


# U.S.I. JOURNAL

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(Established : 1870)



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- Beyond The 123 - Is There A Plan B ? - General Shankar Roychowdhury,  
PVSM (Retd)
- Security Environment in 2025 : - Air Commodore Jasjit Singh,  
India's Interests and Strategies AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)
- Rise of Naxalism and its Implications for - Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)  
National Security
- Getting to Grips with Global Terrorism - Michael Clarke
- Stability in Afghanistan and Implications - Brigadier Vinod Anand  
for India
- Continuity and Change in War Fighting : - Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Zaki  
The Indian Experience
- "Op Khukri" The United Nations - Lieutenant General V K Jetley,  
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JANUARY-MARCH 2007

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## EULOGY

### BRIGADIER NOSHIR BAYRAM GRANT, AVSM



Brig NB Grant was born on 17 November 1918 at Chennai. He did his schooling at Bishop's School in Pune and went on to do his BE from College of Engineering Poona. He was commissioned into the Corps of Engineers on 17 July 1943 during the Second World War and was on active service in Burma and Malaya.

After independence he took part in two wars with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. During his Army career he held several important appointments. He served as Chief Engineer Nepal Road Project and constructed the first road linking Khatmandu to India. He retired as Chief Engineer Southern Command in 1970. He was awarded Gorkha Dakshin Bhahu Medal (Right Hand of the Gorkhas) by the Royal Government of Nepal. For his meritorious service in the Army he was awarded Ati Vishist Seva Medal (AVSM).

After retirement from the Army, he served as General Manager Bharat Aluminum Company, Chief of Management Services Thermax Private Limited, and Chief Executive of Sikkim Distilleries. He was honorary lecturer at Symbiosis Institute of Management, Pune.

Brigadier Grant was a distinguished member of the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi and served as a Council member for a period of 19 years in two spells from 1977 to 1989 and later from 1993 to 1998. He was a frequent contributor of articles to the USI Journal on defence matters.

He passed away on 02 December 2006 after a brave fight against cancer. May his Soul rest in Peace.

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## EDITORIAL

The article titled 'Beyond the 123 - Is there a Plan B' by General Shankar Roychowdhury, PVSM (Retd) focuses on pros and cons of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and need to work out an alternate Plan B to avoid putting all eggs in the same basket. The author asserts that nuclear technology has intrinsic strategic connotations and even civilian usage envisaged in the Henry J Hyde India-US Civil Nuclear Co-operation Act signed into law by the US President on 18 December 2006, is no exception. The Act and the formal 123 Agreement to follow is ultimately more about the overall strategic relationships India and the US look to construct. For India the core issue is not so much about purely civilian use of nuclear energy, rather the unstated objective of preservation of country's indigenous nuclear weapons programme under all circumstances. Unless this can be ensured the agreement will not be in the national interest. Formal discussions on the agreement are yet to commence, but the Hyde Act carries clear directive to the Government of the United States to adhere to the parameters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all transactions under the Act – a nuanced reiteration of the dictum "Cap, Roll back, Eliminate". Reverting to the strategic connotations, the author has emphasised that China demonstrates its "peaceful rise" not only through surging economic growth, but also by periodic displays of iron beneath the velvet, this time the anti-satellite missile. For India, this is specifically manifested in the ring of China's regional defence agreements with countries in the neighbourhood particularly the military-nuclear nexus with Pakistan. Both the USA and India cannot be faulted if China's galloping advance creates concerns of thunderclouds on the horizon. Perhaps India needs to examine the feasibility of initiating an Indian military-nuclear strategic nexus of its own. This strategic partnership at least in the short or middle term could be with the United States. Public responses to such proposals have to be of denial, framed in politically correct phraseologies. The US has also discovered the limits of its power in Iraq and Afghanistan during war on terror. Under the circumstances, India and the US might be receptive to strategic partnership on mutually beneficial terms. However, if the US side builds around the NPT, 123 Agreement may not go through. Alternatives for such a contingency are needed. These according



to the author boil down to two – either acquire alternate “natural allies” agreeable for nuclear co-operation on mutually advantageous terms, or resort to the self reliance mode of nuclear development both for civilian and strategic purposes. There is a need to move forward on 123 Agreement with caution after having worked out an alternate plan.

On 24 Aug 2006 Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, AVSM,VrC,VM (Retd) presented a paper at the USI on the subject of ‘Security Environment in 2025 : India’s Interests and Strategies’. The script of the talk is published in this issue of the Journal. The author has focused on major trends that are likely to impact the security environment in the near future. During the past couple of decades a global power shift from the Euro-Atlantic West to Asia-Centric East has been taking place. Some of the contributory factors for this shift are ; high growth of economic and military power of China; economic growth of India; economic recovery of Japan; economic and political recovery of Russia and renewed urge to play a global role with closer strategic ties with China ; rising prices of oil affecting energy security and religious extremism acquiring global linkages and greater sophistication. Each of these factors have been discussed in detail in the Article. According to the author, in the year 1820 China accounted for 32.4 per cent of the global income which dropped to 5.00 per cent in 1978. India was the second advanced and rich country with 22.6 per cent of the global income in the year 1700 which dropped to 3.40 per cent by 1978. Both countries are now doing well economically. As per the author’s perception China’s national power is likely to remain ahead of that of India through the coming decades. But that by itself does not create adverse security challenges unless asymmetry in specific areas like the balance of military power usable across the frontiers becomes very significant. Currently, we live in a unipolar world with the USA as the sole super power. The US would do its best to prolong its current status for as long as it can. However, a multi-polar international order with six major players – the USA, China, Japan, European Union, Russia and India – has been evolving. China – Russia axis is gathering strength with China as the stronger partner. The US has sought to have closer relations with India. The United States till recently tended to balance the rise of China unilaterally. It is only now that the US



has said that it would like to help India to become a global player which may imply supporting India as an emergent balancer to China. The author has emphasised that India should respond appropriately keeping her national interests in mind. It may be in India's interest to work through multiple cooperative bilateral relations rather than any polarization. We need to focus on long-term national security planning and strategy making. The NSC Task Force addressed this in its recommendations in June 1998; but these have remained unimplemented. We need to do something about it.

In India 'Naxalite Problem' has become the second major internal security problem after *Jehadi* terrorism and needs to be addressed expeditiously. Shri EN Rammohan in his paper on the subject of 'Rise of Naxalism and its Implications for National Security' has stressed that in any insurgency, the first step should be to study the economic background, assess the causes and then dovetail the security strategy with the plan of setting right the economic, social and developmental failures by the government so that the economic and social issues are set right as the security operations progress. Handling of insurgency should be left to the professionals without political interference. As far as Naxalism is concerned, security and delivering economic and social justice are the key areas. The issues in 'Naxalite Problem' are the 'land' and 'forest produce'. The author has opined that land ceiling should be enforced, forgetting the political factor. The Security Forces should be used to enforce the land ceiling, evict the landlords from their excessive holdings, and ensure that the surplus lands are cultivated by the lowest classes and tribals. They should ensure that the crops grown by the new land holders are secure and they harvest the crop, keeping the landlords away. As far as the forest tracts are concerned, laws should be legislated that only forest dwelling tribes and scheduled castes should have access to forest lands. Cooperatives should be organised of tribals who can be trained and only tribal cooperatives should be allowed to trade in forest produce. The author has emphasised that when these steps are taken, the tribal will know that the government is with him and he will befriend the police force and stop putting land mines for them. The 'Naxalite Problem' will then wither away.



## Beyond The 123 - Is There A Plan B ?

**General Shankar Roychowdhury, PVSM (Retd)**

Nuclear technology (as also aerospace or ocean technology) always has intrinsic strategic connotations irrespective of the background context, and even its civilian usage envisaged in the Henry J Hyde India – US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Act signed into law by the US President George W Bush on 18 December 2006, is no exception. As such, the Act and the formal agreement to follow between the two countries, informally christened as the 123 Agreement (in reference to Section 123 of the American Atomic Energy Act 1950 under which it will be negotiated) is ultimately more about the overall strategic relationships India and the USA look to construct, rather than exclusively regarding access to sensitive technology. It must also be clearly understood at the outset, that for India, the core issue in this engagement with the United States is not so much about purely civilian use of nuclear energy, rather the unstated but overwhelming strategic objective of preservation and maintenance of the country's indigenous nuclear weapons programme under all circumstances. Unless this can be ensured, the agreement will not be in the national interest and not worth the paper it is written on.

Here, it would be well to remember that under the American legislative system, the Hyde Act is an essential preliminary proceeding before attempting to induce any modifications in one of the most sensitive and inviolable precepts of American national security – nuclear non-proliferation. Successful conclusion of the 123 Agreement between India and the USA is a *sine qua non* for the further negotiations down the line which are to follow with the 45 nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the international custodians of nuclear materials and technology, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the watchdogs over nuclear proliferation. Here it would be well to remind ourselves that the USA, along with Russia, China, England and France, is a

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**General Shankar Roychowdhury, PVSM (Retd)** is a former Chief of the Army Staff.

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founder member of the NSG and NPT, and also one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It remains a heavyweight in international negotiations, Iraq and the War on Terror notwithstanding. These negotiations would want the NSG to allow country-specific exemptions for transfers of nuclear materials and technology to India as a non – signatory to the NPT and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), regarding safeguards on Indian nuclear infrastructure declared civilian. Meanwhile, negotiating the 123 Agreement is also becoming somewhat time sensitive to both India and the United States as the countdown to the American presidential elections of 2008 begins, with indicators of a possible Democrat incumbency, who may not be as supportive of the Hyde Act as the current administration. The whole issue is assuming all the signs of speed chess, which India must play with skill and circumspection, because on first viewing, it is playing with a limited number of pieces on the board.

That the Hyde Act could at all shoot the rapids of the American legislative process can be credited entirely to the strong support extended by President George W Bush (whatever his public approval ratings), who took it up almost as a personal mission, while at the Indian end Prime Minister Manmohan Singh similarly exerted himself to bring around a sceptical Indian Parliament on the issue. Formal discussions on the agreement are likely to commence in the near future, but there are strong misgivings in India about the fine print of the Hyde Act which appear to indicate shapes of some of the things to come, as for example, the clear directive to the Government of the United States to adhere to the parameters of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all transactions under the Act – in effect a nuanced reiteration of the basic Clintonian non – proliferation dictum “Cap, Roll back, Eliminate”. The American presidential signature culminated but did not terminate the extended public debate in both India and the United States against the proposed Agreement. The debate in both the countries was intense, contentious, and often bitter, though for differing reasons. It also generated strong adversarial resonance in China and Pakistan who also criticised it, but only because it would be detrimental to their own national security, an aspect which does not seem to have registered at all in this country, perhaps because it is not politically fashionable to do so. The



opposition in India was driven by environmental, strategic, and ideological considerations, with objections ranging from nuclear waste disposal and threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear installations, to compromise on non-alignment and resultant loss of strategic independence, plus knee-jerk anti – Americanism in which Islamic fundamentalists converged with politically correct left intellectuals. In America, the anti – Hyde Act debate was fuelled by classical non-proliferation theology and a sense of rewarding transgression by India, along with perhaps a leftover dash of Cold War pique over the country's pro-Soviet - non-alignment during those years. But all this notwithstanding, the Henry J Hyde Act is, undeniably, a truly watershed legislation which marks a momentous departure for the United States from the basic tenet of non – proliferation, one of the main pillars of its national security doctrine and foreign policy almost ever since the commencement of the nuclear era at the end of the Second World War in 1945, and through the Cold War thereafter. The Act is very specifically India - centric, and an acknowledgement that India's special status as flourishing democracy as well as a non-formalised but de facto nuclear power requires a special tailor - made engagement, rather than the earlier broad brush of technology denial. Even as a non-signatory conscientious objector country, India has adhered to the spirit and guiding philosophy of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), even as it has developed civilian and military nuclear capability through entirely indigenous efforts. Some tend to read into the Henry J Hyde Act – even if somewhat between the lines – a tacit, unstated, perhaps plausibly deniable, acceptance of India's nuclear weapons programme by the United States, but in the shifting sands of international geo-politics such speculations can be either naïve or motivated, and in any event are downright unsafe.

On the Indian side, what has been completely missing so far is a degree of balance and focus on the wider strategic environment within which India has to engage with the United States on this very sensitive issue, with its many implications for geo – political vectors impinging on India's national security, whose possible fallout requires to be assessed within a cat's cradle of several other connected factors which also converge on the issue. These include the overall rivalry between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, the strong military component in the “peaceful rise” of the Peoples Republic of China and its influence



on the currently evolving Sino-Indian relationships, the well entrenched Sino-Pakistan military - nuclear axis which underpins Pakistan's endemic hostility to India and which China retains as a contingency strategic option should need arise in future, Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme and the implications for India, and the pervading cloud of international *jihad* emanating from epicentres in Pakistan, the Middle East, and now the Horn of Africa. It is precisely on these other realities that logical debate on the Indo-US agreement has been conspicuously absent at the Indian end. Meanwhile, additional *masala* is being stirred into the cooking pot, beginning with China's President Hu Jintao's surprising - almost off hand - offer during his visit to India of cooperation in civilian nuclear energy. China is always a major - almost predominant - factor in Indian geopolitical calculations, so, on the face of it, such an offer could open up many hitherto unheard of prospects. However, no further details are in the public knowledge as yet, so it will obviously be desirable to await them, meanwhile attempting to ascertain if any terms and conditions are attached to this bumper offer, and if so, what these could be. Would it for example, be independent of the ongoing Indo - US dialogue on the civilian nuclear issue, or would it be conditional on their short closure ? The possibility of a dummy offer with intent to delay, confuse, and derail ongoing process can of course never be totally discounted (which by the way would be in consonance with China's grand strategies vis a vis the USA on other issues as well). On an overlapping track, outcomes of President Putin's visit on Republic Day 2007 have been extremely positive, but again with the clear precondition of a finalised 123 Agreement. Russia is competing strongly with the USA for strategic relationship with India, but is simultaneously also in a close strategic partnership - almost economic dependency - with China as a major market for weapons technology, and hydrocarbon energy. Russia is undoubtedly a tried and trusted friend of long standing, but the world has changed, and so too have national interests. The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also murmured something about a China - Russia - India triangle, but it is difficult to estimate if this, too, is a serious offer. Meanwhile, "trust but verify" even with old friends in new circumstances.

Blast waves from the Iraq situation are uncovering Iran as yet another major factor in India's "near abroad", which needs to



be handled with circumspection. On the one hand are India's requirements for natural gas from that country, (via Pakistan, which has its own set of problems), and also access by road to Central Asia via Bandar Abbas and other Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, but on the other are also misgivings of nuclear weaponisation by an avowedly hardline Shia Islamic State. As a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is fully entitled to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but western intelligence casts doubt on the possible end ~~use~~ <sup>#</sup> of indigenously enriched uranium, and suspects an ultimate intent of weaponisation on their part. (gab)  
 No matter that the credibility of western intelligence has been severely eroded after their total dishonesty in respect of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but it will nevertheless be advisable for India to tread extremely softly because the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran under its present hard line evangelical leadership, even if conveyed by a generally discredited source, cannot really be regarded with any degree of equanimity. In this connection, it would be well to remind ourselves that India's frequent overtures proclaiming the common cultural and social linkages for over five thousand years with Iran are generally not reciprocated, and in any case interaction between the two countries in more recent times has not been too fraternal either. Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, Iran, a member of CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation), supported Pakistan materially and morally during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. After his deposition in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution, the country governed by the Ayatollahs of the Supreme Religious Council presented itself as the spiritual source of hardline Shia fundamentalism, which President Mahmoud Ahmednihad's violent diatribes against Israel seem to perpetuate further. Indo – Iranian relations must, therefore, be viewed realistically for what they are - formal, correct, but distant, rather than warm or especially close as some want to propagate.

The Peoples Republic of China demonstrates its "peaceful rise" not only through surging economic growth, but also by periodic displays of iron beneath the velvet, this time the anti-satellite missile. For India, this is specifically manifested in the ring of China's regional defence agreements with countries in the neighbourhood particularly the "firm all weather" military-nuclear nexus with Pakistan which has imposed a strategic check since 1963. Both



India and the USA cannot, therefore, be faulted if China's galloping advance also creates concerns of thunderclouds on the horizon. Traditionally addicted to soft-line rhetoric, but without the requisite back up in terms of hard muscle, India is undoubtedly aware of its vulnerabilities *vis a vis* China in almost all aspects of hard national power and capability. This makes it important to utilise every opportunity to try and regain some of the strategic balance lost in the aftermath of 1962. In this context, might the time have arrived for policy makers to examine the feasibility of initiating an *Indian* military - nuclear strategic nexus of its own with a suitable geo-political "natural ally"? Could such a strategic partner at least in the short or middle term, be the United States? *Might* the upcoming negotiations for the 123 Treaty be an opportunity for this? Public responses to such proposals in both India and the United States have necessarily to be of denial, framed in politically correct phraseologies. Such reactions will have to be accepted at face value, but are unnecessarily pejorative to both countries, one a superpower and the other emerging into a status of its own. India is a powerful entity, too large and firmly established to be "used" by anybody, even a superpower, while the United States has discovered the limits of power in Iraq and Afghanistan during its War on Terror. Under the circumstances, might both countries be receptive to strategic partnership on mutually beneficial terms? Are such arrangements at all feasible and if so, what are the conditions on which they could be workable? How much could India concede, yet preserve its core interests intact? Could there be Sino-Pak counter-moves to such an agreement, and what would be a possible response? The outcomes of such hypothetical speculations have of course to be totally imaginary – but nevertheless might be worth the effort. The envelope of negotiating skills will have to be pushed to the outermost limits in such endeavours, but one thing is quite clear even at the very outset - if the US side should indeed intend to build the discussions around the letter of the NPT, 123 is definitely likely to go kaput as far as India is concerned, with the inevitable residue of acid spillover on Indo-American relations, and every likelihood of leaving a permanent stain. There is need for fall back strategies, - for a Plan B as it were, if matters do not work out as anticipated.

Failsafe alternatives for such contingencies ultimately boil down to two – either acquire alternate "natural allies" agreeable for



nuclear cooperation on mutually advantageous terms, or launch out in the self reliance mode of nuclear development, both civilian and strategic, under a philosophy sometimes designated as *Swadeshi*, a historic term but since much devalued in contemporary times by hardline liberal politicians who have bestowed lunatic Hindu connotations upon it. But here too, what are the practicable options? Alternate alliances with other "natural allies" for a 123 - type treaty appear far fetched enough to be unlikely in the foreseeable context. In any case, Russia, the most publicly supportive of putative "natural allies" has politely conveyed that a clearance from the United States through an Indo-US 123 Treaty is an essential prerequisite for future transactions. As for the Chinese offer, it would be advisable to consider it with extreme prudence, like an invitation into the spider's parlour. The second is the *Swadeshi* option of self reliance does not carry as much (WHICH) international baggage, but demands a sustained national determination and focus which has often been difficult to achieve. Here, it may sometimes slip the mind that notwithstanding stringent denial regimes after the 1974 Pokhran nuclear test, India has developed well established infrastructure and substantial indigenous programmes covering the entire nuclear cycle. Indeed, after listening to the severe denouncements of the Indo-US nuclear dialogue by India's undoubtedly talented nuclear scientific community, it would be justifiable to take them at their word and challenge them to take the country, India, to its strategic goals without depending on foreign resources and technology. Nevertheless, a restrictive factor remains the limited availability of nuclear fuel from the natural uranium deposits in the country (resources estimated at 74,000 tons). This is compensated to a large extent by rich deposits of thorium bearing monazite sands, which can be processed downstream into plutonium, but that technology is still some distance in the future, fifteen to twenty years by some estimates. Until that time, however, the threats posed by uncertain neighbours armed with nuclear weapons, together with the demands of an economy poised to gallop into the ten-per cent growth range have to be met by other alternate means. Nuclear weapons and alternate sources of industrial energy are both inescapable as an ongoing requirement which cannot and must not be compromised or diluted under any circumstances. Assuming our scientific community can be taken at face value that indigenous science and technology will not be



a problem, the critical bottleneck is of adequate natural uranium resources within the country for both nuclear weapons as well as industrial energy. To meet these divergent goals, an option based on self-reliance will compel several perceptions to be stood on their head, for which few major policies will require to be implemented. Firstly, the quantum of "minimum credible" strategic capability will have to be determined and indigenous uranium resources reserved primarily to achieve it. Only after these have been attained, can available balances of nuclear fuel be made available for the civilian energy sector. Secondly, in the interim, energy security will require to be developed primarily from non-nuclear fuels and renewable technologies, where there must be a massive scientific and technological campaign to reduce, preferably eliminate, dependence on imported hydrocarbon fuels especially from the Middle East and Gulf regions. With a whole host of latest power generation technologies arriving on the scene from non-petroleum hydrocarbons like coal and methane, bio mass and renewable energy sources, this might now be capable of achievement, but requires resources, urgency as well as enthusiasm and sense of purpose. To date, the latter have been conspicuously missing. Thirdly, exploitation and recovery of natural uranium resources in the country will have to be enhanced and maximised by technological modernisation and upgradation of prospecting and mining capacities in the country. In the process, extreme attention will be required to mitigate the attendant socio-political and environmental issues, which will arise. People-sensitive legislations, essential for the social and economic rehabilitation of those who will inevitably be displaced, will require to be put in place as rapidly as possible, along with its positive implementation, which has so far been the weakest link in the chain. Fourthly, indigenous nuclear research development, and engineering capabilities must be resourced and oriented for rapid surge, with thorium based fast breeders as the technological Holy Grail. Given the necessary focus and will, *Swadeshi* nuclear power is definitely do-able.

*The traffic signals ahead for 123 are definitely amber and blinking rapidly, requiring movement with extreme caution. But, at this stage, the million dollar question that should be posed to national policy makers – is there a Plan B?*



## **COLONEL SATYA PAL WAHI (RETD)**



In recognition of his outstanding contribution to the Indian Petroleum upstream Industry, Colonel Satya Pal Wahi has been conferred with the PETROTECH 2007 Lifetime Achievement Award on 16 January 2007. He is a distinguished member of the United Service Institution of India (USI). The USI felicitates Colonel Wahi for his lifetime achievement and for his invaluable contributions to the Indian petroleum industry.

Colonel Wahi is an Engineering graduate from Banaras Hindu University. He was commissioned in the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) in the Army on 11 December 1950. In 1972 he took premature retirement from the Army. In the corporate sector he has had stints as Chief of Planning at Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) at Bokharo, Executive Director Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL), Chairman Bharat Ophthalmic Glass and Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) Cement Corporation of India. He served as Chairman of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd (ONGC) from 1981 to 1989. In 1988, he was bestowed the Padma Bhushan.



# Security Environment in 2025 : India's Interests and Strategies

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)

It would be rash to try and define the specific security environment affecting India two decades hence and, worse, attempt to outline the "role" India should play to successfully deal with the challenges that the environment would pose. This role is not a simple mantle that countries can put on or discard. But they play a role based on their cultural correlates, intellectual acumen, core values, and national (in some cases narrower regime) interests and capabilities in relation to the environment and policies of other players on the international and regional arena. When our potential role is viewed in the context of our higher defence organisation, the complexities are obvious. It would be naïve — and even counter-productive, therefore, to go down that road. What can be realistically undertaken is an assessment of the trends that are likely to shape the (broader global, regional and national) security environment in 2025, in the context of our core interests and try and outline the direction along which we should be thinking, keeping in mind the main approach outlined by the organisers.

While a very large number of factors and events would shape the security environment as we approach 2025, at this point in history we can identify some major trends that are likely to impact that environment during the coming two decades. These are briefly outlined in the following paragraphs.

## **Global Power Shift**

It has been clear for the past two decades that a global power shift from the Euro-Atlantic "West" to an Asia-centred "East" has been in progress. This has far reaching implications not only for the nature of the international order as it emerges in the coming decades and great power relations, but also inevitably for the security environment. This shift has started to attract serious attention due to a number of factors, among them being the following : (a) Sustained high growth of economic and military power of China leading to perceptions (and concerns) about the "Rise of China," (b) Robust



economic growth of India under a resilient democratic political system bringing a new recognition of "Emerging India," (c) Economic recovery of Japan (after the stasis of the late 1980s and 1990s), and (d) Economic and political recovery of Russia and its renewed urge to play a global role along with its increasingly closer strategic ties with China, (e) Rising prices of oil along with the prospects of the beginning of its depletion in the next quarter century affecting energy security of the developed as well as developing countries, with the likelihood of the proportion of global oil (and natural gas) reserves (and consumption) increasingly located in Asia and (f) Religious extremism, and terrorism and political armed violence having acquired global linkages along with its greater sophistication.

It needs to be remembered that the rise of the West owed itself substantively, (if not primarily) to the dawn of the industrial revolution in mid 18<sup>th</sup> century the techno-economic fruits of which were the primary factors for the European powers to establish territorial empires (to control human and material resources that multiplied the techno-economic advantages) across the world through the exploitation of military technology and force. Industrial revolution also provided the means to alter the means and methods of economic productivity, and hence of national income and industrial output. This, in turn, resulted in the de-industrialisation of China and India besides other countries which came under colonial rule and domination leading to their modern status of underdevelopment.

For example, among the two large countries of Asia (and the "East") China accounted for 23.1 per cent of the global income in 1700 AD increasing to 32.4 per cent by 1820 AD before the western domination on the strength of industrial revolution resulted in the shift in the balance of economic strength from East to West. And China's share dropped to as low as 5.0 per cent by 1978 AD. India as the second largest advanced and rich country itself accounted for 22.6 per cent of the global income in 1700 AD before its decline started bringing its share down to a mere 3.4 per cent by 1978.<sup>1</sup> A similar trend was applicable to the manufacturing-industrial output where the changes in the technologies of economic productivity strengthened the growth of western countries.<sup>2</sup> Two important points need notice.

One is that China was historically ahead of India through the past four centuries in economic industrial terms. To this must be



added the historical fact that it was never under total alien rule like India had become by mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. China under the *Qing* dynasty (1644-1911) had remained a powerful independent country with a central rule that expanded its borders unlike India which experienced fragmentation and internal wars after the *Mughal* Empire started to crumble by the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century (ironically coinciding with the rise of Europe). Also, Japanese occupation of its territories in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century led to the industrialisation of its north-eastern region. Second, China's modernisation since 1980, managed with strong national policies without the distractions of democratic dissonances has demonstrated phenomenal techno-economic growth of its capability inviting admiration as well as concerns as far away as the western hemisphere. India's economic reforms, subject to constant pulls and pressures of a vibrant though noisy democracy with coalition governments, commenced a decade after that of China.

In view of the evidence of historical processes, it is reasonable to conclude that China's national (comprehensive) power will remain ahead of that of India through the coming decades. But that does not, by itself, create adverse security challenges unless it becomes significantly asymmetric in specific areas like the balance of military power usable across the frontiers. This is where Indians would need to shed the trauma of 1962 war, where the failure of the higher defence organisation on one side and near absence of sufficient force and logistics played the key role in our defeat which was more marked in the eastern sector than in the north-western one. The real issue affecting future strategic environment, therefore, is not that China's power is increasing, but the strategic uncertainty about how China might use that power in the coming decades? And what would be the balance of military power between now and 2025 that could be applied on India's frontiers by China, if relations start to deteriorate?

### Emerging International Order

Global power shift from West to East with new centres of power rising is inevitably shaping the nature of emerging international order that has intrinsically an important impact on the security environment affecting the powerful as well as the weak states. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the international order during the Cold War was not bipolar in the strict sense but more a Euro-Atlantic bipolarity. The reality of nearly 130 countries staying formally out of the military-ideological-political alignment was proof enough of the limited nature



of bipolarity. In addition large countries like India, which charted an independent foreign policy and China, which adopted a similar position by the 1960s had fractured the bipolar system making it more of a diffused multipolar world with bipolarity among the rival alliances (and a degree of multipolarity within the alliance). By the 1980s, during the peaks of the Cold War, strategic thinkers and leaders like Henry Kissinger and Zgniew Brezinsky were talking of a pentagon of powers (USA, USSR, Japan, China and the EU). To this, Kissinger had started to add India in the early 1990s as a provisionally emergent power.

So what we see in reality is a diffused multipolar international order that has been evolving into a polycentric system with six major players the USA, China, Japan, India, the EU, and Russia impacting the future strategic environment.<sup>3</sup> It is in this context that there has been talk of China's attempt to create conditions (as demonstrated in the formation and actions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) for opposing hegemony (of the United States) where Russia appears to be willing to join in. China-Russia axis is gathering strength with a marked difference from the alliance of the 1950s in that it is China as the stronger partner that drives strategic trends. It is in this context that the US has sought to seek closer relations with India, consciously or unconsciously strengthening the shift toward polycentricity.

The current international order has some specific characteristics that need to be noted for their implications for foreign and security policy. There is substantive asymmetry of power, capability, and willingness to exercise that capability among the leading centres of power in today's world. The United States in that respect is the most complete power, and hence the image of unipolarity intensified by the fact of almost all the developed countries being its military-political allies, members of the erstwhile G-7 etc. Thus, what we observe is the phenomenon of concurrent competition and cooperation among the leading players of the world. There is every possibility that this would lead to conflict in military as well as non-military terms, with many of the signs of the latter phenomenon already in practice in trade and technology terms. Whether this leads to an element of uncertainty in the world order, or the disorientation resulting from a rather rapid impetus of change in the international system is the cause of continuing uncertainties, is not the issue. What is clear is that the phenomenon of concurrent competition and co-operation is



likely to persist as long as significant asymmetries among the primary powers continue. A parallel effect of this phenomenon is that this co-operation and competition will continue to be functional rather than ideological. For example, non-proliferation issues are likely to remain a source of friction among the main players till there is agreement on disarmament. But none of the issues are likely to reach a point of divergence of interests as to call for a fracture of the system.

It is reasonable to assume that there will be strong tendency toward polarisation of the polycentric international system over time leading to multipolarity, and possibly, even bipolarity again, although the poles in either case would be significantly different than those of the past. But any form of polarity in the international system intrinsically contains an implicit phenomenon of areas of control and influence and hegemonic framework of interstate relations. While this may reflect the traditional concept of power, it also remains contradictory to the goals of democratisation of the international system. India's interest would be served well by the perpetuation of non-hegemonic polycentrism rather than any form of polarisation in the international order.

The big question that we need to reflect on is, how will the international order get shaped by the changes taking place with the global power shift? In particular, how will the emergent powers of the world like China and India respond to these changes? Equally, if not more important, how will the current and sole super power, the United States, adjust to the changes taking place? Its actions in Iraq and the Middle East in general provide us with little confidence of its ability to make the necessary transitions. This is not so unusual. Great powers have, historically, found it difficult to adjust to the changing power equations in the world and accommodate the rise of other powers leaning toward greater unilateralism than at other times. They, therefore, have tended to resort to the use of force, directly or indirectly, (as the UK did in 1956) though not necessarily against the challengers and sought to create a "balance of power" as the European states continued to do since the 17<sup>th</sup> century by shifting alliances and alignments. The United States, till recently, has also tended to balance the rise of China and India unilaterally though it did seek China's cooperation to cooperate in its own policy goals.<sup>4</sup> It is only now that Washington has given out clear signals that it would like to "help India to become a global player" which has



been mostly interpreted to imply supporting India as an emergent balancer to China. While the US cooperation and closer US-India relations are important necessities, it would not be in our interest to balance China on American behest or to support its grand strategy as much as it would not be in our interest to side with China to counter American hegemony.

