

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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OBITUARIES

With a deep sense of grief we inform you about the passing away of the following Life Members of USI :-

- (a) Squadron Leader KD Mehra (Retd), F (P), passed away on 04 September 2012. He was a Life Member since 1997.
- (b) Lieutenant Colonel Sandeep Singh Ahlawat, Skinners Horse, passed away on 23 December 2012. He was a Life Member since 1999.
- (c) Lieutenant Colonel Hari Om Sharma (Retd), Artillery, passed away on 13 January 2013. He was a Life Member since 1975.
- (d) Lieutenant Colonel SK Rawla (Retd), Signals, passed away on 14 January 2013. He was a Life Member since 2004.
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- (f) Brig JS Antal (Retd), Assam Regt, passed away on 29 Jan 2013. He was a Life Member since 1971.
- (g) Wing Commander SK Gupta (Retd), passed away on 22 February 2013. He was a Life Member since 1988.
- (h) Air Vice Marshal Anup Singh Sethi (Retd), Medical Corps passed away on 28 February 2013. He was a Life Member since 2002.
- (j) Air Marshal HK Oberai (Retd), F (P), passed away on 12 March 2013. He was a Life Member since 1991.

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Date	Time	Events	Subjects and Speakers
13 May 2013 Monday	1100	Talk	Complexities of Nuclear India Dr Roshan Khaneijo Chair : Air Mshl TM Asthana, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)
20 May 2013 Monday	1100	Talk	Military Applications of Space Gp Capt RK Singh Chair : Lt Gen Davinder Kumar PVSM, VSM and Bar (Retd)
29 May 2013 Wednesday	1100	Talk	Dynamics of Preventive Diplomacy Shri RS Kalha, IFS (Retd) Chair : Shri SK Bhutani, IFS (Retd)

*Please see USI website: www.usiofindia.org, for details and any changes.

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The USI website had over a million hits during the period January to December 2012. The total “hits” during the year were 1,167,813 and the total pages viewed were 454,883.

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Editorial

USI National Security Paper 2012 on the subject : 'Restructuring and Integration of the Ministry of Defence with the Three Service Headquarters' was written by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) and the same is being carried as the lead article in this issue of the Journal. It has been a subject of much debate in the past and continues to be so. Even though, the necessity for this long standing reform stands well established; yet for some inexplicable reason, the change continues to elude us. General Nambiar in his well researched and thought out paper has put the whole issue in correct perspective and gone on to suggest a structure and the process to achieve the end result that would serve the Nation well. I earnestly hope that his labours would receive due attention from the policy makers. In any case, the initiators of this change ought to be the Defence Services themselves as visibly it affects them the most; undoubtedly, the change would also be in national interest.

Cyber attacks continue to make news but it is neither possible to pinpoint their source, nor are there any regulatory mechanisms in this field. The possibilities of damage and disruption are horrendous. Lieutenant General Davinder Kumar, PVSM, VSM and Bar (Retd) in his article 'Cyber Weapons – The New Weapons of Mass Destruction' has analysed the whole issue of cyber warfare, its implications for national security and highlighted the need for deterrence capabilities in this uncharted field.

In the next article 'China's Border Wars', Major Akshat Upadhyay has done a wide ranging survey of China's border disputes with its neighbours and on what terms most of these, except India and Bhutan, have been resolved. The author has drawn some very perceptive inferences about Chinese behaviour in border negotiations; primarily, "never bargain from a position of weakness". Our negotiators may well keep that in mind.

In the same vein, Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh in his article 'Henderson Brooks Report and India's China Challenge' argues that the debate over declassification of the above report has been

rendered irrelevant with the passage of time. He, however, emphasises that getting to know the Chinese better is more important as that would help India manage its relations with China. Historians may not agree with this view but it is a view that also needs to be taken into account.

Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) in his article 'India's Third Front' has examined India's internal fault lines in the light of Pak - China nexus and its implications for national security. Needless to say, it would require a grand strategy to hedge and marginalise these threats, while at the same time building capacities to meet them in the long term.

Space seems to be emerging as the new battleground for military supremacy. At the same time there are no international treaties or regulatory mechanisms in this arena so far. Group Captain RK Singh in his article 'Indian Anti Satellite Weapon: Necessity, Urgency and the Way Ahead' takes stock of the Indian capabilities in this field and outlines the way ahead for India to be an important player in this game of space domination.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones are being developed and used by many countries including India. Consequent to the increasing use of UAVs by the USA in its 'War on Terror' in the Af - Pak Region and elsewhere, ethical issues have come to the fore. In the next article 'Conceptual and Ethical Dilemmas in Employment of Armed UAVs in Counter Terrorism (CT) / Counter Insurgency (CI) Operations in Indian Context', Colonel Amar Ramdasani, VSM, examines the whole issue from ethical and operational point of view in the Indian context.

In the next article 'Why Japan Needs India as a Security Provider?', Dr Satoru Nagao looks at the converging security interests of India and Japan in the Indo - Pacific Region and makes a convincing case for Japan and India to not only cooperate with each other but also with the USA, Australia and ASEAN to come together to stabilise Asia as a whole. He has, however, also asked a very relevant question – whether India has the required will?

As a fall out of the recent incident of beheading of an Indian soldier on the Line of Control (LC) by Pakistan troops, there was considerable debate in the media on the continued relevance of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Lieutenant Colonel Shailender Arya in his article 'UNMOGIP : A Sub-continental Relic' traces the history, composition and functioning of this Mission since its inception in 1948 through the turbulent decades of India - Pak relations to the present times. He has also argued that though this Mission hardly has any meaningful role; yet its presence in the Valley continues to impact on the Kashmiri psyche and credibility of the 'return to normalcy'. While India cannot terminate the Mission unilaterally, he goes on to recommend restricting the Group to its existing office in Delhi with no field presence in Srinagar. It is a food for thought !

Similarly, there is a continuing debate in the media on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) regarding its continuation in various parts of the Country and the need to modify some of its provisions. In the next article 'The AFSPA – Need for Review' Lieutenant General Raj Kadyan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd), based on his considerable experience of having operated in CI environment under AFSPA, carries out an in-depth analysis of various issues raised from time to time and gives a practitioner's point of view based on ground realities.

The next article 'The Story of a Lady Helicopter Pilot' by Wing Commander Namrita Chandi (Retd) is a personal narrative which describes vividly : the expectations, sense of adventure, doubts, apprehensions and finally a profound sense of achievement that she experienced through her years with the Indian Air Force which at the time of her joining the Force was primarily a male bastion.

The last section of the Journal carries four personal experiences of 'Indian Wars – As Seen Through Soldiers' Eyes'. These are : 'A Thorny Operation' by Admiral Sushil Kumar, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, NM (Retd), former Chief of Naval Staff (a reprint by kind courtesy Quarterdeck 2012), 'Fly Low' and 'Tanks with the IPKF' by Group Captain AG Bewoor, VM (Retd), 'Operation

Riddle – 7 Sikh Action in Poonch Sector (Aug – Sep 1965)' by Lieutenant Colonel Ravel Singh Sidhu (Retd) and 'The Revolutionary Government of Nagaland Joins the Mainstream' by Brigadier N Bahri, VSM (Retd). I would like to reiterate that these pieces are meant to share with the readers the feelings and emotions which the authors felt when faced with combat or war like situations. These are neither an attempt to write a history of these operations, nor a critique to bring out lessons learnt. Readers are most welcome to share their experiences of Indian Wars. Even if all contributions cannot be carried in the Journal, these will be preserved in USI Archives for posterity.

Errata

Please refer to page 603 in USI Journal Vol CXLII, Oct – Dec 2012, No 590.

In the footnote, date of commissioning of the Author, Captain Skekhar Dutt, SM, IAS (Retd) :-

For – 06 August 1969

Read – 06 August 1967

Error is regretted.

Editor

Restructuring and Integration of the Ministry of Defence with the Three Service Headquarters

**Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar,
PVSM, AVSM, VrC, (Retd)***

Introduction

In a parliamentary democracy like ours it is inevitable that when governments change, there are some modifications to policy. However, in so far as the country's policies on national security and external affairs are concerned, there should be a degree of consistency and bipartisanship. If that be so, there should be institutional arrangements that ensure the involvement of at least the major opposition party or parties, in the formulation of such policies. Such an arrangement would largely eliminate the scope for important policy decisions on these two vital ingredients of the nation's destiny, being overturned or "brushed under the carpet" when political change takes place.

When the deliberations for the formation of a National Security Council were being examined over a decade ago by a Group of Ministers (GoM) and other experts, I recall having been asked to inter-act with the group. Among other aspects, in so far as the composition was concerned, I had then suggested that the National Security Council core group should comprise the Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Home Minister, Finance Minister, the National Security Adviser and the "Leader of

* Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), a Padma Vibhushan awardee in 2009 for his contribution to National Security Affairs, was commissioned into the 20th Battalion of Maratha Light Infantry on 15 December 1957 and retired as the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff on 31 August 1994. He served as additional Director General and Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) at the Army Headquarters from mid-1989 to March 1992. He was the first Force Commander and Head of the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and served as a member of a High Level Panel appointed by the UN Secretary-General to review the status of international collective security mechanisms and make recommendations for reform. He was Director, United Service Institution of India from July 1996 to December 2008. Presently, he is an elected Member of USI Council and a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and continues to steer the thinking processes related to the Nation's Armed Forces and National Security at national and international forums.

the Opposition". The worthy interlocutors nearly fell off their chairs and laughed away the suggestion about the "Leader of the Opposition", on the grounds (in the words of one of the eminent members who had been a Minister in earlier cabinets) that "in our system that sort of arrangement cannot work". I found the basis for rejection of my suggestion rather illogical, and made the point of saying so; by reminding the worthies that, as it happened, the Leader of the Opposition at that time was a person who had held the portfolio of the Defence Minister of the Republic of India in the administration that preceded the one then in power. It is indeed a reflection of the insecurity and possibly arrogance of our political leadership, that on aspects of national security and foreign policy, we cannot evolve a bipartisan approach.

To a large extent, it is this arrogance, insecurity and indifference on these two issues of national importance, that is at the root of the inability of the political leadership to pursue with some vigour, the vital and, I dare say, the already long delayed, decisions on the integration and restructuring of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) with the Indian Armed Forces, as also the measures for promotion of "jointness" and "integration within and between the Armed Forces".

In order to place the subject matter of the paper under consideration in perspective, it is essential that India's security commitments into the 21st Century be first briefly reviewed.

A Brief Review of India's Security Commitments Into the 21st Century Military Conflicts with Other Countries

As things stand, together with the perennial scope for conflict with Pakistan, scope for conflict in the foreseeable future exists with only one other power, a major power at that. Whereas there is scope for difference of opinion or clash of views, one cannot perceive any reason for military conflict with the USA, Russia, the European Union or Japan. However, with the People's Republic of China, scope for military conflict exists in context of bilateral contentious issues like the unresolved boundary question, the presence of the Dalai Lama and his followers in India, China's continued support to Pakistan's nuclear and sub-regional ambitions, and the competition between the two countries for space in Asia on trade and economy. Notwithstanding this adversarial relationship, in context of the imperative of focusing on the

economic growth of the country, it is important that our political and diplomatic efforts be directed at precluding military conflict with China. But let us be quite clear: this will only be possible if India is politically, economically and militarily strong. The Chinese (like any great civilisation) recognise and respect strength and demonstrated performance. To that extent, while we continue to engage with China at the political level and build on our economic and trade relations to the mutual benefit of our people, it is imperative that we:-

- (a) Modernise our Armed Forces to maintain a credible deterrent military capability.
- (b) Address the long-neglected infra-structure in the border areas of the North and Northeast.
- (c) Consolidate our strategic assets in all three dimensions to provide deterrence capability.

In so far as Pakistan is concerned, besides maintaining the appropriate force structures, we need to put in place capacities for punitive action should Pakistan undertake any military adventure against us in Jammu and Kashmir directly, or by proxy.

Other Roles for the Military

Looking into the foreseeable future, there appears to be little doubt that our military is likely to be increasingly applied in roles other than conventional warfare. Foremost among these tasks is that of dealing with terrorism and insurgency in one form or another, whether it is against ethnic or religious groups seeking secession, terrorists promoting such activity or drug traffickers. This is a form of conflict that will require significant readjustment of basic attitudes towards soldiering in the classic sense, modifications in equipment requirements and training. The Indian military has been at it for over five decades; but more recently, to a much greater extent. In this form of conflict, the military is subjected to considerably greater pressures than in regular warfare for which they are trained, because more often than not, the soldier is required to deal with the terrorist or insurgent with at least one hand (if not both) tied behind his back. In the sense that unlike classic combat operations where he can engage the enemy without reservations or inhibitions, in counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations, the soldier is inhibited by the imperative that he should not cause casualties

to innocent civilians or inflict collateral damage that would cause resentment in the local population and outrage in the international community. It is invariably part of the military's mandate to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the local populace who may be genuinely alienated, or under threat from the terrorists.

Dealing with Terrorism

Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: namely, respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is generally believed that terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; and that it profits from weak state capacity to maintain law and order. In so far as India is concerned it is important to emphasise that notwithstanding all the initiatives under discussion and implementation at present at the international plane and the recommendations made, our fight against terrorism on the sub-continent will, for some time yet, have to be undertaken by us on our own. Without doubt we may be able to count on the active support of some countries that are similarly affected, and the sympathy of some of the other countries favourably disposed towards us. However, it is difficult to foresee any sections of the international community assisting us materially in the process. Not that we should be looking for any direct assistance in this regard. Hence we need to continue dealing with the menace as best as we can by mobilising and organising our capacities accordingly.

A major threat India faces today internally is that of terrorism sponsored and directed by Pakistan based terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) etc with varying degrees of collusion and assistance by some local groups. Whatever the international community may wish to assume about the involvement of sections of the Pakistani establishment, particularly the Pakistan Army and the ISI, we should have no doubts on this score. And in that context there should be no inhibitions about the measures we need to put in place. We have been the target of such terrorism for many years now, long before countries like the USA and the UK woke up to the seriousness of the threat after the attacks in the US mainland on 09 September 2001.

In pursuing its agenda the Pakistani establishment including the ISI, is obviously using all its influence within Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and possibly even Sri Lanka, as also in Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf Countries like the UAE, to facilitate the movement of terrorists and their weapons and equipment, and as a conduit for the infusion of counterfeit currency into India.

In evaluating our responses for dealing with such terrorist activity, it is important we rid ourselves of the following fallacious assumptions: —

- (a) That the Pakistani establishment has very little control over non-state actors operating from its territory. It most certainly has.
- (b) That the so-called “*soft attitude and double standards of the West on Pakistan*” will change. They will not and we must factor that into our responses.
- (c) That *linkages with Jammu & Kashmir and Afghanistan (and now Baluchistan)*, will disappear; they will not.
- (d) That the USA, Saudi Arabia, China and some others, will cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan unless it produces results in the operations against the Taliban. That will not happen.

Given the increased dimensions of the threat, it is imperative that effective counter terrorism mechanisms are immediately put in place. The time for commissions, task forces, and so on is long past. Rhetoric and symbolism must be replaced by implementation action without further delay. The prime focus should be on “Prevention” in as much as we must invest all our efforts on preventing terrorist attacks from being launched against us. We should remove any thoughts about the inevitability about terrorist attacks.

To effectively complement our ‘Prevention’ strategy it is imperative that we formulate a credible and clearly articulated ‘Pre-emption’ strategy. Any comparisons with what Israel does in this context are invidious because we are not in the same league; the USA will never stand by us as they do for Israel. Development of covert capability is essential but not a subject that can be discussed; one would hope that this is being developed as it takes

decades to bear fruit. "Surgical strikes" across the border/Line of Control (LC) are a feasible and even legitimate option under the terms of the UN Charter when the country is attacked or under imminent threat of attack. The provocation has to be severe; as for instance when the Kargil intrusion took place, or when Parliament was attacked. We should not bluff ourselves into believing that the international community will support us in case we respond with strikes across the border/LC to a Mumbai type attack. But respond we must. And if we are to respond with surgical strikes, we should prepare ourselves to deal with international disapproval when it comes; and more importantly, be prepared for escalation to war with Pakistan.

Left Wing Extremism (LWE)

LWE is today as serious an internal threat as Pakistani sponsored terrorism, the difference being that it is largely indigenous with possibly some marginal connections with the movement in Nepal. That however does not detract from the possibility that our regional adversaries may well be exploiting the phenomenon by provision of weapons and equipment, as also sanctuary. Unfortunately the threat has assumed its present dimension because of neglect, indifference, poor governance, lethargy and sheer incompetence by the political leadership and civilian bureaucracy. It is ironic that in claiming to recognise the seriousness of the threat, the Indian establishment is glossing over its own failings and inadequacies, and suggesting that the remedy lies purely in robust offensive operations against the armed cadres and those who support them. In the process of determining the measures required for countering the threat, the movement must be placed in perspective. The point regarding poor governance and associated deficiencies has already been made. What needs to be evaluated in greater detail is the fact that whereas there is no doubt some individuals are pursuing the activities for ideological reasons and have a dedicated cadre, large numbers of the so-called 'revolutionaries' are in the game purely for exploitation for personal benefit that derives from the possession of the gun. They have the advantage of working up anger and antagonism against the State to their advantage.

As in the case of dealing with Pakistan sponsored terrorism, we must fully exploit available technological capability to our advantage in terms of monitoring and surveillance of areas under LWE dominance, tracking of the movements of their armed cadres,

using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), monitoring of their communications, etc. There can be little doubt that LWE cadres would have access to 'state-of-the-art' equipment under the auspices of forces inimical to India.

The main aspect that needs to be stressed is that the process of restoring state control over the areas impacted by LWE will be slow and painstaking; block by block; moving from one block to the next only after re-establishing effective and credible governance structures. There can be no "quick fix" solutions, given the fact that the situation has been allowed to go out of control for so long.

One observes that there are calls for a "*military approach*". Whereas some sections of the political leadership and the bureaucracy may not have any compunction about launching military operations against our own citizens who have been deprived of the rights and privileges accorded to them under the Constitution, it may not be unreasonable to hope that the military leadership will be able to resist the pressures of launching operations against our own people. Use of the military should be restricted to provision of training and equipment, together with advice and logistic support where necessary.

In this context, the recommendation made in the GoM Report of February 2001, for the lateral induction of trained Armed Forces personnel into State Police, Central Police Forces and Para Military Forces like the Assam Rifles, Sashastra Seema Bal and the Coast Guard should be pursued with some vigour. In particular context of the directions of the Standing Committee on Defence, implementation has been stalled over the years by vested interests that should not be allowed to call the shots any longer. Its implementation will not only bring in "*some Armed Forces ethos and culture into the police forces, but also conserve state resources on training. Laterally inducted Armed Forces personnel will benefit by serving longer and in many cases within their own state. The Armed Forces will benefit significantly by retaining a younger age profile*".

Peace Operations

The end of the Cold War and the relative success of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, had induced a sense of euphoria that the international community was geared to deal with threats to

international peace and security in a more effective manner than before. However, the experiences of Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, and those in some of the former republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union, quickly dispelled these expectations, and in fact, induced a sense of retrenchment in regard to UN peacekeeping operations for some time. In recent years however there has been an ever increasing demand for UN peacekeeping particularly for dealing with the conflicts in Africa. Today, almost 115,000 personnel are deployed on 15 UN missions; with about 113 countries contributing troops; and the budget for 2012-13 is over 7.5 billion US dollars. There is every indication that the demand for this form of application of militaries is likely to continue, together with the increasing deployment of civilian police and humanitarian aid personnel in mission areas. UN forces are being increasingly mandated with provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter that call for the use of force to deal with belligerents. Ironically, countries that have the best capability in terms of equipment and training, namely the developed Western world, are shying away from participation in UN operations, preferring to be part of operations undertaken under the aegis of military alliances like NATO, or regional organisations like the EU.

Intervention Operations

There is little doubt that in this day and age, with the reach of the electronic media and greater awareness even in the most backward of societies, it is well-nigh impossible for countries to insulate themselves from the global community. Hence, whereas national sovereignty will continue to be the bedrock of international relations, the days are gone when under that rigid façade, governments are able to persecute their populations without drawing reaction from the international community. In fact, if oppression of the people and suppression of human aspirations goes beyond a point, a state itself may break up from within. The international community does therefore have a responsibility towards people and societies. And this has been recognised by the adoption of the "Responsibility to Protect" recommendation at the 2005 World Summit in New York. A concept subsequently endorsed by UN member states in the General Assembly in 2010. *Even so, it is inconceivable and unacceptable that a decision to intervene militarily in a sovereign nation's affairs should be the prerogative of a group of countries of the Western world led by the USA, who set themselves up as 'judge', 'jury' and 'executioner'.*

The interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2012, were in the perception of many in the developing world, induced by the pressures generated on the societies of Western Europe by the media focus on the problems and by the influx of refugees fleeing civil war. What then is the answer to situations that call for the attention of the international community? In the first place, efforts must be directed sub-regionally, regionally, and globally, towards conflict prevention, diplomacy and negotiations. Military intervention must be a last resort. And when essential, undertaken with the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council or by a majority vote at the General Assembly. If existing practices need revision efforts must be made to do the needful. Maybe, not permitting a veto in the Security Council on such issues, but allowing a majority decision; or some other appropriate mechanism.

The bottom line is, we must recognise that there may be occasions on which military intervention for humanitarian purposes is required, but it must not be a unilateral decision taken and acted upon by a group of nations outside the umbrella of the United Nations. Needless to say, considering the circumstances and setting in which such operations are undertaken, the operative principles of International Humanitarian Law must apply in terms of the use of military force. The United Nations does not have an 'enemy'. Hence only minimum essential military force must be applied and unarmed civilian populations must not be placed at risk.

Given India's established expertise and military capability, there is little doubt that we may well be called upon by the international community (represented by the UN or by regional organisations or by our neighbours on a bilateral or multilateral basis) to deploy our military, together with others in a multi-national force, and possibly take a lead role, for dealing with what are perceived as threats to regional or international peace and security. This is an aspect we need to start deliberating and focusing on. To study in detail and evolve a concept: for command & control; coordination; operational compatibility etc together with other like minded countries in the region and beyond.

Recommendations of the GoM on “Reforming the National Security System” made in February 2001 in the Wake of the Kargil Review Committee Report

While there have been many writings and sporadic discussion since Independence on the subject of “Higher Defence Management”, a detailed exercise on the subject was undertaken in the wake of the 1999 Kargil conflict. It is to the credit of The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) that was convened under the chairmanship of the late Shri K Subrahmanyam (a former civilian bureaucrat who had served as Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and was one of our foremost strategic analysts), that India’s security commitments into the 21st Century briefly set out in preceding paragraphs, were taken into account while compiling and submitting a report that brought to light many grave deficiencies in India’s security management apparatus particularly in the areas of intelligence, border management and *the higher defence organisation*. The report noted that notwithstanding the fact that the country had fought five wars, grappled with a plethora of insurgent movements, been subjected to a proxy war through externally sponsored terrorism, buffeted by far-reaching developments brought about by the dramatic changes in the “world order” following the end of the Cold War, subjected to the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and other such technological developments, and the increased nuclearisation of the neighbourhood, *the original structure of India’s national security system had, by and large, remained unchanged*.

The Committee urged a thorough and expeditious review of the national security apparatus in its entirety. It strongly made the point that such a review should not be undertaken by an “over-burdened” bureaucracy, but by an independent body of credible experts, through one or more task forces, or other such mechanisms. Towards this end, in April 2000, the then Prime Minister constituted a GoM comprising the Ministers of Home Affairs, Defence, External Affairs and Finance. Which in turn set up four separate task forces on ‘Intelligence Apparatus’, ‘Internal Security’, ‘Border Management’ and ‘Management of Defence’, comprising distinguished individuals with acknowledged expertise (most of them then no longer serving in Government). These task forces inter-acted and conducted discussions and deliberations with organisations and key actors within and outside the

establishment, including field visits, and submitted their reports in August/September 2000. The reports of the task forces were circulated to concerned ministries and processed in several inter-ministerial group meetings. The GoM itself held detailed discussions with the heads of the various organisations and agencies to get a clear understanding and evolve the rationale for some of the recommendations.

On 19 February 2001, the GoM submitted its report and recommendations, which were subsequently placed in the public domain, with deletion of selected portions on grounds of national security. In so far as the theme of this paper is concerned, namely *"Restructuring and Integration of the Ministry of Defence with the Three Service Headquarters"*, there are a host of observations and recommendations that were to have been implemented. However, a few major recommendations of the KRC and GoM report that merit particular scrutiny in context of this paper are set out in succeeding paragraphs for purposes of recapitulation.

"Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. This has led to many negative results and it is felt that the Services Headquarters should be located within the Government. The entire gamut of national security management and apex decision making and the structure & interface between the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces' headquarters, should be comprehensively studied and organised".

(Para 16 of Appendix B to the GoM Report)

"Establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels from Command Headquarters to operative formations at the ground level is essential to smoothen the relationship during times of stress and to prevent friction and alienation of the local population".

(Para 21 of Appendix B to the GoM Report)

"In view of our dynamic and rapidly changing security environment, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to be suitably restructured and strengthened. Far reaching changes in the structures, processes, and procedures in Defence Management would be required to make the

system more efficient, resilient and responsive. This would also ensure the maximisation of our resources, potential, and establishment of synergy among the Armed Forces”.

(Para 6.2 of the GoM Report)

“There is a marked difference in the perception of civil and military officials regarding their respective roles and functions. There has also been on occasions, a visible lack of synchronisation among and between the three departments in the MoD, including the relevant elements of Defence Finance. The concept of ‘attached offices’ as applied to Services Headquarters; problems of inter-se relativities; multiple duplicated and complex procedures governing the exercise of administrative and financial powers; and the concept of ‘advice’ to the Minister, have all contributed to problems in the management of Defence. This situation requires to be rectified, to promote improved understanding and efficient functioning of the Ministry”.

(Para 6.4 of the GoM Report)

“The functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has, to date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. This institution needs to be appropriately revamped to discharge its responsibilities efficiently and effectively, including the facilitation of ‘jointness’ and synergy among the Defence Services”.

(Para 6.5 of the GoM Report)

“In the organisational setup of the Government, as it exists now, besides ministries and departments, there are either ‘Attached Offices’ or ‘Subordinate Offices’. For merely administrative reasons and not as a management device, the Service Headquarters are referred to as ‘Attached Offices’ of the Government. Consequently, there is sometimes the erroneous perception that the

*Armed Forces Headquarters do not participate in policy formulation and are outside the apex Governmental structure. In order to remove this impression, the Service Headquarters may be designated as 'Integrated Headquarters' of the MoD. **In order to give effect to this arrangement, the 'Transaction of Business Rules and Standing Orders' should be appropriately amended and issued.***"

(Para 6.14 of the GoM report)

"The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate. It needs to be strengthened by the addition of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The CDS is required to be established for the following reasons: to provide single-point advice to the Government; to administer the strategic forces; to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process through intra and inter-Service prioritisation; to ensure the required 'jointness' in the Armed Forces."

(Para 6.18 of the GoM report)

*"The CDS may be a 4-star officer drawn from one of the three Services in rotation. He shall function as a permanent Chairman of the COSC with the VCDS as member secretary. Accordingly he should rank *primus inter pares* in the COSC and function as the principal military adviser to the Defence Minister. It is essential that no CDS ever reverts to his original Service after a tenure as CDS....."*

(Para 6.19 of the GoM report)

*Towards enhancement of **jointness** in the Armed Forces, the GoM report suggests that: "The appointment of the CDS/VCDS with designated defence staff and the cross-posting of officers in the operations, intelligence and plans directorates in the Service Headquarters would be the first major step in establishing synergy and jointness among the Armed Forces.." (Para 6.29 of the GoM report). The report goes on to stress the need "to*

*optimise the use of **training resources and other facilities...** to avoid replication of similar training facilities in the individual Services and the CDS/COSC should therefore arrange for joint training of the three Services at the earliest possible time....”*

(Para 6.30 of the GoM report)

“It is extremely important that there is no dilution in the role of the Defence Secretary as the Principal Defence Adviser to the Defence Minister. He should be officially designated in standing orders as such and rank primus inter pares among secretaries in the MoD. Standing orders need to be promulgated specifying that the Defence Secretary has the primary responsibility for advising the Defence Minister on all policy matters and for the management of the Department, including financial management.....”

(Para 6.26 of the GoM report)

The GoM report makes a number of other detailed recommendations pertaining to defence intelligence, financial management, defence budgeting, procurement procedures, defence research and development organisation (DRDO), inventory management, quality control, and so on.

Implementation of the GoM Report Recommendations

An attempt has been made to assess the implementation of the recommendations made by the GoM. In that context, the last available document that the author has been able to access is the 32nd Report of the Standing Committee on Defence that was presented to the Lok Sabha on 18 December 2008 and laid in the Rajya Sabha the same day. It dealt with action taken by the Government on the recommendations contained in the 22nd Report of the Committee (to the Fourteenth Lok Sabha) on “review of implementation status of GoM Report on reforming national security system in pursuance of the KRC Report – a special reference to Management of Defence. This Action Taken Report (ATR) is available on the net and can be accessed by those interested in detail. In context of the theme of this paper, a few extracts are set out in succeeding paragraphs to highlight the fact that notwithstanding the observations of an important constitutional body

like the Standing Committee on Defence and its directions for initiation of action, the bureaucratic establishment of the MoD has found it expedient to either ignore the observations and directions, or indulge in lethargy and indifference.

Upgradation of the Post of Defence Secretary - Recommendation (Para Nos. 2.20, 2.25 and 2.26)

In their earlier Report, the Standing Committee had observed that the unequal status being enjoyed by the Chiefs of Staff vis-à-vis the Defence Secretary had been causing lack of coordination and synergy in the functional relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters. The Committee had accordingly, desired that post of Defence Secretary should be upgraded to the level of Cabinet Secretary or equivalent to the Chief of Service in order to enable him to synergise the functioning of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces and to promote improved understanding and efficient functioning of the Ministry as a whole.

In the statement on the Implementation Status of 22nd Report of the Standing Committee on Defence made by Raksha Mantri in Lok Sabha in October, 2008 he had stated: 'The roles of Civilian and Military officers are defined. However, on such issues wherein there is a requirement of clarifying roles between the Civilians and Military officers, the same is resolved through mutual consultations. With regard to the question of upgradation of the post of Defence Secretary to the level of Cabinet Secretary or equivalent to the Chief of Service, it is reiterated that the recommendations may not be accepted at present as the same is premature at this stage.'

Although the Committee had made the specific recommendation for upgradation of the post of Defence Secretary to the level of Cabinet Secretary or equivalent to the Chief of Service with the precise objectives of promoting efficient functioning of the Ministry of Defence as a whole and to bring about effective synergy amongst the three Services and the Ministry, nothing was mentioned in the reply as to what factors have weighed with the Ministry in coming to the conclusion that this recommendation may not be accepted at present being premature at this stage. The Committee had then expressed a desire to know the precise reasons for considering their recommendation as "premature" at present. *The Committee do not expect the Ministry of Defence to*

be apathetic to the present situation of lack of coordination and synergy in the functional relationship between the Ministry and the Service Headquarters and they strongly feel that reply of the Ministry clearly shows their intentions of avoiding responsibilities. They, therefore, reiterate their earlier recommendation that the post of Defence Secretary should be upgraded at the earliest.

Synergy amongst the Three Services - Recommendation (Para No. 2.21)

The Committee had observed that although the Government had taken a number of steps to bring synergy amongst the three Services like planning and formulation of Long Term and Five Year Plans, tri-Service Commands like the Andaman and Nicobar Theatre Command (ANC) etc., the desired level of synergy in such commands was missing and there was no jointness of Command and Control. The Committee accordingly, pointed out that it was a very serious lacuna and earnest efforts should be made to correct it immediately. The Committee also stressed that Coast Guard Services might also be inter-connected with the jointness of Command and Control of the three Services.

The MoD in providing the Implementation Status on the 22nd Report of the Standing Committee on Defence subsequently made by Raksha Mantri in Lok Sabha in October, 2008 on the subject, stated: "The present system is working well with all the joint aspects being coordinated by HQ ANC where staff from all the Services is posted at each branch as per requirement. Respective Component Commanders take instructions from the joint staff of HQ ANC and execute the given task as only they are competent to carry out the Service specific operations and it is not advisable to allow outside interference in their specialised fields/ service. ANC, as a tri Service organisation, is relatively young. Issues relating to allocation of additional resources and upgradation of infrastructure are being addressed, based on threat perception. The integration of communication within components of the Army, Navy and Air Force in ANC and from HQ IDS / Service HQ to ANC is in progress as a recent initiative, to further improve and streamline interoperability.

