

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



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JULY-SEPTEMBER 2012

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ISSN 0041-770X

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

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Vol CXLII

July-September 2012

No 589

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January. Subscription per annum w.e.f. Jan 2012 : In India Rs. 700.00. Postage extra (Rs 80 for four issues). Subscription should be sent through Bank Draft/Local/Multicity Cheque in favour of Director USI of India. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution in India. Articles, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries should be addressed to the Deputy Director (Adm).

Overseas annual subscription (By Air Mail) - £ 50 or US \$ 80

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in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular

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The views expressed in the Journal are not official and opinions of the contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

USI CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

1. The USI conducts correspondence courses for DSSC – Army and Navy, TSOC (Army), Entrance Examinations and Promotion Examinations Parts B and D.
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3. Schedule of Correspondence Courses 2012-2013.

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(a) DSSC (Army)	3 rd Week of Nov 2012	Sep 2013	Rs 3600/-	Rs 900/- each for Tac B & MH Rs 600/- each for remaining subjects
(b) TSOC (Army)	3 rd Week of Nov 2012	Sep 2013	Rs 3000/-	Rs 900/- for MH Rs 600/- each for remaining subjects
(c) DSSC (Navy)	3 rd Week of Dec 2012	Jun 2013	Rs 700/-	
(d) Part 'B'	1 st Week of Dec 2012	Jun 2012	Rs 2000/-	Rs 600/- for MH Rs 450/- each for remaining subjects
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4. **Contact Programmes.** Three contact programmes for DSSC/TSOC Entrance Examination-2013 will be run at USI. Details later. Separate examination papers will be set for each programme.

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11. Prospectus : Available from Course Section and on Website.

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	Defence Personnel	Entitled Civilians
1. Life Membership wef 01/01/2012	(Rs)	(Rs)
(a) Entrance	2,000	2,000
(b) One Time Fee	7,000	10,000
Total	9,000	12,000
2. Ordinary Membership (For 3 years as per FY at a time commencing 01 Apr)		
(a) Entrance	600	700
(b) Subscription/Renewal Fee	2,400	3,300
Total	3,000	4,000
3. Membership forms available at the USI with Deputy Director (Adm).		

FORTHCOMING EVENTS AT USI*

Date	Time	Events	Subjects and Speakers
11 Oct 2012 Thursday	1100	Talk	"Who Will Guard the Guards ? : An Overview of Cyber Security" "Shri KK Mookhey, Principal Consultant at Network Intelligence Chairman : Lt Gen Sunit Kumar, DGIS
01 Nov 2012 Thursday & 02 Nov 2012 Friday	0930-1630 0930-1320	USI National Security Seminar 2012	Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region <i>Tentative Programme Overleaf</i>
05 Dec 2012 Wednesday	1100	USI National Security Lecture 2012	National Security Reforms : Ten Years after the Kargil Committee Report Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM (Retd), former Chief of the Naval Staff
14-15 Feb 2013 Thursday-Friday	0930-1630	Seminar	Afghanistan Beyond 2014 : Challenges, Perspectives and the Way Ahead

* Please see the USI Wesbite for any changes : www.usiofindia.org

USI NATIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR 2012 : "TRADE, COMMERCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION"

TENTATIVE PROGRAMME

Day One - 01 November 2012

0915 - 0945 - Registration and Tea.

Inaugural Session

0945 - 1000 - Welcome Address - Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) Director, USI.

1000 - 1020 - Keynote Address - Shri Shivshankar Menon, IFS (Retd) (Tbc).

1020 - 1050 - Tea

Session 1

1050 - 1330 - Trade and Commerce in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Security. (Paper Presentation 1050-1200, Discussion from 1210-1330).

1330 - 1430 - Lunch Break

Session 2

1430 - 1630 - Energy, Environmental and Maritime Security. (Paper Presentation 1430-1540, Discussion from 1550-1630).

1630 - Tea

Day Two - 02 November 2012

Session 3

Subject : Future Security Challenges and Opportunities.

0930 - 1115 - Presentation of papers.

1115 - 1140 - Tea

1140 - 1230 - Discussion.

Valedictory Session

1230 - 1300 - Valedictory Address - Shri Ranjan Mathai, IFS, Foreign Secretary.

1300 - 1315 - Vote of Thanks - Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) Director, USI.

1320 - Lunch

Editorial

By the time this issue of the Journal reaches our readers it will be fifty years, almost to the day, since the Chinese launched a war of aggression against our northern and northeastern borders. There is really nothing to celebrate the fifty years about that war but yes, certainly a good reason to commemorate the sacrifices of our soldiers. Equally important, this is a good time for introspection by the political as well as the military leadership to be able to come to terms with that debacle. In fact, this should have been done long ago but since the same has been kept under wraps, its ghosts have not yet disappeared. We need to squarely face it at the political, diplomatic and military levels, so that appropriate lessons are learnt for the future.

In the same context, I would like to draw the attention of our readers to Volume CXLI, No. 586, Oct - Dec 2011 issue of the Journal wherein, an article "1962 – Battle of Se-La and Bomdi-La" has been carried. Encouraged by the response from our readers, USI has now undertaken a project to do a critique on the entire war from all angles. Hopefully, we plan to publish the same in the form of a book before long. Through this column, I appeal to our readers that if they have a personal experience to share about that war (political, diplomatic or military) and the same has not been published anywhere so far, please be kind enough to share it with us so that the same can be used for the project study.

The Sixteenth Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture on the subject "Indigenisation in the Defence Industry – Current Status and Future Prospects" was delivered by Shri MV Kotwal, Member L&T Board & President Heavy Engineering on 05 Sep 2012 and the same is being carried as the lead article in this issue of the Journal. Shri Kotwal covered a very wide canvas, especially from the point of view of the defence related Private Sector. He laid great stress on the issues related to policy implementation, including offsets and highlighted some examples of successful collaboration between the Defence Research & Development Organisation, Ordnance Factories, Defence Public Sector Units and the Private Sector. The talk was well attended and generated a stimulating discussion.

In keeping with our policy of organising events at other stations with large membership, USI had organised a joint panel discussion with Amity University at their campus in NOIDA on the subject of "Problem of Naxalism in India: Ground Realities and Strategic Challenges Towards Conflict Resolution" on 26 Jul 2012. Many interesting ideas were articulated by the eminent panelists. The Amity University provided unstinted support for the event. A full report on the panel discussion is being carried in this issue of the Journal.

Continuing with the same theme, the next three articles : "Urban Perspective Plan – An Analysis of Maoist Perspective and Assessment" by Lieutenant General VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM and Bar, YSM, VSM (Retd); "Countering Terrorism" by Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) and "The National Counterterrorism Centre : Critique and Recommendations" by Dr Prem Mahadevan deal with various facets of terrorism as it affects the Indian State. If India is to become a developed nation, which it must, it is important to deal with the scourge of terrorism, be it home grown or externally sponsored.

Recent sectarian violence in Assam shocked the entire nation. Its ripples were felt far and wide; the disturbances in Mumbai on 11 Aug 2012 and thereafter the exodus of the people belonging to the northeast from many cities of the Country, are events which are of great consequence for cohesion and integrity of the Country. In the next article "The Recurring Violence in Western Assam – An Analysis", Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd) who has served in the northeast for many years analyses the basic causes for this flare up which happens time and again, and makes some sharp observations.

China's presence and activities in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), especially in the Gilgit-Baltistan region have been of great concern to India for quite some time. In the next article "India's North West : The New Great Game", Lieutenant General Kamleshwar Davar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) analyses the strategic significance of this area and its connection with the Siachen Glacier Issue, namely the Saltoro Ridge which he has called *the strategic fulcrum*. As India negotiates this issue with Pakistan, it ought to take into account the effect it may have on the ongoing Sino-

Indian negotiations to resolve the boundary dispute, particularly in the J&K region abutting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China.

In the next article "Indian Strategic Interest in Afghanistan", Wing Commander Anurakshat Gupta looks at the effects of Indian efforts in stabilisation of Afghanistan. Wing Commander Gupta, a surgeon by profession who spent a year as part of an Indian surgical team working amongst the people of North Afghanistan feels that the Indian soft power has begun to make a significant impact on the lives of ordinary Afghan people.

Captain Akshat Upadhyay in the next article "Impasse in the Middle East" traces the history of the US - Iran relations since the Mid-nineteenth century which were quite cordial and how these have grown to be of intense distrust and confrontation. The young author has tried to put the US - Iran - Israel imbroglio into perspective that may help in understanding the issues at play and the leverages that each player is trying to obtain for itself.

In the next article 'Electronic Document Handling in the Armed Forces : Need for an Automated Approach', Commander K Ashok Menon (Retd) highlights the extent to which the Armed Forces have become dependent on electronic documentation but the safeguards have lagged behind. He outlines the main concerns in a simple manner and makes certain recommendations for protection of electronic documents through organisational measures at each level.

Colonel Yogesh Nair in his article 'Environment as a National Security Concern : A Perspective' has emphasised the impact of environmental issues on national security. He recommends that 'environment' *per se* ought to become a factor to be considered universally while dealing with security issues and planning military operations.

The last article in this issue contains a report by Colonel KS Dhami (Retd) on the USI sponsored "Study cum Adventure Trek to the Baspa Glacier – source of the Sutlej River" which he undertook from 08 - 17 Jul 2012. This is part of the ongoing USI programme since 2010 for *in-situ* monitoring of the 'snout zones' of big glaciers in the Himalayas to study the environmental impact of climate change.

India's Wars Through Soldiers' Eyes

Our readers would recollect that in the USI Journal Vol CXLI, No. 586, Oct-Dec 2011 Issue, through the Director's Page, we had invited first-hand accounts of India's wars as seen through the soldiers' eyes, i.e. those who participated in these wars. We have received some contributions but the response has not been very encouraging.

We have formed an editorial team to evaluate the material received and edit the same for publishing. As the material received was not adequate to be published in the form of a book, we have decided to carry the selected pieces in the USI Journal over a period of time. It is a work in progress. In any case, the complete material will be kept in the USI Archives. Even if some material is not published, it will be available for reference to research scholars for posterity.

Through this column I once again appeal to our readers that those of us who have been thinking of writing their personal war experience but have not been able to do so for some reason, there is still time to put the pen to paper or tap the keyboard. We are open to receiving the same.

I would like to thank those who have sent in their contributions. Their names and the subject of their write-up are mentioned below:-

S.No.	Rank and Name	Contribution Pertains to
	ARMY	
1	Lt Gen Ajai Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Former Governor of Assam	Combat Leadership, 1965 and 1971 Wars
2	Brig N Bahri, VSM (Retd)	Nagaland 1973
3	HE Capt Shekhar Dutt, SM, IAS (Retd). Presently Governor of Chattisgarh	1971 War in The Barmer Sector
4	Maj Gen Surinder Singh Chhachhi, SM (Retd)	Partition 1947, 1947-48 J&K War and Mizoram 1965-66
5	Brig PT Gangadharan (Retd)	1971 War - Kargil Sector
6	Brig KA Gopalan (Retd)	1962 War - Kameng Sector (Se-La and Bomdi-La)
7	Maj Gen SCN Jatar (Retd)	1971 War - Poonch Sector
8	Lt Gen Pran Pahwa, PVSM (Retd)	1962 War - Kameng Sector (Bomdi-La)

9	Lt Col Ravel Singh Sidhu (Retd)	1965 War - Poonch Sector
10	Col SC Tyagi (Retd)	IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka (1988)
NAVY		
11	Cdr Arun Saigal (Retd) with inputs from General VN Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), former COAS & Gp Capt Anant Bewoor, VM (Retd)	Operation Cactus (Maldives) 1988
AIR FORCE		
12	Air Mshl MS Bawa, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)	1971 War, Western Sector Operations
13	Gp Capt Anant Bewoor, VM (Retd)	Iraq 1980, IPKF Operations 1987-88
14	Air Mshl KC Cariappa, PVSM, VM (Retd)	1962, 1965 and 1971 Wars
15	Gp Capt A Choudhry, VM	Kargil War 1999
16	Gp Capt AS Gill	IPKF Operations 1987-88
17	Gp Capt Sushil Gera	IPKF Operations 1990
18	Wg Cdr S Philip	Kargil War 1999
19	Aircraftman RA Sakuja (Retd)	1962, 1965 and 1971 Wars
20	Wg Cdr Gursharan Singh Uberoi (Retd)	Goa Operation Dec 1961; 1962, 1965 and 1971 Wars

Note:- The names above appear in alphabetical order of the surname and in the absence of the surname, the first name has been taken.

Editor

PROCESSING OF MEMBERSHIP **APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY POST**

Officers desirous of membership must obtain prescribed form from USI. Requests for membership will not be entertained on plain paper, letters or mere chits often sent by officers as many required details are missed out. Applications have to be accompanied by serving certificate; retired officers should attach any defence photo identity proof.

OBITUARIES

With a deep sense of grief we inform you about the passing away of the following Life Members of USI :-

- (a) Surgeon Commodore KS Grover (Retd), expired on 25 January 2012. He was a Life Member since 1992.
- (b) Captain JL Kapoor, IN (Retd), expired on 03 July 2012. He was a Life Member since 1997.
- (c) Colonel AK Chakraborty (Retd), 5 Para, passed away on 17 July 2012. He was a Life Member since 1974.
- (d) Brigadier Sandeep Randev, ASC, expired on 16 August 2012. He was a Life Member since 1990.
- (e) Brigadier JM Singh (Retd), 62 Cavalry, expired on 27 August 2012. He was a Life Member since 2010.
- (f) Brigadier JP Sud (Retd), Regiment of Artillery, expired on 13 Sep 2012. He was a Life Member since 1994.
- (g) Colonel VM Nayak (Retd), AMC expired in 2012. He was a Life Member since 2011.

Indigenisation in Defence Industry – Current Status and Future Prospects*

Shri MV Kotwal**

Introduction

Present Level of Indigenisation in India

India will become the 3rd largest Defence spender after the USA and China by 2014. There has been a 15-20 per cent increase in equipment buying for Defence Forces during the last five years while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has projected an expenditure of about US\$ 100 billion over the next five year period. Details of defence expenditure for the year 2010-11 are given in **Table 1**.

Defence Expenditure (2010-11 Figures)	Rs. Crore
Defence budget	1,51,581
- Revenue expenditure (budget)	90,748
- Capital expenditure (budget)	60,833
Ordnance Factories (OF) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU)	38,615
Equipment purchased from Large Private and Small Scale Industries + other PSUs	9,800

Table 1

From this table, it can be seen that out of the capital budget, the allocation to OF + DPSU is 65 per cent, import is around 30 per cent and a meagre 5 per cent is for purchase from private industry. Further, 50 to 60 per cent of OF and DPSU budget is allocated for defence imports. This figure, combined with 20 per cent of private sector imports, increases the figure of defence imports to 65-67 per cent. This renders the current Indian Armed Forces' modernisation plans, primarily based on imports, ineffective,

* Text of the talk delivered by **Shri MV Kotwal**, Member of the Larsen and Toubro (L&T) Board and President (Heavy Engineering); with **Colonel SP Wahi, PhD (Retd)**, Former Chairman ONGC, in the chair.

** **Shri MV Kotwal** is also the Co-Chairman of Confederation of Indian Industry's National Committee and a Member of the Vijay Kelkar Committee responsible for advising the Government of India on restructuring Defence Production in the Country.

and defeats the idea of indigenisation and development of the Defence Industry in India for self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

India has nine DPSUs and 41 OFs with an aggregate turnover of 38,622 Crore (US\$8.46 billion) in 2010-11. They employ base of 1.8 lakh people. With such a large capacity, India meets only 30 per cent of its Defence requirements internally while the remaining is imported. Besides, there are negligible defence exports from India.

According to the Annual survey of Industries conducted by the Ministry of Finance, the output per employee in DPSUs and OFs comes to around 15 lakh per year, as compared to a benchmark of 20-40 lakh per year for a range of manufacturing sectors within India. Indian private players contributed to around 10 per cent of the total Defence turnover in 2009, mainly as Tier II or III suppliers to the DPSUs and OFs.

The three pathways followed for Defence indigenisation in India are – indigenous technology development, transfer of technology, and licensed manufacture. This however, creates an incorrect impression that local manufacture is taking place. But this is far from the actual position, as the Intellectual Property (IP) rights, including designs, remain with the foreign manufacturer. Only the “*know how*” is passed on, without the “*know why*”.

Support of Defence Research & Development (R&D)

In Indian Defence, R&D is almost totally the prerogative of the DRDO which has 48 laboratories located across India, researching in various fields, and with a budget of nearly five per cent of the defence budget. The DRDO has always been successful in basic research and that has been passed on to the private industry for production processes. In all the scenarios, the role of private players remains confined to applied research and production process.

Various Constrains

As stated earlier, import forms the major part of defence equipment acquisition, even at the component level. The semiconductor chips which are the heart of systems, may it be mechatronics systems or communications systems, are all imported, and, therefore, the major basic components required for manufacturing are not available locally. The essence of self-reliance is hence defeated.

Besides chips, the industry also depends upon imports of items such as carbon fibre and special alloy steels.

India, while needing to invest in R&D, production technologies and integration of complex systems and equipment platforms, also requires developing of human capital for Defence. This is very crucial as this is the key for the execution of projects, product development, and for meeting customer requirements. It is important that young, talented people head the project teams for project management. This has largely remained neglected, and has thus affected the execution of all major projects eventually causing project delays.

Defence Procurement Procedure / Defence Production Policy Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP)

In DPP 2009, MoD announced a 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) of the Armed Forces outlining technology perspective and capability building. The road map of the MoD is to be shared with the Industry Associations to enable the industry to prepare for creating these technologies and capabilities through in-house R&D or technology tie-ups with leading foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) through joint ventures (JVs) / teaming agreements.

In DPP 2010, a new category, 'Buy and Make (Indian)' was introduced to encourage participation of private sector companies as *prime contractors*. In this category, a minimum 50 per cent work share must be under the scope of the Indian industry (Prime) and remaining 50 per cent could be sourced from foreign OEMs. This will facilitate formation of JVs with foreign OEMs.

In DPP 2011, the scope of the offset policy guidelines was expanded to include civil aerospace, internal security and training within the ambit of eligible products and services for discharge of offset obligations. The list of companies eligible for Transfer of Technology has also been expanded to include maintenance infrastructure.

Categorisation of Procurement Schemes

The Procurement Schemes can be categorised as under : –

- (a) Buy (Global)** - Outright purchase from foreign/Indian vendors.

(b) Buy and Make with Transfer of Technology - Purchase from foreign vendor followed by local manufacture under licensed production by a designated Production Agency.

(c) Buy (Indian) - Outright purchase of a product from the Indian industry.

(d) Make - (High Tech) for development of new products and systems to meet the MoD requirement, with technology tie-ups with foreign OEMs for selected technologies through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). MoD will select two industries as development partners and fund 80 per cent of the cost of development of the product/system for each of the selected partners. DPSU/OFs and private sector companies with defined qualifications for infrastructure, technical and financial capabilities can participate.

Defence Production Policy

Defence Production Policy was issued recently to "harness the emerging dynamism of Indian industry and capabilities available in the academia and the R&D institutes". The policy is believed to be instrumental in promoting Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), providing necessary impetus to R&D, addressing grievances of the Indian industry, and to design domestic manufacturing in line with the futuristic demands from the Defence Forces. The Production Policy also aims at progressively identifying and addressing any issue which impacts, or has the potential of impacting, the competitiveness of the Indian defence industry in comparison to foreign companies.

Issues in Implementation of Policies/Procedures

Repeated Dilutions in the Offset Policy

Offsets were introduced in the Indian Defence Industry with a perspective to build-up the defence industry capability, and integrating it with the global supply chain, while providing self-sufficiency to the Indian Armed Forces. The subsequent dilution of Offsets norms since the release of the Offset Policy has rendered the whole policy as non-progressive. A few such points are highlighted below:

(a) **DPP- 2008.** Allowed offsets in non-licensed defence fields, allowing discharging offsets through low-technology, quasi-military products like field shelters and air conditioning.

(b) **DPP- 2011.** Permitted discharge of offsets in non-defence fields of civil aviation and homeland security

(c) **Defence Offset Guidelines dated 01 August 2012.** Allowed multipliers for SME / MSMEs, thus limiting the capacity build up for the Defence industrial base to component / sub system level. However, no multiplier has been provisioned for system integration capability build up which is essential for self-reliance in defence manufacturing.

(i) Multiplier for technology acquisition by DRDO only. No multiplier for technology acquisition by industry / Joint Ventures (JVs), thus giving no incentive for next generation product development through private sector / JVs.

(ii) Multipliers introduced without raising the overall offset percentage, thus not leveraging the complete potential of offsets for developing the defence industrial base.

(iii) No mandatory sourcing by global OEMs from the Indian Industry.

(iv) No specific provisions to facilitate access of Indian industry to the global market / export.

Conflict of Interest – MoD

In the field of defence acquisitions, policy making, planning, procurement, R&D as well as production functions are all controlled by the MoD. The Department of Defence Production represents MoD on all policy bodies, production boards, procurement decision making bodies and DPSU Boards. This leads to a classic “ownership syndrome” where the MoD decision makers, tasked with judging the capability of the Indian Industry in a holistic manner, may not make objective decisions and will tend to protect the interest of Government owned industries under their charge. Private sector industries are the victim of this classic conflict of interest situation. Representation of the entire private sector is limited merely to a single presentation by industry bodies to Capital Acquisition Plan Categorisation Committee (SCAPCC). As a result, in spite of the Raksha Mantri stating on record a number of times that there will not be any more purchases on nominations, many major programs continue to be nominated to DPSUs. Nomination of Integrated Air Command and Control Systems (IACCS) and

Electronic Warfare (EW) programmes to Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is a recent example.

Lack of Accountability for Building Local Capabilities

According to the Vijay Kelkar Committee report on review of Defence Procurement Procedure, a paradigm shift in the concept of indigenisation is required – from basic component supply to Tier 1 industries, to higher level of design and system integration with adequate capability enhancement and development. Also, a centralised agency capable of achieving the above is lacking. The Committee's recommendation of nominating selected private sector companies as Raksha Udyog Ratnas (RuRs) has not been implemented, although shortlisting has been completed.

Entry Barriers for Private Players

Private players wanting to enter the defence space find themselves competing against much larger and more experienced DPSUs and established global manufacturers with a track record and available products. A more pro-active role in nurturing and developing the private defence sector is required from the Government, especially during the initial period.

Required Skill Resources for the Sector

With increasing technological sophistication in defence, the skill requirements of the defence industry are very specific. For meeting these requirements, a framework of specialised courses needs to be created, with additions to curricula of existing and related fields. A network of knowledgeable experts in the field needs to be tapped. Also, the private industry must re-employ skilled retired personnel of the Indian Armed Forces in various programmes and projects, enabling the private sector to produce to the expected level of quality and satisfaction of the user.

Coordination between R&D Institutes and Private Sector

Research institutes like DRDO are a rich source of human capital which can be very effectively leveraged to help the private sector jump-start its development. In the current environment of blanket secrecy, it is difficult to develop meaningful partnerships with academia beyond DRDO. Research grants and funding can be made available through a Public Private Partnership approach if private players are assured that some of the gains can accrue to them.

Skill Upgradation of the Interested Private Participants

Weapon technology requires a very high level of precision and sophistication. Skill upgradation programmes for industry professionals in the form of certifiable training and courses are required. Necessary support and advice in dealing with administrative procedures and regulations involved will be required, and as exports start growing, private players will have to be trained in managing international agreements and regulations.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Defence Industry

FDI in defence manufacturing is capped at 26 per cent. On the other hand, 100 per cent FDI is permitted under the automatic route in the Services Sector, irrespective of whether they can provide service to the Defence Sector or not. Applicability of the FDI cap for services industry catering for defence industry needs to be clarified.

According to the recommendations of the Industry Associations, FDI in Defence needs to be increased from current level of 26 per cent to 49 per cent subject to the following:

- (a) Control and governance to be in Indian hands.
- (b) State of the Art transfer of technology, cleared by the OEM's government, to be made available for the JV.
- (c) Creation of 'Centres of Excellence' in the selected areas.
- (d) Products and technologies to include 'Priority List' of MoD.
- (e) Promotion of export from JV and providing access to global markets for the industry.
- (f) JV products should have more than 50 per cent indigenous content.

Lack of an Official Defence Export Policy

In the absence of any official Defence Export Policy, the private industry has to approach MoD for obtaining permission for every export opportunity on a case-to-case basis. There has been no announcement by the Government of a negative list of countries, nor an official list of banned products.

Ambiguity in Definition of Defence Industry

Presently defence licenses are issued only for manufacturing. There are many companies involved in defence production, e.g. Information Technology companies. They do not require a license for producing defence related software or providing services. It is not clear whether such companies are to be considered as Indian defence industry or not. The definition of Defence Industry is still not very clear.

Delay in Issue of Defence Production Licenses

As per DPP - 2006, the Indian defence industry includes DPSU, Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and any private defence industry manufacturing under an industrial license. By this, public sector companies mainly get qualified as Indian defence industries because very few licenses have been issued to the private sector. Further, for the past few months all fresh license applications as well as applications seeking renewal of an existing license or addition of a factory or address to an existing license, have been put on hold for verification of security aspects.

Lessons to Be Learnt From Defence Models of Other Countries

The USA has a National Defence Industrial Association (NDIA) which connects government officials, military and industry professionals, branches of the armed forces, homeland security etc. It has the following functions:

- (a) Assist Government in policy development areas.
- (b) Provides NDIA members with access to key Government and industry officials.
- (c) Monitors and advances sound and practicable procurement/acquisition policies.
- (d) Critical technologies and focus areas are outlined and systematically communicated.

Other nations like the UK (National Defence Industry Council) and Korea (Korean Defence Industry Association) have similar arrangements. In the UK, the Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) nurtures an innovative environment for creating new technologies.

The Way Ahead

JV Formation Between DPSUs and Private Industry

With the recent guidelines for JVs between DPSUs and private industry, the MoD has taken a very constructive step towards partnering and involving the private industry. Clarity is yet to emerge on work allocation to these entities by the DPSUs. It is to be noted that these newly formed JVs should be a combination of the best of both, that is, the skills and infrastructure of the DPSU on one side, and the agility and execution capabilities of the private player on the other. Else, the JV entity formed may only add to the list of DPSUs that already exist.

Collaborative Approach and a Few Success Stories

There are many examples of successful collaboration of the Indian defence private industry with various other players of the defence industry such as DRDO, DPSUs and the Defence Forces.

(a) **Rohini / Revati Radar.** One of the examples of successful collaboration of DRDO, DPSU (BEL) and the Private Sector (L&T) is the development of the Rohini and Revati Radar system. For this project L&T has developed the mast and energy system, whereas the design and data analysis centre was implemented by DRDO and BEL respectively. The prototype radar is shown in **Figure 1**.




Figure 1

(b) **Pinaka MBRLs.** Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) has been jointly developed by L&T (launcher and fire control system), BEML (reloading and supply system) and OFB (weapon system). The Pinaka has been successfully inducted in the forces with the first two regiments supplied by

L&T and TATA. The Pinaka MBRL is shown in Figure 2.





Figure 2

(c) **Dhanush System.** Dhanush system is an exclusive example, where the user (Indian Navy) has interacted closely and provided valuable inputs for the successful development of the system according to their need. The Dhanush system has been jointly developed by L&T (system provider) and DRDO (design supplier).

Dhanush System



Recommendations

The Government should plan to give incentives to the private industry for providing an end to end defence product. The incentives should be such as a risk sharing contract, tax relief on production and R&D, a research grant etc., to help producers in ensuring that their business remains viable.

There is need for a dedicated department in the MoD which will look after the interests of the private industry engaged in defence

production. Besides this, the Government should consider the DPSU and the private sector as one in the defence industry, and allocate jobs accordingly. Further, the Research & Design organisations (DRDO & Academia) and the Armed Forces should work together towards self reliance and move towards the indigenisation of the defence industry.

The Government should shift from the existing selection of a successful bidder which is on the L1 basis alone, to the L1-T1 concept for ensuring quality of equipment and reduction in life cycle cost.

The Government should consider enhancing the FDI limit to 49 per cent which will facilitate receipt of state of the art technology from foreign OEMs. The capping of 26 per cent FDI is holding back major global defence manufacturers from forming JVs with Indian firms and from giving important know how.

The offset policy needs to be regulated strictly. Dilution of offsets has resulted in high end technology not being inducted in the Indian defence industry.

