

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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Total	<u>2,000</u>	<u>3,000</u>
3. Membership forms available at the USI with Deputy Director (Adm).		

Editorial

'India as a Knowledge Power' was the subject of the USI National Security Lecture 2009 which was delivered by Dr Pratap Bhanu Mehta on 16 Dec 2009. The text of the lecture is being carried as the lead article in this issue of the Journal. Notwithstanding the general perception that India is well on its way to becoming a 'knowledge super power' (some even think that we are already there), Dr Mehta brought to fore the fundamental flaws in our approach to higher education and highlighted the importance of the relationship between education and occupational structures. The next two articles : 'Challenges for Military Leaders of future due to Changing Socio – economic Norms' by Lieutenant Commander Yogesh Athavale and 'Are We Neglecting the Training of Our Young Officers?' by Major Divik Kandpal are the first prize winning essays of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2009 in Group A and B respectively. Dr NC Saxena, IAS (Retd) delivered a talk on the subject 'Delivering Governance and Reform of the Bureaucracy' at USI on 03 Mar 2010. The text of the talk is being carried as the next article in this issue of the Journal.

The war in Afghanistan has entered its tenth year and the end is not yet in sight. Brigadier Vinod Anand in his article 'Future of Afghanistan : Regressive Trends' analyses the situation, especially post the recent London Conference and examines possible scenarios in Afghanistan, and more importantly, implications for India.

The next two articles – 'Information Warfare : the Latest Chinese Thrust Area' by Major General SV Thapliyal, SM (Retd) and 'Asymmetric Warfare' by Lieutenant Colonel Subhojit Bhattacharya draw our attention to the capabilities being built by China in these unconventional fields which are of great relevance to us.

Dr David Stone, a professor of Military History had delivered a talk on 'The US and the Negotiation of the Indus Water Treaty' at USI on 13 Jan 2010. The text of his talk is being carried in the Journal. This treaty took nearly ten years to be negotiated and inspite of a number of wars and periods of great tension between India and Pakistan, has held. However, it also continues to be debated on both sides. An interesting fact which emerged from the talk was that the USA, though not a party to the talks as such, was always present as an invisible third party. It is good to know the history to deal with the present and look at the future.

Water issues are assuming increasing importance all over the world and it is so, in our context too. In the next article 'Himalayas: A Wake Up Call', Colonel KS Dhami (Retd) looks at the phenomenon of receding glaciers, which was a subject of great media attention recently following the report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Colonel Dhami has done some seminal work studying various glaciers as a matter of hobby and through this article he brings to the reader a first hand perspective on an issue which is assuming great importance globally.

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM (Retd) in the next article 'Women in the Armed Forces' carries out an in-depth analysis and argues that the issues must be subjected to objective review and not be a matter of political or populist expediency. Of course, this debate would continue for many more years.

Civil-Military relations is another subject which receives considerable media attention from time to time. Dr Kanti Bajpai while writing in the Times of India, New Delhi, Saturday, 06 Mar 2010, under the title 'Be Civil With The Military' says, ".....We think that discussion of civil-military issues will encourage subversive thoughts, but the truth is that our refusal to discuss the state of civil-military relations could undermine our democracy and our society.....". The recent spate of judgements by some High Courts, Armed Forces Tribunals and the Supreme Court do reflect that there are substantial unresolved issues which continue to fester. Air Marshal SG Inamdar, PVSM, VSM (Retd) has put together some relevant excerpts from the ancient treatise Arthashastra by Kautilya under the heading 'Kautilya to Chandragupta on the Mauryan Soldier' which have great relevance in statecraft even today. The same are being carried in this issue of the journal.

The last article 'Mountbatten as I Saw Him' by Lieutenant General SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd) is based on his personal recollections of the famous personality and the momentous events of that period. It would, no doubt, add to the oral history of those times.

I also regret to inform our members that due to some technical difficulties, our library catalogue is no longer available on the USI website. We are in the process of upgrading our website and do hope that the catalogue would be available in 3-4 months.

OBITUARIES

It is my sad duty to inform the USI fraternity about the passing away of some of our members.

Lieutenant General K Balaram, PVSM (Retd) who was commissioned into the Corps of Signals on 21 Dec 1947 breathed his last on 14 Feb 2010 at Delhi. He retired from the Army as the Adjutant General with the status of Vice Chief of Army Staff on 30 Sep 1985. After his retirement, he was a consultant in the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies (1986-89), Vice Chancellor of Kurukshetra University (1989-92) and a Consultant in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (1992-96). General Balaram was a life member since Feb 1959 and had been a member of USI Council for 11 years (in four terms), and was a Council member at the time of his demise.

Lieutenant General Eric Alexander Vas, PVSM (Retd) passed away on 17 Aug 2009. He retired in May 1981 as GOC-in-C, Eastern Command. Amongst his many other achievements, General Vas was also responsible for setting up and developing the College of Combat (Army War College). He was a frequent contributor to USI Journal and also authored three books. He was a member of USI since 1949.

Lieutenant General SP Malhotra, PVSM (Retd) of Guards, who had been a life member since 1947, passed away on 24 Jan 2010. The General had a distinguished career in the Army and retired as GOC-in-C Northern Command.

Lieutenant General HK Sibal, MVC (Retd) who had been commissioned into 5th Gorkha Rifles, passed away on 25 Jan 2010 at the age of 92 years. He had been a life member of USI since 1992.

Lieutenant General Vijay Kumar Sood, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) who had been commissioned into the Dogra Regiment on 13 Dec 1953, passed away on 24 Mar 2010. He retired as the Vice-Chief of the Army Staff in 1992. He had been a life member of USI since 1989.

Brigadier Yogesh Kumar Saksena, VSM (Retd) of Engineers, expired on 21 Jan 2010. He was wounded in 1965 Indo-Pak War and was taken a prisoner of war. During his distinguished career he served on a number of UN missions and continued to do so as a UN Military officer and Diplomat, even after his retirement. He was a member of USI since 1985.

Commodore Babri Bahan Yadav (Retd) passed away on 22 Jan 2010. He had been a life member of USI since 1991.

Lieutenant Colonel Debabrata Sarbadhikari, SM (Retd) of 5/8 GR, passed away in Dec 2009. He was a life member of USI since 1957.

Lieutenant Colonel Amar Nath Juneja, (Retd) who had been commissioned into Ordnance Corps, breathed his last on 16 Feb 2010 at the age of 88 years. He was a life member of USI since 1996.

On behalf of the USI fraternity, I convey our heartfelt condolences to the next of kin of the departed comrades in arms whose loss will be deeply felt. May their souls rest in peace.

Editor

India as Knowledge Power The Subtle Inequalities of Education*

Dr Pratap Bhanu Mehta**

It is a great privilege and honour to speak at the USI and be asked to deliver the annual National Security Lecture. The members of this organisation represent exemplary Indians, whose contribution to defending and building India leave us both humbled and grateful. In the overarching subject of 'India as a Knowledge Power', the theme that I have chosen for today is education, or to be more specific '*certain neglected inequalities in the sphere of education*'. There is almost a national consensus that education is necessary to secure India's future. There have been some astonishing and encouraging development in recent times. Till a few years ago academics used to debate whether there was a demand for education. Do poor parents want to send their children to school? Now that question seems laughably patronising. Poor parents are going to enormous length to send their children to school, often at great private expense. The question now is whether the system can meet the demands? The second piece of good news is that state allocations on education have increased and the Right to Education Bill finally looks like it will become a reality. Enrolments are also up.

But these positive trends cannot disguise some issues of pressing concern. First, as reports by every single independent organisation suggest, learning outcomes in schools are abysmal. Fifth graders who cannot write their name or do elementary addition testify to how poor learning outcomes are. Second, there are still great disparities in access to education. The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, has not really addressed these disparities. In some cases, it has exacerbated them. Third, there is an acute shortage of trained teachers, the single biggest bottleneck in improving learning

*Text of the talk delivered at USI on 16 Dec 2009, with Professor PN Srivastava, former Vice Chancellor of JNU and Member Planning Commission, in the Chair.

**Dr Pratap Bhanu Mehta is President, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. He has done extensive public policy work. He was Member-Convenor of the Prime Minister's National Knowledge Commission and has authored a number of studies and reports on policy formulation.

outcomes. Under conditions where the demand for education is high, people's expectations have been rightly aroused, such unequal access to education is bound to generate great resentment. We also have two additional problems. While spending on primary education has increased, secondary education remains underfunded. Given India's demographic profile, spending less than a sixth on secondary education compared to what we spend on primary is unsustainable. Higher education, a critical area for the economy is also somewhat in a shamble. While there are a few islands of excellence, the vast bulk of the University system, public or private, is of very poor quality. Think of the political and security consequences of this. What will happen when thousands of graduates discover that their education has not equipped them for much? The paradox of India's education was captured the other day in a leading English daily, which carried two news stories back to back. One news story as describing that the recruitment for a handful of posts of peons had attracted more than twenty thousand applications, mostly from graduates! On the other hand, the same paper carried a story that India faces acute skills shortages. We know from comparative political experience, that youth unemployment can be a source of great political instability. We don't yet have a strategy for improving India's universities.

But my focus today is not these large issues. I just want to draw attention to two neglected dimensions of inequality in contemporary debates. The first is around social inequality in schools, the second around inequalities produced by the merit system. The Right to Education Bill was long overdue. While the quality related provisions of the bill leave much to be desired, one of its more interesting provisions is the requirement that private schools take in at least 25 per cent students from marginalised communities within the neighbourhood. Since the state will reimburse the schools based on its average spending per child, some see in this provision of the bill elements of a voucher system. But this provision could, if implemented correctly, usher in far-reaching social changes. It will force us to confront an unspoken issue in Indian society: how we educate children into a culture of equality and reciprocity in the face of immense inequality. *While there is an abstract allegiance to norms of equality and rights in a formal sense, the social mores and interpersonal norms of recognition are marked by all the disfigurements of hierarchy.*

In many ways, recent social developments have contributed to the evasion rather than a resolution of this issue. One of the, perhaps unintended, by-products of the reservation discourse was this. On the one hand, it immobilised far more discomforting discussions about discrimination and the norms of social behaviour that would give minimal meaning to recognising the equal moral worth of all citizens; on the other hand, it converted what should have been a discussion about debilitating hierarchy into a political clash over identity.

Second, despite the rhetoric of inclusion, our institutional architectures were *de facto* creating new forms of segregation. One of the biggest worries about private education is that, despite all its promise, its capacity to segregate by class is immense; fee structures make this an inevitable outcome. Arguably, the top private schools are now even more upper class than old "convent" schools. Within the state structure itself, the state was able to give access to but not dismantle social hierarchies. One of the most shocking pieces of research suggests that Dalit children were more likely to be subject to corporal punishment at the hands of government school teachers. This is a shocking finding to which educators have not paid attention. The fascination amongst the poor for private schools comes from a sense that they have more power over those schools than they have over government schools. One of the reasons for preferring private schools by the poor is the perception that low-end private schools, whatever their quality, are less likely to be degrading experiences for their children. And many government institutions have also encouraged a form of segregation. There are other interesting patterns. A few years ago, it was possible for children to "mix" across social classes, at least in the streets and parks which were available as open spaces. Those spaces exist even less today. To be sure, that form of mixing was still marked by a sense of hierarchy and power, but in an odd sense privileged kids a few years ago were more likely to have a sense of deprivation than they do now.

There is also a subtle transformation happening in caste relations that is positive, but still one that poses interesting challenges for social relations. The sense of empowerment and dignity amongst Dalits has been growing. There are interesting measures of this. In many cities, the marginalised, even those in

a relationship of servitude, assert a sense of dignity in one crucial respect: by their refusal to clean toilets, at almost any price. In some ways, this is an astonishingly encouraging phenomenon. To invert Gandhi, the revolution is not how many upper castes clean their toilets; the revolution is measured by how many lower castes have the option of refusing to clean other people's toilets. This change is not as widespread as one would wish, but it is clear and palpable. But it is precisely this moment of rightful reclaiming of dignity that also makes the question of social relationships across caste and class divides tricky. The worry about being slighted, even unintentionally; and on the other side an uncertainty about how to handle this new social state leads to a kind of safe harbour of isolation. On college campuses certainly, there is a subtle dynamics that often makes *de facto* ghettoisation a psychologically more comfortable zone than the labour of creating norms of reciprocity. These changing dynamics complicate the still powerful markers of social hierarchy; the master-servant relationship, although transformed in some ways, experientially inscribes hierarchy more than any abstract teaching of equality can counter.

How much social mixing the legislation will produce is an open question. But implemented properly, it could force parents and children to confront the dynamics of hierarchy and exclusion in a way in which they have not had to. Even the most privileged schools will have to ask: what does the pedagogy of inclusion truly entail? Our entrenched hierarchies or embarrassed avoidance of this question will now have to be squarely challenged in our schools. But we would be living in a fool's paradise if we think negotiating this issue will be easy. At the most mundane level, schools will have to cope with students with vastly different economic and family backgrounds; even supposedly enlightened universities have not found it easy.

Second, a lot of research suggests the disquieting possibility that students from marginalised groups under certain conditions perform comparatively poorly in the presence of upper caste kids. Their sense of self-esteem can be adversely affected by this social experience. For the privileged it can, sometimes in subtle ways, provide more ground for expressing their prejudice. It is fair to say that very few of our teachers are trained to handle complicated social dynamics; if government schools are any guide, they are

perpetrators of exclusion. None of these challenges constitute an excuse not to implement this significant step towards a common school education system. On the contrary, it reinforces the idea that we need measures to reverse the trends that re-inscribe social hierarchies.

Arguably, the process of assimilation in common spaces would be made easier if the relevant criteria of inclusion were not exclusively caste. The objective should be to remove deprivations based on caste, but using the instrumentality of caste itself to address that deprivation often reinstates the very identities we are trying to dissolve. Doubtless, this is a complicated issue. But make no mistake about it: teachers, parents, administrators and students will now be truly tested in how they shape their own sense of 'self' in relation to others. It is one thing to not discriminate, to support the social uplift of the marginalised and engage in the rhetoric of equality. It will be quite another challenge to make the school a site where all kinds of children can feel equally at home, and the promise of common citizenship be redeemed.

The second issue I want to turn to is this. The question of meritocracy is often debated in the context of affirmative action or reservation. I want to just highlight some subtle aspects of the meritocracy question. Debates over examinations embody not just technical pedagogical questions, but a vast array of social anxieties and aspirations. The reaction to possible changes in admissions criteria for the IITs was a small example of this phenomenon. A few months ago, the Singapore education minister provoked great discussion by suggesting that Singapore was a "meritocracy of examinations", but America was a "meritocracy of talent". Examinations don't pick out a vast array of unquantifiable forms of talent necessary for a vibrant and creative society. The minister was suggesting that Singapore would do well to incorporate other elements as well. The relationship between talent and examinations is a deeply vexed one. In an examination system there is the worry: what exactly are we trying to pick out through an exam system?

But there is another disquieting question about the relationship between examinations and meritocracy. America fits in oddly in the category of "meritocracy". At an intuitive level we understand

that America is extraordinarily open to talent, from wherever it comes. But it is not a meritocracy in the classic sense. Its powerful institutions of access to education and other forms of power never have and still do not rely exclusively on what we would classically define as criteria of merit. Its institutions have vast discretion to use a range of considerations, including a candidate's wealth, in determining admissions. What is striking about the American system is how much discretion is built into it at all levels. In fact, the more radical question the American experiment poses is this: why do we assume that for a society to be able to nurture a vast array of relevant talent it has to be a meritocracy all the way down? There is one sense in which it has to be meritocratic, namely that people are not excluded from participating because of who they are, based on characteristics like race, ethnicity or gender. But, beyond that it is an open question - what principles nurture talent?

It is no accident that societies that are closer to being meritocracies, like Singapore and possibly China, are based on examinations. Pure meritocracies require objective measures of selection. Although this is not a necessary consequence, meritocracies usually are suspicious of what we might call judgment and discretion. In India, we signal meritocracy by largely removing all those criteria of judging talent that might be open to judgment and discretion. Pure meritocratic societies are likely to be examination based.

But meritocracies have other paradoxical effects too. Kapil Sibal's efforts to reduce the stress levels on our students are salutary. But here is the bad news. It is very likely that stress levels related to seeking your place in a meritocratic society will increase, not decrease. The sheer pressure of numbers suggests this outcome. We often forget that so far our education system has had limited reach. Once millions more students start competing to find their place in the objective distribution curve of talent, the pressures will only intensify. If you think pressures in India are great, just read accounts of what China's national examination system that determines places to universities entails. In theory, you could argue, that stress will not rise with numbers if you have a vast array of institutions, where supply keeps up with demand. But this will not be sufficient. For the stress associated with examinations depends upon the consequences attached to not

coming out on top. This in turn will depend upon the structure of economic opportunities on offer. The more egalitarian an occupation structure, the less severe are the perceived penalties for not coming out on top. Europe has in part escaped the neurosis, a meritocratic competition can induce because there is greater background equality. In short, stress is not primarily about education. It is about the economy. The real debate we need is on the kind of occupational structure we see emerging. What then is the relationship between education and that occupational structure?

But the relationship between meritocracy and equality also turns out to be more complicated. As many in the IIT debate sensed, the character of admissions criteria determines who will do well. Some think a single examination favours the privileged, because they can invest in coaching; others think a board result plus an examination criteria will favour the privileged doubly over. But all agree that meritocracy must act as a counterweight to privileges of wealth. But here the comparative evidence turns out to be more complicated. For the instruments we use to pick out talent, examinations and so forth, seem to vastly give advantage to those with access to a wide range of goods and privileges. How to design principles of meritocracy, which genuinely aid social mobility, is not as easy a question to answer as we suppose.

Meritocracy also has two peculiar psychic consequences. One of its unintended consequences is that it inculcates the idea that those who are left behind are somehow less worthy; and it creates a new form of inequality in turn. There is also an argument to be made that over the last twenty years or so, it is precisely meritocracy that has ideologically underpinned an ideology of great inequality. As some social observers have noted, people who rise through the system based on an idea of merit also have a greater sense of entitlement to all the fruits of their effort. What is interesting about income inequality in places ranging from the USA to China is not the fact that it exists. It is that people at the top in particular and society more generally also came to the view that those at the top deserved what they have. They deserved it in part because they rose by the dint of their own talent. There is an odd sense in which privilege has to justify itself, but merit does not. However, the consequences can be more paradoxical than we think. Perhaps Aristotle was right in thinking that societies need "mixed

constitutions” to function well. They require an array of competing and diverse principles, rather than a single architectonic principle like merit.

There is a frustrating simple-mindedness to our debates over education. The excessive focus we have put on IITs and IIMs is a manifestation of this. While we tinker with them, several actions underway in our system, including the way new universities are being built, continue to weaken our prospects as a society. But debates over education are so narrow and short-sighted because we are not placing them in the right frame. These debates are fundamentally about the character of modernity we are about to create. Unless Indian modernity takes into account how education is marked by different kinds of inequalities, it will remain deeply vulnerable.

Challenges for Military Leaders of Future due to Changing Socio-economic Norms*

Lieutenant Commander Yogesh Athawale**

*'When a Military spirit forsakes a people, the profession of arms immediately ceases to be held in honour, and Military men fall to the lowest rank of public servants; they are little esteemed and no longer understood ... Hence arises a circle of cause and consequence from which it is difficult to escape – the best part of the nation shuns the Military profession because that profession is not honoured, and the profession is not honoured because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it.'*¹

– Alexis de Tocqueville, on peacetime armies

Preamble

Military leadership has been studied extensively the world over. The special treatment of this subject stems from the fact that through the course of history, state power has often manifested itself via the barrel of the gun. Destinies of empires, like the destinies of modern states, had a lot to do with their militaries. Militaries are unique and artificial societies, established to provide security to the State. In their management, the role of Military leadership is very crucial since it provides the means for constructively channelising the energies of an extraordinary human resource which is characterised by professional attributes like controlled aggression and organised violence. In India, the Armed Forces have a glorious tradition of providing first rate leadership to its rank and file. The Armed Forces of India have been staunchly apolitical and secular in character, discharging their responsibilities in accordance with their constitutional charter. In recent times,

*This is a slightly edited version of the essay which won First Prize in Group A.

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however, the Country has witnessed an unprecedented public debate and controversy over some human resource management issues related to the Armed Forces. These include the 6th Central Pay Commission award, the fracas over civil-Military rank equations and the publically articulated concerns over the steady decline of the image of the Armed Forces as a career option for the youth. This essay analyses how traditional motivators in the Armed Forces have come under strain in the 21st century and what can be done to manage the change to keep the leadership and professional standards intact. It will also objectively bring out organisational flaws which need to be addressed to restore the pre-eminent position of the Armed Forces as an attractive career option for the youth.

Traditional Motivators – Why did they work earlier?

The British, after conceding Independence to India in 1947, left behind a legacy of socially deep-rooted and well-settled Military establishment. The Indian Army, Navy and the Air Force in free India were based on the classical British organisational precept of Commissioned officers as 'leaders' and the recruited or enlisted men as the 'followers'. The officers were obviously the higher-class, distinct from the gentry by virtue of their social background, anglicised education, even race and genealogy. The Army maintained a tradition of inducting anglicised young men, many belonging to the royalty or the princely families. The Navy and the Air Force too received men from similar backgrounds. Young men from martial and ruling clans found this calling particularly appealing to their sense of honour and pride. Entry into the officer cadre of the Services was much sought after and keenly contested by the cream of the educated youth. Likewise, many communities in the vast rural populace of India found the soldier's profession particularly appealing to their martial instincts. Therefore, recruitment of the 'right' soldier material was never a problem then. This phenomenon perpetuated all along the early decades of Independence. There was a psychological and social background to this trend. Noted psychologist Abraham Maslow's famous 'hierarchy of needs' model provides some useful pointers to understand how the Military was once a successful employer ² (Refer to Fig 1).




Figure 1 : Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Lower Order Motivators. Physiological, security and safety needs dictate choice of profession among prospectors from financially weaker backgrounds. The Armed Forces of the post Independence era offered very satisfactory terms and conditions of service to fulfil these needs. The monetary benefits were pitched at a higher level; perks and privileges were also comparable to the top few professions in the society. Most importantly, a member of the Military was accorded an esteemed status in the civil society. Even in his absence, his family members would be extended support and sympathy by the neighbourhood they resided in. For those joining in the rank and the file, the assurance of fulfilling

most of the lower order needs was perhaps the biggest motivator. The Military profession gave good returns to the rustic recruits, who predominantly came from agrarian backgrounds. The assurance of an early pension and long term medical support was unique to the Military among other government services.

Higher Order Motivators. The Armed Forces provided an ideal vocation for a buoyant young man to satisfy his higher order needs of self-actualisation such as recognition, approval, achievement, sense of pride, honour, taste of authority etc. Apart from grooming young men to become effective leaders, the Services encouraged them to practise leadership in a uniquely adventurous way. The pride of wearing the uniform, notions of chivalry, patriotism and national service enthused self-esteem among the youth of a nascent democracy, which India was in the early years of Independence.

Relative Comparison. In the early decades of Independence, the Armed Forces outscored most other professions by offering much attractive perks and compensation afforded to prospectors with comparable educational qualifications. For the officer cadres the Indian Foreign and Civil Services were formidable competitors but the selection there was difficult owing to requirements of high academic qualification. The industry was in its infancy. Other scholastic disciplines such as medicine, science, law and literature demanded high intellect and academic perseverance. Lucrative employment opportunities abroad were very rare and almost like a privilege for a select few! The Military on the other hand promised early returns, decent social security by virtue of perks and pension. By and large, the Military retained its appeal to young men with a spirit of adventure and taste for 'outbound' life. For those in the 'rank and file' or 'lower decks' the assurance of fulfilling lower order needs along with some of the higher order ones was attractive enough to volunteer for an otherwise tough profession.

Changes and Challenges

The ongoing transformation process is ringing the alarm bells for the Military, which finds itself at the bottom of the priorities when bright young men and women choose their careers today. Once a coveted profession, the Services today are no longer the desired destination. While this is true for the officer cadres, even for the non-officer base, the recruitment patterns have undergone a

marked change. While there is no dearth of volunteers, today's recruits are much better educated, aware and aspiring than their predecessors. Correspondingly, the service conditions and compensation in the Armed Forces have not improved to the level where a majority of these new-age entrants would feel fully satisfied. Many factors have contributed towards the decline of satisfaction levels in the Armed Forces. The traditional motivators in the Armed Forces have been adversely affected by certain socio-economic developments of the last decade or so. These developments have directly impinged on the Military's ability to fulfil the various 'higher' and 'lower' order needs of its constituents. We shall try to understand these by broadly classifying them into external and internal factors.

External Factors

The Armed Forces cannot be completely insulated from the effects and influences of socio-economic phenomenon that occur in the world around them. The external influences that pose socio-economic challenges to the Services today are covered in the succeeding paragraphs.

Economic Upsurge. It is well known that in the last decade, the fast paced economy and booming markets have had far reaching implications. Successively, now India has ranked as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with its GDP ranking fourth largest in the world in terms of Purchasing Power Parity.³ As a result of growing foreign investment, domestic industrial growth and increasing number of international partnerships in sectors such as Information Technology(IT) and IT enabled services, Financial Services, Manufacturing, Offshore Exploration, Automobile, Tourism, Hospitality, Civil Aviation, Biotechnology and even Agriculture, the career opportunities for well educated youth abound like never before. Unfortunately for the Armed Forces, the fallout has not been particularly favourable because the lucrative options in the private sector tend to wean away many of the potential bright youngsters who otherwise may have taken the call for the Services. As the growth pike of the economy continues to rise, the dazzle also tends to distract those who are already a part of the uniformed community. Many who find themselves professionally stagnated or disillusioned with their assignment begin to see the grass greener on the other side. In contrast to the

improving life styles in the civil world, tough working conditions may become a way of life for some in the Services, only to compound the problems caused by family separations and housing shortage.

Media Activism. In recent years the Armed Forces are coming to terms with two unsettling phenomena – media activism and rising public inquisitiveness in their affairs. The media revolution which the country witnessed over the past two decades in a way caught the Services by surprise. Traditionally the Armed Forces have despised unsolicited interference from outside. Unmindful of the sensitivities associated with Service customs or way of life, the media often indulges in sensational reportage, which results in avoidable damage to the image of the Military. The increasing awareness levels in the country have also brought into focus activities concerning the Military that involve large sums of public money. Reforms like the adoption of the Right to Information (RTI) Act have set into motion a process of rising public inquiry into the affairs of the state. All this sensationalism has caused the Military to appear less glamorous and more ordinary. The romanticism surrounding the military profession has been watered down by intrusive media attention.

Perceived Exclusion and Neglect. The run up period to the 6th Pay Commission award saw unprecedented controversy and public debate over the status of the Armed Forces vis a vis their civil counterparts in the Government. Strong opinions were articulated publically on these matters by Military veterans. This public debate saw a general expression of a perceived sense of neglect and disregard displayed towards the Military profession by the decision makers. The steady decline of the status of Military ranks in relation to their civil counterparts was highlighted as a prime example of this slight. While newsroom discussions and television debates have their share of relevance, this kind of publicity becomes counterproductive for the Services when it comes to portraying their profession as an attractive career option to the youth. It is hard to believe that the Military's promise to fulfil the higher order needs of bright young men would find many takers when the public opinion repeatedly revolves around the injustice done to the soldier's profession by those in positions of power. After some rather sordid episodes of demonstrations by Military veteran organisations, a reformative step has been taken by the declaration

of intent to set up a separate Armed Forces Pay Commission in the future.⁴

Nature of Warfare. Today's Armed Forces face challenges in multiple domains – sub-conventional (asymmetric), conventional and also in the nuclear domain. This transformation from a pure conventional level has happened within a span of last two decades. The preponderant involvement of the Armed Forces in countering asymmetric threats and fighting a proxy-war waged by a conventionally weak adversary has arguably taken a toll on their preparedness for conventional warfare. For instance, when an infantry battalion trained in conventional infantry battle tactics gets deployed in a counter-insurgency role in civil populated areas, it is bound to experience some degree of dissonance no matter how well prepared it is for the change. Similarly, when skilled sailors of a warship or specialised aircraft technicians in an airbase find themselves deployed as sentries and guards on the perimeter, it is but natural that their trade-specific skills get blunted over the months. These pushes and pulls in opposite directions have confronted the Services with daunting challenges in human resource management. Maintaining high motivation levels in such environment is a very tall order placed on young leaders of men today.

The Ethics Deficit. In an environment where scandals, scams and corruption seem like the order of the day across the Nation, the Armed Forces cannot remain completely unaffected. The lure of quick money, fame and creature comforts has trapped many a seasoned soldier, a moment of weakness thus destroying impeccable reputations built over a lifetime. The culture of consumerism, materialism and credit spending has led to an increase in petty crimes, incidents of dishonesty and loan default. With each passing day it is becoming increasingly difficult to monitor individuals who have easy access to plastic money, electronic cash transfers and high-tech communication technology. The rising proclivity of individuals for share-market speculation has altered the popular Service culture of saving and exercising financial prudence.