The personnel Branch of HQ IDS, along with representatives of the JAG Department, are examining the aspects of amendments required to Army, Navy and IAF Acts for devolution of disciplinary

powers to Commander-in-Chief, Andaman & Nicobar Theatre Command (CINCAN) in respect of personnel of different services posted to ANC, to re-emphasise single point authority / responsibility. Coast Guard is a service under MoD and a system of their deputation to joint command during peacetime needs to be resolved for further integration.”

The Committee underscored its understanding that due to lack of authority and power, the present system of Unified Command is neither very effective nor able to achieve its intended objectives as the aspects relating to single point authority/ responsibility are still being examined with a view to bringing in requisite amendments in the Army, Navy and Indian Air Force Acts. The Committee expressed its anguish over the routine nature of reply in the instant case and strongly recommended that the requisite amendments in the relevant Act should be carried out expeditiously. The Committee also observed that the reply of the Ministry is silent on the aspect of connectivity of Coast Guard Services with Jointness of Command and Control of the Services. *The Committee, therefore, desired that urgent and concrete steps be taken to ensure that the Unified Command is vested with adequate powers to discharge its responsibilities. Steps should also be taken to resolve the issues connected with integration of Coast Guard Services with the jointness of Command and Control of the Services.*

Restructuring of MoD and Service Headquarters - Recommendation (Para Nos. 2.30, 2.31 and 2.32.)

Taking note of the fact that the GoM had recommended restructuring of MoD and Service Headquarters and desired that a committee headed by the Defence Secretary should look into the delegation of administrative powers and such restructuring, the Standing Committee on Defence had expressed the view that there was an urgent need to review the working of all these organisations set-up by the MoD on the basis of recommendations made by GoM.

The MoD, in their reply, had stated: “That in pursuance of these recommendations, a number of institutions like Integrated Defence Staff, tri-Service bodies like the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Strategic Forces Command and ANC had been established. In addition to these, Defence Acquisition Council, Defence Procurement Board, Defence Production Board and

Defence Research and Development Board had also been established. That it was considered that the efficacy of these institutions and organisations needed to be reviewed by MoD since some of these organisations are chaired by the Hon'ble Raksha Mantri and Defence Secretary."

Given the fact that a number of institutions/organisations had been established by the Government in pursuance of the recommendations made in the GoMs' Report, the Standing Committee on Defence had made a specific recommendation that a team of experts should examine the actual working of these organisations to ensure their efficient working and to have synergy. The Committee therefore expressed surprise at the reply of the Ministry that the Government considered that the efficacy of these institutions might be reviewed by the MoD since some of these organisations are chaired by Hon'ble Raksha Mantri and Defence Secretary.

The Committee pointed out that their recommendations did not call for any review by the Ministry of Defence and what they intended was a review of the functioning of these institutions by an independent expert body in order to strengthen their functioning and ensure synergy amongst them. The Committee expressed a hope that the MoD would now move in the right direction and take appropriate steps to implement their recommendation in letter and spirit. At the same time, the Committee also found that the reply of the MoD was completely silent on the aspect of giving adequate flexibility to these organisations. The Committee asked to be apprised of the precise measures taken by the Ministry in this regard.

Lack of Synergy Among the Services - Recommendation (Para No. 2.19)

The Standing Committee on Defence noted that it was the lack of synergy among the three Services which caused difficulties to the Armed Forces during the Kargil War. The Chief of Staff assumed the role of operational Commander to the respective forces rather than that of Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. This led to a number of negative results and protocol problems. The Committee understands that in pursuance of the observations and recommendations of KRC, the GoM had felt seriously the need for creation of the post of CDS in order to boost synergy among the three Services of Armed Forces and to provide a single

point military advice to Prime Minister and Defence Minister. The Committee also noted the observations of GoM that the functioning of COSC has revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the Government.

The reply of the Government was that based on recommendation of the GoM, HQ IDS was created on 01st October 2001, and that in the last few years much had been achieved by HQ IDS towards greater integration and in promoting synergy and jointness between the three Services. Some of the achievements summarised were that: Military advice to the Government continues to be provided by the COSC; a tiered system of decision making has been adopted amongst the three Services to address joint issues; the COSC is assisted by a number of tri-Service committees; in order to address inter-Service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. HQ IDS had a number of achievements like those on disaster management, revitalisation of the Integrated Space Cell, and coordination of C4I2 concept, induction to technology and joint systems interaction.

The conclusion arrived at by the Ministry was that a lot of action has been initiated by the HQ IDS with regard to streamlining COSC functioning and improving its effectiveness. The process cannot be deemed as complete, nonetheless it is an incremental process that would take both time and efforts and that is being pursued by the Services and MoD in right earnest.

The Committee, in their earlier report had recommended the creation of the post of CDS. In view of this, the Committee, therefore, reiterated that the Government should take the GoM's recommendations as well as the Committee's concern in this matter seriously and take the final decision on CDS at the earliest and till the final decision on CDS is taken, the functioning of COSC should be seriously streamlined and positively made effective.

Lateral Entry of Armed Forces Personnel and Induction of Ex-Servicemen in various Para-Military Services - Recommendation (Para Nos. 2.72, 2.73, 2.74, 2.75, 2.97 and 3.28)

With a view to ensuring proper resettlement of Service personnel being retired to keep younger age profile of the Armed Forces, the Standing Committee on Defence had desired that such Ex-servicemen should be given lateral entry into various Para Military,

Border Security Force, Central Police Forces as well as in State Police Forces and other such forces, as they were fully trained in handling arms and ammunitions and had the first hand experience of handling infiltrators and insurgents, etc. The Committee also expressed the view that induction of Ex-servicemen into the para-military and other such forces would lead to huge reduction in pension and other retirement benefits bill of the Government.

In the statement made in Lok Sabha in October 2008 on the implementation status of the 22nd Report of the Committee on the subject, the Raksha Mantri stated: "The GOM, appointed in pursuance of the KRC, had recommended lateral transfer of Indian Armed Forces personnel to para military organisations in their report on 'Reforming the National Security System' with the primary aim of keeping a young profile of the Army in peak combat effective state, capable of meeting the challenges of future conflict. Based on the recommendations of the GOM report, an Apex Committee consisting of Cabinet Secretary, Chief of the Army Staff, Defence Secretary, Home Secretary and Secretary Expenditure was constituted to look into the terms of engagement of soldiers and their lateral entry into other organisations. In addition, a Working Group under the Chairmanship of Adjutant General, Army Headquarters with Joint Secretary (Police), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), representatives of Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force and National Security Council Secretariat as Members, was constituted to carry out a detailed study of various issues, and, work out modalities for lateral transfer. The Working Group, after in depth deliberations submitted its report in March 2002. The recommendations of the Working Group envisages Long Term and Short Term lateral transfer of Armed Forces personnel into Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs). Since then, a number of meetings at various levels including with the Cabinet Secretary and Home Secretary have been held. The following issues largely remained contentious and intractable : –

- (a) Fixing the inter-se seniority of the transferees vis-à-vis original inductees of CPMFs without adversely affecting the latter's promotion prospects.
- (b) Disparities in the pay and allowances and perks of CPMF personnel and Armed Forces transferees.
- (c) Issue of reservation for backward classes.

“A meeting was taken by the Home Secretary on 2nd November, 2006. As per the decision taken in the meeting, a Committee under the Chairmanship of Director General, Border Security Force has been constituted to work out the modalities. RM had also written to Home Minister in this regard to solve the impasse on lateral transfer of Army Personnel to Central Para Military Forces. Home Minister had earlier informed that further action in this matter will be taken after receiving the report of the Committee under the Chairmanship of DG, BSF. Ministry of Home Affairs have recently intimated that the said committee has had deliberations and that their report may be awaited.”

The Committee are not satisfied with the replies given by the MoD that the issue of lateral entry of Armed Forces personnel remains contentious and intractable due to factors relating to fixation of inter-se seniority and disparity of pay and allowances between transferees vis-à-vis original inductees in the CPMFs. Yet another issue stated to be contentious is reservation for backward classes. Although the Working Group constituted by the Government for the purpose had submitted its report way back in March, 2002, the Committee find it distressing that the issues remain unresolved and precious time has been lost in deliberations without arriving at a final decision. Considering the fact that even Sixth Central Pay Commission, in their report, have recommended for a scheme of lateral transfer of Defence personnel to Central Police Organisations etc., the Committee would impress upon the Government to make concerted efforts to arrive at positive conclusions without any further loss of time.

The Committee find it rather strange that the MoD have termed induction of Ex-servicemen in the CPMFs as a complex issue. In the light of the fact that retirement age in Central Police Forces is higher than that in the Armed Forces, the Committee are unable to comprehend the plea now put forth by the Ministry that Central Police Forces are also experiencing adverse fall out of higher age profile in the case of large number of battalions raised in recent years. Astonishingly, the Ministry have also tried to explain away that there are certain other factors like no reservation for SC, ST, OBCs in the Army which has constitutional implications; need to modify recruitment rules; promotion avenues of CPF personnel etc., which need to be considered for coming to a decision. The Committee are not inclined to accept these reasons as convincing

enough for the delay in settling this issue. The Committee feel that rather than finding excuses, the Government should examine this issue in its entirety and take concrete steps in the right direction in a time bound manner.

Developing Capacities within the Defence Establishment for Meeting Future Demands

Relevant extracts of the KRC report, the GoM report and observations of the Standing Committee of Defence have been set out in the preceding paragraphs primarily for the information of those readers who either have not accessed these documents, or have not worked up the time or inclination to go through them in detail. It would be evident from a quick perusal, that the inadequacies and infirmities of the present structure of our higher defence organisation and the MoD (that have been the subject of much discussion and comment in the years since Independence, but not acted upon) have been fully recognised, identified and serious recommendations made at the senior political level for remedial action in the GoM report of February 2001. It is another matter altogether that, twelve years on, while some action on a few recommendations of the GoM report like the setting up of a Headquarters IDS, the ANC, and the Strategic Forces Command have been initiated, action on the more substantive aspects pertaining to the higher management of defence, such as the restructuring of the MoD and its integration with the Armed Forces Headquarters, appointment of a CDS, and institutional measures for promotion of "jointness" between the three Services, has either not been pursued or deliberately delayed by the machinations of a bureaucracy that has cleverly bypassed or ignored the directions of even the political establishment.

It is indeed a telling reflection of the bankruptcy of our system that decisions taken by the political leadership are, where considered to their disadvantage by the bureaucratic machinery, referred for deliberation to bodies or committees constituted of members of the civilian bureaucracy or representatives decided upon by them, in order to either stymie implementation or delay the process indefinitely.

Transaction of Business Rules and Standing Orders

It is probably best to start an analysis of the aspect of higher defence management to meet the emerging demands on the

country, by addressing the very first recommendation made by the GoM in para 6.14 of its report that states: "In order to give effect to this arrangement, the 'Transaction of Business Rules and Standing Orders' should be appropriately amended and issued". One is given to understand that these "Business Rules" that form the basis for the conduct of business by the Government of India are to be found in two volumes issued under the constitutional powers of the President of India in 1961. According to this set of rules, *"the responsibility for the defence of India, and every part thereof, including preparation for defence, and for the armed forces of the Union, namely Army, Navy and Air Force has been vested in the Defence Secretary"*.

The most charitable explanation one can possibly put forward for such a ridiculous arrangement which would have been laughable if it was not so serious, is that when the "Business Rules" were drafted soon after we proclaimed ourselves a Republic, those entrusted with the task, without doubt from the civil services, would have, as is more often than not the case, got hold of our colonial masters' documents on the subject, and gone about doing a "cut and paste" job to fit what they would have considered were our requirements. It is therefore more than likely that in so far as the higher management of defence was concerned, the portion on the responsibility for the defence of the country would have been copied verbatim from the British document. Not allowing for the fact (deliberately or otherwise), that in the British system, then as is even now, the Defence Secretary is a political appointee, a member of the cabinet nominated by the Prime Minister to hold the charge of the defence portfolio, and not the senior-most civilian bureaucrat, who in the British system is the permanent under secretary for defence. In our case, the provisions in the draft would have served our civilian bureaucracy well in terms of denying the military leadership in the persons of the Commanders-in-Chief or later the Chiefs of Staff, a role in government. Whether the political leadership of the time or even the military leadership, saw through the fallacy of the arrangement, can only be a matter of conjecture. However the important point at issue is, that in so far as one can ascertain, no attempt has been made to implement this first and most important recommendation given in the GoM report of 2001.

It is therefore time that we put in place an institutionalised arrangement that ensures that the responsibility for oversight and direction of military operations is vested, not in the civilian bureaucracy, but in the political leadership, represented in our case by the Defence Minister, with the assistance of a CDS (when that appointment is made) and the Service Chiefs, and through him to the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by the Prime Minister. To that end, steps should be taken without any further delay to amend the Government Business Rules to the effect that *“the responsibility for the defence of India, and every part thereof, including preparation for defence, and for the armed forces of the Union, namely Army, Navy and Air Force is vested in the Defence Minister (Raksha Mantri)”*.

Once this is implemented, most of the other recommendations made in the GoM report will fall into place, as the political leadership would become better aware of their responsibilities in regard to the management and control of the defence apparatus. In this context it may be prudent that the Government of the day accords greater attention to the deliberations and observations of the Standing Committee on Defence.

Restructuring of the Ministry of Defence and Integration with Services

A major observation the GoM makes in Paragraph 6.2 of the report is that: “In view of our dynamic and rapidly changing security environment, the MoD needs to be suitably restructured and strengthened. Far reaching changes in the structures, processes, and procedures in defence management would be required to make the system more efficient, resilient and responsive”.

Restructuring of the MoD really implies review of its manning policies to ensure that there is inbuilt capacity for understanding operational commitments, equipment requirements, and administrative needs of the Armed Forces. With all the right intentions, the current arrangement of generalist IAS officers moving into the Ministry and back to their state cadres, or out to other central government ministries, is barely workable, leading to periodic tensions in relations between the military and the civilian components; not quite the arrangement for such a vital organisation responsible for the security of the nation. Regrettably what has been done in the last twelve years since the release of the GoM report has been largely cosmetic and most unconvincing.

The best arrangement for manning the MoD is without doubt having civil service officers from a dedicated national security cadre, who could move around within the security apparatus at the central government such as within the Home Ministry, as also to similar offices at state government level. Obviously supplemented and complemented by induction of officers from the two organisations so closely involved with the evolution of policies on national security and their implementation, the Armed Forces and the Foreign Service.

Till such an arrangement is put in place (which will probably take some years yet even if pursued) it should be possible, with some political will and purpose, to institute the following measures:

- (a) It should be made mandatory for IAS officers deputed to the MoD to have done professional courses at Service institutions; as for instance those posted to Director level appointments should have attended the course at the Defence Services Staff College Wellington; and those posted to appointments at joint secretary and above should have attended the National Defence College course.
- (b) Suitably qualified Service officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel equivalent and above should be inducted into selected appointments within the MoD for fixed tenures of two to three years.
- (c) As should officers from the Indian Foreign Service into selected appointments within the MoD.

Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)

The need to have a CDS within the Indian higher defence structure has been the subject of discussion in earlier years from time to time without any real moves towards fruition. However, the KRC and GoM reports have quite categorically asserted that it is time for the institution of this office together with a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) and an integrated headquarters in order to provide single point military advice to the Government, exercise control over India's strategic forces, enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process through intra and inter Service prioritisation, and promote required jointness in the Armed Forces. It is indeed a matter of some irony that despite the recommendations of the GoM and the prodding of the Standing Committee on Defence, there has been no progress on this issue.

This is a decision to be taken by the political leadership on its own merit. It is indeed unfortunate and a sad reflection of the knowledge of matters military, and the capacity for taking decisions, that despite the recommendations made by the GoM in their report, successive Governments have not been able to muster the will to 'bite the bullet' as it were. To the best of one's knowledge, the reasons put forward for not being able to arrive at a decision is the lack of consensus within the three Services. This is a contention that needs to be placed in the right perspective. In the last few decades, nowhere in the world has such an arrangement been put in place with the agreement and consensus of the various components of the armed forces. The decision has, in every case, been taken by the political authorities, and implementation ordered through acts of Parliament or Congress or whatever. The service chiefs were directed to implement the decision and do so without question, even where they were not necessarily fully in agreement with it. Those in the military hierarchy who felt strongly enough about their disagreement with the political decision, were allowed to leave with grace and dignity, and leave its implementation to others down the line.

Jointness and Integration

By all indications, there is absolutely no difference of opinion within the Armed Forces, other sections of the governing establishment, and the strategic community, that 'jointness' and 'integration' are key to success in operations in the emerging environment. The debate really appears to be only on how this is best achieved. The arrangements that served us in the past, not always to the desired degree, are just not robust or resilient enough to withstand the rigours of the demands on our forces in the future. And in that context, it is pertinent to suggest that restructuring, jointness and integration cannot be complete without taking the following major steps : –

- (a) Dismantling of many if not most, existing single service organisations and establishments to provide for integrated ones for engineering skills, communications, logistics, repair and recovery, ordnance back-up, transport other than specialised, etc and a number of training facilities that have duplicating or common features. Not only would all this contribute to jointness, but it would also ensure savings in

finances and manpower. Needless to say, some "empires" would stand demolished; but to the good of the establishment. This is an aspect that hardly merits further discussion if we are talking about jointness and integration.

(b) In context of the changes that have, and are, taking place at the geo-strategic plane, and the possible demands that we are likely to be faced with, it is no longer possible for single service chiefs to oversee the conduct of operations. One will not try to make a case in regard to the other two Services, but as a person who served as Additional Director General and then Director General of Military Operations at Army Headquarters in New Delhi from mid-1989 to March 1992, when we were handling the final stages of the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka, coping with terrorist activity in Punjab, dealing with the explosive situation that had emerged in the Kashmir Valley, and had begun to be drawn into dealing with the emerging threat from the ULFA in Assam, besides the ongoing insurgencies in Nagaland and Manipur, permit me to state with some authority, without treading on the ego of the personalities of that time, that there were better ways of handling them. And it is no doubt important to stress that one is not yet talking of a war situation; one-front, one-and-a-half-front or two-front.

Operational Control of Forces

There is therefore little doubt that if we are to undertake future operational commitments effectively, as important as the case for the creation of the post of a "Chief of the Defence Staff", is the compelling requirement for divesting the Service Chiefs of the responsibility for the oversight and conduct of operations on our Western, North-Western, Northern and North-Eastern borders, as also maritime operations off our Eastern and Western sea-boards and beyond, by the establishment of "Theatre Commands". Theatre commanders would then be directly responsible on operational matters to the Defence Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) through the CDS. Such an arrangement cannot and should not be put off any longer. Instituting such a dramatic change will without doubt be resisted by the current and prospective Service Chiefs. To arrive at a realistic and pragmatic decision on

the subject, it would make sense to elicit opinions confidentially from Corps Commanders and selected Division Commanders and their equivalents in the other two Services, of the desirability or otherwise of instituting the theatre command concept. Simultaneously, in context of the fact that allocations for defence needs will invariably impose considerable strain on national resources and therefore be more and more difficult to come by, every effort must be made to save on avoidable expenditure. To that end it is imperative that we take immediate measures to remove duplication and triplication of personnel requirements and infrastructure on training and logistics, by pooling the resources of all three Services, and maybe even of para-military organisations like the Coast Guard, to a common joint Services grid. In order to manage such an arrangement it would be appropriate to also set up "Functional Commands" that complement the "Theatre Command" concept.

A possible framework of such a concept has been the subject of discussion at a number of fora in the last few years and many useful and pragmatic suggestions are on the table. One such set of suggestions was presented at a National Security Seminar at the United Service Institution of India a few years back by an enterprising and imaginative serving participant. The view he presented did not obviously have official sanction or approval, but provides a basic template around which the concept may be developed, and is set out below as a basis for detailed consideration:

(a) Integrated Theatre Commands

- (i) Northern, Western, Central and North Eastern Commands based pre-dominantly on land forces with air support; to be commanded by Army C-in-Cs.
- (ii) Indian Ocean West, Indian Ocean East and Southern Commands based pre-dominantly on naval assets together with land forces components and air force support; to be commanded by Navy C-in-Cs.
- (iii) South Western Command based on land forces and air force assets together with some naval component; to be commanded by Air Force C-in-C.

(b) Integrated Functional Commands

- (i) Strategic Forces Command; to be commanded by Air Force C-in-C
- (ii) Air Defence Command; to be commanded by Air Force C-in-C
- (iii) Joint Training Command; by rotation
- (iv) Joint Operational Logistics Command; by rotation
- (v) Communications and Information Warfare Command; by rotation
- (vi) Cyber Space Command; by rotation
- (vii) Out of Area Contingency Operations Command; by rotation
- (viii) Internal Security and Disaster Relief Command; by rotation
- (ix) Joint Special Forces Command; by rotation

Apex Level Control

Directives to theatre commanders for the planning and conduct of operations within the framework of a National Security Strategy approved by the National Security Council (NSC) should be provided by the CCS through the Defence Minister and the CDS. Apex level operational control over theatre commands would also be best exercised by the CCS through the Defence Minister and CDS/CJCS.

Lateral Induction of Armed Forces Personnel and Selective National Service

Both the KRC and the GoM as also the Standing Committee on Defence have stressed the need for immediate implementation of the recommendation for "lateral movement" of Armed Forces personnel into the para military, central and state police forces.

In making a case for better understanding of matters military within the governing establishment, it may be appropriate to go a few steps further by putting in place institutional arrangements to ensure that all entry into Central and State Government employment

including into public sector undertakings, be made contingent on two/ three years of compulsory service in the Armed Forces; a "selective national service" concept. This recommendation includes induction of personnel into the IAS, IFS, IPS, etc, as well as entry at lower levels including into the state police, CPOs, the para-military and public sector undertakings. Such a measure will not only address the shortage of officers in units of the Armed Forces at the junior level but also ensure ready availability of trained manpower to deal with internal security situations that often call for coordinated 'muscular' response.

Conclusion

Most established democracies in the world have retained firm civilian control over their armed forces. This has also been the case with India since Independence primarily because of the sense of responsibility and vision of the senior military leadership that the country was fortunate to have at the time. Even so, few militaries have been subjected to the kind of overwhelming civilian bureaucratic dominance that the military in India has endured. It is therefore not surprising that the civilian bureaucracy in India is hardly enthusiastic about providing greater room for the military in the conduct of national security and diplomacy. It is time for the country's political leadership to assert itself and draw the military into the national security decision making process by restructuring the MoD and putting in place institutionalised arrangements for military advice and conduct of military operations. To that extent, it is probably relevant to state that the countries that have drawn the military into the national security apparatus in an institutionalised manner are in a position to review current arrangements for modification in a graduated manner. In so far as India is concerned, a radical overhaul is called for. The basis for this has been provided by the recommendations of the GoM in their Report of February 2001. It needs political will for implementation in context of the analysis provided in this paper.

Cyber Weapons – The New Weapons of Mass Destruction?

Lieutenant General Davinder Kumar,
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Introduction

In this Information Age, while Cyber Space has been accepted as the new domain of warfare, it still does not have an internationally accepted definition. The same is true for cyber weapons. The US Government security expert, Richard A Clarke, in his book, *Cyber War defines Cyber Warfare as actions by a nation state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption.*¹ Cyber Weapons, accordingly, are the tools for conducting cyber warfare.

Weapons, in their simplest form, could be considered as, “instruments of harm”. Since the dawn of time, humans have used weapons to hunt and demonstrate or acquire power. The types of weapons and their range, lethality and precision have increased substantially with the advancement of technology and the need to obviate the perceived threat. *The weapons thus have evolved with time.* The time taken to translate the concept into a product/weapon has been reducing in consonance with the pace of development of technology and its engineering into production. Cyber weapons are also evolving just as the conventional weapons albeit at a much faster pace. In the cyber world, the technological advancements happen in days or even hours with the emergence of corresponding new threats. *The most significant development has been the reach of cyber weapons in the real physical world as demonstrated by the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian Nuclear facility.*²

Definition

We need to define cyber weapons correctly as the same has significant political, security and legal consequences. This is an urgent and important requirement - for being able to assess both

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the level of threat from a cyber attack and the consequent political and legal responsibilities attributable to the attacker. Two definitions, one by a security expert and the other with legal overtones are given below:

"Cyber Weapon could be defined as a computer code that is used or designed to be used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional or mental harm to structures, systems or living beings."


"A device or any set of computer instructions intended to unlawfully damage a system acting as a critical infrastructure, its information, the data or programmes therein contained or thereto relevant, or even intended to facilitate the interruption, total or partial, or alteration of its operations."

The above definitions imply that cyber weapons may span, in theory, a wide range of possibilities: from Denial of Service attacks (which typically have a low level of penetration) to, "tailored" malware like the Stuxnet characterised by high intrusiveness and a low rate of collateral damages. It may be prudent, therefore, to evaluate cyber weapons from its domain of relevance, cyber space, with the distinct possibility to cross the virtual boundaries and extend to the real world.

Classification ³

With the above idea in mind, cyber weapons can be classified according to the following four parameters as shown at Figure 1 :-

- (a) Precision** - That is the capability to target only the specific objective and reduce collateral damages.
- (b) Intrusion** - the level of penetration inside the target.
- (c) Visibility** - the capability to remain undetected
- (d) Ease of Implementation** - a measure of the resources needed to develop the specific cyber weapon

**Figure 1****Why Cyber Weapons? ⁴**

Use of cyber weapons is complementary to conventional military strikes. It could be possible to:-

- (a) Support offensive operations by destroying enemy's defence/critical infrastructure
- (b) Probe the technological capabilities of the adversary by evaluating the ability of an agent to infect the enemy system.
- (c) Cyber weapons are more efficient and less expensive.
- (d) The attack is carried out at the speed of light.
- (e) Cyber weapons are less noisy (stealth weapons) - no one wants to acknowledge the vulnerabilities of their system.
- (f) Attribution is very difficult - the possibility to operate under cover makes cyber weapons very attractive.
- (g) Cyber weapons are offence dominant and ideal weapons for asymmetric warfare - the warfare of 21st century
- (h) Preparation phase of cyber weapons is easy to hide

from prying eyes and development of cyber weapon is hard to identify.

The above advantages make cyber weapons very attractive to those "small" states that despite having reduced funds for military expenses can compete with the most powerful countries in the new domain. At present, nearly 140 countries in the world are engaged in the development of offensive cyber warfare capability.

Likely Targets of Cyber Weapons - Impact on Cyberspace ⁵

The spread of a malicious agent in cyberspace could lead to the loss of human lives and cause the destruction of critical infrastructures. These are considerable as a direct effect for which the cyber weapon has been designed, but there are also "collateral damages" caused by the uncontrolled diffusion of a cyber weapon. A cyber attack could cause similar damage to a conventional attack with serious impact on citizens. The spectrum is very wide. In general, cyber weapons could hit every critical infrastructure and vital systems of a country such as:-

Electronic National Defence Systems. By hacking a defence system of a country it is possible to control its conventional weapons, for example there is the possibility to launch a missile against the state itself or other nations. Similarly, Command and Control systems of the adversary can be degraded substantially by interfering/disrupting the defence communication networks

Hospitals. Electronic systems present in hospitals and health centres could be exposed to cyber attacks that can compromise their functioning, causing serious consequences.

Industrial Control Systems (like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System or Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) of Critical Facilities. A cyber attack could compromise the management system of a chemical plant, dams, energy production plants or a nuclear site, altering production processes and exposing large areas to risk of destruction.

Water Supply. Water is an essential resource for the population. Interruption of the supply might leave large areas without water. The alteration of the control system might allow it to be functional but vulnerable to a successive attack such as water poisoning.

Fully-automated Transportation Control Systems and Civil and Military Air Traffic Controls. All those systems do not require conductors or drivers, or give a sensible aid to the conduction and control of transportation. Consider the effect of an attack on train control systems or to an air traffic management system.

Electricity Grid Management Systems. This target represents the vital system of a country. Attacking these systems, it is possible to interrupt the electricity supply, causing the total block of the activities of a nation such as computers, trains, hospitals and telecommunications services. These represent a privileged target for a cyber attack, and their defense is a fundamental in every cyber strategy.

Communication and Data Networks

Banking Systems and Financial Platforms. Financial systems are critical assets for a nation and their blocking could cause serious problems. Despite being unable to cause the direct loss of human lives, a cyber attack could cause the financial collapse of a nation through interference/blocking of all economic activities. The scenario is worrying - if we think that global finance today is strictly dependent on the economy of each single state, a cyber attack against a state could cause serious and unpredictable consequences to the entire economic system.

Limitations of Cyber Weapons

One of the most dangerous effects of the use of a cyber weapon is the difficulty to predict its diffusion since cyber space has no boundaries. This means : –

(a) Cyber weapons could hit in unpredictable ways other systems and networks that are not considered targets. In extreme cases, there is a possibility that it attacks the systems of host nation in a sort of “boomerang effect”.

(b) Presence of cyber weapons in cyberspace could open up the possibility of reverse engineering of its source code by ill-intentioned individuals. Foreign governments, cyber terrorists, hactivists and cyber criminals could be able to detect, isolate and analyse the agents, designing and spreading new cyber threats that are difficult to mitigate.

(c) Cyber weapons have limited shelf life since they are designed to exploit a particular vulnerability.

(d) Span of attack and extent of damage is inversely proportional to the sophistication of the cyber weapon

Generations of Cyber Weapons⁶

Cyber weapons, like any other weapon system are evolving with time, technological advances and threat perception. The three generations of cyber weapons could be defined as follows:

Generation 1. Physical or (Anti) radiation electronic warfare weapons that can blind, cripple, degrade or incapacitate through physical attack or traditional electronic warfare means. These are effectively command and control weapons. The criterion is the level of effect delivered. Traditional effects are degradation, disruption of communication with very closely controlled deployment and targeting. Examples are the blowing up of the Siberian oil pipe line in 1982; destruction of Iraq's power grid by deploying carbon fibers to short the electric grid; blowing up of Baghdad telephone system in the Gulf war and so on.

Generation 2. Software and hardware derived technical implementations that allow for vulnerabilities to be exploited in the systems of systems or specific targets. These are characterised by their requirement that somebody has an exploitable feature in systems design, configuration, or software implementations. This is further characterised by heavy reliance on network infrastructures though they may not be the primary mechanism of exploitation. There is varying levels of barrier to entry. Traditional characteristics are of espionage and sabotage with varying level of sophistication and control of deployment. Estonia⁷ and Georgia⁸ incidents would qualify.

Generation 3. Fusions of generation 1 and 2 weapons then become point and shoot weapons that can destroy, degrade or disrupt the adversary's systems without requiring the vulnerabilities to be exploited. The adversary is no longer required to make a mistake. These kinds of weapons simply destroy the command and control, (communication and coordination) behaviours of cyber infrastructures. Emerging characteristics are of selective targeting and speed of deployment.

Generation 1 weapons primarily work against the availability of systems and the inherent infrastructures that they operate upon. Generation 2 weapons tend to operate at the logical layers against the protocols and applications that run on top of the network. Finally, Generation 3 weapons appear to be destined to work against the entirety of the systems of systems infrastructures inclusive of the human being.

Another interesting way to define cyber weapons would be based on the contemporary threats and their classification.⁹ The current state of threats is best represented as a pyramid. The base of the pyramid is made up of all kinds of threats – what we call ‘traditional’ cybercrime. Its distinguishing features include a reliance of mass attacks targeting ordinary users. Cyber criminals’ are mostly interested in launching these attacks for direct financial gain. This accounts for over 90 per cent of all contemporary threats.

The second tier is made up of threats aimed at organisations. These are targeted attacks, which include industrial espionage, as well as targeted hacker attacks designed to discredit their victims. The attackers are highly specialised and work with a specific target in mind or for a specific client. The goal is to steal information or intellectual property. Financial gain is not the attackers’ primary goal. This group of threats also includes a variety of malicious programmes created by certain companies at the request of law enforcement agencies.

The third tier, which is the top level of the pyramid, includes malware which can be categorised as true cyber weapons. *These include malware created and financed by government-controlled structures. Such malware is used against citizens, organisations and agencies in other countries.*

To summarise, we can identify three main groups of cyber weapons based on threats:-

- (a) **Destroyers.** These are programs designed to destroy databases and information as a whole. They can be implemented as ‘logic bombs’ that are introduced into victim systems either in advance and then triggered at a certain time, or during a targeted attack with immediate execution. The most notable example of such malware is Wiper.¹⁰

(b) **Espionage Programmes.** This group includes cyber weapons (malware) like Flame, Gauss,¹¹ Duqu¹² and miniFlame¹³. The primary purpose of such malware is to collect as much information as possible, particularly very highly specialised data (e.g. from Automated Computer Aided Design (Autocad) projects, SCADA systems etc.), which can then be used to create other types of threats.