The private industry should use skilled retired personnel of the Indian Armed Forces in various programmes and projects, thereby enabling the private sector to produce equipment to the expected level of quality and satisfaction of users.

Conclusion

On the positive side, the Government has framed guidelines for formation of JVs between DPSUs and private industry players. A few JVs have already been formed, to leverage the benefit of the vast experience of the DPSUs in defence production and the good infrastructure and resources, and the flexibility available in the private sector.

The 'Make' programme has made a good beginning with the Tactical Communications Systems (TCS) and Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) projects of the Indian Army being in advanced stages. It is also learnt that many 'Make' projects are in the pipeline.

If the suggested recommendations are implemented by the Government in right earnest, the day is not far away when our defence will have a very high degree of indigenisation.



Panel Discussion in Progress



A View of the Audience

Problem of Naxalism in India: Ground Realities and Strategic Challenges Towards Conflict Resolution *

Introduction

A joint USI-Amity Panel Discussion on the subject '*The Problem of Naxalism in India*' was conducted on 26 July 2012 at the Amity University Campus for the convenience of nearly 600 USI members residing in NOIDA. Approximately 175 USI members and 100 eminent Amity invitees attended the event. The panel discussion began with welcome remarks by Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Director USI and Major General K Jai Singh (Retd), Group Vice Chancellor, Amity Universities Group and Executive Senior Vice President, Ritnand Balved Education Foundation (RBEF); and some thoughts by Dr Ashok K Chauhan, Founder President, RBEF and Amity Group of Universities and Institutions.

Director USI, in his welcome remarks stressed, "It is beyond doubt that Naxalism is the most serious internal security threat that the Country is facing today; it is expanding with increasing evidence of external linkages and if left unchecked, it will sooner than later threaten India's cohesion, stability and economic growth and that the challenge has to be faced squarely". He highlighted the great personal experience and expertise of the panelists to discuss this problem in its entirety. He thanked Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, MP, Rajya Sabha for having agreed to deliver the Special Address and Lieutenant General KM Seth, former Governor of Tripura and Chattisgarh to Chair the event. The following were the panelists :-

- (a) Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd), former DG, BSF
- (b) Lieutenant General VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd), former GOC-in-C Central Command
- (c) Ms Shoma Chaudhury, Managing Editor, Tehelka

* A report on Joint USI - Amity University Panel Discussion held on 26 July 2012 at Amity University Campus, Noida.

Special Address by Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha

Let me begin by narrating a story – how the Americans got rid of a large number of alligators (crocodiles) that inhabited Florida swamps by ‘draining the swamps’ to settle human beings there. We must draw a lesson from this episode to get rid of Naxalism in India. Simply killing them would not result in an enduring solution. Even if we succeed, as through *Operation Greyhound* in Andhra Pradesh; those Naxalites that were not disposed by the Police, took refuge in the neighbouring states of Chhattisgarh and Odisha. Similarly, if we were ever to succeed in driving them out of the jungles of Dandakaranya, we would find them surfacing in Mumbai, Kolkata and New Delhi.

A few years ago, a Ministry of Home Affairs report indicated that one third of the Indian districts were either partially or very severely affected by Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The current figure of 78 LWE districts is bogus because of a plan under which money is made available for them. To access that money, politicians have started claiming with considerable pride that they have LWE districts in their constituencies. At the same time, there are districts which ought to be declared LWE affected; but are not included in that category because they are voiceless. Without quarrelling over the specific figure, we ought to recognise, as the Prime Minister indicated a few years ago, that “LWE constitutes the single most important internal security problem that this Country faces”. Over the years many ad hoc solutions have been attempted, however, none have succeeded.

The spread of this malaise indicates the reluctant acquiescence of the people and rising active collaboration. There is no way of knowing the extent to which they are acquiescent because they are bullied into doing so. There may be no full proof way of assessing whether it is an active form of collaboration; but in this context, we need to take note of what Mao Tse Tung said about Guerrilla fighters. He said, “The Guerrilla are like fish in the ocean and the ocean is like the people’s support; the ‘fish’ can survive only so long as there is for them the support of the people”. Therefore, it would be foolish to consider the presence of Naxalism in Dandakaranya forests either as an accident or as something to which there could be an ‘easy security based solution’.

He referred to a report commissioned by the Government of India (GOI), titled, '*Developmental Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas*'. It was Chaired by Shri Deobandopadhyay, a former Rural Development Secretary of the West Bengal Cadre, who later became an active politician and is an elected Rajya Sabha Member now. He and his very eminent colleagues are deeply dedicated to the 'cause of lifting the poorest of poor'. They have given convincing details of '*what lies at the root of the Naxal Problem in India*'. At the time that report came out, another internally commissioned joint report of Ministries of Home Affairs and Defence, indicated the quantum of additional security complement required in terms of arms, ammunition and personnel to be deployed. Those days attention was wholly focused on '*Crushing Naxalism through the use of our security forces*', causing a personal sense of despair at not getting my voice heard in the Cabinet meetings. Since then, the Deobandopadhyay Report has remained in the Yojna Bhawan without any chance of it being ever heard again. That report clearly shows that Naxalism has not come up suddenly upon our Country. It mentions, why frustration, anger and fury have grown amongst the most quiescent people of India.

Long ago, the tribal people withdrew into the forests to save themselves from the onslaught of so called civilising influences; firstly, of the Aryans and finally of the British; and now, of the Brown sahibs. They hid themselves in the jungles, kept to their own practices and remained ethnic at extraordinarily low level of livelihood. They survived by largely having a very strong community sense, development of traditions, customs, usages and rituals. They have stuck to their own lives and preserved their own ecological systems. They could do this because there was nothing to pollute their environs and they had enough food of the kind they wished to have to survive and replicate; and then came modernisation.

Modernisation hit India in 1947 and came to be recognised by an expression, which was later used by Jawaharlal Nehru while inaugurating the Hirakud Hydel Project. He referred to the hydro-electric plants as "The modern temples of India". A recent study has indicated that; since 1947, the number of tribal people that have been displaced (many of them more than once) amounts to an accumulative total of 60 to 65 million – the figure may be 40 million, but nobody can deny that it runs into millions of displaced

tribals. Generation after generation, the same families have spread out geographically as a consequence of economic development. Modernisation and industrialisation demand acquisition of as many of the resources of land and whatever is the wealth above the land; but most importantly, the wealth that is below the land with deep concern for the GDP growth rate, with 'no concern for, what happens to the people?'

In this connection, I would like to mention about the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. It is an antiquated colonial legislation which modern India has to get rid of; and replace it with a law that is not '*Imperial*' in nature. The British Act did not provide for any land acquisition for any private company by the Government, except for Railway companies. In 1920s, there were amendments which permitted the Government to acquire land in order to enable canteens and dormitories to be built for workers who were part of laying the Railway lines, till they moved further.

In 1984, the Land Acquisition Act was amended by the Indian Parliament to provide for '*massive and completely unrestricted / unlimited acquisition of private property by the poorest for the private benefit of the richest*'. In the same year Ranveer Sena started to take law into its own hands, which led to the resurgence of Naxalism, which had earlier become a phenomenon under Charu Mazumdar in a small district of Darjeeling. In the last thirty years it has grown as a result of the actions of Independent India, with delightful collaboration of a huge number of State governments. They have seen great benefit (for themselves) in bringing in capital investment; domestic in some instances and, even more lip smacking, led from outside India. This included the largest single investment ever made by the Republic of Korea anywhere in the world or received in India at the Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) Project, Odisha.

We have a complete disconnection between the rising curve of economic growth and rising curve of people's discontent. It manifested fully when Medha Patekar succeeded in persuading the World Bank '*not to finance*' the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River. But, we still went ahead. The World Bank's refusal was based on GOI and local government's lack of concern in not having a clear resettlement and rehabilitation plan. Today, we have the dam and lots of complaints by the displaced people.

Perhaps, that is the last multi-purpose dam that was built in India because these dams cannot be built without displacing people.

In recent years, there has been considerable increase in the entry of outsiders into these Tribal properties. Its sheer coincidence or may be strange are the ways of the Lord; because, much of our mineral resources are found in lands on top of which the tribals have been settled for centuries, even millennium. In the meanwhile, the value of what is above this land in terms of timber is over Rs. 50,000 crore annually, of which only a pittance of Rs 500 crore only finally reaches the tribals. Their lives have also been seriously disrupted by saying that *'they cannot access major forest produce on environmental grounds'*. An ordinary tribal who cuts down a tree is liable to immediate arrest and imprisonment. And, since he is a poor tribal he will actually be never released, even after his prison term is over. A tribal is entitled to have some access to *'minor forest produce'*; but that has so far been regulated by State corporations, who send in armies of non tribals into these lands. The tribal then, quite literally, becomes the *'hewer of wood and drawer of water'*. He provides the berries, leaves or the seeds or whatever grows on a plant/tree. It goes into the hands of the State Forest Produce Corporation, from there it finds its way to the United States; where it is used for plugging into oil drilling machines which are now used for producing shale gas – that is where the Guar gum and the seeds are now going. The tribal, regrettably, remains where he is.

This fast economic growth is breeding enormous inequality in our Country. Thus far, it has not damaged our democracy. But, now we are facing a dilemma. The democracy polity, which includes the tribals and the workers at Manesar, have got completely used to it through 15 general elections for the Lok Sabha, thousands of elections for State assemblies and millions of local bodies elections. They are aware of the secrecy of their ballot. They exercise their ballot in complete contrast to the developed countries. The poorest in India, the most powerless, have discovered that once in every five years they can determine who will form the next Government; and that nobody will be able to discover either who they voted for or how they voted. They exercise their ballot ferociously with enthusiasm and also with great viciousness.

India is the only democracy in the world where *'incumbency'*

is a serious handicap. In more than two third cases, the incumbent government is overthrown. Even when an incumbent government returns to office, more often than not, two third of the incumbent MPs are thrown out only for the reason that they had been in office for more than five years. In this way democracy is able to inflict retribution.

Democracy in that way becomes an active vengeance. However, it is only a matter of time, when the electorate discovers that whoever 'they vote for' or 'they vote against' their condition is not going to improve. Therefore, they feel that this 'five years revenge' cycle should perhaps be converted into 'once in five days' affair. That is why you get, this fury in which a completely innocent manager has his legs broken and his office set on fire – resulting in his death. To address issues; such as, demand for excessive wages, housing conditions and privileges of the labour class, we need to make our labour laws more flexible.

In our Country, we have such severe inequality that Vivek Deb Roy, an anti-Marxist economist, has estimated that in five years from 2004-2009 (which were the best years of GDP growth for India) the Ground Economic (GE) coefficient that measures inequality, the GE co-efficient of income and wealth in urban India has gone up from 0.37 to 0.65 – which means 'doubling of inequality'. We also have symbols of obscene prosperity everywhere; but, they are all part of the democratic space. There is also social unrest; and there is a cauldron bubbling in our Country. That cauldron bubbled first in the jungles of Dandakaranya. But today, we are talking not only about, "How to free Dandakaranya of Naxalism, but how to prevent this terrible disease from spreading through the rest of our Country, before it is too late?"

People have got used to democracy; which means 'one person one vote'. It also means that no person has more than one vote. Yet our economy says, "*one person many notes, many persons no notes*". The dilemma is, how do you reconcile votes with notes? It is because Indian society has always been aspirational more so, in the last 70 years. Today, even rural India wants to learn English. But, after learning English, the rural youth wants a job to fulfill his long awaited aspirations. But, is there a job available? The latest figures indicate that in the period of highest boom (2004-2009) in organised sector we were adding only 40,000 jobs a

year. Due to recent economic downturn the numbers have come down to 25,000 new jobs per year. Therefore, we need to have economic reforms to meet the rising aspirations of youth across the whole Country.

There is a need to understand the mind of the tribal; who finds himself displaced again and again 'repeatedly' because of a completely uncaring bureaucracy. The political system in both these States, Jharkhand & Chattisgarh, has been captured by non tribals who are completely contemptuous of those whom they are supposed to serve. In Chattisgarh; particularly, created because the Government wanted it to be a majority tribal area, the non tribal civil servants find the area to be of great discomfort; because there are no doctors in the dispensaries, no teachers in the schools and no engineers to look after the irrigation and the roads there. They are left to fester there and fester they did.

The Instruments in hand to improve the lot of tribals are principally :-

(a) The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992, called the 73rd Amendment, came into force on 22 April 1993. It is now sanctified as Part IX of the Constitution. It creates and indicates a road to empowerment of institutions of democratic local communities.

(b) It was supplemented in 1996 by a remarkable piece of legislation called the Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) of 1996.

If you combine the 73rd Amendment with PESA, you have an instrument of making the people feel that they are incharge of their own lives. If you affect the empowerment that is provided for in this Act; then, given what the Central Budget is earmarking every year, for the 29 subjects mentioned in the 11th Schedule that is Annexed to Part IX of the Constitution, you arrive at a figure of these 1/3rd affected districts being entitled to about Rs 50,000 crore of Central Government funding. If, of this Rs 50,000 crore the State Government were to retain about Rs 30,000 crore and give say Rs 20,000 crore to these Panchayats (that are partially or locally affected by Naxalism, we could go to the tribal, who is supporting the Naxalite and say, "You come here, you have Rs 20,000 crore of your own to spend; if you remain there, you will

either be killed by Naxalites or Security Forces". The choice is stark. Why would any rational people not pick the possibility of running their own lives in terms of the legal guarantees of the Constitution and PESA. As far as the Governors are concerned, we have the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution which requires the Governor to review any kind of law that is passed by the State Assembly before allowing it to go into tribal areas. We also have provision under Paragraph Three of the Fifth Schedule for the Central Government to direct the State Government in respect of the Administration of Fifth Schedule Areas. There is no lack of instruments; but, there is a total lack of will.

The Central Government has an integrated plan of Rs 50,000 crore administered by a committee comprising the District Collector, the Police Chief and the Forests Chief. It is these three functionaries who are responsible for the situation that got created. They are the ones that are given additional money to build the roads and schools, that they should have built anyway. But, they throw up their hands saying, *"Look at these awful Naxalites, they are destroying our schools"*. The tribals say, *"Yes, the school are there, but when did the teacher last come there?"*

I would like to reiterate, *"If we want to kill this alligator, which we must otherwise it will swallow all of us, we have to drain the swamp."* Draining the swamp means empowering the peoples' neighbourhoods and communities to take charge of their lives once again; empowering them with finances, functions, functionaries who will do their bidding; and ensure that, if there are any mistakes they will be of the tribals themselves and not of non tribals dominating over them. Once they know that they have got the money, power and self-respect; and find that they cannot be displaced without their consent and without adequate compensation; why would they pick up the gun against the Government soldiers and policemen?'. They will realise, there is no need to do so. But for them to do so, we have to include them in the process of governing and safeguarding their interests. This is the right way of looking at the problem. If it is taken only as a law and order problem, you cannot kill them all, because, then they will either move away or they will breed more of their kind. Every time innocent people are killed, it automatically creates more Maoists. In the end, I would like to say 'while there is this internal security problem',

we have to have security forces, dealing with it. They may be able to contain the problem but the solution lies in the hands of the civil society and the civil governments.

Chairman's Opening Remarks

I remember my first talk on Naxalite problem in October 2003 at the National Defence College, New Delhi, and later in 2004 at USI, wherein I had mentioned that this problem, which is being swept under the carpet and wished away as a mere socio-economic problem of the State concerned or at best a law and order, would one day pose a serious threat to our internal security. From a handful of districts in a few States this *hydra-headed* monster has spread to nearly 200 districts in 16 states. Our Prime Minister on 13th March 2006 said, "*Naxalism constitutes the greatest Internal Security Threat for the Nation*". In my personal opinion – severely affected districts would be about 80 out of a total of 608 districts that the Country has.

The phenomenal spread of Naxalism can be attributed to the inability of the State to deliver basic services and make the rural inhabitants, particularly in tribal belts, part of the national development process which provided space to the LWE to take roots in these States. Naxalites exploited the opportunity to discredit the capability of the Government and failure of the Parliamentary Democratic System of Governance to bring relief to the poor and deprived.

We have an eminent panel to go over the *ground realities and strategic challenges* to resolve the problem, but let me go over some of the ground realities which I had the opportunity to see from close quarters and not seen through the glass window of the air conditioned chambers in Delhi.

- (a) Exploitation and oppression of dalits, adivasis and landless people, living in interior areas due to feudal agrarian system and strong interface of caste and class. For the adivasis forest is their natural habitat and their means of livelihood. They have been deprived of their land and even the picking rights of the minor forest produce through the unfair Forest Conservation Act of 1980, which needs immediate relook.

(b) Total alienation of the population, due to virtual absence of health care, drinking water, roads, electricity and educational facilities in the interior areas, from the Government machinery.

(c) There are schemes after schemes for the development of the area – Central Government has allocated thousands of crores, but on ground not even 20 per cent of it has been deployed. The current system has completely failed to deliver or implement any of these schemes.

(d) There are liberated areas like '*Abhujmadh*', an area of 7000 sq km mainly in Chhattisgarh, which has no administrative machinery or police stations to govern this huge mass of land having nearly 237 villages and a population of about 20,000 tribals. This area serves as the Nerve Centre of Naxalites housing logistic and training bases. This area has not even been surveyed by the revenue department.

(e) *Inadequate Police Force*, in all the Naxal affected districts. The density of police force per sq km is just about 30 per cent of the average need. Not only this, the training and equipment profile, which goes to create the desired capability and capacity of the security force, is far from satisfactory.

(f) It will be unfair to blame the Government alone for the lack of development. Naxalites themselves do not want any developmental activity to succeed, they do not allow construction of roads and want the area to remain as such for their designs to succeed and the tribals to remain dependent on them.

(g) Naxalites resort to killings, kidnappings, abductions, extortions and IED blasts with impunity. They are reported to have developed linkages with terrorist organisations, like Maoists (Nepal), ULFA (Assam) and with other northeast extremist organisations for training and procurement of modern weapons.

(h) Naxalites are able to raise adequate funds for their cadres and other needs. It is estimated that their annual income runs into nearly 14 billion rupees.

(j) 80 per cent of coal reserves and nearly 19 per cent of other rich mineral resources are located in Naxal affected

tribal areas. With pressures building on greater exploitation of national resources, to maintain India's growth trajectory, this has given them an additional weapon and impetus to extract maximum benefits and greater scope for extortion.

The Naxalites have a centralised command and control; whereas, our response is most diffused. We have got to evolve a national strategy and response in a holistic manner which is ruthlessly implemented with specific time frame and strict monitoring. Political considerations must give way to national interest. The strategy must focus on tackling security environment and infrastructure development simultaneously, which would require immediate revamping and capability enhancement of the security forces deployed in these areas apart from improving numbers of security personnel per sq km of the affected area. The Governance per se and an innovative delivery system has to be put in place without any further delay. For all this to happen, better coordination between Central Government and respective State Governments has to be there. The present approach of State Governments towards National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) has to give way to what is the need of the hour.

If this strategy can be put in place our focus should be on economic development which is the most promising solution to the current state of affairs. Economic development increases accessibility and decreases individual dependence on others for survival. This also would encourage demographic mobility to reduce the feeling of alienation. For this, the Government has to be the prime mover and we cannot indefinitely wait for 'peace to return first' concept. What, possibly is needed is 'aggressive infusion of developmental effort' which should be all encompassing as far as essential human needs are concerned. One last thing I want to mention is that we have got to restore the 'dignity' of the Adivasis and evolve a system to get them speedy 'Justice' close to their place of residence.

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd) on The Naxalite Maoist Insurgency in India – the Root Causes and a Possible Solution

The Naxalite Maoist insurgency has been festering in India since 1946, when the Communist Party of India began working in North Bengal and Telengana among landless scheduled castes and tribes who worked for a pittance in the lands of the upper caste land

owners of these two areas. The root causes of this problem lie in the pernicious caste system of our society. During the evolution of this caste system, the upper castes saw to it that ownership of cultivable lands remained with the upper castes. As for the tribals during the evolution of the caste system, they were driven into the forests and hence came to be called *Vanvasis* or *Adivasis*.

The British did not interfere with this system. However, when India became Independent and the Constituent Assembly was convened to frame the Constitution of India, our leaders framed two Articles that are relevant to this issue – the Fifth Schedule and the Ninth Schedule.

Briefly, the Fifth Schedule states that all Scheduled Areas of the Country which are the Forest Reserves and that are inhabited by Scheduled Tribes are to be administered by the Governors of the States by appointing Tribes Advisory Councils from among the tribals of a particular Forest Reserve or a Scheduled Area. Regrettably, no Governor of any State in India has ever constituted Tribes Advisory Councils of Scheduled Tribes living in the Reserve Forests or Scheduled Areas of the States where they were functioning as Governors. In this vacuum, the Chief Ministers of the States have merrily administered their Reserve Forests by leasing forests for mining to private companies, evicting the tribals who were living in these forests for thousands of years.

The Ninth Schedule of the Constitution dealt with the fact that cultivable land, which over thousands of years had come under the ownership of upper castes, should be acquired by the Government and redistributed among India's landless peasantry. Since land was a State subject the States were directed to legislate Land Ceiling laws and implement these laws by acquiring farm lands from landlords and redistribute these lands to landless farmers who for thousands of years were working under the most abominable conditions on the lands of the land owners.

Regrettably only three States had implemented the Land Ceiling laws legislated by all the States by 1955. These were Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal and Kerala, the latter two when Communist Ministries were ruling there. In West Bengal, the *Jotedars*, as the landlords are called there, tried to manipulate the land records and deceive the landless farmers and the Government.

This resulted in an uprising in a village called Naxalbari led by a faction of the Communist Party Marxist called the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (CPIML). In Kerala, the Land Ceiling laws were successfully implemented in the plains districts and this has prevented the Maoist Naxalites from organising a revolution there.

In the vacant space created by the Central Government in not implementing the Fifth and Ninth Schedules of the Constitution, the CPIML, that has further evolved into the Communist Party of India Maoist (CPI Maoist), has entered on the scene from the 1970s, trained and organised the scheduled castes and tribes who were deliberately denied cultivable lands and rights in the forest or Scheduled Areas that are enshrined in the Constitution of India. The Land Ceiling Acts legislated by all the States are lying abegging in the statute books as also the Fifth Schedule because no Tribes Advisory Councils have been formed by any Governor.

Today, the States and the Centre are only screaming about the Maoist threat to the Country and a mini war is being carried out against the evil Maoists and the poor scheduled castes and tribes whom the Maoist leaders have organised as their cadres. Nobody wants a Maoist Government. But what is the answer to this problem? Is it to maintain a thunderous silence on not enforcing the Fifth and Ninth Schedules of the Constitution of India? Under what laws have the State Governments leased forest lands to mining companies when it is the Tribes Advisory Council who is to decide how to utilise their forest lands, where they have been living for thousands of years?

There is a simple solution to the problem of the forests. The forests have to be divided into sections of ten villages. The whole area should then be cordoned by the CRPF or BSF and Tribes Advisory Councils constituted in each section. The Para Military Force deployed around will prevent any Maoists from entering this area and also see that the Tribal Advisory Councils are formed. The Councils will then decide how to organise collection of Forest Produce or liase with mining companies. The rest of the State's Scheduled Areas should then be covered step by step in a similar manner. As each section of tribals find that the Government has now devolved powers to them through the Tribes Advisory Councils the Maoist leaders will automatically be neutralised. The CRPF should be retained in each segment cleared, to see that the Minor

Forest Produce from the forests are sold directly to the Cooperatives set-up by the State Government and the Private Sector businessmen are cut-out from trading with the Scheduled Tribes.

In the States, the Land Ceiling laws must be enforced by deploying the CRPF on the ground and supervising the removal of land in excess of the Land Ceiling laws of the State and distributing it to the landless people. The oppressed people will then realise that the CRPF are their friends and not the oppressive arm of a corrupt Government. This is not as simple as stated. There will be enormous pressures from the upper caste lobbies, particularly in States like Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. The Central Government should be firm on this and if necessary impose President's rule in the recalcitrant States if they refuse to obey the Centre's directions on enforcing the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.

Lieutenant General Vijay Kumar Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (Retd) on Naxalism: Ground Realities and Strategic Challenges**

Amongst all the insurgent, secessionist and revolutionary movements in India, the Naxalite problem at present is the greatest threat to India's internal security. This is primarily because of the nature, reach and expanse of this problem to nearly 40 per cent of the Country's landmass and at least 35 per cent of the population. The Naxal movement in India entered a phase of transformation with the merger of two of the principal lethal armed organisations, viz. People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), which resulted in the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), also called CPI (Maoists), on 21st September 2004. The merger of the PWG and the MCCI brought about a radical change in the dynamics of the movement in India.

Naxalism is a natural outcome of abject poverty, deprivation, exploitation, injustice and poor socio-economic conditions of an area. This is true not only for the states afflicted by Naxalism in India but also for any such area or country in the world, which is rich in natural resources but has been exploited unscrupulously by the State or a group of individuals or an individual, e.g. Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria etc. In India also, it is a case of 'rich land but poor people'. Poverty alone does not drive a man to violence;

it is social exploitation, deprivation and denial of justice along with poverty that drives a man to violence.

Non implementation of land reform laws, archaic forest laws, corrupt and repressive administration made the situation worse for the lower classes, especially the tribals in these regions. This coupled with illegal and uncontrolled mining activities, clearance of forests for timber, dams and industries led to large scale displacements of the indigenous tribes without any proper rehabilitation programmes. According to a study by D Bandhopadhyay, Chairman of the Expert Group of Planning Commission on "Development Issues to deal with Causes of Discontent, Unrest and Extremism", the villagers in the Maoist dominated areas lost trust and confidence in successive governments because 5.5 crore of the rural population was displaced between 1951 and 2005. These sentiments were fully exploited by the Naxal leaders to propagate the plight of the people at the hands of the government. Rehabilitation programmes, if any, were also not fully and effectively implemented leading to further discontent. All this has had a profound negative impact on the socio-economic conditions of these areas.

Human Development outcomes are a function of economic growth, social policy, poverty reduction measures and more importantly, their implementation on ground. Some of the indicators of major concern in these areas, which have led to social and economic development of the population are: poverty (BPL), education (availability of schools, literacy level), unemployment, land ownership, food security, health, mortality rates of children, hygiene and sanitation. A close study of all these indices and statistics, including those of mineral resources and forest cover, does suggest that the Naxal affected areas have wide gap between the national average and the affected areas, much to the disadvantage of the latter. For instance, these areas have over 42 per cent of the forest cover of our Country and enormous mineral wealth. Almost all type of minerals are found – coal, lignite, iron ore, bauxite, copper, zinc, manganese, lead, gold, mica, diamond, gypsum, graphite, limestone, crude oil etc.

Food security has a very important role to play in enhancement of human capabilities, which is directly related to employment opportunities. Poverty alleviation cannot be achieved through provision of economic infrastructure alone. There is a need to provide social

infrastructure along with supporting facilities like housing, power, telecommunications, sanitation and accessible surface connectivity that can give economic growth a human face. While these enhance the human capital and capability, the land (rich with natural resources) has not been the beneficiary of India's growth story. As there are no meaningful cash crops in these areas, people have taken to illegal growth of opium and cannabis, which gives the local population much higher returns in terms of cash, its adverse effects notwithstanding. Poverty alleviation can best be achieved by ensuring implementation of social and economic developmental projects on ground.

It has been seen that the support base for the Naxals has also increased substantially, particularly in the remote and inaccessible parts of rural India, primarily due to voids left by inadequacies of governance, as also non availability of basic amenities. Given the progressive increase in the spatial spread, casualties and destruction of infrastructure in the Maoists' affected areas, the statistics are too large to be ignored by anyone – instead, it warrants a serious look. As per statistics on the government website, 5467 civilians have been killed and 281 schools destroyed in the Naxal affected areas from 2001 to 2011. The governments, both at the Centre and in the States, have a great role to ensure the safety and security of its people. It is no longer a security related issue; but predominantly, has its roots in socio-economic, environmental, cultural and political problems. Insurgency is a result of accumulation of a large number of grievances - till such time these genuine grievances are addressed and the faith of the population in the legislature, judiciary and the executive is restored, the problem cannot be solved effectively.

In order to formulate and recommend a national strategy for conflict resolution of the Naxal problem, it would be prudent to lay out the key strategic challenges which must be addressed in order to move towards a definite end state, which is conflict resolution. Some of the major challenges, therefore, are – achieving national consensus, achieving inclusive growth, perception management, prevent further spread of Naxalism, empowerment of youth, ensuring implementation of developmental initiatives, isolation from external support, capacity and capability building of police forces, choke the flow of funds to Naxals and early passage of pro poor people socio-economic reforms. Harmonious Centre and States

relations are significant to conduct a synergised anti-terrorist and anti-Naxal campaign.

