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Award of Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Research Fellowship - 1996

The Board of Management of the USI Research Centre has awarded the Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Research Fellowship for 1996 to Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM, AVSM (Retd). The subject of the research project is :

“Sustainable Defence : Harmonising Long and Short Term Goals”

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DIRECTOR'S PAGE

As I assume stewardship of the United Service Institution of India, I am deeply conscious of the responsibilities I am undertaking, particularly in context of the Institution's history, and record of dedicated performance. My immediate predecessor, Major General S C Sinha, and his predecessor, the late Colonel Pyara Lal, had devoted their lives, more or less, to the Institution. They have steered it through difficult times, and set it on course to becoming an institution the Armed Forces and its members can be proud of. Colonel Pyara Lal's unmatched contribution will be commemorated by naming the new library after him, and by an annual memorial lecture that the Council has approved, funding for which has been contributed to, by his brother, Shri S L Agarwal. In so far as Major General Sinha is concerned, the new building that will house the Institution and all its facilities, is in itself a tribute to his untiring and dedicated efforts; all of us should be indebted to him for what he has managed to achieve, against some fairly heavy odds. We therefore say thank you very much, and farewell with a heavy heart, but secure in the knowledge that, his advice and services will always be available to us.

With the move of the Institution to the new premises from the rather restricted environs of Kashmir House, the fact that the new premises are indeed generous in terms of space for the reading room and library, and have some very fine facilities in the form of a well-equipped auditorium and two seminar rooms, rooms for research workers, and Hostel accommodation on site, among other things, there is very naturally a perception that the United Service Institution of India must play a more dynamic role in allowing its members and others connected with it, to articulate views and ideas on matters of national security, defence strategy and international relations, among other subjects; all this without losing the perspective that is enshrined in its Charter - that of providing an appropriate forum for serving and retired officers of the Indian Armed Forces and civil services to sustain, improve upon and further kindle, interest and knowledge in the art, science and literature of national security in general, and the Armed Forces in particular. In this eminently laudable and vital task, the addition of the Research Centre will, no doubt, play a significant role.

When I was requested at the meeting of the Council on February 29, 1996, to take over the stewardship of the Institution from Major General Sinha, I accepted in all humility, fully aware that running it in the new environs, in context of the enhanced expectations, and with having to try and match the standards set by my illustrious predecessors, would be a daunting task indeed. Secure in the knowledge that I shall have the support, advice and guidance of not only the Council members, but of all other members, as also of the

dedicated staff of the Institution, I wish to assure each one of you through the medium of this page, that I shall spare no efforts to ensure that the United Service Institution of India takes its rightful place among the leading think-tanks on national security and defence strategy, by providing the forum, facilities and research material, to all its members and well-wishers within the Armed Forces and outside.

In conclusion, allow me to quote what the Institution's founder, Maj General Sir Charles MacGregor, had stated in a memorandum apparently circulated to all members and dated May 8, 1878, "I submit that nothing will be done that will stand, unless this principle is recognised, that everyone, secretary, Council, corresponding members and ordinary members, must take an active personal and continuous interest in the success of the Institution"; what he then said is still valid, and I hope to draw strength and support on the basis of that principle.



(Satish Nambiar)
Lt Gen (Retd)
Director

New Delhi
01 July 1996

EDITORIAL

Multi-dimensional Warfare

To the existing four dimensions of warfare - the air, land, sea and space - a fifth dimension of warfare has been added. It transcends the other four and has no boundaries nor limits. Its battlefield is the invisible, infinite space with its satellite monitoring and reconnaissance systems and a world-wide communications network. The Information Warfare (IW), as this warfare in the new dimension has been described, is engendered by the new technologies that provide us, for the first time, a capability to detect, intercept, collect, evaluate, analyse and disseminate information world-wide in real time, making it possible for the virtual presence of the top team of defence managers in the tactical area.

To be effective, Information Warfare needs a new framework of doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training with the aim to achieve information "dominance" or "superiority". Today there is a virtual flood of information; and its processing to obtain the relevant and useful, and to leave out the unimportant, is a human task; and this is the weak link which needs to be strengthened.

In addition to the information collection function, there is a need to protect our own information which may be valuable to the opponent; since information after it has been processed becomes intelligence, which we must have and which must be denied to the enemy. The value of intelligence has been stressed by military thinkers like Sun-Tzu, Chanakya and Machiavelli from the earliest times to the present. However, the new technologies have given it a sharp cutting edge and a distinct and all-pervasive dimension.

In our lead article in this issue, General John Lorber, with penetrating insight, presents a very clear picture of the multi-dimensional aspects of the Information Warfare which the new technologies make possible. His net assessment: "Information Superiority will be a battle-winning factor in future conflicts." No one can disagree with that; but can we ignore the implications of it for our own national security?

Military Operations in the Information Age

GENERAL JOHN G LORBER
United States Air Force

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you for the gracious introduction and kind observations. I am honoured and truly excited about being here and having the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon.

I understand that a large number of you represent the United Service Institution of India and are involved in numerous think-tank activities. I applaud your efforts and encourage you to be resolute in your labour to look ahead, consider new ideas, and try to solve some of the problems that confront not only you, but your neighbours around the world.

I hope that what I have to share with you today whets your "Appetites" and causes each of you to consider the possible implications of maintaining peace in this new era called the "Information Age". I believe this new era will present many formidable challenges for each of us. At the same time, it may also provide unprecedented opportunities for improving our abilities to preserve peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

INTRODUCTION

Before I discuss the concept of Military Operations in the Information Age, allow me a few moments to digress-I am often asked "What is the U.S. role in Asia-Pacific?" Stability in the Asia-Pacific region is Important to my nation's future economic prosperity - Asia-Pacific is our largest trading partner. We, the U.S., as a Pacific nation, are driven to ensure this region remains at relative peace-well into the next century.

U.S. PRESENCE

The wealth of diversity we enjoy in the Asia-Pacific region has led to its prominence among the world's economies. But this wealth of diversity can

Text of a talk given by General John G Lorber, Commander U.S. Pacific Air Forces to the members of the United Service Institution of India and other Senior Service Officers at New Delhi on March 22, 1996.

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also be a source of trouble. I believe one would be naive to think that this region will be free of wars - It's simply a matter of when and where they will occur. An historical fact to consider: In the previous 3 millennium, only 268 years have been free of major wars. That is equivalent to on average, 7 to 8 peaceful years in each of the past 30+ centuries (*Lessons of History*, published in 1968). The "When and Where" also applies to natural disasters - over the last 50 years, our dedicated men and women have participated in 26 major humanitarian operations in the Asia-Pacific region. PACAF's people reached out to aid victims of floods, typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, and epidemic disease. We will do the same in the future.

Our Secretary of Defence, Dr. William Perry, recently emphasized the importance of our presence in this region. One year ago, he stated, "Dangers and potential threats (in the Asia-Pacific region) require us to maintain military forces powerful enough to be a persuasive deterrent, and if deterrence fails, powerful enough to fight and win decisively." The question still remains - how do we do this in cooperation with our friends and allies in an era of declining defence budgets?