(c) **Cyber Sabotage Tools.** These are the ultimate form of cyber weaponry – threats resulting in physical damage to targets. Naturally, this category includes the Stuxnet worm. Threats of this kind are unique and require adequate intelligence and R&D resources. Some developed and networked countries are devoting more and more effort to developing this type of threat, as well as defending themselves against it.

Cyber Weapons – The New WMDs¹⁴

Just as the industrial revolution brought about a fundamental change in warfare, the Information Age is ushering in a new, low cost option for strategic defence in the form of cyber warfare in general and cyber weapons in particular. These can now accomplish most of the strategic tasks that once required air superiority or nuclear capability. The situation is similar to the time when early nuclear theory wrestled with many of the similar issues that we now face in attempting to understand cyber weapons. Some of the important issues are:-

- (a) The long range strike capabilities of cyber warfare have the potential to be extremely effective when employed as an anti-coercion weapon (power projection capability at minimal cost).
- (b) A strong cyber capability is a deterrent force that will largely mitigate outside interference in domestic and regional affairs.
- (c) Cyber weapons have the potential to become an equalising force because they require a fraction of investment compared to nuclear weapons or the strategic air power and yet would be able to execute most of similar missions and that too with limited or no collateral damage. While a cyber

weapon can cause a total black out of the electric grid for the operationally desired duration, the same can be restored just by a click of a switch!

(d) Given the speed and precision with which a cyber attack can be carried out, these weapons can be used for anything from a warning shot to signal an adversary to a catastrophic strike that could cost trillions of dollars and an unspecified discomfort to the people.

The wide range of issues mentioned above make the cyber weapons unique. The fact that a cyber arsenal is also exceedingly cheap means that the available destructive capacity for poor and weak States vis-à-vis a developed and networked State is unprecedented. The ability to strike quickly and on such a scale with no possibility of retribution makes cyber weapons uniquely terrifying. A well executed cyber campaign coupled with careful public relations has the potential to traumatise a society in ways not seen after Nagasaki. *Cyber weapons are a cheap way to build a global strike capability against networked states.*

Implications¹⁵

Curtailling of Inter-State Coercion. Just like large and capable conventional forces, cyber weapons present a strong deterrent for a potential attacker. While very few countries have the capability of intervention at the regional or global levels, any country with a network connection may be able to launch an effective retaliatory strike. Consequently, interventionist foreign policies will become exceedingly expensive both in the material and human cost. The new dangers that the fifth domain of warfare creates will limit the behaviour of bigger nations. There is a school of thought that the Iraq war would have to be fought differently if Iraq had cyber weapons.

Derailment of Human Security Issues. The cost of intervention increases in direct proportion to the target state's ability to launch a strategic cyber attack. Accordingly, not many nations would like to intervene to prevent humanitarian crises.

Alteration of Conventional Force Structure. Cyber weapons present the possibility of altering conventional force structure in a fundamental way. For example, there are multiple comparative advantages of cyber weapons over air strikes. The first and the

most compelling is cost. The second is the temporary nature of the effect of cyber weapons and finally negligible collateral damage caused by cyber weapons.

Cyber Deterrence

The above implications mean that cyber deterrence is capable of reducing the incidents of violence in the International system. At the same time, it is also likely to make the world a safer place for corrupt and abusive regimes. Cyber weapons and their value may not rival that of nuclear weapons at present, but they certainly have greater deterrence force than conventional systems. These have the potential of increasing the transactional cost of war to such an extent that developed nations will be far less willing to use force internationally based on ideals or a perception of marginal regional balance of power.

Failure of Deterrence¹⁶

There are, however, glaring issues regarding deterrence in cyber space and these are:-

- (a) Unlike nuclear weapons or any other conventional capability, it is almost impossible to demonstrate cyber power.
- (b) It is very easy to develop this capability with an exceedingly small foot print.
- (c) The technical nature of cyber weapons requires a pre-existing vulnerability in the software or the ability to assume the identity of a trusted user to carry out an attack (Identity theft when viewed in this context becomes extremely serious).
- (d) The shelf life of a cyber weapon is limited to the presence of the particular vulnerability. Further, a near perfect defence against a cyber weapon can be brought in a matter of days or weeks against the use of that particular exploit.
- (e) Cyber weapons, at present, can only penetrate network defences if there are exploitable flaws in those defences (It is in this context that probing attacks on the networks are to be viewed seriously and reported).
- (f) Most of the technology and material needed to develop sophisticated cyber weapons are commercially available and

completely unregulated. Consequently, traditional technology and arms control regimes are impossible to create and verify.

(g) Currently, the only way we can correctly estimate the cyber capabilities of another actor is by measuring the frequency and sophistication of attacks emanating from a source/state.

The world has dealt with the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, commonly known as WMD, in the past. However, in the world of Cyber Space, we are now confronted with a new WMD threat: *Weapons of Mass "Disruption"*.¹⁷ If we do not prepare now, we could, one day, face a cyber attack that could cripple our government, our economy and our society. We need to formulate and announce our Doctrine regarding Cyber Warfare and develop demonstrable Cyber Defence and Cyber Attack capabilities to act as an effective deterrent.

In the nuclear domain, the nuclear weapon states have promulgated their respective doctrines and have built or are in the process of building a strategic triad of land, sea and airborne capabilities of launching nuclear weapons. Consequently, the nuclear deterrent has held thus far. In the Digital Age, we need a, '*Cyber Triad*'¹⁸ that will deter cyber attacks on our information infrastructure by employing *Weapons of Mass Disruption*. The various legs of the 'Cyber Triad' are as under : –

(a) **Resilience (First Leg).** Cyber resilience would mean such things as Redundancy of critical connectivity; the ability to handle increased traffic loads under the most stressed conditions; and the ability to protect and secure sensitive and private information.

(b) **Attribution (Second Leg).** Our continued inability to attribute attacks tantamount to an open invitation to those who would like to harm us, irrespective of their motives. If the adversary can attack our networks and systems without leaving finger prints, they can attack without consequences and that means they cannot be countered or deterred; a serious matter indeed. To deter cyber attacks, we need to improve our capability to attribute these attacks to their ultimate source and display a very strong political will that we will respond in the most devastating manner. Concurrently,

we need to announce our likely response to probing or cyber espionage attempts by any player.

(c) **Offensive Capabilities (Third Leg).** Just as in the kinetic weapons, the adversary must know that the nation has an effectively balanced defensive and offensive cyber capabilities backed by a very strong political will. The nation's strategic doctrine must clearly state both the likely response to a cyber attack and the response that the same would invite. For example, many countries have promulgated that an electronic attack on their assets will be construed as an act of war and would attract appropriate response.

Development of credible cyber deterrence would have to be a national effort that would involve the government, industry, academia and most of all the people. At the same time, we will have to work very closely with the international community to develop a forum for peaceful co-existence in the cyber space, the corresponding legal framework; the development of secure products and services and the likely international response to a cyber attack on a nation state. We need to work harder on fostering international alliances and be an active member in the formulation of best practices and a code of conduct in the cyber space.

Conclusion

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has created a virtual world with no boundaries where the rules of engagement are being constantly defined by the world community with very little interference from the government. This virtual world called the, "cyber space" has not only opened new avenues for interaction, development and exchange of views but as a natural corollary, it is also becoming more hostile. Worldwide, people and in some cases, the governments are engaged in the exploitation of the cyber space for illegal activities like espionage, theft of technology, financial frauds and so on. They have, accordingly, developed means and methods to carry out such activities by way of viruses, root kits, malware and so on. These are the initial steps in the evolution of cyber weapons which till date do not have a formal definition. This evolving threat to society as a result of these cyber weapons and their capability to disrupt networks, systems and their functionality; their suitability for the conduct of asymmetric warfare, coupled with the all pervasive application of ICT in the

Military and civilian domains, have opened a new dimension of warfare.

The recent critical development wherein ICT has enveloped the physical space has led to both the weaponisation of cyber space and the consequent threat to the Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). While blowing up of the Siberian oil pipeline in 1982 indicated *the possibility*; the destruction of Iraq's power grid by deploying carbon fibres to short the electric grid in Gulf war, the interference of financial system in Estonia and effective neutralisation of the war fighting capabilities in Georgia displayed the emergence; the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian Nuclear facility and the recent discussions in the Pentagon of possible option of taking out the Libyan Air Defence system by cyber weapons are pointers to both the emanating threat and coming of age of cyber weapons. While the USA, Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are said to have developed effective cyber weapons, many other nations are engaged in developing the same. The challenge is to stop their development and proliferation or at least regulate them through generating trust and confidence. There is an urgent need to have international treaties for limiting the use and proliferation of cyber weapons, independently or as part of expanded role of the United Nations. India, while participating in the international efforts, must enter into alliances - bilateral, multi-lateral or regional to secure her national interests and sovereignty. She must formulate a national doctrine and develop credible cyber offensive and defensive capabilities. Notwithstanding our strength in the field of ICT, such capabilities, skill sets and the much needed synergy amongst all concerned in the nation would take a long time; assuming that we have and can display political will and resolve. A few initial steps have been taken but we have a long way to go. The nation urgently needs to develop a credible cyber deterrence through promulgation of a doctrine, development of the skill sets, a dedicated organisation and demonstrable cyber defensive and offensive capabilities.

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China's Border Wars

Major Akshat Upadhyay*

Introduction

The rise of communist China has been a phenomenon in itself, a force in being such that a new term has been coined in the lexicon of international relations in the 21st century: 'The Century of the Dragon'. This growth has been achieved in the backdrop of the post 9/11 world, a world which has seen new alliances being made, old ties forgotten and in some cases, turning sour. However, whatever the new era may bring with itself, the question of territorial integrity has and will always remain imperative to nation states, especially those who have gained independence from their Western masters in the 20th century. Boundary disputes have been a perennial feature of the Third World countries. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the third largest country in the world and the largest in Asia is blessed with fourteen neighbours at its peripheries and has featured in boundary disputes with almost all its neighbours.¹ As of today, China has resolved, peacefully or forcefully, twelve out of fourteen of its disputes. Some have been resolved on its own terms while some have been legalised due to the necessity of protecting the territorial as well as religious sanctity of Xinjiang, its Achilles heel, a region plagued by Uighur separatism and abject failure of Chinese law and order. The only border disputes remaining are with India and Bhutan, both having Indian stakes.

This article takes an analytical look at China's border conflicts with its neighbours; namely, North Korea, Russia (erstwhile Soviet Union), Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar (then Burma), Laos, Vietnam and finally the maritime borders of Taiwan (ROC) and then draws inferences that could be helpful in leveraging India's position in its border dispute with China.

Sino – North Korean Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 1**. China's relations with Democratic People's

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Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been relatively stable since 1949.² As the main benefactor of North Korea during the Korean War (1950-53), Beijing acquired quite a toehold over its 'ally' in term of its economy, defence and foreign affairs. A theme which will occur repeatedly in all of China's border disputes is the Sino-Soviet split during the 1960s. This period, which almost culminated in an all out nuclear war between the two countries in 1969, has been the source of majority of border episodes featuring PRC.³ China and North Korea share a 1416 km long border, which is aligned along the course of two rivers, the Yalu and the Tumen.⁴ The Yalu river, incidentally, was the boundary set by the Chinese for the UN forces under General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean war, crossing of which by the UN forces brought in Chinese intervention, forcing them back to the 38th Parallel. The areas of contention between the PRC and DPRK are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.




Figure 1 : Maps depicting the flow of River Tumen and the location of Mount Paektu

Mount Paektu⁵ (Baekdu – san, Changbai in Chinese). A 2774 metre high volcano, lying at the source of both the Yalu and the Tumen, which cradles Chongji lake (13 km long and 204 metre deep) that crosses a few prefectures of China before ending up in North Korea. Mount Paektu is considered sacred in Korean anthology and has been associated with the birth as well as the most famous and daring exploits of its legendary leader, Kim Il Sung.⁶ The Chinese, on the other hand, claim the mountain to be the source of origin of its Manchu people. Beijing has ruled out any

negotiation with Pyongyang on this issue and has even initiated plans to develop the volcano as a tourist attraction.⁷

Islands in the Yalu and Tumen River. China has recognised the sovereignty of North Korea over 80 per cent of the islands.⁸ The fate of the rest of the uninhabited islands has not been decided and an unofficial joint ownership is now being followed.

Shindo Island. This island has been in Korean hands since ages but coveted by the Chinese for its role in the transportation and communication in development of oil extraction facilities, off the Gulf of Beihai.⁹

Access to the Sea of Japan. The last seventeen kilometers of the Tumen river¹⁰ form the border between the DPRK and Russia,¹¹ thus depriving China of any access to the Sea of Japan. The Sea of Japan is a major strategic factor for China in its political and military posturing in North Asia.

Maritime Boundaries. North Korea, unilaterally established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the Yellow Sea in 1977,¹² laying claim to 200 miles of an ecologically rich maritime region which has since been contested by Beijing as it delays the economic development of the Gulf of Beihai.

North Korea has never let any boundary or territorial dispute sour its relations with its giant neighbour to the North just for the simple reason that it cannot afford to do so. In 1965, in the midst of the Sino-Soviet crisis, a loose statement made by Kim Il Sung had led the Chinese to demand 160 square kilometers of area around Paektu – San, in lieu of the aid proffered by Beijing to North Korea during the Korean war.¹³ A decrepit economy, sanctions due to development of nuclear weapons, deteriorating political situation since the death of Kim Jong- Il, facing famine like conditions since 1995-96 and a burgeoning Chinese debt since the 1980s are hardly cards to place on the table when dealing with China.

Sino-Mongolian Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 2**. China and Mongolia have never had cordial relations. In fact the acrimonious border dispute regarding the Altai mountainous region,¹⁴ which Beijing regarded as part of its Xinjiang region, was resolved only in November 2005 along the 4677 kilometer long boundary.¹⁵ Mongolia, historically, has aligned

itself towards Russia. The Altai mountainous region was used by the Soviets for gold and tungsten mining and was the setting for a major confrontation between the Mongolians, supported by tanks and air, and the Kazakh and Chinese troops in June 1947.¹⁶ Ulaanbaatar allowed three divisions of Soviet infantry to be deployed within its territory opposite China in 1971, in addition to a coordinated air defence centre controlling upto 1000 aircraft.¹⁷ This was during the period when there were rumours of a Soviet surgical strike on China's nuclear facilities. A 'Secret' document by one of the most influential China watchers, Allen S Whiting, mentioned ten Soviet airfields operating in Outer Mongolia as well as Soviet long range aircraft undertaking reconnaissance and weather data collecting missions along the Sino Mongolian border.¹⁸




Figure 2 : Map showing the Altai mountainous region of Mongolia

Sino-Kazakhstan Border Dispute

Analysing the Sino-Kazakhstan border relations, a very interesting premise comes to light. The US CENTCOM conducted a multinational exercise in Kazakhstan in 1997 named CENTRAZBAT 97.¹⁹ This exercise featured the longest non - stop flight to a drop zone in history : From the Continental United States directly to Kazakhstan. In July 1998, China resolved its long standing border issue with Kazakhstan (total time period 36 years),²⁰ a 944 square

kilometer area whose possession now rests 56.9 per cent with Astana and 43.1 per cent with Beijing.²¹ PRC also solicited a promise from Kazakhstan not to shelter Uighur separatists²² threatening Chinese interests in Xinjiang. The US foray into the Central Asian Region, intensified after the September 11 bombings has gravely worried the Chinese who see the American thrust into their perceived backyard as one more step to containing China, in addition to anchoring Japan and Taiwan. China has now entered into a confrontational phase with Kazakhstan over the distribution of water of two of the trans - boundary rivers, the Ili and the Irtysh which originate in China but end up in Kazakhstan.²³ This emerging trend could be a future development in context with India as major rivers in India have their origins in Tibet, now part of PRC.

Sino-Kyrgyztan Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 3**. China and Kyrgyztan share a 1100 kilometer long border²⁴ and relations have been uneasy over the free trade zone of Naryn featuring the vast Karasu Bazaar in Kyrgyztan,²⁵ which is now being rapidly populated by the Chinese. President Akayev's government moved a secret resolution granting 125000 hectares of territory to China in the mountainous region of the country in 1999. This was not approved by the Kyrgyz parliament and border negotiations have stalled since 2001.²⁶ However, the borders have remained tranquil and since most of the trade deficit is against Bishkek, the boundary dispute has not been raised frequently. The Chinese, however, are concerned over the militant Uighurs who have found a safe haven in Kyrgyztan and their own Turkic Muslims²⁷ who view the independence of these Central Asian republics as an achievable dream.

Sino - Tajikistan Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 4**. The Tajikis have been a fortunate lot. Their territory shrank by just one per cent during 2011 when Tajikistan ceded 1142 square kilometers of its land to the Chinese as opposed to the 28500 square kilometers demanded by them. Dushanbe inherited the border dispute when Tajikistan was formed from the ashes of the Soviet empire in 1991. However, the dispute over approximately 41000 square kilometers of area in the Pamirs goes back to the days of Imperial Russia and China. The area ceded is in the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous region which the Tajiki government considers mountainous and lacking in natural resources.²⁸



Figure 3 : Map showing the disputed free trade zone of Naryn



Figure 4 : Map showing the border between China and Tajikistan. The encircled portion is the disputed area

Sino - Vietnam Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 5**. China never should have had a border dispute with Vietnam, let alone a full scale border war. After all, the two were ideological allies and shared a common nemesis at the time ie the US. China and the Soviet Union were instrumental in providing much needed arms and materiel to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), the dreaded NVA, which enabled this rural 'half – country' to defeat the military might of the United States in 1973. However, the much debated Sino - Soviet split, which scarred the relations between the two communist giants had an adverse effect on Sino – Vietnamese relations also. Faced with the option of choosing between the monolithic Soviet empire and its oft threatening neighbour whose bellicosity could any day escalate into an armed invasion, the Vietnamese chose the former and therefore drifted into the Russian camp. Chinese strategists had always desired of a fractured Indochina with Cambodia and Laos gaining some autonomy vis-à-vis Hanoi. However this was not to be the case as Vietnamese troops marched into Cambodia in December 1978 to uproot the Pol Pot directed brutality of Khmer Rouge. This was condemned by PRC who had supplied the Khmer Rouge with both materiel as well as diplomatic assistance.²⁹ The double whammy of Vietnam's defeat of the Cambodian dictator as well as its proximity to the Soviets led the Chinese to start a full scale border war which started on 17 February 1979 and lasted for 28 days. The Chinese entered North Vietnam and captured some of the border cities. On March 6, they declared they had punished Vietnam enough and retreated back across their border. The unofficial casualty figures for both sides are 26000 killed and 37000 wounded for the Chinese and 30000 killed and 32000 wounded on the Vietnamese side.³⁰ This act of punishing a neighbouring country in a limited border conflict has been a recurring feature of Chinese foreign policy, as seen in the Sino - Indian border conflict of 1962 and the Sino - Soviet conflict over the Zhenbao island in 1969.

The PRC and Vietnam are embroiled over the more than 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China Sea,³¹ collectively known as the Spratly islands as well as the Paracel islands off the Gulf of Tonkin. The only border dispute that has been resolved by the two former allies concerns the 1306 kilometers land border.³² The border markers were officially set up in 2009 marking an end (land only) to a centuries old conflict.³³




Figure 5 : Map showing the disputed area of the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea

Sino - Soviet Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 6**. The Cold War had neatly divided the world into two camps: the Capitalists, led by the US and the Communists, led by Soviet Russia. However as the years progressed, the lines between the two were obscured with the Sino - Soviet split marking a watershed in the great ideological dispute. The Chinese accused the Soviet Union of subverting the Uighur population in its Xinjiang province when in May 1962, around 60000 Uighurs crossed the frontier into the USSR.³⁴ Prime amongst China's 'concerns' were the 'unequal' treaties imposed on it by Imperial Russia, through which it seized a total of 2.9 million square kilometers from China.³⁵ The region where all the vitriolic was concentrated was the Eastern border of China with the Soviet Union, especially the two islands of Qiliqin and Zhenbao³⁶ on the Wusuli (Ussuri) river. A number of seemingly disconnected minor incidents involving civilians, starting in 1964,³⁷ soon gave way to limited clashes between the Soviet and Chinese troops. The prospect of a nuclear war engulfing the whole subcontinent had never been more probable. The Chinese pattern regarding the Zhenbao and Qiliqin islands was the one used with India in pre-1962 and also later with Vietnam and in current times, Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. The Chinese infiltrated into small groups




Figure 6 : Map showing the Eastern portion of the border between China and the USSR

on the islands and started their construction activity, which was then repulsed heavily by the Soviets. The most serious incident took place on 5 January 1968, when the Soviet patrol along with a couple of armoured vehicles attacked the Chinese, resulting in four civilian deaths. Seen from an analytical point of view, a significant number of China's border disputes were initiated or settled during the 1960s decade, prompting one to ponder that the Sino- Soviet split in conjunction with the Cultural Revolution were the driving force behind these negotiations.

On 2nd and 15th March 1969, the Soviets and the Chinese troops engaged in a full fledged firefight involving tanks, armoured vehicles, in addition to small arms. According to the analysis of an internal Chinese circular, the Chinese had been despatched in groups and had actually sprung a trap on the hapless Soviets who were not prepared for such an intense fight.³⁸ The Zhenbao Island battle was not simply a logical outcome of the long existing tensions on the Sino-Soviet border; it was a well calculated attempt at a defensive counterattack on the part of Mao. Repeated Chinese concessions in face of Soviet provocation had made the Chinese leaders feel that they had reached the limit of forbearance. By early 1969, they found it necessary to strike back in a well planned military attack. The Chinese had already practiced attack plans against the Soviets in Qiliqin in 1968 which they then used to devastating effect at Zhenbao. In ordering Chinese troops to fight the Zhenbao battle, Mao had no further military aims beyond teaching the Soviets a bitter lesson. The main aim, however, of Mao was to trigger a massive internal mobilisation of his country's resources, population and patriotic sentiments, which had been fractured completely in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, what with factional infighting and internal rioting becoming the order of the day. Mao had never contemplated an equally belligerent response from Moscow and the prospect of a nuclear war forced it to tone down its bellicose xenophobia. Soviet Russia began to 'probe' the response of the US, if Moscow were to carry out a surgical strike on China's nuclear facilities and sent out feelers to various countries. The fear of the Soviets led to the famous 1972 Sino - American *rapprochement* marking a thaw in the relations between the two countries. As of today, China has been granted control over Tarabarov Island, Zhenbao Island and approximately 50 per cent of Bolshoy Ussuriyski Island.³⁹

Sino - Myanmar Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 7**. No dispute brings the duplicitous nature of Chinese hankering to fore than the settlement of the Sino-Myanmar border. While contending, on one hand that the McMahon Line is invalid in case for India, China has amicably settled for the same line as the International Border (IB), with regard to Myanmar. China made extensive claims for all of present-day Burma north of a line extending from Myitkyina almost due west to the Indian boundary in 1941.⁴⁰ However after much haggling by the newly independent Burmese government (Burma gained independence in 1948) the Chinese came to the negotiating table in 1954 and by 1960 had settled peacefully along a line, roughly matching the contours of McMahon Line. 132 square miles of Burmese territory was transferred to China (59 miles at Hpimaw and 73 miles at Panglao-Panghung) while Burma gained full title to the 85 square miles of Namwan leased territory.⁴¹

China, incidentally has no major existing border disputes with Nepal and Laos.⁴² However it is perturbed by the lawlessness prevailing in the Mekong Delta region of Myanmar and had dispatched around 300 armed police to control of the situation.⁴³



Figure 7 : Map showing the disturbed areas along Sino-Myanmar border

Sino-Bhutan Border Dispute

Please refer to **Figure 8**. Bhutan is the only country, except India, that has refused to bow under Chinese pressure. Border negotiations regarding the watershed of the Chumbi valley in the country's North West and the crest of the Himalayan ranges in the North remain stalled as of date.⁴⁴ However, cross border incursions by Chinese soldiers and Tibetan herders have plagued the country's security situation since 1966.⁴⁵




Figure 8 : Map showing the disputed areas of Bhutan

Sino - Indian Border Dispute

The most enduring amongst all the disputes has been the one with India. It is a complex issue and has defied a solution in spite of sixteen rounds of talks held at the level of Special Representatives of the Government of India and China. It is a subject of ongoing negotiations; hence is not being covered in this paper. In any case, it can easily form a subject for a separate research paper.

Inferences

Scrutinising all the above border disputes of China, a few useful inferences can be drawn which are mentioned in the succeeding paras.

Xinjiang is a vulnerability that has time and again surfaced in almost all of China's disputes. The nuclear testing facility of Lop Nor⁴⁶ as well as most of China's strategic missiles forces, the Second Artillery are based in this region. Xinjiang has acquired such an importance that China has embroiled itself again in a dispute with Kazakhstan, this time over the distribution of the waters of two of its rivers in the region. This region has been the reason for China negotiating its border disputes with the Central Asian nations of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyztan. In fact, China settled its dispute with Kazakhstan within six months of a major US exercise so as to maintain its control over the Steppes. Tibet, on the other hand, considered earlier not to have any major economic significance and only as the platform for any future attack into India is being seen differently. Tibetan assimilation in mainland China is still a distant dream for Beijing despite infrastructural and economic development of the region and settling down of Hans. This imperative (for China) has a great potential of future conflict with India as, with the passage of time, Chinese behaviour is likely to become more assertive and overbearing, symptoms of which are being seen today in a number of disputed areas.

China settled for just 1142 square kilometres out of the 28500 demanded by it of Tajikistan as it was keen to gain the confidence of Dushanbe in its persecution of the Uighur separatists, who owe their origins to these nations. Kazakhstan benefitted from the USCENTCOM exercise in 1997, which hastened the process of demarcation of its borders with China, with minimum loss to Dushanbe. This brings to fore the three basic concerns of China which are:-

- (a) Physical security along its frontier borders with Central Asia.
- (b) Ensuring that no power hostile to China has any influence over the Central Asian steppes. Considering the polemics of Sino - US relations in the context of post September 2001,

this has become a major factor as China saw the US influence increase manifold with unfettered access to air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁷

(c) Gain access to the natural resources of the region. The case of Kazakhstan and its inability to stop China's unwarranted activities on its two rivers comes to mind.

China has evolved a very subtle way of intruding and then claiming any land which it considers to be part of its territory. Consider the case of India and Russia, in both the cases the Chinese surreptitiously crept towards unclaimed boundaries and started their construction activities. When challenged by the other side they retaliated with fire, and claimed publicly that they were just protecting their territory. These tactics were observed by the Russians during the Zhenbao incident and is now being reported regularly by the Indian armed forces in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.

Another attitude that has been observed is the Chinese practice of punishing its neighbours with punitive action in order to take the pressure off its internal instability. This behaviour has been observed during the border conflicts with Russia, India and Vietnam. Only Russian aggressive reaction forced China to look towards a boundary settlement that it could not resolve at its own terms.

All the border disputes with China have taken decades to get resolved and that too at China's terms and conditions. This is the legacy that the treaties of Argun (1858)⁴⁸ and Peking (1860)⁴⁹ have bestowed upon China: *never bargain from a position of weakness*. This is the reason why China has taken such a long time to resolve its border disputes with its neighbours. The only anomalies have been found in cases where China's own security interests or economic interests have been the prime concern. In fact, it compromises with its neighbours when its internal stability is threatened.

Conclusion

This article takes a broad look at all the major border disputes of PRC with its neighbours and draws inferences which go beyond the usual military interpretation; instead delving into the behaviour and nuances of Chinese attitudes and policies that have shaped

its response to the world since its bloody inception in 1949. These historical experiences could help the Indian policy makers in negotiating with China to resolve the boundary dispute which has defied solution so far.

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Henderson Brooks Report and India's China Challenge

Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh*

Introduction

As India finished the 50th year of its humiliating defeat by China, the clamour for declassification of the Operations Review Committee on the 1962 Sino-Indian War (called the Henderson Brooks Report or the HBR) once again found coverage in the mainstream media¹. This was soon after the Union Government informed the Indian Parliament on 10th May 2012 that the Report would not be published following the 2009 decision of the Central Information Commission (CIC). It is to be noted that the decision by the CIC on 19th March 2009 rejecting the declassification demands for HBR under the Right to Information (RTI) Act has not satisfied the appetite of some in media since many of them have the perception of the Report's leakage to the Western press long back². Unfortunately, the emerging debate on HBR is locked within narrow contours of transparency and declassification rules and in the process overlooks the issue that the HBR could be too old and miniscule to understand India's China challenge.³

The Union Government's decision against the declassification may not be final and the wise men (both inside and outside the Government) may continue to argue if the HBR should be declassified at some stage⁴. It has even been urged that the lessons of the China War will remain unlearned unless the HBR is declassified⁵. However, the polemics on the HBR does bring into question many issues related to the history and future of Sino-Indian relations. *First*, how authentic are the claims made by the HBR (assuming that the Report was leaked to Neville Maxwell and reflected in his 1970 book and other publications)? Numerous books, publications and official secret records of many countries throw sufficient light on the developments that led to the war. These collections may help us arrive at a definitive conclusion. *Second*, is the HBR still relevant since it was submitted 50 years

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ago? In particular, does it resolve India's security dilemma vis-a-vis China? Can it help India avoid another unforeseen war against China? *Third*, with or without HBR, one may be tempted to ask if the Indians have learnt any lesson from the 1962 War.

This paper will, therefore, seek to explain the above three issues. The intention here is not to discuss the so-called contents of the HBR or make an authoritative statement about the exact causes of the 1962 War or the factors that led to India's defeat. Enough has been written elsewhere on these issues. Rather, the focus will be on discussing HBR as a representative symbol of Indian efforts to understand Chinese military strategy and an effort to see if India has done enough in the last five decades to avoid another experience of 1962.

Background of the HBR

In the immediate aftermath of the Sino – Indian War of 1962, the Indian Army constituted an internal 'Operations Review Committee' to investigate into the tactical causes and mistakes that led to the debacle. The enquiry team consisted of Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) PS Bhagat and was asked to go through the official records and prepare a report on the War. Sometime in May 1963, the General presented his study to the authorities and was immediately classified as "Top Secret". Rejecting an early demand for making the HBR public, the then Defence Minister YB Chavan said this on 2nd September 1963 in the Lok Sabha :—

I am sure the House would appreciate that by the very nature of the contents it would not be in the public interest to lay the Report on the table of the House. Nor is it possible to attempt even an abridged or edited version of it, consistent with the consideration of security, that would not give an unbalanced or incomplete picture to you ... The publication of this Report which contains information about the strength and development of our forces and their locations would be of invaluable use to our enemies. It would not only endanger our security but affect the morale of those entrusted with safeguarding the security of our borders.

Since then, successive defence ministers have cited 'public interest' as the reason for not declassifying this Report each time

a question on this was raised in the Parliament. In February 2008, in response to a query in Rajya Sabha on the release of HBR, the Defence Minister, AK Antony reiterated that the freeze on the release of the Report would continue considering the sensitivity of information contained in the Report and its security implications.⁶ The fact that various political parties have been in power during this period has not changed the status quo on the HBR. For example, the former Defence Minister, George Fernandes also rejected the demand for the declassification of HBR on more than one occasion when he was in office.⁷ The Ministry of External Affairs has equally been against making the HBR public, since it could jeopardise the relations with China, particularly the ongoing border negotiation that is in critical stage.⁸ The CIC decision has only shown that different organisations of the Government have unanimous opinion on the issue.

