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PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
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- India and the Future of SAARC - *Lt Col K S Ramanathan,*
Signals (Retd)
- Tragic Disintegration of Yugoslavia - *Vice Admiral S C Chopra,*
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JANUARY-MARCH 1995

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EDITORIAL

A New Strategic Vision

"The law of universe", according to the famous British historian, G.M. Trevelyan, "was progress, evolution, and perpetual change." But according to a French proverb, "the more things change, the more they remain the same." Between these two concepts of continuity and change, perhaps, Thomas Carlyle may be right when he said that, 'the deepest truths lie buried in silence.'

But the clearly evident fundamental truth to be faced by India today is the threat to the security and integrity of the State, wherein the internal dimensions have assumed far greater significance than external ones. The evolution and change in the security paradigm engendered during the last 45 years, in a darkening landscape, is clearly visible. This evolution will continue and new patterns of our security concerns will emerge with changes in the domestic, regional and global forces and interests.

How do we relate to these security concerns with a reducing defence budget? This is a vital question at this moment and needs creative intellectual effort, penetrating political insight, and strategic understanding to provide the correct answer.

In addition, on the one hand, the revolution in the information and communication technology is leading to a sweeping transformation of society; on the other, new military technology has engendered a revolution in the nature of warfare, as witnessed during the 1991 Gulf War. Airpower with precision guided weapons, space - based satellite intelligence, communication, and navigation, and electronic warfare systems have proved their dominant and decisive character. But above all, it is the methodology of their employment by the synthesis of human intellect and weapons capability, in other words, strategy, that really counts.

Strategy for peace and strategy for war, need to be reviewed in the context of the transformation in the nature of modern warfare. Traditional concepts may be dangerous in a time of change and it needs scientific objectivity to create a new construct of security providing synergistic relationship of all resources available: diplomatic, military, economic, political; and to ensure flexibility of the military machine to counter diverse challenges: internal, external, desert, mountain, air and sea.

In this context, our recent opening to the United States provides one option. There are certain convergences in our interests, for example, in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The mutuality of these interests in the security field between India and the United States are well-articulated in our lead article which contains the text of the talk given by Dr William J. Perry, US Secretary of Defence, to the members of the United Service Institution of India.

U.S. Perceptions of Global Security

DR WILLIAM J PERRY

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN SHRI K.C. PANT FORMER
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND CHAIRMAN FINANCE COMMISSION

His Excellency, Dr William Perry, distinguished guests from the United States, Lt Gen Surinder Nath, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to welcome you Dr Perry and your delegation to India. I am reminded of my visit to the USA in 1989, the first official visit by a Defence Minister of this country and the warm hospitality extended to me and my delegation on that occasion. I hope that we too can make you feel that you are among friends. We are grateful to Dr Perry for having found the time to be with us here today. He brings to his current assignment as Secretary of Defence of the United States, the wealth of knowledge and experience built upon a distinguished academic career. He has made his mark in entrepreneurship, research and development, and formulation of public policy. Your visit Dr Perry is of great significance as it takes place at a time when the geo-political map of the world has undergone great changes since the end of the Cold War. But localised conflicts and uncertainties continue in many parts of the world. Both our countries have stake in world peace, you as the most powerful and we as the second most populous. We have readily participated in UN Peace Keeping missions. In these, many of us feel that India should be prepared to shoulder its share of responsibility for world security as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Your visit underlines the mutual desire to enhance defence cooperation between the two countries. One area of cooperation, which I hope will get the benefit of your specialised knowledge, is that of technology and joint production. Service-to-Service cooperation has been steadily growing and evolving but I hope you will agree that service-to-service cooperation cannot be fostered in isolation. To be effective and enduring, it must form part of the broader canvas of developing Indo-US relations. India and the United States have a shared commitment to democracy. Since its independence in 1947, India opted for vibrant pluralistic secular democracy. I believe we have a common interest in supporting and encouraging pluralism and secularism and preventing the spread of religious or ideological extremism. India is concerned about the threat posed to the nation State system by ethno-nationalism and is worried that the developments in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and West Asia may create strife and uncertainty in this area. India is deeply interested in promoting the stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and other Gulf States.

Texts of the Introductory Remarks by Shri K.C. Pant, and of a talk given by the US Secretary of Defence Dr. William J Perry to the members of the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi on January 12, 1995.

In this light, Pakistan's continued aggressiveness and disregard for the basic tenets of stability and peace are perplexing. The present developments in Afghanistan and some of the Central Asian republics like Tajikistan have serious implications for the stability of this region. Drug trafficking and terrorism are an important part of the broader issue of the regional security. India has been a major victim of international terrorism of all categories. India has a large stake in fighting international terrorism specially that emanating from the aftermath of the Afghan War. It is against this background that the evolving relationship between India and the United States in this sphere of defence cooperation has great significance. I have no doubt that this would be mutually beneficial and in the interest of peace and stability in the region, a goal to which I believe both our governments are committed. Another window of opportunity to foster and strengthen the ties between the two largest democracies in the world has been created by the courageous and far reaching programme of economic reform and liberalisation adopted by India. I would urge that the opportunities afforded should not be wasted. I believe that commonalities between these two great countries and their peoples are significant and substantial enough to warrant far greater convergence of thought and action than we have seen in the past. With these words I now request Dr Perry to deliver his address on "US PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBAL SECURITY".

Dr. William J. Perry

Thank you for that generous introduction.

It is a particular honor for me to be the first American Secretary of Defense to visit India in seven years. And it's a special honor to be here at the United Service Institution speaking to such a distinguished audience.

The purpose of my visit to India is to help increase and deepen the cooperation between our two countries on defence and security issues. The ending of the Cold War has completely changed the world's security picture. And in this new era, the United States and India have a historic opportunity to build stronger security ties. Old barriers have been replaced by new opportunities. Increased cooperation in the security area will allow us to better pursue our common security interests and to provide a better base of understanding to work out our differences.

I want to start off by giving a global overview of the United States' defence and security policy. And then from that, I want to focus on security issues in South Asia. And I want to specifically talk about where I think there are opportunities for expanding the security ties between the United States and

India. Finally, I want to explain why the United States places such a high importance on the issue of nonproliferation in this post-Cold War era.

I start with this fundamental fact: The end of the Cold War has completely changed the security equation not only for the United States, but for the entire world. During the Cold War, the policy of containing the Soviet Union drove almost every aspect of our security thinking, planning and action. And our overriding goal was preventing a nuclear holocaust. During the height of the Cold War, the Russian nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov said, and I quote: "Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations." And it did. That was what guided our security policy during the Cold War. The United States had a total commitment to nuclear deterrence.

Today, the Soviet Union, whom we were deterring, no longer exists. But in the post-Cold War security era, the security problems for America, for Russia and, indeed, for the rest of the world are both very different and more complex. First of all, the world is more interdependent economically, both with good effects and bad effects on the potential of conflict. On the one hand, increased trade forges important bonds between former adversaries. But at the same time, the growing world trade in illegal narcotics tears at the fabric of both producing countries and consuming countries. The challenge of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction seems to loom larger every year. And across the globe, "ethnicity" — what the former American Ambassador to India Daniel Patrick Moynihan once called the "great hidden force" of our age — is hidden no more. It rips old states apart, and causes, sometimes, violent birth of new ones. And as these and other conflicts multiply, the role of international peacekeeping effort grows in importance.

America cares about these problems, first of all, because we care about our own self-interest. But we also care because we have a more general, and a broader interest in trying to help build a new and a better world; a new world in which democracies based on law and economies based on market can thrive and flourish. Protecting America's interests in this new era means having security policies that are pragmatic, flexible and directed at no one. During this era we have no enemies.

Nowhere are the new challenges of the post-Cold War security era more demanding, or more potentially rewarding, than here in South Asia. Here, all of the characteristics and problems of the post-Cold War security environment can be found at once. And nowhere have the removal of Cold War restraints opened up more opportunities than in South Asia — especially for the United States and India. We want to develop stronger security ties with India and with

other states of the region. Stronger security ties can help us develop common understanding and approaches to the threats to democracy and stability, such as proliferation and narcotic trade. And stronger security ties will also help us tackle important challenges, such as United Nations peacekeeping.

In the economic field, India and the United States are building an exciting new relationship. This has been made possible by Indian economic reforms and a new aggressiveness by American companies to pursue commercial opportunities here. Secretary of Commerce Brown's visit this week emphasizes the high importance we in the United States place on expanding American-Indian trade and investment.

It is our belief that cooperation in the security field can grow in a similar positive direction. Indeed, the two of them can go hand in hand. The foundation for this is a large area of common interests. Let me define for you what I think those common interests are. *First and foremost, we share an interest in the security and stability of the Indian Ocean region. We also share an interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf region. And we share an economic and a political interest in a stable and economically open Southeast Asia and Western Pacific region.*

Additionally, the economies of both of our countries depend absolutely on freedom of the seas. This reliance will only grow as our economies become even more global in their markets and in their sources of supply. Finally, both of our countries are bearing a heavy burden in United Nations peacekeeping efforts, with our military forces sometimes serving side-by-side. Because of this, we share an interest in making peacekeeping operations work better.

No two countries can have an exact identity of interests, and certainly our two countries do not have this exact identity of interests. But with these very real, very pragmatic mutual interests serving as the strategic basis of our relationship, we can build an American-Indian security relationship that is both strong and stable.

An important component of a healthy strategic relationship are military-to-military ties. Today, Minister Mallikarjun and I signed an agreed minute on defence relations which will go far to advance these constructive relations.

Indeed, I think it is not too strong a statement to say that this agreement is not only significant, but it is historic. It allows us to build trust, and by building trust, these ties will allow the U.S.-India relationship to be a force for stability in the entire region. One way they build trust is by helping both sides understand each other's defence policies and strategic intentions. This is what

we call transparency. Both of our countries need to do better in this area. That's why the agreed minute calls for expanded cooperation and contacts between our top civilian defence officials and our top military officials. India is a large country with a proud and an independent spirit. Your capabilities in all areas, including the military area, are very impressive. But we welcome your assurances about the peaceful and defensive focus of your defence program. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to nations throughout Asia — and to the United States — if your budgeting and strategic planning were more open and visible to the outside world. We have nothing to fear from a better understanding of each other.

Of course, we understand that this is a two-way street. We want you to know about United States planning in the future. That's why I'm pleased to come to India personally to help this process along.

The agreed minute which we signed today will also pave the way for gradually increasing cooperation in defence research and production. I need to point out that this will not be an area for immediate, bold steps. For now, arms transfers and joint technology development cannot be our primary areas of cooperation.

The United States greatly appreciates the active and generous contribution made by India to UN peacekeeping missions. We also would express our sincere condolences to India for the seven peacekeepers and three medics who lost their lives in Somalia. Americans too suffered losses in that country. So we understand the difficulty in sustaining political support for these missions in the face of casualties. South Asia generally has been a major supplier of forces for UN peacekeeping efforts. Indeed, the South Asian countries have supplied more than half the peacekeeping forces around the world. Despite other differences, the countries of this region have united in these efforts and we applaud it.

Another area where we can make important contributions is joint training and exercises. Our two militaries have already conducted several joint exercises and they've been quite successful. The United States welcomes the opportunity to do more.

A very important benefit of increasing the cooperation between our two militaries is that it will make us more efficient, effective and safe when we work together in UN peacekeeping operations. We should also look for the ways to spread the lessons we have learned from past peacekeeping operations, and from our joint training, to other countries, particularly other countries in the region.

I am convinced that our two militaries, working together, are working towards the same goals of mutual understanding, peace and stability. And I envision a relationship that is not simply led by our highest military officials, but that rests on a solid foundation of younger officers who will lead our armed forces into the twenty-first century.

I've described for you the type of security relationship that the United States would like to develop with India. At this point I need to emphasize that improvement of relations with one country need not to be at the expense of good relations with another. I've just come from two productive days in Pakistan. While I was there I reiterated that the United States remains a friend of Pakistan. We have a strong and long-standing interest in its security, its prosperity and the development of its democratic institutions. I believe that India does also. And I think the United States' interests — as well as India's — are served, and well-served, by a strong American-Pakistani security relationship.

Right now the United States is also in the process of expanding its security ties with China. China's booming economy — by some estimates now the world's third largest — make it a strategic power which cannot be ignored. But I want to emphasize that just as America's growing security ties with India are not a threat to Pakistan, America's growing security ties with China are not a threat to India. Hopefully, the United States' growing security relationship with China will contribute to an atmosphere in which effective dialogue can take place on issues of critical importance — such as missile technology transfer, human rights and economic reform. Our growing security ties to China will include military to military ties — but it will not include arms or technology transfers. Building a security relationship between China and the United States will be a long term project, but we're off to a good start and I'm optimistic. And again, I believe that it's in India interest, as well as our own, that the United States have good security ties with China.

Finally, I'd like to address the topic of nonproliferation. There can be no doubt that in the post-Cold War world, the role of nuclear weapons has changed dramatically. Now, more than ever, it is incumbent on the world's responsible nuclear powers to set an example. Containing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons is a high priority for the United States. I want to stress that in our discussions and in our interest in nonproliferation, we are not singling out South Asia on this topic — our efforts in this area span the globe. And we've had some important achievements recently.

In 1988, in his famous address to the UN General Assembly, your late Prime Minister Gandhi committed to a goal of denuclearization. In just a few

years since then, the United States has reduced its strategic nuclear warhead stockpile by almost 50 per cent; and our non-strategic nuclear force by a full 90 per cent. That is, we've reduced it 90 per cent from what it was during the Cold War. The United States is dismantling about 2,000 nuclear weapons a year — a rate limited not by political will, but by physical capacity.

The START I treaty, besides greatly reducing the arsenals of the United States and Russia, also entails the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons by three other states — Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

We also think it is an important achievement that China this year agreed not to make transfers of missiles that violate the rules of the MTCR; that is the missile technology control regime.

No informed observer can reasonably dispute that South Asia — India and Pakistan specifically — present special questions on the world's nonproliferation agenda. India and Pakistan are two great nations which have fought three wars against each other since their independence. That's why it is so important that the governments of both countries work hard to carefully manage any tension between them. But the fact that they now both have nuclear programs that make them nuclear-capable states, raises the stakes dramatically. Consequently, South Asia must have a place on the world's nonproliferation agenda. And this agenda needs to address delivery systems as well as weapons.

We recognize India's need for a capable defence. We also recognize that for India the nuclear question does not just involve what Pakistan does or does not do, but involves China as well.

Certainly, there are a number of areas where the United States and India share the same goals. For instance, we look forward to continuing to work with India on a comprehensive test ban treaty and also on a global halt to the production of fissile material, the raw ingredients for nuclear bombs.

But the United States continues to see the extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a critically important national security interest of the United States. And we will continue to seek the support and participation of like-minded states. In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru observed, and I quote: "The only alternative to coexistence is codestruction". His comments, of course, at the time, were directed to the two superpowers. But now, in the post-Cold War era, his words also apply to regional powers with nuclear potential, such as Pakistan and India. T.S. Eliot, great British poet, once wrote: "We had the experience but we missed the meaning." If we fail to seize the opportunity before us — and allow the Cold War to be replaced by regional arms races — we will have "missed the meaning".

History has given the United States and India an historic, new opportunity. I'd like to summarize my comments on this opportunity by quoting a favorite author of mine, Graham Greene. He once wrote that there always comes a moment in time when a door opens and lets the future in. The end of the Cold War has opened such a door. In particular, it has opened such a door in South Asia. The future is out there waiting to come in. The future that comes in could be a future of continuing conflict between India and Pakistan. Or, the future could entail evolving co-existence leading to peace and stability in the region. Both of those potential futures are out there — each is waiting to come in. I can only hope that India and Pakistan will choose the right future. And I hope that the new security relationship between India and the United States will allow the United States to play a useful and a constructive role in helping India and Pakistan to a better future.

Thank you very much.

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Part - II

THE CHANGING CONCEPTS OF DEFENCE

The principles and strategy of defence of India have gradually evolved since partition in 1947. British concepts were based on global power and deployment, the Indian defence forces being employed to assist British forces in their military tasks in Europe, North Africa and Burma besides their major role of internal security. Since the British left, the threats to the land borders of India have vastly increased with a belligerent Pakistani neighbour and the massive Chinese armed forces with nuclear weapons across undemarcated or disputed borders. There is a constant military threat to India such as few other nations face, especially since India is pacifist and non-aggressive, leaving all military initiative to potential enemies. Further, in view of India's political, ethnic and caste turmoil together with a struggling economy, it is vulnerable to economic, trade and political pressures from world powers and neighbours. Military and subversive threats can primarily be faced by military preparedness, strong defences and a counter-offensive capability. But astute political and diplomatic means are vital to ensure the nation's internal cohesion and to reduce or delay the external threat by settling contentious issues with our neighbours. Diplomacy, economic strength and military power are really parts of the same coin; one cannot easily succeed without the others. Historically, successful internal political control in India has always required the nascent threat of central military action against Indian states or organisations which attempt to undermine the Constitution and rule of law or to break away from India. Today's defence services provide the legal military back-up to Government's handling of external or internal threats to the Indian state.

After the Chinese war of 1962, the Chinese occupied their "claim lines" in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) though they later withdrew from captured NEFA areas. A large part of NEFA areas, now Arunachal Pradesh, was vacated by the Indian army for over fifteen years. It is only after much persuasion by military leaders that the army was permitted to build up its strength and allotted additional funds so that it could start the slow and

Text of the USI National Security Paper (1994). General V N Sharma was Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army during 1988-1990.

deliberate re-occupation of the areas lost. The army was determined to do so in the face of political and bureaucratic restraint and fear of Chinese retaliation. This is a clear example of how lack of military strength can atrophy government thinking and freedom of action. Today, after determined injection of army funds for communications, infrastructure and defence works, the army has regained all territory right upto India's perception of the McMahon Line which we consider the factual border between India and Tibet, though the Chinese claim even this line to be further Southwards. India is thus back to its original administrative control of territory abandoned in 1962 but this time with powerful military forces fully backed by the air force. With simultaneous move northwards of army defences into North Sikkim since 1981, backed by road construction to carry heavy trucks and tanks, strong ground defences have been created right upto the border on the Tibetan plateau. Since 1987 a conventional military offensive by China across our Northeastern borders is precluded and the military advantage in border defence rests with India.

The over-confident Chinese border army realised this situation when in July 1986 they ingressed just across the Indian perception of the McMahon line in Kameng Frontier Division of Arunachal Pradesh to occupy the minor summer yak grazing hamlet of Wangdung. This post had long been used by India as an IB (Intelligence Bureau) observation post after the snows melt in July; the post lies in a valley 3000 metres above sea level. Without awaiting any orders from Delhi, the Indian army's local formation under JM Singh, backed by his corps commander Narhari, rapidly occupied the heights overlooking Wangdung from the South and physically prevented further advance by Chinese troops rushing up the slopes. After a few bursts of machine-gun fire and a number of verbal altercations later, the Chinese advised the Indian soldiers, led by a major, to go back and await orders from Government of India to whom the Chinese had complained; but the Indians held firm and reserves were soon ready to destroy the Chinese penetration, tactically a simple task. The Indian 'China Study Group' at Delhi under the external affairs ministry requested our army withdrawal on the grounds that we had crossed the line of government stipulated 'limits of patrolling' to avoid clashes with Chinese patrols, and our Eastern Army Command was instructed to desist from planning eviction of the Chinese. But no one in our Eastern Command was prepared to withdraw and invite 1962 type criticism since any withdrawal would allow the Chinese onto the high 4000 metres ridgelines south of the McMahon line and endanger our defences at even lower heights on subsequent ridge lines. At those heights snows in December freeze all movement and the matter had rested till I was appointed Army Commander in June 1987. In Eastern Command we had to think of ways and means to continue our strong new military positions, with attendant military self-confidence, despite orders to the contrary. We requested changes in superior orders in that should the Indian

perception of the international border be accepted as indicated on our maps as issued after approval by Government, then we were in our own territory and any withdrawal orders by government or army headquarters would be considered illegal as the army was tasked to defend India's borders. Conversely, if the Indian border as marked on all our maps was considered incorrect and we were thus in Chinese territory, we would certainly withdraw to the Chinese perceptions of their claims, namely the Brahmaputra Valley, and leave the Himalayan ranges of Arunachal Pradesh for Chinese occupation. We should appreciate the logic of government thinking since a war with China would be detrimental and it was pointless picking a quarrel over unimportant disputed territory. But Eastern Army's view was that surely China must also show responsibility for border peace and stability and its unilateral attempt to change the status-quo must be countered, no matter if this led to conflict.

We were happy that Delhi changed its policy and the army is still on this line from where nothing but major Chinese military action would be required to remove us, an option obviously not to Chinese liking since they are unlikely to succeed unless nuclear weapons are used. Moreover, the Chinese Wangdung position is tactically weak and remains the Chinese "Achilles heel" in this area. Needless to say, the Eastern Army's stance and self confidence in border defence raised many a bureaucratic and political morale in Delhi. It was with renewed confidence that Rajiv Gandhi could plan his visit to China in 1988 clear that any talk of equal mutual withdrawal from the assessed McMahon line border by both sides, as suggested by China and our diplomats, was not acceptable to India due to lack of tenability of Indian defences on lower ridge lines and greater time required for Indian forces to move upto the border in emergency. Withdrawal must be by Chinese forces if they wish to create greater distance between the two armies since Chinese troops can fall back to the Tibetan plateau which affords easy and quick movement to front-line defences; otherwise they are welcome to stay where they are till the border is demarcated and accept the possibility of military clashes. The Wangdung incident is unique in aggressive border management by Indian defence forces against China, since the ignominious Indian defeat in the 1962 war. This has also led to better military and political relations between India and China, since it is now clear that India is too strong to be bullied.

On the other hand, the Indo-Pakistan face off along the line of control (LC) in J&K has also been one of attempts at military domination by both sides, the advantages of local terrain being the main criteria for success. Incidents have occurred since the earliest days of this confrontation where either one or the other side has attained military advantage. The Indian Army has made many sacrifices to retain an edge at what is more of a live disputed border than a 'cease-fire' line. Pakistani political and military leadership have

never really accepted a cease-fire and many pacifist Indian leaders pleas for restraint to the Indian Army have fallen in the face of constant attempts at aggression by Pakistan troops and their highly trained irregular forces; who take "restraint" by Indian forces as merely a sign of weakness and lack of military or political guts. A major Indian success has been the Siachen Glacier region where the army stole a march over Pakistan in the early 1980s led by Lt Gen Chibber, then commanding the Northern Army, and a number of younger leaders. Given the indomitable and stoic Indian soldier to command, they excelled in defence of what is perhaps the most difficult area in the world, against full-blooded assault by the Pakistan army causing the latter unacceptable casualties. The Siachen line of control runs along the Salto ridge line to the South of the glacier and Indian pickets are held at heights upto 6600 metres. Many call this the idiotic, and forgotten war. When I took over as Army Chief in May 1988, I was informed that the Army's morale in this region was low and the time had come for unilateral withdrawal. I promptly visited our defences at Bilafond La pass at some 6300 metres height to see for myself; the Jawans and their commander ridiculed such an idea-they only asked for more ammunition and were determined that they would stay, or even go further into Pakistan held Kashmir, but would not like to come back until the Pakistanis accepted this line of control and went back themselves. This view was heartening to all and indicated the need for personal assessment of the exact ground situation and morale by leaders before any decisions are taken affecting the national military or political stance. It also highlights the necessity of giving soldiers fighting at such high altitudes and difficult terrain their due in public praise and emoluments; emoluments which are miniscule in relation to what normal civil servants get in our so called remote hill towns such as Shimla and Gangtok.

The point being emphasised here is that foreign policy decisions cannot be taken for border regions without understanding our military compulsions and the exact position on the ground. Schemes of mutual and "equal" withdrawal pacts so liked by diplomats and the intelligentsia are not applicable in our high mountain regions especially in North East India where natural features and dominating ridge lines tilt the balance and make treaties sow seeds of future conflict. Besides, an "unequal" treaty is only agreed to by nations lacking the political will and military power to face an aggressor in all aspects of the international game of power politics and military coercion. India must learn the lesson that despite our pacifist ideology, other nations fail to understand high sounding principles when they are not backed by national will and military power. That is why the highly developed economies of Germany and Japan must bend their goals to cater to USA demands. And that is why, despite their economy being in a shambles from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, the Chinese have faced upto all American and erstwhile Soviet military and eco-

conomic threats during their development of a viable nuclear weapons capability, with both antagonistic super powers on their doorstep; that perhaps was the measure of the leadership of a Mao Ze Dong. India's military strength on the North Eastern border, assiduously built up since the late 1970s with the then army chief General Krishna Rao's insistence and Indira Gandhi's acquiescence, has been one of the basic factors in the improvement of diplomatic, political and military relations with China. The visit to China by prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988 was politically successful and India was complemented by China on its effective border management; this had prepared the ground for the later visit of prime minister Narasimha Rao in 1993 whereby the possibilities of a border agreement with China improved. This is as much due to India's growing political maturity and self-confidence in military defence as China's own developing goals of economic resurgence as opposed to military hegemony.

In the case of Pakistan, their political immaturity, internal chaos and military fears makes them intransigent, with the only goal of dragging India down to the Pakistani level of criminalised international relations with neighbours. We have to tread carefully with Pakistan; military defeat of Pakistan, if ever contemplated, must be complete otherwise it would only create the seeds of the next conflict as we have seen after three wars. Military dismemberment of Pakistan may be a solution but at great cost for which we lack the political will; the alternative is to ensure firm defence, punish any hostile aggression both military or terrorist and rectify our own politics in border states while we await development of Pakistani democracy and political maturity.

THE MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT

With the steady move of the military into the border regions since the late 1950s, the development of these regions has increased rapidly. Whether it is the counter-insurgency areas of Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram or the high altitude, Ladakh, Sikkim or Arunachal areas, the military had to develop vast infrastructure to be able to carry out their tasks of border defence and counter-insurgency operations. The army has played the major role right since the days of the British Raj. The British basically left tribal areas alone but bases were established by the para-military Assam Rifles in certain selected regions and the British mounted military expeditions to punish recalcitrant tribal villages. The Second World War brought major infrastructure development in areas utilised for conflict with Japan in North East Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. Good roads were constructed to connect the Burmese border at Ledo in Assam and Tamu near Manipur, through Assam. Airfields were constructed in Assam and Manipur and even one in Mizoram for air support of

military operations into Burma; and railway lines stretched across Assam crossing the great Brahmaputra by rail ferry. After independence, with government policy of development rather than suppression of tribals, the civil administration extended into these regions following the permanent location of military establishments. Small hamlets which formed around the original army and Assam Rifles posts grew to big towns and state capitals such as Kohima, Imphal and Aizawl. The insurgency in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram from the mid-1950s onwards greatly increased the number of army, Assam Rifles and armed police units with rapid development and extension of infrastructure of these remote regions. With the army's move into the Northeastern border regions and Ladakh in the late 1950s and over the period of the 1962 war with China, commenced the development of these remote and difficult high-altitude and submountainous regions. Vast defence funds have been spent in building road networks across some of the highest and most difficult geographical regions of the world; also in building military posts and defences, telegraph, telephone and military and civil road transport systems; with vast back up townships, workshops and maintenance organisations, to enable transport of heavy stores and goods for the support and upkeep of our military defences. Civilian towns, markets, business infrastructure, animal husbandry and agriculture increased beyond all comprehension to support our troops and take advantage of lucrative military contracts for supplies, motor and animal transport, labour gangs and technicians. Most of these regions, especially Ladakh, have rapidly developed a tourist handling capacity on the heels of their development and local families have greatly increased their wealth, education and standards of living. The hard effort of the army in permanently establishing itself in such remote and inhospitable areas was followed by air force units in support and the construction of airfields and communications for air operations. These led to establishment of civil airline routes with civil and tourist visits using air force infrastructure. Similarly, the navy established bases at remote islands to defend our maritime boundaries with army and air force units in support. The development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep resulted; with harbours, airfields and road networks, giving a fillip to local business, industry and tourism. Army, naval and air bases on the mainland at small hamlets in areas of no civil consequence and in the midst of uninhabited coastline, desert areas and vast stretches of fallow lands, have also led to swift development of infrastructure in these areas and rise of civil industries and business ventures, besides townships.

The vast sums spent from the defence budget over the years have been dismissed by many economists as wasteful non-plan military expenditure in their cry to reduce military spending in favour of 'development'. They have failed to assess the valuable effect of such military expenditure on swift development and raising of standards of living of many regions of our country

which would otherwise have been totally ignored for decades. This has been achieved not only by development of infrastructure but by providing the opportunity for civil wealth and resultant private enterprise which does not await "government planning" but rapidly forges ahead, with many benefits to our nation's economy but which finds no place in the tomes written by our economists. Even military cantonments and factories all over the country have created high-growth development in view of the business, building and commercial activity generated by such institutions. There has been commendable contribution of the armed forces in national development and creation of opportunities for common Indians all over the country without any governmental effort. Many economic experts now have the view that defence expenditure is directly proportional to a nation's development and an essential ingredient of scientific and technological advancement in view of the urgent compulsions and funding of defence research and development projects. Reduction of defence budgets below 2.7 per cent of our GNP, as it now stands, would have a retrograde effect on the economy. For a country of our size and population, with serious threats facing us across our borders and internally, expenditure on defence upto some 4 per cent of GNP is reasonable and equitable. Our failure to curtail large civil expenditures on needless consumption, large governmental organisations, administrative and electoral corruption and the unaccountable public sector establishments of poor efficiency, is the main cause of India's economic weakness, not defence spending. Nations in our vicinity and the world powers spend comparatively a much greater percentage of GNP on defence, but those nations and organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF who grant us massive loans, insist on cuts in defence spending and subsidies. Theirs is not a role of ensuring India's basic defence, political stability and social uplift; theirs is the theme of best utilisation of money for their own profit and to ensure India remains in their economic power for ever. The example of Germany and Japan who have vast economic resources but comparatively little military power is not at all relevant to India. Both Germany and Japan are dependent vassal states of the USA which continues to provide them a military shield against all enemies to enable their development; the USA extracts its costs for this role, in economic and political terms. If India is to tread its own path, there is no alternative to hard efficient work, correct conduct, thrift, social development, internal political cohesion and viable military power. A strong economy will follow. Let us not agree to any reduction of military power by slashing our already comparatively small military budgets, when there is so much corruption, wastage and inefficiency to be rectified in our budgeting for almost all other departments of government, besides conspicuous wasteful expenditure by many in power.

THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

India's greatest weakness is not its economy but internal dissensions.

Perhaps the most dangerous threat the nation faces is not so much from its enemies on the borders but from the internal political struggle causing growing violence between ethnic groups, castes and creeds; the political scramble for votes at any cost, and the struggle which makes sworn enemies of those in power and those who wish to wrest this power by all available means fair or foul. In our so called democratic polity, the question of even a fair election is in doubt as criminalised politics uses money and 'goonda' muscle power to sway the voters, prevent any just action by the police or by those responsible for the election machinery or even by the judiciary. Politics has been progressively criminalised and those rising to political power and authority have forced the bureaucracy, police and democratic institutions to fall in line at the cost of jobs, promotions and postings. For the seething masses of India, there is little equity, law or justice, but only that of criminalised action, corruption and 'safari' - the appeal for help to those who wield power. The bureaucracy has slowly wilted in the face of political demands, as has the police. The only way for officials to survive is to tacitly obey the dictates of their criminalised masters. The only way for the destitute masses to retain some self-respect and vent their anger, is in violence, insurgency and terrorism; for underground criminal gangs and terrorists, society itself is the enemy, money must be made by any means and any opposition must be removed by force against individuals. The millions of jobless educated youth are fair game for recruitment drives by illegal violent gangs and every political party or leader must have their private armies of goons to achieve advantage within or outside the law. Is there any doubt in any Indian's mind as to why there is so much violence, terrorism and insurgency in all parts of this land? Only the security and comparative safety of the rich or the influential intelligentsia shields them from the horrors faced by millions of less advantaged citizens; whose problems only increase with the population explosion with more power and wealth to criminals.

In this milieu the defence forces have so far stood firm. It is the army which directly faces India's citizens and millions when the police fails to control violence, a situation steadily growing in dangerous trends despite all talk to the contrary. The intelligentsia, the press and defence services outcry that the army is used "too much" in aid to civil authority for law and order duties, begs the question; what is the alternative? The police, despite its vast rising strength of armed battalions under the central home ministry or under the various states, with thousands of crores expenditure, is unable to easily control the violent masses when the police itself is subservient to criminal political masters and their fawning bureaucrats. The main bulwark of policing crime and criminal gangs is the state police, functioning from innumerable police stations in every nook and corner of this country. The police Station House Officer (SHO) generally buys out his lucrative post and should he wish

to remain at this post for some years, to recoup his expenditure, or to get his promotion in turn, he must 'please' his political and police bosses; the basis of police investigation of crime and any resultant action is this man. Honest and efficient police officers are not allowed to easily function in this system and the public must pay to even get a complaint recorded in an FIR (the first information report). In every state, violence is many times engineered with political aims in view, engineered by money, muscle men and goons, directed at specified target individuals, communities and traders. Calling out the army to control resultant violent riots is also politically advantageous for the concerned state and the police; the state leadership gets law and order controlled free of cost, since the defence budget pays for such army intervention, besides getting political aims achieved without too close an investigation by legal or public bodies. It is the general theme of a political party in power at the centre, to work towards removal of opposition political parties which may be in power in some of the states. One of the means being engineered violence in that state so that either that state government is dismissed by the President for incompetence in maintaining law and order, or the electorate is encouraged to vote for some other party in the next election to ensure a more efficient law and order machinery. Needless to say that political parties so removed from power in a state, try and return the compliment of violence to their successor government, both sides vying to buy out the 'goondas' with the latter growing in wealth and power so that they themselves can get elected to office with a large following. In accordance with the CrPC (Criminal Procedure Code), as laid down by the British Raj and still relevant, any magistrate can legally call out the nearest army contingent to control law and order whenever such magistrate deems it necessary. In British days such a law was necessary to control the growing independence movement by native Indians. Today this law is open to misuse and the army has had to pass its own orders for careful verification of a situation before a local commander obeys such a law, which may result in needless loss of lives and property of innocent citizens. For major communal and class conflagrations, consultations between the army, ministries of defence and home and the state administration become necessary; many times the army must insist on only central police action especially when the role of state officials and leaders is dubious. Nevertheless, in genuine break down of law and order, military commanders are encouraged to act immediately in concert with civil and police officials.

