myanmar) too would have equal numbers if not more. In Africa, a Chinese Special Forces officer in a development project admitted (off the record), his tasks include evacuation of Chinese nationals in emergency. Listening posts in Great Coco Island, Chinese run hotels in Kathmandu and various projects in CAR and Afghanistan too would have PLA presence.

Having realised the strategic value of irregular forces, China has focused on building proxies to augment PLA's sub-conventional warfare capabilities, which may well be termed the 'noxious' face of Chinese military diplomacy. China provided arms, support and advice to Shia rebels in Iraq, Taliban against US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, Maoists in Nepal, insurgents in India (particularly Maoists, ULFA and PLA in Manipur) and the USWA (United State Wa Army) of Myanmar. Insurgents in India and Myanmar have been provided arms manufacturing capability by China. USWA in Myanmar were supplied with two Mi-17 'Hip' medium transport helicopters armed with TV-90 air-to-air missiles in February-March this year, with three more such helicopters in the pipeline. China had earlier supplied USWA with assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank rockets, QW-1 shoulder fired missiles (reverse engineered from Stinger and Igla missiles), and even armoured vehicles. All this rips apart the facade of 'peaceful' rise of China.

Geopolitical aspect of Chinese military diplomacy includes strategic partnerships, boosting relations with strategically located countries (North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Cambodia), engaging advanced countries and employing Special Forces at strategic levels for shaping the environment to Chinese advantage. With strategic footprints in Pakistan, POK and Nepal, Chinese military diplomacy is focusing on a China led coalition in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with a view to woo prospective partners — Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, North Korea, Tanzania, Seychelles and even Bangladesh — providing them technical, economic, military aid along with generous infrastructural development.

Western Military Diplomacy

Full discussion of military diplomacy of western countries is not possible for constraints of space but some nuances are highlighted here. Peculiarities of the US military diplomacy include: very senior

officers accompany the President, Defence Secretary, National Security Adviser on visits abroad; Theatre Commands have Ambassador level foreign service officers posted; all Commands are required to pursue roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command including facilitating / leading military operations, to include broader 'soft power' issues like health, infrastructure rehabilitation, environment, economic development, security issues, conflict attention and other human security aspects. Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Germany is typical example of military diplomacy aimed at strengthening US-Africa security cooperation. Creation of 'Enabling Command' is another example of military diplomacy.

British military diplomacy aims at dispelling hostility, building and maintaining trust and assisting in the development of democratically accountable armed forces to make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution. UK identifies military diplomacy as *one of the military's eight defence missions*. A typical example of British military diplomacy is in aftermath of the Anglo-French-Israeli assault on Egypt in 1956 when the British were booted out of Middle East. Some years later the British offered the services of the Special Air Service (SAS) as "advisers" and experts to help Middle-East regimes quell their insurgencies. This led to the British regaining their influence in the region and re-emerge as a major foreign player in the energy-sensitive region. Similar initiatives have been undertaken by the US and Israeli Special Forces.

Indian Scene

In India, military diplomacy is generally seen as one of the tools in the conduct of a country's diplomacy but India has not made much use of it perhaps as a result of bureaucratic and political inertia.⁹ In 2011, K Shankar Bajpai, then Chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) stated, "The instruments of State action have become dysfunctional.... India's strategic interests extend from the Suez to Shanghai.... but we have neither the manpower nor the strategic thinking to handle these challenges". China too has limited military muscle, say with relation to IOR, but is employing military diplomacy proactively. Our basic problem is lack of strategic culture echoed by many and succinctly articulated by former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal in saying, "That we

produced Chanakya almost 2400 years ago is not sufficient ground to claim that today's India possesses a strategic culture."¹⁰ We have not even put our act together in terms of ensuring continuous surveillance in areas of our strategic interests despite glaring intelligence voids and the Defence Minister, AK Antony stating in 2005, "We see our area of regional interest extending over entire IOR, which includes Persian Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan to the West, Central Asian Republics, China to the North and Myanmar as well as littoral countries of South East Asia to the East. All planners must bear this in mind while planning."

Though British left India in 1947, we have not even outgrown the British legacy of 'military not permitted contact with foreigners', though British discarded this policy decades back. Even contact with classmates and friends established post foreign postings / courses is not permitted, which amounts to simply distrusting discretion of military personnel. This is just one manifestation of India's overall denial of a place for the military in foreign policy. We should have permitted military officers to keep in touch with foreign friends with systemic feedback in place. Apart from a miniscule number of mid-ranking officers who work together on limited issues, the fact is that there is little synergy between our Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and MoD and the turf war needs addressing.

Military Chiefs of China, Pakistan, Myanmar and their colleagues contribute in a major way in shaping their nations' policy towards India.¹¹ India hardly engages them and if it is done, then it is more on civilian diplomatic terms that make it perfunctory. The primary US interlocutors with Pakistan Army are the US Defence Secretary and CENTCOM Theatre Commander. They engage with Pakistan and Pakistani Military in particular at diplomatic and military levels with India as focus. Should India not be engaging them periodically? Similarly, joint exercises and military-to-military cooperation arrangements only cover professional military matters. Actually, India does not engage in military diplomacy in any concrete and meaningful form.

India must make military diplomacy part of its foreign policy and create the capacities, structures and processes necessary to put it into action. Diplomacy must enter the syllabuses of our military academies. In a recent strategic war-gaming exercise covering specific global scenarios in 2025, conducted at the Army

War College, MHOW, former ambassadors acting as mentors to syndicates were impressed by the vision and diplomatic acumen of participating Colonel level officers. Trained military officers must be deputed to Indian embassies and missions around the world to augment strengths of our missions abroad. They should also perform non-military functions. This would also ramp up the deficiency of numbers of the IFS. Intermingling of military and IFS officers through such postings will create benefits in the long term, in terms of greater understanding and policy coordination. Special Forces must be integrated in military diplomacy and deployed strategically for shaping the environment in India's favour. Late K Subrahmanyam consistently argued that India must restructure its Armed Forces along the lines of the US, with a Joint Chiefs of Staff and Tri-Services Theatre Commands that would lend itself to the conduct of efficient military diplomacy. In the interim, adjustments are needed to existing structures to facilitate application of military diplomacy in the real sense. India should have a National Security Adviser with military background and have both serving and veteran military officers in the MEA, MoD, NSC, NSAB and staff of NSA on full time basis. The HQ Integrated Defence Staff must be seamlessly integrated with the MEA and MoD.

The urgency to have a clear cut policy for military diplomacy was never more. More importantly, such policy must be fully synchronised with our security and geopolitical interests, covering all aspects discussed above. The implementation would require a coherent roadmap with timelines based on our strategic calculations. There is urgent need to also energise our military industrial complex, which can play a major role in military diplomacy and should be fully dovetailed into our military diplomacy framework. Application of military diplomacy must be done in holistic fashion simultaneously engaging most of the countries, particularly in areas of our strategic interest.

Conclusion

Democracies like India have to manage perceptions that question the utility of force in a rapidly changing environment and society that is on the cusp of economic growth. India presents a matrix of a developing democracy with multiple internal fissures and external threats to sovereignty. The inescapable requirement of 'hard power' in today's uncertain strategic landscape cannot be denied but

India's insistence that its force application philosophy should base itself on 'defence' has led to India being called a soft state. It is necessary to give deterrence, coercion and compulsion equal importance. In all these military diplomacy has a significant role.

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Diaspora, Foreign Policy and National Security

Captain JC Sharma, SM, IFS (Retd)*

Human beings have migrated in search of better climatic conditions, fertile land, for trade and commerce, to escape religious and political persecution and in the spirit of adventure since times immemorial. Process of Globalization has given a major fillip to this phenomenon. According to International Migration Organisation today there are about 214 million people working in the countries in which they were not born.¹ The number would be even higher if we include people who have migrated in earlier generations. The migrant communities are commonly referred to as 'Diaspora' which is a Greek word meaning dispersal from a common source. The communities that have broad affinity with a common civilization, culture, ethnicity and or language are generally considered 'Diaspora'. Some communities are identified as diaspora because of common religious identities. The best example would be Jewish diaspora. Globalisation and liberalisation of global economic system and the rapid advancement of transport and communication technologies have intensified their socio-economic, political and cultural ties with their origin countries. Diasporas have therefore attained importance not only at the international level, but also in the domestic political and economic affairs of home countries than ever before. They have emerged as an 'inevitable link' between their home and host lands along with major political and economic implications for both sides.

Diasporas have also emerged as a major source of investments, knowledge transfers and capacity building. The Chinese Diaspora has been a propelling force for its emergence as an economic and industrial power. Overseas Chinese account for approximately sixty five per cent of total foreign investment in China. They have also been a major source of transfer of

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technology, modern management practices and facilitators of international trade. East European countries relied heavily on their Diasporas for transformation of their economic systems after the Cold War. African Union has declared diaspora as the sixth region of Africa. They are playing a useful role in capacity building.

Remittances have emerged as an important factor in foreign exchange management of a number of countries. India is the largest recipient of remittances in the world with US \$ 69 billion in the year 2012.² Remittances constitute twenty two per cent of GDP of Kerala. They constitute a significant part of foreign exchange reserves of Mexico, Philippines, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and many other countries.

Diaspora has been an important part of Indian polity since colonial times. Colonial government heavily relied on Indian indentured labour for sustaining its plantation colonies in the wake of abolition of slavery. Indenture system and the treatment of migrant labour became a major point of discussion in the Congress Party sessions since its early years. Colonial government took several policy measures to manage public opinion in India. Protectorate General of Emigrants was established and the committee was constituted to examine the issues of Indian indentured workers. Congress Party sent delegations to report on the conditions and treatment of Indian migrant labourers. Mahatma Gandhi with his first-hand experience in South Africa strongly opposed indenture system and it was finally abolished in 1916. Komagata Maru incident in Canada and firing on the returnees at Calcutta became land mark events. Overseas Indians played a significant role in the Independence movement. Moderates like Dadabhai Naoroji who became the first Asian member of the House of Commons in 1892 pleaded for greater devolution of power. The Ghadar movement initiated in 1913 in California emerged as a prominent centre for revolutionary Indian nationalism outside India.

Shyamji Krishna Varma founded India House and The Indian Sociologist in 1905 which rapidly developed as an organised meeting point for radical nationalists among Indian students in Britain. India League mounted a major lobbying effort in the United Kingdom. Netaji Subhash Bose received enthusiastic support from Indians in South East Asia. Dilip Singh Saundh became the first Asian to be a member of the US Congress. Overseas Indians also raised funds during the time of war with China in 1962.

25 million strong overseas Indians spread in every continent constitute second largest diaspora in the world. There are more than half a million Indians in 11 countries and more than 100000 in 22 countries.³ Large scale migration from India was a byproduct of colonialism. Labour was recruited from India to sustain plantation economies of colonial powers. Beginning with 1834, indentured labour was sent to Mauritius followed by Caribbean, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Fiji. Other colonial powers France, Netherlands and Portugal followed suit. Indian labour was recruited to build East African Railways. They were followed by professionals and traders who went as free passage migrants and Mahatma Gandhi was one of them. Colonial connection also led to some migration to the UK and Canada. Some migrants to Canada moved to the USA. Some Indians also went to the UK and the US for higher education. Post-independence some Indians migrated to the UK to meet labour shortage. This was followed by migration of professionals to the UK and North America. Many students who went for higher education settled down in the US and Canada in the wake of change of immigration laws in 1965 and 1966.

There was also secondary and tertiary migration to developed countries of Indians from Africa and Caribbean because of growing insecurity. Many IT professionals also migrated during dot com bubble and Y2K problem. Achievements and entrepreneurship of Indian professionals and high education standards have completely changed the profile of Indians in developed world. They are seen now as a major asset by the host countries. In the wake of oil crisis of 1973 and rise in oil prices, countries in the Gulf required large human resource to build infrastructure. This resulted in large migration of Indians to Gulf and soon Indians numbering around five million became the largest foreign community in Gulf.

As a result of growing profile and prosperity of Indians, particularly in developed world, Indian diaspora have acquired a higher profile and started playing a role in the politics of the host countries. They have also started getting important assignments and have been elected to important public offices. The end of Cold War and policy of economic liberalisation pursued since 1991 have led to emergence of India as an important player in international arena. Growing stature of both India and its diaspora has led to emergence of overseas Indians as an important factor in India's foreign policy, national security and economic development. They

are seen as an important resource in India's quest to be a knowledge power.

Observing the role played by Chinese diaspora in transformation of China and Jewish diaspora in influencing the US policy towards west Asia a debate on the role of diaspora has started in India. Negative actions of certain sections of diaspora have also led to a debate whether diaspora is a strategic asset or a liability or a bit of both? It is not that India has not faced foreign policy challenges because of overseas Indians earlier. Congress Party kept constant pressure on colonial government. In spite of a large overseas population Nehru wound up the department of overseas Indians in 1947, though on March 18, 1946 while addressing a predominantly Indian gathering in Singapore, Jawaharlal Nehru said: "India cannot forget her sons and daughters overseas. *Although India cannot defend her children overseas today, the time is soon coming when her arm will be long enough to protect them.*"⁴ He gave primacy to India's larger foreign policy interests and the policy of anti colonialism, anti apartheid and Non Alignment. Answering a question from Seth Govind Das in Lok Sabha in 1955 he stated 'Our interest in them becomes cultural and humanitarian and not politics.'⁵ He also faced two major challenges when large number of Indians left Burma in the wake of policy of Burmanisation and Nationalisation.

A question of Indians in Sri Lanka was another thorny issue India had to grapple with. PM Lal Bahadur Shastri entered into Shastri Srimavo Pact on the question of Indians in Sri Lanka. Indira Gandhi had to deal with the issue of exodus of Indians from East Africa and their brutal treatment by Idi Amin. This was a major item on agenda for discussions with Margaret Thatcher as most of them held British passports. Foreign exchange shortages made her policy towards overseas Indians remittance centric. Indians in the USA also opposed declaration of emergency in 1975. This led to closer engagement between Indian missions and the community. Operation Blue Star led to estrangement of large sections of Sikhs overseas particularly in the UK, Canada and the USA. Many Gurudwaras became major source of financial and political support of separatists. This created irritants in our relationship with several countries. Kanishka crash was the single biggest incident of aviation terrorism killing 329 people. Another bomb exploded in baggage handling area of Narita airport. Bombs

to bring down two Air India planes were placed by members of the Indian community in Vancouver.

Earlier Kashmiri separatists had killed Ravindra Mhatre in UK in 1984. Rajiv Gandhi felt that diaspora could play a major role in modernisation of India. He felt diaspora could play a useful role in his vision of India of 21st century and brought technocrats like Sam Pitroda to India who changed the entire telecom scenario in the country. Rajiv Gandhi also took proactive stand on the coup in Fiji in 1987 and put in considerable diplomatic effort in getting Fiji expelled from the Commonwealth.

The end of Cold War and dissolution of Soviet Union, liberation of Indian economy and rising profile of diaspora created the right environment for a mutually beneficial engagement. The investment by overseas Indians in the India Development Bonds helped in overcoming the foreign exchange crisis in early nineties. National Democratic Alliance led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee launched a major initiative for engaging the diaspora. The Government introduced Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) card in March 1999 and established a NRI/PIO division in the Ministry of External Affairs in March 2000. A high level Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr LM Singhvi, MP was appointed in September, 2000. The Committee was to provide a blue print for India's engagement with overseas Indians. All the major recommendations of the Committee were accepted. 9th January was declared Pravasi Bhartiya Divas (PBD) and Pravasi Samman Awards were instituted. The first Pravasi Divas celebrations were held in New Delhi from 9-11 January 2003. PM Vajpayee announced the acceptance of the demand for dual citizenship. He also announced the insurance scheme for Indian workers.⁶

UPA Government announced establishment of Ministry for Overseas Indians Affairs (MOIA) in May, 2004. They have introduced several measures to leverage the resources of diaspora. MOIA has paid special attention to the welfare of Indian workers abroad particularly in Gulf. As a result of intensified engagement since the nineties, diaspora has become an important factor in our foreign policy. Indo-Americans have emerged as a major strategic asset in our relations with the USA. Thanks to their efforts, India caucus has emerged as the largest caucus on Capitol Hill. They actively supported India's cause in the aftermath of new nuclear

test in 1998, Kargil conflict and the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Corporation agreement. They occupy influential positions in every walk of life and are able to leverage the Democratic process in pursuit of India's national interest. The profile of Indo-Canadians has also been rising and they are an important factor in our relationship with Canada. Every senior leader from Canada makes it a point to visit Golden Temple during his visit to India.

Indian Community in the UK has also emerged as one of the most influential overseas community. They have become active participant in public life at all levels. The representation in the Parliament has been steadily increasing. Like the US they are also able to leverage the Democratic process. They are also a force to reckon within the economic field. Indian Community has also made a mark in cultural field. Indian cuisine and Punjabi fusion music have become extremely popular. There are large Indian communities in Holland, Italy, Portugal and overseas territories of France. These communities can play a useful role in promoting our relations.

Presence of large Indian communities has been an important part of our relationship with East and South Africa. They play an important role in our bilateral trade. Threat to their safety and security and overt discriminations is bound to generate reactions in India. It would have major implications for our bilateral relations. Similarly, the safety and security of large Indian communities in Malaysia and Fiji will have a bearing on our relations. Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) agitation in Malaysia had its fallout in India. M Karunanidhi, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu issued a sharp statement drawing an equally sharp rejoinder from a Malaysian Minister. Indian High Commission in Fiji had to be closed down in the aftermath of the coup in 1987. Killing of Indian students in Australia led to a major uproar in India. Same was the case with the issue of custody of a child in Norway.

Five million strong Indian community in Gulf is a vital factor in our relationship with GCC countries. The biggest air lift was organised for evacuation of Indians during the first Gulf War. Remittances from Indians in Gulf play a significant part in our foreign exchange management. Largest number of consular issues are dealt with by our missions in Gulf. Recent introduction of *Nitakat* law in Saudi Arabia had major impact on the Indian diaspora.

Several demarches at Ministerial level had to be made to provide some relief to affected workers.

No foreign policy can be effective without economic strength. Knowledge power and technological capabilities are a major determinant of standing of a nation. Diasporas are invaluable assets in this regard. India's rise as an IT power owes a lot to the success of Indians in Silicon Valley. Diasporas are a major asset in India's quest to be a knowledge power.

Overseas communities have been used as an intelligence asset by all major intelligence agencies. CIA has used them in many parts of the world. Both Richard Headley and Tahavvur Rana are overseas Pakistanis whom they effectively used for reconnaissance for Mumbai 26/11 operations. Ghulam Nabi Fai a member of Kashmiri diaspora and an active ISI operative has been convicted in the USA. Overseas Bangladeshis were a major asset to India in 1971.

India has already experienced that overseas communities can also be major strategic liability. Khalistan movement could not have survived so long without strong support of Sikh diaspora. LTTE relied heavily on Tamil diaspora for financial, political and logical support. Overseas Kashmiris have lent considerable help to the separatists. Most of the demonstrations against Indian leaders have been organised by overseas Indian communities. Intelligence agencies inimical to India, particularly ISI, have repeatedly exploited overseas Indians. There was a strong nexus between Khalistani and Kashmiri separatists and ISI. No effort has been spared by ISI in recruiting Indians in Gulf through indoctrination and inducement. They are recruited in Gulf to become sleeper cells. Entire handling is done by operatives in Gulf. Indoctrinated returnees have spread fundamentalist ideologies which have led to polarisation and disturbed communal harmony. Overseas communities are a major source of money laundering through hawala route.

Diaspora has also become active participant in our electoral process. They are an important source of funding and also come to India to participate in election campaigns. Advertisements were taken out in NRI media during last assembly elections in Punjab. This development has major implications for our democratic process.

To sum up, because of globalisation, revolutionary changes in the field of transportation and communication technology, overseas communities have become an important factor in international relations. They are major players in the field of soft power diplomacy, knowledge transfer, modernisation and economic development. A well-disposed diaspora can be a major strategic asset and community with grievances can be a major liability and exploited by unfriendly countries. It is, therefore, essential to have an active diaspora policy for a mutually beneficial engagement. A thorough study of the implication of overseas communities, its implications for our foreign policy and national security is extremely important.

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The Afghan National Solidarity Programme: A Grassroot Development and Governance Model

Ms Swati Kundra*

Introduction

The rubble of destroyed buildings, blood on the ground, sky lit up with gun flares, lack of utility or basic public services and millions of Afghans abandoning their own land, are clear indicators to list Afghanistan as one of the failed states. As of 2013, it is ranked seventh in the Failed States Index as compared to sixth and first in 2012 and 2011 respectively.¹ A little progress is in sight. Among the many factors that have enabled the war-ravaged country to be on the track of progress is the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), an initiative of the Afghan government under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, to empower the rural communities to make them self-reliant in initiating and taking forward the rural-centric development projects. It has truly brought out the transformative power of development at grassroot level.²

The NSP is funded by international donors, with the United States (US) being the largest, and supported by facilitating partners viz Afghan Aid, Action Aid, Concern Worldwide to name a few. Started in 2003, the NSP finished its first phase in the time span of four years and covered 17,300 communities. The successful completion of first phase soon led to the commencement of the second one in April 2007, which got completed in 2010. This was followed by the third phase which is still functional. Each new phase happens to be bigger and better. NSP III was approved in January 2011 and is estimated to be completed in September 2015 with an estimated budget amount of US \$ 500 million.³

The Idea behind NSP

The founding father of the Afghan NSP is the then Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani; but the idea behind starting one such programme

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with 'community-centred approach,' did not strike him overnight. His graduate school friend Scott Guggenheim, a World Bank staffer, who had initiated a similar programme 'The Kecamatan Development Programme' in Indonesia in 1998 for the upliftment of the villages, became his inspiration. The following case study of the Indonesian Development Programme, reproduced (unabridged) from Gregory Warner's article, 'The Schools the Taliban Won't Torch', published in *Washington Monthly* in 2007, says it all.

Case Study: The Kecamatan Development Programme⁴

The novel thinking behind the NSP is largely the work of Scott Guggenheim, who in the late 1990s pioneered a similar programme in Indonesia. At the time, development work in Indonesia was a thorny business: the ruling Suharto government was unreliable and deeply corrupt, and funds intended for aid projects often went missing. Guggenheim wanted to work directly with local villages, but in a way that would avoid a main pitfall of past "community-based" aid approaches: having money siphoned off by dubious local leaders.

So Guggenheim designed a programme that would distribute small grants to villages and thereby, as he told the *Washington Monthly*, ensure "greater local accountability." When the Kecamatan Development Programme was launched in 1998 (the word *kecamatan* means "subdistrict"), Guggenheim's staff organised town hall-style meetings to ask villagers: How they thought grant money should be used? Local leaders were charged with administering the projects and required to take bookkeeping classes and keep minutes at planning meetings. Billboards at above project sites indicated how money had been spent, encouraging local oversight. "The core elements were requiring that citizens participate and that there be high levels of transparency about how money was being transferred and used," one of Guggenheim's former Bank colleagues, Dennis de Tray, now at the Centre for Global Development in Washington, said, "It had to be auditable."

Not only did the villagers help in planning what to build, they also managed the funds. The fact that the programme gave the residents this discretion was a radical step for the World Bank; which, like most donors, preferred to maintain control of how its resources were spent. Guggenheim believes this element was crucial to its success. Because villagers, rather than a foreign aid

agency, controlled the purse strings, there was a much greater sense of local ownership over projects—it was their money to lose. Villagers therefore watched more closely and demanded more from the councils that managed the projects. Eventually these councils, supported and trained by the programme, took on additional tasks, such as channeling international hurricane assistance. The significance of the approach “wasn’t just that people got a water pump,” as Guggenheim said, but “that they selected a water pump and [the government] gave it to them.”

According to World Bank reports and independent evaluations, the Indonesia programme succeeded in its twin goals of enabling small development projects and strengthening local governance. But it was another unexpected accomplishment that really caught the attention of Bank officials and the international aid community: when the Suharto government collapsed, the World Bank had to suspend most of its aid programmes, but Guggenheim’s programme was able to continue operating. The reason was that, unlike other aid programmes, the Kecamatan Development Programme could function even when there was no central state to work with. The World Bank coined the term “community-driven development” to describe this development model, and under then president James Wolfensohn launched similar programmes in other conflict-ridden areas, from Nepal to Colombia.

In late 2001, shortly after the fall of the Taliban, a friend of Guggenheim’s from graduate school, Ashraf Ghani, was appointed as the new finance minister of Afghanistan. Ghani had followed Guggenheim’s work and wanted to try something similar at home. So Ghani phoned up his old friend, reaching him in the car on his way up a volcano in Indonesia. “Scott,” he said, “we need you in Kabul.” In early 2002, the pair set about designing an ambitious community-directed development programme for Afghanistan—and the NSP was born. As with the Indonesia programme, the mission was twofold: to erect small development projects and to build trust among a village population that for a century had known government only as a predatory force.

A Glimpse in the Past

Post the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, the worst suffering populace was the rural dwellers who were badly sandwiched between the drone attacks launched up from the sky, and guns and bullets on the ground. When all the premier institutions of the

country were either bombarded or good enough to be shut down, Afghan people had lost faith in the concept of governance. The development projects were the need of the hour. Amidst the crises several national development projects: as diverse as National Emergency Employment Programme to provide jobs across the country; a National Health and Education Programme to provide basic health packages to citizens and to get children back in school, a National Transportation Programme to make Afghanistan a land bridge for South and Central Asia and the Gulf; a National Telecommunications Programme to set up a cell phone network across the country and attract private investment; a National Accountability Programme to build good financial management, and finally, a National Solidarity Programme to carry out rural development, empower citizens in decision-making, and connect them to their government⁵ were commenced. The NSP happens to be the country's largest and most successful rural reconstruction and development programme. Another interesting fact to notice is that the budget invested in the programme is lower than the budget invested in any of the western led development initiatives in Afghanistan.⁶ This very fact has brought it from the periphery of Afghan affairs to centre stage over past few years. The popular belief is that the programme needs to be expanded; this aspect has been touched upon later in the article.