### Other Issues

Among the large number of issues that impinge on the security environment as it evolves toward 2025 that of energy (especially hydrocarbons) security stands out. It has been clear for more than two decades that the world is going to experience the beginning of the end of oil in the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Oil prices have been expected to rise (which has been happening for the past four years). This has made oil exploration in commercially less attractive exploration more feasible. But that still does not alter two fundamental realities that impinge heavily on the security environment toward 2025.

One is the expected decline of availability of oil by about 2030 in relation to the continued rise in consumption. In fact, the accompanying Graph 1 indicating the reserve to production ratio tells us a lot about the picture of current and future global security environment since oil is crucial to world economy and security. To this has to be added the second important factor: bulk of the high growth in consumption is taking place in China and India, with the bulk of global oil (and natural gas) located in the region around these two large Asian countries.

Since oil is the last territory-related strategic resource base, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that whatever were the other reasons for wars and conflict in Afghanistan, (since 1980s), Persian Gulf region (since 1980 starting with Iran-Iraq War, followed by the Gulf War 1990-91 and then the Iraq War 2003 onward), oil has been a major factor influencing the course of events. Impending shortage of oil and its rising prices are bound to create tussle among producers and consumers, large consumers like the US, China and India, besides providing countries with large reserves (like Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran) with additional leverages of global influence.

Linked to the problem of oil, but not necessarily only affected by it, is that of potential reversal in the economic growth rate of key



countries which would have profound impact on the security environment of the future. Consider the following possibilities of alternate scenarios like:

(a) China's economic growth starts to decline and the already visible social dissonance increases to high levels. This is highly hypothetical and unlikely to actually take place except if China's access to oil and gas is significantly curtailed. But its consequences would be far reaching for the global and regional security environment. If past history is any indicator, Beijing's efforts to retain national stability may lead to substantive use of force and possible reaction outside its frontiers. This may be compounded if it views the problem of Tibetan refugees in India or close US-India relations inimical to its immediate interests.<sup>5</sup>


(b) India's economic growth slows down to below 6 per cent leading to serious internal turbulence and weakness in dealing with challenges from outside.

(c) Pakistan is located in a crucial geographical area dominating current and future oil transportation routes. If Pakistan enters into a stage of increasing instability leading to strengthening of radical violence emanating from its territory, it could have far reaching implications for global economy and security besides peace and security on account of ethno-religious violence in states and societies.

(d) West Asian stability has been under potential stresses for quite some time. It is reasonable to assume that the political structures in these countries would change in the coming two decades. Serious problems could arise if that change is not evolutionary and is accompanied by violence.

(e) The US war in Iraq (and now Israeli war in Lebanon) and its continued hostility toward Iran has had profound impact on the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf region. The contours of its implications are too complex to make a definitive assessment of how the conflicts would play out.<sup>6</sup> But what we are witness to is an unprecedented shift in the nature of even asymmetric conflict with ethnic and religious ideologies overlays.





Note : U.S. volumes were added to the USGS foreign volumes to obtain world totals.

**Graph 1**

Humanitarian disasters, both man-made as well as natural disasters, already attract tremendous global attention. There are few signs of the man made disasters reducing in future. In fact, the conflicts in West and Central Asia and Afghanistan (where Taliban seem to be regaining ground) indicate that the worse is yet to come. It is not clear if the rise in natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunami, extensive floods and debilitating droughts etc. are a consequence of climate change and global warming. But they are increasingly demanding greater attention from security planners. Most of these demand the involvement of military forces and hence are a factor in security planning, especially for "out of country" contingencies that need rapid responses.

### India's Interests and Strategies

From our perspective, given the current trends as they evolve toward 2025, we need to reflect on how should India approach the issue of its own rise to power? What should be India's policies that serve its core interests best in the context of the evolving strategic environment? What should be its response strategy to the concept of balancing China? On the other hand, how should it deal with the rise of China and its military power? And where and how does our higher defence organisation fit into this picture? Conversely, what would be the context in which our higher defence organisation would need to function and the tasks it would need to address?



To begin with, we need to remember that we have a stake in the nature of the international order which would allow us the greatest autonomy of decision making and would be conducive for the pursuit of our national interests. This implies supporting the strengthening of polycentricity and the evolution of a polycentric world order. While the predictability of, say, a polarised world may appear attractive, it could hardly serve our national interests in the future. For example, while we managed quite well during the Cold War, it is a fact of history that whenever the Cold War came close to us, it not only complicated our foreign policy choices, but in fact had an adverse impact on our security environment.<sup>7</sup> Any future Cold War (possibly between the United States as the most powerful state and China the challenger) would play out on our frontiers posing serious challenges. India's interests require that we make every effort toward shaping the international order toward a polycentric system that remains non-polarised, non-hegemonic and cooperative.

An objective analysis would reveal that India's interests into the future would be best served by the pursuit of its traditional policy of non-alignment, which is another term for independent foreign policy.<sup>8</sup> This would provide the flexibility and space for manoeuvre for New Delhi to take the maximum advantage of the opportunities emerging at the global level and in its relations with other countries, small or big. Overall, we would have far more to lose by aligning politically (leave alone militarily) with any power. Jawaharlal Nehru's words at the Asian Relations Conference are even more relevant for the future than at any time in the past. As it is, there are sufficient signs to indicate that the world itself is becoming less aligned as compared to two decades ago.

g — Our foreign (and security) policy, therefore, must be based on this goal and work through the formula of multiple cooperative bilateral relations rather than any polarisation that may be tempting in terms of acquiring our zones of influence or a perceived necessity of balancing some country or the other. In fact we must resist, as much as we can, the trends toward polarisation. By definition, a polycentric order would lead to requisite equilibrium in international relations that would best serve our interests. Hence, we must reject the concept of balance of power as it emerged and was practiced in the West where wars and conflict were seen as an integral component of its principles and practice. This should, however, not be interpreted as

*lies*  
*(POLICIES)*



negating the concept of power which is essential, as Mahatma Gandhi used to say, "to make the change" to achieve our goals. The central issue is how that power is used.

A policy of non-alignment implicitly implies (and demands) a policy of self-reliance in defence and national security. What we have to take into account is that, like the changing international order in which non-alignment has to be practiced in the future, self-reliance in defence and national security also has to be pursued in the altered parameters of the post-Cold War world and changing landscape of the future. As it is, our self-reliance model had gone off-track after 1962.<sup>9</sup> This needs to be brought back into fresh focus in tune with a new paradigm of inter-dependence for the future in view of the enormous changes that have taken place in global defence industry. In turn, this implies sustaining sufficient military capability, not for dominating other states, or "teaching lessons" like the philosophy of some countries, or "playing an out of area role" as some others want to do, but to ensure our own national security. The rise of India as a global player is contingent to its ability to generate sustained economic growth rates with equity and social empowerment, and to ensure its own defence and security.

Seen in the context of our present study of the role and structure of our higher defence organisation for the future, this requires that we seek to ensure that our military power would be able to:

- (a) Ensure credible nuclear deterrent against nuclear threat and use.
- (b) Provide credible deterrence and territorial defence capabilities against potential military challenges, including (and especially) conventional warfare under nuclear overhang, and other conventional military contingencies, small or big.
- (c) Ensure credible capabilities and strategies to successfully respond to proxy war through terrorism and other "unconventional" and asymmetric methods of warfare. It must be noted here that this would require significantly different type of force and strategies than those for the first task above.
- (d) Maintain adequate capability for "out of country contingencies" (which must be defined objectively and specifically) to protect and ensure the safety and security of



our citizens abroad (as indeed had to be done during the Gulf War, and now in the Lebanon War, etc.) and to support international peace and security (mostly under UN mandate, or bilateral agreements etc.), disaster relief etc.

(e) Build a strong and self-reliant defence industry through greater international interdependence. One of the most important aspects of managing future security environment (which requires our higher defence organisation to specifically address) is the issue of China's military posture and its implications for us.

### China's Military Posture

China's official policy document titled *China's National Defence 2004* issued on 28 December 2004 sets out its assessment of the strategic environment under which it plans to shape its military posture and some of the key elements of its military policy to support its objectives.<sup>10</sup> At its core the official policy now argues for greater rather than lesser role for military power in international relations. This is an obvious shift from earlier official positions perhaps as an outcome of an enhanced confidence about its own increasing political, economic and military capabilities on one side and the use of military force in Iraq by the US-led coalition on the other.

This is the first time the defence White Paper has clearly expressed China's strategy related to the role of its military power. In particular the White Paper specifies China's basic military goals and tasks to include :

(a) "To build a strong military by means of science and technology. The PLA works to improve its combat capabilities by taking advantage of science and technological advances and aims at building qualitative efficiency instead of a mere quantitative scale, and transforming the military from a manpower-intensive one to a technology-intensive one."

(b) "The PLA will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the *Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force*, and strengthen comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities." (This, of course, was also reflected in the Chief of Air Force being



made a member of the Central Military Commission, the highest policy and executive body to develop and employ China's military power).

(c) "The PLA takes as its objective to win local wars under the conditions of informationalisation and gives priority to developing weapons and equipment, to build joint operational capabilities."

The White Paper's conclusion that "world peace is elusive" now (which we can agree with) and the "military factor plays a greater role in international configuration and national security" (a line of assessment that should caution us) would probably not come as a surprise to many experts watching the strategic and security environment especially in Asia. But it is clear that China, if anything, is once again emphasising the importance of military power in its strategic calculus and appears to have taken a more pessimistic view of the security environment where it believes "military imbalance worldwide has further increased" no doubt reflecting its concerns about expanding the US military presence in regions around China.

China has the third largest nuclear-missile arsenal in the world and it has been developing more accurate mobile ballistic missiles now being deployed. China's nuclear weapons improvements appear to be directed toward increase in yield-to-weight ratio of warheads, perfecting multiple re-entry vehicles, and more accurate survivable delivery systems. In substance, the expressed rationale is that China has been lagging behind other nuclear weapon states, in particular the United States, and its goal is to narrow that gap in the coming years. This has profound implications for China's neighbours since the overwhelming proportion, (as much as 96 per cent) of China's nuclear and missile capabilities have rationale only for them because of the ranges of delivery systems developed and deployed by China.

At the same time China, in view of its lag behind the US capabilities in BMD (ballistic missile defences), would have to rely on counter-BMD strategies. Quantitative and qualitative growth of China's nuclear and missile capabilities at a faster rate may be expected to constitute a major element of these strategies. Significant increase in China's capabilities, spurred on by BMD deployments by the United States will also make China more difficult to deter. In turn, this may lead to China becoming more assertive with the risk that it may resort to coercive policies, especially with regard to its



neighbours. This will pose a different type of challenge to India than what was experienced in the past.

### **Shifting Balance of Military Power**

Pentagon's official report to the Congress has been emphasising that "the principal area where China appears to be making advances in coercive military capabilities involves airpower, to include missiles and information operations." And China's own official 2004 Defence White Paper now categorically states the future objectives of its defence policy when it states that:

"While continuing to attach importance to the building of the Army, the PLA gives priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force to seek balanced development of the combat structure, in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic counter-strike."

There are many areas where Indian defence planning would need to pay close attention to build requisite capabilities for the type of war which may get imposed on us. But the case of combat air power is probably symptomatic of the nature of challenges ahead. The head of the Chinese Air Force has publicly sought a greater role for the PLA Air Force declaring that the Chinese Air Force will strive for a transformation from the air defence type to an offensive and defensive types as soon as possible. He announced that "At the turn of the century and in the early part of the new century, the Air Force will have a batch of new-types of early warning aircraft, electronic-equipped fighter planes, and ground-to-air missiles" and that the Air Force "must give more prominence to air offensive, gradually integrate offensive and defensive, and build up a crack, first-rate air strike force"<sup>11</sup>. This has already taken definitive shape.

In fact, by 2010 China would be capable of deploying nearly 300 to 500 multi-role combat aircraft of the Su-27/30 class (air refuelled) with long range precision strike and air superiority capabilities. Further down, plans to build 500 to 1000 of China's Jian-10 fighter (and its future Pakistani version of FC-20) are fructifying and even Pakistan is planning to acquire the aircraft as the first export customer of J-10.<sup>12</sup> Nearly 800 F-7 (MiG-21 design) with modern fire control and interception radar would provide a strong force besides the other combat aircraft being added to the PLA Air



Force inventory. Above all, aerial refuelling capabilities would dramatically enhance the ability of the Chinese Air Forces to operate from bases deeper inside China and still be able to impact on Indian territory and targets. Acquisition of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) would dramatically alter the ability of PLA Air Force to apply combat power in a variety of offensive and defensive missions with greater impact. On the other hand, the force level of Indian Air Force has been dropping and is expected to go down by 30 per cent by the end of this decade. The real impact of this trend would be on our land forces in case of armed conflict. It is indeed surprising how and why our higher defence organisation, especially with an Integrated Defence Staff in place as the successor to the Defence Planning Staff of the COSC, has allowed this situation to emerge?

India has to also take into account the strategic nexus between China and Pakistan though the reasons are not all related to India and its possible "encirclement." China has provided Pakistan with not only conventional weapons since 1965, but also nuclear weapons technology, "proven nuclear weapon design and enough enriched uranium for two devices" in the 1980s and has since continued to provide additional assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme during the 1990s.<sup>13</sup> Pakistan has made no secret of the rationale of its nuclearisation which is specifically targeted against India. There have been numerous persistent reports that the Pakistani device was tested at Lop Nor in China during 1983. In fact, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand who was in-charge of the nuclear tests in May 1998 claimed that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device in 1983.<sup>14</sup> China supplied ballistic missiles to Pakistan in 1991.<sup>15</sup> China's arms sales policies have greater strategic rather than commercial rationale. "As with Pakistan, Beijing seeks to use arms sales to Myanmar to complicate India's security planning."<sup>16</sup>

India's relative defence capability has been undergoing some fundamental changes. At the time of 1962 war China's military capability was high and at an all-time peak. Its military had won the revolutionary civil war against the US backed and supplied KMT forces, and its leaders were military commanders led by Mao Tse Tung. In early 1950s China had fought the UN Command (with forces veterans of World War II) to a halt in Korea. Its military was equipped



with massive supplies of Soviet state of the art weapons and systems now tested in the Korean War. The fact that Chinese military was qualitatively inferior to the US military did not lead to any definitive advantage for the UN. In fact, serious consideration was given by the US military commanders to even the use of nuclear weapons to defeat the Chinese "volunteers." Thus by the time of 1962 China-India war, the PLA was perhaps at its peak both qualitatively and quantitatively. From then on the quality of PLA declined even though its size increased. Broadly speaking, the decline had bottomed out by the time of the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979. From then onward military modernisation has been leading to increase of military capability, especially in qualitative terms even though the size of PLA has been cut back.

The problem is that while Chinese military capability has continued to grow in absolute and relative terms, the Indian military capability started to decline after 1987 from 3.38 per cent of GDP to its current figure of 2.24 per cent for 2006-07. There has been very little modernisation or replacement of weapons and equipment since the mid-1980s. Declining defence capability was, undoubtedly, one of the factors responsible for Pakistan launching its war in Kargil in the summer of 1999. There has been concern that similar weakness in relation to China could result in a situation not different from that in 1962 which had led to the humiliating defeat suffered by India.<sup>17</sup> The parliamentary committee on defence has been demanding increase in defence spending to 4 per cent of GDP.<sup>18</sup> However, while increase in defence spending is to be expected, it is extremely unlikely that this is more likely to stay below a level of around 2.5 per cent of GDP in the years ahead.<sup>19</sup> While there is every likelihood that the force levels may have to be reconsidered and down-sized, modernisation of Indian military is likely to receive particular attention in the years ahead. This would include special emphasis on force multipliers, surveillance systems and precision guided weapons besides replacement of platforms, where necessary.

One of the strategic realities of the present period is that the balance of military capabilities between China and India is rapidly shifting to our disadvantage in operational terms. And nowhere is this more noticeable than in the air and space capabilities. This has to be weighed in the context of the fact that future wars are going to be heavily influenced by air power. There is no question that we



must continue to improve relations with China and reduce the potential for disagreements and possible conflict. It would not be in our interests to think of China in any adversarial terms. But it would be less than prudent to ignore the changing realities of military power that would provide the capabilities on which altered intentions could be based. Factors beyond our control could propel the two countries into a possible conflictual situation.

## Managing Policy

What is clear from the above is that we can expect substantive strategic uncertainty in the coming decades. This would require deep and extensive studies looking closely at historical and cultural factors affecting the security environment, current trends and future developments. While this naturally includes intelligence as we understand it in India, but in reality it goes far beyond mere intelligence to comprehensive, continuing, policy-related, future-oriented empirical studies of global trends and developments impinging on our security and detailed assessments of political-military capabilities of key countries of interest. Overwhelming proportion, (normally believed to be over 95 per cent) of such studies has to be undertaken in the public domain in suitable think tanks. This would perform two inter-linked roles: that of providing independent inputs for decision makers, and second, to assist in broader understanding (so crucial in a democracy) of our challenges, policy options and their implications.

Unfortunately this remains a major deficit. The NSC Task Force recommendations in 1998 to establish five think tanks, and the NSAB (National Security Advisory Board) recommendation (accepted by the NSC chaired by the Prime Minister) in June 1999 have remained unactioned. Our universities focus almost exclusively on academic research which is extremely important, but that leaves few institutions undertaking policy-related studies. Barring a few notable exceptions, our area studies centres have also not been able to provide the type of inputs crucial to policy making.

This raises the issue of intelligence assessments. Our major weakness in dealing with military challenges since independence has been the failure of military-related intelligence and strategic trends, all the way from 1948 to Kargil. Contrary to conventional wisdom this has been due less to lack of information than requisite

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assessment. Information in such matters will mostly remain sketchy and ambiguous. The success of intelligence assessment, therefore, rests on the ability of experienced analysts well-versed in their fields to construct the most probable scenarios and their implications. The decision makers should then be able to apply their experience and professional judgement to shape policy. The task of analysts cannot be undertaken by short-tenure appointees; and suitable institution is needed to nurture the long-term study and analyses.

One of the consequences of erosion of our higher defence organisation in the late 1950s was that the quality of work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had declined. Worse still, instead of re-invigorating the JIC, it was taken out of the ambit of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and placed separately under the Cabinet Secretariat depriving the Chiefs of Staff Committee of a vital source for the basis on which military power could be planned and employed effectively. If the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has to perform the role of intelligence assessment (including net assessment, which is necessary foundation for current assessments) which it must, then it will have to be answerable directly to the Chiefs of Staff Committee rather than an intermediate planning staff (which would receive its reports in any case to undertake its own task). And the DIA should have the wherewithal to provide intelligence assessments independent of those from the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and the IB (Intelligence Bureau) even where the same basis information is common to all of them, which should be the norm. An emergent India in tomorrow's world (and its credible defence) simply cannot afford a weak intelligence assessment system, especially in the crucial area of national defence and military power.

There are many other aspects which require attention if defence decision making is to be improved. But the core of all problems is that there are fundamental systemic dysfunctions in the higher defence system, the most serious of these being the vertical disjunction where the higher military organisation is not an integral part of the government framework. Non-democratic countries (like China and former USSR) have a totally military staffed department of the government which combines the functions of current preparedness and conduct of operations, with future force development. In many countries like Pakistan, the military exercises extra-constitutional authority and controls both functions in the name of the government of the day. All established



democracies in the world, on the other hand, have an integrated civil-military staffed ministries of defence to undertake the planning and development of future defence capabilities. India seems to be the singular exception for reasons which have been difficult to identify.

The vertical disjunction must also be seen in the context of two realities. Unlike the earlier eras, military power is increasingly used by states for political purposes without necessarily resorting to classical war and would have to take into account the existence of nuclear weapons where they exist exercising profound influence on the way military power can be used. The disjunction between the government and higher military organisation is a serious handicap in managing this "coercive diplomacy", both against and for the state. The problem is further compounded by short tenures, especially in military bureaucracy, limited experience of defence matters in the civil bureaucracy, poor understanding of defence issues amongst the intelligentsia in general, and the pre-occupation of political leaders with (domestic) politics.

The second major problem is that the functions related to force development — the policy related to creation of doctrine, strategy, technology, and force levels and structures require resource allocations and commitments on a long term basis. These, by their very definition, are governmental functions. In fact, they substantively extend beyond the jurisdiction of even the Ministry of Defence. The civil bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence is too small, is overburdened by routine (and crisis) management, and has too little professional expertise to manage this task. Their decision making is further heavily conditioned by the financial bureaucracy which focuses more on expenditure audit and control approach.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, service headquarters keep planning for future force development, essentially in vacuum, since they are not part of the process examining and planning resource allocation.

Thirdly, because of, and together with, this vertical disjunction, substantive horizontal dysfunctions exist — within the defence forces, between them and agencies and departments dealing with foreign policy, finance, intelligence, internal security etc. Once again, this is the reason for people looking for structures like the National Security Council. What is obviously needed is a methodology and framework which removes these disjunctions in policy planning. A second major deficit is that of lack of long-term national security planning and strategy making. The



NSC Task Force addressed this in its recommendations in June 1998; but these have remained unimplemented.

## Notes

1. Angus Maddison, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run*, OECD, Paris, 1998.
2. All countries of Europe combined, for example, accounted for 23.3% of global income in 1700 AD which kept rising to 40.3% by the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century before declining giving way essentially to the United States whose share increased from 1.8% in early 19<sup>th</sup> century to nearly 22% by 1980.
3. This was argued earlier in Jasjit Singh "Challenges of the Strategic Environment" paper presented at the seminar on "Command and Staff Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" organised by Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, April 14-15, 1998.
4. For example, in June 1998 President Clinton sought China's cooperation to work for non-proliferation in South Asia and pursue its goal of "cap, reduce and eliminate" nuclear weapons capability of India, which, if it were to succeed, would leave China as the obvious dominant power in Asia where Washington could hardly be expected to risk itself for the security of, say, New Delhi. After all that was the rationale under which Washington declined to provide security guarantees to India in 1967!
5. It is worth recalling that its war in 1962 was substantively motivated by similar factors where Zhou Enlai even asserted to Mongolian leader that the war was not about territory but to teach India a lesson for moving too close to the United States and possibly "giving away" Kashmir to the West (See Cold War History)
6. For example, my preliminary assessment is that Israeli war in Lebanon indicates a new paradigm of a terrorist organisation acquiring the status and support of being a semi-military sub-state actor with the population supporting it while it engages one of the most professional militaries in the world forcing it to ceasefire after a virtual stalemate. This has been happening while Iraq moved almost inexorably toward a civil war, Turkey massed its troops on the Syrian border to threaten any move toward Kurdish independence, and Iran maintained similar posture. Celebrations in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria of what has been perceived as the Hizbollah (and hence Shia) victory is likely to trigger the rise of similar trends in future.



7. US military alliance with Pakistan with transfer of massive arms in the 1950s, the establishment of CENTO and SEATO, entry of extra-regional naval power into Indian Ocean following the Vietnam War, the US-directed proxy war against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan conducted through Pakistan as the "front-line state" and Islamic "Mujahideen" with sophisticated weapons in the 1980s (the after-shocks of which have been reverberating ever since all the way to the US World Trade Centre on side, Punjab and J&K in India to the Islamist terrorism across the world), the debris of the Cold War in the shape of the phenomenal spread of small arms and light weapons into society besides the narcotics trafficking are but some of the examples that continue to affect our security decades later.
8. Non-alignment, as distinct from what came to be called the Non-Aligned Movement, was not the product of Cold War and was adopted as the strategy for pursuit of Indian foreign policy a decade before independence. See Jasjit Singh, "Conflict Prevention and Management: The Indian Way" in Jasjit Singh (ed) *Asian Strategic Review 1995-96* (New Delhi, IDSA, 1996) pp 9-26.
9. Ajay Singh, "Quest for Self-Reliance" in Jasjit Singh, *India's Defence Spending* (New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2001).
10. *China's National Defence in 2004*, Chapter III, p.1, the White Paper published to illustrate China's national defence policies and the progress made in the previous two years, *China Daily*, December 28, 2004 at [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/28/content\\_403913.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/28/content_403913.htm). Emphasis added.
11. "Air Force Commander Liu Shunyao on Air Force Transformation" FBIS-CHI-1999-1107, dated 07 Nov 1999.
12. Sergio Coniglio, *Military Technology*, Vol. XXX Issue 7, 2006. See also earlier reports like SWB dated 28 August 1999, p.19.
13. *China's Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications*, RAND Report, 1999, p.viii.
14. Cited in *The Gulf Today*, May 19, 1999
15. For China's supplies of ballistic missiles to Pakistan see Pakistan Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi's statement on August 26, 1993, cited in *The Nation*, August 27, 1993; and Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar's statement to the Senate August 26, 1993, cited in *The Nation*, August 27, 1993. See also Chinese ambassador to USA, Zhu Qizhen's address to the National Press Club, Washington DC, Reuters Transcript Report (June 27, 1991) cited in John Wilson and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs", *International Security*, Fall 1992, vol. 17, no.2,



- p.37, where he stated that, "We have sold some conventional weapons to Pakistan, including a tiny amount of short-range tactical missiles..."
16. RAND Report, op. cit. note 11 above.
  17. This is not to suggest that a similar conflict would naturally follow.
  18. *Defence Policy, Planning and Management*, Sixth Report of the Standing Committee of Defence (1995-96) Tenth Lok Sabha, March 1996, p.37.
  19. The average for the past 15 years works out to 2.3% of the GDP annually.
  20. Amiya K Ghosh, a former Financial Adviser (Defence) in his seminal study *Defence Budgeting and Planning in India* (New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2006) goes further to conclude that the Defence Ministry and the Department of Defence has little control over planning since budgeting remains under the actual allocations are decided by Ministry of Finance and the Financial Adviser (Defence) thus marginalising defence planning by military professionals.

Second Edition "**The Indian Army : A Brief History**" (CAFHR-9) has been published and is available for sale. Price of the book is Rs. 750/-. A concession of 10% upto 9 copies and 20% for 10 and above copies is given. Rs. 55/- towards postal charges per copy is to be added. No postal charges if collected by representative.



# Rise of Naxalism and its Implications for National Security

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)

*If the country does not belong to everyone it will belong to no one.*

## Tupamaro Manifesto.

I would like to state at the outset that I hold the firm belief that in any insurgency, the first step that the government should do is to study the economic background of the insurgency, assess the causes and then dovetail the security strategy with the plan of setting right the economic, social and development failures by the government so that the economic and social injustices are set right as the security operations progress. I believe that handling an insurgency is best left to the professionals. It is absolutely necessary to leave politics out of it. I also believe that psychology has no role in the counterinsurgency module. I am, therefore, basing my paper on two factors only—security and delivering economic and social justice. I feel that when this is done the insurgency will wither away because there will be no cause for any of the people of the affected area to fight with the government.

I have always held that the best model of a counter-insurgency that succeeded was the campaign conducted by President Magsaysay of the Philippines against the Huk guerillas. In fact, the leftwing extremism or Naxalite insurgency that we are facing in this country strongly resembles the situation in the Philippines, when the Huk insurgency erupted before the Second World War and continued after the country was given freedom by the United States. The issue in the Huk insurgency was land. Tenant farmers were being squeezed by big land holders and were getting a raw deal in tenancy rights. Regrettably, the government sided with the landlords and set the police and the military against the Huk guerillas. The police and the military were blundering around committing excesses against the tenant farmers for supporting the guerillas, so much so that when President Magsaysay went touring the affected areas, the people told him again and again that they

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hated his corrupt police and brutal Army and corrupt civil servants who sided with the landlords against the poor tenant farmers. Magsaysay went back to his capital, amended the tenancy laws in favour of the tenant farmers, reigned in his Army and ensured that no excesses were allowed to be committed. After a year when he toured the affected areas, the scenario had changed. The people now told him that his soldiers were behaving well, the police were fair and the civil servants were not sucking the blood of the tenant farmers any more. The Huk insurgency gradually withered away.

In India, the obstacles hindering the counter-insurgency effort are easily identified. They have bad politics and not just bad politics but rotten politics. One of the major obstacles is something that the Philippines did not have. This is caste, at the root of the Naxalite problem. The third problem is a peculiar concept that was introduced into the body politic and administration of India during the emergency and perpetuated thereafter by all political parties without exception. This is the concept of committed bureaucracy not just to the party in power but to the family heading the party in power. When you have a situation of the caste factor being conjoined with the political factor, then you have a stranglehold where on the basis of caste the oppression of the poorer economic communities continue and economic and social justice is continually denied and the concept of committed bureaucracy protects the perpetrators who are oppressing the lower castes. Denied economic and social justice, the oppressed classes are motivated by the left wing extremist (LWE) parties and you have an insurgency in your hands.

Let us now examine the incidents of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in India briefly assessing the cause of resorting to violence in each case.

#### **1946. The Tebhaga movement in undivided Bengal**

The demand was for the share of the landlords to be reduced from one half to one third. The movement spread from Rangpur and Dinajpur in the north to 24 Parganas in the south. When their demands were not heard the *Kisan Sabhas*, dominated by the Communist party, encouraged the peasants to forcibly take two thirds of the harvested crop from the granaries. As a result, there were bloody clashes between the peasants and the landlords. The movement petered out when the landlords with the help of the local administration let loose a wave of repression.



### 1946-51. The Telengana Insurrection

The movement was directed by the Communists from the very beginning. The peasants launched their struggle on economic issues against forced labour, illegal exactions and unauthorised evictions. It soon developed into an uprising against the feudal rule of the Nizam. More than 4000 lives were lost before the Communist party withdrew the struggle. The Telengana insurrection (1946-51) was broad-based and had no parallel in Indian history since the 1857 war of Independence.

### 1967. Naxalbari

The revolt was in the area of three police stations-Naxalbari, Kharibari and Phansidewa. About 65 per cent population of these three police stations was scheduled castes and tribals. They worked as agricultural labour or in mines, forests and plantations. A small percentage owned small holdings. The majority cultivated on agency basis (*baghchash*). The *baghchashis* were exploited by the *jotedars*. When the land reforms act was passed in 1955, the *jotedars* started *malafide* transfers of land. Santhals armed with bows and arrows forcibly occupied the lands of the *kulaks*, lifted stocks of hoarded rice and killed an inspector of police. Thereafter, there were a number of such incidents. After this, there was a major deployment of police forces by the CPI (M) government and after several operations the movement was squashed. The leadership of the movement was by communist cadres who were following the path set by Mao Tse Tung after the Cultural Revolution. This culminated in the formation of the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) on 22 April 1969. Not more than a score of people were killed in this uprising, but it left a far reaching impact on the entire agrarian scene throughout India. It was like the throw of a pebble bringing forth a series of ripples in the water.