There are innumerable examples where the army has functioned with sensitivity, sympathy and humour to control and diffuse potentially disastrous situations, without firing a bullet and without any blind obedience to intemperate verbal orders of a shaky and frightened civil administration. During the series of AGP (Assom Gana Parishad) student agitations in Assam in the early 1980s, all types of caste, creed and political groups were rioting and killing

and destroying each other's villages; tribals against plainsmen, Muslims against Hindus and Assamese against Bengalis. The situation went out of control and the army was called out all over the state. In a few days, total peace was restored with only two bullets being fired in the air, at one particular village. Till today, the arrival of troops in olive green (OG) uniform is a sign for all inter-village conflict to end and the military commander is requested to settle the dispute. A similar situation exists in the annual Hindu-Muslim riots in Ahmedabad; the Army had to re-issue a set of OG uniforms to their khaki-clad desert troops stationed in Gujarat to prevent troops being mistaken for armed police while on law and order duties so that the public would immediately respond to military presence with stopping of rioting. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the late prime minister, on 31 October 1984, the resultant communal riots in Delhi and North India were basically controlled by the army since police was considered partisan. In areas such as Mathura, when hunted minority communities ran to the military cantonment for succour, the army not only gave protection but threatened raging mobs with opening of fire to disperse them, despite total police inaction and no calling out of the army, as "no orders had been given". In Tripura during the run up to the elections in late 1987 with a communist state government in power and an average of 22 deaths per day by political pogroms, the army moved in on central government orders and stopped the mayhem in 24 hours. This with the simple expedient of visiting every remote village and town by military patrols with the threat of immediate action against the village headman and the police SHO should another death occur in their jurisdiction. The elections went off peacefully with public hero-worship of any soldier wearing OG; many a young military NCO or officer could easily have been elected to political office with such an adoring public who never believed that peace would come to their land, a peace which lasted a good four years even after military withdrawal before violent politics again took sway. The main reason for military success in law and order duties is the complete trust of the citizen in reasonably fair conduct of the soldier and that the military would never take political sides nor ever become a slave of any 'political party weighted' orders of the central government. Army leadership at all levels has a good idea of causes of political upheavals and largely get excellent support from officials of the civil administration and police officers. Many such officials and officers ostensibly obey their political masters but, in private, and if given an understanding ear in strict confidence, are able to spell out the political skullduggery that may be causing conflict; they know that the military commander will respect their confidence and act impartially. When such support from local officials and police does not exist, the military may not be too successful, though it does use its own intelligence to try and get at the truth.

To illustrate the causes of internal conflict in India, the GNLF (Gorkha-

National Liberation Front) and Bodo agitations of 1987-88 come to mind. Subhash Ghisingh's GNLF in Darjeeling district of North Bengal went on the rampage against the communist West Bengal government and burnt the homes of all who did not support the GNLF. Families of Gorkha soldiers of the army residing in Darjeeling district, fled to Sikkim and the jungles, while their sons and husbands were soldiering with the Indian army in far off Siachen Glacier and the IPKF in Sri Lanka. In Eastern Army Command we moved fast to contain the mayhem and locate these army families without awaiting any instructions from Delhi as it was known that some political parties were encouraging the GNLF cause against the communists in Bengal. Eastern Army rapidly got the support of local police and intelligence agencies and made direct contact with the GNLF leader Ghisingh, an ex havildar of 8th Gorkha Rifles. He was informed of the army's interests and contemplated military action to protect army families if the illegal depredations of GNLF cadres persisted in their effort to ensure a favourable hill Gorkha vote; Ghisingh immediately backed off. A large number of unarmed military teams were then sent to give succour to frightened military families hiding in the hills, bringing them money, rations and canteen stores and encouraging their return to their homes in safety. The army teams were given full support by GNLF and the local police who had lately been at loggerheads. Concerned Gorkha soldiers on duty all over the country were promptly informed by Eastern Command of the well being of their families; and the Bengal Government, Army Headquarters and the Central Government were approached to donate substantial funds to re-build military family homes destroyed in Darjeeling hills. Some months later, when I had taken over as army chief, the government requested the army to consider stopping recruitment of Gorkhas from Nepal to Gorkha battalions of the Indian Army and to only recruit Darjeeling Gorkhas instead, as had been demanded by GNLF as one of the criteria for their accord with the Bengal and Central Governments. This was not acceptable to the Army who countered that Darjeeling Gorkhas were Indian citizens and had no restraint in joining any unit of the army based on their merit and qualifications, whereas Nepal Gorkhas must continue to be recruited to selected Gorkha battalions in accordance with the existing legal treaties with Nepal besides the excellence, total loyalty and faithfulness of Nepal Gorkha soldiers. We further suggested no political interference with the military recruitment system in vogue, for short-term gains of political parties in India. We are happy the Government agreed, despite its ongoing diplomatic confrontation with the Nepal government in those days.

The Bodoland agitation in Western Assam and North Bengal in 1988 was again based on political encouragement and funds due to a bias against the Assam ACP government's capacity to maintain law and order. When all movement of goods by rail and road into Assam from North Bengal came to a halt due to Bodos' firing at trains and road transport, only military trains and

road convoys could move. One day three army jawans were killed by Bodo fire on a military train; the Bodo chiefs were immediately contacted through the local army formation to demand an explanation on pain of immediate military action against the Bodos. The Bodo leaders profusely apologised and pleaded mistaken identity, requesting the army to prominently mark military trains and convoys which would be given full right of way; they also accepted free passage for all goods being sent to land-locked Bhutan with army assistance, besides payment of compensation to the families of the killed soldiers. The army was also informed of large sums of money having been given to the Bodo leaders by some political factions to encourage their revolt against the Assam government. Some weeks later the army was requested by central government to move into Bodo areas to control their growing agitation which was stated to have gone beyond the scope of the armed police to handle. The army raised questions on the propriety of inducting the army in an area of politically created problems and government was requested to use other available central armed police forces to quell disturbances caused by provocative politics. This was, happily, agreed to. Details will no doubt evolve as history of these times comes to be written, but no army of correct moral conduct can be made a slave of what would be considered "illegal orders" from its political superiors against the spirit of the Indian Penal Code and the Constitution. The business of controlling agitating masses or revolts can cause needless deaths, sometimes of innocent people, and military commanders must not be made unsuspecting murderers at the behest of covert political party machinations which cause such agitations. The army can and must check for itself the causes and needs of control over a serious law and order situation if it is to retain its apolitical integrity and uphold the rights of the citizens of this country. The responsibility for this rests with the army chief, the army commanders and the adjutant general. In this stance, I am glad to say, the army gets full support even if covertly, of all right thinking bureaucrats, police officers and intelligence agents, of which there are many; as also of many political leaders who do not know of the machinations indulged in by different wings and factions of their own political party. All political parties are guilty of such incorrect conduct to force elected governments out of power at the centre or in the states.

Law and order duties are clearly the primary role of the police and not the army. During the British Raj the army had to be used frequently because of widespread agitations and later public disobedience during the independence movement. But after independence and the advent of a democratic Indian government, public upheaval was not expected nor relevant. It is only when political parties and leaders developed undemocratic and criminal methods of gaining power and staying in office that public institutions, the civil services, the police and business houses deteriorated in standards of conduct and corruption became rife. Till this is corrected, violence in our society is likely to

grow further. It appears that the use of the army is only going to increase until criminalised politics and corruption is corrected. Such correction is possible by the people of India by the way they use the ballot box and the way they handle their political leaders based on public opinion. It is also necessary for individuals in the bureaucracy, civil services, the police and the defence forces to resist perceived incorrect or illegal orders and corrupt practices; this can only be done if they, especially senior officers, forgo their chances of promotions, plum appointments and 'under the table' perks. This may sound as though it is impossible but with organisation of the civil and police officer class and good leadership nothing is impossible. It is of interest to examine how the defence services have largely remained aloof from political machinations. Slowly over the years, the armed forces have been able to ease out officers with reputations of incorrect conduct or political affiliation. The 1962 India-China war was, on hindsight, one of the best events affecting the post-independence Indian army, causing deep introspection amongst the officer corps and a drive to get rid of self-seeking officers with too much personal ambition and a 'no holds barred' approach to personal advancement. The army is well known for court martials of even general officers who stray from the path of rectitude; many in the press and judiciary raise questions of the 'harsh' military discipline which punishes even minor transgressions when compared with the civil world which has no guts or desire to meet out any punishment at all to those who deserve it. Even the police has a reputation for covering up a case within their service rather than openly punishing offenders.

On balance, a rational person would agree that any crime, petty or otherwise, must not go unpunished especially in government services. The defence services have set a comparatively better example and all citizens sincerely hope this example will continue and their strict discipline maintained. This means that only competent and upright men must be permitted to rise to high rank in the armed forces. Political leaders have every right to promote only those senior officers they deem fit, over and above the recommendations of selection boards of the three services but should such decision be without cogent reasons or in favour of politically acceptable and pliable officers, military leaders have every right to contest such decisions. And this is what happens frequently between military service headquarters and the ministry of defence. Over all, the strict selection system of the defence services is amongst the best in the world and is perhaps one of the reasons why the armed forces have set a high standard of discipline and conduct as compared to other government services. It is also true that presently the political and bureaucratic machine does attempt minimum interference with military promotion systems and tries to act more as a watch-dog over military selection boards, rather than insist on its own way, except in a few cases. As long as the military systems remain above suspicion and top commanders are men

known to be of reputable conduct there is basic support from government. All seem to be agreed that in India we must keep the military shielded from factional political feuds and political interference in the promotion system. The lessons of political and bureaucratic interference in the military in the lead upto and during the 1962 India-China imbroglio appear to have been well learnt and the defence forces are largely left to their own system of functioning. There is little doubt that one of the greatest contributions of the defence services is that they are, in fact, largely responsible for India remaining a single united nation. An example of national integration of all castes, creeds and ethnic groups of India can be found in the defence forces, who treat all servicemen alike; advancement of individuals is largely on merit, character and conduct.

TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

The newly independent India faced its first and most prolonged insurgency in Nagaland in 1956 which still continues on a low key. This was followed by insurgency in Manipur and then in Mizoram in 1966. India is one of the few nations of the world which by the mid 1980s successfully terminated the Mizo insurgency by a combination of military force, civic action, good administration and self-government as a state of the Indian union. Similar action had led to earlier statehood for Nagaland and Manipur though a low scale insurgency still continues due to the porous borders with Burma across difficult mountain and jungle terrain. Consistent army action, supported by air force for communications and supply, have been the main reason for success; even the civic action has mainly been military based. The army has had very good training in these areas, not only in infantry tactics and personal qualities of a soldier but, at higher command levels, training in civil organisations, governance and the law. This training has given many advantages to the army during actions in support of civil authority to contain terrorism and insurgency in Assam, Punjab, J&K and during the IPKF operations in Northeastern Sri Lanka in recent years. It is of credit to the army that even operations in Sri Lanka were conducted with full respect for individual human rights, the civil government and institutions as done in India; this being the main reason for democracy being upheld and the many successful results of army counter-insurgency operations. Never was Sri Lanka treated as an 'occupied territory' and the Indian defence forces got full cooperation from the local people and the Sri Lankan defence forces. In any anti-terrorist and counter-insurgency operation, some innocent civilians do get affected and even injured or killed. There is also inconvenience to private citizens during cordon and search operations since the terrorist is a ruthless trained civilian fighter, hidden in villages and homes as part of the population, while conducting his depredations mostly against innocent civilians. Terrorists are also found in remote or secret camps

while under recruitment, training or rest under terrorist leaders. Crimes by individual military soldiers do occur, especially due to psychological stress and violent reaction under constant threat, but these individuals are brought before military court-martial and the percentage of conviction is far higher than what civil courts achieve in similar civil cases. Many times, as in J&K, terrorists provoke military or police fire due to sudden attack in public places and then claim "human rights abuse" by security forces because of civilian casualties. Such incidents are then built up by national and international media due to the sensational aspect of the news and interests of foreign countries to force curtailment of our military operations. Opposition parties and politically antagonistic groups in our country also take the opportunity to indict the government; all this is expected to weaken the government and security forces resolve to contain terrorism and insurgency. Military and armed police anti-terrorist operations can only succeed if good intelligence from the public is forthcoming. Handling such intelligence for effective operational action while protecting sources of information are paramount needs; any inept handling by lower level commanders and staff results in the brutal elimination of informers and their families. It is a difficult and thankless task, but the army itself is the basic reason for India's growing success both in Northeast India and Punjab.

In J&K, there is great need for close coordination between politician, the administration, the police, intelligence agencies and the army; only then will total success be ours. In this, there is need for the army to set the pace, as it has done in Punjab, to act basically in support of civil armed police without allowing inter-service competition for the accolades resulting from successful operations. All operational control should vest in the army, as it was in North-east India and Sri Lanka; and political interference must be kept on leash except to assist in civic action schemes and the correct functioning of the administration. It is India's own internal political strife which is the root cause of terrorism and insurgency in Punjab and Kashmir; the situation deteriorates due to the active support of Pakistan to terrorist gangs in India by way of money, training and weapons as also a safe haven across the international borders or the LC in Kashmir. It is not going to be easy for government to spell out a coherent political plan for Kashmir until terrorist atrocities are curtailed and the ground situation controlled.

Frequent calls for not using the army in anti-terrorist or counter-insurgency operations are totally misplaced. This is one internal upheaval which is most suited for military counter-operations as the nation has to deal with an underground army, organised militarily in units and formations, with a command and control organisation functioning in a military manner and foreign control with political aims antagonistic to India. This is the hidden, underground war, not mere 'civil strife'. The armed police are not organised, trained

or equipped for such operations; should they be so reorganised, they will only become another army, controlled by corrupt party-biased civilian political leaders, with dangerous portent. In any case, the amount of national funds spent on the armed forces cannot only be to earmark such forces exclusively for border defence and no other work. The army gets good training in battlecraft when dealing with armed insurgents and terrorists; this has been a basic military role since the advent of armies anywhere in the world and is still an important role for armies in most developing nations with unsettled political framework and facing internal insurgency and tension. It is also a role of the British army in Northern Ireland and will be the main role of the Russian army for some years to come. Infact, today India's internal threat is far more serious than external threats on the borders and we have to use all power, politics and leadership at our command to overcome this danger. In the nation's struggle against insurgency, terrorism and our ensurance of law and order it is the defence services which have led the way; not wavering despite serious setbacks, a media which blows up adverse incidents beyond logical need and a wavering civil administration more concerned with how to please political masters rather than to get on with their duty. When the police fails, and civil governance quakes, only the defence services can be called upon to uphold the Constitution and rule of law. India is indeed lucky to have a defence force which is stoic and disciplined and all citizens must ensure that our military remains this way.

YOUTH FRUSTRATIONS, MILITARY TRAINING AND BUDGETS

Indian youth has had a fascination for military service for centuries; folklore and mythology, besides the great epics, have invariably eulogized the dutiful and brave soldier as an example to all citizens. During the Second World War and after India's Independence the military services presented the best option for youth seeking jobs. Military service was disciplined, adventurous and very well paid and was considered the topmost government service, above the civil and foreign services. Due to the ongoing war in J&K after the British departed, high levels of recruitment to the defence services offered a viable job outlet to Indian youth both in the ranks and officer cadres. Reduction in recruitment effected in the 1950s was reversed during and after the 1962 conflict with China, followed in quick succession with the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. With the reduction of military manpower in the 1970s, a command social economy and quiet borders after the Shimla Agreement of 1972, military recruitment greatly declined. At the same time, the opening of equal recruitment opportunities to all Indian states, in proportion to their population to ensure widely mixed ethnic groups in the defence forces, caused reduction of recruitment in traditional "martial race" areas, especially Punjab, despite a rise of military manpower strength in the early 1980s. With popu-

lation growing rapidly and reduced job outlets, frustration amongst educated youth has rapidly grown. Heavily populated states along the Indo-Pakistan borders were affected by Pakistani propaganda, the flow of illegal weaponry and drugs from across the border and, combined with youth frustration, boosted lawless gangs which led to organised terrorism. The "cause" for terrorism and insurgency was provided by the fabrication of the myth that the Sikh religion was in danger and Muslims were being crushed under a "Hindu Raj". There are a number of causes of terrorism and insurgency in Punjab and J&K but frustration of the youth is an important one, especially with poor civil administration, political chicanery and encouragement from a belligerent neighbouring Pakistan. This neighbour has decided that destabilisation of Indian border states would be a sweet revenge for Pakistan's defeat in three wars particularly the loss of East-Pakistan in 1971. These wars were clearly started by Pakistan with little other reason than to overcome an India whose comparative success in secular governance was a nail in the coffin of the "two nation theory" based on which Pakistan was created to provide a homeland for Muslims oppressed by a "Hindu State". If we are to avoid continual internal conflict in our country, there is need to reduce frustration of our youth, to develop avenues of employment and to ensure their useful contribution to nation building. Such an effort is unlikely to succeed in the present milieu of self-seeking violent politics with little leadership; wherein all youth development schemes have massive funds allotted but little effect at the grass-roots of village-level youth. Nor will the new economic policies provide the millions with jobs. Frustration increases with the smattering of education village youth receive but with no job outlets other than daily wage labour. Political unrest, drugs, terrorism and insurgency enforce far greater costs on Government budgets than all other subsidies put together including the entire defence budget; there is urgent need to generate viable jobs.

Military recruitment provides an opportunity for disciplined training, enhanced education and development of youth. The defence forces are unmatched in their training schedules and provision of leadership to the large section of government servants who form part of the military establishment. On retirement, trained military personnel provide leadership to their villages and an example of disciplined conduct, until some face serious frustrations themselves while they eke out a living. Military service also ensures good health, training in cleanliness, hygiene and sanitation which achieves some raising of standards of living and respect for nature in our villages, besides giving an example of the qualities of a good citizen to their village brothers who have had little other exposure to such qualities. It appears advantageous to retain a reasonable quantum of military recruitment for such advantages to the nation and the character building and discipline of our people. These advantages have never been computed but would surely outweigh the so called

savings of a reduced defence budget and reduction in manpower of the military services, which western trained economists are wont to stress. Practical schemes could be introduced to tap the advantages of military training, even for 2-3 years, for all citizens and utilise towards this end the services of thousands of retired soldiers from every part of the country. Youth volunteer services could be organised to create a national work force at village level, available for disciplined work to improve village infrastructure, improve ecology by mass plantation of appropriate trees which may provide cheap fodder and fuel on a renewable basis, create and improve water resources, construct roads and buildings and be available during conflict, natural and man-made disasters to render organised assistance to the community. Such a force could provide organised employment to youth for a few years and also provide recruits for the military, police, other government services and to private industry. It is apparent that organisation of youth in all village level sectors would cost the government less than the millions of rupees spent daily in countering terrorism, insurgency and the effects of break down of law and order by communal strife. Military recruitment schemes will perhaps require to be re-structured for provision of manpower to provide both permanent military employment with pension on retirement, as also short term employment for a few years to meet the needs of military manpower with a young profile; such schemes could be meshed with the youth volunteer service at village level. Short-term employment in military service would tend to increase training costs but greatly reduce cost of pensions after full-term service; it would also reduce the vast number of military personnel retiring every year at ages 35-40 years and improve the prospects of continuing government employment upto 56 years age by lateral induction of selected military personnel into other government services as discussed earlier. The manpower policies India needs to evolve would be vitally different to those followed by many western nations who have proportionately much smaller populations. For instance, our Territorial Army (TA) concept of recruiting 'citizen soldiers' to assist the army during emergency is not as effective as hoped for in reducing manpower needs of the army. The concept is based on a usefully employed citizen in civil life being called up for military duty when required and then returning to his civil job on completion of such duty as in vogue in many European nations and Israel. Our problem is that recruits to the TA have no other employment, they only get paid when called up and embodied and have no jobs to go back to. Therefore, they agitate for permanent military employment or permanent embodying which is not feasible under budgeted funds. Similarly, conscription would never be required in India with our massive unemployed population seeking whatever jobs are available; there are over a thousand job-seekers for every single vacancy in the military. We must find original solutions after weighing the visible and hidden costs, but always to ensure social uplift and character building of our village youth as this is an important way of reducing internal

conflict and thus reduce future costs. The defence forces can play a very useful role in tackling national manpower problems and advantage should be taken of military expertise without slavishly following western ideas or IMF and World Bank conditionalities.

In fact, defence budgets have a beneficial effect on a nation's economy and development. In India when the public sector undertakings and defence industries were formed by Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna Menon, there was little production infrastructure in India and a miniscule heavy industry. The flow of massive defence funds for building infrastructure and heavy industries, has encouraged the rise of the present private sector industry. Military strategic needs have caused the swift development of the country as already discussed. Wherever the military is present, education and youth development with improvement in ecology results. Some years ago, Kargil in Ladakh region of J&K had rains for the first time in history due to greening of this high-altitude region by the army. These rains washed away mud roofs of Kargil villages, designed solely for protection against snow and cold, and frightened the population who had to be given full compensation for new roofs by local army commanders; the people can now improve living standards and job availability by agriculture and agricultural industry besides sheep-herding because of increased rainfall. High altitude regions of Ladakh and Sikkim also now have growth of hardy trees and greenery to face the extremes of temperature and rarified atmosphere due to military efforts. The military has not only created effective national integration but also social uplift of remote border regions and their connection by trade and culture to the rest of India. It is not only necessary to spend more for defence in our country but to ensure better development through defence budgets. It is improved government efficiency and prevention of waste in various departments of government that can reduce budget deficits, and not merely cutting defence expenditure, which is proportionately one of the lowest in the world.

THE SINEWS OF POWER

What does India aspire to and where do we go from here? If you ask any thinking Indian, anywhere in the country, you generally hear one answer; that India must become one of the greatest and most powerful nations on earth and must spread its culture of equity, non-violence and equality for all castes, creeds, ethnic groups and nations. At present we ourselves are a poor example of these ideals but these are written in our Constitution, comprise the law of the land and this is what we aspire to. Our destitute and hungry, jobless millions have first to be given some place in the sun before we can raise this nation to any position of eminence. Our greatest failures are the population explosion, endemic corruption and criminal politics. Our weaknesses are being

taken full advantage of by Pakistan and some powerful nations who certainly would not like to see us become a cohesive and strong nation. Our markets are sought by the USA and the developed world on their terms and towards their profit, we have little alternative but to acquiesce in demands made of us if we are to sustain even the present level of developmental loans from abroad and retain some measure of an advantageous export trade. Further, we may be required to bow our heads to USA or UN demands on alleged human rights violations by us in controlling terrorism and insurgency, even though developed nations too have their serious human rights violations but are secure in their power. The countries of South Asia, Africa, China and Southeast Asia, with their oceans, have tremendous land and sea resources which the developed world must control to retain their own power, standards of living and income. Hence countries such as India must be kept out of the power game by all means of destabilisation and internal conflict to prevent them from exercising their rights on such resources.

What then is "power" in a nation? The modern economist insists that it is the economy which, if strong, gives a nation power - power to do whatever required for national uplift despite opposition from other nations; hence the need to sacrifice all else to develop economic power. Some say it is military power which makes a super power; but the example of the erstwhile Soviet Union and its collapse points to other factors. Are Japan and Germany powerful because of their strong economy, and what makes USA a super power? Obviously, Japan and Germany must bend to US will since the USA combines strategic, military and economic power with control of world trade and the UN through its alliance with important countries of Western Europe, despite its recession and declining economic clout. Since the dawn of recorded history, no nation which reaches the pinnacle of power ever permits other nations to rise to eminence and be able to compete for such power. Nations rise in power despite every effort to prevent them by the more powerful. There is no such thing as 'friendship' between powerful nations, only competition and struggle whether in trade, the economy or even by military means. In the world struggle between the haves and the have-nots, between those who control trade and those who desire to control it, there is really little possibility of "peace" except an armed balance of power. The greatest set-back to national power is internal struggle and the conflict within. Today it is not advantageous to fight wars because of unaffordable high costs involved in men, material, funds and world public opinion. It is better and cheaper to play the game of internal destabilisation of hostile nations. India is a worthy victim of this game since India has the potential for great national power but poor leadership and little public desire to face the hard options. Pakistan, with its historical hatred of India is only a 'front' nation in this game, backed by other powerful states, and Kashmir is the present focus of contention. It is naive to believe that should

the Kashmir question be solved, the India-Pakistan confrontation would end; there is little hope for any such result and little likelihood of ending the Kashmir dispute by reasonable peaceful means, or even by attempting to prevent other serious quarrels from rising. Only higher levels of national power can suppress such quarrels to dimensions more easily handled. The basis of such power is in internal cohesion, economic strength, a strong modern military and determined leadership which can bestir national public opinion.

Our defence forces have so far effectively contributed an important facet of national power. They have also given a clear example of principles to be followed to achieve another major facet of power, internal cohesion, by virtue of their success in integration of Indians of all castes, creeds, ethnic groups and of different cultures and languages, despite our criminal politics which encourages ethnic and caste conflict. This has been achieved by the defence services more by leadership and determination than by chance or mere discipline; even to the extent of Muslim officers and troops fighting very effectively against Pakistan despite their similarity of religious belief, giving the lie to Pakistan's claims that it is religion which is a basis for their existence as an entity and is a reason for their independence as a nation. Most great wars of the past have been fought amongst people of the same religion, such as Christians and Muslims indicating the importance of perceived national interests and compulsions of development which are amongst the major causes of war between sovereign states rather than religion. Our defence forces have also structured internal cohesion wherever they have been in close contact with or in control of civil areas in remote regions of our country, by providing leadership, jobs, construction of infrastructure and developing cultural and social bonds with the local people. Indian defence forces have been greatly aided in such tasks by their not having any political affiliation with political parties, especially whichever party may be in power in the central government, as also by the comparative high discipline and moral conduct of troops and their commanders. The government, however, has a much more difficult task in national development, ensurance of internal cohesion and on converting the millions of destitutes into wage earners. Massive funds are required to even attempt such a task and every effort is required to open up the economy to attract foreign investment and to earmark substantial funds for creating jobs, building village infrastructure and improving appropriate, job-related education of our people. But this cannot be at the cost of the defence budget, curtailing of which in real terms has already created critical weaknesses in our defence forces, their vehicles, equipment and training over the last six years. Government should concentrate on eradicating their own departmental weaknesses, removing corruption, correcting aggressive and violent politics with its self-seeking and criminal bias, and preventing ostentatious and wasteful expenditure; and above all ensuring that allotted funds for development are well utilised with grass-roots benefit

rather than funneled away amongst corrupt middle-men. It is essential to maintain our nation's strength while attempting to eradicate weaknesses. Our military strength must be built up to excellence within an allotted affordable budget of at least 4 per cent of GNP, not the present crippling 2.7 per cent. In areas of military locations and work, the defence forces must be encouraged to continue to play an increasing role in national development, the uplift of the citizenry and assistance in youth organisation and training.

Serious weaknesses in government procedures, red-tape and higher command organisation require to be urgently corrected to introduce greater efficiency and accountability of those who make decisions for others to implement. Government has no institutions for future thinking and national strategy, making contingency plans for possible set backs and utilisation of some percentage of budgeted funds to meet assessed future needs. The defence services have such think tanks for in-house planning but these lack authenticity without government political guidance, strategy, consultation and views. The political and senior bureaucratic committees doing crisis management deliberately keep out the military who are seldom consulted during decision-making even when matters concerning national security are being discussed. It is time to create more trust in the service chiefs and their views sought in matters of national strategy and security rather than 'hand over' the situation to the services when things go out of hand or when conflict is probable. In fact, the service chiefs can contribute sane judgements in internal or external security situations and future planning as they are not constrained by party affiliations or the need to ensure political advantage to the party in power but have a national perspective. There is need for reorganising the ministry of defence and command and control of the defence services to give more responsibility to service chiefs and less to bureaucrats and to leave inter-defence service coordination and direct approach to political leadership to a professional military person working directly under the political leader and assisted by an institutionalised inter-service secretariat. The bureaucratic filing and noting system requires to be redesigned for quick and effective decision-making and implementation of orders rather than its present design to delay all decision by tedious and numerous notings, taking years to come to any conclusion defeating all initiative and causing far greater expenditure when decisions are eventually made. The archaic bureaucratic rule books and procedures were designed for the old British Raj days where time was aplenty and quick decisions were possible by the white man cutting across all procedures to give and implement orders which invariably favoured the Raj rather than the people. Now we need far quicker and more efficient procedures, clear accountability and responsibility directly given to management and service chiefs within budgeted limits. Government needs to authorise a commission to examine all procedures and suggest changes. The bureaucracy must continue to play the important role of assisting and

ensuring proper governance and providing continuity in government policy towards achievement of national goals. But their role must not be permitted to expand in control of all central government services and public sector establishments. The bureaucrat's role has slowly increased in power and reduced in accountability because few political leaders have the expertise or time to master the needs of their ministries and to contribute to effective functioning of the ministry; all this is left to the secretary and his staff while the minister concentrates on political games required to retain his seat in the Cabinet. Some ministers take whatever personal advantage is available from their ministries but there are notable exceptions. We have seen some excellent ministers who have galvanised their ministries into effective action and got full backing and support from the defence services; unfortunately such men and leaders do not last long in the Cabinet to the loss of the nation; perhaps they never knew about political games for survival.

Kashmir is the most serious problem faced by India today. The machinations of Pakistan and their full support of terrorism in India to force destabilisation of Indian border states was well recognised by the world and US intelligence reports, and Pakistan was almost declared a terrorist state on India's plea. But President Clinton's administration has changed the 'kaleidoscope' by deft sleight of hand and India is sought to be placed in the dock on human rights violations in Kashmir; with no thought to the factual position on the ground where the greatest violations of human rights of innocent people is the Pakistan sponsored terrorism. US historical support of dictatorial regimes since the Second World War, despite US pretensions of support for a democratic world order, is part of the strategic game that great nations must play to achieve their perceived national interests. The latest thrust on 'human rights' is certainly a major step forward in world thinking but powerful nations are making political use of this theme to bend others to their will. In Kashmir there is only one single factor which can possibly resolve the impasse in favour of India; and that is clear success in control of terrorism and ensurance of law and order on the ground. Every time the political leadership reacts to human rights and other opposition political charges by restraining the controlling forces of law and order or by inter-party political advantage-seeking, the ground situation tends to go out of hand, aided by the terrorist controlled local press which only obeys terrorist orders under threat but is unable to speak out the truth. This does not mean we ignore human rights. On the contrary, operational success against insurgent forces is greatly helped by all forces enforcing law and order, themselves setting the example of strict observance of the law which also encompasses the rights of all individual citizens of the country. Winning of hearts and minds of the public is crucial to success against insurgent forces as is clearly the experience all over the world and our own experience in the Northeast states and with the IPKF in Northeastern Sri

Lanka. Whenever policemen or soldiers react against innocent individuals by torture, rape or violence, they must be and, especially in the army, are certainly proceeded against under the relevant military or civil law. Such cases must never be hidden or sought to be covered up, but should openly be made an example of. However, we must appreciate the psychological stress under which security forces operate in anti-terrorist or counter-insurgency operations, individual violence is to be expected. Corrective punishment should suffice but media hype is taken advantage of by terrorist and human rights groups beyond all balance and this constrains commanders and political leaders, leading to harsh orders which lower morale of troops causing inefficient functioning or reluctance to show initiative. There must be no restraint in anti-terrorist operations which must be encouraged with full vigour. No quarter must be given to any terrorist group and returning of fire against hostile attack is perfectly legitimate even if some inadvertant casualties occur amongst civilian's assisting these terrorists or bystanders.

Success in such operations is largely based on accurate intelligence and forceful swift action by commanders and troops using full initiative and surprise. There is need for single operational command and close friendly coordination and assistance to all government services involved ie, the army, civil police, para-military forces, the intelligence services and civil administration. Should such close friendly cooperation and coordination be achieved, Kashmir will quickly come under control and the situation made appropriate for the democratic political process to proceed. We have clear examples in Punjab and Northern Sri Lanka when the Indian army was able to create conditions for peaceful and well attended elections. Similar success has been achieved by the army in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura. But we must continually face upto the propaganda of Pakistan and the "human rights" groups engineered largely by terrorist media hype. Our dealings with foreign powers must progressively become firm, diplomatically and politically. India need have no fear of anyone as long as we are clear we tread the legal and moral path. There is certainly no need at all for our government and political leaders to react with a fawning apologetic attitude to every foreign accusation. Our accusers have little moral ground to stand on in regard to their own actions in respect of human rights and there are innumerable examples of their high-handed self-seeking conduct for their own benefit, in world affairs and within their own countries. India must also make clear that the whole of Kashmir is ours and that we retain the right to forcibly take possession of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) if serious efforts are not made by Pakistan to continue a useful dialogue.