One of the key drivers of the national security process is the aspect of demographic growth. As per the Census of India-2011, India's population stands at 1.21 billion. India is one the youngest nations in the world today. It is, therefore, important to engage the youth, particularly from the Naxal affected areas, in a constructive and positive manner. Failure to empower the youth or to create number of jobs, with other factors, could lead to large scale unemployment and consequent serious conflict and internal instability. It remains a huge strategic challenge to empower the youth of the Country and to provide job related skills.

The Naxal problem is multi – dimensional that encompasses a large number of factors. There is a large amount of trust deficit between the people in the affected regions and the Government. It is this trust deficit, which is being used by the Naxals to gain the confidence of the locals by filling the void, which has been created due to the absence and ineffectiveness of the Government machinery. While formulating the National Strategy, it must be kept in mind that trust cannot be won overnight. It is a prolonged process and can be achieved only if successive governments, both at the Centre and the States, make genuine efforts.

Ms Shoma Chaudhury, Managing Editor, Tehelka on The Maoist-Tribal Crisis (A Synopsis)

How we articulate a problem defines the solution we bring to it. The Maoist crisis should not be seen as merely a security threat but a reflection on India's own approach to development; its neglect of the tribals; its greed to extract mineral resources now on any terms – by displacing tribals, violating environmental norms and having no regard for the rights of ordinary people

The Maoist affected areas should not be called "red corridors" but "grey zones". Who is a Maoist is a very layered question. Yes, there is a threat to the idea of India by Maoist ideologues, who want to overthrow Indian parliamentary democracy. But that is a distant threat and there are only a handful of party ideologues. The bulk of the Maoists following are tribals – the most dispossessed of Indians – who have joined the insurgency out of desperation; people who are angry with the Indian State; who have felt its brute

face; who have no health care, roads, electricity, schools; and more importantly, don't have access to justice. They are picking up arms not because they want to place the Communist flag on Red Fort. They are picking up arms because apart from neglecting them, the Indian State now wants to push them out of their lands to be able to get at the minerals. To declare war on these people is to declare war on our own people. It's better to wean tribals away from the Maoists by displaying the positive and benign face of Indian democracy than sending in only security forces.

Yes, some factions of the Maoists have become corrupt; yes there is coercion in their liberated zones; yes, many Maoist factions extort money from the corporate, but tribals are caught between the Maoists and the Indian State. What complicates this further is that the Maoists still speak a language of rights – forest and land rights of the tribals, and raise flags on illegal and senseless jailing of thousands of innocent tribals; they talk of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and PESA. These are issues that the democratically elected Government of India should be addressing. Instead of committing itself to improving its track record in these areas, a harsh security approach will only drive more angry citizens into the Maoist fold.

India is a country which is inhabited by two distinct sets of people - one which is fairly happy; people like us – privileged, middle class and rich. For us, Indian democracy is a very robust and benign place. For Muslims, dalits and tribals, India is a much darker place. When we say people have taken up arms against the Indian State, it's not our experience of the Indian State they are fighting and refuting; it's the experience of the Indian State that they experience, which is unfair, unjust and draconian. Unless we fix this, we can bring on as many police forces and security forces as we want, the fever will only rise.

You cannot police an entire nation; you cannot bring in the army into central India which is thousands and thousands of square kilometers. Just Kashmir required six lakh security forces; imagine the resources it would need to put down an insurgency that stretches across 200 districts and more than half a dozen states. Also, if we do this, the illogicality of violence and the gun will take over. With each mistake like Sarkeguda, the cycle of anger and violence will renew and expand itself.

If we want to control the Maoist crisis, India needs to create enclaves of model governance around the core crisis zones. Create more benevolent governance zones like Sarguja. The tribals themselves will get tired of the Maoists and the circle of fear and summary killings they are guilty of. Treat the Maoists as a political challenge. To call Naxals just terrorists is to miss the correct response the Indian State needs to have to them; because it paints them as pure, unmotivated evil and removes the burden of the Indian State from introspecting about itself. As DG, CRPF Vijay Kumar recently said, the security forces have to see the Maoists as adversaries, not enemies. In the final analysis, we need to win the moral battle against the Maoists.

Views of Former Governors

After presentations by the Panelists, the Chairman invited Lieutenant General VK Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd) Former Governor of Manipur and Nagaland and Lieutenant General Ajai Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Former Governor of Assam to share their views with the audience.

Lieutenant General VK Nayar highlighted the need 'to win over the people of the area'. Also, it was not the correct approach to create a new instrument everytime the Nation was faced with a new problem. He stressed that the main drawback of the present approach was that not enough efforts were being made to bring Naxalites into the mainstream. If we continue to tackle the Naxalites by using force, it is likely to create more problems. He recommended a 'people-centric approach, whereby the focus would shift to the people'.

Lieutenant General Ajai Singh in his brief comments posed four questions : Have we defined what India is? ; Have we defined who is an Indian? ; Are we resolved to solve the Naxalism problem?; Are there different types of threats to National Security? As there was not enough time to discuss these questions, he asked the audience to ponder over these in their own time. He was of the view that 'all threats to the Nation, whether external or internal, ought to be treated as one and addressed with single minded resolve, like we deal with a disease in our body'.

Discussion

Due to the constraint of time, the interactive session had to be

curtailed. The important points raised by the participants and responses by the panelists are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Crisis Management vs Long Term Preventive Steps. These are the two aspects which merit consideration. 'Crisis Management' comes in the domain of evolving an effective strategy. The state is well equipped to deal with security related issues. There is, however, a lack of consensus and resolve to use the instruments of the State decisively. Rightly, there should be no hesitation in using all the instruments of power to gain an upper hand against anti-national segments of the society because they are a threat to National Security. However, from the long term perspective, partisan political interests coupled with monetary considerations by the non-tribals (mining mafia) were hampering the Government's efforts to evolve and implement an effective plan of action. The Government needs to ensure that issues related to efficient governance are addressed with utmost honesty and transparency to meet the interests of local inhabitants and tribals fearlessly – without favouring any vested interests. If the Government servants and functionaries fulfill their duties and responsibilities related to improving the tribals living conditions, bringing them into the 'national mainstream' should not take a very long time. The Government's policy as enunciated by Shri P Chidambaram appears to favour that security had to precede development in most areas affected by Naxalism.

Role of Corporate World and Business Community . A few far seeing corporate houses have taken right steps in this direction. Some of them are : (a) Identifying and training tribal youth to get gainful employment and jobs to meet their economic needs. (b) Improving the effectiveness of Panchayat Committees by enhancing their mobility and accessibility into remote tribal areas by providing them the right means of transportation e.g. jeeps, trucks and heavy earth moving vehicles. (c) Providing quality education and amenities to meet the aspirations of the tribal people to identify themselves with the 'Spirit of Oneness' with the rest of the Country.

Building-up on Past Experience to deal with Separatist Movements. We succeeded in suppressing violence in dealing with Naga problem in 1950's, Naxals in early 1970's and Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s and worked out Peace Agreements;

albeit, without fully meeting the aspirations of the affected people in the long run. Past experience of dealing with such issues needs to be put to good use through better use of the government machinery to: (a) Enforce Constitutional Provisions with missionary zeal (b) Keeping welfare and interests of the tribals uppermost while executing infrastructural development projects and making use of mineral wealth and above the ground products like timber, forest produce and agricultural products.

Employment of the Military and Para Military Forces.

Employment of excessive force can lead to dangerous consequences. The men in uniform should 'present themselves as friends of the people' and not treat them as 'enemy'. The emphasis should be on 'catching the correct culprit', which at times may take a longer time, but that would not arouse the hostility of those who are not involved in hostile activities. The reason why the Army should not come into the area is because they are 'trained to treat their opponents as enemy' and to inflict maximum damage'. That is the 'psyche of the soldier' which motivates him to 'act with determination to succeed'. This attitude is alright against a 'sworn enemy', but not against own people; in a Country which takes pride in being civilised and believes in observing democratic norms which require that the rights of the people be respected. Unrestrained retaliation should be avoided. It needs to be appreciated by all such forces who are involved in anti-Naxal operations that the tribal people continue to live in fear and misery. They are fearful of coming out of the forests of Abujhmad, even when they fall sick; because if they stay out for more than five days, they are deemed to be informers by the Maoists and they cannot go back to their homes.

Linkages with Nepal Maoists. There are some distinct differences between the two. The Maoists in Nepal achieved success within four years; whereas Maoists in India, though they have been active since 1967, have achieved nothing as compared to them. The Maoists in Chattisgarh know their limitations. They know that it is not easy to fight against democracy by undemocratic means and that it would be a prolonged struggle.

We need to take note that the Naxalites only want 'Revolutionary Democracy'. We need to understand: What do they mean by 'revolutionary democracy'? They certainly want

democracy and are confident of getting their constitutional rights. Despite these differences, 'linkage between the two are there' and these (linkages) need to be strengthened by reaching out to them.

Conclusion

It may appear that the panel discussion has not indicated a clear cut approach to resolve the problem of Naxalism. Such a feeling is natural and correct to a great extent. As the papers presented and the ensuing discussion would indicate that it is quite a vexed problem. The number of people involved and the areas affected are large, underdeveloped and difficult terrain. The problem has been allowed to fester and a lot of time has been lost. One may definitely draw a conclusion that it has to be a multipronged approach and that resolution will take time. The State has to gradually regain the lost ground which it has lost due to lack of governance in these areas. It will require a special and dedicated band of administrators who would remain committed, even at a risk to their lives. The Security Forces employed in these areas will require a different type of leadership to succeed. It is not a simple law and order problem. It is a socio-political problem. The challenge is to neutralise the Naxalites, to win the hearts and minds of the people and draw them into the mainstream.

Rightly, the Naxalites should be treated as political opponents and not as terrorists and anti-national elements en masse. A mix of patience, firmness and effective governance would help in getting them into the mainstream of Indian polity and enable them to enjoy the fruits of a vibrant democracy.

Urban Perspective Plan – An Analysis of Maoist Perspective and Assessment

Lieutenant General VK Ahluwalia,
PVSM, AVSM and Bar, YSM, VSM (Retd)*

Introduction

Large scale violence along with the brutal killing of a manager at Maruti Suzuki's Manesar plant on July 18, 2012 has set the government thinking whether there is any Maoist influence on the trade unions in the industrial belts in the National Capital Region (NCR).¹ Approximately 200-300 workers (earlier reported to be around 3000) reportedly went on a rampage, destroying the CCTV cable network, its control room and then setting the office on fire, as a result of which around 100 persons, including two Japanese executives, were injured during the dreadful incident. Considering the nature of attack, the chairman of the company has claimed that 'Extreme Left Wing may have triggered Maruti violence'.² Near similar incidents of violence have taken place in other industrial hubs of the Country in the recent past. Notwithstanding the outcome of the investigations, the Maoist urban perspective plan merits an analysis to understand its likely multifaceted impact.

Consequent to the release of the '*Urban Perspective Plan (UPP)*' by the Maoists in 2007, three years after the release of their famous document, '*Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (STIR)*' in September 2004³, which had also partly dwelt on the urban revolution, the CPI (Maoist) puts forth the UPP – the strategy for the Maoist revolution in the urban areas. Based on the strategy propounded in the UPP and STIR, it is evident that the Maoists have seriously started spreading their tentacles and wings into semi-urban/urban areas. In fact, it was way back in January 2007, that the "Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist), at its meeting, is believed to have constituted an Urban Sub-Committee (USCO) to implement the plan.

* Lieutenant General VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM and Bar, YSM, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into Regiment of Artillery on 14 Nov 1972 and retired as GOC-in-C, Central Command on 29 Feb 2012. As the Central Army Commander, he was closely associated with the analysis of the Naxal problem, the ground realities and strategic challenges towards conflict resolution.

USCO is believed to comprise five very senior Central Committee members, and has been tasked with the building of the working class movement".⁴

Over the last few years, a fair number of arrests of the Maoists have been made from the important cities, more prominently the capitals and industrial hubs/cities of the country like Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Bangaluru, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Patna, Raipur, Ranchi and Chandigarh. It is under the 'All India Perspective Plan' that the Maoists have, as per reports, set-up a 'Golden Corridor Committee' to build its base in hitherto untouched areas of Gujarat and Maharashtra, stretching from Pune to Ahmedabad. These areas are one of the most industrialised belts in India and include commercial hubs like Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad, Nashik, Surat and Vadodara.⁵

Considering the serious dimension envisaged in the UPP by the Maoist, the paper seeks to analyse UPP in conjunction with the STIR and the broad rationale for the ideology and the strategy for building the urban revolutionary movement in India and the means to achieve their goals and objectives. Simultaneously, it also briefly discusses some of the actions that need to be taken to control the situation in time.

Essence of Maoist Document

The Maoist document STIR states, "*Work in the urban areas has a special importance in our revolutionary work.... in our revolution, which follows the line of protracted people's war, the liberation of urban areas, will be possible only in the last stage of the revolution.*"⁶

The Maoists are clear that the liberation of urban areas would form the last stage of their revolution, the centre of gravity being the urban working class. The Maoists in their grand strategy have enumerated plans for spread of their ideology and movement amongst the working class in the semi-urban / urban areas. They see the urban areas as the centres of power of the 'ruling class,' whom they plan to overthrow to capture political power. The working class in the urban areas are identified as a reliable ally in their revolution. They feel that the urban working class is exploited by the 'ruling class' and the capitalists, and therefore if properly motivated would form a major support base for their revolution, once it closes in on the urban areas. A study of their documents reveals that the Maoists consider that the urban movement would be one of the main sources, which would

provide cadres and leadership having various types of capabilities essential for the people's war and for the establishment of liberated areas. The responsibility for the provision of supplies, technology-expertise, propaganda, information and such other things, to the people's war, is seen to lie on the shoulders of the urban class. Hence, in their perception, the urban revolution has great significance without which, they feel that the growth of the people's war will face limitations and difficulties in its advancement. The Prime Minister's concern regarding the urban scenario is totally justified if we take into consideration the plans of the Maoists for the urban areas.⁷

Urban Areas as Strong Centres

The Maoists have laid a great deal of stress on their work in the urban areas. STIR, at pages 69-70, mentions, "We should not belittle the importance of the fact that the urban areas are the strong centres of the enemy. With this long term perspective, we should develop a secret party, a united front and people's armed elements; intensify the class struggle in the urban areas and mobilise the support of millions of urban masses for the people's war." The document examines the following issues in some detail, to draw useful deductions for the urban revolutionary movement ⁸ :-

(a) Deindustrialisation of some of the major cities and resultant reduction in workers' population in large industries and the strength of the trade unions/associations. The Maoists are required to carry-out local class analysis to formulate area specific action plan.

(b) Possible methods of exploiting ghetto – a slum or locality inhabited mostly or completely by one community – by dividing the communities on various emotive issues and by triggering violence / riots. The aim, therefore, is to make firm entries into the ghettos to organise the community(s) to carry forward the movement, among others.

(c) As per 'urban work' policy and guidelines, the role of political and military strategy in dealing with a stronger enemy (government) is also given.

Strategy and Methods to Achieve Objectives

The envisaged role of urban work would be to form close links with the working class and through the class struggle establish the party

as a proletarian vanguard, thereby mobilising and unifying all other sections (as identified by them to be likely allies) under the proletarian leadership. In the long term, the Maoists wish to avoid engaging the state in a fight till such time the conditions are not favourable. The Maoists opine that the policy should be one of protecting, preserving, consolidating and expanding the Party forces, while mobilising and preparing the broad urban masses for revolutionary struggle. It advocates the tactics of advancing step by step with restraint and maintaining the principle of waging struggles on just ground and turning it to their advantage by making use of such open forms of activity, as are permitted by law, decree and social customs. Their plan propagates that the party organisation within the urban areas must be secret, whereas the mass organisations should be open in order to have a wide base. However, they maintain that the link between the two must be kept in utmost secrecy. The work in the cities and towns has been combined under three broad objectives⁹:-

(a) **Building the United Front.** It envisages mobilisation of the basic class in the urban areas, i.e., the working class, as well as other classes and sections like the semi-proletariat, students, middle class employees, self employed persons and intellectuals, etc. It also aims at dealing with the problems of special social groups like women, dalits and religious minorities, and mobilising them for the revolutionary movement. Their goal is to form a *Working Class Unity* (e.g. trade unions), *Industry Based Unity* (formation of coordination committees of unions within a particular industry), *Issue Based Unity* (joint front of various unions and political organisations to oppose government policies or take up socio-political issues) and *Area Based Unity* also called *Ghettoisation* (common front for a particular industrial area/locality/community related problems like water, electricity, transport etc). Thus they aim at consolidating these classes into the party folds once they are suitably politically mobilised and then build an alliance between the working and the peasant class.

(b) **Military Tasks.** They have put forth military plans for the urban areas. They seek complementary roles for the urban class as far as military tasks are concerned. These involve infiltrating into the enemy ranks, organising activities in key industries, sabotage actions in coordination with the rural armed struggle,

providing logistical support etc.¹⁰ Setting up of *self defence teams* against social evils, secret self defence squads with an aim of participating with the masses to give them confidence to undertake militant actions during their struggles and formation of an *Urban Militia*¹¹ are their major military tasks for the urban areas.

(c) **All India Perspective Plan.** In order to put their urban plan into action, the Maoists have carried out extensive research to identify and prioritise the main target areas.¹²

Assessment

The Maoists have correctly assessed that the urban population in India today is greater than what was available in urban China at the time of the Chinese Revolution. Census of India 2011 substantiates the increase in urban population. Over the past decade, the urban population has grown by as much as 31.20 per cent as compared to the rural growth rate of 12.18 per cent.¹³ The Census 2011 shows us that for the first time in 90 years urban India (91 million) has added more people than rural India (90.6 million).¹⁴ The number of metropolitan cities with population of 1 million and above has increased from 35 in 2001 to 50 in 2011, and is expected to increase to 87 by 2031.¹⁵ Uncontrolled increase in urban population, without adequate infrastructure and facilities, could become a socio-economic problem of gigantic scale in the future.

Therefore, the importance that they attach to the urban revolution can be gauged by the fact that they have published a separate document detailing their ideology and strategy to be followed for urban areas. The urban area perspective however, is the last stage of the Maoist revolution and definitely not the end state. The document is obsessed in its approach towards appreciating the Indian fact file. The future perspectives have probably been deliberately ignored to retain an apparent upper hand in portraying the background information. Although the assumptions of the urban profile appear to be correct to a large extent, the Maoists need to understand that the urban areas have fairly effective democratic institutions, administrative and public information system in place, with basic amenities being made available to majority of the population. In addition, the urban centres have huge population, spread over a large area, which would be difficult to control by the Maoists. Notwithstanding this, considering the dynamic nature

of changing environment, better awareness and increased aspirations of the working class in particular, there is a need to pay special attention to the pulse of the trade unions and the working class, which may otherwise be a critical factor in the movement per se. The Maoists are looking towards the urban areas to supply them with literate cadres which would form the base of their leadership in the rural areas. In the short term, they, however, do not intend targeting the urban areas with guerrilla warfare style attacks as they fear that it may deter the literate urban class from supporting them, thus eroding their mass base.¹⁶

The document thus points to a long term approach of the Maoists towards the urban areas. This would include solidifying their existing bases in urban areas, trying to penetrate the industrial working class, trade unions, unorganised labour, white collar employees, youth bodies and NGOs. Under the current circumstances, they are required to provide logistics support to the Maoists operating in the rural areas by way of supplying arms, ammunition, medicines, food supplies, foot wear, clothing, spare parts, communication equipment, batteries etc. In addition, they could provide further impetus to mobilise the front organisations, media, social activists and human right activists to espouse their cause. They have also analysed the use of cyber warfare, which is intended to be used more in the urban environment due to higher penetration of the internet in such areas. Though not given out in detail, they probably intend to progressively target vital installations, crucial networks like financial networks, security networks and essential services, which today run on internet and social networks to profess their ideology and spread their propaganda.

Exploitation of Vulnerable Population

The Maoists intend to exploit the economic divide in the urban society at large. Their design aims to use and exploit the fault lines in the prevailing socio-economic environment, as also the condition of the displaced people. The people who migrate to the urban areas are predominantly young people, looking for better job opportunities and better quality of life. Non availability of the same in the urban areas coupled with exploitation by middlemen and labour contractors who offer low wages, no security, poor working conditions and no standard benefits, creates dissent, distress and disillusionment in the minds of the poor migrants. Most of these migrants are people who have given up their traditional source of employment in rural areas like

agriculture.¹⁷ Dr Moore R Scoot, Department of History, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, mentions, "While in the past, insurgencies grew among rural peasants, they now mature among the world's displaced and vulnerable urban populations."¹⁸ The poor living conditions and the widening disparity between the rich and the poor are particularly the main vulnerabilities. However, they have underestimated the capability of the established lot of private industry, which is today forming a large part of our services and manufacturing industry, in preventing the activism by the trade unions as private industries tend to look after their aspirations, attempt to apply best practises of human resource management and keep them under great amount of check as compared to government enterprises. However, a lot more needs to be done to improve the working conditions of the workers, their pay and facilities, improve working conditions, opportunities to improve their skills or professional knowledge and progression in their careers. The industry is also under tremendous pressure to contribute towards social and environmental responsibilities.

Migration is not a problem in itself. Migration from rural to urban areas is one of the natural outcomes of economic development. Mega cities provide better employment opportunities, modern amenities, education, culture and trade. Economic growth, especially when it is driven by services and industry, is labour intensive, both skilled and unskilled, though the proportion of skilled labour required is much more. Therefore, migration of people from rural to urban areas in search of better jobs, lifestyle and knowledge appreciation, is a natural outcome. Considering the demographic pattern, uncontrolled migration to the urban areas (predominantly the youth in search of jobs and better quality of life for their families) and resultant manifold increase in the population in the urban areas, it must be understood that rampant corruption and crime, lack of basic amenities cum essential services (facilities such as potable water, electricity, affordable houses, solid waste disposal, sewerage, education, medical, transport, security facilities), infrastructure and lack of job opportunities for the unemployed youth in the urban areas, could act as a catalyst to aggravate the conflict situation. In this context, the words of Dr Moore R Scoot, are relevant and merit due attention, "Within cities and populated areas, instability feeds on poverty, crime, ethnically exclusive enclaves and corruption."¹⁹

In a Policy Research Working Paper, co-authored by Henrik Urdal, senior researcher, and Kristain Hoelscher, research assistant, both from The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), have analysed at length the demographic profile, economic exclusion and unemployment, education, gender imbalance and their impact on the society.²⁰ Extraordinary growth in urban population could pose considerable challenges to the urban governance, in providing efficient and effective basic facilities and services, as also adequate job opportunities to the population, else may lead to instability and violence. The Maoists would make efforts to infiltrate trade unions / government organisations, which are responsible for providing essential facilities. They could, in consonance with the dissatisfaction among the population, create a crisis of sorts by disrupting the services like provision of electricity, water, clearance of garbage and waste to show their visibility in the urban areas.

The Maoist document also focuses on taking advantage of the religious divide between the Hindus and the Muslims, by proclaiming the Muslims as the oppressed class by 'fascist' Hindus.²¹ This is an alarming proposition as it tends to try and inflame a decades old perceived simmering feud between the two communities, which is not true and must be guarded against at all levels through proactive measures by the government machinery.

The All India Perspective Plan drawn-out by the Maoists does not appear to be pragmatic and fully implementable since it lacks credible direction and vision. The document is vague and does not indicate clear cut objectives, tasks, task analysis, timelines, logistics, finances, training, propaganda, communications, futuristic leadership or a credible action plan. While the document appears to have been circulated only to appease the masses by selling a popular dream, it could actually gain ground if we do not address the serious issue of uncontrolled urbanisation, huge unemployment among the youth, lack of basic facilities for the ever increasing urban population and exploitation of the workers etc.

Recommendations

- (a) The urban areas are easy for a criminal or insurgent to hide because of the high density of population in these areas. The tacit support being advocated to various types of mass organisations like trade unions, associations and NGOs for

furtherance and deeper penetration of their agenda in the government organisations/industries must be guarded against by proactive checks and preventive counter measures. Therefore, the surveillance, intelligence mechanism and law and order infrastructure has to be further strengthened, to take timely action against the terror and criminal networks. The leaders, who are given the task of organising urban support to rural insurgency must be identified.

(b) The strategy and modus-operandi of the Maoists' must be given adequate publicity to promote awareness, particularly along the industrial corridors and important cities identified by them. The perception management programme should also target their ideology.

(c) Maoists penetrating into trade unions / youth organisations and fostering communal / caste / regional divide among the communities, as propagated in their document, need to be identified and appropriate action taken. Therefore, our present focus on development in rural areas to curb Maoism must not be made an excuse to neglect the urban areas, for it may lead to disastrous consequences.

(d) As part of long term perspective plan, we must create new semi-urban areas in the vicinity of rural areas or on the outskirts of large urban areas, which can absorb the migrant population. Simultaneously, the aim should be to empower the rural economy, improve education, medical facilities, provide training for job related skills to the youth and create employment opportunities.

(e) Urban local governments will play a critical role in the structural transformation of the Indian economy and in sustaining the high rates of economic growth. Ensuring high quality public services in the cities and towns is important to meet the aspirations of the rising urban population and thus prevent violence and conflicts. While maintaining a watch over the activities in slums/ ghettos, the conditions of the slums need to be improved by selectively legalising them and providing essential facilities, among others.

(f) Specialised cyber crime units must be set-up to tackle cyber crimes.

(g) Since the Maoists have designs to penetrate into industrial hubs, the management of the industries too must take genuine interest towards the well-being of their workers and their families; i.e. working conditions, opportunities for upgrading their skills and career progression, salaries, hiring process, education and medical facilities, workers-management relations etc.

Conclusion

Just as we had grossly underestimated the threat of Maoists building-up in the rural areas for over a decade, as a result of which the rural insurgency has increased in its intensity of violence and spatial spread, it would be prudent to analyse the lethal 'threat in being' in the urban areas and take proactive measures to prevent it from taking roots. As extension of urban support for the armed struggle in the rural areas is of prime concern to the Maoists, the state must take immediate action to cut-off all intellectual, moral, psychological, financial and logistics support emanating from the urban areas. While addressing the ills of rapid uncontrolled urbanisation, the government must promote awareness of Maoist's urban perspective plans, improve intelligence mechanism, identify elements fostering religious/caste/regional divide amongst the working class and those penetrating the trade unions / youth organisations/white collar employees/ NGOs etc to instigate the vulnerable population.

Endnotes

1. Joshi Sandeep, 'IB asked to probe Maoist link in Maruti plant violence', The Hindu, July 23, 2012.
2. 'Extreme Left-Wing may have triggered Maruti violence', Times of India, August 02, 2012.
3. The document titled "Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution" was conceived by the Joint Central Committee of the PWG and MCCI prior to their merger in September 2004. Five draft documents were prepared after a series of intense discussions over a long period. The document is the synthesis of all important policies and perceptions of the two erstwhile parties.
4. PV Ramana, "Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement", IDSA Fellow Paper, New Delhi, July 10, 2009. Copy made available by author.
5. Mohan Vishwa - 'Red Octopus Spreads Tentacles in West India', The Times of India, 14 December 2011.

6. Maoist document, "Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution."
7. *"Rapid urbanisation has not only outpaced infrastructure development, but has also brought in its train a terrible downside - the downside of proliferating slums, the downside of increasing homelessness, the downside of growing urban poverty and crime, of relentless march of pollution and ecological damage. This gives you an idea of the massive challenge that lies ahead"* - Speech given by PM Manmohan Singh during the launch of Jawahar Lal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) on 3rd Dec 2005 via <http://jnnurm.nic.in/about-us.html> accessed on 23 Feb 12.
8. Document, 'Urban Perspective Plan.'
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10. 'Dangerous Shift in Maoist Strategy: IB' – The Asian Age, 06 Oct 2011.
11. Formation of the Urban Militia is envisaged only at an advanced stage of the movement.
12. Key Industries, towns and cities of military and economic significance from their document urban perspective plan UPP).
13. The Census of India 2011.
14. Ibid.
15. Ahluwalia Ishar Judge, 'Report on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services'
16. Such a similar situation has happened with the movement in 1971 when Charu Majumdar tried to usher in such dramatic attacks and violence in urban areas of West Bengal, which did not go down well with the urban middle class thus leading to a loss of support for the movement leading to easy subjugation by the security forces.
17. Between 1991 and 2001, over 7 million people for whom cultivation was the main livelihood, quit farming-P Sianath, "Census Findings Point to Decade of Rural Distress" – The Indian Express, 27 September 2011.
18. Moore R.Scoot, The Basics of Counterinsurgency.
19. Moore R.Scoot, The Basics of Counterinsurgency.
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Countering Terrorism

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Introduction

Terrorism has been spreading like bushfire despite Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and measures by individual countries. Take terrorism at sea where Somali pirates have increased their sphere of operations from 165 nautical miles off the Somali coast in 2006 to 1300 nautical miles.¹ The global terrorist map categorises the region Af-Pak, Iran, Iraq and Syria in 'severe' probability and South Asia and practically whole of South East Asia in 'high' probability.