Internal Factors

The challenges that have emerged to the symbiotic relationship between the Services and their personnel are a reflection on the rapidly transforming social dynamics of our Nation. In the face of the compelling social changes, the major issues that are emerging

as challenges to the unique social structure of the Services are mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs.

Altered Human Resource Equations. The effects of societal and economic transformation of our nation can be most vividly seen in the comparison of recruitment of the past and present. As the Armed Forces are in themselves a microcosm of India, the rising education and awareness levels in recruits are easily perceived. The typical recruit of yesteryears hailed from a rural milieu and belonged to communities with dominant martial traditions. The average academic qualification was matriculation at the best. Selection as a recruit was an admirable achievement for any rustic young man. A complete paradigm shift is visible in the hordes of young men who line up outside recruitment offices across the Country today. Most hopefuls are the educated unemployed youth who turn towards Military for acquiring early financial and social security. Educational qualification is Class XII on the average, many being graduates too. The fact to be noted is that the average recruit of today is decently educated, aware, ambitious, often more conscious of his rights than obligations.⁵ The stereotype of an innocent, less educated but hardy soldier is now a thing of the past. The officer base has also shifted predominantly to the middle class. Socially this could be viewed as a positive development but for the Services it has further narrowed the gap between the 'leaders' and 'followers'.

Separation. Separation of serving personnel from their families for varying durations is an integral feature of Military life. In the Armed Forces, a variety of factors such as field postings, operational deployments of seagoing units, unaccompanied temporary duties, training courses and non-availability of married accommodation can lead to separation. In the olden days, separation was accepted as *fait accompli*. However, today most parents are explicitly conscious about their children's upbringing and schooling, with a keen desire for personal involvement in the process. Therefore, management of separation can be an intense experience for many inexperienced families. Prolonged separations bear potential to cause marital discord, especially so in present times when joint families are breaking apart. The rate of separation is only on the rise with recurrent field duties, deployments of seagoing units away from base ports and detachments of aircraft squadrons or flights. Hence the need to systematically treat the issue of separation induced due to Service exigencies is real.

Spouse Employment. The winds of economic and social change in our Country blowing since the advent of liberalisation have thrown open the doors of opportunity for many a skilled individual. Wives of Service personnel, who represent the exuberance and diversity of Indian society, are no exception. Hitherto, the institutionally encouraged role for Service wives has been limited to volunteers for community welfare activities and paid employment in Service run schools. However, an objective assessment will reveal that the aspirations of many wives go beyond volunteering for community welfare. Many wives see themselves as 'career-worthy' and strive to assume an earning role for themselves. Till now this issue has been completely left in the private domain of the Service member. However, experience of militaries in some developed countries has brought out that institutional assistance to spouses for seeking paid employment is a major motivating factor, which improves the family's trust in the organisation.

"Ignoring or denying social change has enormous cost and operational implications for the Armed Forces, for whom the 'ostrich position' is not a credible long-term choice"

· Christopher Jessup

Shaping the Environment

It does not take much soul searching to realise that certain fundamental changes in approach and policy are required to stem the tide of regression that threatens the delicate socio-cultural construct in the Armed Forces. As seen earlier, the challenges are diverse and multifaceted. However, without complicating the issue, we need to identify the thrust areas that can take care of most of the difficulties. These are covered in the succeeding paras.

Focussed Leadership. In an HR crisis, when organisations are in need of a shake down, the cliché often heard is 'get back to the basics'. This is equally relevant for Military organisations. Basics of leadership have not changed. To quote late Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, *"Leadership does not change. The attributes of leadership have come down over the years. All that happens is that greater emphasis is placed on certain attributes of leadership as countries advance and technological developments take place"*. Leadership training has been formalised in the Services over the years. At various levels, officers and senior Personnel Below Officer

Rank (PBOR) are provided opportunities for honing their leadership skills. In the face of the prevalent socio economic stresses that affect human resource, there is a need to cast a fresh look at some of the techniques and the tools employed by leaders. In terms of Military leadership, a useful approach to understanding the subject is to categorise leadership into three distinct categories – strategic leadership, organisational leadership and direct leadership.⁷ These categories can be flexibly applied to leaders at various hierarchies in the Military. Leaders at the strategic and organisational levels are required to essentially create those enabling conditions which would allow direct leadership to be effective. The process of redefining leadership has to address two dimensions – technological and human. The significance of both aspects needs to be acknowledged by leaders at all levels. It would be illuminating to see how new approaches to old issues have become imperative to meet these challenges.

(a) **Impact of Technology.** The technological impact on leadership pertains to two types of technologies. The first type concerns the technology ushered into the professional domain as a result of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The second type is more individualistic and has to do with personal use gadgets and devices which are the products of the Information Technology revolution. In the context of this essay, the second type is more relevant and is therefore being discussed at greater length. The Information revolution has transformed the way people communicate and understand the world around them. Technological innovations such as satellite based telephony, mobile connectivity; Internet and Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled phones and micro sized computing devices have shrunk the world to a 'global village'. These technologies have also changed the way soldiers communicate with their families. Soldiers, sailors and airmen can now receive regular feedback from their dependents and families. This phenomenon can have positive as well as negative fallout. While regular good news from home would obviously contribute incrementally to the soldier's motivation levels, bad news and complaints can cause quite the opposite to happen. All modern-age technical gadgets are like a double-edged sword. Junior leaders have a very crucial role in ensuring that this kind of equipment is authorised and

exploited appropriately. A fine balancing act in management of technology has to be performed to ensure that it positively contributes to the organisational environment and does not become an impediment in human resource management.

(b) **Adapting to the New-Age Soldier.** Common sense dictates that followers have to adapt themselves to their leaders, particularly in the 'appointative' leadership pattern that is followed in the Services. However, this conventional belief needs to be modified in context of the Military leadership of the 21st century. The onus of changing and adapting now equally lies on the leader who has to calibrate his or her leadership style to suit the new-age recruits. This requires modern leaders to understand the aspirations of the new class of recruits joining the Military. Attitudinal changes are imperative in this regard. As seen earlier, entrants at all stages, be it officer or recruits, are better educated, informed and aware than those of yesteryears. Rising awareness and education has increased aspirations and expectations. Today soldiers look beyond pay, food, the Patiala peg and a bedroll. Men are becoming increasingly perceptive about dignity and needs of self-esteem. Future leaders have to seriously address this issue. In certain cases major policy amendments will be required to address this issue. Junior leaders will have to take the lead by adopting changes in their area of influence. This will be not easy, particularly in organisations with very deep-rooted culture of menial employment of men. Automation technology can be of great help in this context. It can substitute and relieve manual labour involved in unavoidable mundane work. Even for junior leaders themselves, the need of the future is to be on the real job, remaining away from unproductive or ceremonial employment. This means to focus on assimilation of technology, hone professional skills and interact with men. The Services can provide a high sense of purposefulness to their younger leaders by discarding the baggage of redundant practices and red tape, which result in squandering of time and effort. The complexities of Military leadership are best reflected by a quote from Norman Dixon as reproduced below⁸ :-

"Of the psychological problems which beset Military officers few exceed in severity those associated with leadership.

In this respect they are required to fulfil incompatible roles. They are expected to show initiative, yet remain hemmed in by regulation. They must be aggressive, yet never insubordinate. They must be assiduous in catering for their men, yet maintain enormous social distance. They must know everything about everything, yet never appear intellectual”.

Reinforcing the Value System. Indians have always pride in their ‘value’ based culture and society. Values and ethics find an equally profound significance in the context of the Armed Forces, where human life and public money presume high stakes. During training and in subsequent service the insistence on moral values and assertion of the ‘harder right’ is universal across the Services. Indian Military history and chronicles from the retired community are replete with instances where men in uniform responded beyond the call of duty, displaying unusual moral and physical courage. Equally notorious are examples of those who brought infamy to the organisation by their unethical acts. So what are these core values? It is a tough call to clearly list and define them, though the Armed Forces have, in their own way, attempted to identify them for their members. Be it the Army Chief’s ‘Ten Commandments’ or the IAF’s ‘Code of the Air Warrior’, the endeavour has been to provide an aide- memoire for the constituents to follow the righteous path. The Navy has popularised an interesting acronym of ‘PRIDE’ to define its core values. The letters expand into *Patriotism and Loyalty, Resolve and Fighting Spirit, Integrity and Honesty, Duty and Commitment*, Example. Honour is another lofty concept that is the latent spirit behind service in the Military. Camaraderie and esprit de corps are features that lay the foundation for team work. In essence the Armed Forces cherish all those values that appeal to the higher human conscience, which propagate their sanctified image and cultural distinction in the society. The value system and its supporting ethos are the fundamental strength of the Armed Forces. Secularism and inclusive character have been the defining virtues that have now become models in communal harmony for the civil society to emulate. It is only by adherence to these time tested ideals and principles that the Services shall be able to retain the reputation they have traditionally enjoyed in the society. When it comes to morality and ethics, nothing works better than having real life role models to inspire and lead. Leaders at all

levels have to make a conscious effort to show the way and spread enthusiasm in the ranks. Negative, cynical and phlegmatic attitudes have to be shunned. An effective system of positive feedback and reinforcement should be created to encourage those who choose the harder right in face of the easier wrong. Officer-man relationship rooted in trust and loyalty has to be the basis of any combatant unit. Ethics are closely associated with good leadership. In face of modern day challenges such as suicides by ranks, fratricide and other stress related behavioural inconsistencies; the value system can provide clues for leaders to redress burning issues.

Strengthening Welfare. Welfare as an organisational responsibility is a feature that can be credited to the Military ab origine. It is a different matter today that large industrial houses and other government agencies have borrowed the philosophy from the Military and modelled their employee welfare on similar lines. The British created large cantonments during their times, leaving generous real estate to the Armed Forces post Independence. Notwithstanding the housing crunch, the Services are today well known for offering a good standard of living to their members. The welfare measures cover a wide range, from amenities such as Canteen, free medical facilities and subsidised education to support Services in the form of 'rehabilitation' and 'resettlement'. Financial assistance of various kinds, placement agencies, the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), MoUs with Civil Universities are some of the recent initiatives that have sought to bolster the process of 'Welfare'. Welfare is misconstrued by some as paternalistic largesse or pampering. To the contrary, an effective welfare and support system can be immensely beneficial to the productivity of an organisation. Within the fiscal space provided to them, the Services have always strived to provide the best of facilities and amenities to their members including families. It is imperative now to build upon this fine tradition and reorganise welfare to suit the changing times. The value system and ethical conduct can only be germinated in a genial environment. Pay and remuneration, housing infrastructure and other amenities require constant enhancement. Emerging needs such as family advocacy, relocation assistance, student counselling, financial consultancy and spouse employment have to be factored in the gamut of welfare. In our Armed Forces, welfare' is a function that is tackled at two

levels – primarily within the unit and later at the station level. The arrangement works generally fine in peacetime locations and family stations. Unfortunately, the function of welfare in the context of families may be adversely affected when the unit, ship or the squadron is deployed in non-family stations. In the Western Armed Forces such as the United Kingdom and the United States, they have a well established welfare service within each larger service with clear charter of duties.⁹ The welfare service has its offices spread across the country and even abroad, co-located with the units of their parent Service. This kind of arrangement comes with an inherent advantage of standardisation and professional approach to community welfare. Our present arrangement certainly does not require an overhaul but it can definitely do well by adopting some features of the foreign models, particularly those pertaining to standardisation of services, stress reduction techniques, use of Internet and other innovative family support measures.

Transparency and Internal Reform. Military organisations are based on the premises of disciplined workforce and unity of command. However, on the extreme side the culture of ritualism and excessive regimentation can become deep rooted in certain organisations where creativity fails to act as a moderating factor. While discipline is the basis of the Military's functioning, there is a thin line that divides healthy discipline and authoritarianism. Commercial organisations have to innovate, reinvent and reform, lest they get left out of the commercial competition. In case of the Military, the compulsions may not become immediately apparent. Therefore, a continual revision of policies is a must. Particularly in the domain of Human Resource Management, a progressive approach becomes imperative. In the face of rising public criticism, cases of corruption and negative publicity, the response should be directed at increasing transparency. At the same time, the positive facets of the Military culture should be projected in the public domain to lay frivolous doubts at rest. Unless the Military reassures the public proactively, critics will continue to point suggestive fingers at its closed doors, seeking answers to uncomfortable questions.

Conclusion

The winds of social, cultural and economic change are sweeping across the length and breadth of India, changing fortunes and altering destinies. A silent socio- economic revolution is on its

way, bringing in its wake fundamental and enduring variations. It would be naïve for any organisation to presume that it can remain unaffected by the turbulence that occurs during such profound changes. The Military as an institution still inspires confidence and hope in the civil society. To keep this trust the Armed Forces need to reinvent and constantly revise those ways that may have outlived their relevance. With the onerous responsibility of National Security, the Services must respond to the socio-economic challenges with élan and alacrity. In an environment where enemies of freedom and democracy recurrently undermine the peace and security of the country, reform and reinvention may well be the only options for the Armed Forces to retain their high standards of leadership.

End Notes

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Are We Neglecting the Training of Our Young Officers?*

Major Divik Kandpal**

Introduction

Young leaders are commissioned into the Army after a basic grounding into the credo of military leadership. In fact, at the Officers' Training Academy (OTA) / Indian Military Academy (IMA), they are merely introduced to the mystique of military leadership. That remains the core around which leadership traits are developed during the full span of their careers. The real education, development and grooming of a Young Officer (YO) starts only when he joins a unit and gets an opportunity to interact with real soldiers i.e. officers and personnel below officer rank (PBOR). The quality of development and grooming depends a lot on the operating philosophy of different arms and services. Even more important are the working environment and leadership role modelling prevailing in each unit. It is here that the key process of mentoring begins, to give a definite shape to his personal and professional development. The whole effort is directed in turning a vibrant lieutenant into a model Army officer with good leadership qualities.

The next stage of imbibing professionalism is undertaken at designated training schools, colleges and the regimental centres where a YO undergoes special professional courses in his formative years. The learning and values imparted at these courses lay the foundation of his career which enable him to take his rightful place in the profession of arms – essentially by displaying his physical prowess, professional acumen and leadership traits.

Thereafter, the dynamics of converting a enthusiastic YO into a battle worthy Army officer is interwoven in the grooming process embedded in the units and in the training institutions. This model, which our Armed Forces have followed since Independence, has never let us down till date. It has succeeded in creating a

*This is an edited version of the essay which won the First Prize in Group B.

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string of dedicated YOs whose sacrifices are unparalleled in the world. A closer look at all our post-Independence military campaigns reveals that, with the possible exception of 1971 to some extent, all campaigns were conducted at unit and sub-unit levels; which itself speaks much about the courage and leadership qualities of our junior leaders.

Unfortunately, as we come close to the end of the first ten years of the service of the first batch of YO's commissioned in the 21st Century, the environment can easily discern that slowly somehow the above training continuum is getting disrupted. The results of this trend may not be visible in a flash. Nevertheless, the slowly declining sheen of the officer corps can be attributed to '*erosion of values amid their quest for easy success*'. The reasons for this downward trend are manifold. Changing socio-economic dynamics and shortage of officers are the main culprits in the all encompassing malaise that is plaguing our Armed Forces. This coupled with rapidly changing security scenario at the national and international level has put a complex challenge on the military training system. However, we cannot afford to send out our YO's underprepared to face their adversaries on the battlefield inadequately trained with obsolete weaponry in their hands.

The aim of this essay is to examine the issues which are a key to our future as a professional Army, which depends largely on it's inspirational junior leadership. *Is the present day training system of YOs dynamic enough to cater for the burgeoning challenges the Indian Army faces today? Does it cater for their personal aspirations and professional growth in the globalised world today?*

Present Model

Taking infantry as the basic model, the grooming and education of a YO passing out from the academy, starts at the respective Regimental Centres. It comprises of a capsule of two to three weeks on Regimental History, Heritage and Leadership lore. This is followed by living with troops for some duration on joining the units, which is done primarily to familiarise him with the hardships and challenges of soldiers' lives. This helps him to understand his spiritual and emotional quotient, and developing '*camaraderie*' especially with the young soldiers. This is in parallel with the designation of a junior officer as 'Senior Subaltern', who acts as

an institution to mentor him. The YO is made to undergo all the promotional cadres and is also taught the finer details of office work and documentation at company and battalion levels.

After a few months in his parent unit, he goes for his first structured career course – the YOs course. It is followed by Commandos' and Weapons' courses. During the service bracket of five to eight years, he is detailed for Junior Command (JC) course. Interspersed between these courses are Part B and D Promotion examinations and a string of miscellaneous courses like Regimental Signal Officers (RSO), Mechanical Transport Officers (MTO), Quarter Master (QM), Military Law, Mountain / Jungle Warfare, Computer and Information Technology (IT) courses, to name a few. These are generally vacancy based. Unfortunately, due to a variety of internal and environmental factors the above mentioned continuum of educating and grooming YOs stands disrupted and has led to a '*start-stop*' necessity based approach.

Changing Milieu and Its Impact on the Training System

The '*shortage of officers*' is the single biggest reason for the above problem. The inadequacy of officers at the unit level leads to lack of mentoring at all levels. Add to it, the ever '*increasing commitments*' which take away from them the traditional growing up period. They are pushed into operations straightway after commissioning. This at times leads to picking up wrong practices and values, which at later stages, become difficult to rectify. The changing socio-economic dynamics have also touched both leaders and the led. The YOs of today have different dreams and aspirations. Last but not the least, is the increased awareness and interaction with the civil environment which leads to inevitable comparisons in pay and allowances, status and career advancement. All these influences make mentoring more difficult and complicated. The ever increasing unit commitments, both in peace and field, combined with shortage of officers leaves little or no time for the Commanding Officers (CO's) to give them adequate time for normal cadres and courses, leave aside thinking of grooming them. Although most of the units are keen to mentor their YO's, this aspect of their upbringing is now being conducted more and more in a perfunctory manner.

The present day training curricula, right from the OTA / IMA upto JC course is sufficiently covering the '*tactical*' aspects of

conventional environment. However, the challenges that the Country faces in the form of Asymmetric Warfare (AW) requires review of the basics of our training, especially at the YO's level. Add to it, the quantum leap in technology that our Army is making to prepare itself for Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and the demands of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Thus, the environment expects our YOs to be *'technocrat wizards'*, with requisite adaptability to imbibe and implement rapidly changing technological concepts that are getting introduced endlessly, and also *'intellectual understanding'* to comprehend the subtleties of humanities oriented subjects like Perception Management, Human Rights, Media Management, International Relations and Diplomacy. On top of all this is the challenge of 'leading' and 'managing' an increasingly awakened and educated PBOR, who most often would not question your decisions and actions but would also not submit meekly 'always' without expressing reasonable doubts or seeking premature exit from Military service.

The Road Ahead

"Our aim is to extract the potential officer at the start of his career and begin His grooming for leadership as soon as possible. Responsibility breeds Responsibility; The best thing for training Leadership is Leadership."

Field Marshall William Slim

Our training has focussed on two dimensions of education – the 'military field' which can be termed as specialised grooming and the broad based 'education' covering distinct and varied subjects ranging from liberal arts, languages to engineering disciplines. The road ahead lies in effectively adapting and modifying our training syllabi and methodology, and introducing these new parameters at all levels to keep abreast with rapidly changing battlefield requirements and challenges to National Security.

Proposed Model

Paradigm Shift at the National Defence Academy. The change has to be brought in at graduation level at the NDA, where basic streams have to be redefined from humanities and science to defence management and engineering. The model for Bachelor in Defence Management can be taken from Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Master in Defence Studies and Bachelor in

Business Administration from the civil education system. The focus should be more on human resource development, man management, leadership, psychology, materials & inventory management, foreign languages and international relations. Similarly, the engineering stream initial training and electronics training can be conducted in the civil institutions to start with. This can be modelled on already established Communication Theory Workshops (CTWs) and the recently introduced similar concept at the Naval Academy. The teething troubles can be taken care of by co-located College of Military Engineering as well as active support of MCEME and MCTE. The intake into CTWs should also be increased. These steps would not only give the cadets professional competence but also personal satisfaction.

Raising the Bar at IMA / OTA and YOs Training. At IMA / OTA the training curricula should be revised upwards, to aim at turning out potential sub unit commanders. With majority of cadets earning their spurs after commissioning in active counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, the emphasis on the same cannot be neglected. It should be part of curriculum right from the first term onwards and not merely as a capsule course in the end. Interactive sessions with gallantry award winners as well representatives from active field formations should be organised. Subjects like media management, perception management, human rights etc should be introduced. Emphasis should be more on case studies from the field army.

The logical implication of the above would be raising the bar at the '*corps specific*' YOs' courses to JC level. The training void after commissioning upto the YOs course needs to be filled in respective units under the guidance of respective COs. The period between commissioning and YOs courses also needs to be increased to one year plus. Institutionalised E-courses can be started in this period which along with unit level grooming and mentoring would help in the desired transformation. During the YOs training, apart from customary focus on tactics, development of an officer as a 'leader' is the core issue – that aspect needs to be addressed. The varied subjects introduced at IMA / PTA, such as media management, perception management, human rights etc should be taken to a higher level. The mode of delivery of these subjects should also change from lecture based programme to those that encourage original and creative thinking, e.g. discussions

and seminars based on case studies would arouse more active interaction, culminating in innovative ideas. This would lead to the field army having competent sub unit commanders at a relatively earlier service bracket and age. This would also conform to present day realities in which sub-unit commanders appointments are handled by greenhorns. This will equip these officers to take on responsibility effectively, without waiting for the JC course to empower them with the requisite knowledge base.

Professional Courses. The next mandatory course for the YOs is the JC course, in a service bracket of 5-8 years. This intermediate period is filled with a string of non-mandatory miscellaneous courses like RSOs, MTO, QM, Military Law courses. The content of these courses needs to be skillfully modified to keep the officers abreast with the latest technologies and man management concepts. Aim should be to utilise their '*management*' and '*engineering*' know how acquired during graduation; and suitably updating them through these courses. The importance of these courses needs to be redefined. The problem arises in case of upgrading tactical knowledge, because the gap between the two courses is large. This can be taken care of by introducing a sequential E-learning process. There can be an integrated correspondence cum E-learning course with a contact phase to augment the same. However to fully utilise these courses, there is a need to tie up these courses/studies to career progression and incentives in terms of making career choices.

The Junior Command Course. The content of JC course can be increased to do away with ad hoc Command Pre-Staff courses. Since, every officer does not attend this course, the JC course could also prepare them for 'staff' appointments teneted by middle level officers. The course content needs to be upgraded to also train for UN Peace Keeping Operations. Exposure on international affairs, national security policy etc should be covered in the form of lectures and seminars. The duration of course should be increased and officers should be encouraged to opt for specialisation in different subjects like Operation and Administration Logistics, Intelligence, Information Warfare, Electronic Warfare etc. In fact, the JC course can be modelled on the lines of Post Graduate Diploma in Business / Man Management for executives which needs five years of work experience. The course can be of a limited duration followed by a mini project / thesis report in

respective units which should lead to award of a PG Diploma. This will not only enhance an individual officer's professional qualification, it would also boost his confidence and lead to higher motivation and self esteem levels. Thereafter, constructive projects and research work may be assigned to him on existing field army level problems to find and suggest workable solutions.

Promotion Examinations. The subjects in promotion examinations should also look for a broader perspective. If the above suggested model is implemented then the logical step would be to raise the level of Part B examination to sub-unit level. In essence, it should be seen as a validation of his '*on the job*' learning as well as that on the courses. Technology is touching each and every sphere of personal and professional lives, therefore, introduction of science and military technology as a subject both in Part B and D examinations should be considered. With the help of technical arms and services a formal syllabus may be worked out. It should facilitate gradual progression at all the levels catering for basic technological requirements including the functional needs of latest systems that are being inducted in our Army as well as updating us on latest trends and developments. This will help in preparation of a strong foundation for the DSSC aspirants as well. There is also a strong case for introduction of a subject which would guide our Young Officers on the subtleties of leadership, man-management etc. Though biographies of great military leaders are there for officers to learn from, there is much more military literature, highlighting certain facets of leadership, man-management and variety of other topics which can be of a great learning value. It is recommended that a non-thematic subject based on one or two such books can be introduced. The emphasis should not be on cramming for examination, but on application, analysis and transferring that knowledge into lessons learnt to facilitate their implementation. The level of other subjects also has to be suitably revised to enable the officers to smoothly graduate to JC level and beyond and the knowledge gained should help him in his preparations for the DSSC entrance examination.

Training for International Assignments. The above model would raise the stature of our YOs to a reasonably high level. Thereafter, they can confidently interact and operate at every level for carrying out tasks either in the civil domain or on international assignments. There would be no need for any specialised course for the same.

When officers go out on foreign assignments with their units, they would get enough warning cum preparatory period. If an individual officer is selected for a specific appointment, then the course run by Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) at USI would be good enough.

Mentoring in Units. Shaping 'greenhorns' into good leaders, through mentoring is as old as the concept of leadership itself. We have Lord Krishna mentoring Arjuna in the Mahabharata. The requirement of grooming in the Military exists for a variety of reasons; chief amongst them being the fact that there is a wide gulf between the responsibilities of a gentleman cadet (GC) and a YO. The gulf is not so much due to the rank, but it is in the mindset. As a GC, the interaction is between fellow GCs and instructors through a set training schedule while a YO gets involved in administration and the decision making process. This wide expanse needs to be bridged by grooming a newly commissioned YO through regimentation under the watchful eyes and ears of responsible mentors. The traditional model used to consider these YOs, full of enthusiasm and bubbling energy, as a huge piece of wax which could be moulded, shaped and structured to suit the organisational requirements and to turn them into effective leaders. However, because the shortage of officers and the graph of commitments continues to rise, these realities need serious consideration. These are the two primary causes which have led to the deterioration of the mentoring model. The Commanding Officers do not have enough officers and time to look into this aspect and this vital aspect of a YO's development process has got much neglected. The onus for this vital aspect of a YOs meaningful development has now shifted onto the formation commanders. The training cadres for development of YO's model should be implemented at formation level by 'pooling in' the best available instructors. Preparatory cadres for YOs and JC courses and Part B and D examinations should be organised. Guest lectures on a variety of topics need to be conducted at formation level. The officers who have finished their YOs course need to be exposed to the war games, sand model discussions etc. Professional competitions amongst YOs should also be conducted to develop competitive spirit. Wherever business schools, universities and industries are available in close vicinity, meaningful participation of YOs in their workshops and creative programmes should be facilitated. Under field conditions, where such formation level

integrated training may not be possible, Corps Battle Schools should take the lead and a similar model may be introduced in the form of pre-induction training for YOs. *However, the traditional mentoring and grooming model still needs to be the basis for all such actions and all possible efforts should be made to revive it.*

Conclusion

Young Officers are the backbone of any unit. Grooming them and turning them into assets is a vital command function for commanders of at all levels. The proposition outlined above is primarily 'infantry' centric which can be suitably modified for other arms, technical arms and services. The technical arms and services need to groom their officers into technology managers role. It needs to be emphasised that this may not be the final solution for this problem, but the contours of grooming and training of YOs needs to be looked at holistically and addressed with utmost urgency at the highest possible level. Last but not the least, the mystique of leadership is full of endless possibilities and we must not forget that despite all these changes, it is important to remember that not every good officer or leader will be a good academic or vice versa. There would always be a need to shape these training modules in such a way that they provide the right mix for everybody to hone their professional skills on ground under the able guidance of battle hardened military leaders before they go back to the units.

"The Greenhorn is the ultimate victor in everything; It is He that gets the most out of life"

Gilbert K Chesterton

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Delivering Governance and Reform of Bureaucracy*

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According to a recent survey¹ on 12 Asian economies done by the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, India's "suffocating bureaucracy" was ranked² the least-efficient, and working with the country's civil servants was described as a "slow and painful" process. 'They are a power centre in their own right at both the national and state levels, and are extremely resistant to reform that affects them or the way they go about their duties,' the report said. India's own Second Administrative Reforms Commission is no less scathing in its criticism:

"The state apparatus is generally perceived to be largely inefficient with most functionaries serving no useful purpose. The bureaucracy is generally seen to be tardy, inefficient and unresponsive. Corruption is all-pervasive, eating into the vitals of our system, undermining economic growth, distorting competition and disproportionately hurting the poor and marginalised citizens. Criminalisation of politics continues unchecked, with money and muscle power playing a large role in elections. In general there is a high degree of volatility in society on account of unfulfilled expectations and poor delivery. Abuse of authority at all levels in all organs of state has become the bane of our democracy."