The Shimla Agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan is really an effort to solve the dispute by treating the LC as an international border thus

suggesting effective division of J&K along the present line. But if Pakistan wishes to reopen this question and physically violates the Agreement as it is doing by sponsored terrorism, it opens the probability of war, a war which is likely to cause the destruction of Pakistan. Military dialogue between India and Pakistan in 1989-1990 has already suggested a solution to the Siachen issue, along the appropriate and factual present line of ceasefire, generally along the Salto ridge-line; but this did not come to political fruition due to Pakistan not politically being able to accept such a solution. There can, however, be no other solution except war and Pakistan has to acquire political guts to terminate the confrontation with India in J&K. If they require time, as appears necessary, India can easily stay the distance. Political solution to the J&K issue is also fully on the cards but Pakistan is yet to understand the path of political wisdom and rectitude in its relations with India. It will, once subtle encouragement from the USA remains unsuccessful in promoting Pakistani designs against India. India itself is maturing in its views on the dispute with China on our Northern borders and pragmatic solutions are in the offing; but India took many years to understand this and Pakistan too perhaps requires more time to stabilise in democratic governance before it can accept pragmatic solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Our present goals in Kashmir must continue to stress success in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations and to make all efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir. 'Self determination' in Kashmir, as being encouraged by Pakistan and the USA is not the correct solution for a democratic sovereign state like India. If this was permitted in the world whenever ethnic groups are motivated to demand separation, no nation could exist for long. The USA fought a four year civil war starting in 1861 to prevent the southern states from gaining independence. Even today, given the chance, Texas and New Mexico could opt for secession from the USA. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have long been candidates for 'self-determination' if given the opportunity. This way lies a future of total chaos in the world as can already be seen in erstwhile Yugoslavia. The Indian Constitution is clear on Kashmir and it being a part of India or not is not debatable. India has states which are communist or have low or high caste leadership or comprise various ethnic and religious groups in majority; all are equally part of the Indian nation. Kashmir being a Muslim majority state is of no relevance; India in any case has a much larger Muslim population than Pakistan and India has a secular Constitution where all people are equal. The defence forces have their duty and they will continue to efficiently contribute to the solving of the Kashmir imbroglio as they have successfully done so far both in Kashmir and other areas of our land.

The fabric of our nation has basically been kept intact by the defence services against all forces of ethnic and religious conflict, and the machinations of foreign powers and their efforts at destabilisation of India. With our

present external and internal threats it is totally out of context to speak of reduction of defence budgets. India's defence expenditure is proportionately too low and requires increase to even retain some standard of efficiency and effectiveness in the myriad tasks for defence on which the nation depends for its integrity. Internal functional efficiencies and reduction of waste are certainly needed in the defence services as in government departments, and are ongoing based on detailed studies and implementation of new, more efficient ideas. In any careful consideration of future perspectives it becomes clear that India cannot escape her destiny or strategic position in South Asia; responsibilities for this region of earth will continue to grow and India will be required to play its part in world order. India can only succeed if it corrects its internal weaknesses and encourages high standard leadership to be able to accept national responsibilities. The role of the defence forces is likely to grow, not reduce, as India gains in political wisdom and economic strength. It is upto us to reorganise our potential and work towards its logical development. The defence forces will always play an important part in India's advancement, we must recognise their capabilities and ensure their adequate structure and strength to assist national development and power.

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A Time of Troubles, A Time of Need

MICHAEL KREPON

I

Relations between India and Pakistan are at a low ebb. Formal bilateral discussions on security matters have been stalled since early 1994 with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's decision to suspend Foreign Secretary-level discussions on new conflict avoidance or confidence-building measures (CBMs). Government officials in Islamabad cite the need for improvement in India's treatment of Kashmir before they are resumed. Both governments are unhappy with the implementation of existing measures to reduce tensions and avoid unintended conflict, but with bilateral channels of communication closed, the situation is unlikely to improve in the near-term.

Nor is there an agreed regional forum to discuss security concerns, as India resists such a framework with a tenacity equal to Pakistan's reluctance to reopen bilateral channels of communication. The existing regional forum that might be employed for discussions of security issues, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), is expressly excluded from doing so by its mandate. Meanwhile, the level of violence in Kashmir remains high, reinforcing hard-line positions in New Delhi and Islamabad.

Domestic politics in Pakistan has assumed a particularly fierce, unforgiving character. The opposition leader and former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, has found it unacceptable for the incumbent to carry out the same exchanges on CBMs that he endorsed while in office. National politics within Pakistan appears trapped in a bitter contest between arch rivals. The struggle for power supersedes all; effective governance has become an afterthought.

Kashmir has long been the reason for conflict avoidance measures on the Subcontinent. In the current, intractable state of Pakistani politics, it is also the reason not to engage in official dialogue on such matters. For Prime Minister Bhutto to acknowledge Indian steps removing New Delhi's heavy hand in Kashmir and to reopen bilateral discussions would be to invite a political firestorm fanned by the opposition. Pakistani media coverage of the Kashmir issue has hardly laid the groundwork for a change in government policy. It will take formidable leadership to engineer such a change, as the city streets of Pakistan, like those in India, have long been mobilized to fan tensions, not to relieve them.

Text of a talk given by Dr. Michael Krepon, President, Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, to the members of the United Service Institution of India on May 19, 1994.

Even with far-sighted and bold political leadership, Pakistan would be hard pressed to initiate gestures of reconciliation with India as long as Kashmir is on the boil. As the weaker party in the dispute, Islamabad has added reason to wait for New Delhi's example. India's Congress (I) Party leaders, however, seem deeply disinclined to initiate change in regional security policies. After all, there is no immediate or pressing reason to chart a new course, unlike the case for economic liberalization.

For New Delhi, the safest position on security matters is one that claims the moral high ground while allowing maximum freedom of maneuver. Thus the ardent embrace of global, nondiscriminatory solutions to security problems that place the burden of action on others. Global change, however, is predicated on prior initiative at the personal, local, national, and regional level. By absenting itself until the end of this transformational process, India limits the constructive role it might otherwise play. Gandhiji operated under a different philosophy, advising that "An ounce of practice is worth more than tons of preaching." But there are few Gandhis walking the earth today, and fewer still who aspire to high public office.

Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao is clearly cut from different cloth. He has demonstrated a surprising durability in office, but faces resurgent domestic opposition and a restive political base. Rao's natural tendency has been to respond to Pakistani grievances with studious indifference. Since any Congress (I) Party initiatives to soften Indo-Pakistani relations would surely become campaign ammunition for the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Rao's posture is well-grounded in domestic political realities. Provocations within Kashmir, Bombay, and elsewhere, which are universally presumed within India to be inspired by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), have been met with armed might and police action. Rao's natural disinclination to take risks for normalized relations has no doubt been reinforced by the unlikely prospect of a favourable response to any such initiative by a besieged counterpart in Islamabad.

Thus, the prospects for small steps to minimize tensions, let alone to promote political reconciliation, are modest at best in 1995. Indeed, the greater likelihood in the near-term is that Indo-Pak relations will continue to worsen, as exemplified by the closing in 1994 of the Indian consulate in Karachi and the Pakistani office in Bombay.

II

One of the paradoxes of conflict avoidance and confidence-building measures is that, precisely when they are most needed, they are most difficult

to negotiate and implement properly. For these measures to be of greatest utility, they must be in place and working properly before tensions mount. Such conditions do not exist on the Subcontinent, where measures have been implemented begrudgingly, at best. Thus, there is no sound and reliable basis for India and Pakistan to defuse a surge in tension, especially when the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers have a poor working relationship or are in a weakened position at home. Under these circumstances, whatever steps to be employed in the event of another crisis will have to be ad hoc, and may require third party involvement. India and Pakistan deserve better than this.

One does not need to look far afield for the makings of another ratcheting up of tension. Pakistan's lack of strategic depth and highly vulnerable lines of communication mandate a forward posture and high state of readiness for its ground forces. This in turn mandates prudent defence countermeasures by India. With the fourth and eighth largest land armies in the world facing each other, and with both sides having firepower less than one kilometer apart along the Line of Control, every large-scale training exercise near the border is necessarily a cause for concern.

The absence of bilateral and regional channels of communication on security matters, the uneven implementation of existing CBMs, the poor personal chemistry between the Prime Ministers and the constraints imposed by domestic politics in both countries provide sufficient kindling for new fires on the Subcontinent. The kindling can be lit by sparks from acts of terror and subversion, continued unrest in Kashmir, and the introduction of new missile systems capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

III

It does not take too much imagination to envision how fears, rumours, and provocations can conspire to increase tension significantly between India and Pakistan. Several scripts have already been written and enacted that could form the basis of another dramatic performance gaining international attention.

Act one might begin with an announcement that the Indian Army is carrying out military exercises with armoured units at the Mahajan training ground adjacent to the Rajasthan/Punjab border. But intelligence officers in Pakistan, notorious for their alarmism and troubled by the lack of proper advance notification, suspect that this may not be a routine training exercise. Some believe that Delhi wishes to send Islamabad a message about continued interference in Kashmir. Their fears are reinforced by partial evidence suggesting unusual activities involving the use of railroads to support the "exercise".

As a precaution and to signal continued resoluteness in support of the Kashmiri struggle, Pakistani armoured units assemble at the training area around Multan, only three hours away from the border. Indian intelligence, notorious for its excitability, believes that Pakistani units are equipped with ammunition and petrol far in excess of that required for a mere exercise.

Then, to be on the safe side or, perhaps, to make for more realistic military exercises, the Indian Army commander practices tank crossings of the Indira Gandhi Canal. This, in turn, reinforces fears in Pakistani General Headquarters that the exercise masks hostile intent. To be on the safe side, Pak units are placed on a higher state of readiness and, to relieve pressure from the apparent Indian build-up on the border, the ISI or "non-governmental" groups step up support for those seeking the separation of Kashmir from the Indian Union. Camps conspicuously reappear in Azad Kashmir to train freedom fighters. It is not clear whether the government in Islamabad is aware of, let alone in control of, the re-establishment of these camps.

This, in turn, generates formal protests and stern rhetoric from Indian government officials about the risks entailed by heightened support for terrorist activities across the Line of Control. Opposition leaders demand airstrikes against the camps and, at long last, an end to paramilitary operations against Indian territory.

By this time, our script is well into the third act. In response to 'hot' rhetoric from Delhi, the Pakistani Prime Minister travels to Muzaffarabad, declaring Pakistan's unending support for the beleaguered Muslim population of Kashmir. To which government officials in New Delhi join opposition leaders in publicly surmising that it might be time to teach Islamabad a lesson about the dangers of fomenting secessionist movements.

With street demonstrations throughout Pakistan led by opposition leaders now a daily occurrence, the Prime Minister declares that Pakistan will never cower before Indian threats, and that the country is able and willing to respond at whatever level necessary to defend national honour. India responds by moving Prithvi missiles from "recessed" to overt deployments, actions reported under banner headlines in the Indian press.

At this point, the Pakistani media blares unconfirmed reports, believed to be reliable in some intelligence circles, that India has brandished nuclear weapons against Pakistan. The government responds by deploying Hatf missiles and by moving strike aircraft to forward operating bases. There are also unconfirmed reports that M-11 missiles have been moved from secured storage into the field. In Washington, key members of Congress call for the imposition

of sanctions on Pakistan for having violated the Missile Technology Control Regime. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is stormed and partially damaged by angry mobs.

Pakistani missile deployments and the movement of strike aircraft to satellite bases generate wild reports in the Indian press about hostile preparations for a nuclear attack. Opposition leaders and eminent commentators call for pre-emptive action. The United Nations Secretary General offers to play a mediating role, but is rejected by India. The United States offers its services, but is rejected by Pakistan. Acts four and five are left to the imagination of the reader.

Granted, the aforementioned scenario is unduly alarmist, even though it is drawn in part from the 1986-7 Brasstacks episode and the 1990 crisis. Large-scale military exercises along the Indo-Pak border, like those placing both countries on the brink during Brasstacks, are hopefully a thing of the past. Most importantly, Delhi and Islamabad do not want to have a fourth war, and leaders in both capitals can be expected to try to avoid one — just as they did during the 1990 crisis.

Nonetheless, this troubling script is worth pondering in a region prone to mishaps. Sometimes the momentum of events during crises control leaders, rather than the other way around. Simple prudence requires that attention be paid to worst cases. The smoldering resentments of two generations on the Subcontinent have not been doused. There are many in both India and Pakistan eager to pour kerosene on them. The geography of conflict within the region will not change, which places the Indian and Pakistani armies at close quarters, while Kashmir remains an open sore. In these circumstances, no harm can come from taking steps to make highly damaging scenarios increasingly remote. Indeed, there is much to gain for both India and Pakistan in doing so.

IV

Some strategic analysts and retired senior military officers in India and Pakistan argue that offsetting nuclear capabilities will provide needed stability to South Asia. In this view, it is better to rely on overt nuclear deterrence than on mere shadow play. A few Western analysts have also adopted this view, noting that offsetting nuclear capabilities kept the cold war from becoming hot, and might serve a similar purpose on the Subcontinent.

It is odd that South Asian strategists who have long rejected the imposition of alien Western constructs should warmly embrace a concept of nuclear deterrence developed at the RAND Corporation and other redoubts of U.S.

Cold Warriors. In truth, the cold war history of nuclear deterrence was far from stable. Instead, it is replete with close calls and near misses. A few of the horror stories that nearly happened have been revealed — especially those surrounding the Cuban missile crisis — and more will come to light as U.S. and Soviet archives are opened. The principal culprits usually have been technical snafus, weak command and control procedures, and faulty intelligence assessments.

The first decade of overt, offsetting nuclear capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union — and between the Soviet Union and China — were particularly hair-raising. This should come as no surprise, since nuclear equations are most unsettled and tension-producing at the outset of any such pairing. Invariably, tense relations immediately become more tense when the destructive power of nuclear weapons are added to the equation.

Over several decades, offsetting nuclear capabilities can theoretically provide the basis for normalized relations. This did not occur, however, in the U.S. - Soviet case, where new developments related to nuclear weapons repeatedly set back the process of normalization. Long after the point when nuclear deterrence should have helped ameliorate fears, the domestic politics of the United States and the Soviet Union were dominated by paranoia, fueled in part by new variations of overkill.

Even during the 1970s and 1980s, both countries continued to experience brushes with nuclear disaster, despite highly evolved command and control procedures. Farsighted political leadership, not nuclear deterrence, broke the back of the cold war. True normalization came with the odd juxtaposition of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, leaders who utterly rejected traditional Cold War valuations of nuclear weapons. Then, of course, an entirely new set of nuclear dangers emerged, centered on the safe and secure dismantling of bloated stockpiles.

It will take time and considerable research for the full picture of these near-nuclear disasters to be revealed. Such cautionary tales need to be exposed to move discussions about nuclear deterrence away from presumed cultural biases. The message of nuclear danger from Western analysts should not be construed as patronizing; at issue is not whether the “volatile” brown man is more prone to self-immolating behaviour than the “rational” white man. White men nearly blew themselves up time and again, despite the “stabilizing” presence of nuclear weapons.

Surely, India and Pakistan will not engage in arms racing of deplorable cold war proportions. Even engaging in nuclear deployments at a small scale,

however, invites multiple dangers. Clearly, if serious tensions exist between states, they will not be ameliorated by nuclear weapons, regardless of the race, colour or creed of their possessors. The central paradox of offsetting nuclear deployments is that while they may prevent war, they will also increase tensions in any crisis.

The recent history of South Asia — with two nerve-racking crises during a period when there may have been “offsetting” nuclear weapon capabilities — provides scant testament to the stabilizing role of nuclear deterrence. To be sure, one can take comfort that the crises in 1986-7 and 1990 did not lead to wars and that crisis escalation was contained. Still, no responsible political or military leader in South Asia can be sanguine about this recent track record. To the contrary, recent history cries out for stronger conflict avoidance and confidence-building measures.

V

The principle reasons why confidence-building measures have not taken root in South Asia relate directly to the hard issues in dispute between India and Pakistan and the ill-will they have engendered — especially Kashmir. There are more subtle reasons, as well, that make ameliorate measures even harder to achieve. CBMs operate on a premise directly contrary to the predominant culture of adversarial politics in both India and Pakistan. In this bitter domain, any step that benefits an adversary must necessarily be bad for the home side. It is remarkable to note how deeply rooted this “zero-sum” perspective has become for two nations that were joined at the hip just two generations ago.

Another reason why CBMs have not been accepted is that they are viewed as a foreign import. CBMs appear to be an outgrowth of the cold war, as they were most deeply developed and successful in ameliorating conflict in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, they are naturally suspect. The Indo-Pak military exercise and airspace agreements were negotiated after the 1990 crisis at the urging of the United States. These conflict avoidance measures appear to have been accepted not so much for their intrinsic merit, but because they would do little harm while satisfying well-meaning outsiders and aid donors. As a result, there is little sense of national ownership for measures in place to foster their proper implementation.

These “cultural” impediments to proper CBM implementation make difficult problems like the Kashmir even harder to resolve. In Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, the letter and “spirit” of agreements are usually honoured. In South Asia, there is no cordial “spirit” to existing

agreements, and the letter is often broken, as well. Existing measures have become another means of expression for adversarial politics.

In contrast, U.S. and Soviet military officers took pride in maintaining highly professional and proper implementation of CBMs — even when political relations were abysmal. Once during the Reagan administration, after a U.S. military officer was shot in East Germany by a Soviet sentry, Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger wished to cancel a regularly scheduled meeting between U.S. and Soviet naval officers implementing the Incidents at Sea Agreement. He was overruled, much to the satisfaction of military leaders opposed to politicizing their CBM channels of contact. Israeli and Egyptian CBM implementing was similarly correct during their “cold peace”.

South Asia follows a far different pattern. Interviews with active duty military officers in India and Pakistan responsible for the implementation of existing CBMs invariably produce comparable complaints: reasons are found not to provide prior notification of military exercises, and the air space agreement is regularly violated. When asked why he did not raise concerns over compliance, one Director General of Military Operations — the transmission channel for CBM notifications — replied that to do so would only provide more satisfaction to his opposite number than to himself. Demanding proper implementation of CBMs between India and Pakistan is viewed as a belittling and fruitless exercise.

Unless there is a greater sense of ownership for existing CBMs and some relief from the culture of adversarial politics, South Asia will continue to lag well behind other regions that have normalized long-adversarial relations. Change is possible with the recognition that, despite all of their heartfelt grievances, India and Pakistan have a strong mutual interest in avoiding war and unintended escalation. The dispute over Kashmir makes such work more difficult to carry out, but more necessary, as well.

VI

Creative ways must be found to surmount domestic political constraints in India and Pakistan to re-establishing channels of communication on security issues. For both countries, this requires reconsideration of positions that serve short-term political purposes, but at the expense of long-term national security gains. Significant progress to reduce tensions is unlikely unless Islamabad reassesses its firm opposition to the resumption of bilateral discussions with India, and unless Delhi reassesses its steadfast resistance to regional talks.

India is ready to resume dialogue with Pakistan. Given Nawaz Sharif's

decision to make this a partisan issue, the views of the Pakistani military leadership is key to breaking the impasse. This is not a time for India and Pakistan to exchange military bands or to conduct joint mountaineering expeditions. It is a time, however, to strengthen measures to avoid unwanted conflict and unintended escalation. Fundamental issues of national security need to be placed above partisan politics. If Pakistan's generals take a renewed interest in conflict avoidance measures, bilateral channels of communication can be reopened. India can help in this process by signalling its intention to propose an agenda for discussion that clearly serves the security interests of both states, while repeating its willingness to discuss the Kashmir issue.

It would be easier to reopen bilateral channels if New Delhi could somehow see the value of regional security discussions. Pakistan says it is ready for such talks, but India is concerned that a regional forum will become an unwanted source of outside pressure. In actuality, Pakistan has greater reason than India to fear isolation at this time, given Islamabad's uncertain course and India's much improved ties with China and the United States. A regional forum must therefore operate by consensus to alleviate the concerns of any individual state over outside pressure.

China's economic growth and military potential are not simply India's concern. Consequently, a discussion of regional security issues in which China is constructively engaged can be important for all states in the region, especially when Beijing is undergoing a transition in leadership. Moreover, those in Pakistan who feel estranged from the United States may increase the possibility of erratic behaviour in Islamabad. A regional dialogue can therefore be important to engage Pakistan in constructive ties with its neighbours. Far from being a threat to India's security, much can be gained by the creation of a regional security forum that engages both of India's neighbours of greatest concern. Since the deliberations could clearly advance India's desire to discuss global issues, New Delhi might usefully reconsider its position.

Bilateral and regional channels can obviously be employed to advance conflict avoidance and confidence-building measures. India and Pakistan would be wise to take these measures more seriously — not as a favour to the United States, Germany, or Japan, but as a favour to themselves. This means taking greater responsibility for existing measures, ensuring their proper implementation in deed and in spirit. Both India and Pakistan might also be well served by considering new measures that serve mutual national security interests, despite lingering grievances. There is no shortage of good ideas for CBMs within the region. For progress to be realized, the Subcontinent must be blessed with political leadership equal to the region's promise and problems.

Towards Rationality in Defence Preparedness

LT GENERAL J.F.R. JACOB, PVSM, (RETD)

In the volatile geomilitary and geostrategic environment currently obtaining defence preparedness depends on the ability to assess the military threats and the military, economic and infrastructural wherewithal to meet these threats. This implies adequate land, sea and air forces to counter these threats, a defence industrial base to sustain these forces and adequate reserves of men, equipment, weapon systems, ammunition, petrol and oil supplies. We are not an aggressor nation. Pakistan has attacked us on three separate occasions and China once. Besides this, Pakistan is currently sponsoring insurgencies in Jammu & Kashmir and to a lesser degree in North East India.

Our armed forces should be so structured as to enable them to initially hold the aggressor forces and inflict heavy losses on them. When a sufficiently high degree of attrition has been attained, offensive operations may be launched to destroy, as far as possible, the aggressor's military forces and to seize such objectives to facilitate the subsequent negotiations for a favourable peace settlement following the ceasefire. On 3 December 1971, when Pakistan bombed our airfields we had a favourable military environment in the then East Pakistan, which enabled us to achieve a decisive victory, culminating in the liberation of Bangladesh.

Today, as in 1971, Pakistan is capable of posing a major military threat. As far as China is concerned it is difficult at this time to predict her attitude and action in the event of hostilities with Pakistan. In 1965 China issued threats and moved troops in the Chumbi Valley. They seized the crest line of the Jelap La. Incidentally Indonesia too took a hostile stance. In 1971 China's attitude was more pragmatic based largely on her perceptions on the ultimate Independence of Bangladesh and the substantial international support for the cause of the Bangladeshis. Still, initially there were apprehensions in New Delhi that China was likely to intervene. This was despite the assessment of Headquarters Eastern Command, who were monitoring the situation, that there were no indications on the ground of any Chinese build up in Tibet. Eventually some days after hostilities began it became apparent to Army Headquarters that the Chinese would not intervene.

Lt General J.F.R. Jacob was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Command during 1974 - 1978. Earlier, in 1971 Indo-Pakistan War he served as the Chief of Staff at Eastern Command and was responsible for the planning and execution of military operations in Bangladesh.

Since 1971 Pakistan has been building up and modernizing her armed forces. She has embarked on a nuclear programme which is basically military in structure. She is reliably reported to have produced some 15 nuclear bombs or war heads. She has embarked on a missile production programme and has in addition received a number of M-11 missiles from China. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear war heads. China too is supplying Pakistan with major weapon systems and aircraft. In addition, she is retrofitting obsolescent military hardware and assisting Pakistan in establishing a defence industrial base. Pakistan has the geo-strategic advantage of operating on what the classic strategic thinkers called, interior lines, enabling Pakistan to mobilize and concentrate her field forces much more rapidly than India. Interior lines also give Pakistan the ability to switch forces from one sector to another far more speedily than India. India has the geostrategic disadvantage of operating on exterior lines. Our border from the Rann of Kutch to Kashmir is geographically and communicationwise such that it takes us much longer to switch forces from Gujarat to Kashmir than for Pakistan to switch from either of these two sectors. Our initial concentrations too will take comparatively longer due to dispersed peace time locations. It is therefore imperative that we have timely intelligence and surveillance to give us adequate warning.

Our deployment has so far been largely linear along the border. This is due to political constraints of not allowing Pakistan even limited penetration anywhere. A linear weighted defensive layout precludes India having a larger proportion of mobile reserves. This was the position on the Western front in 1965 and again in 1971. The situation obtaining today is somewhat similar. We do not today have that degree of battlefield superiority to ensure a decisive victory as was possible in East Pakistan in 1971. A comparison of published figures in 1994 of both India and Pakistan is given below:

<u>Army</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
Armoured Divisions	3	2
Infantry Divisions	22	19
Mountain Divisions	10	-
Independent Armoured Brigades	5	6
Independent Infantry Brigades	7	9
Para Brigades	1	-
Artillery Brigades	3	9 (corps)
Army Aviation Squadrons	14	15
Engineer Brigades	4	7

<u>Navy</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
Carriers	2	--
Principal surface frigates/destroyers	24	14
Submarines	15	6
Patrol/Coastal	40	18
Inshore/Offshore	21	7
Combat Aircraft	64	4
Helicopters	75	10
<u>Air Forces</u>		
Combat Aircraft (Total)	707	393
Fighter ground attack Squadrons	23	7
Fighter Air Defence Squadrons	17	9
Maritime Squadron & Patrol	1	2
Helicopter Squadrons (attack)	2	
Recce	--	1
<u>Air Defence</u>		
Air defence brigades	6 air defence brigades	8 (artillery air defence brigades)
	2 air defence missile groups	

It will be apparent from the above balance sheet that, other than the mountain divisions, India does not have the overwhelming superiority required for decisive offensives in the West. Out of the ten mountain divisions the majority of them will be required in defensive holding role in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The number of mountain divisions required for this role will depend on the assessment of Chinese action and that can only be made closer to the time. In 1971, based on Headquarters Eastern Command's assessment of Chinese intentions and the Command's monitoring of Chinese strengths and deployment in Tibet, it was appreciated that there was no build up of Chinese forces in Tibet for any offensive. This enabled the Command to move out a large number of artillery units from the Himalayan border to make up the order of battle of the divisions earmarked for operations in East Pakistan. Reserve Infantry units were utilized to make up deficiencies. Three infantry brigades deployed in depth were also moved down to launching areas in anticipation. A similar situation may not obtain again and it is therefore,

dangerously premature for our planners at this time to take as assets a substantial percentage of the mountain divisions deployed in the East as assets for operations in the West.

There is a large body of opinion amongst our senior civil and military decision makers that any future conflict with Pakistan will be of short duration as was the case in 1965 and 1971. The military equation, though in our favour, is such that decisive results cannot be achieved in a short time frame. A future conflict with Pakistan is likely to be protracted. The ability of our armed forces to sustain themselves during the span of operations and immediately after will be crucial. The pattern of operations is also likely to be different. Targets and objectives will not be limited to military ones. Industrial and infrastructural complexes including offshore oil installations are likely to be targeted (It may be recalled that the Iran-Iraq War which military strategists thought would not last long was an indecisive conflict of attrition spread over a very long duration).

Pakistan's expanding submarine arm is also likely to be very active particularly against our commercial shipping and our vulnerable oil supply lines through the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. It may not be out of place to mention the apprehension caused by the entry of the Pakistani Submarine *Ghazi* into the Bay of Bengal in December 1971. Fortunately, the *Ghazi* blew up whilst preparing to lay mines off Vishakapatnam just prior to the commencement of hostilities.

In 1971 Headquarters Eastern Command assessed that the duration of operations for the liberation of Bangladesh would be spread over a period of between two to three weeks. This assessment was based on force levels and the favourable military environment created by the operations of the Mukhti Bahini. Detailed logistic plans were made and implemented to build up the administrative infrastructure. We provisioned for thirty days logistic support of ammunition, spares, replacements and supplies. Perhaps this could be termed as over insurance. We, however, never had to look back.

The preparations to attain this logistical position took many months of concentrated hard work by the administrative staff at all levels. The problems of spares was particularly acute. There were critical shortages of numerous items like firing pins for light machine guns, tracks and track links for tanks and equilibrator wire ropes for guns, to name a few. The industrial units in West Bengal were most cooperative and undertook local manufacture of critical items, including dry batteries for wireless sets. We were short of transport and had to requisition several thousand civilian load carriers to support the operations.

It will be apparent from the above that in order to sustain operations, it is imperative to buildup a viable logistical support system. The required initial reserves have to be created. Replacement schedules have to be worked out to replace stocks when they run down. This problem is further complicated by the somewhat haphazard proliferation of weaponry and equipment. To illustrate this, artillery units in Eastern Command in 1971 were equipped with a variety of artillery pieces and mortars. There were the 75mm Indian pack howitzer, the 75mm U.S. Army pack howitzer, the 76 mm Yugoslav pack howitzer, the 3.7 inch Indian pack howitzer, the 105 Italian pack howitzer, the 25 pounder gun howitzer, the 5.5 inch Medium howitzer, the 130mm Russian gun, the 120mm Brandt mortar and the 120 mm Israeli Tampella mortar. All these weapons fired different ammunition. Provision of ammunition and spares for such a proliferation of weapons was indeed a logistical nightmare.

Our logistical planning should ensure sufficient logistical back up to create stocks to cater for conflicts of longer duration. The length of such conflicts should be assessed by the general staff taking into account the military balances. Replacements of ammunition and spares should, as far as possible, be based on our industrial capacity both of the ordnance factories and the various industrial units of the public and private sectors. We should aim to simplify logistics by rationalizing the various types of weaponry, equipment and stores. There is still too large a proliferation of types of weapons and equipment. The artillery is equipped with a large variety of guns, howitzers and mortars. We currently have in service the 75mm pack howitzer, the 105 mm Mark 1 Indian gun, the 105 mm Mark 2 light gun, the 100 mm Russian gun, the 122 mm Russian gun, the 130mm Russian gun, the 155 mm Bofors gun, the 120mm Brandt mortar and the 160 mm Tampella mortar. Russia is leasing six regiments worth of self propelled 152 mm guns. There are reports that we are negotiating for 155 mm guns with turrets to be mounted on T72 tank chassis.

The position regarding tanks is not much different. We have in service Russian T55 tanks some with 100mm guns and some upgunned to take the 105mm gun. Then there is the Vickers Vijayanta with a 105mm gun. The T72 tanks on the order of battle have 120mm smooth bore guns. The Arjun main battle tank, when it does enter troop service, will have a 125mm rifled gun. Hybridization is an expedient that should be avoided. With a few exceptions hybrids have not been very successful. Some examples are; the 130mm gun mounted on a lengthed Vijayanta chassis (the catapult), the 105mm Mark I mounted on a cumbersome heavy hybridized carriage comprising component types of various equipments, the 75mm Indian pack how originally of Canadian design for both gun barrel and carriage-the carriage was redesigned to utilize the heavy obsolete 3.7 inch how recoil system, and components adapted

from other equipments. Arjun, the main battle tank under trials, is an example of hybridization with sub-systems and components from several countries. The armoured hull is indigenously designed.

There is a tendency to underplay logistics. Ambitious officers prefer to serve on the more glamorous general rather than logistic staffs. Planning staffs have only experience of short conflicts. Due to no fault of theirs, they have not experienced the problems of sustaining armed forces in a conflict of long duration. Teaching establishments too tend to gloss over this contingency. The lessons of World War II, particularly the Burma campaign, where administration and logistics were cardinal factors, virtually governing the conduct of operations, are still valid. In 1962 we were ill prepared and ill equipped. In 1965 there were critical deficiencies. In 1971 we had more time to prepare, and though there were deficiencies we were able to improvise and make up most of the shortages. In 1986-87, the controversial "training" exercise "Brass Tacks" did bring out one important but unlegislated for lesson, namely, the state of serviceability of our vehicle fleet, particularly the armoured elements. Fortunately, we have had the time to repair and make serviceable the equipment involved in this exercise.

The armed forces require modernization. Obsolescent equipment requires retrofitting and upgradation. There is a need for force multipliers and induction of modern weapon systems. This programme will be very expensive. The armed forces should endeavour to lessen the burden of additional budgetary allocations required for this by trimming unessentials. Priorities have to be laid down - "must", "should" and "could". Perhaps most of the "coulds" can be deferred. There is a need to buildup viable general staff and maintenance reserves to cater for any future conflict. The expected duration of these conflicts should be reassessed, as they are likely to be of a far more protracted duration than the short wars of 1965 and 1971. Both public and private sector industries should be geared to manufacture the required items taking into account their technology and capacities. Finally, the creation of an adequate general staff, and maintenance reserves of weapon systems, equipment, ammunition, petrol, oil and spares, and the ability to replace wastages from the reserves and from the defence industrial establishments, public and private sectors, and industrial units, is of paramount importance. Consequently, the complete spectrum of expansion of our Research & Development in conjunction with rapid indigenization of our defence production must be given very high priority.

India and the Future of SAARC

LT COL K S RAMANATHAN, SIGNALS, (RETD)

BIRTH OF SAARC : EFFORTS OF A FLEDGELING NATION

It was with the yearning to bring some measure of stability and peace, and to improve the sub-human conditions of eternal poverty and misery of his new born nation, that the much beleaguered President of Bangladesh, Mr Zia-ur-Rehman mooted the idea of regional cooperation in the immediate surroundings. His nation's survival and progress depended on active cooperation with immediate neighbours-all powerful and better placed. His sentiments and hopes found ready acceptance from Sri-Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. It was perhaps his logic that combination with the other tiny nations and Pakistan forming ring on the top, and Sri-lanka at the bottom, will assure a better bargaining strength and moral justification.

India and Pakistan, the two major players of the "seven aside" team, were reluctant to join for obvious reasons. Pakistan felt that once a member, India will dominate by sheer weight and size of everything-land, economy, military, industry, power, infrastructure, science and technology, to mention a few. It is not a very comfortable feeling to sit and watch India presiding. It has always been 'Never say Yes to India'. India, the boy at the age of fourteen of Tagore's 'Homecoming,' is neither here nor there. A Giant among Lilliputs and a dwarf outside. India wanted to avoid the impression of playing the "Local big brother". It could uneasily sense the unwritten motto of other partners in bold relief "To corner, contain, and extract more concessions without confrontation". India also had the lurking doubt and uneasy feeling that the principle of BILATERALISM so zealously guarded by her, may lose its significance and the forum may be used to raise bilateral issues a preliminary step towards international forum.