PREDICTING THE FUTURE

Now let us turn our attention to the future. Looking into the future is something both you and I can relate to - we do it every day- it is a critical part of our jobs, but not an easy part. Casey Stengel, a famous baseball player, stated the obvious - "predictions are hard, especially about the future."

In Industry, anticipating the future and searching out new opportunities separates the successful companies from those that falter and eventually go away. The Sam Pitrodas, Sam Waltons, and Bill Gates of the world understand this critical feature - their "visions" were not limited. Mr Pitroda, your communication's giant here in India, used his ingenuity and bold foresight to revolutionize your telephone industry. He had a "vision" and the courage to pursue it. We all reaped the benefits - the economic stability of India is stronger - you are more competitive in the global economic market place. Mr Pitroda was not afraid to make a decision. If any of you have travelled in the U.S. you have probably had the opportunity to shop at a Walmart Store - it is almost considered a tourist attraction. Walmart's, Sam Walton's were the brainchild - anything and everything at affordable prices. He had the courage to step into the future with an idea without fear of making a bad decision. When asked to explain his success, he replied with just two words, "Good decisions." he was then asked how he was able to make good decisions? He answered, "experience", when asked where he got that experience, he answered, "from making bad decisions". If you step out and make decisions, some of

them will inevitably be bad ones. If you learn from that bad decision, then success will follow. Most of you are familiar with the computer software company called "Microsoft." Mr Bill Gates, its founder, had a vision of "a computer on every desk in every home." He took a personal role in convincing other computer companies to standardize their products and architecture. This fuelled the computer industry growth in the 1980s. Much of his success was due to his courage to make decisions, and to translate technical visions into market strategy. He blended his creativity with technical acumen - the rest, as they say, is history.

RECOGNIZING NEW TECHNOLOGY

The focus of these successful men was not to stay aligned with their competitor but to stay one, two, three, or even more steps ahead-to capitalize on the opportunities of the future. In my profession, the military, the same rules apply, being second best in a competition of two is not an acceptable result. If you fail to recognize a new technology, it can rapidly change the number of steps between you and the competitor, or in some cases, the adversary.

With limited resources (people and money), we all need to concentrate our efforts on future technologies that may hold the most promise to revolutionize military operations. Revolutionary technologies have made the difference in the past - the future should be no different. I believe that *Information warfare* is one of these critical new technologies.

Where should we, as militaries go? How should we get there? How do we contemplate this concept of information warfare while continuing to focus on safeguarding our freedom and security in this region? Being here today gives me the opportunity to address those questions.

HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY

Let me begin by taking you back a few years in history. Even 5000 years ago, it was technology, the long bow (used by Egyptians), that extended the battlefield beyond hand-to-hand combat and revolutionized warfare. This type of weapon was also used by Europeans in Central and East Asia during the renaissance period. Gunpowder followed as the next revolutionary technology (gunpowder-originated in China, was manufactured in England in 1344, and used to build British empire which eventually colonized India). In the defeat of the Spanish armada in 1588, thousands of English troops on board ships were experimentally equipped with firearms. While the Spanish relied on archers— this was the beginning of Spain's downfall as a world power. The

success of the English forces played a major role in convincing military theorists that archery had become an inefficient method for waging war. For centuries, wars were fought in two distinct domains-on land or in the water. Fighting wars on land was similar to fighting on water; it was two dimensional. Submarines gave water a third dimension, and was another leap in technology. Submarine warfare had its roots in the American Civil War, but was not refined until the twentieth century. The turn of the century also brought other technological advances that made a real difference in the conduct of warfare -motorized vehicles, aircraft, and exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Motorized vehicles led to tanks that were first used by the British in 1915 - this changed the strategy and tactics for conducting land warfare. Aircraft introduced the next domain for conducting war - the air. However, through many wars, two dimensional thinking resulted in air power being employed as an extension of artillery. This exemplifies that wars were fought using the same philosophy as the first cannon shot-ballistic projectiles directed against a target or target set. Bombs dropped from B-17s in World War II saturated targets with little regard to collateral damage. During the 1950s and 1960s, we were introduced to space as the fourth domain for conducting war. Over the past 30 years, technological advances in reconnaissance, communications, intelligence, and command and control gave us the ability to better know ourselves and the enemy. It improved our abilities to attack and defend all centres of gravity, to include : tactical (battle), strategic (nation), and operational (campaign). Weapons now have "brains" — they are guided by radar, laser, and infrared technology and have imbedded computers right in the weapons itself. Stealth technology eliminates the ability of the enemy to see "you". Infrared detection has taken away the cover of darkness. Precision guided munitions take the "guess work" out of hitting the target. All these technologies have changed the "face" of military operations and eliminated the mass destruction of past wars.

We can now conduct war by attacking our targets simultaneously (parallel warfare) vis-a-vis sequentially as in serial warfare (allowing enemy to adjust). Combine all these technologies with the domains of air, land, sea, and space and you significantly reduce the "fog" of war.

Since the early 1970s we have seen phenomenal advances in the way information is processed and transmitted. We have experienced unprecedented "Leaps" in the quality and quantity of information and the speed of information systems. Desktop and laptop computers have replaced large mainframes. Hand-held telephones are nearly as popular as wrist watches. If automobiles were developed at the same rate as computers, they would get 70 kilometers per litre and cost 340 rupees each. "Surfing" the internet and the world-wide web brings the enormity of all this information into perspective. All these

technological advances have produced rapid increases in our ability to process information day-to-day. It has definitely opened my eyes to the fact that those who dominate the flow of information when conducting military operations (information dominance) will have a clear advantage. They can observe the battlespace, analyze events, then make the correct decisions—those who fail to exploit this dominance will lose, it is as simple as that!

TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED WARFARE

In World War II, commanders monitored the war in large rooms with models representing forces that were manually moved about a map. Their movements reflected actions hours and even days old. As late as Vietnam, we were still using grease pencils on a map. In desert storm, through technological advances in space and airborne platforms (satellite surveillance, AWACS, J-STARS, data links, satellite communications), commanders and the national command authority were literally “on-scene” despite being hundreds or thousands of miles away (virtual presence). Satellite based positioning and navigation (global positioning system) and advances in precision guided munitions allowed us to attack well defined targets with surgical accuracy. Technology affected our post attack assessment capability as well for many years we used aircrew to overfly a target to photograph the attack results. This put the aircrew at risk, provided “aged” information and many times, provided no information at all. Today, through the use of space-based systems, we can get near real time assessments of target destruction. Commanders can now divert resources and avoid “overkilling” a target.

THE NEW DOMAIN - INFORMATION WARFARE

This fifth and newest dimension in warfighting, information warfare, is common to the other four (air, land, sea, and space) -although it requires its own planning, strategy, and tactics to exploit the advantage. But that is where the commonalities start to break down. Land, sea, air, and space provide a clear-cut domain in which to fight. Each can interrelate or stand alone as a battlefield. Information warfare, however, transcends the battlefield as we know it and is entwined throughout the four previous domains. Where the others have defined limits and boundaries, the information battlefield knows none. As commanders and leaders, we must recognize the challenges of this new domain and begin to develop the necessary strategy and tactics to employ and defend against the “weapons” of information warfare. We must bring information warfare into the mainstream of our doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training. This must become routine, like flying basic fighter manoeuvres to keep our aviation skills honed.

TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

There are problem areas in reaching this level of information superiority. As we become more and more technologically advanced, we quickly become saturated with information - more than a human being can assimilate. Do not be confused, man is the weak link in the application of technology. The F-16 block 5C aircraft and F-22 aircraft will collect and deliver more information to the single pilot in the cockpit than was available to commanders and planners (combined) just a few years ago. To make this information usable, we need to somehow prioritize it, do integrity checks that prove its accuracy, then display it so that the pilot can use it effectively.

It's my job as a commander to ensure the right information gets to the right user at the right time and in the right format - no small feat. Excess information is redundant and useless, and is not affordable, especially when faced with today's reduced budgets.

Information protection is the key to conducting successful military operations. It will produce a clear advantage in observing the battlespace, analyzing events, and making the right decisions. How can we achieve this (together) using an open architecture, while at the same time having the safeguards in place to protect our information domain?

INFORMATION PROTECTION

As we compete for information in military operations of the future we must be vigilant in our efforts to protect that information and enhance our own capabilities; while at the same time degrade and if required, counteract enemy capabilities. Smaller nations are using information to increase their capabilities exponentially. Some of those small nations are becoming formidable adversaries. This information boom, unfortunately, has also allowed terrorist and non-governmental groups to become a serious threat to the societies of the world as well. We learned about the importance of protecting our information in the deserts of Iraq. Last year, the USAF spent \$ 80 million on information defence. Much of that was spent on hardware, but much of it was also spent on training - a very critical aspect of information dominance. At one time, the former Soviet Union was convinced that control of the electromagnetic spectrum would guarantee victory. I contend that now, "information superiority" is critical to victory. To quote Winston Churchill, "In wartime, truth is so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."

Space systems will allow the United States to win the "Information Wars" of the future. Satellites will give us the disposition of forces - the

masked invasion of normandy would not be so masked today. We know the geographic limitations of a battlefield. We know what to expect from the environment. Exploiting space allows us to establish and maintain "Information Supremacy", thus enabling our fighting forces to operate and manipulate - get into the enemy's decision loop. If you can affect the information the enemy uses, then you can affect the outcome of the battle. In fact, we may even win a war without ever using a destructive weapon. During the American revolutionary war; General George Rogers Clark, Commander of the Continental forces west of the Allegheny conquered a far superior British force through information warfare. General Clark marched 130 men for more than 300 miles through a flooded countryside to capture a fort held by the British in Ohio. Upon their arrival, they found a much stronger fortification and force. General Clark marched his men around and around the fort for three days, creating the illusion of a far greater foe. He also posted snipers to eliminate British sentries and deny his adversary key information. The British believed they were outnumbered and surrendered to a small ragtag group of exhausted colonists. Although this is an excellent example of information warfare, we cannot wait until the battle is upon us to employ it. It must be an integral part of our strategy from the beginning. Space forces are central to this revolution in military operations in the information age - space will allow us to gather, process, and disseminate information on a global basis.

I have spent a lot of time talking about information and technological advances as they apply to warfare. These "weapons" are not limited in application. Just as a C-130 can airlift munitions and combat support supplies it can also deliver food, medicine and blankets in an humanitarian effort. Information warfare techniques and technology can be applied to help people. Weather satellites give us the ability to detect and predict events such as typhoons giving us valuable time to prepare or evacuate. Distribution of information to a nation where none or very little infrastructure exists is the key to establishing and maintaining viable democratic governments.

CONCLUSION

Well, I have talked long enough; the bottom line - technology and the flow of information affects us all. As we consider the many opportunities in this information age, we must remember the sum total of all the information is useless unless it equates to support for the "Good Guys" not the adversary- it must be focused and useable. The human is the weak link.

As we look at this information warfare revolution and technology explosion, we should realize the military is not necessarily the leader. In fact, we may be behind. We are counting on the innovative spirit of industry, the

commercial sector, and of the minds of forward thinkers such as yourselves, to create and apply the new technologies of the 21st century. If you are not already engaged, start today.

As we all continue to develop our base of professional knowledge we must continuously assess and factor in the application of information dominance as an essential tool of modern warfare.

Once a country falls behind in this effort, it becomes difficult to catch up-the changes are that drastic. Where should we go (with it) and how should we get there! We cannot afford to start working the information dominance dimension after an adversary fires the first shot. I believe to do so almost guarantees defeat.

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The New Stealth Weapon

B RAMAN

The plight of Iraq during and after the Gulf War has highlighted dramatically the vulnerabilities of nations that are dependent on imported telecommunication and information systems (IS), if they do not have adequate knowledge of how such systems and technologies could be disrupted by the suppliers and other external elements and if they do not protect themselves against such disruptions.

Writing in his book "Protection and Security on the Information Superhighway", Dr. Frederick B Cohen, a leading US expert on computer security, says: "Operation Desert Storm was an object lesson in the critical importance of information in warfare, in that it demonstrated the ability of the US to obtain and use information effectively while preventing Iraq from obtaining and using comparable information. But it was also a lesson in what happens to a country that only moderately depends on information when that information is taken away. The vast majority of the destruction in Iraq was to systems that provided the communications required for command and control of forces. The effect was the utter destruction of the Iraqi economy.... The world has seen the effect of removing the information infrastructure from a country that was only marginally dependent on it, and the effect was devastating. But what about the effect on a nation that is highly dependent on its information infrastructure?"

The power or the ability to remove vital information away from an adversary through disruption or destruction of his information infrastructure has placed in the hands of nations and individuals a new stealth weapon of mass destruction (SWMD), a weapon which destroys not individuals and property, but accumulated knowledge without which one cannot function in this information age and fight and win a war or deal with terrorists, drug smugglers and other criminals gifted in the techniques of disruption.

In an article titled "High Level of Anxiety over Security Measures" (April 3, 1996), the *Financial Times* of London has pointed out that the possible use of the computer virus as a military weapon has left the pages of science fiction and entered the pages of military tactics.

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Industrialists and businessmen as well as national security agencies of Governments have been increasingly concerned over the threats posed to their information systems by hackers and viruses. According to a Pentagon study, there are 2,000 known computer viruses. Industrialists and businessmen are concerned over the increasing losses in the US due to viruses which went up from US \$ 1.4 billion in 1993 to US \$ 2.7 billion in 1994, according to a study of the US National Computer Security Association.

And, national security agencies of Governments are worried over threats to national security not only from the ability of adversary nations to steal, distort and destroy stored information, but also from that of individual hackers to do so.

An oft-quoted example is that of a 16-year-old British hacker who managed to break into the IS of the Air Development Centre at Griffith Air Force Base in Rome, New York, through the Internet, collect stored data regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities and widely disseminate it over the Net. It was reported that his success led to the compromising of over one million passwords used by the US Government, which had to be changed creating temporary disruptions in US networks in East Asia. If an intelligent and determined amateur can do this, what damage can be caused by a trained and well-equipped governmental agency to the IS of adversary nations?