Community Development Councils

For proper execution of projects, Community Development Councils (CDCs) which are consultative decision making bodies required to ensure effective governance, were created. Rural communities have the right to choose their own representatives who can further form and head their respective CDC. This makes the NSP a transparent and democratic programme. Besides that, the programme ensures equality on ground by involving and empowering women in it. "Through the NSP, more than 22,000 Afghan women are actively participating along with men in more than 10,000 CDCs to assess local needs, receive and implement grants from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and lead project design and implementation."⁷ In a short span of a decade, the CDCs seem to have been doing so much better. So far, approximately 31,245 rural communities have elected local councils to represent themselves. They have been instrumental in monitoring over 72,266 sub projects.⁸

The Role and Impact of Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund on NSP

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which happens to be the biggest Trust Fund presently in the Country, keeps the Afghan government functional by covering its operational costs and development budgets. The ARTF is managed by multiple institutions as diverse as the World Bank (as the administrator), the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Ministry of Finance (as the Observer). The reason to keep it under the auspices of these institutions is to retain transparency, coordination amongst the donors, and boost the Afghan Government in its efforts towards development. The ARTF has been the largest contributor of the NSP since 2002, and has handled its Block Grant scheme very efficiently.⁹ "Block Grants are calculated at US \$ 200 per family with an average grant of US \$ 33,500 and maximum of US \$ 60,000 per community. Portions of the Block Grant are released for procurement and phased implementation of the approved sub-project(s). Communities must contribute a minimum of 10 per cent of the total project costs in either labour, funds or materials....The NSP receives funding from four primary sources: the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), the ARTF, the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) and bilateral donors. Contributors to the NSP via the ARTF include Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EC/EU, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK / Department for International Development (DFID), and the United States. Bilateral donors include the Governments/Embassies/International Aid Agencies from Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. The proportion of the funding received to-date is as follows: US \$ 437.84 Million (22 per cent) IDA, US \$ 1369.48 Million (69 per cent) ARTF, US \$ 41.81 Million (2 per cent) JSDF and US \$ 130.80 Million (7 per cent) bilateral funds. Funding from some donors is "preferenced" by geographic area or core components.¹⁰ Out of 65,000, some of the main subprojects undertaken, with the figures stating their level of completion, are reflected in Figure 1.¹¹

Water Supply and Sanitation	24 per cent
Rural Roads	26 per cent
Irrigation	19 per cent
Power	12 per cent
Education	10 per cent

Figure 1 : Completion of Main Subprojects

NSP Needs Expansion and More Funds

The primary reason behind the effective implementation of the NSP is that it being under the Ministry of Rural and Rehabilitation Development (MRRD) which happens to exist with minimal corruption in an otherwise corrupt Afghan Government. The programme which reaches out to people in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan is in its third phase; rural communities along with international community want it to be expanded, which is certainly not going to be an easy task. The emerging problem in the years ahead is the cost cutting in development projects by the international community following its efforts to make Afghanistan dependent on its own resources and revenues.

Now, this endeavour of the international community puts the world in dilemma about the repercussions. The obvious change in the priority list of the US is quite visible. With the numerous engagements worldwide (in the conflict zones), it is primarily focusing on building its military strength, and this brings condemnation for not contributing enough in the ongoing development projects such as the NSP.¹² "Civil aid programmes are a fraction of what is spent by America, Britain and other countries on military operations there.... Too much aid from rich countries is wasted, ineffective or uncoordinated... Spending on tackling poverty is a fraction of what is spent on military operations."¹³ The cliché is that no war is won merely by guns and bullets. More efforts can be put in the reconstruction efforts and in boosting other Afghan ministries such as education, health, women affairs, communications and information technology et al. These efforts will benefit Afghanistan in the long run.¹⁴ The international community will have to be very careful in tailoring its development strategy for Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Having talked about development, the NSP is quite a progressive model and does seem to have worked for Afghanistan, but to

consider it obstacle-free is a myth. The Taliban has more often than not targeted heads of the councils after they refused to give away the money to be invested in small development projects.¹⁵ This brings out the issue of security which is likely to further deteriorate with the withdrawal of the US and its allies' troops. In 2012, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) estimated an increase in the security cost of development projects by over US \$ 55 million over one year, following the Afghan government's decision to disband private security firms in Afghanistan, and replace them with state owned Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).¹⁶

The threat of the Taliban vis-à-vis development projects and the risk of renewed civil war post 2014 loom ahead. Extraordinary situations need extraordinary measures. High security is the need of the hour in order to execute these projects, and for the security of workforce associated with them. Development projects alone cannot guarantee progress. By providing required security measures and proper funding, the NSP has the potential to become a change maker and set an example for other war torn countries as well.

Endnotes

1. The Fund for Peace is a non-partisan, non-profit research organization that comes up with the Failed States Index every year since 2005 in collaboration with Foreign Policy. The organization also works on the risk-assessment factors at national and regional level. Failed State Index 2013 is yet to come.
2. For more information on the subject, readers may refer to the official website of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, 'National Solidarity Programme'. Accessed at <http://www.nspafghanistan.org> on Aug 25, 2013 at 2.00 AM.
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8. Ibid, Endnote 2
9. Readers may study the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund at [http://sitereso-urces.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstruction-Trust-Fund/ARTF information.pdf](http://sitereso-urces.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstruction-Trust-Fund/ARTF%20information.pdf), accessed on August 24, 2013 at 10:38 pm.
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11. See <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=1225&mid=15756&ItemID=36316>, accessed on May 23, 2013 at 5.00 pm.
12. Ibid, Endnote 4.
13. Richard Norton-Taylor, "40% of Afghan aid returns to donor countries," the guardian, accessed at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/25/Afghanistan.intern-ationalaidanddevelopment1> on March 25 at 7.45 pm.
14. Ibid, Endnote 4
15. Alissa J Rubin, "Taliban Slay Elders Over Aid Money," *The New York Times*, May 25, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/world/asia/26afghan.html?_r=0 accessed on May 26, 2013 at 12.01 am.
16. Nathan Hodge, "Afghan Phaseout of Security Firms Draws Concern", The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2012.

Author's Note : As per findings of recent quarterly report of SIGAR, the amount spent on security services has been quite less comparatively ever since APPF has become active in the country. But that is because of the security advisory services provided by the Risk Management Companies hired by the implementing partners of some of the projects reviewed by SIGAR. Also, Afghan government is billing each of the implementing partners much higher than the proposed amount of the services provided to the projects, since now it happens to be the sole security provider in the country following preparations for the US withdrawal next year. The average cost per guard has risen as much as 47 per cent under the APPF. For more information see the report of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 30, 2013.

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Service Jurisprudence in the Defence Forces : A Conceptual Approach – An Overview*

Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Vashishta**

Introduction

The Service Jurisprudence in India has followed a course charted by the conventions mellowed with practices, legislations, precedents and ordered by the judicial pronouncements as also by the Principles of Administrative Law, the Constitutional Law, the Fundamental Rights and the Principles of Natural Justice. What is today known as the 'rule' in this field is what Justice Holmes called as the "*prophecies of what the courts will do.*" The Courts and the Tribunal, seek to draw a balance between the twin needs of the Services viz., the need to maintain discipline in the ranks of the Government servants; and the need to ensure that the disciplinary authorities exercise their powers properly and fairly.

The Imperial Background.

The Imperial inheritance of the Law of the Defence Services is an undeniable fact and also its remarkable feature. Perusal of the early Charters reveals that though their provisions had a clear colonial ostentation, their constitutional propriety was remarkable. A Crown servant carried a liability that of a servant to his master; which emanated from a contract and thus bound the latter by its conditions – which the Crown, in certain situations, would repudiate unilaterally under the Royal prerogative. This was also termed as the 'Pleasure of the Crown' vis-à-vis his servants. The same concept was imported and adapted to the Indian Services. 'The Mutiny Act of 1754', the 'Articles of War' and then the Ordinances of the Viceroy and the Governor General, all fell into place to create the Indian Military and the Naval Law.

*The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are that of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement.

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The Services in India – the Guiding Principle

The Services (civil and defence), in the modern nation State are essential and almost indispensable. The dependence on the civil services is right from the drafting of legislations to the implementation of the policy. In the United Kingdom, Ivor Jennings termed it as peculiar in the following words:

“Civil service is in many respects the most peculiar of the institutions of the British Constitution.”²

Admittedly, the Defence Forces occupy a central place in the elaborate executive bulwark. Prior to Independence, the Defence Services jurisprudence revolved around the Articles of War which had their origin in the United Kingdom and had stood the test of time. However, later, the rich Service conventions, tempered the pristine code into an amiable mix of statute and usage, which was suitable to the basic constitutional set-up. Usage infact had much to do with the development of the Service Law. Sir William R Anson writes:—

“The Crown is not Sovereign, nor is either House of Parliament, still less are the ministers or servants through whom the Crown conducts its executive business of the Government; but each of these stands in established relations to the other and to the general body of citizens, and of these relations some are fixed by law and some by custom.”³

The Defence Forces in the early ‘Bharat’ were governed by a code of conduct based on the scriptural texts (the *Dharamshastras*) and some pristine customs of war. The State had, as a focus for their services, the public welfare as the central theme of administration.⁴ The King exercised control on forces through his Generals, the *Senapatis* and the *Maha-senapati*. Accordingly, *Kautilya* encouraged the establishment of a strong kingdom protected by a strong army. As discerned from the texts, the army was governed, by the definite rules of ‘employment’ and ‘dismissal’, generally referred to as ‘removal’ on breach of law or the custom of Military service. The rule book for the King was the *Dharamshastras*.

Arthashastra of Kautilya

Kautilya was well aware of the dangers of anarchy as well as the absolute necessity to transcend it by strict adherence to the law. The punishments prescribed for the State officials for violation of

the *Acharya Sanhita*, the official code of conduct, were deterrent and reformatory. *Kautilya*, in fact exhorted harsh punishments for offences involving moral turpitude of graver kind while the minor infractions of discipline were visited by fines and brief incarcerations. The medieval India was dominated by the Mughal jurisprudence and the country saw major reformations in the law relating to the *Revenue and the Diwani*. The Service Code was largely the law from the Koran mixed with the service custom and the usage.

The Army, Navy and the Air Force under the Union of India

The advent of the Civil service has always preceded that of the Defence Forces. One way or the other, the military campaigns in the history have been planned and executed in pursuit of some non-military objective. Following the British pattern of bureaucracy, the Services in India have scrupulously avoided the 'spoils system' prevalent in the United States of America where appointments are made as a reward for political service to a party. The Services in India thus grew in an environment of political neutrality.

For administration of the forces, the Constitution has kept the Defence Forces out of the purview of Articles 310 and 311 and has allowed the Parliament to pass legislations in respect of each force for its governance. For their overall allegiance to the Union, Article 52 of the Constitution of India declares, "There shall be a President of India" and Article 53 has vested the executive power of the Union and the resultant supreme command of the three forces in the President. The highest executive authority vested in the President, is for all purposes i.e., for appointment of the personnel into the Services and also for their removal therefrom. The exclusion clause is contained in Article 310 itself. Though the Constitution actually guarantees continuous, uninterrupted employment for a specified period and its sanctity whenever challenged, is upheld by the Courts, the rules relating to this aspect would be contained in the legislations framed under the authority of Article 309 i.e., The Army Act, 1950, The Air Force Act, 1950 and the Navy Act, 1957.

Thus the factor which distinguishes the service in the Defence Forces from that of the Civil organisation albeit, the Government, is the *terms and conditions* of their service. Chapter IV of the Army Act, 1950, Chapter V of the Navy Act, 1957 and Chapter IV of the Air Force Act, 1950 enshrine the '*Conditions of Service*' in

respect of the personnel belonging to the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively.

Conduct as a Factor

Military service jurisprudence developed around the decisions by the authorities where the conduct has been at issue. In cases of administrative removals, terminations, dismissals or even trials by Courts Martial where the judicial review has been extensive and the service jurisprudence has evolved in some measure, the primary ground for adjudication has been the misconduct of the delinquent. The *Dharamshastras* have thus, rightly exhorted the good conduct over everything else. "*The rule of conduct is transcendent law*", declared the *Manusmriti*.⁵ Even Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, the first Home Minister of Independent India described it as an essential quality for the senior civil servants in his following address:-

*"I will never be displeased over a frank expression of opinion. That is what the Britishers were doing with the Britishers. We are now sharing the responsibility. You have agreed to share responsibility. Many of them with whom I have worked, I have no hesitation in saying that they are as patriotic, as loyal and as sincere as myself..."*⁶

The President as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

The President of India though modelled on the British Monarch is still incomparable with the latter in its relationship with the Defence personnel. The position of a servant of the Crown in England and servant of the Government under the Indian Constitution appears to be similar, yet the Queen in England and the President under the Indian Constitution though have the absolute power to regulate the services of their servants, the scope of their powers differs with respect to their subjections. For instance, the 'Pleasure of the Crown' is subject to Parliamentary control whereas the 'Pleasure of the President' is not.

The Principal Doctrine of Defence Service Jurisprudence – the Doctrine of Pleasure.

Every person belonging to the Defence Forces holds office during the 'Pleasure of the President.' This is what is the Doctrine of Pleasure (*Duranto bene placito*). Peculiarity of Pleasure in respect

of the Defence personnel is its scope, which is beyond all controls - an *unfettered Pleasure of the Supreme Commander* unlike the Pleasure of the Crown in England which is subject to the Parliamentary control.

A Legacy of Common Law. The Doctrine of Pleasure is a common law doctrine, and thus has its origin in the customs of England. The doctrine is based on public policy as the Crown is not bound to retain in service any person whose conduct is not above board and satisfactory, “.....the civil servant is in law only a servant of the Crown, dismissible at the Queen’s pleasure without notice or compensation, or retiring allowance or pension.”⁷ There, however, is an exception to this rule, the operation of the doctrine can be modified by an Act of the Parliament of England.

Military Jurisprudence and the Judicial Review.

With very few jurists adverting to the Military jurisprudence, the Courts in India deserve rich credit for being the sole beacon in this field. To mention a few landmark decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts which changed the course of law relating to the Defence Forces in India –

(a) On Modification of Fundamental Rights. Union of India v. Prithipal Singh Bedi, AIR 1982 SC 1413.

(i) “Army, with its total commitment to national independence against foreign invasion must equally be assured the prized liberty of individual member against unjust encroachment ... the Court should strike a just balance between military discipline and individual personal liberty. And door must not be bolted against principles of Natural Justice.”

(ii) “The core question is whether *at least there should be one appeal to a body composed of non-military personnel* and who would enjoy the right of judicial review both on law and facts as also determine the adequacy of punishment being commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged”

These observations of the Apex Court became instrumental in the establishment of the Armed Forces Tribunal three decades later which is as of now dispensing justice as a Court of Appeal

in accordance with the provisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

(b) On Speaking Orders. Major SN Mukherjee v. Union of India & others, AIR 1990 SC 1984.

"The recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. Therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision, or judicial review."

This was instrumental in the amendment to Army Rule 62 and started a cult of Speaking Orders.

(c) On Defence Forces as a Class in Themselves. Chief of Army Staff v. Major Dharampal Kukrety, AIR 1985, SC 703.

"Army defends the country and its frontiers. It is entrusted with the task of protecting against foreign invasion and preserving the national independence. The arduous nature of duties, the task they have to perform in emergent situations and the unknown lands and unknown situations wherein they have to function, demand an exceptionally high standard of behaviour and discipline compared to their counterparts in the civil services. That is why the military people command the respect of the masses. Such factors taken together demand the military services being treated as a class apart and a different system of justice i.e., the military justice being devised for them".

This fortified the stand that the processes of military justice adopted under the Military Law are Constitutionally valid.

(d) On the Justiciability of the Presidential Pleasure. Ex. Major NR Ajwani & Ors. v. Union Of India & Ors., 55 (1994) DLT 217.

"Section 18 of the Army Act provides that every person subject to the Act shall hold office during the Pleasure of

the President. Undoubtedly, the section does not provide for procedure to be followed while passing an order under the said section. However, it does not permit passing of an order which is arbitrary, mala fide or illegal. As observed by the Supreme Court, judicial review is the exercise of the Courts inherent power to determine legality of an action and award suitable relief and thereby uphold the Rule of Law. Thus, order under Section 18 of the Army Act is subject to judicial review.”

Though the Pleasure of the President with respect to the Defence personnel remained absolute and unfettered as ever, it became justiciable and subject to a limited judicial review henceforth.

Conclusion

Everything in India must conform to the *National Grund Norm* viz., the Constitution. The legislations and the rules framed thereunder, have to pass the dual tests of procedural propriety and constitutionality. This is dependent upon the extent of the service jurisprudence available. The courts and the authorities in whom vests the discretion, determine for the service, what Bernard Schwartz in administrative law describes as the ‘statements of general applicability.’⁸ Jurisprudence relating to the Defence Forces is in a state of evolution and offers an extensive field for research and innovation.

Endnotes

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5. F Maxmuller, *The Sacred Books of East* (vol xxv) Oxford University Press, 1886, p. 27.
6. Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, in his address to the senior civil servants, as extracted by HM Seervai in ‘*Constitutional Law of India*’, (4th edition) 2002.
7. Ivor Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution*, 5th edition, Oxford (1958)
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Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme - Needs Restructuring?

Brigadier Amarjit Singh Randwal (Retd)*

Introduction

The Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) was launched with effect from 01 April 2003. The scheme aims to provide quality medical care to Ex-Servicemen (ESM) and their dependents for all known diseases through a network of ECHS Polyclinics, service medical facilities and empanelled Private / Government hospitals spread across the country. The Scheme has been structured on the lines of Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) to ensure cashless transactions, as far as possible, for the patients. The scheme is financed by the Government of India (GoI) and one time contribution by the retiring personnel at the time of retirement.¹

Conceptually the ECHS is to be managed through the existing infrastructure of the Armed Forces in order to minimise the administrative expenditure. The existing infrastructure includes command and control structure, spare capacity of Service Medical facilities (Hospitals and MI Rooms), procurement organisations for medical and non-medical equipment, defence land and buildings etc. In order to ensure minimal disruption of the Scheme during war/training and availability of ECHS services in non-military areas, the above mentioned resources are to be supplemented by new *ECHS Polyclinics* in Military areas, Non-military Stations and by Empanelling civil hospitals/diagnostic centres.²

Current Status of ECHS

The scheme is under the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (ESW) with ECHS becoming an attached office of Department of ESW (Ministry of Defence), which exercises executive control over the scheme. The ECHS Central Organisation is responsible for the management and implementation of the scheme. The Central

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Organisation is headed by a Managing Director and Deputy Managing Director. They are assisted by Director (Medical), Director (Operations and Management) and Director (Procurement and Fund Control).³ The existing Command and Control Structure of the Army, Navy & Air Force has been given the administrative and financial powers to run this Scheme. Station Commanders exercise direct control over the ECHS polyclinics.

Taking a macro view of the ECHS system, the scale of operations, growth in number of beneficiaries and per capita expenditure over the years are shown at **Figures 1 and 2 :-**




Figure 1




Figure 2

Problems Faced by ECHS

Ground Level Problems. These are due to lack of effective implementation of policies and include problems such as lack of awareness about the scheme, staffing problems, high lead time in the procurement of medicines, delays in bill processing and absence of effective vigilance and grievance management systems⁴.

Macro Level Problems. These are due to archaic and bureaucratic delays and include inadequate authorisation of manpower and long winded procedure for empanelment. Moreover, the scheme faces the problem of dual control—policy matters are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Central Organisation, ECHS and Regional Centres. However, the scheme is dependent on the existing chain of command of the Armed Forces for administrative matters.

Inadequate Authorisation of Manpower. The present authorisation of manpower in polyclinics is governed by MoD as per the rules specified by GoI. Even after a decade and manifold increase in the dependency base, no change has been made to the manpower allocated to polyclinics. Moreover, the manpower authorised at polyclinics does not conform to staffing norms and has some glaring omissions. For example, X-Ray machines have been sanctioned but no technician has been authorised to operate the machine. ECHS case regarding revised scale of manpower for Polyclinics is pending with the MoD since Dec 2009.

Procedure for Empanelment. The procedure of empanelment of hospitals/diagnostic centres/chemists is a long winded procedure and acts as a deterrent. Thus, not enough medical facilities are empanelled. Additional problems which are being faced are:-

- (a) Allegation of corruption at the level of Quality Council of India (QCI) which inspects the application received by ECHS for empanelment.
- (b) Presence of agents exploiting the delay in the system.
- (c) The issue is being addressed through development of online application of empanelment module but the progress on this front has been really slow.

Lack of System Ownership and Dilution of Accountability.

The management of the ECHS scheme is the responsibility of the Department of ESW, (MoD). The Central Organisation, ECHS, which is responsible for management and implementation of the scheme is an attached office with the MoD. Accordingly, all policy decisions have to be approved by the MoD. These approvals get caught in bureaucratic processes and important decisions are delayed. Some of the problems being faced are :-

- (a) At functional level, the polyclinics face the problem of dual control.
- (b) For technical support, the polyclinic is dependent on the Regional Centre and the ECHS Central Organisation.
- (c) For administrative support, the polyclinic is dependent on the Station HQ, Command HQ and then the Army HQ.

Need for Reorganisation of ECHS as an Independent Body

The ECHS currently has over 40 lakh beneficiaries. This number is going to steadily increase in the future and is expected to stabilise at 65 lakhs by 2020. The present day dynamics of an increasingly demanding clientele coupled with rapidly changing technology has made a paradigm shift in healthcare management. All these factors are bound to make the management and implementation of the scheme more complex.

The current management structure is wrought with bureaucratic delays and multitude of stakeholders. The Department of ESW under the MoD exercises *executive control* over the scheme. The *administrative control* is with the Adjutant General (AG's) Branch. The office of the Director General Armed Forces Medical Services (DGAFMS) is responsible for procuring medicines for the scheme. The functional support is provided by the command chain of three Armed Forces. This has caused a decision paralysis. Important decisions take months, sometimes years, to materialise that adversely impacts the operational efficiency of the scheme. The present arrangement is depicted in **Figure 3** :-




Figure 3

On the other hand, the management bodies of ECHS, the Central Organisation and the Regional Centres have not been given adequate powers for managing and implementing the scheme. For example, the Central Organisation lacks the authority to make any policy changes without the approval of the MoD. Decision making process is slow. Bureaucratic delays and vested interests prevent positive changes to the scheme. Minor administrative issues also need sanction from MoD, i.e., reimbursement for air travel in emergency cases for life saving treatment to a military/empanelled medical facility is required to be sent to the MoD for its consideration and sanction⁵. All these factors have led to inefficient implementation of the scheme resulting in a lot of dissatisfaction among the various stakeholders – the ex-servicemen, the employees at polyclinics, the civil/empanelled hospitals and administrators at Central Organisation. Thus, there is an urgent need to carry out a reorganisation of the executive control of the scheme. It is proposed that the scheme is reorganised on corporate lines to aid professional management of the scheme.

Suggested Reorganisation Structure⁶

Currently, the ECHS organisation is handling more than 40 lakh beneficiaries and has a sanctioned budget of more than 1500 crores. These numbers are bound to increase in future which will make ECHS bigger than few of the existing PSUs. In order to

handle a system of such huge proportions, it is proposed the ECHS should be made an independent body.

Management Structure. The structure of the Central Organisation will continue in its present form except a new Director (Vigilance). The MD and Deputy MD will be accountable to a Board of Directors that will meet once every quarter to review the performance of the scheme and grant necessary approvals. There will be no dependence on the MoD for any decision making or for policy changes as their role will be assumed by the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors could comprise:

- (a) A representative of the MoD (Finance).
- (b) A representative of the Department of ESW, MoD.
- (c) AG, Army HQ.
- (d) Independent Directors - Appointed with the consent of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).
 - (i) Retired Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral and Air Marshals who are now part of the scheme and receiving benefits under the scheme. These can be three in number.
 - (ii) Two respected individuals from the private sector who have experience in administration of a large scale scheme/enterprise e.g. the Investment Advisory Committee of Army Group Insurance Fund (AGIF).
- (e) MD, ECHS.
- (f) Deputy MD, ECHS as Secretary.

Such a composition of the Board of Directors will ensure adequate representation of the interests of all the stakeholders. It will also ensure that best industry practices are incorporated in the scheme. The policy directives discussed and approved by the Board of Directors will be implemented at the ground level via hierarchy of zonal centre, regional centre and polyclinics. The zonal centre should be set up on the lines of Military Commands, while the Regional Centres can continue to function as per the existing structure. The proposed management is shown in diagrammatic form in **Figure 4**.

Proposed Management Structure of ECHS




Figure 4

At present, the decision making is centralised at Delhi, far removed from the actual site of the problem. One of the objectives of reorganising ECHS would be to decentralise decision making. More powers will be given to the zonal centres and regional centres. At the same time, they will be held accountable for the decisions taken by them and for the performance of the sub units under them. This structure is somewhat similar to that of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) which provides health care to veterans in the USA.⁷

A new vigilance department, headed by Director (Vigilance) has been recommended to investigate irregularities reported. In addition, the vigilance department will also be responsible for performing random checks to ensure that no fraudulent activities hamper the functioning of the scheme. The proposed structure of the Central Organisation is shown at **Figure 5**.




Figure 5

Financial Aspects

Major Expenditures

- (a) **Operating expenditures.** This would include payments for medical treatment, medicine, salaries and consumables.
- (b) **Capital expenditures.** On the establishment of new polyclinics and additional infrastructure such as own hospitals and medical facilities for implementation of the scheme.

Sources of Revenue

- (a) One-time contribution from ESM.
- (b) Additional funds such as CSD profits and inflows from the welfare funds of the Armed Forces.
- (c) Annual budgetary allotment from the MoD. Many PSUs sign a MoU with the GoI to sell their products/services to the government. Similarly, the ECHS can sign a MoU to provide medical services to the Department of ESW, GoI.

Based on the estimated expenditure for each quarter, the MoD will release funds at the beginning of each quarter. ECHS can submit a summary of revenues and expenses to the MoD and a monthly progress report to the Department of ESW by a specified

date in the following month. ECHS will be required to undergo an audit at the end of each quarter in accordance with the standards laid down by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).

Benefits of Corporate Structure

- (a) The proposed corporate form of ECHS will not suffer from any bureaucratic delays. The formation of the Board of Directors will facilitate quick decision making. ECHS will be in a position to easily procure the necessary infrastructure etc. for smooth expansion.
- (b) There will be a system of checks and balances which will prevent misappropriation of funds and other malpractices.
- (c) The Board of Directors will ensure that the system will be equipped with the best of breed technology.
- (d) The salary structure of government employees is based on competitive market rates. Similarly, ECHS can offer attractive salaries to the contractual employees/employees on deputation from the Services and other types of employees so that it can attract the best talent to work under the scheme.