The poor shape of India's bureaucracy has also resulted in indifferent progress on the marginal developing groups (MDGs). High growth notwithstanding, India seems to have failed on two fronts. First, social indicators on *health, nutrition, hygiene*, and quality of education are either stagnant or moving very slowly. And secondly, a large number of marginalised and disadvantaged

* Text of the talk delivered at USI on 03 Mar 2010.

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people have either not gained from development, or in many cases have actually been harmed from the process. Weak governance, manifesting itself in poor service delivery, uncaring leadership, and uncoordinated and wasteful public expenditure, are the key factors impinging on development and social indicators.

Political Compulsions and Bureaucracy

In a well-functioning democracy, the political process would ideally find answers to governance problems. Political pressure can be healthy if it results in greater demand on administration for efficiency and better services to the people. Pressures properly regulated and wisely tempered, improve the spirit of administration and help to keep it on an even keel, but this is not happening in India.

There is a growing belief widely shared among the political and bureaucratic elite in the Government that the state is an arena where public office is to be used for private ends. Immediate political pressures for distribution of patronage are so intense that there is no time or inclination for the ministers and bureaucrats to do conceptual thinking, to design good programmes, weed out those that are not functioning well, and monitor the programmes with a view to improve the effectiveness of delivery. At the same time elections require funds which have to come through the largesse of the Government treasury.

The political system in many states is accountable not to the people but to those who are behind the individual Members of the state level Legislative Assemblies (MLAs); these are often contractors, mafia, corrupt bureaucrats, and manipulators who have made money through the political system, and are therefore interested in the continuation of chaos and patronage based administration. The fact that half of the politicians in some states are either criminals or have strong criminal links and thus have no faith in the 'Rule of Law' further compounds the problem.

The state resources are the most valued prize for both politicians and their constituencies, which lead to a client patron relationship between the holders of state power and those seeking favours. Patronage is controlled by individuals, not established institutions bound to follow set procedures. Where power is highly personalised and weakly institutionalised, the decision making

process is replaced by arbitrary and behind-the-scene transactions. In such an environment, exercise of power for its clients demands fudging of rules, dependence upon corrupt civil servants, pilfering of the public treasury, and decay in governance. When the fence starts eating the field, there is little chance of development reaching the poor.

Winston Churchill on the eve of India's Independence had said, "Power will go to the hands of rascals, rogues and freebooters. *All Indian leaders will be of low calibre and men of straw. They will have sweet tongues and silly hearts. They will fight among themselves for power and India will be lost in political squabbles*". What appeared as a scandalous outburst then, may be called an understatement now!

Impact on the Bureaucracy

In almost all states people see the bureaucracy as wooden, disinterested in public welfare, and corrupt. Bright men and women join the IAS, but adverse work environment, constant political interference, frequent and often meaningless transfers, and corruption below and above them, all leads to the death of idealism; and encourages them too to misuse their authority. Disillusionment and greed, and not need, is the driving force behind graft amongst civil servants. A young IAS officer from Bihar described³ the predicament of honest officers in the following terms:-

"As Project Director (PD), I was handling rural development funds and it was often a problem to release money to the sub-district Blocks and Panchayats (elected village councils). This was so because the Block Development Officer (BDO) or the Mukhia (elected panchayat president) would immediately take up 'n' number of schemes and distribute the total money as advance to either his own relatives who act as agents or Abhikartas (Junior Engineers) in employment schemes or the muscle men or petty contractors of the local MLA. If any action is proposed against the BDO or the Mukhia a report has to be sent to the Minister who often does not take any action. This further emboldens the BDO while the Collector/ PD gets demoralised. Upright officers

have been systematically marginalised by the indulgent political masters who expect a committed bureaucracy. Committed officers enjoy outstanding CRs (annual confidential reports) and foreign training, while upright officers are sidelined in useless departments like Rajbhasha (Official Language), Protocol etc. When they apply for GOI deputation, all kinds of hinderances are created. This is done to break the upright officer and make him submissive and more committed."

The IAS serves the state but the state structure is itself getting increasingly dysfunctional and divorced from public interest. In some North Indian states parallel authority structures and Mafia gangs have emerged. Tribal regions in central and north-east India are out of bounds for normal administration. In such a situation, it is no surprise, if the bureaucracy too is in a bad shape.

Over the years, whatever little virtues the IAS *possessed - integrity, political neutrality, courage and high morale* - are showing signs of decay. Many civil servants are deeply involved in partisan politics: they are preoccupied with it, penetrated by it, and now participate individually and collectively in it. This is understandable, though unfortunate, because between expression of the will of the State (represented by politicians) and the execution of that will (through the administrators) there cannot be any long term dichotomy. In other words, a model in which politicians would be casteist, corrupt and will harbour criminals, whereas civil servants will continue to be efficient, responsive to public needs and change-agents cannot be sustained indefinitely. In the long run administrative and political values have to coincide.

While defending the continuation of the all India Services, Sardar Patel had said, "they are as good as we are". At that time it was taken as a compliment that the civil service was being compared with statesmen who had won freedom for the country. One does not know how many civil servants will like to be told today that they are like politicians. But things have moved a full circle, and perhaps many of them behave like politicians- the English speaking politicians- corrupt, with short term targets, narrow horizons, feudal outlook, disrespect for norms, contributing nothing to the welfare of the nation, empty promises and no action.

Internal Problems of the Bureaucracy

Lack of Professionalism. A high degree of professionalism ought to be the dominant characteristic of a modern bureaucracy. The fatal failing of the Indian bureaucracy has been its low level of professional competence. An IAS officer spends more than half of his tenure on policy desks where domain knowledge is a vital prerequisite. However, in the present environment there is no incentive for a young civil servant to acquire knowledge or improve his skills. There is thus an exponential growth in both, his ignorance and arrogance. It is said that in the house of an IAS officer one would find only three books - the railway timetable, because he is always being shunted from one post to the other, a film magazine because that is his level of interest, and of course, the Civil List - that describes the service hierarchy! An important factor which contributes to the surrender of senior officers before political masters is the total lack of any market value and lack of alternative employment potential. Beyond the Government they have no future, because their talents are so few. Most IAS officers thus end up as dead wood within a few years of joining the service and their genius lies only in manipulation and jockeying for positions within the Government.

Creation of Redundant Posts. Due to the control that the IAS lobby exerts on the system, a large number of redundant posts in the super-time and superior scales have been created to ensure them quick promotions. Often a senior post has been split, thus diluting and diminishing the scale of responsibilities attached with the post. For instance, in some states against the post of one Chief Secretary, there are many officers now in equivalent but far less important posts drawing the same salary. In one state, previously where one officer used to be the Secretary of Medical and Health, now there are five officers doing the job of one; four are in-charge of health, family planning, medical, and medical education respectively, whereas the fifth one, as Principal Secretary oversees the work of these four Secretaries!

This has apparently been done to avoid demoralisation due to stagnation, but the net result has been just the opposite. First, it leads to cut throat competition within the service to grab the important slots. The old camaraderie has vanished. Instances are not lacking when IAS officers wanting plum jobs have gone to the

politicians denigrating their competitors. Second, this no-holds-barred competition is then exploited by politicians in playing up one against the other leading to officers becoming more pliable. Third, for IAS officers in the marginalised positions Government seems remote, heartless and more unjust now than ever before. Many have gone to the Tribunals and Courts for promotions and postings, a phenomenon that was unheard of two decades ago.

Perverse incentives are not the only factor undermining the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Its composition is also skewed. For instance, in most states, about 70 per cent of all government employees are support staff unrelated to public service – drivers, peons and clerks. Key public services – education, healthcare, police and judiciary- are starved of people, whereas many wings are overstaffed.

Structure of Reward and Punishment. It may be recalled that even in the 1970's the officers exerted pressure on the system to move to what they thought were more glamorous positions. Some decades back, when "useless" posts were almost non-existent, an informal hierarchy of jobs had existed. The Secretary Industries, as also every one else, thought that he was holding a more important job than the Secretary Social Welfare although they drew the same salary. A Collector of a large district felt humiliated if he was transferred as Director of Tribal Development.

The difference between then and now is that previously civil servants had clear ideas about the type of behaviour that would be rewarded or punished; furthermore, control over that, and judgment about it, was in the hands of the Civil Service itself. Now, the structure of reward and punishment is decidedly and squarely in the hands of the politicians, who therefore cannot be displeased. Today, many Legislative Assemblies meet only for 20 to 30 days in a year. MLAs are not interested in legislative functions, they all want a share in the executive! Most of the time they interfere in the role of other wings of the Government with no sense of accountability, but they have nuisance value for back-door influencing in decision making. Such back seat driving means informal control over the bureaucracy, but it promotes irresponsible decision making and encourages corruption. The traditional separation between the executive and the legislature has disappeared in India. This has meant erosion of internal discipline

and emergence of the district MLAs as the real boss for the Collector.

Poor Service Delivery. To be fair to the modern brand of politicians, it must be admitted that except for high integrity, neutrality towards party politics, and provision of minimal administrative services in times of emergency, the Civil Service even in the past had little to commend for itself. Efficiency in the civil services was always very narrowly defined; it was in terms of contempt for politics and adherence to rules, but never in terms of increased public satisfaction. In such a scenario of low institutional capability it is unfair to expect that the political processes would be totally free from populism or sectarianism. Because of the inability of the system to deliver, politicians do not perceive good governance as feasible or even important for getting votes. No Chief Minister seems to be saying to his constituents: *'within three months all canals would run on time, you would get 10 hours of electricity, rations would be available for the poor, you apply for a license today and within a month it would reach your doors, your grievances will be promptly attended to, etc.'* One reason why he does not say so is the total lack of faith on the part of voters in such promises which need delivery through the administrative apparatus. Ministers too are conscious of the limitations of the system, and realise that such promises cannot be delivered.

It is here that the Civil Service has failed miserably. Politics is after all 'art of the possible', and if the Civil Service is no longer able to ensure service delivery, politicians are forced to resort to identity based politics in order to reach at least some sections to keep the faith of the voter alive in the political system.

Although many civil servants hold the view that it is the nature of politics which largely determines the nature of the Civil Service and the ends to which it would be put, and therefore Civil Service reforms cannot succeed in isolation, causation is also in the other direction. Non-performing administration leaves little choice to the politicians but to resort to populist rhetoric and sectarian strategies.

Rather than try to improve the delivery system, many IAS officers are compromising with the rot and accepting a diminished role for themselves by becoming agents of exploitation in a state structure which now resembles more like the one in the medieval

period - authoritarian, brutal, directionless, and callous to the needs of the poor. A few competent and ambitious civil servants would be able to rise above all this, by joining the UN and other such organisations. Their material success will further fuel the desire of the ordinary members of the Service to enrich themselves by hook or by crook. In the process they would become totally indistinguishable from other rent seeking parasites - politicians, inspectors and middlemen. Perhaps, they had not imagined that they would end up like this at the time of joining the Service. Stagnation in their intellectual capabilities and a decline in self-esteem will further demoralise them. Disillusionment and corruption are thus likely to coexist in the IAS for quite sometime to come.

How to Stem the Rot?

Government of India (GOI) transferred almost Rs 4 trillion in 2008-09 to the states. If even half of it was to be sent to the sixty million poor families (at 28 per cent as the cut-off line for poverty, 300 million poor would be equivalent to roughly 60 million households) directly by money order, they would receive more than Rs 90 a day! It proves that public expenditure needs to be effectively translated into public goods and services that reach the poor for it to have an impact on poverty and social outcomes. Unfortunately different kinds of distortions can come in the way of resource allocations reaching the intended beneficiaries.

Although there has been a growing realisation among some Chief Ministers on the need to improve governance, only a few have been able to translate this into concrete action. This would necessarily involve keeping the MLAs and Ministers under check, which is difficult when the state is under a coalition regime, or the ruling party is constrained by a thin margin in the Assembly, or is divided into factions. In many other states even Chief Ministers seem to be averse to professionalising administration.

When neither politics nor state administration has the capacity for self-correction, only external pressure can coerce states to take hard decisions that will hit at their money making tactics. In the Indian situation (where foreign donors provide very little aid to the states as compared with what is provided by the Centre) this can come only from the Centre, backed by strong civil society and media action.

Conditions under which the civil servants operate in the social sector Ministries in GOI are somewhat different from the work environment prevailing in the states. First, the Central Government Joint Secretary does not control field staff and is, therefore, free from the pressures of transfers and postings. Second, his/her tenure in GOI is for five years, which facilitates growth of professionalism. In the states, when officers fear that they would be transferred within six months there is hardly any incentive to perform. Third, central government officials are more in touch with experts, donors and specialists, and therefore are under peer group pressure to learn their subject and be able to converse with the specialists on equal terms. In some cases, where GOI Ministries (such as in Education and lately in Health) have started behaving like donors and make states to be answerable for results, results in the field are more satisfactory than in the Ministries, such as Tribal Affairs, Food & Civil Supplies, and Women & Child Development, where they are content with just release of funds or foodgrain with little monitoring of outcomes.

Therefore, the enhanced control by the Centre on social sector expenditure should provide a window of opportunity to put some pressure on the states to improve their administration and service delivery. Some of the ways it can be achieved are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Focus on Outcomes. At present officials at all levels spend a great deal of time in collecting and submitting information, but these are not used for taking corrective and remedial action or for analysis, but only for forwarding it to a higher level, or for answering Parliament / Assembly Questions. Equally, state governments do not discourage reporting of inflated figures from the districts, which again renders monitoring ineffective. As data is often not verified or collected through independent sources, no action is taken against officers indulging in bogus reporting. The practice is so widely prevalent in all the states, that the overall percentage of malnourished children, in case of 0-3 years according to the data reaching GOI from the field is 8 per cent (with only one per cent children severely malnourished), as against 46 per cent (with 17 per cent children severely malnourished) reported by an independent survey sponsored by GOI. The field officials are thus able to escape from any sense of accountability in reducing malnutrition.

The situation can easily be corrected by asking the state governments to show greater transparency of the district and centre records by putting them on a website, and by frequent field inspections by an independent team of experts, nutritionists, and grassroot level workers. The Centre should also pull up the states for not recognising almost 90 per cent of the severely malnourished children.

Fiscal Transfers. Very little of the GOI transfer of roughly Rs 4 trillion (this amount does not include subsidies, such as on food, kerosene, and fertilizers) annually to the states is linked with performance and good delivery. The concept of good governance needs to be translated into a quantifiable annual index on the basis of certain agreed indicators, and central transfers should be linked to such an index⁴.

Accountability. As a consequence of its colonial heritage as well as the hierarchical social system administrative accountability in India was always internal and upwards, and the civil service's accountability to the public had been very limited. With politicisation and declining discipline, internal accountability stands seriously eroded, while accountability via legislative review and the legal system has not been sufficiently effective. Often too much interference by Judiciary (as in Bihar) in day to day administration further cripples administration. But strengthening internal administrative accountability is rarely sufficient, because internal controls are often ineffective—especially when the social ethos tolerates collusion between supervisors and subordinates.

'Outward accountability', therefore, is essential for greater responsiveness to the needs of the public and thus to improve service quality. Departments such as the Police and Rural Development, which have more dealings with the people, should be assessed annually by an independent team consisting of professionals such as journalists, retired judges, academicians, activists, NGOs, and even retired government servants. These should look at their policies and performance, and suggest constructive steps for their improvement. At present the system of inspections is elaborate but often precludes the possibility of a 'fresh look' as they are totally governmental and rigid. The system should be made more open so that the Civil Service can gain from the expertise of outsiders in the mode of donor agency evaluations

of projects. It is heartening to note that GOI has already started doing so for some of its flagship programmes, such as in education and health. Petitions under the Right to Information Act (RTI) have also empowered citizens, but its use is still dominated by civil servants on personnel issues of appointments and promotions.

Priorities for enhancing both internal and external Civil Service accountability should include: improved information systems and accountability for inputs; better audit; face-to-face meetings with consumers and user groups; publishing budget summaries in a form accessible to the public; a stronger performance evaluation system; scrutiny and active use of quarterly and annual reports; and selective use of contractual appointments.

One way to bring in accountability is to start the system of holding public hearings in matters pertaining to the works handled by each office. Prominent social workers and NGOs should be associated with this exercise for more productive results. The teams would undertake surveys of quality of service delivery in key areas; scrutinise policies, programmes and delivery mechanisms. Civil servant's views on work constraints and reporting fraud and corruption should be elicited. The reviews conducted should also form the basis of time bound changes and improvements which should be monitored.

Needless to say that such comprehensive reforms need for their sustenance strong political and administrative will from the top. In its absence, reforms remain only on paper. Accountability has to be induced; it cannot be decreed by fiat. Accountability is a result of a complex set of incentives, transparency in processes and decision making, and checks and balances at various levels of government. Thus, the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues IAS in GOI have to put their weight behind new accountability systems and review it from time to time.

Personnel Issues

Appointments and transfers are two well-known areas where the evolution of firm criteria can be easily circumvented in the name of administrative efficacy. Even if the fiscal climate does not allow large numbers of new appointments, a game of musical chairs through transfers can always bring in huge rentals to corrupt officials and politicians. As tenures shorten, both efficiency and

accountability suffer. In Uttar Pradesh, the average tenure of an IAS officer in the last five years is said to be as low as four months!

The topic of reducing political interference is a sensitive one, for the right to transfer government servants is clearly vested within the political leadership of the States under Article 310 of the Indian Constitution, which maintains that civil servants serve at the "pleasure" of the ruling authorities. Yet, few would disagree that this power is often abused by both government servants and politicians – the former in seeking plum postings, and the latter for making Civil Service pliable. The prime concern of the political executive now is not to make policies but to manage jobs and favourable postings for their constituents. This means a high degree of centralisation at the level of the state government and little accountability.

Several reforms are needed here. Powers of transfers of all Class II officers should be with Head of the Department, and not with the government. At least for higher ranks of the Civil Services e.g. Chief Secretary and the Police Chief, postings may be made contractual for a fixed period of at least two years (as is being done in GOI for Secretaries in the Ministries of Home, Defence, and Finance), and officers be monetarily compensated if removed before the period of the contract without their consent or explanation.

Stability index should be calculated for important posts, such as Secretaries, Deputy Commissioners, and District Superintendent of Police. An average of at least two years for each group be fixed, so that although government would be free to transfer an officer before two years without calling for his explanation, the average must be maintained above two years.⁵ This would mean that for every short tenure some one else must have a sufficiently long tenure to maintain the average.

At the same time it must be recognised that some posts would have more attraction for the employees than others. These may be due to better location where good schools or cheap government housing is available, more challenges, the pull of private practice for doctors, or simply more opportunities to make money. Except for the Indian Foreign Service, no other service categorises posts according to its demand so as to ensure that everyone gets

a fair chance to serve on both important and difficult (such as in remote and tribal areas) assignments. One should categorise posts in each department according to the nature of duties and geographical location into A, B and C posts, and chart out the kind of mix that should dictate the average officer's span of career. At least for IAS officers, one should be able to know through websites that total transparency is being observed and whether some 'well connected' officials have not been able to get 'plum' postings and avoid difficult areas.

Conclusion

A good Civil Service is necessary but not sufficient for good governance; a bad Civil Service is sufficient but not necessary for bad governance. Thus, a dilapidated Civil Service has been a key factor in Africa's economic decline. Conversely, a strong Civil Service is one of several reasons why in several East Asian economies, especially Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, authoritarianism has co-existed with excellent economic performance. It can be argued that the link between authoritarianism and economic decline, so evident in Africa, has been inoperative in these Asian countries largely because of their strong Civil Service. Greater responsiveness and openness can legitimately be demanded of public administrations in many East Asian countries. Clearly, Civil Service systems in most East Asian countries cannot be considered a problem; they are, rather, an important part of the solution to these countries' other problems.

The situation in many Indian states who are responsible for achieving the Millennium Development Goals is different. A vast gap exists between the stated and unstated objectives. On paper the avowed objective of the government is to give clean administration and work for the poor, but lucrative posts are auctioned to the highest bidder. Corruption is rampant. People have unfortunately accepted the position as fait accompli and resigned themselves to their fate. They too tend to seek short cuts and exploit the system by breaking rules or approaching mafia gangs and politicians for favours.

Governance reforms are intractable under a 'kleptocracy' that exploits national wealth for its own benefit and is, by definition, uninterested in transparency and accountability. A pliable and unskilled Civil Service is actually desirable from its point of view—

public employees dependent on the regime's discretionary largesse are forced to become corrupt, cannot quit their jobs, and reluctantly become the regime's accomplices. Providing financial assistance from GOI to such states without linking it with performance and reforms would be a waste of resources. In all other cases, reform is manageable, albeit difficult, complex, and slow. Therefore, considering that the states would need external pressure on them to improve outcomes, certain control by GOI over the IAS and policy domain in social sectors is necessary, till such time that the states show signs of improvement in governance.

End Notes

1. Times of India, 3 June 2009
2. Ranking by most efficient to least efficient economies: Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Indonesia and India.
3. Planning Commission, 2000, Mid Term appraisal of the 9th Plan, Govt. of India.
4. It is informally learnt that the 13th Finance Commission has recommended giving additional funds to states who do well on certain indicators, such as Infant Mortality Rate, forest cover, etc. This would be a good beginning, if the suggestion is accepted by GOI.
5. GOI has accepted this suggestion, and has made changes in the IAS Rules; however the choice of posts for which this would be applicable has been left to the states. Predictably, no state has declared any post under the new rules.

Future of Afghanistan: Regressive Trends

Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)*

Introduction

Trajectory of events in Afghanistan is pointing towards a return of situation which prevailed in Afghanistan in pre-9/11 era. While Obama administration promised a *de novo* look at Afghanistan imbroglio it is rapidly losing appetite for staying the course. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains a reluctant ally of the USA in its war against terror because of a number of contextual reasons. Obama's March 2009 Af-Pak strategy announced with much fanfare and reviewed after nine months in December increasingly resembles like a strategy of 'compromise and exit'. Pakistan with its proclivities towards reinstalling a Taliban regime in Kabul appears set to play a key role in shaping the discourse in Afghanistan. Recent trends regarding developments in the Af-Pak region have serious consequences for regional security and stability particularly, for India.

Strategy of Compromise and Exit

Regressive trends were clearly evident from the two back to back conferences; one held at Istanbul (26 Jan 2010) and second in London (28 Jan 2010) which in a sense were path breakers from the normal discourse of surge and stability in Afghanistan. The Istanbul Conference (The Summit of Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia) allowed Pakistan to hijack the proposed US-envisaged 'regional powers' approach to solution of Afghanistan conflict agenda by involving Islamic Nations Coalition comprising Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and a handful of Central Asian Republics bordering Afghanistan, with the explicit aim of denying India a strategic role in Afghanistan. The London Conference recognised that Pakistan, despite its duplicitous commitment to war on terror, remains a central player in any far reaching resolution of Afghan

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conundrum. The explanation that the conference included only contiguous countries does not cut much ice as UAE, Saudi Arabia and even Turkey are hardly contiguous to Afghanistan. In a sense it was a well-thought out strategy to keep India out of any regional approach.

Further, both General Kayani and the ISI Chief attended the Conference, signifying acceptance of the relevance and ossified thought processes of Pakistani military establishment in the complex puzzle that Afghanistan is. That Pakistan's military considers Taliban as strategic assets and they have the ability to manipulate them to shape favourable outcome of conflict in Afghanistan too seems to have been acknowledged, though not without reservations. From Indian perspective this is a huge development that will allow Pakistan to shape future discourse in Afghanistan with a regime in Kabul which would be beholden to Pakistan (read Pakistan military) and its world view.

If Istanbul Conference highlighted primacy given to Pakistan in shaping regional discourse, the London Conference was in a sense vindication of Pakistani centrality in conflict resolution in Afghanistan and its role in proposed reconciliation with 'Taliban'. In that sense London Conference was a clear attempt to de-hyphenate Pakistan from the Af-Pak strategy with sole focus on Afghanistan. Largely, the central outcome of the London Conference was that Pakistan, (which till yesterday was part of the problem in terms of cross border movement of militants, sanctuaries for insurgent groups and, attacks on NATO logistics supply chain together with less than successful counter-insurgency campaign) was now part of the solution and responsible to assist West in the emergence of Afghanistan as a moderate democratic Islamic nation.

The basic approach formalised at the 60-nations Conference was cash-for-peace plan aimed at weaning away non-ideological and "moderate" Taliban, fighters with the aim of their eventual participation in the governance of that Country. These outfits have consistently waged war on the US & NATO Forces in Afghanistan for the last ten years and are an integral part of Pakistani Army's grand strategy of inducing strategic fatigue and eventual mission failure in Afghanistan.

A cache of \$500 million for the reintegration and rehabilitation effort has been planned for motivating moderate or so called good Taliban on the premise that those elements could be weaned away from the hard-line elements in the Taliban leadership through attractive settlement offers. A kitty of US \$ 140 million has been created for the first year of Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to finance the Afghan-led Peace and Reintegration Programme. Surprisingly there was no talk of militarily defeating Taliban, rebuilding Afghanistan or even promoting democracy. In fact the focus was on creating conditions over the defined time period from three to five years for creating 'notional stability' to allow foreign forces to begin leaving Afghanistan for which a date has already been set by the US President i.e. mid 2011.

Coming as it is within months of Obama's November review of Af - Pak strategy and the proposed surge with lofty goals of clear – hold and build populated centres as part of US doctrine of counterinsurgency the only conclusion that can be drawn is that US and NATO allies have come to basic determination that war in Afghanistan cannot be won and that a strategy of what can be called 'Compromise and Exit' is being put in place.

Talking to Taliban seems to have acquired increased urgency, in case the timeline of drawdown have to be strictly adhered to because of the political, financial and strategic imperatives of a prolonged war. The war in Afghanistan is not exactly popular with the US and other Western nations. Increasing fatality counts are exerting enhanced pressures on the political leadership 'to bring the boys home'. Collapse of Netherlands Government on the question of extension of the tenure of their 2000 troops in Afghanistan indicates the deeply unpopular nature of Afghan war in Europe. The developing discourse amongst the Western nations is looking at Pakistan and the notorious ISI alongwith Saudi Arabia with their pre-dominant Wahabi-Sunni proclivities as the preferred instruments of negotiating with Taliban. Pakistan would be suspicious if the Americans or others were to negotiate with Taliban without involving their military security establishment. An indication that America has accepted Pakistan as a power-broker is evident from Richard Holbrooke's statement on a visit to Kabul. He opined "Pakistan's ISI can play a role in negotiations and I support that role...Pakistan has an influence in this area and has a legitimate security interest."¹

Plan for the induction of the Taliban in power-sharing arrangement in Kabul has very significant political and strategic implications for India both in terms of its Afghan and Central Asian policies.

Pakistan's Jostling for Primacy

These developments have resulted in Pakistan becoming a key actor even as its cooperation in counter-insurgency operations remains at best lackadaisical; and operations in South Waziristan less than effective, with Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) sanctuaries largely intact, despite claimed deployment of 1,40,000 troops in counter insurgency campaign. However, such is the nature of dependence on Pakistan particularly in terms of logistic supplies that policy of compellence or cooperation has hardly worked. In fact as if to drive home its new found centrality, Pakistani military has suspended operations in South Waziristan, by six months to a year, as if to await the consequences of above developments; even as British and Americans troops launched a major operation in Marjah Region of Helmand province, perceived to be strongest bastion of Taliban. Further, it has also rejected the American demand of launching full scale operations in North Waziristan, an area where Al Qaeda is ensconced and from where Haqqani and other groups have been launching operations against the US and NATO troops.

Second perspective of the developments is that, having assumed a key role of the arbitrator of the Afghan destiny, Pakistan has already started to flex its muscles. Pakistani Army Chief General Kayani, fresh from attending NATO military commanders meeting in Brussels in end January averred that "Pakistan wants a 'peaceful, friendly and stable' Afghanistan; strategic depth isn't about 'controlling' Afghanistan but about ensuring Pakistan doesn't have a long-term security problem on its Western border; India's role in Afghanistan is 'unhelpful'; and more importantly Pakistan wants Afghan state institutions, including the Army and the Police force, to be fashioned in a manner that they don't pose a threat to our strategic interests"². Evidently, it is merely a declaration; unless Pakistan has a certain degree of control over Kabul it can not promote the Kayani doctrine which has been modelled on Zia doctrine with the premise that from Indus to Oxus (Amu Darya) should be the sphere of influence of Pakistan.

In yet another statement he offered to train the Afghan army, in its establishments in Pakistan, coming as it is in the backdrop of a natural reluctance of Afghan National Army (ANA) for training in Pakistani military training establishments. Given the poor political relationship this statement points to new found confidence and dare; particularly, as a well trained and popular ANA will have a substantial say in shaping both security and political discourse. The fact that ANA despite being trained by ISAF has looked for Indian support particularly for training its officer cadre and maintains very cordial and good relations with India is anathema to Pakistani military leadership. It is in above perspective General Kayani's statement that Afghan army should not become a strategic challenge to Pakistan needs to be seen. The offer to train ANA by General Kayani too needs to be seen as an attempt to prevent India usurping any training role for the ANA, either in collusion with Afghan Government or the USA.