Unfortunately, while information technology has made tremendous strides in the Asia-Pacific region, with India in the forefront in the field of software, knowledge of IS security measures and the creation of the necessary protective expertise and infrastructure are still in the primitive stage. In India, we do not even have a deterrent law to deal with computer crimes. Such laws are essential ingredients of any protective infrastructure and have been in the statute books of western nations for nearly two decades now.

After the Gulf War, a number of countries have taken seriously the need to protect their information infrastructures from externally-induced disruptions. Important amongst them are Russia and China which have set up special research and development centres for the development of new hardware architectures that can provide enhanced protection. Countries such as Australia and Germany have also been encouraging non-governmental R & D in protective architecture. The Queensland University of Technology has special projects for the design of high-integrity networks capable of withstanding malicious disruption and for developing cryptography integrity techniques. The University of Hamburg in Germany has been concentrating on perfecting techniques to counter computer viruses.

A concern that the presently-available software and techniques are not totally effective against viruses was the underlying theme of a report titled "A False Sense of Security" prepared by two officers of the US Air Force Institute of Technology to which the *Financial Times* of April 3, 1996, has drawn attention.

They say: "It is difficult for anti-virus products to keep up with the proliferation of new virus programmes. Some accepted methods for assessing the effectiveness of virus blocking systems are seriously flawed. In some cases, products labelled as 95 per cent effective are only 60 per cent effective, leading to a misplaced sense of security by making blanket effectiveness claims in the absence of scientific data to support the claim."

Malicious software are not the only means of causing disruptions of IS. Other techniques are also increasingly available ranging from the classic disruption of power supply to networks on the one side to the use of electromagnetic pulses to destroy information processing equipment on the other.

COMPUTER-RELATED CRYPTOGRAPHY

Breaches of IS security are generally difficult without the complicity of an insider, either for stealing information or for distorting or destroying it through the infiltration of malicious software. Of course, many hackers have succeeded in breaking into systems on their own without any inside help, but such instances are less in number as compared to those involving insiders.

According to a recent study in the UK (*The Times* of March 24, 1996), 60 per cent of reported IS breaches were facilitated by insiders, through negligence or complicity. The annual industrial and business losses world-wide due to computer crime, now estimated at Pound Sterling 9 billion, is expected to rise exponentially by the year 2000, if security measures are not tightened up.

The concept of IS security and the definition of an insider have undergone a tremendous change in recent years. Till the late 1970s, computer security meant protection of a mainframe computer and of the premises within which it was kept and control of access to it. An insider was either someone in the office who had access to it or an employee of the firm responsible for its servicing and maintenance.

With the emergence of Large Area Networks (LANs) with a wide geographic spread, breaches could occur at any of the connected points and an insider posing a threat could be located at any of those points. The concept

was, therefore, expanded to cover not only the physical protection of the network and access control at various points, but also techniques for safeguarding the data itself so that if someone, despite the physical security measures, manages to have access to the network, he may still not be able to read, distort or erase the data or to carry out other operations.

Thus, an important objective of IS security now is to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the information itself. Confidentiality means enabling only authorised persons to read the data for any purpose and integrity means protection of the data against wilful distortion or erasure. Integrity also covers techniques (e.g. digital signature) by which a recipient of data or other communication can satisfy himself that it has really originated from where it claims to be coming and that it has not undergone any wilful distortion during transmission.

This new objective led to the birth of computer-related cryptography—the art of coding and decoding—whether hardware or software based. Till the 1960s, cryptography was treated as a highly sensitive and restricted field of study and application, the knowledge of which was to be kept confined to sensitive Government departments in the interest of national security. With the integration of encryption technologies into IS and the growing dependence of the business world on computer networks; cryptography has now entered the market-place.

Encryption technologies now have increasing commercial applications such as for electronic banking transactions, E-Mail, for sensitive communications between US multinationals' headquarters and their branches in other countries etc. With the priority now being given by intelligence agencies to commercial and industrial espionage, there is likely to be a growing demand for commercial cryptography.

How to facilitate the availability of encryption technologies for such commercial purposes while restricting the export of more sophisticated versions suitable for defence and national security related purposes is a question which has been under examination in the US for some time now.

As Dr. Frederick Cohen observes: "The dilemma of cryptography has haunted Governments throughout history. The people in Governments want their cryptography to be very strong in order to keep their secrets secret, but they also want everyone else's cryptography to be very weak so that they can read everyone else's secrets."

Thus, despite the easing of export controls on super computers by the US, India would still face difficulty in procuring high-grade encryption

technologies for sensitive departments like its nuclear and space establishments, the armed forces, the intelligence agencies etc. Any technology which the US might eventually be prepared to share is bound to be medium or low grade which its intelligence agencies are confident of breaking into for reading, distorting or erasing vital data.

In a sensitive field like computer-related cryptography, any dependence on foreign technologies would be risky for national security and we would be exposing ourselves to risks of externally-induced distortions or loss of data. In times of war, we would find ourselves reduced to the plight of Iraq.

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

What has been discussed so far is the defensive aspect of information warfare. Equally important is the offensive aspect, that is, developing a capability to penetrate and disrupt the IS of our adversaries, whether nations or extremist groups or individuals. Our ability to develop such a capability would depend upon a flow of concrete information from our intelligence agencies regarding the IS of our adversaries, their weak and strong points. In fact, our intelligence agencies have an important role to play in collecting intelligence having a bearing on the defensive as well as offensive aspects.

Unfortunately, this is a field to which the required attention has not been given by our intelligence agencies, whose thinking and operational concepts remain frozen in the 1970s, if not the 1960s. At the senior levels, there are very few with a technical bent of mind and with a clear understanding and appreciation of how the entire concept of national security and the role of intelligence has changed dramatically in this age of information networks.

To the late Shri Rajiv Gandhi should go the credit for realising the importance of our intelligence agencies keeping pace with the galloping strides in IT. Under his constant prodding, a beginning was made with the induction of equipment and IT experts from other departments, frequent interactions with IT professionals, training courses to make officers at various levels IT-literate etc, but there has subsequently been a loss of interest, with the generalist officers easing out technical professionals and downgrading their importance and reducing computers to word processors for typing out reports and as instruments for visual displays during presentations at conferences etc. The role of the computer as a weapon of information warfare has been totally lost sight of.

This state of affairs needs to be corrected. A comprehensive inter-departmental approach to IS security and information warfare, with the Ministry of Defence or the Army Headquarters acting as the nodal agency, is called for.

Integration of Ministry of Defence with Service Headquarters

COLONEL IVAN DAVID

ORGANISATION FOR HIGHER DEFENCE

The organisation for Higher Defence Control can be summarized as under :-

- | | | |
|-------------|---|--|
| (a) Tier 1. | PM, Cabinet and Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA). | Lays down the aims and broad political and defence policy objectives. |
| (b) Tier 2. | Defence Minister COSC and other policy interpreting agencies including the Ministry of Defence. | Interprets the aims and objectives and formulates the policy and plans. |
| (c) Tier 3. | Army, Naval and Air Headquarters. | Formulates plans for execution of the policy and plans laid down by Tiers 1 and 2 and is the main executive level. |

Tiers 1 and 2 of the organisation generally function through committees.