Scope for Expansion

Currently, the scheme covers only Ex-Service Personnel (ESP) and their dependants. However, once the scheme achieves operational efficiency, it will be possible to extend ECHS facilities to the dependents of serving soldiers in rural areas who are deprived of this facility as of now. Polyclinics in rural areas have been approached by serving soldiers and their dependants. However, as per the current mandate, the polyclinics are exclusively for the benefit of the ESP population and they have to turn such patients away. An efficient ECHS scheme will not only provide quality healthcare in rural India but also cater for healthcare facility to serving Armed Forces personnel in peace and provide additional Medical capability during war or war like situations.

Conclusion

The ECHS was started with the noble aim of providing comprehensive, quality and timely medical care to ESP and their dependants. Even though the scheme recently celebrated its 10th Raising Day on 1 Apr 2013, it has not managed to achieve this

aim. There is a lot of dissatisfaction among the ESP due to long queues at the polyclinics, non-availability of medical officer and specialists at the polyclinics, poor quality of service at the polyclinics, non-availability of medicines, long referral procedures and denial of service at civil/empanelled hospitals.

Moreover, the contractual employees at polyclinics have very little financial incentive to work and no job security. This further deteriorates the quality of service at the polyclinics. The civil/empanelled hospitals are reluctant to join the scheme due to long delays in bill processing and complicated procedures for empanelment. This adds to the woes of the ESP as they sometimes have to travel great distances in critical conditions to avail medical care. Policy changes have been stuck due to bureaucratic delays. With increase in the number and awareness levels of beneficiaries each year and rapid technological advancements in medical care, the management of the scheme is bound to get more complex. To remain relevant, ECHS needs to reform itself through continuous improvements. Thus there is a need to restructure the scheme. Some of the PSUs, under various ministries, are running successfully and profitably. Even AGIF is functioning efficiently and providing full satisfaction to its members. ECHS also needs to be organised on similar lines under the MoD. ***ECHS has great potential to provide quality health care to veterans all across the country. It can be a model health care programme that is accessible, affordable, and acceptable to the ESP population.***

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Indianisation Process and Creation of an All India Brigade

Mr Narender Yadav*

Introduction

After the uprising of 1857, the British adopted a policy of balancing the troops in India, under which some British troops were always posted in each formation of the Indian Army. They feared the domination of Indian troops in any military formation. The British authorities, therefore, placed at least one British or Gorkha battalion with each Indian brigade. The 'Eden Commission', constituted in 1879, recommended that each infantry brigade should comprise of two British and two Indian battalions (then called regiments). It also recommended the inclusion of one British regiment in each cavalry brigade.¹ Kitchener's reorganisation of 1903 and the recommendations of the 'Army in India Committee' of 1912 also echoed the voice of the Eden Commission. These Committees provisioned one British and two Indian regiments in each brigade of infantry as well as cavalry.² The War Establishments of 1923 and 1927 also reflected the same policy.³ The War Diaries pertaining to the Second World War confirm that the said policy of balance continued till the end of 1944.⁴

The Defence Department explained this act of balancing as a sign of partnership and understanding between the British and the Indian troops.⁵ But in reality the British authorities feared a repetition of the 1857 uprising. They, therefore, did not allow Indians in the officer cadre of the army. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Lord Curzon conceived an idea to take Indians in the officer cadre but not to place them in command, but to place them in the service of the Viceroy for ceremonial purposes. The Imperial Cadet Corps formed by Curzon in 1902 was restricted to the nobility of the Indian princely states. This again raised the image of the British Empire when sons of Indian rulers in the Imperial Cadet Corps performed aide-de-camp and staff duties to the Viceroy during the Delhi Darbar.⁶ This scheme, however, did not last long.

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Initial Efforts at Indianisation

After the First World War, the officer cadre was opened to Indians. Indian leaders had been demanding that Indians be given opportunities of service in the Indian Army equivalent to those enjoyed by British subjects. The British officer community vehemently opposed this, arguing that a "large influx of Indians as officers in place of British would have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of the fighting machine upon which India depended for security," and also that "if Indians are commissioned, British boys would be reluctant to join the Indian army."⁷ Further, Lieutenant General AS Cobbe, then Military Secretary to the India Office, advocated establishment of Dominion Army in India which could function side by side with the existing army and could be officered entirely by Indians.⁸ When their plea did not work, they decided upon segregation of Indian officers by introducing an Indianised unit scheme in 1923. Under this scheme, Indian officers could be posted to eight Indianised units reserved for them. It was done on the pretext of limited experience of Indian officers; as also to test the practicability of successful Indianisation.⁹ It was said that the scheme would give 'a fair chance' to Indians to show that such units could be just as efficient as those with British officers.

The scheme of segregation of Indian officers in Indianised units became extremely unpopular. It was equally disliked by Indian people in general and the Indian officers in particular. Indian officers thought that the segregation scheme would confine them to certain units while the British officers could select any unit of their choice. Even family connections in selecting the units on commission were lauded in case of British officers but Indians had little option.¹⁰

According to General Rudra, British authorities did not forget to keep the best Indian regiments reserved for British officers. Except one or two, the units of lesser reputation were earmarked for Indianisation.¹¹ In 1933, total units earmarked for Indianisation rose to twelve infantry and three cavalry units.¹²

The segregation scheme continued till the onset of the Second World War. It was decided in early 1941 to post Indian officers throughout the Indian Army.¹³ Some British commanding officers even made efforts to wreck the Indianisation experiment, losing no opportunity of deprecating the Indian officers and sending the best Indians away from battalions on extra regimental postings.¹⁴ This

was done against the very essence of the Shea Committee which had stated that "The Committee desire to record their [Committee's] strong opinion that the success of any scheme of Indianisation must depend very largely upon securing the goodwill and safeguarding the interests of the fine body of Indian officers of the existing type, to whom India is deeply indebted."¹⁵

The British Mindset

The British officers indeed joined the Indian Army because besides higher pay and lower cost of living, "life in India offered a romance and quasi-aristocratic status which was no longer possible in the British Army."¹⁶ They saw Indian officers as rivals who could prove a check to their unfettered aristocracy and gradually take over their vacancies. In fact, the pace of intake of Indians in officer rank was kept slow even after formation of the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun in 1932. The excuse put forth was that there was not sufficient officer material in India. The British officers were reluctant to accept the Indians as their colleagues, share the Officers Mess with them and permit them to know their weaknesses. On the issue of separate units, Lieutenant General MacMunn, a scholar military leader, who also had been a Member of the Indianisation Committee (Shea Committee, 1922), sided with the discontented group of British officers, and stated in early 1930s, "the mixed mess on the whole would have been best for all, but as it seemed that any such step would alienate the better British boys from the Indian Army, the segregation policy appeared unavoidable and was adopted"¹⁷ Besides, British officers also apprehended that on becoming senior, Indian officers could command the units making the junior British officers to work under them.¹⁸

The Indianisation of the Army indeed was a political decision taken under political pressure and public demand. The new entrants naturally faced social boycott, derogatory remarks and non-cooperation. They were kept away from important portfolios. The memoirs and biographies of the Indian officers who joined in 1920s and 1930s speak of the discrimination faced by them.

Indian Officers and Command Appointments?

During the Second World War, the British had to expand the Indian Army and commission a large number of Indians as officers. The strength of Indian officers in the Indian Army at the onset of the

War was only 528. It increased to about 25 times by the end of the War in 1945. However, Indians were kept away from crucial appointments. Indian officers suffered discrimination in other areas also. Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs) were given less salary than the British officers of same rank and service.¹⁹ In the mess, they got stepmotherly treatment. Indian food was rarely prepared. Further, Indians were not authorised to command British troops. The command of Indian battalions was entrusted to Indians in rare cases.

But what prompted the British to deny the command of units to Indian officers? Firstly, the British were apprehensive about the loyalty of the Indians as they could never forget the 1857 uprising. The formation of the Indian National Army (INA) augmented their apprehension. Wavell, then C-in-C Indian Army, wrote about his interaction with Prime Minister Churchill in June 1943:

*"Churchill found another subject for criticism in the loyalty of Indian Army.....The PM [Churchill] however, chose to read into Amery's note, the impression that the Indian army was liable to rise at any moment, and he accused me [Wavell] of creating a Frankenstein by putting modern weapons in the hands of sepoys, spoke of 1857, and was really almost childish about it.... At a luncheon (on 24 June 1943), the PM took occasion to make some rather caustic references both to Arakan operations and to the Indian Army, which annoyed me.... I ignored the Arakan remarks but defended the Indian Army with some heat, and the PM said no more."*²⁰

Amery, the Secretary of State for India, while quoting Churchill wrote to Wavell on 21 June 1943, "Winston at the moment has got one of his fits of panic and talks about a drastic reduction of any army that might shoot us in the back."²¹ This distrust about the Indian Army was not confined to senior political leaders only. Many British officers of the Indian army were also disturbed by the INA. Lieutenant General Slim, Commander XIVth Army, "was sad about Indian Army personnel joining Japanese."²² Thus the 1857 factor coupled with the INA was a great source of distrust.

Secondly, the competence of the Indian Army and officers was questioned by some British officials and commanders of the Indian Army. Milner, a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons even commented that most of the Indian soldiers sent

overseas were idiots (*Ganwar*). Many of them had not even fired a single shot from a rifle in their lifetime.²³ Major General Wingate, in a report in July 1943 criticising GHQ India and the Indian Army, said that Burma could be won by Chindit operations alone. He, therefore, did not include Indian battalions in his brigade which ironically was for namesake an Indian Brigade.²⁴ Major General Tucker, Commander 4 Indian Division wrote in a letter that "certain Indian Commissioned Officers have proved unsatisfactory. It seems to be exceedingly difficult to get rid of them."²⁵ Tucker also asked if it was "possible to have a more efficient 'weeding out' process before officers [Indians] are sent to active units and for it to be made easier to get rid of them quickly if they prove unsatisfactory." Major General Pratap Narain, a Second World War veteran mentions that Brigadier Callahan while criticising the summing up of day's exercise of jungle warfare training near Murree shouted rudely on the Indian Brigade Major, "What do you bloody Indian dogs know about war."²⁶ The Indian Brigade Major was so hurt that he resigned from the Army. In early 1940, on his return from University Training Corps (UTC), Madras (1937-1939), when Thimayya failed to write a letter to his commanding officer about his joining the battalion, the latter blurted angrily, "If ..., you have temerity to think that you and other Indians can be good officers, you are sadly mistaken; your behaviour proves it otherwise. You people just don't have it in you."²⁷ Lieutenant Colonel PHM Cann, who commanded an Indian Army battalion during the war, writes that "many ICOs have failed badly and have been passengers in a unit and a permanent worry to their commanding officers."²⁸ Such remarks on the ability of Indian officers are numerous and noted by almost every Indian officer in his biography. The British thus discreetly coded the Indian officers as incompetent.

Some British and other dominion officers did not like to work under an Indian officer. This racist feeling might have worked against assigning the command of a battalion to Indian officers. It could indeed be disastrous if a subordinate officer disobeyed the commander, especially during operations. A South African Major, for instance, went up to his British superior appealing that he should not be commanded by an Indian. This South African was transferred to serve under a British officer elsewhere.²⁹

The Indian officers were thus largely kept away from the command of units. A few, however, were given command but

hardly anyone commanded a unit during active operations. The shift in policy came in late 1944 and early 1945 when some Indian officers were promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel to make them eligible to take over the command of a battalion.

Making of 'All India Brigade'

During the Second World War, India was politically unstable. The Quit India Movement and demand for Independence further made things uncomfortable for the British in India. The issue of Indianisation and assigning the crucial roles to Indian officers was also raised time and again. As the Indian officers complained against the discrimination, the C-in-C Indian Army had to circulate letters to all commanders of Indian regiments and formations to stop such discrimination.³⁰ General Auchinleck also visualised the serious implications of continued disregard of Indian officers in promotion and appointment matters. He asked Rudra, his adviser, to suggest six names of Indian officers for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. This opened the door for the Indian Officers to command battalions.³¹ The political agitations, questions in Legislative Assembly and Council of State and the complaints of Indian officers for their rightful dues further compelled the British to initiate some strong measures. The British did not want to take any further risk of giving the Indians a chance to raise additional issues. To please the Indians, the British finally decided on the formation of an experimental 'All India Brigade' of three battalions.³²

The Brigade chosen for Indianisation was the 51st Indian Brigade pitched against the Japanese in the Arakan region of Burma. In 1944, the Brigade consisted of two Indian and one British battalion. The British battalion, the 8 York & Lancaster (8 Y&L) was moved out of the Brigade and an Indian battalion replaced it. When the commanding officer of 8/19 Hyderabad Regiment got wounded in heavy enemy shelling, KS Thimayya, the second-in-command was ordered to take over the command of the battalion.³³ The British commanding officer of 2/2 Punjab Regiment (under 51 Brigade) became a casualty in November 1944. Lt Col SPP Thorat was brought to command the Battalion.³⁴ LP Sen was appointed to command 16/10 Baluch Regiment which was a part of the 51st Brigade. Thus some recently promoted officers were assigned the responsibility of commanding the battalions. In tune with this, the 'All India Brigade' was raised and assigned a role to fight its maiden battle at Kangaw in the Arakan.

Maiden Battle of the All India Brigade

Kangaw lies on the costal side 50 mile south of Myohaung, the ancient capital of Arakan (in Burma). Being the only route of withdrawal for the Japanese it was important to both the Japanese and Allied forces. The Battle of Kangaw was fought in January-February 1945 and lasted for about three weeks. The issues of *Fauji Akhbar* continuously carried the news of raising of an 'All India Brigade' and the Kangaw battle in which it was engaged. The issue of 2 January 1945 recorded "For the first time in the history of Indian Army what is virtually an 'All-India Brigade' led by Indian commissioned officers has been in action."³⁵ Kangaw was termed as 'the bloodiest battle of Arakan' by Lord Mountbatten.³⁶ Five squadrons of the Royal Indian Air Force supported the ground forces, while the Royal Indian Navy manned the assault and landing craft to land the troops on beachheads which later captured the village of Kangaw. It was again the first time that purely Indian formations had cooperated on such a large scale in the Burma war. Thus the Kangaw battle was unique in the annals of Indian military history.

The task allotted to the 'All India Brigade' was tough and to some it was tougher than the Kohima battle. The Brigade in cooperation with other Allied forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese. Major General Wood, Commander 25 Division said in a special order, "every man who landed on the Kangaw beaches can recall the feat with pride."³⁷

Conclusion

The policy of balancing Indian troops with British troops at the brigade level started after 1857. The Second World War forced the British to commission a large number of Indian officers but they were not assigned crucial assignments. In 1944, a number of Indian officers were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and made eligible to command battalions. The command of three infantry battalions fighting in the Arakan was given to Indian officers, and these were grouped under 51 Indian Brigade. The making of an All India Brigade was a shift in the age-old British policy. Further, the leadership of Indian officers of these battalions was tested in battle at Kangaw.

There were some strong reasons which pushed the British

authorities to take this decision. The political pressure, irritating questions by Indian members in the Legislative Assembly and Council of State, discontent among senior Indian officers and complaints against discrimination forced them to assign command to Indian officers. Further, the British authorities wanted to generate a feeling of self-respect and dignity among Indian soldiers to guard against any further discontentment. Bringing the three Indian battalions under a brigade was intended to infuse new spirit among Indian warriors.

The three senior Indian officers of the All India Brigade led their troops intelligently and courageously. It is evident from the fact that the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) was awarded to all the three Indian commanders for their creditable role in the Kangaw battle. Soon Thimayya, a battalion commander, was promoted to become the first Indian Brigade Commander, thereby paving the way for further promotions to Indian officers, up the military chain.

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Documenting of Indian Defence History*

Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd)**

In this talk I shall be focusing on aspects dealing with the Military History of Independent India i.e. the period since 1947 when India ceased to be a British colony. By no means does this imply that the Military History of events prior to Independence is not of significance or importance. However, the subject of this talk is 'Documenting of Indian Defence History'; and this particular aspect is a function of the State and the Society that it serves, both of which altered significantly with Independence. Therefore, it is in this altered context that we must examine the proposition before us today.

However, before we do so, it may be beneficial to ask the basic question as to why is it important for Defence History to be documented? In order to provide an answer, I would like to highlight the role of three distinct institutions that have a stake in the documenting of our Military History. These are the State, Military, and Civil Society, including Academia and the so-called "Strategic Community" centred around indigenous think tanks, both official and autonomous. Each of these segments have a direct stake in structuring the historical narrative of our military institutions, albeit from different perspectives and with differing objectives. First, the State.

Following the well-known Clausewitzian maxim that "War is but an extension of politics by other means", it follows naturally that the State as a political entity will have a keen interest in developing an "official" narrative of historical military events. These accounts provide an official version of the military and political events that contribute to the development and execution of inter-state conflicts. In India the responsibility of compiling these official accounts rests with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), History Division, one of the oldest such departments of the Government.

These official histories of India's wars are, in theory at least, intended to be critical assessments capable of analysing faults

*This is the text of a talk delivered on All India Radio on 27 Aug, 2013.

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and failures and of serving as a tool for study and instruction by military professionals. To avoid degeneration into mere laudatory hagiographies, they are therefore usually compiled by professional historians working with a team of civil and military officers.

After Independence, India has been engaged in four major conflicts: three with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, and one with China in 1962. In addition there have been a number of significant military deployments and engagements deserving of documentation: these include the Police Action against Hyderabad 1948, the Liberation of Goa 1961, the Indian Peace Keeping Force or IPKF in Sri Lanka (1987-90), Kargil 1999, operations in the mountain ranges around the Siachen Glacier since 1984, and numerous counter-insurgency operations; as well as peacekeeping operations around the world, under the UN flag.

However, for reasons that do not stand-up to scrutiny, the operational records of the MoD after 1962 are still classified. As a result, none of the operations undertaken by India since the 1962 Sino-Indian War have an official version. The sole exception to this is the 1965 Indo-Pak War; however, even this is a bowdlerised version of an original draft history. Though it is published by the MoD, the ministry has not accorded it the status of an "official" history, so great is the ambiguity prevalent in official quarters. Consequently, the histories of the 1962, 1971 Wars, the Siachen and Kargil Conflicts and the IPKF Operations have not been published even though copies of the unpublished draft histories of the 1962 and 1971 Wars compiled by the MoD have been available on the internet for nearly two decades. That such a regrettable state of affairs prevails despite the recommendations of a Parliamentary Committee clearing their publication, points to a systemic problem that deserves serious attention and the sustained pressure of the Academia and Civil Society to initiate measures to rectify it.

The second institution that is intimately connected with Defence History is the Military itself. History has multifarious uses for the Military. Military institutions use history as tool for motivation, for promoting esprit de corps and as a means of study, analysis and instruction of various professional aspects, ranging from tactics to strategy. Incorrect recording of operational history, or the non-publication of it prevents our military institutions from analysing

and learning operational lessons based upon past experience. This has serious implications for National Security.

The third, and in my opinion most critical element that has a primary claim to knowledge of our Military History and access to the Records that document it, is we, the people, i.e. Civil Society and Academia. In any democratic society, the people have a right to be informed about activities of the Government. The Armed Forces form a vital pillar of the State, one upon which the security and very existence of the country may depend in times of national crises. It is therefore all the more incumbent upon the people to ensure that the Government provides them with access to information about the Military and its activities, so that the systems of checks and balances which are the bedrock of a democratic polity are implemented on the basis of informed debate and not left to the tender mercies of a Civil or Military bureaucracy to decide.

This leads us to the due process which governs the preservation of Records based upon the study and analysis of which Military History is written. Primary source Records form the life-blood of the historian's craft. Without them, there can be no authentic Military History.

In India, the preservation of Records by official record making bodies, including the Military, is governed by the provisions of the Public Records Act 1993 and the Public Records Rules 1997. These lay down the process by which the Records are to be managed and in due course, transferred to the public domain.

However, certain ambiguities combined with the lack of institutional accountability have led to a situation wherein very few official Military Records find their way to the public domain. A review of the Public Records Act and Rules, initiated by the National Archives of India a few years ago has still not resulted in any satisfactory solution. As a consequence a large number of important Records continue to be destroyed largely through ignorance. These Records are treated as functional documents in the Government offices and are destroyed once they have outlived their utility. Record rooms with trained Record Officers, as mandated by law, are either defunct or moribund. The Right to Information (RTI) Act is often resorted to by the citizens in order to obtain information about non-current records, adding to the burden of governance and to the inconvenience of researchers.

Timely and correct transfer of Military Records to the public domain under the provisions of the Public Records Act will ensure that such superfluous RTI applications are eliminated.

India is today a rising power with the third largest Army in the world. It is also a fascinating example of a flourishing post-colonial democratic polity. Its geopolitical position and security environment demand that its Military institutions function at an optimal capacity. In order to do so, the military professional, the strategic expert as well as the average citizen, all must have access to a well analysed and documented Military History and to the Records that enable further research, analyses and informed debate. These considerations alone make it incumbent on all stakeholders in documenting India's Defence History to ensure that this history is not lost to the Nation through ignorance, neglect or apathy.

1962 – War in the Western Sector (Ladakh)* (A View from Other Side of the Hill)

Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)**

Introduction

The War in Ladakh was very different from the operations in the Eastern Sector in many ways. Firstly, the Chinese aim in the West was to reach their Claim Line of 07 Nov 1959 as compared to annihilation of Indian troops deployed in the Kameng Sector in NEFA. Secondly, there were no large scale battles. Most of the actions were at battalion, company or even at platoon levels. Thirdly, the troops were already in contact for many months/weeks preceding the operations as a result of the 'Forward Policy' of India and that of 'Armed Coexistence' followed by China. And lastly, not enough is known about this war, at least in India, for reasons that will become apparent as we proceed with this narrative.

Confrontation Begins

The Chinese made their first official claim in Aksai Chin in 1954. Ten alignments of the Aksai Chin highway were reconnoitered in 1954-55 by the Chinese and it was announced as completed in Sep 1957. India sent two patrols to the area in 1958; one returned and the second under Major Iyyenger of the Madras Sappers was seized by the Chinese. **The confrontation in Ladakh had begun.**

During 1959, there were two serious incidents which made the border situation very tense.¹ However, there were two very different approaches on the part of India and China. India, unsuspecting of Chinese intentions, relied mainly on diplomatic exchanges and did not adopt any viable military measures till

*This article is in continuation of the two earlier articles "1962–Battle of Se-La and Bomdi-La" and "1962–The Battle of Namka Chu and Fall of Tawang" published in Oct-Nov 2011 and Apr-Jun 2013 Issues of USI Journal respectively.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIII, No. 593, July-September 2013.

about Nov/Dec 1961 when it decided to establish additional posts, under what came to be termed as the 'Forward Policy'. Chinese on the other hand, while continuing to respond with diplomatic exchanges, had set about improving their defensive posture, including patrolling and improvement of infrastructure, as also preparing for military operations.

China Prepares

Chinese deployment in the depth areas of Xinjiang and their staging forward to the area of operations in northern Aksai Chin is shown in a diagrammatic form at **Sketch 'P'**. Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) issued instructions to Chinese Frontier Forces on 01 Feb 1962 regarding actions to be taken in the face of Indian provocations. The main thrust of these instructions was to avoid any premature commencement of hostilities while responding to Indian actions. As part of these measures a Forward HQ called Kong HQ under the command of Deputy Commander of Xinjiang Military Command alongwith 2nd Infantry Regiment was set up at **Kangshiwar as shown in Sketch 'P'**. It was tasked to organise reconnaissance of the border areas and make preparations for military operations in Aksai Chin.

PLA GHQ had divided the area of operations into four defence areas as shown at **Sketch Q** from North to South as under :-

- (a) Tianwendian Defence Area with HQ at Point 5243.
- (b) Heweitan Defence Area with HQ at Heweitan.
- (c) Kongka Pass Defence Area with HQ at Point 5408.
- (d) Ali Defence Area with a Forward HQ southeast of Spangur Lake.

The overall command and control in the Western Sector was to be exercised by the Xinjiang Military Command. Great emphasis was laid on reconnaissance to obtain information about terrain, routes and Indian posts so as to build up a comprehensive intelligence picture before the operations were launched.

Chinese Policy of Armed Coexistence

From about Jul 1962 onwards, in response to India's 'Forward Policy', China adopted the policy of 'Armed Coexistence'. It is of interest to note the instructions issued by the CMC to Xinjiang

Military Command regarding conduct of troops in the developing situation.

"Firstly, follow the principle of not firing the first bullet; adopt the measure of 'you encircle me, I encircle you'; 'you cut me off, I cut you off'. Secondly, If Indian forces attack us, warn them, if warning is ineffective time and again, then carry out self defence. While laying seige of Indian forces, try and not to kill them; leave a gap for Indian forces to retreat. If Indian forces try to flee, let them flee, do not stop them. If Indian troops do not withdraw, then stalemate them".²

So, the two forces came to be interlocked as is quite obvious from **Sketch Q**. However, the strategic perceptions on both sides were different. Indian political leadership advised by the Intelligence community felt that the Chinese were bluffing and would not resort to a large scale military action. Hence, Indian Army could establish posts in an area unoccupied by Chinese to stake claim upto the claimed boundary and at times even going behind the Chinese. On the other hand, the Chinese tried to match this race for occupation of posts to check further ingress by India and this they called 'Armed Coexistence', but it was not to continue for long. *The Chinese by now had a 'game plan' but did not want the hostilities to erupt prematurely, till they were ready for a deliberate and coordinated military action to achieve their politico-military objectives.*

The Chinese Game Plan

It needs to be noted that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC were laying down the principles and guiding the Chinese military actions on ground very intimately from Jul 1962 onwards. In a conference at the Secretariat in Beijing, Deputy Chairman of the CMC Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou En Lai put forward two options to deal with India's 'Forward Policy'. The first option was 'to drive out the Indian forces by use of force'. The second option was 'to compel Indian forces to withdraw without using military force'. It will be interesting to quote Chairman Mao's response to the above two proposals :-

"India has set up its posts in our territory; we have a logical reason to fight but there is a need to show restraint.

Firstly, it would reveal Nehru's real face. Nehru considers that his stubborn tactics are successful. A few days back an Indian newspaper compared Nehru and Menon's tactics to Napoleon.