Capture of Mullah Baradar the number two in Taliban rankings followed by arrests of two shadow Taliban governors from Karachi by the ISI is part of the Pakistan military's drive to demonstrate to the Western Coalition that if they want to exit they have to depend largely on them. The arrests also come at an apposite time amid many contradictions and murky goings on engineered by ISI regarding controlling the negotiations with Taliban. Arrests are also timed with the ongoing operations against Taliban stronghold of Marjah in Helmand. Ahmed Rashid, a well-known author on nexus between Taliban and ISI, commenting on the arrests observed that "*Pakistan now wants to dominate any kind of dialogue that takes place.*" There were reports that mullah Baradar was becoming 'too independent' of ISI and was negotiating directly with Karzai government.

These developments clearly forecast that Western Coalition working on their immediate interests has allowed Pakistan to shape the future discourse in a manner that does not augur well for strategic stability in the region and may end up in undermining all that has been achieved in nearly decade of struggle against terrorism. It is hardly important that whether the policy of divide and rule now being attempted by the UK and NATO, supported by the USA will work, what is important from Indian perspective is that despite having excellent relationship with Afghan Government

and undertaking sterling development activities it is increasingly marginalised.

Pakistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

There is yet another development that has portents for enhancing Sino – Pak collusion both in Central Asia and Afghanistan where China is developing considerable economic and strategic interests. These developments have detrimental effect on Indians interests not only in Afghanistan but also in Central Asia. SCO is closely looking at Iranian and Pakistani application for full membership of the organisation, perhaps at Chinese recommendations³. Give the strategic partnership and close military and commercial ties with China, full membership of SCO will mean that Pakistan along with China will be able to shape the strategic discourse not only in Afghanistan but in Central Asia as well. An important construct of which will be warm water access to land locked Central Asian 'stans' and access to energy and other raw material resources to Pakistan and its ports at the exclusion of India which lacks direct access. This is a major development particularly in the context of growing Chinese influence in Central Asia and attempts by it to open strategic land corridors by upgrading the Karakoram highway with a talk of a possible rail link.

Likely Future Scenarios in Afghanistan

As a consequence of London Conference, one scenario could be the so called moderate Taliban ruled Afghanistan sidelining Karzai and other leaders, leading to emergence of Pashtun influence, a scenario that could gradually set a stage for takeover by "Quetta Shura", and emergence of Afghanistan as a theocratic state, backed by Pakistan. In the bargain, if they are able to integrate ANA (reason why Kyani wants to train the ANA and ANP) then not only will they have the Afghanistan state but the army as well.

Flip side of above scenario is the possibility of a standoff between predominantly Tajik ANA supported by erstwhile regrouped Northern Alliance cadres and Moderate Taliban attempting to enhance their influence akin to developments in Nepal. This could result in a bloody civil war destabilising not only Afghanistan but the region as well.

Second scenario could be that attempts at integration of moderate Taliban run afoul on number of accounts which could include terms of demobilisation, inadequate inducement or political rehabilitation, leading to upsurge in Taliban violence. Criticality of this will be the ability of ISAF or the US residual forces to intervene; a scenario quite akin to what is happening in Iraq. Failure to do so would mean growing salience of radical forces. That such a scenario will impact Pakistan and its heartland is not fully appreciated.

Third scenario could be gradual integration of not only moderate Taliban but also northern warlords into a stable Afghanistan. This scenario presupposes, emergence of nationalistic sentiments, weaning away of moderate cadres into nation building processes, good governance and ability of ANA and ANP to maintain peace. A tall order but could come about only in a graduated fashion together with firm commitment from Western coalition to sustain.

Implications for India

As mentioned, the first two scenarios have serious implications for India. India will be marginalised in Afghanistan plus it would face the blow back of creeping Talibanisation and radicalisation, which the Muzaffarabad conclave in February 2010 has highlighted, remains a defined Pakistani goal. The developments in Afghanistan, if not contained, would also impact Pakistan with increasing impetus to Islamic radicalism. In case moderate Taliban integration is not properly managed as highlighted above, it will lead to a strategic vacuum. A Taliban victory spurred by defeating sole super power would result in Taliban becoming more aggressive.

Such a scenario is unlikely to emerge suddenly but it would be a gradual process; in fact contours of which have been laid by misperceived and hasty action as a matter of political expediency in London. India should read the writing on the wall and start shaping its political response. Some facets of Indian responses could include:-

- (a) First and foremost India must ensure close and enduring relationship with ANA in all scenarios. This means, continue ongoing collaboration and render all required assistance including training of ANA. An important point is funding of the

ANA, eventually the costs of maintaining 200,000 man strong army will become unbearable for the West; it is here India, with relatively low costs, can be an important partner.

(b) At an appropriate time open dialogue with Taliban leadership particularly, those moderate elements that are planned to be inducted as partners in nation building. Make a political judgment for fostering contacts with Northern Alliance and bordering Central Asian states, to ensure strategic foothold.

(c) In the likely scenario of instability in Afghanistan, China would also be an affected party, particularly, if Pakistan is also reeling under growing radical onslaught despite being a close ally. It would be prudent to engage China in developing post ISAF common strategy.

(d) Iran is emerging as an important player with considerable stakes and congruence with India. It is important that dialogue at highest level is initiated to forge regional consensus. India must act in own national interest, in developing strategic relationship with Iran.

With internal situation in Pakistan deteriorating, it is imperative that effective steps are initiated to protect the Country from backlash of creeping Talibanisation and radical forces. This would require dealing with disruptive forces within, including dialogue with separatists in J&K and coming to a working consensus amongst all. Additionally, strong measures would be necessary to deal effectively with communal forces.

At some stage dialogue with Pakistani leadership (political and military) will become imperative – a process which has already begun. However, it is equally important to engage Pakistani military leadership, to make them see the futility of pursuing a policy of confrontation or unjustified concerns about an Indian threat. It is time the Armed Forces are included in these parleys to provide security perspective in the dialogue.

India – USA dialogue on developments in Afghanistan, its implications on Indian core strategic interests is becoming vital. India will need to critically spell out its interests and its thresholds unambiguously, leaving no scope for misinterpretation. Last but importantly, we need to do a reality check in terms of our Central

Asian policy and SCO membership. It is important that India remains engaged with Central Asian states and uses its leverages to shape the discourse, particularly energy policy and trade.

Conclusion

Foregoing has been an attempt to highlight consequences of emerging regressive trends in Afghanistan and their implications on Indian interests. Although Pakistan may have gained centrality in bringing about stability in Afghanistan; yet it is a very complex issue with many moving parts. No easy and enduring solution is visible on the horizon. While Pakistan may be able to address its security concerns temporarily, its key role in Afghanistan is unlikely to throw up a permanent solution; it remains part of the problem as defined in the original Af-Pak strategy. India needs to carefully assess the consequences of emerging regressive trends in Afghanistan. Probable future scenarios also require a careful reshaping of policy to safeguard Indian interests and overall regional stability. India can ill afford to be sidelined and has to act proactively.

End Notes

1. Lyse Doucet, "Pakistan's Push for a New Role in Afghanistan", BBC News, February 19, 2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/south_asia/8521823.stm
2. Zahid Hussain, "Kayani spells out Terms for Regional Stability", *The Dawn*, 02 February 2010
3. *The Dawn*, 05 February 2010

Information Warfare : The Latest Chinese Thrust Area

Major General SV Thapliyal, SM (Retd)

Introduction

Perhaps the most profound transformation to take place in the PLA Army has been the wide and deep application of information technology to enable the development of joint doctrine and tactics, to increase the ability of PLA Army to surveil and target its enemies, and to give its weapon systems more combat power. The PLA has given this broad doctrinal aspiration the term "informationalisation." To be sure, the PLA has been able to pursue this aspiration largely as China has developed a modern information sector to include building a substantial national fibre optics network and a world class computer and electronics sector. This process has been assisted by a very broad commercial interaction with companies in the USA, Japan and Europe.

Each PLA Military Region now has a "Special Technical Reconnaissance Unit" which is responsible for mainly computer network attack "information warfare" and its members are often reservists drawn from the civilian computer sector. But the PLA has also closely followed the US Military experience as the world leader in developing military information innovations. One can see widespread use of wireless laptops throughout the PLA services.¹

In addition, the PLA has also sought specific foreign information technologies to enhance its combat power. It has obtained Russian electro optical and radar satellite technology, and French communication satellite technology. Russian and Ukrainian naval radar technology dominates new PLA warships. Russians have accused the Chinese of stealing their application of modern computer processing to produce better counter stealth

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radar. China is also producing its own passive radar, patterned after the innovative Ukrainian Kolchuga radar, which is also an excellent counter stealth system. While the Israeli Phalcon aerial active phased array radar (APAR) was supposed to have been denied to China in 2000, a radar with similar characteristics is now flying on three AWACS aircraft. The PLA is developing APAR technology into a long range electronic attack weapon, by using the array to focus radiated energy on target electronic systems.

Information Warfare (IW) with Chinese Characteristics²

How has the information age affected China's attitude toward warfare? It is fair to say that the major change was a re-evaluation of how to evaluate and conduct warfare. China realised that it couldn't threaten countries as a superpower might do with its current nuclear force, but something it can do with its IW force. For example, China can theoretically threaten the US financial stability through peacetime IW. Electrons lie at the heart of not only IW but also with worldwide economic boom associated with stock markets and e-commerce. The characteristics of information (global reach, speed of light transmission, non-linear effects, inexhaustibility, multiple access, etc.) control the material and energy of warfare in a way that nuclear weapons cannot. IW attempts to beat the enemy in terms of promptness, correctness, and sustainability, and electrons are capable of reaching out and touching someone a long way away. It thus makes complete sense to put a significant effort into developing an information-based capability in both the civilian and military sense. From the Chinese point of view, IW is like adding wings to a tiger, making the latter more combat worthy than ever before.

Recent reports of hacker attacks indicate that China is moving from theory to practice in security matters as well. The Washington Times reported that hackers suspected of working for a Chinese government institute broke into a Los Alamos computer system and took large amounts of sensitive but unclassified information. Los Alamos spokesman Jim Danneskiold stated that "an enormous amount of Chinese activity hitting our green, open sites" occurs continuously. India's National Security Adviser also reported attempt by Chinese to hack into PMO computers.

Targets of Chinese IW include information sources, channels, and destinations, and C4I and electronic warfare assets. First attack objectives, some note, will be the computer networking system linking political, economic and military installations of a country as well as society in general; and the ability to control decision-making to hinder coordinated actions. This requires that both cognitive and information systems are hit. This IW focus implies that not just soldiers will conduct warfare in the future, but civilians too. Some Chinese theorists have recommended organising network special warfare detachments and computer experts to form a shock brigade of 'network warriors' to accomplish this task. They will look for critical nodes and control centres on networks, and sabotage them. Thus both computer experts and soldiers, a reflection of China's changing attitude, may conduct warfare.

A senior official on the PLA General Staff has declared, "The twenty-first century will be an information era, and wars in the twenty-first century will be information wars. We can say that whoever has the advantage of information and the control of information will have the initiative and will win future wars". "Which are more powerful?" ask Chinese experts-nuclear or information weapons? They answer that this is a difficult question since it resembles "a contest between a lion and a tiger."

According to Major General Wang Pufeng, former head of China's Academy of Military Science, IW refers to a kind of operation and a kind of operational pattern. Along with changes in the war pattern in the current information era, IW has already become a major pattern for high-tech operations. The PLA must shift its concept from waging electronic warfare-which is but a prelude to IW to fighting IW, and from seizing the electromagnetic initiative to seizing the information initiative.

Major General Xu Xiaoyan³, Director of the General Staff's Communications Department, has outlined seven strategies to implement "leaps" in technical development based on information technologies. These are :-

(a) Embedded transformation. Implant or merge advanced information technologies into equipment already in service; thereby, achieving the lead in combat effectiveness.

(b) Integrate systems. Take existing, separate, loosely connected, or unconnected subsystems and merge them to form a new integrated and tightly connected system.

(c) Direct upward leaps. Conduct research, development, testing and evaluation directly in accordance with informationisation standards, in order to leap over the mechanisation phase and proceed directly to informationisation.

(d) Borrow/import. Absorb advanced technologies and products used in foreign militaries in accordance with the overall requirements of the PLA's informationisation effort; thereby, increasing the speed and effectiveness of military development.

(e) Rely on compatibility. Exploit the dual-use nature of information technology, using the combination of military and civilian technologies as the main measuring rod.

(f) Upgrade structure. Exploit the characteristics of information technology as a multiplier, thereby reforming, adjusting, optimising, and upgrading military structures through the enhancement of information capabilities.

(g) Innovate measures. Increase the speed of military development by incorporating innovative scientific research methods.

According to Chinese military scientists, information weapons may be roughly divided into three types : weapons that destroy the enemy's national defence, state and economic infrastructures; psychological weapons; and weapons that use wireless suppression procedures. Targets of the first type include the enemy's national defence information systems, telecommunications systems, electric power distribution systems, petroleum and natural gas storage and transportation systems, banking and finance systems, transportation systems, water supply systems, emergency services systems, etc. The target is not merely the information system itself; an even greater emphasis is placed on using new technologies to alter informational content without otherwise affecting the information carrier. Targets of psychological weapons include both operating personnel and civilians. Finally,

weapons that use wireless suppression procedures emit or reflect electromagnetic waves, sound waves or infrared signals, etc., that can knock out the enemy's electrical equipment, sonar or infrared equipment.

Chinese military scientists assert that future wars may become too "civilised" and that a smokeless computer war is likely to achieve combat objectives through "soft casualties." Tactics in this kind of warfare might include electromagnetic field probing and advance, timely and indirect planting of computer viruses.

Information Weapons/Operations

"New-concept" weapons,⁴ say the Chinese, are completely new information weapons that use advanced technologies (especially information technology) and new casualty-and-damage-producing mechanisms. Major weapons of this type include : super-kinetic energy weapons (electromagnetic guns), directed-energy weapons, artificial intelligence weapons, thought control weapons and micro-electromechanical weapons (miniature robotic electronic incapacitating weapons).

Information Warfare⁵ – said to be the dialectical counter to PGMs – is conducted in six-dimensional strategic space : ground, sea, air, space, information and cogitation. Major General Dai Qingmin – Director of the General Staff's Fourth Department and the PLA's "senior electronic warfare official" – has provided a series of guidelines that serve as a theoretical foundation for conducting information operations. The guidelines include suggestions for integrating operations, adopting multiple means, and focussing on strategies. In integrating operations, he stresses : the integrated use of IW forces, both military/civilian and professional/non-professional; the integrated application of IW assets – both network space and electromagnetic space as well as "soft" and "hard" weapons; and the integration of offensive and defensive operations as well as all-dimensional operations. Adopting multiple means by launching an attack on the enemy's CISR system in all-dimensional space simultaneously or one after another, he says, is the only way for the inferior side to be able to conduct effective information operations and seize local information control. The guidelines focus on strategies, meanwhile, as a critical factor

in defeating superior forces with inferior ones in future information operations. While an army with high-tech superiority may overwhelm an enemy with accurate or highly mobile assault arms, it will have to rely on advanced – but exceedingly vulnerable – CISR systems.

Dai has also provided the theory behind “integrated network – electronic warfare. “The ideology” of integrated network – electronic warfare represents “a total innovation in information operations theory.” It embodies information operations theory with Chinese characteristics – a synthesis of foreign and uniquely Chinese military – theoretical achievements. Integrated network – electronic warfare has the following four main characteristics :

(a) Comprehensive Combat Objectives. In future high-tech warfare, the destruction and control of the enemy’s information infrastructure and strategic lifeblood-by selecting key targets and launching effective network-electronic attacks-can directly constrain the enemy’s strategic planning. It can weaken and even paralyse his overall combat potential-including political, economic and military aspects. Integrated network-electronic attacks thus have a comprehensive effect on the enemy.

(b) Integrated Methods of Combat Operations. Weakening and destroying the overall effectiveness of the enemy’s information systems while protecting one’s own is a joint objective in both network and electronic warfare. Therefore, when executing an information attack, the PLA must have a unified plan and organisation for both, so that they will be coordinated closely, become a single entity and constitute an integrated attack against a single target. When executing information defence, network and electronic defence must similarly be incorporated into a unified system with an integrated plan and coordinated execution.

(c) An Expansive Battlespace. The integrated employment of network and electronic warfare transcends the traditional boundaries of network space and the domain of the electromagnetic spectrum. Full-depth integrated attacks, non-contact combat operations, non-linear combat operations, etc., will permeate the entire course of combat on the informationised battlefield. Integrated network-electronic

warfare will be conducted in a battlespace larger than that of any current form of warfare.

(d) Integrated Operational Effectiveness. Integrated network-electronic warfare selects as its main targets of attack the normal operation of information systems in the enemy's military, political, economic and social systems. It seeks to cut these nerves and paralyse the entire body. Therefore, the combat effect resulting from such warfare exceeds that of any traditional or single form of combat operations.

Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, Major General Dai Qingmin⁶ has asserted that conducting information-based warfare requires the following four basic capabilities :-

(a) Integrated Information Support Ability. The high-level combination of all-dimensional information perception, real-time information transmission, intellectual information disposal forms, integrated information support ability, and becomes "the base and the backbone" of China's information-based warfare system.

(b) Information-Based Fire Strike Ability. Information technology has propelled the Chinese transformation from mechanised firepower to information-based firepower. Information-based weaponry and equipment tend to be developed in the direction of being accurate, miniature, stealthy and unmanned.

(c) Multi-Level Information Warfare Ability. China's ability to totally destroy the enemy's information-based warfare system-the essence of IW depends on whether China's IW system can develop multi-level and all-directional IW capabilities.

(d) All-Directional Comprehensive Protective Ability. China's integrated protective system requires efforts to improve the "Three-Counterattack and One Resistance" abilities of the information system.

Conclusion

The PLA considers active offensive operations to be the most important requirement for information warfare to destroy or disrupt an adversary's capability to receive and process data. Launched mainly by remote combat and covert methods, the PLA could employ information warfare pre-emptively to gain the initiative in a crisis. Specified information warfare objectives include the targeting the destruction of an enemy's command system, shortening the duration of war, minimising casualties on both sides, enhancing operational efficiency, reducing effects on domestic populations and gaining support from the international community. The PLA Army's IW practices also reflect investment in electronic countermeasures and defence against electronic attack (e.g. electronic and infrared decoys, angle reflectors and false target generators).

China's computer network operations (CNO) include computer network attack, computer network defence and computer network exploitation. The PLA sees CNO as critical to seize the initiative and achieve "electromagnetic dominance" early in a conflict, and as a force multiplier. Although, there is no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine, PLA theorists have coined the term "Integrated Network Electronic Warfare" to outline the integrated use of electronic warfare, CNO and limited kinetic strikes against key C4 nodes to disrupt the enemy's battlefield network information systems. The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks. The PLA has increased the role of CNO in its military exercises. For example, exercises in 2005 began to incorporate offensive operations, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks.

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Asymmetric Warfare – An Insight into Another Dimension of Warfare

Lieutenant Colonel Subhojit Bhattacharya

Introduction

Asymmetric Warfare (AW) was originally referred to as a war between two or more actors or groups whose relative military power differed significantly. Contemporary military thinkers tended to broaden this to include asymmetry of strategy or tactics. Today AW can be described as a conflict in which the resources of two belligerent powers differ in essence; and in the struggle they interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the "weaker" combatant attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.¹

It is thus incorrect to see AW as a new development, even though AW has only become a preoccupation for both military planners as well as academic commentators in the last few years – more so post 9/11, when it has become a cottage industry of sorts!

Sun-Tzu and Asymmetric Warfare

Sun-Tzu begins 'The Art of War' by elaborating his general principles of warfare. Highest among these is the principle of winning without fighting. Here Sun-Tzu warns commanders against seeking pitched battles. He counsels, "The highest realisation of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. Thus, one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of 'preservation.' Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved."

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It was not until the beginning of the 20th Century that Sun-Tzu's work played a major role in the conduct of Eastern warfare. Often credited with providing inspiration to modern asymmetric actors, *The Art of War* actually addresses conflict between States. In many instances, the ascription of concepts and tactics used by guerrillas, terrorists and other Non-State actors to the work Sun-Tzu is erroneous. Asymmetry, for Sun-Tzu, enables conventional military forces to overcome their adversaries with the least loss of life and wealth.

Militaries have always attempted to seek asymmetric advantages so as to inflict maximum damage to the enemy at minimum cost. Asymmetric strategies are especially favoured by the weak because they tend to offset the conventional superiority of their opponents. Sun-Tzu, himself, noted that in general, one engages in battle with the orthodox and "gains victory through the unorthodox".²

However, AW has taken on a new relevance today. Opponents are increasingly willing to employ "the unorthodox" in battle as well. This is because conflicts today tend not to be total wars; they tend to have complex causes and manifest themselves in small wars, low-intensity conflicts (LICs) or sub-national conflicts.

In a situation of more limited political and strategic objectives, the means associated with conventional wars of the past appear inappropriate. Therefore, both states and non-state actors are increasingly employing unconventional means as these will prove less politically costly and more unlikely to provoke a massive conventional response from the adversary and the international community. Such means might include terrorism, economic sanctions, information operations and so on.

Types of Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetries in Political/Strategic Objectives. Asymmetric strategies are often a result of asymmetries in political and strategic objectives. For example, Milosevic's political objective during the Kosovo war was not to defeat NATO but to prevent NATO from defeating him. As a result, he did not need to launch a conventional military operation against NATO. Instead, the Serbs relied on Information Warfare to frustrate NATO's political objectives and to fragment the Alliance's unity in a bid to minimise the military damage NATO could cause.

Asymmetries in Strategy. AW can also result from one side engaging the opponent in a form, and/or at an intensity, which the enemy is unable or unwilling to resist. The Vietnam War was a good example of both. Asymmetries in form were observed when the North Vietnamese employed Truong Chinh's strategy of "interlocking", i.e., a mixture of both conventional and guerrilla operations, against the American strategy of conventional military operations.

Asymmetric strategies are usually not the norm in Inter-State conflicts. The strength of symmetric strategies such as conventional military operations are proven and understood. This is the reason why conventional armed forces still take up the bulk of defence resources in most countries. Moreover, as long as potential enemies possess conventional military capabilities, there will always be a need to deter and defend against them in a similar way. States will, therefore, never rely exclusively on asymmetric strategies in the conduct of military affairs.

Furthermore, the effects of asymmetric operations are ambiguous. For example, one cannot be certain of how much public support can be eroded through negative information-media operations. In fact, asymmetric operations may sometimes have little strategic consequences. Osama's terror attacks have not weakened the US involvement in the Middle East. They have in fact concentrated the minds of American policy-makers on the need to push through a political settlement in the unstable region so as to erode the underlying causes of terror and religious fanaticism.

Therefore, when used by states, asymmetric strategies are more likely to be deployed alongside conventional capabilities in order to enhance the latter's overall effectiveness and to provide more choices for policy-makers. Some asymmetric challenges, such as Media Warfare, can turn out to be double-edged swords. While images of casualties suffered in acts of terrorism (a form of AW) may erode public support for military action, it may also fuel a desire for retribution and revenge.

Characteristics of Asymmetric Strategies³

Strategies exist along a continuum of symmetry in relation to their opponents. While the term "asymmetric strategy" logically suggests

that it must be understood in relation to another strategy, at a practical level, it is more useful to understand “asymmetric” as synonymous with “unconventional”. In this regard, it is possible to identify some general characteristics of asymmetric strategies.

First, asymmetric strategies seek to exploit key vulnerabilities of the enemy. Such vulnerabilities tend not to be appreciated (e.g. simmering resentment in minorities) or else are unable to be rectified (e.g. the volatility of public opinion in liberal democracies). Indeed, the asymmetric character of such threats contributes to their not being appreciated.

Second, asymmetric strategies are highly suited for strategic competition between States in the absence of all-out war because they may be employed not only during the violent phases of a conflict but during any phase of the conflict.

Third, the actual agents behind asymmetric threats cannot always be identified, especially when future adversaries could be Non-State actors. For example, the planting of a computer virus (such as the ILOVEU virus which plagued computers world-wide in May 2000) could be virtually imperceptible until the damage is done.

Fourth, it is difficult to counter asymmetric threats. Deterrence requires known opponents. Richard Betts made the point that “retaliation requires knowledge of who has launched an attack and the address at which they reside.”⁴ When hostile acts cannot be attributed, deterrence fails. Even if preparations to react against asymmetric attacks could be made, the costs are likely to be prohibitive.

Where AW is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly Non-State actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's interest, it may be deemed war by proxy. This is typically done to give deniability to the State actor. The deniability can be important to keep the State actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the State actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathisers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes.

Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

There are two different viewpoints on the relationship between AW and terrorism. In the modern context, AW is increasingly considered a component of Fourth Generation Warfare. When practiced outside the laws of war, it is often defined as "terrorism". Terrorism is usually resorted to as a tactic by the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict.

The other view is that AW is not synonymous with terrorism, even though it is used as a tactic by the weaker side. It is typical, in an asymmetric conflict, for the stronger side to accuse the weaker side of being bandits, pillagers or terrorists. These accusations are usually part of propaganda campaigns, although they are sometimes true. Some argue that AW is sometimes called "terrorism" by those wishing to deny the political aims of their weaker opponents and to exploit the negative connotations of the word. There are those who hold the view that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." An example of this is over Kashmir: the Pakistanis claim that a war of freedom for the Kashmiris is being fought with the Indians, who in turn, label them as terrorists. The sectarian killings upon Iraqi civilians by insurgents are similarly labelled as terrorism by some and resistance by others.

One example of AW involving terrorism is the use of terrorism by the much lesser Mongol forces in the creation and control of the Mongol empire. The other is the use of terrorism by the superior Nazi forces in the Balkans, in their attempt to suppress the resistance movement.

Success of Asymmetric Warfare⁵

The tactical success of AW is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:

- (a) One side can have a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the decisive English Longbow at the Battle of Agincourt is an example. The advantage may be the other way around. For example, the vast numerical superiority of the Chinese forces during their initial involvement in the Korean War overwhelmed the technological superiority of the United Nations forces.

(b) Training and tactics as well as technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For example, for several centuries the Greek hoplite's (heavy infantry) use of phalanx made them far superior to their enemies. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well known example.

(c) If the inferior power is in a position of self-defence; i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles in which the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the laws of war. This tactic can sometimes be used to play on the inward political situations of a nation and its citizens' patience with the war, perhaps provoking demonstrations.

(d) If the inferior power is in an aggressive position, however, and/or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (*jus in bello*), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or clearly-marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush, but an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, laws of warfare prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior power uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior power will respect the law that they are violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.

Conclusion

"Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence"

- Sun Tzu, Art of War

This famous quotation of Sun Tzu has led many to keep searching for silver bullets to defeat potential adversaries. Some might be tempted to look at asymmetric strategies as potential silver bullets in future wars. However, predictions about future wars always tend to be upset by "unk-unks" - unknown unknowns. Developing strategic analytical capabilities will prove vital in both

dealing with and in employing asymmetric strategies. After all, the highest realisation of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans, not his soldiers and you cannot know the enemy's plans unless you understand the enemy himself.

But just as it would be wrong to assume that asymmetric strategies will always be effective against any enemy, it would also be reckless to assume that one's adversaries will not challenge through conventional military combat. The practice of war, once the prerogative of the strong, "is instead increasingly the tactic of the weak". The more a nation shows a disdain for violence, the more violence it invites upon itself – this is the truth being proved in the Indian context. However, major conventional wars may not become obsolete after all. Such wars may prove to be the greater challenge for nations in the longer term.

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The United States and the Negotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty*

Dr David R Stone**

World Bank Vice-President Ismail Serageldin predicted in 1995 that the wars of the next century will be over water. South Asia's need for rational water management to sustain an ever-growing population means that water has an ever-present potential to provoke conflict, both within states and internationally. Given that threat, the survival of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, governing India and Pakistan's use of the Indus River system, is a remarkable achievement. It has survived full-scale wars in 1965 and 1971, as well as numerous limited conflicts and war scares. As climate change may make water an even more precious resource, the origins of the Treaty are well-worth exploring.

This essay looks specifically at the role of the USA and Dwight D Eisenhower's presidential administration in the negotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Though credit for the Treaty properly belongs to the diplomats and statesmen of India and Pakistan, together with the World Bank's chief negotiator and intermediary Sir William Iliff, the US did play an important supporting role in closing the deal, a role explored here using sources from the US State Department and the White House itself. While these American sources shed light on Indian and Pakistani diplomacy, they reveal much more about American strategy—what the Eisenhower administration perceived in South Asia, where those perceptions matched reality, what Eisenhower wished to achieve, and how he wished to achieve it. Exploring these questions will, I hope, help to understand American policy in South Asia more generally and shed light on contemporary water issues.