The Ministry of Defence as constituted at present, is partially a policy interpreting or formulating agency and partially an executive and coordinating agency. Details of the organisation and functions of the Ministry of Defence are given later in the paper.

Till September 1946, the Defence Department of the (British) Government of India functioned directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India in his capacity as the War or Defence Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. The Defence Department was transformed into the present Ministry of Defence on August 29, 1947, as a unified agency for dealing with all the three Defence Services.

Edited text of the article which won the Second Prize in Group I of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1995. Col. Ivan David is with the Military College of EME, Secunderabad.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

FUNCTIONS

Major responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence relate to :-

- (a) Defence of India and every part thereof, including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination, to effective demobilisation.
- (b) The Armed Forces of the Union, namely the Army, Navy and Air Force and their reserves.
- (c) The Territorial Army, Auxiliary Air Force and National Cadet Corps.
- (d) Works relating to Army, Navy, Air Force and Ordnance factories.
- (e) Military Farms organisation, Canteen Stores Department (India), Military Lands, Cantonments and connected matters.
- (f) Civilians paid from Defence Service Estimates.
- (g) Ex-servicemen and pensioners.
- (h) Hydrographic survey and preparation of navigational charts.

ORGANISATION AND WORKING

The Ministry of Defence provides the secretariat organisation to the Defence Minister for dealing with all matters pertaining to the three Services, Interservice organisations and civilian establishments under it; it also coordinates the actions of Department of Defence Production, Supplies and DRDO, where necessary. The professional head of the secretariat is the Defence Secretary (who has the status of a General, and takes precedence after the Service Chiefs in the order of precedence). He is assisted by an additional secretary and a number of joint secretaries, deputy secretaries and under secretaries (equivalent to Lieutenant Generals, Major Generals, Colonels and Majors respectively in the warrant of precedence).

It is to be noted that the structure of the secretariat is not as formalised and fixed as in the services; distribution of work, charter of duties and chain of responsibility are frequently modified and changed to meet the requirement

of the moment. Frequently, the same secretariat official is responsible to different superiors for different subjects. Also as the internal structure of the Ministry does not strictly correspond to that of the Service Headquarters dealings between the two are, therefore, on subject basis rather than on counterpart basis; the level of correspondence between the two is on a functional basis, unrelated to the status of the individuals.

INTEGRATED FINANCIAL ADVISER SYSTEM

The Integrated Financial Adviser System was introduced in the Department of Defence Production, Defence Supplies and Research and Development of the Defence Ministry in May 1976. It was decided to introduce the Integrated Financial Adviser System in the Ministry of Defence also with effect from August 1, 1983 with the issue of the following instructions :-

- (a) The Defence Division of the Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure), headed by the Financial Adviser, Defence Services was transferred to the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence and forms the Finance Division of the Ministry of Defence.
- (b) The officers and staff of the Finance Division of the Defence Ministry would be required to have a background and training in Finance and Accounts and FA(DS) will be consulted in the filling up of all posts in the Finance Division of the Defence Ministry.
- (c) The Defence Accounts Department will continue to report to the Financial Adviser, Defence Services who will be the cadre controlling authority as before.
- (d) In matters within the delegated powers of the Ministry of Defence, FA(DS) or his officers will be consulted before exercise of financial powers. In such cases, it will be open to the administrative secretary to over-rule the advice of the Financial Adviser Defence Services, by an order in writing, but it will also be open for the FA(DS) to request that the matter be placed before the Defence Minister.
- (e) Keeping in view the special requirement of the Defence Ministry the following procedure will be adopted in respect of schemes costing more than Rs 2 crores :-
 - (i) Scheme costing more than Rs 2 crores but less than Rs 10 crores will be processed on file for obtaining the concurrence of Ministry of Finance.

(ii) Scheme costing over Rs. 10 crores will be examined by the Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC) presided over by the Secretary (E), with Defence Secretary, Secretary (EAD) as member and FA (DS) as secretary. Secretary (Defence Production) and SA to Defence Minister would be invited when items concerning their Departments come up for discussion. The recommendations of the above committee will be subject to formal approval of the Ministries concerned and CCPA etc, as per existing instructions.

(iii) Cases relating to revision of cost estimates in respect of items approved by EFC, where excess is over 20 per cent than the originally approved cost, will be referred to EFC as hithertofore.

(f) FA(DS) have the right of access to the Defence and Finance Ministers through Secretary (E) on such issues where he differs from the view of the administrative ministry.

INTEGRATION

Having reviewed the higher control of defence, it is necessary to highlight the shortcomings in regard to the relationship between the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). These are enumerated in the succeeding sub paragraphs :

(a) The lack of direct and regular interface between military professionals with the political leadership.

(b) The supremacy of the bureaucracy and the triplicated bureaucratic channel which requires examination of all matters first at the Service Headquarters, then by the MOD and finally by the MOD (Finance). In his paper* on the subject Mr Arun Singh has highlighted the bureaucratic bottleneck and the business of unnecessary repetitive analysis of issues. He says, "the passage of time has seen a drawing tendency of checks to overwhelm the balance." Further, he refers to the duplication (in fact triplication of work at Service Headquarters, MOD, Defence Finance) of the thinking processes and "thus a very fine set of intellects and experience in the form of middle and senior civil servant are spending an inordinate amount of time in relatively wasteful activity."

(c) The MOD in its present role of a superior military headquarters, which requires that every issue has to be referred to it, whether it pertains to courses to be run at service schools of instructions or the establishment

*This paper by Mr Arun Singh, a former Minister of State for Defence, was published in the *USI Journal*, July-September 1989, Vol 119, No. 497, pp. 263-268.

of a movement control detachment at a rail head where the movement of troops returning from leave or courses of instruction necessitates its presence. In this role it duplicates the Service Headquarters and is redundant.

(d) The management of the day to day running of three Services, their training, administration and operational planning should logically be the domain of the Service Chiefs exercised through their respective Command Headquarters, intermediate and subordinate headquarters within the charter spelt out by the MOD.

(e) The MOD should primarily concern itself with national security issues and it should provide the secretariat for the "National Security Council" and other committees for the higher control of defense. At all such forums direct military advice to political leadership of the nation must be available rather than being sifted by the MOD. It would provide the coordinated views of the Chiefs of Staff (Chief of Defence Staff-when established). It would coordinate intelligence under the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), defence research and production. Procurement of weapon systems would constitute a major responsibility.

(f) Integrated finance with Service Headquarters will facilitate speedy and efficient functioning. Detailed expenditure within budgetary constraints on the advice of the integrated finance would constitute the necessary checks and balance.

(g) Integration of operational plans of the three Services can best be achieved by the Chief of Defence Staff system, rather than by the Chairman Chiefs of the Staff Committee; wherein the Chief longest in the chair as head of a service assumes the position of chairman. This would dilute the bureaucracy interface in the form of Secretary Defence, but would be an appropriate reorganisation. Almost all countries have now introduced unification of Services at the top by appointing a professional expert as Chief of Defence Staff. In India in the absence of any such arrangement, we continue to rely on the civil servants in the Ministry of Defence to resolve any conflicting plans or recommendations of the service, and specially so in respect of resource and budget allocation. Not unnaturally, the MOD has gradually assumed the duties and status of inter service arbitrator and director, a responsibility for which it is not constituted, or even competent.