*Secondly, strive for maximum sympathy and international support for us, especially from the non-aligned group. At the international level there are some countries who are not very clear about Sino-Indian border issue. There is a need to make it clear who is right and who is wrong. Our struggle with India is a complicated international issue. It is not only an Indian problem, the America and the Soviet Union are also supporting India. They (Americans and Soviets) think of using this opportunity to push us into a battle and make us suffer a bit. However, we will not fall into this trap. We will not fire the first bullet. **Our guiding principle will be of eight characters, "never to make concessions and avoid bloodshed".***

*On 16 Jul, Chief of the General Staff Luo Ruiqing instructed Xinjiang Frontier Guards about Mao's instructions. Chairman Mao further added to the above eight characters a sentence to say, **"armed co-existence, and to be very close to and be interlocked with".**³*

As a consequence of stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in the Tianwendian Defence Area and Heweitai Defence Area, Chinese were compelled to withdraw from some of the posts in the Galwan River Valley as their positions had become untenable. However, this action of the Chinese was misread by the Indian politico-military leadership as a success of the 'Forward Policy'. As a result, Indian forces were ordered to set up more posts wherever gaps existed. This process gave rise to a race to set up posts by both sides to lay claim to the territory by physical presence. It continued unabated from Jul-Sep 1962. By the end of Sep 1962, Chinese had set up 57 posts in key areas and Indians had set up 77 posts out of which 43 Indian posts were considered as intrusions by the Chinese.

Just to illustrate the effect of 'Forward Policy', the example of 14 J&K Militia which was holding the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO)

Sub-sector along with a company of 5 JAT can be cited. The battalion was holding a total of 21 posts and none of these was mutually supporting. Out of these, 7 posts were of a platoon strength each and the rest were of a section strength. One company was deployed with the Battalion HQ. Similar was the situation with other battalions. In all, atleast 36 posts were of a section or even a lesser strength.⁴

Indian Order of Battle (Western Sector)

India had deployed HQ 114 Infantry Brigade consisting of four battalions (14 J&K Militia, 1/8 GR, 5 JAT and 7 J&K Militia) for defence of Ladakh. Around end Sep/ beginning Oct 1962, this Brigade was reinforced by 1 JAT and 13 KUMAON ex 70 Infantry Brigade, i.e. a total of six infantry battalions. Each of these Indian posts was given a number by the Chinese. HQ 114 Infantry Brigade was located at Leh, while its tactical HQ was at Chushul.⁵

Chinese Order of Battle (Western Sector)

Xinjiang Military Command under He Jiachen, Commander and Political Committee Member was responsible for conducting operations in the Western Sector. HQ 4 Infantry Division was also moved forward for command and control purposes. Apart from the Border Defence Troops already deployed in the area, it had the following additional units/formations ⁶:-

- (a) 3rd Battalion/10th Infantry Regiment / 4th Infantry Division (3B/10R/4D).
- (b) 3rd Battalion/11th Infantry Regiment/ 4th Infantry Division (3 B/11R/4D).
- (c) 120 Artillery Regiment, Engineer Battalion, Anti Aircraft Gun Battalion and the Signal Battalion; all these were units of 4th Infantry Division.
- (d) 2nd Infantry Regiment.
- (e) Ali Detachment (equivalent to a regiment)
- (f) 3rd Cavalry Regiment (four companies)
- (g) 1st Battalion of 109 Engineer Regiment.

A total of 12
Infantry
companies

The Decision for Attack

On 17 Oct 1962, the CPC Central Committee issued orders for launching the general offensive. However, forces in the Western Sector (Aksai Chin) were to coordinate their actions with the Eastern Sector (NEFA). Xinjiang Military Command in order to accomplish the mission assigned to it decided to concentrate superior military forces and adopted the tactics of encirclement, blocking enemy's retreat and then destroying them.

The Chinese Plan

Please refer to **Sketch R**. Broadly, the Chinese planned to eliminate all the 43 Indian posts which they perceived to be intrusions, i.e. across their 1959 Claim Line. However, priority was to be given to the two northern defence areas, i.e. 'Tianwendian Defence Area' and 'Heweitan Defence Area'. Operations for these were to commence simultaneously with the Eastern Sector. The D Day (day to commence operations) which initially was 18 Oct was changed to 20 Oct 1962 to allow preparations to be completed in the Eastern Sector (Kameng Frontier Division).

Tianwendian Defence Area (DBO Sub-sector)

On the Indian side this area was held by 14 J&K Militia plus a company of 5 JAT. On the Chinese side, the defences were held by four companies of 2nd Infantry Regiment with their HQ at Point 5243. The 'Indian Stronghold No.6 in Tian Area' was considered the most dangerous position and was selected as the first objective for the attack. It was named by the Chinese as the 'Red Top Hill'. This is an independent mound (Point 5270) with a circumference of more than one km and a relative height of approximately 200 m. Its northern and northeastern slopes are steep, while the southern and southeastern slopes are comparatively gradual. The mound is terraced with two layers and a commanding hill top. It seems to have been held by company less a platoon of 14 J&K Militia, a strength of 62 all ranks. The attacking troops were :-

- (a) 3 B/11 R/4 D.
- (b) One platoon of 57 mm recoilless guns (3 guns).
- (c) One company of 82 mm mortars (6 mortars).
- (d) One platoon of Engineers.
- (e) One platoon of flame throwers (10 flame throwers).

- (f) Artillery Group comprising :—
- (i) A battalion less one company of 120 mm mortars.
 - (ii) A company of 76.2 mm field guns.

As per Chinese assessment, the attacking troops had a superiority of 10:1 in numbers and 7:1 in fire power. The approach march was carried out during Night 19/20 Oct and the assaulting troops were in position by 0500 h 20 Oct .⁷ The route of reinforcements had also been interdicted by a reconnaissance detachment during the night.

The attack commenced at 0825 h with an artillery bombardment which lasted for about 30 minutes. No. 8 and 9 Companies of the 3rd Battalion formed the first echelon of the assaulting troops while No. 7 Company was in the second echelon. The attack was launched from South to North. The battle was over by about 1045 h on 20 Oct. On the Indian side 42 men were killed and 20 made prisoners of war (PsW). **No Indian soldier was able to come back to tell the tale.** The Chinese battalion suffered 8 killed and 26 wounded.

In the wake of the success at Red Top Hill, the Chinese troops (3 B/11 R) continued the attack and eliminated another 6-7 Indian strongholds, including Indian Posts 8 & 11, each held by about a section (8-10 troops). So buoyed were they with their success that the 3rd Engineer Company deployed in the vicinity asked permission to attack Indian Stronghold No. 5 which was granted and the Indian post was attacked and captured soon thereafter. The Chinese troops continued to attack during the Night 20/21 Oct and the day of 21 Oct. By last light 21 Oct, they had eliminated all the Indian posts in the Tianwendian Defence Area which they perceived to be intrusions. As per Chinese accounts, 14 J&K Militia suffered about 90 casualties (killed, wounded and PsW).

Commencing on the Night 21/22 Oct, HQ 114 Infantry Brigade gave permission to 14 J&K Militia to withdraw all the isolated posts as these posts had no mutual support and could not be reinforced. Most of these posts had been sited to show the Indian flag and were not tactically sited. The withdrawal was carried out in an orderly manner though it involved movement across some of the most difficult terrain and with heavy loads. Each man carried his personal weapon and 100 rounds of ammunition. Heavy equipment was destroyed. However, the machine gun platoon of 1 MAHAR

refused to destroy the heavy Vickers Machine Guns and carried them along. The IAF carried out air drops of supplies to the withdrawing troops on 23 and 25 Oct and also evacuated some of the serious casualties by helicopters.⁸

By 24 Oct, all the forward posts established in the Chip Chap and Nachu Chu river valleys had been withdrawn. DBO was also abandoned. 14 J&K Militia continued to hold Saser Brangsa, Murgo, Sultan Chushku and the junction of the Galwan and Shyok rivers. The Chinese had established effective control upto their 1959 Claim Line. There was no further fighting in the DBO Sub-sector right upto the unilaterally declared ceasefire by the Chinese on 21 Nov 1962.

Heweitan Defence Area (Changchenmo and Galwan Sub-sector)

On the Indian side this area was held by 1/8 GR till the end of Sep 1962. During the first week of Oct, 1/8 GR was relieved by 5 JAT less a company in Changchenmo and Galwan River Valleys. 1/8 GR continued to hold the area further South (Pangong Tso Lake and South of it). In this area, Galwan Post (named by Chinese as Indian Stronghold No. 14) which had been established on 04 July 1962 and was held by a company of 5 JAT was considered the most dangerous as it cut off the rearward communication of three Chinese posts; namely, 5, 6 and 16 held by the 9th Company of 10th Infantry Regiment. Hence, on establishment of this post on 04 Jul, the Chinese had reacted immediately by moving in the 3 B/10 R/4 D as reinforcements to this sector and had surrounded the Indian post from three directions, i.e. North, South and East. *Thus, the 3rd Battalion of the Chinese had been in a state of 'Armed Coexistence' with the Indian Stronghold No. 14 for about three months and had already drawn up detailed plan for the attack.*

The Chinese Plan of Attack against Indian Stronghold No. 14

The Chinese Forward HQ at Kangshiwar had ordered the formation of a Combat HQ to deal with the Indian Stronghold No.14. This HQ consisted of Deputy Commander of Kong HQ, Lishuangsheng; Head of Operations Branch Liuyw Zhong and the Deputy Regimental Commander of the 10th Infantry Regiment, Liusanfang. The plan was to encircle the post during night and launch attack at first light. The attack was to be launched from three directions,

i.e. North, South and East; the main effort being from the East. The 3rd Battalion 10th Regiment (3 B/10 R) tasked its 7th and 9th Companies to launch the main attack from East to West on the northern half of the objective, while the 8th Company was to attack the southern half from the South. One platoon ex the 9th Company was tasked to cut off the route of withdrawal. 8th Company was also tasked to send a section to occupy a small spur on the western bank of Galwan River to intercept the withdrawing Indian troops. *The trap was to be completely closed with no escape route.*

The Attack

The assaulting troops had reached their designated positions during the Night 19/20 Oct. At 0825 h on 20 Oct, the artillery guns and mortars commenced an intense bombardment which was to last for about ten minutes. The assaulting troops commenced the attack at 0835 h as per the plan. The Indian company HQ was overrun right in the initial stages. No artillery guns or mortars were available to support them. The men had only small arms and open trenches to fight from. However, they fought to the bitter end. **Not a single Indian soldier escaped from the battle.** The defenders (a company of 5 JAT) had a total strength of 68 all ranks. They suffered 36 killed and 32 wounded/taken PsW. As per Chinese accounts they suffered ten casualties.

After the above success, the Chinese 3 B/10 R received instructions to remove all Indian positions in the Galwan River Valley. They divided themselves into two groups. The main force of the battalion was to move on the northern route, while the 8th Company alongwith the Engineer Company was to continue attacking on the southern route. By the evening of 23 Oct the battalion had successfully removed six Indian strongholds located on the North and South Bank of the Galwan River. The Chinese had thus reached their 1959 Claim Line in this sector also. Indian troops had suffered about 80 all ranks killed/wounded and made PsW.

Battle on the Pangong Tso Lake and Chushul Sub-sector

There were two Indian positions on the northern bank of Pangong Tso Lake. The first position was located at 4000m on a small height (relative height 8m) and was held by a company less two platoons of 1/8 GR. It was referred to by the Chinese as the

'Indian Stronghold No. 16'. The second position was on the northwestern side of the above position and was located at 4400 m (relative height 60 m). It was held by a platoon of 1/8 GR. The Chinese referred to it as 'Indian Stronghold No. 29'. Together, these positions were also referred to as the 'Sirijap Complex'. It was supplied by boats across the lake and had no land link with the battalion. There were two Chinese posts – Kang 9 and 10 which were located East and North of Indian positions and the troops of the two sides were face to face.

1/8 GR had deployed another company on the southern bank of Pangong Tso Lake in three posts. These were referred to by the Chinese as 'Indian Strongholds No 1, 2 and 3 in Ali Area'. The Chinese Posts held by the 5th Company of Ali Sector were face to face with the Indian positions but were located on a dominating hill feature (4903 m), relative height difference between Indian and Chinese posts being 600 m, with advantage to the Chinese.

The rest of the battalion (1/8 GR) was defending the Spangur Gap and was deployed on the northern shoulder called Gurung Hill and the southern shoulder named Magar Hill. There was a post in the Spangur Gap itself.

The Attack against Indian Strongholds No. 16 and 29 (Sirijap Complex)

The responsibility for capturing the Indian positions North of Pangong Tso Lake was that of the Kongka Pass Defence Area. As no uncommitted troops were available, the Kong HQ organised a 'Task Force' for carrying out this task. This Task Force had a total of 117 personnel and consisted of personnel from various detachments defending this area; namely, 2nd Company of 2nd Infantry Regiment (2C/2R), 2nd Platoon of the Engineers Company of 11th Infantry Regiment, 66 personnel of 3rd Company of 2nd Battalion of 4 Division Artillery Regiment and a water surface squadron. The fire support was to be provided by 6x82 mm mortars.

The plan was to carry out encirclement during the night and launch the attack at first light. The main attack was to be launched by 2C/2R from the southwest, while a subsidiary effort was to be launched by 3rd Artillery Company from the northwest, both directed towards the centre. Two sections of engineers formed the reserve. One platoon strength was employed to interdict Indian reinforcements from Point 4400. The Water Squadron on the lake

was tasked to exercise surveillance of any other troop movements, possibly from the South Bank towards North.

The assaulting troops started from Chinese Post 'Kong-10' at 0600 h on 21 Oct and moved stealthily along a dry ravine to get close to their objectives. Unlike previous attacks, this was a silent attack. The assault was launched at 0900 h from southwest and northwest simultaneously. **Both the attacks faced stiff resistance and were temporarily stalled.** The Company Commander and the Platoon Commander were both wounded. Some regrouping had to be done and reserves were committed to continue the attack. However, keeping in view the tactically unsound positions of the Indian posts and lack of any reinforcements or fire support means, the result was a foregone conclusion. **The battle was over by about 1100 h and the Indian Stronghold No 16 was captured, and no Indian soldier could come back to tell the tale.** The Indian casualties were 14 killed and 25 made PsW, which included the Company Commander Major Dhan Singh Thapa, PVC. The Chinese suffered 21 all ranks killed. The casualties suffered on both sides indicate that it was a tough fight with no quarters given by either side.

Having captured the Indian Stronghold No 16, the Chinese now turned their attention to the 'Indian Stronghold No 29' (Point 4400) which was held by a platoon of 1/8 GR, strength of 22 all ranks. After some rest and reorganisation, the Chinese launched their attack on Point 4400 at about 1330 h the same day. 2C/2R launched the main attack from North to South and the 2nd Platoon of the Engineer Company attacked from East to West. The Artillery Company sent a part of the force to block the route of withdrawal, while rest of the company was to form the reserve. Six 82mm mortars, one anti-aircraft machine gun and a heavy machine gun were to provide the fire support for attack from the Chinese Post 'Kong 10'. The battle was over by 1700 h. The Indian troops suffered 10 killed and 12 made PsW; **apparently no one was able to escape.** The Chinese suffered five killed.

Attack on Indian Posts No. 1, 2 and 3 on the South Bank of Pangong Tso Lake

The sector South of Pangong Tso Lake was designated as Ali Defence Area and was held by Ali Detachment (equivalent of an

infantry regiment). 1/8 GR had established three posts on the southern bank of the lake, the total strength being a company. Chinese named these posts as 'Indian Strongholds No. 1, 2 and 3 in Ali Area', from East to West. Chinese considered No.1 Post to be about 20 kms inside their 1959 Claim Line. The Chinese post at Azhi held by 5th Company of the Ali Detachment was in contact with the Indian positions, the inter se distance being about 1.5 km. However, the relative height of the Chinese positions was about 600 m higher (4903 m), while the Indian positions were at 4300 m. Thus, the Indian Posts 1, 2 and 3 were dominated by the Chinese positions. The communication from the Battalion HQ of 1/8 GR to these posts was by boat over the lake. Since the lake was dominated by the Water Squadron of the Chinese, these Indian posts were practically isolated.

From the Chinese accounts it appears that during the Night 21/22 Oct, the Indian troops at 'Strongholds No 2 and 3' managed to exfiltrate leaving their infrastructure intact. During the same night, the troops from 'Indian Stronghold No. 1' which was 12 km to the East moved into 'Stronghold No. 2' which had been vacated and remained there during the day of 22 Oct. The Chinese Post No. 12 at Azhi sent a reconnaissance detachment of 9 men on the morning of 23 Oct to check if the Indian Post was still held. The reconnaissance detachment on finding that the Indian Post No. 2 was still held called for reinforcements. Soon a proper attack was launched at 1805 h on 23 Oct from the South and East, while cutting off the route of withdrawal to the West. The battle was over by 1100 h the next day. It was not really a battle as Indian troops were trying to withdraw in small groups and were being intercepted by the Chinese. They had no option but to surrender once they ran out of ammunition. The Indian casualties were two killed and 18 wounded / made PsW. **No Indian soldier could return to tell the tale.** The Chinese suffered two wounded.

The Operations in the Indus Valley (Balijiasi Region)

The Chinese now turned their attention to the Indus Valley Sector which lies to the South of Chushul. This area was held by 7 J&K Militia. It had deployed the Battalion less three companies at Koyul, with a company at Dungi and rest of the troops (two companies) at various passes and bottlenecks along the International border as perceived by India.

On 22 Oct, Xinjiang Military Command issued orders for the following troops to start moving South to Ali Defence Area, a move of approximately 500 km over rough and frozen roads, and be ready for battle by 26 Oct:-

- (a) 3 B/11 R/4D which had taken part in battles in the Tianwendian Defence Area.
- (b) 3 B/10 R/4D which had already taken part in battles of the Galwan and Chengchenmo River Valleys.
- (c) 3rd Cavalry Regiment less one company.
- (d) Reinforcing artillery (120 mm mortar battalion less a company and a 76.2 mm gun company)
- (e) Reconnaissance Company and the Engineer Regiment of 4th Division.

The attacking troops were divided into two groups. One group was to advance on the northern flank and cut off the route of withdrawal of the Indian forces. The second group was to advance on the southern flank and launch the main attack along Shiquan River valley, and attempt to surround the Indian forces in an area between Zhamagere - Kariguo and annihilate them.

The first unit to kick off on its mission was a detachment of 3rd Cavalry Regiment. It commenced move at Midnight 26/27 Oct from Jiagong and after covering about 40 kms reached the area of Changla Pass by 0800 h 27 Oct. The Pass was held by 17 men of 7 J&K Militia under a JCO. The attacking column was discovered by the defenders and they held their fire till the Chinese column was within 100 m. The two leading vehicles were destroyed and a fierce battle developed which continued for more than three hours. However, on finding themselves outnumbered and outflanked, the JCO was ordered to withdraw to Fukche. In this battle, Indian casualties were four killed including the JCO commanding the platoon and seven wounded, and made PsW. On the Chinese side, they suffered two killed and four wounded.

The main attack by the Chinese against the Indian positions held by 7 J&K Militia in Demchok sub-sector was launched on 27 Oct. The attack was in the form of two pincers aimed to meet at Kariguo, thus cutting off the route of withdrawal from Shiquan River Valley. The 3 B/11 R Group carried out a wide outflanking

move on Night 27/28 Oct from Jiagong southwards to Zhaxigang and then turned northwest towards Kariguo behind Demchok. Simultaneously, the 3 B/10 R Group moved out at 1200 h on 27 Oct and bypassing Yue Pass, converged on to Kariguo. This was the northern inner pincer. The outer pincer in the North was provided by 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the 4th Division Reconnaissance Company. Since the southern outflanking move by the 3 B/11 R Group was delayed, the trap could not be closed fully. Indian troops were able to withdraw during the Night 27/28 Oct to Koyul and Dungti in fairly good order. The Chinese Engineer Regiment was not able to provide bridges over Shiquan River (it had to be crossed twice) in time due to paucity of bridging material. As a result crossing of artillery vehicles got delayed and they could not marry up with the assaulting infantry in time. Hence, these attacks were launched with inadequate fire support.

However, by the end of the day of 28 Oct, the Chinese troops had achieved their objectives and had occupied the Kailash Range that dominated the eastern bank of the Indus Valley. All the seven Indian strongholds in this sub-sector were removed and New Demchok itself was captured. **The first phase of the operations in the Western Sector which had commenced on 20 Oct had concluded on 28 Oct.** In these operations, four battalions of the Indian 114 Infantry Brigade had been severely mauled. As per Chinese accounts, the Indian casualties in the Indus River Valley Operations (26-28 Oct) were approximately 136 killed and 160 wounded/made PsW. On the Chinese side there were 37 killed and 93 wounded. The Chinese attacking troops had withdrawn to Ritu, Jiagong and Shiquan river region to rest, reorganise and await further orders.

The Second Phase : 18-21 Nov 1962 (Please refer to Sketch 'S')

There was a lull in the fighting in the Western Sector from 29 Oct – 17 Nov 1962. On the Indian side, this period was utilised to organise the defence of Leh and to strengthen the defensive posture in the Chushul Sub-sector. The 3 Himalayan Division was raised on 26 Oct at Leh. It was commanded by Major General Budh Singh, MC. HQ 114 Infantry Brigade moved to Chushul on 27 Oct and took over the responsibility for Chushul and Phobrang Sub-sectors. HQ 70 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier RS Grewal, MC was inducted on 25 Oct and took over the responsibility for the

Indus Valley Sub-sector. 163 Infantry Brigade was inducted for defence of Leh. For this phase of the operation, we will be concerned with the actions of 114 Infantry Brigade in the Chushul Sub-sector. It was holding a frontage of about 40 km as under :-

(a) 1 JAT - Area Chushul.

(b) 1/8 GR was deployed to cover the northern flank of Spangur Gap. Two companies were on Gurung Hill and one company to the North of Point 5167. The fourth company was located in the Spangur gap itself. The battalion HQ was located at the Chushul airfield with an adhoc company as reserve.

(c) 13 KUMAON looked after the southern flank with two companies on Muggar Hill, a company with a section of 3 Inch mortars at Rezangla Hill and the battalion HQ with one company at Track Junction.

(d) The Brigade had two troops of AMX – 13 tanks located at the airfield. These tanks had been airlifted to Chushul on 25 Oct by the AN-12 aircraft, a major aviation feat in itself.

(e) The Brigade also had the support of 13 Field Regiment less a battery (25 pounder field guns).

The Chinese had named the positions held by 1/8 GR North of Spangur Gap as 'Indian Strongholds No. 5, 6 and 16 in Ali Area', while the positions held by 13 KUMAON South of Spangur Gap were referred to as 'Indian Strongholds No. 7, 8 and 9. The Indian positions on No.16 Stronghold in the North and No. 8 and 9 Strongholds in the South were on prominent heights which were approximately 600m higher than the Chinese frontier posts No. 1, 2 and 11. Indian positions had a clear view upto nearly 20 km from the border and could observe clearly the activities of Chinese forces in the area of Spangur Lake. Besides, Chinese felt that Indians could also launch a limited offensive through the Spangur Gap; thus posing a threat to their rear areas.

To overcome the above concerns, the Chinese took the following counter measures :-

(a) They set up two posts – 'No. 1 Ali and No. 11 Ali' on both sides of Moerduo Pass, opposite to 'Indian Strongholds No. 5 and 6 in Ali Area'.

- (b) Between the Chinese Posts No. 1 Ali and No. 2 Ali, they laid a mixed anti-tank and anti-personnel minefield to cater for the Indian threat through the Spangur Gap.
- (c) Chinese set up another post – ‘No. 2 Ali’ on the opposite side of ‘Indian Strongholds No. 7, 8 and 9’ to be able to observe Indian activities on these positions.
- (d) More importantly, they set up a post – ‘No. 10 Ali’, North of ‘Indian Stronghold No 16’ which was more than 100 m higher than the Indian post. From this post they could observe the activities of Indian troops deep in rear areas.

China Prepares for Phase II (18 – 21 Nov 1962)

On 14 Nov 1962, CMC issued telegraphic instructions to Xinjiang Military Command and the Forward HQ of Kong in Tibet Ali Defence Area conveying their approval of the plans for annihilating Indian forces deployed at Strongholds No. 8, 9 and 16 (No. 8 and 9 were held by 13 KUMAON and No. 16 by 1/8 GR). The instructions issued with the above approval are of interest and an extract is reproduced below:—

“While eliminating the Strongholds, do not fight with the Indian forces deployed in artillery bases and Strongholds set up outside our territory by the Indian troops. If we do not attack and Indian forces attack us, in that case we will definitely launch a counter attack. Retaliate with short, fierce and sudden fire power, hit their airfield at Chushul; the shells may cross the border but personnel should not cross the border. While returning fire it must be approved by the GHQ.”¹⁰

The Plan for Attack

Xinjiang Military Command and Kong Forward HQ decided to first deal with Indian Strongholds No. 8, 9 and 16 which were considered most threatening. Depending upon the situation, further operations were to be undertaken to wipe out Indian Strongholds No 5, 6 and 7. Their plan was to utilise the following troops for attack on Indian Strongholds No. 8 and 9:—

- (a) 3 B/11 R.

- (b) 9th reinforced Company of 3 B / 10 R.
- (c) One platoon from Post No. 2 Ali belonging to Ali Detachment.
- (d) 120mm Mortar Battalion (less one company) and a company of 76.2 mm guns.
- (e) Four 75mm recoilless guns directly attached to 10th Infantry Regiment.
- (f) One platoon (three guns) of 57mm recoilless guns of 3rd Cavalry Regiment.
- (g) One engineer company.
- (h) One flame thrower company.
- (j) One anti-aircraft gun company.

Simultaneously with the above, another Task Force based on a company from Ali Detachment and reinforced by a mortar company of 3rd Cavalry Regiment, recoilless gun platoon, one platoon of engineers ex 10th Regiment, one flame thrower platoon plus one company ex 3rd Cavalry Regiment as the second echelon were to attack and wipe out 'Indian Stronghold No. 16 in Ali Area' (held by 1/8 GR). Later, depending upon the situation, they were to be prepared to eliminate 'Indian Stronghold No. 5 in Ali Area'.

Further, 3rd Cavalry Regiment (less two companies) and 3rd Battalion (less one company) of 10th Infantry Regiment were to act as reserve under the Forward HQ during Phase 1 of the attack. They were to be prepared to deal with Indian reinforcements and counter attack, if any. The reconnaissance company of 4th Division was to control the Xinzhang Pass and prevent any Indian troops from Dungti intruding into the rear and flank of the Chinese attacking forces. They were also to be prepared to act in anti-airborne role.

The Artillery Support Group consisted of four 120mm mortars, four 76.2mm guns, mortar company of 10th Regiment and two 75mm recoilless guns. This was deployed at the rear flank of No. 1 Ali and No. 11 Ali posts. An anti-aircraft battalion was deployed near 'Post No. 2 Ali' for providing cover against air attacks in the direction of the main effort.