Issues Involved in Declassification Demands

The ongoing demand for declassification of the HBR is based on several arguments. *First*, it has met all the cannons of declassification rules. According to such rules, classified government documents should be made available to the National Archives of India after finishing the mandatory period of 30 years for declassification. The HBR has been in the lockers for almost 50 years and hence is a fit case for declassification. The protagonists are, therefore, critical of any further attempts to keep the HBR within the lockers and rather perceive it as a most undemocratic action in a democratic set-up.⁹ From a military point of view, studying history of past conflicts is a must for military planners and strategists and the 1962 War is a fit case.¹⁰

Second, the RTI has come as an added tool to extract binding information from the Government. In December 2005, a veteran journalist, after several failed attempts to extract the information, both inside and outside the Parliament,¹¹ had indeed approached the MoD under the RTI asking for declassification since the document was already mature enough to be declassified. The request was firmly turned down by the MoD since it was part of the "internal review" and, therefore, could not be placed in the public domain. The CIC supported the Ministry's opinion that the controversial HBR, detailing the reason behind the Sino – Indian War in 1962, cannot be disclosed under the RTI Act as it would "seriously" compromise the country's security and its ties with the neighbouring nation even today'.¹²

Third, while the CIC may have valid reasons to keep the HBR under the carpet, some in the journalistic world regret the decision, particularly, since the Report was allegedly leaked to the Western press long back. Apparently, the Report formed the basis of Neville Maxwell's rather controversial and partisan book, 'India's China War (1970)'. Much later, he also published an introduction to the so called contents of the HBR.¹³

Fourth, the protagonists of the declassification movement also suggest that the HBR would be of immense relevance to the Armed Forces in particular and Sinologists in general in learning from the mistakes committed in 1962: while the former (particularly the younger generations of military officers) are deprived of the knowledge they must have in order to avoid the mistakes their forebears made in the past, the latter would have cleared the cobwebs of confusion and motivated misinformation being fed to them all these years. In the long term, this will only help consolidate India's preparations against another attack by China.¹⁴

Finally, there is a broader political constituency that supports the declassification of HBR for variable reasons. Apart from journalists, senior defence officials, academicians and even politicians support the demand for declassification of HBR. The list is quite extensive but the thematic justification is broadly similar: that it will be a knowledge building exercise for India's military historians and strategists and in no way would compromise the national security or for that matter India's preparedness against China.

So-called Contents of the HBR

There is no way to ascertain if Maxwell had access to the HBR. Maxwell specialised in India-bashing and made his career out of consistent and virulent criticism of India, often based on malicious and fallacious grounds. Unfortunately, many in India view the Sino-Indian War through the Maxwellian prism.

Maxwell's claims of access to the HBR is laced with satirical language and sweeping generalisations. According to him, 'while the communist China viewed India through a Marxist prism as a potentially hostile bourgeoisie state; in the Indian political perspective, war with China was deemed unthinkable and through the 1950s New Delhi's defence planning and defence expenditure expressed that confidence'. Further, India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino - Indian

borders (left 'undefined' by the British), extend its administration to make those good on ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it. Through the 1950s, this policy generated friction along the borders and led to increased distrust and hostility. From 1961 the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the Army and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, Chinese forces would hit back. China did hit indeed and launched a 'pre-emptive' attack on India all along the borders overcoming the Indian resistance and advancing some distance in the eastern sector.

Maxwell also concluded that the HBR was an expression of the factionalisation of Indian Army which was a by-product of political interference in promotions and appointments. The political leadership forced the Army to implement the forward policy. In many areas, the Army was supposed to attack or defend areas which they could not have done due to paucity of resources or strategic difficulties. If these are the contents of the HBR, then they are mere repetitions of what Maxwell had already said in his 1970 book. There is very little that he dishes out as new revelations. The Maxwellian interpretation of the HBR, therefore, needs to be read along with other researches on the Sino – Indian War in order to have a balanced perspective.

Authenticity of HBR: Inferences from other Publications

If Maxwell's claims about the contents of the HBR are presumed to be 'true', then there are other reports and studies that 'debunk' the Maxwellian hypothesis. In 1992, the MoD published an official *History of the Conflict with China* (1962) which is since then available on internet.¹⁵ What renders legitimacy to this Report is the fact that it was commissioned by the Government of India itself and was allowed access to the HBR as claimed by the authors in the preface. The Report exposes the Chinese hand in instigating the conflict through sustained expansionist policy that was discreet during early fifties but was quite visible by late fifties. All through this Chinese mind game, the Indian political leadership was under the illusion that 'whatever be the situation, China was not likely to attack India. They were, therefore, reluctant to respond to the Chinese aggressive activities in a big way'.¹⁶ At the same

time, the book is quite candid in identifying the tactical mistakes that led to India's defeat in the war. For example, the so-called 'forward defence' went 'too far, got too reckless and lost its balance in its later stages'. The policy decision of not using the Indian Air Force (IAF) is also identified as a serious mistake. Air attacks on the advancing Chinese columns and bases in Tibet would have been advantageous to India not only militarily, but also psychologically and in the politico-diplomatic field. Political factors responsible for the debacle have also been put under critical perspective in the book. Krishna Menon, for example, is blamed for attempting a drastic modification in the existing operational doctrine of the Indian Army which was itself undergoing a transition process and lacked fighting equipment and stores.¹⁷

One must also refer to JW Garver, a Sinologist with otherwise pro-China leanings. He is quite critical of Maxwellian hypothesis that he feels, is based on inferences drawn from Chinese public sentiments. Garver argues that Chinese perceptions of Indian policies toward Tibet were fundamentally erroneous, and that, these misperceptions contributed substantially to the 1962 War.¹⁸

Elsewhere, the CIA had also sponsored secret studies on Sino – Indian War known as *Polo Series*. Declassified now, this study establishes that the Chinese leaders were motivated by one primary consideration, apart from other considerations in attacking India. They were determined to retain the ground on which their border forces stood their ground in 1962. The primary reason reflected their view that the Indian leaders had to be shown once and for all that China would not tolerate any strategy to 'recover' border territory. In clearing away Indian border posts in two key sectors, the Chinese conducted what has been called a 'punitive' expedition to chastise the Indian leaders for past and intended moveups.¹⁹

HBR: Is it Relevant in Addressing India's Security Dilemma Against China?

The HBR was perhaps a telling comment on a series of factors that led to the defeat in war against China. These include issues such as logistics and infrastructure, political and military leadership and finally doctrinal and strategic preparedness. Even then, the HBR holds little relevance primarily because of two contemporary realities. *First*, the report is almost five decades old and may no

longer reflect the ground reality. *Second*, the basket of issues that constitute India's security dilemma against China have either changed or expanded and need to be analysed in the present context. Whatever indices are taken to measure India's strength against China, the position continues to be as shaky and vulnerable as it was in the early sixties. Some of them are discussed as follows:

(a) Logistics and Infrastructure. The ground reality is that India has made only marginal progress since sixties. The efforts of dedicated organisation like the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) notwithstanding, India still doesn't have fair-weather roads to ensure round the year movement of troops and supplies. While there have been a further push to road building plans in the Northeast, the Central tracts still remain neglected. The Terai area adjacent to Nepal still remains poorly served. If China were to attack India alternatively through (in collusion with) Nepal, it would be a cakewalk for them to reach the Gangetic plains.

(b) War Waging Capacity. Despite having increased infantry presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) including few mountain divisions as well, the proportionate troop strength is far below compared to China. Similarly, India is yet to operationalise long range attack weapons despite the development of Agni series.

(c) Doctrine and Strategy. India still doesn't have a doctrine or strategy for defence against China, at least in public, which would spell out the war fighting strategies against China. The so-called 'cold start war strategy' (later denied) was Pakistan – centric and had little to offer against China.

(d) Confidence. The asymmetrical size of China supplemented by its huge defence expenditure and tactical advantage in Tibet area creates a confidence gap that is unlikely to be bridged under any circumstances.

HBR: Has India Learnt to Know China Better?

HBR was an assessment, rather, reflection of the knowledge gap about China that led to the humiliating defeat in 1962. While a timely publication of the report could have helped in objective assessment of the knowledge gap, the situation is no better today. India still doesn't have primary ways and means to gather and

analyse intelligence about Chinese military preparedness and strategic thinking. To a large extent, information about China are derivatives emanating from Anglo–American sources. These secondary sources of information are of little importance in addressing India's knowledge management about China.

It is really debatable if serious steps are being taken to bridge this knowledge gap through indigenous methods. India still doesn't have a healthy basket of Mandarin speaking people. The number of Sinologists having fluency in Mandarin is even less. Further, there is not much autonomous development of societal relations between the two countries, despite state level support from the two sides. Both countries have only a symbolic presence of emigrant population. The communications networks are very shallow and even the recent initiatives of direct flights have not created much enthusiasm in the two countries. The bilateral economic relations are way behind what China has with its other neighbours.

Conclusion

The debate over declassification of HBR is unlikely to end soon. However, the perceived benefits would be marginal; more so, since considerable time has elapsed. Declassification, therefore, is not desirable. The protagonists of declassification debate, it seems, are less keen to learn the strategic and operational lessons from the HBR. On the contrary, the objective (perhaps) seems to be to bring embarrassment to political and military class. Whether the HBR declassification will serve the National Security interests vis-à-vis China, (therefore) remains an open ended proposition. Perhaps, it is time to move beyond HBR and develop contemporary sources of information that will help India manage relations with China.

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India's Third Front

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Introduction

The Army has been talking of a two and a half front war for some years now. The Prime Minister had been terming the Maoist insurgency as the biggest threat to India over successive years, despite which, the Home Minister in 2010 said the Maoist problem will be resolved within two-three years. Nothing can be more utopian than the last statement considering the ground situation. There is every indication that the 'half front' comprising plethora of terrorist organisations has the potential to become a 'full front', as being striven by Pakistan and China, aided by our intransigence. Pakistan's proxy war over past two decades is well known but the increasing involvement of China as apparent from periodic intelligence reports, though downplayed by the government, should be a matter of serious concern to us.

Ideological Unconventional Warfare

Chinese are acknowledged long term strategists and to this end, unconventional warfare in the Chinese context can be linked way back to ideological spread of Maoism. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is but one handiwork of the little known Chinese Ministry of Foreign Liaison set-up in Mao Tse Tung's time that engineered political indoctrination of indigenous cadres through covert operations globally; supporting extremist groups and creating Maoists in Nepal and Myanmar, New People's Army of Philippines, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Japanese Red Army and Shining Path in Peru.¹ Links between the Nepalese and Indian Maoists were discovered three years back while cadres of the CPI (M), that spawned the Maoist movement in India, have been known to be visiting China.² This ideological spread gave China irregular allies and an unconventional springboard for enlarging operations behind enemy lines, in line with Sun Tzu's preaching, "*To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill*".

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Indoctrinating Pakistan

Pakistan used tribals in 1947-1948 to grab Kashmir. Her initiation into unconventional warfare was based on Chinese advice. Zhou-en-Lai while visiting Pakistan in early 1960's advised Ayub Khan that Pakistan should prepare for prolonged conflict with India instead of short term wars by raising a militia force to act behind enemy lines.³ Consequently, Pakistan raised anti-India *jihadi* forces much before the Taliban emerged on the scene. These Pakistani proxies, therefore, inadvertently are proxy-proxies of China. These irregular forces embedded behind enemy lines match Sun Tzu's teaching, *"Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his enemy's fate"*.

Unrestricted Warfare

The Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare was first unveiled through a book sponsored by the Ministry of National Defence, authored by two serving Senior Colonels and published in 1999, prior to the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade.⁴ The book was aimed primarily at the United States, it advocated a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military; hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, conducting urban warfare and the like – the first rule of unrestricted warfare being that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden. It stated that If mankind has no choice but to engage in war, it can no longer be carried out in the ways with which we are familiar, referring to the terrorist attack on the US embassy by Osama-bin-Laden, gas attack on Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo and havoc wreaked by likes of Morris Junior on the Internet, degree of destruction not being second to war, representing semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, sub-warfare - embryonic forms of another kind of warfare. Significantly, it emphasised that the most modern military force does not have the ability to control public clamour, and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner. On the battlefields of the future, the digitised forces may very possibly be like a great cook who is good at cooking lobsters sprinkled with butter, but when faced with guerrillas, who resolutely gnaw corncobs, he can only sigh in despair. It also suggested developing weapons that 'fit the fight' and even fancied creating laser images in the sky at opportune time on the battlefield to subdue radically religious opponents.

In terms of 'fit the fight' weaponry, China has the capacity to arm irregular forces from modern assault rifles to hi-tech (like hand-held Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) guns), providing communication and other warlike stores.⁵ Hand held EMP weapons exist and are easily accessible for covert injury and destruction of many types of targets including computer networks.⁶

Assassin's Mace

Assassin's Mace is the Chinese equivalent of the term "Shashou Jian" used in ancient Chinese strategy, linked to "Shashou Jian" - a club with which the assassin incapacitated his enemy, suddenly and totally instead of fighting according to rules, enabling overcoming a far more powerful adversary.⁷ It is part of Chinese military strategy; the capacity to rapidly and decisively seize the initiative and turn the tide to one's advantage when confronting a conventionally superior foe. The assassin's mace is relevant to both conventional and unconventional warfare in Chinese military strategy.

China – Pak Collusion

The China-Pakistan collusive unconventional warfare nexus dates back to early 1960s, as mentioned above. Pakistan started inducting armed modules pan-India in 1992-1993 and such cells were identified in the states of Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Kota/Ajmer region of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala.⁸ Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) started sending cadres to Pakistan for training with Mujahideen, Taliban and Al Qaeda. At the same time SIMI also established firm linkages with radical organisations in Bangladesh. Terrorist training was conducted in facilities located inside Bangladesh and under the very noses of Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR).

Simultaneous to the above, upsurge began in the Indian Maoists movement with unmistakable links between the CPI (M) and Beijing. When ULFA camps were evicted by the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) from Bhutan, training and arming of ULFA was organised on Chinese soil. The ISI reportedly organised nucleus Maoists training in mines/IEDs/explosives with LTTE. It may be recalled that in the heyday of LTTE, the Al Qaeda - LeT had sent

cadres for training with naval wing of LTTE. LeT representatives have been attending Maoists meetings for the past two years.⁹ Sophisticated Chinese arms and communication equipment started getting noticed with Maoists.¹⁰ This weapon supply has been intensified with China provisioning Maoists with weapon manufacture facilities as also to Kachen rebels in Myanmar through whom assault rifles are being pumped into People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur and further to Maoists.¹¹ Besides links with Maoists in Nepal, India and Myanmar, China was linked to Al Qaeda and Taliban even prior to 2006.¹² China has provided advisers and weapons to Pakistan Taliban.¹³

The Indian Mujahideen (IM) is the creation of ISI, axiomatically integrating the armed modules transplanted by Pakistan who would have acquired Indian identity over the years courtesy administrative intransigence.¹⁴ The LeT is inexorably linked to the ISI as evidenced by David Headley and telephonic intercepts during 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks.¹⁵ The ISI has been operating in Kerala for years, if not decades, and has armed Popular Front of India (PFI), with the administration once again remaining complacent.¹⁶ Significantly, four LeT recruits from Kerala were killed in Kupwara in 2008 while exfiltrating to POK. As per R&AW extremists from Kerala terror groups had been going to Pakistan since 1992. Despite such evidence, PFI still does not figure in the 35 terrorist organisations banned by India.¹⁷ China has been tacitly supporting Pakistan's anti-India jihad, one reason being Pakistan's promise to suppress Uighur separatists including some 320 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) cadres from China hiding in Pakistan.¹⁸

Special Operations Forces ¹⁹

Very little is known about Chinese Special Operations Forces. Their strength is estimated to be about 14,000, specialised in rapid reaction combat in a limited regional war under high-tech conditions, commando operations, counter-terrorism, and intelligence gathering. Separate Special Forces units are stationed in Guangzhou, Chengdu, Beijing, Shenyang, Nanjing and Lanzhou Military Regions besides central reserves and one sub unit each in Hong Kong and Macau.²⁰ Most of these units are capable of air, sea and land operations. Specialisations include surveillance and target designation, sabotage, offensive strikes and emergency evacuation. Equipment includes UAVs, hi-tech explosives and hand

held laser dazzlers. The process of digitisation of Special Operations Forces is on. PLA also maintains separate Marine Corps Special Operations Forces. Interestingly, evacuation of Chinese nationals from North Africa in the event of emergency is the responsibility of the Chinese Special Forces Commander in situ unofficially. This implies that not only the PLA but Chinese Special Forces are deployed as part of various development projects globally in areas of China's strategic interests since PLA / PLA affiliated firms are undertaking such projects. This would be the case in all our neighbouring countries also. For Chinese Special Forces to operate in India merging with locals in border areas is not a problem; and presence in business concerns, development projects and operating through proxies and proxy-proxies is well on the cards. Moreover, illegal smuggling routes provide avenues for developing contacts and unconventional operations.

Airborne Forces ²¹

China's 15th Airborne Corps is part of PLAAF comprising three airborne divisions with roles similar to the US 82nd Airborne Division. It is part of the Rapid Reaction Forces which are primarily designated for airborne and special operation missions. Only one of the three airborne divisions can reportedly deploy to any part of China within 48 hours – 11,000 men with light tanks and self-propelled artillery. Reports claim that a 10,000 man airborne division was transported to Tibet in less than 48 hours in late 1990s. This capability may have gone up though details of the recent airborne exercise in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), in proximity of Line of Actual Control (LAC) during 2012 are unavailable. While in 1962, the PLA went for outflanking land manoeuvres by ground troops, the same outflanking manoeuvres may be expected through airborne / rapid reaction forces, preceded by Special Forces coupled with proxies acting as vanguard in the event of a conflict. Significantly, the recent PLA exercise in border areas practised capture of passes in very high altitudes – a contingency certainly not in terrain adjoining Taiwan!

Threats ²²

China is strategically playing its ancient game Wei qi, seeking strategic edge by encircling opponent's pieces. In Wei qi, strategy unfolds gradually as the game progresses. Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory

through psychological advantage, avoiding direct conflict. Chinese 'string of pearls' beefed with 'ring of Islamic radicalism' is part of the same policy. In the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP), both soft and hard power are equally relevant. While China professes peace and friendliness, its strategic aim remains marginalising India through overt engagement and covert containment. Capitalising on India's neglect of border areas, China has built roads right up to the LAC and is covertly providing rations and money to villagers in selected areas including in East Sikkim. Such areas would facilitate deployment of Chinese Special Operations Forces through the spectrum of conflict. Chinese nationals with fake Indian documents apprehended in Indian territory few months back were most likely Chinese Special Forces operatives.

The biggest threat to India is the China-Pakistan anti-India nexus that will enlarge further with China wanting to establish military bases in North Waziristan and FATA.²³ Baluchistan is likely to become a Chinese administered province by 2030²⁴ and Pakistan may even lease Gilgit - Baltistan to China for 50 years.²⁵ This unholy nexus is already engaged in collectively integrating terrorist organisations in India (Maoists since enlarged operations to Assam in 2012) and promoting sophistication of terrorist acts in Indian hinterland. Particularly the Maoists anti-aircraft weapons, mortars (already demonstrated), anti-tank missiles, hand-held Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons (China has already conducted EMP tests on mice, rats, rabbits, dogs and monkeys, causing eye, brain, bone marrow and other organ injuries), WMD's of dirty bomb, biological agents, gas etc. are clear indications of this nexus. Already a 1.5 kg uranium IED has been recovered by the army in Assam.²⁶

On balance, China in conjunction Pakistan is working towards creating an Afghanistan like situation in the Indian hinterland (progressive game of Wei qi), inadvertently aided and abetted by India's intransigence.²⁷ LeT, covert arm of ISI, will remain the main external player, already being acknowledged as a threat to the US.²⁸ Should conventional war occur, the envisaged half front in our hinterland can explode into a full front. The deployment of China - Pakistan's Special Forces, proxies and proxy-proxies will be ambiguous under full cover of deniability and in line with Sun Tzu's ancient teaching, "The ultimate in disposing one's troops is

to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you." This is likely in addition to the asymmetries we have in the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains with respect to China.

Conclusion

The fully State controlled media in China will continue to portray China's benign face but are its real intentions obfuscated? There is little doubt that unconventional warfare including terrorism is here to stay in the foreseeable future with increased lethality and intensity. The requirement for India to establish a deterrent against irregular / unconventional warfare was never more, given the dim prospects of break-up of China-Pakistan anti-India nexus, China giving up covertly marginalising India and Pakistani Military - ISI combine allowing India - Pakistan peace.

Unconventional warfare is here to stay. India must deny its own fault lines through forging a joint civil - military approach.²⁹ Additionally, there must be frank and open dialogue on the issue with China, including on Pakistan's generation of global terrorism. With Chinese Communist Party continuing in power, China's policies may not easily change. However, it may be hoped that there would be a realisation within the PLA that Pakistan is fast becoming a liability.

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Indian Anti Satellite Weapon: Necessity, Urgency and the Way Ahead

Group Captain RK Singh*

Introduction

India is a developing nation with a major role in Asia. The pace of development is moving ahead with positive growth, even in the times of recession the world over. India's growing stature in the world is reflective of the new role which the country has started to play in the world affairs. This economic growth has resulted in a bigger geopolitical and geostrategic role for India, not only in Asian continent, but also in the World Order which is apparently transforming into a New Economic World Order. In this new scheme of things, the space assets have been instrumental in shaping the Indian success story. As a result, more and more satellites are being launched to support large number of services which are poised to shore up the economic activities of the country, apart from supporting a large number of social welfare programmes.

When so many satellites are there in space, their safety and security becomes crucial for India's progress and sustained growth, especially when India is facing a hostile adversary Pakistan in the West and not so friendly a neighbour in China in the East. The security of Indian satellites has become a matter of concern, ever since the shooting down of a defunct Chinese weather satellite by China's anti satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007. The test opened a new flank of vulnerability in India's \$12 billion (Rs 60,000 crore) space infrastructure.¹ China's alarming test spurred India's quest for a similar satellite-killing system.

The Necessity

Offence is the best form of defence. Apart from the military, even a common man understands this axiom. However, when transposed to the national level, it is surprising that the "killer instinct", which pumps the adrenaline and justifies one's belief in "offence is best defence", appears to be amiss. Perhaps that's the

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only justification for the country's political leadership to withhold the decision of developing its own ASAT programme, inspite of the fact that the country, as per the top defence scientists, does have the capability of developing an ASAT weapon for India, as and when the situation demands. In this regard Dr VK Saraswat, the Director General of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has gone on record while briefing the reporters at Thiruvananthapuram in January 2010, "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralise enemy satellites. We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to our space assets." The nation's grit towards building ASAT capability was also visible from the statement of Dr Saraswat after the successful test of Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile programme in April 2012, wherein he said, "Agni-V's launch has ushered in fantastic opportunities in building ASAT weapons and launching nano / micro satellites on demand. The said ASAT would include marrying Agni-V's propulsion system with the kill vehicle (AAD) of the successful II-tier Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Since the ASAT is required to reach an altitude of 800 km – Agni-V will give the boosting capability and the "kill vehicle", with advanced seekers, will be able to home into the target satellite". He further stated that "India will not test ASAT capability through destruction of a satellite so as to avoid space debris. Instead, the Indian ASAT capability would be fine tuned through simulated electronic tests".

Infact, there appears to be an intense debate going on within the Indian space and the strategic community on two counts; firstly, the necessity of possessing an ASAT, and secondly, its impact on the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. India appears to be sceptical about disturbing the Asian security architecture, which is led by China. Yet, it also appreciates the vulnerability of its space assets and thus the necessity to protect them in view of their importance as national assets, which are indeed the engines for economic growth and development. Dr Kasturirangan did appreciate this necessity immediately after the Chinese tested their ASAT on 11 Jan 2007. After the Chinese ASAT test, which took the world, including India by surprise, Dr Kasturirangan said "India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space. Hence, it becomes

necessary to protect them from adversaries. There is a need to look at means of securing these.”

Towards this, the development efforts in respect of the Indian ASAT have moved forward. In a televised press briefing during the 97th Indian Science Congress in Thiruvananthapuram, the DRDO Director General VK Saraswat announced that India was developing lasers and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle that could be combined to produce a weapon to destroy enemy satellites in orbit. Dr Saraswat also claimed that the kill vehicle for intercepting the satellite, needed to be developed, and that work was going on as part of the ballistic missile defence programme.² He said that the propulsion module and kill vehicle already existed in principle on the Agni (missile) series of ballistic missiles, but that India did not have a formal ASAT weapon project as yet. He indicated, however, that the ASAT weapons could be developed as part of the Indian BMD Programme, which will complete the development stage in totality by 2014.³ India had identified development of ASAT weapons “for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both Low Earth Orbit (LEO) (2,000-km altitude above earth’s surface) and the higher geosynchronous orbits” as a thrust area in its long-term integrated perspective plan (2012–2027).⁴

However, the poignant silence on the ASAT programme maintained by India, since the Chinese ASAT test in 2007, could apparently be for the lack of technical competence towards development of a potent ASAT weapon or international considerations. Since Dr VK Saraswat has already gone on record to say that the capability was available within the country, there could be two questions bothering the Indian policy makers; specially the mandarins of Ministry of External Affairs. Firstly, who will have the onus to justify to the world about the strategic compulsions for India to go for an ASAT weapon. Thereafter, the more arduous task would be of countering the move by the world powers to isolate India through sanctions, if any. Thus, there are two basic questions which India needs to consider : –

- (a) Should India disturb the status quo in Asia by testing its own ASAT weapon?
- (b) International fallout of ASAT test by India, specially the Chinese reaction?

The Necessity of Protecting the Satellites

Since the country's economic development is so dependent on satellite based technologies, the Indian space assets need to be secured from physical damage and destruction. This destruction could be from internal threat of sabotage and physical damage of ground support systems or threat of physical destruction of the satellites, which are vulnerable to ASAT threat from our adversaries. Towards this, India definitely needs to develop its indigenous ASAT capability. The technology apparently is available within the Country, as has been claimed by the defence scientists from DRDO. If that be the case, the time has come for India to initiate its effort towards demonstrating its ASAT capability, which would act as a deterrent to our adversaries from initiating any attack on Indian space assets. Deterrence is credible only when it is physically demonstrated.

The Urgency

The necessity of testing an ASAT weapon to fulfil the Indian strategic requirement has been well appreciated in the strategic community. They also have appreciated that the strength to negotiate and talk peace with a powerful neighbour like China will come from a potent deterrence in the form of ASAT, which can effectively provide an asymmetric advantage to India against China. The only factor that needs to be appreciated is the international reaction towards testing of an ASAT weapon. Since a strong international reaction may be expected, India needs to prepare in advance the ways and means to tackle the fallout, which is likely to impact Country's economic development. Since the international community is paranoid about the space debris, the repercussions are likely to be strong and thus India needs to guard against the negative impact. Since restrictive regimes or negative list is nothing new for India and also the fact that India has learnt to live with nuclear apartheid, the expected restrictive regime consequent to ASAT testing by India, is not bound to have significant impact. The present day India is economically much stronger to handle the impact of any regime and would be able to handle the fallouts, without compromising its economic activities and international relations.

However, there is a way to avoid the international fallout over ASAT test, if the space debris is avoided or controlled in such a

way that it re-enters the earth's atmosphere and automatically burns out. This can be conducted on the lines of the US ASAT test on 21 Feb 2008, wherein the US destroyed its malfunctioning spy satellite USA-193 using a RIM -161 Standard Missile 3. We need to appreciate the whole gamut of this supposed Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) Test by the US. The satellite, USA-193 was an American spy satellite, which was launched on 14 Dec 2006 by a Delta II rocket, from Vandenberg Air Force Base. It was reported about a month after launch that the satellite had failed. In Jan 2008, it was noted that the satellite was decaying from orbit at a rate of 1,640 feet (500 m) per day.⁵ On 14 Feb 2008, it was reported that the US Navy had been instructed to fire an SM-3 ABM weapon at it, to act as an anti-satellite weapon.⁶ The *RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)* is a ship-based missile system used by the US Navy to intercept short-to intermediate-range ballistic missiles as a part of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System.⁷ Although primarily designed as an ABM, the SM-3 has also been employed in an ASAT capacity against a satellite at the lower end of Low Earth orbit.⁸

The primary reason for destroying the satellite, according to the US Government, was the approximately 1,000 lb (450 kg) of toxic hydrazine fuel contained on board the satellite, which could pose health risks to persons in the immediate vicinity of the crash site, should any significant amount survive the re-entry.⁹ On 20 Feb 2008, it was announced that the launch was carried out successfully and an explosion was observed consistent with the destruction of the hydrazine fuel tank.¹⁰ Experts debated whether the hydrazine tank would have survived an uncontrolled re-entry. However, if it had, any human fatality would still have been very unlikely. Although hydrazine is toxic, a small dose would not have been immediately lethal. The chance of the (assumed intact) hydrazine tank landing close enough to at least one person for that person to be killed if he or she lingered in the vicinity of the crash site was about one per cent, while the cost of the intercept was about \$100 million.

The intercept, however, was widely interpreted as a demonstration of the US capabilities in response to the Chinese ASAT test a year earlier. The intercept was different from typical ASAT missions in that it took place at a much lower altitude (133

nautical miles or 247 kilometres) than would normally be the case, and the SM-3 missile as currently deployed would not have adequate range and altitude reach for typical ASAT missions in low-Earth orbit. However, the warhead was shown capable of hitting a satellite at orbital closing speeds. While an SM-3 missile would require significant modification to fill an anti-satellite role, the test was a proof of concept, demonstrating that it can operate in such a role if required. The best part of this demonstration was that it can be achieved with almost negligible debris; hence, not much of hue and cry can be expected from other space faring nations, except from the proponents of weapon free space. India could thus take a cue from this simulated incident, in case it wants to carry out testing of an indigenous ASAT system.

The Way Ahead

The successful 19 Apr 2012 trial of 5,500 km-Agni V Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, that Dr Saraswat calls a "game changer", is another step towards the capability to target objects in space. The missile scaled a height of 600 km before re-entering the atmosphere. The ASAT weapon is unlikely to be publicly tested. This was confirmed by Dr Saraswat who said that India would not test this capability through the destruction of a satellite. Such a test risked showering lethal debris in space that could damage existing satellites. Instead, India's ASAT capability would be fine-tuned through simulated electronic tests.

Seeking to guide India's responses to this emerging threat, Space Security Coordination Group (SSCG) was set up in 2010. Chaired by the National Security Adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon, SSCG involved representatives of DRDO, Indian Air Force (IAF) and National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO). Besides laying down the Government's space policy, this body will also coordinate response on an international code of conduct in space.

In June 2010, the US indicated that they would consider a new treaty for restrictions on space-based weapons. A new treaty would foreclose India's options for testing ASAT weapons. Indian analysts say it could lead to a new restrictive regime on space weapons, like the present treaties on testing and possession of nuclear weapons and long range ballistic missiles. The SSCG has directed DRDO to accelerate its ASAT capability.

Another key ASAT milestone capability will be reached with the first test of a Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) interceptor later this year. This slender two-stage missile can destroy incoming ballistic missiles at an altitude of 150 km. The Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) project that aims to protect the country from hostile ballistic missiles has, in fact, developed the three critical elements required to destroy satellites. A long range radar able to detect them and a missile that can inject a "kill vehicle" or warhead into an orbit that actually homes in to destroy it. All these elements have been developed under the BMD programme. The DRDO's Long Range Tracking Radar can scan targets over 600 km away. The 'kill vehicle' has been developed as part of the ballistic missile system. It has both electronic and radio-frequency guidance that can home onto a target.

Besides the BMD system and an ASAT test, the following is strongly recommended to ensure that the Indian space assets are well protected and India has a credible deterrence : –

- (a) Space surveillance network of satellites equipped with radars to ensure launch detection, tracking measures and cataloguing the orbiting objects and space debris, improved accuracy and surveillance.
- (b) There is an urgent need for a dedicated Space Command. Space assets with military applications need to be placed under the Space Command. A dedicated Space force must be raised from within the Armed Forces cadre.
- (c) Dedicated training of space forces to be initiated for effective and efficient adaption of space technologies in the Armed Forces.
- (d) India's Kinetic Kill Energy (KKE) ASAT must be demonstrated at the earliest for strategic balance in Asia.
- (e) Space assets with military applications ought to be concurrently taken-up alongwith integration of military capabilities in the Armed Forces.

If these recommendations are finalised and incorporated into the Indian strategic build-up, it is for sure that India's offensive space capabilities will not only ensure safety and security of Indian Space assets but will also enhance its strategic and tactical capability, which in turn will contribute to a secure India.