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES :

The preamble of the SAARC Charter enshrines the following Principles:-

- (a) Respect sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs.
- (b) Mutual understanding and good neighbourly relationship and meaningful co-operation.

Edited text of the essay which won the First Prize in Group A of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1994.

- (c) Joint action and enhanced co-operation.

Objective and organisation - Acts (1 to X) envisages the following :

- (a) *Promote Welfare, social, progress, economic growth and cultural development*, with active collaboration and co-operation in technical, scientific and cultural fields.
- (b) Such co-operation "*Shall not be a substitute for bilateral and mutual co-operation*" but complement them.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FORMAT

The charter has catered for a four level organisation.

- (a) *Policy Decision Level* Heads of states to meet once in a year.
- (b) *Policy Formulation Level* Foreign ministers meeting twice a year.
- (c) *Standing Committees Level* Foreign secretaries doing spade work.
- (d) *Technical Committees* Representatives of countries for monitoring progress in respective regions.

The bottom line of the charter declares that **DECISION AT ALL LEVELS** shall be taken on the basis of unanimity. It ensures of course the self importance of each member-small and big.

UNANIMITY Vs MAJORITY

The provision of VETO implied by unanimity may prove to be the undoing of the SAARC. Anybody, anytime, at any level may throw a spanner to bring the machinery to halt. Unfortunately, there is no General Body as in the UN. Perhaps at a later date, majority may become the guiding principle.

THE BALANCE SHEET :

Since inception there has been some progress, mostly paper progress with some real time ones.

CREDITS

- (a) SAARC secretariat at Kathmandu
- (b) Formulation of 'BASIC NEED PERSPECTIVE 2000'
- (c) Creation of Centre for Human Resources Development
- (d) Special Documents for Judges and MPs

- (e) Natural disaster study.
- (f) Agricultural Info Centre
- (g) South Asian emergency centre
- (h) Meteorological Research Centre
- (i) Integrated Programme of Action
- (j) SAVE - the Saving grace
- (k) Inter Government Group IGG, and signing of *SAPTA* frame work, to be launched by Dec. 95.
- (l) South Asian Festival 92
- (m) Plan for the poor
- (n) SAARC TB Centre
- (o) Creation of funds for Regional Projects.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS

The temptation and opportunity were too strong perhaps to be resisted by Heads of States, not to raise bilateral issues.

- (a) India got involved in air dropping, Sri Lanka resented.
- (b) India sponsored Afghanistan and Pakistan was uncomfortable.
- (c) Pakistan spoke about a Nuclear Free Zone and India sulked.
- (d) Nepal's theory of 'Zone of Peace' was not bought by India.

SOME POSITIVE STEPS

Though it may be a paradox, some interesting and unexpected side products of SAARC summit are the major decisions after bilateral discussions between the Heads of States.

- (a) India showed sympathy to 'Ganga Water' problem with Bangladesh and saw it from opposite Banks also.
- (b) India and Sri Lanka discussed the ethnic problem with LTTE in attendance.
- (c) 'Brass - Tacks' Time bomb was diffused
- (d) India and Pakistan agreed not to attack each other's nuclear Installations.

Such major decisions would have never seen the daylight under the normal protocol, bureaucratic procedures and vitiated political atmosphere.

THE ECONOMIC CORE

One of the interesting and intriguing mystery factor was that none of the nations were, from the beginning, showing any keenness about the most fundamental factor in regional cooperation, the core economic factors i.e., trade, industry, energy, environment. In every other meeting and summit, it was a merry go round on the periphery and the list of areas identified for cooperation were long declarations; more akin to an election manifesto.

It was only in the 1987 Kathmandu meet, where India, the reluctant entrant, broached the subject of cooperation in the core economic sector.

NATURAL RESOURCES

Mother Nature has been and is very generous to all of us whether in natural assets or human assets. Some of the SAARC, notable and mind boggling (!) assets are:-

- (i) A population of 130 crores.
- (ii) 22 percent of world's fuel and fossil deposits.
- (iii) 460 cubic kilometres of renewable water resources.
- (iv) 86 million hectares of forest cover.
- (v) 250 million hectares of farm land.
- (vi) Largest animal population and abundance of milk.

An import bill of 38 billion dollars (1990) with a meagre share of 2 billion dollars by SAARC nations. Some of the more interesting anomalies in the trade and industrial areas make very pathetic reading. A few glaring examples are:-

- (a) India produces 15 percent of world's iron ore and Pakistan imports from Australia, Canada, Brazil, Liberia at a much higher cost.
- (b) Sri Lanka exports 120,000 tonnes of natural rubber. India needs 40,000 tonnes mostly, imported from Malaysia, though Sri Lanka's price is lower.
- (c) Pakistan imports 70-90 thousand tonnes of tea from elsewhere. India is sitting next door with better quality tea and at lesser cost. Similarly, coffee is imported by Sri Lanka from Ivory Coast and not from India.

(d) India can buy cotton from Pakistan. All other SAARC nations import synthetic and rayon textiles from South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, France, UK except of course from India next doors.

(e) Aluminium, transport, equipment, metal products, electronic telecommunications, medicines, farm products, fertilizers, rubber products, automobile spares, paper, pulp, and waste, newsprint - the list is endless - all these items are available within SAARC nations but these are imported from outside.

Let us also have a close look at some of the natural resource potential of SAARC nations:-

(a) Nepal has potential for producing a mind boggling 85,000 MW hydro-electric power, (the combined output of Canada and the USA) but produces only 51,679 KW hydro electric power; very little exported to India.

(b) Bangladesh has a potential for 10 trillion CFT of recoverable gas reserve.

(c) It has vast potential for Jute production.

Before we go to discuss and analyse the basic cause or impediments for such a poor economic show, let us take a look at key economic indicators of SAARC countries. An impartial analysis indicates the following:-

(a) India has 77 percent of population (occupying about 72 percent of land).

(b) 78 percent of GNP is generated by India. It is, in physical terms, almost three times larger than all the other countries put together.

(c) India's annual export is twice of other nations.

(d) Import of six other countries taken together is about two third's of India's annual import.

The other equally discouraging factors of the "Economic Inequality" not in favour of the nations are:-

(i) India accounts for just 1 percent of exports of each SAARC country, except Nepal at 15 percent.

(ii) Share of India in imports is 0.6 percent in case of Pakistan, 8 percent in case of Sri Lanka and 13-14 percent in case of Bangladesh and Nepal. Percentages for Maldives and Bhutan are still negligible.

The above analysis more than justifies the apprehension of other nations including a better placed Pakistan, that in all ventures, whether under SAARC or under bilateralism, India is far better placed than all of them and India will not only dominate but also swamp their economy, industry and trade by mere size and volume of its economy. Another reason for this 'fear-complex' is the military might and defence potential. India may be honest and sincere in its intentions, but the fears are very genuine and real among the other partners in the "ventures of inequality", may be some are exaggerated for political gains. There can be no doubt that in the consideration of other nations India is a "BIG BUSINESS SHARK" in SAARC waters. Perhaps, what MNC is to Indian industry, India is to SAARC partners.

We would do well to remember these in-born fears and suspicions while formulating any joint strategy. Before concluding this section it would be only proper to take a look at some of the grey areas which cast doubts about India's unintended "big brother" image.

- (a) India's defence potential, growing missile capabilities, industrial infrastructure.
- (b) India's physical size.
- (c) India's reluctance to carry on with these minor partners tied to her apron as additional weights, in her own race in a new and changing international economic arena for survival.

IMPACT OF BILATERALISM

The bilateralism which was supposed to be the foundation for cooperation between neighbours and kept zealously outside the periphery of SAARC charter so emphatically by India, will be the nemesis of the future of SAARC. The estranged relationship between India and its neighbours over the decades on major and minor political and economic issues, military equations are (and will certainly be) the major deciding factors making the difference between survival/success of SAARC and its premature demise. It is no exaggeration to say that the Indo-Pak stormy relations in all their complexities on all fronts at its bitterest heights loom large and menacingly at the horizon threatening to blow away the "infant" SAARC. It is our inherent hesitation even to appreciate and accept the problem in its totality and real perspective that has been our undoing. Let us briefly touch upon the bilateral problems.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The obsession of India and Pakistan with all and every issue dates back to the freedom and post independence days. Pakistan has, as India feels, a one point agenda of foreign policy "anti India campaign". Anywhere, anytime, in

any forum, it readily campaigns against India. While India insists that it is an historical and constitutional reality that J and K is an integral part of India, Pakistan is not going to accept it for centuries to come. Till such time Kashmir issue is kept alive by any and all means, it need not really worry about any alternative to divert the attention of the nation.

Pakistan is determined to raise bilateral issues at all international levels. UN, Muslim forums, even at SAARC forums, and to project itself as a champion of Islamic cause; it makes mockery of "SIMLA AGREEMENT" and the advices of friendly nations. To believe and to hope that Pakistan will abide by the agreement is a self delusion of the highest order. We know it was signed by Mr ZA Bhutto with one single aim of saving his face, after the Bangladesh War, for extricating a "lakh prisoners of war" without granting any concessions to India. It was very vital for Bhutto to save the 'nascent democratic govt.' inherited after the national disaster. Mrs. Gandhi signed the agreement with a generosity unparalleled in history. Perhaps in her wisdom and historical perspective, the most important thing at that juncture was to ensure a firm rooting of a democratic set up, with whatever weaknesses, than immediate war gains. Pakistan did not ever expect that all her preconditions for bilateral talks will even be considered, let alone be accepted by India.

We cannot also expect Pakistan to forget the humiliation of defeat in 1971 war, or accept the dismembering of the nation. It took India, almost 30 years to get over the blues of 1962 drubbing at the hands of China, in our "Himalayan blunder".

SUPPORT TO TERRORISM

What cannot be won by a direct war can be won by a proxy war. The story of Pakistan's involvement in the "Kashmir affairs" by open and direct support with all means at its disposal is perhaps the next important corollary to the Kashmir problem. It is an open secret needing no elaboration.

Pakistan, with an impressive track record in its brutal suppression of the freedom movement of the erstwhile East Bengal has become a champion of "Human rights", raising the issue on all possible occasions. They become god fathers of Muslim minorities overnight. It is another story that India won the first round by political acrobatism and adhoc adjustments with all and sundry at a political price.

NUCLEAR DIMENSION

Another area of open hostility is the 'nuclear' race between India and Pakistan. Each is convinced that the otherside has nuclear bombs.

Unfortunately, the problem of Kashmir is in-extricably linked with nuclear problem by the West.

MISSILE PROGRAMME

Our missile, and rocket testing programmes, for purely peaceful purposes have not found many buyers, least of all Pakistan. It is convinced that these are meant for use against Pakistan only. It is sure that India, in its right frame of mind, would not entertain any idea of starting a war with China. After all China's active defence policy envisages "We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked we will counter attack."

NOTES OF DISCORD WITH OTHER MEMBERS

Compared to our embittered relations with Pakistan, those with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are not that serious. Fortunately, the relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives are on a different plane. Sri Lanka had strained relationship with India over the LTTE issue, air drops, role and deployment of IPKF to fight Sri Lanka's war on their soil, unceremonious withdrawal of Indian troops. Of course, presently the situation is dormant and may look up subsequently.

With Bangladesh, the major issue is the sharing of Ganga waters, with both sides repeating primacy of their needs. The fencing of the border is another sore point though the honest aim was to seal the porous border. Bangladesh did not like it. Bangladesh also linked water dispute to the natural floods. The burning issue of "Chakma refugees" and Bangladesh's support to Pakistan's intelligence agencies on their soil are adding fuel to the fire. India did not kindly take to the idea of China developing Chittagong port when India could have happily done it perhaps at a lesser cost. India's good-will gesture on TIN BIGHA issue went unacknowledged.

RESURGENCE OF SAARC ON THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL FRONT

There is no escaping from truth for both India and Pakistan that the most important pre-requisite for resurgence of SAARC is permanent peace in the region. This in turn solely depends on the friendship and amity and lasting peace between them. Both countries have politically crossed the "point of no return" in the major burning issue of Kashmir. Political leadership on both sides is scared of bold initiatives for fear of internal upheaval of the masses, brainwashed over the decades. It will tantamount to signing their own death warrants. Let us explore dispassionately, without being branded as unpatriotic or anti-national, the few possible avenues open to both sides on the Kashmir issue.

RESOLVE BY WAR

One powerful means of resolving the issue is by outright war between India and Pakistan. War may be a reality but will it ensure a lasting solution? If at all there is a war, even of a very short duration, it will, in all probability, involve the nuclear dimension at the tactical as well as strategic level. It will be mutually destructive leaving no victor or vanquished but a trail of death and destruction. Let us not forget that with three wars already fought between the two neighbours, the Kashmir issue refuses to be resolved. Intervention of US and UN may also pre-empt such adventures. Both sides should realise that war can never solve the issue for another century.

FREEZING THE KASHMIR ISSUE

With the passage of time, the world's perspective and priorities of the Kashmir issue have also undergone a change. The present generation of world leaders are not even aware of the genesis of the Kashmir issue; its implication and importance. From their point of view, when PLO and Israel can resolve the disputes after being daggers drawn for decades, why not India and Pakistan? One real alternative is to freeze the "Kashmir issue" for at least a generation by mutual consent and agree to maintain "status quo" accepting the line of control as the "DE FACTO LINE OF PEACE". Let the people on both-sides of the "PEACE LINE" have an opportunity to enjoy peace, its fruits and engage in constructive work. Let both sides hold elections under the respective political systems and have the right to determine their destiny. The government on both sides should take the opposition parties into full confidence lest they cry "wolf wolf". Both sides should launch a peace offensive to educate the masses on the virtues of peace for prosperity. Media and the intelligentsia should play a leading role.

CAPPING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

Without waiting for the US and other major nuclear powers to blackmail both the sides from their nuclear programme, both India and Pakistan should, as a confidence building measure, declare openly what is in the kitty and what can be "got ready" at short notice. They should bring to an end all nuclear weapon activities, if any (both are stoutly denying the presence). This, however, should not mean an embargo on pursuing all programmes of harnessing the nuclear energy for power generation and other allied fields.

INDIA'S MISSILE PROGRAMME

The successful test launching of short and medium range missiles and

other generation of guided missiles by India, have no doubt created an uneasy feeling in the minds of Pakistanis at all levels. Politicians and the public on road believe that these are meant for use only against them and nobody else. It is also difficult to convince them that these are for our future security and insurance against our "strategic priority I-China". As Inder Malhotra categorises, "Pak is our IIInd strategic priority". It should not be difficult for India at this stage having attained a level of technological advancement, to call a "Missile Holiday" for a full decade. A similar guarantee is needed from Pakistan that it will not arm itself with fighters and bombers which can be used only against India. Again this should not be construed as putting an end to the satellite development programme for communication, metereology, and geological survey. As a matter of cooperation, India can help Pakistan to build its own "communication satellite systems" to be launched by Indian rockets.

AGREEMENT ON SIACHEN

An agreement to withdraw troops from "Siachen Glacier" having no real time strategic importance as envisaged by defence experts, will be another confidence building measure. Unfortunately, though agreed in principle by Heads of States in one of the SAARC meetings, it not implemented for fear of political fallouts and lack of (political) will power.

END OF TRANSBORDER SUPPORT AND EXPORT OF TERRORISM

Pakistan, which is actively and openly supporting terrorism by clandestine training and supply of arms, exporting mercenaries in large quantity should honestly realize that it still can never win a war or annexe Kashmir by these methods. People of Kashmir, like many other terrorist stricken states elsewhere, are getting weary of facing the bullet from both the sides. It should call an immediate halt to the "low intensity" war by proxy. All elements, who have crossed over will automatically disappear. This will allow normalcy to return.

DELINKING OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

When political leadership cannot take any serious steps for delinking religion in all its shapes and hues from politics, it is the wisdom of the common man which should decide the fate of political parties that are taking shelter under the garb of religious fundamentalism. Luckily (or unluckily), both India and Pak have their own special mix of politics and religious fundamentalism. It is to the great credit of common voters of both the countries who, branded illiterate, poor and famished, have shown their own brand of 'down to earth wisdom and common sense' by putting those religious parties in their places in the recent elections.

"NO FIRST" NUCLEAR STRIKE AGREEMENT

India and Pakistan should sign another agreement that they will not resort to nuclear strike against both military installations/targets and civil targets/population. After all, both have already agreed not to attack military installations (read nuclear) as an outcome of the direct talks between President Zia and PM Rajiv. The fear of the other side exercising the first nuclear strike option, has been the cause of the nuclear race between the countries, not withstanding the cost.

HALT TO DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

Both India and Pak have specialised in the art of painting the other side as "villain of the piece" on every occasion of any incidence. Both sides gleefully give prominence to the others trouble in officially controlled electronic media and all national dailies. It is not just possible that good things never happen on the other side. People on both sides have become immune to the other's bright sides because of the political brain washing of Hitler's type.

For a change, the electronic media and newspapers should give importance to major non-political, human activities as they are presently doing as a "saving grace" about the sports activities. Let people know, read and see each other, not through the myopic and tainted glasses of their respective political and religious leadership.

NO WAR PACT

While initiating bilateral actions to build confidence and ease tension, India should concurrently on its own, offer bilateral 'No war Pacts' with Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka to dispel the fear in the minds of the Govt. and people about India's intentions. Let us confirm to them "No attacks till attacked" is the bottom line of the such mutual pacts.

HISTORICAL PARADOX

It is another intriguing and paradoxical historical psychology of our sub-continent that we lived united, in complete harmony as members of one big family, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians and other communities, under the "YOKE OF BRITISH RULE". Once the binding alien rule was eliminated and nations were created by artificial demarcation on maps, the same people started murdering and cutting throats in millions, leaving behind ravaged nations in shock.

AN IDLE DREAM

The above proposals may and will appear to be optimistic at its

extremes, totally unrealistic and pronounced words of an "Idle dreamer" as Julius Caesar dubbed the soothsayer. But then what is wrong in dreaming of "good things". It is not in the least to suggest that armies on both sides should be withdrawn from the borders or should relax their vigil. No such things are going to happen. If "eternal vigil" is the price for freedom, which is unfortunately misinterpreted in purely military sense, then "human faith" is also foundation of 'peace and prosperity'.

PEOPLE'S PEACE OFFENSIVE

It is the people on both sides who should be taking the peace offensive at all levels. Let them try to understand each other's sentiments, respect others points of view, develop religious tolerance and above all things see in their own honest "human" perspective. In the words of the Pakistani intellectual Mazar Ali Khan "Despite years of confrontation, three border skirmishes and a history of hostility and suspicion at the leadership or the state level, I believe that India and Pakistan are separated only by a narrow divide. This assessment is based on the reality that the people of the two states have refused to imbibe the hostility often exhibited by rulers or fostered by small groups interested in promoting ill-will and confusion."

PRACTICAL MEASURES

Let India set the ball rolling (by words and deeds) to build confidence. Let SAARC awareness, presently restricted to bureaucratic rituals from ivory towers, and in the glare of 'five star' conferences, be made a reality. Let 1995 be declared the 'peoples year' of the SAARC. Let us give wide publicity that the SAARC is 'A way of Life' a means for "peace and prosperity" through mutual cooperation. Let there be a wide publicity "Blitz" in the electronic media, TV and radio and all newspapers and magazines. Let India propose the motto for SAARC "PEACE AND PROSPERITY WITH EQUALITY AND DIGNITY". Let voluntary organisations, human rights organisations, women activists, intellectuals, professional lawyers, engineers, teachers, doctors and grass root politicians carry the message of SAARC to the remote corners of nations.

Let there be a full time discussion in Parliament and state assemblies on the proposed 'SAPTA' taking into confidence the opposition and the public. Let the good, bad and indifferent aspects of the agreement be discussed thread bare. Let the nation know what and when we contribute generously to the venture which of course will definitely be many times more than others. It will also be a long term investment in terms of peace and stability of the sub-continent. Even then, our contribution will be less than what the Govt. annually writes off without losing much sleep, 'a few thousand crores; be it the

stock scam, sugar scam, arms deal or our losses incurred by the eternal white elephants 'the banks and some of the PSUs'. Let the govt. not allow 'SAPTA' to be GATTED out by opposition.

Newspapers, magazines, should carry special features on SAARC, its members, the natural glory of nations, industrial progress, their beautiful children and above all the common man in his struggle to make a living. Let our TV wizards like News Week, News Track etc. go across the length and breadth of our neighbours and bring serials like "SAARC this Week". SAARC BIZ SHOW etc. Let there be a quiz, essay, debate competitions and discussions at college and school levels. Let people, of whom we are worried, be partners in the efforts to improve their life qualitatively.

Before concluding the 'proposals for peace', it is pertinent to say that the topic of "Joint Defence Pact" of SAARC nations, which should be the next natural step, has deliberately been omitted. It will not be viewed kindly by our neighbour China or the western nations, if two countries having nuclear potential come together. It should not be construed as the beginning of another cold war scenario.

THE ECONOMIC AND TRADE FRONT

The progress of the SAARC nations till 1993 has been confined to issuing statements and expressing satisfaction over progress of various committees, at best paper progress, and as Mr. PV Narasimha Rao, has observed, it only proved that "South Asians are known to be wordy people". However he has touched the core of the subject, of "real time progress", when he emphasised "our collective economic strength and weight as a mega market of billion consumers. History tells us that economic development in all its aspects, is among the best cures for socio-political ills. He did not mince words when he observed "the contents and range of cooperation within the region had been slower than we would have wished for. The reasons are the geo-demographic disparity amongst members and inhibitions born of problems inherited from the past. We cannot wish them away".

STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

Two major actions have been taken as the first right steps to capture the real objective of regional cooperation. One, the formation of SAARC CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (SCCI), and signing of the framework of SOUTH ASIAN PREFERENTIAL TRADING AGREEMENT, "SAPTA" at the seventh summit 1993. The spade work was done by the IGG on trade liberalisation. The members are expected to complete all formalities for making it operational including the finalisation of schedules of concessions

and rectification of it by Dec 95. However, no time limit has been set for signing the 'instrument for ratification'. It is an omission which may create problems. The SAPTA envisages the following (in general terms):

Measures to reduce tariff including tariff, non tariff barriers, initiation of direct trade measures in respect of long and medium contracts, state trading and buying agreements. The states may hold negotiations on the following:

- (a) Product by product negotiations.
- (b) Across the board tariff reductions.
- (c) Sectoral basis.
- (d) Direct trade measures.

Also safeguard measures under SAPTA would protect the interest of nations which are economically not strong. The trade concessions can be stopped by member countries suffering from injuries to their domestic industry or problems of balance of payment. They are to be given favourable treatment.

The creation of SAPTA has been welcomed in a cautious manner; Mr. Nawaz Shariff intones, "Trade and economic cooperation forms the bedrock for any organisation. SAARC has taken the first step". The Indian Prime-Minister said, "We are embarked on a programme of starting regional economic cooperation to build a "dynamic South Asian Community".

THE BOTTOM LINE

We should honestly and squarely face the implication of all the provisions of SAPTA, and concessions to nations especially those with economically weaker label. The bottom line is that, India placed strongly in all respects, "should accept to spend more and receive less in all trade dealings". An eminent Bangladeshi economist has suggested "that India should grant tariff concessions to Bangladesh. As in the case of Nepal, imports from Bangladesh should be duty free for a period of five years on a non reciprocal basis to help Bangladesh build an export base.

India's condition is summed up in a famous saying in Telegu which is popular in their business community with the import "what will you bring when you come to my house; what will you give me when I visit your home"?

WHAT SHOULD (AND WHAT CAN) INDIA DO?

We should realise that India is comparatively less poor amongst SAARC,

but is none the less very poor in the international context. Notwithstanding this, India has made dramatic strides in the field of trade and industry in the last 4-5 years with the liberalisation. We should be able to extend a helping hand both financially and technically with our expertise in various fields.

RATIFICATION AND ADOPTION OF SAPTA

Without delay India should move a Bill in Parliament for ratification of SAPTA instrument at the earliest. The government is notorious for sleeping over important bills and introduce them abruptly at the fag end; opposition parties should be taken into full confidence and the public made aware of the full and real implications both financially and economically so that no doubts are created in the minds of common man as it happened in the case of GATT. Opposition, if taken into confidence and consulted from the beginning, will be more than willing to cooperate, without extracting much political mileage.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON SAARC AFFAIRS

To prove we are earnest about SAARC and its development, a permanent Parliamentary committee on SAARC affairs should be constituted with members of all parties with either the speaker or the leader of the largest opposition party as chairman. Members, experts in specific fields from both the houses should be inducted in the committee. All SAARC affairs should be monitored by this committee and reported to Parliament. CAG and Attorney General (or equivalent) should be coopted to ensure proper accountability and proper channelisation of India's share of expenditure and all legal matters.

CABINET SUB COMMITTEE ON SAARC

A sub-committee with the PM as chairman, cabinet ministers of finance, foreign affairs, commerce, human resources, industries, telecommunications and information and broadcasting, with the leader of opposition (after all he enjoys status of a minister) should be formed to take all major decisions on India's involvement in major economic activities.

SUB COMMITTEE AT EACH MINISTRY

Each ministry should have a panel of experts to deal with "specifics" of their speciality and major project under the aegis of the respective ministries. They should also have "monitoring cells".

INDIA "SAARC" PROJECT FUND

India should create a "SAARC PROJECT FUND" to cater for the initial financial expenditure, specially earmarked in financial planning. Since any

investment in any major project, properly planned and executed, will generate a minimum return, India should involve private sectors and financial institutions as is being done with all MOUs with foreign multinationals. Investors should be assured of a reasonable return and aid to the country concerned for projects should be in the form of Grant in aid and long term "Soft loans" refundable over a period of 50 years.

SAARC STOCK EXCHANGE

India should also initiate concurrent action with others for the establishment of SAARC stock exchange on actual agreement, offering shares like we are doing to FII. Should some private enterprise go public at a later stage, it will be useful to coordinate. This will be major item under multilateral consultations and cooperation.

SAARC BANKING SYSTEM

This will be again on mutual agreement on multilateral basis. All funds of projects and transactions should be conducted through this banking system. It may also be used by ordinary citizens to remit money to friends families and other organisations in the normal course. Issue of SAARC credit cards by this bank will go a long way to build confidence among the business community.

CURRENCY 'EXCHANGE CONVERSIONS' MADE EASY

When all nations accept conversion of currency on the strength of US Dollar, it should not be a very difficult system of "Currency exchange". Under the aegis of the SAARC banking system, with statutory control resting with the Reserve Bank or its equivalent in other countries, the conversion should be at the prevailing exchange rates with a stipulated limit for individuals and business community. In this regard, all nations should ensure strict vigil to prevent bank scams and stock scams.

SAARC INDUSTRIAL FINANCING CORPORATION

This will facilitate funding of projects under private sectors, for participation of financial institutions and common citizen.

"SAARC" AID CONSORTIUM

There are many mega projects like harnessing the available usable gas reserves, generating hydro electric power potential, creating a "multinational water grid" for optimum utilisation of river water in this subcontinent, which

otherwise is wasted year after year leaving in its path devastation as in Assam and Bangladesh. However, these projects, finances, technical expertise and engineering resources are far beyond the capacity of SAARC nations. India with its experience in international financing should initiate steps in consultation with other interested members to approach industrially developed nations under the aegis of IMF and the World Bank, to constitute an AID CONSORTIUM for finance mobilisation for the mega projects. UN organisations and its expert bodies may be approached for feasibility studies.

SAARC "CONSULTANCY SERVICES"

Every field today is a specialisation and needs experts for functioning. It should be possible to open "SAARC consultancy services" to offer expert advice on many projects which can be undertaken based on the resources available and required. This can function as an expert body under the proposed ministerial sub committee or preferably as an autonomous agency.

SIMPLIFIED TRAVEL REGULATIONS

India should also initiate positive action to simplify travel regulations, issue of visa and passport to make travel of the common man easy and not a nightmare. There are certainly some grey areas - it may open the flood gates for refugees or intelligence agencies, drug traffickers, smugglers and so on. These things are happening even otherwise today unofficially. It should not be an excuse to make legitimate travel a difficult thing. This arrangement can be done on a bilateral basis to start with and can be extended to the entire region over a period.

CHARITY BEGINS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

It has already been brought out that except for noble sentiments and lofty ideals, nothing has been done to improve the trade either bilaterally or multilaterally. What is readily, and easily available and at lower cost in one country is required by others. Yet things are sold outside and bought from outside at a higher price.

India should earnestly set the ball in motion and explore the immediate possibility of importing her requirements from SAARC members on bilateral basis to begin with. Such items have already been identified earlier on. This will, to some extent, remove the disparities in the present export/import trade balances and bring in a measure of confidence and will find reciprocation.

It has already been mentioned that India will always be looked up to set

the trend and take the initiative. It will always be looked forward to make major concessions and accept minor returns. It may not be a great price to pay, if in the bargain peace and stability can be ushered in the region.

Before concluding this section, it must be confessed that being a non expert in any of the fields mentioned above, is a great advantage. One need not lose sleep over the political implications, constitutional ramifications, the technical refinements, feasibility and viability or all associated problems. The suggestions and steps have been made purely from common sense and common man's point of view with the hope that they may provide a start point and we can show to the other members in the 1995 summit, what we have done by "words and deeds" to build confidence.

These are also, at the the most, hypothetical postulates in a very basic and raw form. Lots of spade work, efforts by experts, technicians in all spheres of activities will be needed to give final shape at the earliest.

CULTURAL CONFLUENCE AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

Mass Movement. Whether politics and politicians fail to deliver the goods, it is the involvement of the masses that provides life saving oxygen. SAARC's survival also depends on the people's involvement in a big way, since it is meant for them. Kingdoms and monarchs may have perished but the fabric of human culture has not only withstood the 'rage of time' but also provided the foundation for the survival of human race. How can we bring the people together to work for a better tomorrow?

Cultural confluence. Culture is a beautiful mix of music, dance, fine arts, literature and festivals and traditions. The best way to understand the others is to bring all of them together in the 'cultural confluence'.

Cultural Exchanges. The SAARC nations should exchange cultural troupes at every level-schools, colleges, professionals, and academics. India should invite teams to perform not just in the capital but throughout the country during major festivals. Let the musicians, dancers, painters, writers from the tiny tots to the senior citizens visit us and meet the people - the real people, and break the mental blockades and political barriers.

Annual SAARC Festivals. Let India invite others to organise regular festivals of SAARC nations combined with regular trade fairs/national festivals.

SAARC Sports Games and Athletics Meet. Let us set the ball rolling by

organising the SAARC sport, games and athletic meet at schools, colleges and institutional levels-banks, railways, industries and the like. We may not break or create Olympic records but provide the ground for the "Olympic of Hearts"

'Kavi Sammelan. Let the poets and writers be invited to recite their work and regale the audience.

SAARC University. India should also establish a 'SAARC University' to provide the much needed educational base in all branches of technology, humanities, arts, and literature with intake from all the nations and our own also. Let them be the messengers of human understanding and goodwill.

'SAARC' SCOUT, NCC CAMPS AND TREKKING

Let us organise on a regular basis scout jamborees and NCC trekking camps during the vacation of schools and colleges. Let them live in harmony with nature and friends.

SPORTS AND ATHLETIC ACADEMIES

India can take the lead in running proper institutions and academies in some of the disciplines of sports and athletics and nurture the talents of budding champions.

SAARC 'PACKAGE' TOURS

India can also organise, under aegis of the private sector, package tours, for and of all the countries to all important places of historical and religious importance and natural beauty. Let the people absorb in their system the charm and grace of nature.

COMPETITIONS

Inter 'SAARC Nations' competitions for children and students of all age groups in TV/Radio quiz, painting, dramatics, essay writing and the like can be organised on a yearly basis.

WHEN TO MAKE A START?

In the earlier section, it has been suggested that 1995 should be declared as the 'year of peoples peace' offensive to involve the 'common man' at all levels. What time can be more suitable than the 'year of Peace' to launch the

cultural confluence and social interactions. It is not just by an accident that India is hosting the 1995 SAARC Summit. Let it not be just a formality, an annual ritual of "they came, met and dispersed". Let 95 SAARC summit be the culmination, the climax of all the activities and the 'Grand Finale' of human interaction - not the end by itself but the beginning of a concerted effort to put SAARC on a firmer and stronger foundation.

FUTURE OF SAARC AND ITS EFFECT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

'Will SAARC survive'? is political speculation, 'Can SAARC Survive' is hypothetical thinking. But SAARC 'must and should survive' is the need of the hour. If we cannot be G-7, we have made a beginning as P-7, the "poor seven". Poverty, certainly not of our making, is "NO SIN", but to accept it as a curse of destiny is a sure sign of defeatist/fatalist mentality. We can and should change this.

THE GREAT DIFFERENCE

The one positive and most significant difference between SAARC and other regional bodies is that SAARC did not take birth as a result of unholy liaison between two power blocks or opposing political systems nor, as a result of regional/military loyalties. It was conceived as a basic, inescapable, prerequisite for ensuring better living standards for millions of people for whom even living is a daily ordeal. It was a bold political experiment involving seven nations with different political systems (democracy, autocracy, democratic monarchy, military dictatorship), vast multitudes of millions belonging to different caste, creed, religion, speaking hundreds of languages, cultural background and divergent economics. It was an honest attempt at self improvement accepting the reality as start point. It was also a realisation that peace was not only a vital and important pre-requisite but also a philosophy and a way of life, which should be preserved at all costs. This important factor alone will prove to be the sheet anchor for the survival and success of SAARC.