Terrorism / Violent Terrorism

No universal definition exists for terrorism.² The US Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism as an act of violence intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government through intimidation or coercion or to affect conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping." The recent shooting at the Wisconsin Gurudwara killing six people was publicly described by the US Attorney General as an act of terrorism motivated by hate. Conversely, the Fort Hood massacre in the US in 2009 killing 13 and injuring 30 has never been described as an act of terrorism despite the shooter shouting "Allahu Akbar" while opening fire. Violent terrorism is a term coined by the West but without definition. The gas attack on Tokyo Subway in 1995 was termed an act of "violent extremism" killing 13, severely injuring 50 and causing temporary loss of vision to some 1000 people. The cult had two remote controlled helicopters and a Mi-8 helicopter smuggled in parts. Had they used aerial spraying, they had enough Sarin to kill one million people. Could you classify this cult non-violent 'before' the gas attack?³ Thousands of *madrasas* in Pakistan are indoctrinating little children. Is this non-violent terrorism? What about cyber attacks that can bust dams or strike at nuclear plants?

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Main Causes of Terrorism

There are two basic causes of terrorism. First is perceived political, social and economic injustice, lack of access to law and political participation. Second is a belief that violent means will usher in change because there is no other choice; other choices being considered ineffective. Terrorism does not always reflect objective social or economic deprivation. The cocktail of youth, illiteracy, unemployment, drugs and weapons are ready made prescription for terrorism with terrorist organisations luring youth on promise of employment. The term non-state actor is a misnomer since he resides in a state and requires funding, arming, administrative and other support. Therefore, the state can really not abrogate total responsibility. At the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Trialogue (2010), Afghan Lieutenant General Abdul Khalid told Pakistani participants that they ought to discuss where terrorism was emanating from and who is supporting it.⁴ On 5th October 2011, Afghanistan confirmed Pakistani complicity in plotting assassination of President Karzai. Even in the case of cyber attacks, technology can fairly give out (99 per cent in case of China) the origin of attack.

Religious fundamentalism and radicalisation are major drivers of terrorism, so is sectarian strife. China has used terror for spreading communist ideology - spawning and supporting Maoists movements in Nepal and Myanmar, New People's Army in Philippines, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Japanese Red Army and Shining Path in Peru. States like Pakistan sponsor terrorism as a policy option in addition to supporting and instigating indigenous terrorist outfits to undertake terror tasks at their behest. In recent years, hate crimes have proliferated, neo-Nazis and white racists hitting headlines periodically. A dangerous phase of terrorist infiltrating security forces has begun - Pakistani media mentions this in terrorist attacks on Karachi and Kamra airbases. Indian Maoists talk of plans to infiltrate security forces for killing political leaders. Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD's) by terrorist organisations will usher in a critical phase. Success of banning terrorist organisations is questionable as these organisations have numerous affiliates, infinite ways to finance and periodically switch names. A disturbing phenomenon also is low level political support to terrorists because of vote bank politics and passivity in countermeasures (physical action, appropriate laws, prosecution etc) again fearing erosion of vote bank.

India's Volatile Neighbourhood

Admiral Mike Mullen had confirmed Pakistan's state policy of terror before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵ Pakistan apparently adopted it on advice given by Chinese Premier in 1960's that Pakistan should prepare for prolonged conflict with India instead of short-term wars, advising raising a militia force to act behind enemy lines.⁶ MK Dhar, former Joint Director IB says, "Way back in 1992-93transplanting armed modules in the heartland of India had started taking cognisable shape.....cells were identified in Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Kota/Ajmer region of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala. SIMI had already started deputing 'volunteers' to Pakistan for training along with the Mujahedeen, Taliban and Al Qaeda cadres. They established firm linkages with organisations in Bangladesh." Ajmal Qasab admits to training by Pakistani Marines; creation of Indian Mujahedeen by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence stands established and more damaging evidence has come from Abu Jundal, all of which Pakistan denies.

ISI is linked with Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani network, LeT, HUJI, HuM, LeJ, Dawood Ibrahim, in Bangladesh with AHAB, Huji BD, JMB, JMJB, and in India with SIMI, IM, Maoists, PFI either directly or through LeT (covert arm of ISI). At the same time, LeT is indoctrinating, training and arming Maldivian youth in Pakistan.⁷ Ashley J Tellis recently stated, "The only reasonable objective for the US is the permanent evisceration of LeT and other vicious South Asian terrorist groups—with Pakistani cooperation if possible, but without it, if necessary."⁸ Bruce Riedel adds, "With Al Qaeda on the ropes, LeT, with the help of Pakistani backers, is now probably the most dangerous terror group in the world."⁹ As for Taliban, Murtaza Ali Shah says, "Taliban commanders acknowledge in BBC documentary titled 'Secret Pakistan' that Pakistan is still running training camps to support and arm the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan." Why Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks the Pakistani establishments sometimes is reflected in the October 2011 statement of Maulvi Fazlullah of TTP: "Pakistani leaders approach us when their relations sour with the US and later forget their promises.... We know these tricks and do not trust their promises". Understandably Pakistan doesn't have 'total' control but links are maintained and used.¹⁰ An editorial in Express

Tribune stated, “.....this time too Pakistan could infiltrate its non-state actors to achieve ‘strategic depth’..... What is scarieris the perception that Pakistan doesn’t control its non-state actors hundred per cent, as demonstrated by the Punjabi Taliban fighting the Pakistan Army in parts of Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).” Concerns about safety of Pakistan’s nukes must also be viewed concurrent with increasing radicalisation in Pakistan that affects the military too.

Terrorist infrastructure is intact in Pakistan and POK.¹¹ Jeff M Smith categorically wrote in Washington Times that Pakistan is playing a double game and Pakistan is using Islamist militants as an extension of its foreign policy. Deliberate violation of ceasefire and their latest hand in inciting communal tensions in our North East indicates their resolve for continuing mischief. The ISI-military combine has taken the polity and bureaucracy hostage in Pakistan.¹² Huma Yusuf writes, “In the absence of the activism of democracy, you are left with the fatalism of patronage.....patronage also nullifies future possibility of democracy....” Is India countering Pakistani propaganda adequately? Talk to foreigners / think tanks and their response is “very poorly” especially when results of first ever poll on both sides of the Line of Control in J&K conducted by Chatam House, UK¹³ conclusively proved 98 per cent of people in J&K do not wish to be part of Pakistan and 50 per cent of people in POK do not wish to remain with Pakistan.

China was reportedly running a training camp for Taliban in Xinjiang before the US invaded Afghanistan. It is providing sanctuary and support to ULFA, tacit support to Pakistan’s anti-India *jihadi* policy and support to insurgents in Northeast India. Sophisticated weapons and communication equipment are being smuggled in. China has recently gifted an AK 47 manufacturing facility to Kachen rebels in northern Myanmar and these rifles are being supplied to the PLA in Manipur and Indian Maoists.

Countering Violent Terrorism

Delivering the Madhav Rao Scindia Memorial Lecture in 2011, The Dalai Lama had said, “It is difficult to deal with terrorism through non-violence.....They (terrorists) are very brilliant and educated...but a strong ill feeling is bred in them. Their minds are closed.....The only way to tackle terrorism is through

prevention.”¹⁴ There is tremendous merit in these words though fully radicalised hardcore terrorists are beyond the ambit of prevention. Therefore, an effective strategy for countering violent terrorism should comprise:

(a) Treating ‘community’ as centre of gravity negating their support to terrorism, providing security both physical and moral including thorough systematic education, development and psychological programmes.

(b) Continuous de-radicalisation of communities; varied focus may be needed for select communities/ regions, teachers / religious teachers, youth, girls / mothers, apprehended terrorists plus population at large that is liable to support terrorism.

(c) Use force to strike the hardcore / terrorist infrastructure through special operations, preferably by proxy.

(d) Security Sector (indigenous) operates simultaneously at moral and physical levels; provide security and assistance to population while destroying terrorists and blending development and education with combat operations.

(e) Choke state support to terrorism, including states in which so called ‘non-state actors are located.

(f) Establish efficient intelligence system with intelligence acquisition and psychological operations road maps.

(g) International strategy must accommodate individual national interests to maximum extent.

(h) Effective periodic re-evaluation of measures affected versus changes required. At the strategic level, a doctrine is required to attack radicalisation and recruitment for making the environment more permissive despite this being a very tall order.

Dialogue with the population must be continuous. Genuine efforts are required to resolve local disputes and grievances. Locals must be integrated into making communities safe, assigning roles and responsibilities for threat mitigation and sharing accurate threat related information. Locals must be involved both in executing development plans and generating them. Community policing is a

good concept over which can be superimposed community based monitoring groups / ombudsmen. Education should be integrated into the national mainstream with adequate mix of ethics and true nationalism. Alternatives need to be introduced to expend youth energies including employment avenues. Psychological treatment is required including exposing terrorist abuses. Communities need to be informed and empowered to challenge radical ideology. Finally, an effective monitoring system needs to be instituted to measure the effects of de-radicalisation versus ongoing radicalisation – to gauge what is succeeding and corrective measures needed. Police forces must differentiate between law and order and countering terrorists. They must avoid / minimise collateral damage. They will require training for engaging communities. They must respect religion, culture, women and customs of the population. Genuinely assisting in education and development will help win the population. Training is also essential for private security organisations, educators, religious teachers, community leaders, and other relevant government officials and NGOs, however, this should not be forced upon the population. It is better to first coax them into willingness. Overall effort should be to provide a sense of 'belonging' to locals.

Considering the expanse of terrorism, a collective approach at global level is essential; building global consensus against terrorism. More focus will be required on terrorist breeding / terrorism prone regions / states / communities.¹⁵ A 2009 study by the 'Centre For A New American Security' said, "Some countries require particular attention. Pakistan, for example, represents the most difficult problem because it has become the host of the global jihadist movement and terrorists can increasingly operate with impunity there because of the weakening of the state.... challenges must be addressed with a range of different tools and approaches."

Special Forces and Special Operations

Special Forces are ideally suited in countering violent terrorism since they are adept in covert operations. They should be central to asymmetric response in countering threats like terrorism. Their application should be at low and precisely calculated levels without signatures or with ambiguous signatures. The objective should be to achieve strategic objectives through application of modest resources with the essential psychological element. They should

preferably operate by proxy and / or in conjunction indigenous special forces. They may also operate incognito as force multipliers to indigenous security sector, as required. The roles for which special operation may be launched could cover:

- (a) Information support operations.
- (b) Neutralising terrorist leaders, organisations, support groups, infrastructure including by infiltrating terrorist organisations through proactive, sustained and disruption operations.
- (c) Intelligence, surveillance, psychological operations.
- (d) Incident response operations; building partner capacity in countries under terrorist threat.
- (e) Employing unconventional warfare against state sponsored terrorism and trans-national terrorist groups.
- (f) Assisting existing resistance movements where populations are subject to genocide.

Faced with asymmetric wars by China and Pakistan who have no compunctions about using terror to de-stabilise, the ostrich like approach of barricading one's own house cannot suffice. There is urgent need to create a deterrent against irregular and unconventional forces. India must go for pro-active employment of Special Forces to create such deterrence.

International Cooperation

Establishing and linking Regional / National Counter Terrorism Centers is required. Intelligence must be speedily shared through real time communications. An overall preventive strategy is essential. International cooperation should include better coordination and resource optimisation, sharing of technology, data, tools, models and visualisation, R&D for counter terrorism including in cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. Joint training for special operations, periodic dialogues and forums will help build collective capabilities. It should also be noted that while hackles get usually raised in some sections whenever an 'alliance' is mentioned, it is possible to achieve the same through strategic partnerships that can be both at bilateral and multilateral levels.

Conclusion

Terrorism is a self-perpetuating virus that threatens to consume entire mankind. Manifestations like hate crimes have added in recent years. Sole focus on eliminating terrorist organisations rather than treating community / population as centre of gravity has increased radicalisation, especially in Pakistan. GWOT has not made much headway with patchwork operations serving individual national interests. India must take note that the China – Pakistan asymmetric wars aim to destabilise and balkanise India. Their support to Maoists and other terrorist organisations in India is proof enough. Simultaneous with Pakistani parliamentarians on peace mission to India this August, Pakistan resorted to deliberate breaches of ceasefire and incited communal violence in our northeast through misinformation on social media. The ISI – military in Pakistan hold democracy to ransom and their confrontationist approach towards India is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. We must develop adequate deterrence through pro-active covert special operations. Globally, a holistic pro-active preventive approach to tackle radicalisation suitably integrating special forces operations to destroy the core need to be adopted.

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The National Counterterrorism Centre: Critique and Recommendations

Dr Prem Mahadevan*

Introduction

The proposal to create a National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) is sound, but the mandate and structure of this organisation should differ from that presently suggested.¹ At present, the NCTC proposal (under review due to objections from some state governments) tries to fuse two distinct intelligence systems into a common framework. These are –

- (a) A warning intelligence system and,
- (b) A counter intelligence system.

However, each system has different objectives. By combining them in the same organisation, without clear separation of tasks or delineation of responsibilities, the proposed NCTC risks losing focus. It would end up being scapegoated for failing to prevent attacks, since it would have the mandate but not the method to fight terrorism.

Warning Intelligence System

In counterterrorism, a warning intelligence system aims to predict outlier events such as unconventional, mass casualty attacks, the execution of which require considerable planning and coordination. Warning intelligence tracks the organisational learning and doctrinal innovation of terrorist groups. It is best suited to the 'war model' of counterterrorism, which is driven by specific events rather than ongoing processes. It functions on the premise that all information necessary to prevent a terrorist attack has already been gathered, and just needs to be pieced together. A telling example is the US National Counterterrorism Center, which was conceptualised, post 9/11, to serve as the apex of a warning intelligence system. Its operational role is virtually non-existent.²

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The US National Counterterrorism Center

From open sources, it appears that the US NCTC duplicates the strategic analysis and assessment function of other intelligence bodies that have ground-level source networks, such as the Central Intelligence Agency. It has no mandate to collect intelligence independently. Neither can it order other agencies to follow-up on its assessments and recommendations. Its role is confined to advice-giving and agenda-setting, neither of which is binding upon sister government agencies that deal with counterterrorism.³

Thus the NCTC, which is an information-sharing hub based in Virginia, is forced to rely on second-hand data to frame assessments. Its analysts are far from the epicentre of counterterrorist action in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. As such, they are better suited to track long-term trends in terrorist activity, rather than deliver time-sensitive 'actionable' reports to law enforcement personnel in the field. (Experience has shown that for intelligence analysts to support tactical decision-making, they must be located close to their targets and in direct personal contact with their consumers).⁴

The US NCTC has been designed to backstop the analytical efforts of other agencies, so that if another complex and unconventional attack such as 9/11 were planned, warning signs could be pieced together swiftly enough for preventive action to be taken. This system would offer little defence against a less sophisticated conspiracy, conceived of and executed by domestic militants operating within a much smaller space than what the 9/11 planners had. In short, a warning intelligence system makes sense against terrorists who coordinate their activities across great distances, leaving a large electronic footprint. It is less useful against self-starter modules relying mostly on verbal communications.

Counter Intelligence System

A counter intelligence system on the other hand, aims to pursue the planners of smaller attacks which feature tried and tested tactics, and which can be carried out with relatively little preparation. This intelligence system serves to track the physical movements of terrorist cadres and mostly operates under the 'criminal justice model'. A counter intelligence system assumes that additional information always needs to be obtained through detainee interrogation, document exploitation and rapid follow-up action.

As with other long-term threats like espionage and subversion, a counter intelligence system treats terrorism as a police problem rather than a military one. Instead of triggering dramatic responses to an intense but isolated threat, it coordinates routine responses to a manageable but continuous threat.

UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre

An example is the UK's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). Although nominally similar to the American NCTC, it was set-up in June 2003 ie., *before* the UK was hit by Islamist terrorism in July 2005. It therefore did not have its mandate warped by the political after-effects of a massive domestic trauma such as 9/11. As a result, it has been able to develop organically from the UK's own counterterrorist tradition, which is grounded in fighting separatist militancy in Northern Ireland. Facilitating the identification, surveillance and penetration of terrorist modules through timely strategic assessment is its core function. This requires that, through its parent organisation MI5, JTAC must work closely with the Metropolitan Police's Counterterrorism Command and local Special Branch units. Although an analysis and assessment body, it receives information from MI5's eight Regional Intelligence Cells (RICs) spread across the UK. The RICs function as a *de facto* information collection grid for JTAC.⁵

In a small island-country like the United Kingdom, where cross-border movements can be monitored and suspects tracked physically, intelligence efforts are focused not merely on predicting conspiracies but on penetrating and manipulating them through undercover operations. While threat assessment is a routine part of JTAC's work, its primarily objective is not to anticipate one-off events originating from abroad, like the US NCTC, but to calibrate the police response to an ongoing process of domestic radicalisation.⁶

Difference between Warning and Counter Intelligence Systems

A warning intelligence system is designed to combat terrorism in the manner adopted by the US National Counterterrorism Center. It would aim to 'watch the shores rather than the sea', since the terrorist threat would primarily emanate from abroad, and would likely be massive in its operational scope. A counter intelligence system, however, would be like that headed by the UK's JTAC, and would focus inward, on separating terrorists from their sympathisers. It would use legal instruments to neutralise plotters

after gathering evidence of their culpability. In some cases the evidence might be gathered through 'sting' operations. The main differences between the two systems are summarised below.

Warning Intelligence System	Counter Intelligence System
Aims to <i>predict</i> low probability/high impact events, such as WMD, aviation or maritime terrorism.	Aims to <i>pursue</i> the perpetrators of high probability/low impact attacks, such as firearm assaults and low-yield IED blasts.
Suited for countries located far from terrorist bases and sympathisers.	Suited for countries located close to terrorist bases and sympathisers.
Prioritises intelligence analysis to enhance anticipatory capacity.	Prioritises intelligence operations to enhance response capacity.
Requires well-rehearsed emergency protocols to deal with a one-off surprise attack.	Requires institutional liaison for continuous joint operations with local police.
Is focused on incident prevention, and is minimally affected by legal constraints.	Is focused on combating subversion, heavily shaped by legal requirements.

An Assessment of India's Counterterrorism Intelligence Requirements

After Kargil, India began building a counter intelligence system to counter Pakistan-sponsored terrorist networks, but following 26/11, it abruptly switched over to the American model of a prediction-oriented warning system. (The switch might have been partially prompted by spurious American and British arguments that 26/11 was a 'rogue' operation, executed independently of Pakistani state involvement). The structural shift was not explicitly recognised as a change in organisational and operational focus. Consequently, there has been political and bureaucratic confusion as to what value-addition the NCTC would provide to counterterrorism, and what its structure should be.

Criticism over Purpose and Structure

There are principally two main sticking points in the political debate.

(a) Firstly, should the Indian NCTC be placed under the Intelligence Bureau, or should it be a stand-alone organisation like its American counterpart?

(b) Secondly, should NCTC operatives be given arrest powers?

According to one expert, the answers to these two questions

are mutually opposed. If the NCTC is to be under IB control, it should not have executive powers as this could expose it to accusations of human rights violations and politically-motivated spying.⁷

Removing the NCTC from IB control (as is currently being considered) might be a serious mistake. The organisation has evolved from the IB's Multi-Agency Centre, which was basically set-up to guide counter intelligence efforts against terrorism. The MAC was not focused on predicting outlier events, like 26/11 (which has been the Indian equivalent of 9/11). Rather, it was supposed to pool together data held in police and subsidiary IB records across the Country; data which was vital to tracking the all-India operations of Pakistani terrorist networks. As the nodal agency for counterterrorism, the IB was a logical home for the MAC and is also a logical home for the NCTC.

By attempting to place the NCTC under IB control *and* seeking arrest powers for its operatives, the Union Home Ministry was acting correctly in a narrow operational sense. However, it politically overreached. Critics alleged that it was trying to bypass the implicit reluctance of opposition-ruled states to lend full support to counterterrorist efforts. They ignored the more plausible explanation: the NCTC must have arrest powers because many past IB operations have been frustrated by bungling and or/interference from state police forces, on whose cooperation the agency's performance depends.⁸

In adopting an American label – 'National Counterterrorism Centre' – the Home Ministry has created an erroneous impression that the Indian NCTC is modelled on its US counterpart. In fact, the proposed NCTC is a mismatch of two systems, one focused on counter intelligence (a legacy of the MAC) and one focused on warning intelligence (a result of the political shock caused by 26/11). These two systems both need to be fed with the latest secret information, and both need a built-in memory, in the form of a professional analytical cadre. However, the difference in their tasking means that they should be allowed to function in two distinct work patterns, rather than be intermeshed.


Suggestions for a Modified NCTC

The NCTC structure should allow for a clear delineation of long-term versus short-term analytical tasks. Within its short-term tasks,

its working should allow a differentiation between defensive and offensive objectives.

Defensive analysis would focus on identifying critical vulnerabilities in the Country, assessing the probability of their being attacked, and developing crisis management protocols to minimise the damage done if an attack were to occur. *Offensive* analysis would focus on identifying critical vulnerabilities in the terrorists' command, control, communications, intelligence and logistics systems. These would then been targeted for action by the state police; action which would be calibrated by the NCTC either directly or through the local Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau.

For greater efficiency, the Indian NCTC should not have one common database on Pakistani jihadist groups but rather, three separate databases. Each database should hold only that information which is relevant to the needs of its principal consumer. This would prevent the NCTC's warning and counter intelligence analysts from each getting bogged down in irrelevant trivia and thus being unable to piece together critical inputs in time. An outline of how the NCTC could be structured is given below:



The above structure is suggested based on the following twin assumptions:

- (a) Pakistan shall remain a key base area for anti-Indian terrorism and,
- (b) Elements within the Inter-Services Intelligence may assist large-scale attacks on India through jihadist proxies.

At the moment, there seems to be little acknowledgement from the political class, and even sections of the security bureaucracy, on the enduring threat from Pakistan. Thus, it is imperative to focus the NCTC exclusively on Pakistani jihadism, with a view to raising awareness levels among strategic and tactical decision-makers.

The Director NCTC should preside over a three-part organisation, plus a secretariat dedicated to maintaining liaison with state police agencies, sister central agencies, and foreign governments. The three functional components of the NCTC should respectively deal with warning intelligence, counter intelligence and psychological intelligence.

Warning Intelligence Division. This division would track tactical and doctrinal innovation in jihadist groups and devise counter-measures. Should another complex attack like 26/11 be planned against India, the division would have to piece together details of the conspiracy in real time. It would however, not be responsible for predicting conventional incidents of terrorism, such as small-scale IED blasts in crowded areas. Rather, its aim would be to provide warning of one-off spectacular attacks, which would necessarily be preceded by much planning and preparation from the terrorists' side. Examples could be: attacks on energy infrastructure and commercial shipping, and mass hostage incidents at educational institutes. The division would have one cell focused simply on collating all source reports dealing with known terrorist attack plans, another cell which would analyse these reports for signs that a conspiracy is underway, and a third cell which will assess the likely damage done.

Counter Intelligence Division. This division would map out key vulnerabilities in the command, control, communications, intelligence and logistics networks of jihadist groups. It would identify priority targets for the state police forces to neutralise or gather further

information on. For instance, which jihadist cadres are most effective in coordinating preparations for terror attacks, which supply routes need to be shut down urgently, which communications channels need to be monitored for further intelligence leads? The CI division would employ regular tools of the trade i.e. link analyses and association models, to determine just how deep within India the striking capacities of jihadist groups reach. Ideally, it would also track ISI activities that are specifically focused on covert action, as opposed to plain espionage against military and political targets. This would involve monitoring Pakistani efforts to co-opt and manipulate Indian lobby groups and 'peace activists'.

Psychological Intelligence Division. This division would have the responsibility of studying terrorist recruitment patterns, organisational structures, fund-raising activities, and propaganda. It would provide medium-term forecasts about changes in the intensity and trajectory of the jihadist threat facing India. For instance, is Lashkar-e-Toiba seeking to position itself as a global successor to Al Qaeda, or is it seeking to trigger an Islamist insurgency in India? The former would suggest that more brazen i.e. Mumbai-style, attacks are likely, while the latter would suggest that LeT will outsource operations to the Indian Mujahideen to maintain plausible deniability. The psychological intelligence division of the NCTC would have to formulate assessments that look at such macro-level questions, based on data received from open sources and peripheral secret sources.

Conclusion

At the moment, there does not seem to be a clear typology of the terrorist threats facing India and the different kinds of responses needed to counteract them. The proposed NCTC, as outlined in official statements, shall deal with everything from preventing terrorist attacks, to pursuing the perpetrators, to crisis management. The problem is, pursuit of terrorists has little value after a rare catastrophic attack like Mumbai 26/11, since the key planners would be safely ensconced in Pakistan. For smaller attacks carried out by LeT affiliates like the Indian Mujahideen, the objective should be to track down terrorists and their supporters on an ongoing basis, without waiting for evidence of a major plot. Anticipating a catastrophic attack would require the NCTC to organise drills and rehearsals with Central Paramilitary Forces and elite intervention

units like the National Security Guard and Army Special Forces. Meanwhile, pursuing second-order terrorists would require that the NCTC maintain close ties with state police.

Eventually, the Indian NCTC would have to fuse together the operating philosophies of the US National Counterterrorism Center and the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. India faces both kinds of threats: mass casualty terrorism using unconventional tactics, and small-scale attacks from locally recruited and brainwashed jihadists. It needs to have a specialist agency for counterterrorism that can look both outwards and inwards at the same time. Unlike the US, India does not have the luxury of treating terrorism as an exclusively foreign threat. Neither is it lucky like the UK, which only has to deal with disorganised terrorist modules whose trade craft is not very sophisticated.

India is under continuous covert attack from its hostile neighbour. It needs to develop both a counter-intelligence system to deal with high probability/low impact scenarios (such as small scale bombings), and a warning intelligence system to predict low probability/high impact scenarios (such as another sea-borne assault or an attack on a nuclear site). By paying lip-service to India's resilience but still refusing to denounce the main sponsor of jihadist terrorism in South Asia, the US and the UK have shown both; the extent and the limits of their friendship. It is therefore necessary for India to stop blindly emulating their counterterrorist structures, and instead, evolve a system catered to its own needs.

Endnotes

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The Recurring Violence in Western Assam – An Analysis

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)*

Introduction

There have been severe communal clashes and rioting between the indigenous Boro tribals of Assam and the Bangladeshi Muslims settled in the region in July 2012. It is reported that more than eighty people have died in the rioting. More Bengali Muslims than Boros have died. The figures of the injured should reflect the same situation with more Bengali Muslims having been injured. This should indicate that most probably the riots were instigated by the Boros. These riots have also found an echo in other parts of the Country, such as in Mumbai on 11 Aug 2012.

The reasons for the present rioting are explained in this paper. As will be seen it was known that tension between the two communities had been building-up ever since the territory of Kokrajhar and Chirang districts became part of the Boro Territorial Council (BTC). The BTC comes under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and this would mean that in this area land can be owned only by a tribal and there can be no transfer of land from a tribal to a non tribal.

The Root Causes of this Communal Divide

The roots of this problem go back to the coming of the British into Assam in the 18th century. In the 13th century, Assam had a number of kingdoms ruling the Brahmaputra valley. There were remnants of the Koch Rajbongshis in western Assam, the Dimasa Cachari kingdom with their capital in Dimapur and controlling some portions of central Assam. In the East, the Morans and Chutiyas were controlling parts of what we now call Upper Assam. It was at this time that a Burmese prince Sukapha after having some differences with his brother ruling the kingdom of Ava or Burma left Burma westwards, and crossing the Patkai hills that divided

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the Brahmaputra valley from the Irrawaddy valley of Burma, entered into Upper Assam. There must have been some opposition from the local king, but the Burmese prevailed and set-up their new kingdom in what is now Sibsagar district. The Burmese soon intermarried with the local Morans, Borahis and Chutiyas and a new community called the Ahoms was born. The Burmese were Buddhists while the Chutiyas, Morans and Borahis were animists with a veneer of Hinduism. Soon the new community became Buddhist. This transformation could not have been very difficult as all the peoples of Assam were Mongoloid and the Burmese who migrated into Upper Assam were also Mongoloid.