(h) Drawing on the British experience, and making the Service Headquarters part of the MOD would ensure an integrated approach by Service Headquarters, Finance and MOD. This would change the role of

civil servants to a participatory one with Service officers who are specialist in their fields providing advice.

(j) Unlike the procedure in any other country in the world, our defence services are processed by three tiers of command and managerial control; ministerial, secretariat and financial. Ministerial and financial controls are but necessary in any democratic organisation, however, this novel feature of secretariat control is peculiar to India and is unnecessary and what is more uneconomical. In this respect today the position appears to be that although the civilian administrators in the MOD have a very important say in the strategic planning and coordination and financial control of three services in almost all day to day policy matters affecting defence, nevertheless, they have no responsibility towards military failures. To illustrate this, after the NEFA debacle in 1962 and for the many failings of the 1965 and 1971 conflicts with Pakistan, the fiasco that took place in OP Blue star, OP Pawan, Brasstacks and for what goes on in the Kashmir valley, no blame has been accepted by any single civil servant in the MOD or for that matter the Finance.

(k) Interservice rivalry and the lack of cooperation has further aggravated issues and lend credence to the fact that the requirement of civil servants in the MOD to arbitrate and resolve claims and counter claims is a must. While not unified in their argument for a Chief of Defence Staff, or for that matter on most issues of importance including operational planning, our political leadership is not left with any option but to have the civil servant as an interface between the political leadership and the military. For all practical purposes inter-service cooperation does not exist. At a point in time, it is a well known fact that the three Service Chiefs were not on talking terms. This is the first issue to be resolved.

HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION

The integration of Service Headquarters with MOD is in itself not a panacea for all the ills of the system. It is a very small part of the larger issue - the Higher Defence Organisation in India. Let us briefly examine what is expected of such a Higher Defence Organisation before suggesting integration of Service Headquarters with the MOD.

(a) There exists a requirement for Service Chiefs to interact directly with the national political leadership on matters pertaining to defence. No dilution of the advice rendered, by intermediate organisations in the hierarchy is desirable.

- (b) On matters relating to defence, where many departments and ministries are involved, coordination by civil servants would be indispensable and is essential.
- (c) The Financial Advisor must be fully integrated into the system at the Service Headquarters level.
- (d) Duplication and triplication of examination of issues must be eliminated.
- (e) The creation of a system, similar to Chief of Defence Staff, to coordinate operational planning and allied functions of the three Services.
- (f) The MOD accept a participatory and accountable role in the operational planning from the inception.

A Higher Defence Organisation model which incorporates the above issues would be most appropriate. That is not to say that the present system of the Higher Defence Organisation is inadequate. It has stood the test of time and has effectively arbitrated issues between the three Services. However, a more efficient manner of realisation of this role would warrant a degree of change. This can best be brought about by having an appropriate Bill passed in Parliament; similar to the Barry Goldwater Act of 1985 in the USA. This would integrate Service Headquarters into the direct operational planning along side the civil servants and those who have their role at the national level.

CONCLUSION

To understand the requirement of the need for integration of Service Headquarters with the MOD we have examined at length the various departments in the MOD as also the financial advisors role. The duplication and triplication of examinations of issues, lack of direct access of military leadership to the political leadership, arbitration by the Defence Secretary on inter-service related matters and the non accountability by civil servants in the MOD for lapses in the Defence Services are some of the undesirable issues. The present Higher Defence Organisation has worked over the last 48 years; however, to make the system more efficient and responsive, it has been suggested that a Bill to reorganise the Higher Defence Organisation in India be enacted in Parliament. This would lead to a comprehensive integration of the Service Headquarters with the MOD and make the latter more accountable and participatory in its role in the defence of the nation.

Key to Confidence Building in South Asia : Fostering Military-to-Military Links

BHARAT KARNAD

South Asia is widely believed by the international strategic community to be the region most likely to witness advertent or inadvertent nuclear war. Averting such a cataclysm is, therefore, high on the agenda of many countries, especially the United States of America. Despite their spotty record in the subcontinent, the preferred means remain Confidence Building Measures of the type successful in the East-West context, which presume to prevent "total" war between States with little in common.

It is the contention of this article that these presumptions do not apply to India and Pakistan, which share religion, history, ethnicity, language and culture and have waged deliberately controlled and limited wars and, hence, that the CBMs tried out so far are inappropriate; that, what is needed is a better understanding of the subcontinental milieu and of the peculiar quality of wars it has spawned; and that, the cultural and military insecurities at the heart of the India-Pakistan conflict are best dealt with by cobbling together a military reassurance system based on social links between the armies of the two countries.

Notwithstanding the present troubled state of bilateral relations, the time may be right for such ties. The military in Pakistan dominates that country. Its counterpart in India has over the years become so marginalized (in the decisionmaking process) that contacts between the two sets of armed forces are unlikely to occasion dread, as it once did, in the minds of the Indian civilian authority.¹ But first there is a need to understand the core nature of India-Pakistan warfighting before the proper confidence-building measures can be conceived.

VERY CIVIL WARS

Actually, the two States have fought very civil wars characterized by so much restraint and fellow-feeling as to raise the question whether the infrequent

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fracas they have engaged in can reasonably be labelled wars as we know them. And, if history is anything to go by, will the India-Pakistan "Wars" of the future be any different? Needless to say, even these gentlemanly spats may be too much for an international system under strain to stomach and hence ways have to be found to minimize tension and to keep the troubles from boiling over into hostilities. So, there is need to rethink just what is involved here and what requires to be done to prevent these albeit low level conflicts.

The problem between India and Pakistan is one of over-familiarity. It has bred mutual contempt, but also fear and loathing particularly in the Pakistani mind, eventuating in differences with India being made to fit the hoary Hindu-Muslim social interactional paradigm. But the unarguable sharing of cultural space by the two nations has imposed its own curious constraints on the conduct of conflict, notwithstanding Kenneth Waltz's claim that "the fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones are fought within areas populated by highly similar people whose affairs are closely knit."² A distinguished Indian General has described wars in South Asia as "communal riots with tanks". He was closer to the truth than most military analysts reckon.

If wars are seen as a means for States to settle their differences by violence, then they are distinct from riots occurring within disturbed polities only in the degree to which the objectives are defined, in the greater lethality of the means of violence, and in the extent of human and material damage.

Now consider the nature of wars the two countries have fought to appreciate how closely they resemble riots and how unlike almost any other conflict in the post-Second World War period, they have been. These wars, like riots, were characterised chiefly by their short duration, sharp and sudden breakout of violence followed by its abrupt subsidence and end to hostilities, territorial localization of conflict, fairly rapid restoration of the *status quo ante*, and in the scale of things, relatively few casualties and little collateral damage to out-of-area people and property.