Scholars have seen a number of factors as explaining American policy towards South Asia, but for the Eisenhower

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administration and the Indus Waters Treaty, the central issue was Security and the Cold War. While considerations of economics and finance were ever-present in Eisenhower's policy towards Europe, his administration's discussions of South Asia were always focussed on the twin threats of Soviet expansion and Communist subversion. Economics was secondary: a means of dealing with those threats, but not an end in itself. Indeed, some members of Eisenhower's administration objected to the cost of American participation in the Indus settlement, but Eisenhower's own commitment to the project on security grounds never wavered.¹ Some researchers have seen cultural issues as making it easier for the US to deal with Pakistan than with India.² Indeed, Eisenhower and Ayub Khan were both military men, while the intellectual, pacifist Pandit Nehru came from a different background. In fact, though, the records of Eisenhower's conversations with Nehru suggest that the two men understood one another quite well. Both saw themselves as statesmen, not politicians. Eisenhower as a career military officer avoided identifying himself with a political party until late in life, and Nehru likewise saw himself as above sordid political.

The evidence makes it clear that the US policymakers were preoccupied by the Cold War, and their policy in South Asia was subservient to that greater goal. Because of this emphasis on Security, Eisenhower faced a structural problem in South Asia that was almost impossible to solve. In American thinking, both Pakistan and India were allies in the Cold War, but allies of a very different kind. Pakistan, though it did not border the Soviet Union, was a military ally against the Soviet Union, providing manpower and an important airbase. It was a founding member of the American-supported 1955 Baghdad Pact. Pakistan's price for this alignment with the West was American military aid, an ongoing source of tension in the US relationship with India. Nehru repeatedly stressed that the central problem in relations with the US, indeed the only problem in relations with the US, was American arms to Pakistan.

India was also seen in Washington as an ally, but of a different sort. Nehru's commitment to Non-Alignment and India's geographic position meant that the Eisenhower administration could not conceive of India as a potential military ally. Instead, India's greatest potential benefit to the American government was as an alternative

to Communism: i.e., a model for democratic, non-communist development. Despite Nehru's policies of state-led economic growth and central planning, India's mixed economy and democratic institutions marked it as clearly distinct from Communist China in the competition for hearts and minds among the newly-independent states of Africa and Asia. A non-aligned India, as long it combined economic growth and democracy, was as useful as if it had been an ally.³

In both cases, Indo-Pakistani hostility worked against American interests. America wanted weapons provided to Pakistan aimed at the Soviet Union, not Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan. In addition, American officials regarded Pakistani military expenditures as excessive, hurting Pakistani economic development and thereby reducing the country's usefulness as a military ally. At the same time, Indo-Pakistani hostility worked against American interests in India as well. Money expended on an arms race could not be spent on economic development, and India's economic success was an important part of India's role in American strategy. In addition, the US could live with a non-aligned India, but a hostile India was something else again. American arms to Pakistan, an essential part of Pakistan's role in American strategy, almost guaranteed Indian hostility.

So if the US wanted Pakistan as a military ally and India as a model of non-communist development, the resolution of Indo-Pakistani tension was a necessary first step. As seen from Washington, there were three fundamental issues that separated the two sides. While other questions might create problems, they paled in significance next to those three: Kashmir, the Indus River system, and Pakistani arms. In each case, the difficulty of a solution was clear.

The ongoing Indus Waters negotiation enters the picture here. For Washington, water was a means of producing a broader settlement between India and Pakistan. Partition had created an international boundary that cut through Punjab's elaborate network of rivers and canals. Management of its water had thus been a clear question of national survival even before Independence. The Boundary Commission, meeting in Lahore at the end of July 1947, raised the issue of Punjab's irrigation system. Cyril Radcliffe proposed joint management of the canals, to which Jinnah replied

that 'he would rather have Pakistan deserts than fertile fields watered by the courtesy of the Hindus', and Nehru responded to that, 'what India did with India's rivers was India's affair.'⁴ Mountbatten's haste to achieve a division meant that no solution was achieved, and tensions over the Indus system began immediately after Independence. India's later plans to build the Rajasthan canal (later named the Indira Gandhi canal) to divert water for irrigation raised the temperature of the dispute. In 1952, the World Bank offered its "good offices" as an intermediary, but painful and tortuous negotiations stretched out for years. By 1954, the Bank had proposed the outlines of the compromise settlement that would eventually prevail: after construction of the dams, canals, and reservoirs to enable Pakistan to fully use available resources, the three main Eastern rivers of the system (the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) would be for India's exclusive use; the three Western rivers (the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) would be for Pakistan's exclusive use. The World Bank, inspired by David Lilienthal, former head of America's Tennessee Valley Authority, would have preferred cooperative development of the Indus basin, and the final treaty included language allowing for joint exploitation of water resources. Political reality, though, produced a simpler and more politically-feasible proposal: three rivers for each party.⁵

To the US State Department, the three key issues (Kashmir, Indus Waters, Arms), taken on their own, were deadlocked; the new idea was to treat the three questions together. The Indus Waters and Kashmir questions were already closely linked, as key waterways originated in and flowed through disputed territory. More significantly, though, the hope was that concessions by one side on one issue could be matched with concessions by the other side on another issue. The State Department laid out this position to the American military's Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1958. The State Department's 'basket solution' would link all three elements. First, settlement of Kashmir in India's favour—turning the cease-fire line (perhaps with minor adjustments) into an internationally-recognised border. Second, a resolution of the Indus Waters in favour of Pakistan by Indian support for Pakistani infrastructure improvements. Finally, solution of those two issues would allow resolution of the third through mutual arms reductions.⁶ Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree laid out the logic for the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: the US would assist in

moving toward a compromise settlement on the three issues by serving as a mediator and underwriting financially an Indus Waters deal. As he put it to Dulles:

*For almost ten years now the 'Kashmir problem' has been before the Security Council for solution and the 'Indus Waters problem' before the Indus Basin River Development (IBRD). Neither of these problems has proved during this decade to be susceptible to solution taken independently. A basic principle, therefore, behind the presently proposed approach is to unite the Kashmir and Indus problems and to see whether, if considered together, there exists a greater opportunity to effect the necessary compromises"*⁷

Dulles presented this to Eisenhower himself a week later, and the President gave his enthusiastic agreement.⁸ The result was a simultaneous letter from Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nehru and President Mirza offering his good offices as an intermediary.⁹

The Pakistani response was cautiously positive; India's was not. While careful to thank Eisenhower for his concern and his offer, Nehru did not see American good offices as helpful. Nehru was not opposed to ongoing negotiations, but he regarded normal diplomatic channels and not presidential intervention as the proper means for any potential improvement in relations.¹⁰ Keeping discussions low-key reduced the danger of public backlash in the event of leaks, but more importantly Nehru regarded any American role as a go-between as putting India and Pakistan on an equivalent footing, something he would not accept. It smacked of, he said, 'each side arguing its case before an umpire'. As Nehru later explained to Eisenhower, 'If third parties intervene, even though that intervention proceeds from goodwill . . . the aggressor country and the country against whom aggression has taken place are put on the same level, both pleading before that third party.'¹¹

There was, in addition, a basic structural problem with the American package deal. The two key issues—Kashmir and the Indus Waters—had India in an advantageous position and Pakistan as the dissatisfied party. India held the Vale of Kashmir, and India possessed the headwaters of the rivers in the Indus system. America wanted concessions by one side on one issue to balance concessions by the other side on another issue, but Kashmir and

Indus Waters would *both* require Indian concessions, meaning that no Indian government could see real benefit from connecting the two problems. British diplomats had noticed this difficulty in the American proposal immediately.¹² The American assumption had been that Pakistan would surrender its claims to the Vale of Kashmir and accept the Cease-Fire Line as an International Border in return for a successful resolution of the Indus Waters. At least judging by available evidence, this assumption was entirely incorrect, and it is not clear why American officials thought Pakistan might accept the permanent status of the *de facto* border. No Pakistani official ever told an American that Kashmir itself was negotiable, though the concession of Jammu was possible.¹³

With the failure of the package deal, American policymakers recognised the need for a change of tactics. Dropping the idea of tying issues together, American diplomats threw their support instead behind achieving an Indus Waters settlement in the belief that the goodwill it generated would bring movement on the Kashmir question. The American ambassadors to India and Pakistan jointly told the State Department that it was absolutely vital that the US be prepared to throw financial resources into the Indus Waters dispute at a moment's notice in order to achieve a settlement. By early 1959, the US government informed the British of its new tactic: settling one issue at a time, beginning with the Indus Waters.¹⁴

Circumstances in 1958 and 1959 made an Indus Waters settlement more likely. In both the USA and India, Ayub Khan's takeover in Pakistan was perceived positively. Though neither approved of military government in itself, after initial skepticism both Washington and Delhi regarded Ayub Khan as significantly more effective and stable than the political chaos he replaced. As Langley and Bunker eventually saw it, 'the government of Pakistan now in better position to make agreement which government of India would consider firm.'¹⁵ Liff agreed that the Indian government likely trusted Ayub's regime more than its predecessor.¹⁶ Immediately after the signing of the Treaty, Nehru told Eisenhower 'with some admiration in his voice that Ayub works in a military way...'¹⁷

In addition, difficulties with India's Second Five-Year Plan also seem to have played a role in India's willingness to

accommodate World Bank priorities. The 1956 Second Five-Year Plan had been considerably more ambitious than the First and focussed on the development of industry. As a result, it required significant foreign investment. The Second Five-Year Plan encountered foreign exchange difficulties from the beginning; as well as, a drought in 1957 forced the import of wheat from Canada and the USA. Eighty per cent of the Plan's foreign exchange was initially intended to come from the United Kingdom, but the 1956 Suez Crisis revealed Britain's financial weakness and India was forced to rely far more heavily than expected on loans from the USA.¹⁸ Langley, the US ambassador to Pakistan, saw this weakness as enabling greater pressure on Nehru. As he saw matters in September 1958, 'both Pakistan and India are edging closer and closer to bankruptcy', and India in particular was in financial terms becoming 'more desperate daily'. The USA was thus in a position to put conditions on loans to make Nehru more amenable to a settlement with Pakistan. Persuasion alone had failed, and would continue to fail 'unless some of the facts of international life are impressed upon Nehru.' Financial pressure could serve that purpose.¹⁹

Nehru's financial difficulties provided a means for the USA to provide substantial support for an ultimate settlement. The outline deal that had been on the table since 1954—three rivers for Pakistan, three rivers for India, and Pakistan given money and time to prepare its rivers for use—required funds. The details of the plan—the timing of Pakistan's shift to using the western rivers, the extent and cost of infrastructure improvements, and the division of the bill—took years of painstaking negotiation to resolve, and almost derailed the entire settlement. Indian money going to Pakistan was difficult enough for Nehru to sell under normal economic circumstances; in the financial straits of the Second Five-Year Plan, outside assistance was clearly required. The projected cost kept rising. In May 1958, Iliff had suggested it would be \$660 million, but by December Pakistan was asking for \$700 million. By April 1959, the cost was \$985 million. A year later, the cost had risen to \$1033 million.²⁰ The ability of American money to smooth over ongoing differences was vital. As early as June 1959, Iliff reported an agreement in principle between India and Pakistan; a year of hard bargaining over the details of the arrangement would be necessary before final resolution. The Pakistani

government in particular wanted firm assurances of financial support before it surrendered its claims on the Eastern rivers. As late as July 1960, there seemed serious danger of a breakdown.²¹

The new American position, of supporting an Indus Waters settlement as a mean of improving Indo-Pakistani relations more generally, still required a great deal of delicacy. America's public position was that it supported the World Bank's efforts, but had no involvement in the process.²² This was not the case; the US State Department officials and World Bank negotiator Iliff regularly informed each other of their efforts. In May 1958, for example, Iliff gave the US State Department the estimated cost of infrastructure improvements in Pakistan, and expressed his hope that Pakistan *not* raise the Indus Water question in the United Nations and risk disrupting progress; only one week later, Dulles instructed his ambassador in Pakistan to dissuade the Pakistanis from going to the Security Council.²³ Iliff continued to brief American officials on the negotiations, including Pakistani negotiating tactics.²⁴ American strategy also required restraining Pakistan's desires for additional weaponry. American diplomats spent much of 1958 and 1959 putting off Pakistan's requests for military assistance.²⁵

Patient effort by all parties produced the 19 September 1960 Karachi signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. It created an Indus Basin Development Fund of \$900 million, underwritten by an international consortium of governments together with the World Bank. That Treaty has survived fifty years, though hopes that it might produce joint and cooperative development of the Indus basin, or lead to progress on the Kashmir question, proved hollow.

The Indus Waters Treaty provides some insight into contemporary South Asian water questions. While water has the potential to create conflicts, to date there are numerous encouraging signs, not least the resilience of the Treaty itself. In 1996, India and Bangladesh signed the Ganges River Treaty, and in the last few months concluded additional talks on the Teesta River. Also in 1996 India and Nepal signed a Mahakali River Treaty, suggesting that ample precedent exists for the peaceable settlement of water disputes.

The exception to this pattern, however, is the question of China's plans for the Brahmaputra / Yarlung Zangbo. In the autumn of 2009, India's mass media raised concerns about the possibility

of China damming or even diverting the river's waters, either for hydroelectric power or to supply the water needs of northern China. Much remains mysterious, as the real intent of the Chinese government is difficult to ascertain, particularly given the lack of opposition parties and a free press. Some possibilities for development in the Brahmaputra system would be unproblematic. Run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants (that is, those which do not interfere with natural flow) pose no threat. During Indus Water negotiations, Pakistan accepted India's building hydroelectric plants (without diversion) on upper reaches of the western rivers intended for Pakistan's use.²⁶ The creation of reservoirs with the potential to withhold or release water is a far more serious issue, and certainly diversion of the Brahmaputra's water would prove an ecological and human catastrophe.

Even here, though, there are reasons for optimism. Dams cannot be constructed quickly or in secret, reducing surprise and providing time for diplomacy to function. Any potential implications for India from dams on the Brahmaputra would have serious consequences for Bangladesh, a country enjoying good relations with China. The most dangerous possibility—diversion of the Brahmaputra—would be an engineering feat of unprecedented scope, and whether such an action is even technically feasible is still unclear.

Finally, the emerging consensus of International Water Law is on India's side. In 1966 the Helsinki Rules (a set of principles agreed by authorities on water law, not an international convention) established "reasonable and equitable" as the standard for sharing the benefits and burdens of water usage and dam construction between upstream and downstream states. A 1992 Helsinki Convention used 'reasonable and equitable' as the basis for International Water Law, though only for the European states involved in that Convention. A proposed 1997 United Nations convention took as its basis the 'equitable and reasonable' use of water. India, Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh all participated in the debate. Bangladesh voted in favour of the convention (which is not yet in force). Pakistan and India abstained, but in each case the objections to the convention were narrow and technical. It is easy to imagine a revised convention meeting both sets of objections while still holding to the principle of 'reasonable and equitable'. China, by contrast, held to an increasingly outdated

principle of absolute territorial sovereignty.²⁷ China's representative stated in the UN debate that 'territorial sovereignty is a basic principle of International Law. A watercourse State enjoys indisputable territorial sovereignty over those parts of international watercourses that flow through its territory. It is incomprehensible and regrettable that the draft Convention does not affirm this principle.'²⁸

Long before the United Nations attempted to establish 'reasonable and equitable' usage of water between upstream and downstream states, the Indus Water Treaty employed the same concept of a just and fair settlement, one that has endured severe trials. India and the broader world community have an opportunity to promulgate that principle further. Not only could this promote mutually-acceptable use of the Brahmaputra system, but also provide a model for solving the ever-growing number of disputes where environment and security collide.

End Notes

1. Discussions of South Asia policy within the Eisenhower administration are relentlessly focused on security issues with economic questions of minor and secondary importance. See, for example, the security-focused discussion of South Asia policy at the 6 August 1959 meeting of the National Security Council: *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960* (hereafter FRUS), volume XV, document 4, pp. 15-26. By contrast, the files of the Eisenhower Administration's Council on Foreign Economic Policy have very little material on South Asia, and no serious discussion of the Indus Waters Treaty. For objections to the Indus Waters Treaty on cost grounds, see Dennis Fitzgerald memorandum of 31 July 1959: Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DDE): Dennis A. Fitzgerald Papers, Box 37, folder Reading File 7/1/59-12/30/59 (5).
2. Most notably, Andrew J Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca, NY, 2000).
3. See Eisenhower's remarks to National Security Council, 28 May 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 2, p. 9; also NSC 5909/1, 21 August 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 6, p. 38. Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York, 1994), pp. 272ff, sees this approach in the subsequent Kennedy administration, though it is clearly at work in the earlier Eisenhower administration as well.

4. Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 45, citing Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (New York, 1962), p. 199.
5. RK Arora, *The Indus Water Treaty Regime* (New Delhi, 2007), pp. 3-9; Joshua Nichols, 'The Indus Waters Treaty: A History', Henry L Stimson Center (<http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020116301>); Ramaswamy Iyer, 'Water-Related Conflicts: Factors, Aspects, Issues', in *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia* (Boulder, CO, 2003), pp. 278-283. The three western rivers enjoy a much larger volume of flow than the three eastern; the simplicity of the 3-3 division seems to have outweighed a more even but more complicated proposal.
6. State-JCS meeting, 10 January 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 8, pp. 48-9.
7. Rountree to Secretary of State, 10 April 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 26, pp. 75-81.
8. Dulles to Eisenhower, 17 April 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 27, pp. 81-82.
9. Eisenhower letter to Nehru and Mirza, 2 May 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 34, pp. 101-2.
10. Bunker (Embassy in India) to State, 8 June 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 44, pp. 119-123; Bunker to State, 11 June 1958: DDE (Whitman File) International Series, Box 29, folder India, PM Nehru 1957-1961 (2).
11. Bunker (Embassy in India) to State, 17 May 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 37, pp. 108-9; Nehru to Eisenhower, 7 June 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 43, pp. 117-19.
12. Memorandum of conversation, Rountree (State) with British representatives, 25 April 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 29, p. 87.
13. See, for example, the report from the embassy in Pakistan of a conversation with Prime Minister Noon: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 47, pp. 128-130.
14. Langley (Ambassador to India) and Bunker (Ambassador to Pakistan) to State, 5 December 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 59, pp. 148-9; Bartlett meeting with British government representatives, 19 January 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 61, p. 153; see also McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery*, pp. 263-4.

15. Langley and Bunker to State, 5 December 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 59, pp. 148-9.
16. Report of Iliff's views in memo from Embassy in Pakistan to State Department, 19 May 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 69, p. 168.
17. Record of Eisenhower-Nehru meeting, 26 September 1960: DDE (Whitman File) International Series, Box 29, folder India, PM Nehru 1957-1961 (5).
18. J Anjaria, 'Industrial Planning in India', *Current History* # 174 (February 1956), pp. 98-99, 102; Norman D. Palmer, 'India and the US: Maturing Relations', *Current History* # 211 (March 1959), pp. 132-33.
19. Langley to Rountree, 2 September 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 52, pp. 136-139.
20. Bartlett and Iliff conversation, 13 May 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 35, pp. 104; Memorandum of conversation, Pakistani ambassador to the US Mohammed Ali with Donald Kennedy (State), 22 December 1958: FRUS 1958-1960, vol. XV, doc. 60, pp. 150-1; Rountree to Acting Secretary of State, 28 April 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 66, pp. 163-4; Fitzgerald memo, 31 July 1959: DDE: Dennis A. Fitzgerald Papers, Box 37, folder Reading File 7/1/59-12/30/59 (5).
21. Iliff report to Western representatives, 1 June 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 73, pp. 170-171; Kennedy to Dillon, 6 November 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 84, pp. 190-1; Aziz Ahmed (Pakistani ambassador to US) meeting with State Department, 7 July 1960: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 96, pp. 210-212.
22. See, for example, Christian Herter's instructions to the US embassy in Pakistan, 14 March 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 18, pp. 66-67.
23. Compare memorandum of conversation, Rountree and Iliff, 13 May 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 35, pp. 102-5 and Dulles to Embassy in Pakistan, 20 May 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 39, pp. 110-111; also Herter to Embassy in Pakistan, 29 May 1958: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 40, pp. 112-114.
24. Eugene Black and Iliff meeting with Douglas Dillon (Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs), 29 April 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 67, pp. 164-5.
25. McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery*, pp. 232-271 and Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford,

2008), Chaps. 8-9 both mention Pakistani frustration, but not the specific link to American efforts not to disrupt the Indus Waters talks.

26. See, for example, Embassy in Pakistan to State Department, 19 May 1959: FRUS, vol. XV, doc. 69, pp. 167-8.
27. Often called the Harmon Doctrine, named for American Attorney General Judson Harmon who articulated this concept in a dispute with Mexico over the Rio Grande.
28. Gao Feng, 21 May 1997: UN Official Records A/51/PV.99, p. 6.

Himalayas: A Wake-Up Call

(Blunders – Lapses - Threat -
Need for Action - Consequences)

Colonel KS Dhami (Retd)*

All is not lost with melting of glaciers – yearly rains and snow in the catchments areas will keep the rivers flowing. The danger lies from glacial lakes bursting; and in the water run-off due to reckless degradation of Himalayan forests and pastures – storehouse of water – which can keep the rivers flowing even when there is no rain. The source of the Indus, Himalayas oldest river, is not a glacier but moss covered earth named by the Tibetans “Senge Khabab” (Lions Mouth) - marked by Chortens and prayer flags.¹

In the build up to the ‘Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change’ a number of extreme views were expressed on the effect of global warming on melting of Himalayan glaciers. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) claimed that Himalayan glaciers ‘will melt by 2035’ and on the other extreme was Dr VK Raina’s claim that there was ‘no abnormal melting’ ; Minister Jairam Ramesh took the middle path with the view ‘all was not well’ .These controversial opinions have led to embarrassment and lack of credibility of many individuals and organisations—not to mention doubts amongst the people.²

All these controversies could have been avoided if a ground check had been done and taken into account the “*International Geophysical Year 1956-57*” programme during which a number of Himalayan glaciers were studied and their snout position fixed. In 1955 Geological Survey of India organised an expedition to the Bara Shigri glacier as India’s part of this programme.³ Geological Survey of India (GSI) should have this information. From these

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fixed positions of snouts and those taken every five / ten years one will have a clear ground-based- data covering over 50 years period to put aside all doubts about the abnormal melting rate/ retreat of glaciers. If this has not been done it would be a major lapse – another ‘Himalayan Blunder’. It is also surprising that such an important ground-based-data observation – giving conclusive evidence – has not been brought out by anybody especially by the GSI and other institutions keeping track of Himalayan environment.

The IPCC has erred with the date ‘2035’ but not with the assessment that ‘most of the Himalayan glaciers are in an abnormal melting state’. The Government is responsible for its failure, in not coming out with data to clear doubts on the melting rate of Himalayan glaciers because it has organisations, resources and expertise at its disposal to do so conclusively. It was left to Dr VK Raina, retired deputy director-general of the GSI, to draw attention that melting of Himalayan glaciers by 2035 assessment was wrong and there was ‘no abnormal retreat’, but then stated that he could not give ‘conclusive evidence’ as there was only one automatic weather monitoring station in the Himalayas.⁴ One wonders where Government scientists/advisers and its aided institutions were, whose job it is to keep a tag on what is happening in the Himalayas—a serious omission or just incompetence or not bothered. In our governance system ‘the buck does not stop’—it keeps rolling ensuring no one is held accountable.

The serious threat is from deforestation and glacial lakes. With too much hype and focus on glaciers, the greater threat in the Himalayas from bursting of glacial lakes and water run-off due to deforestation is not getting the attention it deserves. Bhutan is the only country in the Himalayas where the forests are being preserved and potentially dangerous glacial lakes identified for taking protective measures. After the devastating 1994 flash floods, the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB) – with assistance from GSI — emptied glacial lakes posing danger through controlled bursting and preserved some for their scenic beauty through stabilising works. Now it is controlling dangerous ‘glacial lakes outburst flooding (GLOF)’ with Japanese assistance.⁵

On the question of glaciers retreating and some advancing, the ground reality is that most Himalayan glaciers are melting at

an abnormal rate, some more than others, depending on their location and glacier characteristics. Some glaciers are not just retreating; they are shrinking and cracking, the limit of ablation rising, and accumulation zones decreasing. It is the increase in volume/weight of glaciers that leads to true advance of glaciers. You cannot judge the true advance of the glacier from the snout only as it is possible that the advance could be due to sliding of the glacier consequent to fragmentation / shearing. Some glaciers, as a whole or on breaking up, advance and then stop/melt forming a moraine dam behind which glacial lakes are formed.

Nepal and Bhutan have no doubts on climate change and its effects; and despite their limited resources have taken preventive measures. Nepal has 49 weather monitoring stations at selected locations and a network of 12 stations (more coming up) set up with German help to collect ground-based data on glaciers / glacial lakes. Bhutan has similar set up and a labour oriented force for inaccessible places.⁶

Precipitation in the Himalayas is in the form of rain and snow-plus avalanches fed snow on glaciers. With global warming the snowline has gone higher. *At some altitudes where once it snowed now it rains; and nothing melts snow and ice more than rain.* Trans-Himalayan regions which were considered to be in the rain shadow now have been infiltrated by monsoon rains. The combined effect of rain at higher heights, rise in ablation limit due to increase in temperatures, and reduction of accumulation zones, is the major cause of fast retreating /disappearing glaciers, ice caps, snow beds/shelves.

To get a true and broad view of the state of the Himalayan snow cover, glaciers and glacial lakes there is a need for high resolution remote-sensing satellite system, ground - based monitoring stations and most important, ground observation. From start of the winter till May/June the higher regions of the Himalayas are covered by a white mantle of snow making it difficult to differentiate glaciers, ablation limits, lakes and snow fields. It is from May that true picture of the landscape emerges and scientific means and ground observation can be carried out to note glacial retreat/advance, snow / debris covered ablation line and yearly mass balance. The period from June to the beginning of winter snows, is also the time to take corrective action to drain out glacial lakes threatening to burst and turn into 'mountain tsunamis'.

Bhutan, which is most prone to formation of glacial lakes, has taken protective measures starting from 1994 when a glacier lake burst causing loss of life and massive damage to villages, roads, bridges and power projects. In 1998, Bhutan with its labour force armed with digging tools – against time – reduced the waters from high altitude Raphstreng Tso glacial lake, the water level of which had reached dangerous level. The lake was seven days march from the road head. Another glacial lake Thorthurim Tso (with three times the water of the lake that burst in 1994) has formed in the upper reaches of the Po Chu (river) is being controlled with Japanese help. Bhutan and Nepal have set up surveillance of potentially dangerous lakes (20 in Nepal, 24 in Bhutan) to give timely warning.⁷


The surveillance and warning systems in Bhutan and Nepal consist of electronic sensors, transmitters, sirens, personal deployed with wireless sets and satellite phones. *GLOF can result in catastrophic consequences if timely preventive steps are not taken as has recently happened in the 'Sutlej Basin'.*

In the Indian Himalayas, the most destructive have been the bursting of a glacial lake on the Sutlej in Tibet. On the night of 31 July / 1 August 2000, a massive wall of water – a Himalayan Tsunami – 40 to 70 ft high (3 to 5 storeys), at highest flow level taking about 30 min to pass a point, thundered along the Sutlej River from Tibet across the Great Himalayas destroying all in its path – overnight washing away roads, bridges, habitations, commercial establishments and threatening the very viability of the prestigious Nathpa Jhakri Hydel Project.⁸ (The Government having failed to take warning measures called this a freak act of nature/ cloud burst – a view that was disproved by 'Indian Space Research Organisation' through detailed satellite images).

Bursting of Para Chu Lake formed on the Para Chu river just on Chinese side of the border in Spiti in June 2005 is another example of the devastation GLOF can cause in the absence of reliable surveillance, warning systems and disaster management. Now a flash-flood warning system has been set up at Khab near the Indo-China border where the Sutlej thunders out of the Zaskar Range.⁹

Time has run out for discussions, ritual meetings and waiting for more data; which, with clear ground situation before you, will only be of academic value. The hill - folk who are most affected are not interested in whether Himalayan glaciers are melting due to climate change, black carbon/brown clouds, natural or divine causes—they want action on the ground. Added to this is the constant threat in the Himalayas of landslides and cloud bursts.