Upper Assam now saw the rise of a new dynasty from this amalgamation of Mongoloid peoples - the Ahom dynasty, which beginning in the 13th century lasted for 600 years ending in the 19th century. This was the situation when the British East India Company sent probing patrols into Upper Assam from their base in Cachar which they had already brought under their control. At about this time, the Burmese decided to attack both the Ahom kingdom in Upper Assam and the kingdom of Manipur. The Burmese overran both the Ahom kingdom and the Manipur army. Both the kings appealed to the British East India Company for help. The British, based then in Cachar, sent armies to Upper Assam and Manipur. The Burmese armies were roundly defeated in Upper Assam and in Manipur. In Upper Assam, the British attached the territory to the East India Company.¹

The British exploring the beautiful countryside of Upper Assam found that tea grew well in the low hills bordering both the Himalayan range to the North and the Naga Hills to the South. The administration of the East India Company soon changed the necessary revenue regulations and opened Upper Assam to tea cultivation. Finding that there were very few local tribal people of Upper Assam to work as labour in the tea gardens, the East India Company brought Adivasi people from Central India to work as tea garden labour.

After a few years, as the tea gardens were developing, the British found that paddy cultivation was poor in Assam. They had come to Assam through the rich rice paddies of East Bengal where the Bengali Muslim peasant was a demon of a cultivator. They also found that vast stretches of cultivable land were fallow

in Assam. They decided to open immigration from East Bengal to Assam. The immigration from the crowded rice paddies of East Bengal to Assam started as a reluctant trickle that soon developed into a flood as the land hungry East Bengali Muslim peasant found thousands of acres of vacant paddy land in the Brahmaputra and Surma valleys of Assam. The East Bengali Muslim peasant settled mainly in Cachar district of Southern Assam and in Goalpara, Kamrup and Nowgong districts of British Assam. This migration began in the first years of the 20th century. Within thirty years the population of Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal had saturated the western border districts of Assam, Goalpara, Kamrup and Nowgong districts to the extent that the Assamese population began to protest at the extent of this immigration. Mr CS Mullen, the Census Commissioner, while voicing the fears of the local Assamese people had this to say in the Census Report of 1831:²

"Probably the most important event in the last 25 years, an event moreover which seems likely to alter permanently the whole future and to destroy more surely than did the Burmese invasion of 1825 the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization, has been the invasion of a vast horde of Bengali immigrants mostly Muslims from the districts of East Bengal....Wither there is vacant land thither flock the Mymensinghias...Without fuss, without tumult without undue trouble to the district revenue staff, a population that amounts to about half a million has transplanted itself from Bengal into the Assam valley during the last 25 years. It is sad, but by no means improbable that in another thirty years Sibsagar district will be the only part of Assam in which an Assamese will find himself at home."

In the background of the Census Commissioners report of 1831, it can be understood that the brunt of the silent invasion of Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal in the first years of the 19th century was taken by the tribal population of Goalpara and Kamrup districts. In Nowgong district, the existing population were mainly Assamese caste Hindus, but for a small section of Tiwa or Lalung tribes in the southern part. Both caste Hindus and the Lalung were affected by the Bengali Muslim migration. This was manifested in the Nellie massacre during the brutal election of 1983 that was provoked mainly by encroachment of tribal lands of the Lalungs.

Alarmed by the size of the migration, the British Government enacted some Land Revenue laws that designated certain areas of agricultural land as Tribal blocks, specifying that agricultural land of tribal blocks could not be transferred to non tribals. Regrettably this order was breached by mostly petty revenue officials and sometimes by senior revenue officers too by affecting land transfers after taking bribes. In Mangaldoi district there is an area designated as a Tribal block called Dalgaon. Today most of the land in this block has gone into the hands of immigrant Muslims. There have already been violent clashes between the Boro tribals and immigrant Bengali Muslims in this area. It is in this background that one has to see the recent clashes in Kokrajhar and Chirang districts of Assam. These are districts carved out from Kamrup and Goalpara districts of Assam mainly for the Boro tribal population.

Besides this, an illegal action by the Government of India (GoI) in the form of an executive order issued in 1972 and later confirmed by amending Section 6 of the Indian Citizenship Act in 1985 shifted the cut-off date for conferring citizenship to illegal immigrants from East Pakistan from 26 January 1950 to 25 March 1971. By changing this date several lakhs of Bengali immigrants, who had illegally migrated from East Pakistan into districts of Assam, Tripura and West Bengal, were conferred Indian citizenship. This has certainly exacerbated the situation in Assam.

When India and Pakistan were created in 1947; large scale migration of Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan, and of Bengali Hindus from East Pakistan took place. Migration from East Pakistan was into West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, bordering states of East Pakistan. The GoI legislated the Indian Citizenship Act in 1955 to regularise the lakhs of Hindus and Sikhs who had fled to India from West and East Pakistan in 1947 as refugees. The cut-off date for these refugees who fled to India in 1947 for applying for citizenship was fixed at 26 January 1950. Hindus and Sikhs who came after this date were also considered for citizenship on individual merits. In any case there was no case for any Muslim from East Pakistan to migrate to India. However, as can be evidenced by the narrative in earlier paragraphs, there was continual migration of Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal to the plains of Assam before Independence. This continued after Independence, unabated.

Settlement of these illegal migrants was abetted by the petty bureaucracy of the State Government's Revenue department. After the legislation of the Indian Citizenship Act the Government directed the preparation of the National Register of Citizens in the Northeastern States, district wise. This register was prepared on the basis of the cut-off date for migration from East and West Pakistan to India being 26 January 1950 as per Section 6 of the Indian Citizenship Act 1955. This register was kept in the custody of the District Superintendent of Police. On every report of a suspected East Pakistani national, the Police referred to this National Register of Citizens to see if the suspected person was a genuine resident of the village he claimed to be living in. If his name was not there he had obviously come into India from East Pakistan illegally.

This whole system was sabotaged by the party in power in Delhi in 1972 after the liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971. After the liberation when Mujibur Rehman came to India, to thank the Prime Minister of India for the help rendered in liberating Bangladesh from Pakistan, he requested that the large number of East Pakistani Muslims and Hindus who had illegally gone to India after August 1947 and before December 1971 should not be deported to Bangladesh. This was clearly an unfair request and India's Prime Minister should not have agreed to this. Unfortunately, she did and this has created an enormous problem of illegal immigrants who illegally migrated into India between 15 August 1947 and December 1971. Pursuant to unwisely agreeing to this unjust request, an executive order was issued by India's Home Ministry to the northeastern States. The first casualty of this illegal order was the National Register of Indian Citizens, which had the names of the Hindu people who had fled from East Pakistan during August 1947 and sought shelter in India and had obtained citizenship. By changing the cut-off date of 26 January 1950 to 25 March 1971, the date of the creation of the State of Bangladesh in exile, all the people of East Pakistan Muslim or Hindu who had illegally trespassed into the northeastern States after 26 January 1950, as noted in the Indian Citizenship Act, got legitimised. This was probably a figure of several lakhs in Assam alone.

The National Register of Citizens had suddenly become irrelevant. Several lakh illegal immigrants, mostly Muslims, who had slipped in between 26 January 1950 and March 25 1971, over

a period of twenty two years, suddenly became Indian citizens. Besides, illegal immigration of Bengali Muslims and Hindus continued unabated into Assam, Tripura and West Bengal. This unholy and diabolical order was issued to create a vote bank for the party in power then.

Foreigners Agitation

Seven years after this illegal direction was issued, the sitting MP of the Congress party from Mangaldoi constituency died. After the illegal order changing the cut-off date for citizenship for immigrants from Bangladesh was changed from 26 January 1950 to 25 March 1971, a large number of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh had managed to enter their names in the electoral rolls. When the sitting MP of Mangaldoi died, the All Assam Students Union spearheading the movement against foreign nationals organised sending of hundreds of petitions from Mangaldoi requesting the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) not to hold the by-election until the electoral rolls were checked and the names of foreigners deleted. The CEC sent an official from his office to enquire into these allegations. After his officers visited Mangaldoi and verified the allegations, the CEC announced in a press conference, that the allegations sent from Assam were enquired into and found correct. He stated that he would not hold elections until the electoral rolls were revised and the names of Bangladeshi nationals deleted.

The Muslim lobby must have reacted to this. All we know is that the Morarji Government was displaced and Charan Singh became the Prime Minister. The CEC was summoned and told to conduct by-election in Mangaldoi immediately. Regrettably, he humbly acquiesced and summoning a press conference announced by-election in Mangaldoi constituency on the basis of the 1974 electoral rolls! The very next day, a combined body of the All Assam Students Union (AASU), the Purbanchal Lok Parishad (PLP) and the Jatiyatibadi Yuba Chatra Parishad (JYCP), a joint body that had written to the CEC to check for foreigners in the electoral roll, met in Assam and decided to launch the Foreigners Agitation against the changing of the cut-off date for immigrants from Bangladesh from 26 January 1950 to 25 March 1971.

Negotiations with the AASU from 1970 through 1980, 1981 and 1982 did not persuade the AASU to accept the changed illegal date of 25 March 1971. Finally in 1982, after a round of talks in

Delhi in early 1983 the Centre decided, finding the AASU quite stubborn on accepting the illegal date of 25 March 1971, to force an election on Assam. This election was the most brutal election in India, with more than 6000 people dying in violent clashes between the Assamese and the illegal Bengali Hindu and Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh and in police firing on violent mobs determined to stop the fake elections. After this blood drenched election, there was an uneasy calm for a few months while the Foreigners agitation continued.

Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunal) Act, 1983

It was at this point that the Central Government and the party in power in Delhi played a dirty trick on the Assamese people. In 1983, soon after the blood drenched election, the Central Government passed a resolution in Parliament bifurcating the Foreigners Act of 1946. In the Foreigners Act of 1946 the onus of proving, that one was a citizen, was on the suspected foreigner. In the two new acts that were legislated, the Foreigners Act was kept in abeyance in the State of Assam; and whereas it was applicable in the rest of India. In Assam a new act called the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act 1983, known as the IMDT Act 1983, was passed. In the latter act, all Foreigners cases were to be sent to Tribunals set-up under this act. These tribunals were to be manned by retired judges, a nice sinecure for obedient judges who were retiring, to carry out the illegal directions of the party in power in Delhi. This meant that no cases under the Foreigners Act were to be registered in Police Stations and sent to court!

Firstly, it is illegal and unconstitutional to have two acts for the same offence in different parts of the same country. These infamous acts were passed in 1983. In the same month a MP from Assam, Sarbananda Sonowal filed a petition in the Supreme Court praying for these illegal acts to be struck down as you could not have two acts for the same offence. Regrettably, the Supreme Court sat on this petition for 22 long years before striking it down as illegal and unconstitutional. This delay of 22 years speaks for itself. Finally they struck it down in 2005.

Foreigners Tribunals

As soon as it was struck down, the Home Ministry amended an order in the Foreigners Act that literally took our breath away in

the National Security Council Advisory Board, where I was a member in 2005. The Foreigners Act of 1946 had an order legislated in 1955, that stated that a State *may establish* a Foreigners Tribunal to expedite disposal of cases of illegal immigrants. This order was now removed and two orders legislated in its place. The new order stated that the State of Assam *shall* establish a Foreigners Tribunal to try all Foreigners Act cases, while all other States *may* establish a Foreigners Tribunal. This meant that in all States except Assam all Foreigners Act cases would be filed in the courts after charge sheeting, while in Assam all Foreigners Act cases should go only to a Tribunal and no case would be charge sheeted in court! The same MP, Sarbananda Sonowal immediately filed a petition in the Supreme Court to strike down this patently discriminatory legislation. This time the Supreme Court promptly struck down this devious legislation. The dirtiest part of this story is that despite this obviously discriminatory order being struck down, from 2005 till today, all Foreigners Act cases are still being sent to the Foreigners Tribunal and no case is being sent to the Criminal Courts. The Foreigners Tribunals should have been closed in 2005 after the Supreme Court struck down this patently illegal legislation. All cases decided by the Tribunals from 2005 onwards should be treated as invalid!

Foreigners Agitation and Agreement with the AASU

The foreigners agitation continued for six years from 1979 to 1985. During these seven years, the Centre through its agencies like the Intelligence Bureau kept trying to persuade the All Assam Students Union and the other groups to accept the new cut-off date for foreigners from Bangladesh in India. Finally in end 1984, the party in power suggested to the Government that the AASU could form a political party and the Congress government could step down and fresh elections could be held provided the AASU would accept 25 March 1971 as the cut-off date for Bangladeshi immigrants. The AASU leaders succumbed to this temptation and signed an agreement with the Gol accepting 25 March 1971 as the cut-off date for immigrants from Bangladesh to India. There was one crucial factor that the Gol forgot in this transaction. What was the constitutional status of the AASU to sign this agreement with the Gol. Can the AASU, a student body of the state sign an agreement that could change the demography of the Country? This act of the Home Ministry of signing an agreement with a student body of Assam was illegal and unconstitutional!

This then is the basic cause for the bitter feelings of the original inhabitants of Assam - the Boro, Koch-Rajbongshi, the Rabha and other tribes, and the caste Hindus against the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and against the Gol that perpetrated this irrational act.

The Recent Conflagration of the Boro Tribals and the Immigrant Bengali Muslims

Let us now see, what led to the sudden explosion of violence on the immigrant Muslims followed by retaliation by them on the Boros and related tribes in the districts of Kokrajhar, Dhubri and Chirang.

When the Foreigners Agitation started, the Boro people were not aligned with the Assamese caste Hindus. This was because, the Boro people wanted to contest the elections. The Saraniya Boros, who had been accepted in the caste hierarchy, were not for the elections. After the elections, the leader of the Boros, Upen Boro, though he was close to the Ahom Gana Parishad leaders, was not given a Minister's post. This was despite the fact that though he was close to the Ahom Gana Parishad (AGP) leader during the Assam Foreigners Agitation and later when the AGP fought the elections. However, when the AGP won the elections, the AASU leaders ditched Upen Boro. The wily Congress leader Hiteshwar Saikia immediately called him and told him that he had warned him not to get close to the AGP leaders and that they would ditch him. He took him to Delhi and there, one of India's premier intelligence agency advised him to start a guerilla war against the AGP. The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) soon got their young volunteers trained in guerilla war by another premier intelligence agency, equipped with weapons and explosives and let loose on the Assam Police. The new group was called the Boro Liberation Tigers (BLT).³ There were a series of improvised explosive devices set-up for the hapless Assam Police vehicles moving in Boro areas like Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, and Goalpara districts culminating in the demolition of one span of the three span concrete bridge across the Manas River. Much later when I was Inspector General Operations against the United Liberation Front insurgency of the Assamese people, I met Army engineers who told me that the insurgents who demolished the Manas bridge and later the Gourang bridge in 1999 were trained by a premier counter insurgency force! It was a thorough professional job!

The insurgency of the BLT continued for some years. Meanwhile in Darrang district another more hardened and determined insurgent group was formed by Ranjan Daimary, a Baptist Christian who had studied in Union Christian College Barapani in Meghalaya, also a Baptist institution, where Thenguilang Muivah and Isaac Swu, the leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland had also studied. Incidentally, the area where Boros lived in Mangaldoi district of Assam had a tribal block in Dalgaon that had been so designated by the British, to stem the tide of illegal immigration from the then East Bengal. A large number of Boros here were also Baptist Christians. Unfortunately, a major portion of the Tribal Block of Dalgaon block was overrun by Bengali Muslim illegal immigrants from East Pakistan. There was no love lost between the Boro tribals and the illegal immigrant Muslims of Dalgaon since many years.

Conclusion

Many clashes had taken place in the last ten years across the fault lines between the Bengali Muslim villages and the tribal villages of the Boros. The July 2012 clash was the sixth major spell of rioting between the Boros and the Immigrant Bengali Muslims in the Brahmaputra Valley since 1993. More than 150 Bengali Muslims and Boros have been killed in these riots. In all such riots, the figures of Bengali Muslims killed were generally double that of Boros killed, clearly indicating that the aggressors were the Boros. One of the aggravating factors was a clause in the Boro Accord forming the BTC that stated that all villages with 50 per cent Boro population would come under the BTC. This clearly gave motivation to cleanse the villages having a combined population of Boros and Bengali Muslims to try and chase out some immigrant Bengali Muslims so that a Boro majority would be created and facilitate inclusion in the BTC!

The present riot was triggered off when three Boros on motor cycles killed two Bengali Muslims settled at Mussalman Para near Bowragiri in Kokrajhar district. A little later bodies of four Boros were found in Joypur Namapara locality of Kokrajhar. The facts on the ground are that the immigrant Muslims are seen as close to the party in power in Assam. It can be seen that it was the Congress who have subverted the laws of the land in getting illegal Bengali Muslim foreigners citizenship. There is, therefore,

bad blood between the indigenous communities of Assam be it the tribal or caste Hindu and the immigrant Bengali Muslim community.

On 6 August, there were again clashes and communal killings in Kokrajhar district, despite the deployment of forces. The Government of Assam should ensure the deployment of forces across the fault lines between the Bengali Muslim and Caste Hindu populations. The least that the Government of Assam should do is to see that further infiltration does not take place. It can thus be surmised that this problem would continue till such time the political parties find it expedient to use Bengali Muslims for their vote bank.

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India's North West: The New Great Game

Lieutenant General Kamaleshwar Davar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)*

Introduction

The “high roof of the world”¹, the Gilgit-Baltistan region of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, in illegal occupation of Pakistan since 1947 and earlier referred to by them as the ‘Northern Areas’, has its geo-strategic importance steeped in history. For hundreds of years in the past, the Russian, Persian, Chinese, Tibetan and the British Indian empires, sought to control the passes of this region to dominate each other. This region lies between the high Hindu Kush and the Karakoram mountain ranges to its north and the Western Himalayas to its immediate South. It borders Pakistan’s Dir, Swat, Kohistan and Kaghan districts of Khyber Pakhtunwa in the West, the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan in its northwest, Xinjiang province of China to its East and northeast, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to the southwest and, importantly, a 480 km long Line of Control (LC) running alongside India in the southeast. The region lies along “the ancient axis of Asia”² where South, Central and East Asia converge and, since time immemorial, has been the gateway for both India and China to Central Asia.

History of the Region: Post 1947

At the time of partition of India in 1947, when the princely states of the British Indian Empire were given a choice of either acceding to India or Pakistan, the then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh vacillated till he was faced with an armed invasion by a combined force of Pakistani regulars and irregulars to annex the state. Soon thereafter, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession with India, but before the Indian Army landed in the state and could push back the invaders, most of the Gilgit-Baltistan region and some other portions of the state of J&K had been

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illegally occupied by the Pakistani marauders. The area of J&K which the Pakistanis occupied was around 85,793 sq km. In 1970, it was further divided by Pakistan into two separate divisions namely, Mirpur-Muzzaffarabad (referred to by Pakistan as 'Azad Kashmir') and the Federally Administered Gilgit-Baltistan, which was referred to, till 2009, as the Northern Areas.

The Gilgit division was further sub-divided into five districts, namely: Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Astore and Hunza-Nagar while Baltistan comprises the two districts of Skardu and Ghanchi. Gilgit-Baltistan has a population of about two million people who belong to the Balti, Shin, Burushu, Vashkuns, Turki ethnicity. This region had around 85 per cent Shia population in 1948 which has now come down to around 50 per cent as successive Pakistani governments have systematically settled Sunni Wahabis in this region through unfair land allocations and giving employment to outsiders at the expense of the locals. The locals consider themselves very different from any Pakistani ethnic or linguistic group and share common historical links with Tibetans, Kashmiris, Ladakhis, Tajiks, Uighurs and Mongols.

In addition, this region is resource rich and substantial deposits of uranium, gold, copper and gems are located here besides the potential for production of hydro electricity is tremendous.

In an unprecedented move in 1963, the Pakistani government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto illegally ceded an area of 5180 sq km to China in the Shaksgam Valley in the north-eastern part of the Gilgit-Baltistan region which borders the East Turkestan region of China. Pakistan's nexus with China has continued since then with its devious endeavour to bring China into the Kashmir dispute by ceding Shaksgam to them.

Strategic Significance of Gilgit-Baltistan and Karakoram Corridor

The unique strategic salience of this region, inexplicably underplayed for many years by most of the regional players, has suddenly come into limelight in the last few years with the Chinese not only establishing its footprint in this region but enlarging and consolidating its sway, both economically and militarily. The Chinese ambitions in this region are bound to have serious security

implications especially for India in the foreseeable future. In 2010, noted American analyst Selig Harrison revealed that nearly 7000 to 11000 China's People Liberation Army (PLA) personnel had been deployed in this region under the guise of engineering personnel and civilian labour. He succinctly termed this development as the unfolding of a "quiet geo-political crisis."³

The Shaksgam Valley area as ceded to China, facilitated the construction of the Karakoram Highway that links China's restive Xinjiang region through the Khunjerab Pass with Gilgit-Baltistan and thence Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunwa regions. It took nearly two decades to complete (1959-1979) and now the 1300 kms long highway connects Kashgar in China's Xinjiang province with Islamabad via Abbotabad and is an engineering marvel as it traverses extremely rugged high altitude terrain.

The southern end of the Karakoram corridor is the strategically important Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea and the Pak naval bases of Pasni and Ormara, which lie close to Gwadar where the Chinese have built a modern deep sea port for subsequent utilisation by the Pakistani and the Chinese navies. The latter, now has an access to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf and will be able to not only transport and guard its energy flow and other commercial supplies coming from West Asia and Africa but also monitor and intercept cargo ships and oil tankers, if required, carrying supplies to countries inimical to China. With high speed rail and road links via the Karakoram Highway, the time taken for transportation of cargo from Gwadar to the Chinese mainland will now be reduced to a mere 72 hours from the current 16 to 25 days which Chinese oil tankers take from the Gulf to Chinese ports via the circuitous sea route and the Malacca Straits choke-point. Thus the Gwadar Port and the vital Karakoram Highway 'slackens' the sea lanes of communications noose at Malacca for China, conferring immeasurable strategic dividends to it. Accordingly, the Chinese have been investing heavily in the Karakoram Highway and are now engaged in widening it from the current 10m to 30m width besides making it an all weather highway. Former Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta has in relation to Gwadar candidly stated, "it will assist Pakistan to take control over the world energy jugular. This port and corridor pose a major threat to India's energy security and would have great implications in any two front war."⁴

China's Current Activities in the Region

Apart from the speedy and intensive development of the Karakoram Highway / Energy Corridor to the Gwadar Port, the overall involvement of China in the whole of POK especially in Gilgit-Baltistan has been spectacular. China is also widening the 165 km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135 km long Thakot-Sazin road at a cost of PKR 45 billion with China taking on 85 per cent of the expenditure.⁵ Apart from work going on the widening of the Karakoram Highway, rigorous efforts to complete the rail link from Kashgar in the remote Xinjiang province to Havelian near Rawalpindi is under progress. Along this Highway, it has been reported that 22 massive tunnels have been constructed which could also be used as storage facilities for missiles. In addition, China is heavily involved in developing massive hydel infrastructure with 15 mega projects on the anvil in this region including POK. These projects include raising of the Mangla Dam reservoir by sixty feet, the Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Power Project and the Daimer-Bhasha Dam. Approximately US \$ 12.6 billion have been earmarked by China for these gigantic projects. Reportedly, China has invested US \$ 300 million in the housing and communications sector in this region. All such activities point to the simple fact that the Chinese are building this infrastructure also for their own use and they are in this region for a long haul.

Recently, an alarming development has been reported by a US based think tank, 'The Middle East Media Research Institute' that Pakistan was seriously considering handing over Gilgit-Baltistan region to China on a 50 years lease.⁶ Briefing US lawmakers, this think tank, claimed that China has already assumed de facto control of the region. It further opined that this area would end up like Tibet and East Turkistan if "China's unwarranted interventions are not challenged." A local Pakistani newspaper, Roznama Bang-e-Sahar had also reported this development in its 13 Dec 2011 edition. Well known Kashmiri researcher, Dr Shabir Choudhry has expressed that this region had the makings of a battleground between Pakistan and China on one side facing the US and India on the other side.

The Siachen Glacier Imbrolio

An analysis of the Gilgit-Baltistan region is incomplete without comprehending the subtleties of the Siachen Glacier stand-off.

The Siachen Glacier is one issue which the Pakistanis seem to be in an indecent hurry to settle, even preceding the Sir Creek and other more important issues.

During the last few years, Pakistan has been indulging in smug statements as regards the Siachen stand-off for the benefit of the world and the many ill-informed peaceniks in India. On 7 Apr 2012, at the lower western slopes of the Saltoro ridge, an avalanche and massive landslide buried nearly 135 Pakistani soldiers at its Ghyari base camp. This tragedy prompted a visit to the accident site by the Pak Army Chief, General Ashraf Kayani who, rather sanctimoniously, stated to the accompanying media teams, that both Pakistan and India should mutually vacate the glacially inhospitable Siachen Glacier area and expressed that peaceful co-existence between the two neighbours was very important. Such a statement, coming from an otherwise reticent Pak Army Chief and an ex ISI Chief, perhaps shell-shocked at the tragedy, made peaceniks on both sides of the border go on an overdrive with appeals to the Indian Government to speedily resolve the Siachen issue. Even some scholars and analysts in India have been underplaying the strategic and tactical importance of the redoubtable Saltoro Massif which India holds since 1984 when the Indian Army occupied the Siachen Glacier area, pre-empting the Pakistanis by a whisker.

The formidable Saltoro Ridge which the Indian Army holds and thus controls the major passes on this ridge, namely Turkistan La (connecting Shaksgam Valley with Siachen), Indra Col, Sia La, Bilafond La and its positions completely dominates Pak deployments on the lower western slopes. If it is ever vacated and the Pakistanis occupy the Ridge, it will be virtually impossible to recapture it – as all soldiers who have served in this region unanimously acknowledge. More importantly, the Saltoro/Siachen region provides essential depth in the east to our Sub Sector North deployments from the Aksai Chin region as also through the Karakoram Pass. The Saltoro Ridge as a strategic fulcrum also provides much needed depth to our Turtuk, Leh and Kargil garrisons and also prevents the possibility of convergence between the Chinese from the Aksai Chin areas in the East, Karakoram Highway and Shaksgam Valley from the North and northeast, and Pakistan from the Gilgit Baltistan areas in the West and northwest, should a conflict situation arise. Vacating Siachen will be nothing

short of a monumental military blunder. Pakistan's unwillingness to even ratify current deployments of both sides, as part of any Siachen demilitarisation programme, clearly indicates its future perfidious intentions.

The Indian Army is well entrenched in this region and years of experience in operating in these high altitude snow clad areas has drastically brought down weather and terrain related casualties to acceptable levels. On the other hand, in case the Pak Army, for its own problems, wishes to vacate this region, can do so and the Indian Army can give them an iron clad assurance that it would not violate the Actual Ground Position Line, except if Pakistan commits an act of war. The inalienable fact remains that while in occupation of the Saltoro Ridge, India is essentially occupying its own territory and hence the Indian and Pakistani stated stands cannot be equated. Siachen is a part of J&K and as and when the J&K issue finally gets resolved, this issue will also automatically get settled.

Sectarian Strife in Gilgit- Baltistan

Sectarian strife developed in this region especially since the 1980s accentuating the Shia-Sunni divide. At the time of Independence, though Gilgit-Baltistan was predominantly Shia, under the Maharaja of J&K, there were virtually no Shia-Sunni clashes. The Chairman of the Balwaristan National Front, an organisation which is fighting for the independence of Gilgit-Baltistan, Abdul Hamid Khan has unequivocally stated that ".....before the treacherous occupation of our land by Pakistan, inter-communal harmony in our region was exemplary even during the Sikh and Dogra rule."⁷

The communal problem got exacerbated during the Zia ul Haq regime as Sunni violence was introduced into this region and elsewhere to serve Pakistan's larger goals. General Zia ul Haq followed a policy of Sunni Islamisation wherein Sunnis were given preferential treatment all over Pakistan and in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, Sunnis were settled from the hinterland to change the demographic character of this region. The drive to subdue the Shias in this region was spearheaded by none other than, then Brigadier Pervez Mushharraf (later the architect of the Kargil mischief and President of Pakistan), who was especially selected by General Zia ul Haq for this region. Since then, there have been Shia-Sunni riots off and on. The political yearnings of the locals

have been given a go-by. Political and economic deprivation and the insensitivity of the Pakistani establishment has given rise to the locals demanding autonomy and demands for this region to seek independence from Pakistan have also erupted.