Indian Dispositions on Rezangla Hill (Strongholds No. 8 and 9)

The Rezangla Hill was defended by a reinforced company of 13 KUMAON commanded by Major Shaitan Singh, PVC (posthumous). The two strongholds were defended by a platoon each. The Company HQ and the third platoon were deployed on a height Point 5150 between the two strongholds. The total strength including the supporting elements of mortars, heavy machine guns and rocket launchers was 141 all ranks. The localities were mutually supporting and defences were well coordinated. *However, Chinese during their reconnaissance had noted that fire power towards the front was strong and was comparatively weak towards flanks and rear.*

Chinese Pattern of Operations

Chinese commanders had carried out a detailed reconnaissance of the layout of defences of Indian Strongholds No. 8 and 9 (Rezangla Hill). They planned to carry out a night approach march and attack at first light. They decided to outflank the positions from the South and launch a multidirectional attack. As for Indian Stronghold No. 16 (held by 1/8 GR), since outflanking was not possible, they decided to launch a frontal attack under the cover of heavy artillery fire.

The Battle of Rezangla (Attack Against Indian Strongholds No. 8 and 9)

3 B/11 R/4 D alongwith a reinforced 9th Company of 3 B/10 R was given the task of capturing Indian Strongholds No. 8 and 9. The attacking force was divided into two groups – North and South, each under the command of the Deputy Commander of 4th Division, Wanghongjie and the Regimental Commander, Gaohuanchang respectively. The Southern Group consisting of 7th and 8th Company (less one platoon) of 11th Regiment under the Regimental Commander was to attack from South to North and capture Indian Stronghold No. 9. The Northern Group consisting of 9th Company of 11th Regiment and 9th Company of 10th Regiment under the Deputy Divisional Commander was to attack from North to South and capture Indian Stronghold No. 8.

The attacking troops commenced their move from assembly area near Ritu on respective routes – North and South at 2000 h

on 17 Nov. The southern route was longer and difficult; it took them nine hours to cover about eight km and could reach their base for launching the attack only by about 0600 h 18 Nov. The northern group did the approach march in vehicles moving without lights and dismounted after reaching the foothills of Point 5580, and thereafter moved up the mountain to reach their point for launching the attack. 9th Company of the 10th Regiment penetrated between 'Indian Strongholds No. 7 and 8 in Ali' and cut off the route of withdrawal of 'Indian No. 8 and 9 Strongholds', thus achieving the encirclement of Indian positions, as also prevent reinforcements.

After a short but intense artillery bombardment, the attack from both directions commenced at 0915 h on 18 Nov. The battle was fierce with no quarters given by either side. The attack by the Southern Group was stalled time and again, and reserves had to be called in. The Chinese Company Commander of No. 8 Company was killed in battle. For several hours the outcome of the battle hung in balance. Men were engaged in hand to hand combat. The Indian Company Commander even tried to launch a platoon counterattack to regain the height, Point 5300 but did not succeed. The telephone line to the Battalion HQ was cut and the company radio set was destroyed in the initial stages. C Company 13 KUMAON was now on its own. No reinforcements could reach them. For them it was a fight to the finish. The guns fell silent only around 2200 h on 18 Nov. **As per Chinese accounts, out of a total strength of 141 Indian troops, 136 were killed including the Company Commander Major Shaitan Singh, PVC (posthumous) and five men were made PsW. The Chinese suffered 21 killed and 98 wounded. It was a battle which has gone into the annals of military history as an epic battle.**

Attack against Gurung Hill (Indian Stronghold No. 16 in Ali Area)

Indian Stronghold No. 16 was located North of the Spangur Gap and was held by a company less a platoon (about 60 men) of 1/8 GR. Its height was 5100m. The responsibility for capturing this position was given to the Forward HQ of Ali Detachment. As outflanking was not possible, they decided on a frontal attack. A Task Force consisting of three sections 4th Company, two sections of 5th Company, two sections from No. 8 Post, one section from

No 1 Post; altogether eight sections formed the assaulting company under the command of 4th Company Commander Zaofurong. It was reinforced by one heavy machine gun, one 57 mm recoilless gun, one platoon of eight flame throwers and one platoon (18 men) of 1st Platoon of the Engineer Company of the 10th Regiment. 1st Company of 3rd Cavalry Regiment formed the second echelon for the attack. The fire support was to be provided by 12 X 82mm mortars.

The attack commenced at 0922 h on 18 Nov and was preceded by a short artillery bombardment. An effort was also made to outflank from the South but did not succeed. The defences were well coordinated and covered by a protective minefield which stalled the attack and caused a number of casualties. The Gorkhas held their ground and forced the Chinese to regroup and call in reinforcements. The attack had to be reorganised and was resumed at 1100 h. The Chinese finally succeeded in capturing the position by about last light on 18 Nov after repeated attacks. The Chinese Engineer Platoon played a major role in maintaining the momentum of the attack. By now 1/8 GR had suffered about 50 killed and several wounded. No reinforcements were forthcoming. This was also a fight to the finish. **In this attack Chinese attacking troops suffered 81 casualties (killed and wounded) and expended 20,000 rounds of various types of ammunition.** The Chinese communication link also broke down. Apart from being a frontal attack, it was poorly planned, coordinated and executed. The high casualties suffered by the Chinese testify to the brave fight put up by the Gorkhas.

Keeping the overall situation in view, i.e. loss of Rezangla Hill and the Northern Shoulder of Spangur Gap, it was decided by HQ 114 Infantry Brigade to withdraw troops from Gurung Hill, Muggar Hill, Spangur Post and Tokung, and to redeploy them on mountains West of Chushul. Thus, despite the fact that some of the defensive positions were holding on, a withdrawal was ordered on the Night of 19/20 Nov.

The Chinese made no attempt to follow the withdrawing Indians, nor did they try to capture the Chushul airfield. However, it was rendered unusable as it now lay in no man's land and was dominated by the Chinese on the eastern hills. It seems the Chinese had no plans to conduct any further offensive operations

as they had reached their 1959 Claim Line in the Chushul Sub-sector.

As per Chinese accounts, the total casualties to Indian troops during Phase II of the operations were 160 killed and five made PsW. The Chinese suffered 67 killed and 133 wounded.

Some Conclusions on the Fighting in the Western Sector

The fighting was spread out over a large area from North to South (approximately 600 km) but was confined to an area of about 20 km from West to East. There were no large scale battles. The Chinese attacks were mostly battalion / company group attacks but were well coordinated and adequately supported by artillery and other combat support elements.


In the Western Sector, Chinese aim was to remove the Indian posts which they perceived were across their 1959 Claim Line. Chinese had neither aimed, nor did they have the resources to capture Leh or any sizeable chunk of territory in Ladakh.

Chinese had also given a lot of importance to psychological aspects of warfare. During the phase of 'Armed Coexistence', they gave no indication of impending operations. They were successful in making the Indian political leaders, diplomats, intelligence agencies and the military leadership believe that they were neither capable, nor likely to undertake large scale military operations. At the same time their military preparations were proceeding apace.

As regards their pattern of operations, the assaulting troops moved by night and launched their attacks soon after first light. The attacks were invariably preceded by a short but intense artillery bombardment. Also, before launching the main attack, the route of withdrawal was cut off and the post was encircled. Most attacks were multidirectional.

It needs to be noted that during the phase of 'Armed Coexistence', Chinese invariably left a route open for withdrawal but once the war started, the policy was to completely encircle the post and annihilate the defenders. ***In most of the actions, hardly any defender was able to escape to tell the story. This explains the fact that very little information is available in India about these battles.***

Sketch Showing Chinese Deployment in Depth Areas of the Western Sector October 1962




Source : <http://www.greysilkriders.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Xinjiang.jpg> accessed on 1/07/2013.

The information on this Sketch has been sourced from the Chinese Book 'A History of Counter Attack War in Self Defence Along Sino-Indian Border, Academy of Military Science Publications, 1994, First Edition.



Sketch Showing Chinese Attack in Chushul Sub-Sector : 18-21 Nov 1962 (Battles of Rezangla Hill and Gurung Hill)



This Sketch has been prepared by the Author based on description of the battles in the Chinese sources.

There is a difference in policing a border and defending a disputed border. India from 1959 – 62 was using its Army to police the border with China which was unsettled, un-demarcated and disputed. Police like border posts were being established by the Army at the behest of political authorities abetted by the Intelligence Bureau. It was for the Army to resist such an irrational course and insist on holding ground based on operational and tactical considerations. *That is the real test of generalship.*

The last and the most important observation which comes out loud and clear is, that the Indian soldier was not found wanting in courage and fighting spirit, even in the most inhospitable terrain and under highly adverse tactical circumstances. **Time and again, even in the most hopeless situations, he stood his ground and fought to the very end.** Unfortunately, these heroic deeds and sacrifices have not been accorded due recognition. *He gave his life for the Country with abandon. He had nothing more to give!*

Endnotes

1. The first such incident occurred in the Eastern Sector at Longju on 25 Aug 1959. The second incident was more serious and took place on 21 Oct in Ladakh in the area of Kongka Pass in which an Indian Police patrol suffered nine killed, three wounded and eight personnel including Deputy Superintendent of Police Karam Singh taken as prisoners. Chinese suffered one person killed.
2. Chinese Book, A History of Counter Attack War in Self Defence Along Sino-Indian Border, Academy of Military Science Publications, 1994, Chapter 3, Section 3.
3. Ibid 2.
4. History of the Conflict with China, 1962, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992 (accessed on internet on 20 Aug 2013).
5. Ibid 4.
6. Loc cit 2, Appendix, Table 1
7. All timings are based on Chinese time which is 2 hand 30 min ahead of Indian Standard Time.
8. Loc cit 4.
9. Loc cit 2.
10. Loc cit 2, Chapter 5, Section 5.

My Experience of the Retreat from Tiddim During World War II : Feb to Apr 1944

Late Lieutenant Colonel RK Duleep Sinh (Retd)*

I was inducted into the Special Observers Corps on 17 Jun 1943. It was a specialist organisation slated to monitor enemy communications and ground and air movement in 'No Man's Land' and report it to the nearest air force base from where our fighters and interceptor aircraft would engage the enemy. I reported to the Training Centre at Rawalpindi with a sense of achievement as I had to go through much travail to join the Army. I had annoyed my family members by deserting the Law College, Lahore, and seeking Commission at the peak of World War II, when Britain had suffered a grievous blow and our leaders had mobilised vast multitudes during the Quit India Movement. My earlier efforts to join the Royal Air Force (RAF), when I was studying in England, had been stymied by my father, who used his considerable clout to get me shipped back to India midway through my semester in 1939, prior to the Battle of Britain. I was thus forced to complete my studies and get a BA degree from Mayo College, Ajmer.

Having joined up I was sub-posted as the Second-in-Command of 9 Mobile Wireless Operating Company (MWOC), consisting of Pathans from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), recently raised under command of Major Ronnie Lewis. On account of the criticality of the Burma Front, we were ordered to move to Kohima at short notice and were located near the Tennis Court. Being GHQ troops in the front line, the chain of command was fairly nebulous. We were immediately deployed along the Kohima – Phek Track where we established a number of posts right up to the Chindwin River. There was no report of enemy movement and life proceeded at its leisurely pace.

***Late Lieutenant Colonel RK Duleep Sinh (Retd)** was commissioned into the Special Observer Corps in 1943 and fought in Burma during the Second World War. He was transferred to 1/3 GR in 1953, and later raised and Commanded 4/3 GR from 1962-1965. He also served as Military Adviser in Australia from 1967-1971. He passed away on 27 Oct 2012.

One day, in late Feb, while I was relaxing in my bunker after a hard day's walk from one of my posts, Ronnie rushed in waving a signal form informing me that I was to proceed immediately to Tiddim and take over 6 MWOC, as the Officer Commanding (OC) and the Second-in-Command had both been evacuated sick. No time was to be lost as the troops were critically deployed and the Fourteenth Army was expecting a Japanese push any day. My halcyon days came to an abrupt end (no one then realised that at that very moment a large Japanese column was preparing to move towards Kohima) and I hurriedly packed my bags while Ronnie got two Jeeps ready for me; one for the bulky wireless set and its equipment (a 1042/43 Air Force receiver transmitter) and the other for me and my personal baggage. I said my farewells and left, little realising that Ronnie and I would not meet till after the War. Lieutenant RD Palsokar (later Brigadier) was posted as my replacement. While visiting one of the posts on the Chindwin he was captured along with Lance Naik Manzur Ahmed while his Viceroy Commissioned Officer, Jemadar (now Naik Subedar) Ajaib Khan, was killed. He managed an adventurous escape and his gallant conduct earned him a well-deserved Military Cross (MC).

It was an unforgettable drive. The road was of indifferent quality, which subsequently became near impassable in the rains. With my Army HQ formation sign and two jeeps I was frequently mistaken for a staff/senior officer (both regarded with much caution and awe) and given the right of way. The long interminable drive took nearly three days. At one of my halts en route I was invited by the local chieftain for dinner, who turned out to be a very pretty but clever Naga Princess. I remember being entertained well and plied with questions and the local brew. The lady kept her options open during the coming conflict and cooperated both with the Allies, especially the redoubtable Ursula Graham Bower, and the Japanese. She seems to have subsequently met her just deserts as I could not locate her when I moved into the Naga Hills with 1/3 GR in 1955.

Our drive through Manipur still reminds me of the beauty of the Imphal plains, its cheerful people and the brilliant sparkle of the Loktak Lake, an arena which would see the most savage fighting. Things became more business like as I approached Tiddim and one could make out the signs of war. Reports had started filtering along the road that the Japanese were up to something. Since the

road was not under fire I continued our journey till we reached the heights overlooking the Manipur River, a place embedded in my memory; as I started hearing the sound of shells bursting and encountered a stocky Gorkha soldier, feet firmly implanted, who signalled us to halt and unceremoniously bundled me inside a bunker and set about dispersing my men and vehicles. I had entered in the nick of time as the area came under heavy shelling. Through the dust and dim light I could make out a number of officers, looking businesslike and nonchalant (as only the British can be), and some Gorkha troops. A mug of tea was pressed into my hand and I was ignored, thereby allowing me time to observe the activity around. Once the shelling stopped introductions were made and I informed the officers that I was bound for Tiddim to join my company. After some light hearted banter I emerged from the bunker and proceeded on my journey. This was my first meeting with First Battalion the Third Gorkha Rifles (1/3 GR). The Battalion was holding a feature to rest and re-group after their successful encirclement of the Lophei Heights. Little did I know that this would be the same Battalion in which I would spend 12 years of unbroken service with three tenures in J&K along the Cease Fire Line and one in the Naga Hills.

The sounds of war increased as I approached Tiddim. One could see the change also in the attitude and activity of personnel around. I reported arrival at HQ 17 Infantry Division (17 Inf Div) and was informed of the approaching offensive of 33 Japanese Division and what was expected of me. It was vital that we give advance warning of any major movement as well as aircraft activity. I did not have much difficulty in locating 6 MWOC and mindful of Ronnie's exhortation promptly returned the vehicles of 9 MWOC as I did not want them to either get embroiled in the battle or get impounded by 17 Inf Div and thus face his wrath. I immediately set about familiarising myself with the Company and the operational task as ominous reports were filtering in through the jungle. The Company was deployed on the Tiddim – Aizawl Track right up to Aizawl from where it was perfectly suited to monitor air and ground activity on the open flank of 17 Inf Div. Our timely radio reports ensured that Japanese Zero fighters sneaking in towards Imphal and Silchar were unable to maintain surprise and were shot down in large numbers.

On the ground, reports of Japanese movement were becoming alarming and a couple of my posts had to disengage in a hurry. I had got sufficiently disturbed to report the matter to HQ 17 Inf Div but being a youngster was largely ignored. One morning my signaller thrust a signal from one of my posts which said that they had sighted a large Japanese force advancing along a *khud* (ravine) parallel to the Track and wanted to know what to do. I quickly rushed to the Division HQ, where, after the usual bureaucratic rigmarole, I was ushered into the presence of the General Officer Commanding (GOC), the redoubtable but impatient, Major General 'Punch' Cowan. He took one look at the message and allowed his choleric temper full reign. He exploded that this was all nonsense as his troops were deployed in the area and none had reported such a movement. However, after calm deliberation he cooled down and ordered me to find out more.

On my return I found another message from the Post to say that the Japanese force numbered approximately 3000 and was preparing to assault them. In conformity with standing instructions they were destroying all equipment and documents, and escaping into the jungle. This was the same force which, subsequently laid road blocks and disrupted the withdrawal of 17 Inf Div. The Japanese invasion had commenced in right earnest along with the rains and my posts were the first to be contacted. Since we had been told not to withdraw they got overrun one by one. While some men escaped most were either killed or went missing. All the expensive signal equipment had to be destroyed along with the documents. It speaks volumes of our procedures that not a single cipher document or equipment fell into Japanese hands. Many a time, in a desperate bid to retrieve my men and equipment, I had to take to the jungle to avoid Japanese columns.

17 Inf Div meanwhile, commenced its retreat and the chaos was something to be seen. The day finally came when I had lost my first command and was myself in tatters. I do not recommend to my young readers that they go through this experience. It requires a strong heart and head to undergo such a trauma. I reported to HQ 17 Inf Div with the dismal news and like Cassandra was not well received, 6 MWOC was no longer considered a fighting unit. My vehicles were commandeered and my heavy equipment ordered to be destroyed. The remnants of my unit were absorbed into the Division Camp as foot soldiers while I was

temporarily attached as a staff officer. I had come to the War for a lark and had brought my phonograph and an enviable collection of records which, naively, I cunningly hid in the jungle by digging a large hole and covering it by tarpaulin. The Japanese seemed to have found it as my name and address were broadcast over their radio, picked up by people who knew my family and they informed my mother. One can well imagine what would have gone on in her mind as I was the only son. Brave heart that she was she retained her stoic calm and asked my Father, a heart patient, to find out more through his considerable resources. Matters did not improve when an official letter came informing them that I was missing in action.

The Division had to go through a fighting retreat in the mud and slush and we all had to pull our weight. Fort White and Kennedy Peak had to be abandoned and then Tiddim. On the day the Divisional HQ commenced its withdrawal the Supply Depot and the Canteen were thrown open to the troops who had a field day in collecting whatever they could carry on their backs. It was a ludicrous sight to see jawans completely encumbered with the most ridiculous items trudging back in pouring rain. War is a terrible master and we soon had to go through the nightmare of the 'Chocolate Staircase' where one slipped two steps while climbing one. The steep ascent took its toll and all those who had loaded themselves with goodies found their nemesis and had to jettison their loads in order to reach the top. The whole route was lined with odds and ends along with cadavers of dead animals. I was so exhausted with exertion and lack of food that I may have just sat down on the slope and given up in despair until salvation in the shape of a mule enabled me to grasp its tail and literally drag myself up!

Having reached the top and after some rest I staggered to the first 'Box' where a team of officers were directing all those who had arrived to man the perimeter. I and another British Captain were told to hold one flank. We climbed up the slope and tired as we were, cursorily got hold of things, made a wall of stones and tried to sustain ourselves. We had consumed some food and had dropped into an exhausted sleep when Japanese jitter parties started firing into the Box. It was the signal for all mayhem to break loose. Everyone started firing wildly with even Medium Machine Guns and some guns joining in. It took considerable time

before order could be restored and 'Punch' Cowan was so incensed that he threatened to withdraw all ammunition if firing was resumed without orders. During whatever rest that could be managed, Division HQ finalised the plan for the next day's withdrawal. An advance party of some officers and men in a 3 ton vehicle was to move to the next 'Box' (I never came to know which one!) and prepare to receive the HQ marching column. I had come down from my position for further orders from the perimeter commander when I was shanghaied and thrust into the vehicle, already full, in which I managed a toehold. The leader (whoever he was) listened to and passed instructions, got into the front seat and the vehicle pushed off.

The Japanese had an elephant mounted gun, moving parallel to the road, on the Manipur River. They had observed our move and as our three tonner came chugging along, the gun opened fire at a pre-determined spot. After some ranging rounds a shell landed right on the bonnet of the vehicle blowing its front to smithereens. The officer and the driver, and all those sitting in front were killed or badly injured and the smoking vehicle with mangled bodies lurched onto the side of the road. Being in the rear I was thrown into a ditch with minor injuries. Those of us who were not badly injured gathered ourselves, shell shocked as we were, and disappeared into the thick jungle. Devilishly, the Japanese had anticipated such a move as they had an ambush party on the slopes, which opened fire killing and wounding some more of us. At this stage, I found I was the only officer around. I managed to get those still able to move into thick cover and organised ourselves to fire on the ambush party thus succeeding in extricating ourselves. The Japanese however were implacable in their pursuit, picking us off one by one until I found I was the only one alive. I dived into thick bushes and feigned death. The Japanese went from body to body picking up whatever they could, incessantly chattering.

After an hour or so, I realised that they had gone and no one else was alive. I started moving slowly parallel to the road through near impenetrable undergrowth not daring to expose myself. I ate what I could and rested when possible. At least the rainfall assuaged my thirst. I don't recollect the number of days this lasted until weak and despairing I descended on the road. The road seemed clear enough and not having the strength to trudge through

the undergrowth again, I started walking along its edge. I soon started to hear the sound of gunfire but my state of mind, no doubt weakened by deprivation, was bordering on recklessness and though I became somewhat cautious, I refused to leave the road. I had gone some distance when I suddenly came upon a jeep parked on the side with its key in place. What gladdened my heart was a hamper full of food! I promptly stuffed myself, filled my pack and then turned the key. Lo and behold the vehicle started and I promptly drove away. By now hunger pangs under control and weakness at bay I suddenly realised my foolishness, especially as the sound of battle had increased. I abandoned the jeep and disappeared into the undergrowth though keeping close to the road.

After fair amount of trudging I decided that I was well within our lines and descended onto the road and to my shock found the battle raging right in front of my eyes. The winding road on which I had emerged climbed on to a ridge and disappeared beyond. That location was being pounded by artillery and I realised that the entire ridge was being held by the Japanese. The shelling was the preliminary to an assault but before I could assimilate all this I heard loud and repeated shouts of '*Ayo Gorkhai!*'. From a ravine near me ant like figures of Gorkhas, wielding *khukris* emerged, charged up the hill carrying all before them. They captured the ridge decapitating the Japanese holding it. I learnt later that the attack had been put in by 2/5GR (FF). It is not often that an entire battalion puts in a *khukri* attack and it falls to the lot of very few to witness such an attack. It was terrifying and no doubt the Japanese wished themselves elsewhere.

I joined up with the rear headquarters of 17 Inf Div and found it in bad shape, its units all but broken. However, the sheer personality of its GOC kept its spirit alive and the retreat, though horrendous in casualties, continued to remain orderly. 23 Inf Div moved South from Imphal to assist 17 Inf Div withdrawal, which ultimately involved clearance of the major Japanese block at the Tuitam Saddle. I was debriefed in detail, given an odd job or two and generally left to my own devices as my command had disappeared. At this stage most infantry units had lost a great deal of men, especially officers, and 1/3 GR was badly affected with barely three to four officers on its roll. I often came in contact with the Battalion, and but for the fact that Indian officers in those days

did not serve with Gorkha battalions I could easily have become a part of it for the duration of the retreat. As part of my liaison duties for the Division HQ I was frequently in contact with the Battalion though I did not take part in its battles around Bishenpur.

Times were so hectic that I only have a faint recollection of what all transpired. However, I recollect the Junior Commissioned Officers and Non Commissioned Officers, grim but imperturbable, holding together the remnants of their sub units. There was hardly any hot food, clothes were wet and torn (some of the men had improvised bamboo shoots for a variety of things including shoes) and all of us had sores and trench foot. Despite that supplies and ammunition did reach and all ranks carried their weapons. Finally, the road to Imphal was through and since the Division had no further use for me I hitched a ride in a vehicle to the town. The rest of my men had either become casualties or were missing in action and none ever reported back to the parent unit. That closed my chapter with 17 Inf Div. I was recommended for a Military Cross, though I ultimately received a 'Mention-in-Despatches' for my exertions.

Being a part of an Army HQ unit and without a command I had to fend for myself and thought it prudent to stay close to the airfield. As far as the Army was concerned I had disappeared from the scene and my father received a polite letter from Army HQ (kept prominently in the family archives) declaring me missing in action. When I finally arrived in Bombay on being evacuated, after a little more adventure, it took my mother and sisters some convincing that they were not seeing a ghost.

Well, those were stirring times and I thought it fit to put things in print before my memory finally fails me. What of the actors of that period? I could not forget my little experience with 1/3 GR and after Independence, though transferred to another regiment, I finally got my wish to join the Battalion in 1953. This decision transformed me and my family. Five members and three generations have served the Regiment and continue to do so. The Special Observer Corps did not survive the War and its history can only be found in some musty archive. Ronnie Lewis and I remained the best of friends. He became a banker and leads a contented retired life. He has visited me and so have my son and grandsons visited him in the quaint village of Chipping Sodbury near Bristol. My grandson,

Abhay, has hosted his grandson Edward amidst the silver of the 4/3 GR Mess in Almora. Palsokar made a name for himself in the Army and also as a historian and trained my son in IMA.

Punch Cowan was the stuff of legend; ex 4 GR, he lost his only son in Burma serving in his Battalion. He refused to relinquish command of his Division by refusing promotion and led it to victory against the Japanese. When you visit Bishenpur on the Tiddim Road; perhaps, you will still see the rusty tank hull destroyed by Subedar Sher Bahadur Thapa, MC, who later became my company Senior JCO, or the corrugations on the ground where 1/3 GR and other units of the 'Forgotten Army' stood bravely against an enemy considered invincible. I am proud that I am a part of this tradition and legacy.

First Hand Account of Delhi During Partition in 1947

Major General SS Chhachhi, SM (Retd)*

At the time of Partition in 1947, I was Second-in-Command of 8 Engineering and Maintenance Company, Bengal Sappers, which was the only Engineering Unit in Delhi, in what later became the Delhi and East Punjab Command. Our charter in Delhi was to look after the essential services of the city. We had detachments at all the major installations, such as Water Supply, Sewage Stations and Electric Supply Stations. Small detachments were assigned to each location and we had the facilities to move around all over the city of Delhi.

As the partition of the country began, in Aug 1947, huge numbers of refugees began to come to Delhi from across the new border, and in Delhi, large number of Muslims wishing to cross to the other side were gathered in camps. Both these groups of people required substantial welfare support, which was also provided by us.

As news of attacks on the trains built up, we then needed to provide support for the troops attached to the refugee trains for their protection. To carry out this task, we created sandbag 'sangars' on the train flats on which the troops could ride and repel the attacks. Within the city, Paharganj area was overtaken by internecine violence and many buildings were burnt. These had to be demolished, to ensure safety, so that they did not collapse on top of people. We carried out these demolitions in the midst of the riot situation.