For the Defence Forces, what is happening in the Himalayas is a serious security matter. GLOF triggered through natural cause, sabotage, raids, aerial strikes is a potential threat, which beside causing economic damage can disrupt operations and ground maintenance routes at critical times. There is an urgent need for the Armed Forces for continuous surveillance and monitoring of glaciers, glacial lakes; and carrying out controlled bursting of those that are dangerous. Four big Himalayan rivers – Indus, Sutlej, Karnali and the Brahmaputra – have their source in Tibet and three have a long run before entering India. The extent of destruction can be visualised from the floods in the Sutlej basin caused from floods originating in Tibet. Overall coordination and compiling data could be done jointly by the 'USI' and the 'Adventure Cell' in the Army HQ. Refer to the map below:-¹⁰



The resources are there on the ground: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Surveillance, Satellites, Army and Para Military Forces, personnel of GSI and Mountaineering Institutes. What is lacking is a sense of urgency and coordination of effort by Central and Hill State agencies.

It is not possible, nor is it necessary to get ground based scientific data and physical ground monitoring of all Himalayan glaciers. A few that could be selected to cover the complete Himalayan Range are: Kolahoi (Kashmir), Bara/Chhota Shigirj (Lahaul), Gangotri (Central Himalayas), Khumbu (Nepal) and Thorthom (Bhutan) or glaciers that have been identified as 'benchmark'. In the Trans-Himalayas Region, Parkachik glacier, which has easy access, in the Suru valley, Ladakh could be selected. Army units and Mountaineering Institutes located near these could do the ground check. Coordination of the Eastern Himalayas could be done by The Himalayan Mountaineering Institute (HMI) Darjeeling, the Council Members of which include representatives of Nepal and Bhutan Governments.

The need of the hour is for action on the ground for the sake of the mountain folk and ultimately for the people of the Indo-Gangetic Plain – collection of data can carry on simultaneously. The emphasis should be on monitoring formation of glacial lakes and steps to stop them from bursting, through controlled draining/blasting; and a foolproof flood warning system to measure, transmit state of dangerous glacial lakes and forecast water level upstream.

"Natrusahat Param Balam" (There is no greater force than Enthusiasm)

- Bhagawad Gita

This is the spirit expressed in the Nepal and Bhutan scientist's motto "Rugged as the Himalayas we will not Buckle". Indian Government departments/organisations/aided institutions - totally out of touch with ground realities – can take a cue from them: not be chair borne, and show the 'will and spirit' to perform.

Indian hill states – J&K, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal – need to act quickly on the lines of Bhutan to manage glaciers and deforestation in the interest of their hill-folk, and not depend wholly on the Centre.

There should be no doubt that the main cause of accelerated global warming is destruction of forests and carbon emissions. We cannot stop the *Himalayan glaciers and the snow cover from melting, but forests can be preserved and increased – they are the key to survival.*

Global warming, on noticeable basis, began with the Industrial Revolution when tree cutting started on a massive scale to fuel it. Environmentalists then warned against its harmful effects, if cutting of forests went on uncontrolled. Deforestation in the Himalayas started with the East Indian Company in 1816 – exploitation continued under the Crown. *Yet, it is the post-Independence period that saw massive cutting of trees—with no thought of its disastrous affects.*

The signal from the recently concluded Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change is clear – you are on your own—keep beating the drum but do not forget our mountains, rivers and the poor. It is time to accept the challenge. Survival lies in proper balance between development and acceptable carbon emissions; preserving and planting forests on a massive scale; controlling explosive population growth, accountability and clamping down on rampant corruption.¹¹

End Notes

This article is based mainly on my experiences and ground observations and interaction with locals during my treks and drives across the Himalayas from the extreme East to the West including Bhutan, Nepal and Trans-Himalayas regions of Indian Himalayas. My particular interest was in forests, glaciers, icecaps, rivers, ecosystems and wildlife.

1. Empires of the Indus by Alice Albinia, Published by John Murray, 2008, page 306. The book is a work of research covering the story of the Indus from the sea to its source.
2. News Report Times of India 11 November 2009 and other papers / media reports before and after the Copenhagen meet on Climate Change which covered the controversy regarding melting of Himalayan glaciers by 2035
3. <http://hplahaulspiti.nic.in/River.htm> refers to the International Geophysical Year 1956-57 programme covering fixing snout positions of glaciers and participation of Geological Survey of India

4. <http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2009/WWFPresitem14549.ht> Gives details of steps taken by Bhutan after the Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding (GLOF) in 1994. It is after these floods that Bhutan got on to taking protective measures against GLOF.
5. Ibid 2
6. <http://www.scidev.net/en/features/monitoring-climate-change-at-the-top-of-the-world.html> Gives details of weathering stations set up by Bhutan and Nepal.
7. Ibid 6
8. <http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jul/gov-sutlej.htm>. More detail of the damage caused is covered in an article "Sutlej: The Untamable Himalayan Powerhouse" in Hindustan Times dated 3 August 2005 by self.
9. <http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jul/gov-sutlej.htm>. mentions of the Diplomatic failure in engaging the Chinese into sharing vital data on river hydrology within its territory
10. Map showing 'Impact of Climate Change'. Pollution Figures given in News report in The Tribune, Chandigarh, 5 November 2008. The government decides to declare Ganga a National river.
11. More on the Himalayas magnificence, degradation and consequences is on my website: www.himalayanecotrails.com, plus details of a slideshow "Himalayas: The Last Awakening Call", a presentation which was given by me at the Prime Minister's Office on 15 October 2007.

Women in the Armed Forces: Misconceptions and Facts*

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM (Retd)**

The recent debate about the induction of women in the Armed Forces has been highly skewed and shallow. An issue that critically affects the fighting potential of the Armed Forces has been reduced to 'equality of sexes' and 'women's liberation'. Many ill-informed observers have trifled such a sensitive matter by terming it as 'conquering the last male bastion'. Sadly, stances have been taken more on the basis of personal views and mind-sets rather than on well evolved logic. Both military and non-military experts are equally guilty in this regard.

In the recent past, the Nation was shocked to hear a retired senior Army officer recommending constitution of all women battalions in the Indian Army. There cannot be a more preposterous and perilous proposition. It is equally common to hear the argument that if the Naxalites and LTTE can have women fighters, why the Indian Armed Forces should be reluctant to do so. Often people quote the number of American women fighting war in Iraq and Afghanistan to question India's stance against allowing women in combat. This article endeavours to remove some common misconceptions and put all issues in their proper perspective.

To start with, it needs to be stressed that the Services carry no male chauvinistic mindset. The very fact that daughters of Service officers have excelled in all fields proves that Service officers do not suffer from any gender bias and are very supportive of women's advancement. However, the issue of women's induction in the Services warrants singular treatment.

It will be instructive to take a look at the genesis of the issue. Earlier, entry of women was limited to the Army Medical Corps, the Army Dental Corps and the Military Nursing Service. In the

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early 1990s, a Service Chief visited the United States and saw women participating in Guards of Honour. He was suitably impressed and wondered why India should lag behind in this aspect. This shows that the decision to induct women was neither need-based nor well thought-through. The first batch of women Short Service Commission (SSC) officers joined in 1992. No attempt was made to study likely long term implications of multiple issues involved and their effect on the fighting potential of the Services. In other words, a decision of colossal significance was taken in a totally cavalier, slapdash and hasty manner. As the other two Services did not want to be seen as 'male-chauvinists', they followed suit. Soon a race got underway between the three Services to induct women in maximum number of fields. It is only now that a plethora of complex issues are getting thrown up with resultant adverse fall-out.

Presently, the Indian Army counts 2.44 per cent women in its ranks, the Indian Navy 3.0 per cent and the Indian Air Force 6.7 per cent. The tenure of women SSC officers has since been increased to 14 years.¹ The Government has also approved grant of Permanent Commission to SSC (Women) officers prospectively in Judge Advocate General (JAG) Department and Army Education Corps (AEC) of Army and their corresponding Branch/Cadre in Navy and Air Force, Accounts Branch of the Air Force and Corps of Naval Constructors of the Navy.²

Common Misconceptions and Facts

Women must get equal opportunities in the Services. The concept of equality of sexes is unquestionable. Its application should, however, never affect the fighting potential of the Armed Forces. Two points need to be highlighted here. First, the Armed Forces are constituted for National defence and there can be no compromise on that issue. Secondly, the Armed Forces are not a 'Rozgar Yojana' to provide employment to all segments of the society in equal proportion. As it is a question of Nation's defence, the best man or woman should be selected for every job. In other words, women should be inducted in the Services only if they add value or at least not affect it adversely. No right thinking individual can advocate women's induction at the cost of the fighting potential. That would be disastrous for the Country.

Interestingly, demand for equal opportunities is selective in nature. Women want to join only as officers and not as soldiers. Additionally, the concept of equality is given a go-by soon after commissioning. Applications for peace postings and other special dispensations proliferate. They join the Military on the plank of equality of sexes but this plank vanishes the day they join the training academy. Thereafter, they again become the weaker sex needing special privileges.

Women can perform all physical tasks as well as men.

Standards of physical fitness of women can never be the same as those of men. It is a biological reality and is true for all fields including sports. In the case of women officers, Indian Army has lowered the standards to appallingly low levels. Even then many women fail to qualify during their pre-commission training. Whereas male cadets are required to run 5 km in 28 minutes, women are given 40 minutes. Similarly, males are required to jump across a 9 feet wide ditch with full equipment and personal weapon; women have to negotiate only a 5 feet wide ditch.³ Worse, most women fail in the test.

All male officers and soldiers are subjected to annual Battle Physical Efficiency Tests till they attain the age of 45 years. No such tests have been prescribed for women officers to avoid embarrassment to them in front of the troops. Concerns have also been expressed about the susceptibility of Indian women to frequent back problems, pelvic injuries and stress fractures.

A recent review conducted by the British Army concluded that women have neither the upper-body strength nor the physical resilience to withstand intensive combat. Tests in 2000 respondents found that women were eight times more likely than men to sustain injuries other than wounds in action.⁴

Physical fitness is of lesser importance in modern fighting.

Need for physical effort is dictated by two factors - level of technological development and nature of military's involvement. Requirement for physical prowess undoubtedly reduces as the armies advance technologically. In other words, quantum of physical effort needed is inversely proportional to technological progression. Thus, as an army evolves technologically, more high-tech jobs get generated where technically qualified women can be gainfully employed. In a high-tech army like the USA, a woman sitting in the US mainland can effectively guide drone attacks in

Afghanistan. India on the other hand is still a second generation technology force which is trying desperately to graduate to the third generation. Indian Defence Forces are man-power intensive needing physical ground effort. India has very few high-tech jobs.

As regards degree and extent of a military's involvement in active combat duties, countries like Canada and Australia face no internal or external threat and their militaries are generally in peacetime mode with routine passive duties. They can certainly afford to have a larger per centage of women in their forces. Contrast this with India where the majority of Army troops are deployed on active combat duties in remote, inhospitable and uncongenial areas. Only physically fit and tough troops can survive. Worse, peace tenures are short and there are very few periods of comparative lull.

Therefore, the Indian Services continue to be physical-power intensive and will remain so in the near future. Only the very fit can survive to deliver in India's hostile environment.

The USA has deployed a large number of women soldiers for fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although a large number of women have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, their employment has been confined to support functions. Although till the end of 2009, the USA and allies had suffered a total of 4689 casualties, there has not been a single woman war casualty. Similarly, despite the fact that the USA and allies have suffered 1555 casualties, not a single woman has lost her life in the Afghanistan war so far.⁵ Many people tend to confuse casualties due to hostile action with combat casualties. The USA has lost 19 female soldiers in Iraq to hostile activities like car bombs, IED blasts and helicopter crashes since the beginning of 2007, but there has been no combat casualty. It is simply because of the fact no women are deployed in combat duties. As a matter of fact, they are forbidden to be placed in direct ground combat with enemy. They generally perform medical, intelligence, logistic and traffic control duties. Women are thus kept sheltered in safe appointments, away from the risk of capture by the adversary.

Even in Israel which has conscription for women (as well as men), women are not allotted active battle field duties. They serve in technical, administrative and training posts to release men for active duty.

If BSF can have an all women battalion to guard border, why not the Indian Army? The Border Security Force (BSF) has certainly raised an all women battalion and deployed it on the international border. However, the following important facts need to be highlighted:-

(a) The battalion is led by male officers and subordinate functionaries.

(b) The battalion has not been positioned on the Line of Control (LoC) where firing and infiltration attempts are frequent. Instead, it has been deployed near Ferozepur on the International Border (IB) which is totally peaceful and where Indian and Pakistani troops routinely exchange sweets on festivals.

(c) Even on IB no independent sector has been entrusted to the women battalion. It has been superimposed on an existing male battalion. Importantly, women perform no night guard duties – these are performed by males.

Earlier, village women were not allowed to go across the border fence to cultivate their fields as no women sentries were available to frisk them. It was a sore point with the border folks. The sole purpose of raising the women battalion is to redress this long standing grievance. Their task is akin to what CISF women have been carrying out at the airports for long – frisking of women. Therefore, it will be incorrect to call the BSF battalion a fighting force.

Women officers help overcome the shortage of officers in the Forces. It is an erroneous impression that there is a shortage of male volunteers for the Services. As per the report of the Union Public Service Commission for 2006-07, there were a total of 5,49,365 candidates for 1724 vacancies for all Civil Services examinations with an Applicants to Post Ratio (APR) of 319. On the other hand, 3,41,818 candidates applied for 793 vacancies in the National Defence Academy (NDA), maintaining APR at a healthy 431. It implies that for every seat in NDA there were 431 applicants.⁶ Therefore, it is a fallacy that male volunteers are insufficient. It is just that the Services seek very exacting standards for males while women are accepted with abysmally low standards.

Short Service Commission (SSC) for women has proved highly productive. As a matter of fact, SSC (normally extended to 10

years) has proved to be a totally wasteful and counter-productive exercise. Women normally get commissioned at the age of 23 to 25 years. Within two to three years of their commission, they get married, mostly to colleague male officers. Soon, thereafter, they start applying for peace postings on compassionate grounds to be with their husbands. Every pregnancy means three years' exemption from physical activities – one year pre-natal and two years post-delivery. With the standard two-child norm, a women officer remains physically inactive for close to six years. It implies that after the first post-commission tenure, a woman officer is rarely in a position to participate in field exercises and has to be exempted all out-door work. Thus, the Services gain little.

In an informal interaction, a senior Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) questioned the rationale of granting SSC to women. "In the case of men, 25 to 35 years age span is most productive and grant of SSC is understandable. On the other hand, women have to raise their families during that period. By granting SSC to women, we have achieved nothing except increase the load on maternity wards of military hospitals," he opined.

If women can fight as soldiers in LTTE and Naxalite outfits, why not in the Services? Comparing irregular outfits with constitutionally created regular forces shows speciousness of the logic. In any case, even LTTE recruited women only after it fell short of male volunteers. Moreover, women held no high appointments and were generally used as pawns in indoctrinated suicide squads. If one was to carry the comparison forward, LTTE had recruited boys of 15 years to take up arms and act as human bombs. A lawfully structured formal organisation cannot be expected to follow suit.

Indian women officers have proved themselves and established their credibility as leaders. Notwithstanding the public posturing of the Services top brass, the experience so far has been highly discouraging. Superior male officers admire their enthusiasm despite the environmental difficulties, but are faced with the twin problems of their safety and useful employment. Additionally, as many duties (like night duty officer) cannot be assigned to women, male officers have to be given additional work load, which they resent. There are also concerns, based on Israeli studies, that soldiers first instinct may be to defend the women in their ranks rather than to fight the enemy.

Male officers also question the logic of having women only as an officer. Indian officers pride themselves in the fact that they lead from the front and hence have to be better than their soldiers both physically and professionally. But, by having women only in the officer cadre an impression gets conveyed to the environment that officers' duties are softer and can be carried out by women as well, thereby lowering their standing.

As per an informal survey carried out, 81 per cent of the troops were convinced that women officers could never lead them in war efficiently. The balance 19 per cent were unsure of their response.⁷ Acceptability of women as leaders was thus very poor. Another segment of respondents viewed the whole issue as a political gimmick which did not warrant serious attention. "How can the Government be naïve enough to think that a leader who cannot run, train and exercise with troops and lacks required physical fitness can lead them in war?" they query.

Women in Western forces are well accepted and adjusted. It is a fallacy. Acceptance of women in the Military has not been smooth in any country. Despite efforts made to sensitise the environment, they continue to be confronted with social, behavioural and psychological problems at all levels. To date most countries do not allow women tank crews because of the cramped conditions and lack of privacy. There are also concerns about cramped living conditions on board submarines and dangers posed by fumes inside the submarine to a foetus if a woman becomes pregnant.

Sexual harassment and assaults of women soldiers is known to be blatant and quite prevalent in the US forces. A sexual harassment hotline set up at Aberdeen received 6,825 calls from women from all branches of the military in just two months.⁸ Hundreds of women are said to have complained of sexual assault in the forces since the beginning of Iraq war in 2003.⁹ Level of moral degradation can be gauged from the fact that 'command rape' has come to be accepted as a common phenomenon in the military - a superior official, under the might of his command authority, can force a subordinate woman soldier to accede to his sexual demands.¹⁰

A joint survey carried out in 2006 in the UK by the Ministry of Defence and the Equal Opportunities Commission found that 67

per cent of the respondents had experienced sexualised behaviour directed at them personally in the previous 12 months. Worse, over half of those who made a formal complaint stated that there had been negative consequences as a result of which 64 per cent were considering leaving the Services.¹¹

On the other hand, Indian Armed Forces can be rightfully proud of their record which is far better than that of any advanced nation in the world. Women are treated in a manner befitting their dignity and their safety is ensured.

India Needs to Exercise Caution

It is universally accepted that induction of women in the Services should be dictated by the level of technology, prevailing security environment and the nature of likely deployment. Availability of adequate number of male volunteers is another major consideration.

India should follow a graduated approach. Women's expertise, talent and competence should be profitably utilised in areas which are totally non-combat in nature. For the present, women must continue to play their established role in the medical, dental and nursing services, both as SSC and Permanent Regular Commission (PRC) officers. However, they should not be granted SSC in any other branch. The Government has rightly approved grant of PRC to women in Legal and Education departments of the three Services, Accounts Branch of the Air Force and Constructors of the Navy. Grant of PRC should also be considered for women in Survey of India, Military Engineering Service Militarised Cadre and Director General Quality Assurance.

The current policy of non-induction of women in combat arms should continue. Additionally, their entry into Engineers, Signals, Supply Corps, Ordnance and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) should be deferred till infusion of technology generates adequate number of high-tech jobs.

Finally, it should never be forgotten that the *raison d'être* for the constitution of the Armed Forces is to ensure security of the Country. Decisions which have a far reaching effect on the defence potential of the Armed Forces must be taken with due diligence. Instead of replicating a model, India must chart its own policy. It has an experience of 18 years. Honest feedback must be sought

to appreciate the true ground situation and initiate corrective measures. Most importantly, the military brass must show moral courage to admit that the present mess demands a holistic review of the policy, protestations of self-styled champions of gender-parity notwithstanding. Decisions taken as a matter of political and populist expediency can prove disastrous for the Nation in the long run. Defence matters cannot be treated as publicity gimmick to flaunt sexual equality.

End Notes

1. This information was given by Minister of Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in a written reply to Shri Syed Shahnawaz Hussain in Lok Sabha on 16 Dec 2009. See <http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=56000&kwd=>
2. Ibid
3. Information received from sources in Officers Training Academy, Chennai.
4. Findings of the British "Combat Effectiveness Gender Study". See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4182428/Army-decides-to-keep-women-off-the-front-line.html>
5. Up to date details of the US and the allies casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan are available at <http://icasualties.org/>
6. Annual report of the Union Public Service Commission for the year 2006-07, available at <http://www.upsc.gov.in>
7. Over 120 JCOs and Other Ranks of different arms and Services were informally spoken to. Most thought that induction of women was a frivolous decision.
8. The Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 'Sexual Harassment in the Military', available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june97/harassment_2-4.html. Also see Paper on "Sexual Harassment of Women in the Military" by National Women's Law centre, Washington D.C.
9. Andrea Lewis, 'Pentagon cultivating culture of violence against women', the Salt Lake Tribune of 19 Jul 2006.
10. Ibid
11. Report of Ministry of Defence/Equal Opportunities Commission on 'Quantitative & Qualitative Research into Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces' of Mar 2006; available at <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/538E55EE-9CA4-4177-9A0B-6853A431B283/0/20060522SRReport.pdf>

Kautilya to Chandragupta on the Mauryan Soldier

Air Marshal SG Inamdar, PVSM, VSM (Retd)*

Kautilya in his treatise on Statecraft : *Arthashastra* dwells on the Mauryan Army and has in many places sought to advise the *Rajadhiraja* on myriad aspects of the duties and responsibilities of the Head of State.

While heading the Air Force Pay Commission Cell, in 1995 at my personal request, a Sanskrit scholar in the Benares Hindu University researched and gave me some excerpts in bits and pieces, which were put together as a cohesive whole for inclusion in the Armed Forces Memorandum to the 5th Pay Commission. Since then, I have taken the liberty of superimposing / interjecting a little more to what has been said on the same subject in the *Neeti-Shataka*, by the sage-king Bhartruhari.

It is amazing how clearly those ancients saw the likely faultlines in governance, the intricacies of management of the military by the state functionaries, the nature of the military and the citizenry and the close interplay between them all. It is truly amazing how those observations continue to be so completely relevant today, even after 2000 years.

The passage underneath on 'The Mauryan Army' is actually an anthology of some of those 'dwellings'.

The Mauryan Army

"The Mauryan soldier does not himself the Royal treasuries enrich nor does he the Royal granaries fill. He does not himself carry out trade and commerce nor produce scholars, thinkers, littérateurs, artistes, artisans, sculptors, architects, craftsmen, doctors and administrators. He does not himself build roads and ramparts nor dig wells and reservoirs. He does not himself write poetry and plays, paint or sculpt, nor delve in metaphysics, arts and sciences.

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He does not do any of this directly as he is neither gifted, trained nor mandated to do so.

The soldier only and merely ensures that:

The tax, tribute and revenue collectors travel far and wide unharmed and return safely;

The farmer tills, grows, harvests, stores and markets his produce unafraid of pillage & plunder;

The trader, merchant and moneylender function and travel across the length and breadth of the realm unmolested;

The savant, sculptor, painter, maestro and master create works of art, literature, philosophy, astronomy and astrology in peace & quietitude;

The architect designs and builds his Vaastus without tension;

The tutor ('*acharya*'), the mentor ('*guru*') and the priest ('*purohit*') teach and preach in tranquility;

The sages ('*rishis, munis, and tapaswees*') meditate and undertake penance in wordless silence;

The doctor ('*vaidyaraja*') tends to the ill and the infirm well, adds to the pharmacopoeia, discovers new herbs and invents new medical formulations undisturbed;

The mason, the bricklayer, the artisan, the weaver, the tailor, the jeweller, the potter, the carpenter, the cobbler, the cowherd ('*gopaala*') and the smith work unhindered;

The mother, wife and governess go about their chores and bring up children in harmony and tranquility;

The aged and the disabled are well taken care of, tended to and are able to fade away gracefully and with dignity; cattle graze freely without being lifted or harmed by miscreants.

He is thus the VERY BASIS and silent, barely visible CORNERSTONE of our fame, culture, physical well being and prosperity; in short, of the entire nation building activity. He DOES NOT perform any of these chores himself directly: he ENABLES

the rest of us to perform these without let, hindrance or worry ('*nirbhheek and nishchinta*').

Our military sinews, on the other hand, lend credibility to our pronouncements of adherence to good *Dharma*, our goodwill, amiability and peaceful intentions towards all our neighbour nations ('*sarve bhavantu sukhinaha, sarve santu niramayaha...*') as also those far away and beyond. These also serve as a powerful deterrent against military misadventure by any one of them against us.

If Pataliputra reposes each night in peaceful comfort, O King, it is so because she is secure in the belief that the distant borders of Magadha are inviolate and the interiors are safe and secure, thanks to the mighty Mauryan Army constantly patrolling and standing vigil with naked swords and eyes peeled for action ('*animish netre*'), day and night ('*ratrau-divase*'), in weather fair and foul, dawn-to-dusk-to-dawn ('*ashtau prahare*'), quite unmindful of personal discomfort and hardship, loss of life and limb, separation from the family, all through the year, year after year ('*warsha nu warshe*').

While the *Magadha citizenry endeavours* to make the State prosper and flourish, the *Mauryan soldier guarantees* that the State continues to EXIST! He is the silent '*sine qua non*' of our very being!

To this man, O *Rajadhiraja*, you owe a debt for that very guarantee which is the vital *key-stone* of our nationhood *arch*. Please, therefore, see to it, *suo motu*, that you are *constantly* alive and sensitive to the soldier's legitimate dues in every form and respect, be those his needs or his wants, including his place in the social order. Do thereafter ('*tadanantara*') ensure that he receives these *in time or preferably ahead of time*, in full measure, *for he is NOT likely to ask for them himself*.

This is so because before getting so completely wrapped up in his onerous, harsh and exalted charge, the soldier has assumed with good reason that the State, in return for his extraordinary burden and services, has freed him from all responsibility towards his own present and future welfare as also that of his family back home in the hinterland. He is thus very clear in his mind when deployed at a distant border outpost, fighting lumpen groups within

Magadha or when campaigning in far away lands that he need only look out in FRONT for the enemy of the State and concentrate only on his MILITARY ONUS and aim (*'shatrunjaya'*), completely free of all temporal worries. This assumption is a holy sacrament and an unwritten covenant that exists between him and the State. *And rightly so!*

If ever things come to a sordid pass, O King, when, on a given day, the Mauryan soldier has to LOOK BACK over his shoulder (*'Simhawalokana'*) prompted by even a single nagging worry about his and his family's material, physical and social well being, it should cause you and your Council the greatest concern and distress! I beseech you to take instant note and act with uncommon dispatch to address the soldier's anxiety. It could be on account of harsh living conditions, inequitable material compensation or asymmetric Court or societal dispensations affecting either his self respect or his family's material welfare, or both.

If any in your household, in your Council or among your courtiers is/ are responsible for allowing matters to come to such a pass, punish him/ them exemplarily without loss of time and send him/ them to serve for four cycles of seasons (*'Chaturrutuchakre'*) alongside the soldiers, on the border outposts. If they perish, those would be their just desserts. If they survive, they will return wiser and wizened, more responsive to and with greater empathy for the soldier's cause.

If you first learn of your soldiers' problems and needs from your own trusted informers (*'gupt doota'*) and NOT from the Commander-in-Chief (*'Senapati'*) himself, relieve him of his charge and retain him not for another day. No matter how good a horseman (*'Ashwarohi'*), a swordsman (*'Khadgaveera'*), a wrestler (*'Malla'*), an archer (*'Dhanurdhara'*) or a tactician (*'Rana neetigya'*) he is, dismiss him (*'ardha chandra prayoga'*) for failing to keep his ear close to the military ground. Dismiss him also for not having the gumption and courage to be the first to tell you of the soldiers' anxiety and needs before the others do. The *Senapati* owes a downward loyalty and sensitivity to his troops in much the same way and measure as he owes these upwards to you, for this is a unique and age-old essential feature of sound military leadership and an article of faith between the troops and the General!

It is my bounden duty to caution you, My Lord, that the day when the Mauryan soldier has to *demand* his dues or, worse, *plead* for them, will neither have arrived suddenly, overnight nor in vain. It will also bode ill for Magadha.

For then, on that day, you, My Lord, will have lost all moral sanction to be *Rajadhiraja* ! It will also mark the beginning of the end of the Mauryan Empire!!”

Mountbatten As I Saw Him

Lieutenant General SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)*

Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma was one of the most colourful personalities of the Twentieth century. He was gifted with almost everything in life, blue blood, good looks, professional ability and good fortune, all of which he put to good use in his meteoric career, full of astounding achievements. His role as Viceroy and Governor General of India became controversial. I do not propose to go into that. I shall confine myself to recalling what little I saw of him, when I was a very junior officer.