2012, in particular, saw a surge in violence directed against the Shias. February 2012 witnessed the gruesome killing of 18 Shia pilgrims in Kohistan on the Karakoram Highway when they were returning from Iran by bus. This led to clashes between the two communities and once again, dozens of Shias were brutally massacred on 3 April 2012 at Chilas. In mid August 2012, 18 Shia bus passengers were massacred in the region while returning from Rawalpindi. The Sunni militant organisation Ahle-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamat has been suspected for these sectarian killings.

It is pertinent to mention the shabby treatment meted out to troops of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who hail from this region. Post Kargil, having used these troops to the hilt, General Pervez Musharraf, then Pak Army COAS, refused to accept the dead bodies of the NLI's Shia soldiers who were subsequently buried with full Islamic rites by the Indian Army. This blatant discrimination by the Pak Army against their own Shia soldiers was deeply resented by locals of this region. The composition of the NLI is 49 per cent Shias, 18 per cent Sunnis, 23 per cent are Ismailis (followers of Aga Khan) and 10 per cent Nurbakshis while the officers are mostly Pathan, Baloch and Punjabis. The Pakistan Army has been deliberately using troops from this region as cannon fodder in their half-hearted operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban elements in the badlands of the Khyber Pakhtunwa belt.

Legal Status : Gilgit-Baltistan

The illegal occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan region by force by Pakistan has been questioned by some locals and their leaders many times in the past. In the legislative assembly of the region, local legislators have been clamouring for an end to their ambiguous political status. They have demanded a legal cover for the currently enforced Gilgit Baltistan Self Governance and Empowerment Ordinance 2009 or a set-up similar to the so-called "Azad Kashmir". Meanwhile, in a major embarrassment recently to the Pakistan government, their Supreme Court while hearing a petition filed by Dr Ghulam Abbas, Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan National Movement, has questioned the legality of Pakistani President's

authority to issue appointment orders regarding judges for the region as Gilgit does not even find a mention in the Pakistan constitution!⁸ Even in 1994, the High Court of the so called 'Azad Kashmir' had opined that this region was essentially a part of the former princely state of J&K in 1947 and should be treated as such.

Suggested Indian Response

The massive infrastructure being developed in this region has primarily two objectives. First, China is creating an energy corridor linking its hinterland to the Gwadar port and thus ensuring its energy security. Secondly, enlarging its footprint in India's northwest regions is another 'pearl' in China's string of pearls strategy vis-à-vis India. From all indications, in keeping with its growing assertiveness in South Asia, China is shifting the centre of gravity of its future land operations to J&K in concert with Pakistan. As China awaits the final exit of a battle weary USA from Afghanistan in 2014, it is determinedly preparing itself to take the lead role in this troubled region with Pakistan in tandem and is speedily readying the wherewithal for it. It would, therefore, be prudent for the Indian Armed Forces to factor in the China-Pak operational nexus now from a newer front. Additional formations, both for defensive and offensive roles, to undertake operations in these high altitude areas will have to be raised.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), opposite our J&K sector, suffers from the drawback of having just two major airbases at Kashgar and Khotan which are 800 and 600 km away respectively from the nearest Indian air bases.⁹ However, if the PLAAF utilises the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bases in this region namely Gilgit, Skardu, Chilas, Chitral and Muzaffarabad – a distinct possibility now – the overall air threat to India becomes far more acute than existing and the Indian Air Force will have to factor such ominous developments in its operational preparedness. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence agencies will have to keep a strict watch on the infrastructural developments taking place at these POK air bases to analyse the possibility of any PLAAF-PAF nexus taking shape.

Apart from upgrading the operational preparedness of the Army and its Air Force to thwart any collusive threat from China and Pakistan, India must become politically proactive in this region

in the pursuit of its national interests. Since, by all accounts, Gilgit-Baltistan formed a part of the state of J&K at Independence, India through its Parliamentary resolution in 1994, is committed to regain the entire state of J&K back to the Union of India which also includes this region. This will only be possible if India stops accepting the current status-quo as regards either, the POK or the Gilgit-Baltistan region. The populace of this region and its diaspora, the world over, always wonder as to why the Government of India does not take proactive measures to support their cause for independence from Pakistani rule and sensitises the UN and other nations in the world about Pak oppression in this region. India has much at stake strategically especially with the ever growing Pak-China nexus in this region and at strategic level. It will be in India's interest to factor in these developments and take appropriate political, diplomatic and military measures to safeguard its national interests.

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Indian Strategic Interest in Afghanistan

Wing Commander Anurakshat Gupta*

Introduction

The historical ties between India and Afghanistan stretch back several millennia with strong people-to-people contact, trade and cultural exchanges forming the bedrock of these ties. The country once formed a part of the Mauryan empire, and was later ruled by the Hindu-Shahi dynasty just prior to the advent of Islam. The Bamiyan Buddhas were amongst the most prominent archeological features testifying to this shared heritage. Even after the advent of Islam in Afghanistan and South Asia, these links continued. The most significant empire that ruled India in the last 500 years i.e. the Mughals, was established by the first Mughal emperor, Babur. The fact that he was buried in Kabul bears testimony to the strong link between the two nations. Partition created a new state between these two countries but the social, cultural and emotional bonds continue to exist till date.

That India has had a strategic interest in Afghanistan for ages is a fact that cannot be denied. Today, an engagement with Afghanistan should form part of a grand overall strategy to protect our national interests beyond the confines of South Asia. It was possibly with this in mind that India engaged Afghanistan very early in its efforts to recover, after the Taliban evacuated Kabul. Besides visible help in the form of aircraft for *Ariana Air* or teachers for schools, it set about developing infrastructure with the intention of freeing-up the landlocked nation from its dependence on Pakistan for access to the rest of the world. That was indeed a smart move. In one stroke it gave India an opening into Afghanistan and also a potential route into the energy-rich Central Asia.

Afghanistan's location at the crossroads of China, the Middle-East, South Asia and Central Asia has attracted traders and

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invaders for over 2500 years now. Its cities have held pre-eminent positions on global trading routes for longer than most cities across the world. After a period of relative obscurity the nation has been thrust onto the global map once again by a combination of its status as a hub of terror and its geography – which makes it an inevitable partner in any plans to feed the energy-hungry economies that surround it. Add to this its vast unexploited mineral resources and you have a country that is bound to be a significant part of the strategic calculations of the major players of the world – India being no exception.

Strategic Considerations

Indian strategic interests in Afghanistan have many facets. The rise of fundamental terrorism in the region, egged on by Pakistan, was almost exclusively targeted at India in the initial few years. The trajectory of Jehadi attacks in India virtually mirrors the kind of government that was ruling in Kabul. The worst years were certainly between 1989 and 2002, when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan and acted as proxy warriors for their Pakistani masters. A scenario where these elements regain control of Afghanistan will certainly hit India badly. For the sake of our own citizens we need to ensure that the present status is maintained.

The reality of the extent of our energy needs was brought home best by the record-breaking blackouts that hit half of India in July/August 2012. The result was alarm bells being sounded off not just in India but across the borders in China too. There is certainly an urgent need to exploit all possible resources to ensure that our national growth is not derailed due to a deficiency of energy. Accessing Central Asian gas has to be a part of our plans for the future. A strong physical presence in Afghanistan with a friendly government in Kabul is the best bet to ensure uninterrupted energy supply if and when the pipeline from that region becomes a reality. The ground work for this has begun and is but naturally part of our long-term strategic plans.

The Chinese entry into Afghanistan to develop Aynak Copper mines in Logar province means that we have yet another country where we are likely to encounter our rival nation in the race to utilise precious natural resources. The experience in Sudan and South China Sea has taught us that unless we are quick off the blocks and nimble on our feet, we may get left behind by the

Chinese once again. Unlike Sudan and Vietnam, however, this is happening in our backyard and is therefore an extremely important issue. We need to build our capacity within Afghanistan to counter this new, though not-unexpected challenge.

Engagement with Afghans and Afghanistan

In contrast to the NATO forces, Indian efforts in Afghanistan have been a mix of infrastructure development and projection of its 'soft power'. Four landmark projects that have been completed by Indians include the Delaram-Zaranj Highway, transmission lines providing Uzbek electricity to Kabul, the hydroelectric Salma Dam and a new parliament building in Kabul. The Highway has opened up a link between a deep sea port at Chabahar in Iran to Afghanistan's main ring road system which connects Kabul, Kandhar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz. This has enabled free transport of goods from Afghanistan's main cities to the Iranian border. This will not only promote regional cooperation by opening new trade routes but also provide access to the landlocked nation to sea. The inauguration of the new parliament by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh saw an additional commitment of \$500 million being made by India towards the development of Afghanistan. This has made India the largest regional donor and the 5th largest global donor towards the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

A consortium of Indian miners and steel companies that calls itself Afghan Iron and Steel Company or AFISCO, was awarded three of the four concessions in Hajigak (Bamiyan) in November 2011 by the Afghan government. AFISCO will now have 30 years to develop the mine and put-up a steel and power plant. Additionally, the consortium plans to build a 900 km railway line connecting the mines to the Chabahar port in Iran that will ease the export of finished products. It may be pertinent to point out that presently there are no passenger services or railway stations in the entire Afghanistan. The only small railway line that exists links the Northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif to Termez in Uzbekistan. A creation of the Soviet Union, it is primarily used for transporting construction material. In view of this, the significance of the proposed Hajigak-Chabahar railway line cannot be over-emphasised.

India has projected considerable soft power in Afghanistan through its provision of education, medical treatment and small-

business support. 2,000 Afghans get scholarships annually for schooling and training in India. Many present-day Afghan leaders including President Hamid Karzai have studied in India in the past. More than 100 Indian-supported development projects are being implemented. English teachers, water-treatment experts, communication engineers and many others have been helping communities across the nation in the process of rebuilding. While many 'experts' have warned about the dangers of such close contacts and also doubted the benefit of the same, the ground reality is that it is this very nature of assistance that has endeared the Indians to the average Afghan more than the citizen of any other donor nation. The fact that our assistants share the miseries of their daily grind by living with them in their villages and cities and not dictating terms to them from the comfort of an air-conditioned office, has given us an influence which far exceeds what a \$2 billion assistance package should have got us.

Another well-acknowledged facet of our soft power is the influence of Indian television and movies. In the years following the Soviet invasion, millions of Afghans took refuge in Pakistani camps. Here they gradually picked up the local language 'Urdu' and came into contact with Indian tele-serials and films. Over the last 30 odd years these have been the primary source of entertainment for the Afghans. As Dr Shashi Tharoor says, the strength of these is that they are seen to have 'nothing to do with government propaganda'. Other experts see them as an ideal means of engaging with the population by a means that they are willing to accept happily. It is, therefore, not surprising that the over 4000 Indians working in Afghanistan find it far easier to get acceptance in the country than any westerner.

Extension of health care facilities is another very important aspect of direct Indian involvement with the populace of Afghanistan. Indian medical missions in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif have been providing free treatment for nearly a decade to over 400,000 Afghans annually. The number of Afghans who are coming over to India each year is also on the rise. A liberal visa policy has ensured that the number of cases coming to India for advanced medical care has grown from 3000 to nearly 10000 per annum. Patients include members of all ethnicities including Pashtuns. Hospitals have employed translators and

Afghan cooks to help these patients have a pain-free experience while in India. This has helped cement India's position as the preferred destination and has far-reaching long term benefits. However, such growing influence has come at a cost for India. In February 2010, terrorists targeted the doctors of the Indian Medical Mission in Kabul in a direct attack. Besides other casualties, one doctor died and five were injured. Such attacks aim to dissuade other medical professionals from coming to Afghanistan to help out the local population. However, the extent of faith in Indian health assistance can be gauged from the fact that medicines manufactured in Pakistan are sold with a label of "Made in India" all across Afghanistan. However, the fact that the label is in Urdu, ensures that no one is fooled.

Future Plans and Strategies

Indian assistance to the efforts of Northern Alliance in defeating Taliban was greatly responsible for creating a favourable impression amongst the members of this influential group. However in the Karzai era, this group has been marginalised to a great extent. Following a period of inactivity it has seen a revival in the form of National Front of Afghanistan (NFA) or Jabh-e-Melli. The major players are Ahmad Zia Massoud, Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq and Abdul Rashid Dostum. The National Front strongly opposes a return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan and retains significant military capabilities. The chairman of the National Front is Ahmad Zia Massoud, the younger brother of the anti-Taliban resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. The NFA has called for decentralisation of powers and a Parliamentary form of government instead of the current dispensation. Its total opposition to the Taliban is in tune with Indian rejection of 'good' versus 'bad' Taliban. Pakistan on the other hand is playing a wait-and-watch game where-in it hopes to thrust Taliban back into Kabul once the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces leave by 2014. India needs to ensure that the revived entity is provided support in as many ways as possible so that a credible alternative favourably inclined towards itself is available in the post-ISAF Afghanistan.

The signing of a strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan on 04 October 2011 during Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to India was an historical event with great implications

for Indo-Afghan relations. Amongst other things it sets out a blueprint for the manner in which Indian engagement will increase after 2014. For the first time India has spelt out a clear plan which includes “training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan national security forces”. Additionally, trade and economic activities will be strengthened along with cultural, social, educational and people to people contact. Mining and Hydrocarbon exploration have seen separate MoUs being signed.⁴ This signals a deep and long-term commitment of Indian involvement in Afghanistan as the very nature of these activities implies a life-cycle of a few decades in the least. The agreement showcases India’s considerable soft power and demonstrates to the other neighbours the benefits to be had from partnering with India. India now has the task to ensure that these agreements translate into significant engagement with Afghans in all parts of the country.

Conclusion

“Every triumph from patience springs, the happy herald of better things” – wrote the 15th Century Sufi poet Jami. As Indian efforts in Afghanistan over the last decade start giving dividends, it is important that we do not take our foot off the pedal this time. A visit to the nation reveals the strong support for Indian reconstruction and development efforts even in Kandahar – the heartland of Pashtuns. It is time to build upon this goodwill and ensure that peace and development in Afghanistan continues uninterrupted. For it is only in a peaceful Afghanistan, that we can find the germs of peace for the entire neighborhood.

Endnotes

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Impasse in the Middle East

Captain Akshat Upadhyay*

The US and Iran have been at loggerheads since the 1979 revolution that overthrew the monarchy of the Shah and established a theocratic state under Islamic jurisprudence. The present tripartite stand-off involving the US, Iran and Israel is a lethal extension of this stalemate, with Israel adding the recent, but volatile flavour to the fiery concoction. There are elements on both sides of the fence as well as outsiders that are hell bent on ensuring that the US gets sucked into a long drawn campaign with yet another Muslim country, destroying whatever little credibility it has managed to build by not interfering visibly in the beleaguered Arab states of Libya, Egypt, Yemen or Syria during the Arab Spring. Israel has not helped the situation either, with the right leaning premier Benjamin Netanyahu insistent on treating Iran as an existential threat. This has added an ominous undertone to the already decrepit situation, as Israel has shown with considerable determination how it deals with nations it considers threats to its very inception, during the Arab Israeli wars of 1948,'56,'67 and '73.

The US-Iran relationship can be described as rocky at best. However, it was not like this always. Starting from the very beginning, the US and Iran first established political relations in 1856, when the Shah of Persia sent his ambassador Mirza Abolhassan Shirazi to Washington DC.¹ However, America became etched in the minds of many Iranians when, in 1909, a young American Howard Baskerville took-up arms in support of the Constitutionalists against Royalist forces and died fighting in Tabriz², during the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905. To this day he is revered by the Iranians. The cause of this revolution was almost similar to the one that destroyed the Shah regime in 1979 ie alleged mishandling of the country's revenues by the Shah and foreign domination of Iranian assets. The end result of the revolution

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was the reduction in the power of the Shah and the creation of the Majlis, a parliament of elected representatives.

The relations between the US and Iran were cordial, in fact insignificant on the greater world stage until the Second World War. Iran's Reza Shah Pahlevi, who came to power with the help of the British in 1925, was seen as being sympathetic to the Nazis and was forced to abdicate to make way for his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlevi in 1941. This was after the Russians and the British had invaded and occupied Iran, despite its declared neutrality, to ensure Allied aid to Russia flowed unhindered through the country. The post Second World War relations between the US and Iran can be divided distinctly into four phases³ : the first one from 1941-53 till the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadeq; then from 1953 to the late 1960s; from 1973-79, when the Shah began to assert his will on his relationship with the US, which until that time had taken for granted the superiority of the US; and finally post 1979, when all diplomatic relations between the two countries ended.

The Anglo Iranian Oil Company, established in the early 20th century by the British, operated in several oilfields of Iran and shared profits in the irregular ratio of 85 per cent for the British and 15 per cent for the Iranians. Moreover it withheld its records for audit by the Iranian Government. Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, who came to power in 1951, led a movement which sought to nationalise all of the country's oil assets. This was passed by the Parliament in near total unanimity as well as huge public support. The British vehemently opposed the move and imposed an embargo on Iranian oil in addition to starting preparations to invade the country. The embargo hurt the Iranians badly and the economy started deteriorating. However, the then Democrat President Harry Truman was in favour of negotiations to end the confrontation and therefore persuaded the British not to go ahead with the invasion. However, unbeknownst to President Truman, the CIA had already started a series of covert actions against Mossadeq and his National Front government since 1952.⁴ The US made a public show of empathising with the Iranians, all the while honouring the British embargo and keeping the hopes of the Iranian people alive.

The change of baton in the White House occurred amidst these negotiations, and power then rested with the Republican

President Dwight D Eisenhower. He favoured the overthrowing of Mossadeq as he believed that Iran was heading towards instability and chaos, a perfect opportunity for the Communist vultures to swoop down on the country and take it under their dominion. It might not have occurred to the Eisenhower administration that it was the actions of its long-standing ally, Britain that had caused the instability in the first place. The CIA station in Teheran, with the help of British intelligence engineered a coup, resulting in the overthrow of Mossadeq and the reinstallation of the Shah⁵ (The coup had failed in its initial attempt and forced the Shah to flee to Italy). The operation was code named Ajax and resulted in the imprisonment of Mossadeq. The invalidation of a perfectly legal government, which wanted to take control of its own resources and limit foreign intervention created an enormous amount of bad blood between the two countries.

The Shah, after coming back to power, was determined not to let events like these endanger his authority and began consolidating his power with a vengeance. Sāzemān-e-Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e-Keshwar (SAVAK), Iran's brutal and most feared intelligence agency was created with the help of the CIA in 1957, and was instrumental in eliminating political dissidents, including the clerical establishment. The Shah also introduced the 'White Revolution', a package of social and economic reforms that sought to modernise the country. He developed close relations with Israel during this period, a fact unheard of, as many of the Arab countries had refused to even recognise the state of Israel. This, according to the Shah's calculations, was necessary for his survival as his neighbouring countries were increasingly turning into republics. The Shah started leaning towards the US for all kinds of support including political, diplomatic and financial. The US administration, breathing a sigh of relief that it had saved a country from the clutches of communism, wholeheartedly supported the Shah's regime.

According to historian Randy Bell, USMC(Retd)⁶ "American military and security interests in the Persian gulf area originated during World War II. However, it was not until around 1971 that the US became increasingly and directly concerned with the defense of the region and Western interests there. Prior to 1971, the responsibility for the region's security fell to the British, with the United States maintaining a supportive role. However on 18 January

1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced to the House of Commons that the British had decided to withdraw their forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. That action set the stage for America's future involvement in the Persian Gulf." The US policy in the Gulf was shaped by three successive presidents, i.e. Nixon, Carter and Reagan. The US believed that the British withdrawal from the Gulf would lead to the creation of a void which may be filled by the USSR leading to a situation where America would find itself totally cut-off from the Gulf, source of the largest amount of crude in the entire world. The fact that the Tudeh Communist Party had gained quite a following in Iran helped accelerate the formation of a foreign policy specifically for the Persian Gulf region. It was Richard Nixon, who initiated the twin pillars policy in the Persian Gulf area, according to which Iran and Saudi Arabia would form the foundations on which the security of Middle East would be based. Since Iran was the more powerful and influential partner of the two, due to its military might and the Shah's ambitions to make Iran the most powerful nation in the Middle East, and was willing to fill the void left by the British, it received an unprecedented amount of military hardware and technological sophistication.

The fourth Arab-Israeli War of 1973 changed everything drastically. The powerful Arab oil nations temporarily halted the production of oil, triggering the Petro crisis due to which the global prices of crude skyrocketed. Iran was also one of the countries that willingly participated in the collusion. Despite American pleas, the Shah refused to lower the prices of oil as he believed it would be beneficial to Iranian economy. This may be seen as the beginning of the end of the US-Iran relations which finally culminated in the 1979 revolution. According to an article published in the Middle East Journal in October 2008, "In 1976 the US and Saudi Arabia colluded to force down the oil prices, inadvertently triggering a financial crisis that destabilised Iran's economy and weakened the Shah's hold on power."

The Iranian revolution of 1979 that brought about the downfall of the Shah was initiated not by the clerics but by Iranians from all walks of life who wanted :

- (a) An end to SAVAK's brutal policies and end of political oppression.

- (b) Reduction of gap between the rich and the poor.
- (c) End to disastrous fiscal policies of the Shah.
- (d) Rejection of foreign intervention.

Ayatollah Khomeini, who had opposed very vocally the SOFA or the Status of Forces Act⁷ of 1964 that gave any US military personnel in Iran diplomatic immunity and was exiled for the same reason, made the revolution his own. He injected into it, his compassionate anti-American rhetoric coupled with the people's anger against the Shah and very adeptly steered the revolution in the direction he wanted. He seized power and declared himself the 'Supreme Leader' and ensured that anti-Americanism remained the most binding theme among the Iranians in the post revolutionary period.

The years between 1979 to 1982 proved to be very crucial to the US foreign policy towards the Gulf region. First came the war between North Yemen and South Yemen in March 1979. The US, anxious to prove its loyalty towards its Arab partners sided with North Yemen, which was also being supported by the Saudis. The attack by South Yemen was considered a communist adventure against a conservative government and the Carter administration dispatched a carrier based task force in addition to deploying AWACS aircraft based in Saudi Arabia to deal with the threat. Concurrent with the Yemeni war, the monarchy of the Shah in Iran was breathing its last. The Shah left Iran for exile in mid-January 1979, and in the resulting power vacuum two weeks later Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran to a greeting by several million Iranians. The royal regime collapsed shortly after on 11 February when guerrillas and rebel troops overwhelmed troops loyal to the Shah in armed street fighting. Iran voted by national referendum to become an Islamic Republic on 1 April 1979. If this wasn't enough bad news for the US, Russia (erstwhile Soviet Union) invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 on the pretext of providing support to the communist government of Nur Mohammed Taraki. Fearing a communist takeover of Afghanistan spilling on towards the Gulf, the Carter administration initiated the Carter Doctrine, which according to the President's own words,⁸ "Let our position be absolutely clear: any attempt by outside force to gain control of Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault;

on vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force." America very clearly defined the Gulf to be its sphere of influence and warned against any interference by the outside world, particularly the Soviets at the time.

The eight year war between Iran and Iraq proved to be the proverbial icing on the cake. The war, initiated by Saddam Hussein, was an attempt by Iraq to oust Iran as the most powerful state in the Gulf region; in addition, to dispel any notion of resurgence amongst the majority Shia community in Iraq which was buoyed by the successful revolution in Teheran. The war which claimed half a million lives on both the sides witnessed a massive arms sales rush to supply both the countries. More than 30 countries including Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Spain, Netherlands, Greece supplied arms to either one side or the other and in some cases both. The countries tossed aside their so called scruples and benefitted massively in the conflict which also witnessed use of Mustard gas by Iraqis on Iranians and their own people (Iraqi Kurds). The US, which initially had vowed not to take any side, launched Operation Staunch⁹, in order to stop the illegal third country transfer of its own arms to the belligerent nations. It also provided intelligence support to the Iraqi forces and reflagged Kuwaiti tankers (carrying oil to Iraq) as belonging to the US Naval Central Command. This brought it into direct conflict with the Iranian Navy during the Tanker phase of the Iran Iraq war. It also resulted in one of the largest naval engagements since the Second World War (Operation Earnest Will, Operation Nimble Archer and Operation Praying Mantis).

The most controversial event, however, from the point of view of both the US and Iran was the 1979 hostage crisis¹⁰ which occurred in the US embassy in Teheran on 4 November 1979, when student revolutionaries claiming victory of the Iranian revolution, took hostage 52 diplomats of the US Embassy Office in Teheran. This event acted as a *coup de grace* to the deteriorating relations between the two countries. Even after intense diplomatic negotiations, the kidnappers did not yield. America launched a military rescue operation Eagle Claw on 24 April 1980. However, the mission ended in a disaster and the death of eight US servicemen. The hostages were finally released after 444 days,

just hours after the new President Ronald Reagan was sworn in. Though the two countries did sign the Algiers Accords in 1981, the diplomatic relations were severed, never to be re established till today.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 proved to be an extension of the long winding story that was the US Iran relationship. Israel sought to finish the PLO which had ensconced itself firmly in Lebanon, especially West Beirut, which had become the de facto headquarters of Yasser Arafat.¹¹ The PLO had launched many attacks against Israel from this territory including the notorious massacre of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics. The Fakhani, Sabra and Shatila neighbourhoods of West Beirut had in fact become, Arafat's quasi sovereign territory. However, soon after the invasion was underway, kidnapping of foreigners especially Americans began in earnest. The US was forced to compromise with Iran, which was suspected to be the guiding force behind these kidnappings and provide arms to Iran in 1986. The funds that flowed into the US due to these arms sales were diverted to the 'Contras' fighting the elected government of Nicaragua. This came to be known as the Iran Contra affair and resulted in a major foreign policy fiasco for the US.

Though most of the people are aware of the current developments in the US-Israel Iran crisis and may relate them to Iran's attempt to build a nuclear bomb, they may or may not be aware of the complicated history between the two main rivals i.e. Iran and the US. This article is a small effort to put into perspective the various events that occurred between the nations and the double faced nature of American foreign policies which have played a major part in advancing the confrontation to the stage that it is at today. In the words of Igor Korotchenko, editor of the Russian National Defense Magazine "Basically, Washington will use any convenient reason that appears legitimate cause for the international community to attack Iran."

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Electronic Document Handling in the Armed Forces : Need for an Automated Approach

Commander K Ashok Menon (Retd)*

Background

The instances of leakage of Radia Tapes, the draft version of the Coal Block allocation issued by Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) getting to the public domain, the Chief of Army Staff's classified communication to the Defence Minister reaching the press and last but not the least, Defence Research Development Organisation's (DRDO) inability to fathom leakage of an internal audit report, against all laid down norms, are some of the instances in the recent past where the agencies concerned are having their backs against the wall and grappling to find a way to contain this menace. The thin line that separates 'information theft' from 'information leakage' is indeed hard to define and perhaps has to be inferred on the basis of the context. That such action, malafide or otherwise would happen in any era is natural to assume, but the ease with which it can be done today, is a matter of concern that needs urgent addressing.

The Economist in its Feb 2011 edition¹ had stated "They are one reason why International Data Corporation (IDC), a market-research firm, predicts that the "digital universe", the amount of digital information created and replicated in a year, will increase to 35 zettabytes by 2020, from less than 1 zettabyte in 2009; 1 zettabyte is 1 trillion gigabytes, or the equivalent of 250 billion DVDs. But these tools will also make a firm's borders ever more porous. "WikiLeaks is just a reflection of the problem that more and more data are produced and can leak out," says John Mancini, president of Association for Information and Image Management (AIIM), an organisation dedicated to improving information management". An earlier IDC paper² had deduced that an average

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1 MB file attachment has a footprint, 50 times as large within the organisation's intranet. Whether, in the first place such a large circulation of copies of a document is needed, is one debate, but importantly after it reaches the respective recipient, how long should it 'exist' is another. Even greater is the debate on how an enforcement of the 'cradle to grave' principle can be achieved.