PROOF BY PERFORMANCE

Sometime or other at a later stage of history, the present format and scope of SAARC will have to be enlarged to encompass the nations of the Southern Asian Region including the Asia Pacific Region. At present SAARC has not done anything spectacular to attract other nations to rush for becoming its members. They are better off, and certainly in no hurry. Their priorities are different. The only way is to 'prove by performance' and show positive results of improved living conditions, higher per capita income, better GDP/GNP, viable industrial infrastructure, better trade balances and a sound, strong eco-

conomic base. SAARC should prove its credentials of a viable entity as a progressive, positive and forward looking dynamic team of players brought together by choice, not by compulsions; SAARC should also usher peace with prosperity in this small region. It should prove what an association of small and big nations can achieve by cooperation and not confrontation. Till such time, let others wait and watch before joining SAARC with conviction and confidence.

CHAIN REACTION

The success of SAARC should initiate a chain reaction in the entire pacific region so that the centre of gravity of 'world political dynamics' shifts to the heart of Asia-the land of peace, prosperity and happiness. Let SAARC, on its own merit, command peace with dignity and equality for its progress.

CONCLUSION

The late President of Bangladesh, Zia-ur-Rehman compelled by the events of history, designed the basic though coarse 'homespun fabric of cooperation and coexistence at a mini level and scale and not the international scale or perception.

Further refinement and painting the future of a 'THIRD OF THE WORLD' population depends entirely on the skill, ingenuity, honest efforts, with an attitude of give and take and sacrifices on our part, so that we handover to the generation of the 21st century, something to build, develop, and live, in an "OASIS OF LOVE AND COMPASSION" as human beings.

Let us resolve not to squander this unique historical opportunity by sheer political short sightedness but use it sincerely and live up to the expectations of the future generations; and SAARC is an excellent start point.

Tragic Disintegration of Yugoslavia

VICE ADMIRAL S C CHOPRA, PVSM, AVSM, NM (RETD)

If there was another country as diverse as India, it has to be Yugoslavia. No other country matches our multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious character. Yet Yugoslavia's systematic break-up caused by internal and external forces, has attracted very little comment or analysis in our media. Currently, this beautiful country, a founder member and active participant of the non-aligned movement, has reached the terminal stages of a religious cancer and no one knows when or how peace will be brought to the warring factions of this tormented land. There is no Tito visible over the horizon and the future looks grim. For the past 36 months a vicious civil war has engulfed this land, with hundreds of thousands killed or missing and over two million rendered homeless in a systematic process of ethnic-cleansing, by all factions.

The credibility of the UN Peace Keeping forces and the mighty NATO alliance lies in ruins along the vast mountainous stretches of Yugoslavia. Not to be left out, the European Union (EU) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has also pitched in with arms and economic embargoes followed by hastily planned peace solutions to stop the on-going murderous civil war. These only helped fuel further defiance and violations of ceasefire commitments. Indeed the western media has coined a new name to describe the unrelenting aggression "as ceasefire violence".

A proper analysis of Yugoslav tragedy is not possible without a brief description of the history of this land, which lies in the Balkan peninsula; the soft but turbulent underbelly of Europe. The word balkanisation aptly brings out the almost continuous carving up of this area by powerful neighbours, right through the history. Marshal Tito, a charismatic leader and a personal friend of Nehru and Nasser, almost single-handedly snatched modern Yugoslavia from the clutches of Nazi Germany and ran it for 38 years as a progressive socialist state before his death in 1980. Despite its relative affluence, growing industrial base and economic stability the bells of discord were made to ring all over again. Many observers feel that there was a devious central European plot, led mostly by Germany and Austria, to dismantle Yugoslavia, in order to get even with the humiliations of the past. Certainly, there is enough evidence to suggest that this might be true, as will be seen later.

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HISTORY

Yugoslavia, literally the land of Southern Slavs was originally inhabited by Illyrians and Thracians from ancient Greece, before it came under Roman empire for almost 500 years from 3rd century BC. In the 5th and 6th century A.D., Slavs from north-east settled in large numbers. It is estimated that Slavs form the most numerous ethnic and linguistic body of people in Europe. Their language belongs to the Indo-European family. Whilst Southern Slavs form the modern day Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians, the Western group form Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Wends and the Eastern group settled in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Both the Eastern and Southern groups came under the influence of Eastern Orthodox Church and the Western Group along with Slovenes and Croats, adopted Roman Catholic Church, when Charlemagne briefly asserted his authority over Croatia in the 8th and 9th century. The Byzantine empire gave the Serbians the Orthodox Church, which became a symbol of their national consciousness where the Patriarch of the Church is selected from native stock.

In the 11th century A D Croatia was united with Hungary and subsequently came under the Austro-Hungarian empire from the 12th to 20th century. Serbia also regained its independence from Byzantine empire in the 12th century and Stefan Dusan, the greatest Serbian ruler was to strengthen its autonomous character till 1463 when once again it fell to the Ottomans, except for the mountainous region of Montenegro. Thus a third element was added to the religious Scenario in Yugoslavia. Since the Turks came via the Dalmatian coast, occupation of the central part took place before Serbia which was captured almost 60 years later. The seat of Turkish governor or Pasha was Banja Luka in Bosnia which was later shifted to Sarajevo leaving Serbs in Belgrade and Croats in Zagreb relatively immune from direct Turkish overlordship. In Bosnia the Slav nobility, in order to save their lands and power, converted to Islam as a class but continued to speak Serbian and did not adopt polygamy. For the next two and half centuries Bosnia became an important Ottoman outpost for waging constant warfare against the Austrian Hapsburgs and Venice. Not until the beginning of 20th century the Slavic people of Bosnia were able to emotionally rejoin their brethren in Serbia and Croatia¹.

20TH CENTURY

A dramatic series of events followed the First Balkan War. In 1912 Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece temporarily set aside their differences and attacked Turkey, achieving a resounding victory which took the rest of Europe by surprise. "After an illness lasting over 200 years, European Turkey, 'the

sick man of Europe', suddenly expired". A year later followed the Second Balkan war in which Serbia and Greece, protégés of Russia defeated Bulgaria the protégé of Austria. A year later on June 28, 1914 Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian empire was assassinated in Sarajevo, by a young Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip, which triggered off the First World War. Though Princip was an Austrian subject the assassination had been planned in Serbia by a Serbian terrorist organisation (The Union of Death) dedicated to the unification of South Slavs. Aided and abetted by Bismarck's Germany, Austria attacked Serbia in July 1914. The Triple Entente of Russia, France and Great Britain entered the War on behalf of Serbia against the Triple Alliance of Austro-Hungary, Germany and Ottomans. The Great War of 1914-18, a cataclysmic 'war to end all wars', was strangely destined to give birth to present day cohesive, pan-slavic Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. Alexander I, the Prince-regent tried valiantly to mould his kingdom into a composite, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation. He became the King on Aug 16, 1921 at the death of his father King Peter I of Serbia². From then on till 1990 Yugoslavia was to remain the largest country in the Balkan peninsula with a total area of 98,726 Sq Km and comprising six Republics of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia - Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and two autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia. Serbs formed 36% of population followed by Croats at 20% , Muslims at 9% Slovenes 8%, Albanians 8% Macedonians 6% Montenegrins 3% and the rest were Hungarians and Gypsies at 2% each. Centuries of constant warfare had totally drained the mental and physical faculties of Yugoslav population. The non-Serbian nationalities were both bewildered and hostile and nation building task proved to be extremely difficult. More than eighty per cent of the population were peasants who totally resented control by bureaucrats and middle classes which grew exponentially in the cities. Whilst Serbs were nationalists, the non-serbs by and large stood for autonomy and federation. Fired by the Russian revolution peasants and workers joined the Communist Party in large numbers and strongly opposed the Radicals and Democrats in Serbia and Croatia. The political situation was to remain near the boiling point right through the twenties until on January 6, 1929, Alexander I proclaimed the royal Dictatorship and took over personal command of all administration. He changed the official name of the country from Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to Yugoslavia and decreed that regional nationalism must give way to wider loyalty i.e. Yugoslav patriotism. Unfortunately, despite his idealism and genuine desire to weld the nation together, the dictatorship only increased the abuses of bureaucracy and police repression.

The abolition of all political parties with regional or religious flavour tended to cripple all political activity, bringing forth differences rather than commonality of purpose. The appeal of the Cross and the Crescent seemed

more popular than the Slavic ancestry and the growing strength of erstwhile powerful neighbours did not help matters. Traditionally the North-Western region consisting of Croats and Slovenes was more influenced by the Roman Catholic Church and Western traditions of reformation and renaissance; whilst eastern region, the erstwhile greater Serbia, by the Orthodox Church and Russian bolshevism. In the central region of Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims who had flourished under the Ottomans, became rich and economically stronger than their Serbian brothers. The three officially recognised languages consisted of Serbo-croatian, written in Cyrillic by Serbs and Latin by Croats, Macedonian and Slovene. Use of Arabic by Bosnian Muslims was usually confined to religious functions only. Literature of the country mainly conveyed the people's resistance against domination by outside powers. At one time or the other all the six republics forming Yugoslavia had to fight with overwhelming odds against neighbours and distant enemies. The folk songs, drama and literary traditions reflect these emotions with great pathos. While recognising dissimilarities of the current period they also emphasized the intrinsic togetherness of original Serbian ancestors. Love and marriage cutting across the religious barriers, multi-ethnic pretensions and universal patriotism became the predominant themes of all literary and educational works³.

Nation building tasks of Alexander I came to sudden grief when he alongwith French foreign minister Jean Louis Berthov was assassinated by a Macedonian terrorist in Marseilles in 1934. Prince Paul, a relatively weak person, was appointed regent on behalf of his young son Peter II. He was totally overwhelmed by the matters of state. Failing to realise the rapidly changing power equations in Europe with the galloping rise of Nazi Germany on the one side and Communist Russia on the other, he decided to follow a neutral path. Whilst the political pendulum swung from one extreme to the other, in a multi-faceted society made up, largely of peasants and working classes, the Russian revolution by far held the greater attraction. Thus his options for political manoeuvring were also limited.

Be that as it may, like in the First World War, Yugoslavia was to once again play a unique role in the Second World War too. By early 1941 Hitler's rampaging armies had systematically swallowed up Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and a fascist regime had been set up in 'Rumania' and the German High Command had been secretly ordered to prepare for the invasion of Russia by mid-May 1941. Hitler now demanded neutral Yugoslavia to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact with the three Axis powers. Italy in the meanwhile had completed the annexation of Albania and invaded Greece. Thus faced with hostile and victorious armies from the North-West and South, Regent Paul buckled in and signed the pact on March 25, 1941. Ink had hardly dried on this document when two days later he was overthrown in a coup led by Air Force officers,

who declared King Peter II of age and formed a new government under General Dusan Simovic. Hitler not to be cowed down by this blatant insult to the German Reich ordered the German High Command to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a nation. Eye-witness record that Hitler was seen to be in the wildest rages of his entire life. The German High Command which was at the time secretly moving up almost 150 divisions consisting of over 680,000 men under arms to their jump-off positions in Rumania for mid-May invasion of Russia-codenamed "Operation Barbarossa" - was completely taken by surprise by this mindless diversion. Try as they might, Hitler would not be persuaded otherwise and in the event "Yugoslavia operation, caused a vital delay of four to seven weeks in that German armies did not reach gates of Moscow before winter had got them in its grip". This turned out to be the greatest blunder committed by Third Reich and was eventually to cost Hitler the war; merely to vent his personal spite against Yugoslavia⁴.

Belgrade was literally razed to the ground on the night of April 6, 1941 by Luftwaffe, and another ten days of work by German armies, saw the total rout of Yugoslav army; a rag-tag force which was badly led and incompletely mobilised. The country was thereafter swiftly carved up between the victors. Germany and Italy divided Slovenia, put up a puppet regime in Croatia and placed Serbia under German military occupation. Italy took Dalmatia for itself, Kosovo and western Macedonia for Albania and set up a puppet regime in Montenegro. King Peter II with his entourage escaped to London via Egypt. Armed resistance began in Bosnia where the Croatian puppet regime called Ustashi, began massacre of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies so horrendous that it even surpassed the German savagery against Polish Jews. In Serbia a force led by Colonel Draza Mihailovic and directed by Government-in-exile started attacking German formations on regular basis. Whilst it tied up German reserves meant for "Barbarossa", the Chetniks as the force was called, steadily lost their popular appeal as they moved from revolt to collaboration due to excessive German reprisals against their families. Meanwhile, a more powerful and effective force, the Partisans, led by Tito, a communist by choice, Croat by birth and a leader par excellence emerged. So successful was their rebellion that by the end of war Tito led a full-fledged partisan army numbering 800,000 men and women. Stalin initially and Churchill grudgingly, provided whatever help they could to Tito, to ensure that a large part of German army, almost 25 divisions, was continuously kept engaged in Yugoslavia. The partisans were mostly of peasant stock and spread throughout the mountainous regions in one coordinate movement to do or die, against the German occupation forces. No other country in Europe can boast of, "So much with so little" against the all powerful German might. All inter-regional animosities were forgotten and partisans became the symbol of resistance to German armies throughout Europe. This is how Churchill described partisans in British parliament on Feb

22, 1944 "Led with great skill, organised on Guerrilla principle, the partisan were at once elusive and deadly. They were here, they were there, they were everywhere they inflicted great losses and toil upon the enemy. In Marshal Tito the partisan found an outstanding leader, glorious in their fight for freedom"⁵.

POST WORLD WAR II ERA

Marshal Tito, at the end of the war, put together the brand new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kasovo in the republic of Serbia. After a brief partnership with King Peter II at the behest of Allied Powers, Tito was nominated President for life and monarchy was abolished. He ran the country with his own special brand of communism, with a much more human content, than the Russian Bolsheviks.

His personal relationship with Stalin was never particularly warm and Yugoslavia was expelled from Comintern in 1948 for allowing various communist heresies to persist in his country. Later Bulganin and Krushchev tried to remedy the break-up, but old fraternal sentiments did not quite emerge. US aid, recognition by West Germany 'friendly trade relationships with the West, and active membership of the non-aligned group, permanently weaned Yugoslavia away from the Communist world, led by Comecon and Warsaw treaty organisation. So successful was Tito in rebuilding war-torn Yugoslavia, that his example as a relatively benign dictator was the byline for many speakers throughout the world. He maintained a particularly close relationship with India and was an elder statesman of the Non-aligned group after Nehru and Nasser.

After Tito's death in 1980 a rotating federal Presidency between the republics was put into effect. An elected representative of each republic held office as the Federal President, initially for 5 years, which was later reduced to one year. He also became the ex-officio President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the only political party permitted. Unfortunately, the honeymoon between various republics in the absence of a charismatic national figure did not last very long. The Albanians in the autonomous region of Kesovo were the first to revolt against the so-called second-hand treatment meted out to them. Next came the full scale orchestration of sub-nationalist movements in Slovenia and Croatia, who were encouraged to hold referendums in their republics to elicit public opinion on sovereignty and independent statehood by their erstwhile mentors in Austria, Germany and Italy, as a preliminary to recognition by the European Community. This despite the fact

that Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia in January 1991 had annulled the sovereignty clause of Slovenian assembly's resolution passed in July 1990. On January 25, 1991 Macedonian assembly also unanimously passed a resolution seeking sovereignty, right to self-determination and secession from Yugoslavia, if events came to that. Aided and abetted by neighbouring countries the sub-nationalist movements went into full gear by early 1991. When Croatian assembly took preliminary steps towards independence, their Serbian population immediately declared that they would stay with Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and formed what has now come to be known as Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina [SARK].

YUGOSLAVIA DISINTEGRATES

It has been claimed by some European nations that the sudden and dramatic turn of events in Yugoslavia was purely due to historical differences between various groups within Yugoslavia and traditional animosities born out of religion, race and culture, Serbians on the contrary claim that the more powerful industrialised neighbours particularly Austria and Germany were bent upon settling historical scores with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav national army (JNA), tried valiantly to prevent the break up of the nation and was forced to go into open confrontation with hastily raised militias after people voted for sovereign independent republics. Whilst the Serbian people in Krajina voted for reunion with Serbia and Montenegro, thereby setting the stage for open civil war. In June 1991 Slovenia announced its secession from Yugoslavia followed on the same day by Croatia and the country swiftly slid into civil war. The Croatian and Slovenian Presidents advised their ethnic soldiers to desert JNA and join up with local militias⁶.

As the civil war grew in intensity some members of European Community pitched in with the suggestion to reorganise Yugoslavia into a loose federal arrangement, guaranteeing unchanged internal and external borders, a single market, protection of human rights and those of national minorities with defence and foreign affairs going to federal capital and last but not the least associate membership of the EC. A trioka of Italy, Netherlands and Luxemburg was despatched to broker a ceasefire, which if broken would result in cut off of all aid and trade. Whilst this went on, Germany suddenly demanded recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. President Kohl went on record stating that "people of Europe had to be free to chose their own future". Austria moved its troops along the Slovenian border. US Secretary Baker visited Yugoslavia in June 1991 and declared that the US will not recognise Slovenia and Croatia but federal government must find ways to give vent to national aspirations of various elements within Yugoslavia in a peaceful manner. A month later US policy did a somersault by declaring that it would indeed recognise breakaway

republic's independence, if achieved peacefully. The US will also no longer support use of force to preserve a nation's integrity. Strange words indeed coming from a nation that itself fought a major civil war to preserve its own integrity, and currently supports Russian invasion of Chechnya⁷.

As the civil war in Croatia grew in bitterness and ferocity, EC placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met to agree to send an EC mission to supervise the fragile ceasefire brokered by the Trioka. By end September Krajinian Serbs had consolidated their hold on almost 1/3rd of Croatia and declared themselves as the independent Serbian Republic of Krajina consisting of Krajina and Slovenia. In the same month a peace conference under Lord Carrington assembled at the Hague to resolve outstanding issues between warring factions; as 200 EC monitors arrived in Zagreb to enforce ceasefire. Serbian President Milosvic, agreed to withdraw JNA from Croatia in the aftermath of UN Security Council resolution ordering complete arms embargo on Yugoslavia and cessation of hostilities. In October 1991 Gorbachev also brokered a ceasefire, which was broken even before the negotiators could return to Moscow.

In end October Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance visited Yugoslavia to recommend positioning of a UN Peace Keeping force, which Serbians refused to accept in areas held by them. UN advised Germany not to recognise Croatia and Slovenia, in a hurry; which it did anyway by mid-december 1991. European Union followed suit in January 1992 after its representative Ambassador, Badinter recommended the same. Macedonia and Bosnia were not recognised as they did not meet EU's criteria. Former's name was found to be objectionable to Greece whilst the latter presented an entirely different set of problems because of its extremely diverse ethnic groupings ie 40% Muslims 32% Serbs and 17% Croats.

UNITED NATIONS INTERVENES

First 50 of the United Nations Military Liaison Officers (UNMLO) arrived in Zagreb in January 1992, five of them dying within the week when their helicopter was shot down. In the same month Security Council passed Resolution 721 to send a peace-keeping force to Croatia with a mandate to supervise ceasefire and assist UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief through out Croatia, besides providing protection to its personnel in the war-torn areas. Initially a force consisting of 14,000 personnel, the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] under Lieut. General Satish Nambiar was raised. It started to arrive in Sarajevo in May 1992, amongst growing tension in the town generated by the declaration of independence by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite stiff opposition by Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

Although the UNPROFOR was meant to contain the conflict in Croatia, another civil-war of greater dimension had already cast its murderous shadow in Bosnia. President Izetbegovitch, of Bosnia-Herzegovina had held a referendum on February 28, 1992, to decide the future status of his republic, knowing full well that Bosnian Serbs and Croats will not go along with his desire for an independent state. In the event, 63% of the people are supposed to have participated in the referendum and 95% voted for an independent, sovereign Bosnian state; Serbs forming one third of the population had abstained. By March 3, 1992 Alija Izetbegovitch threw down the gauntlet at his fellow Serbs and declared Bosnia as an independent republic, even while the three community leaders were meeting to discuss an EU plan on division of Bosnia into three units with either absolute or relative majority in each municipality. Serbs and Croats had further made it reasonably clear that eventually they intended to rejoin their parent republics, whilst Muslims lined up solidly against any form of division on ethnic lines. Croats were the first to indulge in some of the bitterest communal fighting seen so far in the city of Mostar against Muslims. With the impending arrival of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo the Bosnian Serbs swiftly spread their control over most of Bosnia in a mad frenzy, killing, burning, sniping and raping in mindless anger and laid a siege on Sarajevo town itself. There is no doubt the JNA and Croatia militia helped their ethnic groups openly, inviting blistering criticism from the Islamic countries who demanded UN and EU to put pressure on Yugoslavia to halt attacks on Muslims immediately. Madame Chirac and Benazir Bhutto, prime ministers of Turkey and Pakistan even visited Bosnia to show their solidarity with the fellow Muslims. If the western media is to be believed a clandestine arms pipeline emerged soon after their visit, the UN embargo against arms supply notwithstanding. Almost within the month of declaration of independence, EU recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, unmindful of the bitter civil-war which had by now totally engulfed the region. Lord Carrington, heading the Peace conference on Yugoslavia was able to broker one of the many ceasefires and a guarantee that JNA will not interfere in the Bosnian affairs. Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, not to be left behind, had on March 28 declared the formation of the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, later to be renamed as the Republic of Srpska. The growing communal violence and the siege of Sarajevo made the task of UNPROFOR, whose primary task was to keep peace in neighbouring Croatia, very difficult. Within weeks of its arrival UN emissary Marrack Goulding recommended that UNPROFOR HQs move out of Sarajevo, a town some 20 kms. away. By June 1992 Security Council enlarged the mandate of UNPROFOR, directing it to take complete charge of Sarajevo airport and operate it for humanitarian relief. Meanwhile, Security Council also placed very comprehensive sanctions on FRY. It ordered severing of trade links, oil embargo, freezing of govt assets abroad, cut air-links and cancel participation in international sports meets.

By September 1992, UNPROFOR was formally asked to cover Bosnia-Herzegovina in addition to Croatia and a Bosnian Command with contingents from Denmark, Netherlands, Canada, France, Spain and UK was set up. Its commander, however, was to operate under the overall control of the Force Commander UNPROFOR. Bosnian command slowly but inevitably slid under NATO, whose member countries had provided major contingents (except that of France) and was required to enforce a "no-fly-zone" over Bosnia using NATO aircraft. This also enabled the USA to have a say in day-to-day Bosnian affairs without stationing a single soldier on the ground. US desire to dictate policy while refusing to commit forces on ground, had perforce invited much criticism from EU members, especially France and the UK, who refused to go along with the US perception that arms-embargo against Bosnia should be lifted to give them an opportunity to defend themselves against better armed Serbs. By May 22, UN General Assembly admitted the three new republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as full members, utterly unmindful of the tragic civil war that continued to blaze on, in at least two of them, with great ferocity, thus adding more fuel to the fire⁷.

YUGOSLAVIA IS EVERYONE'S GAME

Ever heard of the saying "Too many cooks spoil the broth". Strange as it may seem, the future prospects of Yugoslavia are currently being debated at six different world forums at the same time and not one of them fully agreeing with the other. The European Union and Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe were the original negotiators. They also established a Peace Conference under Lord Carrington at the Hague which later shifted to Geneva under the UN to produce a mutually acceptable peace plan. Meanwhile, the UN through its executive wing, the Security Council sent in UNMLO, followed by UNPROFOR, ordered total arms embargo and economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), established a no-fly-zone over Bosnia and 'Safe-Areas' at Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. A contact group consisting of USA, Russia, UK, Germany and France also emerged as a pressure group to deal with all problems on as required basis. Since the Bosnian Muslims are actively involved in the conflict even the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) were next, to get into the act, demanding lifting of arms embargo against Bosnia to enable Muslims to arm themselves against their fellow Serbs and Croats. And if that is not enough NATO is now fully engaged in maintaining the no-fly-zone and arms embargo⁸.

PEACE PLAN

All this while efforts to produce a suitable peace plan ambled along at Geneva - the one under Lord Carrington at the Hague having failed due to

rapid recognition accorded to the self-declared independent republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia - Herzegovina. Macedonia's recognition was delayed due to Greek objections, which was subsequently rectified by calling her the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. By August 13, 1992, even FRY recognised Slovenia and a permanent peace conference on Yugoslavia opened in Geneva. Lord Owen of EU and Cyrus Vance from UN became its Chairmen. It authorised UNPROFOR to use force for its own protection. By January 1993, they produced a peace plan in which Bosnia was to be divided into 10 Swiss type cantons with fair measure of autonomy, wherein a group of three will have a preponderance of each ethnic group, whilst Sarajevo would be demilitarised and declared an "open city". Serbs which by now held 70% of Bosnia were to get less than 50 percent of the land area. Complicated as it was, the plan was not rejected outright by all the three warring groups. US policy makers, however, rejected the plan as it rewarded ethnic cleansing, "A peace plan should be accepted by the parties and not imposed". Whilst Bosnian Serbs refused and none would sign the maps. Faced with a situation where no agreed peace plan was on the cards and fighting on the ground continued with relentless ferocity, Security Council on May 6, 1993, declared six areas as "Safe areas" which would be free from armed attack or any other hostile act. These were Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Goradze, Bihac and Srebrenica.

By June 1993 another peace plan recommending a three way division of Bosnia was produced which was broadly acceptable to Bosnian Muslims and Croats, but Serbs were against it as it did not give them an outlet to sea. The new plan produced by Owen and Stoltenberg, the latter having replaced Vance, steadily gained acceptance, as it gave Serbs almost 49% of the land areas. The plan further recommended the three constituent republics to remain within a demilitarised Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Foreign policy and foreign trade was to be handled by a rotating three member Presidency. All citizens were to have the right to settle anywhere. Serb leader Karadzic accepted the plan with only minor changes, whilst Bosnian Muslim President Izetbegovitch sought agreement on the maps. He felt that his....choices were limited "either to seek ending of civil war by talks or accept total defeat at the hands of the Serbs", due to complete ineffectiveness of UN forces to change the ground realities. He even sought moral support from Islamic countries who immediately offered a force of 17,000 troops made up of Turkish, Pakistani and Iranian elements to forcefully implement UN's safe areas plan which was not acceptable to EU. Meanwhile, US President offered to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia - a strange proposition, which faced extremely heavy weather in European capitals. They accused President Clinton of playing politics and not peace. France immediately threatened to pull out its contingent from Yugoslavia, whilst UK rejected US pro-

posal out of hand. Even though faced with the Bosnian demand "either defend us or arm us", US President somehow managed to stall lifting of arms embargo by six months. He next offered US troops (if approved by Congress) as part of NATO but not UN force, knowing full well that both were non-starters. And Republican leader Dole tells UN "to get off NATO's back and let them do the job properly". French foreign minister starts to wonder "what are we trying to wage - war or peace" whilst Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic warns "US risks another Vietnam by sending marines to Bosnia"... "We will survive, the way we have survived everything in the past, but are they ready for another Vietnam?"

All this, while-the-Peace Conference in Geneva fine-tuned its 3-way partition plan to meet objections on a town here and corridor there, raised by the 3 parties to the dispute. It even agreed to the proposition that constituent republics may remain together initially for two years only and thereafter would be free to exercise the option of joining Serbia or Croatia - something that Izetbegovitch had flatly refused to consider.

In view of renewed US interest in Bosnian conflict, France warned that they will be responsible for a major catastrophe if they did not put their weight behind European powers seeking an early settlement between the warring parties. Consequently, President Clinton agreed at NATO meeting in January 1994 not to push any unilateral programmes and provide more aircraft to enforce the safe areas plan. He, however, would not agree to enforcing a peace plan on aggrieved parties.

By March 1994, US successfully brokers an accord between Bosnian Muslims and croats on forming a federation with 8 Swiss type Cantons; 4 Muslim majority and 2 Croat majority making up 58% of land, knowing full well that Serbs would not budge beyond keeping 49% of area, considering they already held 70% of Bosnia anyway. Whilst Peace Conference in Geneva remains stalled on nitty-gritty the US initiatives only help dilute their efforts further⁹.

As the tragic pantomime was continually being played out in various Western forums, the situation on ground continued to remain fluid. Fighting in Bihac - a designated safe area- flared up in November 1994, when Bosnian Serbs, supported by their Krajinian brethren and Muslim army of renegade Muslim leader Firkat Abdic attacked the outskirts of the town, capturing the fortress overlooking the town and sent a shock wave through the elite 5th Corps of the Bosnian army; as well as forcing UNPROFOR to negotiate withdrawal of its troops from the besieged city. The Serbian counter-offensive had followed a successful attempt by the Bosnian army to capture more

territory, thus once again establishing their superiority over opposing factions. A chilling reminder for all, that Serbs may be down but not out. More so because the training and arming of the elite 5th Corps had been done by Pakistani and Turkish elements, with full backing of the United States.

PROGNOSIS

As the so-called Balkan civil war completes its 3rd winter with over 500,000 dead or missing and millions turned into refugees, after being displaced from their homes, no one really knows how to stop this carnage. The international community, especially the Western alliance are at cross-purposes. They have neither been able to produce a workable peace plan nor been willing to agree on the degree of force to be used for containing the conflict. Each pressure group within the Western alliance, be it the European Union or the NATO or the CSCE, have displayed a complete lack of understanding of ground situation. They initially encouraged break away of Slavenia and Croatia, and accorded them recognition in great haste, oblivious of the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina will follow suit and create complications they had never imagined. It now suits their purpose to blame the Serbs for all the misery that has befallen the hopeless Yugoslavia.

The question that needs to be asked over and over again is: do the Serbs have a right to self-determination? Apart from being the original settlers of the area they have large predominant pockets in all the republics that have been weaned away from former Yugoslavia. The deliberate internationalisation of an internal dispute had led the country into a chain of broken promises and empty threats. Arms embargo, economic sanctions, cut-off of all international aid, no-fly-zones, safe areas plan, partition of republics into self-ruled majority zones, have all been tried out but none seem to achieve their intended purpose. The U N Peace Keeping force along with humanitarian arms of UNHCR and International Red Cross, despite blistering criticism to the contrary, have somehow managed to function in this no-win environment with a degree of dignity which far surpasses the action of others. Whilst their mandates are ill-defined and constantly being changed, their chain of command is also tenuous and most of the times unworkable. Many famous names and professional soldiers have bitten dust in Yugoslavia. Many more might still- Brigadier Ridgeway the Commander of the British contingent sums up the situation with a prophetic warning - "There is no peace and no ceasefire, in former Yugoslavia- I foresee twenty years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina".

Whilst the Serbs in the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina (SARK) within Croatia, occupy one third of its territory; the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina occupy nearly two thirds of Bosnian territory under the self-

proclaimed Republic of Srpsaka. Croatia is happy playing ball with the USA and Europe, as it did with Hitler in World War II, and may still agree to settle with SARK provided other international players moved out of the field. But for Bosnia the new experience is an unusual one. A Muslim republic in Europe revives ghosts of Ottomans which neither the Serbs nor the Western neighbours are easily going to accept even if the 3-way partition plan becomes a reality. In fairness to President Izetbegovitch it must be stated that he started off with the intention of setting up a multi-ethnic, sovereign, independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only proud inheritor of former secular Yugoslavia until some of his Muslim ministers went in for deliberate Islamization. Alcohol was banned on grounds of security; TV newscaster started to greet viewers in Arabic before switching to Serbo-Croatian; a rewrite of school books was ordered and Arabic made the first foreign language before English. Little Muslim girls shed their miniskirts of yesterday and switched to head scarves. Mixed families in their thousands are planning to move out if not already done so, as their cry for fourth option beyond Serb, Croat and Muslim communities was snuffed out by the Minister of Culture and Education.

Bosnian society remains bewildered with the rapid pace of change in its social values, whilst the battlefield is locked in a bloody stalemate - "a future truly without choices". Branding Serb's or Croat's nationalists as the only aggressors hardly helps. An effective arms pipeline through Slovenia and Croatia already exists to help the Bosnian Muslims. Pakistan and Iran have emerged as major suppliers, and western intelligence agencies are fully aware of these goings on. It is difficult to say who alone is the aggressor and who the victim. Muslim led Bosnian government declared its independence in the teeth of opposition from its Serbs and Croation populations, and international recognition given in mad haste can hardly justify the bizarre series of events that followed.


The growing rivalry between the European powers and the United States is merely intensifying the conflict which is now being seen as a tussle between the UN and NATO. Having let the cat amongst the pigeons, Germany has decided to relatively stand aloof to watch the growing rivalry between France and the UK on one side and the US on the other. French have repeatedly reminded US President that without committing troops on ground the Republican moves in US Congress to free NATO aircraft for completing the unfinished tasks in Bosnia are not only fraught with danger but will eventually lead to a major catastrophe. They obviously understand Serbs better than anyone else. French view is that air strikes and close air support missions must be undertaken at the request of UNPROFOR, and NATO has no independent role to play in this conflict. Similarly they are the most vocal opponents of lifting arms embargo on Bosnia.

Although it is extremely difficult to predict what the future holds for the former state of Yugoslavia, one lesson is that international intervention clearly has not helped resolve historical animosities between ethnic communities specially when they have acquired different religious persuasions along the way. Somehow these have to be dealt with at bilateral forums. The thin line that existed between ethnic and religious groupings is now totally being blurred by fundamentalism. The Patriarch of Serbian Church and Primate of Roman Catholic Church of Croatia did well in appealing for peace to their followers. Ultimately it is the spirit of accommodation between the Cross and the Crescent which is likely to throw up a solution for Bosnian problem not hastily drawn lines on the map. The so-called ethnic-cleansing in Bosnia is clearly synonymous with religious cleansing.