### 1968. Srikakulam

*Girijans* or tribals comprised about 70 per cent of the population of Srikakulam district living in the agency area of the Eastern Ghats. They were mainly involved in agriculture, while some collected minor forest produce. The British, conscious that they may be harassed by the plainsmen decreed that no land could be transferred from a *girijan* to a plainsman, without the permission of the District Collector. The Act was, unfortunately, observed more



in the breach. The traders and money lenders took full advantage of the poverty of the *girijans*. They gave them daily requirements like tobacco, kerosene, salt and cloth on credit and also lent money for purchase of seeds. Those unable to clear their debts were made to part with their land. Thus, most of the fertile land was alienated from the *girijans* and passed into the hands of the plainsmen. The landlords squeezed them to the utmost and paid subsistence wages. Lease holders had to give two-thirds of their produce to the landlord. It was in 1967 that one Vempatapu Satyanarayana started work among the *girijans*. The movement he led was able to make substantial gains for the poor *girijans*. Wages of farm servants rose, the landlord's share of harvest was reduced from 2/3 to 1/3, 2000 acres of land was wrested from the landlords and more than 5000 acres of wasteland came under the possession of *girijans*. Then on 31 October 1967, a clash took place between a large group of tribals going for a meeting of the Marxist party and a group of landlords. The landlord group had guns and they shot and killed two tribals. The *girijans* were incensed and the movement became violent. Vempatapu Satyanarayana organized the *girijans* into guerilla squads called *dalams*. At this stage, the Srikakulam leadership who had joined the CPI (M) faction of the Communist party broke away from the CPI (M) and joined a group that split from it to form the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries which in due course evolved into the communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist CPT (ML). There were a series of raids on houses of landlords and money lenders; their houses were burnt down and cash looted. There were a number of encounters with the police. From December 1968 to January 1969, twenty nine policemen were killed in action by the *dalams*. Charu Mazumdar, the CPI (ML) leader visited Srikakulam and gave a fillip to the movement. During 1969, the Naxalites committed 23 murders and 40 dacoities. Some of the murders were gruesome. For example, on 11 May 1969, a landlord, P Jammu Naidu of Ethamanuguda was killed and slogans were painted with his blood by the members of the *dalam* that executed him. He was a notorious man who had grabbed the land of the poor tribals and forcibly taken the daughters of the tribals as his wives. When he was killed he had seven wives, two of whom were little girls he had forcibly taken from tribals. This showed the extent of exploitation of the tribal people by the upper caste landlords. The exploitation of the forest tribals who collected minor forest produce is evidenced by



the account of a trial of a *sahukar* by a Peoples Court. The *sahukar* or usurer used to go into the Agency area to collect tamarind from the forest *girijans*. The list of borrowers which he brought showed that he had lent a sum of Rs. 280/- to peasants of 4 villages. Against this he proposed to collect from them 40 bundles of tamarinds which at the market rate was worth Rs. 1600/-. This meant that the peasants were to pay back nearly six rupees for every rupee they had borrowed! The usurer was arrested and tried before a Peoples Court. He repented and promised to behave and not fleece the peasants. He was let off.<sup>1</sup>

### **1967-71. West Bengal, Midnapur and Birbhum**

The Midnapur district of West Bengal bordering Bihar and Orissa witnessed a well planned and well organised Naxalite movement in the Debra and Gopibhallavpur police stations. The district has a sizeable tribal population of Santhals, Oraons and Lodhas. The majority of them were landless labourers. A small proportion owned small plots of land or cultivated the *jotedar's* land under the *Barga* system. Gopibhallavpur has a long forested border with Orissa and Bihar. After the Naxalbari uprising in 1967, a section of CPI (M) workers in Midnapur started propagating the extremist line. They supported the *kisans* and *bargadars* and worked for a movement against the *jotedars*. Santosh Rana, Ashim Mukherjee, both first class postgraduates of Calcutta University and a host of students from well to do upper caste families from Calcutta lived and worked among the tribals, identifying themselves wholeheartedly with them. From September 1969, big tribal groups armed with spears, bows and arrows attacked the houses of *jotedars*, killed some of them, looted cash and burnt all deeds of land. The State Government alarmed at the spate of killings sent several companies of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and state police and by March 1970, the area was brought under control. The Naxalite uprising in Birbhum district was also masterminded by several students from Calcutta University. The State Government reacted by deputing CRPF, State armed police companies and an army infantry company for cordoning and searching the area. Nearly 150 CPI (ML) cadres were arrested and the movement died down.

### **1968-70. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh**

The Mushahari block of Muzaffarpur district of Bihar covered 12 villages with a population of about 10,000 people. There were



various forms of oppression by the upper classes on the peasantry. In April 1968, the peasants of Gangapur harvested the *araha* crop of the landlord in broad daylight. Retaliation was quick. Bijli Singh the *zamindar* of Narsingpur organised an attack on the peasants with 300 men armed with *lathis*, swords and firearms with the landlord leading on an elephant. In the fight that ensued, the landlord and his hoodlums were routed. The humbling of this powerful landlord by the *harijan* peasants had a magical effect on the surrounding villages.<sup>2</sup> *Kisan Sangram Samitis* were formed and there were incidents of seizing of land by the peasants. In April 1969, landless peasants forcibly harvested the crop on 14 acres of land of a landlord. There was a clash in which the retainer of the landlord was killed. In June 1969, an attack was made in Paharchat village. The landlord and two associates were killed. Hundreds of peasants gathered after the raid. In their presence, all the deeds and documents were burnt and the pawned ornaments returned to the owners. A series of incidents followed. Alarmed, the State sent police forces and after several combing operations, the movement died down. The Mushahari struggle caused ripples to spread into Dharbanga, Champaran and Chota Nagpur. Here in May 1970, 54 *Adivasis* were arrested in the Jaduguda forest during police operations. A British girl Mary Tyler was found among them. Later she wrote poignantly about the movement-"The Naxalites crime was the crime of all those who cannot remain unmoved and inactive in an India where a child crawls in the dust with a begging bowl, where a poor girl can be sold as a rich man's plaything, where an old woman must half starve herself in order to buy social acceptance from the powers that be in her village; where countless people die of sheer neglect, where many are hungry while food is hoarded for profit, where usurers and tricksters extort the fruits of labour from those who do the work, where the honest suffer, while the villainous prosper, where justice is the exception and injustice the rules and where the total physical and mental energy of millions of people is spent on the struggle for mere survival ."<sup>3</sup>

The Naxalite violence that erupted in Singhbhum and Ranchi had more serious dimensions. Jamshedpur became a mini Calcutta, with instances of attacks on schools and, government offices and police piquets. Schools were also attacked in Jamshedpur. There were also large scale attacks in Ranchi. In Uttar Pradesh, the Palia area is part of the Lakhimpur district in the Terai region. It was inhabited by Tharu tribals. The state government encouraged



poor peasants to go to the Palia area, allotting 10-12 acres of land to each family. In actual fact landlords forcibly occupied big chunks of land, ejecting the poor peasants. This provided the Naxalites with fertile grounds for agitation. Their object was to clear the area of big farmers, *thugs*, corrupt political leaders and moneylenders.<sup>4</sup> A series of attacks and raids on landlords ensued in which a number of firearms were also snatched. Deployment of the armed police in the area brought the situation under control.

In all these states, the Naxalite movements were organised and coordinated by various CPI (ML) groups. Unfortunately, the top Marxist-Leninist leaders like Charu Mazumdar in West Bengal, Satyanarain Singh of Bihar, were not tactically sound in their approach. They thought that there would be mass uprisings and they could build up a Peoples Liberation Army from the rag-tag band of peasants who had revolted against the atrocities of landlords and money lenders. Charu Mazumdar succeeded in arousing the students of Calcutta, who left their studies and went and lived in the forest villages and shared the tribulations of the tribals. The vital element of building up a guerilla force training and equipping them to take on the might of the state was lacking. One by one the movements fizzled out as the Central Para-Military forces with the state police were deployed in the interior areas and well planned raids and search operations were carried out. The CPI (ML) leadership lacked the vision to organise the poor peasants against the might of the state, though the cause was just. Also, lumpen elements infiltrated the leftist groups and affected the discipline of the groups.

According to a rough estimate, there were about 4,000 incidents of Naxalite violence from the middle of 1970 to the middle of 1971, with the break-up as follows-West Bengal-3500, Bihar-220 and Andhra Pradesh-70. The Government of India made a plan for joint operations in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa with the Army, Para Military Forces and the state police. This was undertaken from 1 July to 15 August 1971. This was *Operation Steeplechase*. The broad strategy was to surround an area that was a known stronghold with an outer cordon of the Army, an inner cordon of the CRPF, and local police operating inside. The operation disrupted the network of the naxalite cadres and the movement stalled. Meanwhile, internal dissensions between the factions of the CPI (ML) also disrupted the movement. A number



of top leaders were arrested, including Charu Mazumdar. When he died shortly after, it marked the end of a phase of the Naxalite movement in India. However, it was only a lull. The movement was to surface again, for the Indian Government had not removed the causes of the insurgency. This movement was not going to be finished with cosmetic remedies. The causes were deep rooted in caste, the crucial factor behind the exploitation of the poor and the downtrodden.

### **1980. Peoples War Group (PWG) Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra**

Andhra Pradesh has a radical tradition going back to the Telengana struggle of 1946-51. The *Girijan* awakening in Srikakulam had preceded the Naxalite movement. The forces of the state squelched the uprising by 1970. The movement, however, continued to simmer. After Charu Mazumdar's death, his associates Kondapalli Seetharamiah, KG Satyamurthy and Suniti Kumar Ghosh formed a Central Organising Committee (COC) in December 1972, concentrating on organising and mobilising the masses. They decided to eschew militancy until such time as the party was strong enough to embark on a course of violence. Kondapalli Seetharamiah encouraged the party workers to commit money actions- an euphemism for dacoity or robbery. He was arrested on 26 April 1977, but jumped bail and thereafter organised underground activities on a large scale. He broke away from the COC of the CPI (ML) on 20 April 1980 and formed the CPI (ML) Peoples War Group. For the next ten years, he moved from strength to strength and the Peoples War Group emerged as the most formidable Naxalite formation in the country.<sup>5</sup>

What led to the resurgence of Naxalism in the Telengana area? The basic reason was the continued economic exploitation of the tribals by the landlords, traders and government officials especially those of the Forest Department. As PS Sundaram wrote- "The tribals owning small pieces of land are expropriated and sharecroppers impoverished. They are all kept under perpetual bondage towards repayment of a small debt supposedly taken generations ago. The forest wealth is freely smuggled out by contractors in connivance with the forest staff. The tribals get neither a remunerative price for their produce nor a fair wage for their labour."<sup>6</sup>



The social dimensions of exploitation were far more revolting. The landlords of the region were commonly known as *dora* (lord). C Lokeswara Rao has described the high-handedness of the *doras*- "The tyranny of Doras in Telengana is unmatched. Tribal girls working on the Dora's land are forcibly taken in his household and are at the disposal of the master and his guests. She is forced to have abortions when she gets pregnant. She has to subsist on the leftovers passed on by the cook, but has to satisfy the appetite of any male in the master's household. Naxalite songs are replete with references to rape by landlords and to girls growing up with the knowledge of the inevitability of rape that awaits them. Only a few such practices have disappeared and the pace of change is slow."<sup>7</sup>

On 20 May 1981, the Naxalites had called for a meeting of tribals at Indraveli in Adilabad district. More than 30,000 tribals had turned up. The administration refused permission for the meeting, apprehending a clash between landlords and tribals. The tribals were determined to have the meeting. There was a *lathi* charge and firing and 13 Gond tribals were killed. The PWG exploited the anger of the tribals and consolidated their hold on the area. Kondapalli Seetharamiah was arrested for the second time on 2 January 1982. He escaped from hospital on 4 January 1984. He now concentrated on organisation of the PWG cadres. He constituted Forest Committees for the forest areas and Regional Committees for the plains areas. Armed squads or *dalam*s comprising 6 to 10 members were formed. About 50 *dalam*s were soon active in Telengana.

The PWG is believed to have redistributed nearly half a million acres across Andhra Pradesh. The modus operandi was to forcibly occupy excess land of big land owners and give them away to the landless or to the labourers working for the landlord. As per the State Government's own admission, counter affidavit 68/82 filed by the state against the Naxalites, the radicals had forcibly redistributed 80,000 acres of agricultural land and 1, 20,000 acres of forest land. I wonder that the court did not react to this. What was the government doing all this time since the land ceiling act came into being? This is the crux of the matter in Andhra Pradesh and in many states of India. The land ceiling act is not enforced. The party activists insisted on a hike in the daily minimum wages from



Rs. 15/- to Rs. 25/- and the annual fee for *jeetogadu* (year long labour) from Rs. 2000/- to Rs. 4000/-.<sup>8</sup> The poorer sections were particularly happy at these two measures. They found that what the politicians had been talking about and the government promising year after year could be translated into a reality only with the intervention of the Naxalites. *Gorakala Doras* (Lord of the Bushes) is how the Naxalites came to be known in the interior forest areas. Revolutionary writers helped in furthering the Naxalite ideology. The moving spirit of the *Jana Natya Mandali*, the cultural front of the PWG was Gummadi Vittal Rao, better known as Gaddar. This wandering ministerial's ballads inspired the simple tribal. He became a legend in Andhra Pradesh.

The PWG fought a running battle with the Telugu Desam Government. When the Congress came to power in 1989, they took a soft line with the Naxalites, freeing a number of Naxalite who were under detention and in prison. They, however, did nothing to control the exploitation of the tribals like enforcing the land ceiling or controlling the moneylenders. The Naxalites began organising, extorting money and running peoples courts, giving the general impression of a parallel government. The Congress resumed the hard line. Soon the PWG had spread to the adjoining areas of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and into some areas of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. They also acquired 50-60 AK 47 rifles probably from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Naxalite violence was gradually stepped up peaking in 1991 with several attacks on railway and electrical installations and police stations and patrols. On 8 May 1992, the PWG was banned and coordinated operations commenced against them by the Central Para Military Forces and the state police. The results were good with 3500 cadres being arrested and 8500 surrendering. By 1993, the Naxalites surged back with violence again rising.

They now spread to the Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh, which till then was a sleepy forest outpost. The tribals of Bastar were used to a life of deprivation. They made the truant teacher to take classes regularly and the absentee doctor to attend to his patients. The tribals began to look at the Naxalite cadres with awe and respect. The Peoples Union of Civil liberties wrote about Bastar- "A lopsided socio-economic development of the district caused by exploitation through cheating and duping was an ideal setting for



the Naxalites to take root in the area. With their idealism, free of corruption or other vested interests, they could win the confidence of the tribals. They punished corrupt officials, made the tendu leaf contractors to increase the wages.<sup>9</sup> The movement spread to Balaghat and Rajnandgaon districts.

Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra is largely inhabited by tribals. The jungle is spread through 10,495 square kilometres out of the district area of 15,434 square kilometres. The entire life of the tribals revolves around the forests, yet the tribals were denied access to the forests due to a stupid interpretation of the Forest act and rules. With the coming of the Naxalites, the forest officials abdicated their jurisdiction. The best testimonial of the presence of the Naxalites was given by an innocent tribal who got a lift from the Commissioner of Scheduled castes and tribes during his visit in Gadchiroli district. The Naxalites are called *Dadas* in Gadchiroli. When asked about the *Dadas*, the tribal replied-"There is at least one change since the *Dadas* have come. The government atrocities are over and the police cannot harass us."<sup>10</sup> There were 113 incidents of Naxalite violence in the district in 1990 with 16 deaths. On 12 November 1991, ten State Reserve Police Force (SRPF) personnel were killed and 13 injured in a landmine explosion under their vehicle. The PWG has attained a high degree of expertise in making and detonating improvised explosive devices (IED).

### **The New Left in Bihar**

The best description of the dismal state of affairs in Bihar is summed up by Arvind N Das-"Bihar's economy has been at a stand still for decades. The discriminatory nature of public and private investments, the green revolution bypassing the state, principally on account of non-implementation of land reforms, the willful subversion of whatever social security system existed, all this has pushed the people into poverty, the economy into backwardness, the society into violence."<sup>11</sup> The resentment of the oppressed sections in this environment found an outlet in the emergence of a 'New Left' manifested in the form of three Naxalite groups in the beginning of 1980-The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), CPI ML (Anti Lin Piao Group) and the CPI ML Party Unity. In May 1982, the Bihar Government reported that 47 out of the 857 blocks were affected by the Naxalite movement. Subsequently, the movement has grown enormously in the face of a corrupt,



casteist and incompetent administration.<sup>12</sup> When the CPI ML was formed, one Naxalite group *Dakshin Desh* had remained aloof. Amulya Sen and Kanai Chatterjee were its leaders. They considered mass mobilisation as a precursor to armed action. The group chose Jangal Mahal area of Burdwan, with a sizeable population of scheduled castes and tribals, for its operations. Agricultural land was inadequate, irrigation virtually nonexistent, and the wage rates dismally low, all conditions suitable for a Naxalite uprising. The landlords generally belonged to the upper castes, while the sharecroppers and landless labour were scheduled castes or tribals, the ideal cocktail for the Naxalite to enter. By 1973, the party had 37 militias who organised actions like looting of food grains, killing of class enemies and snatching of arms. In 1975, the group was renamed as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The MCC gradually spread over central Bihar. Its membership exceeded 10,000 and they had stockpiled about 700 weapons including some AK rifles. There were gruesome slaughters of Rajputs by Yadavs in the MCC. These were more by way of the feuds between the two communities and because of the way the Rajputs had treated the Yadavs. On 29 May 1987, the Yadav cadres of the MCC slaughtered 42 Rajputs of Baghaura and Dalelchak villages of Aurangabad district. On 12 February 1992, 37 members of the landowning Bumihar caste were hacked to death by the MCC cadres in Bara village of Gaya district.

Vinod Misra formed the CPI ML anti Lin Piao faction in December 1973. It struck roots in Bhojpur district and spread to Rohtas, Jehanabad, Patna and Nalanda districts. They had 50 underground armed squads and some weapons, mostly country made guns, a few rifles and sten guns. The Indian Peoples Front was the political front of the anti Lin Piao faction. The CPI (ML) Party Unity was formed in 1982 by the merger of the COC CPI (ML) of Andhra and the Unity Organisation of CPI ML of West Bengal. The Party Unity has about 30,000 members. It has 25 armed squads holding about 150 weapons, including a few sten guns.

The third phase of Naxalite violence commenced with the holding of the 9<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Peoples War Group in 2001 in which it was decided to give more sophisticated arms to the Peoples Guerilla Army. This phase has extended the Naxalite war to nine states.



## Conclusion

It will be seen that in all the theatres of Naxalite violence, there has been a diagnostic response only in one state-West Bengal. Here, the CPM government carried out operation *Barga* under which share croppers were registered and given permanent and inheritable rights on cultivation of their plots covering a total area of 11 lakh acres. Besides 1.37 lakh acres of ceiling surplus and *benami* lands were acquired by the state government and distributed among 25 lakh landless and marginal cultivators. The land reforms have seen the emergence of a new class loosely termed rural rich, weakened the social and political power enjoyed by the landlords in the countryside. This has not even been thought of by Andhra Pradesh or Bihar, where the Land Ceiling Act has not been enforced after more than 50 years of its legislation. And sadly this is not the end of the picture in these two states. The Law enforcing officers say openly that the Naxalites are a band of *thugs* and criminals and must be wiped out. There is no question of the Land Ceiling being enforced. What they have left unsaid is that it is the right of the upper classes to have hundreds of acres of land and it is the duty of the scheduled classes and tribes to slave on these lands for the benefit of the upper classes. In this regard, the case of land tenancy in Kerala is of interest. The upper classes in Kerala were generally landlords but with medium holdings. The majority of the landlords had tenant farmers on their lands who deposited half of the crop to their landlords. The landlords themselves and their progeny were educated and took up white collar jobs in the metropolises of the country. Then the CPI M was elected in the late fifties, they legislated land tenancy laws that transferred ownership of tenant holdings to the tenants who were having tenancy for 12 years. At one stroke hundreds of upper caste landlords lost their holdings and tenant farmers got ownership rights of the lands that they had tilled for long years. This is one reason why the Naxalite movement did not grow roots in Kerala. They had no cause.

The issue in the forest lands of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand is different. Traditionally the forests here, have been the home of the tribals for centuries. Here again, the root cause is the caste factor. It is the *Vaisya* who trades. It is he who is the moneylender. In thousands of years of Hinduism the roles of the castes have been honed well.



You will find that in the forests of all the Naxalite affected states, the *bania* has had a vice like grip on the tribals. He lends money to them and collects minor forest produce against the loans, taking care to keep the tribal perpetually indebted.

When posted in Hyderabad in 1989, I had a chance to discuss the Naxalite problem with the state's Home Minister, who asked me how this problem could be solved? When I replied- "You have to enforce the Land Ceiling." The Revenue Minister of the state raised his hands and replied-"But that is impossible." What he did not tell me was that the two major castes of Andhra, the Reddy and the Kamma, both landlords would never allow the land ceiling to be enforced. And they were the main political force in the state. Here then is the crux of the problem. The same situation exists in Bihar, where the Brahmin, Bumihar and Rajput will have his land holdings in the names of his pet dogs and cats rather than allow the land ceiling to be enforced.

In the landed areas, the upper castes are the main political factor and they will not allow the lower castes to get their share of land. In the forested lands, it is the *bania*, the *Vaisya*, who is in league with the political class and who bribes the bureaucrat and keeps the poor low castes and the tribals in perpetual subservience. There can be no solution to the problem of the CPI ML leading a proletariat rebellion without solving the basic problem of giving rights to the lower castes and the tribals and putting an end to the exploitation by the upper castes. Measures like the *salwa judum* are clever ploys by the same upper caste political and bureaucrat nexus operating. Above all there can be no military solution to this problem.

### The Way Forward

In the landed areas, the first step is to enforce the land ceiling. This has to be done, forgetting the political factor of particular political parties wanting to retain power in states like Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The Central Para Military Forces and the state Police which are used in operations against the Naxalites should now be used to enforce the land ceiling, evict the landlords from their excessive holdings, and ensure that the surplus lands are cultivated by the lowest classes and tribals. They should ensure that the crops grown by the new land holders are secure and they harvest



the crop keeping the landlords away. Once this is done, the Naxalite cadres will not use landmines on the police forces.

In the forest tracts, laws should be legislated that only forest dwelling tribes and scheduled castes should have access to forest lands. Very strictly, upper castes should be prevented from entering the forests. Cooperatives should be organised of tribals who can be trained and only these tribal cooperatives should be allowed to trade in forest produce. Branches of banks with micro credit loans as operated by the *Grameen* bank in Bangladesh should be set up with forest cooperatives to sanction loans to the forest tribes. The Para Military Forces that were used to hunt the Naxalites should now be used to enforce the new laws for the forests. They should see that the *Bania* does not enter within 100 kilometres of a forest. They should ensure that all trade is carried out only by the Forest Cooperatives. They should guard the branches of the micro credit *Grameen* banks.

When this is done the tribal will know that the government is now with him at last and he will befriend the police force and stop putting land mines for them. The Naxalite problem will then wither away.

## Notes

1. Liberation. May 1969. Page 83-84.
2. Naxalites in Bihar-Fight for Land. N.K.Singh. Patriot. 11 October, 1969.
3. My years in an Indian Prison. Mary Tyler. Page 191.
4. The Naxalite Movement in India. Prakash Singh. Page 72.
5. Ibid. Page 130
6. Causes of spurt in Naxalite Violence. Indian Express. 1 September 1987.
7. Why Naxalism flourishes in Telengana. The Times of India. 1999.
8. Madiga Malliah Inherits the Earth. Chidananda Rajghana. The Times of India. 9 December 1990.
9. The Illustrated Weekly of India. 3 September 1989.
10. 29th Report of the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes and Tribes. 1987-89. Page 171.
11. The Republic of Bihar Arvind N Das Page 14.
12. Ibid. Page 107.



# Getting to Grips with Global Terrorism

Professor Michael Clarke

**T**errorism is as old as conflict itself. To terrorise innocent people has always been a way of putting pressure on their leaders to change policy. And to attack soldiers, policemen, government institutions, with bombs and assassinations is a way of striking at an enemy and claiming the moral authority of the soldier while doing it: 'our bombings are the only effective tactics we have against our enemy,' says the terrorist, claiming to be in a 'war' with government – whether government recognises it or not. There is no surprise in this. The real surprise is how easily it is forgotten by leaders under pressure.

So, much western policy since 11 September 2001 has mistaken a technique of conflict for a type of conflict; confusing an age-old tactic of many wars with a new species of twenty first century war. Washington declares flatly that 'the enemy' are now the terrorists, whether they operate in Afghanistan, Iraq, Europe, or inside America. Britain, while it has never been comfortable with the rhetoric of a 'global war on terror', nevertheless defines terrorism as a major 'threat' to its safety and interests. Western relations with Pakistan become highly sensitive, the 2001 terror attacks on the Indian Parliament or the 2003 and 2006 bombings in Mumbai take on a new significance, and Putin's Russia gladly accepts that Chechen terrorism is all one with the global enemy. When terrorism shapes the US security agenda, it also shapes, for that very reason, the agenda for much of the rest of the world.

It is easy to assume that the *jihadis* pose some sort of global threat. But is the *Al Qaeda* movement -its network of networks, its pyramids of hard-bitten professionals and dangerous amateurs – really something that poses a global challenge? Has it elevated terror from being merely a technique, into a defining identity among those who would engineer a world revolution to enforce their vision of *salafist* Islam and the rule of a new *sharia* Islamic order from Morocco to Indonesia? In its rhetoric, at least, it has. The *jihadis*

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war on western values, on Jews, Hindus, apostates in the Middle East, on shi'ite peoples in the Islamic world, on modernity, gays and women's rights, don't leave many of us out. If wishes were horses, *jihadi* spokesmen would ride a very long way. There is a genuinely global dimension, too, in the way terrorists of all persuasions now learn from each other. The most effective techniques are well-publicised across the global web. No image can be effectively suppressed, no declarations squeezed out of the system. The propaganda of the deed itself is ever-present; and no terrorist deed is a failure if it attains immortality in cyberspace.

Not least, there is a global dimension in the glamour and fashion that attaches to terrorism in the present era. It attracts recruits from all backgrounds and circumstances. Its conspiracies are exciting and it 'franchises' itself so that groups spring up claiming an allegiance that the professionals can accept or reject as they please. Suicide bombers are revered before and after their deaths, bound into the act with celebrity status, threats of shame and promises of paradise. With its use of all the technologies available in a globalised world, terrorism is both an ultra-modern, and a very traditional conspiracy.

All of this, however, is more gloss on the activity of terrorism than cause of it in the first place. *Al Qaeda* may have global rhetoric but its initiatives are driven by localised factors. This is generally understood in western society and for the last five years there have been constant calls to 'deal with the root causes of terrorism' within and between our societies. But this is chasing rainbows. Not only is it a practical impossibility—its not as if any of us could agree on what would have to change to satisfy the terrorist—but those who are attracted by the glamour and pornography of terrorism will continue to be terrorists as a lifestyle choice as much as a political one. Their activities have to be addressed in preventative measures: through public protection, intelligence penetration, disaster management. It requires good police work allied to good intelligence, and preferably between good international allies. But our real targets for the long term are not these individuals themselves but the wider public that might give *jihadi* terrorists the support that sustains them beyond the cycles of fashion and glamour.

Most western societies have lost much valuable time over the



last five years. We have been fixated on what the terrorists do rather than on what they stand for. In a multi-cultural society as Britain now is, there has been a great reluctance to challenge the narratives that terrorists create and feed off. The elaborate conspiracy theories of systemic oppression of Muslim peoples, of global control by a cabal of Jews, of religious humiliation at every turn – all the stuff of cliched suicide videos – have gone largely unchallenged by the British government and by the majority of the population. It is not that there is any agreement with this view of the world, but rather that the majority opinion doesn't really know where to start. It is easier to dismiss the wickedness of the individuals rather than challenge the legitimacy of their ideas.

This is the sense in which the *jihadi* movement is a significant global challenge. This is where America's global war on terror, and the war that involves the rest of us, should concentrate its energies. In Britain, at least, there is a growing realisation among the political classes that we have now got to establish a robust dialogue among all our majority and minority communities. The callow narrative of the terrorists must no longer be allowed to run unchallenged. The British government is on the verge of establishing a 'Joint Information Unit' to try to influence this more robust perspective. In truth, governments can encourage such an approach but there is not much they can do to make it happen. Society itself must drive the desire to confront its truths and prevent its minorities falling into fear and self-pity. The media is crucial, the international atmosphere the backdrop of the whole enterprise.

Five years ago it would have been easier for governments to have a constructive influence on this difficult process. But in the West we analysed *jihadi* terror wrongly. The US rushed to war, the Europeans rushed to more draconian criminal legislation. We all ignored the effects on the ideas behind the *jihadi* movement and it made some spectacular propaganda gains as a result. Now America's war on terror is in deep trouble in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Europeans have felt the effects of 'home grown terrorism'. There is a more sober appreciation of what we are up against. It is both less and more serious than we thought. Less serious in that *jihadi* terror can be contained, if never completely prevented; more serious in that it is still riding the crest of a propaganda wave that is genuinely global and to which we have only just begun seriously to turn our attention.



# Stability in Afghanistan and Implications for India

Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)

USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and its consequential failure (some refer to it as USSR's Vietnam) of its policy is said to have contributed in not an insignificant manner to the demise of the Soviet Union. By the time Soviet Union withdrew in early 1989, about 14,500 Soviet and an estimated one million Afghan lives had been lost since the USSR incursion in 1979. The US's and Pakistan's policies in Afghanistan gave rise to the emergence of the *Taliban* and other factions of *Mujahideen*, who still remain active in Afghanistan. While these policies served the short term interests of both the US and Pakistan, yet as the events have proved, supporting *Taliban* did not turn out to be beneficial in a number of ways both for the US and Pakistan. Afghanistan during heydays of *Taliban* regime (1996-2001) had become epicentre of terrorism with sanctuaries and training facilities being provided to likes of *Al Qaeda*, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and holy warriors from Chechnya and CAR countries besides providing training to other assorted terrorist groups. Even China felt threatened from fundamentalist and extremist Muslim elements of Afghanistan because of its vulnerabilities in Xinjiang and its problems with Muslim Uighurs.

Therefore, when American forces launched *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) against the *Taliban* regime in October 2001 consequent to 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, this step was largely welcomed by Russia, China, CAR, India and others. Russia and China raised no objections to the US being granted air bases and logistics facilities in CAR nations since it suited their short term strategic interests. Pakistan was forced to do a U-turn in its policies, however, till now it remains a reluctant partner in the US and western nations' global war against terrorism and its attitude to terrorism continues to be ambiguous.

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## Stability in Afghanistan

*Taliban* with the help of its sponsors Pakistan, is on the comeback path in southern and eastern Afghanistan which threatens to undermine the international efforts of achieving peace, security and stability in Afghanistan. Thus, even after five years of demise of *Taliban* regime the situation in Afghanistan, at present, looks somewhat similar to what it was before, except that *Taliban* is not in power. Neither the US forces nor International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) manned by the NATO countries or for that matter President Karzai's democratically elected government have been able to exert control over outlying areas especially the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Several factors are responsible for this continuing state of instability and insecurity which would have cascading effects on regional and international security.

There appears to be weakening of commitment on part of the US which has handed over the most important mission of combating the insurgency in the South and East to NATO which was more comfortable with its mission of providing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in northern and western Afghanistan. The US also diverted its attention, resources and efforts from building Afghanistan and concentrated more on Iraq which created conditions for present situation in Afghanistan. Peace dividend gained after removal of *Taliban* regime consequent to the success of *Operation Enduring Freedom* was not consolidated and exploited. Half a decade of intervening period has become a tale of missed opportunities.

The problems of governance, security, unemployment, opium cultivation and drug trafficking, lack of law and order and reconstruction remain even after five years of commencement of Bonn process started in October 2001. An elected parliament (after September 2005 parliamentary elections and October 2004 Presidential elections) was expected to provide legitimacy and strength to the government to address these issues in a substantive way. But the Afghan government has not been able to address the domestic issues in a meaningful and substantive manner. Neither the international aid which was to be provided to Afghanistan by the participants of Bonn process has contributed to improve the lot of the common people.