The riots in the aftermath of the Partition of British India in 1947 took the heaviest toll in human lives—some 800,000 civilian dead. The three Indo-Pak wars since have been fairly "non violent" affairs, with the countries losing a total of 20,000 military personnel but few civilians. The low rate of military fatalities is surprising considering that the wars featured some of the biggest tank battles since the British Eighth Army clashed with Rommel's Afrikakorps in the Maghreb. Heavy masses of armour and infantry partook of intense slug-fests on the Punjab plains and the Thar Desert³ but with little lasting damage.

Further, strategic bombing and air raids on populated cities were scrupulously avoided by both sides. Tactical air forces over the battlefield airspace were active. But, in the 1965 War in the Rann of Kutch, even these tactical combat sorties were forsaken by, what amounted to, a private understanding between the opposing air force chiefs acting with their respective government's blessings!⁴ Besides, the principally counter-force doctrine underlying the Indian and Pakistani military actions meant that only equipments deployed in the border belts were targeted. This ensured that damage to the social infrastructure as a result of War was minimal and the cost to the two countries, other than in attrited war material, slight.

To look at each of the wars a little more closely, the combined human losses in the 1947-48 War restricted to the 500 miles or so of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir totalled 2,000 dead from both the sides. The 1965 War fought over the entire length of the border in the west (approximately 1,500 miles, i.e., three times the length of the front in the previous operations) in the Indian provinces of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Kashmir, accounted for 7,000 dead. (The then East Pakistan, incidentally, was left untouched by the Indian forces surrounding that province.)

The last war, in 1971, encompassing an additional 1,500 miles of the border in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) with a six-fold increase in the war frontage from 22 years before, resulted in a total of 11,000 military casualties on both sides. The longer list of casualties in this India-Pakistan encounter was because of the Bangladesh guerrilla forces, like the Mukti Bahini.

To put things in perspective, the loss of 20,000 uniformed personnel in the three wars nearly equals the number of civilian (including police) and military dead (18,000) in communal rioting and other disturbances in India and Pakistan in the period 1983-1992. Indeed, the fatalities in the 1965 War which, by all accounts, was the hardest fought, does not greatly exceed the toll of 5,000 military men in ethnic and communal clashes in the subcontinent in the last decade.

Compare these figures for the personnel losses with those in the Arab-Israeli wars: 8,000 dead following the partition of Palestine in 1948 and 16,000 dead in the 1973 Yom Kippur War⁵. Or, to take another fratricidal conflict—the American Civil War: there were 51,000 dead and wounded out of the 168,000 men (75,000 Confederate, and 93,000 Unionist) committed in just one battle lasting three days, at Gettysburg in early July 1863, i.e., a loss of a third of all troops committed to action. In the South Asian wars, human attrition has amounted to a fraction of one percent of deployed strengths.

The meagre level of war deaths aside, other things also indicate that conflict in South Asia is of a generically different variety. For instance, disputed territory captured in war has been expeditiously and unconditionally restored. This is unlike wars in the Middle East, for example, where Israel has used captured territory to leverage Arab "moderation". The Indian government, on the other hand, despite strong opposition by the military, promptly returned to Pakistan the strategic Haji Pir salient in the Pir Panjal Range of mountains in Kashmir captured in the 1965 War, which was in Pakistani hands since 1948. Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, took this decision at the Tashkent Summit in order not to destabilize the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan.⁶

Again, after the 1971 operations, as the absolute victor with some 93,000 Pakistani prisoners-of-war India could, with support of international law, have imposed its version of peace, forcing Pakistan to accept, for instance, the LoC in Kashmir as the international boundary, but it did not.

The contained nature of South Asian wars is also evidenced in other factors. The duration of war a country fights is a function of resource availability and political will. In South Asia, the Indian government's generally conservative expenditure policies and defensive security mindset have dovetailed with the fact of resource scarcity. The result is an informal official policy to build up capabilities for only short wars. The Pakistan armed forces, given their prominent role in national life, are in a position to sequester a larger proportion of public funds for defence.⁷ But faced with a much smaller resource base, the monies tasked for use by the Pakistani military nevertheless remains limited.

Restricted funds have forced the two major South Asian countries to prioritise their expenditure programs. The payroll liability of the employment-generating, labour-intensive Indian and Pakistani militaries is necessarily top priority followed by acquisition programmes for the three Services. Thus, some 50-55 per cent of the Indian Defence budget is expended on Payroll & Allowances". After subtracting monies set aside for defence science and industry, that leaves less than 40 per cent of the budget for the acquisition programmes, maintenance spares and for the replenishment of "military stores".⁸ In this situation, the build-up of war wastage reserve and warstock (of arms and ammunition, capital equipment, POL-petroleum, oil and lubricants, etc.) is accorded the lowest priority.⁹

This is the case for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy as well and, if a *speculative* analysis were done of the Pakistani defence budget (because, unlike in India, no detailed breakup is published for legislative scrutiny by Islamabad), a similar spending pattern will be seen to accrue for the Pakistan armed forces also.

Small reserves of war material dictate the length of time the forces can fight. The Indian and Pakistani war plans are accordingly designed around this hard fact of life⁹. Typically, the two countries have holdings of war wastage reserve and warstock to enable operations at "intense" rates for only two weeks and at "normal" rates of material expenditure for no more than 30 days.

Thus, the war in September 1965 lasted 22 days and ended in an impasse when Pakistani supplies were down to five days' warmaking capability and Indian stores amounted to a residual seven days' reserve, forcing the two countries to agree on a ceasefire. The 1971 War ended in fewer than 13 days with the surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. India's one other war, with China in 1962, was over within three weeks and ended in an Indian rout in part because with the Indian Army focussed exclusively on the Pakistani threat, mountain warfighting was entirely neglected and neither forces nor supplies were available in any strength on the north-eastern border.¹⁰

With both India and Pakistan on a short supply leash owing to the scarcity of financial resources, supplier-country policies, and the absence of political will to "fight to the death", the operational plans of their respective armed forces in effect amount to fighting until the ammo' lasts or an UN-arranged ceasefire materializes, whichever comes first! Moreover, because the belt of land on either side of the border (especially in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab) is heavily defended, criss-crossed with ostensibly agricultural use-canals that also double up as effective tank traps and DCB (Ditch-cum-Bund)-type of earthen work fortifications, the deepest penetration by either country in the short and intense wars has never exceeded 80 to 100 miles.

But building up of stamina to fight long wars by allocating larger funds for replenishment spares and the war reserve is possible if the militaries so desire. It requires changing the end-use of the scarce funds. The armed forces in military-dominated Pakistan should have no difficulty in deciding that a larger portion of the defence budget ought to be tasked for this purpose. In India too, the army, navy and air force have the final say, other than in major capital acquisitions, in how each Service wants to spend its tranche of the defence budget. (The total amount is divided roughly in the ratio 1:2:4 for the Navy, Air Force and Army.) Significantly, this end-use switch is not made.