Finally, a word about UN peace-keepers. They have come under criticism from not only President Izetbegovitch for failing to restore his lost territories but strangely have become special bete noire of the American media and the Republican leadership. Bob Dole has been particularly harsh in his language; he is convinced that reprisals against Serbs will work and UN should get off NATO's back and let it finish the job¹⁰. Dole can be excused for being short on Serbian history but what about the media and the State Department. What's more surprising is the growing commonality of views between the USA and Germany on how to deal with Serbs, despite warnings to the contrary by London and Paris. Even Adm Leighton Smith, USN, Commander-in-Chief, NATO Allied Forces, Southern Europe, has been very outspoken about Republican moves in the US Congress to unilaterally lift arms embargo against the Muslim-led government in Bosnia and make NATO the big brother in Bosnian peace-keeping operations¹¹. The point that is being made to US policy makers is that without a single soldier on ground in Bosnia they were in no position to dictate policy on ground. Air Power a la Desert Storm is a poor substitute for bad weather and mountainous terrain of Bosnia, but the saber rattling in Washington goes on. The chinks in Western Alliance are wide open and they would be lucky to get out of this mess with any degree of respectability. The latest in carrot and stick approach by President Clinton is the offer to remove all sanctions against Serbia provided they recognise Bosnia. He obviously forgot to mention which part of Bosnia, the 70% under Serb control or the 30% under Muslim control. Taking a cue from the prevailing mess, even Croatia has demanded removal of UNPROFOR after its current mandate finishes in March, 1995. Since SARK is not about to disband itself, they must have worked out their future strategy; only time shall tell. It is clear, however, that the civil war in former Yugoslavia is not about to end in a hurry.

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Map - 1 : Yugoslavia - Population



Map - 2 : Areas Under Serbian Control

Pluralism and the Resurgence of Ethnic Identity in the Contemporary World - the Balkans with Particular Reference to Former Yugoslavia

LT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

At the outset, allow me to say how privileged I consider myself to be in such a distinguished company. I am not a historian, nor do I lay claim to being a scholar. However, in my capacity as the Force Commander and Head of Mission of the United Nations Protection Force in former Yugoslavia, I had the unique opportunity of being closely associated with the developments in the Balkans for a period of one year from March 1992 to March 1993, and of interacting with the leadership and people of the region, as also with UN and European Community negotiators, and senior representatives from troop contributing countries. It was an unforgettable experience in many ways, and I hope to share that with you this morning in the context of the subject under discussion, by submitting to you certain observations on the developments I was witness to; many of these would be relevant in our own context, and may therefore, merit greater in-depth analysis.

At every set of talks or negotiations, we were engaged in with the parties to the conflict, we were invariably treated to fairly lengthy history lessons. The animosities, suspicions and hatred generated in the Region have their roots in history. For many centuries, the Balkan region had been considered an object of spoils among the then imperial powers. Among the many reasons for this, was the fact that the Balkan people often clashed among themselves over religious and national differences. Though the Balkan people were all Slavs in culture and Christian in religion, jealousies and quarrels arose among them on account of their different nationalities - Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Rumanians and so on - due to the separation of small national groups from their homelands - Rumanians in Bulgaria, Albanians in Greece and Serbia, and so on.

In so far as former Yugoslavia was concerned, most of its peoples were subjects of foreign empires, and many of their lands were the scenes of constant warfare. The Croats spent almost two centuries under the despotic and

Text of a paper presented by Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, a former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff and former Commander of UN Forces in former Yugoslavia, at the Round Table Discussions organised by the KPS Menon Memorial Society on October 23, 1994.

barbaric rule of the Ottoman Turks; then from 1699 to 1918, Croatia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, run from Budapest. The various tribes of Orthodox Serbs were loosely united by the end of the 13th Century, forming an Empire which was, however, beset by endemic dynastic conflict, and territorial disruption, as the fortunes of war ebbed and flowed. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389, snuffed out Serbian independence, and for the following four centuries, the Serbs endured brutalising Turkish rule. However, by 1830, Serbia had wrested autonomy from Turks, and by 1878, independence. A series of wars, mostly successful, had by 1914 enlarged the country to include Kosovo, the country's spiritual home - its Jerusalem - and much of Macedonia. In the First World War, the Serbs, after some initial defensive victories, were overrun by the Central powers in 1915; Serbian military casualties were proportionately the highest of all combatants in that war - with 57 dead per thousand of population and 371 dead per thousand mobilised (the comparative figures for Britain were 16 and 125 respectively).

Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided as early as the 10th century between the Catholic West and the Orthodox East. Most of the area was part of the unstable Serbian Empire until it too was occupied by the Turks. Turkish occupation changed the religious map of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the conversion to Islam of many local Slav inhabitants. In 1878, the province, along with the Sandjak region, was given to Austria - Hungary, thus robbing Serbia of part of what the Serbs regard as their homeland. Thus the people of Bosnia - Herzegovina never enjoyed even an autonomous existence.

Settled by Slavic tribes since the 7th century, Macedonia became part of the Bulgarian Empire in the early 13th, then part of the Serbian Empire towards the end of that century. The area was seized by the Turks even before Kosovo, and mis-ruled by them for five and a half centuries. Russia awarded Macedonia to Bulgaria in 1878, on ostensibly strong ethnic grounds, but the other powers forced its return to Turkey. The Balkan Wars of 1912 - 1913 led to its liberation, but also to partition between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Macedonia therefore was another region without its own history and traditions, or even identity.

In 1918, a voluntary union, the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created. This comprised restored Montenegro and pre-war Serbia, (enlarged by the acquisition of Vojvodina from Hungary, and some bits of Macedonia from Bulgaria), and, from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sandjak. This came about because the southern Slavs continued to be acutely apprehensive about their political survival. They feared their re-subjugation by the major European imperial powers. This united Kingdom was renamed, in 1929, as Yugoslavia, meaning the land of the Southern Slavs.

In 1941, a German Blitzkrieg overran the country, and Yugoslavia was partitioned. Germany and Italy annexed or occupied and administered large areas; Vojvodina reverted to Hungary, most of Macedonia was awarded to Bulgaria, and the large puppet state of Croatia was created. There followed a war against the German, Italian and Bulgarian occupiers, combined with a civil war between Croat Ustashe and Muslim supporters of the Axis on the one side, Tito's communist dominated partisans on another, and Serbian monarchist nationalists (Chetniks) in the middle. This was a struggle (centred in Bosnia - Herzegovina) of a viciousness hardly paralleled, even in the Soviet Union, in which about 1.8 million Yugoslavs died. (10.9 per cent of the population). Over half of these deaths, including about 500,000 Serbs massacred by the Croatian Ustashe and their supporters during "ethnic cleansing" in Croatia, were the result of the civil war. One can therefore imagine the scare that still exist.

Aided by the collapse of German power elsewhere, the partisans under Tito, emerged victorious over the Axis, the Ustashe regime and the monarchists. Tito then set about creating a Yugoslavia in which bourgeois nationalism would be eliminated in favour of a socialist unity of the Yugoslav peoples, all of whom would be treated as equals. The country was divided into six federal republics-Serbia (including the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo), Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. These were purely administrative divisions, and did not (indeed could never) reflect the boundaries of Yugoslavia's heterogeneous ethnic groups. Each republic, except Slovenia, contained substantial minorities.

The 1981 Census showed that in the Republic of Serbia, which was divided into three administrative units - Serbia proper had 85 per cent Serbs, the autonomous region of Vojvodina had 55 per cent Serbs and 20 per cent Hungarians, and the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija had 75 per cent ethnic Albanians and 12.5 per cent Serbs. Croatia had 76 per cent Croats and a substantial Serb minority of 11 per cent. Montenegro had 20 per cent Muslim, 10 per cent Albanians and 67 per cent Montenegrins. Macedonia had 20 per cent ethnic Albanians and 4.5 per cent Turks against a Macedonian population of 65 per cent. The Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina contained a mix of about 39 per cent Muslims, 32 per cent Serbs and 19.5 per cent Croats.

In this historical background and ethnic diversity lay the recipe for the disintegration of Yugoslavia following Tito's death, almost concurrently with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the emergence of nationalism. There are other contributory factors as well, like the economic disparities between the republics, and the perceived diversion of resources from the affluent ones to the ones not so well off, the predominance

of Serbs in the central bureaucracy and the senior levels of the Armed Forces, and not least because of the impetus given to separatism (in the name of self-determination) by powerful European neighbours.

While the leadership of the republics of the former Yugoslavia must bear the responsibility for their break-up, the role of the international community, particularly the European Community and the USA, cannot easily be condoned. The European Community accorded recognition to Croatia and Bosnia - Herzegovina against the recommendations of the Badinter Commission, which the Community had itself set up to determine whether these republics fulfilled certain basic constitutional requirements to merit such recognition. Any number of theories can be advanced in this context. The Serb view is that it is a devious plot by the Germans and Austrians, with the support of some others to cut Yugoslavia to size, and subjugate the region - initially economically, and, in due course, politically. Another is that the reactions of the European Community and the USA were based more on naivete. What is more likely, though only time will tell, is that it was all a series of miscalculations by the Community and the USA, who blundered from one irresponsible decision to another, and finally reached a point of no return where they had to back the process of self-determination.

In so far as the tragedy of Bosnia - Herzegovina is concerned, I can best summarise developments by quoting what Henry Kissinger had stated in the *Washington Post* in mid - May 1993 - "It is important to understand that Bosnia has never been a nation. There is no Bosnia ethnic group or specifically Bosnia cultural identity. Located at the intersection of the Muslim, Greek Orthodox and Catholic religions, and at the dividing line between the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires, Bosnia - Herzegovina had been the no - man's land where nationalities displaced by endless wars were thrown together. Serbs, Croats and Muslims (who are descendants of Slavic Christians converted to Islam during Turkish rule, and are, therefore considered turncoats by the other ethnic groups), have managed to co - exist only under alien rule. The most irresponsible mistake of the current Bosnia tragedy was international recognition of a Bosnia state governed by Muslims". He goes on to state, "But where Croatia and Slovenia had their own identity, Bosnia was a Yugoslavia in microcosm. It is a mystery why anyone could think that Croats and Serbs, unwilling to stay together in the larger Yugoslavia, could be induced to create a joint state in Bosnia - Herzegovina, together with Muslims they had hated for centuries".

Unfortunately, the lesson of Yugoslavia is that of self - determination taken to an extreme. Slovenia and Croatia sought and attained violent separation from a perceived Serb dominated Yugoslavia on this principle. The same

theme is now being used by the Serbs in Croatia, and the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia - Herzegovina, for their recognition as independent entities. It is not inconceivable that the Albanian Muslims living in Kosovo and Macedonia, and the Hungarians living in Vojvodina, would seek similar self - determination, leading no doubt to further bloodshed. Against this backdrop, what the Secretary General of the United Nations has to say in his paper on *An Agenda for Peace* is significant:- "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, has passed; it was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world. Commerce, communications and environmental matters transcend administrative borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the first order of their economic, political and social lives. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve".

Notwithstanding present trends, if the conflict in former Yugoslavia can be contained or managed, it is not inconceivable that, given the interdependence of their respective economies, the diverse republics may, in due course, find it expedient to arrive at some sort of confederal arrangement in order to survive. This does not appear to be on the horizon; in fact, things may get a lot worse before they get better. But the international community would do well to work towards such an arrangement.

To quote the Secretary General again, "The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self - determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial; in communities, within States and within the community of States. Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all".

In so far as our country is concerned, if we are to manage this with any degree of credibility, we must shed the arrogance of any one group against others, rid ourselves of the hypocrisy that appears to govern our body politic at this juncture, and prevent the exploitation of religion towards political ends. On the economic front, which in fact, is probably the most important aspect, a great deal has been done, and is being done; that in itself should go a long way in neutralizing the divisive trends induced by ethnicity and sub-nationalism. We must build on it with greater enthusiasm.

Forward to Basics

MAJOR GENERAL CHAND N DAS (RETD)

The heading of this article would appear strange as normally it is 'Back to Basics'. It is not only the heading but the article would also appear strange as to make progress one goes forward but we must have a sound foundation of basics to make progress. Due to several commitments and service conditions, emphasis appears to have shifted from basic to advanced training which can result into dangerous situations. It has, therefore, become vital that basics are redefined to go forward.

LEADERSHIP

An officer leads his men in war by taking them along to endure hardship, face dangers and by displaying qualities of fortitude that are, perhaps, beyond comprehension of an average man. He inspires them when they are physically exhausted, mentally irresponsible and are in great danger. Only a person with positive qualities of leadership, with the mental robustness and physical stamina that goes with it, can function under such conditions. As a leader he overcomes all difficulties; and operations and battles are nothing but series of difficulties to be overcome. There is no doubt that there are certain qualities that are essential elements of success, both in peace and war. It is, therefore, vital that the basic qualities of a leader are restored.

Essential qualities for successful leadership are character, professional knowledge, the ability to make well considered decisions, discipline, humanity and courage.

Of all the components of leadership, the most important is the quality of character. Leadership is really the unconscious expression of the character and personality of a leader. Character is made up by integrity, humanity, selfless concern for others. But the most important of these is really integrity.

After character, knowledge of profession is most important as it builds confidence and decisiveness. An officer is thus encouraged to be bold and decisive in action. As thorough knowledge of the profession is essential, he acquires it by study and application. He has to have confidence in himself and in his seniors and the juniors he commands. Confidence comes from

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knowledge based on studies, training and practice in successfully handling of men. This requires study of human nature, development of human relationships and concern for men under his command. An officer can get his subordinates to carry out orders through fear, but under such conditions the men will never give their all to a commander. A real leader is loved by his men because they know that their leader has sound professional knowledge and love and consideration for them. Full credit is given by a leader to his subordinate, playing down his own role. No leader can do everything by himself, he has to delegate his tremendous workload to others to succeed and survive.

Taking decisions is a part of leadership. An officer has to have moral courage and strength of character to make decisions and for his judgement to be right. His mistakes will be counted in unnecessary deaths and destruction and this is a responsibility that no sane person can take lightly. It should also be remembered that mistakes in promotion of officers are paid by the lives of men.

For discipline, an officer sets a personal example for others to emulate. He cannot expect his men to do something which he ignores or avoids himself. He cannot possibly expect his men do something which he cannot do himself and do it better.

Courage is a quality which an officer has to show by personal example. He leads his men and urges them to fight on regardless of difficulties and fully appreciates the qualities of endurance and fortitude in face of danger.

MORAL VALUES

These days it is quite a common practice among a great number of officers to talk about deterioration in moral values and blame every one else and conveniently forget the fact that they themselves may have been, even inadvertently, a party to it. They seem to forget that as officers, they have to give a lead. Needless to say that those who value moral value no explanation is necessary and those who do not, no explanation is possible.

TRAINING

In the recent years the main aim of training in the army has been almost exclusively the building up of a division as a complete combat formation ready for immediate service. This policy is being pursued with intensity and justified on the possible threat. As a result there has not been sufficient time for individual training of the officer and soldier.

In view of the terrain in which the army is likely to operate, tactical developments and induction of weapons of mass destruction, the main emphasis in training should shift from the larger to a smaller formation and unit groups. It will not only reduce strain on finances but will produce a more efficient army.

The old system in which the rifleman is only a rifleman and an officer or a non-commissioned officer performs only his own particular job needs to be changed. It is considered that it would be better to train all troops in order to produce an army of capable leaders, so that, should a crisis arise, each individual soldier would be able to occupy a position as leader when the army is mobilised after it is reduced in size due to financial constraints. In any case the troops will be better trained and ready at all times to go into combat, the young officer as company commander, the JCO as platoon commander, the NCO as section leader and rifleman as an efficient soldier. Organisation and training will have to work hand in hand in order to comply with the two requirements. This could be improved with the experience gained. Training must, however, be as realistic of battle condition as possible and not be too theoretical.

The potential of armour and air have not been fully appreciated. In addition to the armoured formations which should have the mechanised infantry as its integral part, the infantry formation should have adequate armour and anti tank weapon as its integral part. Armour and infantry both require each others' support for fast movement and quick deployment. In addition deployment of helicopters not only for observation but also for quick fire support has become necessary.

It must be appreciated that a body of capable leaders can be created only by highly qualified and experienced officers. Special attention should be directed to careful training of officers and potential officers. In view of the rapid developments in technology every officer should have technical training in addition to tactical training. Training of all officers should be intensified by frequent exercises without troops, map exercises, tactical walks and instructions on the aim and methods of training followed by courses at schools of instructions.

The general officers are the elite of the officers Corps of the Army. As senior general officers have gained considerable experience during wars and command appointments their further training could be left to themselves. Constant contact with each other will give them opportunities to express, discuss and digest military matters. Other means of instructions could be through observation of foreign armies manouvres, military reports and publications and through study of operations and lessons learnt from them.

Special TEWTS should be conducted by a group of senior officers including some retired officers of experience for all field formations and unit commanders and their HQ Staff to assess battle readiness and battle worthiness.

DISCIPLINE

Young soldiers are apt to think that smartness, whether in dress, appearance or movement, is merely a fetish on the part of an officer and there is no denying that there are times when these may be carried to excess. But from time immemorial in the history of war, it has been found that the best disciplined regiments always fight better than other, endure hardship better and hold together in the face of incredible difficulties.

The soldiers who suffer least and who have fewest casualties from the cold or heat are the men of a unit who are the elite of the army accustomed to obeying orders without question. Badly behaved units quarrel over minor issues, such as meagre food supplies, which could be shared out equally among the battalions so that every man gets a fair share of rations. When an ill-disciplined unit struggles hopelessly over the snow covered mountains and men drop out unheeded due to exhaustion, the disciplined units keep together and encourage the weaker comrades to somehow better remain in the ranks.

The whole idea of discipline is to accustom the men to obey orders automatically so that deafened by the roar of battle, weary, hungry and thirsty, they will still do their duty and carry out orders cheerfully. Mere enthusiasm may survive the rigours of battle and hardship, discipline and pride in one's regiment will more than perform miracles.

Take saluting for example. A man who is slack in noticing an officer or an officer who is slack in returning a salute is very likely to be slack in more important things on the battle field for he is obviously unobservant. The good soldier is always on the look out for a senior who is entitled to a salute and the senior, however busy his mind may be on other things, must always be watchful that the salute of a soldier is properly acknowledged. That makes for an alert mind.

Commanders, whose cars bear the formation flags have been known to stop their cars and demanded to know why a soldier failed to notice the flag which marks the commander's car. This was not a mere piece of officiousness or snobbishness, as some thoughtless people assume, but because the commanders know that the soldier who does not take the trouble to notice the little flag which distinguishes that car from others will be equally unobservant on the field of battle. All this makes for mental alertness.

The same thing applies to personal appearance. The slackly dressed soldier is generally slack in other ways - ways that make all the difference between life and death. In the last world war many commanders, in fact most, insisted on their men shaving in the trenches every day. It was sound psychology, because a freshly shaven man feels better than the fellow with stubble on his chin. How often one sees officers and men walking out without a head dress. They carry it rolled up in their hands or in their pockets as if they were ashamed to wear it. They seem to have no pride of their unit.

You can tell an elite unit a mile off by the way the men march. There is something magical in them, because that shows they have the strictest discipline in the army and are proud of it. It may seem hard at first to the young recruit, but if he is made to realize that in the long run good discipline saves lives and wins battles, he will cheerfully play his part; to a good soldier there is nothing irk-some in obeying orders swiftly and unhesitatingly. There was a practice that before a soldier went out of unit lines, he was duly inspected by the non commissioned officer of the day and men took pride in their turn out when moving out.

When people talk about the soldier obeying orders blindly they imply that it is all wrong. It is impossible for a soldier to be told the whole motive and aim behind every operation; he can be told only the part he personally is to play and it is essential that if the operation is to succeed he shall obey without question.

During training human relationship and confidence in officers and men has to be built to ensure prompt action by the men. These things should be carefully explained to a newcomer to the unit at the very outset, explained with good humour to avoid any misunderstanding, and it will ensure cheerful obedience. Even the drill that seems so dull and meaningless to the recruit has its functions.

Let no soldier ever forget that discipline is based on tradition - and it is tradition which always has carried and ever will carry every one of the glorious units of the Indian Army through the most dangerous and difficult times to victory. It is, therefore, essential that if we have to make progress we must concentrate on the basics.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Dear Sir,

DEFENCE R & D

I refer to Major General Partap Narain's letter to the Editor, USI Journal titled "DEFENCE R & D" p. 379, USI Journal, July-Sept 1994, and venture to offer some clarifications.

The liquid propellant missiles of our IGMDP (missile programme) do indeed use high density, packaged storable fuels as does the 'Lance' which you referred to. Our liquid propellant missiles have an edge over the 'Lance' because our fuel has a higher density impulse, and the missiles can be easily defuelled by the User, unlike 'Lance' which has to be sent back to the factory after operations, if the weapon is not used. Once filled, our storable liquid propellant missiles can be kept in stored condition for several years, but in the Indian context such a requirement may not arise at all. But this capability is available.

Solid propellant missiles are ROAD MOBILE, and are not FIELD MOBILE. Solid fuel tactical SSM's were designed for use in the NATO context, because excellent road networks exist all over Europe. Solid propellant missiles cannot be used in adverse field conditions, because transportation bump and shock loads tend to lead to internal and surface cracks in the large solid fuel blocks. Detection of such cracks in the field is impossible and ignition of cracked solid fuel blocks lead to explosion.

Packaged liquid propellant rockets are field mobile under all conditions. The technology to fill propellants very quickly in the field is indeed a *force-multiplier*, because empty tactical SSM's weigh less than 25% of the filled missile, thus greatly enhancing field mobility needed for surprise attack. Witness the Gulf War, when the entire U.S. and Israeli Air Forces, with satellite surveillance, were unable to seek and destroy even a single Iraqi battlefield SSM, which were liquid fuelled and thus gave them an enormous operational flexibility.

Most important of all, the total impulse of liquid propellant missiles

(i.e. the product of its thrust multiplied by time of burning) is programmable i.e. its thrust can be precisely terminated at any instant as "desired" by the guidance and control system. The thrust vector of the liquid propellant engine can also be "gunballed" i.e. swivelled. These two technological features viz total impulse programming and thrust vector control give the liquid propellant missile an extremely high terminal impact accuracy at both minimum and maximum ranges, which is vital to accomplish the mission when conventional (high explosive) warheads are used. Needless to say, these technical features are not possible with solid propellant rockets currently. Use of nuclear warheads has been advocated by advanced countries as a substitute for impact accuracy. Lastly, in terms of cost, it is true that the motor of a liquid propellant missile is costlier than a solid rocket motor. But, the cost of a solid propellant block is much higher than liquid propellant. Hence the sum total of propulsion system cost i.e. cost of motor + propellant is almost exactly the same. Marginal differences do not matter, because the propulsion system cost is a small fraction of the overall missile system cost.

In view of the reasons given above the choice of liquid propellant for IGMDP SSM's was perhaps the optimum one, given the circumstances. Even if thrust vector control and thrust termination features are made available for solid rocket motors, this would steeply increase manufacturing complexity and the cost; and still leave unaddressed the basic problems of lower mobility coupled to the tendency for crack propagation in large solid propellant blocks due to shock loads during field transportation.

With these clarifications, I trust you are satisfied that given these relevant technical and tactical conditions, choice of liquid propellants for battlefield SSM's in India's context was indeed the optimum one. For the future, in my opinion, the mobile battlefield cruise missile with terrain hugging navigation, guidance and control systems would be best suited for the Armed Forces. Such a missile would be powered by a liquid fuel *ramjet* engine, a natural evolution from technological and industrial capabilities set up for liquid propellant missiles. Of course, the rest of the world won't like this also.

D (10)-53, Vayupuri,

Air Force Officers Co-op. Housing Society
Secunderabad-500 594

January 2, 1995

Yours sincerely

Air Cmde, R. Gopalswami,
AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Former C & MD Bharat Dynamics Ltd

II

Dear Sir,

DEFENCE R&D

This is regarding Maj Gen Partap Narains's comments, in the July-September 1994 issue of the journal, on my article entitled "India's Defence Industrialisation: An Overview of Some Aspects," published in the April-June issue.

I was away till late December and have seen letters, on my article, only after my return to India. I am indeed happy to note that all the letters, all addressed to me directly except the one by Gen Narain, which was addressed to you, have regarded my article as 'excellent'. May I thank Maj Gen Partap Narain - and others who wrote to me - for their comments.

As regards the three points the General has mentioned, may I say that what I have stated in the article are all correct. Apart from the sources quoted by me, namely Reference No 6 on the current British organisation, one could check with other sources, eg the HMSO publication (available in the British Library here etc) on MOD organisation etc, and see the correct position. In my case, since I had recently given an invited lecture at the RUSI (London) and met a few officers of the UK MOD's PE after my lecture on 21 Nov 1994, I am aware that sources quoted by me have given correct information. This covers the General's third point. As regards his first and second points, I agree with him : I had not stated that TDEs were not manned, also, by military officers, many of them were. The point to remember is that the TDEs then, like the OPs, were 'civilian' set-up, with many posts filled by suitably qualified and experienced military officers, under the British C-in-C of the Indian Army. Some TDEs, eg for metallurgy and explosives and allied sciences, were mostly headed by civilian scientists, both in the UK and in India, and for understandable reason.

With best wishes

I-1688, Chittaranjan Park,
New Delhi - 110 019
January 22, 1995

Yours sincerely

Air Vice Marshal Samir, K. Sen

Review Article 1

Wars in Afghanistan

BHARAT KARNAD

Colonel Edgar O'Ballance, lately of the British Indian Army, has proven himself a diligent chronicler of small wars. Since the early 1950s, he has written about all manner of conflicts, from Yemen to the Algerian insurrection, from the several wars in West Asia to the Sudan. Curiously, he has never, until now, tackled the numerous affrays on the subcontinent.

In this book, he deals in the main with the Soviet-mujahideen war in Afghanistan, which lasted some nine years and ended in much the same way as the colonial British incursions into that country had done in the 19th century: the foreign power, desperate to cut its losses, proclaiming victory and getting the hell out!

The Soviet imbroglio further proved that alone among the South Asian nations, the Afghans, because of their high level of motivation and intrepid fighting qualities, have remained unconquered and are apparently unconquerable. And that, it is precisely these qualities of uncompromising hostility towards an adversary that prevents the various armed factions within the country from ending the ongoing civil war.

The title promises a substantive post-mortem of the Anglo-Afghan wars in the last century, but the first 70 pages of the 240-page book dealing with this subject make no pretence at delivering on these promises.

It is a sketchy reprise of events, a warmed over chapter of colonial history, with the spotlight firmly on the British commanders involved in the Anglo-Afghan wars, rather than on the mostly "native" soldiery of the Bengal and Bombay Armies who did the hard fighting against the tribal levies and irregular forces.

Indeed, what passing reference is made to the Indian troops is derogatory, as in the author's typically truncated version of the eventually successful Battle of Ghazni (23 July 1839) in the First Anglo-Afghan War, where he refers to some of the sepoys of the "Army of the Indus" breaking line without also indicating that the British regiments, including some reputed units were, likewise, forced to retreat because of accurate fire from the besieged Afghan defenders, which sowed confusion in the ranks of the invading force.

Afghan Wars 1839-1992: What Britain gave up and the Soviet Union Lost. by Edgar O' Ballance, London, Brassey's, 1993, p. 259, £ 19.95, ISBN 0-08-040722-6.

Bharat Karnad is a Consultant on National Security Expenditure to the Tenth Finance Commission.

Perhaps, such an antique view redolent of the British prejudices of another era is not altogether unexpected considering the sub-title of this book — “What is British gave up and the Soviets lost”. But what is surprising is that a fairly knowledgeable military analyst should use such a tendentious perspective as the peg to hang his narrative on.

Thus, according to the author the British “gave up” Afghanistan not, mind you, because of the costly and often disastrous military campaigns frequently led by incompetent British commanders, or because the Afghans had better mountain fighting skills and tactics, but because the British had a nuanced appreciation of the Afghan reality and achieved more by manipulating the rulers and the many pretenders to the throne.

On the other hand, the Soviets “lost” Afghanistan, he concludes, because of the superior guerrilla skills of the mujahideen. This sort of biased and historically blinkered viewpoint only diminishes this book which, otherwise, has many insights into the war waged by the Soviet military against the Afghans.

Actually, by O’Ballance’s own account. “the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan” had fairly early come to terms with both the strengths and weaknesses of the mujahideen. The latter’s foot mobility over difficult terrain was respected as was their popularity among the people, especially in the countryside. But, equally, the Soviets were aware that like the khalq-parcham ethnic divide that complicated their support for the Socialist regime in Kabul and the conduct of the war against the “freedom fighters”, there was the intense ethnic and tribal factionalism on the other side that diluted the effects of the mujahideen on the battlefield. This latter was exploited effectively by the Soviets using the secret domestic intelligence agency KHAD (Khedemati-e-dolati) they founded in 1982. Run by (later, President) Najibullah, KHAD was able to encourage blood feuds in the enemy camp.

The Soviets erred initially in seeking a conventional military solution to the mujahideen problem, which encompassed such measures as depopulating vast tracts in order to deny the guerrilla fish the Maoist water that sustained them. Later they changed their tactics, incorporating a more extensive use of the Spetznaz special forces dropped into rebel-held zones and equipped with specialised anti-guerrilla equipments, like the infra-red sniper-scope rifle, to harry guerrilla movements. Further, this combined with the air dropping of mines on mountain paths previously scouted by the Spetznaz, meant that the mujahideen often discovered that in trying to escape the confusion wrought by their colleagues being picked off in the dark, they stepped into even bigger trouble of familiar trails blowing up under their feet.

The Soviet troops also learned not to follow the retreating mujahideen into deep-set and inaccessible valleys, where they were likely to be destroyed in detail by well ensconced and well armed guerrilla units. Instead, they sent in helicopter gunships to flush out the guerrilla and then peppered the valley openings with massive gun and tank fire.

The Mi 24 helicopters worked well until such time, according to the author, as two Afghan Air Force pilots defected with these aircraft into Pakistan and the US technicians figured out a way to neutralise the gunship avionics, when jamming and other devices were provided to the mujahideen.

The US Stinger missile in the hands of the adversary further curbed the use by the Soviets of helicopters and low-flying fighter aircraft. Denuded of air cover, the Soviet and loyalist Afghan troops withdrew into garrisons, allowing the mujahideen to consolidate their hold over the countryside and progressively to marginalise the Kabul government.

All this is well told with a liberal spicing of tidbits. O'Ballance reveals, for instance, the Soviet use of satellites to track mujahideen movements (using air-dropped sensors? it is not clear) and appropriately to cue the Spetznaz. And the fact that the local CIA station chief, Peter Tomsen, actually led the failed attack on Jalalabad by 10,000 mujahideen in November 1989, and that Gulbadin Hekmatyar, chief of the Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan, took the war to the Soviets by mounting mujahideen attacks on targets inside Soviet Tadjikistan. He also attributes the lack of success in the use of modern arms by the freedom fighters to their egalitarian ethos on the battlefield. This resulted not in the best trained man handling prestige weapons, like the Stinger missile, but virtually each man in turn in the fighting group.

One wishes though that O'Ballance had compared and contrasted both the mujahideen guerrilla and Soviet counter-insurgency strategies and tactics with the conduct of other such wars he has written about. A comparative analysis would have rooted his comments about this particular war in the larger context and made his conclusions meatier.

Review Article 2

West Asia Peace Process

AIR MARSHAL H K OBERAI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war dealt a body-blow to Arab pride. The ruthlessly efficient Israeli war machine had overwhelmed them in seven days. Israel occupied Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights. It now had the real estate necessary to deal with the Arabs from a position of strength.

Sadat tried to change the asymmetry in 1973, but despite the initial gains, ultimately had to accept a humiliating defeat. He realised, that in the face of continued American military and political support to Israel, a military solution to the Arab-Israeli Imbroglio was not feasible. He agreed to negotiate, but the Camp David Accords split the Arab community. The PLO stepped up its campaign, however the Israeli retribution was quick and harsh. It was forced to move out of Lebanon and Arafat set up his Headquarters in Tunis. Away from the scene of the conflict and little to show for his efforts, Arafat soon came under considerable pressure from within his own organisation. There were additional difficulties as well. The Soviet Union was no longer there to support his cause. He had sided with Saddam Hussein in the "Gulf War" and his financiers viz Saudi Arabia and UAE had choked his financial pipeline. At the same time, thousands of Palestinian workers were forced to move out of Saudi Arabia and UAE. Time was running out for Arafat and the writing on the wall was clear; like Saddam, he too needed to seek a political settlement with Israel. The ongoing "Madrid Peace Process" offered little hope as the talks were stymied right from the beginning. Both sides fearing adverse public opinion at home were unwilling to offer any meaningful concessions. Another channel, away from the gaze of international media had to be found for a heart to heart dialogue. Here one's sincerity for a just and durable reconciliation could be determined more easily. Norway, a geographically remote country which had all along taken a neutral stance on Arab-Israeli issues, provided this opportunity.

In fact, the initial idea of secret talks was the brainchild of a Norwegian social scientist, Terje Rod Larsen, who was engaged in a study of the Palestinian diaspora. During his numerous visits to the Middle-East, he had established good personal relations with the highest in the PLO hierarchy as also with some well meaning academics in Israel including Yossi Beilin, who in

Gaza First : The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO. by Jane Corbin, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994, p. 213, £ 15.99. ISBN 07475-1700-2.

Air Marshal H.K. Oberai is a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Air Force and a Principal Staff Officer at Air Headquarters, New Delhi.

June 1992, became the Deputy Foreign Minister in the newly elected Labour Government. Larsen realised, that both sides were searching for peace, but an appropriate channel for dialogue was lacking. He believed that Norway could well provide a confidential setting for an Arab-Israeli meeting. The Norwegian Government when approached by Larsen readily supported the idea and thus the "Norway Peace Channel" came in to being.