## Current Situation in Afghanistan

The year 2006 has already achieved the dubious distinction of being one of the goriest year of last 23 years of turmoil in a turbulent nation which has not seen peace since April 1978 when communist regime took over. Since beginning of 2006, over 4000 people mostly *Taliban* have been killed in violence related incidents in Afghanistan. NATO forces claim to have killed 180 *Taliban* insurgents in first week of November alone. *Taliban* leader Mullah Mohammad Omar warned in October 2006 on the occasion of holy month of Ramadan that his men will intensify their fighting to 'surprising levels' to drive out foreign infidels. *Taliban* leaders are preparing for a massive spring offensive in early 2007. The fatal casualties of the US forces and NATO so far (12 March 2007), from 2001 onwards, have been 540 with the year 2006 contributing 191, the largest so far in a single year. Many innocent civilians have been killed in *Taliban* related violence because of indiscriminate response of the security forces especially due to heightened intensity of air attacks against *Taliban* insurgents. This has further alienated the local populace. Charles De Gaulle, a former President of France observed, "You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination" – in the same vein the US and NATO forces have adopted sledgehammer tactics which have been instrumental in creating more local support for *Taliban* rather than causing any substantial harm to them.

## Strategic Underpinnings or the Conflict

The strategic interests of many regional and extra regional players have a great bearing on the emerging security situation in Afghanistan. The presence of the US and NATO forces prevents *Taliban* and Pakistan from installing a regime of their liking. Instability in Afghanistan not only justifies the US military presence in Afghanistan but it also enables the US to maintain its military and logistic bases in Pakistan and Central Asia which help it to address its other global security concerns (although such presence may not be liked by many regional players). Logistic facilities and bases provided by Pakistan help the US and NATO forces not only in their war against terrorism but also enable the US to keep a wary eye on a nuclear and unstable Pakistan, where internal dynamics and external policies are moving it towards a precipice. (For



instance, in the Failed State Index, Pakistan stands at ninth place for states most likely to fail, ahead of Afghanistan which is at tenth place). The US military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other areas puts a serious strategic pressure on Iran to accommodate the US interests and offers increased options to the US in its dealings with Iran. The US air base in Kyrgyzstan, logistics support from Tajikistan for OEF and transit rights in Kazakhstan keep the US flag flying in Central Asia where Russia and China are working to expand their strategic influence.

For NATO, Afghan mission has become a test case for its credibility and relevance. After demise of the Soviet Union it had been looking for expansion and was involved in missions in its geographical periphery. Though initially a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Afghan mission is becoming more of a mission to combat a full blown insurgency. There is also lack of mission clarity in their role and different NATO partners have their own rules of engagement thus complicating the coordination of a disparate force in synergizing their fight against *Taliban*. Years of neglect of military budgets by NATO nations reflect on their inadequate performance on the field. NATO troops lack the wherewithal to fight insurgency in difficult Afghan terrain and look over their shoulders for helicopters, air support and logistics support from the US. While the US is in the process of reducing the strength of its troops by 20 per cent in Afghanistan, NATO is unable to muster additional troops required (2500 additional soldiers needed according to one estimate) from its member countries. Poland, a new convert to NATO is expected to provide 1,000 troops for Afghanistan but it would hardly solve NATO's problem. Increasing tally of fatal casualties of NATO partners and public opinion in their respective countries is also exerting a negative impact on NATO's efforts.

Meanwhile, Pakistan, a fragile state in itself is thriving on instability and insecurity in Afghanistan. Even though Pakistan's President, Prime Minister and its military establishment has stated many times that they support a peaceful, prosperous, stable and strong Afghanistan, the evidence on the ground points to the contrary. In fact, a strong and stable Afghanistan has always been a rival of Pakistan and except for *Taliban* government no other dispensation in Afghanistan has either been under Pakistan's



tutelage or favourably disposed to it. A strong government in Kabul has always been a motivator for Pashtoon and Balochi nationalism in Pakistan and has raised questions on controversial Durand line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Taliban* thus becomes an instrument in hands of Pakistan to suppress nationalistic tendencies and supplant it with religious fervour that lays emphasis on Muslim *Ummah* and helps Pakistan in achieving its long term political and strategic objectives in Afghanistan.

During the *Taliban* years, Pakistan had achieved its ambition of obtaining 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and had also entertained visions of extending strategic depth to include Islamic nations of Central Asia through *Taliban*. In the bargain it ended up by exporting fundamentalism, terrorism and instability to Central Asian countries. Pakistan and *Taliban* trained and funded terrorists had reached as far afield as Chechnya.

Pakistan has become a key player in Afghanistan and is in a happy position to harass the US, NATO and Afghan government through its support to *Taliban* on the one hand and also remain an indispensable, major non-NATO ally by providing logistics and other support to the US and NATO on the other hand. Whether the US and NATO forces stay or leave, it benefits Pakistan either way. Presence of the US continues to make Pakistan strategically relevant to the US and it benefits both militarily and economically. Because of its support to the US, it receives military aid which meets one third to one fourth of its military expenditure and it enables Pakistan to obtain latest military hardware which need not necessarily be for fighting counter terrorism missions. It has also received economic aid of over \$ 1.6 billion and the US nod to World Bank and IMF to extend credit facilities which have improved Pakistan's macro-economic growth. And if and when the extra-regional forces leave Afghanistan, Pakistan would be waiting to claim its strategic space in Afghanistan through its *Taliban* proxies who have become better placed with their recent resurgence with the help of Pakistan.

### **NATO Delicately Poised**

Situation for the NATO forces has been worsening since Pakistan signed a truce with *Taliban* in Waziristan area of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) in first week of September



2006 which gave *Taliban* a free run of the area. Ahmed Rashid, a renowned Pakistani analyst considers it a blow to counter-terrorism struggle and has opined that this agreement would set up a safe haven for *Al Qaeda* and the *Taliban*. His warning seems to be coming true since the incidents of *Taliban* attacks against the NATO forces increased threefold between beginning of September and towards end of October 2006 in the Afghan provinces bordering Waziristan. And with thaw in winter, frequency and intensity of *Taliban* attacks on NATO forces has again picked up. Further, Waziristan has completely become *Talibanised* with *Taliban*'s summary style of justice being dispensed and local *Taliban* chiefs issuing edicts to fight the foreign infidels in Afghanistan.

NATO Commanders fighting *Taliban* have expressed dismay at George Bush and Tony Blair for declining to call Musharraf bluff that Pakistan and ISI are not aiding *Taliban*. Vice President Dick Cheney also continues to be a strong supporter of Musharraf's way of approaching the Afghan issue. During a tri-partite meeting between President Bush, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Musharraf on 28 September 2006 at Washington, President Bush declined to raise the question of Pakistan's support to *Taliban* out of Quetta sanctuaries in Balochistan province of Pakistan. Later on General David Richards, the head of NATO forces in Afghanistan was expected to present mounting evidence of *Taliban* headquarters being in Quetta and the extensive involvement of ISI in aiding *Taliban* during his visit to Islamabad in early October 2006. However, after his meetings with President General Musharraf and other top generals of Pakistan, General Richards came back appreciating Pakistan's role and "thanked the President, the government, the armed forces and security agencies of Pakistan for the excellent cooperation being extended in the fight against terrorism." Short of singing paeans he became convinced about the Pakistani point of view that vast majority of Afghan problems emanated from within the country and *Taliban* activity was being funded through narcotics trade and other criminal activities. Further, with mounting evidence of Pakistan's involvement in supporting *Taliban*, Dick Cheney again visited Islamabad in the end of February 2007. Reports suggested that it was to give a tough message to Musharraf but on official plane, it was mentioned that the trip was mostly to praise Pakistan's contribution to war on terror.



Not only had NATO Chief extolled virtues of Pakistan's role, he had emulated Pakistan by concluding a Waziristan like truce with *Taliban* in Musa Qala a district of Helmand province of southern Afghanistan where British troops casualties have been the highest. NATO forces and troops of the Afghan National Army have also withdrawn from the Babrak Tana area in the Ali Sher districts of the South-eastern province of Khost in mid-October 2006 upon the mediation of tribal elders. The Taliban spokesperson referred to the pull out as another major victory of the *Taliban* against NATO forces. By end October 2006 talks were also underway between the *Taliban* and NATO forces - through tribal elders - over the pullout of troops from 12 districts along the Pakistan Afghan border. The talks revolved around *Taliban* making concessions to the NATO forces and agreeing not to attack their bases in those Afghan provinces where the deal is signed. This does not bode well for shape of things to come in Afghanistan. By the end of February 2007, *Taliban* was virtually ruling Musa Kala.

NATO would be fighting for many years in Afghanistan unless *Taliban's* head in Pakistan is removed. All these new 'peace zones' would be sanctuaries for rest and recuperation and training bases for further Taliban operations. Frederic Grare, an American analyst opines, "Pakistan's agents can help vary the intensity of Taliban attacks and, therefore, pressure the Afghan Government and the US and NATO forces at will, according to the needs of the moment, while it maintains the fiction that it is still committed to the war on terror, thus preserving its usefulness and maintaining its standing in the international community increasingly trapped by its own priorities and disconnected from on-the-ground realities."

Pakistan has perfected the art of fighting proxy wars for achieving its foreign policy objectives and political goals. Though it may have met with mixed success in Jammu and Kashmir it is looking for a major success in the shape of installing a *Taliban* regime in Kabul beholden to Islamabad. Internally, Pakistan's military establishment has been described as a predatory institution which, at first, creates threat to security and then offers itself to neutralise the threat so created. And in the bargain it remains in the driving seat appropriating most of the national resources of Pakistan. It can easily be perceived that it is following similar strategy with the US and NATO by using *Taliban*. Thus, a number of American and



western analysts have concluded that removing Pakistan military's stranglehold on reigns of power and democratising Pakistan is a strategic imperative and key to improving security and stability in Afghanistan.

### **Afghanistan's Internal Dynamics**

All the problems of Afghanistan are not because of Pakistan or other external players. President Karzai has not been able to exert control over warlords and tribal chiefs who still wield considerable power in their strongholds. Some of them have been allowed to retain their militias along with their arms which militate against the aims and objectives of disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programme enshrined in Bonn Process. Karzai had made some of the warlords who were accused of serious crimes as police chiefs thus eroding his reputation. This has also compounded the difficult problems of enforcing law and order and ensuring good governance.

Drug production in 2006 has reached record levels with almost 60 per cent rise in its growth since 2005 and it is heading for another high in 2007. Proceeds from sale of drugs and drug trafficking are fuelling the insurgency as well as contribute to worsening law and order situation since *Taliban*, warlords and Tribal Chiefs stand to gain from opium cultivation. Government has not been able to find alternative means of livelihood for the poor farmers and opium cultivation is the only attractive occupation. Weak government enforcement, corruption in the government and police force and protection offered by *Taliban* to opium farmers in lieu of partaking of some of the proceeds exacerbates the problems of building a stable nation state.

In addition to the above are the problems of building a strong Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Guard and Afghan National Police. The US goal was to train 70,000 ANA soldiers by 2007 out of which 31,000 have been trained and mid-term objective was to reach strength of 62,000 troops. But now the US has surmised that Afghanistan does not have enough internal resources to support such a large army. There have been many desertions in ANA and the quality of soldiers also suffers because of general lack of education. Poor wages and ethnic tensions also have negative effects on the combat value of ANA. There are



reports of security forces having been infiltrated by *Taliban* and pro *Al Qaeda* elements. ANG and ANP have similar problems. There are inadequate numbers of policemen for border guarding tasks which is further compounded by rampant corruption and inadequate motivation.

Further, the enormous aid promised by the international community under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, has not been translated on the ground as tangible benefits to the poor and common man. About 40 per cent of the aid may be real and rest is phantom aid. Large portion of this is taken away by the fancy salaries of the members of the NGOs and other foreigners working in Afghanistan. Afghan government has not had much say in the utilisation of the aid provided by the foreign governments. This has not only eroded the authority of the government but has also deprived it from laying down priorities.

America has been spending on the average one billion dollars per month in Afghanistan for military operations. Till fiscal year 2005, it has spent \$ 67 billion for defence related expenditure in Afghanistan whereas for reconstruction programmes from years 2001 to 2005, it has spent \$ 28 billion and for trade security forces, it has spent one billion dollars. For fiscal year 2006, the US has budgeted for \$ 920 million for reconstruction, law enforcement and counter narcotics. Going by South Asian standards, these are colossal amount of funds. Some of the activities being undertaken by civilian officials, western contractors and NGOs can be economically outsourced to countries like India to get best value for money.

However, Afghan Compact of February 2006 and a successor to the Bonn process promises to remove the short comings with the aid of international community. In the Interim - Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) which is based on likely aid to be provided, the Afghan government has made a five year plan to address the problems of security, governance, social and economic development. A 15 year development has also been planned which is largely based on foreign aid to be received since Afghanistan would not be able to generate adequate internal resources for development. Therefore, international community has to remain committed to play a larger role in both security and development in the near and long term future.



## India's Goals in Afghanistan

India, the US, NATO, CAR nations and even Iran share similar goals in Afghanistan because all support a peaceful, stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, which should never be allowed to become a haven for terrorists. The visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Afghanistan in August 2005 was the first by an Indian Prime Minister after a hiatus of 30 years. India, itself the largest democracy, has been supporting the movement of Afghanistan towards the goal of sovereign and democratic state. India has extended aid of \$ 650 million out of which over \$ 300 million have already been utilised for a number of projects which would help recovery of Afghanistan. Additional \$100 million have been granted to Afghanistan during Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Afghanistan in January 2007. Some of the areas of assistance are cooperation in development projects, health, education, community development and agricultural research. \$ 50 million have been earmarked for rural development programmes in 100 villages based on the Indian experience. \$ 80 million have been earmarked for rebuilding hydro electric plant in Heart and another \$ 100 million would be spent towards constructing power lines to Kabul. However, the most symbolic contribution towards fledgling Afghan democracy has been the construction of Afghan parliamentary building in Kabul at a cost of \$ 25 million.

India has also been endeavouring to encourage trade, commerce and integration of Afghan economy within the region and has brought in Afghanistan as a member of SAARC in November 2005. Afghanistan's membership of SAARC would be advantageous for economic reconstruction and it would also be a great opportunity for member countries to benefit from possible opening of a corridor between South and Central Asian countries. However, in this age of globalisation, Pakistan continues to follow obscurantist policies and denies transit facilities to India for trade, commerce and even aid for reconstruction and development of Afghanistan linking grant of such rights with solution of the Jammu and Kashmir problem. This not only deprives Pakistan of transit fees, but it also deprives Afghanistan of much needed revenue and trading opportunities through access to vast markets of South Asia, Central Asia and beyond. For Afghanistan, to exploit its unique position as a land bridge between Central and South Asia it needs



cooperation of both Pakistan and India as also of other neighbouring countries. One of the major thrusts of American foreign policy has been to encourage India and Pakistan towards rapprochement on their outstanding issues.

### **Implications for India**

With the *Taliban* resurgence on both sides of the Durand Line and Pakistan having signed peace deals in North and South Waziristan and dilution of Pakistan's sovereignty in these areas, contours of a de facto independent Pashtoonistan are emerging. Pakistan's efforts and resources are directed towards *Taliban* resurgence which may not be bad from Indian point of view. Apparently, there is no need to get into a zero sum game with Pakistan or get involved in a messy situation in Afghanistan. It is also being widely perceived that Pakistan is involved in a 'wasteful extravaganza' and its ambitions of controlling Afghanistan are unlikely to bear fruit because of nature of fiercely independent Afghans. In the long run, *Taliban* is likely to create more problems for Pakistan rather than solve any or add to so called "strategic depth" of Pakistan. Further, no Afghan government, including the Pashtoon-dominated *Taliban* regime that was recognised by Pakistan, has accepted the division of Pashtoos along Durand Line. Afghan leaders consider the British-drawn; colonial-era border line deprives Afghanistan of Pashtoon territory now inside Pakistan.

Sending of Indian troops to Afghanistan at present juncture and opening a proxy front against Pakistan would be the most imprudent step. It is likely to cost us the goodwill of common Afghan people who, in any case, resent any kind of foreign interference. And as the history bears witness whether it were British during the Anglo-Afghan wars of 19<sup>th</sup> Century or Soviet Russia or even Alexander the Great, all were routed by proud and freedom loving Afghan fighters over a period of time.

Better alternative would be to revert to exclusive focus on people-to-people relations and strengthen our economic, cultural and historical bonds with the Afghan people. We need to extend additional aid and promote reconstruction and development projects especially in peaceful areas in North and West of Afghanistan. Also, there is a need to have a re-look on our opening of four consulates in Afghanistan, especially in the areas of conflict. If



consulates are not serving any useful purpose the same may be relocated, their number reduced or may even be closed till situation improves. However, there is also a view that consulates in the area of conflict do serve as a pressure point in the strategic games being played in the arena and it cannot be said that they are devoid of any use.

Another question which arises is whether there is a need to seek political accommodation with *Taliban*. *Taliban* and its philosophy go against the grain of nature and ideology of Indian state. However, it also needs to be noted that *Taliban* is not listed as a terrorist entity either in any official list of the US or its allies, perhaps, because of political expediency. There is also a gnawing feeling among the western nations and the US that eventually they may have to reach some understanding with *Taliban* if further losses are to be avoided and peace and stability is to be restored. But as long as the US and NATO stay in Afghanistan, *Taliban* is unlikely to gain complete control. At present, India needs to strengthen its relations with nationalist elements amongst Pashtoons and other dominant ethnic groups in order to pursue its interests in Afghanistan. Further, in politico-diplomatic matters one can never take an absolute position. However, at the present juncture our interests would be well served by strengthening all *non-Taliban* forces in Afghanistan.

## Conclusion

The development of Afghanistan and improving the lot of its people cannot take place unless there is peace and stability and further, peace and security would be as a consequence of development and prosperity. This is a mutually interdependent phenomenon and international community has to address comprehensively all dimensions of problems of Afghanistan in moving it towards a strong, stable and a vibrant democratic nation.

Over two and half decades of strife in Afghanistan has impoverished a proud nation with no stability in sight because of policies being pursued by some of the regional and extra regional players. Internally, a weak government has not been able to force the rule of law and provide health, education, employment opportunities and food security to the populace. Thus, a resurgent *Taliban* is gaining strength. Ethnic divisions further complicate the



problem of restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan. Near term future of Afghanistan is likely to be a continuum of the present situation. Prospects of achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan in mid-term to long term period would be brighter if all the benchmarks and timelines outlined in Afghan Compact can be achieved to some degree with the help of international community. Failure in Afghanistan would impact both the regional and global security adversely and Pakistan and India would be the worst sufferers of unstable and insecure Afghanistan.

### **ADDRESS UPDATE**

**ALL MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO INTIMATE  
CHANGE OF ADDRESS ON OCCURENCE,  
INCLUDING TELEPHONE NUMBER AND E-MAIL**



# Continuity and Change in War Fighting : The Indian Experience

Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Zaki

*"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur".*

— General Giulio Douhet, *Command of the Air*, 1921

## INTRODUCTION

The coming decades are likely to be as volatile as in the recent past, with our potential adversaries likely to confront us with conventional as well as unconventional means. The instability in our neighbourhood and extended area of interest will impinge, directly or indirectly, upon India's security. The pace of change, in the future, is likely to increase for a number of reasons. Technology is rapidly changing and if the armed forces do not absorb it at the same rate, they are likely to be left behind. Great changes are also taking place in our society. Being a part of the society, all societal changes will have a profound effect on the structures and functions of the armed forces.

In keeping with technological and societal changes, war fighting has been undergoing a rapid transformation in means as well as the ends. Traditional war fighting concepts of capturing territory and destruction of military forces or strategic resources are increasingly becoming less relevant in modern warfare. We are witnessing Non-State Actors (NSA) using unconventional means to confront state militaries and thus negate their conventional edge. This was clearly illustrated in Lebanon recently, where the *Hezbollah* fought the Israeli forces to a standstill. Nearer home, in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Army has been facing proxy war waged by militants sponsored by our adversaries. All this marks the advent of a new form of warfare.

## AIM

This essay examines the transformation of modern warfare, prognosticates the emerging threat profile in the Indian context and

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recommends necessary doctrinal realignment and force restructuring to enable our armed forces to retain their combat edge in the coming decades.

## THE TRAJECTORY OF WARFARE


### The Generational Shift

According to William S Lind, modern warfare has seen four generations that have evolved over the last few hundred years. The first generation warfare (1GW) was dominated by massed manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation warfare (2GW) was dominated by firepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced third generation warfare (3GW), characterised by manoeuvre. The fourth generation warfare (4GW), evolved since World War II, unlike previous generations does not attempt to win by defeating enemy's military forces. Instead, the unconventional 4GW adversary, making use of all available networks - political, economic, social, and military - directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will to fight.<sup>1</sup>

In 4GW, the state loses its monopoly on war.<sup>2</sup> All across the globe, state militaries find themselves confronting NSAs such as *Al Qaeda*, *Hezbollah*, *Taliban*, *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and the likes. It is pertinent that only 4GW has defeated numerically superior conventional forces - the *Mujahideen* defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan, Vietnamese defeated the French and US forces, *Hezbollah* surprised Israel in Lebanon recently and the outcome of Operations *Iraqi Freedom* and *Enduring Freedom* being conducted by the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively, is still uncertain.

This view is also echoed by Martin Van Creveld, the author of *The Transformation of War*,<sup>3</sup> in which he illustrates the relative successes of unconventional wars against conventional opponents and highlights the failures of regular militaries to deal with this evolving threat. He predicts - "If the last fifty years or so provide any guide, future wars will be overwhelmingly of the type known, however inaccurately, as 'low intensity.' Both organisationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment.....".<sup>4</sup>





**Fig. 1 : The “Generations of War” Model<sup>5</sup>**

It is evident from the above figure that although vestiges of 1GW, 2GW and 3GW shall remain for some time, the trajectory of future warfare is inexorably moving towards 4GW. The challenge lies in retaining adequate potency against ‘the continuity’ of extant threats, while simultaneously adapting to ‘the change’ wrought by 4GW.

### **The Indian Experience**

The momentous changes taking place at the global level in war fighting, as explained earlier, have not left the Indian Armed Forces untouched. Being a professional force, our Armed Forces have been imbibing these changes and applying them to the Indian context.

The Indo-Pak War of 1971 is a classic example of successful conduct of 3GW and is taught in foreign armies as such. The *Sunday Times of London* had reported, “It took only 12 days for the Indian Army to smash its way to Dacca, an achievement reminiscent of the German *Blitzkrieg* across France in 1940. The strategy was the same: speed, ferocity and flexibility”. The Army, of course, was not alone. The IAF and the Indian Navy the *Mukti Bahini* helped to shape the victory.



On the other hand, our experience of 4GW has not been so encouraging. In Operation PAWAN, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka applied the conventional 3GW tactics to what was essentially a 4GW adversary, with resultant losses. From 1990 onwards, we have been embroiled in Jammu and Kashmir in a similar confrontation with 4GW forces. In both instances, we have not fully grasped that a new form of warfare is upon us which is engaging a major portion of our forces and shall remain so in the coming decades. It calls for a realistic prognosis of the emerging threat profile.

## **THREAT PROGNOSIS**

### **Conventional Conflict**

**Pakistan.** Kargil '99 has demonstrated that there is space for calibrated conventional war within the nuclear threshold. Hence, the likelihood of a conventional war with Pakistan remains a possibility in the near term, triggered as a result of punitive strike by India in response to a terrorism or border incident. However, the likelihood of such a conflict in the mid to long term is likely to decrease due to international pressure to prevent conflict between the two nuclear states, emergence of a stable democratic government in Pakistan and resolution of the Kashmir Issue at some point of time in the future, as well as India's maturity and responsibility as an emerging global power.

**China.** A conflict is possible in the medium to long term, on account of clash of interests arising out of competing regional and global aspirations and, unresolved boundary disputes. Infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), like the recent construction of the Golmud to Lhasa rail line, coupled with the ongoing modernisation of China's armed forces, are indicators. However, China is likely to turn its attention to India only after it has consolidated its position economically.

Hence, there is a requirement to maintain our conventional combat edge against Pakistan in the short to mid term and a conventional dissuasive posture against China, in the mid to long term.

### **Nuclear Conflict**

Any conflict with Pakistan will be fought under a nuclear shadow with Pakistan threatening to use its nuclear weapons as



a desperate measure to stall our conventional offensive beyond a threshold threatening its very survival. The threat gets magnified in the event of Pakistan disintegrating into a failed state and its nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of *Jehadi* elements. The only effective counter to such eventualities is maintaining an assured second strike capability which would deter Pakistan from embarking upon a nuclear misadventure.

Against China, the equation is completely reversed, in that the Chinese armed forces have a decisive conventional edge over us which if we try to match, will be a severe drain on our economy. The nuclear option will be the only effective means to deter the Chinese dragon, of sufficient reach and size.

Hence, while both, conventional and nuclear conflicts remain on the threat horizon, the latter is only a consequence of the former as an escalation. This defines their inter se priority.

### **Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)**


Given the low probability of being able to achieve their aims by open hostilities, whether nuclear or conventional, there is an increasing tendency of both, state and NSA, to take recourse to 4GW. China has in the past aided insurgency in the North East while Pakistan applied it first in Punjab, where it failed and then in Jammu and Kashmir. A major portion of our Army continues to remain tied down in Counter Insurgency (CI) operations with growing cost in manpower and material.

There are other threats to security in the hinterland. There is a growing menace of Naxalism in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and Bihar in collusion with the Maoists in Nepal who dream of a Compact Revolutionary Zone. These forces are growing bolder by the day and have directly challenged the authority of the state. The gravity is evident from the fact that Naxalites have killed 460 people in the first six months of 2006,<sup>6</sup> nearly equalling our total combat casualties in Kargil War. The social and cultural fault lines of our heterogeneous society are also breeding grounds for 4GW forces in form of terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism, as evident from the Mumbai train blasts on 11 July 2006.

As the central paramilitary forces are still not able to combat this threat and the employment of the Armed Forces has adverse



implications, it has been proposed that a separate force, manned, led, equipped and controlled by the Army, called the Internal Security Force be raised to meet this requirement.<sup>7</sup> The Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles could provide the nucleus for such a force. It would be the 'lead force' in tackling the high end threats to internal security.



**Fig. 2 : The Prognostic Indian Threat Model**

The above prognosis reveals that while conventional and nuclear conflicts remain in the realm of possibility, the LIC is the reality we are facing today and shall continue so in the future. There is, therefore, a need for re-appraisal and re-prioritization of the emerging threats. While retaining our conventional combat power, together with the nuclear deterrent, the emphasis has to shift towards LIC (4GW) as the primary threat in the coming decades.

**Emerging Challenges**

Apart from the threats outlined above, many more challenges may emerge in the future, as India gains eminence in the global stage commensurate with its economic growth. Free flow of energy and overseas trade will become central to this development. Prime Minister Mr Manmohan Singh, in his address to the Combined



Commanders Conference in October 2005, stated - "We must ensure workable alliances with like minded countries for security of our sea lanes, for our commercial and energy security."<sup>8</sup> This entails a critical shift from essentially a 'continental approach' of our military strategy to a 'continental-cum-maritime' strategy.<sup>9</sup>

Asymmetric warfare is another emerging challenge. It is certain that terrorists and other 4GW forces will get emboldened by the *Hezbollah's* success in the recent Lebanon conflict and will apply its tactics elsewhere. The *Hezbollah* divided Southern Lebanon into military zones and spent the last six years digging tunnels and dispersed about 12,000 rockets in a vast network of hidden caches. Their fighters, operating in small teams accessed the weapons only at the moment of attack, and then disappeared. *Hezbollah* fired more than 100 rockets a day at the start of the conflict and continued at the same rate at the time of the cease fire. It attained the status of a 'state within a state' controlling territory and seats in the Lebanese government.<sup>10</sup> This Conflict merits further study to understand its implications in our context.

### DOCTRINAL REALIGNMENT

The analysis of the existing and emerging threats, necessitates a realignment of our doctrines. While the individual service doctrines were released sometime back, the recently published *Joint Doctrine: Indian Armed Forces* attempts to give a shape to the Indian strategic thought process. It lays down that - "To defend the national territory, we need to maintain a full spectrum of dissuasive and deterrent capability on land, air and sea. This capability should be such that it is effective against all types of armed conflicts, from LIC to conventional, under a nuclear shadow."<sup>11</sup> Consequently, the essential doctrinal issues that merit consideration in a further study of desired force structures are outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

### Strategic Vision - Enabled by Politico-Military Interaction

It has already been highlighted that the 4GW will take place across the spectrum of political, social and military fields. This would necessitate a close politico-military interaction enabled through revamping of the higher defence organisation. The establishment of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) under command of the Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman COSC (CISC)



was the first step in this direction. The CISC needs to be upgraded to the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), to provide single point military advice to the Raksha Mantri. The direct access of military leadership to the political leaders would enable development of strategic vision for the country through the mechanism of the National Security Council.

### **Military Diplomacy**

The ability of military forces of a nation to support diplomatic initiatives and manipulate behaviour of other nations to safeguard own national interests is military diplomacy.<sup>12</sup> A strong force projection capability, based on air lift, sea lift or a combination of both, is essential for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in response to a crisis situation in neighbouring countries, disaster relief and peace keeping operations. This would also include building robust relationships with other nations through bilateral and multilateral military-to-military cooperation.

### **Joint Operations**

The nature of future warfare requires harmonious and synergetic application of land, sea and air forces. Joint operations are the most essential requirement of future wars and have to focus on the seamless application of all available resources to shock, dislocate and overwhelm the enemy.<sup>13</sup> There is a need to 'think purple' and transcend from single service operations to joint operations to optimise and integrate the full combat potential of each service. This demands an integrated command structure at all levels - strategic, operational and tactical in the context of land-air-maritime battle. This should be complemented by joint training, planning and conduct of war.

### **Revolution In Military Affairs (RMA) : Transformation Through Technology**

Future wars will be fought under high-tech conditions characterised by greater transparency and increased precision of munitions. This calls for imbibing RMA through adoption of high technology in our doctrine and organisation, at all levels, thus bringing about a change in our war fighting methodology. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) forms an essential component of the RMA, where in the challenge lies in reducing the 'sensor to shooter' gap in the information and cognitive domain.



## **Human Resource Development (HRD)**

In the surfeit of hi-tech gadgetry, one is apt to overlook the 'man behind the machine'. In the background of the changing socio-economic conditions in the country, the human resources have to be harnessed to its full potential. Adopting systems approach to training, directive style of command, manoeuvre approach to war fighting, improving the technical threshold and imbibing secular moral values are some of the essentials.

## **FORCE RE-STRUCTURING**

The analysis so far indicates that force re-structuring is an operational necessity to give our forces the wherewithal and capability to tackle the existing and emerging challenges. There can be no single prescription for this venture, since the existing threat profile is diverse in nature and will evolve over time. The force profile should be so configured that it is capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict identified earlier i.e. ranging from LIC to conventional conflict under the nuclear shadow.

### **Conventional Forces**

A future conventional conflict with our primary adversary will be fought under a nuclear overhang that will limit the scope of offensive action to multiple shallow objectives. Towards this end, battle groups have been constituted, based on division or division plus force levels, organised for this purpose. The battle group's constituent formations are not necessarily their organic elements, but could be from any other formation, primarily based on the mobilisation matrix and the mission orientation.

If such a mission oriented organisation is the imperative of our pro-active strategy, then there is a need to carry this forward and institutionalise it. This entails building 'modular force' structures for our conventional forces. The basic 'module' or the primary building block of such a force structure could be a brigade size force that is self contained for fire power and logistic support and composed of combined arms combat groups. This brigade-centric organisation could be scalable from heavy (armour heavy), medium (mechanised infantry heavy) to light (infantry heavy) roles. These brigade size battle groups would have all the capabilities presently found at divisional level i.e. it will have its integral combat service



and logistics support. A corresponding exercise can be undertaken in the Navy and the Air Force, to create a modular force structure.