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Conceptual and Ethical Dilemmas in Employment of Armed UAVs in Counter Terrorism / Counter Insurgency Operations in Indian Context

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Introduction

The military use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)/ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, has grown exponentially in recent years. While mostly drones are being used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, increasingly militaries are using drones in offensive roles to launch missiles and bombs. Armed drones have been used by the US military in Afghanistan (since 2001), Iraq (since 2002), and Yemen (since 2002), by the CIA in Pakistan (since 2004), by the UK military in Afghanistan (since 2007) and by Israel in Gaza (since 2008).¹

It is estimated that drones are being used or developed by over forty countries. In its latest report on the worldwide drone market, market analyses firm Visiongain has stated that the US dominates the UAV market as it integrates these systems into all its armed services and at different levels while Israel is both a leading exporter of UAVs and a key market. Although not as big as the US market, there is robust demand worldwide from countries in Europe, particularly the UK, France and Germany. There are also comprehensive plans for UAV purchases by a number of countries in the Asia-Pacific such as China, India, Japan and South Korea".²

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The Seductive Appeal of Killer Drones

It has been reported that one out of every three aircraft in the US military is an UAV.³ The fact that since 2004, the US Military, which has over 10,000 unmanned aerial systems has conducted over 300 drone strikes from Afghanistan to Yemen to Pakistan⁴ clearly signifies the pivotal role that drones play in execution of the US counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy. Their low material cost, zero human cost and expendability makes them a weapon of choice of many counterterrorism (CT) strategists. *For some analysts, drones signify a transformation in warfare similar in scale to the gun powder revolution.*⁵ Compared with traditionally piloted aircraft, they are cheaper to make and carry an array of sensors and cameras that can keep watch both by day and night. Without a pilot, drones can fly at altitudes beyond to 30,000 feet without needing pressurisation and temperature control. It has been reported that there are some UAVs that can fly air continuously for up to 40 hours.⁶ Unlike a pilot, a drone is not prone to battle fatigue, and can record on video all that is happening on the ground below and transmit it live to the ground station. New generation armed drones are likely to be bestowed with stealth capability, so that the attack is carried out totally undetected. *Such capabilities offer new opportunities in achieving politico-military objectives by bringing down vital politico-military targets at zero human, negligible politico-economic costs.* Accordingly, the demand of militaries across the globe for armed UAVs is growing.

Some analysts even hypothesise that killer drones might one day not only replace manned aircraft in combat and logistics role but may even make the classic cordon and search operations (CASO)/search and destroy operations (SADO) look irrelevant. Notwithstanding, the tremendous force multiplier effect of UCAVs/armed UAVs, there are certain issues that need to be deliberated upon while contemplating employment of UCAVs for strike missions in CT/CI Operations in our context.

Conceptual Challenges and Tactical Dilemmas

Drone Operations and Human Rights. *Employment of armed UAVs for strike missions in populated built-up areas is fraught with risks of extensive collateral damage and civilian casualties. Indian Army has an envious record of conducting CT/CI operations (ops) while upholding human dignity and human rights, by abiding to the*

dictums of “Josh, Tezi, Sidhai aur Tehzeeb”, “Heart is My Weapon” and “Jawan Aur Awaam, Aman hai Muqam”

The basic tactics adopted by Indian Armed Forces deployed in CT Ops, has been always to “Evacuate civilians from target areas”, “Isolate holed up terrorists”, “Challenge”, “Draw Fire”, “Fix”, “Engage” and “Neutralise”. This remains the time tested highly successful approach rather than “Bomb and Berries” approach involving a drone operator enjoying berries while bombing militants along with civilians!! It has been reported that since 2004 between 1,717 and 2,680 people have been killed in Af-Pak region because of drone attacks.⁷ The Bureau of Investigation Journalism (TBIJ) has reported that since 2004 to mid-September 2012 about 474-881 civilian including 176 children were killed in drone attacks in Af-Pak.⁸ It is actually difficult to ascertain what proportion of persons killed were militants, terrorists or civilian. However in our context, even if a quarter of such fatalities were to occur in J&K/NE states where our armed forces remain embattled in fighting insurgents/terrorists the repercussions would have a strategically adverse impact on gains made over the years in these areas.

Drone Operations and Precise Targeting. *The second issue is: will the ability to strike a target precisely with negligible risk to own troops make classic CASO/SADO ops in CT redundant? Another related issue that stares at a military decision maker while taking a call on ordering a UCAV strike mission is that whether such systems provide a capability of absolutely precise targeting? The answer is, No!! Despite the much hyped technological advances in the field of UAV domain which proclaims that UAVs of future will take off, navigate to a destination, strike return and land without human intervention, the crucial issue that remains unanswered is under what circumstances we might trust a machine to correctly identify a target and fire a weapon without human involvement. The drones rely on multiple intelligence sources to accurately identify targets. This limitation further gets compounded because of lack of dependability of local HUMINT sources that are notoriously unreliable and often give wrong information to settle personal scores. Additionally, while the drone camera can provide crystal clear images, it is difficult for drone operators to accurately identify individuals when looking at them directly from above. For example, just months after the September 11 attacks, a Predator pilot spotted a tall man in flowing white robes walking near the eastern border*

of Afghanistan. Intelligence officials incorrectly believed the man to be Osama bin Laden and fired the Predator's missile, killing the innocent villager and his two companions.⁹

Kill Versus Capture Debate. Then is the issue of loss of invaluable intelligence due to a 'Hunter-Killer' type strike missions executed by an armed UAV leading to on spot neutralisation of the terrorist and thus loss of potential intelligence that could be gained through capture/ surrender. Dead have no stories to tell !!

Expendability of Drones. Last but not the least is the often hyped issue of the 'Expendability of Drones'. It has been reported that even when not facing enemy fire, the famed US drone Predator crashes due to mechanical error was 43 times per 100,000 flying hours, whereas typical manned aircraft crash was 2 per 100,000 hours.¹⁰ A 2010 media study reported that "Thirty-eight Predator and Reaper drones have crashed during combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and nine more during training on bases in the US — with each crash costing between \$3.7 million and \$5 million.¹¹ Altogether, the US Air Force has reported that there have been 79 drone accidents costing at least \$1 million each."¹² When compared to other aircraft, the cost of an individual remotely piloted vehicle can be misleading.¹³ UAVs operate as part of a system, which generally consists of a ground control station, a ground crew including remote pilots and sensor operators, communication links, and often multiple air vehicles. *As an example, a Predator air vehicle costs \$4.5 million, while the Predator system, including four air vehicles and control equipment, costs over \$20 million.¹⁴* Besides this the rising sensor costs have prompted some observers to recommend equipping UAVs with self protection devices, implying that those UAVs are no longer considered expendable.

The Legal and Ethical Dilemma

Another major issue to ponder about is: Can neutralisation / targeted killings of suspected individuals be justified legally or ethically? In the wake of the 9/11 atrocity the US government passed a legislation enabling the President to use military force to pursue those responsible.¹⁵ It is on this basis that the CIA has operated drones in a persistent campaign of targeted and killing in northern Pakistan. How does this fit into the legal domain?

In our context: Can the Indian Armed Forces execute drone attacks in insurgency prone areas in hinterland under Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) or we will need a special act of parliament? *Who will authorise such attacks – Brigade Commander/ General Officer Commanding/Corps Commander or the Commander-in-Chief / or clearance from Political bosses would be mandatory?* Should a drone attack go haywire leading to civilian fatalities, who would be held accountable!! Will it be the operator or the Commanding Officer of the UCAV fleet or the person who gave the orders? Will it be the Company Commander under whose area of responsibility this strike has taken place based on his intelligence input while his company was tasked to lay stops to neutralise fleeing militants? Can a UAV pilot be held accountable for something that has been executed by a high tech gizmo due to a technical snag?

How does this pre-emptive killing without prior warning, without challenge and without drawing fire from the holed up militant, based merely on suspicion / a visual sighting of an individual carrying something that resembles a weapon, fit into international laws / Indian laws governing use of deadly force? It is pertinent here to mention that the law of armed conflict accepts the targeting and killing of combatants based solely on their status as members of armed forces or party to conflict who might engage in hostilities to make themselves lawful targets. In the Indian context, while opening of fire in self defence/ to protect government property and innocent civilians is covered under provisions IPC/AFSPA, how would a killer drone strike, merely on suspicion/ communication intercept, be covered legally? These are certain disturbing issues that commanders on ground would have to resolve before the UCAVs are operationalised in our context.

Just War Theory and Drone Attacks

There are some analysts who defend use of drone attacks in insurgency areas under the shield of 'Concept of Just War'. Let us now analyse: What is the Just War Concept in relation to use of drone attacks? The Just War provides moral criteria or a moral calculus, for determining whether such action is morally justifiable. These criteria comprise what is traditionally referred to as '*jus ad bellum*'. Historically '*jus ad bellum*' criteria have included the following principles: just cause, right authority, right intention, proportionality, reasonable hope of success, and last resort.¹⁶ Just

cause is defined in terms of a response to the crime of aggression. *Therefore, do pre-emptive drone strikes particularly in our context, as a means of security against a possible act of terrorism meet the criterion of just cause? This is a debatable issue.*

Further, according to the principles of '*jus in bello*', in particular the principle of discrimination is designed to provide non combatant immunity, and thus the intentional killing of innocents as a military and/or political strategy is never justifiable¹⁷. Similarly the Just War theory propounds that use of force be the last resort, that sufficient non-violent attempts to resolve the conflict have been made and failed. In the Indian context, opening of fire has to be preceded by a warning. The pamphlet on Aid to Civil Authority and the provisions of AFSPA clearly mandate this. Drone strikes being entirely pre-emptive in nature, thus violate the spirit of 'Laws of the Land', as often these strikes are made without challenge/warning to the holed up militants. Therefore, a universally agreed legal frame work for employment of drones for combating terrorism and insurgency operations has to be evolved. Meanwhile, acting with restraint and in accordance with laws of land while upholding the human rights in the finest traditions of the Indian Armed Forces, is a far surer path to stability and peace than acting with disregard to human life/dignity, without legal justification and ethical prudence that can only breed anger and resentment amongst population in the affected areas.

Miscellaneous Issues

The Aspect of Air Space Management. For UAVs to take an active role in internal security, law enforcement, and other proposed civilian uses, airspace management has to be well coordinated. Collision avoidance capabilities need to be developed and a nodal agency at tri-service level has to be evolved to allocate the already crowded air space for UAV operations.

Manpower Requirements. The most striking and talked about characteristic of UAVs is that they are "unmanned". However, this is a myth. *"There's nothing unmanned about them. It can take as many as 170 persons to launch, fly, and maintain such an aircraft as well as to process and disseminate its ISR products."*¹⁸ Thus besides the capital costs involved in the in-house development/acquisition of modern Armed UAVs, the recurring revenue costs relating to recruitment, training and retention of associated manpower have also to be factored in.

Psychological Impact on UCAV Pilots. The issue of psychological impact on soldiers or operators based at locations far away from Tactical Battle Area (TBA) executing UCAV strikes leading to killing of militants and civilians has to be considered. It has been brought out that a play station mentality surrounds drone killings.¹⁹ Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life? How will commanders and policymakers keep themselves immune from the deceptively antiseptic nature of drone killings?²⁰ While studies are underway to examine physical, emotional and psychological impact involved in the operation of killer drones, only the passing of time will reveal if the drone crews will develop symptoms associated with combat stress or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Psychological Impact on Civilians. In its report titled '*Living Under Drones*',²¹ the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic has brought out that US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury. Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in North West Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorises the people, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities. Those living under drones have to face a constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These fears have affected behaviour. *Some parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or traumatised by strikes have dropped out of school.* The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims.²²

In contrast, in our context, the Indian military history is replete with examples of our troops demonstrating extreme compassion and empathy to civilians entrapped in the conflict zones. Such is the resilience and ethical standing of Indian soldiers that our troops are today in greatest demand internationally for peace keeping operations. Therefore this issue too merits to be factored in before we formulate a policy to operationalise killer drones.

Geographical Boundaries: Drone Operations

Finally the issue of geographical boundaries is perhaps the most intriguing one. Moving beyond the issue of civilian collateral damage, the most salient issue that comes to forefront is that these emerging technologies redefine the geography of war. The laws of war have inchoate boundaries for where they apply, *lex specialis*, and where the Law of Everyday Life applies. Redefining those boundaries through changes in war's technologies, and the ordinary law of everyday life, including criminal law, constitutional protections, and more, suddenly might not apply.²³

Terrorists move across the length and breadth of the world. Hijackers of IC 814 took shelter in Afghanistan, the Hizbul Mujahidin Chief, Syed Salahuddin, the Lashkar ideologue Hafiz Saeed etc are all known to be based in Pakistan. Can, in pursuit of National Security Objectives, the Government of India order a drone strike? *Conversely if a top Al-Qaeda/Pakistan Taliban leader shifts to a hideout in Sopore in North Kashmir, can the US Govt/Pakistan launch a drone strike under garb of Global War on Terror? What will be our response? Terrorists might be located anywhere in our country, does it mean the AFSPA or a specially enacted law is to be applied across the length/breadth of the country to authorise a drone attack.* There are no satisfying/reassuring answers to this question. *Terrorism thus creates conceptual tensions and moral dilemmas.* To conduct war according to ethical principles is not only moral, it is sensible.²⁴ Any advances in technology in the battle space should therefore be weighed against accepted ethical practices to ensure we are at least maintaining, if not elevating, the existing ethical standards by deploying this technology. Lowering the standards, however great the capability the technology may provide, would be self-defeating.

Conclusion

Despite their immense appeal, UCAV operations are thus not "costless", as contrary to the popular belief. In light of the above described conceptual dilemmas, the high cost of armed UAVs vis a vis the resultant limited pay offs in terms of elimination of few terrorists, it may not be prudent to rush in with operationalising of armed UAVs in CI/CT situations in our context as yet. 'There is simply no point in using a hammer to kill a fly'. Using armed drones may yield short-term gains but is not a substitute for a long-term strategy.

Thus , in our context, while the employment of UCAVs in a conventional war to shape the battle space through battlefield degradation, to facilitate break-in operations by precise targeting of enemy defences in obstacle ridden terrain/built up areas/in desert/ semi-desert terrain, enemy bunkers in mountainous terrain and in support of special force operations shall yield significant operational advantages by reducing human costs and enhancing operational tempo, the employment of armed UAVs in CI/CT operations in our context needs an informed debate in order to arrive at an appropriate policy .

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Why Japan Needs India as a Security Provider? The View from the Current Asian Scenario*

Dr Satoru Nagao**

Introduction

When we think about Japan-India military relations as they stand today, we cannot forget one fact that Japan is located far away from India. For example, from Tokyo, Japanese must spend ten hours to visit New Delhi by air. However, if we want to visit Los Angeles in the USA, we spend same ten hours by air. The database of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan points out that about 5,500 Japanese lived in India in 2011 but about 400,000 Japanese lived in USA, about 140,000 Japanese lived in China and about 12,000 Japanese lived in Indonesia. Compared with these numbers, there are relatively fewer Japanese in India¹. Geographical distance between Japan and India has been the primary reason for fewer military relations between the two countries historically.

However, further cooperation in military relations between Japan and India is more plausible now. Japan and India have already started a 2 + 2 dialogue (vice ministerial level) and an annual exercise called Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX). It was the first time in 2012 that Japan participated in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It is important to bear in mind that Japan has not entered into any such deep security relationship with other countries except the US and Australia. Thus, military ties between Japan and India should be treated as very important and exceptional.

This paper attempts to analyse the context in which Japan-India military relations are gaining importance in Asia. From the viewpoint of the current power game in Asia. There are three important actors, i.e. the USA, ASEAN, and Japan.

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
The US needs Japan - India Cooperation

Firstly, the US needs an "ally" to maintain military balance in Asia because their naval power is declining and China's naval power is rising. After the Cold War, US lost the reason to maintain large number of warships in their navy. In 1990, US Navy possessed 15 aircraft carriers, 230 "big surface combatants" which are more than 3000 tons of full load displacement and 127 submarines which included 126 nuclear submarines. However by 2012, the US Navy consisted only of 11 aircraft carriers, 110 "big surface combatants" and 72 nuclear submarines. And by 2013, US will decrease one aircraft carrier and nine "big surface combatants" with just an addition of one nuclear submarine. Despite what the US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta said at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, "By 2020, the navy will reposture its forces from today's roughly 50-50 per cent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60-40 split between those oceans²", the number of deployed warships in the Pacific will be nearly the same in 2020 because total number of warships are declining. This information means that US power has been declining for the last 23 years and in theory, declining power leads to a power vacuum.

China has been modernising its navy for the last 23 years. The white paper of the Defense of Japan points out that the nominal size of China's announced national defense budget has more than doubled in size over the past five years, and has grown approximately 30-fold over the past 24 years.³ Further, the focus of China's military modernisation is Navy and Air Force. As a result, Chinese navy have been increasing their capability to a "blue water navy". In 1990, China possessed 55 surface combatants. 16 of those 55 are "big surface combatants". By 2012, the total number of surface combatants has grown from 55 to 78 and 37 of those 78 are "big surface combatants". Generally, a big ship can operate in a wider area than a small ship. As a "Blue Water Navy", the capability of Chinese navy has been improving considerably. Their submarine forces have modernised with the number of nuclear submarines going up from 5 to 10. It is of significance that China's first aircraft carrier 'Liaoning' was formally handed over to the PLA Navy and entered into service on 25 Sep 2012.

As a result, theoretically it can be inferred that China's

assertiveness in West Pacific and the Indian Ocean reflects this power shift in Asia. The US needs an ally or a friendly country to fill the power vacuum as against China. For example, Mr Richard L Armitage, former US Deputy Secretary of State pointed out that the US needs a 'strong Japan' when he published the report "US-Japan Alliance" written by him and Professor Joseph S Nye of the Harvard University.⁴ As a "Natural Ally"⁵ or a "Linchpin"⁶, the US needs a strong India too. Japan and India are candidates to fill the power vacuum in Asia. Hence, US wants to support the coalition of Japan and India. The above power equation is illustrated in **Map 1** below : –



Map 1 : US Needs Japan and India

ASEAN Needs Japan - India Cooperation

One of most important questions regarding the US - China Power Game is, to locate where exactly will "the theatre of the power game" be, in the worst case scenario. To understand this question, we need to know what takes for qualifying as a theatre of a power game. If Central Europe including Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary etc was the theatre of the power game in the Cold War, we can image three basic features as pertaining to this concept. Firstly, Central Europe is has been

the centre of world politics. Secondly, Central Europe stood separated as a major military power arena. Thirdly, Central Europe was surrounded by great powers like USSR, France, Britain and United States of America. Thus, it can be concluded that one of the most prominent features required for an area to become a theatre of the power game is that a lot of different groups in strategically important places are surrounded by great powers. In the case of Southeast Asia as well, three similarities with the Central Europe can be drawn. The essentials of this power game as under are examined in succeeding paragraphs.

- (a) Strategically Important Place
- (b) Separated
- (c) Surrounded by Great Powers

Strategically Important Place. Firstly, the region of Southeast Asia is a strategically important place, is sitting on key Sea Lines of Communication between the Middle East and East Asia. Further, Southeast Asia is a resource rich region and economically a good market. Thus, Southeast Asia is fulfilling the requirement as a strategically important place.

Separated. Secondly, ASEAN is not an integrated region. Most ASEAN countries have been expanding their navies which implies a certain arms race in the region. Submarines are one such symbol of arms race in Asia, because submarines cannot carry out military operations other than war. For example, Vietnam ordered six new submarines in 2009 first of which they will receive in 2013. Malaysia got two submarines in 2009. Singapore increased their submarines from four to five. Indonesia plans to increase submarines from two to twelve. The acquisition of submarines by the Philippines and Thailand is under consideration⁷.

The most important and obvious question that emerges from the above description is why these countries have started modernising their navies. According to an analysis done in a Jane's Defence Weekly article, these countries want to achieve sea denial capability to tackle China's naval modernisation. Because "sea denial only requires the perception of threat to cause unease in an opponent" and "small numbers of submarines have the potential to deny large areas of sea to an opponent"⁸, submarine is the most effective weapon to build sea denial capabilities. If the rationale of

this submarine modernisation is to tackle Chinese naval modernisation, it is not a problem because this modernisation will symbolise an integrated ASEAN.

However, in 2012, ASEAN could not conclude a Joint Communiqué at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting because only Hanoi and Manila has proclaimed a strong stance against China's assertiveness. ASEAN is still not an integrated region.

Surrounded by Great Powers. Thirdly, Southeast Asia is surrounded by great powers like China, Japan, the US, Australia and India. Not only China, but other great powers are also modernising their navies. For example, Japan decided to increase their submarines from 18 to 24 (including 2 for training) in 2010⁹. Australia decided to increase theirs from six to twelve despite shortage of crews in 2009¹⁰. India will increase the number of nuclear submarines from one to four or five in the near future despite decreasing the total number of conventional submarines¹¹. And in 2011, the US deployed 31 of their 54 nuclear submarines in the Pacific. This US presence is likely to remain unaltered in near future¹².

Under such a situation, ASEAN needs to amalgamate their leadership as one integrated power and beef up their military power with trustworthy partner to provide ASEAN military support. The US military power has been playing a role of a security provider in Southeast Asia since long; especially, in the Cold War, the US had their bases in Thailand and the Philippines. Recently, the US have again started to show their presence in Southeast Asia. To cite a few examples : they have concentrated their naval and air power in Guam under Air-Sea battle concept, increased naval exercises, restarted naval assistance to the Philippines, enhanced defense relationship with Vietnam, set-up new base in Darwin in Australia and will deploy Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. However, when compared with bases like Subic Bay in Philippines, which was set up by the US in the Cold War, new bases located in Darwin and Guam are farther away from China. It appears that China's military modernisation has somewhat pushed the US military bases further east.

Therefore, to correct military balance and ensure stability in Southeast Asia, not only the US and ASEAN countries, but also

allies of the US and other friendly countries including Japan, Australia and India should come together and negotiate with China. Since, both Japan and India face border issues with China; Japan - India relations are gaining significance in this region now.

Japan Needs 'Japan – India' Cooperation

Going by Japan's threat perception, China poses serious security concerns currently. Ministry of Defence in Japan has specially been concerned about China's military modernisation. As per the White Paper Defense of Japan "China's response has been criticised as assertive in regard to the issues on conflicting interests with its surrounding countries, including Japan. Thus, there is a concern over its future direction." "Furthermore, China has been expanding and intensifying its activities in its surrounding waters. These moves, together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis."¹³ These strong words in official documents indicate an increasing concern in Japan with respect to China's rising power.

Not only the ministry of defence, but most Japanese people too think of China as unfavourable. The Japan-China joint annual survey implemented by the Genron NPO and the China Daily in 2012, shows that, "the ratio of Japanese who had an unfavourable view of China climbed to its highest-ever level of 84.3 per cent". "The ratio of Chinese who had an unfavourable opinion of Japan slightly improved to 64.5 per cent from 65.9 per cent last year, but it remained above 60 per cent". "When asked about the possibility of a military dispute occurring mainly between Japan and China in the waters of the East China Sea, 50.2 per cent of the Chinese polled said, they foresee such an incident in the near future or in several years. This far surpassed a comparable percentage of 27.2 per cent for the Japanese pollees."¹⁴

Therefore, the argument and the need of the hour is 'to check the military balance in East Asia and the need to ponder over its feasibility'. In the words of James R Homes, Associate Professor at the Naval War College, "Despite Japan's latter-day image as a military pushover, a naval war would not be a rout for China. While the Japanese post war "peace" constitution "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of

force as means of settling international disputes.” The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has accumulated several pockets of material excellence, such as undersea warfare, since World War II.” ¹⁵(Refer **Table 1**)

Table 1 : Naval Balance of Four Countries

	Japan	India	China	USA
Aircraft Carrier	0	1(+2)	0(+2)	11
(Anti-submarine)Helicopter Carrier	<u>2(+2)</u>	0	0	0
Destroyer, Frigate, Corvette	46(-2)	46	<u>78</u>	110
Submarine	16(+6)	15	<u>71</u>	72
Anti-submarinePatrol Aircraft	<u>80</u>	9	4	147
Anti-submarine Helicopters	<u>88</u>	54	28	255

***Source:** International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance 2012

To further elaborate on this point, let me substantiate with some examples. Japan possesses two anti-submarine helicopter carriers, 46 anti-submarine destroyers and frigates, 80 P-3C anti-submarine aircrafts and 88 anti-submarine helicopters. Compared to India and China, the number of these anti-submarine forces is large. Compared with US Navy, Japan’s anti-submarine forces are relatively big despite Japan being significantly smaller than the US. The bottom-line of this elaboration was to point out that Japan has world class anti-submarine capabilities.

However, there is another issue involved. To operate these anti-submarine forces except submarines, Japan needs air supremacy too. Japan’s 278 fourth generation fighter aircraft will not be enough to tackle China’s 522 fourth generation fighters in the near future¹⁶. Compared to Japan, China’s defence budget has been increasing considerably.

In addition, the problematic point is that the US military budget itself has been declining – despite the Japanese needs for additional airpower from the US. Thus, in *The National Military Strategy of United States of America 2011: Redifining America’s Military Leadership*, the US abandoned its “Two major Regional Conflict Strategy” which implied US keep the capabilities to defeat enemy when the US faces two major regional conflicts occurring nearly

simultaneously¹⁷. Japan is apprehensive of a situation wherein the US may not provide Japan enough military support, if the US is faced with other conflicts in places like Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Middle East, Africa etc.. To tackle such a contingency, if friendly countries fill the power vacuum as a security provider in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, Japan can get full support from the US to maintain the military balance.

Therefore, *National Defense Guideline Program* which decides the direction of Japan's defence policy made in 2010 points out that "Japan will enhance cooperation with India"¹⁸.


India's Importance as a Security Provider

Above all, the US, ASEAN and Japan need India as a stabilising force. There are three factors in favour of India to prove their claim of becoming a trustworthy security provider in Asia.

Geographical Potential as a Security Provider. Phase refer to **Map 2**. First factor is the geographical location. Historically, three centres of power have dominated the sub-continent, the Mauryan Empire, the Mughal Empire and the British Raj. These three Empires could not project their land power far beyond South Asia because India is surrounded by high mountains. However, as a naval power, the influential area of the Chola Empire could extend to Southeast Asia. The history of Chola Empire has indicated that strategic connection between India and Southeast Asia existed since ancient times. This means that India has the potential as a security provider in Southeast Asia for geo-strategic reasons.


Possessing Enough Naval Power as a Security Provider. Secondly, India will possess enough naval capability to be projected as a strong naval power in the future. For example, the number of "big surface combatants" whose full load displacement is more than 3000 tons had been increasing rapidly in the Indian Navy. In 2012, the Indian Navy has a total of 21 "big surface combatants", up from 14 in 1990. And in 2013, the number will increase to 26. Generally, big ships can operate in a wider area than smaller ones. As a "Blue Water Navy", the capability of Indian Navy is improving rapidly. The above concept is illustrated in **Table 2**.

Trustworthy Partners. There are two reasons, as to why India is perceived as a trustworthy partner by most countries, except China



Map 2 : Geographical Potential of India

Table 2 : The number of warships in the Indian Navy



*The load displacement is more than 3000 tons in the Indian Navy

and Pakistan. When we try to understand military strategy of other countries, we collect information by not only reading official documents but also by interacting with experts in and outside the governments. Freedom of expression in India enables the experts to voice their opinions about government policies and institutions freely.

Secondly, because India has exercised restraint to use military power as a strategy in the past, most countries can trust India. Indian Armed Forces have not crossed their borders since 1972, except for peace keeping or peace building operations. India's restraint to use force is a consistent strategy. For most countries, India's perception is that of a trustworthy country.

Conclusion

Finally, deducing from the arguments presented above, it can be concluded as to why Japan needs India as security provider in the current Asian scenario. Firstly, we need to fill the power vacuum created due to the declining US power. Secondly, Japan and ASEAN alone do not have enough power to fill the power vacuum. Thirdly, India has the potential to become a trustworthy security provider. Thus, to maintain the military balance in Asia, India's implementation of a rapid military modernisation is important for Japan. Hence, Japan and India need to cooperate with the US, Australia and ASEAN to come together to stabilise Asia.

However, the question that needs to be asked is whether India has the required will. The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral DK Joshi's statement that the Indian Navy will protect its interests in disputed South China Sea is reflective of India's rising determination to play a larger geopolitical role in the said region¹⁹. Hence, Japan is waiting for India to show up as a great power in the world.

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UNMOGIP: A Subcontinental Relic

Lieutenant Colonel Shailender Arya*

Introduction

The recent sparring by India and Pakistan over the United Nations (UN) observer group at the Line of Control (LC) has again brought in focus this long drawn and perhaps irrelevant UN group whose utility and role is now a question of debate. This group, called United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), a legacy of the 1947-48 Pakistan sponsored tribal intrusion in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the resultant Indo-Pak war, struggles to find its identity and role in the current scenario where the subsequent agreements between India and Pakistan have resolved to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations. In India, the UNMOGIP is increasingly viewed as symbol of the idealism based foreign policy of the Nehruvian years and the ghost of a failed third party intervention in J&K which needs a quick burial.

As recently as on 22 January 2013, during a UN Security Council (UNSC) debate on peacekeeping, incidentally organised by Pakistan as a non-permanent member of the 15-nation Security Council, India's Ambassador to the UN Hardeep Singh Puri stated that UNMOGIP's role has been overtaken by the 1972 Shimla Agreement, signed by the Heads of the two governments and ratified by their respective parliaments and even went on to suggest that it would be better to spend resources allocated for the observer group elsewhere in the difficult economic times.¹ Today, India and Pakistan play cricket, allow artists to perform in each other's country, have agreed upon for increased people-to-people contact and an easier visa regime. The closure of UNMOGIP shall remove a symbolic obstacle between the two nations and may encourage Pakistan to adopt a pragmatic foreign policy.

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Nehru's Ideal World Fails

It was India which had formally referred the case of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir to the UNSC under Article 35 of the UN Charter on 01 January 1948. Under Article 35, any country is allowed to bring a dispute to the attention of the UNSC or the General Assembly. While it was the first armed conflict for the young and somewhat dreamy India, the UN was also confronting its first set of conflicts in the post World War II era commencing with the Israel - Palestinian issue and followed by the Korean War. On 20 January 1948, the UNSC adopted Resolution 39 (1948) establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the Kashmir issue.

Initially, Pakistan denied that its troops were present but when a three-member UN delegation, subsequent to the *ibid* UNSC resolution 39, visited the actual scene of fighting, the Pakistan government admitted the presence of its troops. The first team of unarmed military observers arrived in the mission area in late January 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. The Karachi Agreement between India and Pakistan was concluded on 27 July 1949 which established a ceasefire line to be supervised by UN military observers. Subsequently, on 30 March 1951, following the termination of UNCIP, the UNSC by its Resolution 91 (1951) decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in J&K.²

The UN involvement in Kashmir was active for the first few years wherein the various UN appointed mediators, from UNSC President, General AGL McNaughton in 1949 to Gunnar Jarring in 1957, tried to resolve the issue. The UN involvement ebbed to a superficial level after the 1965 Indo-Pak War wherein it was the erstwhile USSR rather than the UN which negotiated the Tashkent Peace Agreement. The UN involvement completely stopped after the 1971 Indo-Pak War which resulted in the Shimla Agreement. Nothing exemplifies the engagement levels better than the number of resolutions. Between 1948 and 1971, the UNSC passed 23 resolutions on the Kashmir issue, and none thereafter till date as the Shimla Agreement fundamentally altered the nature of the dispute from a supposedly international to a purely bilateral issue. The last UNSC resolution (307) that, *inter alia*, dealt with Kashmir was passed in the wake of the 1971 Indo - Pak War, where J&K

in any case was not at the centre of the conflict and could be passed only after India had declared a unilateral ceasefire.

Pandit Nehru went to the UN with high hopes and faith in the recently established World body. However, soon the disillusionment set in with the complex proposals and resolutions, which though asking Pakistan to withdraw its forces, did not directly, blame Pakistan which was the evidently aggressor in spite of clouding its actions behind a smoke-screen of tribal *lashkars*. In fact, the arrival of UN mediators had quite the opposite effect for India – it internationalised the issue in spite of J&K legally being a part of the Union of India.