E-Document and the Armed Forces

The electronic document editors; be it Word Processor, Spread Sheet or Presentation packages in the form of MS Word, MS Excel and MS PowerPoint deployed across the Forces have empowered users at all levels to templatise, crunch data or facilitate authoring presentations effectively. This has undoubtedly become a high-end productive tool set whose efficiencies are not measured normally as it is taken as a base-line for day to day functioning. With the proliferation of the number of Personal Computers across units, formations, ships and establishments, each pre-loaded with an MS Office package, an end user leverages the same to see that files of the various formats stated above are stored on the respective machine. Customarily, these machines are on a centralised Network, in few cases, Local Area Networks of different sizes. There are machines that operate on a stand-alone mode too.

Navy, for example, with its New Energy Systems Group (NEWN) backbone has been able to ensure that a most of the Local Area Networks that were hitherto operating in isolation are integrated with it. It is therefore imminent that, gradually a complete centralised control would come about. Across the three services there have been a few ERP implementations apart from Messaging solutions, that have matured during the 1990's. Again in the case of the Navy, one of the successful implementations over NEWN has been the Navy wide E-Mail solution - it has been in operation for a few years now. There are also a few structured Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)/ centralised implementations that are used by a defined set of users, like Messaging/Communication, COTS ERP for Sailors, home grown ERP for General and Aviation Logistics etc. Similar centralised messaging solutions and applications for Ordnance and Inventory do exist in the other two services. In all such cases, however, control of access to information is implemented through the respective solution

framework itself. Responsibility and ownership of ensuring the same also, lie within the specific application's administration group. Further, in most of these cases it is relatively easy to audit and check effectiveness of how these controls are implemented, because of the nature of the architecture and tools used.

Since the number of such ERP or centralised applications – are very few, it is evident that maximum amount of information on an on-going basis is generated on workstations, through a combination of Office utilities like a Word Processor or a Spread Sheet. It would also be fair to assume that such information, which could be of varied degrees of criticality and importance, is made available to the entire senior leadership, leveraging standard packages like MS Office. It is relevant to mention that while there would be a few implementations of Office Packages on other Operating Systems, like Linux for example, a substantial percentage of users use MS Office on Microsoft Windows.

Currently, as a practice, each user classifies a document, by typing an appropriate classification label, say 'Secret' or 'Confidential' on the top and bottom of each page. As a policy, 'Secret' and above classified documents are not to be held in electronic form, and the permitted classified documents are to be stored only in encrypted form.

Periodic Information Security audits, are undertaken to check and confirm effectiveness of IT Security issues in various directorates/units.

Concerns

Against the above backdrop, following are some of the concerns that are likely to exist:-

- (a) Lack of a 100 per cent integrated IT infrastructure, that allows information assets to be created and held in islands.
- (b) Data created on a day to day basis, over a period of time builds the information inventory on each workstation, with no mechanism available to know the nature of content that each machine holds.
- (c) Due to lack of any form of automation, there is nil visibility of a establishment's/unit's/directorate's - Document-Inventory holding.

(d) As a corollary there is nil visibility on the amount of classified information held on each machine / across the Organisation - in absolute terms.

(e) Resultantly when an IT asset (workstation, hard-disk, laptop etc.) is lost, the Organisation has no visibility on the quantum of classified information lost.

(f) While encryption tools have been installed on each machine for encrypting local documents held, there is no mechanism to establish whether it is actually used, unless a physical check on each machine is carried out. This implies significant possibility of:-

(i) Presence of un-encrypted 'confidential' documents in a workstation

(ii) Presence of un-encrypted documents labeled 'Secret' or 'Top Secret' in a workstation.

(g) Since noting sheets, memos etc. are all typed in MS Word and further since important justifications are given by embedding data from MS Excel Files into these Word documents, it is apparent that condensed critical and confidential information is likely to be lying strewn in various workstations across the enterprise and in many cases unencrypted.

(h) Lack of an automated audit measurement tool to check classified information held, aggravates this risk dimension further.

(j) With increase in usage of internal e-mail, it would be fair to assume that 'attachments' containing critical information are held in multiple workstations. This apart from creating overheads in storage, importantly increases risk exposure due to leakage from multiple sources.³

Key Information Security Lessons from WikiLeaks

A cursory glance at the Wikileaks site reveals that, content obtained by the Wikileaks owners was pushed by them into a structured Database from which retrieval was simple. Information was organised based on 'location' and 'classification-label'. A quantified statistic in terms of classified content held was most certainly a

powerful representation of the likely loss to the stake-holder, reputational or otherwise.⁴

The key question here however is whether the concerned stakeholder itself - say a specific embassy in this case - have details of the content it would have lost – and more importantly, held it in a similar fashion, as presented by the Wikileaks site. If indeed had the information in such granular detail been available to any tier of leadership within, perhaps the mechanism that would have been in place to protect it, would have been different.

Recommended Approach for Complete Document Protection

While there are tools in Document Management, Information Rights Management etc., the complexity of the Services Organisation makes it difficult to implement these even if the IT maturity within the set-up goes up substantially. However, there is a compelling case to address e-Document protection.

It is clear from the facts brought out that in order to protect Electronic Documentation created through utilities like MS Office that draw strength from its de-centralised architecture, deployed across multiple workstations, in a fragmented network environment, a tailored approach that leverages innovative use of technology combined with effective management processes needs to come into play.

Following are the recommended steps to attain the objective of achieving a reasonable assurance on document protection:-

- (a) Build an Information Security culture that sensitises the importance of each individual's role in the Document Creation and Management Process.
- (b) Make aware the criticality of the A 7.2 control of the ISO 27001 standard on Information Security that deals with Data Classification to all personnel.
- (c) Take steps to incrementally build localised databases of classified content held within a workstation, across units/ships/directorates.
- (d) Take steps to create a centralised repository that

integrates information stored in these localised databases. This repository acts as the basic audit database that provides:-

- (i) Summarised information on overall document holding of the enterprise.
- (ii) Summarised information of classified documents held across the enterprise.
- (iii) Drill down details for audit and basic forensic purposes.

These steps are possible only with deployment of an automated tool to enforce classification of documents. Any other alternative, like maintenance of manual register - introduces subjectivity. Also physical verification for audit would be a non-starter. The choice of tool should ensure following:-

- (a) It should integrate with the encryption tool that is currently in use for end point document encryption.
- (b) It should enhance the effectiveness of encryption usage.
- (c) It should be possible to implement a suitable Data Leakage Prevention solution that integrates with the Document Classification Solution. This solution would ensure that logs are created when classified documents are being 'sent' or 'copied'. Adequate controls around despatch of information can also be built. Essentially this would address content leaving the perimeter of the organisation.

Once the above is completed, a more informed decision on whether and how document flow within the environment needs to be controlled, can be taken. Based on the same, an appropriate Information Rights Management tool could be deployed, in a phased and defined manner – where relevant. The reason why this point is being emphasised, is because of the highly rule-driven nature of the tool sets available. This would have an impact on its successful implementation across the Organisation – because of the complex dynamics of the environment.

Based on the facts stated above, a layered approach to protect e-documents is recommended. Diagrammatic representation of the same is shown at **Figure 1**.




Figure 1

Conclusion

The proliferation of electronic documents within the Armed Forces on the one hand and the complexity and challenges associated with augmenting IT assets with sustained rapidity has begun to throw up the inadequacies in addressing electronic document handling. Digital Forensics is used for investigation purposes currently and would continue—but this is after an Information Security incident has occurred.

With leakages of data/documents taking place at periodic intervals, there is a compelling need to be proactive. That can happen only if the basic aspect of creating visibility of the e-Document Inventory – which also acts as an audit database - is addressed with speed.

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Environment as a National Security Concern: A Perspective

Colonel Yogesh Nair*

Introduction

With changing security dynamics and emergence of multidimensional threats, the concept of National Security has acquired fresh connotations to encompass various non-military considerations. In the contemporary era, many factors relevant to human well-being and development are linked to broader security lexicon. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report (1994) national security in the present epoch includes issues like economic security, food security, health security, personal security, common security, political security and environmental security. Of these, the environmental security is one of the most important issues as it not only deals with security of human beings from hostile aggressions in physical terms but delves in the very existence of ecology itself needed for survival of the human race.

Environmental issues transgress national boundaries, and can jeopardise not only the security of the country in which they occur, but also that of others it connects.¹ In a highly populated country as India with extremely variable resource distribution and uncoordinated development activities, the issue of environment security is gaining prominence with depletion and degradation of resources. This paper is an attempt to examine the linkages between environmental concerns and the national security paradigm.

Factors Affecting Environmental Security

Environmental security is a complex issue and examining factors that relate to national security is a challenging task. Environmental security encompasses the interactive dynamics of the diverse human and natural networks that constitute the modern world.² In

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the hierarchy of human needs, security is one of the most basic impulses—exceeded in its primacy only by the even more basic physiological needs for food, water, shelter, and the like, each of which is dependent on environmental well-being. These are serious issues that can ultimately lead to disasters, regional tensions and violence and many eminent scientists have predicted catastrophic consequences if environmental issues are not addressed on priority. Some of the factors affecting environmental security are analysed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Population

Since humans are part of the ecosystem, it is becoming increasingly clear that one cannot consider environmental security issues without concurrently examining human population. Every activity in the universe is human centric and many of them affect environment and in turn the Security. An increasing population would have environmental impacts, as only a finite population can be supported without damaging the land's ability to sustain its natural state.³ An ever increasing population and its demands for natural resources, renewable and non-renewable, has led to unabated environment assaults. The heavy demand of renewable resources is resulting in rapid depletion of these resources than the rate with which it can be replenished by natural systems.

In reality, majority of the environmental problems are man-made. Encroachment on wildlife habitats due to agricultural extension, construction of infrastructure, construction of embankments and barrages, deforestation and land degradation are some of such problems. The pressure of a burgeoning population often damages the natural resources to such an extent that it can create imbalance for the region leading to migration of population from one region and uneven population influx in other areas, leading to heightened security concerns.

Global Climate Change

Climate change is another issue which has high environmental consequences associated with it. Temperature rise and uneven distribution, spatially and temporally, will change the weather and climate over large areas of the Earth. Higher temperatures over land would augment evaporation of soil moisture, raise dry soil temperatures, and increase melting of ice. All of these factors will

combine to change the weather pattern of a particular region, in both frequency and intensity of events.⁴ Grasslands and forests will shrink, and deserts will expand with worsening climates. Due to melting of ice and resultant rise in sea levels estimated to rise by about half a metre by 2100, many islands in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean will have to face catastrophe.⁵ Rise of sea water level, coupled with natural land subsidence in some low lying regions, could have large impacts in several critical areas of the world.

A second significant impact of global warming is likely to be non availability of usable water. Consequent to climatic change and resultant monsoon pattern, rains are expected to become increasingly erratic and unpredictable. Rainfall is likely to become more intense and concentrated to fewer days, which may lead to adverse situation such as flash floods. Floods erode arable and valuable land and in turn affect environment sustenance. Linked to this is the food production particularly because of changed water availability. Besides, some areas may even witness droughts due to changes in Hydrological cycle. Floods and droughts cause more deaths, misery and economic damage than any other type of disasters. Any increase in their frequency would have most damaging impact on global climate change which could in turn influence the environmental security.

Land Use

Deforestation is the most fundamental and ongoing action of human modification of the environment. There is a definite relationship between the deforestation in the world and the environmental security. Trees and plants control the carbon content in the environment and in turn regulate the greenhouse effect. The impacts of deforestation range from the very subtle changes in climate that loss of forest areas may induce, to urgent life-threatening issues of depletion of productivity of arable lands and the resultant displacement of populace. Desertification thus can generate broad scale problems for human welfare and political stability. By virtue of its capacity to trigger famines, desertification on occasion has served as a recipe for political instability (e.g. Algeria, Chad), for tensions between neighbouring countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Botswana), and may even be a cause of armed conflict.⁶

Water Use

Water is the life source of the environment without which no living being can survive. Water, apart from being the very basis of human survival is also essential for food production, power generation, transportation and critical to many industries. In fact it is a resource which is utmost essential for economic growth in present day society. With development and population rise, demand for water has increased manifold, resulting in overexploitation of surface and ground water, leading to water scarcity. Environmental degradation has not only affected water in terms of availability of sufficient quantity but also deterioration of quality as well. Fresh water supplies are increasingly coming under threat of pollution from industrial effluents and municipal waste. Inadequate and contaminated water has severely affected the health and hygiene of many people across the globe. Nearly all infectious diseases and major epidemics in the world have degraded water and poor sanitation as the root cause. Water scarcity is also a major factor contributing to population migration and this can have a delimiting impact in the affected regions/countries. Further, as water is "shared" by different countries or different peoples, water scarcity emerges as a serious security issue.

Under the ambit of water use, oceans are also considered an environmental security concern, primarily because of their role in feeding the world's population and the regional economic importance of fishing for some countries. Annual fish harvesting increased from 22 million tons in 1950 to just over 90 million tons in 1995.⁷ The increased harvesting is caused by the demand as population grows, resulting in increased per capita consumption of fish. This has led to an imbalance in oceanic and sea water ecology. A secondary impact of the water quality is the damage to the estuaries, which causes a reduction in the production of food for the ocean's fauna. Discharge of domestic and industrial refuse into sea, is also adversely impacting the blue water ecology of many regions of the world.

Technology

Development brings in technological upgradation and most of these lead to environmental degradation, one of the major concern areas which can seriously impact the safety and security of the region and world at large in times to come. Problem of toxic and hazardous

waste disposal are another modern day reality. Today, millions of tons of different chemicals are manufactured for some "beneficial" use. These organic and inorganic chemicals have become ubiquitous throughout the world. Many of these chemicals biodegrade very slowly, and therefore, when released into the environment, they have the capacity to cause long lasting damage to the environment and mankind.

Environmental Issues and Their Impact on National Security

Today, nations face multiple security challenges from traditional conflicts between states – such as territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism to non-traditional issues to include environmental degradation and energy crisis. The new challenges posed by environmental issues are due to multiple reasons; natural and man-made, which have resulted in complicating the environmental security issues. While some issues are global, the others are peculiar to a particular region. Environmental issues are universally centrepiece to human survival and as a source has strategic significance for nations who build power through natural resources like water, oil, gas and various other minerals. Environmental devastation faced by a country due to natural calamities, especially those originating from beyond its borders, eventually sour bilateral relations and hamper regional stability. Some of the major environmental issues that are likely to cause security ramification have been deliberated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Environment Deterioration and Disruption. Environmental deterioration and degradation involving deforestation, desertification, reclamation of wetlands, damming of rivers, clearing of vegetation etc have adversely affected the health of the ecosystem. According to recent estimates, environmental degradation is threatening the health and livelihood of two billion people living in arid regions around the world. Ecosystem disruption from natural disasters such as tsunamis, floods, hurricanes, El Nino, La Nina etc caused large scale devastation, unprecedented economic loss and human suffering and death. Unless effective prophylactic and remedial measures are taken, tsunami and Katrina type of disasters are likely to be common features in the coming decades. This is a serious issue, as continuous environmental calamities decrease the economic growth of a nation, hamper its social cohesion, and destabilise its political structure.⁸

Environment Induced Migration. In recent times, environmental challenges ranging from pollution, excessive carbon emissions and rapid population growth have led to increased scarcity of natural resources like water, energy, and food. Environmental resource scarcity, fostered by a combination of population growth and resource depletion, has already been a cause or a contributing factor in regional conflicts. As the population increases, there is a related increase in environmental hazards for national security. Population-increase creates many societal and economic problems that cause environmental degradation and resource deficit. Further, environmental change reduces economic opportunities for a country by causing demographic displacement within states and across international borders. An unexpected movement of population across the international border raises political tension between neighbouring countries. The ecological impacts of large movement of people can have significant environmental implications for the receiving region. This cumulative causality is a characteristic feature of the link between environment and security including ethnic conflict. Thus environmental induced migrations are potential trigger of economic and political conflicts and in turn national security.

Environmental Conflicts. The root cause of most violent conflicts throughout history has been competition for territory and resources; such conflicts are likely to intensify as resources progressively become scarce and the quality of the environment degrades even further. Resource criticality has many times led to violent conflict within and between states. One particular area of tension and rivalry will be over trans-boundary resources such as river waters that flow between countries. Out of 261 of the world's major rivers, water is shared; with 176 of them flowing through two countries, 48 through three countries and 37 through four or more countries and many of these countries have some kind of dispute on water sharing.⁹ As many as 80 countries, with nearly three billion people or two-fifths of the world's population, already suffer serious water deficits; hence with rise in water scarcity, likelihood of conflict emanating from distribution pattern of the river waters cannot be ruled out.¹⁰ Given the geopolitical scenario, the situation can ignite local tensions and provoke violent resource-based conflicts. This type of insecurity severely affects the resources challenges both at intra or inter-state level and has a potential to expand to international levels also.

Impact on Military

Use of different facets of environment during military operations is of utmost importance and is inescapable. In the modern times, it has assumed greater significance due to emergence of latest environmental challenges and demographic dynamics. With depletion and degradation of natural resources there will be high demand for protection of important environmental assets. Force deployment to accomplish mission will have to include principles to avoid unnecessary environmental impact and limit collateral damage. As environmental factors become strategically vital, military analysis for planning of any operation will need special deliberations:-

(a) Environmental effect of military operations on economics and social aspect of the country will have to be examined in detail. It may well be that the potential long-term environmental risk due to loss of productivity outweighs the importance of other considerations.

(b) Resource rich areas close to the border falling in potential conflict zone need to be identified for their strategic environmental importance. For instance, a particularly productive area or a seashore may need to be avoided for its economic importance or survivability of the people of that region. Areas which assume importance are :

(i) Region contributing to the global climate balance.

(ii) Ecosystems of national importance recognised as fragile.

(iii) Areas that provide habitat to an endangered or threatened species.¹¹

(c) Response to an environmentally destructive attack needs to be engaged with an aim to prevent destruction of the ecosystem rather than just retaliation to cause similar damage in adversary's country. Actions whether military or diplomatic need to be decisive and trenchant, with the larger goal for avoiding environmental catastrophe.

(d) Treaties and conventions with potential adversaries need to be in place to serve as a foundation, for environmental conservation during war.

In addition to operating within the limitations brought about by environmental considerations, military as a responsible constituent of the society will have to be prepared for innovative environmental challenges:-

- (a) Conducting humanitarian operations after environmental disasters and large scale natural calamities like floods, earthquake, cyclone, tsunami, famine, drought etc.
- (b) Integrating force health protection considerations in environmentally degraded areas that lack substantial public health measures.
- (c) Responding to environmental terrorism or sabotage.
- (d) Remedying adverse environmental impact as a part of the exit strategy.

Way Ahead

It is critically important to recognise that environmental security is only one component of the larger process of national security and cannot be separated from the whole. The strategic analysis needs to begin with understanding of the key environmental security issues and how environmental scarcity and environmental degradation could impact security.

Deteriorating environment is a threat to individuals, nations and the entire universe. Hence, there is a need to identify problems and issues concerning environmental security of the region; to enhance common understanding of the issues at hand along with the emphasis on shared responsibility. Threats to environmental security are usually diffused, unintended, and trans-national; causes and effects often separated in time and space, have long term implications, and their quick resolutions requires commitment and cooperation from a wide range of actors. These issues have extended human understanding of environmental change, conflict, and vulnerability in promoting peace, stability, and human security.¹²

Growing threats to environmental security demand promotion of 'collective security', as part of accommodative diplomacy and international cooperation. Multilateral security cooperation on environmental issues is vital to regional security, stability and economic growth, and to elicit regional responses on the most

viable approaches to addressing these issues. Resolutions of environment security threats will not only remedy the environmental constraints but will also serve as confidence building measures contributing towards peace making and peace building. In view of global ecological interdependence, there is a need to design new forms of ecologically enlightened development, diplomacy and governance.

As regard involvement of military, it is very important to examine the multiple dimensions of roles of military in dealing with threats arising due to environmental terrorism and in protecting the environment during military operations. Some of the steps have been taken in the form of setting up of National Disaster Management Authority; however the role and impact on military needs holistic analysis for a successful disaster response and consequence management.

Conclusion

Traditionally, the realistic understanding of security does not include the environment as a matter of concern. Comprehensive security of the state must incorporate the political, economic, diplomatic, societal and environmental dimensions of security. To protect the citizens and to ensure their well-being, nations need to plan and promote environmental conservation for safeguarding environmental security. Healthy ecosystems form the basis of environmental security, sustainable development and ultimate survivability of people. If not addressed and resolved, environmental problems viz; water shortages, land degradation, pollution etc could become security threats. In this respect the South Asian region is one of the world's most vulnerable areas. Because of the destabilising potential of environmental issues, environmental security should form an inescapable part of national security analysis and planning.

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Baspa Glacier: Sutlej's Big Feeder – A USI Sponsored Study-cum- Adventure Trek*

Colonel KS Dhami (Retd)**

Baspa is a big glacier. The valley is amongst the most beautiful in the Himalayas. The road journey, a destination by itself—and witness how, bumper to bumper, 'run-of-the river' hydel projects are killing the mighty Sutlej, and affecting the fragile ecology.

General


The author's trek to Baspa glacier was conducted from 08-17 July 2012 in continuation of USI sponsored adventure-cum-study treks for ground monitoring of 'snout zones' of big glaciers: Gangotri, Siachen and Kolahoi, feeding the main rivers of northwest Himalayas. The phenomenon of receding glaciers and its effect on climate change was earlier described in an article '*Himalayas: A Wake-Up Call*' in USI Journal, Vol CXL January-March 2010, No.579.

The journey, to the road head at Chitkul for the Baspa glacier, starts from Chandigarh through Simla to Narkanda. From Narkanda the National Highway leads up the Sutlej river to Rampur. The other route is along the old Hindustan-Tibet Road (HTR) that goes along the Narkanda-Bagi-Khadrala-Sungri ridge line and the Indo-Gangetic watershed—running at about 9000 ft through one of the finest fir line stretches in the Himalayas. This approach was very popular with the British Viceroys. From Sungri the old road/track led to Taklesh and then keeping well away from the Sutlej, crossed it at Wangtu. Presently, from Taklesh one has to come down to Rampur on to the main road—the old stretch has yet to be developed. At Kharcham a steep road takes off for Chitkul crossing

* This article is based on personal observations of the author on the ground and his earlier travels to this area.

** Colonel KS Dhami was commissioned into 14 Horse on 12 June 1960. Later, he got himself transferred to the Parachute Regiment, commanded 6 PARA and took premature retirement in 1983. He led the USI sponsored adventure-cum-study treks to Gangotri Glacier in Oct 2010, Siachen and Kolahoi Glaciers in Oct 2011 and Baspa Glacier from 8-17 Jul 2012.

the Sutlej over the diversion dam of the Kharcham-Wangtu Hydel project. (Refer to Map)



Map – Baspa River Valley

Along the road on the Sutlej are numerous hydel projects that have come up and are under construction, killing the great river as its flow will be restricted by passing through tunnels. They are becoming a major cause for environmental degradation of the Sutlej Basin. It was an interesting sight to see a Nano car near Chitkul at 11,000 ft, a road stretch which is traversed mostly by powerful SUVs – others not daring to do so. Later, while on a walk near the ITBP camp, I met three tribal women de-weeding in a field to the 'sound of music on a cell phone' and asked them about the Nano car. The reply was a full assessment of the mini car: "*Bahut achi hai, choti hai, is ilake ke liye nahi hai par fir bhi sab jagah jati hai*" (It is very good and small; not suitable for this area, but still it goes everywhere).

The 'Adventure-cum-Study Trek' started with the aim of fixing the snout position of the Baspa glacier and to observe the state of the ablation zone. The team consisted of; besides myself, Subedar Jagat Pal, Naik Champa Panchok, Sepoy Bheem Sen of

Dogra Scouts—the mountain warriors, a title they lived up to with tremendous enthusiasm. Champa and Bheem are from Spiti and Lahaul Valleys respectively. Earlier they were members of the Dogra Scout's mountain expedition to the Kamet peak in Garhwal Himalayas.

The Baspa River Valley

The Baspa Valley is also popularly called the Sangla Valley. It is amongst the most beautiful valleys in the Himalayas (**Refer to Photograph P1**). At the head of this valley is the Baspa glacier—the source of the Baspa river which joins the Sutlej at Kharcham. From Kharcham, a steep road leads to Sangla and from there a gradually ascending road runs through the most picturesque part of the valley to Chitkul, the road head. Some time in the past a beautiful lake existed at Sangla which dried up with receding of the glacier. Now a man made lake (reservoir) has come up as part of the 300 MW Baspa-II 'run- of- the river' hydel project from where water is taken through a tunnel to the power house below at Kharcham.

From the Baspa Valley a number of famous high altitude treks take-off. The famous ones being: around the Kinnar Kailash massif on the great Himalayan Range; across the Indo-Gangetic watershed over the Lalalanti pass into Pabbar river valley to Rohru; over the Lamkhaga pass to Harsil on the Bhagirathi river; and over the Yamrangla into Tibet, which was one of the popular trade routes into Tibet prior to occupation of Tibet by China.

The Glacier Trail

From Chitkul a steep 44 km pony/foot trail takes one to the Baspa glacier snout. It is a difficult and demanding trek with most of it over stones, rocks, steep skiing slopes. At times toeing is required to make a foothold, and to walk over glacial moraines. Numerous big and small glacial streams have to be crossed by stone hopping over improvised wooden log bridges and some of them have to be waded through. Change in weather can lead to sudden torrents of water gushing down suddenly, leaving you stranded on the wrong side.

In high valley pastures and on high mountain slopes, flocks of sheep and goats can be seen. At lower heights cattle are much healthier than those around Simla Hills. Degradation of forest cover continues unchecked near habitations and by graziers — like it is happening in other parts of the Himalayas. The Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) keeps surveillance over this area right up to the International Border. It has set-up posts at Tangtse, Khannadundi and Nihal Thach (**Refer to Photograph P2**). From Nihal Thach routes bifurcate, one to the Baspa glacier and over the Lamakhaga pass to Harsil and the other to the north to Yamrangla (pass) on the Indo-China border, which in older days was a popular trade route.



P 1 – Baspa Valley – A View to Remember



**P 2 – Nihal Thach ITBP Post.
Rainbow – A Welcome Omen in the Mountains**

The Snout Zone

From available records Baspa glacier extends across 18 km with its width varying from half a kilometre near the snout to about 3 km, covering an area of 35 sq km. The snout is about 4300 m and the highest portion of the glacier is 5800 m.

The Baspa glacier snout zone is quite different from the Gangotri, Siachen and Kolahoi glaciers that we have studied. The glacier spreads over relatively level ground and has gradual gradient. The melted water does not gush out from one or two cave like openings as in the glaciers mentioned above; but from a big cave like water outlet covering practically the whole front. The edges of the glacier, near the mountain slopes on which we stood, have solid ice covered by debris. The water flow close to the snout is well spread and is used for crossing, rather than to take the risk of crossing lower down (**Refer to Photograph P3**).



P 3 – Baspa Glacier Snout. Toe Cutting will lead to large scale shearing of unsupported ice

Ice is visible only at the melting face of the snout or in crevices, other visible portions are all covered by black soot and debris. The backward and side toe cutting due to melting will lead to the massive unsupported portion shearing and crumbling—this is the way the glacier snout is melting and retreating. The melting rate cannot be assessed without some previous record but from what we saw on the ground, the glacier is definitely receding fast and shrinking, like others.

The snout zone was photographed clearly and the coordinates were recorded by using the GPS and data recorder. Accurate reading on the GPS could be taken from a distance of about 100 m from the ice face and in line with the snout's left (southern) edge. The snout coordinates were recorded as: Long - 78° 41' 54.36" E, Lat - 31° 13' 33.32" N (**Refer to Photograph P4**).



P 4 – For accuracy taking coordinates on GPS 100 mtrs from cave opening and in line with left edge of snout

Weather was an important consideration on which we could take a calculated risk. We had to do our job quickly and then get out fast. In four days we trekked about 90 km at altitudes ranging from 11,500 to over 14,500 ft and it was really a tough going. Last year, tourists were stranded in Sangla and had to be evacuated by helicopters. I had assured my team not to worry about the weather based on my experience of last 12 years of trekking in the Himalayas. The weather Gods had never upset my plans even once nor, interfered with my photography. Weather remained clear during the four days of our trek. We felt further reassured to see a rainbow—a welcome ‘omen’ in the mountains. It appeared in the evening of the day prior to our trek to the snout; but at night, I was awakened by rain drops on my tent which had me worried the whole night. I wondered, how can this happen? However, the weather Gods relented and we could not have asked for better weather on the next day and the day after that — that helped us to complete our trek successfully. The logistics support provided by HQ Western Command and its units in the area of the trek contributed considerably to the success of our expedition.