The command echelons above the brigade, i.e. division and corps headquarters (and their equivalent in the other services) would be made independent of their subordinate formations i.e. it will have no organic formations under command. Rather, tailor made mix of such brigade modules can 'plug and play' under any division headquarters to accomplish the mission assigned. Similarly, the corps headquarters can have its own mission specific organisation.

Eventually, these command echelons above the brigade will evolve into a truly joint and battle focused command structures capable of controlling a mix of modules from any service contingent on their threat based mission. In essence, we would achieve a right balance of 'capability' and 'threat' based force structure; the brigade size modules being the former and the command echelons above it being the latter.

While a comprehensive study would be necessary to arrive at the exact organisation and command and control structure, which could be implemented in an incremental manner, the following advantages of such a scheme are evident:-

(a) It will enable a flexible and joint force packaging, which will generate more options for the commanders at all levels enabling them to reach for a broader set of tactical and operational objectives, in a tri-service context.

(b) It will migrate our vertical hierarchical organisation to a horizontal networked organisation, with its inherent advantages.

Having realised these advantages, the US Army is also transforming into a modular force and has already deployed six such Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq.<sup>15</sup>

### **Strategic Forces**

The Indian Nuclear Doctrine is well articulated and is based on maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, with built in survivability and necessary safeguards, to cater for all contingencies. Within this policy frame work, the role of the armed



forces will be to guarantee the second strike capability based on a triad of land, sea and air based missiles, with secure command and control networks. The current status and the desired capabilities are shown in figure below:-

STRATEGIC FORCES			
CAPABILITY	LAND	SEA	AIR
PRESENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Based on Prithvi and Agni Class of missiles. Range limited to tactical and operational depth.</li> <li>● Road and rail based launcher. Easy detection and hence low survivability.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To be based on Dhanush and Sagarika missiles.</li> <li>● Ship and submarine launched.</li> <li>● Greater reach and highest survivability. Hence, most potent deterrent.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Based on Mirage 2000, Jaguar and Su 30 MKI.</li> <li>● Range limited by operating radius of the aircraft.</li> <li>● Highest payload capacity and accuracy.</li> </ul>
DESIRED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Enhance range of Agni missile beyond 5000 km (ICBM class).</li> <li>● Construct underground bomb proof silos at likely launch sites to ensure survivability.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Early completion of the Advance Technology Vehicle (ATV), the indigenous nuclear submarine projects.</li> <li>● Concurrent finalisation of Sagarika SLBM.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Consider space based options.</li> </ul>

**Fig. 3 : Capability of Strategic Forces**

The potency of the nuclear deterrent will not be a function of number of warheads, but an assured second strike capability based on adequacy and flexibility of the delivery systems and survivability of the command and control structures. This has to be demonstrated to potential adversaries, so that it knows that, however, strong a first strike it may launch, India is capable of launching a crippling retaliatory strike.

Nuclear weapons are very like conventional military armaments in that the credibility of their use is only in terms of their utility in war.<sup>16</sup> This is possible only when these forces are kept operationally ready by having nuclear war plans in place and exercising them periodically.

To ensure the continuity of our nuclear deterrence, we have to ensure that our military nuclear programme is kept out of the ambit of the ongoing US-India Civilian Nuclear deal and the IAEA safeguards.



## Special Forces

It has been established that the trajectory of modern warfare is steadily moving towards the 4GW. Such asymmetric threats, bring into focus the need of tackling an unconventional enemy, with Special Forces (SF) who are superbly trained, well equipped and highly motivated to tackle the demands of such a warfare. Indeed, the US military relies heavily on SF detachments in Afghanistan and Iraq in its ongoing campaign. The Indian SF are based on the SF battalions of the Army, the Marine Commandos (Marcos) of the Navy and the Garuda of the Air Force.

The key element of SF operations is jointness in training, planning, preparation, conduct and integration of all SF resources under a single command. Having identified this critical need, a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), should be raised, taking under its command all service SF units, including those units under the Home Ministry manned by army personnel. This JSOC should come under command of the HQ IDS, providing the SF capability at operational and tactical levels to the three Services. The second element of the jointness is a common operating philosophy through a joint SF doctrine, which is being prepared by HQ IDS.

While the specifics of the nature and scope of SF operations will be spelt out by the joint SF doctrine, guided by their strategic reach and force capabilities, the broad domain of their operation would be:-

(a) **Offensive Action.** This will include all small scale actions performed in direct support of an operational level commander during the conduct of conventional operations; such as raids, ambushes, search and destroy missions, targeting vital communications and logistics infrastructure and enemy commanders. It will also include conduct of the reconnaissance and surveillance, at strategic and operational levels, sometimes even before the commencement of actual operations due to their 'small footprint'.

(b) **Counter Insurgency (CI).** India's CI campaign in Jammu and Kashmir has reached a state of strategic stalemate. Although Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles and the regular army units will continue to be the mainstay of our CI operations, we



need to break out of the current impasse by shifting focus from 'saturation tactics' being presently employed, to 'surgical strikes', by SF units on both sides of the Line of Control (LC), directed against key militant leaders, training infrastructure, launch pads and logistics installations. Such operations, carried out clandestinely, do not risk escalation, while causing grievous hurt to the Pakistani establishment that supports proxy war.

(c) **Counter Terrorism.** This includes our response to terrorism in all its manifestations; hostage rescue, evacuation operations, bomb disposal, infiltration of militant/terrorist organisation and emerging challenges of countering Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), cyber terrorism and terrorism effecting energy security. Of these, the counter WMD requires urgent attention and could entail setting up organisations on the lines of US Chemical biological Incident Response Teams (CBIRT) and Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST).


(d) **Expeditionary Contingency.** The aim of the SF's expeditionary capability would be to maintain law and order on the high seas as part of Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMO) and in the proximal land areas, render help to friendly governments in the region facing threats from rebels and terrorists like the Maldives operation, disaster management like carried out post Tsunami and to cater for contingencies like Kandahar hijacking. This capability would be based on a mix of air borne and amphibious means with adequate reach in our area of interest. These operations could also be undertaken as part of a coalition along with friendly foreign forces or under the UN auspices. A good model to follow in this regard is the Marines Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) constituted from the US Marine Expeditionary Force.

## CONCLUSION

Hierarchical organisations like the armed forces inherently resist change, forgetting that changes in the emerging security environment and future battle field milieu, as well as societal changes demand change. Considering the momentous changes taking place in the global, regional and domestic environments and their impact on our security, the armed forces need to realign doctrinally and restructure organisationally to remain a potent force. Some of the



'ways' and 'means' to achieve the desired 'ends' have been explored in this essay, summarised below -



**Fig. 4 : Ways, Means and Ends**

There is need to exercise an element of caution while embracing these changes. Any undue emphasis or insistence on a tailor-made orientation focussing primarily on any particular level of warfare would be dangerously misplaced.<sup>17</sup> The words of Sir Winston Churchill while addressing the House of Commons in 1923, sum it up-

“The armed forces are not like a limited liability company, to be reconstructed from time to time as the money fluctuates. They are not inanimate things, like a house to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprices of the tenant or owner. They are living things, if they are bullied, they sulk, if they are happy, they pine, if they are harried, sufficiently they get feverish, if they are sufficiently disturbed, they will wither and dwindle and almost die, and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived with lots of time and lots of money.”

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# "Op Khukri" The United Nations – Operations Fought in Sierra Leone

Lieutenant General V K Jetley, PVSM, UYSM (Retd)

## INTRODUCTION

India's participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations has always been exceptional in terms of the quality and quantity of troops and commanders provided to various trouble spots around the world. As on 31 January 2007, India is the third largest contributor to the UN with 8052 troops committed on various UN Missions all over the world.

In the year 1999-2000, we were amongst the largest contributors to the UN with a total commitment of approx 4,000 troops, mostly deployed in Sierra Leone, on the West African coast. I was privileged to be appointed its first Force Commander and was given the unenviable task of raising the mission from scratch. This proved to be an exciting and challenging experience with a fair share of trials and tribulations. Fortunately, long years of experience in the Indian Army, coupled with an earlier tenure with the UN, came handy in the execution of this task as also in handling many tricky situations that occurred.

Because the UN is always strapped for resources, establishment of a mission from scratch is never an easy task. A credible force was created despite various shortcomings. This Force, on being raised, was deployed as per the instructions received from UN Headquarters, New York from time to time, much to the discomfiture of the various rebel groups, led by the Revolutionary United Front, who saw the deployment of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops as a threat to them. This should not have been the case as the rebels themselves were part of the Government of National Unity of Sierra Leone. It was evident that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were ill at ease due to the professional conduct of the UNAMSIL and its rapid deployment. It was not surprising, therefore, that, around May 2000,

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Lieutenant General V K Jetley was commissioned into Dogra Regiment. He Commanded a corps in the North East. He retired as Master General of Ordnance



g — Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, a Minister in the Government and a Vice President equivalent, gave orders to the RUF rebels to renege on their commitment to the Agreement. The rebels under his orders chose to attack the Kenyan positions due to the fact that they had achieved moral domination over the Kenyan troops. They killed a few of them and took many others as hostages including a number of military observers. After attacking the Kenyans at Makeni and Maqburaka, the rebels, using guile, tricked more than half the newly inducted Zambian battalion into captivity. At Kailahun, in the Eastern part of Sierra Leone, 11 Milobs were taken hostage and the Indian position was surrounded by the rebels. However, due to a healthy respect for the professional capabilities of the Indian troops, they refrained from taking any rash action such as attacking them, as they did in the case of the others. g

4/c — According to Michael Fleshman, writing in *'Africa Recovery*, a United Nations Publication, I quote "the repudiation of the nearly an year-old peace agreement in Sierra Leone by rebel forces reignited the country's long civil conflict and thrust the UN Peacekeeping Mission into a war for which it was neither mandated nor equipped. Some observers, particularly in developed countries, were highly critical of the operations, arguing that the UN was naive to trust the rebels' commitment and negligent in deploying poorly trained and lightly armed troops". He went further to add, g

u — "The record, however, shows that senior UN officials and the Security Council were fully aware of the challenges awaiting the organization's peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and that the Secretary-General Mr Kofi Annan, had repeatedly sought but did not obtain the resources required from member States to meet those challenges". I was unaware of all this.

# (gals) — The attack on UN peacekeepers resulted in steps having to be taken to salvage the situation. The military solution lay in conducting a series of military operations to bring the rebels to their senses. Operation Khukri was one such military operation. Much has been spoken and written about this operation since then by people whose sources of information are probably articles and news reviews picked up from the internet or opinions of so called UN experts. For sure, the sources of information are either second hand or third hand accounts or they are accounts from reporting which is biased to cover up lapses.



Before proceeding further, it is essential to highlight a few important issues pertaining to the geography and terrain of Sierra Leone, as also the background to the problem in this troubled State, for without it, would be difficult to understand the said operation. Sierra Leone is located on the West coast of Africa. It is roughly circular in shape and has an area of approximately 72,000 square kms. It measures 332 Km from North to South and about 328 km East to West. It is bounded on the West and South West by the Atlantic Ocean, on the North East and North West by the Republic of Guinea, and on the East and South East by the Republic of Liberia. 4c

### BACKGROUND

The conflict in Sierra Leone dates back to March 1991 when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war from the East of the country near the border with Liberia, to overthrow the government. With the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sierra Leone's Army tried at first to defend the governments but, the following year, the Army itself overthrew the government. Despite the change of power, the RUF continued its attacks. In February 1995, the United Nations Secretary General appointed a Special Envoy, Mr Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia). He worked in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS to try to negotiate a settlement to the conflict and return the country to civilian rule.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February 1996, and the Army relinquished power to the winner Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The RUF, however, did not participate in the elections and would not recognise the results. The conflict continued. Special Envoy Dinka assisted in negotiating a peace agreement, in November 1996, between the Government and RUF known as the Abidjan Accord. The agreement was derailed by another military coup d'etat in May 1997. This time the Army Joined forces with the RUF and formed a ruling junta. President Kabbah and his government went into exile in neighbouring Guinea.

A new Special Envoy, Mr. Francis G. Okelo (Uganda) and other representatives of the international community tried, but failed to persuade the Junta to step down. The Security Council imposed



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(space)

an oil and arms embargo on 8 October 1997, and authorised ECOWAS to ensure its implementation using ECOMOG troops. On 23 October, the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing the chairman of the junta held talks at Conakry and signed a peace plan which, among other things, called for a ceasefire to be monitored by ECOMOG and if approved by the UN Security Council assisted by the UN military observers. On 5 November, President Kabbah issued a statement indicating his acceptance of the agreement, and stated his government's willingness to cooperate with ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the United Nations and UNHCR in the implementation of their respective roles. Although the junta publicly committed itself to implementing the agreement, it subsequently criticised key provisions and raised a number of issues, with the result that the agreement was never implemented.

In February 1998, ECOMOG, responding to an attack by rebel/Army junta forces, launched a military attack that led to the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. On 10 March, President Kabbah was returned to office. The Security Council terminated the oil and arms embargo and strengthened the office of the Special Envoy to include UN military liaison officers and security advisory personnel. On June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. The Secretary-General named Special Envoy Okelo as his Special Representative and Chief of Mission. The mission monitored and advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams, under the protection of ECOMOG, documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians.

Fighting continued with the rebel alliance gaining control of more than half the country. In December 1998 the alliance began an offensive to retake Freetown and in January overran most of the city. All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated. The Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer continued performing their duties, maintaining close contact with all parties to the conflict and monitoring the situation. Later the same month, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and installed the civilian government, although thousands of rebels were still reportedly hiding out in the



surrounding countryside. In the aftermath of the rebel attack, Special Representative Okelo, in consultation with West African States, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999 and on 7 July all parties to the conflict signed an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a government of national unity. The parties to the conflict also requested an expanded role for UNOMSIL. On 20 August the UN Security Council authorised an increase in the number of military observers to 210.

On 22 October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of UNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL. On 7 February 2000, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1289, decided to revise the mandate of UNAMSIL to include a number of additional tasks. It decided to expand the military component to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed. The Council also authorised increases in the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative and technical components of UNAMSIL, as proposed by the Secretary-General.

Coming back to its pre-expansion days, it is pertinent to bring out that by end of April 2000, UNAMSIL was more or less deployed at most of its pre-designated deployment areas in Sierra Leone. We had managed to set up five Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration camps (DDR Camps). The sixth one was to be established in the diamond rich areas of Koidu. As mentioned earlier, this caused considerable consternation amongst the rebels, who saw this as the end of the road for them. The situation came to a head on 01 May 2000 with the RUF demanding the handing back to them of ten rebels from their cadre who had themselves surrendered RUF rebels at the DDR camp at Makeni. This camp was under the jurisdiction of the Kenyan troops. RUF attacked the DDR camp and the Kenyan positions at Makeni and Maqburaka. There were a number of casualties including fatal ones and the rebels also succeeded in capturing and taking hostage a number of military observers and some peacekeepers. They also



laid siege to both Makeni and Maqburaka making movement of supplies, casualty evacuation and other similar activities difficult. Needless to say, this action of the RUF was a blatant violation of the Lome Peace Accord and it came as a jolt to UNAMSIL.

To set things right, a three-pronged offensive was planned on the rebels at Makeni and Maqburaka. This was achieved by using a company of the Kenyan troops based at Kabala in the North to attack the rebels deployed around Makeni. The APCs based Quick Reaction Company of the Indians was moved from the South to attack the rebels deployed around Maqburaka. The aim of these two thrusts was to beat back the rebels laying siege to these two places as also to strengthen Makeni and Maqburaka positions. Using these thrusts as anvils, the newly inducted Zambian battalion was launched as the hammer from the East. Unfortunately, while the two thrusts fought their way into the Kenyan positions and bolstered their strength, the Zambian operation went awry as most of them were tricked into captivity and taken hostage.

Simultaneous to the attacks at Makeni and Maqburaka, the rebels also surrounded Indian peacekeepers tactically deployed at Kailahun. However, due to the professional competence of the Indian peacekeepers and their earlier humane attitude, the rebels could not muster courage to attack them. The rebels had, however, taken approximately 500 peacekeepers in the Makeni and Maqburaka areas, as hostages. Spurred by this the UN entered into protracted diplomatic discussions with the rebels through President Charles Taylor of Liberia, who succeeded in getting most of the hostages released through his country viz. Liberia. He could do this because he had a hold over the rebels. In fact, he was touted to be the de facto leader of the RUF rebels, especially after corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF was captured and put into prison. While hostage negotiation was in progress, the rebels continued with their stand-off at Kailahun as it was the only bargaining chip that they had for extracting concessions. The continued tension of being surrounded impacted on the morale of the beleaguered garrison at Kailahun. As it turned out the stand-off was to last for 75 long days. It was necessary to end the stalemate and the only means at my disposal was to resort to military action at Kailahun. Other reasons for the launching of an operation at Kailahun were denial of supply of food to Kailahun by road and air since the beginning of July 2000, refusal by rebels to permit air



evacuation of casualties, failure of diplomatic means to convince RUF to desist from the stand-off coupled with the unwillingness of President Charles Taylor to secure release of the largely Indian peacekeepers at Kailahun and last, but not least, the impending rainy season. Sierra Leone as it is well known is the second rainiest place on earth after Cherapunji.

Planning for the rescue of the garrison had commenced by mid May 2000 and the plan was constantly reviewed and refined. During the planning utmost coordination was ensured between participating units. We could not, however, put this plan into effect until mid-July due to various constraints under which we were working. Primarily the constraints were lack of resources in terms of troops, attack helicopters and logistics. There was concern and desire to prevent collateral damage as long as possible with the faint hope of resolution of the issue through diplomatic means. There was also the concern for the safety of the hostages including 23 Indian peacekeepers held captive at Kuiva, who had all been divested of their weapons.

The UN headquarters New York did keep up its effort to end the stand-off through diplomatic means but to no avail. Many felt that the UN's efforts lacked the earlier fervour, but that is perhaps just conjecture. Simultaneously, hectic efforts were made by the UN to build up reserves for impending military operations, if the need for the same arose. By resolution 1299 of 19 May 2000, the Security Council increased the authorised strength of UNAMSIL, to 13,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers. This resulted in substantial reserves coming in from Jordan who sent two infantry battalions and Bangladesh who sent one infantry battalion, India sent one infantry battalion viz 18 GRENADIERS, one mechanised company, one engineer company and a flight of attack helicopters. It is pertinent to bring out here that the British troops, already on Sierra Leonean soil, neither joined up as part of UNAMSIL nor participated jointly in any operation against the rebels.

On arrival of the reserves, it became possible for us to put our plan into action, but we held on until 29 June 2000, when the final breakthrough of getting the last of the hostages, the 23 Indian peacekeepers being held at Kuiva, freed by diplomatic means was achieved. The stage was finally set to launch the operation which was code named 'Op Khukri',



## TERRAIN IMPERATIVES

It is necessary to have an idea of the type of terrain obtaining in the area of operation, to fully understand the implications of the same. The entire area was densely wooded with primary jungles. It was criss-crossed by a number of swamps and rivers full of water, which made cross country movement extremely difficult. It also meant that such water obstacles could be crossed only at existing crossing places where ambushes could be laid by the RUF. Due to dense undergrowth and overgrowth, the terrain lent itself to sneak attacks by the rebels. To complicate matters further, there was only one unmetalled road connecting Kenema with Daru and Daru with Kailahun. This road had three prominent bridges South of Pendembu after which there were a number log bridges, which were all potential bottlenecks. Road Kenema-Daru was not in use due to being in RUF control. Hence, all move from Kenema to Daru was based on helicopters. Road Daru-Kailahun was also under the domination of the RUF.

The Indian battalion (5/8 GR) was deployed deep inside RUF held territory at Daru which was 70 kms away from the nearest pro-government town of Kenema. Kailahun, where one company of 5/8 GR and one Indian mechanised company were deployed, was a further 70 kms East of Daru on the same road.

## PLANNING

Soon after the stand off at Kailahun, I started planning for a military operation to break the same. For this, it was essential for me to know the exact deployment of the RUF between Daru and Kailahun. It was also essential to find out about the weapons available to them. As we were initially on a good understanding with each other, movement of the 21C of 5/8 GR, being held at Kuiva alongwith 22 others, was permitted between Kuiva and Daru on the one hand and sometimes between Kuiva and Kailahun on the other. The company commander and RMO at Kailahun were permitted to move from Kailahun to Kuiva to provide medical relief to the sick at Kuiva and logistics convoys were permitted movement from Daru to Kailahun and back on a regular basis. All this was done on an "honour-code" basis. This permitted me to gather intelligence about RUF deployments along this axis.



Initially, we were also permitted to evacuate casualties by air. This gave us a bird's eye view of the deployments of the rebels. We took aerial pictures not only of the rebel deployments but also of open areas along the axis which would serve as Landing Zones (LZs) during the operation. By the time I was ready to put my plan into action, I had a very clear picture of enemy deployment and the terrain. It was confirmed that the rebels had their Brigade headquarters at Pendembu, which was roughly half way through from Daru to Kailahun. Despite great deal of ground and air reconnaissance and inputs from various other sources, I felt that these inputs were not quite sufficient.

Due to the danger of the plan being leaked out to the rebels by their sympathisers, planning was restricted to a few key personnel on a need to know basis. The British troops stationed in Sierra Leone for the rescue of their one military observer held captive at Kailahun along with the others, exerted considerable pressure on me to divulge the plan to them. Their High Commissioner who was always after me to disclose the plan, finally, acceded to my request for two Chinook helicopters which had the capability to fly at night and during hours of bad visibility. Needless to say, he did so after having obtained approval from his superiors in London. While the plan was more or less finalised well in advance, the operational order was issued only on 12 July 2000 i.e one day before the actual launch.

## **FORCE LEVELS**

### **Force level – RUF**

As per the known dispositions of the RUF in the area of operation they had an approximate cadre strength of 550 to 600. No 1 Brigade headquarters was at Pendembu with a cadre strength 250 to 300 rebels. This brigade had under its command four battalions which included a strike battalion. The cadre strength of these battalions was between 210 to 240 for No 1 Battalion based at Buedu ; between 210 to 250 for No 2 Battalion based at Kuiva; between 230 to 260 for No 3 Battalion based at Koindu and between 230 to 260 for the strike battalion based at Segbewemba. In addition, the RUF maintained part of its GHQ at Kailahun. Including their theatre reserves, the RUF had in this sector an approximate cadre strength of 1700 to 1800 rebels. (See Appendix 'A').



## **Force Level-Own**

Initially, I had conceptualised launching this operation using only Indian troops. This was because of my confidence in their professional capabilities and also due to the fact that their motivational level was the highest. However, due to insistence on the part of Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary General, whom I met at Lome, capital of Togo prior to the launching of the operation, I integrated into the over all plan, two companies each of Nigerian and Ghanaian troops.

I had with me two Indian battalions (5/8 GR and 18 GRENADIERS), two companies each of the Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, one Quick Reaction Company (QRC), one team of 2 PARA (SF), one Mechanised Infantry company, one composite artillery battery, one company of Indian engineers, a mobile surgical team, an Indian aviation unit. This gave me a total strength of 1963 fighting troops with an additional complement of 308 supporting troops. When compared with the RUF in this theatre, it spelt out a combat ratio of 1: 1. Yet I had a definite edge over the rebels having with me attack helicopters, transport helicopters, artillery and mechanised infantry and special forces. The British contribution of two Chinook helicopters for one sortie only and one C 130 Hercules aircraft helped to boost up my combat ratio. In addition, there were chartered UN helicopters flights of MI8/17/26. (See Appendix 'B').

## **OPERATIONAL PLAN**

### **General**

The operation was planned as a multi-national, multi-dimensional and multi directional one. Two companies of Nigerian troops and two platoons of the Indian engineer company relieved 5/8 GR at Daru. I planned to use the Ghanaian battalion less two companies for a diversionary attack along axis Kenema-Daru, in order to keep the RUF reserves in this sector tied down. They were to secure Bendu - Junction by 1200 hours D-Day i.e 15 July 2000.

The attack was to be a three pronged one by ground forces involving air insertion at three places to establish stops along axis Daru-Kailahun to enable the Kailahun garrison to breakout. The concept of establishing an airhead was also planned. This was to be done at Kailahun. However, if this did not materialise, then it



was to be established at Pendembu, where the link up between these two columns was to take place. I planned this operation in five phases as under:-

(a) **Phase-1.** During this phase, it was planned to induct the participating troops and equipment by land and air from Freetown to Kenema and Daru on D minus 2 and D minus 1 Day i.e on 13 and 14 July 2000. On reaching Daru, the Nigerian troops were to relieve 5/8 GR of their responsibilities of defence of Daru by last light D minus 1 Day.

(b) **Phase-2.** It was initially planned that this phase would commence with a pre-emptive strike by attack helicopters at Pendembu and Kailahun. However, due to the reluctance on the part of the British to go in after the surprise was lost, it was planned to start the operation by the insertion of a 2 PARA (SF) stop at Kenewa, using British Chinook helicopters, after which the helicopters were to land at the helipad at Kailahun and pick up unarmed military observers, wounded and sick peacekeepers and warlike stores and return to Daru. Thereafter the operation was to be conducted as under:-

(i) A pre-emptive strike by artillery using smoke at rebels positions along the axis of advance with the express purpose of giving a warning to innocent civilians to evacuate from areas along the line of advance. By this it was ensured that loss of innocent human lives and co-lateral damage was avoided.

(ii) Simultaneously, attack helicopters were to strike at Pendembu, the rebel Brigade headquarters, prior to the commencement of the advance by 5/8 GR from Daru.

(iii) This was followed by the heli landing by a company each of 18 GRENADIERS and QRC between 0700h and 0900h to establish pivots at Geihun and 3 Bridges Area respectively.

(iv) After the artillery bombardment, columns of 18 GRENADIERS, 5/8 GR and mechanised company were to commence advance along axis Daru-Kailahun with a view to establish pivots at Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai.

(v) The Kailahun garrison was to breakout from Kailahun and link up with 2 PARA (SF) pivot at Kenewa. Attack helicopters were tasked to saturate the area to assist the garrison in the breakout.



(vi) The Ghanaian battalion less two companies was to launch a diversionary attack as explained earlier.

(c) **Phase-3.** In this phase, it was envisaged that the Kailahun column would breakout towards Pendembu and link up with 5/8 GR who were tasked to capture it by noon on D Day. To achieve this, the Kailahun column was to link up with pivots at Kenewa and Geihun. 18 GRENADIERS after securing Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai, was to secure area upto 10 kms short of Pendembu by 1500h to facilitate launching of 5/8 GR for its capture. Finally, 5/8 GR with the mechanised company was to advance and secure Pendembu, establish a link up with the Kailahun column and create an airhead by 1200h D Day.

(d) **Phase-4.** In this phase, it was envisaged that a link up between Kailahun column and 5/8 GR would take place at Pendembu by 1200h D Day after which 5/8 GR was to establish an airhead. Thereafter, air extrication of the foot column and non essentials was to take place by air from the airhead.

(e) **Phase-5.** 5/8 GR was to carry out a tactical withdrawal back to Daru by 1200h D plus 1 day. Thereafter, 18 GRENADIERS was also to carry out a tactical withdrawal to Daru after ensuring safe passage of 5/8 GR through them. Simultaneously, Ghanbatt was also tasked to carry out a tactical withdrawal back to Kenema.

The plan has been diagrammatically laid out as Sketch 'P'

## INDEX

HQ East Comd	— Headquarters Eastern Command
Bn	— Battalion
Sect	— Sector
Ghanbatt	— Ghanaian battery.
Mech inf coy	— Mechanised infantry company
Comp Artillery	— Composite artillery battery
SF team	— Special Force team
QRC	— Quick Reaction company
Eff str	— Effective strength
NIBATT	— Nigerian battery
IND ENG COY	— Indian Engineers Company
Mob surg team	— Mobile surgical Team
Comb	— Combat



Appx 'A'

**FORCE LEVEL : RUF**

<b><u>HQ EAST COMD - KAILAHUN</u></b>	(550-600)
• <b><u>BRIGADE HQ - PENDEMBU</u></b>	(250-300)
• <b><u>NO 1 BN - BUEDU</u></b>	
• KAILAHUN	(80-90)
• NYANDEHUN	(70-80)
• BEWABU	(60-70)
• <b><u>NO 2 BN - KUIVA</u></b>	
• GEIHUN	(80-90)
• MANOWA	(50-70)
• KUIVA	(80-90)
• <b><u>NO 3 BN - KOINDU</u></b>	
• KANGAMA	(80-90)
• BAIAMA	(70-80)
• SANDALU	(80-90)
• <b><u>STRIKE BN - SEGBEWEMA</u></b>	(250-300)
• <b><u>TOTAL IN SECT</u></b>	1700-1950

Appx 'B'

**FORCE LEVEL : OWN**

**FIGHTING TROOPS**

• 5/8 GR	- 821
• 18 GRENADIERS	- 53
• GHANBATT	- 230
• MECH INF COY	- 86
• COMP ARTY BTY	- 61
• SF TEAM	- 95
• QRC.	- 140
• TOTAL EFF STR	- 1963

**SUPPORTING TROOPS**

• NIBATT 3	- 64
• NIBATT 4	- 61
• INDENGCOY-2	- 75
• AVIATION UNIT	- 98
• MOB SURG TEAM	- 10
• TOTAL	- 308

COMB RATIO 1:1



## U.S.I. JOURNAL





# The Environmental OODA Loop

Colonel PK Gautam (Retd)

*Global climate change may become what nuclear arms control was for the past half century.<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) is a term well understood by the military. The term implies that to defeat your enemy you have to make him react. The OODA cycle has to be faster than that of the enemy.

In climate change terminology, something similar is now emerging. The adverse climate change which is largely due to anthropogenic reasons is performing OODA loop faster than humanity can cope with. Instead of controlling runaway climate change or “mitigation”, we are witnessing a losing battle where we are forced to only “adapt” to terms being dictated by natural disasters. The intensity, frequency and consequences of the climate change are faster than the OODA loop of mankind. Rather than proactive, we are being reactive.

Another way of classifying this “threat” is to term the adverse weather events, episodes, and disasters as strategic, and tactical battle indicators. Regular onset of late winter and an early scorching summer or steady retreat of Himalayan glaciers could be called strategic indications. The fires in Iberian peninsula in the summer of 2005, the repeat of floods in the Danube in April 2006 and the famous ‘shock and awe’ hurricane that struck New Orleans in August 2005 could be called tactical or late indications. In a tactical timeframe and situation when disasters are “managed”, not much of strategic posturing matters. This is the bitter lesson of recent disasters and extreme climate.

## Climate Change as a Security Threat

The surface air temperature in most parts of India has increased by half a degree centigrade during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The surface air temperature in the Himalayas

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has, however, increased by one degree centigrade during the same period.<sup>2</sup> The United Nations Environmental Programme conducted a recent survey covering 50 countries in which environmental experts and research scientists perceive climate change as a dominant environmental issue. The survey found that 51 per cent of scientists considered climate change as the major environmental problem facing humanity.

Climate change or global warming cuts across nearly all boundaries of conceptualisation of security. It is an international security concern. Undoubtedly, it affects human security. It impacts water, food and energy security. It affects national security where resources dwindle leading to a struggle over them in an age of rising population and expectations. Coastal areas are under threat of storm surges and rise in sea level. So are the inhabitants of the Indo-Gangetic plains and major parts of India and the entire Pakistan Indus basin, which is dependent on the Himalayan glaciers. These glaciers also feed the rivers of China and South East Asia. Any adverse impact on the glaciers would lead to a cascade of disasters on nearly half of humanity.