From New York to Shimla

The 1972 Shimla Agreement was a game changer. Among other things, it was mutually agreed that the two countries have resolved to settle their differences by *“peaceful means through bilateral negotiations”*. Post this agreement, India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, since it related specifically to the ceasefire line under the Karachi Agreement. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position. Meanwhile, the UNMOGIP continued its mission in spite of differences as reflected on its website wherein it states that *“despite the disagreement between India and Pakistan over UNMOGIP’s mandate and functions, the mission has remained in the area to observe the 1971 ceasefire arrangements.”* The UN maintains that the Secretary-General’s position has been that UNMOGIP could be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such an agreement, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same arrangements as established following 17 December 1971 ceasefire, and has remained in the area to observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire and report thereon to the Secretary-General.³

On the contrary, Indian diplomats often point out that UNMOGIP’s role was only to supervise the ceasefire line, which was created in J&K as a result of the Karachi Agreement of 1949. This line no longer existed and a new line came into existence on 17 December 1971.⁴ The current Chief Minister of J&K also seems to have similar opinion wherein he recently said the UNMOGIP had failed to maintain the sanctity of the Line of Control (LC).⁵

Current Status

The group is currently headed by Major General Young-Bum Choi

from the Republic of Korea who is the Chief Military Observer and Head of Mission. He is assisted by 39 military observers and 25 international civilian personnel with the total budget of the group for the financial year 2012–13 being US\$ 21,084,900. The military observers are mainly drawn from the far-off and generally neutral countries like Chile, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Sweden and Uruguay. UNMOGIP currently has four offices located at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK), Islamabad, New Delhi and Srinagar. Post Shimla Agreement, India has lodged no complaints with UNMOGIP since January 1972 and has imposed certain restrictions on the activities of the UN observers on the Indian side while logistic assistance and other facilities are still being provided to the observers. However, Pakistan continues to lodge complaints with UNMOGIP about ceasefire violations. Pakistan has also provided the UNMOGIP staff members in Islamabad and Muzaffarabad direct access to LC at Chakothi in POK.

Changing International Opinion

The first signs of the changing global opinion on the Kashmir issue came in 1990 wherein the USA changed its stance after nearly four decades and no longer urged for a plebiscite in Kashmir, saying the dispute should be settled through direct negotiations between India and Pakistan.⁶ Soon the 'bilateral talks' view was endorsed by most of the Western nations. In November 2010, in a significant blow to Pakistan's attempts to internationalise the issue, J&K was removed from the UN list of unresolved disputes. While the UN continues to mention Middle East, Cyprus, Western Sahara, Nepal, Guinea Bissau, Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as disputes, as a reflection of changed ground realities in the Indian sub-continent, J&K no longer finds place in this UNSC list.⁷ Incidentally, its omission was first noticed by Pakistan, whose envoy Amjad Hussain B Sial then moved to file a protest. Soon, the Kashmir-issue was a big no-no at the international forums while the US moved to arrest a Pak-sponsored Kashmiri activist named Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai in July 2011 who was being paid about US \$ 700,000 per year by the ISI to organise pseudo-seminars in the US to falsify facts about Kashmir.

Au contraire, nothing much has changed for Pakistan even if there are no takers. As usual, in September 2012, President Asif Ali Zardari raked up the issue at the 67th session of the UN General

Assembly wherein he stated that Kashmir remains a symbol of failure of the UN system and Pakistan's principled position on territorial disputes remains bedrock of its foreign policy. Pakistan uses the official UN map of Kashmir region though quietly it has absorbed the Northern Areas, part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K, into Pakistan and is in the process of changing the demographic composition of these areas which are much larger in size than the so-called 'Azad Kashmir'. Pakistan also misuses the pretext of UN presence to continue to show J&K as a disputed territory while dishonouring almost all the UNSC resolutions, starting from withdrawal of troops from POK to blatant and often craven ceasefire violations.

The Psyche and a Tool

The existence of a UN group, coupled with the past UN resolutions on Kashmir, meanwhile has done nothing to prevent proxy war by Pakistan, but it has nevertheless influenced the Kashmiri political identity. It played on the psyche of Kashmiri people which was already wounded by the treacherous court-politics of the 19th century and the brutal tribal invasion of 1948. This cumulatively led few of them to think differently and attempt to carve a distinct political identity, of course with generous assistance from Islamabad. The misplaced sense of alienation and the liberal democratic practices of India have enabled the separatists to submit many memorandums to the UNMOGIP office in Srinagar, demanding implementation of UN resolutions or related demands. Consequently, this well-located office in Sonawar has served as a destination for many separatists led marches in Srinagar. Kashmiri writers like Wajahat Ahmad claim that the presence of UNMOGIP office in Kashmir continues to symbolically affirm the Kashmiri sentiment that their land is not yet another Indian State but an internationally recognised dispute.⁸

While the separatist leaders employ UNMOGIP as a useful propaganda tool, they resent the framing of the Kashmir issue in the inter-state (India-Pakistan) context by the UN rather than as a nationalist movement which has prevented international recognition to them. They forget that a former princely state had no legal status after decolonisation and even the British strongly discouraged any state from maintaining independence. Prominent hard-line separatist leader and Hurriyat Conference (G) chairman

Syed Ali Geelani reiterated in January 2013 that since the Kashmiris as a party were not included in Shimla Agreement, thus the accord has not overtaken the role of UN observers in the region. They publicise the continued presence of UN observers in J&K as a proof that Kashmir remains disputed and its resolution with regard to its future political destiny is yet to be resolved.⁹ For once, the two factions of the Hurriyat are united. Around the same time, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the Chairman of Hurriyat Conference (M), stated that the presence of UN in Srinagar was enough indication that Kashmir was a dispute and the amalgam will not allow winding up of its office from J&K till the issue is resolved.¹⁰

Between the Lines

The UN resolutions regarding the Kashmir issue are not self-enforceable. In other words the resolutions are recommendatory in nature and can be enforced only if the parties to the dispute consent to their application.¹¹ It has its origins in India lodging the initial complaint under Article 35 (Chapter VI) of the UN Charter which authorises the UNSC to issue recommendations but does not give it power to make binding resolutions. Such resolutions have been operative only with the consent of all parties involved, and this was no exception, as stated by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2002 that the UN resolutions on Kashmir were not "enforceable in a mandatory sweep". Traditionally, Chapter VI has not been interpreted to support collective intervention by member states in the affairs of another member state.¹² As such, taking *de facto* cognisance of the Shimla Agreement, if not a *de jure* cognisance or a formal note, no resolution on Kashmir has been thereafter passed by the UN.

The UNMOGIP has some other peculiarities. Besides the milder Chapter VI, it is not a mission in classical sense but only an observer group. On the other hand, where required the Chapter VII missions have well armed military peacekeepers who can 'enforce peace', as in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Haiti or in the Gulf War I. Under Chapter VII, UNSC was granted broad powers essentially as a reaction to the failure of the League of Nations, and it may impose measures on states that have obligatory legal force and therefore need not depend on the consent of the states involved. Further, from the beginning, it was called 'UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan' and not

as 'UN Military Observer Group in J&K', thus fundamentally denoting a ceasefire related issue rather than questioning of the legality of succession of the erstwhile princely state of J&K to India, which is a settled issue by all international laws.

Therefore, the mandate of the group was only to monitor, investigate and report complaints of cease-fire violations along the "ceasefire line" in Kashmir to the UNSC. More precisely, it is monitoring along the erstwhile "ceasefire line" which is not existing any longer and therefore the Indian position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, since it related specifically to the ceasefire line under the Karachi Agreement. In the 1971 War, a number of positions changed hands. Thus, the previous "ceasefire line" and the now LC, as promulgated in the 1972 Shimla Agreement from NW 6055 to the famous NJ 9842, are two different entities with the former no longer in existence.

Way Ahead

While the UNMOGIP remains in Kashmir, the reports of normalcy and return of tourists to the Valley shall always sound less than credible, besides providing a propaganda tool to the separatists and their handlers across the LC. Further, India – the world's largest democracy, an aspiring permanent member of the UNSC and itself a major troop contributor for the UN missions across the globe – cannot continue to have a UN group in a territory which India rightfully asserts to be an integral part. While the Pakistan may maintain that the UNMOGIP should continue to function because no resolution has been passed to terminate it; to avoid any controversy India can restrict the group to its existing office in New Delhi with no field presence, pending further diplomatic action to officially close the group, preferably after Pakistan relinquishes non-permanent membership of UNSC on 31 December 2013.

Things are changing in J&K. In 2011, Centre's interlocutors on J&K stated that most people who met them were not in favour of implementation of the UN resolutions seeking plebiscite on Kashmir, but favoured socio-economic and political empowerment of people and devolution of power. The fancifully-named house boats and the *Shikaras* in the Dal lake are filling up again, after some of them had rotted in the water due to disuse, an elegant five-star hotel now overlooks the lake and the thieves in Srinagar

have become bold enough to steal ATMs in the night – admittedly a strange sign of normalcy but earlier they wouldn't have dared to venture out after sunset. In the lovely Vale of Kashmir, the UN is now something in New York. There is talk of missed opportunities, of inviting the Kashmiri Pandits back to the Valley, concerns about rising marriage expenses and a sharply divided opinion about a three-girl band called *Pragaash* which has quit playing. Essentially, there is hope for the future and amidst this infectious hope, a relic from a troubled past is inconsistent with the changed realities.

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The Armed Forces Special Powers Act – Need for Review?

Lieutenant General Raj Kadyan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Justice Verma Committee (JVC) was constituted in the wake of widespread public protests that followed the ghastly gang rape in December 2012. The committee examined over 80,000 suggestions and produced a voluminous report in just 29 days. They deserve our collective compliments.

The JVC was asked to review existing laws and suggest amendments to effectively deal with instances of sexual violence. It made wide ranging recommendations with a view to ensuring the women's right to equality and to dignity. While examining the issue the committee also delved into areas that were not strictly within its charter. Among the subjects covered was the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

The AFSPA was passed by the Parliament in 1958. It is a legal enabling act of a sovereign parliament which is essential for the security forces to enforce the constitutional authority of the State under subversion by hostile elements. Under the Act, Central government sanction is needed before an alleged offender can be tried by a civil court. Over the years the AFSPA has become a favourite whipping boy for certain vested interests. Unfortunately even the JVC joined that fringe chorus of populism. This article proposes to discuss the recommendations made by JVC vis-à-vis the AFSPA and the armed forces.

The Committee recommends that sexual offences by the Army personnel be tried by ordinary criminal law without needing sanction of the Central government. Unfortunately, this is based on the false assumption the Army lets off its members found guilty of sexual misconduct. It is stressed, one agency which has the

* Lieutenant General Raj Kadyan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into Rajasthan Rifles on 10 June 1962. During his three tenures in Nagaland and one in Mizoram, he operated under the provisions of the AFSPA, 1958 and has personal experience and knowledge of its implications. He was also the first Chief Instructor of the National Security Guard from 1985 to 1988. After retiring as the Deputy Chief of Army Staff in 2002, he has articulated his views on Defence related issues both in print and on TV. He has also authored a book on promotion system in the Army in 2005.

highest stake in ensuring that soldiers adhere to the strictest norms of discipline, is the Army. It has its internal mechanisms to enforce discipline and ensures justice is imparted with speed and the guilty are punished severely. This is borne out by statistics where guilty officers, JCOs and men have been dismissed, cashiered or awarded rigorous imprisonment. There is an ill conceived notion that an Army court martial is a totally in-house affair implying that members of the court can be influenced. Apart from the fact that members come from different external units, in a court martial the accused has the freedom of engaging a civilian lawyer. There are numerous examples of Army courts having given quick and effective judgments. Unfortunately the Army keeps low visibility and these cases do not get publicised. If the JVC recommendation is accepted, it will lead to soldiers being involved in litigation endlessly as false accusations particularly in J&K are galore. It is empirically known that witnesses can be threatened and coerced by militants into giving false evidence. Many such instances can be quoted.

JVC observation that "The brutalities of the armed forces faced by residents in the border areas have led to a deep disenchantment and the lack of mainstreaming of such persons into civil society" is indeed strange. Willy nilly it makes the Army the cause of the problem and not a part of the solution. It also overlooks the fact that the Army gets inducted only after the 'residents' are alienated. The JVC comment leads to a simplistic but tempting inference that if we withdraw the Army, everyone would join the mainstream and the situation would be hunky-dory. How one wishes that were true. I believe alienation is a far more complex subject that requires examination by experts from political, economic, administrative, social, psychological and other related fields. Legal luminaries are not the best qualified to pass judgmental comments on alienation. Additionally, to term Army's functioning as brutalisation is unfair and betrays ignorance. The role played by the Army in building roads, playgrounds, creating civic amenities like water supply and sanitation and running schools etc is well known and is appreciated by the locals. The JVC's ill-advised comment must indeed sound music to the ears of the detractors and to those across the border.

The JVC has also recommended criminal liability of commanders for breach of command responsibility. They have

said “...not exercising control or supervision over persons under his command if they commit offences”. They might not have been aware that the commanding officers indeed already have an administrative liability. Not only serious offences like rape and fratricide, even for others like noticeable number of malaria cases, vehicle accidents, absentees without leave etc, a commanding officer is held responsible and is liable for administrative action that also seals his career. But to make him criminally liable for an offence committed by one of the 800 odd subordinates would be counterproductive. With the large number of false accusations being made, the commanding officer would spend more time in attending courts instead of doing his operational duties. The JVC recommendation also ignores the fact that in a counter-insurgency grid, battalions are deployed in small subunits of companies and platoons over a wide area and teams of 5-7 men are on patrols on 24X7 basis. He cannot obviously be present everywhere to exercise control and supervision. In an off the record discussion with a legal expert and backer of the JVC recommendation, I asked why the criminal liability of a commander is confined only to the defence forces. Giving example of the Punjab and Haryana High Court judge who is under trial for a ‘cash on the doorstep’ offence I asked: Why the Chief Justice of the court should also not be made criminally liable being technically the ‘commander’? He agreed it should be so, provided the Chief Justice had advance knowledge that the offence would be committed. The JVC of course has not used any such qualifier in their recommendation. Even otherwise it is unthinkable that a potential rapist would make known his intentions in advance. And after the unfortunate action takes place, no commander has been found wanting in trying and punishing the guilty. Any suggestion of criminal liability entailing imprisonment up to seven years seems highly misplaced.

In commenting that ‘training and monitoring of armed forces personnel be reoriented to include and emphasise strict observance by the armed forces personnel of all orders issued in this behalf’, again the JVC has erred on facts. I wish the committee had called for a copy of the training syllabi of recruits or officer cadets to know how much emphasis is being laid on this aspect. Additionally, in daily roll calls, patrol briefings, sainik sammelans and on every other occasion it is emphasised that countering insurgency is not a battle of bombs and bullets but of hearts and minds. The Army

Chief himself has issued 'Ten Commandments' to be followed by all officers and men deployed in counter-insurgency role. Respect for local women comes high in the list. These commandments form the very military anthem of every uniformed person. The few cases of sexual offences that do take place are not because of lack of training but due to human failing.

Another facetious argument that is often raised against continuation of AFSPA is that despite its operation the Army has not been able to solve the insurgency problem. It ignores the fact that solving insurgency has never been and, in a democracy, can never be the task of the Army. The armies can only solve problems that are of military nature. In the Indian context the Army can and does keep the insurgency suppressed down to a level where the civil administration can carry out its functions. For that to be achieved, AFSPA is essential.

The Indian Army must be unique in having been deployed in counter-insurgency scenario almost continuously since Independence. The continued involvement in a difficult and complicated environment is not of Army's volition; it is a national compulsion. Soldiers need legal cover to operate in these circumstances. AFSPA serves a very useful purpose and should not be misconstrued as a licence for sexual offences. Undeniably aberrations do occur but the Army always takes necessary punitive and preventive action. The Army has been performing its task with admirable success. There are and will always be anti national elements out to defame, demoralise and finally drive out the Army from affected areas. Let us not contribute to their designs by constantly throwing darts at the Army. It makes little sense to keep picking at one's healthiest tooth.

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The Story of a Lady Helicopter Pilot

Wing Commander Namrita Chandi (Retd)*

I was a girl with stars in my eyes...quite literally. Every night as I sat on the veranda of my father's rural farm house, I watched the stars and even had my own special one. I often asked my star to guide my destiny as I wanted to do something really different and something really special..... But how far that star would take me, I did not know. My life and that of my sister, Supreet, was very normal and very humdrum. We lived and went to school in the moffusil town of Rudrapur in Uttaranchal, where doing something special in life for girls was not only unheard of but almost impossible. But the fire burned slowly, yet steadily, inside me. Everyday my special star would counsel me to dream big and to relentlessly pursue that dream.

I left for Chandigarh to pursue my college education. The days and years were monotonous, even though interesting. College years always are fun, but nothing to write home about. I joined a postgraduate course in IT and joined the first batch for doing MCA, Punjab University, Chandigarh. Years went by and I stood at the threshold of being a Post Graduate in Informatics. But fate had other plans for me.

One day I saw an advertisement in the newspaper. It was by the Indian Air Force asking for Lady recruits to be trained as pilots. I and my sister filled in the application form just for a lark, and lo and behold we were selected!!! It was perhaps the most exhilarating moment in the life of my simple, farmer parents. Suddenly, we were catapulted to feeling immensely proud of our upbringing and our education. In a flurry of packing, preparations and mentally bringing ourselves to the fact of leaving our home for something defining in our lives, became the issue.

Our Air Force Academy in Secunderabad, was a test of all our faculties. Life was tough. Waking up at 5 AM was a trial that put us through fire every morning. We were, afterall, spoilt kids

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that were used to our daily ghee soaked *paranthas* and our mom mollycoddling us. We were absolutely not aware of the rigorous physical and mental hardships that this was going to put us through. But I am proud to say that the Air Force Academy made us women of substance. I qualified to be a Helicopter Pilot as did my sister Supreet. Together, we feature in the Limca book of world records as being the first sister duo in the world to fly as Pilot and Co-Pilot.....

Long hours of theory and even harder grind of physically demanding activity filled our days. But we gamely toiled on, quite sure of the fact that this is what we wanted for ourselves in life-to be a good lady Helicopter Pilot. Breaking of stereotypes was also important to us. We wanted to prove that girls can, and will be good at whatever they set their hearts on. We wanted to prove all the naysayers wrong.

I still remember my solo flight with some trepidation. It was perhaps the single most defining moment of my young life. I felt like reaching out and touching my special star and saying-look I am flying my own helicopter. Someday, I will fly out and touch you! Helicopter flying is not an easy skill. I thank my instructors who worked so hard with me to make me a competent Heli-Pilot. And finally the day arrived when I graduated with my wings. I was finally a Helicopter Pilot. I was proud of our achievements, as were our parents...and also my prospective in-laws.

Hurray we had our wings on us.... a long dream had finally come true and with the little experience and expertise that we had gained, we were ready to face the alien world of complete male domain. The challenge now was to break into male bastions and assert that I can be as good, if not better, at my job as a Helicopter Pilot, and was knowingly intruding into a domain that was traditionally perceived as being only for men. The first day of my first posting will remain fresh in my mind forever. The unit situated somewhere in the Western Sector was all set to receive its first "Lady Pilot". I quickly realised that the requirement for me now was to fit in almost as "one of the boys", in the unit without making others feel awkward and uncomfortable. But the challenges were manifold – from sharing the male toilets (those days there were no lady toilets) to proving your worth each and every time professionally, and to fit in with a male dominated culture, where

bad language and sexist jokes were a norm (things have now changed drastically). Well I proudly say that I did very well for myself. I was quick to realise that the attitude, perceptions, professional competence and preparations can make a huge difference.

Then after another posting came my dream posting – to Leh to fly on the Siachen Glacier, the highest battlefield in the world. I am proud to say that I am the only Lady Pilot to have flown in the Glacier. I was told that Siachen is where only one type of pilot operates - the brave and a notch above the average and was told to be prepared to be pushed to my self-imposed limits and beyond.

Flying in Siachen was a challenge where records of human endurance, flying and technical competence are set nearly everyday. The area was more beautiful than one could have ever imagined and the flying – just out of this world. All operational sorties had an element of risk involved in them, especially if they were over an inhospitable terrain like the Siachen Glacier. As I started flying I realised that we had to brave temperatures as low as minus 50° Celcius, strong winds, lack of oxygen and flying in poor weather conditions in close proximity of hills. There was always the threat of powerful downdrafts that pull the helicopters down, if we were not careful with zero scope of error. Added to that was the fact that the helicopters at Siachen fly at the edge of their flight envelope, where the power margin available is small, if not negligible. Any miscalculation or mishandling of controls could result in a catastrophic accident. The landing on the match box sized helipads was precise; the Army jawans would open the door, take out the load, put in the mail/casualty and then we would execute a take-off - in the reciprocal direction. The motto of our unit was "We do the impossible as a routine, the possible may take a little longer". This posting for me was a dream come true and I think I was very fortunate to have experienced and to have enjoyed every moment of it.

The black snout of the glacier which is to say the least, imposing and menacing yet truly majestic is still so close to my heart even today.....

I proudly feel that the best part of being a Helicopter Pilot is to get the opportunity in the most easy way to explore the most

inaccessible places in this magnificent country. Perhaps the best experience that people will not get even upon paying the world's biggest money, has been flying in the Siachen Glacier. Believe me, to see the world's most inaccessible and highest battlefield from the helicopter, which you yourself are flying, is an incredible experience. My one regret is that I was not able to be "Glacier Captain", as it was against the Air Force rules for a Lady Pilot to be Glacier Captain but that is part of life. The Air Force teaches you to take the grain with the chaff.

But I hold the world record for being the only lady to have operated in Siachen and landed at the Highest ALG in the world.

I met my husband, Wing Commander Nikhil Naidu, in the Academy. He too is a Helicopter Pilot. He has been very encouraging and supporting in all my endeavours. We married after two years of our commissioning and are proud parents of two lovely children.

My experience as a Helicopter Pilot, has enabled me to get education in a very specialised field. I have had to take responsibility far beyond my own imagination; made good friends, led an amazing life.

With due apologies to all other forms of flying, no other form of Aviation can provide such an experience. It is probably the closest thing to flying like a bird, that a person can ever achieve – flying low and slow, landing in a forest clearing, mountain tops, in an ice field, pushing the envelope to its limits! Hence, flying helicopters has been exciting, challenging, empowering and just plain fun.

I have received many awards, the most prominent amongst them has been the 'Woman Achiever of the Year', awarded by the Ministry of Women and Child Welfare in the Year 2007. I was on the cover of INDIA TODAY, and that brought me a lot of name and fame as a representative of the women of tomorrow. I am told that my picture is in the museum of flying in Texas, USA.

There is large fraternity of women like me out there, hoping to make a mark for themselves, in this world of great and innumerable opportunities. I wish all the best to all those girls seeking that special opening and making plans to be a Helicopter

Pilot. Do not miss the correct openings. Find the right motivation, high quality training; persevere and great adventures, wonderful opportunities and a great life awaits ahead.....no risks, no pains...no gains.

After my retirement from the Air Force, I am still serving the cause of Helicopter flying with another agency.

I think I am quite close to being in close proximity of my Special Star...in winking distance!



Namrita receiving the 'Award for Women Achievers' on the International Women's Day on 09 March 2007

A Thorny Operation*

(Former Navy Chief recounts the Navy's moment of glory)

Admiral Sushil Kumar, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)**

It was November 1988 and the Indian Armed Forces were in the midst of Operation Cactus – the military intervention at the request of President Gayoom of the Maldives. After the swift landing of an Indian Army Para Brigade at Hulule Airport the rebel group who were Sri Lankan mercenaries, ran for cover and hijacked a merchant vessel *Progress Light*. Grabbing seven hostages from ashore the rebel ship slipped out of Male harbour but unknown to rebel leader Luthfee a high speed Indian Navy Task Force led by INS Godavari was fast closing-up.

As the drama unfolded at sea, the Navy War Room at South Block got top heavy with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi keenly following the action. Also present and deeply concerned was the Swiss Ambassador to India, since the only lady amongst the seven hostages happened to be his mother-in-law. Capturing the rebel ship was the least of the problems but the safety of the hostages, which included the Swiss Ambassador's mother-in-law, made Operation Cactus a very thorny problem. And so the mission assigned to Captain Gopalachari was of incalculable difficulty – rescue the hostages and capture the rebels.

With the rebels on board *Progress Light* being hell-bent on taking the vessel to Sri Lanka, the Indian Navy War Room received a terse message from the Sri Lankan Navy – 'The SLN had been directed by its Government to destroy the rebel ship if it approached within 100 miles of the Sri Lankan coast'. This was a strange new twist that could seriously endanger the hostages.

The Indian Navy operational staff went into a huddle to re-appreciate the changed situation and, as the Director of Naval

*This article was originally published in the Quarterdeck 2012 Issue. Reprinted here with approval from the Editor.

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Operations, I was given the task of convincing my counterpart in the SLN to avoid a needless naval confrontation. Fortunately, the Director of Naval Operations (DNO) of the SLN, Commodore Clancy Fernando was an old friend who had also been my student at the Defence Services Staff College. And so having ensured more sea room for manoeuvre our Task Force Commander on INS Godavari was given an immediate aim, '*Stop Progress Light*'. After a tense hour came the message from Captain Gopalachari on board INS Godavari. 'All hostages rescued safely and rebels captured'.

In the Navy War Room at Delhi there was visible relief and an elated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi strolled across to Navy Chief, Admiral Nadkarni and gave him a pat on the back, adding in good humour, 'Damn good job Admiral but I doubt if the Swiss Ambassador will forgive the Indian Navy for rescuing his mother-in-law'!

Fly Low, We Are Missing A Missile

(An Experience with IPKF in Sri Lanka)

Group Captain AG Bewoor, VM (Retd)*

Introduction

The IPKF had been in Sri Lanka for a few months when the calamitous mass suicide by LTTE cadres occurred because they were being handed over by the IPKF to the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). There followed a massacre of Lankan civilians and SLA personnel by the LTTE, with attacks on Indian Army units. The fragile Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was coming apart before the ink on the document was dry. Under these conditions I had assumed command of 44 Squadron with IL-76s. The unit had limited experience on the IL-76 since its induction in April 1985. Extensive training of aircrew and technical personnel was still our primary aim, yet the demands of transport support for the rapidly expanding IPKF had to be given priority.

The Jaffna University misadventure on the night of 11 / 12 Oct 1987, where 13 Sikh LI and 10 Para Commandos were severely mauled by the LTTE, as were the MI-8s of 109 HU, changed the complexion of IPKF operations into confrontation with LTTE rather than peacefully disarming them, as hoped for in the Accord. Induction of T-72 tanks continued and they were flown into Jaffna and Trincomallee from Chennai.

The Approach and Landings at Jaffna

When the IAF started operations in 1987 into Palali, the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) air base at Jaffna, the length of the runway was less than 6000 ft, if I recollect correctly. Many IL-76s had already landed at Palali before the induction of T-72s started in Oct 1987. The runway surface was rough with loose gravel making braking

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inefficient. The runway Load Classification Number (LCN), indicating the strength of the surface was unknown, but pretty low. This meant that every landing by an IL-76 would damage the surface, so it was advisable to land at the lowest All Up Weight (AUW). Keeping sufficient fuel for return to Chennai, carrying a T-72 tank with First Line ammunition and a 400 litres barrel of diesel, forced the landing AUW to 145 tons which was 5 tons above permissible limits. But we had to do it, and that is the challenge for air transport operations of swift but assured induction of land forces in an emergency.

So there we were flying tanks into Jaffna and Trincomallee. Those unfamiliar with terrain must know that Trinco has a tall rice mill building on the right hand about a kilometre short of the runway with derricks of ships necessitating a steep final approach. A lagoon surrounds the runway on the East, North and South. At Jaffna the runway is on the west coast and the final approach is over coconut plantations and rice fields. At both places, final approaches are precautionary for short field operations. On one occasion, while we were loading another tank at Meenambakam, I got a message to attend a telephone call from the Air Force Element HQ of IPKF. There were no mobiles around in 1988, so I trudged across to the terminal building. The interaction was amazing, read on.

Can You Make a Very Low Approach?

A brand new CO is always reluctant to refuse a task without consulting Flight Commanders, Navigation / Engineer / Signals / Gunner Leaders, and that is how it should be. In this case I had to decide myself without consultations and refuse a task. Here is, why? The officer at the other end of the phone wanted me to modify the approach procedure for a landing at Jaffna. First he asked me at what distance from the runway (RW), did the IL-76 start its final approach. I explained that it was about 8 to 10 kms from the RW. He then wanted to know at what height the approach started, and I told him that it was about 800 metres Above Ground Level (AGL). What he said was that I should descend down to about 100 to 150 metres AGL, at a distance of some six kms from the RW, keep flying at that height, and then execute a landing off such an approach. Through a window I could see the struggle in progress to load the tank. So I explained that such an approach

was impossible in an IL-76, to which he immediately asked me "Why not, we have all done such things in our days?" So I explained.

The IL -76 would be landing at 145 tons AWW, higher than normal. Unlike other aircraft where Flaps are taken in stages during the final approach, in the IL-76, full landing flaps are lowered at the beginning of the approach, approx 8 to 10 kms from the RW. In this configuration, the engine power is quite high to maintain the desired speed of 245 kms / hr. The landing speed in an IL-76 is AWW plus 100 (145 + 100) thus 245 kms/hr. Rather simple. It would be aeronautically imprudent to fly at 150 metres AGL, 8 kms from the RW at this high AWW. The wheels of the IL-76 are more than 30 feet below the pilot, from the flight deck a pilot cannot see wing tips of the 50 metres wing span, manoeuvring such a giant on final approach is not the easiest of tasks, doing it a 150 metres AGL for 6 to 8 kms would be unwise. The terrain is covered with coconut plantations and rice fields with plenty of bird activity requiring sharp turns to avoid bird hits, which is impossible at the suggested low height. The pilot cannot see the RW at a height of 150 metres AGL and is 8 kms away, how does he align with the RW, and if not aligned, how can he make sharp turns at this height at probably the last minute for what has to be a precautionary short landing? If he is misaligned he will have to overshoot and do it all over again putting the IL-76 and crew through an avoidable hazardous envelope. I ended by saying that as the CO I decide that it would not be done. There was silence at the other end, I then spoke with the Commander, and repeated most of what I had already stated. But finally I had to ask as to why we wanted to do this circus, and added that the IL-76 is not a big Dakota; it was a different class of aircraft.

The reason was equally amusing. It reflects the confusion and uncertainties that reigned supreme throughout the IPKF campaign. It seemed that the LTTE had procured three shoulder fired SAMs, one of which they had fired at a SLAF Marchetti without success. One day earlier IPKF had unearthed another one of the three SAMs, and the *'higher management'* of the IPKF was unsure and extremely worried about the possession and control of the missing third SAM. They felt it could be used against IAF transport aircraft landing at Jaffna; hence, this unconventional approach and landing into Jaffna. How about it, I was asked, after

getting this fresh input. I reiterated that nothing in the configuration and manoeuvrability of the IL-76 had changed; missile or no missile, the IL-76 could not make this type of an approach anywhere in the world, especially without any land based electronic guidance to keep it aligned with the RW. Besides, other factors precluded attempting such an approach, it was unsafe and unsound, and that as CO I could not permit this procedure.

Before signing off, I asked the Commander that since the 'third SAM' was presumably with the LTTE, should I abandon flying into Jaffna because of imminent danger to the IL-76? Dear readers, the answer I got was, "We haven't asked you to stop flying".

Conclusion

Normally, as is expected, I should have shared briefing inputs with the crew and concerned personnel of the Squadron. In this case I remained silent, flew another tank into Jaffna, and returned to Agra. Months later after many IL-76s and AN-32s had been in and out of Jaffna, I told the story to the aircrew during routine briefing. Never heard of the third SAM. Does anyone know?

Tanks with the Indian Peace Keeping Force: I Want My Jeep for Reconnaissance

Introduction

While the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) moved into Sri Lanka in June 1987, the real troubles started in October 1987 when LTTE cadres in Indian custody were to be handed over to Sri Lanka and they committed suicide. That act created a conflagration and the rest is history.

Under these conditions, I assumed the command of 44 Squadron with IL-76s in October 1987 to be as they say 'baptised under fire'. The massive airlift commenced within days of my becoming Commanding Officer (CO) with giant IL-76s flying into Jaffna and Trincomalee from Gwalior, Jaisalmer, Hyderabad and Chennai. New Delhi was abuzz with plans and one decision was to induct T-72 tanks into Jaffna. Our exposure in loading / offloading

this metal monster into the IL-76 was very poor. We had received no training on this aspect in the USSR. A little background narration of the difficulties would be worthwhile.

Marrying the T-72 with the IL-76

Getting the Monster In and Out. The tank weighs 43 tons with First Line ammunition, topped-up fuel, 400 litre diesel barrels strapped on and crew. This is the maximum cargo that the IL-76 can carry, nothing more. The tank cannot drive into the aircraft like a BMP/BRDM. The 'tension' of both tracks has to be equal, so that when they are engaged to the drive from the engine, the tank does not give a jerk to one side. And would the reader believe, that the tension is calibrated by a plumb line, even today. To load, the T-72 drives onto the ramp and stops; it is then winched inside for about 15 feet into the cargo compartment. Then the tank's engine starts, tracks are engaged and the tank moves forward under its own power to the Centre of Gravity in the middle of the compartment. For off-loading the reverse process is followed. It is a hair raising exercise where providence and skill of the driver share equal credit. It is pertinent to add that the space between the tracks and the hot air pipes running along the cargo floor is just about four inches. Anyone who has not witnessed this operation cannot imagine the heart-stopping moments, specially when during the winching in and out, the T-72 stops at 45 degrees angle at the loading sill between the horizontal floor and the tilted ramp and swings up and down like a pendulum, frighteningly close to the hydraulic jacks that operate the cargo doors. Steadying the tank by hands is not an option.