I recall on a bright clear day on 12 February 1947, John Spittle and I watched a long cavalcade of cars racing up Raisina Hill from Vijay Chowk to the Viceroy's House (now Rashtrapati Bhavan). A black limousine flying the Union Jack was most prominent in the convoy. The incoming Viceroy, Mountbatten was travelling in that car. John was a Major and I was a Captain working together in the Operations Room of GHQ on the first floor of South Block. John was a few years older. We had become good friends. He quoted Queen Victoria's words inscribed on the arch of the entrance to North Block, "*Liberty will not descend upon a people. A people must raise themselves to liberty that must be earned before it can be enjoyed*". He said that Independence of India was in the air and it was in the fitness of things that the great grandson of that great Queen had come to grant Independence to India. I did not want to raise any acrimony by saying that Independence would be coming to us as a compulsion in a post World War era and not as an act of bounty. I reminded him that Churchill had said that he had not become the Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. And now Mountbatten a protégé of Churchill who had appointed him Supreme

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Commander, had come to preside over the Empire's liquidation. John laughed and said no doubt Churchill had made Mountbatten Supreme Commander much out of turn. The Chiefs of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in South East Asia were much senior but his royal connection would make him acceptable to them as also to the Americans. General Joe Stillwell, known as Vinegar Joe had to be appointed his Deputy. He was not an easy person to deal with. No Hollywood star in an Admiral's uniform could be as striking as Mountbatten. He shook hands with a dazzling smile and Vinegar Joe's resistance melted in the glow of his personality. John added that he had now been sent by Atlee to India to mesmerise Indians with his charm and overwhelm the feudal Princes by his royal lineage. Neither John nor I could then foresee that within six months India would be partitioned and Independence would come to the two dominions through a pool of blood and most horrendous suffering. Partition was announced on 3 June 1947. The next day we had a special calendar with two dates. 15 August and the date of the day with the number of days left for Partition. As we tore the pages of this calendar, it reminded us that Partition was getting closer. This calendar was put up in all Government offices.

I had served in Burma and Indonesia during the war when Mountbatten was the Supreme Commander. My first glimpse of him was in Singapore in March 1946. Jawaharlal Nehru was visiting Singapore at the invitation of the Indian community. He held no official position at that time. Thousands of Chinese and Indians had gone to Changi airport to receive him. I was one of them. I was surprised to see a number of Indian soldiers in Army vehicles with Congress flags at the airport. This had never happened before. I was now convinced that India's Independence was round the corner. I saw a British Colonel go to the tarmac at the airport and receive Nehru. I was told that he was the Military Secretary of Mountbatten. He saluted Nehru and took him in an Army staff car to the Government House, where Mountbatten was staying. Nehru was to lay the foundation stone of a new Indian National Army Memorial. The previous memorial had been dynamited by the British soldiers when Singapore was recaptured. Nehru was also to visit Indonesia at the invitation of Soekarno. Indian Army was fighting Soekarno's forces. We learnt that, Mountbatten switched on his charm on Nehru and persuaded him to give up both these

engagements. He told him that India would soon be independent and he should not do anything that would impair the discipline of the Indian Army. That was the first time the two had met and this was the beginning of their long friendship. The following day Nehru and Mountbatten visited the Army canteen for a cup of tea with the soldiers. There was tremendous enthusiasm among the soldiers on seeing them in their midst. That was the first time I got a glimpse of Mountbatten.

On the second occasion, I saw Mountbatten from close quarters. I was on duty in the Operations Room at the Corps Headquarters in Batavia, now Jakarta. Mountbatten walked into the Operations Room along with the Corps Commander, Sir Montagu Stopford. My boss, Colonel Stevens briefed him on the map. During the briefing Mountbatten said he wanted to talk to General Mansergh, commanding the division at Sourabaya. I was asked to put a call to him. I rang the Division's Operations Room at Sourabaya on the hotline. My counterpart was Bill Cunningham. I used to talk to him frequently. I told him that the Supremo would like to talk to his General. He said, 'OK' and after a pause when I heard a voice saying, 'yes' I said, "General Mansergh is on line Sir". Mountbatten took the telephone and said, "Mountbatten here, is that you Bob?" The voice at the other end replied, "If you are Mountbatten, I am Montgomery." Mountbatten did not take offence. He smiled and said, 'Would someone convince him that I am Mountbatten'? Cunningham had thought I was pulling his leg. The Colonel now took the telephone and sharply told Cunningham to get his GOC promptly on the line. Thereafter Mountbatten talked to Mansergh. After Mountbatten left the room, I was ticked off by my boss. I was told that I should have first spoken to General Mansergh before saying that he was on the line. Bill Cunningham also got away lightly. Later In the day Mountbatten addressed all officers in the station. Sitting next to me in the audience was Mohammad Nawaz also a Captain at our Headquarters. He later joined the Civil service and became Cabinet Secretary in Pakistan. Also present was Captain Niazi from the Rajput Regiment. He later became a Lieutenant General and surrendered to us with 90,000 soldiers at Dacca in 1971. I was in charge of all the prisoners and I met Niazi again a few times. We were all very impressed by Mountbatten's flamboyance and speech that day. He told us that soon after he took over as Supreme Commander,

he had gone to Cairo to present plans for the offensive in South East Asia to the Big Three, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. The British Army Chief, Alanbrooke was also there. He remarked that it was dangerous to have Admirals on land, to which Mountbatten retorted, "*Not as dangerous as Generals at sea*". He was happy that his plans had succeeded and South East Asia had been liberated from the Japanese. He then told us that his Command both in territory and population far exceeded the commands of the other two Supreme Commanders, Eisenhower and MacArthur. Whereas the war was over elsewhere, in South East Asia Command we were still fighting in Indo-China and Indonesia, and this will determine the future of Asia. I wondered whether, while talking of Indo-China and Indonesia, he had India in mind in the new world order emerging in Asia.

Hukum Singh Yadav a dear friend of mine whom we called Kim, was appointed ADC to Mountbatten. I heard many interesting stories about the Mountbatten household from him. Mountbatten was very particular about his looks and his dress. No wonder he was referred to as "a glamour boy, a matinee idol with nice eye lashes." He had a brought a barber from Trumpers a gentleman's saloon near Piccadilly Circus in London, to give him hair cuts in India. After he dressed up whether in uniform or in civil clothes, the ADC was expected to examine his dress from different angles and make adjustments, if any. He would inquire, "How do I look?" The ADC would reply, "Excellent Your Excellency." Kim became friendly with Ann, the Secretary of Lady Mountbatten. The two got married and lived happily for the rest of their lives. Alas both are no more. Kim gave a reception at the swimming pool in the Viceroy's House. I attended the reception. The Mountbattens came for a short while for the reception. Mixed marriages were frowned upon in those days. By attending the reception, Mountbattens showed that they had no inhibitions on that score.

While Mountbatten was Viceroy, I had glimpses of him on occasions but no opportunity to interact with him. On Independence Day, I saw him going down Kingsway (now Rajpath) towards India Gate in a horse carriage with Nehru. There was tremendous enthusiasm in the crowd. The people were cheering them saying, '*Pandit Nehru ki Jai*' and '*Pandit Mountbatten ki Jai*'. As they arrived at the site of the parade, the crowd broke the cordon engulfing the

troops lined up for the parade. The band played the National Anthem and our new tricolour was unfurled. No parade could be held. Kim told me that Mountbatten had said that it was the best parade he had seen in his life. In the evening, Mountbatten held a reception at his palatial mansion now designated Governor General's House and later to be called Rashtrapati Bhavan. A Major in the Army still figured in the Warrant of Precedence and I along with several Majors was invited to that reception. There were about a thousand guests and the Mountbattens stood in their regalia shaking hands with each guest as he arrived. This was a tremendous display of their physical stamina. I also attended the farewell function held at Delhi Gymkhana Club for the departing British and Pakistani officers. Major General Cariappa promoted to that rank on Independence Day and Indian officers were the hosts. Admiral Sir Andrew Fraser Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet at Trincomalee and his wife were also present. As Mountbatten arrived, the National Anthem was played. While shaking hands with Mountbatten, Fraser stood to attention and bowed while Lady Fraser did a courtesy. This is done only for the Sovereign or his representative. Fraser was ten years senior to Mountbatten and a four star Admiral while Mountbatten was still in his two star substantive rank. In 1948 Mountbatten reverted to the Navy in his substantive rank, commanding the cruiser squadron in the Mediterranean, while Fraser was now the Chief of the Royal Navy, the First Sea Lord. It took a few years for Mountbatten to work his way up and become not only the First Sea Lord but also Admiral of the Fleet, counterpart of a Field Marshal. He was also appointed to the newly created appointment of Chief of Defence Staff in the UK, an appointment he held for six years.

In late August 1947 the law and order situation in Delhi and Northern India had become very critical. One afternoon we in Military Operations were told that an operations room had to be set up in the Governor General's House for Mountbatten by nine o' clock in the morning. Mountbatten who was in Simla was returning to Delhi the same evening for a Cabinet meeting the next day. Manekshaw had just become a full Colonel as our Deputy Director. He took me along with another officer and some draftsmen and clerks to the Governor General's House. He explained to us what all had to be done. After he saw us working for a while, he left us there saying that he would come the next morning to check

things. It was a Herculean task and we had to work throughout the night putting up maps showing troop locations and incidents of violence. Mountbatten's staff was very considerate. We were well looked after with several rounds of coffee, sandwiches and other refreshments. Manekshaw came in the morning and was satisfied with our work. At 9 AM, Mountbatten walked in to see how things were. He was quite satisfied with what we had done. He asked his Military Secretary, Colonel Douglas Currie "I hope these officers were not made to starve while they were working" Currie replied that we had been well looked after. He then turned round to us saying, "Well done." In 1972 Manekshaw was the Army Chief and I was a Major General on his staff. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, came to Delhi to collect material for their book *Freedom at Midnight* which they were writing. Manekshaw asked me to brief them about what had happened and show them around the various sites in Delhi connected with events of 1947. I showed them the room in Rashtrapati Bhavan where we had worked through the night and had put up maps for emergency meeting of the Cabinet. In their book they wrote that Nehru and Patel asked Mountbatten to come over from Simla to help them manage the critical situation in the Country. They also wrote that Mountbatten took charge and used to preside over Cabinet meetings. A Governor General being a constitutional Head of State was not supposed to play an executive role. Cabinet meetings are required to be presided over by the Prime Minister who is the Head of the Government. This became a controversial issue when the book, '*Freedom at Midnight*' was published. I read in the papers that some people contradicted this saying that this had not happened.

In 1960, I was sent for a course at the Joint Services Staff College at Latimer near London, an Institution recently established at Mountbatten's initiative. It was a combined integrated staff course for the three Services. It was an intermediate staff course between the Service Staff Colleges in Britain and the Imperial Defence College. The latter is now called Royal College of Defence Studies and the former National Defence College. The students at Latimer were all from Britain and NATO countries except one from India and two from Pakistan. Mountbatten in his flamboyant style gave a most interesting talk to us. I shall mention some of its highlights. He stated that when he was a child he used to sit on his father's knees and ask his father Lord Brattenberg, who was then the First

Sea Lord, *'Dad what is the secret of the supremacy of the Royal Navy in the world?'* He told him, *'The Royal Navy should be twice as large as any other Navy in the world'*. Mountbatten said that his problem was that when he became the First Sea Lord, the Royal Navy had become half the size of other great navies of the world. Mountbatten and his father had been the only father son duo in the history of the Royal Navy to have held the appointment of First Sea Lord. His father had to step down from that appointment in the First World War because of his German name and connection. It was Mountbatten's ambition to redeem his father's honour. He not only attained that appointment but also became Admiral of the Fleet and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In this there was a similarity between him and another great war leader of that century. Douglas MacArthur was the son of Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur, one of the distinguished Chiefs of the US Army who later became Governor General of the Philippines. Douglas also became the US Army Chief but outranked his father as a five star General and with a most impressive war record, as also in his appointment as Pro Consul of Japan. Mountbatten talked to us about the need for joint functioning of the three Services in modern war. Each Service had to give up its inhibitions. He found that in the name of tradition, the Navy quoted the Battle of Trafalgar, the Army the Battle of Waterloo and the Air Force not to be left out, the Battle of Britain. Given the fact that as Chief of Combined Operations in 1940, he used to attend meetings of Chiefs of Staff Committee, while the present Service Chiefs were going around with three stripes on their shoulder, he was able to make them fall in line and introduce a new working ethos. In India he had introduced a common cadet academy for the three Services, the first of its kind in the world as also a common staff college at one location for the three Services, with each Service having its separate course along with some common training programme. Before the war, the Army used to have a two years staff course, the Navy six months and the Air Force one year. He had heard that with one year course for all the three Services in India, the Army had no week-ends, the Air Force had all the week-ends and the Navy was on a permanent week-end. He also had a dig at all the staff courses in the UK. He told us that he knew that in the Service Staff Colleges at Greenwich, Camberley and Bracknell, the instructors asked questions and if the students did not know the answers, they bowled them out. At the Joint Services Staff College the instructors asked questions

and if the students did not know the answers, they did not mind. And at the Imperial Defence College they dare not ask any questions because they were sure that the students did not know the answers. After cracking this joke, he advised us not to go by that way of working. He wanted us to put in hard work and know the answers better than our instructors.

That evening there was a reception in his honour. Dinner jacket with black tie was the prescribed dress. I chose to wear my black *sherwani* and *churidar*. Apparently to identify himself with India, he came straight to me as I was the only Indian at the function. He said to me, "You look like Pandit Nehru". I knew he was referring to my dress rather than my appearance. I replied, "But Sir, I do not have a red rose." He replied, "In our country we had the war of roses before the Tudors came to power. Make sure that you do not have a war of roses in India." That was the last time I saw Mountbatten or interacted with him.

In 1979, I was a Lieutenant General holding the appointment of Adjutant General. I was the Army's chief of personnel and was also in charge of ceremonials. One day, the British Military Attache came to see me in my office. He told me that Mountbatten was upset that a letter he wrote to our Defence Minister over three months back had not been replied, nor even acknowledged. I inquired from him the subject matter of the letter. He said that Mountbatten was planning arrangements for his own funeral. It had been agreed that the function would take place in Westminster Abbey. I assured the Attache that I would look into the matter and get a reply sent to the Admiral. Normally such a letter would have come to me to draft a reply. I had not received any such letter. I checked up with the Defence Minister's Secretariat and they were not aware of that letter. I spoke to Jagjivan Ram, the then Defence Minister. He remembered that such a letter had come. A search was launched by his staff. The letter had been misplaced. It was located after a couple of days. Instead of sending it to me to put up a draft, Jagjivan Ram on his own, made out a tactful reply. He wrote to Mountbatten that he had received his letter some time back but he did not have the heart to send him a reply. In India it was a bad omen to discuss the funeral of a living person. He was so much loved in India that there was no question of the Armed Forces of India not suitably participating in his funeral.

However, he prayed that the occasion for that did not arise for many many years to come. I received this letter to be handed over to the British Military Attache for sending it on to Mountbatten.

It so happened that within a couple of months of this, Mountbatten while holidaying in Ireland died off the coast. The IRA had attached a bomb to his small boat which exploded at sea. India was represented at his funeral in Westminster Abbey by a suitable contingent of its three Services, led by the then Naval Chief, Admiral Pereira.

REQUIREMENT OF INSTRUCTORS

USI has been conducting contact programmes for DSSC aspirants. These have proved to be very useful and popular. This year we have planned to run five such programmes (from Jun to Aug 2010). Officers who wish to be instructors on such programmes may please contact Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd), Chief Instructor USI.

Letters to the Editor

I

Morale of the Armed Forces

Sir,

The Chambers dictionary defines 'morale' as the mood as regards courage and confidence in the organisation. Some of the recent events and controversies in the media—whether pertaining to corruption in the sale of canteen goods, fake citations for seeking awards, unauthorised diversion of petrol and rations for personal gains, or the role of middlemen and inducements for procurement of arms—have shown the Armed Forces in poor light. The so called 'Sukhna land scam' and the role of senior army officers in it have drawn adverse criticism in the media. It is good that we have a proactive and vigilant media. However, what the media also needs to say - which so far it has not - is the fact that even today the Armed Forces have zero tolerance for corruption, especially in comparison to most other national institutions and organisations.

The Indian Armed Forces are a large organisation. They have their own traditions, institutions and norms. In fact, by and large, they are a unique community, well respected for their distinct identity and standards. This is reflected by their conduct in national wars, natural calamities and even in its smart cantonments. This is because we operate in a time-tested systematic and transparent manner, following the norms and chain of command. The senior officers are expected to and display high moral standards, following the service norms. In case of any aberrations, the Armed Forces take swift action unlike other organisations. I am personally aware of many cases, where Army personnel have been given strict punishments, including dismissals. Which of the other national institutions can truthfully claim a similar record? However, the Armed Forces believe more in action than in presentation. That is why, even after many instances of the Armed Forces taking appropriate actions against deviant personnel, just because we have not unduly projected such actions, the media has chosen not to cover these.

It is for us to examine the reasons for the 'beatings' in the media and in the public eye, which appears to increasingly be the case although the Armed Forces of today are significantly better in many ways than that of a decade ago. We have better tools, more professional junior leaders and better fighting doctrine. We have top class training institutions and

management systems, well supported by regimental customs and excellent opportunities for sports and adventure. However, we have not projected these well in the public domain, because of our traditional aloofness inherited from our colonial heritage or the perception of the 'security syndrome' which is often misplaced. Thus, we are also not getting the better talent which we should ideally attract.

The Armed Forces have to operate in an environment which cannot be immune to the pressures and influences of the society. These must, however be resisted strongly by senior leaders in the Services. We have allowed influence in matters of promotions and extensions of services in a few cases of senior officers. We also have to realise that our political leadership is generally not aware of military ethos, conventions and doctrines. They are dependant on the civil servants who process all our cases, even though they are no specialists or experts in any military issues. We do not have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to render single point military advice or resolve inter-service priorities.

The 'combat edge' has been allowed to be eroded. We have got used to accepting directions and saying 'yes'. Civil servants and politicians have got used to taking the Armed Forces for granted, and also exploiting intra-service differences. But taking the Armed Forces for granted places us all as a Nation at peril. The Nation was surprised at Kargil and again in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai for want of adequate surveillance means. But despite these scares and attacks, acquisitions still remain slow. As a Nation and a society we are quick to point fingers, and when in danger to rely on our Forces, but we have become far too selfish and self-centred to constructively strengthen them materially and morally.

In such circumstances, how can one upgrade the morale of our Armed Forces. Modern wars are fought on the strength of technological superiority of the Armed Forces. While we have a highly skilled Defence Force, its capability to defend the borders and the security of the Country depends to a large extent on the provisioning of arms and equipment, i.e. combat potential. This implies:

- (a) Improving our combat edge by modernisation of defence equipment, guns and aircraft.
- (b) Resolving alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which is subject to interpretation by the two sides.
- (c) Improving surveillance, both ground and air-based.
- (d) Ensuring better development of infrastructure along the borders for roads, airfields and logistics.

We simultaneously need to counter other threats to National Security, by development of a National Strategy and proactive response to cross-border terrorism. This needs to be reflected in the pro-active actions of our political leadership rather than belated disjointed and defensive response - as was post 26 November 2008. We also *must* enhance maritime power to defend our coastline and island territories, and project our Comprehensive National Power - economic, military and technological - aggressively. This needs to be supplemented by a firm and pragmatic foreign policy.

We must at the same time harness the incisive expertise of 'Senior Retired Officers' by giving them an active role in the National Security Council (NSC). Presently, the CCS and the NSA constitute the NSC. It needs to be supplemented by a senior retired service officer to balance the national perspective. Our response to events such as the Mumbai terrorist attacks and our preparation for such contingencies would have been perhaps different with the induction of a military adviser, as also a permanent CDS.

The Armed Forces also have to introspect and reflect within as to why there has been erosion in values and standards. The intention here is not to highlight all the possible shortcomings and the anomalies, but the soldiers tend to blame their officers for not getting a fair deal. Lack of job satisfaction and over centralisation of authority even in matters of resource control by the senior officers create dissatisfaction amongst the juniors.

Finally, it needs to be emphasised that the Armed Forces function best in an environment of faith and trust. This extends to superior/ higher echelons, vertically, to the sister formations and with the subordinate units. The guiding principle is always '*National Interests*' and '*Service Before Self*'. This ethos and culture takes time to build. The political leaders and the media need to be made aware that military institutions have been developed over a period and need to be respected and *not judged by isolated events*. Dignity of soldiering and the soldier has to be maintained. The shortcomings which erode military capability, technological superiority and leadership qualities must be highlighted, but the '*status and morale*' of the Armed Forces must not be diluted by tampering with its systems and institutions. Such tampering will prove counter-productive.

Yours Sincerely

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

II

The Enemy Within

Sir,

In his otherwise interesting and thought provoking article "The Enemy within" in the USI Journal (Oct-Dec 2009), Lieutenant General S Talwar, PVSM, VSM (Retd) is dismissive of the impact of Kautilya's thinking specifically the concept of Circle of Neighbouring States on Indian psyche. The author makes the astounding assertion that "Kautilya's teaching led to an inflexible stance in our thinking"! Further, the Author has deduced that lack of cooperation amongst Indian kings against external aggression was due to the doctrine of Rajmandala (Circle of Neighbouring States) propounded in Arthashastra by Kautilya (or Chanakya as he was variously addressed). I would like to suggest that the Statal Circle concept has to be understood in its entirety before such an inference can be drawn. That does gross injustice to arguably the greatest thinker ancient India has produced. I shall confine my brief to Statal Circle Concept and Chanakya's thoughts on the importance of military in a nation state.

In fact Chanakya's Rajmandala (Statal Circle) Concept was for a Vijigishu (Conqueror) and was used with telling effect by him in pursuance of statecraft, higher direction of war and strategy to create an empire in a brief period for Chandragupta. To explain the concept succinctly I quote from Arthashastra-"Throwing the circumference of the Circle of States beyond his friend's territory and making the Kings of those States as the spokes of that Circle, the Conqueror shall make himself as the nave of the Circle".¹ The idea is marked by aggrandisement, of expansion, of dominating maximum possible lands in and around the vicinity of own territory. *En passant*, I may mention that the present day US policy in the Far East is termed as Hub and Spokes System where the USA is the hub and Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand are the spokes!² Is there a similarity of concept here?

It was obvious to Kautilya that the dynamic situation in a Statal Circle would always be in a state of flux and hence he laid emphasis on a flexible strategy. Rigidity in thinking as mentioned by the author was anathema to him. In addition to the standard model Kautilya discusses various contingencies e.g. when the Vijigishu is strong or when he is weak etc. The Rajmandala Concept was to be synchronous with the Strategy of Sadgunya (Six Fold Policy). These were – Sandhi (Peace), Yana (Active Preparations), Asana (Neutrality), Samsraya (Alliance), Dwaidibhav (Double Policy) and Vighraha (war). Kautilya enjoins the Vijigishu to adopt policies that would lead the nation state to Vriddhi (prosperity) and avoid those that result in kshya (decline)³.

Was Chanakya's Rajmandal Concept merely a high sounding theory or did it produce tangible results? This can be easily gauged from the fact

that his protégé Chandragupta, in a very short span of time, rose from humble beginnings to become the first emperor in ancient India. In 321 BC he destroyed the powerful army of Magadh that was feared even by Alexander's army. In 305 BC when Selukus Nikator, (Alexander's famous commander) attempted to regain the provinces of India that had been won earlier by Alexander from Porus, Chandragupta thrashed him decisively. Terms of peace included giving up the provinces of Kabul, Herat, Kandhar (Afghanistan) and Gedrosia(Eastern Iran)⁴. Additionally, Selukus gave the hand of his daughter in marriage to Chandragupta and appointed Megasthenes to his court as an ambassador^{5,6}. Thus the empire founded by Kautilyan thinking that spanned from Bengal to Afghanistan and beyond continued to flourish even later during the reign of Bindusar and Asoka.

Further, Kautilya believed in creating a formidable military machine as he considered it a *sine qua non* for governance. According to Plutarch, Chandragupta had 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 9000 elephants, 8000 chariots and an Admiralty.⁷ These figures compare favourably even with the present day Army! Chanakya ensured that this large standing army was extremely well paid and in the order of precedence the Senapati (C-in-C) ranked higher than the Yuvraj (Crown Prince)!⁸ To India's misfortune the latter day rulers of Indian states did not follow the precepts outlined by Kautilya and paid little attention to matters military.

The question why rulers of Indian armies in the 18th Century employed foreign mercenaries is answered by Shelford Bidwell himself when he says that "they (Indian commanders) saw in the European methods – order, drill and discipline – simple qualities but alien to the native military"⁹.

Yours sincerely

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

End Notes

1. Shamashastry R, Kautilya's Arthashastra, Book VI, Ch 2.
2. Power Realignment in Asia: China, India & the United States, Alyssa Ayres and C Raja Mohan, Sage Publications, 2009.
3. Ibid, BookVII, Ch 16.
4. Ancient India & Indian Civilisation, by Paul Masson, Helena de Willman-Grabowska & Phillipe Stern, pp34-37.
5. Asoka by Vincent A Smith, Ch I pp15.
6. Ancient India & Indian Civilisation, by Paul Masson, Helena de Willman-Grabowska & Phillipe Stern, pp34-37
7. Singh Nagendra, The Theory of Force & Organisation of Defence in Indian Constitutional History, pp51.
8. Ibid, Book VII, Ch 5
9. Bidwell Shelford, Swords for Hire

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Securing India: Assessment of Defence and Security Capabilities.

By Rahul K Bhosle (New Delhi : Vij Books, 2009), pp 298, Rs 795.00, ISBN: 9788190848787.

This book has a simple leitmotif: assessing how secure India as a Nation and Indians as a people are today. The issues dealt with are enmeshed in a wave of complexity. They need to be analysed and understood because of immense importance to the Nation. The Indian penchant of treating all defence related issues as a 'holy cow', has ensured that the subject was not given the attention it deserves by the policy makers in power, the intelligentsia and even the media. The public at large of course remains blissfully ignorant of the issues involved. This book by Brigadier Rahul Bhosle is a valuable addition to the very limited literature on the subject.

The author has rightly stated that the Indian state has been reticent in articulating National security policies. This is a lacuna which we need to overcome at the earliest considering the multifarious nature of challenges which the Nation is faced with today. As India is yet to articulate a National security policy, the author has attempted to derive it from original quotes by key leaders such as the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and others on the subject. Despite scanty information from public sources, the author has done a commendable job in analysing India's security concerns and has thrown up a whole lot of suggestions which deserve debate and implementation.

The book has been divided into four parts dealing with the security challenge, Indian capabilities, the role of Indian Industry in defence and finally a review giving out recommendations on how India should be secured. Written in good prose, it is a must read for the strategic community. I recommend this book to all those who have an interest in India's security.

Major General Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd)

Confronting Terrorism. *Edited by Maroof Raza; Foreword by Stephen P Cohen, Delhi: Penguin India, 2009), pp 201, Rs. 450.00 (hardback), ISBN 9780670083695.*

Are we finding a way to confront terrorism? The action that India's Home Minister proposes; to bifurcate his Ministry into two segments with one totally devoted to tackling terrorism, is a sign of the an attitudinal shift in our methods. However, creating structures is one matter but

understanding the problem is yet another ball game. We succeed only if we mesh the two. It is these problems that the recently released Penguin India publication *Confronting Terrorism*, edited by Maroof Raza, is all about.

He succeeds in presenting several crucial aspects of the Indian difficulties with his selection of multidisciplinary practitioners and scholars contributing to the thematic framework. However, what is material is the long and detailed introduction by Maroof Raza, where he very timely points out, "India's leaders are yet to decide where to start. All they do is, dismiss the wickedness of the individuals rather than challenge the legitimacy of their ideas, despite the fact that, since the mid 1980s, India has witnessed terrorism in one form or other."

According to Professor Stephen Cohen in his detailed and splendid foreword to the volume, "India's security managers have a good idea of how to manage insurgencies that are purely domestic but tackling those which receive outside support require the willing or unwilling co-operation of others, notably Pakistan". This is the kernel issue and Afsir Karim, Gautam Das and Ali Ahmed, all military men turned scholars like Maroof, have objectively referred to this nefarious link whilst elaborating on the canons of the fourth generation warfare. Over and above the commonalities, both Karim and Das have delved at length on the country's home grown radicalism and militancy in the North-East. The most material input in my view, comes from an ex- policeman Ved Marwah, whose review of the deficiencies of the Indian Police is truly comprehensive.

Bharat Karnad is a scholar on nuclear issues and, therefore, his presentation on Nuclear Terrorism is an area for key consideration. Bhasyam Kasturi has ventured to suggest structural changes in the intelligence processes but he has looked at it from a distance; although such changes are already taking place. Shairi Mathur has surveyed terrorism and Swapna Nayudu draws from Afghanistan's experiences.

However, this well informed commentary from the Indian security intelligentsia can only help if we think out of a box of conventional ideas having assimilated what the authors had to tell. There are crucial political issues of interference in matters police, which only a political system can set right. There is an ingrained message that inter - disciplinary learning from each other's core competences amongst the security forces; for internal or external threats must be made the order of the day. And lastly perhaps, is to determine the best methodology through which the politico understands the new nature of the war. This book – a collector's item – does justice to all these issues.

Power, Commerce and Influence: India's Look East Experience. Edited by R Sen, T Chakraborty, A Majumdar and S Chatterjee (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 2009) pp 355, Rs 630.00, ISBN: 9788170951186.

India's Look East Policy is an important foreign policy initiative taken during the stewardship of PV Narasimha Rao even as some argue that its implementation lacks coherence. The basic idea is to integrate India with the growing economies of South East Asia and Asia-Pacific. Amongst other factors this was farsighted and important in context of increasing Chinese presence in Indian Ocean and South Pacific region.