The adverse effect of climate change has a relationship with population of the area. More the number of people in a given area, the greater are the chances of being affected by climate change and related disasters. Briefly, two aspects are being highlighted as under:-

- (a) Human settlements and destruction of natural barriers.
- (b) The eco-politics of climate change.

### **HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND DESTRUCTION OF NATURAL BARRIERS**

#### **Tsunami of 26 December 2004**

The tsunami disaster which struck the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004 made us aware of the fury of nature and our inability to be masters of it. It has humbled us. The tsunami was due to an earthquake in the ocean floor. Though the tsunami was not a result of climate change, its capacity to inflict disaster and loss of life was exacerbated due to flouting of the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ), and tampering with the natural eco-systems



such as mangroves, which are natural speed breakers. When a cyclone hit the Orissa coast in 1999 maximum devastation was in areas devoid of mangroves. Not many lessons from its consequences were learnt. Noted science fiction writer Arthur C Clarke who is settled in Sri Lanka criticised the plundering of coral reefs and mangroves along Sri Lanka's coast. According to him the damage caused by the tsunami may have been less if this had not happened.<sup>4</sup>

Post tsunami, a comparative study of the death toll and destruction on the coast of Tamil Nadu shows that the maximum damage took place where mangroves were absent. The high density of population led to disappearing of mangroves over decades. The least damage was in regions which had thick mangroves.<sup>5</sup> As a measure of good environmental stewardship to enhance tourism, the Maldives purposely preserved its barrier reefs which absorbed the brunt of waves, so what hit the islands was a gentle swell, not a deadly wall of water.<sup>6</sup>

### **Mumbai Rains of July 2005**

**Drainage.** A clear lesson that emerges from the flood related events in Gujarat and Maharashtra is complete neglect of drainage, due to rapid urbanisation, blockage of drains with waste of sorts, destruction of natural ecosystem like wetlands and ill planned construction. While these events have shifted focus away from floods in the villages to urban areas ; one factor that is common to floods in agricultural lands and urban areas is drainage congestion and the neglect of storm water drains. This happens when natural path of water flow of a river, stream or nullah is reduced or outlet of flow is obstructed by construction of infrastructure such as high embankment roads, railway tracks, urban conglomerates and so on.

**Natural Ecosystems.** Natural cushions or buffers such as wetlands, lakes and ponds have been encroached upon and converted to concrete construction for urban infrastructure and housing colonies. Besides problem of drainage, it has led to drastic reduction in the ground water recharge. Mithi river in Mumbai was converted to an urban drain clogged with solid waste including non biodegradable plastic.



## Hurricane Katrina of August 2005

The ferocity of Katrina cyclone which hit the USA was due to global warming.<sup>7</sup> According to Professor Kerry Emanuel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) hurricanes have become more destructive over the past 30 years as a result of ocean surfaces becoming warmer.<sup>8</sup> Not unlike Mumbai, wetlands around New Orleans, which provided a vital protection against flooding and tidal surges, had been drained and built upon.

## Extreme Weather Events

Other examples of extreme weather events are freezing of Moscow in late winter and early spring of February 2006; in North India, February 2006 became as hot as April while March reversed the trend and it felt like February.<sup>9</sup> Local strain on crop output has been reported on this account. This adversely affects food security.

## One Planet Many People

The environmental atlas of the UN titled *One Planet Many People* (June 2005) shows through remote sensing the devastation of the earth's habitat. The *UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report* released in July 2005 warns that two third's of world's ecosystem are degraded. One key point is that degradation will be felt in the next five to 50 years.

Experts warn that there are too many people in nature's way. Between 1994 and 2003 more than 2.5 billion people were affected by floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and other natural disasters, which is 60 per cent increase over the previous two decades. In the 1970s, only 11 per cent of earthquakes affected human settlements, which went up to 31 per cent in 1993-2003.<sup>10</sup>

## THE ECOPOLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The Kyoto protocol for members has come into force. It is considered only the first step. It is ambitious and the current state of knowledge indicates that global emissions have increased by 60 per cent over the 1990 levels.<sup>11</sup> It has been estimated that the carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) and the green house gases from Europe, Japan, US and other industrial countries would grow by 17 per cent during the period 2000 to 2010.<sup>12</sup> The Pew Centre has estimated that 60 per cent or greater reduction, will ultimately be



needed to avert serious impacts of climate change.<sup>13</sup> But restructuring of the world economy to mitigate global warming "demands nothing less, an entire overhaul of the global economy, which is currently based on the very fossil fuel whose combustion we can no longer afford, but whose replacement remains technologically, economically, and politically more challenging than perhaps any transition in modern human history."<sup>14</sup> To accommodate aspirations of developing countries, the global economy needs to expand five fold over the next 50 years, food production needs to double and energy production triple.<sup>15</sup> In order to achieve these targets with limits of atmospheric tolerance, human induced CO<sub>2</sub> emission will have to be restricted. The requirement would be to increase non-fossil fuel to nearly 80 per cent by 2050.<sup>16</sup>

India is vulnerable to climate change. Climate projections indicate upsetting of rainfall patterns and variability in precipitation. Severity of drought and intensity of floods are, therefore, likely to increase, placing food security at risk. Long-term irreversible impacts on forest eco-systems and bio-diversity are predicted. Sea level rise would threaten coastal regions. Malaria will move to higher altitudes. We need strategies to adapt to the change.

Those who polluted the atmosphere historically were required to control emissions. The developing countries were exempt from obligations to reduce emissions. In short, the industrialised countries were to mitigate the drivers which were causing global warming. Mitigation was considered one step to control adverse effect of climate change. India though not bound to cap emissions by the Kyoto Protocol has taken measures to reduce harmful green house gas emissions. These include increase in use of renewable sources for energy, afforestation, switch to cleaner fuels and measures such as increased share of service sector in gross domestic product (GDP). In absolute terms our green house emissions in the year 2020 would be below five per cent of global emissions and the per capita emissions will be low compared to most of the developed countries as well as the global average.<sup>17</sup>

Unfortunately not much restraint has been demonstrated by the developed countries. We need to overcome the vicious circle of the OODA loop being delivered to us by nature.



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# "In the Line of Duty" : Remembering India's Fallen in The World Wars

**Captain Sanjay J Singh**

India and her soldiers have made seminal contributions to the cause of stability and security in the world across the last century, in terms of material, personnel and fighting capability, at great cost to the country and her citizens. In the two world wars, India contributed more than four million men under arms, all of whom were volunteers, with 161,439 members of the Indian Armed Forces laying down their lives in the line of duty.<sup>1</sup> It is appropriate, therefore, for their sacrifices to be remembered and memory honoured. India has regularly remembered her soldiers at various memorials set-up in their honour, including those who served and fell in the two World Wars. Commemoration of the latter has been done regularly as part of the annual Commonwealth Remembrance Day ceremony and also on other occasions in various parts of the world. The memorials commemorating fallen Indian troops span 59 countries, extending from the Pacific rim to the Atlantic coast, marking the massive area of operations undertaken by Indian forces and honouring their deeds of valour. These include the Tehran Commonwealth War Cemetery and Memorial, where 3,464 members of the Indian Armed Forces are commemorated. These soldiers laid down their lives in the course of duty whilst serving in the Iran sector in the First and Second World Wars. A dedicated 'Indian Remembrance Day' was held at the Tehran Memorial on 27<sup>th</sup> October 2005 to honour these soldiers, coinciding with the Indian 'Infantry Day' as the vast majority of the fallen were from the Infantry. To complete the homage to their memory, it is important to remember their role and sacrifice as part of the overall role and contribution of the Indian Armed Forces in the two world wars.

## **Dual Perspective of India's Involvement in the World Wars**

The issue of remembering our fallen has at times given rise to mixed views when it comes to the pre-Independence 'colonial' period, centered on whether the Indians who served and fought in

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the two world wars did so in India's core interests or were, in a sense, furthering the interests of the colonial power. The issue was, and perhaps will always remain, debatable to some extent. But, the duality above needs to be recognised as being inherent in and characteristic of India's growth and evolution as a modern, democratic power, and accordingly viewed through the lenses of prevailing political perceptions, realities and also contradictions, as well as the military cultural ethos of India. In the First World War, in contrast to the call of Mrs Annie Besant for opposing the war, none other than Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence, disagreed. In fact, he raised a Volunteer Field Ambulance Corps to serve in the European battlefields, looking upon it as the duty of a citizen of a larger nation under war.<sup>2</sup>

In the Second World War, Pandit Nehru and the Indian National Congress held unequivocal views in opposition to Nazism, Fascism and Militarism. They proffered sympathy on the side of democracy and freedom, and maintained their readiness to support the Allies in the war, but under conditions of sovereignty, so as to resolve the moral dilemma of Indian forces fighting for world freedom and democracy even whilst India herself remained a colony.<sup>3</sup> Although such a political settlement could not be reached during the period of war, it did not alter their core views. Nor does it seem to have led to efforts by them to curtail or counter India's burgeoning contribution to the War, which they could presumably have done but evidently chose not to, and instead they chose a deliberate policy of non-embarrassment.<sup>4</sup> In fact, at key moments when the war seemed to be going the worst for the Allies, such as after Dunkirk and onset of the Japanese advance to India's sea and land borders, the Indian leadership called off planned civil disobedience movements so as not to jeopardise the war effort, even as they continued with other political projections of India's case.<sup>5</sup> This duality of approach no doubt harboured inherent contradictions, but these are integral to India's history, role and evolution, which were also seen in India becoming a founder member of the United Nations in 1945, even though still a colony, in evident recognition of its significant role and contribution to the War.

The fact is that, all Indians who served in the Indian Armed Forces in the two world wars were volunteers. They were part of the political evolution of India, on the one hand, and personification



of the concept of duty on the other hand, which is embodied in Indian cultural and military ethos and encapsulated in the Holy Gita. Mahatma Gandhi once wrote of soldiers that, "like Arjuna, they went to the battlefield, because it was their duty."<sup>6</sup> The military contribution of India's Armed Forces was central to the success of the Allies and defeat of Fascism, Nazism and Militarism. In reviewing the role and contribution of the Indian Armed Forces in the two world wars and sacrifices made in the line of duty, there is a need to look beyond the above duality per se towards their seminal contribution to freedom, democracy, equality, peace and stability – issues which were at the time, and remain to date, at the core of India's political philosophy.

### Indian Armed Forces in the First World War

In the First World War, India contributed over 1,400,000 volunteers to the Indian Army,<sup>7</sup> with nearly 75,000 laying down their lives in the course of war.<sup>8</sup> The Indian Army saw action in August 1914 in the former German colonies in China, played a vital part in the first critical battles of 1914-15 in France and Flanders, formed the major part of the forces in the war in Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine, and fought in Gallipoli, East Africa and Salonica.<sup>9</sup> Two Indian infantry divisions, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Lahore Division and the 7<sup>th</sup> Meerut Division, covered themselves with glory in France and Flanders, especially at the Battles of Neuve-Chapelle and Ypres in spite of enormous casualties that left some battalions with only a quarter of their strength after the battle. Of the courage of Indian troops, a poignant tribute came from a German soldier in his letter published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* where he said<sup>10</sup>:-

*"At a hundred metres we opened a destructive fire which mowed down hundreds but in spite of that others advanced. In no time they were in our trenches ... and with butt ends, bayonets, swords and daggers we fought each other..."*

The Indian forces in Mesopotamia swelled to over half a million troops and fought a long and difficult campaign, which claimed almost 40,000 Indian lives.<sup>11</sup> In Egypt and Palestine, a force of nearly 150,000 Indians played a major part in defence of the Suez Canal (1915-16) and final phase of the Palestine campaign (Sep-Oct 1918). Indian forces took part in the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign and in the assault on Sari Bair (Aug 1915), India's 1/6th Gurkha



Rifles were the only troops to reach the summit of the ridge.<sup>12</sup> Indian forces also campaigned in East Africa. The Indian Army was mostly deployed overseas in the various campaigns of the First World War and, by the end of the war, about 1.1 million Indians had served overseas, making a seminal contribution to the successful conclusion of the war.<sup>13</sup>

### **Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War**

In the Second World War, India contributed a total of 2,786,764 volunteers to the Indian Armed Forces<sup>14</sup>, of which nearly 90,000 laid down their lives.<sup>15</sup> This Indian Army was the largest volunteer Army the world has ever seen, to date, with an active strength during the War of nearly 2.5 million men.<sup>16</sup> It participated in the 1940 campaign in Europe, culminating in the evacuation at Dunkirk. Divisions of the Indian Army won lasting renown in the campaigns in North Africa, in the Western Desert, Eritrea and Ethiopia, in the Middle East, Italy, Greece, and in Burma and the Far East.<sup>17</sup>

In the critical period of the North African campaign (1942-43), six of the fourteen Allied Divisions were Indian and 2,500 Indians laid down their lives in the North and East African campaigns.<sup>18</sup> In the Italian campaign (1943-45), Indian divisions constituted half the Commonwealth force and lost 5,500 troops.<sup>19</sup> In the Burma and South East Asia sectors, Indian forces were the mainstay of defence against the Japanese advance. More than 16,000 Indian soldiers were sacrificed in the Malay campaign (1941-42), and more than 25,000 Indian soldiers laid down their lives in the famous turn-around of 'defeat into victory' in the second Burma campaign and subsequent liberation of SE Asia (1944-45).<sup>20</sup>

The large Indian Army was ably supported by the fledgling Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. The Indian Navy drew 30,572 volunteers during the war, growing from a force of 1,600 at the start.<sup>21</sup> It made significant contributions in actions in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Bay of Bengal and in combined operations off Sicily and Burma.<sup>22</sup> The Indian merchant marine provided essential support through transportation of forces and logistic supplies. The Indian Air Force, which joined the Second World War with only 200 personnel, drew another 52,845 volunteers during the war.<sup>23</sup> Indian officers also served with the Royal Air Force, besides the above. The IAF made seminal contribution in defence of the Burma front, and its most significant operation was



against the Japanese siege of Imphal, where a crucial role was played by the IAF's No. 1 Squadron (commanded by then Sqn Ldr Arjan Singh, later IAF Chief and present Marshal of the IAF).<sup>24</sup> It was also the IAF's newly created Coastal Defence Flight that detected the sailing of the Japanese Fleet into the Bay of Bengal in 1942, an event that has been considered by some, including then British PM Winston Churchill, as a turning point in the World War.<sup>25</sup>

### Gallantry Awards

The hard-fought campaigns and India's large contribution therein was aptly reflected by the large numbers of gallantry awards won by members of its Armed Forces. These total 15,500 gallantry awards of different categories in the two World Wars, including 143 Victoria Crosses. These were won by the combined British and Indian members of the Indian Armed Forces. The Indian members themselves accounted for 8,676 gallantry awards, as follows (in their order of precedence)<sup>26</sup> :-

Victoria Cross	-	39.
George Cross	-	7.
Distinguished Service Order	-	18.
Indian Order of Merit	-	1467.
Distinguished Service Cross	-	4.
Military Cross	-	911.
Distinguished Flying Cross	-	23.
Indian Distinguished Service Medal	-	4406.
Distinguished Service Medal	-	28.
Military Medal	-	1773.

### Indian Armed Forces Deployed in Iran

Indian Army units were first deployed to Iran (then Persia) in 1911-12,<sup>27</sup> as a deterrent force to safeguard Iran's territorial integrity and independence against external aggression. Later, with the onset of the First World War, the Indian Army was deployed to Iran in January 1915 near Ahvaz, starting with the 7<sup>th</sup> Rajputs and the

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4<sup>th</sup> Rajputs.<sup>28</sup> The Indian Armed Forces carried out operations in Ahwaz, Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, Kerman, Yazd, Isfahan, Shiraz, Baluchistan, Makran coast, Azerbaijan, and in the Caspian region. In the Baluchistan sector, Indian troops were deployed to protect the line of communication with India. Indian forces remained deployed in Iran until 1924,<sup>29</sup> and took part in various other operations after World War I for assisting security and order. The total losses of the Indian forces in all the above operations, and who have been commemorated in the Tehran Memorial, are 3,446.<sup>30</sup>

The various forces of the Indian Army deployed to Iran during the War, and whose members have been commemorated in the Tehran Memorial, comprise the following<sup>31</sup>:-

### **Infantry Regiments (in alphabetical order)**

- 124<sup>th</sup>, 126<sup>th</sup>, 127<sup>th</sup> and 129<sup>th</sup> **Baluchistan Infantry.**
- 1<sup>st</sup> and 1/3<sup>rd</sup> **Brahmans.**
- 79<sup>th</sup> and 88<sup>th</sup> **Carnatic Infantry.**
- 2/39<sup>th</sup> and 3/39<sup>th</sup> **Garhwal Rifles.**
- 2<sup>nd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> **Gurkhas.**
- 5<sup>th</sup>, 42<sup>nd</sup> (Deoli), 43<sup>rd</sup> (Erinpura), 44<sup>th</sup> (Merwara), 55<sup>th</sup>, 57<sup>th</sup>, 83<sup>rd</sup> (Wallajahbad), 108<sup>th</sup> and 113<sup>th</sup> **Infantry.**
- 6<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> **Jats.**
- 94<sup>th</sup>, 95<sup>th</sup>, 96<sup>th</sup> (Berar), 97<sup>th</sup> (Deccan), and 98<sup>th</sup> **Infantry**<sup>32</sup>.
- 117<sup>th</sup> **Marathas.**
- 15<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, 31<sup>st</sup>, 62<sup>nd</sup>, 66<sup>th</sup>, 67<sup>th</sup>, 71<sup>st</sup>, 72<sup>nd</sup>, 74<sup>th</sup>, 76<sup>th</sup>, 82<sup>nd</sup>, 84<sup>th</sup>, 89<sup>th</sup> **Punjabis.**
- 120<sup>th</sup> and 122<sup>nd</sup> **Rajputana Rifles.**
- 2<sup>nd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> (Lucknow) **Rajputs.**
- 14<sup>th</sup>, 36<sup>th</sup>, 51<sup>st</sup> and 54<sup>th</sup> **Sikhs.**

### **Cavalry and Lancer Regiments**

- 11<sup>th</sup> Lancers (Probyn's Horse), 12<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, 13<sup>th</sup> Lancers (Watson's Horse), 15<sup>th</sup> Lancers (Multanis), 17<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, 21<sup>st</sup> Cavalry (Daly's Horse), 22<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry (Sam Browne's), 26<sup>th</sup>



Cavalry, 27<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, 28<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, 33<sup>rd</sup> Cavalry, 34<sup>th</sup> (Poona Horse), 36<sup>th</sup> (Jacob's Horse), 37<sup>th</sup> Lancers (Baluch Horse), 39<sup>th</sup> (Central India Horse), 40<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, 41<sup>st</sup> Cavalry, 42<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry, and the Gwalior Lancers.

### Artillery Regiments

- **Indian Mountain Artillery**, including 2<sup>nd</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup>, 31<sup>st</sup>, 32<sup>nd</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup>, 35<sup>th</sup> and 36<sup>th</sup> Mountain Batteries, and 1<sup>st</sup> **Kashmir Mtn Artillery**.

### Sappers and Pioneers

- 23<sup>rd</sup> (Sikh), 64<sup>th</sup>, 106<sup>th</sup> (Hazara), 107<sup>th</sup> and 128<sup>th</sup> **Pioneers**.
- 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> **Sappers**.

### Support Services

- Units of the **Supply, Ordnance and Transport Corps**.
- Units of the Army **Medical and Veterinary Corps**.
- Units of **Military Police**.
- Units of the **Indian Signal Corps**.

In the Second World War, Indian Armed Forces were deployed to Iran as part of the PAI FORCE, to guard against an Axis threat from Anatolia or through the Caucasus.<sup>33</sup> The Allied strategy defined India-Iran-Iraq-Egypt region as the 'Central Bastion', which had to be defended from the east, north and west. India was to be the arsenal for this bastion. If the Central Bastion were to have been lost, the only option for the Allies would have been to fall back on controlling the sea in the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>34</sup>

The 24<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Brigade led the advance into Iran, landing at Abadan as part of a seaborne force on 25<sup>th</sup> August 1941.<sup>35</sup> The 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade simultaneously advanced across the desert from the Basra sector to arrive at Khorramshahr on 25<sup>th</sup> August 1941, and thence made a thrust towards Ahvaz, along with the 25<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Brigade.<sup>36</sup> The 21<sup>st</sup> Indian Infantry Brigade moved from Khanaqin to Karind on 25<sup>th</sup> – 27<sup>th</sup> August 1941, as part of the thrust to Kemlanshah.<sup>37</sup> The resultant truce and ensuing Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance allowed the Iranian sector to become one of the principal routes of aid to the Soviet Union,



which had become a member of the Grand Alliance against the fascist Axis powers, during the Second World War.<sup>38</sup> Two members of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps TPT Companies, engaged in the hazardous 'Aid to Russia' convoys, were awarded the Soviet Order of the Red Star.<sup>39</sup> Indian forces lost 18 personnel in these operations, who have been commemorated at the Tehran Memorial.<sup>40</sup>

### **A Matter of Honour**

In the overall context of the two world wars, and the massive contribution of the Indian Armed Forces therein, the Iran sector saw relatively lesser action. However, the role played by the soldiers was vital to the overall war effort, and a large number of them lost their lives in the process. As the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Booklet on India's War Dead notes,<sup>41</sup>

*Every man who served in the Armed Forces of India was a volunteer, and each did so as a matter of honour. Those who died had accepted a duty and were faithful unto death. Of no man can more be said than this.*

### **Post World War II Contribution**

The Indian Armed Forces have continued in the post-World War II era to contribute substantially to international peace and security. India is among the longest serving and largest troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping activities, and has had an excellent record of performance therein. Indian forces have taken part in 41 of the total 62 UN peacekeeping operations, contributing more than 85,000 personnel to date. In these operations, 116 Indian soldiers have made the supreme sacrifice in the line of duty and have been awarded the 'Dag Hammarskjöld' Medals.<sup>42</sup> Currently, also, Indian Armed Forces are participating in nine of the ongoing 16 UN peacekeeping operations world-wide, with about 6,500 personnel deployed.<sup>43</sup>

### **In Context - Remembering the Fallen**

India's Armed Forces have a proud military record and history of contributing to the cause of international peace and stability, which has been done in accordance with India's core beliefs, and this record extends back into the two world wars. Many of its members laid down their lives in the line of duty. In context, these



soldiers discharged their duty as laid down in the precepts enshrined in the Holy Gita. In remembering them and their deeds, we both honour their sacrifice and endorse the precepts of Duty, and acknowledge their living by, and ultimately laying down their lives by the pledge enunciated by Guru Govind Singh, when he took up arms against oppression:

*Grant me, O Lord, this boon, that I may not falter in doing good. That I may entertain no fear of the enemy when engaged with him in battle. And that I may always be sure of my victory. May my mind be trained in the desire to dwell upon thy goodness. And, when the last moment of my life should arrive, may I die in the thick of battle.*

### Notes

1. Figures provided by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC), Berkshire, UK.
2. Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 1997), pp 277-278.
3. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1981), pp 422-423, 426-427.
4. *Ibid*, p. 472.
5. *Ibid*, pp. 435, 442, 451.
6. Robert Payne, n. 2, p. 121.
7. *India and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission*, (Berkshire, CWGC. Apr 2002), p. 2.
8. As per data provided by the CWGC *ibid* and also the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR), United Service Institution (USI) of India, New Delhi.
9. Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC). 'Commemoration of the War Dead of Undivided India 1914-18 and 1939-45' (Berkshire: CWGC), p.2.
10. Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour* (Harrnondsworth, Penguin Books, 1974) p. 413
11. *India and the CWGC*, n. 7., p. 3.
12. *Ibid*.
13. *Ibid*.



14. Dr Nandan Prasad, 'Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45', Appendices 15 and 16, in '*Official History of the Indian Armed Forces In the Second World War*', Fourth Volume, Edited Dr Bisheshwar Prasad (New Delhi: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section India & Pakistan, 1956).
15. CWGC, Op Cit, n.4.
16. *Official History of the Indian Armed Forces In the Second World War*, Op Cit.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid*, p.4.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Inputs provided by the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi
25. *Ibid.*
26. Data from CAFHR, USI, New Delhi. Op Cit. The Order of Precedence noted is from the Indian Army Order 752/1947, provided courtesy CAFHR
27. R Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History: from 3500 BC to the Present* (London, Macdonald, 1970) p 1007 This is also endorsed by some engravings at the Persepolis site, near Shiraz, marking the presence of Sikh troops, Central India Horse, etc in this period.
28. CWGC, Tehran Memorial Booklet. p.1
29. CWGC Booklet *Op Cit*, n.15, p.4
30. As per data provided by the CWGC
31. As per names and units inscribed at the Tehran Memorial
32. As per inputs from Brig PK Saxena, former Commandant of the Kumaon Regimental Centre, these regiments were later formed into the Kumaon Regt.



33. Compiled from inputs provided by the CAFHR, USI of India. New Delhi
34. Philip Mason, *Op Cit.*, note 4, p. 474-5
35. Inputs provided by CAFHR, USI of India. New Delhi.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. CWGC, *Op Cit*, p.2.
42. Inputs provided by the Centre for UNPK, USI. New Delhi.
43. *Ibid.*



## Motivation for Terrorism\*

Brigadier Vinod Anand\*\* (Retd)

What is it that drives perfectly rational and sane individuals to commit terrorist acts? How do they get motivated to extinguish the lives of innocent bystanders who have nothing to do with the wrongs perceived to have been done to them either as a group or individually? What was it that drove Abu Bilal (known also as Bomber from Birmingham) leading a comparatively better life in Birmingham to come all the way from England and blow himself up at the entrance of Badami Bagh Cantonment in Srinagar on Christmas day in the year 2000? Experts in counter-terrorism and psychologists have been trying to fathom these questions for long. Some say it is lack of self-esteem, others say it is lack of identity and many say that it is due to indoctrination starting from their early childhood when their values and belief systems are being formed that result in their subsequent behaviour. According to one analyst terrorists reside in nation-states and their motivations and actions are shaped by their connections to particular societies and cultures. Terrorism is, therefore, not only a military and political problem but a societal problem as well.

However, at the broader level, terrorism has become an ideology to achieve politico-strategic goals and is being resorted to by both non-state actors and weak states who become sponsors of such acts. For them end justifies means; terrorism is an asymmetric way to counterbalance powerful adversaries. Further, goals of terror lie far beyond the impact on victims of a terrorist act. Fundamental objective is to create fear psychosis, paralyse functioning of the state, and make the state commit inordinately large resources. Because of globalisation and modern means of communication with information crossing international frontiers with speed a terrorist act reverberates throughout the length and breadth of the world. Publicity is like oxygen for a terrorist to spread his message. The term 'Long War' has replaced Cold War.

The book *The Psychology of Terrorism* by Dr John Horgan proceeds to seek answers to questions like why does someone become a terrorist? Are their common causes? Is there a terrorist personality? The main feature of the book as stressed in Preface is to attempt and play a part in undoing some of the widespread confusions about what 'psychology of terrorism' means. Dr Horgan Being professor in Applied Psychology with extensive research in forensic psychology and terrorism, is eminently qualified to treat the subject of the book deftly with incisive insights.

\***The Psychology of Terrorism.** By John Horgan (New York : Routledge 2006), 199p, price not indicated, ISBN 0-714-6562-8 (hbk) and ISBN 0-714-68239-X (pbk)

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Two The book proceeds logically with Chapter ① defining terrorism and Chapter ② stressing on understanding the phenomenon. The author concludes that there are substantial problems of definition even though he has given many definitions in his treatise. He veers around the view that terrorism is a conscious, deliberate strategic use of violence against a specific type of target to affect the political climate. Terrorism as a weapon can be resorted to by a wide array of state and non-state actors. Problem also lies in its poorly delineated state as even the simplest critical analyses of the concept of terrorism or 'terrorist' reveal a multiplicity of inconsistent and confusing uses. Dr Horgan puts forward very valid and engaging arguments in both the chapters to support his conclusions.

4/c On The succeeding three Chapters deal with individual approaches, becoming a terrorist and being a terrorist. Explanations of terrorism in terms of personality traits are insufficient in trying to understand why certain people get involved in terrorism and others do not. Though there is a widely held view that terrorists may have abnormal personality traits yet, according to the author, such views may be based on weak and shaky foundations and they need to be continually challenged. Coming from a qualified psychologist one may find this hard to reject but empirical evidence does show that in certain cases terrorists have certain traits or individual qualities like low self esteem and need for identification with a group that may propel them towards a path of violence and destruction. Therefore, traditional wisdom about terrorist traits may be as difficult to reject as clinical analyses by psychologists.

Further, the author asserts that identifying issues relating to 'how' people become involved may be more valuable than attempting to arrive at answers 'why' people become involved. There are a number of factors, often a complex combination of factors that can come to bear on an individual's intentional or unintentional socialisation into involvement with terrorism. He cites some incidents and case studies in support of this argument. Being a terrorist provides the individual a growing sense of empowerment, control and defensiveness, a lowering of inhibitions to commit violent acts and overall decrease in non-terrorism related social activity. These assertions by the author have been well argued and bear the stamp of a seasoned analyst.

4/c In the last two Chapters, the author dwells on why individuals disengage from terrorism and stresses on the need for more rigour and research on the issues raised in the book because terrorism is too important a problem to be left to politicians. He is banking on the academic research community to provide further contribution to the analyses of problem of terrorism.

On the whole a very interesting and engaging book even though it is in the long line of many similar books on the psychology of terrorism. The book would give value addition to any library.



## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**Staying Together: The G-8 Summit Confronts the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.**  
By Nicholas Bayne (England : Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 251p,  
£ 45.00, ISBN-0-7546-4267-4.

6/c The Book, gives a clear and comprehensive account of the G-Summit series. It explores the issues, the institutions and strategies of the participants in the G-Summit network of global governance and other action, processes, and the challenges that shape global order in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It evaluates the achievements, the roles played by various world leaders and the fictions that exist between them due to domestic compulsions. It validates the belief of the heads of governments of major powers that their intervention was justified to resolve major economic and other issues like globalisation, terrorism and emerging political security challenges.

The first two chapters including the introduction contain an over view of the G-7 Summits from the inaugural meeting at Rambouillet (Paris) to the Denver Summit of 1997. The first G-8 sequence began at Birmingham (UK) in 1998. The next seven chapters constitute the core of the book and each chapter covers a single summit. The assessment chapters examine the groups of subjects that formed the principal themes from Birmingham onwards. These themes are judged against a consistent set of criteria. The last two chapters examine how the summit formats have changed over the first G-8 sequence to meet objectives and threats posed to the existence of this institution.


The author has given an authentic account in chronological order that facilitates clear understanding of the issues and developments. A lot of useful data is presented in a tabulated form to give an overall view of the G-7 and G-8 summits. According to assessment of the author, the G-7 summits held at Rambouillet (1975) and Bonn (1978) achieved the most; and France and Germany were good hosts. caps

According to the author, the G-8 summit faces three dangers to its continued life: the summit has become more costly and difficult to organise, the G-8 is no longer considered a rational grouping because no serious decisions can be taken without involving a wider circle of countries, and the summit could lapse because of a complete breakdown in cooperation among the participating heads. Notwithstanding these threats, the author feels that there is still a lot of merit in the G-8 staying together as a world without it would be increasingly dangerous. 5



The book is interesting and stimulating. It gives insight into the emerging threats to the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and is, therefore, a valuable addition to the library.