Another really unpleasant job also came into our charge. About 2,000 people had been massacred in the city. The bodies had to be disposed off. We used bulldozers and dug mass graves in Azadpur where these unfortunate people were buried. Strangely enough, at the same time, Delhi got floods. We were able to commandeer 'six wheel-drive' amphibious vehicles (DUKW's known as Ducks) from the local ordinance depot and used them to help

* Major General SS Chhachhi, SM (Retd) was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers (Bengal Sappers) on 14 Oct 1944. He retired as Chief Engineer, HQ Western Command on 7 May 1979.

the affected people. At the other edge of the city, in Gurgaon, a group of Meos, Muslim tribals, were stranded without any water. We supplied water to them, ensuring their survival.

Perhaps the most memorable task I performed was in Jan 1948. Mahatma Gandhi had been assassinated at the Birla House. We were ordered to provide a vehicle to carry his body to the cremation grounds. We prepared a vehicle overnight and reached the Birla House early in the morning. A long discussion ensued between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, who could not decide whether the Mahatma's body should face the front or the rear of the vehicle. Finally, it was decided that the body should face forward. We built a sloping platform for this.

I then drove the vehicle. I had already placed 50 men with ropes attached to the front of the vehicle. This proved to be fortuitous, as the vehicle refused to start! At my signal, they pulled on the ropes, and the vehicle started. I drove the cortege up to the India Gate until, overwhelmed by emotion, I handed over to another driver.

There are many other incidents which I will not mention in detail here — such as providing support to the infantry troops who were under attack from Muslims holed up in Delhi Gate (on seeing a bullock cart full of dead bodies), while going to the Unit HQ in the Cantonment, etc. However, I will recount an amusing situation that arose at the Viceregal Lodge during this period. The entire staff at the Mountbatten residence had gone on strike. We were asked to supply semi-skilled Sappers to help out. They did so well that Lady Mountbatten told me that she would rather have my men than her regular staff!

My Experiences in 1947-48 War in J&K - Battle of Naushera

Major General Lachhman Singh Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd)*

Background

By capturing Jhangar on 24 Dec 1947, the raiders gained considerable advantage for building-up their forces for attacks on Naushera, Rajauri and Punch. Recapturing Jhangar, thus became vital for us. The month of Jan 1948 passed in raids and counter-raids. The main trial of strength took place on 6 Feb 1948, when the enemy attack on Naushera was decisively repulsed. This paved the way for the recapture of Jhangar on 18 Mar 1948.

Preliminary Operations (Refer to Sketch 'P')

On 1 Jan 1948, after being relieved by a battery of 16 Field Regiment at Chhamb, we (HQ 30 Field Battery and Alfa Troop), rejoined B Troop at Naushera, to form a Battery under Major Bhupinder Singh.¹ By now the raiders were aggressively poised around Naushera. Brigadier Usman, Commander 50 Para Brigade and 'Z' Brigade under Brigadier Lakhinder Singh had been assembled in the T - Junction area of roads Jammu -Naushera - Jhangar and Rajouri - Naushera. On 3 Jan, I went as a Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with 3 MARATHA LI (Para), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rawind Singh Grewal, MC, an officer of high repute in battle. His task was to clear the enemy from Bhajnoa feature, if possible. He told me, "I command from the front and expect you to maintain physical contact with me". I informed him that I had been sanctioned only five rounds per gun for my troop for the day's operation on which he made no comment. We moved at First Light. When we were about 1200 yards from

* Major General Lachhman Singh Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd) was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery in 1943 and retired in 1978. In the 1947-48 War in J&K, he took part in the battles of Chhamb, Naushera, Jhangar, Rajauri, Uri and Zojila. He was awarded the Vir Chakra for gallantry in the battles for recapture of Jhangar. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, he was General Staff Officer Grade I in the Military Operations Directorate. In 1971, he commanded 20 Mountain Division in Bangladesh and was awarded the Param Vishisht Sewa Medal for outstanding leadership in Battle. He has authored three books on 1965 and 1971 Wars with Pakistan : Missed Opportunities, Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan and Victory in Bangladesh.


the base of Bhajnoa Hill, two enemy machine guns opened fire on us. The bullets went over our heads and we moved forward undisturbed. I, along with my OP party, followed Rawind at the tail of the leading company which entered a nala, about 1000 yards from the objective. After a brief pause in the nala, in which I registered a target indicated to me by firing one round. Rawind then ordered the company to advance on a broad front. As we emerged out of the nala with the leading platoon, a machine gun burst hit him in the leg. The leading troops raced back to the safety of the nala where Raiwind, in pain, told the Company Commander to keep the enemy engaged in firefight. He forbade any talk of his wounds on the wireless and instructed me to report to Major Belliappa, his Second-in-Command. We had left him under a big tree about 1500 yards for Bhajnoa. Soon after my reporting to him, Belliappa decided to pull the battalion back after evacuating the Commanding Officer.

On observing our withdrawal, the enemy became aggressive. My demand for more artillery ammunition was not agreed to. As we fell back, I could see the enemy running along the foothills to occupy positions to keep our withdrawing troops under fire. I resorted to firing smoke to cover the withdrawal, resulting in exceeding our authorised quota of ammunition. My explanation that "restriction on ammunition" applied to HE only" was found unacceptable. I was conveyed the displeasure of the Brigade Commander for exceeding the ammunition expenditure by Lieutenant Colonel Mohinder Singh who explained to me the difficulties of build-up of rations, petroleum, communication and defence stores from Jammu to Naushera on the kacha road.

On return, I was told to establish an OP on the Gorkha Hill, occupied by 1/9 GR under Lieutenant Colonel KL Atal. The OP provided excellent view of the area upto Bhajnoa, Naushera and the Naushera-Jhangar Valley. Next morning, about an hour after 'Stand Down', I saw approximately 1000 men about 2500 yards from my OP, in a well dispersed formation, advancing towards us. I opened fire with my troop, without much effect on their advance. The spread of shells covered only a small portion of the enemy advance. The enemy went to ground, wherever the shell landed; while the rest of them continued to advance. A man on a high horse cantered amongst the advancing foot sloggers who fell on the ground whenever a shell fell in the neighbourhood.

Sketch P

Area of Operations

OPERATION KIPPER**31 JAN - 1 FEB 1948**

Source: Book, 'Operations in Jammu Kashmir 1947-48' by Shri SN Prasad, D.Phil and Dharam Pal, PhD, History Division of MoD, Government of India. Published by Natraj Publishers, Dehradun in 1987. (Reprinted 2005).

At this stage, I was ordered to stop firing to preserve ammunition; and to keep reporting the progress of the enemy advance. A little later, I was told to indicate targets to the aircraft expected in the area in about 20 minutes. Before their arrival on the scene, I saw the enemy entering a nala, which I indicated to the aircraft with reference to a smoke shell fired by me to the aircraft circling overhead. The air straffing and bombing was effective and there was no further enemy movement during the day.

Next day, Z Brigade was moved back to Akhnur, leaving 3 MARATHA LI (Para) and 5 Mountain Battery in Naushera. Now began a period of hectic activity to dominate the no-man's-land by aggressive patrolling, raids and occupation of tactical features to improve the defensive layout. Naushera-Kangota and Tain Dhar were occupied and the defences were strengthened with barbed wire, anti-personnel mines, bunkers / sangars and registration of important DFs. Telephone lines were laid to all defended localities in addition to wireless communications.

Battle of Naushera

Brigadier Usman, Commander 50 Para Brigade, now undertook a series of measures to raise the morale and patriotic spirit of all ranks. The daily evening conference was conducted in Hindustani and '*Jai Hind*' became the form of our salutation. All officers, not committed on operational duty, were expected to attend the daily evening Conference where the day's activities were analysed and next day's tasks allotted. Usman emphasised: "the enemy was gradually closing-in and was building-up strength for a major attack on Naushera; an enemy success at Naushera would give the invaders not only a feeling of superiority over the Indian soldiers but also whet his appetite to grab more territory; the coming 'Battle of Naushera' has a National dimension; If we lose Naushera, Delhi is not far for the Afghan invaders; we are fighting the first major battle of 'Free India' under Indian officers and have to win at all cost. I will not leave Naushera under any circumstance and will make sure that we win the coming battle at any cost."

In the third week of Jan, Lieutenant General Cariappa 'Kipper', visited Naushera in an Air OP Auster aircraft. He instructed Usman to secure Kot feature to add to the security of Naushera. Kot-Pathradi area was estimated to be held by about 500 ex-State

Force soldiers armed with MGs and 3 inch mortars in addition to small arms. Kipper pointed out that the enemy could close in with Naushera defences from the direction of Kot and threaten the guns by infiltrating into the built-up area of Naushera town in conjunction with a strong attack along the Southern, Western and Northern perimeter of Naushera.

For the capture of Kot, Usman planned a two battalion silent attack on Kot-Pathradi area. Five days before the D-Day, registration was carried out by firing one round at First Light on Kot, Pathradi and other targets to work out meteorological corrections for guns. Ponies were assembled in Naushera and careful leaks given out to indicate an attack towards Jhangar, while armoured cars of 7 Cavalry led forays towards Jhangar. Strict wireless silence was observed. 2/2 PUNJAB was to capture Kot by advancing along Rajauri road to Point 3227 and Kot. 3 MARATHA LI (Para) was to simultaneously attack Pathradi -Uperla Dhandesar from the direction of Rajil.

I followed Usman's party as the FOO with the Brigade Reserve. Everything seemed to go well. 2/2 PUNJAB fired the success signal around 0700 hours on capture of Point 3227. The next company moved through and over the Kot village area along the crest line without searching the houses below. Wireless silence was broken after the 'Success Signal'. On hearing the Progress Report from CO 2/2 PUNJAB, Usman spoke in a jovial tone, "End of exercise. Time for breakfast". Suddenly there was a lot of confused firing about 500 yards ahead of us. The enemy ensconced in the houses in the winter morning, was shocked to see our troops walking on the ridge line on top of them. Realising their predicament, the enemy assembled in the morning mist, fixed bayonets and firing their weapons charged the advancing company from its southern flank – killing seven and wounding four of our men. Shocked by the sudden charge, some of our troops on crest line ran back towards Point 3227, while a few moved forward. Usman ordered the Brigade Reserve to form up about 300 yards behind him. Soon the two pre-arranged Combat Air Patrol (CAP) aircraft appeared on the scene. Usman felt that in view of the confused situation, the use of aircraft or artillery for softening the objective was not advisable as we would be killing / wounding our men who might be in the 'objective area'. The Punjabis in the

meantime regrouped and resumed their advance to secure their objective. The final objective was captured within an hour. I was told to join 2 PUNJAB as the OP officer to register DFs and help them against any enemy attacks during the next few days. Before leaving us, Usman told us, "I would never have forgiven myself, if I had, on my first impulse, launched my Brigade Reserve with artillery bombardment to capture Kot in a hurry. I would have been haunted by the spirits of my own soldiers as their murderer and robbed 2 PUNJAB of the glory of being "Victors of Kot."

Later, in 1971 war, it was interesting to recall the words of Usman (on cancelling his Brigade Reserve attack on Kot) which resurrected in my mind clearly during "The First Battle of Hill" when the brigade commander wished to launch his daylight attack on Hill. I, as General Officer Commanding (GOC) 20 Mountain Division, stopped it as I felt that it would amount to bombarding 8 Guards troops who may be still in Hill. My overruling the attack paid dividends as 8 Guards night patrols linked-up with approximately forty jawans under Captain VS Sharma (awarded Vir Chakra in this action) at First Light. We secured Morapara by induction of 8 Guards, who secured Morapara without any further loss of life; and the 'Honour for the Capture of Morapara by 8 Guards' became history.²

I was ordered to rejoin Naushera defended area on relief by a younger OP officer. Usman told us during his evening conference on 5 Feb that we should expect an enemy attack on Naushera any day now and should be prepared for night attack any time.

Night 5/6 Feb was uneventful. Unknown to us, the enemy had stealthily closed-in along our extensive perimeter. They achieved a tactical surprise and launched an attack along the length of the perimeter at First Light on 6 Feb. 3 MARATHA LI (Para) with a section of mountain guns had left for 'road opening' just before morning "Stand To"; while 1 RAJPUT had extended its front by taking over the area of 3 MARATHA LI (Para) — thus thinning the defences along the western perimeter of Naushera. Tain Dhar and Kot were heavily mortared after which hundreds of raiders charged forward. With rifles, swords and knives in their hands, wave after wave jumped over the barbed wire through

bursting mines. Within minutes, calls for DFs started pouring in from all the picquets. The line and wireless communications were soon jammed. Lieutenant Colonel Mohinder Singh, MC, CO 22 Mountain Regiment, set-up an ad hoc "Fire Direction Centre" in the Brigade HQ and coordinated the calls for fire. Major Bhupinder Singh, BC 30 Field Battery complied by firing battery, troop, section or at times, even a single gun.

Tain Dhar, the brigade 'Vital Ground', was held by a platoon of 27 men of 1 RAJPUT. The enemy tried to swamp the picquet by determined rushes. A section of 3 inch mortars, deployed behind the picquet, soon expended its ammunition. 30 Field Battery now resorted to direct fire with 'open sights' on the right and left shoulders of Tain Dhar defences to check the enemy attacking from the flanks.

Brigadier Usman, realising the gravity of the situation had ordered a company of 3 RAJPUT under Major Gurdial Singh, sited half-way up the hill, to reinforce the picquet or to recapture it, if already captured by the raiders. While Gurdial moved with his company at a forced pace, the enemy was attacking desperately to close-in with the defenders through minefields over the bodies of their dead and wounded. The reinforcing company reached the top to find only one survivor, who was keeping the enemy at bay with his rifle fire. The sudden appearance of the company caused the attackers to panic and run down the hill.

Within minutes of the start of firing on Tain Dhar, I was ordered to occupy the OP at the western perimeter in the area of the Brigade Officers' Mess. The perimeter, as mentioned earlier, was thinly held as the 3 MLI had gone out for road opening at dawn. While walking upto the OP, I could hear firing all around on the hills. On arrival, I ordered a direct line to be laid between my OP and the guns about 500 yards behind. Amazingly the western perimeter was relatively peaceful with only an occasional burst of LMG fire by some nervous person in our trenches which got little response from the enemy. At about 1000 hours, I got instructions from Lieutenant Colonel Mohindar Singh that 3 MARATHA LI (Para) would be attacking Radian feature on my right shortly and I should provide fire support to them by observation. Usman had ordered 3 (Para) MLI to return to Naushera defended area immediately on hearing reports of enemy attack from troops in the perimeter.

I shifted my OP from the ground to a corner of the parapet on the roof of the Officers Mess building and asked my Operator Artillery (OPA) and the signallers to stay underneath to avoid detection of the OP. From my new perch, I had an excellent view of the ground in front of me. I watched the Marathas forming up and noticed that the small arms firing had increased considerably. I was so involved in the developing battle and my role in it that I was not conscious of the presence of enemy in the sarkanda about 50 yards in front of me. I got absorbed in the cheery inspiring sight of the Marathas advancing towards Radian feature on my right. A few minutes later, I saw the unforgettable scene of hundreds of the enemy getting up from behind the rocks and 'sarkanda' in front of me like frightened partridges. With bullets flying all over, I saw the Marathas steadily advance, with some firing on the move and a few kneeling down to fire on the enemy on their front. The fleeing rabble presented a dream target and I ordered the guns to open fire on the escaping enemy. On seeing some of them falling down while others running in different directions, I changed over to firing air bursts. With some rounds falling ahead of them, I saw a big group running around in a circle. They were paralysed with fear, leaderless and followed anyone who took the lead. Soon they dispersed into smaller groups; chased by artillery fire, they disappeared into the numerous nallas in the area. Our aircraft came on the scene and played merry hell into the hiding enemy with rockets and cannon fire as indicated by me with coloured smoke.

Despite our success at Tain Dhar and the western perimeter, the firing on most of the picquets continued and stopped only after midnight. On 7 February morning, our local patrols reported that the enemy had disappeared leaving behind a large number of dead. By midday 7 Feb, it dawned on us slowly that we had won a great victory. *Brigadier Usman was undoubtedly the "Hero of Naushera".*

Endnotes

1. Major Bhupinder Singh, a colourful personality, was commissioned into the Cavalry in 1942, changed to the Kumaon Regiment and finally settled into the Gunners in 1946.

2. 'Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan' by Maj Gen Lachhman Singh, PVSM, VRC, Vikas Publishing House, 1979, Chapter 7 - The First Battle of Hilli, pages 66-81.

1962-63: The United Nations Operations in the Congo

Major General SP Mahadevan, AVSM (Retd)*

Background

The UN Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC) from Jul 1960 to Jun 1964, was the largest peacekeeping operation mounted by the UN upto that time. On 4 Mar 1961, 99 (Independent) Brigade Group, designated as the Indian Independent Infantry Brigade Group was ordered to be deployed in the Congo. 4 MADRAS was tasked to capture Jadotville, nearly 130 Kms South West of Elizabethville in the first week of January 1963. On arrival of the Indian Brigade at Kolwezi (on 19 Jan 1963), the UN announced the end of military operations on 21 Jan 1963.¹

I went to Congo in 1962 as a Company Commander in 4 MADRAS as part of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force. On 31 Dec 1962, as the Officer Commanding Advance Guard, while advancing from Elizabethville towards Jadotville, I found that all the road and rail bridges were demolished by the retreating Katangese Army under the leadership of European mercenaries. On reaching crocodile infested Lufira River I, along with a JCO and an NCO managed to do a 'monkey crawl' over the partially damaged rail bridge, using the steel ropes on top. The three of us then managed to ferry across rest of the Advance Guard over the river to establish a Bridge Head. Early, next morning, I captured a white man, a Belgian commando as a Prisoner of War. I produced him before Dr Ralph Bunche, the Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, United Nations and Nobel Peace Prize winner, during his visit to Congo.

After the capture of Jadotville, the mining town of Congo, I was sent on a Long Range Patrol (LRP) to capture Shinkolobwe, a mining town where Uranium was mined for the two atom bombs dropped by the USA on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I was wounded.

* Major General SP Mahadevan, AVSM (Retd) was commissioned into the Madras Regiment on 28 Apr 1946. He retired as GOC of the Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Goa Area on 30 Jun 1982.

I requested my Brigade Commander, Brigadier Norhona 'to avoid' releasing a Press Report on the action so that my family in Palani, Tamilnadu did not get worried on reading about it. However, The Hindu (newspaper) still reported the action.

After the capture of Kolwezi, the border town, we returned to India.

Endnote

1. *For the Honour of India – A History of Indian Peacekeeping by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (Retd); First published in 2009 by Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.*

Letters to the Editor

I

Battle Studies - 1962 India-China War

Dear Editor,

This pertains to the two battle studies of the 1962 war, authored by Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd), which appeared in the USI Journals of Oct-Dec 2011 and the Apr-Jun 2013, describing the battles of Sela-Bomdila and the battle of Namkachu and fall of Tawang. The author deserves rich compliments for the very revealing and well researched accounts of these forgotten battles. He has examined the available literature on these and made them more authentic by studying the Chinese side of the story; their methodical planning, build-up, training and preparations for the offensive painstakingly. As compared to the Chinese, the Indian preparations were disjointed, unsound and highly unprofessional, lacking adequate fire support, logistics, communications and the command and control. The author has been able to bring out that despite the tactically unsound extended linear Indian defences on the Namkachu without occupying the dominating heights, in the immediate front, flanks and to the rear or for the defence of Tawang, the troops on the ground gave strong resistance until they were bypassed, surrounded and overwhelmed or asked to withdraw by the panicky senior commanders. This is evident by the number of casualties suffered by the Chinese as reported by their records even though the Indians had just the first line scale of ammunition with practically no artillery fire support.

The fact that the Indian soldiers also fought gallantly at few places in the Western Sector, like the epic battle of Rezangla by 13 KUMAON in the Ladakh Sector, is often not realised in the absence of any published account by the participating units, as everyone got clubbed together due to the overall debacle in the Eastern Theatre. The debacle was caused by the pathetic political direction and poor generalship and not due to lack of fighting abilities of the soldiers.

Although these battles were fought five decades ago and very few first-hand accounts are available, we need to study seriously the many lessons that emerged at the strategic, operational and tactical levels factoring the tremendous capability enhancement today, on the two sides. The author has rendered yeomen service by presenting a realistic account and giving the perspective from the 'other side of the hill' and highlighting the gallant sacrifices of the Indian Rank and File.

Yours sincerely,

Lieutenant General Chandrashekhar, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd)

II

PLA's Modernisation of its Strategic Forces and Implications for India

Dear Editor,

Colonel GG Pamidi has done well to explain a specific topic in a generic article. The article aimed at uninitiated readers covers basics of the subject, easy to grasp. The comparison of China and India is very simple. India was a decade behind China in exploding a nuclear device. Today, the nuclear arsenals differ in quality, quantity, safety and security. Similarity is observed in the surety and the moral high grounds of "No First Use" (NFU).

The moral high of NFU has never been abandoned either by any of the Chinese leaders under any circumstances or by their scholars, may it be in speeches or in writings. It was the USA who supplied technology and nuclear fuel for Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR) - I at PINSTECH, Islamabad in 1960s.

The US threat is very well handled and managed by the Chinese. The regime survival has been witnessed by the entire world in 1940s (against KMT), 1960 & 70s (Cultural Revolution) and in 1990s (Tiananmen Square). Their political purging has been extremely effective all the times whenever a threat has arisen. China has also played its cards in Tibet and Uighur very well with locals as well as neighbouring countries. Today, HH Dalai Lama's political stance asks only for autonomy under the Chinese rule and does not demand a separate state.

PRC is also doing very well in Indian Ocean Region to have places instead of bases to support all its missions. The anti-piracy and world peace related voyages of PLA Navy have achieved desired effects with all concerned including the USA.

The author discusses Japan as an emerging nuclear weapon state. It is the only country which has suffered the devastating effects of nuclear weapons. Japan has abhorred even the presence of US nuclear weapons on their soil. Japan's reversal of non weaponisation of nuclear technology is far-fetched impossibility. As of date, it is only India which becomes a target by Chinese criteria in SE Asia and Guam in East China Sea.

The PLA's recruitment standards are extremely high. The number of people reaching medical stage is so high, that even small fillings in tooth are considered rejection criteria. The perfection to which PRC goes to ensure the best for the PLA is seen in their recent parades. The author's argument, that China may abandon NFU policy in response to internal demographic challenges (defined as shrinking of population) is beyond comprehension and defies all logic.

The military implications discuss only weapon deployment at a very macro level. The precise number of China's nuclear weapons, their force structure and deployment is known and available in public domain. The only aspect of PRC's nuclear weapons not known is their decision making process.

India certainly has to respond to China's nuclear modernisation and is responding well by slowly but steadily developing ABM capability. India needs to develop cyber and space capabilities, if not better than China, then at least comparable to them. India's strategic approach has to minimise probability of nuclear escalation. A strong and competent military helps in talks only if it is stronger than the adversary sitting across the table. The need of the hour is to provision enough funding and resources for the Strategic Forces Command and make it a formidable force.

Yours sincerely,

Colonel Vinayak Bhat

Kashmir : The Unwritten History*

Lieutenant General SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)**

The author of this book seems to have a bias for Pakistan like many British and American commentators over the Kashmir issue. This is revealed by his so called disclaimer at the beginning of the book justifying his impartiality but still choosing to refer to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir as Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan) as a separate political entity. The latter was a part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which in its entirety had acceded to India by the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 enacted by the British Parliament applied to all the Princely States on the Sub-continent, both in India and Pakistan. No Princely State Ruler had the option for Independence. His choice had to be either India or Pakistan. Independence of any Princely State was not visualised.

Several Western authors have been using twisted arguments to somehow justify Pakistan's case on Kashmir. Alastair Lamb has been one of the champions of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. He has used various arguments to misquote and misinterpret facts. He has given different versions, such as: *the Maharaja did not sign any Instrument of Accession till after Indian troops had already arrived in Kashmir on 27 October 1947; he was blackmailed by India to do so*. Had this been true, the Maharaja who had been treated badly by not only having to shed executive power but also go out on exile from his State (naturally, had a grievance on this account) could have brought out this fact, during the several years that he lived in exile in Mumbai where he passed away. This version is obviously a figment of imagination. Alastair Lamb's hidden aim seems to be to put Indian and Pakistani intervention in Kashmir at par.

***Kashmir : The Unwritten History.** By Christopher Snedden (HarperCollins Publishers India, Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India), pp 434, Rs 599/-, ISBN 978-93-5029-897-8

****Lieutenant General SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)** was commissioned into JAT Regiment in 1944 and retired as Vice Chief of the Army Staff in 1983. After India's Independence in 1947, he was associated with Kashmir War from Day One i.e 27 Oct 1947. In 1949, he was appointed the secretary of the Indian delegation on delineation of the Cease Fire Line convened by the United Nations. He has been the Governor of Assam and J&K. He has authored nine books including 'Jammu & Kashmir Operations of 1947-48', 'Operation Rescue' and 'A Soldier Recalls'.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIII, No. 593, July-September 2013.

My first book, 'Operation Rescue' clearly brings out how we were taken by surprise on the afternoon of 26 October 1947 when we were told to send troops to Srinagar at dawn the following day. I had gone to Srinagar with the first lot of troops to that State after the Maharaja had acceded to India the previous day. Our then Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Russell on whose staff I was then serving, has endorsed this in his comments published on the back cover of this book. Alastair Lamb's other contention is that conditional accession of the Maharaja was not in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Independence Act. This is no doubt a fact but he forgets that there is no mention to conditional accession in the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja. The conditionality is only in the letters exchanged between Lord Mountbatten and the Maharaja. The Instrument of Accession is the real legal document. The Demi-Official letters do not have the same legal status.

Christopher Snedden has now come out with another theory. He argues that the Maharaja was in no position on 26 October 1947 to hand over the State as a whole to India. He has tried to differentiate between what he calls Azad Kashmir and the Kashmir Valley. His argument is that the former had declared its Independence much before Pakistani invasion of the Valley on 22 October 1947. Jammu province had been suffering unprecedented communal violence like the rest of India in the North. Muslims in the Western part of Jammu province where they were in majority were massacring Hindus, just as Hindus in majority in the Eastern part of the province were attacking Muslims. The Poonch region had some 50,000 Muslim Ex-Servicemen of the old undivided Indian Army. They had taken to communal violence. The Maharaja's administration was beleaguered but his troops were still holding out at various locations. His vassal, the Raja of Poonch was still functioning from his Capital at Poonch which was besieged by the local Muslim population and their co-religionists who had joined them from across the border.