While the PLO accepted Larsen's proposal for a dialogue readily, the Israelis not too sanguine about PLO's commitment to the negotiations, agreed to send only a semi official team of two scholars. The first meeting took place near Oslo on 21 Jan 93. As the talks progressed, sensing PLO's commitment to a peaceful settlement, Israel replaced the scholars with senior officials of its Govt.

The negotiations were stalemated on many occasions. The Arabs wanted greater territorial concessions. The Israelis would not compromise on the security of their settlements. Ultimately the trust and confidence generated in free and frank discussions held in an informal atmosphere paved the way for mutual give and take and led to the conclusion of two agreements viz the "Declaration of Principles for Interim Self Govt." and "Mutual Recognition". The Declaration provides for limited autonomy to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the ancient town of Jericho in the West Bank. Israeli withdrawal from these areas was to begin in December 1993 and completed before the end of 1994. Negotiations for the permanent status of the occupied territories are to begin before December 1995 and completed before 1998. Status of Jerusalem is also slated for discussion in the future.

It would appear that it is the PLO that had to make major concessions. It has recognised Israel for only limited autonomy in a small strip of land and the town of Jericho. Despite the promise of future discussions, the realisation of a sovereign homeland does not appear definitive to many Palestinians. Some opposition to the agreements is already discernable. There has been a six month delay in the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and the incidents like the massacre in Hebron will only add to their numbers. The peace process needs to be hastened and a major initiative in this regard must come from Israel since it holds Arab territories. As the Israeli foreign minister has himself said "There are two ways in which to end the conflict with the PLO; "With the power of power or with the power of wisdom. Wisdom is better than power. If we all act wisely, the PLO will become an active partner in peace instead of an obstacle to it". Israel needs to display the power of wisdom more speedily.

The author Jane Corbin is a well known BBC television journalist who

has worked extensively in the Middle East. She has the trust and confidence of both PLO and Israel and on assurance of confidentiality, was given full access to the talks a week before they were finally concluded. Her programme the "Norway Channel" was shown on the BBC on 13 Aug, 1993; the same day the historic accord was signed in Washington.

The hero of the book of course is the social scientist Terje Larsen. He helped the PLO and the Israelis to live and work together. The intimate personal contact thus established helped to remove old inhibitions and aided in reaching the final agreements. The step by step revelation of the talks held in great secrecy makes gripping reading.

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Review Article 3

Saga of India's Navy

REAR ADMIRAL R. SHARMA, AVSM (RETD)

The book is a saga of the ebb and flow of the relationship of India with the seas. India's indifference to the seas and landward looking ethos is aptly termed 'sea blindness' by the author. The uniqueness of the book is that this story of ships and sailors is by an Indian author against this backdrop of Asian sea blindness.

The first chapter highlights the characteristics of the Indian Ocean such as the choke points, the Roaring Forties, the Horse Latitudes, the famed enuch admirals of China, Arab sea-farers and the 'coalesing' of the Indian Ocean community which was largely the result of indentured Indian labour transported by sea. The hijacking of the continental Moghul throne by European maritime powers is the result which endured for centuries due to their might.

The second chapter concerns the change from Raj to Swaraj, the RIN mutiny of 1946, and the Bhutto connection in the Junagadh secession. It also illustrates the non-performance of sea forces in the conflicts of 1962 and 1965.

It adds that the decolonisation of sea power was accelerated with the appointment of Admiral R. D. Katari as the first Indian Naval Chief as late as 1958 and the Navy becoming three dimensional with the alteration of course from the UK to the Soviet Union for naval hardware.

The chapter 'Trumps and Aces' has an interesting account of the commissioning of the nuclear propelled submarine Chakra which event also finds a place in the former President Venkataraman's book 'My Presidential Years'.

Technology as a force multiplier as also a deterrent and a leveller has been brought out but all too briefly.

The fourth chapter is the hitherto little known fascinating story of Mukti Bahini frogmen of Bangladesh. This is followed in the fifth chapter, with the thrilling account of war at sea in 1971, which vividly describes the missile attack on Karachi, the loss of Khukri and the snaring of the Pakistani submarine Ghazi off Visakhapatnam. The aircraft carrier and the submarine opera-

War in the Indian Ocean, by Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy PVSM, AVSM (Retd), New Delhi, Lancers Publishers, 1995, p. 298, Rs. 395, ISBN 1-897829-116.

Rear Admiral R. Sharma is a former Assistant Chief of Personnel Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. At present, he is the Vice President of the Navy League.

tions together with Admiral Zumwalt's 'closing the loop' for the incursion of the US Seventh Fleet is the prelude to the surrender of 92,000 Pakistani combatants including the Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan. It adds the effectiveness of the blockade imposed by only a handful of ships of the Indian Navy in both the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, which is the high water mark in the saga of India's comparatively neglected Navy.

The last chapter deals with today and tomorrow. The effect of climate and water resources on conflict, the need for an enlightened coastal management and preserving ocean environment are very thought provoking but not in sufficient detail. The changing agenda for a new ocean order and the requirement for a National Council for Ocean Affairs also merit deep thinking.

The book concludes with the role of the Navy and Coast Guard as instruments of state policy and the emergence of Australia and South Africa as Indian Ocean powers together with oceanic trade blocks which is a new phenomenon.

The War in the Indian Ocean by Vice Admiral Roy is very thought provoking and interesting. The conclusions of the author about sinking of Ghazi in 1971 and frittering away of the military advantage in 1965 will no doubt raise many controversies. The book will certainly help cure sea-blindness to a great extent. He achieves this not through the use of soft contact lenses but hard logic, backed by incisive research and cold facts. It tends to be different from other books as it identifies the vital issues of today and tomorrow. In this context it is relevant to quote Rachel Carson:-

'It is a curious situation that the sea from which life first arose, should now be threatened by the activities of one form of that life. But the sea though changed in a similar way, will continue to exist; the threat is rather to life itself.

The book is well illustrated with photographs and quotations. Lancer Publications have given it a very attractive get up and have ensured no spelling mistakes.

War in the Indian Ocean is a must for all thinkers, scholars, strategists, analysts and young service officers, in fact anyone who feels any concern for India's destiny and security.

Review Article 4

Banning Nuclear Tests

COL R RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

Towards the end of the Second World War, the USA built two specimens of nuclear bombs; one was produced from highly enriched uranium which was dropped on Hiroshima and the other from plutonium, which was dropped on Nagasaki. The Japanese, by the time these abominable weapons were dropped on them, had all but surrendered. American objective in dropping these weapons was as much to observe the extent of damage that nuclear weapons of the size and design used could cause, as to bring about a decisive victory for the USA and, through its intervention, to its Allies.

In course of time, the Soviets built their own nuclear arsenals followed by Britain, and much later by France and China. However, the USA and the Soviets were the dominant nuclear powers.

The world community has recognised the dangers to the environment from nuclear weapon testing and the futility of nuclear weapons which cannot be used without causing mass destruction to the global society.

In this context, several useful steps have been taken to reduce weapon stockpiles and simultaneously avoid nuclear weapon testing.

First, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963, signed by over a hundred nations including the USA and Russia, banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water.

Second, Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, NPT, signed in 1968. Over 130 'non-weapon' nations have pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives.

Third, the Threshold Test Ban Treat (TTBT) of 1974.

Fourth, The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976, in terms of which neither the USA nor the Soviets would test nuclear explosives whether for peaceful or for military purposes with explosive yield greater than 150 KT (Kilo Tonnes). These two treaties, i.e. (3) and (4), have not been

Nuclear Weapons and Security : The Effects of Alternative Test Ban Treaties. Ed By Jonathan Medalia and others, *Colorado Westview Press*, 1991, p. 275, \$ 39.00. ISBN 8133-8261-0.

Colonel R. Rama Rao is a well known defence analyst and writes frequently on issues dealing with national security, nuclear weapons, defence forces and defence production.

ratified either by the USA or by the Soviets, but both have undertaken to abide by the Treaties.

The USA is for continuation of nuclear testing, though on a very limited scale in order to,

- (1) ensure that weapons in its stock pile perform according to designer's expectations; (and do not deteriorate in storage)
- (2) assess the vulnerability of military systems to nuclear attacks;
- (3) maintain confidence in existing nuclear weapons; and
- (4) test its weapons periodically in order to incorporate improvements in the weapons that may be considered feasible in the light of information available at the time of testing.

It is well to remember that neither CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) nor LYTT (Limited Yield Test Ban Treaty) nor a Quota Treaty which would limit the number of nuclear test explosions by signatories, in a given period - say a year, would prevent deployment of nuclear weapons but each would help restrict the development of nuclear warheads.

'Nuclear Weapons and Security' by Jonathan Medalia, Paul Linsmeister and Robert Civiak deals with the subject comprehensively; it is a book that merits careful study by all interested in limiting the arsenals of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Verification of Dual-Use Chemicals Under Chemical Weapons Convention: The Case of Thiodiglycol. Ed. By S.J. Oxford, *Oxford Univ 1991, p. 144, \$ 17.50, ISBN 0-19-829156-6 (SIPRI Pubns)*

The total world production of mustard gas since 1916, has been of the order of 200,000 tons. Thiodiglycol (T.D.G) route has been used for production of about a quarter. It is more accessible today, and as the production of the end product, only one reaction using simple stirring tanks is required, it is included in schedule 2A, and has been made subject of special study. T.D.G is produced by two routes 1. Ethylene Chlorohydrin & Sodium Sulphite 2. Ethylene Oxide & Hydrogen Sulphide.

Various limitations of inspections, and the extent of the effort, after which, it becomes uneconomical proposition, is also brought out in the study.

A very interesting treatise for those interested in Chemical and Biological Warfare.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab)

Beyond Guns & Butter. By Glen R Pascall & Robert D Lamson, *Washington, Brassey, 1991, p. 144, \$ 23.95, ISBN 0-08-036730-5.*

A thought provoking book, on the need for America to regain its economic leadership, as a prerequisite for military leadership.

The first part, presenting well researched data, points out, the falling trends in disposable incomes and real earnings of Americans. The larger, and continued rate of investment — long after the war damage has been repaired — by Germany and Japan. The inability of the U.S. to catch up in investments due to, reduced Corporate savings after tax, and high rates of interest. The lack of technology development in the U.S, where only 7% students opt for engineering, compared with 20% in Japan and 37% in Germany. Other factors holding back the U.S.A include the lack of certain raw materials, available to Russia and S. Africa. The security restrictions on exports, which resulted in a loss of exports worth \$ 9 billions (1985), and consequent loss of 200,000 jobs.

An excellent book, which was compiled before "Desert Storm"; it has many lessons for us.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)

A Violent Peace : Global Security After The Cold War. Ed By Paul Rogers Malcolm Dando, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1992, p. 209, £ 22.50 ISBN 0-08-036694-5*

The book carries an indepth analysis of the progress of the nuclear arms race, global militarisation, unsuccessful arms Control/disarmament. Large number of myths, created through media, have been exploded and these are of relevance to development of New World Order. For instance it was not a clean precision war in the Gulf (casualties being over 100,000), authority of UN was usurped by the USA for safeguarding of a scarce resource (oil) and preparation for war had been made (although against a different target) for over 10 years.

Authors recommend reversal of militarisation (developed on the basis of 40 years of legacy of East West Confrontation), accelerated yet environmentally sustainable development, a rational exploitation of scarce resources of the South and a conscious effort to bridge the gap between the North wealthier minority and impoverished majority of the South. He also stresses that Britain plays an important role in creating a New World Order.

-- Col R N Khanna (Retd)

Essays on Strategy VIII. Ed by Thomas C. Gill, *Washington, National Defence University 1991, p. 157, \$ 17.00*

A further set of five essays from the Defence University, three of which have been recognised for excellence by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The first on Intelligence on economic matters, mentions the four Pacific dragons - Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong - and Singapore, besides Germany and Japan. It considers the important role played by MITI of Japan in collecting, industrial, economic and technical information. Suggests that the Foreign Service officer's should have an economic commercial outlook. Further the satellite imageries should be available to industry, business and universities. Finally counter intelligence; for safeguarding emerging technologies, spies amongst visitors should be watched.

Two of the essays about open skies and closing down of the U.S. bases in the Philippines show a good grasp of the subjects when these were written. The options offered in the closing down of the bases are commendable.

The essay on Man and Public policy - won an award from the retired Diplomats association. The different concepts of the people of America, China and France, provide a useful predictive capability of their Public policy.

A book which should find a place in all defence libraries.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)

Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crisis. By David R. Mets, *Alabama, Air Univ Press, 1986, p 168.*

In the context of frequent and portentous armed conflicts amongst and within the Third World nations, crisis management by use of military pressure by a third party

has been debated extensively. The United States of America, with her global power status, economic commitments and a virulent public opinion at home, has often been drawn into this exercise during earlier decades.

David Mets reviews the rise, probable course and desired end-result of such flare-ups, contending that, although military power cannot ensure a political solution, it would defuse or atleast stabilise the crisis. He further suggests that land-based air power with its speed of application, flexibility and capability of timely disentanglement, offers the best mode of external military pressure for such assignment. Taking diverse-crisis-situations as his case-studies, namely, the Mayaguez incident 1975, the Yom Kipper War 1973, the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Cuba) and the Congo (Zaire) 1960 and 1964, he has drawn supportive conclusions for his contention.

Overall however, though informative, the book would have limited appeal for general readership.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmaments. Oxford, *Oxford Univ* 1993, p. 834, ISBN 0-19-829166-3

The Annual Report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — S.I.P.R.I, is a mine of information on all, matters regarding World Armaments and Disarmament. This volume under review, is of particular significance as it reports the signing of, two major disarmament agreements. Salt II, on 3rd Jan, — on reduction of Nuclear Warheads to 1/3rd & the Chemical warfare convention-CWC on the 13th, Jan 1993, which took 23 years to finalise. If it comes into force on, or soon after the 13th of Jan 1995, it would be a major breakthrough. Problems, yet to be resolved are:- the use of riot agents, destruction of stocks held which could take upto the year 2004, countries not willing to ratify the treaty?

SIPRI, annual reports are a must for any Defence Library.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)

Conflict Among Nations: Trade Policies in the 1990s. Ed. By Thomas R. Howell and Others, Colarado, *Westview*, 1992, p 633, \$ 49.85, ISBN 0-8133-1255-8

The worlds major trading states are taking on new significance in international relations with the end of cold war and after disintegration of Soviet Union. This book is a significant study of the trade policy making in Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and the European Community based on interviews with business community, government officials, and academicians of these countries.

The book is a comprehensive examination of the world trading environment in the 1990s and is an essential document for students and scholars of international business management and political economy especially that of United States.

-- Col P.K. Vasudeva (Retd)

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. By Liah Greenfield, *London, Harvard Univ., 1992, p. 581, \$ 49.95, ISBN 0-674-60318-4*

The basic theme of the book is based on a fundamental premise that in nationalism lies the structure of the world order. The term 'nationalism' is used by the author in a generic sense covering the related issues of national identity, ideology, political activism and patriotism which vary in manifestation from nation to nation.

The author has brought out the genesis and emergence of nationalism, the reasons why the term has acquired varied connotation when passed on from one social structure to another and the logic behind emergence of various configurations of national identity and consciousness and how these over the years governed institutional practices and patterns of culture, thus shaping the social and political structure of society which grew as a nation state.

The analysis of these issues has been done in the context of the leading social structures of the contemporary world namely England, France, Russia, Germany and the USA. The five countries studied by the author covers over 500 years of socio-historic developments wherein nationalism as a concept has been discussed covering three basic themes namely national identity, consciousness and collectivities.

An excellent research work of conceptual nature covering an intricate theme, very deftly done by the author.

-- Lt Gen MM Walia, AVSM, SM

Arms Watch SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. By Edward J. Laurance and Others, *New York, Oxford Univ, 1993, p. 143, £ 16.50 ISBN 0-19-829177-9*

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been providing information to the public through its Yearbooks regarding arms trade, based on public sources, for the last twenty five years. The SIPRI research report offers the authors authentic estimates, conclusions and postulates on arms transfers especially after the end of the cold war period.

The United Nations register on Conventional Arms can be evaluated from the nature of multilateral negotiations after the cold war period, government information about national security, and international arms trade. The UN Register is not an academic construction but the product of an international governing body. The authors have explained that the major powers will always insist on intelligence gathered by national means as the basis of policy. The authors have presented the data in a way which supports the basis for policy preferences of the agency where it is negotiated or originated.

-- Col P.K. Vasudeva (Retd)

Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Ed By Alexander L. George, Colorado, *Westview*, 1991, p 590, \$ 66.50, ISBN 0-8133-1232-9

An excellent treatise on principles of crisis management, by 16 contributors from academe, government and business from the U.S. and abroad. It classifies unwanted wars into accidental — ie not authorised by central decision makers and inadvertent. For study of the inadvertent, five historical cases where wars occurred, and five others where these were averted are discussed. Cases covered are from WWI to the Kuwait crisis. A study of the volume can give valuable background information on crisis handling.

A learned treatise, this book should find a place in top libraries, inspite of the price.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)

Fatal Words: Communication Clashes and Aircraft Crashes. By Steven Cushing, Chicago, *Univ of Chicago*, 1994, p. 162, \$ 23.50, ISBN 0-226-13200-5

Professor Cushing has adopted an absolutely new approach to an old problem of mis-communication. Mis-communication is an all pervasive phenomenon in almost every sphere of life. By virtue of his experience and qualifications in the sphere of linguistics and computations, the author has very incisively analysed the origin of the problem and effectively tackled it with the 'womb to tomb' approach in preventive and eradivative modes, with special reference to and emphasis on aviation safety. The suggestions made in long and short terms perspectives are simple, practical, feasible and measure up to future challenges.

-- Air Vice Marshal S.S. Malhotra AVSM, VM (Retd)

Wars and Peace Treaties 1816-1991 By Erik Goldstein, *London, Routledge*, 1994, p. 264, ISBN 0-415-07822-9

The book is an elaborate compendium of major and minor wars, - about 123 of them excluding civil wars and freedom struggles, which ravaged diverse regions of the globe during 19th & 20th centuries. The author, in a concise, smooth-flowing narrative style, explains the genesis and the culminating spark of each war. chronologically spotlights the major events of the war and summarizes the political fall out thereof, including peace treaties and defence pacts etc.

While in totality the book stimulates the reader about the emergence and disintegration of regional power groups, the fallibility of peace-treaties, and power gaming by the world community, the research student can also pick and choose the areas of specific concerns to him. The content and the arrangement of the presentation makes the book an excellent reference work.

-- Maj General S.K. Talwar

The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Ed By Alexander L. George and William E. Simons 2nd ed, *Colorado Westview, 1994, p. 310, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-8133-1787-8*

The book updates and expands the earlier edition published in 1971. The revised edition includes events of the past two decades, and emphasises upon US policy in this context.

The authors have defined coercive diplomacy as essentially a diplomatic strategy that relies upon threat of force rather than use of force to achieve the objective. If force had to be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it has to be employed in an exemplary manner in the form of a limited action to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary. Such a definition, hence, fails to differentiate coercive diplomacy from a limited war or even a full -scale armed conflict. Various US policies, studied under 'coercive diplomacy', prove the point. Authors have analysed under it the Cuban missile crisis during the Kennedy administration, the military escalation in Vietnam under President Johnson, military intervention in Nicaragua during the Reagan administration etc. In this case the objective was not to change the policy of the adversary but to change the government itself. US policy *vis-a-vis* Qadafi of Libya and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has also been studied. In both cases coercive diplomacy has almost assumed the shape of a modern crusade. Will that be the definition of coercive diplomacy in the new world order?

-- Prof. K.R. Singh

Live From the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad 35 Years in the World's War Zones. By Peter Arnett, *London, Bloomsbury, 1994, p. 463, £ 17.99, ISBN 0-7475-1680-4*

This book is a travelogue cum autobiography which is daringly honest and brutally frank. It depicts author's lineage, schooling, early struggle in the media including television and peregrinations through Australia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cyprus, Iran, Russia, five countries in Southern Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan covering important political and military scenarios from the front. The author's devotion to journalism and his desire to be the first in filing news made him swim Mekong river to reach Thailand when Kong Le staged a coup d'etat in Laos on 8th Aug 1960. He covered Vietnam war for eleven years from 1962 - 1973 and its veracity angered Lyndon Johnson frequently.

The Gulf War between Iraq and UN was the first war covered by live satellite television and the credit goes to the author. It would be difficult to say whether Cable News Network made Arnett famous the world over or vice versa. The book is interspersed with genial and witty humour. It grips your interest and is difficult to put aside.

-- Maj General J.N. Goel

The Guinness Book of More Military Blunders. By Geoffrey Regan, *Middlesex, Guinness, 1993, p. 188, £ 12.99, ISBN 0-85112-728-2*

Following up on his earlier publication pertaining to military blunders, Geoffrey Regan projects many more cases of defaulted campaigns and battles including case studies of some important ones. He has narrated instances of mis-directed friendly fire-tragic and sometimes comic, of inadequate visualization of integration of air support and sea borne landings, and of the recurring and controversial misdirection of military strategy by political authority.

The indeterminate term "fog of war" comes to mind when, despite high-tech capability of surveillance, communication and data processing failed to prevent the shooting down of the armoured vehicles of the Royal Regiment of Fusilier on 26 February 1991 by American A-10 Tank Busters; or the debacle of Operation Cobra in July 1944.

The thematic presentation and some interesting illustrations, make the book a very enjoyable reading.

-- Maj General S K Talwar

In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations. By Caroline Thomas, *Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1987, p. 228, \$ 14.95, ISBN 1-55587-074-0*

The author seeks to illustrate and explain some of the problems like security, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other problems of the Third World states in the international system. The study is mainly based on themes set in South-North context rather than on North-North context. The author has analysed the concept of security as it relates to the Third World.

The author has paid particular attention to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The Third World countries feel that NPT policy of the super powers is discriminatory and is a great challenge to them. In order to achieve sovereignty in social, economic, political and economic matters the Third World is required to exert more. This book has been written with the needs of Western students in mind.

-- Col P.K. Vasudeva (Retd)

The Penguin Encyclopedia of Modern Warfare : 1850 to the Present Day. By Kenneth Macksey and William Woodhouse, *London, Penguin, 1991, p. 373, £ 9.99, ISBN 0-14-051301-9*

This encyclopedia brings together in a single volume brief yet comprehensive descriptions to battles from 1850 to the present day. Maps and figurative data help in providing the reader with necessary information to understand the strategy and tactics, training and technology, logistics and weaponry of war from the Crimean War to the modern era. It also explains how military organisations, philosophies, and technology evolved with the passage of time. Brief biographical sketches of military personalities adds depth to the work, and demonstrates how human behaviour affects the fortunes of war.

The authors Kenneth Macksey, MC; and William Woodhouse are to be complimented for a well-researched and extensive work with excellent cross-references. They have, however, covered the Indo-Pak Wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971, and the Indo-China War of 1962 all too briefly.

An excellent source of basic military information for students of military history that helps to illuminate grey areas of military knowledge, and helps to point the serious student of military history in the right direction. Would make a valuable asset to all unit libraries.

-- Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Collective Security in a Changing World: A World Peace Foundation Study, Ed By Thomas G. Weiss, *Colorado, Lynne Rienner* 1993, p. 230, \$ 35.00, ISBN 1-55587-338-3

This study has been commissioned by the World Peace Foundation and the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, under the series 'Emerging Global Issues'. It is a continuation of the earlier collaboration which resulted in the publication of 'Third World Security in the Post Cold War Era', edited by Thomas Weiss and Meryll A. Kessler. The book is divided into three parts - Part I provides the case for collective security Part II explores the ways in which collective security could be provided effectively and Part III deals with the recommendations for the same, and an analysis of the chances for the establishment of such a system in the near future.

The contributors provide for a wide ranging and thoughtful assessment of the prospect of a system of collective security - to maintain peace and order in a changing world, where U.S. is the sole 'super power' but with limited finances to be involved in the settlement of any future conflicts on its own. The book has provided a very penetrating analysis of the future of a permanent and effective collective security system through the various options ranging from stronger regional organizations to a stronger and militarily effective U.N. and tackles the vital question of the durability of U.S. commitment to a multilateralism that excludes U.S. hegemony, in the most lucid manner: all the time aware of the impossibility of any dramatic change in the structure of the U.N. in the immediate future or in the behaviour of states which as yet is not thoroughly consistent or professional towards all security crises.

-- Sudha Raman
Senior Research Scholar J N U

New Agendas for Peace Research : Conflict and Security Reexamined, ed. By Elise Boulding, *Colorado, Lynne Rienner*, 1992, p. 198, \$ 35.00, ISBN 1-55587-290-5.

The book under review gives a peep into the end of Cold War with new challenges confronting the world community. Peace researches are bristling with the stark realities of post Cold War era with its attendant 'multi-dimensionality' for strategic security through quiet diplomacy, good offices missions, peace-keeping forces and other instruments of the United Nations System.

In the changed scenario, the main instrument of power politics is the economic power for ushering into a new international economic order. This is the hard core of the thesis.

Political terrorism, which has appeared since 1966 with an ugly face threatens, terrifies, kills the innocent people through various tactics and strategies such as hijackings, bomb attacks, hostages, murders which may well be described as "low-intensity" conflicts of varying magnitudes for which we have to take recourse to conflict-management - continuum; and, therefore, an in-depth analysis of all aspects of human society - cultural, economical, psychological and sociological - is called for. "Peace research is not over because the Cold War has ended. It is just beginning". This 'quote' from the book constitutes the main part of the thesis whose hard core has been encapsulated in para 2 above.

A stimulating and thought-provoking book.

-- Prof T.N. Rastogi

The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil. By Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *New Jersey, Chatham House, 1993, p. 228, \$ 16.95, ISBN 0-934540-99-3*

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the whole world was divided into two power blocs led by the USA and USSR. They were accorded the status of the world's two super powers and rivalry amongst them led to an era of cold war. Both tried to outwit to enhance their military power. Dictating terms on the philosophy of the warring nations, they tried to provide equilibrium in the whole world.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet economy has put an end to the cold war confrontation between the USA and Russia. With its economic and most modern military power, the USA stands alone as the world's only super power. Laying down its own agenda for the trouble spots around the world, it can play a vital role in bringing peace amongst the strife ridden states of the world. The recent "Peace Accord" between PLO and Israel is the best example to prove this point.

The first part of the book describes the real world order, beginning with the division of the world in zones of peace and democracy and zones of turmoil and development. The second part discusses policies for this world order and makes a number of suggestions.

The current world order will be different and better than the one with which we are familiar, "old thinking" using outdated assumptions will produce poor policy and will miss opportunities. "The Real World Order's" special contribution is to provide common ground for a new debate about foreign policy, suitable for the new world in which we now live.

-- Maj Gen Prem Khanna, MVC

Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s : Power, Politics and Policies.

By Peter Van Ham, *New York, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, p. 112, \$ 14.95, ISBN 0-87609-161-3*

Van Ham, a research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union in Paris has provided in a broad manner the dynamics of existing non-proliferation regimes amplifying their respective weaknesses and strength. The book attempts to give out historical perspective on the major non-proliferation regimes and goes on to focus on the conceptual and theoretical problems of regime building and maintenance. The end of the Cold War and the resultant increase of regional problems in the Third World countries has been nicely emphasised. The issues like (a) the break-up of the Soviet Union; (b) the incipient regional arms race; (c) the possible long-term consequences for the nuclear policies of regional powers have been very well highlighted. An attempt has been made to spell out the incentives and disincentives for potential proliferator nations which are striving to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missile technology.

The author has successfully covered lot of ground in suggesting how the management of proliferation problems might continue to be effective in the years to come. A welcome addition to the existing literature of 'Non-Proliferation Regimes'. The book is useful for scholars who are working hard to find out ways and means of managing conflicts.

-- Maj Sunil Chandra

International Human Rights. By Jack Donnelly, *Colorado, Westview 1993, p. 206, \$ 52.50*

The book under review is part of the Westview Series, "Dilemmas in World Politics". The author has focussed on the key issues relating to human rights since the end of World War-II. It deals with the growth and development of human rights as a factor in international human rights policies.

One of this book's distinctive features is its substantial attention to the domestic politics of human rights. Chapter three provides a relatively detailed account of human rights violations in Southern core of South America. In addition, brief domestic case studies of South Africa and Central America appear in Chapter four and five.

Another distinctive feature of this book, alongwith the other volumes in the Dilemmas in World Politics Series, is a relatively extensive emphasis on theory. Chapter two addresses philosophical issues of the nature, substance, and source of human rights, the place of human rights in the contemporary international society of states; and the theoretical challenges posed to the very enterprise of international human rights policy by arguments of radical cultural relativism and political realism (real politic, "Power Politics").

The book should be of immense interest to the policy framers, diplomats, law enforcement officials as well as students of International Relations.

-- Mohun Kudaisya
Senior Research Scholar J.N.U

Peace is a Process. By Sydney D. Bailey, *London Quaker Home Service, 1993, p. 188, £ 8.00 (Swarthmore Lecture 1993), ISBN 085245-2497*

This book essentially elaborates the birth and the evolution of Quakerism - which arose in Britain in the middle of the seventeenth century. The book is neatly divided into three parts. The first part spells out the birth, evolution and growth of the Quaker movement and also explains the dynamics of the working of Quakerism. The second part of the book deals with the initiatives taken by Quaker organisation in the Franco-Prussian War, Anglo-Boer War, First World War and finally the Second World War. The final part of the book is rather interesting as it deals with the process of Quaker Peace Making, their working in War-Time and its working at the United Nations.

The author, Sydney Bailey possesses a rich experience in disarmament process and has the distinction of being visiting Research Scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International peace and has also served on the United Nations advisory committee on disarmament.

He has aptly summed up the book as he concludes, "Peace is a process to engage in, not a goal to be reached".

-- Major Sunil Chandra

Prospects for Global Order (Vol 2). Ed By Seizaburo Sato and Trevor Taylor, *London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, p.165, £ 10.50, The Security Challenges for Japan and Europe in a Post Cold War World : Series, ISBN 0-905031-65-2*

The book contains 9 essays written by eminent persons in the field of political science and military. The authors discuss various aspects of the changed post - cold war world, particularly the formulation of basic rules governing intervention by the United States in internal affairs of sovereign states.

The book brings out that during the cold war, both the communists and the democratic camps had presented themselves as supporters of global justice and welfare. However, the present international landscape is blurred, uncertainty faces many countries. Relationships between countries has become a matter of discussion. The global look has changed and the world's guarantors of security have started resorting to force.

The book lays emphasis on the Middle East and part played by the U.S. in the Gulf War.

-- Maj Gen Pran Nath

Reforming the United Nations : The Challenge of Relevance By K P Saksena, *New Delhi, Sage, 1993, p 271, Rs. 265, ISBN 81-7036-303-9.*

The reforming of United Nations, after ending of the Cold War, has become imperative and is a much debated subject today. What the UN should do and should not do, especially in the economic and social fields and what should be the content and

objectives of reforms have led to sharp differences between the countries of the 'North' & the 'South'. This book focuses on the complex political factors at play, behind the scene & which have a bearing on the present process of reforming the UN. The book also examines the reforms which have been instituted recently or are in the pipe line. It is based on UN documents & secondary sources but also on personal discussions with present & past UN diplomats & officials.

The author is a professor at JNU and has been an advisor to India's Permanent Mission to the UN and a member of India's delegation to six sessions of UN General Assembly and other UN bodies.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath SM

Target Pearl Harbour By Michael Slackman, *Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1990, p.354, \$ 12.95, ISBN 0-8248-1378-2*

Since the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 94' by the Japanese Fleet which plunged America in World War II, a number of books have been written by various authors. However, Michael Slackman has gone into great details by incorporating the recollections of many individuals whose experiences are presented in the events of Sunday the 7th December, when the Japanese aircraft caught the American Fleet unaware and sank 3 ships, destroyed 162 aircraft, damaged 17 ships, 13 seriously, killing 2403 personnel and wounding 1170. On the other hand, the losses of Japanese ships and aircraft and personnel were negligible.

The author has brought out that although secrecy and security were upper most in the Japanese planners and the plan was complex, it made little allowance for errors or unexpected development. It depended for their success on American behaving according to the expectation of Japanese staff/planners. If the Americans had some intelligence of large scale movement of Japanese Fleet, the results would have been different.

The author is to be complimented for his in-depth research and for providing the readers with complete facts and figures along with photographs.

-- Captain R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy, (Retd)

Sino-American Relations Since 1900. Ed By Priscilla Roberts, *Hongkong, Univ of Hongkong, 1991, p. 559, \$ 180.00 (HK) (Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs No. 93) ISBN 0378-2689*

An international conference on "Sino American Relations Since 1900", sponsored jointly by "University of Hong Kong" and "American Studies Association of Hong Kong", was held in the British Colony in January, 1990. Thirty two papers written by scholars from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, USA and some other countries read out at the conference, are contained in this book. The papers have been grouped in three sections viz "Cultural and Educational Interactions", "Sino Amer-

ican Diplomacy in the Republican Period" and "Sino American Diplomacy since 1949"

Despite the large number of papers the book fails to break any new ground. The views expressed by the scholars are on expected lines. Those from mainland China see the Americans as reactionary at least till 1972, when Nixon met Mao and the two agreed to come together in a tacit strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. The Russians of course have been stamped as hegemonistic and expansionist, but there is a complete silence about the role of their own country. The unprovoked attack on India and Vietnam, merely to teach them a lesson, has been conveniently forgotten.

-- Air Marshal H K Oberai
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Around the Cragged Hill : A Personal and Political Philosophy. By George F. Kennan, *New York, Norton, 1993, p. 272, \$ 22.95, ISBN 0-393-03411-9*

The book "Around The Cragged Hill" covers various facets of "Personal and Political Philosophy" by George F Kennan who has authored over 15 books in the last four decades, mainly on foreign policy with particular reference to threat of Soviet expansionism in the world.

Besides sharing his experiences as a diplomat and scholar of standing in the United States, the author has given his views on complex subjects like the sexual urge in human beings, morality, faith, soul, the Church, ethics, human rights, ideology, egalitarianism, socialism, elitism and so on.