*Major General Samay Ram, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)*

**Soldiering with Faith : The Sikh Light Infantry.** Edited by Colonel Harjeet Singh (Retd) (Fategarh : Sikh Light Infantry Regimental Centre, 2006), 200p, Price not indicated, 

A remarkably well documented history of the Sikh Light Infantry presented in the form of a coffee table book. The concept and design of the cover in gold and silver is brilliant and will have instant appeal to book lovers.

4/c The story of the Regiment is well structured and the narrative well illustrated documenting its origins from the Corps of the Sikh Pioneers who were in the forefront of every campaign from 1857 to 1929 the world over and that includes China the North West Frontier, Tibet, and Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and France during World War I. They were disbanded in 1933 as a measure of economy and were re-raised in 1941 as the Mazbhi and Ramdasia Regiment and renamed as the Sikh Light Infantry shortly thereafter. The Sikh Light Infantry took part in World War II as part of the British Indian Army on the battlefields of Burma where the newly raised Regiment did exceptionally well.

4/c The narratives are easy to read and the excellent photographs make the story of the Regiment more interesting. What comes through the narratives is the courage, resilience, tenacity and loyalty of the Sikh Light Infantry soldier who was and continues to be recruited from the Mazbhi and Ramdasia Sikhs well known for their indomitable will, matchless loyalty and dauntless spirit.

The book highlights the steadfastness of the Sikh Light Infantry soldier and reflects his integrity, valour and commitment. The Regiment was raised and re-raised in times of strife and continues to soldier on with the Indian Army in times of war and peace collecting honours and awards as they march to a glorious future. 4/c

4/c The book reflects the spirit of the Regiment and the regimental pride that shapes the recruit from the time of his joining till he retires and inspires him to acts of courage beyond the call of duty. The thirty five battle honours, the impressive array of honours and awards pre and post independence and the unit citations testify to the gallant record of this illustrious Regiment and showcase the part played by the Regiment, in every campaign from 1857 to the present day. 4/c

*Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)*



**Who Owns CBI - The Naked Truth.** B R Lall IPS (Retd), (Manas Publications : 2007), 338p. Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-293-9.

Whenever a major scam comes to light or a gruesome crime hits the headlines, there is public demand for referring the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation. The CBI, as it is commonly known, has earned the reputation of being the ultimate investigative agency and a potent tool for eradication of corruption in public service. But is everything really all that good within the agency? Are its top leaders always free from manipulation by corrupt political elite? Are they fair, honest and impartial? These are questions BR Lall has attempted to answer by narrating his experience of working in the CBI as a Joint Director. Needless to say, the book is an eye opener and the author deserves credit for letting people know about what goes on inside the hallowed portals of the agency.

Mr Lall joined the IPS in 1967 and retired as DG Police, Haryana. He came to the CBI in April 1994 as Joint Director and piloted the investigation of several important cases such as the "Jain Hawala Case", "The Assam letter of Credit case", "V Krishnamurthy case" etc. In well documented chapter after chapter, Lall has revealed how the corrupt and the mighty successfully manipulated two Directors and managed to scuttle investigation of cases entrusted to the CBI. In fact, according to Lall, the agency connived with the guilty. When Lall resisted, he was drawn into a collision course with his superior officer. No wonder he was packed off from the CBI in less than three years.

The author has made public a number of letters sent by him to his Director besides giving details of day to day developments in connection with investigation of those high profile cases which, he felt, were being deliberately subverted with full knowledge of the agency's top brass. In chapter 11, Lall has outlined a framework for fighting corruption. He has made several useful suggestions but who will be seriously interested in rooting out corruption? The author has annexed the full text of Prime Minister Deve Gowda's address at the CBI conference on 22 November 1996 in which the PM ridiculed all those who are agitated over the issue of corruption in public life. Gowda even asked the officers of the anti-corruption agency "which country is free from corruption?" Although it may sound incredible, the Prime Minister even went on to say that the media should be blamed for raising the bogey of corruption. The fact of the matter is that the political leaders are interested in pursuing vote bank politics. They are least interested in ensuring corruption free governance.

The book should be read because people have the right to know how this premier agency is vulnerable to manipulative partnership between corrupt politicians and pliant police officers who are called upon to head the CBI.

Shri Kalyan K Mitra, IPS (Retd)



**Spying on the Bomb.** By Jeffrey T Richelson (New York : WW Norton & Company, 2006), 702p, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-393-05383-0.

Having mastered the genie of nuclear fission in the late 1930s, the United States determined that any other country acquiring the same knowledge could pose a threat to its national interests. So, from the 1940s onwards, it launched an extensive programme of espionage on not only its enemies, but on friends, allies and neutrals. The narrative in this book describes not only the efforts of the US to gain as much knowledge as possible of the nuclear programmes of different countries, but places these efforts in the context of what is known of the evolution of the programmes themselves. The author uses published sources, including newspaper reports and leavens this with records of declassified CIA reports and minutes of discussions within the US establishment.

It is remarkable how widely the US intelligence community spread its tentacles, using universities, scientists, diplomats and journalists to assist in information gathering and analysis. As sources, the intelligence community relied on refugees, defectors (by and large thought to be unreliable), POWs, published literature, and as technology improved, aerial filtering and satellite photography of higher and higher resolution. Other methods to track nuclear detonations were also used, later included in the text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (In fact, the Treaty envisages the analysis of all collected data by the International Data Centre in Arlington, Virginia, before being sent to the CTBTO.) The author also, in an enlightening description of the intelligence gathered on Iraq's nuclear programme, details the close interlinkages between the US intelligence efforts and the information gathered by the IAEA inspectors.

The author details the US intelligence gathering on the nuclear programmes of Germany (during World War II), the USSR, China (in China's case, it appears that Kennedy even thought of military action to take out the Chinese facilities, and a 'mole' in the Chinese programme informed the US of Chinese-Pakistani cooperation.), France and India, the "pariahs", Israel, apartheid South Africa, and Taiwan, the "rogues", Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.

In the context of the recent public uproar about a 'mole' in India's programme, the author's description of the 1995 'episode' lays that claim to rest. Indeed, he says, "...the Israeli, South African and Indian programmes apparently have proved immune from whatever human penetration attempts were made by the CIA."

Clearly, the author is a true believer, and his political judgments are coloured by his leanings. Yet this book is almost non-put-downable in its



flow and in the accumulation of information not only about the target countries, but about the US policies over a period of time.

*Ms Arundhati Ghose, IFS (Retd)*

**The Labour Movement in Pakistan : Organization and Leadership in Karachi in the 1970s.** By Zafar Shaheed (*Pakistan : Oxford University Press, 2007*), 350p, Rs. 550.00, ISBN 0-19-5473-95-0.

The first question that arises is why more than 20 years later the author and the publishers have not provided answers to this important topic? It is a seminal work for which the author earned a Ph D from the University of Leeds. Zafar Shaheed joined the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and later in 1979, the International Labour Office, also an organisation of the UN. A

The author was not on the scene in Pakistan for long periods to update his work. But, his scholarly friends insisted that he should bring his work in the public domain so that other scholars and labour experts could use his insights as a base for scientists exploration of Labour Movement in Pakistan and bring the picture up to date. That indeed has happened. As a follow up, the Oxford University Press has published some books, such as Chador and the Market Female Office Workers in Lahore by Jasmin Mirza and Taboo Hidden Culture of a Red Light Area by Fouzia Saeed. 2

The author has tried not to mention the names of labour leaders in his book so that they do not harm him in the limited democracy or near lack of it in Pakistan. But, they were the key sources of the author's research. He has tried to focus on women workers in Pakistan. But did so to experiment with democracy in mid 1970's as perhaps being done now in a restricted way. This aspect is a highly limited exercise but the new generation of educated and qualified entrepreneurs is open to ideas of labour welfare for research of better production. 15

The book covers mainly textile industries in Pakistan today. A well researched book of good value to the research scholars.

*Commodore R P Khanna, AVSM (Retd)*

**SAPANA : South Asian Studies-SAARC, Volume XIII, Edited by Imtiaz Alam, Editor of South Asian Journal and Secretary General of South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), (Lahore : Free Media Foundation, 2006), 499p, price not indicated, ISBN 969-9069-12-3.**

The book is a compilation of well researched articles by some of the best scholars on their respective subject in the South Asian region. It has



been prepared by members of the 14 research groups constituted under the South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network based in Pakistan, to develop a virtual think tank which was to carry out research and propose policy alternatives on issues critical to the region. The group consisting of researchers from all member countries and some Europeans was assigned to examine the working of SAARC against the backdrop of the challenges that South Asia faces.

The sheer volume should not deter the readers as most of the authors have given their independent bibliography and the last 120 pages are devoted to the background papers on SAARC which one may browse. There are over 25 short articles, which virtually encompass all the major challenges that face the region in becoming the centre of gravity in global affairs. The articles are thought provoking and provide unbiased and genuine alternatives to the policy makers.

Majority of the writers have opined that although there is much greater demand within civil society for greater cooperation within South Asia, the idea of SAARC has remained just an idea! Action has been conspicuous by its absence. The single most important factor that is responsible for retardation of progress is the continued conflict between India and Pakistan. It has been unanimously agreed that it is the root cause of slow development of SAARC agenda. It is heartening to find a refreshing new approach in the book by many authors. Without the usual 'blame games', the approach of most writers is forward looking. It has been highlighted that for the regional grouping to become acceptable, meaningful and substantive, besides setting aside their tendency to politicise issues for reasons of domestic expediency, a number of other inadequacies need rectification to create more dynamic and efficient structures and institutions. Particularly the current SAARC secretariat, the purported backbone and main pillar of strength is powerless and ineffective. The Secretary General and Director's are nominated by the respective foreign officers and all the powers are concentrated in the hands of the Council of Ministers and Annual Summit meetings. All the above structures are constituted of ex officio individuals who are not selected on merit or open competition.

The authors have been successful in their attempt to shift focus from political dynamics and the long list of failed expectations of SAARC, to a vibrant dialogue and debate on looking at SAARC as a 'peoples' organisation and a dynamic vehicle for substantive development in the region.

*Lieutenant General RN Kapur, PVSM, AVSM & Bar (Retd)*



**Crescent Between Cross and Star : Muslims and the West After 9/11.** by Iftikhar H Malik (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2006), 371p, Rs 595.00, ISBN 0-19-547286-1.

Enemy's friend is often seen as an enemy. In the USA before and after 11 September 2001, in the UK after 7 July 2005 and in India ever since terrorism raised its ugly head, an average mind fails to perceive execution of these subversive tasks in an alien country, without support from Islamic faithful in these lands. Muslim diaspora have been alienated from the peoples of their adoptive countries.

In an atmosphere charged with mistrust, the descendents of Abraham are finding peaceful coexistence a challenging task. Attacks on Islamic countries by the USA, the UK and Israel on some pretext or the other appear to have become the order of the day. This book is an unbiased study of alienation of Muslims from Christians, Jews and to some extent, from Hindus.

Iftikhar H Malik, a Fellow of Royal Historical Society, is currently teaching international history and politics at Bath Spa University, England. From 1989 to 1994, he was *Quaid-i-Azam* fellow at St Anthony's College, Oxford. The author of several volumes and research papers, his teaching and research have focused on modern South Asian history, civil society in the Muslim world and the relationship between Islam and the West. His recent publications include *Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban: South Asia at the Crossroads* and *Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and the United States*.

The seven chapters of the book are devoted to diverse issues like mutual acrimonies, the triumvirate's traditions in present era, stance of contemporary writers on Islamic subjects, Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel. The Epilogue is of particular interest to Indian readers as it acknowledges forces sensitive to Muslim predicament and gives a resume of Indo-Pak conflictive relationship. The book has been written in an academic language and flowing style. The font though larger than *Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban* is not a comfortable read for the aged, who invariably form a large portion of readers.

Recommended for general reading in all formation libraries.

Major General Yatindra Pratap (Retd)

**Followers of Krishna : Yadavas of India.** By Major General SDS Yadava (New Delhi : Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006), 185p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7062-2160.

The author dwells on the folklore of the yadavas, originally Ahirs, not just protectors of the cow, not just deeply faithful, but also great warriors,

caps



a) who showed their mettle in World War II, prior to that in 1857, and in a bygone era. But their finest hour was in the third week of November 1962 at Rezang La in Ladakh above Chushul Valley when they beat back the Chinese and laid down more than a hundred lives. As part of the Kumaon Regiment, commanded by Lt Col T P Raina, who rose to be the Chief of the Army Staff later, their Charlie Company commander, Major Shaitan Singh, won the Param Vir Chakra posthumously for historic battle at an altitude of 18,000 feet above sea level. His platoon's soldiers won eight more Vir Chakras, five of them posthumous, almost an unparalleled record in world military history. How did they do it? The tale of valour reveals Rezag La as a locality isolated from the main sector and defended by five platoon positions. On the night of 17/18 November the Chinese subjected Rezag La to heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire and followed it up with human wave tactics in overwhelming strength. Major Shaitan Singh and his men foiled the attack with the major inspiring his men even when mortally wounded. The Chinese left behind 1,310 dead with the last man of Charlie Company of 118 fighting valiantly. Of them one officer, two JCOs and 106 other ranks laid down their lives. In 1963, the bodies of Ahir soldiers were recovered, with most men still holding their weapons. A Chinese radio broadcast on 23 November confirmed that they had suffered their maximum casualties in the battle of Rezag La. It was a saga of indomitable courage, according to General Raina, himself a winner of Maha Vir Chakra.

caps

4c

In World War II, Havildar Umrao Singh had won a Victoria Cross fighting the Japanese in the Kaladan Valley of the Arakans in Burma, now Myanmar.

Having migrated from Central Asia around 6000 BC, they faced invasions from Alexander, Persians and Turks and overcame adversities. Eventually, they established flourishing empires like Bhattis of Jaisalmer, Yadavas of Devgiri and Hoysala Yadavas of Mysore, according to the author.

Maj Gen Yadava would like the Indian Army to have a pure Ahir or Yadava Regiment, and just 25 per cent represented in the Kumaon Regiment as they are the single largest community of India. He would like a fitting memorial to Charlie Company in the heartland of India, not just at Chushul.

The author is to be commended for a well researched book of interest to all Army Officers and Jawans in particular those of infantry.

Commodore R P Khanna, AVSM (Retd)



**While Memory is Fresh.** By Major General Jagjit Singh (New Delhi : Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006), 259p, price not indicated, ISBN 817-0622-15-8.

The book "While Memory is Fresh" is an account of the varied situations that came in way of Major General Jagjit Singh (Retd), who spent forty glorious years in uniform. A full eventful life it had been for him, in its many manifestations - some pleasant and some not so pleasant. He has narrated the challenges that he was faced with. How he found himself on the cross-road of life, at times, and the decision that he made, which route to follow. Looking back, it was invariably an interplay between destiny, on the one hand, and his will, on the other.

As a front line sailor during the Second World War and later as a front line soldier in all post-independence wars fought by India, there were occasions when fear entered his mind. The General has dedicated his reminiscences to the youth of India, with befitting words of advice. He also expressed his views in the last chapter under the caption - "India on the Forward March" in which he dealt with subjects viz - India's placing on the International Chess Board, Defence Preparedness, Weaknesses to rectify and Service of Mother India. varied

Of equal relevance is a "Concept Paper" written by the General. He has made a strong case in advocating Voluntary National Service by the Youth of India, for a period of two years. The paper brings out the manner in which our youth can help in promoting national development, better discipline and furtherance of India's security both internal and external.

Coming straight from his heart, both young and old shall find Major General Jagjit Singh's autobiographical note to be informative, interesting and authentic. In chapters 16 onwards the General has made some recommendations which merit due consideration by the powers that be. This book is worth reading and recommended for all age groups.

Colonel S K Sharma (Retd)

**Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia : 2006.** Edited by D. Suba Chandran, (New Delhi : Samskriti : In Collaboration with IPCS and KAF, 2007), 323p, Rs. 695.00, ISBN : 81-87374-89-9.

South Asia has been beset with a number of inter-states and intra-state armed conflicts, which started soon after the end of colonial rule in the Indian sub continent at the end of the Second World War. The conflicts have caused not only loss of human lives but more importantly their continuance has impacted very adversely on the development of this impoverished region and its fight against poverty, illiteracy, disease and ignorance. Peace processes initiated in the past have failed to bring the



conflicts to any peaceful resolution. This book purports to create a data base on the armed conflicts and peace processes in South Asia, which will facilitate the academic community, think tanks and policy makers to understand better the nature and implications of the armed conflicts and the reasons for the failure to peace processes in the past and the status of the current efforts. This book is the first attempt towards that end, which the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies plan to publish annually; the essays of the annual publication having a common format - short history, principal actors, conflict in the previous year, peace processes and finally conclusion.

L/c Fortunately, the possibility of inter-state conflicts in South Asia is slim. Despite Kashmir Being described as the possible flash point of war between India and Pakistan, the peace process that started in 2004 is holding. Having acknowledged it, the essay on Jammu and Kashmir draws attention to the ground reality and to a more pernicious kind of inter-state violence in the form of proxy war and externally sponsored terrorism.

An analysis of armed conflicts in South Asia reveals that most conflicts are intra-state. Three essays on armed conflicts in India - in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast and the developing left-wing extremism - trace their genesis, which are rooted in demand for autonomy and cessation, tribal assertion and deprivation, the violence in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast have significant external dimension. The essay on tribal troubles in Waziristan and Balochistan are particularly instructive as it points to the vanishing distinction between inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the context of the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan.

g The essays on Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh are equally illuminating and give valuable insight in to the nature of conflicts, which have torn the peoples of these countries apart. There are, however, aspects of the conflicts that have not been addressed. For example, the self-destructive role played by Prabhakaran in continuing violence in the island state; is he the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils and what happens to the Tamil Eelam when he is no longer on the scene? Will the movement fall apart; these are some questions, which have not been explored. Similarly, in Nepal, is democracy a panacea for all their problems; recent events suggest that people are not immune to radicalism and violence even in mature democracies, and what has been the experience of democratic governance in the past; what difference will the replacement of monarchy with republicanism make to the lives of millions of impoverished Nepalese. These are worrisome questions that need to be explored. The emergence of 'Jehadi' fundamentalism in Bangladesh is a frightening possibility to which the essay on the armed conflict in that country has very correctly drawn our attention.



The book ends with a detailed chronology of events in 2005 in each of the conflict areas, which is a gold mine for researchers. All the essays in the book are well researched and informative and fulfill the aim the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies has set for the 'annual'. Researchers on South Asia will eagerly look forward to the next volume of the book.

*Brigadier SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)*

**Divided Cities : Partition and its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957.** By Ian Talbot (Oxford University Press : 2006), 224p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN-13 : 978-0-19-547226-4.

The British Government announced on 20 February 1947 their intention to complete transfer of political and administrative power into Indian hands by 30 June 1948, even if there was no agreement between the Indian political parties. This precipitated the resignation of Khizar Hyat Khan Tiwana as Prime Minister of undivided Punjab on 2 March 1947. As head of a small group of Muslim legislators, he explained he could not negotiate political or constitutional arrangements with the representatives of other communities in Punjab. Swaran Singh, a leader of the Sikh community, told the Governor of Punjab, Sir Evan Jenkins, that the tactics of the Muslim League showed that it wanted to seize Punjab for the Muslims. The Sikhs, he asserted, would not let this happen. He added the decision of the British Government had destroyed the chances of any arrangement between the three religious communities in Punjab and he saw no alternative to partition of the province. Since the Muslim League could not muster the numbers in the legislature to form a government on its own, Governor Jenkins took over the administration.

Dr. Ian Talbot has studied and written extensively on this period in the history of the Subcontinent. In the present volume, he narrates the travails of Lahore and Amritsar, the two major cities of Punjab prior to Independence. He records the suffering and destruction visited on the two cities with sympathy and understanding. There is no denying that the Muslims and the Hindu and Sikh communities led separate lives even though they exhibited warmth in personal or neighbourly interaction. He notes that the experience of the upper strata, the lower strata and the middle class consisting of mostly traders and small industrialists, differed markedly in the communal violence which engulfed Punjab.

The ferocity of clashes forced India and Pakistan to order exchange of population on religious basis - Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistani Punjab to Indian Punjab and Muslims in the other direction. He narrates the process of rehabilitation of the migrants in the two cities. He notes Lahore overcame the disadvantage of a frontier city due to its enhanced political importance; in contrast, Amritsar did not fare as well because the capital



of East Punjab was located in a new city and the trade and industry also moved further east.

By focusing on the plight of inhabitants of the two cities and their efforts to make a new beginning, Dr. Talbot brings in human dimension to the events leading to the independence of the Subcontinent. The book should be of interest to historians and social scientists alike.

*Shri S K Bhutani, IFS (Retd.)*

*AK Bhutani*

**The Study of World Politics Volume I : Theoretical and Methodological Challenges.** by James N. Rosenau, (London and New York : Routledge, 2006), 301p, price not indicated, ISBN 0-415-36338-1.

This collection of essays by one of America's best known scholar on the theory of international relations is a window to the stimulating debate on the uses and non-uses of theory as well as the patterns and paradigms within which to analyse contemporary international relations. The twenty-three articles of Prof Rosenau included in this volume range from those published in 1960 to those published in 2003, and some hitherto unpublished ones too. The articles represent, in the words of Rosenau, "a restlessness" with conventional approaches to the theories and methodologies used in the study of world politics, and a belief that the world is undergoing enormous changes and our theories and methods must be adjusted accordingly.

In an attempt to conceptualise the new dynamics that determine the shape of world politics today, Rosenau in his article, "Building Blocks of a New Paradigm for Studying World Politics", points out that the foremost amongst these is the "Skill Revolution". What it really means is that people all over the world, whether through the internet or otherwise, have evolved new capacities to "render distant events proximate", having acquired enhanced analytic, emotional and imaginative talents. In effect, people at all levels of community and in every part of the world have increasingly undergone empowerment. They know how to engage in collective action and thus contribute to the course of events. "Individuals have joined collectivities as central actors on the world stage", says Prof Rosenau. The truth of this dynamic is evident in the effectiveness of global civil society at various international fora. The other three dynamics to which Rosenau refers is the Organisational Explosion, the Disaggregation of Authority and the Bifurcation of World Politics, which has resulted in the emergence of a "multi-centric" world. He then examines the challenges of analysing such a world.

In another highly stimulating essay, "The Theoretical Imperative", Rosenau quite convincingly proves the relevance of theory in the study of international relations. To those who believe that theorising is "at best a



luxury and at worst, a silly counterproductive exercise", his answer is that world politics cannot be analysed properly unless you learn to differentiate between "the important and the trivial". In a sense, says Rosenau, we are all theorists, for we bring theory to bear every time we assess one or another aspect of world affairs. "Explication" i.e. an attempt to explain or interpret a phenomenon and the principles underlying it, constitute the core of the theoretical enterprise. No matter how crude the propositions or hypotheses may be, the very fact of explicating them means an endeavor towards theorising. The failure of most observers to anticipate the events of 1989-91 (end of Cold War) offers a classic case of the need for explicit theorising, says Rosenau. (FARE)

Theory and methodology have been the prime concerns of James Rosenau and this collection of articles offers us the choicest (fair) of his ruminations in these fields. It includes his famous article "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", as also an extremely interesting article on "The Birth of a Political Scientist" which dwells on the doubts, fears, trials and travails of a doctoral candidate. On the whole, it is a very valuable book for a student of International politics. 4/c

Professor Satish Kumar

**Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and Chechnya : Political and Humanitarian Dimensions.** Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra and Seema Shekhawat (New Delhi : Lancer's Books, 2007), 209p, Rs 395.00, ISBN 81-7095-113-3.

The authors are currently associated with the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu. They are also editor and sub-editor of the quarterly newsletter 'Across LOC' published from the University of Jammu. Dr Mahapatra holds a doctoral degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi and has been a research fellow at the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University, Moscow; Dr Shekhawat holds a doctoral degree from the Department of Political Science, University of Jammu. They are thus insightful as to the subject they have selected for this joint venture.

The authors rightly postulate that conflict in any part of the world is a complex issue, it can only end when peace returns to the minds and hearts of all the concerned parties. Every party to a conflict has a cause to espouse, be it state, ethnicity or terrorism. There can be a prospect of conflict resolution only when the parties involved agree on some common criteria. The incidents of 11 September 2001 brought the picture of international violence to the global agenda. Earlier violence was confined to pockets of certain regions. Now the terrorist menace has acquired an international character. The likes of Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, Basayev and Masood Azhar have played an active role in widening the terrorist network. 4/c

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The major brunt of the on-going conflict is borne by those residing in the conflict zone. The authors urge that the political dimension has over-shadowed the humanitarian side of these conflicts. The women have suffered most because of their vulnerability on account of their gender and as civilians, figuring in different roles – as victims, survivors, resisters, peace-builders and providing combat support, thereby making them more visible. Thus women have played an active role in coping, adapting and surviving against all odds.

While the authors extensively urge a similarity in the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and Chechnya, this reviewer is not in complete agreement as to such "perceptual convergence", mainly on account of the Pakistan factor in Jammu and Kashmir, as such an external instigator does not exist in Chechnya. Apart from this personal viewpoint of mine, the reading of this book is nevertheless a must for all who are associated with the current confidence building measures in Jammu and Kashmir.

To encapsulate at the macro-level, the terrorism virus is spreading; the world and its people are no longer safe. While the areas most affected have undoubtedly been till recently Chechnya and Kashmir, the mountains of the former North West Frontier Province (now in Pakistan) are no longer the ramparts that they had been for undivided India some 60 years ago. Today the molten lava of terror is lapping at the mainland of residual India. We can only relax our guard at our peril, notwithstanding the occasional human rights lapses in Jammu and Kashmir mentioned by the authors, which will be thoroughly investigated as the Prime Minister of India has assured. As this review went to press, the first ever session of the joint anti-terror mechanism, triggered by the Mumbai blasts had met in Islamabad, by circumstance with a backdrop of misgivings. Primarily, most of the terrorism against India, and Indian interests, has its origin in Pakistan.

To conclude, this book has its niche in the bibliography of the Jammu and Kashmir militancy, alongside books like Lieutenant General Arjun Ray's "Kashmir Diary" (Manas, 1998), not mentioned in the extensive bibliography appended to the book under review.

*Lieutenant General S L Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)*

### **The Fantastic Fifth : A History of the Oldest Indian Infantry Brigade.**

*By Colonel Anil Shorey (New Delhi : Force Multi Press, 2005), 152p, Rs. 495.00.*

The book covers the operations carried out by the Brigade since it's raising in 1939 at Jhansi, through the 2<sup>nd</sup> W W, 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir (Ops) and 1962 Indo-China War. In the last chapters, it covers administrative and operational difficulties faced by the formation since its deployment in Arunachal Pradesh.

Operations



While the first seven chapters cover operations, the last four give details of NEFA. A number of photographs and a few maps support the narrative. The operations during the 2<sup>nd</sup> WW are well researched and described, as these have been extracted from books and war diaries already published, and cover western Desert, Italy, Egypt, Tunisia, Greece and other battle theatres. However, these would have added more value with more maps and sketches. The chapter on 1947-48 Punch Link-Up is well covered, and is backed by official and regimental histories. caps

The most important chapter is of the 1962 India-China War. In this, while the author has covered the events and operations in Walong in adequate detail and apparently relied on material provided by the formation, not enough maps or sketches indicating local landmarks (like Ladder, Steps, Knoll) have been included, which leave a military reader imagining features and result in disjointed narrative. Also, no worth-while lessons have been drawn from these actions, for students of military history. THAT

The last four chapters covering various aspects of Arunachal Pradesh, and Siang region will be of interest to those who have not had the good fortune of visiting that beautiful part of our country. J

The author, Colonel Anil Shoery (Retd) needs to be complimented for his effort.

*Lieutenant General Y M Bammi (Retd)*

**Impact of Science and Technology on Warfare.** KV Gopalakrishnan (New Delhi : National Book Trust, 2003), 146p, Rs 50.00, ISBN 81-237-4060-3.

Not many authors in India have delved into the topic of the impact of science and technology on warfare. Professor Gopalakrishnan, a former professor and authority on internal combustion engine at Indian Institute of Technology, Madras has filled this void admirably. His style is simple, and ideas and language coherent. The slim book under review has a very good "power to weight ratio" as it covers more than two millenniums of the historic growth of technology and warfare in just 146 pages. The book has both the hard core topic of science, military technology and dual use technology explained with the help of photographs and diagrams. It is interspersed with philosophical observations on the nature of humankind's primordial propensity to wage war which needs to be understood for controlling it for a peaceful world. The author posits that science and technology may achieve what centuries of moral preaching has failed to achieve - the abolition of war. "power"

The book has 12 chapters. Each chapter unfolds the relationship of a group of technologies with warfare over the ages. Aspects include the impact of metals, chemical explosives (ammunition), steam power,



industrialisation, communications, internal combustion engines (the author's forte), airpower, rockets, electronics, and nuclear energy on warfare. The final chapter is an analysis of the past impact and the future trends warfare. Here, the author argues that two features of technological development which can make big wars impossible in the future. The first is the progressively destructive nature of weapons and the second is globalisation which leads to interdependence.

# (gap) WW II  
The book also is about the nature of strategy like how the Japanese military leadership was doubtful on the end state of war with the US during WWII. The author's observation that navy and air force are technology oriented and no amount of enthusiasm or spirit can compensate for lack of its application is fundamental. Another insight by the author is how due to technology, fire power with less manpower is the logical choice but the military brass wants to continue with the status quo. The portion on rockets, missiles and nuclear weapon technology including the gun type and implosion type and thermonuclear are good primers.

In an era of rapid progress, inventions and discoveries, there is need for the military community to develop, update and sustain a scientific temper. The subject "Science and Military Technology" in Staff College competitive examination may be necessary but not sufficient. The challenges of the so called Revolution in Military Affairs demands a scholar warrior ethos. Similarly civilian academics and scholars need to grasp the essentials of science and military technology. The Israeli author Martin Van Creveld's "Technology and War from 2000 BC to the Present" (1991) was the logical first choice in understanding the topic. Now the book under review comes under the same category. in its present form

Colonel PK Gautam (Retd)

**Operation Bangladesh.** By Colonel P K Gautam, Retd (New Delhi : Manas Publications), 192p, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-273-4.

4/c  
This book is a first person account of life in 24 Medium Regiment during the year 1971 by one of its young officers. The writer has given a vivid account of his final days of training as a cadet and young officer, his joining the Regiment on commissioning, under field conditions in Arunachal Pradesh and thereafter, the move of the Regiment to concentrate the areas opposite Eastern borders of East Pakistan now Bangladesh. The participation of the Regiment in the operations prior to and during the Indo Pakistan war 1971 has been covered in great details.

While the account of training as a cadet and a young officer is no different from that experienced by many young Artillery officers, its distinct value lies in the writer's ability to rationalise the purpose of such trg in a mature manner. The events and thoughts of this period have been recalled well.

TRAINING



The account of the officer's joining the Regiment clearly brings to mind the functioning of a good regiment with extremely professional systems. The recall of the author's interactions with various officers, JCOs and key NCOs further illustrates the excellent team work and esprit de corps, a war winning factor that existed in this Regiment during 1971. 4/c

The main value of this book lies in the actions of the Regiment in its support of operations on the Eastern front during The Bangladesh Operations of 1971. The accounts are detailed, with good accounts of the overall operational plans of formations on both sides and the detailed Artillery plans of 24 Medium Regiment in support of these operations. The narration covers the events which formed part of the border skirmishes and thereafter the fast moving operations leading to the surrender by Pakistan at Dacca. The accounts are very balanced and succeed in capturing the essence and the excitement of the war. The author has taken great pains to research and include additional material from Indian, Pakistani and British sources to come across as a very balanced narrator of events. This book will be of special interest to Artillery officers, both in India and Pakistan. 4/c

A number of maps, equipment charts and a detailed bibliography add value to the book.