The present collection of 15 papers by intellectuals on international relations deals with the historical and contemporary perspectives. The present volume has been compiled post a National seminar in Jadavpur University, Kolkata under the auspices of the UGC. The essays answer many questions including how 'Policy' can be made more resilient, meaningful and effective in future. Asia Pacific region has emerged as the central pivot in the Indian view of Asian stability. It is interesting to note that definition of the East has now been expanded to include China, Japan, South Korea and Australia. India would like a multilateral security order in the Asia Pacific in partnership with ASEAN.

Can an Asian Economic Community emerge as a third pole of world economy after the European Union and the NAFTA? In the perception of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Asian Economic Community can prosper only if the integrated market is served by efficient 'road, rail, air and shipping services. India has launched military contacts and joint exercises with ASEAN states to include Japan, South Korea and China. There are periodic Naval exercises, bilateral cooperation with Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Laos, Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand. India-ASEAN open sky agreement is also noteworthy.

Is our policy driven by the ineluctable rivalry with China? Many would argue that Japan, South Korea and Australia also are in search of a strategic tie up to counter the growing influence of China in Asia-Pacific. India has done well to forge Mekong-Ganga Cooperation so that China is out of it. Again BIMSTEC has potential for future cooperation that may benefit all parties.

The book throws many valuable insights on a subject vital to our security and economic concerns.

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

Environmental Security: New Challenges and Role of Military.
By PK Gautam (Delhi : Shipra Publications, 2010) pp 166, Rs 495.00, ISBN : 9788175415249.

This book is the result of a fellowship awarded to the author by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Out of the four aspects indicated for 'Researching the Role of Military in Environmental Security' the author has covered two in this book viz, 'Role of the Military in Ecological Restoration' and 'Military to Military Cooperation' pertaining to ecology. The two other areas of study mentioned on the Preface of the book have been published as separate studies.

This work combines theoretical knowledge, visits to remote areas and a detailed study of environmental literature, with a deep knowledge of India's security concerns coalesced with the author's passion for environment. Several case studies have been carried out to highlight the activities of the military in ecological conservation. Given the authors interaction with the ecological task forces in the pursuance of his work, the second chapter covers these forces in some detail. Indian Army is the only army in the world which has raised such units. There are eight ecological units in the country; each mandated with a specific task, e.g. one of them has the task of restoring the Agar watershed North of Mussoorie Hills. Subsequent chapters deal with different regions of the country each with its own peculiarities. The insightful study of our less known and remote areas is a highlight of the book.

The author bemoans the lack of sensitivity of the mainstream to the unique culture and people of these areas. The suggested prescription is : develop these areas, urbanise, construct roads and remove entry restrictions where applicable, but with minimum environmental degradation and trampling of biodiversity. The study deftly links ecological episodes to insurgency and points to its economic roots.

Chapter 7 explains another interesting prognosis which identifies ecological threats and links these to the role of Ecological Task Forces. Certain important issues have been raised. Most importantly, the Army plants large number of trees and yet never claims carbon credits and related funds. The advantages of indigenous '*kikar*' over foreign *kikar* have been explained. The latter have been responsible for the extinction of a number of native species.

The last chapter deals with environmental agenda for the military and military-to-military cooperation. The latter, which was one of the two areas of study, has been perfunctorily covered in about two and a half pages. This aspect needed more attention given the fact that the militaries in the region share a common ecological system such as the Himalayas, rivers and the oceans. This cooperation could form an important tool of diplomacy in the region.

This book is a notable follow up of the author's previous book on environment security. It is well written, easy to follow and provides a wealth of knowledge. It has interesting photographs, sketches and good quality print. The depth of research and the authors commitment are discernable. Recommended for libraries and universal reading.

Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)

Natural History and the Indian Army. By JC Daniel and Lieutenant General Baljit Singh (Retd) *Bombay Natural History Society (Oxford University Press, 2009), 260p, Rs. 1200.00, ISBN (10): 0198064500 & ISBN(13): 9780198064503.*

The Bombay Natural History Society (BNHS) has been conserving nature since 1883. In early 21st century, BNHS launched the green governance web portal where the green, pursuits of the Armed Forces are documented. JC Daniel has served with the organisation since 1950. Combined with noted environmentalist Lieutenant General Baljit Singh (Retd) they have filled an important niche in the literature of the relationship between natural history and the Indian Army.

The extinction of species is accelerating. The current campaign to save tigers and the extinction of vultures are the "battle indications" to show that biodiversity is being lost; sometimes even before being recorded. It is well known that in the colonial days the British officers had all the leisure and time to undertake nature watching and recording. Thankfully, this breed of nature lovers were not shikaris who as the book recounts were responsible for extinction of the cheetah.

The excellent book, with added photographs and sketches, has reprinted 25 articles, with comments of editors, from journals by 19 former military officers of which three are Indians. The period is from 1778- 2002.

The subjects covered are Indian trees, birds, animals, reptiles, insects, butterflies etc. as well as essays on natural history of the Narmada region, Kaziranga, and Deesa in North Gujrat, and preservation of wild life.

The question is not just of recording the natural history. It is to encourage a new generation of soldiers and families to revive the strong links of military life with natural history. The military will continue to serve in remote and difficult regions full of wild life. In 2007, a new bird specie Bugun Liocichala was discovered in Arunachal Pradesh. At the same time, documentation by ethnic communities is lacking as some of the languages are without a script. This is an era where even the house sparrow is disappearing as humans and animals struggle for habitat, space and survival in an urbanising India. The book may thus motivate

military personnel to preserve, observe and document wild life and nature. The academic community, scholars, citizens including younger generations as also corporate India will benefit from this book. I would also recommend the book to be in private collection of officers.

Colonel PK Gautam (Retd)

The Armed Forces Tribunal Law. By Maj Gen Nilendra Kumar AVSM, VSM (Delhi: Universal law Publishing Co Pvt Ltd, 2010) pp 357, Rs 395.00, ISBN 9788175348233.

The book is primarily a compilation of The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, and its allied Acts and Rules. The author has incorporated suitable notes under various sections of the Act in a lucid and simple language. The notes would serve as a suitable guide and as a ready reckoner to understand the meaning and purport of important provisions of the Act. The inclusion of some of the views aired by the members during Parliamentary debate in the Rajya Sabha at the time of passing of the Armed Forces Tribunal Bill, 2005 is a noteworthy feature of the book. Similarly, the inclusion of the report of the Standing Committee on Defence will help the reader to understand in brief the background and circumstances which led to passing of the Bill, as well as, discussion on various provisions of the Bill before it became an Act of the Parliament. It also gives an insight regarding the reasons which led to exclusion of some of the aspects of military service like leave, transfers and postings etc., from the purview of the Armed Forces Tribunal.

The book interalia contains the Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2008 and the Armed Forces Tribunal (Practice) Rules, 2009, which will serve as a ready reckoner for a lawyer practising military law. The reader will find useful references in the form of citation of some of the finally adjudicated cases by various courts of India including the Supreme Court. By adding the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957, and the Air Force Act, 1950 in the book with up to date amendments incorporated, the author has provided a single, handy and ready handbook on military law.

Colonel R Balasubramanian, VSM (Retd)

Democracy and Development in India: From Socialism to Pro Business. By Atul Kohli (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp 447, Rs. 850.00, ISBN 978019567933.

Written over a span of twenty five years from the early 1980s to 2006, the collection of 15 essays alongwith the introduction analyse the political economy of development in India. The commitment of the state changed

from socialism to protecting and fostering pro business interests in this period.

The essays thematically divided into political change, political economy politics and development in select states share a theoretical and normative unity as they adopt a state society frame of reference and argue for a social democratic model of development. Indian democracy, the author holds is best understood by focusing on the way power distribution is negotiated by various groups and not by socio - economic determinants alone.

The author observes that the economic reforms introduced from 1991 onwards have been more pro-business than pro-market. The policies have favoured established business groups which have led to 'India Incorporated' taking shape.

The political process in the management of power has been characterised by continuous adjustments between forces of centralisation and decentralisation. The interests of the powerful are safeguarded. Those who challenge the system are accommodated either by granting them more autonomy or a larger share of resources. On balance, the state has put its weight behind the winners of the new economy, namely business groups, without adequately compensating those who are left behind.

The narrative is descriptive and backed by references. Overall, the author gives primary importance to internal factors in determining the nature of development.

The unfamiliarity of the author with details is revealed in various mistakes and awkward phrases, e.g. names are wrongly spelt; '*Bootlingam*' instead of *Bhootalingam* and '*Pi Panandikar*' in place of *Pai Panandikar*; the book informs of '*landlords employing slave labourers*', '*government raiding business houses*' and '*conducting nuclear blasts*' – such aberrations detract from the scholarship otherwise evident in the book.

The book is nonetheless a valuable addition to the discourse on development written in an inter-disciplinary framework viewed by a non resident scholar who can perhaps see the whole more clearly than the parts.

Mrs Sudha Palot Rao, IES

The Unplanned Revolution: Observations on the Processes of Socio-Economic Change in Pakistan. By Arif Hasan (Karachi, Oxford University Press Karachi, 2009), pp 307, Rs 495.00, ISBN 9780195476699

Arif Hasan, an architect and an urban planner, based at Karachi has captured very well the "enormous" socio-economic changes that have

been taking place in different parts in Pakistan. The author, a keen social scientist, has made the observations during his personal visits in 1980s and 1990s. Subsequent new trends in early this century have been updated as postscripts. "The changes have been varied depending on accessibility of social structure, clan and tribal affiliations." The migration from India in 1947 was the "turning point" in the history of Pakistan. The society which was earlier "multi-religious and multi-cultural became uni-religious and is attempting to become uni-cultural as well." This was one of the reason for the break up of Pakistan. The Zia era established "religious power which destroyed government institutions and institutionalised corruption and nepotism." Pak elite created their own 'westernised' world. The Afghanistan war was responsible for introduction of drugs and guns in the society.

In the NWFP, the deeply entrenched traditional leadership of landlords and Imams have not allowed social changes. The segregation of women in most areas of NWFP is very severe. There are contradictions. The number of women hailing from all over the state studying in Peshawar have increased manifold. The postscript of 2008 adds that American attacks from across the border have further strengthened the political base of religious right.

Karachi, the largest town, has about 50 per cent population living in informal settlements called "*katchi abadi*". Its reality is "emergence of first world economy and sociology with third world wage and political structure." The social values of younger generation are changing fast and the joint family system is breaking down.

Pakistan is a divided society: between the rich and poor, orthodox Imams and upwardly young mobile; corrupt state functionaries and civil society groups. The author is of the view that without the process of dialogue and reconciliation between differing sections, the problems in Pakistan's society can not be resolved. Unless this is done, these differences would lead to more violence and crime.

It is a must read book for any one who wishes to understand Pakistan in its entirety.

Colonel Virendra Sahai Verma (Retd)

The Political Career of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. By William S Metz. Edited by Roger D Long (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 168, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 9780546736.

This is the first researched dissertation on the political life of Jinnah, sixty years after his demise. It brings out new material and interpretation relating to the role of Fazl-i-Hussain and Malviya the two fundamentalists, as well as other political players and the Labour Government. The reason,

why Jinnah turned, from a staunch nationalist to a votary of 'two nations' concept has been examined.

It was under the influence of secular minded leaders – Surendernath Banerjee, Naoroji and Gokhale, that Jinnah imbibed nationalism as the key to seek Swaraj. He not only opposed the separate Muslim electorate but also the Khilafat cause. The issues which had a profound impact on him and changed his thinking and course of life were : marital discord at home; public differences in life; and being pushed from the centre stage by Mahatma Gandhi, whose religious fervor to unite the masses to undertake Civil Disobedience dismayed Jinnah. He believed in employing the constitutional methods only.

The neglect of the League by the Congress after 1937 UP elections, wide difference in the Nehru Report and the Delhi Muslim Proposals, and the treatment meted out to him at the Nagpur session further contributed to Jinnah's exit from the Congress.

On "Quit India" call, the Congress governments in the Provinces resigned and their leaders were interned. Jinnah called it "Deliverance Day" and unhampered organised the League on an all India basis. The author absolves the British government of harbouring any motive to partition the Country as was apparent in The Cabinet Mission Plan. That too was rejected by Jinnah and he gave the call for "Direct Action" which led to near anarchy.

The aging leaders of the Congress had a Hobson's choice – Pakistan or Civil War. They chose the former option. The author believes that the demand for Pakistan was only to secure greater say for the Muslims at the Centre and Provinces. The truth of *reductio ad absurdum* was not lost on Jinnah, but the dye had been cast. This is an authentic and highly readable account. It is well supplemented with a comprehensive bibliography and an index.

Brigadier KN Singh (Retd)

Karachi: Megacity of Our Times, (Second Edition), Edited by Hamida Khukhro and Anwer Mooraj (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp390, Rs 1950.00, ISBN 9780195475197.

The book is a historical cum contemporary account of development of Karachi as a city, from ancient times of a small village of Kun of Kalchai on the Arabian Sea (also referred as Kalchai) to the capital of Sindh, and later of Pakistan. Today it is the business hub of Pakistan. The story of how this small port became the strategic and trade anchor of the British Empire in Asia, and its development into a millennium city, are covered in sixteen chapters written by thirteen prominent writers of Karachi. Their

essays exhibit the pride they have in their city, and also their dismay at its decay; especially the temporary migrants living in unplanned areas. The ugly face of terrorism is covered in the last chapter; the last page narrating the events and mood of the city after the fatal terrorist attack on Benazir Bhutto.

The contents can be divided into three major parts; covering history, literature and cultural trends, and the views of the present day people who nostalgically reminisce about the changes the town culture has undergone since 1950s. The unique feature of all narrations is the frankness, sincerity and the feeling of pride with which the authors have described their pieces. For instance, due credit is given to the British for various administrative and planned developments and construction activities which resulted in the city becoming the capital of Sindh, to the Hindu Sindhis for establishing educational institutions, and to the Parsees and the Goanese Catholic Christians for making the city an international one.

A lot of research has been done by Hamida Khukhro on the early history of the city, which she covers vividly in the first four chapters. The literary scenes of Urdu, English and Sindhi society, art and drama (including Indian movies and classical dances), various markets, bazaars, eating joints and entertainments places are covered under Multi-Cultural Karachi-Photo Essay. These take a reader through the town on a 'conducted tour', making the book enjoyable. The chapters 'Saddar of the Fifties and Sixties' by Asif Noorani and 'Millennium Karachi' by Ayela Khuhro need a special mention for their comments bringing out how the past and the present generations feel about their city.

The book has a number of photographs showing the architecture of old and new buildings (including places of worship of all faiths). One wishes the editor had also given a latest map of the city, which would have made it easy for a new reader to identify well known landmarks like Clifton Road and Saddar Bazar etc. The book will be enjoyed much – specially by those who have had any links with the city.

Lieutenant General YM Bammi (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter – Ending March 2010

(The books reviewed in Oct – Dec 2009 issue have been added to the library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Armed Conflicts - South Asia

Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2009: Continuing Violence Failing Peace Processes. Edited by D Suba Chandran. New Delhi, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2010. 240p., Rs.595, ISBN 9780415564441

Armed Forces – India

NDC Research Papers 2009/1: Transforming India's Defence Forces: Need for a Paradigm Shift / National Defence College. Edited by K Malik. New Delhi, National Defence College, 2009. 157p., Rs. 100, ISBN-N.A.

Military Generals of India by SC Narang. Delhi, Prashant Publishing House, 2009. 272p., Rs. 895, ISBN 9788190828291

The Rise of Indian Military Power (Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture) by GD Bakshi. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2010. 347p., Rs.780, ISBN 9788187966524

Biography / Memoirs

Jinnah Linlithgow and the Making of Pakistan: A Document Study by TR Sareen. New Delhi, Uppal Publishing House, 2010. 273p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788176580540

Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan by Doug Stanton. New York, Scribner, 2009. 393p., \$28, ISBN 9781416580515

Musharraf: The Years in Power by Murtaza Razvi. India, Harper Collins, 2009. 243p., Rs. 399, ISBN 9788172338155

Leaders Who Changed the World by Gordon Kerr. London, Futura, 2009. 509p., Rs.495, ISBN 9780708801628

China

China's Tibet Policy by BKP Singh. New Delhi, Sumit Enterprises, 2009. 278p., Rs.850, ISBN 9788184201970

Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan by James R Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2008. 167p., £22, ISBN 9780415545341

Civil - Military Relations in Today's China : Swimming in a New Sea
Edited by David M Finkelstein. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2009. 326p., Rs.995, ISBN 9788182744349

China – India Border Conflict

China-India Border Conflict: Recent Perspective by Mohd Wasim. Delhi, Prashant Publishing House, 2010. 288p., Rs.995, ISBN 9789380565019

Counter – Insurgency

The Counter-Insurgency Manual by Leroy Thompson. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2010. 175p., Rs.495, ISBN 9789380502007

Defence Policy – India

New Defence Policy of India: A Perspective by SC Narang. Delhi, Prashant Publishing House, 2010. 318p., Rs.995, ISBN 9789380565002

Disaster Management

NDC Research Papers 2009/3: Resource Utilization, Food Security and Disaster Management/National Defence College. Edited by K Malik. New Delhi, National Defence College, 2009. 213p., Rs.100, ISBN NA

Economic Policy – India

Contemporary India: Economy Society Politics. Edited by Neera Chandhoke and Praveen Priyadarshi. New Delhi, Pearson Education, 2009. 414p., Rs. 265, ISBN 9788131719299

Freedom Movement – India

Pan - Islam In British India: The Politics of the Khilafat Movement 1918-1924 by M Naeem Qureshi. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2009. 572p., Rs.995, ISBN 9780195979046

Select Documents on Neglected Part of India's Freedom Struggle v.1 & v.2 by TR Sareen. New Delhi, Life Span Publishers and Distributors, 2009. Rs.1700 (Set Price), ISBN 9788183690256 (Set ISBN)

Tatya Tope's Operation Red Lotus by Parag Tope. New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2010. 431p., Rs.595, ISBN 9788129115621

Foreign Policy – India

Nation - Building and Foreign Policy in India : An Identity - Strategy Conflict by Tobias F Engelmeier. New Delhi, Foundation Books, 2009. 304p., Rs.795, ISBN 9788175966352

India's Foreign Policy : The Democracy Dimension (With Special Reference to Neighbours) by SD Muni. New Delhi, Foundation Books, 2009. 178p., Rs. 495, ISBN 9788175967137

Globalization

Globalization and Its Discontents by Joseph E Stiglitz. New Delhi, Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd. , 2002. 282p., Rs.399, ISBN 9780143029465

Military History - Ancient India

Warfare in Ancient India: Organizational and Operational Dimensions by Uma Prasad Thapliyal. New Delhi, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2010. 431p., Rs.1050, ISBN 9788173048425

Muslim Sepoy – British Indian Army

Islam and the Army in Colonial India: Sepoy Religion in the Service of Empire by Nile Green. New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 217p., Rs.695, ISBN 9780521762717

Nepal – China – Relations

Nepal and China: A Historical Perspective by Niranjana Bhattarai. New Delhi, Adroit Publishers, 2010. 243p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788187392897

National Security – India

National Security – Emerging Dimensions and Threats by Navniit Gandhi. New Delhi, Pentagon Security International, 2010.156p., Rs.395, ISBN 9788182744394

We Must Have No Price by Arun Shourie. Mumbai, Indian Express Newspapers, 2010. 343p., Rs.495, ISBN 9788129115638

Naxalism – India

Naxalbari Before and After Reminiscences and Appraisal by Suniti Kumar Ghosh. Kolkata, New Age Publishers (P) Ltd., 2009. 350p., Rs. 495, ISBN 9788178190709

North East – India

Violence and Identity in North-East India: Naga-Kuki Conflict by SR Tohring. New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 2010. 222p., Rs.650, ISBN 9788183243445

Nuclear

Briefings on Nuclear Technology in India by PK Iyengar. New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2009. 191p., Rs.495, ISBN 9788129115294

India in a Changing Global Nuclear Order. Edited by Arvind Gupta. Delhi, Academic Foundation, 2009. 312p., Rs. 895, ISBN 9788171887705

In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age by Stephanie Cooke. New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2009. 487p., Rs.895, ISBN 9788125038443

India's Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb by Priyanjali Malik. London. Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2010. 344p., Rs.795, ISBN 9780415563123

Pakistan – History

Beyond Crisis: Re-evaluating Pakistan. Edited by Naveeda Khan. New Delhi, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2010. 581p., Rs. 895, ISBN 9780415480635

Refugees – Bangladesh

Stateless in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India by Deepak K Singh. New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2010. 289p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788132102366

Religion – India

Landmark Churches of India by Shubhi Sood. Noida, SDS Publishers, 2010. 184p., Rs. 2595, ISBN 9788190282802

Space

Chandrayaan and Beyond : Indian Space Exploration Programme ; New Findings About the Moon by Pawan Sikka. New Delhi, Uppal Publishing House, 2010. 358p., Rs.1195, ISBN 9788176580533

Super Powers

NDC Research Papers 2009/2: India and China: Emergence of Future Great Powers /National Defence College. Edited by K Malik. New Delhi, National Defence College, 2009. 143p., Rs.100, ISBN NA

Terrorism

On Nuclear Terrorism by Michael Levi. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2010. 210p., Rs.695, ISBN 9788130909998

The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century by Paul J Smith. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2008. 257p., Rs.895, ISBN 9788182743304

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9. LM/68947	Capt Devanshu Dubey Gautam	Arty
10. LM/68948	Lt Col Neeraj Joshi (Retd)	Arty
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14. LM/68952	Lt Jitendra Kumar Singh	4 JAK Rif
15. LM/68953	Gp Capt MS Venkateshwar (Retd)	F (P)
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17. LM/68955	Maj Sanjiv Sardana	Sigs
18. LM/68956	Maj Mitesh Rana	EME
19. LM/68957	Gp Capt AK Agtey (Retd)	F (P)
20. LM/68958	Maj PS Sidhu	63 Cav
21. LM/68959	Capt Rohit Singh Baghel	ADA
22. LM/68960	Col Vinod Kumar	RVC
23. LM/68961	Maj Kuneek Faujdar	Arty
24. LM/68962	Lt Col JV Mahadik	Arty
25. LM/68963	Capt Pramod S Dixit	Arty
26. LM/68964	Lt Chandresh Kumar	1 Sikh LI
27. LM/68965	Surg Lt Cdr Amit Kumar	Medical
28. LM/68966	Gp Capt Jyotir Bikash Bose	Accts
29. LM/68967	Capt Sambhooti Arora	ADC
30. LM/68968	Maj Gen Ajay Kumar Chaturvedi	Engrs
31. LM/68969	Brig Anil Khetarpal, SM	AMC
32. LM/68970	Maj Sandeep Singh	Arty
33. LM/68971	Lt Jai Prakash Saini	13 Armd Regt
34. LM/68972	Lt Col (Mrs) Priscilla Joshi (Retd)	AMC
35. LM/68973	Lt RK Banu Chander	11 Bihar

36. LM/68974	Lt Kartik Singh Manral	Mech Inf
37. LM/68975	Capt Rajeev Kumar Rai	Sigs
38. LM/68976	Capt Jaivardhan Pandey	1 AER
39. LM/68977	Capt Abhik Das	EME
40. LM/68978	Cdr Sunil Kumar Bhardwaj	Engg
41. LM/68979	Shri Abhishek Shukla	IFS
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43. LM/68981	Lt Vivek Singh, IN	Exec (GS)
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46. LM/68984	Col Kuldeep Singh Dhami (Retd)	6 Para
47. LM/68985	Lt Harprit Singh	15 Punjab
48. LM/68986	Capt Muktesh Suri	53 Armd Regt
49. LM/68987	Maj Anubhav Gairola	47 Armd Regt
50. LM/68988	Col Rakesh Sharma, SM	Arty
51. LM/68989	Capt Harjeet Singh Dhanoa	EME
52. LM/68990	Capt Rohit Bhatt	9 Garh Rif
53. LM/68991	Lt Cdr Kuldeep Singh	Exec
54. LM/68992	Cdr Sandeep Dewan	Exec
55. LM/68993	Lt Vijendra S Yadav	5 Armd Regt
56. LM/68994	Maj Syed Ashrat Ali	ASC
57. LM/68995	Lt Himanshu Rawat	EME
58. LM/68996	Capt Tarun Rana	13 Garh Rif
59. LM/68997	Wg Cdr Malkit Singh Bains (Retd)	F (P)
60. LM/68998	Lt Neha Chopra	ASC
61. LM/68999	Lt Vikash Singh Tanwar	3 Grenadiers
62. LM/69000	Capt Abhilov Sharma	Sigs
63. LM/69001	Lt Vaibhav Vishal	2/11 GR
64. LM/69002	Capt Abhishek Pramod Dawande	Engrs
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68. LM/69006	Capt Sumit Singh Rathore	Engrs
69. LM/69007	Wg Cdr Niket Deep Kalra (Retd)	F (P)
70. LM/69008	Capt NAJ Joseph, IN	Exec
71. LM/69009	Brig Vinod G Khandare, SM	Garh Rif
72. LM/69010	Lt Anil Kumar Kadyan	4 Sikh
73. LM/69011	Gp Capt AG Bewoor, VM (Retd)	F (P)

74. LM/69012	Lt Gagandeep Singh Purba	5 Grenadiers
75. LM/69013	Maj Ajay Singh	9 Mahar Regt
76. LM/69014	Lt Bhatia Love Tilakraj	4 Dogra
77. LM/69015	Gp Capt Sanjeev Bedi	F (P)
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80. LM/69018	Rear Adm AR Radhakrishnan, AVSM	Exec
81. LM/69019	Maj Gen Gagan Deep Bakshi, SM,VSM	Jak Rif
82. LM/69020	Brig Bolin Kumar Datta	AMC
83. LM/69021	Capt Shriram Shriharsha Joshi	Arty
84. LM/69022	Lt Vikas Singh Dahiya	Sigs
85. LM/69023	Lt Gyanendra Madhukar	23 Grenadiers
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87. LM/69025	Col Neeraj Sharma	4/3 GR
88. LM/69026	Lt Col Suresh Narayanan	Engrs
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94. LM/69032	Capt H Sujith	AEC
95. LM/69033	Col Lakhbinder Singh Lidder, SM	2 JAK Rif
96. LM/69034	Capt Viral Tyagi	Sigs
97. LM/69035	Lt Col Nikhil Srivastava	Arty
98. LM/69036	Maj Anish Sharma	AAD
99. LM/69037	Maj Aseen Lakhera	Engrs
100. LM/69038	Capt Manjul Kafaltiya	16 Garh Rif
101. LM/69039	Capt Amit Kumar Dixit	3 Sikh
102. LM/69040	Maj Amit Pal Singh, SM	17 Mech Inf (Guards)
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104. LM/69042	Capt Shyamji Mishra	3 Sikh
105. LM/69043	Lt Avinash Sahebrao Dange	28 Rajput
106. LM/69044	Capt James Sebastian	EME
107. LM/69045	Maj Ashok Kumar (Retd)	Arty
108. LM/69046	Sqn Ldr Puneet Kumar Pareek (Retd)	F (P)
109. LM/69047	Col MM Bhatt, VSM	5/8 GR
110. LM/69048	Maj Sumit Sood	5/5 GR

111. LM/69049	Lt Mahendra Rathore	22 Mech Inf
112. LM/69050	Capt Saurabh Kumar	EME
113. LM/69051	Lt Himanshu Arora	12 Sikh
114. LM/69052	Wg Cdr A Yagneswar	AE (M)
115. LM/69053	Gp Capt SK Bhattacharya, VM (Retd)	F (P)
116. LM/69054	Lt Nirbhay	Sigs
117. LM/69055	Maj Siddharth Ranjan	Engrs
118. LM/69056	Capt Taru Raj Dev	Engrs
119. LM/69057	Maj Gaurav Grewal	5 JAT
120. LM/69058	Brig KJ Singh	AAD
121. LM/69059	Capt Pankaj J Bhojwani	Arty
122. LM/69060	Lt Anil Kumar	Sigs
123. LM/69061	Col Shailendra Kumar	Sigs
124. LM/69062	Capt Praveen Chandel	5 Raj Rif
125. LM/69063	Maj Gen Hardev Singh, KC	Inf
126. LM/69064	Dr Rajendra Shankar Shukla	IAS
127. LM/69065	Brig Jit Mohindar Singh (Retd)	62 Cav
128. LM/69066	Lt Sumit Singh	Arty
129. LM/69067	Lt Yogender Singh	Arty
130. LM/69068	Lt Col Vijay Langer	AMC
131. LM/69069	Shri SK Mathur (Retd)	IFS
132. LM/69070	Capt Vivek Kumar	Inf
133. LM/69071	Brig Naveen Sodhi	63 Cav

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
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