After the Accession of the State to India on 26 October 1947 the Indian Army relief columns reinforced the State Force garrisons at Naushera, Jhangar, Kotli and Poonch restoring the authority of the State in those areas. The argument of a so called Azad Kashmir Government has no legitimacy. However, it has to be conceded that in the so called Azad Kashmir region which now constitutes Pakistan Occupied Kashmir the local Muslims were anti India while

in the Valley they were not infected with any communal virus and were very pro-India under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. As for the Northern Areas there was a military coup engineered by a British officer, Major Brown commanding the Gilgit Scouts in league with British Governor of North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sir Olaf Caroe and his successor Sir Robert Lockhart, assisted by British Political officers at Peshawar. The Gilgit Scouts surrounded the Palace of Brigadier Ghansara Singh, appointed Governor of Northern Areas by the Maharaja. On the basis of this coup the author has supported the Pakistan view of this region being a separate political entity.

The legality of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was unequivocally accepted in the 13 August 1948 Cease Fire Resolution of the United Nations Council for India and Pakistan. This Resolution was accepted by both India and Pakistan. According to this, while India was allowed to retain its forces in Jammu and Kashmir till a plebiscite was held, while all Pakistan Forces had to be withdrawn from the State before the plebiscite.

Although the author has provided detailed information pertaining to various aspects and an extensive economic and other statistics, his basic approach to the Kashmir problem is very flawed. He has chosen conveniently to ignore two important facts not in line with his prejudiced thinking. An opinion poll conducted in 2002 by a British NGO whose patron was Lord Auckland, a known protagonist of Pakistan, provides interesting statistics about the leanings of the people of Kashmir. 61 per cent want to remain in India, 6 per cent want to be in Pakistan and 37 per cent are undecided. The other interesting fact is the report of Baroness Ema Nicholson a member of the British House of Lords and also of the European Union Parliament. She was asked to submit a report on the status of the three regions of the erstwhile Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. She toured the Northern Areas, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Indian Administered Kashmir. She visited all these three regions and then submitted a report to the European Union Parliament. She reported that basic human and democratic rights are denied to the people of Northern Areas which are now the only surviving colony in the world. There is no democracy in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir which has a facade of independence but is ruled from Islamabad. Democracy is functioning in Indian Administered Kashmir. Pakistan desperately tried to scuttle her report but it was endorsed by 400 votes to 9 votes against it.

History of Bhutan

Dr Avadhesh Prakash*

In recent years, Bhutan has attracted the world's attention for its development philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNH), more of it later, and its policy on tourism where only those who can afford a minimum package of \$ 200 per day are granted permission to visit the country. In 2008, Bhutan became the youngest democracy in the world. Hereditary monarchy was replaced by Constitutional monarchy. King Jigme Keshar Namgyal Wangchuck was crowned in 2008 and became the youngest monarch in the world. Despite these unparalleled initiatives, Bhutan remains most poorly studied place in the world.

There are many books on Bhutan dealing with various aspects separately, mostly by foreign visitors. '*History of Bhutan*' by Dr (Lopen) Karma Phuntsho is the first ever attempt to cover Bhutan and its entire history comprehensively after extensive research. The book is a historical treasure, full of wide ranging insight into the history of Bhutan. It is primarily a historical account but also covers country's geography, its people, and many languages spoken by them, their society, culture and religious practices.

Dr Karma Phuntsho is a leading scholar on Bhutan and his monastic background has helped him to carry out in depth research and study of religious scriptures, as many important events of country's early history involving saints and religious teachers who were chronicled in religious scriptures. Citations from these scriptures have revealed facts of history, which were unknown to foreign writers.

The author has divided the history of the country into various periods. Prehistoric period i.e. before introduction of Buddhism,

***The History of Bhutan.** By Karma Phuntsho (Random House India: United Kingdom, 2013) pp..663, Price Rs 999 ISBN 978-8-184-00311-6

***Dr Avadhesh Prakash** was commissioned into the Naga Regiment in Dec 1970. He served in the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan for five years, first as a major and later as the Commandant. The Royal Government of Bhutan issued a commemorative stamp on him and his wife on Coronation of the 5th King of Bhutan in Dec 2008 as a mark of recognition of service rendered in Bhutan. He retired as Military Secretary at the Army HQ on 31 Jan 2010.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIII, No. 593, July-September 2013.

early historic period i.e. period of introduction of Buddhism and medieval period i.e. period of unification of Bhutan. Lastly, emergence of Hereditary monarchy including modern period when Bhutan came out of its isolation and opened itself to the world.

Sufficient information and material evidence is not available or known about what kind of lives people in prehistoric period lived. The author has given detailed narration of early historical period and how Buddhism was introduced in Bhutan after the first visit of Guru Padmasambhava, an Indian saint. The medieval history covers the period of unification of Bhutan by Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (1594-1651), a monk from Ralung monastery in Tibet. When Zhabdrung was 23 years old, the deity of Ralung, Yeshay Geompa (Mahakala) appeared to him in the form of a Raven and directed him towards South i.e. to Bhutan. The present day protecting deity of Bhutan is also Mahakala and adorns the crown of King of Bhutan in the form of a Raven.

In 1640, Zhabdrung created the system of CHOESI, the separation of the administration of the Country into two offices. The religious and spiritual aspects of the Country were handled by Zhabdrung; the political, administrative and foreign affairs aspect of the Government were handled by the Desi (temporal King). The dual system of governance is practised even today.

After announcement of Zhabdrung's death, next 200 years of Kingdom's history is amazing with intrigues, treachery, fierce battles and extraordinary pageantry, all playing an important part. The book is significant in highlighting how the Hereditary monarchy was established by Sri Ugyen Wangchuck and covers the period of rule of various Kings in some detail.

The fourth King of Bhutan, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck enunciated the philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNH) as a development paradigm in the late 1980s. As a visionary, he saw that future prosperity and well-being of his people lay in preserving the culture as a binding force to maintain distinct identity of his nation and people, and preserving environmental wealth for future generations.

Dr Phuntsho has attributed a quantifiable yardstick when he endorses the critics of GNH, who "Point out that even today over 20 per cent of the population lives below national poverty line".

However, it would be worth noting that in next few years when ten 1000 MW hydel projects in Bhutan are commissioned, its per capita income would be five times that of India.

The concept of GNH has even been reportedly, borrowed by China. China's President Xi Jiping at a meeting on personal management on the eve of Party's 92nd Anniversary in Jul 2013 reported to have said, "The party should place more importance on achievements in improving people's livelihood, social development and environment quality while evaluating performance of officials".

The book is an authentic and reliable source of information for research scholars and will be of immense interest for all those who want to know about Bhutan. To say that this book is really the "Discovery of Bhutan through ages" would not be out of place.

Red Revolution 2020 and Beyond : Strategic Challenges to Resolve Naxalism*

Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM (Retd)**

Descriptive analysis of a contemporary security issue can be undertaken in varied forms. This could be based on survey of literature, personal observations of the author or inductive research based on data and factoids. When an author chooses to combine all these into a single narrative with perceptive reflection borne out of experience a powerful narrative is bound to emerge.

Lieutenant General V K Ahluwalia's work on Left Wing Extremism (LWE) known also as Naxalism is one such magnum opus of sorts. This is based on study of the problem from the vantage point of a theatre commander (GOC-in-C Central Command) under whose jurisdiction the affected area falls, followed by reflections from an academic's perspective.

The result is a book which covers the entire gamut of issues from genesis of the Naxal problem to future projections and possible counter strategies. Each chapter is more or less a self-contained description of a subset of Naxalism in roughly three parts. The first part comprises of a historical review (Chapter 1), root causes (Chapter 2), ideology (Chapter 3) and comparison with other left wing insurgency campaigns (Chapter 4) to derive key factors of success in each. The wide swath of territory engulfed by Naxalism in the country today however may need more innovative solutions for each insurgency is atypical and while some generalisations are possible application will remain, "case sensitive."

In the second part the author covers the current state of violence and strategies of the protagonists' security forces (Chapter

Red Revolution 2020 and Beyond: Strategic Challenges to Resolve Naxalism.
By V K Ahluwalia, (Bloombsbury : New Delhi, 2013) pp..275, Price Rs. 795.00 ISBN 9789382961285

****Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM (Retd)** was commissioned into the 3rd Battalion, the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles in Dec1973. He has researched and written extensively on security related issues. Presently, he is Director of South Asian Security Risk and Knowledge Management Consultancy.

5) and Maoists (Chapter 6) alike to suggest options and challenges for conflict resolution (Chapters 7 and 8). In the final part the author looks at the possible trajectory that the insurgency may take in urbanization (Chapter 9) and suggests strategies for containment (Chapter 10).

Ahluwalia's recommended strategies need serious reflection by the policy makers in the country for these do provide viable options. His recommendation to keep the armed forces out of Naxalism is laudatory, as a former Army Commander he has sagely avoided the trap of the army cleaning up political entrails.

This basic omnibus on Naxalism will certainly be a valuable source for the policy maker, security executive, academic, media and the layman alike who will be provided a bird's eye view of the wide canvas involved in tackling the challenge of LWE. The illustrations in terms of maps and smart charts will simplify complexity in understanding some esoteric issues as for instance grand strategy for conflict resolution and six pillars for development of each region (Page 196).

On reflection it would be evident that Naxalism is grass roots driven unlike ethnic separatism and religious fundamentalism which can be triggered by, "Foco," effect of a leader driving masses to revolt. Conflict resolution will thus entail addressing disaggregated local factors rather than a one size fits all approach. While LWE is geographically spread across Central India, there are discrete differences in virtually each district in the same state which need differential resolution.

The constitutional paradox in management of internal conflicts can best be resolved by empowering States, a lesson starkly evident from success in Punjab in the early 1990s led by then Chief Minister Beant Singh and Director General of Police KPS Gill. Success in Tripura and Andhra Pradesh has been similarly achieved as the author has very well highlighted.

The first principle of resolution of Naxalism before the 2020 scenario depicted in the book will thus be for States to lead from the front with Central support adopting many strategies for management lucidly suggested by the author. With a top down approach we may be staring down the pork barrel of violence for decades to come.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Nepal as a Federal State: Lessons from the Indian Experience. Edited by VR Raghavan: (New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2013), pp. 176, Price ₹ 850/-, Outside India US \$ 39.95, ISBN 9789382652014.

Nepal has been a country with a centralised unitary system since the days of its unification in 1768. Then suddenly in the aftermath of the end of insurgency and the election of the Constituent Assembly (CA), Nepal was declared a 'Federal, Democratic Republic' in 2007, but it was not clear to anyone as to what would be the model of the proposed federation. The demand for a 'Federal Nepal' was first raised in Terai where it was joined by people cutting across party lines. The demand gave a new identity and power to *Madheshi*, long suppressed for centuries, who now challenged the centrality of Kathmandu. Taking the example of *Madheshi* sub-nationalism, other ethnic groups started demanding autonomous provinces based on identity. As things stand today, federalism based on identity has become non-negotiable for most political parties. The CA failed to adopt a new Constitution and met its demise after several extensions on 28 May 2012 mainly on the issue of federalism.

This book contains 11 essays that cover different aspects of federalism; and how they are likely to impact the future of Nepal. For example, the consequences of carving provinces based on single ethnic identity, favoured by the majority. It is argued that such a structure would mean the rule of minority over majority as no single ethnic group in a province will have absolute majority. Besides, how does one satisfy 18 ethnic groups in Nepal, each demanding its own space? The difficulty that will be faced by the central authority in forging relationships with neighbouring countries in a federal set-up is another issue of concern. The essay by Ratna Sansar Shrestha argues for a completely different approach to federalism in Nepal. He argues for carving interdependent regions based on three major river basins; Karnali-Mahakali province in the West; Sapta-Gandaki province in the middle and Sapta-Koshi-Mechi province in the East. It is a refreshing proposal full of possibilities. After all, water is the most precious asset of Nepal. The essay on financial implications of a federal Nepal focuses on the financial burden in a decentralised structure.

The book is a timely and valuable addition to the existing knowledge on federalism in Nepal. It will help channelise the debate on federalism on core issues among opinion makers in Nepal and India.

Brigadier SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)

Laughing in the Shadow of Bullets. By Sunita Bali (New Delhi: Ocean Books (P) Ltd, 2013), pp...135, Price ₹ 200/-, ISBN 978184301892.

In a world gone crazy under the burden of a frenetic pace, this book provides a welcome palliative to a harried individual. It is written in simple language and is best enjoyed on a holiday away from the humdrum of grinding routine.

This is the story of a simple and charming girl's journey through life as the spouse of an infantry officer, encapsulated in 51 crisp chapters. Most graciously the book, in part, is dedicated to, "the never-yielding spirit of Indian Combat Soldiering."

The author begins her story by declaring that the uniform never infatuated her, going to the extent that she even managed to give the mandatory NCC training in college a miss. But fate pushed her into the arms of a soldier, an event she jokingly calls, "her Waterloo".

A highlight is the author's ability to laugh at herself. Out on a drive her vehicle met with a mishap. She was flung out but was saved-landing on soft sand. Her husband rebuked the officer in charge of transport saying, "if you want to do such a good favour to your Commander at least carry out more detailed planning and better execution".

The book makes for light and delightful reading. It has a number of quips – "The God looks after fools and infantrymen". Even the ribaldry associated with SIKH LI soldiers is recalled gracefully. She gives the summation of her life from a young girl to a grandmother thus: "During these long years, I have seen these strange men laugh, joke and enjoy together even in the midst of most trying conditions."

In a happy augury, more spouses of Servicemen are taking to the pen. This particular effort has resulted in an easily readable book across the whole spectrum. At places expression could have

been better. Some errors have crept in : Hoat instead of Hoof (pp 28 and 122). Considerably instead of considerably (pp 84). Anguishly instead of with anguish (pp 113) and boggy instead of bogie (pp 120).

Advice to readers. The day your spouse is more grumpy than usual present this book to her. Priced at Rs 200/- this book is worth its weight in humour!

Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)

Territorial Army: History of India's Part-Time Soldiers. By *Sunder Singh, (New Delhi, Ocean Books, 2013), pp.. 246, Price ₹ 400/-, ISBN 9788184301199.*

The author is a Major with the Territorial Army (TA). The book deals primarily with history of TA with the benefit of good insight into the development of part time forces, the concept of citizen-soldier and certain rules regulations and acts. It is laid out in nine chapters and supported by six appendices.

Tracing the history, it emerges that although the volunteer movement formally started in India after the 1857 crises its necessity had emerged way back in mid 17th Century. The British kept adapting to the security situation in the country in a practical way and raised units ranging from ordinary Infantry units to Cavalry, the Railway Corps, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, EME, Medical, ASC etc. The units were provincial in nature with some urban units located at major cities. The volunteer force could be used for various tasks apart from local and immediate security. These included reinforcement, augmentation, substitution, regeneration and reconstruction; a very flexible affair, easily calibrated and economical.

The rationality of a series of changes made by the British after the First World War till 1920 is well explained in Chapter 5. The TA since independence is tracked in Chapter 7. The TA Act of 1948 gave us a flexible organisation and space for much innovation, which got amply demonstrated by raising various type of units – Infantry, Railway Units, Oil Sector Units, General Hospitals, Ecological Forces and the new avatar called the Home & Hearth battalions. The last chapter deals with Medals and Awards. In 1947, 14 decorations and medals out of 128 of the Indian Army were for volunteers. During the span of last hundred and fifty

years or so, volunteers earned many laurels and awards which shows a high level of motivation and morale.

Overall, the book is well researched and is a painstaking effort by a part time soldier. There are many reasons for keeping a force like TA alive and ticking. Under the prevailing strategic environment it provides a sound and flexible option. The book is a valuable addition to the scant literature available on the citizen armies.

Major General HK Singh (Retd)

Military Wisdom : Military Quotes on War, Peace and Valour. By VK Bali (New Delhi : Ocean Books, 2013) pp..191, Price ₹ 250/-, ISBN 9788184301311.

The book is a collection of quotes of various people, military and civilian, related more to the profession of arms. It has about 600 quotes on which the author has taken great pains to pick them up from all over and put them into one book. The quotes are arranged under various chapters pertaining to leadership in war and peace, management, courage, valour, loyalty, discipline, sacrifice, morale, welfare, victory and defeat, motivation, etc. It becomes a self-teaching book, if read at one go because the quotes convey all they can as distilled thought and wisdom to any person who has donned the uniform for a way of life and for that matter anyone else.

Having read it once, it becomes a good book to possess for ready reference to illustrate with quotes any military writing, a pep talk or a speech. The writer has also added a few of his own beliefs in a proverbial manner. The quotes are relevant not only to military life alone but also makes a good learning and a ready reckoner for all managers in the corporate field or for that matter any professional. It certainly should make its way to unit libraries.

Major General MP Bhagat, PVSM (Retd)

Martyred But Not Tamed : The Politics of Resistance in the Middle East. By Ram Narayan Kumar (New Delhi : Sage Publication, 2012), pp..328, Price ₹ 450/-, ISBN 9788132109600.

What started as a small local movement in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid in December 2010 became the most significant political uprising of the Arab World in perhaps the last 100 years. The author of the book "Martyred But Not Tamed" late Sri Ram Narayan Kumar presciently saw some signs of it during his trip to Syria and

Lebanon in 2007. The book itself is in five chapters and is a combination of his interaction with politicians and academics from Syria, Lebanon and Iraq as well as his own analysis of the modern history of West Asia.

The First chapter is a lengthy discussion with his interlocutors in Beirut on the developments in the Middle East and their causes, role of Imperial powers, myriad internal conflicts and the US meddling in the post World War II period to protect its own interests. In the Second chapter, the theme is discovery of oil, its evolution as the most important strategic mineral with the coming of internal combustion engine and aviation, and its centrality to the geopolitics of West Asia. Chapters Three, Four and Five deal with the rise of Arab Nationalism especially in Syria, Palestinian tragedy and the politics of Hezbollah in Lebanon, respectively. While the serious researchers on the Middle East may not find anything new or different from what is already known about the region and its geopolitics, it could prove valuable to those who want an overview of the complex and strategically significant region in a nutshell. The narrative is coherent, interesting, informative and eminently readable.

There are hardly any factual errors and most of the text is supported by the reference notes, however, there is a glaring error on page 18, where US strategic reserves are mentioned as trillions of barrels. Actually US strategic reserves, though largest in the world, are only 730 million barrels or there about, and are certainly well below a billion, leave alone trillions. Overall, the book is a useful addition to an already large volume of existing literature on West Asia and lucidly explains the nature of conflict in the region detached from western propaganda.

Commodore MR Khan, AVSM (Retd)

Consequences of Longterm Conflicts in Northeast India. Edited by VR Raghavan, (New Delhi: Vij Books India Private Limited, 2013), pp..132, ₹ 795.00, ISBN 9789382652021.

There are eight essays in this publication. The first essay has the main title of the book. Regrettably, the whole concept of the author that the British Government's administration of protecting the tribal areas from the plains people is one of the causes of the insurgency, is fundamentally flawed. Insurgency in the Naga Hills and Mizo

Hills both being districts of Assam has only one root cause, the Caste Hindus of the plains placing the Nagas and the Mizos at the bottom of the Caste list. This is obvious from the reaction of the Nagas who were taken to England during the First World War in the Pioneer Company. They were able to see firsthand the social structures of the British in England. On their return, they submitted to the British at the time of India's independence that they did not want to be kept in India with the Indians.

When the Government of India did not heed the request of Phizo the leader of the Nagas, he organised the Naga National Council (NNC) and created civil and military structures of an underground Naga Army, a Naga Political group and an underground civil administration group and then went to East Pakistan and asked the Pakistanis to equip his underground army and train them to fight the Indian Government for independence. Subsequent developments are well known.

Monalisa Changkija's paper is a bold expose of the male chauvinism of the Naga leaders both open and the underground. She has written a bold and courageous paper about the male chauvinist attitude of the Naga male underground leaders. Samir Kumar Purkaystha has written a frank paper stating the facts as obtained on the ground situation in Assam, Meghalaya Tripura and Mizoram. Jayanta Kumar Ray's paper 'Conflict in Assam and Its Consequences' is an honest appraisal of the ground conditions

Major General Arun Roye's paper has not gone into depth in analysing the way the Burmese Government has treated its ethnic minorities like the Shan, the Karen, the Wa and especially the minority Muslim Rohingyas. Major General Sheru Thapliyal's paper makes a telling point when he writes that the key to an insurgency is to increase the space of society and reduce the space of the insurgents.

Regrettably, no one has written of the role that the Centre has played in fostering the enormous corruption in the Northeast. This is one of the main causes of the insurgency continuing indefinitely in the Northeast. The only exception is Tripura where a Communist ministry for the last twenty odd years has been scrupulously honest.

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)

Policy Choices in Internal Conflict: Governing Systems and Outcomes. Edited by VR Raghavan, (New Delhi: Vij Books India Private Limited, 2013), pp.260, ₹ 1250.00 ISBN 978-93-82652-05-2.

This book is an outcome of a series of papers presented and comments received thereupon, as part of the series of discussions and publications undertaken by the Centre for Security Analysis (CSA), Chennai. The book has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter by K Srinivasan is an introductory essay for the succeeding chapters.

The second chapter by Sudha Ramachandran analyses the four major conflicts in India's Northeast, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal. She draws on the studies conducted by CSA and attempts to identify the causes, evolution of conflicts and their handling by the governing authorities in all four countries. The paper by P Sahadevan focuses on the management of ethnic conflicts based on the four country-based case studies.

Geeta Mahadevan delves into the issue of legal measures adopted by different countries to overcome uprisings and the role of judiciary. Giving examples of Myanmar and Nepal, the author gives a detailed account of the abuse of the legal system and the subjugation of judicial processes. Geeta also analyses laws in the Indian context to include The West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act of 1970, Prevention of Terrorism Act, The Special Public Protection Act, Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958, Disturbed Area Act, amongst others. She finds AFSPA in violation to the right to life and its prolonged usage unacceptable. While she quotes paragraphs from the Jeevan Reddy Committee, which had suggested the repeal of AFSPA, surprisingly, the Supreme Court judgment on the constitutional validity of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. More importantly, the provisions suggested by the Honourable Court to make the act more humane have also been missed, which seems to be a glaring omission.

The last chapter deals with the linkages of internal conflicts with maritime and littoral security. W Lawrence S Prabhakar contends that it is a usual practice to study linkage with internal conflicts from a hinterland perspective. He argues that the study can provide revealing insights if these conflicts are seen from a maritime dimension. One of the examples, he quotes is of the 26/11 Mumbai attack to reinforce this perspective.

The book provides an interesting insight into various issues of internal security. It is well researched and is a useful addition for students of political science and security studies.

Colonel Vivek Chadha (Retd)

Great Game East : India, China and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier. By Bertil Lintner, (New Delhi : Harper Collins Publishers, 2012), pp.. 442, ₹ 699.00, ISBN 9789350293454

The author is recognised as an authority on Burmese affairs, opium and drug trade from the golden triangle which have been chronicled in his earlier books. But it was his book, 'Land of Jade: A Journey from India through Northern Burma to China' which linked both the events and its transborder dimensions. The book, with the backdrop of earlier strategic rivalries of the 19th and the 20th Century, examines the current scenario of clash of interest between the West, old adversary Russia and the emerging giant China in the East – with India emerging as an economic and strategic power in South Asia, perceived to be an adversary to it.

The internal dynamics of the region and the conflict between West, Russia and China over oil and natural resources of Central and Western Asia, through direct intervention and proxies, has engulfed the Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq into a state of turmoil. These aspects are well brought out in the introduction and chapter, 'War and Spookery in the Himalayas'.

Chapters two to five, dealing with turmoils in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Bangladesh, cover the happenings in the area well; mostly from the dissidents point of view, with few snippets of Govt of India's initiatives or lack of it. These will be of interest to general public but will only be a refresher for a scholar.

The concluding chapters on 'Burma' and 'The Indian Ocean : A Tale of Two Islands' as well the appendices 1 to 4 will be of interest to a serious student. The Chapter on Burma deals with the contemporary period, the state of dissipated communist insurgency, the emergence of United Wa State Army (UWSA) in its place and current state of insurgencies after the agreement, are of particular interest. Of special significance is the Chinese establishing a dominant position in Burma through economic, infrastructure construction and supply of weapons and other defence

requirements. The recent upsurge of Burmese nationalism and gradual but careful assertion against the Chinese should be of interest to our Indian planners.

The last chapter on the Indian Ocean gives a clear idea of Chinese methodology and its effectiveness to enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean with the aim of dominating it.

In the overall context, a valuable and welcome addition to the Library.

Lieutenant General VK Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd)

India's Strategic Culture: The Making of National Security Policy. By Shrikant Paranjpe. (New Delhi: Routledge, 2013), pp. 184, ₹ 695.00, ISBN 9780415832083.

This book tries to bust the popular myth that India never had any strategic culture. That was said to be the major reason why India was invaded time and again mostly through the Khyber and Bolan Passes. The author succeeds in his aim only partially. It is in the realm of formulation of national security policy where we have completely failed.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter endeavours to establish that historically India had a strategic culture giving examples of the Ashokan and the Mauryan empires. It is a mystery that no dynasty in India has lasted for more than one or two generations. Perhaps the only attempt to chronicle the strategic thought was Chanakya's *Arthashastra*, which is relevant even today. Chapters two to four analyse evolution of a strategic culture in independent India in two phases. Phase one deals with the period from 1947 to 1991 and the second phase covers the period post 1991. Although the author would have liked us to believe that we have evolved some sort of strategic culture post-independence, the sad fact is that we have singularly failed in this aspect.

Chapter five analyses India's internal security problems and role of the State in combating internal security challenges. In the absence of evolution of any strategic culture and consequently any non-formation of national security policy, we have not been able to put down insurgencies and have not been able to tackle the menace of Naxalism sweeping a large number of states.

Perhaps, the greatest failure has been the unwillingness and inability of the ruling class to formulate a national security policy in which armed forces are also coopted.

In the last chapter, the author reaches the conclusion that absence of a national security doctrine and failure to evolve in fields of strategy and tactics had resulted in India coming and remaining under foreign occupation for over a thousand years. This malaise continues to bedevil us as such even today.

Major General SV Thapliyal, SM (Retd)

Gorkha : In Search of Identity. By Brig CS Thapa (Ghaziabad: Sriav 2013), pp..134 ₹ 350.00, ISBN: 9788192679013.