← Brigadier N Bahri VSM (Retd)

**Security and Nuclear Stabilisation in South Asia.** Edited by Imtiaz Alam (Lahore : South Asian Policy Analysis Network (SAPANA) 2006), 265p, price not indicated, ISBN 96-9906-001-8.

Since 1998, when India and then Pakistan carried out nuclear weapon tests and declared themselves nuclear weapon States, there has been considerable anxiety, particularly in the west, on the impact of this status on the fragile relations of the two hostile countries and the emergence of a nuclear flashpoint. In the countries themselves, apart from some public saber rattling, there has been a more sober assessment of the implications. However, apart from very recent developments, nuclear CBMs, or even discussions between the two countries to understand each other's 'strategic language', have not taken place. The attempt in this collection of essays to address this lacuna is, therefore, timely, if inadequate. 4/c

In 2005, under the aegis of SAARC, the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) and the South Asia Journal established a "virtual" think-tank comprising an interactive network of scholars from South Asia, the South Asian Policy Analysis Network (SAPANA). Of the 14 working groups set up by SAPANA to examine the gamut of relationships, one In Corps



was devoted to the issue of the implications of nuclear security in the subcontinent and the means of promoting nuclear stability. Clearly, this boils down to Indo-Pak relations rather than a SAARC-wide issue, though it would have been of interest to hear the views of scholars from the other countries, <sup>who</sup> which live in this dangerous neighbourhood. The only non-Indian or Pakistani scholar has drawn attention to another often neglected yet increasingly significant threat to South Asian security, <sup>which is</sup> that of small arms.

Unfortunately for the subject, only two of the authors have directly addressed the issue of South Asian nuclear stability Ejaz Haider and Moeed Yusuf. The Indian authors are dominated by peace activists, who have recommended disarmament as the means to achieve stability thus not really contributing to the core issue. As Haider says, it is unlikely that either country would roll back their weapons programmes: the issue has to be assessed from that perspective. Some other issues have been addressed from the point of view of India's foreign policy, and some appear to have been included, almost as an after-thought. Nonetheless, the book is worth reading, if for nothing else, to focus the attention of both countries on an issue of singular importance.

*Ms Arundhati Ghose, IFS (Retd)*

**Economic Diplomacy.** By Shri I.P. Khosla (New Delhi : Konark Publisher, 2006), 268p, Rs. 600.00, ISBN 81-220-0721-2.

The Association of Indian Diplomats during the last few years, has been making seminal contribution in fields other than geopolitics of international relations. The present volume on economic diplomacy edited by Shri I.P. Khosla is a collection based on a seminar conducted in early 2006. This follows the equally valuable seminar on energy security and the volume published in 2005. What economic diplomacy is all about and how it has become a dominant aspect of international relations, is comprehensively brought out by Shri Khosla in his introduction. This volume brings together all aspects of economic diplomacy - policies, instruments, multitrack diplomacy etc., in a scenario of what appears to be an irreversible process of globalisation.

The challenges facing India in economic diplomacy are well brought out by Abid Hussain Asra, Arjun Asrani, Suman Bery, Manmohan Agarwal and Nagesh Kumar, Indra Nath Mukharji, Mahendra Lama and Saumitra Chaudhury. Arvind Virmani's masterly theory and hard data on global power and concept of power potential needs to be taken seriously by policy makers involved in short and long term economic diplomacy. Viewed against his perspective, the emphasis on economic segment of diplomacy assumes even greater importance.



One subject not covered is trading in defence equipment which of late has acquired very large economic dimensions with features such as offsets, buyback etc. and marking a distinct shift from the postwar partners in arms trade.

Reproduction of number of important documents on the importance of economic diplomacy adds value to this volume. Overall, an extremely useful volume for those interested in international relations.

book

Shri PR Shiva Subramanian

**South Asia in World Politics.** Edited by Devint Hagerty (Karachi, Pakistan : Oxford University Press, 2004), 311p, Rs 495.00, ISBN-13 : 978-0-19-547328-5, ISBN-10 : 0-19-547328-0.

A very timely book when Asia in general and South Asia in particular has been drawing world attention. South Asia is a very complex region due to its shared cultural history, inherently interdependent economic activity, very skewed geographical distribution of water, flatlands, forests, desert, seacoast and wetlands. It is to the credit of the editor to have included a chapter on Afghanistan since happenings in and through this area have greatly influenced South Asia over the years.

Over all structuring of the book appears to have been inadvertently influenced by a hangover of the Cold War paradigm of foreign relations and international power play of great powers based on the good old principle of the 'balance of power'. This said, inclusion of post Cold War problems of ethnic conflicts, democratisation, economic liberalisation, globalisation, terrorism, religion and politics has added to the value of the book for readers not knowing enough about the region. In this context, it may be appropriate here to recall the description of the region by Morris Jones calling South Asia a "fractured region of fractured states, an enticing world of little cohesion."

HAVE

This theme could have been developed further for a better understanding of various underlying currents in South Asia. Contributors could have linked the geographical reality of South Asia demanding economic cooperation, with the political reality of attempts by some countries to develop linkages with far off powers and trade blocks resulting in continued economic deprivation, thriving unofficial trade and migration causing perpetual tension. This could then have helped discussion of the region based on the new paradigm of comprehensive national power (CNP) attributed to the Chinese. This includes natural resources, domestic as also external economic, scientific and technological capability. Social development level, military, governance, foreign affairs or diplomatic capability are also part of CNP.



Undoubtedly, the best contribution is by Devin T Hagerty himself in the introduction and while describing 'India's foreign relations' in chapter one with Herbert G Hagerty. The issue of the boundaries of South Asia and that of the book have been well covered, setting a perfect stage for other contributors. However in chapter one, there are certain long held beliefs like India and Pakistan being very close to a flash point during exercise Brass-Tracks in 1986-87, and that the Chinese restraint in 1971 war between India and Pakistan was because of the US 'opening' to China being worked around that time (p27). Later, statement of movement of a US aircraft carrier task force toward the Bay of Bengal (p29) does not sit comfortably with the theme and yet it did not deter the author to call India's nonalignment as 'tilted'!

As rightly explained in the introduction, the book is meant to introduce the region "as the first rather than the last word". However, to sum up centuries of evolution of religions in Indian subcontinent and explaining politics of it all by David Taylor could do with more study and analysis of the subject. To explain third century 'BCE', in terms of political rise of Buddhism betrays the origin of Buddhism in India. Similarly the birth of Sikhism could have been better handled (p214). On the same page Islam's spread has been explained, 'not by forced conversion but by the action and examples of Sufi saints'. It is little wonder that an article should appear in the Times of India of 10 January 2007 by Pankaj Jha, "Obscured by Myth : Wrong Questions Confuse Muslim History". This phenomenon is best explained by BH Liddell Hart explaining 'why do we not learn from history,' in his book.

← Lieutenant General BS Malik  
PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

**Kashmir in Comparative Perspective – Democracy and Violent Separatism in India.** by Sten Widmalm (Karachi, Pakistan : Oxford University Press, 2006), 226p, Rs 350.00, ISBN 10-0-19-547005-2.

An exciting book for those wanting to further explore Kashmir yet again, which to many is best, described using the Churchillian formulation of being a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. Sten Widmalm has been remarkably successful in his attempt to unwrap part of the mystery by simultaneously applying and exploring through multiple theories, as interpreted by political scientists, on 'ethnicity', 'identity and culture' 'economic deprivation' and 'voice and exit'.

Quoting Horowitz, the author of 'Ethnic Groups in Conflict', written in eighties, Widmalm explains Horowitz's proposition saying 'economic theories' cannot explain the extent of the emotions invested in ethnic conflicts", Widmalm feels "culture and identity per se are neutral, and act as a



vehicle rather than a cause for political conflict". He even rejects Pakistan and religious factors as the main cause of conflict by citing well-researched examples. His case on separatism is logically built on denial of the channels of 'voice and exit'.

Widmalm's theory is brilliantly explained in the chapter '*rise and fall of democracy*'. Various connected models are well presented and argued convincingly citing data from 1977 to 1989 and a series of incidents and actions of the main players starting from the eve of Independence, ie, 1947 to the election and installing of the present state government. While building up his case he tellingly quotes from Prem Shankar Jha "In Kashmir, militancy is not born out of poverty or economic deprivation but of the despair of /... / a class that was trained to wield power, but denied the opportunity to do so".

However, Widmalm, buoyed by making a successful case on "Kashmir in Comparative Perspective", goes on to add another chapter on '*avoiding violent separatism in India*' to justify the second part of his book's title, ie, "Democracy and Violent Separatism in India". Use of examples from developments in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal appear to be less convincing and consequently the high voltage used, burns the very essence of the argument of 'voice and exit'. Fall of the high and mighty after imposing emergency and well-entrenched governments in the states has made foreigners describe Indian democracy variously, but not so far convincingly, through any contemporary political theory or a model.

Similarly, ambitious attempt to include and analyse many other events from 1990 to 2004 in India and Pakistan, though useful only incrementally add to the central argument presented in the book. Not surprisingly, an optimistic conclusion arrived midway through the book is able to best capture the essence of Widmalm's painstaking effort, .. a careless usage of the term ethnic conflict easily creates the impression that we are dealing with a specific phenomenon of an utmost mystical nature /.../ Ethnicity as a concept is easily hijacked into the political language and this makes it all the more difficult to use in social science analysis/.../ And, therefore, the Kashmir conflict must not be seen as a zero sum game even if this is what some of the main political actor would like us to believe. There are political force even in this conflict, that are willing to both negotiate and make compromises. These observations are relevant when we look at the expansion and proliferation of the Kashmir conflict which followed in the 1990s and which continues to this day."

← Lieutenant General B S Malik

PRSM, AVSM (Retd)



**Bejewelled Heritage : History of the Rajput Regiment Volume III (1970-2005).** By Colonel Anil Shorey (New Delhi : Force Multipliers, 2005), 258p, Rs. 790.00.

4/c The Regiment has a history of more than two hundred years of a martial tradition and heritage, which continues to nurture the present. In keeping with the changing times, the Regiment has transcended its past recruitment pattern; the new battalions have been raised on a mixed class basis since 1976. Today, the Regiment is an amalgam of many castes, but retaining its distinctive regimental ethos. g

g The chronicler of regimental history is invariably faced with a dilemma: the accounts of battles and counter-insurgency operations must remain the focus of the narrative, but how and to what extent to highlight the 'peace tenure and' no war, no peace' situations, which prepare the battalions for the rigours of war. The author has achieved this balance creditably. The chapters on 'Aid to Civil Authority', 'Winning the Hearts and Minds of the people', 'Sports and Adventure Activities', and 'Other Fronts', have given the book a fine balance. copy

4/c The present volume narrates the accounts of battles fought by the battalions of the Regiment in the lightning campaign of 1971, in erstwhile East Pakistan that gave birth to Bangladesh. Nine battalions of the Regiment fought in the eastern and seven in the western Front. The contribution of the Rajput battalions can be gauged by the many Battle Honours awarded to them in the campaign. The narratives would have been better grasped if sketches illustrated the important battles.

The accounts of counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast have been described adequately. To the uninitiated, the accounts may be repetitive, but each situation was different and the results were achieved at great human cost. The number of COAS Unit Citations and individual gallantry awards bear testimony to their valour.

The book has an interesting chapter on the Fatehgarh fort, which houses the Regimental centre.

4/c The author has produced a comprehensive history of the Regiment covering a tumultuous period in post-independent India. The narratives are in simple readable style that captures the spirit of the regimental traditions. However, the photographs could have been of better quality and more illustrative. g

VS4  
Brigadier S P Sinha (Retd)



**Jinnah : Creator of Pakistan.** By Hector Bolitho (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2006), 222p, Price Rs. 295.00, ISBN 0-19-547323-X.

First published in 1954, this reprint makes interesting reading in the current context. Three threads run through the book: cold and inflexible personality of Jinnah in public and in private life, his unshakable commitment to a homeland for the Muslims in India and his commitment to non-discrimination. The author quotes from his speech on 11 August 1947: "Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State." The inherent contradiction could not have escaped Jinnah's astute mind.

The author makes no reference to Jinnah's statements in 1945 and 1946, visualising transfer of population on religious basis. *Dawn*, the newspaper founded by Jinnah, reported on 26 November 1946 that he told a press conference held in Karachi, the previous day that the authorities, both Central and Provincial, should take up immediately the question of exchange of population."

The author quotes with approval Sarojini Naidu's assessment of Jinnah's personality made in 1917: "...Jinnah is essentially a solitary man with a large political following but few intimate friendships; and outside the twin spheres of law and politics he has few resources and few accomplishments...the true criterion of his greatness lies... in a lofty singleness and sincerity of purpose and the lasting charm of a character animated by a brave conception of duty and an austere and lovely code of private honour and public integrity."

← Shri S K Bhutani (FS (Retd.))

**Energy Cooperation in South Asia.** Ed. Imtiaz Alam (Lahore : Sapana 2006), 280p, Price not indicated, ISBN 969-9060-03-4.

This volume, a compilation of papers by South Asian experts is most timely, because authorities are only lately coming to realise that energy is the foundation of all development. The subject is comprehensively dealt with from the perspective of the individual countries and adequate statistical data are provided. The benefits of cooperation are well elucidated. It, however, is a work by scholars for scholars and would hardly hold the attention of decision makers who are usually birds of passage in political and bureaucratic space. The executive summary does not address this problem and there is scope for a separate paper in which basic statistics are provided but relegated to appendices.



g It is correctly recognised that energy is the sum total of oil, coal, gas, nuclear, hydro, etc. but individual authors have often used the terms, energy, electricity and power interchangeably. It must be stressed that electricity is only a minor subset of energy. Many of the projections refer to India Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 but a related document envisages that by this year India would have achieved the world's fifth rank in "Per Capita GDP". This requires the availability of energy in quantities many magnitudes larger than any of the papers suggest.

All discussions on energy trade have broken down on the question of pricing. Maybe the answer is to let the market decide. For example, there exists a huge international infrastructure based on crude oil and its derivatives with no idea of what oil is going to cost on a day to day basis. There is enough venture capital available worldwide to lay a similar infrastructure for gas and electricity. However, sellers and buyers should come away from the US dollar and denominate the trade in convertible local currencies because most of the capital and operating cost will be in local currency.

Shri Chudamani Ratnam

**Military Law Lexicon.** Major General Nilendra Kumar and Kush Chaturvedi (New Delhi : Universal Law Publishing Co.), 237p, Rs 250.00, ISBN : 81-7534-573-X.

The book is a welcome addition to the Indian military legal literature. The necessity for a Military Law Lexicon containing all statutory definitions and words and phrases, short explanatory notes on all provincial terms and peculiar words relating to military terminology and customs, legal maxims of relevance to military law have been felt by the Services and lawyers. An authentic military law dictionary is a prerequisite for legal fraternity. It would be put to real use once the Armed Forces Tribunal is established by the government.

The Military Law Lexicon is the first of its kind in India. A perusal of the book shows the labour bestowed on it by the authors. However, an annotation by the authors, editors and publishers that "the information, comments and views contained in the book are merely for guidance and reference and must not be taken as having the authority or being binding", has reduced its authenticity.

The authors have included few non-military terms like access, accident, annex, autopsy, consent, crime, damage, deficient, will etc., however, the meaning assigned to these terms is not exhaustive. While defining words like "concept of violence", 'court of military appeal', etc.,



their references have not been properly explained. Lengthy definitions assigned to terms like 'armed forces', 'armed conflict', 'indiscriminate attack', 'international humanitarian law', 'military judge', 'misconduct', 'non international armed conflict', 'peace keeping and peace keeping operations' could have been avoided. Proper editing could have ensured a concise definition of the terms like 'customs of war', 'general order', 'good order', 'rules of engagement', 'treason' etc. The terminology used in the Air Force Act, 1950 and Air Force Rules, 1969 has not been included in the Law Lexicon. Notwithstanding the above comments, the book would be of help to the student of military law as well as the practicing lawyers.

*Wing Commander U C Jha (Retd)*

**The Air Force Chief of Staff Logistics Review.** Edited by John G Drew (et al), (Santa Monica : RAND, 2005), 178p, price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-3658-0.

Rand Corporation is an independent think tank and has undertaken many studies independently for the USAF under Project Air Force. However, this study differs from the others in two ways. Firstly, Rand Corporation's role was as an analytical advisor to the USAF and it developed the analytic approach for this review with the total data being provided by the latter by sourcing the same from active major commands. Secondly, the conclusions arrived at as a result of the review were validated by actual field testing.

The report describes the evolution of various maintenance concepts within the USAF right from the time the aircraft was introduced into the US Army. It also examines centralised versus decentralised execution, gathers insight from both logisticians and operators; develops and examines changes and adjustments within constrained funding boundaries; thereafter develops metrics to compare solution option against the Air and Space Expeditionary Force's operational goals after identifying accompanying benefits, costs and risks for each of the options.

The methodology of the review was as follows. Firstly, inputs for the review in respect of ten published major processes were gathered from the major commands. These processes were supply management, transportation management, logistics plans, maintenance management, maintenance inspections, maintenance repairs, sortie generation, ammunition storage and management, training, and officer development. These inputs, called targets of opportunity (there were over 600 initially but were reduced to 423 by Rand Corporation), identified common problems and solution options. These options were divided into three groups: near-term tests, long-term evaluation, and continuous refinements. The first group solutions were implemented at the test sites and evaluated for their efficacy before arriving at the conclusion. These have been included in the report. The



second category i.e. long-term evaluation could not be fully tested but have been included in the report. The continuous refinement group solutions were those initiatives which were either already underway or were part of policy revisions accomplished routinely.

Indian Air Force has faced similar problems in the past and has followed various wing level maintenance organisations from time to time. These reorganisations took place based on perceptions of the decision makers and not as a result of any scientific study. For optimum utilisation of resources, greater operational preparedness and higher mission success rate, the IAF should carry out a similar review to validate its earlier decision. This review can thus serve as an ideal guide line for the maintenance and operational decision makers for greater operational efficiency.

← Air Marshal Bharat Kumar

**India and South East Asia - The Security Cooperation.** By Lt Gen Y M Bammi (New Delhi : Gyan Publishing House, 2006), 275p, Rs 540.00, ISBN 81-212-0880-7.

A very painstakingly researched book on the South East Asian region, which is comprehensive and thorough. Starting with historical facts and progressing through the various periods of foreign domination and influence in different countries; the author has set up an excellent background against which the modern power plays can be studied and understood.

The strengths and vulnerabilities of every country as also the interests of outside powers and how they impact on the region have been clearly analysed. The different bones of contention, primarily to do with the South China sea and the varied interpretations of historical claims and the laws of the sea relating to territorial waters and economic zones have been narrated. The problems persist and for the time being indicate a jockeying for advantageous positioning by different parties to these disputes. The author has indicated the major threat as China's intentions and actions in the future. Also mentioned in detail are the terrorist activities and their local motivations. Against this threat the primary shield at present is the USA, its interests and presence. To what extent ASEAN has wielded together a security network exploiting common economic and trade factors is the urgent question. How Japan and India can contribute towards this is also relevant.

In the past, India showed limited interest in this region. But since 1992, a greater realisation of India's interests in South East Asia resulting in the 'Look East Policy' has occurred. While dealing with the security



interests, various factors have been covered including military training and cooperation. Perhaps the potential for welding the region together, by integration of sea communications, better ports and mutually benefiting facilities, integrated road, rail and air links, leading to much greater volumes in movements of goods, services and human talent as also mutually beneficial trade against international barriers could have received greater attention. The potential for enhanced tourism, flow of cultural influences also leads to greater regional understanding, integration and consequently a larger stake in peace and security. The final part of the book indicates less of a policy and more of an action plan for the region upto the year 2035.

A bit repetitive at places, the book lacks proper and helpful maps, perhaps due to costs involved. Overall a very good presentation of the region; a must read for students of geopolitics and geostrategy.

VSM (Retol)  
 ← Brigadier N Bahri

**Learning Large Lessons : The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era.** *David E. Johnson, Santa Monica, (RAND : 2006), 23p, Price not indicated, ISBN 978-08330-3876-0.*

The United States Armed Forces have been involved in four major operations during the last two decades viz. Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq in 2003. Each Service has studied and analysed these operations with a fine tooth and comb and drawn the lessons. It is said that the beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder. In a similar fashion, the US Army and the USAF have reached almost totally different conclusions and have claimed that their Service was the most dominant and decisive factor in these operations. The doctrine, strategy, re-equipment, and organisational structures are based on and influenced by the lessons learnt and the consequent battles for the budget to effect these changes. These differences in the lessons learnt and their consequent fall out have fuelled a debate which has been acrimonious and vocal. David E. Johnson, in this Rand Study, lists out the perceptions of each service of the role played by the ground power and air power and his own conclusions after the study.

It is a well accepted fact that air power has proved to be capable of performing deep strike operations that the army long believed that the Air Force either could not or would not reliably perform. The US Army doctrine envisions deep operations as a key element in its corps-level campaigns at the operational levels of war. However, Apache and Army Tactical Missile Systems—the two systems for execution of these tasks - have been less effective than the fixed wing aircraft. The Air Force's



operational efficiency has been adversely affected in this large area of operation beyond the frontline battlefield. These differences, in turn have had their effect on the prosecution of the overall joint campaign. On the other hand, the ground power has proved to be far more effective in military operations other than war. Further, except for the Operation Desert Storm, the other operations did not have a satisfactory conclusion and ended up in military operations other than war in which the air power has a restricted role and it is the ground power which has to bear a major brunt. The effective combination of ground and air power in an integrated theatre campaign is not a single service issue; it is a joint warfighting issue. It is not only the perceived differences in the dominance of ground power and the air power in these operations that has been high lighted but also the doctrinal divide that exists between the various services. Johnson has highlighted these differences and has brought out that the US Joint Doctrine is not a consensus document but is amalgamation of doctrines of individual Services resulting in major differences during the conduct of any operation<sup>g</sup>. For example, the concept of individual<sup>g</sup> as propounded by the US Army is that it must be supported by the other Services, which is not accepted by the USAF. Johnson has highlighted these problems and has given his conclusions regarding what has not been learnt in these operations. He sees the role of air power increasing in the future operations with the other Services playing the supporting role and not the vice versa as has been the case so far.

This Rand Study is a must for all the analysts and military brass involved in the formulation of doctrine, structure and the new technologies for the armed forces. There is an ongoing debate in India on the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff, theatre commands and other joint organisations. Though individual is a necessity but the concept of individual varies with each individual. This Rand Study will help clarify most of the issues from lessons learnt by the United States which has been the role model in introducing these joint institutions.

PVSM, AVSM

Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (Retd)

**Air Power Against Terror : America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom.** By Benjamin S. Lambeth (RAND National Research Institute (<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MGI66>), 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138), 2005, 411p, \$35.00 (soft cover) ISBN 0-83303724-2.

This is a thoroughly professional, and detailed, report on Operation Enduring Freedom prepared for United States Central Command Air Forces. The research is exhaustive and impeccable; and no detail of the air effort has been left out. In some respects, however, non-aviators are likely to



see it as a largely cockpit-centric view. One reviewer (an Air Force Major-General) says: "...it is one of the few accounts that properly approaches the effort as fundamentally an air operation, not a special-forces action supported by air, as some revisionists assert. It provides a level of detail and insight about the air war which actually was the bulk of the conflict that is simply unavailable elsewhere." The point, regardless of who could be said to have supported whom, is that this was an air operation in concert with elements on the ground in the hostile area. Claiming autonomy for such operations may not be justified.

The study assesses the conduct of *Operation Enduring Freedom* during the period October 2001 through late March 2002. The book was published in 2005. Perhaps, at the time of writing, Lambeth's triumphal note could be justified: "Once again the chronic doubters of air power's capability and potential were proven wrong," Enduring freedom "reaffirmed that when the United States leads, others follow." "As The Economist put it", he says "President Bush "matched forcefulness in Afghanistan with an unexpected delicacy in statecraft" and achieved a military success without doing so in a way that would turn others away." By 2006 it was clear that, apart from regime-change, none of the objectives of Enduring Freedom was achieved. The experience in Iraq did nothing to reinforce the optimism generated by the early phases of *Enduring Freedom*.

The lesson for military planners is clear. Armed action (and least of all, action-at-a-distance as in bombing and missile attacks) can only play a limited role in counter-insurgency, and even less, in counter-terror roles. Ian Johnston, writing in the Canadian journal, 'Humanist Perspectives' (Autumn, 2006), has summed up the issue neatly: "After all, when one is up against a fiercely committed enemy united by a passionate ideology and prepared to sacrifice thousands of young men and women to the cause, to kill indiscriminately in the most horrific ways, and to continue the conflict indefinitely, what has one to offer by way of a countervailing force or belief? Precision-guided missiles and bomb-detection devices are clearly not enough, to say nothing of short-term "Mission Accomplished" invasions or massive injections of cash to support unpopular, repressive governments who will keep the oil flowing."

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd)



## **Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending March 2007**

*(The books reviewed in October-December 2006 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

### **AFGHAN - WAR**

**Historical Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and Insurgencies.**

*By Ludwing W Adamec. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2006, 401p, Rs. 995.00, ISBN 81-7049-312-9.*

### **CHINA - FOREIGN RELATIONS - CENTRAL ASIA**

**Central Asia - China Relations Since - 1991.** *By Bhagaban Behra. New Delhi, Vistar Publications, 2006, 210p, Rs. 500.00, ISBN 81-8765227-3.*

### **DESTROYER - WARSHIPS - UNITED STATES**

**Acquisition and Competition Strategy Options for DD(X): The US Navy 21st Century Destroyer.** *By John F Schank. Santa Monica, Rand, 2006, 136p, ISBN 08-3303-870-2.*


### **DICTIONARY - MILITARY QUOTATIONS**

**Dictionary of Military Quotations.** *By Peter G Tsouras. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2006, 512p, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-7049-299-8.*


### **DISASTER MANAGEMENT**

**Disaster Management: Relevant Issues and Challenges.** *By KK Thakral. New Delhi, Cyber Tech Publications, 2007, 250p, Rs. 600.00, ISBN 81-7884-290-4.*

### **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - INDIA**

**India's Economic Development.** *By Falendra K Sudan. New Delhi, Serial Publications, 2006, 308p, Rs. 1100.00, ISBN 81-8387-043-0* ———— 

### **ECONOMIC FOREIGN RELATION| - INDIA**

 **Economic Diplomacy.** *By IP Khosla. New Delhi Konark Publications, 2006, 268p, Rs. 600.00, ISBN-81-220-0721-x.*

### **ENERGY SECURITY - INDIA**

**India's Energy Security and the Gulf.** *Edited by SN Malakar. Delhi, Academic Excellence, 2006, 344p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-88684-41-4.*



## EUROPEAN UNION

**The European Union in Transition: Economy, Politics, Society.** Ed. by Rajendra K Jain, Harmut Elsenhans, Jayaraj Amin. New Delhi, Radiant Publisher, 2006, 225p, Rs. 600.00, ISBN 8170272645.

**India, the European Union and the WTO.** Ed. by Rajendra K Jain Elsnhans. Radiant Publisher, New Delhi, 2006. 316p, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 8 170272610.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS IRAN - LEBANON

**Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years.** Edited by HE Chehabi. London, IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006, 322p, ISBN 1-86064-561-5.

## GLOBALIZATION

**The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalisation, Chaos and War.** By Prem Shankar Jha. New Delhi, Vistaar Publications, 2006, 373p, Rs. 480.00, ISBN 81-7829-684-5.

## GULF WAR

**The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End.** By Peter W Galbraith. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2006, 260p, \$ 26.00, ISBN 0743294232.

**Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy Behind the Gulf War.** By Alan Munro. London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006, 426p, ISBN 1-84511-128-1.

## HISTORY - INDIA'S PARTITION

**Divided Cities: Partition and its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957.** By Ian Talbot. Karachi, Oxford, 2006, 224p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 0195472268.

**The Untold Story of the India's Partition: The Shadow of the Great Game.** By Narendra Singh Sarila. New Delhi, HarperCollins, 2006, 436p Rs 500.00, ISBN 81-7223-569-0.

## HISTORY PAKISTANI - BATTLEFIELDS

**Historic Battlefields of Pakistan.** By Johnny Torrens Spence. Karachi, Oxford, 2006, 140p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 0195978978.

## INDIA PAKISTAN - NUCLEAR CONFLICT

**The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry.** Ed. by T V Paul, New Delhi, Cambridge, 2006. 273p, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 8175963646.



## INDIA, NORTHEAST - ETHNIC RELATIONS

**Dynamics of Power Relations in Tribal Societies of North-East India.** Ed. by Basudeb Dutta Ray, Asok Kumar Ray. New Delhi, Om Publications, 2006, 288p, Rs. 800.00, ISBN 8186867937.

## INSURGENCY - NEPAL

**Nepal Facets of Maoist Insurgency.** Edited by Lok Raj Baral. New Delhi, Adroti Publishers, 2006, 216p, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-87392-75-4.

**Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal: The Maoist Insurgency, Past Negotiations and Opportunities for Conflict Transformation.** By Bishnu Raj Upreti. New Delhi, Adroti Publishers, 2006, 424p, Rs. 600.00, ISBN 81-87392-74-6.

## INTELLIGENCE

**Intelligence Corporate Success and Vigilance.** By DC Paihak. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2006, 216p, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-289-0.

**Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in the West.** By Alexander Kouzminov. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2006, 192p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-307-2.

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

**Guns and Butter: The Political Economy of International Security.** Edited by Peter Domhrowski. New Delhi, Viva Books Private Limited, 2007, 287p, Rs 795.00, ISBN 81-309-0423-3.

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY - EAST ASIA - JAPAN

**Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia: Focus on Japan.** Edited by N S Sisodia GVC Naidu. New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2005, 644p, Rs. 1350.00, ISBN 81-86019-52-9.

## IRAQ WAR

**The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences.** Edited by Rick Fawn & Raymond Hinnebusch. New Delhi, Viva Books Private Limited, 2007, 355p, Rs. 995.00, ISBN 81-309-0427-6.

## LOGISTICS

**The Air Force Chief of the Staff Logistics Review: Improving Wing-Level Logistics.** Ed. by Kristin F Lynch, John G Drew and David George. Santa Monica, Rand, 2005, 178p, Price NA, ISBN 0833036580. — A

MEMOIRS

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**While Memory is Fresh.** By Jagjit Singh. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006, 259p, Price NA, ISBN 8170622158.

**In the Line of Fire: A Memoir.** By Pervez Musharraf. London, Simon and Schuster, 2006, 352p, Rs. 950.00, ISBN 074329582X.

### MILITARY HISTORY

**Sahib: The British Soldier in India.** By Richard Holmes. London, HarperPennial, 2006, 572p, £ 5.99, ISBN 0-00713754-0.

**Battles of the Honourable East India Company (Making of the Raj).** By M S Naravane. New Delhi, A.P.H., 2006, 261p, Rs. 895.00, ISBN 813130034X.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS - AFGHANISTAN

**The Military Operations at Kabul: With a Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan.** By Vincent Eyre. Gurgaon, Shubhi Publications, 2006. 436p, Rs. 995.00, ISBN 81-8290-082-4.

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