How Long Does It Take? We practiced as much as we could at Agra. The Sappers from the Parachute Brigade led by their Officer Commanding (OC) then Major Babbaya, used the classic hit and trial method till a workable solution was found. Much depended on Havaladar Gurbachan Singh the driver and Subedar Pillai from EME who equalled the tension on both tracks, with the plumb line. If the tension is unequal, when the tracks are engaged to move forward / rearward inside the IL-76, the tank skews left/ right, now to get it straight again is very difficult with just 4 to 6 inches between the steel tracks and hot air pipes running along the floor. Any such jerk could pierce the pipes. Sometimes, it took three hours to load / unload the metal monster, and was a frustrating

and tormenting process. After many trials we were ready, with the tank parked on thick railway sleepers to obviate damage to the aircraft floor.

At Meenambakam Airport and Into Jaffna

Immediate Engagement. So one morning we were loading a T-72 at Chennai airport with the whole exercise in full view of the public. With the tank secured, it was time to go; when the Squadron Commander, Major Kaul, asked that his jeep be also loaded since he wanted it for reconnaissance immediately after getting down from the aircraft. I explained to him that with the T-72 inside we could not carry even an empty tin of condensed milk. He was unconvinced, and pointing at the vacant ramp wanted to know why we were refusing to load his jeep. After some more discussions, and Kaul's insistence, I gave up and told him that I was starting the aircraft engines and heading for Jaffna – as I had another task to do later. I added that if he wished to hop a lift he was welcome but I was going – Kaul then came along. The offloading of tank at Jaffna was mercifully quick, and the tank joined the IPKF battle. Later, I learnt that it was immediately tasked to head towards Jaffna University; where earlier, there had been an engagement between Indian helicopter borne troops and the LTTE. Readers, will recall it was 13 SIKH LI which suffered very heavy casualties in that operation. Kaul went on a reconnaissance in that very T-72.

A Strange Take-Off. The induction of troops and materiel continued for many days and slowly the IPKF built-up into a massive force. More tanks were ferried into Jaffna and Trincomalee. On one such occasion I landed in Jaffna at about 1600 hrs with a tank in Dec 1987; and would you believe it, we got the monster out after 1930 hrs, it was pitch dark – night halt at Jaffna was prohibited for IL-76. The runway had no lights at all, I had to get off the ground with the shortest take-off run. We dropped our flaps and slats to fully extended position, and rolled; the empty IL-76 surged skyward very fast but in a very awkward nose down attitude but climbing fast. Pilots will appreciate the strange feeling I had. It was pitch dark over the Indian Ocean, all take-offs being Eastwards.

I Meet Major Kaul again at Pune Military Hospital

A few years later, I happened to be at Military Hospital, Pune and

bumped into Major Kaul. He was then minus a couple of fingers and an eye but looking fit and proud. He told me about the fateful day when he had left our IL-76 for Jaffna University on a reconnaissance. When he was standing-up in his tank, to get a good idea of what his tanks would have to contend with, the LTTE had fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG). As usual, providence had stepped-in. The RPG had hit the tank hull, bounced and appeared to go upwards and exploded; the blast took away a few of Kaul's fingers and damaged one eye, which he lost finally.

It was a chance meeting and, after a few pleasantries, I recalled our discussion at Meenambakam airport about not loading his jeep in the IL-76. Indeed the absence of a jeep at Jaffna had forced Kaul to do his reconnaissance in the T-72 tank, and that in all probability ensured that the LTTE got nothing more of him than 'a few fingers and only one eye'.

Doing it right, appearing to be stodgy and sticking to the rules; even when they can be bent, does pay rich dividends and saves lives. I could very well have taken the jeep, and surely Kaul would have done his 'reconnaissance' in that jeep and the LTTE would have attacked him with an RPG. In that case, would I have had the pleasure of meeting him again in Pune?

Operation Riddle : 7 SIKH Action – Poonch Sector (Aug-Sep 1965)

Lieutenant Colonel Ravel Singh Sidhu (Retd)*

Background

Second Lieutenant (2/Lt) Ravel Singh Sidhu was commissioned into 7 SIKH on 27 Sep 1963. Pakistan had launched Operation Gibraltar in the first week of Aug 1965, wherein a large number of infiltrators supported by Mujahids were sent into the Kashmir Valley with the aim of carrying out sabotage followed by a general uprising; the ultimate aim being to annexe the State of J&K. After the tumultuous events of 1962, the security of India was once again threatened. At this juncture, 7 SIKH was located at Poonch and 2/Lt Ravel Singh Sidhu, though young in years, found himself in command of 'A' Company. In early August 1965, Ravel alongwith his company was located in the Mandi Valley which was a major scene of infiltration.

To give the reader a first hand feel of those momentous days, what follows is an account in 2/Lt Ravel's own words. Read on.....

Mandi Operation : 11-12 Aug 1965

In July 1965, I moved to the battalion HQ at Poonch and was appointed as the Mortar Platoon Commander. Infiltrators entered into the Indian side of J&K and started firing at the forward piquets on or about 1 August. Our Gali Piquet came under heavy fire on 7 August.

Approximately 40 infiltrators had entered Mandi valley and some of them had established themselves in the Mandir area of Mandi town cutting off 7 SIKH less two companies North of Mandi. Our 'A' and 'B' companies along with platoon less two sections of 3 Inch mortars under the overall command of Major KG Belliappa

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
were moved to Sekhlu and placed under the operational command of 52 Mountain Brigade (Mtn Bde) on 09 August. On reaching there our troops found that Mandi town had been occupied by the infiltrators and the locals were fleeing from the area.

Early on the morning on 10 August, a civilian coming from Mandi brought me a chit written in Urdu from the commander of the Pakistani infiltrators located in Mandi town stating '*Hindustan ke afsaron ko hamara salam bolna, kehna ki ab hum kalai pe milenge*' (Convey my compliments to the Indian officers and tell them that we would now meet at the Kalai bridge). I took the slip to the Brigade Major (BM) Major Naidu as Major Belliappa was away on reconnaissance. Major Naidu took me along to meet Brigadier RD Hira, the Brigade Commander who asked me to engage the infiltrators.

My task was to engage the town with mortars while ensuring the safety of our own people. After selecting the mortar position, I left for reconnaissance of the objective.

On reaching the spur overlooking the whole town, I found that most of the civilians were concentrated on the southern side of the town and there was not much movement in the main town except some enemy activity near the Mandir. After reconnaissance I went to the BM and requested him that a message be sent across to the stranded civilians to move down along Mandi river as soon as they got a signal from me and to avoid coming back to Mandi town over the bridge.

I went ahead to the spur area and made my plan to engage the targets in a way that would reduce the risk of casualties to our own population. The mortar firing commenced at around 1000 hr on 12 August and was largely concentrated on the northern part of the town. At the same time, 'A' and 'B' Companies also started firing with their light machine guns (LMGs). The use of white phosphorous (WP) bursting ammunition along with smoke bombs not only started burning the northern half of the town but also created a smoke screen. I then asked the BM to instruct the civilians to pull out. On confirmation of their safe exit, mortar fire was brought down on the whole of Mandi town. By 1500 hr Mandi town, which was mostly built with timber, was aflame, thereby forcing the infiltrators who were in the town to flee for their lives. Having completed the task, we were asked to move forward and link up with the rest of the battalion in Sauji and other localities in that area. **Sketch P** refers.



Move to Sauji (Link up with the Battalion)

The troops began their move at First Light on 13 August. The advancing columns reached Sauji Picquet by last light the same day. This picquet which was a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Post had a capacity in terms of accommodation, rations and ammunition, including reserve stock, for a company strength for 30 days. With the arrival of fresh troops from Mandi the strength increased to a battalion less a company and the picquet became overcrowded. On 14 August, it was learnt that the Gali picquet had been overrun. The Commanding Officer (CO) 7 SIKH asked for artillery fire on Gali Picquet (own position) but it was out of artillery range. I then ordered the 3 Inch mortars to fire on the picquet. We fired about 200 rounds and the fire was effective.

Life at Sauji Picquet

Life at Sauji was quite interesting. Officers, JCOs and men were cramped up in small bunkers. The nights were very cold and since there were not enough blankets, 2/Lt Sandhu and I sharing a bed, managed to get a quilt from an abandoned hut close by. It was filthy, tattered and stinking but we had no option, except to use it.

On 19 Aug, the usual ritual of enemy machine gun and rocket fire started. Around 1130 hr, the enemy firing got intense and one 83 mm rocket landed directly on the kitchen where Bhagat Ram was cooking. The kitchen got blown off and Bhagat Ram, our best cook and a wonderful human being, was killed. As stated earlier, the picquet was overcrowded and we were suffering casualties every day. Rations were restricted and everyone was on hard scale. A Dakota came and hovered around for some but could not carry-out a drop.

On 19 August, 2/Lt Sandhu of my battalion got wounded and I was given the responsibility of evacuating him to Khet Picquet, from where he could be moved to the Field Hospital. Evacuation during day was out of the question as the route was dominated by the enemy. It was, therefore, decided to evacuate him at midnight. Sandhu's evacuation had to be on manpack basis as carrying him on stretcher would have made us a bigger target and would slow down the move. I, therefore, organised a party consisting of six and left the piquet at 0100 hr on 21 August, carrying Sandhu on my back. The move was downhill. At times Sandhu walked while at other times the party took turns in carrying him. While resting after reaching the East side of Sauji Bridge, one of the party walked into a deserted house and returned with a lathi. That stick was good support while walking with Sandhu on our backs and for Sandhu when he was himself walking. Having crossed the bridge, we halted about 200 metres southwest of the bridge. Our move while carrying a casualty through an enemy dominated area had to be stealthy, silent and by bounds and it took five hours to cover an hour's distance. Moving cautiously, the party reached the Khet Piquet by about 0600 hr on 21 August. Sandhu was by now in agony and had a thick white deposit around his lips. He promised to return soon but unfortunately breathed his last in the Field Hospital.

Escape from Ambush

After a short break at Khet Picquet, the party decided to move back to Sauji. Moving through the enemy dominated area during day was full of risk. The party came across one Razakar on the Nala Bend and shot him dead. Another Razakar, who was hiding on the far end of Sauji Bridge, was taken by surprise by us and hit on the head with the lathi. He fell unconscious. We took him to a safe place, revived him and began interrogating him. He told us that they knew that a party with a wounded person had gone the

night before and they expected it to return at night as daylight move was out of the question. One lookout man was positioned at the Nala Bend (whom our party had already killed) while he was the second one covering the bridge. The returning party was planned to be ambushed in general area Nala Bend and if not there, then while crossing the bridge. We had been lucky!

Move to Kinari


'B' and 'C' Companies moved to Kinari towards the last week of August. Life in Kinari was no better. It was a badly sited picquet with unoccupied high features in the West and North. Rations were another problem. The troops again went on restricted ration scale. Lightning struck the aerial of the radio while it was raining one day and the sepoy operating it got electrocuted. His body had become rubbery and could not be cremated easily. It was a horrifying experience.

At Kinari also the enemy would fire at us with their infantry mortars and LMGs from across the cease fire line (CFL) every day. At about 1000 hr on 28 August, I and a few others were sitting in the Signal Exchange bunker when the enemy started firing. One mortar bomb fell directly on the roof of the bunker and destroyed it. We were almost suffocated. Fortunately, no one was injured. While at Kinari, the residents of Poonch town (Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) were so impressed by the role of 7 SIKH in defending their area that they collected some money and prepared 300 kg of sweets (laddus) for the battalion.

Operation Faneshah (Please refer to Sketch Q)

After a few days the battalion concentrated at Poonch base and then moved to Rakh Valley, West of Betar Nala. The battalion was asked to prepare fresh defences from Memorial Hill - Rakh Valley to Jhula Bridge. Then on 19 September, the battalion was ordered to return to Poonch base for an impending task. The troops moved from their locations after Last Light on 20 September. It was pitch dark and drizzling. The move being tactical was painfully slow. The men had not been able to sleep well due to heavy shelling and daily firing by the enemy. As Betar Nala was in spate the troops had to cross by Jhula bridge. The bridge could not carry more than four persons with equipment at a time and it took the battalion the whole night to get across. We reached Poonch base around 0600 hr on 21 September. Everyone was fatigued and sleepy, and settled down for much deserved rest.

I had hardly slept an hour when the battalion received the warning order for an attack and the battle procedure started. The battalion Orders Group ('O' Gp) left for Malti Picquet for operational briefing at 0900 hr where the CO Lt Colonel Bhagat Singh gave out his orders on a hastily made sketch on a ground sheet. He told us that Governments of India and Pakistan had agreed to a cease fire, effective from midnight 21/22 Sep. We had been tasked to capture area East of Pritam Picquet to include Lahori Shah feature and adjoining spurs Knoll, Ring Contour and Point 6160 before First Light 22 September. 3/11 GR was to move ahead to capture area South of Haji Pir and establish contact with 1 PARA in Haji Pir. The CO said that the attacking troops could go lightly equipped as the cease fire would be effective before day break. He also said that according to information received from various sources there was hardly any enemy activity in the area of the objective and at the most the enemy could have one company group there. He ordered one section 3 Inch mortars, all eight Medium Machine Guns (MMGs) and one Browning Machine Gun (.50 BMG), (which was captured by 7 SIKH from Raja Picquet), to accompany the attacking force. Extra mortar ammunition was to be carried by college students from Poonch as they had volunteered to do so.



NOT TO SCALE

That night, the sky was overcast and by 2015 hr it started raining heavily. The visibility had been reduced to one yard. 70 student volunteers each carrying two 3 Inch mortar bombs also joined us. The battalion moved forward for the attack. 'C' Company, behind which the mortars were following, however lost its way and veered eastwards toward Raja Picquet instead of going North. The battalion halted and the company was pulled back and made to move towards Kahuta. Just short of Kahuta 7 SIKH got mingled with 3/11 GR.

Betar Nala which had to be crossed to reach the battalion's objectives was in spate and getting across it became impossible because of poor visibility and non-availability of any crossing expedients like captive ferries, ropeways etc.. The Nala became fordable only around 0730 hr on 22 September. The battalion then waded through it without any opposition from the enemy. Ring Contour was captured without opposition but 'C' Company, which was to capture Knoll, remained at Ring Contour itself. 'B' Company, which was reserve to 'C' Company and was to capture Point 6160 and CO's party also stayed put at the Ring Contour. The whole battalion was now concentrated in an area of about 300 x 300 yds; thus, becoming an ideal target for enemy retaliation. No one moved to capture the planned objectives. This inaction cost the battalion 150 dead and wounded. Everyone presumed that ceasefire had become effective from midnight. No patrols were sent out and no digging was done. In short, no re-organisation stage activities were undertaken by anyone.

The section of 3 Inch mortars with 100 High Explosive (HE) bombs was deployed along the outer ring on the eastern side of the Ring contour. The rest of the bombs had been dropped en route by the college boys who were unable to carry the awkward load. At 0930 hr the CO ordered me to re-deploy the mortars in the centre of the battalion location and prepare a fire plan. In the meantime, news reached us that the Anchor Observation Post (OP) Officer, Captain Lal Singh, had been killed and no artillery support was available through that OP. The Battery Commander (BC) then took a couple of shoots till another OP officer took on the task. After taking a few shoots the new OP officer got injured in the eye by enemy shelling.

Around 1100 hr the enemy started pounding the battalion area with heavy artillery and mortar fire. The enemy had also

occupied Point 6160 and Area Knoll putting 7 SIKH in a very vulnerable position. The troops began digging with pick axes, spades and whatever else, like bayonets and even mess tins that they could lay their hands on. Around 1230 hr two enemy companies came up from the North side and halted 200 to 300 yds from 7 SIKH defended area, adopted assault formation and shouted, '*Naara-e-Tadbir Allah-hu-Akbar.*' The Sikhs also replied with '*Jai Karaas*'. The battalion's reaction was passive on account of limited ammunition. Since the first line ammunition carried by the battalion with its self loading rifles (SLR) and the new sten guns would not have lasted more than 15-20 minutes, strict instructions had been issued to the troops to open fire only when the enemy was within range. The enemy however did not attempt to move forward to assault. After exchange of choicest Punjabi abuses they withdrew without firing a shot. No sooner had they reached a safe distance, their artillery and mortar fire resumed.

Fortunately, they did not fire airbursts which would have caused heavy casualties as the men were in the open. After half an hour of heavy artillery fire, the enemy again shouted war cries and threatened to attack us but did not close in. Thereafter, they withdrew and again brought down artillery fire resulting in heavy casualties to our troops. Captain AK Singh and his Medical Platoon were tireless and provided medical help to the casualties even under intense shelling.

By now Captain Surjit Singh (Adjutant) and N/Sub Makhan Singh had been killed and 2/Lt Dewinder Singh had been injured. I had made the fire plan as desired by the CO and was about to hand it over to him when another attack came. The CO ordered for mortars to open fire. After giving my orders for it, I began digging a slit trench with the help of Naik Buta Singh and a jawan. I suddenly heard the sound of a 4.2 Inch mortar bomb coming at us. I immediately put my arms around Naik Buta Singh and the other jawan and pulled them down. The bomb fell on the mortar ammunition about 5-6 ft away from us which caught fire. The three of us were almost buried in the trench with the loose mud around us and had to be pulled out. Nk Buta Singh was hit by a splinter on his right shin. The other jawan was also wounded and I was hit by splinters on my head and fell unconscious. I regained my consciousness sometime later (am not sure after how long). However, it was a unique experience and I felt that I had returned from the jaws of death.

Later, I went to look up 2/Lt Dewinder Singh. His left knee had been blown off and he was lying in the trench quietly. I cheered him up and gave him two grenades. I told him that permission for withdrawal had been sought and if it did not come through, then he should be ready to die fighting rather than fall into enemy hands. I promised to take him along with me if I lived to do so but if not then he should throw one grenade outside and the second one in his own trench so as not to fall alive in enemy hands. 22 September which was a Friday, was proving to be a 'Black Friday'.

The battalion was finally given permission to withdraw at about 1730 hr. We started moving down and met Captain Santosh Kumar and party on the way. It was already dark. The move was slow especially with Cheema on my back and the Mortar Platoon's heavy weapons and equipment. As we moved, we spotted Captain Surjit Singh's body lying in the open. We collected some men and tried to carry his body, but could not manage to carry a stiff dead body for more than 200 yds. Besides, every jawan was already overloaded. We, therefore, covered his face with a scarf, took his sten gun, saluted and left his body there and moved on with heavy hearts. Along with Cheema and his sten, I was also carrying my own sten gun and a rifle that I had picked up en route. Throughout the night 22/23 September, I carried three weapons and Cheema, with his arms tightly around my neck, on my back. Mercifully, there was no enemy ambush during this disorganised move. We reached the West bank of Betar Nala opposite Bhatt Da Hut at First Light on 23 September where we met the CO.

The remaining officers and men concentrated South of Kahuta in general area Bhatt Da Hut by about 0800 hr. All ranks were totally fatigued. Most of them had not slept for the last 72 hours and had also not eaten for the past 36 hours. During this period, Radio Pak Lahore kept announcing that 7 SIKH which had captured part of PoK territory had been forced to withdraw leaving behind their dead including the Adjutant of the battalion. It was extremely hurting and demoralising for a battalion which had done so well throughout the war.

The Revolutionary Government of Nagaland Joins the National Mainstream

Brigadier N Bahri, VSM (Retd)*

Background

This narration relates to events in Nagaland in August 1973. After years of good work by the army and the civil administration, insurgency was at a low key with the final solution awaiting political initiatives. The insurgents were divided between the Naga Federal Government (NFG) and the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN); the latter consisted solely of the Semas. While the NFG was still active, resorting to violence and sending gangs to China for training and arms, the RGN was living peacefully in their camps, retaining their arms and awaiting a final settlement with the Government of India. The author had frequently met the self styled Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of RGN Zuheto Sema and some of their other leaders.

The author was posted as the Brigade Major (BM) of 56 Mountain Brigade – located at Mokokchung, it had the operational responsibility for the district consisting of Mokokchung, Zuneboto and Wokha Sub Divisions. Headquarters 8 Mountain Division was located at Zakhama with Major General AR Dutt as the General Officer Commanding (GOC). The Brigade did not have Brigade Commander since May 1973. Those days there were no Deputy Brigade Commanders, therefore, the responsibility for coordinating operation rested on the BM. Colonel VN Channa was commanding 15 Assam Rifles (15 AR) responsible for Zuneboto Sub Division where the RGN was located. Read on.....

* Brigadier N Bahri, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into the 4th Battalion, the Brigade of Guards (1 Rajput) on 12 Jun 1960 and later commanded the same Battalion (1976-79). During the period 1973 to mid 1975 he was Brigade Major of 56 Mountain Brigade which had the operational responsibility of two thirds of northern Nagaland. He retired as Force Commander, National Security Guard (NSG) on 31 Jan 1993.

One day in mid August 1973, I was ordered to report at the Division HQ at Zakhama for briefing. The same afternoon, I left on a six hour road journey in our civil painted jeep in civil clothes. We resorted to this mode of moving around frequently to avoid elaborate armed escorts. The next morning, at about 0800 hrs, the General Staff Officer Grade 2 (GSO2), Major Anand of Engineers, briefed me. Thereafter, I was directed to report to Mr Rammuny, the Adviser to the Governor, Shri BK Nehru at Kohima at 1000hrs. I was to collect an individual and safely produce him at Zuneboto on the third day. On arrival there, Colonel Channa, Commandant 15 AR, would give a detailed briefing about the arrangements for an event to be organised on the appointed day at Zuneboto. At Kohima, Mr Rammuny introduced me to Mr Scatu Swu the self styled Prime Minister of the RGN and I was directed to escort him to Zuneboto by road and produce him for the proposed event.

I had no soldiers except the driver and no arms. I requested Mr Scatu Swu to sit between me and the driver in the front seat of the jeep. I decided to take the longer route via Dimapur and Mariani. We spent a night together at Mariani and a second night at Mokokchung sharing a room to ensure 'togetherness' and consequent safety. While at Mokokchung, I had spoken to Colonel Channa who briefly told me about the parade he was organising for the RGN in his unit area.

We reached Zuneboto and I delivered Mr Scatu Swu to Colonel Channa, CO 15 AR. At that time, the situation became clear to me as under : –

- (a) The RGN had decided to merge with the mainstream and had been promised to be absorbed into the Border Security Force (BSF) as two new battalions.
- (b) The RGN strength of about 1000 personnel were formed up for a Ceremonial Parade with Shri Zuheto as the parade commander. On both wings stood contingents of 15 AR personnel facing inwards.
- (c) The Governor, Shri BK Nehru was to land shortly to accept all RGN weapons as 'gifts'. He in turn would gift an air rifle to Zuheto Sema, the self styled RGN C-in-C. The word 'surrender' was taboo.

(d) One RGN cadre named Shri Zekiye, who had the reputation of being '*master of the ambush*' and had twice been decorated with the underground equivalent of the Param Vir Chakra (PVC), refused to join the parade. He stood about 15 metres to the left of the rostrum with his sten machine carbine fully loaded, in hand. Just behind him and on his sides stood two specially briefed men of 15 AR for instant reaction, if needed.

Having read the situation, I went and stood three feet behind Shri Zekiye and the two 15 AR personnel. Zekiye could easily swivel to the right and empty his carbine in a matter of seconds.

Soon we heard a helicopter which revealed the arrival of Shri Rampal Singh, Deputy Inspector General (DIG), BSF. Shri Rampal was from my Regiment, the Brigade of Guards. He was seated amongst the VIPs. The Governor arrived by a second helicopter. He was escorted to the rostrum. Mr Scatu Swu delivered a speech, followed by the Governor. Mr Zuheto Sema, thereafter, marched up to the Governor and gifted his 'open' revolver to him. The Governor gifted him an air rifle in return. Mr Zuheto Sema then returned to his spot in front of the parade. At a pre-arranged signal, all 1000 personnel of the RGN on parade bent forward and laid down their respective weapons to their right side on the ground. Immediately after that, 15 AR contingents on the two wings marched up, equally ceremonially, and picked up all the weapons and deposited them in two secure enclosures on the two wings.

I marvelled at the effort put in by 15 AR in convincing and drilling the RGN personnel and their own ad hoc drill in securing all weapons with utmost efficiency.

Mr Zekiye still stood his ground. Some last minute cajoling of Mr Zekiye led him to loudly pronounce that he would fire his weapon in the air and then gift it. The Governor was briefed, we stood on our toes, witnessed the firing of Zekiye's carbine and its gifting thereafter. Everyone heaved a sigh of relief.

The Governor left by helicopter, soon thereafter, followed by the DIG, BSF in the second helicopter. I thought the show was over and I could now drive back to Mokokchung. But the real fun was yet to begin.

Within an hour or so, I was informed of a great deal of unrest amongst the RGN personnel. I rushed to where they had gathered. I also got hold of our District Collector (DC), Shri Neheve Jakhalu, himself a Sema. The RGN leaders asked me: Where were their new weapons? *Where were their Olive Green uniforms? Where were their barracks and their rations?* They had been promised all these and enrolment into the BSF. There was, however, not a soul from the BSF anywhere within a hundred miles to either clarify or meet the commitments made to them. The DIG, BSF had made his entry for the parade and had disappeared. Neither, the DC nor I, had any prior notice of this. A thousand men who had lived and survived by the force of their arms for 25-30 years, now had not a single weapon between them and felt quite naked and insecure.

I ordered the 15 AR to allow the newly absorbed (prospective) BSF personnel to take twenty weapons of their choice, along with 100 rounds of ammunition with each weapon from those just 'gifted' by them that morning. The DC ordered both the boys and girls school hostels closed and children to go to their homes. This became the BSF accommodation. The business representatives from the market were summoned by the DC, and details of rations and various other administrative arrangements were also tied up.

I rang up the GOC, Major General Dutt and briefed him on the situation. At my suggestion, the entire stock of all Olive Green (OG) uniforms held with the Ordnance unit at Dimapur was moved overnight to reach Zuneboto the next morning. All civil tailors in town were lined-up for outfitting of individual uniforms. The DC and I stayed back at Zuneboto for two days to oversee the BSF (RGN) affairs.

The 15 AR continued to do a marvelous job, till the BSF officers started to arrive a week later to commence the formal raising of two new BSF battalions – Number 112 and 113. This was indeed a unique experience, which I have cherished since those momentous days of counter-insurgency operations in the early 1970s.

Letter to the Editor

1971 – An Excursion in Sindh : Notings from a Soldier's Diary

(Reference Vol CXLII, No 590, Oct-Dec 2012)

Dear Editor

It has been very interesting reading of the dedication with which young Captain Shekhar Dutt had maintained his Note Book wherein he kept a note of events of the time from 21st October to 18th December 1971. Having known Shekhar Dutt for a very long period, I felt very proud of the fact that he had not only kept a note of these events but also kept his Note Book in his safe custody which provided us an opportunity to share a young officers' adventure and the enthusiasm for combat and the sense of team spirit.

Hope today's young officers will have something to learn from such experiences of yesteryear officers.

Yours Sincerely

*Ms Somi Tandon
IDAS (Retd)*

Dr Gautam Sen, an Associate Member, has written through an e-mail to Deputy Director (Administration), "I wish the rest of India would act with the efficiency and courtesy the USI seems to take for granted in its operations; but then it is run by former members of India's Armed Forces, who have so far managed to escape the many calamities that have undermined its civil society."

*(Dr Gautam Sen is a former Professor of
London School of Economics)*

India and the Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952*

Lieutenant Colonel AK Sharma (Retd)**

The title of this book under review is slightly off mark. This is because the author has gone beyond his pale. Whilst he has dealt with the occupation of Japan per se, he has gone on to enlarge the envelope to encompass the entire gamut of Indo-Japanese relations, since 1945. All the same it is very readable.

The Allied occupation of Japan after Victory over Japan (VJ) Day was a major landmark in the history of the Nippon. The Indian contingent was sent as a part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF). This consisted of two brigades—one of the British troops and the other of the Indian. These two were under Major General DT Cowan, who had served with great distinction in the Burma campaign, especially on the Sittang River during the first Burma Campaign. The nominated Indian 268 Infantry Brigade had 1 Punjab, a Battalion of the Maratha Light Infantry and 2/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles. The British Brigade consisted of Welsh, English, and Scottish Battalions.

The Indian soldiers had had the bad first-hand experience of racial discrimination when they were earlier under the Australians. In the BCOF, for the first time, they stood shoulder to shoulder alongside British troops, on equal footing and status, in a combined force, according to Dr Sareen. This is not entirely true. The British Military Police were openly partial and discriminatory. The *gurkha* soldiers did not appreciate this. Even as the Tommies were let-off by the MPs, the *gurkhas* always got hauled up especially whilst trying to fraternise with the local females. One thing led to another...and, when the *gurkhas could not take it any more*, they almost openly mutinied.

The issue was hushed up. The *paltan* moved to Ikado, Tokyo. Once again the problem of female-company surfaced. This time

* **India and the Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952.** By Tilak Raj Sareen, (New Delhi, Life Span Publishers and Distributors, 2013), pp. 258, ₹ 900/-, ISBN 9789381709092.

****Lieutenant Colonel AK Sharma (Retd)** was commissioned into 4/3 Gorkha Rifles on 9 February 1964. In 1965, as a young officer he was awarded the Chief of the Army Staff's Commendation Card for 'galantry in action'. He retired in 1997.

the British officers did what the White MPs had done in Kure. The *gurkhas* felt deeply humiliated, after all they had two living Victoria Cross winners serving alongside, in their *paltan*! They had their self respect, pride and honour; and also the reputation of their valour, loyalty and selfless service to the British Crown at stake. Therefore, one fine morning the *paltan* refused to come on parade. Instead, they staged a 'sit down'. They had to be finally placated and pacified by the Indian Brigade Commander Thimayya. The British Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Townsend, initially kept his *gurkhas* away from him on one pretext or the other, in tune with the British colonial practice and policy of the times! When the situation did not just go away, he reported to the Brigade HQ. It was only after many attempts that he relented and let the Commander hold a *darbar*.

The BCOF, particularly the Indians, made a lasting favourable impression on the Japanese by their sincere and humane conduct. They never looked down upon them as the vanquished, but instead only as fellow Asians. Besides, they were also appreciative of the way in which the Imperial Japanese government had rendered assistance to the great Indian Nationalist Subhash Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army (INA)—*Azad Hind Fauj*—, during its march ("*Dilli Chalo*"), as a part of the Imperial Japanese Army to Delhi. Equally, the Japanese people impressed the Indian troops very much, especially with their dignified demeanour whilst dealing with the occupation force. A trifle sad perhaps; therefore, that despite all the good work of the Indian brigade, it was soon forgotten in Japan, and mostly ignored in India.

After the Peace Treaty was signed, India was the first country to sign a fresh and independent Friendship Treaty with Japan in 1952, on the termination of occupation by the American troops. It was a simple bilateral treaty officially designated as a 'Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Unity', with hardly any diplomatic undertones. It has endured the vagaries of time and tumult to this day.

Dr Sareen has referred to unimpeachable sources and studies in India and elsewhere abroad in coming up with this rare book on a subject which is even more rare.

A worthwhile read for the research scholar, it is good at least, for a browse, by the layman.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia. *Edited by Nihar Nayak (New Delhi, Pentagon press, 2013), pp..256, Price ₹ 995/-, ISBN 9788182747050.*

The book under review has recognised the need to establish a Cooperative Security Framework (CSF) in South Asia and examined the possibility of establishing such a Framework. The concept of CSF implies 'security with' rather than 'security against' one's adversary as the only possible method of interaction in an interdependent world. Scholars and analysts from the South Asian region have been debating this issue for quite some time. In the ensuing debate so far the question whether South Asia could replicate other successful cooperative security models; such as that of the European Union (EU) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Many scholars felt that this was an onerous task , while others thought this is impossible to achieve given what is perceived as asymmetry in South Asia. Indian continent's size in the centre of South Asia with land and maritime boundaries with all the countries, except Afghanistan, its resources and growing international profile, troubled India-Pakistan relations, and mistrust among India's smaller neighbours are perceived as limiting factors for cooperation in South Asia.