Most of the books written on Gorkhas relate to people who hail from Nepal, even though the saga of their bravery may cover events while they were in service with the Indian or the British Army. In this book however, the author, a fifth generation soldier of the Indian Army, focuses on the 'Indian Gorkha', distinct from the 'Nepalese Gorkha'; the former, born and brought up in India over the years. The book flags the travails and aspirations of this martial race; it also creates a framework to project a case for acceptance of their demand of a separate identity, a place in society, granting them the state of 'Gorkhaland', thus empowering the 'Indian Gorkha'.

It delves into the historical aspects and highlights the fact that the Gorkhas had also fought as part of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Army; was part of the British Indian Army during the World Wars, after signing of the Treaty of Sagauli between the British and the King of Nepal in 1816; and formed the core of the Assam Rifles, since its raising as the Cachar Levy in 1835. It also covers their role in India's freedom struggle and other activities, as Indian nationals.

The Gorkha soldier thereafter invariably settled down in vicinity of their regimental centres. As a consequence of this practice, the Gorkhas had settled in J & K, in Punjab, Darjeeling, the Northeastern states and other hill areas many generations ago. Their progeny were thus born and brought up in India over decades, thus establishing the fact that they are an entity by themselves and need to be recognised as such, being separate from the Nepalese migrants, who came to India under the Indo-Nepalese

Agreement of 1950, permitting them to seek employment. The author also reflects on the socio-political aspirations of The Gorkhas as an ethnic group.

Though the book has been researched well, 'Printer's devil' and inadequate editing has resulted in avoidable errors in the book. Bibliography has not been listed, though some references have been included in the text. The book is recommended for academics, social and political activists of the community and supporters of their cause.

Lieutenant General Arvind Sharma, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
The Communist Cookbook. By Sharmishtha Roy Chowdhury
 (New Delhi, Penguin Books India 2013), pp...306, Price ₹ 399,
 ISBN 9780143415596.

The novel, set against the backdrop of the 1940s India marred by political unrest and religious undertones, is an eclectic mélange of espionage, seemingly ceaseless travails of a bright and newly commissioned British Army officer and humorous roguery of a communist-obsessed American Intelligence officer.

The story revolves around George Clark, a young and promising British Army officer posted in the dusty, hot and humid Bajapur cantonment after death-defying feat in Burma in 1943. Eager to prove himself as a worthy regimental officer, George unwittingly finds himself in the middle of a mindless game of upmanship being played between a British officer, James Ruffington and a communist-hating American Intelligence officer, Dennis Porter, both of whom want Clark to spy on his close friends. Determined to decipher the code the Communists use to communicate with the Congress, Dennis's obsession for the quest leads to humorous situations when he snatches a paper from some Indian children playing harmless puzzle game, of which he is certain that it's a communist code.

In all this madness, Clark's only solace is a beautifully hand-painted recipe cookbook that he uses to order meals in the Officers Mess. This piece of sheer talent is the work of renowned painters imprisoned in the Pithampur jail with recipes written in hand by a British lady friend, Deborah Sunderland, who gave it as a present to him.

The delirious Denis Porter, on seeing this brilliant piece of art declares it to be "The Communist Cookbook" and steals it in George's absence. The story amusingly culminates when George, with the help of Deborah and Indian friends, including a communist, catches Dennis in the middle of the donkey fare (the high-point activity of Bajapur) trying to decode the 'cookbook'.

The book makes for a smooth and effortless reading. A historian and daughter of an Army officer, the author has very astutely used her knowledge and experiences in a number of cantonments in India to weave together an enthralling story of a British Army officer in pre-Independence India.

Major Sonali Gupta (Retd)

Science and Technology in China: Implications and Lessons for India. *Edited by Maharajakrishna Rasgotra (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2013), pp..256, Price ₹ 795/- ISBN 978-81-321-1312-6.*

The book is a compilation of authoritative essays on China's space, nuclear, aeronautics and missile technologies; ICT, steel, electrical power and pharmaceutical industries; higher education, etc. Reasons for growth of Science and Technology in China are brought out as: political will, commitment and push; professionals and technocrats in top Chinese leadership; aggressive strategy of reverse engineering; closing down of inefficient R&D institutions after 1995 – converting them into industries – and abolition of concerned ministries; 500 times growth of postgraduate educational facilities from 1980 to 2010 and, even, surpassing the US in production of PhDs; and quick implementation of initiatives by the government.

Professor Rao has emphasised that "China's military posture, its mastery and level of space technology...economic advancement...has serious implications for our country". He cautions: "India cannot and should not overreach its financial resources just to compete with China" and has recommended greater synergy between defence and civilian establishments in space and nuclear energy.

Professor Narasimha has analysed the growth of Chinese aeronautics as: pragmatic and shift in priority to commercial over military aviation, creation of 10 major affiliate companies employing

400,000 employees (as against 40,000 in HAL) and ambition to challenge Airbus (A320) and Boeing (737) in the civil aviation sector; but has pointed out that "Not everything is rosy...China is slowly losing its advantage in terms of labour costs...manufacturing technology is still not sufficiently modern" (compared to the US and France).

Instead of usual China-praising and India-bashing arguments, Professor Parthasarath's analysis has optimistically brought out that India is far ahead of China in steel and pharmaceutical industries; and is almost at the same level in electrical power and renewable energy technologies. While the automobile sector is not covered in this book, but it is clear that, at this stage, China is nowhere near India. India has potential to grow well and prosper in some areas.

Overall the book is a good reference manual for Science and Technology policy and related initiatives.

Shri Ved Prakash Sandlas

A Spectrum of Modern Warfare. By Ajay Singh (New Delhi : Pentagon Press, 2013), pp..260, Price ₹ 995.00 ISBN 9788182747180.

This interesting compendium on warfare is divided in four major parts. In Part-I, Colonel Ajay Singh covers the chameleon like nature of war where issues like conventional war, fourth generation warfare, hybrid wars, mechanised warfare, the impact of technology, nuclear weapons and space warfare are deliberated upon. The Author is of the view that hybrid war or multi-modal war is the ultimate form of warfare and will be increasingly incorporated by all armies.

In Part-II, the Author discusses with some insight the ever diminishing resources of our planet—water and oil as also the issue of global warming. The overriding effects they may have on future conflicts are highlighted. Crescent of Islamic fundamentalism mentioned albeit briefly in the volume could perhaps have been covered in greater detail. In Part -III, to drive home the points made in earlier chapters the author discusses the war against terrorism, Second Gulf War, Israel's campaign against Lebanon 2006 and the Russia-Georgia war 2008. In Part- IV, termed as 'Future Flashpoints' the Author gives free rein to his imagination by painting vivid scenarios

of wars in the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, India-Pakistan, India-China and a US-China confrontation for supremacy.

Curiously enough these scenarios are devoid of any hybrid war described at length in Part-I. Deserving a special mention is his narration of the impact of technology, space, oil and water wars. Equally impressive is the coverage of various wars. Suitable photographs and references add to its overall quality. The Author is to be congratulated for his deep research and coherent depiction of various aspects of modern warfare.

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

Ideaz4india : Prescription for New Age. By PT Choudhary (Hyderabad : Institute for Democratic & Economic Affairz (IDEAZ), 2013), pp..435, Rs 299, ISBN 978-81-926688-0-2

This book is a collection of short essays on a very wide variety of subjects ranging from democracy, governance, politics, finance matters, wars, conflicts, insurgency, environment, social, health, agriculture and law and order among many other issues engaging modern India. The book is laid out in nine chapters in which the author has tried to educate and inform the Indian public of various contentious issues/problems facing India with an aim of bringing a change in governance.

The author has passionately brought out most of the ills & lackadaisical response of Indian political leadership, their lack of meaningful governance and ability to frame requisite policies/ legislations. The book has quite a few quotes from eminent personalities, some of which have also been quoted out of context. It is quite evident that the topics have been covered very briefly/ sketchily and even in bullet format, with the aim of probably assisting candidates preparing for various competitive examinations and interviews. The book lacks the detailed research and analysis. It does not give an in-depth insight into India's complex problems and possible options for overcoming these.

However, the book can be useful for candidates appearing for various interviews and examinations.

Major General RPS Malhan, YSM, SM (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter – Ending Sep 2013

(The books reviewed in Apr-Jun 2013 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Asia

From the Ruins of Empire : The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia by Pankaj Mishra, England, Allen Lane (Penguin Group) 2012. 500p., £20, ISBN 9781846144783

Autobiography/Biography/Memoirs

From Fatigues to Civvies : Memoirs of a Paratrooper by VK Nayar. New Delhi, Ajay Kumar Jain for Manohar Publisher and Distributors, 2013. 472p., Rs. 1395, ISBN 9789350980071

Gin and Lime, Whiskey or Wine ? : Veterans, Humour & Love by Mahip Chadha. New Delhi, VS Books International, 2013. 209p., Rs. 495, ISBN 9788192745602

Interventions : A Life in War and Peace by Kofi Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh. London, Allen Lane (Penguin Group), 2012. 383p., £ 25, ISBN 9781846142970

Jungle Odyssey : A Soldier's Memoir by Ashok Kalyan Verma. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2013. 222p., Rs. 495, ISBN 9789381904756

Bangladesh

Bangladesh : The Price of Freedom by Raghu Rai. New Delhi, Niyogi Books, 2013. 114p., Rs. 1495, ISBN 9789381523698

China

The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China : A Major Turning Point for China. Edited by CV Ranganathan and Sanjeev Kumar. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013. 341p., Rs. 1295, ISBN 9788182747241

Beijing's Power & China's Borders : Twenty Neighbours in Asia. Edited by Bruce A Elleman, Stephen Kotkin and Clive Schofield. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013. 371p., Rs. 1295, ISBN 9788182747265

China : The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom by Tongdong Bai. London, Zed Books, 2012. 206p., £16, ISBN 9781780320755

Modernization of the Chinese PLA : From Massed Militia to Force

Projection by JS Bajwa. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2013. 408p., Rs.795, ISBN 9781935501350

The Rise of China Vs. The Logic of Strategy by Edward N Luttwak. Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. 310p., £26, ISBN 9780674066427

Corruption

Waging War on Corruption : Inside the Movement Fighting the Abuse of Power by Frank Vogl. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. 297p., Rs.2267, ISBN 9781442218529

Defence

Firepower 2030 by PK Chakravorty. New Delhi, KW Publisher, 2013. 125p., Rs.595, ISBN 9789381904800

A Handbook of Military Law : Reference Manual (Revised and Updated Edition) by UC Jha. New Delhi, Vij Books, 2013. 295p., Rs.695, ISBN 9789382652045

The Indian Air Force at Eighty 1932-2012 : Aviation Photography by Vijay Seth. New Delhi, Seth Communications, 2013. 160p., Rs.1500, ISBN NA

Modernist Avant Garde Aesthetics and Contemporary Military Technology: Technicities of Perception by Ryan Bishop and John Philips. UK, Edinburgh University Press, 2011. 238p., £19.99, ISBN 9780748643196

Roar of the Tiger : An Illustrated History of Operations in Kashmir, By 4th Battalion the Kumaon Regiment (4th Kumaon) During India-Pakistan War 1965 by Jasbir Singh. New Delhi, Vij Books, 151p., Rs.695, ISBN 9789382652038

Democracy - India

The Promise of Power : The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan by Maya Tudor. New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 240p., Rs.795, ISBN 9781107046061

Digital Communication

Surveillance or Security ? : The Risks Posed by New Wire Tapping Technologies by Susan Landau. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2010. 383p., Rs.1075, ISBN 9780262518741

Disaster Management

Local Planning for Terror and Disaster : From Bioterrorism to Earthquakes. Edited by Leonard A Cole and Nancy D Connell. New Jersey, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 260p., Rs.5986, ISBN 9781118112861

Environmentalism

Green Political Thought by Andrew Dobson. 4th edition. New Delhi, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2013. 225p., Rs.595, ISBN 9780415403528

Fiction

Empire of the Moghul : The Serpent's Tooth by Alex Ruthford. London, Headline Publishing Group, 2013. 421p., Rs.599, ISBN 9780755347636

Escape to Nowhere by Amar Bhushan. New Delhi, Konark Publisher, 2012. 332p., Rs.299, ISBN 9789322008109

In the City of Gold and Silver : The Story of Begum Hazrat Mahal by Kenize Mourad. Delhi, Full Circle, 2013. 437p., Rs.350, ISBN 9788176212373

Interno by Dan Brown. London, Bantam Press, 2013. 461p., Rs.750, ISBN 9780593072493

The Karachi Deception by Shatrufjeet Nath, Bangalore, Grey Oak Publishers, 2013. 251p., Rs.225, ISBN 9789382618355

Foreign Policy – India

Stuff Happens : An Anecdotal Insight into Indian Diplomacy by Rajendra Abhyankar. New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2013. 348p., Rs.895, ISBN 9788124117361

International Relations/Security/Politics

Avoiding Armageddon : America, India and Pakistan to Brink and Back by Bruce Riedel. India, Harper Collins, 2013. 230p., Rs.499, ISBN 9789350299944

Becoming Enemies : US - Iran Relations and the Iran - Iraq War, 1979-1988 by James G Blight, Janet M Lang and, Hussein Banai. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. 394p., Rs. 2904, ISBN 9781442208308

Emerging China : Prospects for Partnership in Asia. Edited by Sudhir T Deyre, Swaran Singh and Reena Marwah. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 413p., Rs.995, ISBN 9780415502368

The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War by Steve Marsh and Wynn Rees. New York, Routledge, 2012. 245p., Rs.2544, ISBN 9780415341233

India and Pakistan : Friends, Rivals or Enemies by Duncan Mcleod. England, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013. 159 p., Rs.1995, ISBN 9788186268438

India as an Asia Pacific Power by David Brewster. London , Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 219p., £ 90, ISBN 9780415617611

International Security and Gender by Nicole Detraz. Polity, United Kingdom, 2012. 255p., \$22, ISBN 9780745651170

The Second Nuclear Age : Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics by Paul Bracken. New York, Times Book, 2012. 306p., \$29, ISBN 9780805094305

The Dispensable Nation : American Foreign Policy in Retreat by Vali Nasr. New York, Doubleday, 2013. 300p., Rs.699, ISBN 9780385536479

Investments - Guide

The Intelligent Investor : A Book of Practical Counsel by Benjamin Graham. New York, Harper, 2003. 623p., Rs.599, ISBN 9780062312686

Islam – South Asia

Islamic Reform in South Asia. Edited by Filippo Osella and Caroline Osella. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 509p., Rs.995, ISBN 9781107031753

Jammu & Kashmir

The Kashmir Dispute 1947-2012 Vol. 1 & 2 by AG Noorani. New Delhi, Tulika, 2013. 293p., Rs.2000, ISBN 9789382381150

Jihad

Fountainhead of Jihad : The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler. Gurgaon, Hachette India, 2013. 320p., Rs.650, ISBN 9789350096369

Military Ethics

Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia : From Antiquity to the Present by Kaushik Roy. New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 288p., Rs.995, ISBN 9781107017368

Military History

Arms and the People : Popular Movements and the Military From the Paris Commune to the Arab Spring. Edited by Mike Gonzalez and Houman Barekat. London, Pluto Press, 2013. 292p., £ 19.99, ISBN 9780745332970

Gallipoli : A Ridge too Far. Edited by Ashley Ekins. Australia, Exile Publishing Limited, 2013. 710p., Rs.3231, ISBN 9781459657748

The German Wars : A Concise History 1859-1945 by Michael A Palmer. Minneapolis, Zenith Press, 2010. 248p., \$29, ISBN 9780760337806

The Khyber Rifles : From British Raj to Al Qaeda by Jules Stewart. Phoenix Mill, Sutton Publishing, 2006. 267p., Rs.817, ISBN 9780750939645

The Indian Army in the Two World Wars. Edited by Kaushik Roy. Boston, Brill, 2012. 553p., \$ 237, ISBN 9789004185500

The Lost History of 1914 : How the Great War Was Not Inevitable by Jack Beatty. London, Bloomsbury, 2012. 392p., Rs.1299, ISBN 9781408827963

Moment of Battle : The Twenty Clashes that Changed the World by James Lacey and Williamson Murray. New York, Bantam Books, 2013. 478p., Rs.799, ISBN 9780345526977

National Security

Managing Strategic Surprise : Lessons From Risk Management and Risk Assessment. Edited by Paul Bracken and Ian Bremmer. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 317p., Price 1820, ISBN 9780521709606

Red Revolution 2020 and Beyond: Strategic Challenges to Resolve by VK Ahluwalia. Bloomsbury, New Delhi, 2013. 275p., Rs.795, ISBN 9789382951285

Non-Government Organisations – India

Foreign Aid for Indian NGOs : Problem or Solution by Pushpa Sundar. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2010. 363p., Rs.795, ISBN 9780415563154

Northeastern – India

Becoming a Borderland : The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeastern India by Sangharmitra Mishra. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2011. 236p., Rs.695, ISBN 9780415612531

Nuclear Strategy

Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age. Edited by Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes. New Delhi, KW Publisher, 2013. 250p., Rs.395, ISBN 9789381904664

Tibet

Tibet's Forgotten Heroes : The Story of Tibet's Armed Resistance Against China by Birgit Van De Wijer. Gloucestershire, Amberley Publishing, 2010. 256p., £ 25, ISBN 9781848689855

War/Warfare

China's India War, 1962 : Looking Back to See the Future. *Edited by Jasjit Singh. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2013. 332p., Rs.920, ISBN 9789381904725*

Engineers of Victory : The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War *by Paul Kennedy. New York, Random House, 2013. 436p., \$ 30, ISBN 9781400067619*

On the German Art of War (Unit Command). *Edited by Bruce Condell and David T Zabecki. Dehra Dun , Greenfield Publishers, 2001. 303p., Rs.995, ISBN 9789381089118*

War as Experience : Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis *by Christine Sylveste. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2013. 149p., Rs.2271, ISBN 9780415775991*

War Games : From Gladiators to Gigabytes *by Martin Van Creveld. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 332p., £ 17.99, ISBN 9781107684423*

Witness to Blunder : Kargil Story Unfolds *by Ashfaq Hussain. New Delhi, Bookwise (India) , 2013. 256p., Rs. 595, ISBN 9788187330516*

World's Water Crisis

Water, Peace and War : Confronting the Global Water Crisis *by Brahma Chellaney. Lanham , Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. 400p., Rs.2267, ISBN 9781442221390*

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PROCESSING OF MEMBERSHIP
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Officers desirous of membership must obtain prescribed form from USI. Requests for membership will not be entertained on plain paper, letters or mere chits often sent by officers as many required details are missed out. Applications have to be accompanied by serving certificate; retired officers should attach any defence photo identity proof.

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The following officers joined the Institution as Life Members during the period 01 Jul-30 Sep 2013:-

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2.	LM/70759	Capt Kanwar Arun Singh	Punjab
3.	LM/70760	Lt Cdr Sankalp	Engg
4.	LM/70761	Lt Col Devendar Kumar Tyagi	AMC
5.	LM/70762	Capt Maninder Singh Pental, IN	Elec
6.	LM/70763	Dr Ajai Sahni	
7.	LM/70764	Maj M Nagaraj	Guards
8.	LM/70765	Col Saif Ul Islam Khan	AAD
9.	LM/70766	Justice Umanath Singh	Judicial
10.	LM/70767	Capt Atul Dinesh Midha	Guards
11.	LM/70768	Gp Capt A Suresh Kumar	F (P)
12.	LM/70769	Maj Atre Devdutta Prabhakar	Engrs
13.	LM/70770	Lt Varun Prakash Rathi	Lgs
14.	LM/70771	Wg Cdr Akhil Kapoor (Retd)	F (N)
15.	LM/70772	Dr Srikanth Kondapalli	
16.	LM/70773	Lt Gen Anil Malik, AVSM (Retd)	AC
17.	LM/70774	Col Abhishek Agnihotri	Arty
18.	LM/70775	Gp Capt Surender Singh Dhankhar	F (P)
19.	LM/70776	Shri Mohan Guruswamy	
20.	LM/70777	Dr Vinod Kumar Singh	
21.	LM/70778	Wg Cdr Virendar Jeet Singh (Retd)	F (P)
22.	LM/70779	Col Sunil Jain	Raj Rit
23.	LM/70780	Maj Gen Vikram Puri (Retd)	AAD

24. LM/70781	Col Jagdish Prasad	Engrs
25. LM/70782	Shri Ajit Kulshreshtha	CRPF
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27. LM/70784	Wg Cdr Petluri Srinivasa Rao (Retd)	F (P)
28. LM/70785	Dr Mandeep K Bhandari	IAS
29. LM/70786	Cdr Rajinder Bir Singh Gill (Retd)	Exec
30. LM/70787	Brig Harvinder Pal Singh Dhillon, VSM (Retd)	Rajput
31. LM/70788	Capt Manvendra	Guards
32. LM/70789	Capt Mahendra Veer Singh Negi, NM, IN	Exec (P)
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34. LM/70791	Col Inderjeet Singh	AOC
35. LM/70792	Shri Ganesan Venkataraman	IPS
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37. LM/70794	Lt Deepak Kumar	EME
38. LM/70795	Lt Tushar	Arty
39. LM/70796	Capt Harish Kumar	Arty
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43. LM/70800	Brig Jagdeep K Sharma	Mech Inf
44. LM/70801	Cdr Achal Sharma	Engg
45. LM/70802	Maj Abhishek Sharma	AC
46. LM/70803	Col Gagandeep Singh Nagi	AMC
47. LM/70804	Capt Janmejay M Vaishnav (Retd)	AOC
48. LM/70805	Capt Radhakrishnan P	JAK LI

49. LM/70806	Col Rajbir Yadav	GR
50. LM/70807	Lt Navin Kumar	GR
51. LM/70808	Maj Abhishek Sandu	Arty
52. LM/70809	Maj Somesh R Hanchinal	Sigs
53. LM/70810	Lt Col Raghwendra Sharan	Garhwal
54. LM/70811	Capt Suraj Bhan Singh	Arty
55. LM/70812	Maj Samar Singh Chauhan	Armd Regt
56. LM/70813	Lt Col Dinesh Kumar Bansil (Retd)	Dogra
57. LM/70814	Lt Col Rajeev Shukla	EME
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62. LM/70819	Cdr Vikramaditya Singh Chauhan	Exec
63. LM/70820	Cmde Vijay Jerath, Vrc (Retd)	Exec
64. LM/70821	Air Cmde Shri Harsh Tripathi, AVSM (Retd)	JAG (Air)
65. LM/70822	Lt Gen Anjan Mukherjee, PVSM, AVSM	Arty
66. LM/70823	Col Sanjay Gangwar	EME
67. LM/70824	Maj Gen Abhradhwa Parmar, VSM (Retd)	Rajput
68. LM/70825	Wg Cdr Ranjit Singh Pannu (Retd)	F (P)
69. LM/70826	Lt Gen Vijai Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Engrs
70. LM/70827	Col Atul Kathuria	Sigs

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During the period 01 Jul-30 Sep 2013, 39 Ordinary Members renewed their membership and 56 registered as new members.

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1962 War – Use of Tanks in the Chushul Sub-Sector

This is in relation to the article “1962 – War in the Western Sector (Ladakh)” being carried in this Issue of the Journal. After the contents had gone to the press, I came across three articles: “Reminiscences of 20 LANCERS in the Battle of Chushul (Ladakh)– 18 & 19 Nov 1962” by Major General AK Dewan, AVSM, VrC (Retd); “Chushul 1962” by Air Vice Marshal Chandan Singh, MVC, AVSM, VrC (Retd); “20 LANCERS in the Battle of Chushul” by Brigadier Gautam Narain (Retd), based on their first hand experiences, in the Post Horn Gallop 57 published by Cavalry Officers’ Association, describing the airlift of two troops of AMX-13 tanks of 20 LANCERS by AN-12 aircraft from Chandigarh to Chushul on 25/26 Oct 1962 and their subsequent participation in the battle.

Major General Dewan (then a Captain) was the commander of these two troops. His narrative gives a first-hand account of this unique airlift and subsequent participation of one of these tank troops under his command in the battle of Gurung Hill in support of 1/8 GR on 18/19 Nov 1962 at altitudes varying from 14,230 –16000 feet. This perhaps also explains the high casualties suffered and the difficulties experienced by the Chinese in the capture of Gurung Hill. The second tank troop under the command of Lieutenant Avinash was deployed on road Chushul - Tsaka La to prevent the Chinese from cutting off the road axis to Leh.

Readers interested in obtaining the above narratives in full may contact Brigadier Ravi Malhotra (Retd), Honorary Secretary Cavalry Officers’ Association at e-mail ID: shobharavi.malhotra@gmail.com.

Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)
Editor

ARTICLES FOR USI JOURNAL

1. Members are welcome to forward original articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. **Articles should preferably not exceed 2,500 words.** These should be forwarded in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a CD/DVD as a Word document. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternatively, articles may be sent through e-mail on dde@usiofindia.org. The author should render a certificate that the article has neither been published in print or online, nor has it been offered to any other agency for publication. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations.
2. It is mandatory that the author furnishes complete details of the book/journal referred to in the article as end notes. This should include full name of the writer of article/book referred to, title of book/article, journal in which published (in case of articles); issue details, and page numbers. Besides end notes, if the author so desires, a bibliography may also be included, though not mandatory.
3. Abbreviations if any, should be used in their expanded form the first time and indicated in brackets.
4. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers are advised to follow the prevailing services instructions for publications of their articles.
5. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the journal in which his/her article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

GUIDELINES FOR BOOK REVIEWERS

Definition

"A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarise, set in context, describe strengths and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is in his duty to discharge with reason and consistency".

Admiral HG Rickover.

Guidelines

A book review is a critical evaluation of a work or a book to help the reader by your assessment. For a reader to be guided by your evaluation, it must be objective. A few guidelines are given below :-

- (a) Is the information factually correct ?
- (b) Criticism is not a review.
- (c) Is the book going to be an addition to the existing knowledge on the subject ?
- (d) Present the reader what the book contains.
- (e) Author's previous writing experience and performance; has he done better this time or otherwise.
- (f) Some quotes from the book can be given to illustrate the point.

These should be limited and the whole paragraph should not be lifted.

- (g) How is the presentation ? What impact does it make ?
- (h) What does the book say ? (the main theme). How does it say it ?
- (j) Price – is it reasonable or high ?
- (k) The length of the review should be kept within 300 words.
- (l) *Complete details of the book (s) reviewed to be given at the top of the review in the order specified below. It may be noted that the order specified should be followed by a coma or colon as specified here :-*

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