On the whole, a very readable and interesting account of personal philosophy from a writer of standing with rare literary gift who is the winner of prestigious awards such as Pulitzer Prizes and the National Book Award.

-- Lt Gen MM Walia, AVSM, SM

Morotai : A Memoir of War. By John Boeman, *Kansas, Sunflower University, 1981, p. 283, ISBN 0-89745-124-4*

MOROTAI - 'The most Bombed place in the South West Pacific Area', is a book containing personal experiences spanning over three decades from 1941 onwards, by a pilot, as they occurred - recorded in simple language, truthfully & realistically, vividly describing the inner feelings, as well as the visible aspects connected with aircraft/cockpit activity during training, operations, war, (HOT or COLD) peace; in 'command' and 'delegations'.

The real time situations backed by supportive pictorial/graphic illustrations, from personal and historical records, add explicitly & authenticity to the contents. The words particularly portraying the personal sentiment and philosophy of life, soldierly pleasures and traditions are very expressive and trigger the imagination and initiate the un-initiated into the art & complexities of war and peace.

-- Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra AVSM, VM

Sandstorm : Middle East Conflicts & America. Ed By Daniel Pipes, *Lanham, Univ Press of America, 1993, p. 411, £ 29.50, ISBN 0-8191-8894-8*

The book highlights the Arab Israeli Conflict, Camp David agreement and its implications, crisis in Persian Gulf and the role played by the USA to project its influence in achieving its extra regional objectives. The Islamic fundamentalism with its roots in this region has now become an international phenomenon, the study discusses its fallouts particularly the state sponsored Islamic terrorism and motivated exploitation of youth towards this menace. Besides this, the articles provide the revealing realities of shift in Arabs approach from age long collective interests to individual approach, sincerity in settling the bilateral and regional issues by the concerned nations and above all Israel's strive to trade land for peace. The book goes beyond discussing the traditional US-Israel relations and brings out the rarely known facts of US reliance on Israeli Combat experience in upgrading and redesigning its military potential to outmanoeuvre the erstwhile Soviet might.

-- Col Ramesh Davesar

State and Society in China : The Consequences of Reform. Ed By Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, *Boulder, Westview, 1992, p. 240, \$ 43.00, ISBN 0-8133-1175-6*

A collection of eight essays is serious reading for those who wish to understand CHINA. The essays on New Bureaucracy, Urban Industrial workers & Entrepreneurs, and the Rural reforms give background information on the China's rapid economic growth—the basis of progress.

Bureaucratic Technocrats. Since 1972, the regime's goal shifted from revolutionary change to economic development. From 1982, educated bureaucratic technocrats, started taking charge. These changes extended to highest level, Mayors, Governors and party secretaries, have training in technical fields or economics.

Urban Workers & Entrepreneurs. For increased worker productivity, payment of basic salary, piece rates & bonus, led to increase in real wages, inspite of the inflation. Workers were able to afford, durables. The Managers were responsible for workers welfare. The entrepreneurs made an alliance with the bureaucrats. 15% became party members. There was need to lubricate the machinery, all the way up — like in India! The Merchant - Bureaucrat bonds have flourished.

This high priced book is a must for China watchers.

-- Maj General Partap Narain, (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab) F.I.E.,

Ten Years of Turbulence “ The Chinese Cultural Revolution. By Barbara Barnouin and YU Changgen, *London, Kegan Paul, 1993, p. 369, £ 55.00, ISBN 0-7103-0458-7*

Mao Zedong is admired for his achievements, but these are vitiated by his role in instigating and prolonging the Cultural Revolution (CR) that engulfed China for ten

years of violence, destruction, economic and educational disruption. The CR has spawned an extensive literature referred to in the Bibliography (pp. 344-356). This volume, jointly authored by a Western and a Chinese academic, is valuable as a relatively brief, comprehensible and dispassionate account of the CR's origins, spread, fluctuations and final struggles. Two chapters cover the ideological and political background 1955-1965. Mao's manipulation of factional rivalries is well illustrated by the Liu Shaoqi (chapter 3) and Lin Biao (chapter 6) episodes. The chaos, ideological oscillations, vendettas, military interventions, educational paralysis and hideous suffering inflicted on millions of people is depicted with clarity yet self-restraint. Gory details of "struggle sessions" are omitted; "she was brought to the execution ground with her windpipe severed" (p. 191) says everything about intolerance of criticism. Far from strengthening the Chinese Communist Party or establishing a socialist society as Mao intended, the CR undermined both party and state and ironically resulted in a previously unimaginable "emancipation of mind" (p. 299) in China.

-- Dr. Surjit Man Singh

The Politics of China, 1949-1989, Ed by Roderick Macfarquhar, *Cambridge, Cambridge University*, 1993, p 534, £ 15.95, ISBN 0-521-44762-3(pbk)

A comprehensive political survey of contemporary China covering major epochal periods between two significant milestones of Chinese history - 1949 and 1989.

The editor vividly brings out that on both these occasions the Chinese people "stood up" (borrowing Mao's phrase of 1949). In 1949, the Chinese people "stood up" to be counted as a giant Communist state emerging from a century of foreign aggression and civil war. In 1989, the Chinese people once again "stood up" - this time against the Communist state and in support of democratic aspirations. Noteworthy is the fact that on both occasions, the decisive factor was the Peoples' Liberation Army.

The contributing essays are well researched and analytical and the Appendices provide useful details of party leadership at various stages and details of high level party meetings since 1945.

-- Dr. Subhash Kapila

Agricultural Reform in China : From Communes to Commodity Economy 1978-1990. By Simon G. Powell, Manchester, *Manchester University* 1992, p. 231, \$ 40.00 ISBN 0-7190-3382-9

In China's spectacular economic development, agriculture has not figured prominently in writings though Dengist slogan "to get rich is glorious" was first directed towards peasants. The author in this book, through a host of statistics, very authentically presents the impact of 1978 reforms - their achievements and shortcomings. In a sense, it fills a void on available information regarding China's rural development. The conclusion of the author is, that, though there has been a distinct change in individual achievement through de-collectivisation and decentralisation, the policy ax-

iums have essentially been short term. The diminishing returns of high intensity farming and ecological and technical problems that it presents demanded a long term perspective. India could draw some very valuable lessons from the conclusions of the book.

An extremely well researched study which could be of great value to rural social scientists in developing countries.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Creating Single-Party Democracy: Japan's Postwar Political System. Ed by Kataoka Tetsuya, *Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1992, p 172, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0 8179 9112 3*

This volume contains eight essays which individually give an analysis of how the politics of Japan came to be the way it is and how the policy planks of the liberalists, conservatives and the socialists (excepting the extreme left) became indistinguishable by 1960. The period during the 50's was extremely turbulent and a reader not familiar with the political developments and figures of that time may find it difficult to place things in perspective. All authors are of the view that it was the shifting US stance to make an adversary into an ally during the cold war that shaped events. Perhaps the most important outcome was that though the Japanese Emperor was very much a part of the system that engendered fascism and militarism, the monarchy was not liquidated.

The LDP remained in power in Japan from 1955 till it was replaced recently by a coalition led by a socialist. According to the edition, this longevity resulted from the LDPs ability to turn the Confucian maxim that "men of high aspirations aspire to justice and common people to utility" on its head. By giving prosperity it proved that common people preferred utility even when there was not enough justice and high morality.

The essays confine themselves to the situation in the 50's and are indeed a product of outstanding knowledge and scholarship.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Japanese Defence : The Search for Political Power. By S. Javed Maswood, *Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990, p. 113, \$ 12.00, ISBN 981-3035-39-0*

This book examines the defence policy followed by Nakasone the Prime Minister of Japan who did not replace the emphasis on economic issues with defence and political concerns but brought new and major initiatives in both Japan's foreign economic relations and defence policy. It also analyses Japan-US relations and its regional role.

-- Captain R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy, (Retd)

Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism, By Alexei Vassiliev. Reading, Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 384, £ 35.00, ISBN 086372-1680.

This book covers the Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle and Near East along with implications of Security, failure of superiority of Socialism over Capitalism, fate of Comintern, its desire to avert another war and improve relations with the USA. The "twenty second of June, 1941" was the Soviet obsession and the basis of its formulation of foreign policy which inter alia demanded elimination of all including nuclear and conventional strategic and military threat from the South to the USSR. When it became evident that communization or Sovietization of Arab countries was not possible USSR adopted a pragmatic approach and established normal friendly relations with them.

The principles of Panchsheel adopted at the Bandung Conference in April, 1955 and the desire of Third World countries to have an independent foreign policy was seen by Khrushchev as "anti-imperialist" which must be propagated/exploited in Arab countries. This approach brought turbulence and favourable though short-lived tilt towards USSR in the foreign policy objectives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Yemen and Afghanistan much to the chagrin of the Western powers and delight of the Soviets. This 'marriage of convenience' sure enough, ended in a crockery-smashing divorce. The USSR supported Arab countries against Israel, yet it always ensured its survival. After the avalanche-like disintegration of Soviet Union, the foreign policy of Russia towards its southern neighbours will require modification from confrontationalist to co-operative and coexistence one because of Islamic and economic constraints.

A well researched book convincingly analysed, presented and worth reading.

-- Maj General J N Goel

Molotov Remembers : Inside Kremlin Politics Conversations with Felix Chuev. Ed By Albert Resis, Chicago, IVAN R. DEE, 1993, p. 438, ISBN 1-56663-027-4

This book is a result of 139 meetings each lasting more than four to five hours from 1969-1986 between the author and Molotov. Molotov means hammer in Russian and was his adopted name. Molotov was a member of Communist Party for 80 years (1906-1986) out of his age of 93 years (1898-1991), served Lenin as Secretary to Chancery and second-in-Command to Stalin and as such perhaps is the best person to comment on those times. He always propagated harsh measures, forced collectivization, the Great Terror, pervasive repression as necessary and justified for the survival of the party and communism. Molotov acknowledged responsibility for signing all arrests for the victims of 1936-38 and accepted that there were grave excesses and innocent people suffered. He maintained that though Stalin was the Principal force behind eliminations, the Central Committee and the Politburo were equally responsible. A new angle.

Molotov brings to focus the cunningness and genius of Lenin, indispensability and suspicious nature of Stalin, and the desire of peaceful coexistence of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. He was both a theoretician and a pragmatist and held that socialism first

be built and then it must graduate to communism slowly and surely. A book worth reading to understand the inside struggle in erstwhile USSR.

-- Maj General J N Goel (Retd)

The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. By John B. Dunlop, *New Jersey, Princeton, 1993, p. 360, £ 24.95, ISBN 0-691-07875-0*

Dunlop's pioneering work on the break up of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the rise of Russia is of a great significance to students of the transition of the country from a totalitarian regime to a democratic society which itself covers a wide spectrum from 'Westernising Patriotism' to 'Parochial Enrasianism'.

Organised in six chapters, the book attempts to explain the causes leading to the kaleidoscopic changes witnessed during the period 1987-91 with the initial two-chapters focussing on the main political actors, Gorbachev and Yeltsin; it goes on in subsequent chapters to interpret the key political groupism that emerged and the subsequent convulsive political shifts on 1991.

Altogether, a fascinating study.

-- Lt Gen P E Menon PVSM (Retd)

Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992. By George Schopflin, *Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 327, £ 12.99, ISBN 0-631-14724-1.*

The rise and fall of communism in Eastern Europe after World War II is currently a widely debated subject. The author in this book cogently argues that communism found acceptance in these countries because of a lack of plurality of West European democratic nations. The collapse stemmed from the fact that the economic, social and political agenda failed to deliver. In the main the failure was due to a usurpation of power and privilege even by the most ardent left intellectuals whereby they became elites and the institutions preferred as vehicles of change became instruments of tyranny and perpetuation. These intellectuals instead of creating values for the future succumbed to populism and irrational nationalism that was devoid of any moral authority. Whether the collapse of communism will result in a movement towards plurality and democracy in Eastern Europe remains an open question. The author, however, is sanguine because in his view even where people have preferred nationalism and authoritarianism in elections, it has been through democratic conventions.

A book of great analytic depth which decidedly will greatly enhance the knowledge of students of East European politics.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Impossible Country : A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia. By Brian Hall, *London, Secker & Warburg, 1994, p. 422, £ 18.99, ISBN 0-436-20032-5*

The book under review is a travelogue by a novelist rather than a journalist. It

is not an account by a war correspondent because, as the author puts it, he met individuals seeking to learn their reactions to the emerging situation. In fact, he avoided conflict areas. Further, when the author was in Yugoslavia during May-Sep 91, the conflict (which was triggered by a massacre in Brovoselo on 2 May 91) remained confined to small areas and the country was just beginning to witness a slow slide towards chaos.

The author, in his engaging travelogue outlines the historical context of the forces in conflict, on how an impossible Yugoslavia came into being between the wars, how it broke up during World War II only to be resurrected again by Marshal Tito into a federation of six independent republics after the war.

Altogether, a fascinating study which explains the apparently inexplicable strife in Yugoslavia.

-- Lt Gen PE Menon, PVSM

The Last Prussian : A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt 1875-1953. By Charles Messenger, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1991, £ 19.95. ISBN 0-08-036707-0*

The Western allies regarded Field Marshal Rundstedt as the most outstanding German General and yet after he surrendered he was to be tried as a war criminal like other Nazis. TS Elliot asserted "The treatment of the Field Marshals was alien to all our traditions and likely to damage our national reputation." After four years in captivity he was released on health grounds.

The Germans who strove to remove Hitler and all he stood for and did not know Rundstedt well, looked to him to provide the lead. They viewed him as a personification of all that was good about the Prussian Junker class, but never forgave him for not taking an active part in resistance to Hitler, an attitude still prevalent in Germany.

Gerd Von Rundstedt fought in World War I & II and was decorated in both. He was the only General who after being retired was recalled a number of times whenever Germany faced a crisis.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

The U-Boat Offensive 1914-1945. By V.E. Tarrant, *Maryland, Naval Institute, 1989, p. 190, ISBN 0-87021-764-X*

This well-researched and profusely illustrated book provides a summary of strategic and tactical U-boat operations in both the World Wars. The U-boats almost succeeded in cutting off Britain's life-lines across the Atlantic. Three things proved effective anti-dote to the U-boat menace—entry of USA in the war, convoy system and the Allied air power. In World War I, U-boats destroyed over 4500 Allied ships with total tonnage of 12289338; in World War II, 2927 Allied ships were lost with total tonnage of 14915921. U-boat losses were 203 and 821 in World War I and II respectively. The real sting was provided in Allied air superiority - whereas in World War

I only one U-boat was sunk, in World War II, Allied air power destroyed 388 U-boats ie, 47.25% of the total U-boats losses. This book is a useful addition to the history of warfare at sea.

-- Lt Colonel Daljit Singh (Retd)

The Ottomans. By Andrew Wheatcroft, *London, Viking, 1993, p. 321, £ 18.99, ISBN 0-670-84412-8*

This is not a general history of the Ottoman Empire but an ambient picture of the 'Ottoman' idea; its inner life, what made it tick. Out of the mystery surrounding the four and half century empire of these warriors from the steppes is teased out the reality and unreality of the bloody savage and the sybarite; was he one or the other? or perhaps both or none?

In the recent resurfacing of visceral Balkan hatreds in the lands the Ottomans once seeded the book has a sad topicality. Sad because acceptance of human differences rather than squaring of ancient barbarities is central to the book.

It is a beautiful book; researched and written with consummate skill; quality reproduction of evocative pictures lend both scale and point to a very readable, lucid text.

-- Colonel Balwant Sandhu

Ireland Today : Anatomy of a Changing State. By Gemma Hussey, *London, Viking, 1994, p. 536, £ 18.99, ISBN 0-670-84076-9*

The book reflects seriously on every aspect of a nation state depicting the anatomy of change right since its emergence, from 1922 onwards - till date. The account is not only descriptive in detail but it derives its authenticity from the author's personal involvement and exposure to most of the problems and aspects the country had to transit though during the last 70 years. Just like its contents, the book has maintained its excellence in its print and illustrations.

-- Air Vice Marshal, S S Malhotra AVSM, VM

Nazi Germany. By Alan F. Wilt, *Illinois, Harlan Davidson, 1994, p. 161, £ 10.50 (European History Series) ISBN 0-88295-910-7*

This book is a part of the European History Series being published primarily to teach the U.S. public the history of their original homelands, as the majority of Americans emigrated from Europe. Consequently, it is a very concise history though it covers all the essentials.

The war was an outcome of the policies of Nazi Germany. The author, a historian, has given a brief background of the rise of Hitler and the causes for the German people accepting him as their supreme leader. In effect, Hitler was Germany and Germany was Hitler. He has also highlighted the atrocities committed by Himmler and

his police in the name of ethnic cleansing (social Darwinism). In the chapter, Party and the State, he has shown how the state was totally subordinated to the Nazi party. To get almost any job, a person had to join the party.

The war is covered by showing how the German public was kept ignorant of actual happenings by censorship of both the print and electronic media. The Germans were made to live in misery in the belief that this sacrifice would win them the war. How the German armed forces were made to tow the Nazi line has also been highlighted. Yet the author rightly contends that the resistance to Hitler in the army was most active of all, since it had the greatest access to him and knew the actual state of affairs. That the bomb planted by Col. Von Stauffenberg failed to kill Hitler on 20th July 1944, was a matter of chance.

The author also highlights the after effects of the war on both the Germans and the interpretation of the history of this period by German historians. There is a very large bibliographical essay at the end suggesting hundreds of books for further reading. Unfortunately, the author misses two of the most highly researched books written on the Third Reich by David Irving *Warpath* and *Hitler's War*. This is a very good book written for a limited purpose.

-- Cdr S Varma SC IN (Retd)

The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865-1925. By John Lowe, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 257, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-415-10444-0

This book discusses the major issues in international affairs, inter-relationship amongst the Great Powers of Europe with particular reference to their impact on German problem during 1865 to 1925, the colonial rivalries in the East and Africa and propagation of "economic imperialism" in China. Maintenance of Balance of Power was the single most important dictum of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries amongst the dominant powers of Europe to ensure peace and stability. This often resulted in "diplomatic and strategical juggling acts".

The unification of Germany under Prussian leadership apart from being a Bismarckian diplomatic success during 1865-1875 also highlighted her increased global and continental rivalries and aspirations. Some historians believe that the seeds of First World War were sown by Bismarck in 1879 when he propagated the "alliance system" between sovereign states.

This book is a must for those who deal with diplomacy, overt and covert threats, double crossing in international relations and also who want to understand the historical perspective of the causes, responsibilities of continental powers and Britain which led to First World War.

-- Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

German Unification in the European Context. By Peter H. Merkl, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University, 1993, p. 448, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-271-00922-5

The German reunification had been welcomed with mixed feelings from that of fears and trepidations in the words of a Frenchman, "he liked Germany so much, he

would rather there were two of them", to maintaining balance of power on the continent, economic considerations and an underlying desire for democratic institutions. The author addresses a horde of controversial issues like understanding of the whole twentieth century, nationalism, nation-state system, fascism, imperial power politics, pacifism, racial prejudice and ideologies like communism and socialism.

Before 1961, Hallstein Doctrine which claimed German Federal Republic to be the sole representative of German interests in the world and any nation who recognized GDR would automatically lose West-German recognition kept the desire of reunification alive. Perhaps, Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost in 1989 were responsible for accelerating the reunion of two Germanies. The shift in attitudes between the two Germanies from 'contractual community concept' to 'speedy confederation' to 'federal status' to 'self-determination/plebiscite for unification' are well analysed backed by opinion polls from 1950s onwards.

A well-researched book which in addition brings out political, monetary, economic, social union of Germany, status of Berlin and wider security perceptions in Europe against the backdrop of a unified economically giant Germany.

-- Major General J N Goel (Retd)

Security for a New Europe : The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures 1989-90, and Beyond. By John Borawski, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1992, p. 235, £ 35.00, ISBN 1 85753 040 3*

"Thawing away of the Cold War and disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union" have diminished the chances of conflagration among the hitherto Warsaw treaty States and the NATO member states without ruling out the Yugoslavia like situations. Terrestrial disputes, rise in regional nationalism, religious ambitionism/fundamentalism avenging the posh aggrandisement do require a fresh thinking about European Security or North American European Security. The effectiveness of this approach will be highly dependent on the mutual trust, respect and cooperation. In this connection the Vienna Document will go a long way in lifting the veil of secrecy and dispelling lurking doubts of the members regarding surprise military adventures due to "Perestroika" all over. This treatise provides a detailed analytical study chronologically of the Confidence - and Security Building Measures at Vienna. The measures, because of the openness about military activities, inspection, exchange and consultation - will assist in tackling the inter-state instabilities of the new security problems in Europe. Political process coupled with market economy rather than the hardware oriented approach will open new vistas for the security of Europe to which "Security for a New Europe" will act as a catalyst.

-- Air Commodore S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

The Middle East in Global Perspective. Ed by Judith Kipper and Harold H. Saunders, Colorado, *Westview, for American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, p. 347, \$ 57.50, ISBN 0-8133-0296-X*

Judith Kipper is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and a senior programme associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and Harold H Saunders

who directs the International programmes of the Charles F Kettering Foundation. The book is a collection of articles by experts, who include eminent scholars from the West and Middle East, military analysts, bankers, economists, journalists, politicians and statesmen.

The articles challenge many foreign policy assumptions about the role of military and economic power, and the relationship between larger and smaller states.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

The Struggle for Peace : Israelis and Palestinians. ed By Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, Austin, Univ of Texas, 1992, p. 336, \$ 25.00, ISBN 0-292-73071-3

The book challenges the accepted view that the protagonists in the conflict stand in fixed and unchanging positions. The Struggle for Peace : Israel and Palestine, attempts to put forward a fresh perspective on prospects towards peace in this troubled area.

This collection of readings places together a series of different kinds of texts : Twelve original essays in several disciplinary discourses, profiles of twenty five ordinary men and women involved in the peace process in Israel and the West Bank, historical chronology, photos and maps. All these are related to the conflict. The expressions are of different voices and styles and are informative.

A book with a difference. The editors, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hacking, have put together a collection which raises new issues in new ways, offers evidence to factor into any contemporary study of the conflict and suggests a new vision of the conflict may be in order.

-- Capt Vikram Mayne

The Arab - Israeli Search for Peace Ed by Steven L. Spiegel, *Colorado; Lynne, Rienner, 1992, p.197, \$ 10.95, ISBN 1-55587-313-8*

An outcome of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, the book is divided into four parts. From Part - I Factors Leading to the Peace Process to Part - II The Potential for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East and from Part III The Potential for Arms Control in the Middle East to Conclusion in Part IV, one can sense the undercurrent of plea for peace and the need to avoid a military build up based on weapons of mass destruction and a flattering trust in the capabilities of the 'third power' especially the United States in resolving the dispute.

The book clearly identifies that the very nature of instability in the region is at the core of the problem. The keenness to move towards peace with the realisation of the futility of war provide some hope for a permanent settlement of the conflicting situation. William Zartman in his article calls for a concerted effort by the United States Jews, Arabs and Christian communities to help resolve the dispute. The Book

provides for some of the most interesting and enlightening aspects of the Arab-Israeli peace process. It gives a rational and understanding estimate of the concerns of the different actors of the region-which in fact led to a situational asymmetry thus requiring unequal restrictions which could compensate for the instabilities inherent in these asymmetries.

Spiegel and Perrin in their conclusion clearly state that outsiders could only influence not determine the course of events of this region. Solution would depend on analysing the cost of status quo as against the cost of peace process. Ingrained with some of the most sincere proposals, this book is a must for all those who are genuinely concerned about the security of this region.

-- Sudha Raman
Senior Research Scholar J N U

Struggle and Survival in the Middle East. Ed by Edmund Burke, III. *London, Tauris, 1993, p. 397, £ 14.95, ISBN 1-85043-607-X*

This is a comprehensive account of the history of the Middle East produced by the collaborative effort of twenty seven individuals who had studied different aspects of peoples' lives in the vast area extending from Morocco and Algeria in North Western end of the African continent to Egypt in the East. The study also covers the adjoining areas of South Eastern Europe, namely Turkey, the Western part of Asia namely Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran and the entire Arabian Peninsula.

The book, a collaborative effort of the authors and the masterly selection of articles by the Editor, is interesting and informative.

Students of Middle Eastern history and of recent developments in the region will find this book valuable.

-- Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

Going Ballistic : The Build-Up of Missiles in the Middle East. By Martin S. Navias. *London, Brassey's (UK), 1993, p. 262, £ 30.00, ISBN 1 85753 020 9*

This comprehensive study into the causes, policies, and events, of the missile status in the Middle East region explains how their proliferation was a result of global politics and international interests in the area. Sales and supply of knowhow have enabled Israel, Iraq and even Iran to produce or modify missiles, whilst almost all countries have them in their arsenals. Their actual use in war is narrated, and results are analysed, leading to indications for the future, including possible controls. The author is a master of his subject, with deep and detailed knowledge of missiles and the Middle East Wars. As a lecturer in war studies, he amply succeeds in giving a clearly presented and reasoned book, with all the facts and analysis needed for students of this region.

-- Tindi

Post-War Gulf: Implications for India. Ed by K R Singh, *New Delhi, Lancers, 1993*, p. 213, Rs. 220, ISBN 81-7095-034-1

The book has been compiled from papers, talks, and discussions held at a seminar at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi in collaboration with the National Security Programme of the School of International Studies, JNU.

The book highlights the impact of the autocratic and authoritarian nature of the bulk of the Islamic states of the Gulf region on their politics and on their heavy dependance on Western nations, principally the USA, for their external as well as internal security, due to their deep distrust of each others, even as they spend billions of dollars on buying armaments. This also inhibits them from collaborating with each other in tackling regional problems, much less acting in concert.

The book also notes that with the spread of education among the populations and their increasing exposure to nations outside their region there is a growing demand for democratisation, and the regimes based on family and tribal structures have to take note of this, however reluctantly.

Some participants felt that Indian foreign policy has moved too far from the foreign policy enunciated by Nehru and is concentrating too much on the USA to the neglect of the Gulf states. It was suggested that Indian policy planners should give more importance to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to regain their trust and confidence which has been eroded over the years. The implication, perhaps, though it has not been specifically mentioned, is that they may perhaps be less swayed by Pakistan's Islamic rhetoric in international fora.

-- Lt Col S K Dhar, VSM (Retd)

Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis. By S M Burke and Lawrence Ziring, 2nd ed. *Karachi, Oxford University 1990*, p. 498, Rs.375, ISBN 019577407-8.

In the opening paragraph of the first chapter, the author states "Ask any Indian or Pakistani, he will tell you in all sincerity that it is imperative for the security and welfare of both India and Pakistan that the two neighbours should bury the hatchet and settle down to a friendly and co-operative relationship". Although these views were shared by the two former prime ministers of India and Pakistan - Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Sir Zafrulla Khan, this has not been practiced by successive political leaders of Pakistan who consider India as its number one enemy.

Although Pakistan is a recipient of advanced weapons from the United States, it cannot expect Washington to come to its assistance in a future conflict with India, particularly so now in view of its nuclear policy.

-- Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86. By Hussan-Askari Rizvi, *Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1988*, p. 351, Rs. 125, ISBN 81-220-0084-3.

In the context of three military coups d'etat in Pakistan (FM Ayub Khan 1958,

Gen AM Yahya Khan 1969; Gen Zia Ul Haq 1977) and the latest rumblings of military intervention, this book makes an interesting study. Author discusses Pakistan Army from independence and its development, changing pattern of civil-military relations, the role of the military in the decision making process, causes of coup d'etat and the military rule, efforts of Generals to shape politics and society on their whims and the aftermath. The reasons for the decline of civil institutions and the entry of military in non-professional fields is well explained. Like elsewhere in South Asia, corruption, inefficiency and decline of moral values is as endemic in Pakistan as bed-bugs in Ugoke. Civil population gets disillusioned and frustrated and the in-fighting sets in the government creating a vacuum of stability. The Army steps in.

But the question remains: can Pakistan Army evolve permanent remedies for the root-causes of the fragility of civilian/political institutions?

-- Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

National Security and Defence Policy Formation and Decision-Making in India. By Bruce Vaughn, *Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National Univ, 1992, p. 34, ISBN 0158-3751*

This paper examines the evolution of various committees set up from 1947 (since India attained independence) onwards to look after the security and defence policy formulation and decision making in India.

The book brings out that in a bureaucratic set up in India, the officers in uniform have progressively become more isolated from the process of decision making. Even the Chief of Staff papers are scrutinised by civilian under secretaries as they make their way to the Defence Minister.

A well analysed paper which would be of much interest both to the officers of the Defence Services and the bureaucrats, in particular the latter, who must realise that if the running of the armed forces is left in the hands of the professionals who are familiar with weapons and equipment and the men they command, the better it would be for India.

-- Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Indian Arms Bazaar by Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd), *Delhi, Sipra Publications, 1994, p. 318, Rs. 380, ISBN 81-85402-35-3*

"The real worth of an R and D establishment is measured by its contribution in the field of weapons development which results in their production and issue to the troops to increase their fighting efficiency. Mere talk — (does) — not win wars."

The author is eminently qualified as a scientist, an engineer (Cambridge), with army service from 1933, to being the first ever Controller General of Defence Production; and finally an independent high-tech industrialist. His skills, exposure and experience from all aspects, plus contacts and work with defence scientists, engineers,

factories, administrators and ministers, have helped explain how and why our enormous defence industrial base, our well acknowledged scientific and management talents, have failed to deliver performance as promised, within time, costs, and upto stated quality.

Major issues are highlighted and discussed in this book. It succeeds in showing how narrow political and individual interests have kept India for decades as an importer of major warlike systems and smaller items of defence use; even while our established potentials were adequate for self sufficiency and possible export. He compares India to other countries, develops suggested alternatives for management systems, organisations, budgets, controls, and expands to all connected security aspects, including para-military and police. The essence of his approach is to demand performance from identifiable responsible persons and organisations, rather than to impose controls without clear responsibility for results. This is a vital subject at a time when India is struggling to leap the barrier between emerging and advanced countries. We may justly get euphoric on successes from Prithvi to the ASLV, which match world standards. But cold and unemotional appraisal of results against the vast effort and cost deployed on Defence R & D, productionisation, issue and specified performance of warlike systems and common stores, shows far too many sub-standard achievements. One hopes that reports and analysis like this book will lead to demonstrated performance instead of words.

-- Tindi

A League of Airman : US Air Power in the Gulf War, By James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack and Dana J. Johnson, Santa Monica : Rand, 1994, p. 335, \$ 30.00.

The book contains the most scientific analysis of the employment of air power in the Gulf War of 1991. The study is based on an extensive collection of data, obtained from official reports, briefings and interviews. There is an in-depth analysis of each type of weapon system based on actual results. The final conclusion is that air power came of age in the Gulf War and was decisive in achieving Coalition objectives.

-- N.B.S.

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending March 1995

*(The books reviewed in Oct-Dec 1994 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list).*

Air Power

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|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Mason, Tony
(Air Vice Marshal) | Air Power : A Centennial Appraisal, | 1994 |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|

Ballistic Missile Profile

- | | | |
|----------------|---|------|
| 2. Kapur, K.D. | Nuclear Diplomacy in East Asia :
US and the Korean Nuclear Crisis
Management, | 1995 |
|----------------|---|------|

Bangladesh

- | | | |
|--------------------|---|------|
| 3. Chakravarty, SR | Bangladesh Under Mujib Zia and
Ershad, | 1995 |
|--------------------|---|------|

Biography

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------|
| 4. Ramaiah P and
Reddy, Sateesh K | Dr BR Ambedkar's Economic
Philosophy, | 1994 |
| 5. Khanduri, CB (Brig) | Field Marshal Cariappa :
His Life and Times, | 1995 |
| 6. Fraser, David | Knight's Cross : A Life of
Field Marshal Erwin Rammell, | 1993 |
| 7. Srivastava, CP | Lal Bahadur Shastri : Prime
Minister of India 1964-1996:
A Life of Truth in Politics, | 1993 |
| 8. Zhisvi, Li | The Prive Life of Chairman Mao, | 1994 |
| 9. French, Patrick | Young Husband : The Great
Imperial Adventurer, | 1994 |

Birds - India

- | | | |
|--------------|---------------|------|
| 10. Gaur, RK | Indian Birds, | 1994 |
|--------------|---------------|------|

Central - Asia

- | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|------|
| 11. Warikoo, K (ed) | Central Asia : Emerging New Order, | 1995 |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|------|

Cold - War

- | | | |
|------------------------------|---|------|
| 12. Tansey, Geoff and others | A World Divided : Militarism and
Development After the Cold War, | 1994 |
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|---|---|------|
| | China - History | |
| 13. Kristof, Nicholas D
and Wvdunn S | China Wakes : The Struggle for
Soul of a Rising Power, | 1994 |
| | Egypt-Foreign Policy | |
| 14. Pasha, AK | Egypt : Quest for Peace :
Determinants and Implications, | 1994 |
| | Espionage | |
| 15. Perry, Roland | The Fifth Man, | 1994 |
| | Fiction | |
| 16. Hellor, Joseph | Closing Time, | 1994 |
| | Gulf-War | |
| 17. Godden, John(ed) | Shield & Storm : Personal Recollec-
tions of the Air War in the Gulf, | 1994 |
| | India - Defence | |
| 18. Hussain, Abid | Affordable Defence in the 1990s, | 1994 |
| | Indian - History | |
| 19. Kohli, KB | First, Citizen of India:
Dr Rajendra Prasad to Dr Shankar
Dayal Sharma, | 1995 |
| 20. Yadav, KC | India Unequal Citizens : A Study
of Other Backward Classes, | 1994 |
| 21. Brown, Judith M | Modern India : The Origins of an
Asian Democracy, | 1994 |
| | Indian - Politics | |
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