However, with the passage of time, the security environment in South Asia has become further complicated. New issues such as: ensuring energy and environmental security, water related disputes, endemic poverty in the region, illegal migration etc have added to the complexity of the security environment. Consequently, today there is greater awareness and recognition among scholars and analysts of the urgent need to establish a common security framework in South Asia in the interest of peace and stability and the well being of the people of South Asia.

The present volume brought out by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses has focused on the theme of Cooperative Security Framework in South Asia. Scholars representing the eight South Asian countries have given their respective perspectives and the best way forward. Farooq Sobhan from Bangladesh has

put forward a thought provoking suggestion. In his words, "Thus a cooperative security framework that is independent of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) could serve as a body to facilitate confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution" (p 36). Professor SD Muni of India was also of the view that a new multidimensional security framework had to be set-up that was not within the framework of SAARC.

However, the most commendable aspect of the book is the "Consensus Document" on the way forward; a blueprint for future cooperation. As rightly pointed out the need of the hour is to generate the necessary political will. In short, written in a lucid style and well documented, the book is a useful addition to the literature on South Asia.

Professor Nirmala Joshi

Net Security Provider : India's Out of Area Contingency Operations. By IDSA (New Delhi : Magnum Books Pvt Ltd, 2012), pp..84, Price ₹ 395/-, ISBN 9789382512004.

This book, laid out in nine chapters, deals with India's Out of Area Contingency (OOAC) operations. It analyses previous UN peacemaking, non-combatant evacuation, overseas humanitarian and disaster relief missions and military operations; and makes recommendations for future OOACs in line with Indian trans-border interests and responsibilities; even though the authors were without access to after-action reports, particularly of UN Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) and military operations.

Major recommendations include : evolving an OOAC Policy; establishing Emergency Directorate in Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and OOAC Directorate in HQ IDS; creating an inter-agency coordination organisation under the Prime Minister; enhancing MEA, Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Military Synergy; improving intelligence, situational awareness, communications, training, logistics and the like. The book is well researched, well referenced, smooth flowing and adds knowledge of nuances and challenges in conducting OOACs.

Taking this book as basis for future OOAC deliberations, issues requiring focus are : proposed synergy between MEA,

MoD and Military must also incorporate Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) controlling the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) linked with Global Information Grid; total integration of HQ IDS and MoD with MEA and MHA adequately interfaced; appointing CDS rather than voicing "as and when appointed"; survey of Indian diasporas abroad and countrywise evacuation plans; establishing a separate specialised OOAC force including civil affairs components funded over and above the defence budget.

Separate OOAC Directorate in HQ IDS is not warranted as DCIDS (Ops), a three star officer, coordinates OOACs. His office could be suitably augmented. The lift capability for military operations need not be restricted to military aircraft and vessels but must include commercial capacity as considered by Chinese Airborne Corps / Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF).

Akin to a chapter on dealing with strategic communications and perception management, there should also have been a major focus on Strategic Intelligence, which is missing. Covert Special Forces deployment to assist respective missions, as a tool for OOAC, perception management and shaping environment for military operations, are vital in the present day environment. Evacuation of Chinese nationals from North Africa is assisted by on ground Chinese Special Forces. We need to learn from deployment of Chinese Special Forces 'in guise of development projects' and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).

The book is recommended to be read by anyone interested in streamlining OOACs and dynamics of their impact on India's future.

Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd)

Revival of the Silk Route : Growing Role of India. By Mohammad Morin Alam and Willet Ali (New Delhi : Lancer's Books, 2012), pp.. 178, Price ₹ 495/-, ISBN 9788170951254.

The authors, both of University of Jammu, have done excellent work by writing on this contemporary topic. They have gone into the historical background of the ties between India and the Old Silk Route linking China with Euro-Asia; drawing on its cultural and socio-economic impact, they have also highlighted the linkages

between the 'impact of Indian civilisation, including spread of Buddhism', in the countries located on the path of the Silk Route.

The Post-1990s impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union; resulting in emergence of Central Asian States (CAS), strategic and economic interest of China, Russia; and the interests of regional powers like Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and India have been highlighted. The hydrocarbon rich CAS have become a hub of international strategic interest, with China, Russia and other states, in which India also has great stakes.

With help of maps, the proposed expansion of Chinese communication links and pipelines, and interests of mineral rich but land-locked CAS have been shown. The proposed North South Corridor, Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines have been covered. India's quest for oil and gas from CAS and Iran, if need be by-passing Afghanistan and Pakistan, via Arabian Sea, from the new port of Char Bahar (Iran) to Mumbai, and the efforts of New Delhi to project her soft power in the CAS, have been covered.

India's growing role has been covered in Chapter 5. In conclusion, the authors recommend that as the shortest routes from India to CAS region and the Silk Route pass through Pakistan, Afghanistan, China Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Myanmar, India should improve her relations with these countries, especially Pakistan.

Readers may feel that the strategic importance of the region for America has been omitted. The likely future clash of interests between Russia with the expansion of NATO eastwards, and the increasing energy and security aspirations of China, could have been covered in detail. Also, the post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan scenario could also have been covered, as it will have an impact on all countries of CAS lying along the New Silk Route. These geo-strategic aspects have probably not been given due emphasis, the thrust being on socio-economic aspects.

The book is written in simple language, is well researched and has good bibliography.

Lieutenant General YM Bammi, PhD (Retd)

India's Neighbourhood : The Armies of South Asia. Edited by Vishal Chandra (New Delhi : Pentagon Press, 2013), pp..167, Price ₹ 795/-, ISBN 9788182747067.

India's neighbourhood has a profound impact in shaping its economic, foreign and defence policies. It is also a fact that the Army, as an institution, is a key component of power in a sovereign country. In the South Asian region, the armies of some of the countries have indeed played a key role in governance (i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh and to some extent Sri Lanka). It is ironic that although India has been engaged in providing military training to defence personnel of most of the neighbouring countries, a negative perception of this country still persists. Thus it is necessary for military scholars, defence analysts and policy makers to study the structures, role, status and capability of these armies.

This short book gives an overview of the armies of seven countries in the region i.e. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. An attempt has been made to structure the chapters in a uniform manner, where necessary, issues of specific concern to that particular nation have been included. Some of the common issues covered include the security environment of the country, its geopolitical/strategic significance, geographical terrain, threat perception (domestic and external), origin/evolution of the army, its broad structure, civil-military relations, defence cooperation with other countries, people's perception of the army and future prospects. In multi-ethnic countries, the ethnic representation in the army vis-à-vis its percentage of total population have also been highlighted. Where necessary, statistics have been provided in the form of Tables/Figures.

The essays in this book are a very laudable effort by the team of authors to encapsulate the essentials of the evolution and role of the armies in India's neighbourhood. Due to restrictions of space, obviously one cannot expect a very detailed account, but the broad architecture has been extremely well covered, providing a good foundation for those interested in greater research. The book will be a valuable addition to military libraries.

Major General AJS Sandhu, VSM (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter – Ending Mar 2013

(The books reviewed in Oct-Dec 2012 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Afghanistan

Afghanistan from Enduring Freedom to Enduring Chaos? Implications for India by Anwesha Ghosh. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 103p., Rs.180, ISBN 9789381904336

Reconstructing Afghanistan : Prospects and Limitations. Edited by Arpita Basu Roy and Binoda Kumar Mishra. Delhi, Shipra, 2011. 285p., Rs.800, ISBN 9788175415485

Return of a King : The Battle for Afghanistan by William Dalrymple. London, Bloomsbury, 2013. 567p., Rs.799, ISBN 9781408818305

Arthashastra

Chanakya's : New Manifesto, To Resolve the Crisis Within India by Pavan K Varma. New Delhi, Aleph Book Company, 2013. 248p., Rs.295, ISBN 9789382277095

Contemporary Politics and Chanakya : How Chanakya Reincarnated Himself in Indian Politics by DS Yadav. New Delhi, Orange Books International, 2012. 264p., Rs.1995, ISBN 9788192306414

The Military Strategy of the Arthashastra by Harjeet Singh. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 216p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788182746985

Autobiography /Biography/Memoirs

Durbar by Tavleen Singh. London, Hachette, 2012. 312p., Rs.599, ISBN 9789350094440

No Easy Day : The First Hand Account of the Mission that Killed Osama Bin Laden by Mark Owen. London, Michael Joseph an Imprint of Penguin Books, 2012. 316p., £ 12.99, ISBN 9780718177522

Wings of Fire : An Autobiography by APJ Kalam and Arun Tiwari. India, Universities Press, 2012. 180p., Rs.275, ISBN 9788173711466

China

China at War : An Encyclopedia. Edited by Xiaobing Li. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 604p., Rs.1900, ISBN 9788182746114

China's Discursive Nationalism : Contending in Softer Realms by Bhavna Singh. New Delhi , Pentagon Press, 2012. 229p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788182746510

China Restored : The Middle Kingdom Looks to 2020 and Beyond by Eric C Anderson. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 323p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788182746213

China's Space Capabilities by Anand V. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 78p., Rs.180, ISBN 9789381904220

China's Strategy in the South China Sea : Role of the United States and India by Saloni Salil. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 47p., Rs.165, ISBN 9789381904381

China in Ten Words by Yu Hua. New York, Anchor Books, 2012. 225p., \$15, ISBN 9780307739797

A Military History of China. Edited by David A Graff and Robin Higham. Dehradun, Greenfield Publishers, 2012. 324p., Rs.995, ISBN 9789381089095

Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army : Exploring the Contours of China's Military. Edited by Kamphausen Roy and Andrew Scobell. Dehradun, Natraj Publishers, 2012. 582p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788181581853

Civil Wars

Alliance Formation in Civil Wars by Fotini Christia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 343p., \$28.99, ISBN 9781107683488

Hizbullah's DNA and the Arab Spring by Joseph Alagha. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2013. 371p., Rs.720, ISBN 9789381904398

Climate Wars

Climate Wars : The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats by Gwynne Dyer. Oxford, Oneworld, 2011. 297p., Rs.695, ISBN 9781851687428

Cyber Technology

Cyber Infrastructure Protection. Edited by Tarek Saadawi and Louis Jordan. Dehradun, Greenfields Publishers, 2012. 315p., Rs.995, ISBN 9789381089088

Economic Development – India

India Rising But Who Will Make It Happen by JN Rampal. New Delhi, Peacock Books, 2012. 176p., Rs.495, ISBN 9788124802694

Fiction

The Beautiful and the Damned : Life in the New India by Siddhartha Deb. New Delhi, Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd. , 2011. 253p., Rs.299, ISBN 9780143418962

In the Valley of Shadows by Abhay Narayan Sapru. *New Delhi, Wisdom Tree, 2011. 170p., Rs.245, ISBN 9788183281843*

Foreign Relations – India

India - Japan : Towards Harnessing Potentials of Partnership. *Edited by Y Yagama Reddy. New Delhi, Kaveri, 2012. 259p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788174791337*

India and Southeast Asia : Exploring Possibilities of Cooperation. *Edited by Binoda Kumar Mishra. Delhi, Bookwell, 2012. 117p., Rs.400, ISBN 9789380574363*

India's Neighbourhood : Challenges in the Next Two Decades. *Edited by Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K Behuria. New Delhi, Pentagon Security International, 2012. 226p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788182746879*

Indo - Nepal Trade Relations 1846 to 1947 *by Vijay Kumar Tiwary. New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2013. 292p., Rs.840, ISBN 9788121211345*

Indo - Pak Relations *by Muzaffar H Syed. New Delhi, Orange Books International, 2012. 371p., Rs.2150, ISBN 9788192306445*

China - India Economics Challenges, Competition and Collaboration *by Amitendu Palit. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 192p., Rs.22239, ISBN 9780415824569*

In the National Interest : A Strategic Foreign Policy for India *by Rajiv Kumar and Santosh Kumar. New Delhi Books, 1910. 186p., Rs.450, ISBN 9789380740010*

Nepal as a Factor in India's Security During Post Cold War Era *by Sanjay Kumar. New Delhi, Mohit, 2013. 169p., Rs.600, ISBN 9788174456700*

Perspectives on Nuclear Strategy of India and Pakistan. *Edited by Mohammed Badru Alam. Delhi, Kalpaz Publications, 2013. 319p., Rs.950, ISBN 9788178359632*

Political Developments in Afghanistan : Implications for India *by KN Tennyson. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 302p., Rs.840, ISBN 9789381904060*

The Practice of Diplomacy : Its Evolution, Theory and Administration *by Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. 317p., Rs.795, ISBN 978041549765*

Hinduism

Hinduism and Its Military Ethos *by RK Nehra. New Delhi : Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2010. 481p., Rs.795, ISBN 9781935501237*

India – History

Accidental India : History of the Nation's Passage Through Crisis and Change by Shankar Aiyar. New Delhi, Aleph Book Company, 2012. 352p., ISBN 9788192328089

Imperial Identity in the Mughal Empire : Memory and Dynastic Politics in Early Modern South and Central Asia by Balabanlilar Lisa. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2013. 216p., 216p., Rs.1895, ISBN 9788130922676

Netaji in Europe by Jan Kuhlmann. New Delhi, Rainlight by Rupa Publications India, 2012. 281p., Rs.595, ISBN 9788129120847

Indian Armed Forces

Indian Air Force in Wars by AK Tiwary. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2012. 336p., Rs.795, ISBN 9781935501336

Insights into Indian Infantry Regiments : A Basic Fact Book by Anand Ballabh. Delhi, Forward Books, 2013. 262p., Rs.900, ISBN 9789381763117

Handbooks for the Indian Army : Rajputana Class Jats, Gujars and Ahirs (Archives in Indian Historical Reprints) by BL Cole and RC Christie. New Delhi, Three Rivers Publishers, 2012. 203p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788192227528

Military Costume and Accoutrements in Ancient India by Uma Prasad Thapliyal. New Delhi, Ajay Kumar Jain for Manohar Publisher and Distributors, 2012. 165p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788173049552

Intelligence – India

India's Spy Agencies : Shaken not Stirred by Sunil S Parihar. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2012. 235p., Rs.595, ISBN 9788170494386

Iran

Nuclear Iran : The Birth of an Atomic State by David Patrikarakos. London, IB Tauris, 2012. 339p., £25, ISBN 9781780761251

Islam

Symbols of Authority in Medieval Islam : History, Religion and Muslim Legitimacy in the Delhi Sultanate by Blain H Auer. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2012. 237p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788130922652

Leadership

In Business and Battle : Strategic Leadership in the Civilian and Military Spheres. Edited by Charles Style, Nicholas Beale and David Ellery. England, Gower, 2012. 144p., £25, ISBN 9781409433774

Literature

From Hindi to Urdu : A Social and Political History by Tariq Rahman. New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2011. 456p., Rs.725, ISBN 9788125042488

The Adventures of Amir Hamza : Lord of the Auspicious Planetary Conjunction by Ghalib Lakhnavi, Abdullah Bilgrami and Musharraf Ali, Tr. Farooqi. New Delhi, Aleph Book Company, 2012. 565p., Rs.495, ISBN 9789382277125

Management

The Power of Less : The Fine of Limiting Yourself to the Essential ... in Business and in Life by Leo Babauta. New York, Hyperion, 2009. 170p., \$ 16.99, ISBN 9781401309701

Nation Building – India

Peace and Democratic Society. Edited by Amartya Sen. New Delhi, Synergy Books India, 2012. 155p., Rs.395, ISBN 9789382059080

Politics of Nation Building in India by Shibani Kinkar, Chaube. New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2012. 332p., Rs. 990, ISBN 9788121211437

National Security

Media and National Security by Rhea Abraham. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 85p., Rs.180, ISBN 9789381904213

Security Challenges From Naxalism by Shekhar Adhikari. New Delhi, Anubhav Publishing House, 2013. 400p., Rs.995, ISBN 9789380134482

Towards Dominating Indian Ocean by Anand Ballabh. Delhi, Forward Books, 2013. 224p., Rs.900, ISBN 9789381763186

Pakistan

Global Security Watch Pakistan by Syed Farooq Hasnat. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 211p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788182746169

Eating Grass : The Making of the Pakistani Bomb by Feroz Hassan Khan. New Delhi, Foundation Books Pvt. Ltd., 2013. 520p., Rs.895, ISBN 9789382264620

Nuclear Pakistan by Shalini Chawla. New Delhi, Knowledge Word, 2012. 217p., Rs.820, ISBN 9789381904

Pakistan History and Politics 1947-1971 by M Rafique Afzal. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2001. 490p., Rs.795, ISBN 9780195475159

Pakistan : A New History by Ian Talbot. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 311p., Rs.895, ISBN 9789381506233

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons by VN Veda. New Delhi , Knowledge World, 2012. 76p., Rs.180, ISBN 9789381904329

Photo Journalism

75 Years : The Very Best of Life. Edited by Robert Sullivan. New York, Life Books an Imprint of Time Home Entertainment, 2011. 224p., Rs. 2025, ISBN 9781603202121

Population

The Real Population Bomb : Megacities, Global Security and the Map of the Future by PH Liotta and James F Miskel. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 248p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788182746701

River Courses – West Bengal

Atlas of Changing River Courses in West Bengal 1767-2010 by Kalyan Rudra. Kolkata, Sheuli Chatterjee Sea Explorers Institute, 2012. 132p., Rs. 3000, ISBN 9788192495804

Russia

Russia and the Central Asian Republics : Post Soviet Engagements by Sreemati Ganguli. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2013. 137p., Rs.495, ISBN 9789381904312

Sino – Indian Border Dispute

Dividing Lines : Contours of India - China Discord by KN Raghavan. Mumbai, Platinum Press, 2012. 385p., Rs.345, ISBN 9789381836750

South Asia

China - South Asia Political Relation : A View Point of Nepal by HK Awasthy. New Delhi, Sumit Enterprises, 2013. 288p., Rs.1000, ISBN 9788184203530

Internal Security Threats in South Asia by Manan Dwivedi and Devaditya Chakravarty. Delhi , Kalpaz Publications, 2013. 263p., Rs.845, ISBN 9788178358871

Sudan – Oil Diplomacy

Sudan's Oil Diplomacy 1991-2003 by Sandipani Dash. New Delhi, Manak Publications, 2012. 317p., Rs.536, ISBN 9788178313009

Terrorism

14 Hours – An Insider's Account of the 26/11 Taj Attack by Ankur Chawla. New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2012. 164p., Rs.195, ISBN 9788129120656

Headley and I by S Hussain Zaidi and Rahul Bhat. New Delhi, Harper Collins Publishers, 2012. 206p., Rs.350, ISBN 9789350295724

Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan : A Brief History Causes and Effects by SV Salahuddin. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 183p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788182746541

Oil, Globalization, and Terror : The Petroleum Triangle by Steve A Yetiv. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2012. 241p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788182746763

Our Moon Has Blood Clots : The Exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits by Rahul Pandita. New Delhi, Random House India, 2013. 258p., Rs.499, ISBN 9788184000870

Travel

Highway 39 : Journeys Through a Fractured Land by Sudeep Chakravarti. New Delhi, Fourth Estate, 2012. 388p., Rs.450, ISBN 9789350293348

United Nations

United Nations and Global Conflicts Edited by Chanchal Kumar and Sanju Gupta. New Delhi, Regal Publications, 2013. 646p., Rs.2280, ISBN 9788184842302

War / Warfare

Cities Under Siege : The New Military Urbanism by Stephen Graham. London, Verso, 2010. 402p., \$ 34.95, ISBN 9781844673155

Fundamentals of Modern Warfare : An Exploratory Study by NB Mishra. Delhi, Forward Books, 2013. 240p., Rs.900, ISBN 9789381763155

1962 War : Supplying From the Air by M Sadatulla. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2012. 128p., Rs.495, ISBN 9789381904299

Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East by David Stahel. New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 483p., Rs.995, ISBN 9781107654181

The Twilight War : The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran by David Crist. New York, Penguin Press, 2012. 638p., \$36, ISBN 9781594203411

War : Past, Present and Future by Jeremy Black. Gloucestershire, Sutton Publishing, 2000. 310p., £20, ISBN 9780750923941

**Library Catalogue is available
on USI Website**

New Life Members

The following officers joined the Institution as Life Members during the period 01 Jan – 31 Mar 2013 :-

1. LM/70412	Col Vinod Singh Negi	Garh Rif
2. LM/70413	Maj Bhaskar Dutta	Army Avn
3. LM/70414	Lt Akash Singh	7/11 GR
4. LM/70415	Lt Gaurav Singh Rawat	11 Para
5. LM/70416	Lt Arun Kumar	ASC
6. LM/70417	Shri Sundaram Prabhu	IAAS
7. LM/70418	Lt Prashant Rai	EME
8. LM/70419	AVM Keshav Gopal Bewoor, AVSM, VM (Retd)	F (P)
9. LM/70420	Lt Col Naresh Chander Jaggi (Retd)	11 Raj Rif
10. LM/70421	Lt Prerit Sharma	22 MLI
11. LM/70422	Lt Rohan Shirish Soman	Exec
12. LM/70423	Lt Col Naresh Dhawan	AMC
13. LM/70424	Lt Col Kapil Dutt (Retd)	17 Dogra
14. LM/70425	Lt Hemant Nangia	AAD
15. LM/70426	Shri Kuldip Gurtu (Retd)	CSS
16. LM/70427	Shri Shantanu Basu	IA&AS
17. LM/70428	Lt Anurag Shukla	AOC
18. LM/70429	Shri Suresh Chandra Gupta (Retd)	CPWD
19. LM/70430	Col Devdas Acharya	AMC
20. LM/70431	Lt Rishabh Shukla	Arty
21. LM/70432	Lt Pankaj Kumar	Sigs
22. LM/70433	Shri Sanjeev Dhundia, DIG	CRPF
23. LM/70434	Lt Chandra Deep Singh Bhati	4 Bihar
24. LM/70435	Capt Nihar Upadhyay	4 Bihar
25. LM/70436	Maj Deepak Bayala	51 Armd Regt
26. LM/70437	Shri Kuppa Swamy (Retd)	IDAS
27. LM/70438	Shri Manohar Singh Batra (Retd)	IBS
28. LM/70439	Lt Shashwat Khare	69 Armd Regt
29. LM/70440	Ms Krishna Sahai (Retd)	IRS
30. LM/70441	Shri Bikram Singh Sajwan (Retd)	IFrS
31. LM/70442	Lt Anurag Shukla	AOC
32. LM/70443	Gp Capt Smarajit Munshi, VSM (Retd)	AE (M)
33. LM/70444	Shri Harsh Kumar	IRAS
34. LM/70445	Lt Vinayak Gupta	Arty
35. LM/70446	Comdt Lehna Singh Dahiya	BSF
36. LM/70447	Lt Utkarsh Singh Parihar	24 MLI

37. LM/70448	Maj Ankush Chhibber	ASC
38. LM/70449	Lt Aman Chotani	Arty
39. LM/70450	Lt Col Chhaila Chandra Nag	Ord
40. LM/70451	Mrs Promila Bhardwaj	IRS
41. LM/70452	Cdr Rashpal Singh (Retd)	Exec
42. LM/70453	Capt Dildeep Singh Chahal	45 Cav
43. LM/70454	Shri JK Verma	RAS
44. LM/70455	Shri Sujit Kumar Sinha	IRS
45. LM/70456	Capt Aditya Kumar	Sigs
46. LM/70457	Lt Col Sunil Sanghi (Retd)	AMC
47. LM/70458	Shri SS Sirohi	ITS
48. LM/70459	Col Sandeep Misra, VSM (Retd)	Engrs
49. LM/70460	Wg Cdr Rama Kant Kashyap	F (N)
50. LM/70461	Lt Praveen Kumar Rajpurohit	Engrs
51. LM/70462	Lt Anita	AOC
52. LM/70463	Lt LK Subhash Anal	3/9 GR
53. LM/70464	Lt Sebastine Naidu	21 Rajput
54. LM/70465	Lt Praveen Kumar Yadav	EME
55. LM/70466	Brig Ajay Seth, VSM	15 Garh
56. LM/70467	Lt Ranjeet Kumar	ASC
57. LM/70468	Maj Amit Agrawal	Arty
58. LM/70469	Lt Himanshu Singh Bisht	AOC
59. LM/70470	Capt Kartik Bisht	Sigs
60. LM/70471	Brig Anil Kumar Jha	Arty
61. LM/70472	Lt Vishnu Shankar Shukla	9 Madras
62. LM/70473	Capt Shishank Sharma	10 Armd Regt
63. LM/70474	Brig Ravi Pandalai, SM (Retd)	Rajput Regt
64. LM/70475	Lt Kanva Arwari	10 Guards
65. LM/70476	Capt Pawan Kumar Sachan, SM & Bar	Sigs
66. LM/70477	Lt Sumit Kumar Vij	4 Dogra
67. LM/70478	Lt Ambuj	18 Cav
68. LM/70479	Lt Sushil Kumar	8 Sikh
69. LM/70480	Lt Ankush Rana	8 Sikh
70. LM/70481	Capt Krishnawatar Meena	8 Dogra
71. LM/70482	Capt Sumit Pourush	8 Dogra
72. LM/70483	Capt Abhilash Chand	Engrs
73. LM/70484	Lt Rahul Sharma	EME
74. LM/70485	Lt Col Johnson Thomas	Engrs
75. LM/70486	Col JPR Ismail (Retd)	2/8 GR
76. LM/70487	Lt Rahul Mehta	9 Garh Rif

77. LM/70488	Lt Rajat Singha	8 Bihar
78. LM/70489	Lt Col Bijendra Singh Beniwal (Retd)	Arty
79. LM/70490	Mrs Shubhagata Kumar	IRS
80. LM/70491	Capt Akash Raj	Arty
81. LM/70492	Lt Meera Mohan Kishore	Arty
82. LM/70493	Capt Rajnesh	Arty
83. LM/70494	Col Upendra Madhukar Visal	Mech Inf
84. LM/70495	Wg Cdr Harpreet Singh	Lgs
85. LM/70496	Capt Shariq Azad	27 Madras
86. LM/70497	Maj Gen Rakesh Kumar Anand, VSM	Sigs
87. LM/70498	Lt Parvinder Dagar	24 Mech
88. LM/70499	Col Rakesh Shrivastava (Retd)	Sigs
89. LM/70500	Lt Anuj Mahant	19 Sikh
90. LM/70501	Lt Dinesh Chahar	Arty
91. LM/70502	Shri Ashok Chakravarti (Retd)	BSF
92. LM/70503	Maj Praveen Hosmane	Assam Regt
93. LM/70504	Lt Anurag Kaushik	Sigs
94. LM/70505	Lt Gurjyot Singh Deol	Arty
95. LM/70506	Capt Shobhit Mehta	Sigs
96. LM/70507	Maj Smita Manish Kadam	Army Dental Corps
97. LM/70508	Maj Jagjit Sandhu	1/3 GR
98. LM/70509	Shri Vivekananda Pattanayak (Retd)	IAS
99. LM/70510	Capt Surender S	Arty
100. LM/70511	Maj Rohin Chhibber	7 Cav
101. LM/70512	Capt Ashish Pareek	76 Armd Regt
102. LM/70513	Lt Raushan Kumar	9 Sikh LI
103. LM/70514	Capt Rishish Thakur	AOC
104. LM/70515	Capt Koushik G	Sigs
105. LM/70516	Lt Gouravendra Pratap Singh Parmar	10 Guards
106. LM/70517	Lt Yashwant Singh	Arty
107. LM/70518	Lt Deependra V Basnet	4 Sikh
108. LM/70519	Lt Col Sumit Kumar Sharma	2/8 GR
109. LM/70520	Capt Bharat Suresh Pise	Engrs
110. LM/70521	Maj Arun Sangwan	Arty
111. LM/70522	Maj M David A Singh	5/1 GR
112. LM/70523	Lt Loitongbam Johnson	Arty
113. LM/70524	Capt Suhas S Patil	4 Grenadiers
114. LM/70525	Capt Abhishek Kumar	Arty
115. LM/70526	Capt Ritesh Sangwan	7 Garh Rif
116. LM/70527	Cmde Sunil Jetly	Exec

117. LM/70528	Maj Vivek Kumar	10 Sikh
118. LM/70529	Lt Ishat Singh	Arty
119. LM/70530	Lt Digvijay Singh Thakur	8 Mech Inf
120. LM/70531	Capt Amit Prasher	Arty
121. LM/70532	Shri Nawal Kumar Bahri (Retd)	GREF
122. LM/70533	Capt Pritam Kumar	5 Grenadiers
123. LM/70534	Capt Lalit Kumar Sharma	5 Grenadiers
124. LM/70535	Maj Sachin Shinde Patil	15 JAK Rif
125. LM/70536	Maj Satpal Kesri	Engrs
126. LM/70537	Lt Vikas Tyagi	20 Kumaon
127. LM/70538	Lt Mohit Malik	Engrs
128. LM/70539	Maj Rajkumar Pikky Singh	5 Assam
129. LM/70540	Cmde KS Subramanian, NM (Retd)	Engg
130. LM/70541	Shri Gurdial Singh Parhar, VSM (Retd)	DGBR
131. LM/70542	Shri Kanwal Krishan Verma (Retd)	DRDS
132. LM/70543	Lt Oinam Samson Singh	Sigs
133. LM/70544	Lt Bhuwan Chandra Joshi	Arty
134. LM/70545	Capt Rahul Mahajan	Arty
135. LM/70546	Capt Vishwakarma Sudhanshu Jagannath	10 Sikh
136. LM/70547	Lt Nitin Dhadwal	Engrs
137. LM/70548	Lt Col Amitabh U Walawalkar	21 Para (SF)
138. LM/70549	Col Vishal Bhargav, SM	4/8 GR
139. LM/70550	Wg Cdr Rahul Agarwal (Retd)	F (P)
140. LM/70551	Lt Sahil Sharma	Sigs
141. LM/70552	Lt Shivalik Lal Chandani	4 JAK LI
142. LM/70553	Maj Digvijay S Jadhav	MLI
143. LM/70554	Maj Akshay Vijay Pawar	73 Armd Regt
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145. LM/70556	Lt Vyom Kumar	66 Armd Regt
146. LM/70557	Lt S Hardeep Singh Mehta	10 Bihar
147. LM/70558	Capt Vikram Singh, SM	ASC
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180. LM/70591	Dr Rajni Kant Tewari	DRDS
181. LM/70592	Capt Abhishek Sinha	EME
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183. LM/70594	Cmde Jadumani Jena (Retd)	Elec
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The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research was established under the aegis of the United Service Institution of India (USI) at the request of the three Service Headquarters, the purpose being to encourage objective study and research into various aspects of the history of the Indian Armed Forces.

It needs no elaboration that prospective scholars rely on old records, documents, photographs and interaction with veterans of the various operations undertaken by the Indian Armed Forces in order to pursue their projects. To assist them in their effort and in furtherance of a long term aim of making the Centre a repository of archival material on the subject, members are requested to make available to this Centre any documents (including training pamphlets/notes), papers, tapes, photographs, diaries, medals, memorabilia or any other material that could contribute to its activities.

All bestowals/endowments will be properly catalogued, cross-referenced and preserved for posterity as an original contribution to our Nation's military heritage.

Material may be sent to the Secretary CAFHR. For any clarifications please contact 011-26147474 or send a mail to cafhr@usiofindia.org

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5. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his/her article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

GUIDELINES FOR BOOK REVIEWERS

Definition

"A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarise, set in context, describe strengths and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is in his duty to discharge with reason and consistency".

Admiral HG Rickover.

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A book review is a critical evaluation of a work or a book to help the reader by your assessment. For a reader to be guided by your evaluation, it must be objective. A few guidelines are given below :-

- (a) Is the information factually correct ?
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- (c) Is the book going to be an addition to the existing knowledge on the subject ?
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- (e) Author's previous writing experience and performance; has he done better this time or otherwise.
- (f) Some quotes from the book can be given to illustrate the point.

These should be limited and the whole paragraph should not be lifted.

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Correspondence Courses

The Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

USI Journal

The *USI Journal* is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

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The Erstwhile Centre for Research and its resources have been merged into the new Centre named as USI Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (USI-CS3) wef 01 January 2005. The Centre aims at conducting detailed and comprehensive enquiry, research and analyses of national and international security related issues, and gaming and simulation of strategic

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USI Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

The Centre was established in 2000. It aims at organising workshops, seminars and training capsules for peace-keepers, observers and staff officers - both Indian and foreign. It also oversees the practical training of Indian contingents. It functions under a Board of Management headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and works in close coordination with the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence.

Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR)

The Centre was established on 01 Dec 2000 and encourages study and research into the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets such as strategy, tactics, logistics, organisation and socio-economic aspects and their implementation.

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