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Letters to the Editor

I

Dear Editor

Colonel PK Vasudeva in his article on 'China's Dams in Tibet and Diversion of Brahmaputra' (USI Journal, April- June, 2012) has pointed out that future wars are more likely to be over water. In this connection, the warning issued by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon that high population growth and poor water management posed significant threats on water availability and could be 'a potent fuel for war', is relevant. Also a recent report on Global Water Security released in the USA, based on the assessment of Federal Intelligence Agencies, has highlighted the possibility of wars on water in the coming decades. Hence the author has rightly brought out the concerns arising out of China's unilateral decision to divert waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) ignoring the protests of downstream riparians like India and Bangladesh.

Though China has been insisting that it has no such plans, the author has quoted various responses from Chinese experts and authorities on the issue and also about the interest shown by their hydropower lobbies in this regard. Hence he has stressed the need for India to be alert since if the Chinese implement these plans, we would be at their mercy for our water needs during the dry spell and for protection from floods during rainy season. According to the author, India and Bangladesh should jointly take up the matter with China and if the negotiations fail, the issue should be raised at the UN Security Council to safeguard our interests.

For the past many years, China had been frequently assuring India that it would not do anything that would harm our interests, but now it has constructed many projects in Tibet region, like the Senge-Ali project on the Indus, a project at the Zada gorge on the Sutlej; and is now constructing the Zangmu project on Yarlung Tsangpo. Also, from the construction activities going on at the

Metok site situated at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra and from the map of the Grid Corporation of China for 2020 showing the power generated from the Great Bend area as connected to the rest of the Chinese power supply, it can be inferred that the mega project at Metok for diverting the Brahmaputra to Gobi desert is going to be a reality in the near future.

The Chinese projects on the Brahmaputra could pose threats to India since if they divert the lean season flows, our existing hydro-projects have to be shut down for want of minimum river flows. If they release heavy flows during rainy season, vast areas would be devastated, as it happened in Arunachal Pradesh and in Himachal Pradesh in 2000. The sad experience of the co-basin states of the Mekong Basin due to indiscriminate operation of upstream Chinese projects should be a grim reminder to us in this regard.

The author has rightly pointed out that China is not bound by any treaty on water sharing with us. The Joint Declaration made in 2006 between the two enables only sharing of hydrological data, which is not adequate to meet our concerns. Hence while we take up the issue with the UN, we should also be prepared to face situations in the meanwhile, if and when the Chinese projects start operations. The available option is to take-up and construct the large storage project already identified in the Siang (Brahmaputra) to absorb flood flows from upstream. Such a storage would also help to even out river flow fluctuations, to protect our downstream projects. Similar projects identified in the Sutlej also should be taken-up for construction on top priority to meet the likely threats from the liquid bombs ticking away in Tibet. Hence, instead of remaining complacent with the Chinese assurances, let us get ready with various options as above to face the consequences of China's projects for river diversion.

Yours Sincerely

*MS Menon,
Former Chief Engineer,
Central Water Commission*

II

Dear Editor,

This is in reference to the article 'Evolving Military Strategy' by Lieutenant General PC Katoch (Retd) in the April-June 2012 edition of the USI Journal. It was indeed a pleasure to read this article as it reinforced many views that I personally held with regard to the policy paralysis and the lack of a strategic culture in our country. During my study of Strategy as a subject, I found the apathy shown by our politicians, who are rightfully the masters of the military set-up in a democracy, is alarming. There seems to be no urgency to address any of the issues that General Katoch has so rightly pointed out.

Our political strategic guidance and military preparedness are increasingly being called 'humiliating'.¹ Why is it that we remain in denial of a need for joint ethos in war fighting as has been extremely well articulated in the article? Jointness is not an option anymore.

We are probably living in a few years of relatively low insurgency because Pakistan is presently besieged with internal problems. Come 2014, when International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops pull out of Afghanistan and leave the future of that country to its neighbourhood, we may find renewed insurgency into India. As Mumbai 2008 demonstrated, we were caught unprepared. We did not have enough confidence to be able to provide a swift retaliatory strike against the perpetrators of the attack and yet we are no better off today than we were in 2008. The 'Cold Start' doctrine has not been discussed by the political masters and yet the Services remain disjointed and independent in pursuing individual agendas based on their individual doctrines.

The General has written about evolving a Military Strategy despite speaking of a lack of National Strategy guiding the formulation of that very military strategy. Is it possible for the military in this nation, being as subservient to the politicians as it is, to articulate a military strategy without discussing it with the political masters? It seems to me, in my limited experience that we

are planning and procuring for wars that we may never fight. We are practising concepts that the politicians will never have the stomach to authorise. Can any nation of our size function in such a strategic vacuum?

USI is an ideal forum which raises issues of major significance and has an eminent panel of senior serving and retired officers who have experienced these logjams first hand. It would indeed be a service to our nation if USI can take a lead role in bringing awareness about this strategic vacuum within the political class especially with high level committees like the, Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), National Security Committee (NSC) and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). We cannot talk about surgical strikes without having the capability to carry them out. We cannot carry them out unless we have a joint plan for it. Most importantly we cannot afford to be unable to act against another Mumbai style attack while hiding behind the facade of strategic restraint. We need a National Security Strategy and we need an articulated National Military Strategy to guide us so that every man in the Armed Forces knows what we are preparing for and what we may be expected to do.

(Endnote 1. Ashely Tellis, as quoted in Tom Hundley, 'Race to the End', *Foreign Policy*, September 2012 accessed on [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race to the end](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end))

Yours Sincerely

Lieutenant Commander Digvijaysinh Sodha

III

Dear Editor,

The paper of Rear Admiral Menon, is very realistic and futuristic – both for our national and international implications. Hence, to safeguard our security, necessary modifications and implementation are the crying needs of the time. Deployment in Space should also receive attention.

A copy of his paper needs be sent to both, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister.

Yours Sincerely

Lieutenant Colonel Baldev K Sodhi (Retd)

Editor's Note

This is to inform our readers that the USI journal is being regularly sent to The President of India through the Military Secretary, Honourable Defence Minister, Minister of State for Defence, National Security Adviser, Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy & Air Force, and the Foreign Secretary.

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Invincibility, Challenges and Leadership*

Brigadier SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)**

This book by General KV Krishna Rao covers a very wide canvas. It begins with thumb-nail descriptions of empires and civilizations of ancient times, the middle ages and modern times. In each case the author gives reasons for their rise and fall. In the next part, there are brief descriptions of the two World Wars and other major wars of the last century. The narratives highlight the role of leadership in the final outcome of the wars. The 1971 India-Pakistan War forms part of this anthology. In Part III, the author has selected twelve political and seven military leaders whom he considers the greatest. There are short biographical sketches that emphasise their outstanding leadership attributes. Two Indians, Mahatma Gandhi and Indira Gandhi are included under political leaders and Field Marshal Manekshaw under military leaders. The last part has author's reflections on the role and status of leadership in war and peace.

The canvas of subjects is so vast that to begin with the reader is unable to grasp the main theme of the book, which is revealed in the conclusion of the book. In the author's words: "From ancient times to the present and into future, I have attempted to discern the role of leadership and its status in government and functioning of the nation." That theme has been fairly well articulated in the narratives.

Reading through the chapters on rise and fall of great empires, the reader is left wondering why the author did not dwell in greater detail on the Indian situation. The book would have enriched our understanding of India's past had the author attempted a more rigorous enquiry into the causes of India's subjugation by invaders for over a thousand years.

* **Invincibility, Challenges and Leadership.** By KV Krishna Rao (New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan Pvt Ltd, 2011), pp 438, ₹ 895/-, ISBN-9788125041870.

** **Brigadier SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)** was commissioned in 9 Gorkha Rifles in June 1960 and retired on 31 August 1994. He has authored three books : '*History of 8 Mountain Division, Volume II, including Kargil Operations*'; '*History of 3 GR, Part IV, (1980-2005)*' and '*Lost Opportunities - 50 Years of Insurgency in the Northeast and India's Response*'.

The 1971 Indo-Pak War was one of the decisive wars of the last century. There have been criticisms that Dacca was not given as an objective and that forces should have gone straight for Dacca itself. The author who was one of the divisional commanders in that war defends the planning and the conduct of the war and argues that the task given to Eastern Command was to liberate Bangladesh and this naturally included Dacca. Further, the author argues that detailed planning for the capture of an objective in depth could not be planned at the very outset. As the war progressed, Lieutenant General Sagat Singh took advantage of the opportune moment to cross the Meghna by an audacious heliborne operation that contributed to the early fall of Dacca.

There are other observations of the author that have significant relevance in the prevailing context. For example, the author is emphatic in his views on civil-military relations that "the PM interacts directly with the chiefs of the armed forces. The bureaucracy cannot be a medium, but is there as a staff to the minister." It is well known that when the author was the Army Chief, he had direct access to Indira Gandhi. Later, when he was the Governor of J&K, he interacted directly with Narshimha Rao, the then Prime Minister.

The book is written in a simple easy to read style. The backgrounds of events are lucidly explained for ease of understanding. There are no charts or appendices, which make the reading easy. It is a book that will be of great value to young officers to enlarge their understanding of the role and influence of leadership in shaping the destiny of nations and armies. At another level, the author argues that leadership and preparation for the future are equally critical for any institution of the state that is mandated to serve the Country.

It may be noted that the royalty proceeds of the book are donated to the Army Central Welfare Fund.

Bash On Regardless*

Lieutenant General Milan Lalitkumar Naidu,
PVSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd)**

The book has been written by Lieutenant General WAG Pinto who commanded the famous 54 Infantry Division during the 1971 War with Pakistan. He coined the motto "Bash on Regardless", when he assumed command of the Division. The Operations by the Division were one of the most successful actions in the Western Theatre. The formation made substantial gains in the strategically important Shakargarh Sector and remained there, to defend the gains at the time of cease fire. The Battle of Basantar fought on 15/16 December 1971 was the crowning glory of 1 Corps operations, wherein Pak's Theatre reserves stood completely mauled and the road for further operations into the heartland lay open.

The book has been dedicated to the period from 21 April 1971 to 10 April 1974 which was the period of General Pinto's command of the Division. In his book, though, he covers the period from early childhood to his last day in uniform; the central theme, however, remains the conduct of 1971 war.

The book has been written in a simple style and fluid language. He commences his story from 01 July 1924 at Pune, where he was born. The description of his childhood and subsequent experiences as a young officer in the British Indian Army, vividly bring out the culture and ethos that was prevalent at that point of time.

General Pinto has described the tribulations of transfer to the Brigade of Guards and his tenures in the East, sojourn in Wellington at the Defence Services Staff College, subsequent tenures as an Instructor and as a Staff Officer, in a most interesting manner.

* **Bash On Regardless.** Published by Lieutenant General WAG Pinto, PVSM (Retd), (Printed by : Repro India Ltd., Plot No.50/2, T.T.C. MIDC Industrial Area, Mahape, Navi Mumbai, 2012), 145p, Rs 300, ISBN N.A.

****Lieutenant General Milan Lalitkumar Naidu, PVSM, AVSM, YSM** was commissioned into the Rajput Regiment in December 1967 and retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff on 31 December 2008. Presently, he is Member Armed Forces Tribunal (Delhi Bench) and an elected member of USI Council.

Chapter 5 is devoted to Command of his Battalion i.e. 4 GUARDS (1 RAJPUT). This chapter illustrates the character of this great General.

The Chapter on 1971 war brings out the military leader in General Pinto and the manner in which he succeeded against all odds. It was not just success that has been described by him but he has also described the frustrations that he faced during the conduct of battle in a forthright manner. He illustrates certain personalities tongue-in-cheek, like 'Lakeer ke Fakeer' who were very difficult to convince, and would not accept any unconventional thinking. Here the author could have perhaps dealt with the overall concept of operations and its execution at the Corps level in some detail.

Chapter 9 has a description of his higher command assignments as Director of Military Training, GOC 33 Corps, Colonel of the RAJPUT Regiment, Commandant National Defence College and finally as the Army Commander. His observations on leadership style in higher command are very pertinent and relevant. It is essential that one understands and differentiates between leadership traits which should get prominence at higher command level vis-à-vis, as a regimental officer. The General understood the difference and modified his leadership style to suit the task at hand.

The last chapter is titled 'Sunset and Twilight' and it contains several valuable nuggets of wisdom. Here, he writes "*Do your work honestly, sincerely, without worrying too much of the consequences or effect on your career, but at the same time, recognize the problems of your superiors as well as subordinates, and you will never go wrong. Then even if you do make an honest mistake, face up to it, usually it will come out all right in the end.*" He goes on to make certain down to earth observations which include fears and apprehension as a young man and subsequently as a senior officer in the Indian Army.

The book is fun to read, with candid description of fun and frolic that takes places in Regimental life. He has not minced words and comes out as a great character whose life as a Soldier, as an Officer and as a General needs to be studied in great detail so that we may learn from his experiences. The book is highly readable and is strongly recommended for study by all professional soldiers.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Revitalising Indian Democracy. By Vinod Saighal, (New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2012) pp..267, Price Rs. 590/-, ISBN 9788121211505.

The book, laid out in ten chapters, offers significant analysis on a large spectrum of issues related to the decline in governance and the perceived subversion of the state machinery by vested interests. The subjects examined are varied and range from internal threats to democracy, to the fundamentals of good governance, electoral reforms, evils of corruption and black money, to the role of judiciary and its positive contribution, the regional disparity in the Northeast and the Jan Lok Pal debate. He recommends a Model for Restoration of Good Government (MRGG), that he unveiled in October 1995, which has now become a movement and of which he is the current convenor.

The author has made excellent use of annexures based on MRGG letters to the Judiciary and the Decision Makers that supplement the formulations in Chapters 1 to 10. The annexures on 'Judicial Activism', 'Degeneration of the Political Class' and 'Spare a Thought for the Security Forces', are of particular interest and add great value to the book. While examining the employment of the Security Forces deployed in Srinagar, the author explains their problems graphically, which not many are aware of.

Although many of the issues concerning the decline in public administration, dilution of values of the politicians, the absence of will to implement the plans and lack of accountability in the system, have been discussed in the media and in the seminars elsewhere, the author attempts to reinforce these by active involvement of the civil society by creating moral pressure on the Government functionaries and public awareness of voters not to vote for tainted politicians. The author suggests that there is a need to look beyond the Jan Lok Pal Bill as it is felt that even when the Bill is passed by the Parliament, it will require political leaders of high integrity to implement the same in letter and spirit.

The author needs to be complimented for making the book a reading pleasure. The language used is smooth, easy to

comprehend, crisp and expressive. The book will make a fine addition to the literature related to good governance.

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Two Decades of India's Look East Policy : Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity. Edited by Amar Nath Ram (New Delhi : Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2012), pp..257, ₹ 695.00, ISBN 978817304944.

This book is a collection of essays written by twelve former Ambassadors/Secretaries and three others, one from the academic world, a journalist and a researcher. Each one has given his/her prognosis on the origins, the nature and extent of India's re-engagement with countries to its East. Unfortunately, the conceptual framework of the book is rather weak for some essayists try to focus on the policy, sometimes subsuming it with personal achievements without adding significantly to knowledge. Some of the points made are repetitive. It would have been much better had the book in its entirety evaluated and assessed the origins, the significance and the results of India's strategic shift of policy as one thematic whole.

Most essayists have attributed the significant shift in the strategic thinking that led to a renewal of India's engagement with countries to its East to the changed circumstances in the international situation with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower. However, what is lacking is detailed analytical thought that went into decision making or was it simply as put by Ambassador Salman Haider the need to give Prime Minister Rao's visit to China and South Korea a rather 'off-the-cuff' slogan to give this pioneering journey a 'distinctive focus.'

Nevertheless for those trying to understand and evaluate India's relations with ASEAN / ARF and countries to its East, this is a worthwhile read and contains valuable source material. The collection of articles also contains fairly extensive economic and other data, although some is without attribution and would therefore need to be cross-checked. On the whole the collections of articles are an easy read and are commended for their originality.

Shri Ranjit Singh Kalha, IFS (Retd)

Tibet and India's Security : Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino-Indian Relations, Task Force Report. By PK Gautam, P Jagannath Panda and Zakir Hussain (New Delhi: Institute and Defence Studies & Analysis (IDSA), 2012), pp 214, ¹ 375/-, ISBN 9788186019993.

The Report published by the IDSA is both relevant and timely; relevant because it analyses the divergent demographic forces at play in the Buddhist dominated frontiers of India, while it is opportune in terms of its timing due to the continuing simmering in Tibet, frostiness in Sino-Indian relations and the foreboding shadow of succession 'after' the life-time of the 'Living Buddha,' the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.

The Report covers significant ground of the multi-cultural demographics of India's northern borders, and provides well researched answers to the diverse questions ranging from the influence of Buddhism and its role in bonding the people of Tibet and India. Of contemporary relevance are questions of the status of the refugees living in India and the pivotal role of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, India and in Socialist China. Issues that have been touched upon are extremely sensitive, and creditably, have been handled in keeping with the sensibilities of the Tibetans, their Indian hosts as well as the Chinese.

The Report has considered the post-Dalai Lama contingencies, not merely in terms of the succession, but more significantly, how the options are likely to manifest. Importantly, the Dalai Lama has himself announced that his successor will be found from the Exile community and not from the land under control of China. On the other hand, China has announced that though the Fifteenth Dalai Lama will be chosen in accordance with the Tibetan traditions, he would be from amongst the Tibetans born in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This places the issue at cross purposes and there exists the possibility that the Institution may come to an end. There is no denying the fact that there are various complexities and the situation needs to be managed with sagacity, maturity and dignity it demands.

The status of the Tibetan refugees in India remains ambiguous, though as the Report concludes, poses no security risk for India. Thus, the recommendations made in the Report with regard to their status require serious consideration pragmatically speaking;

as time goes by, the chances of their returning to Tibet seem to be receding.

The cross section and extent of sampling that has been incorporated is testimony to the diligence with which the field work was carried out by the team. This has enriched the Report and made it purposeful, making it a vital resource for future scholars.

Brigadier AS Cheema, VSM

Why Bureaucracy Fails. By Kalyan Ray (New Delhi : Manas Publications, 2011), pp..252, ₹ 695.00, ISBN 9788170494003.

The author has dealt with the problems of bureaucracy since Independence in a holistic manner and has covered the evolution of administrative structure in India since the British period to date. He has touched the core of the problem in his statement, 'the more we talk of having less of it, the more we have it'.

His discussion of 'from a Control Raj to Corporate Raj' covers the issue of corruption in its historic and contemporary context. Of particular interest is the discussion of economic liberalisation which covers beyond the domestic areas of international banking and financial institutions, black money and current scams in the Government and the Armed Forces.

The author contends that the IAS being a central service is a misnomer; it is basically a superior state service. While the selection and initial placements are made by the Central Government, the system of Central deputation is not equitable and is based on patronage. His discussion on a committed bureaucracy and its politicisation clearly brings out that in essence it is manifested in the establishment of the Prime Minister's and Chief Minister's Secretariats. This has further marginalised bureaucracy and resulted in centralisation of power.

I do not agree with the author's suggestion that a third tier of bureaucracy is required to serve the local bodies. The requirement is of technical help and guidance in the formulation and execution of local projects. It is not entirely correct that during the British rule self governing institutions and at the local level withered away. As a matter of fact after Independence, instead of reviving and nurturing them, we further marginalised them due to political exigencies.

In the final chapter, 'Way Ahead : Future of Indian Policy', though aptly titled, the idea that democratic polity is the fountainhead of policy formulation, has not been discussed adequately. Instead, he has gone into the known problems of bureaucracy, over extension of the state and fallout of economic development. While one could not agree with this more but I wish he had discussed – what needs to be done? Some of the areas that could be examined are absorption of experts and technocrats in the system, changes in secretarial functioning, pruning and integration of regulatory bodies in the system and their accountability to the legislature.

The book would be a valuable reading for people interested in governance and administration.

Lieutenant General VK Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd)

Global Nuclear Disarmament: Geopolitical Necessities. Edited by VR Raghavan (New Delhi : Vij Books India Pvt Ltd in association with Delhi Policy Group, 2012), pp: 133, Price ₹ 795/-, ISBN 9789381411315.

This book is the result of an 18 month project conducted by the Delhi Policy Group (DPG) between 2010 and 2012 on Pathways to Nuclear Disarmament. The DPG conducted this research study as part of the deliberations of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament constituted by the governments of Australia and Japan. As part of the project, three international seminars were conducted on various issues in an effort to deepen the understanding on various pathways to achieving nuclear disarmament. This book is a compilation of the keynote addresses of the distinguished speakers and the papers presented by experts during these seminars.

The specific focus of the three seminars was Nuclear Disarmament: Time Line Challenges, Doctrinal Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Disarmament Geopolitical Imperatives. The aspect of the time line challenges has been covered by three experts. Of particular interest in this regard is the articulation of the concept of a 'Base Camp and Mountain Top' which has been described as the starting point for the route to lower arsenals and leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The first of the three papers, regarding the aspect of

time line challenges covers various pathways and discusses the two important interim milestones; one in terms of weapons and the other in terms of doctrines. The numbers conundrum has also been covered separately in the second paper and the third discusses the techno-political maze of nuclear disarmament.

The four separate papers on doctrinal challenges discuss various aspects ranging from the general aspect of nuclear doctrines and nuclear disarmament to the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategic concept to different military doctrines and their realities to finally, a discussion of 'No-First Use' as a strategic doctrine. In this regard, it has been argued by one of the experts that working on a global no-first use, as suggested by India, would be a useful first step.

The last aspect addressed in this book is with respect to the geopolitical realities which have been analysed separately by three eminent experts. The various facets analysed include the geopolitical conditions that would enable nuclear disarmament, the perspective from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a separate analysis of the envisaged Chinese view towards nuclear disarmament.

The contents of the book would interest a wide ranging audience; particularly the strategic community and the policy makers engaged in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear security and doctrinal issues.

Colonel GG Pamidi

Post Conflict Sri Lanka: Rebuilding Of the Society. Edited By VR Raghavan (New Delhi, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2012) pp..191, Price ₹ 850/-, ISBN 9789381411322.

This book is the result of a joint seminar organised at Colombo by the Centre for Security Analysis (CSA), Chennai and Regional Centre for Security Studies (RCSS), Colombo. A total of nine scholars from India and Sri Lanka were engaged to carry-out research on themes covering political, socio-economic and ethnic challenges, all relating to reconstruction and development of a post war Sri Lanka. These research papers were presented at this joint seminar.

The four speakers who covered political challenges succeeded in going to the heart of the problem and in describing the deep

seated differences. They felt that the recent elections failed to generate the hoped for support for the government but achieved the opposite, i.e. highlighting the differences. They felt that the main solution rests on devolution of powers which the government is not only slow but reluctant to implement as various historical differences exert their pressures.

The socio-economic claims of the government and speakers were challenged by some others. While work on resettlement, reconstruction and de-mining was appreciated, fears were expressed at militarisation and demographic changes in the Northern and the Eastern Provinces. Data published by the government was challenged. Some speakers highlighted the need for greater efforts in the fields of education and health.

The problems in the way of ethnic reconciliation were analysed and slow progress lamented. The role of the International community and the Diaspora was commented on by some speakers.

The efforts of both the CSA and RCSS need to be commended. The contents of this book provide a very useful insight into the problems faced in post-war reconstruction in Sri Lanka. While the identification of problems has been done well; also highlighted are the multifarious obstacles and the slow progress.

This is a useful book for scholars researching and watching the progress of Sri Lanka's post war reconstruction.

Brigadier N Bahri, VSM (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter – Ending Sept 2012

(The books reviewed in Apr - Jun 2012 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Afghanistan

Afghanistan : A Role for India / Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Edited by R K Sawhney, Arun Sahgal and Gurmeet Kanwal. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 192p., Rs. 780, ISBN 9789380502526

Asia

Bared Wire : Borders and Partitions in South Asia. Edited by Jayita Sengupta. New Delhi, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 316p., Rs.795, ISBN 9780415501507

The Resurgence of Central Asia : Islam or Nationalism by Ahmed Rashid. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003. 278p., Rs. 1200, ISBN 9781856491310

Travels in the Panjab, Afghanistan and Turkistan to Balk, Bokhara and Herat by Mohan Lal. New Delhi : Three Rivers Publishers, 2012. 279p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788192227511

Autobiography/Biography

Beyond The Lines: An Autobiography by Kuldip Nayar. New Delhi, Roli Books, 2012. 420p., Rs.595, ISBN 9788174369109

Catherine the Great : Portrait of a Woman by Robert K Massie. New York, Random House, 2011. 625p., \$ 35, ISBN 9780679456728

Karl Marx on India from the New York Daily Tribune and Extract from Marx-Engels Correspondence 1853-1862. Edited by Iqbal Husain. New Delhi, Tulika, 2006. 308p., Rs.495, ISBN 9788189487019

A Reluctant Hero : The Life of Captain Robert Ryder, VC by Richard Hopton. South Yorkshire, Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2011. 220p., £ 19.99, ISBN 9781848843707

Biographical Dictionary

An Oriental Biographical Dictionary : Founded on Material Collected by the Late Thomas William Beale by Henry George Keene. New Delhi, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2004. 431p., Rs. 795, ISBN 9788173045257

China

China in the 21st Century : What Everyone Needs to Know by Jeffrey N Wasserstrom. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. 164p., \$16.95, ISBN 9780195394122

Chinese Strategies on Central Asia : The New Great Game. Edited by Charles Hawkins and Robert Love. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2012. 232p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788170494232

Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China by Ezra F Vogel. Cambridge : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011. 876p., \$39.95, ISBN 9780674055445

The Party : The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers by Richard McGregor. London, Allen Lane (Penguin Group), 2010. 301p., Rs.699, ISBN 9781846141737

A Resurgent China : South Asian Perspectives. Edited by SD Muni and Tan Tai Yang. New Delhi, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 337p., Rs.845, ISBN 9780415501910

Tiger Head, Snake Tails : China Today, How it Got There and Where It is Heading by Jonathan Fenby. London, Simon and Schuster, 2012. 418p., Rs.599, ISBN 9780857209566

Civil – Military Relations

Assault on Merit : The Untold Story of Civil-Military Relations by RK Anand and Edited by Inderjit Badhwar. New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2012. 200p., Rs.495, ISBN 9788124117002

Corruption

Corruption and Reform in India : Public Services in the Digital Age by Jennifer Bussell. New Delhi , Cambridge University Press, 2012. 306p., Rs.895, ISBN 9781107030343

Current Affairs

Perspective on Current Affairs.2012. Edited by Sohan Lal. Dehra Dun, Natraj Publishers, 2012. 400p., Rs.175, ISBN 9788181581365

Defence

Combat Leader's Field Guide by Brett A Stoneberger. 13th Edition. Dehra Dun, Greenfield Publishers, 2005. 407p., Rs.395, ISBN 9780811731959

Employment of Special Forces : Challenges and Opportunities for the Future by VS Yadav. New Delhi, Vij Books, New Delhi, 2012. 188p., Rs. Rs.795, ISBN 9789381411285

Footprints : On the Sands of Time 1901-2011. Edited by Anil Shorey. New Delhi, Force Multipliers, 2011. 133p., Rs.1800, ISBN 9789381079102

Impact of Defence Offsets on Military Industry Capability and Self - Reliance : The Road Ahead / Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi by SN Misra. New Delhi , Knowledge World, 2012. 186p., Rs.680, ISBN 9789381904084

An Introduction to Military Ethics : A Reference Handbook / Praeger Security International by Bill Rhodes. Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO Information Services, 2009. 165p., £63, ISBN 9780313350467

Managing India's Nuclear Forces by Verghese Koithara. New Delhi, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 194p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788189643218

Moral Issues in Military Decision Making by Anthony E Hartle. 2nd Edition, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2004. 271p., Price Not Available, ISBN 9780700613212

Diplomacy

Pax Indica : India and the World of 21st Century by Shashi Tharoor. New Delhi, Allen Lane (Penguin Group), 2012. 449p., Rs.799, ISBN 9780670085743

Disaster Management

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Admiral HG Rickover.

Guidelines

A book review is a critical evaluation of a work or a book to help the reader by your assessment. For a reader to be guided by your evaluation, it must be objective. A few guidelines are given below :-

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These should be limited and the whole paragraph should not be lifted.

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