This pattern of Indian defence expenditure, for instance, while not immutable in theory, has remained fairly stable over the last 20-odd years, notwithstanding changes in the relative size of defence allocations. Thus, even as the defence expenditure as proportion of the total central government expenditure fluctuated between a high of 22.73 per cent in 1971-72 (the year

of the last India-Pakistan War) and a low of 14.45 per cent in 1991-92, the shares of the defence budget disbursed separately for the wage bill, maintenance stores/war reserve and for modernization and acquisitions, remained largely unchanged. (Defence expenditure as proportion of the central government expenditure averaged 38 per cent in Pakistan.)

Nor have the Indian economic reforms leading to higher economic growth rates and a corresponding curtailment of public spending mostly in the public sector industries, for instance, resulted in bigger defence budgets or different defence expenditure priorities. The annual defence share of the Gross Domestic Product has actually subsided from the 3.12 per cent - 3.89 per cent range in the 1970s and most of the 1980s, and the high of slightly over 4 per cent achieved for a couple of years, 1986-88, to 2.95 per cent in 1991-92 and 2.75 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 when the country's economic policies had undergone a seachange.¹¹

In fact, there is greater pressure on the Government of India to increase social welfare spending as a means of stilling public criticism about the economic reforms and the steady dismantling of the socialist state apparatus. Short of a debacle in war sourced to the endemic shortages induced by the current stockpiling policies and norms, the Indian Armed Services are unlikely to enjoy long duration warfighting capability that comes from a marked increase in the war reserve.

Finally, South Asians fight war by rote. General Moshe Dayan dismissed the subcontinental mode of warfare with his famous remark that the two sides fight textbook fashion "using the same textbook"! But the element of predictability in the Indian and Pakistani methods has the virtue of limiting damage while infusing pride in fighting with gusto what the militaries in the two countries believe to be "classical" wars. Over time there has developed a distinct India-Pakistan battlefield etiquette stressing chivalry and "good, clean fighting", something which was absent in India's war with China in 1962.

REASONS FOR CONTROLLED WARS

An important reason for the controlled nature of subcontinental wars, ones in which both sides routinely pull their punches lies elsewhere, in a specific geocultural reality of South Asia that has become a mutual deterrence feature inhibiting the extension of wars into civilian areas and of limiting the extent of damage and hence of force that can be used. Taken together, these inhibitions result in the unwillingness to strike deep with land or air forces, which would entail an unacceptable enlargement of the battle zone.

This feature is the size and the demographic distribution of the Muslim community inside India, which influences both conventional and nuclear military calculations of the two countries.¹² There was no large scale exchange of populations other than in Punjab when British India was divided. While non-Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces that became Pakistan fled from their homes and into India, the bulk of the Indian Muslims, who were living all over the country, stayed on until now when they number some 160-180 million and comprise 15-20 percent of the population and have grown into the largest Muslim community in the world outside of Indonesia. Their numbers have increased threefold since 1947, most of this growth registering in traditionally Muslim rural and urban pockets.

The sizable Muslim concentration within India has had contradictory results. It has, for instance, rendered Indian Muslims more vulnerable, making it easy to target them during riots. But, it has also beefed up their political clout because of the extant "vote bank" politics in India. This last has meant that no government in New Delhi (including one headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party reflecting rightwing Hindu opinion) can long survive without paying heed to the Indian Muslim sentiment, which among other things, opposes a too forceful prosecution of wars against Pakistan (in part because of the Indian Muslims' kith and kin in that country). That is electoral arithmetic.¹³

The down-side for Pakistan of the marked growth of the Muslim population in India and its increasing role in the Indian polity is that with the steady integration of the Muslim community — larger than the Pakistani population — into the Indian mainstream the "two nation" theory undergirding Pakistan's *raison d'etat* is weakened as are its claims on Kashmir. These developments have further fueled its feelings of insecurity. Moreover, the "Fifth Column" - potential of this community, never very large to begin with because of the guilt feelings and defensiveness induced by Partition, is eroding. Thus, the RDX-bombings in Bombay in February 1993, while alerting the Indian Government to this danger, convinced the Indian Muslims to abjure such activity for fear of losing the political gains already made. It prompted the Bombay Muslims, for example, to help the police apprehend the culprits.

Moreover, the Bangladesh War, the long years of martial law, the ongoing sectarian violence, the growing troubles the *mohajirs* (Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan) are facing in the Sind province and in Karachi in particular, and the socio-political instability generally have led to a disillusionment among the Indian Muslims not only with Pakistan but with the kind of separatist politics that spawned that country¹⁴. It has also strengthened the Indian Muslims' resolve to assimilate. This last is seen in the increasingly bigger involvement by Muslims over the years in state and federal elections in India.

And, it has counter-deterred the Pakistani military from disrupting life and societal cohesion and destroying the Indian public's morale by extending wars into vulnerable civilian and industrial areas inside India because, quite apart from the fear of inviting unacceptable damage that the larger, more powerful Indian forces are capable of inflicting, and of killing Indian Muslims and destroying their property in bombing raids and thereby incurring the wrath of the *mohajir* community, there is the graver apprehension of setting off pogroms and reprisals against Muslims in India and the unpredictable consequences these might have for Pakistan itself.

In the event, it is hard not to conclude that India-Pakistan wars are less conflicts between sovereign countries bent on fatally injuring each other than an internationalized version of a family quarrel usually triggered by the minority Muslim (read:Pakistani) grievance or frustration and the majoritarian (Hindu, Indian) desire to mete out, what is regarded even by many influential Pakistanis as, a hard ear-tweaking—exemplary punishment for an egregiously misbehaving “younger brother”¹⁴.

The reticence against waging all-out war exhibited by India and Pakistan has, over the last two decades, resulted in something akin to mutual confidence that the other side will not start a war even of the staple variety the two countries have got used to fighting. In this respect, George Quester's musings about the nuclear weapons situation in South Asia is relevant as well for the conventional military predicament facing India and Pakistan. Given the palpably greater alarm about the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programmes in Western government and arms control/non-proliferation circles than in the subcontinent itself, he asks: “Have we outsiders all been missing something about the ways in which Indians and Pakistanis *can understand and trust each other*, on this particular question of whether nuclear weapons, once developed, will be used?”¹⁶

War in South Asia may not be all that onerous, but the tensions and frictions endemic to the region have nevertheless to be dealt with. Before thinking about the sort of thing that might work here, let us first examine what has not so far worked and why.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

‘Confidence-building’ in the post Cold War era has become a touchstone of international crisis diplomacy. It is premised on a series of small measures that are expected cumulatively to produce the quota of goodwill, and mutual trust and confidence necessary for States in conflict to achieve normal relations and genuine peace. This process is believed to stretch across the Conflict

Avoidance Measures-Confidence (and Security) Building Measures-peace continuum.¹⁷

That is the theory. In practice, Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) have tended in certain regions to become an end in themselves and, other than superficially, not moderated the confrontational posture and attitude of the two sides. This was true of the East-West face-off in the years leading to the fruition of the Helsinki peace process and (assuming it is any kind of model for South Asia) characterizes the India-Pakistan relations as well.

EAST-WEST

To discover the difference between these two regional contexts and why the CBMs worked in one and have not so far impacted in the other, let us examine the NATO-Warsaw Pact case first. The situation in Europe became amenable to the CAM-CBM process only after the opposing blocs had first attained, what an official Soviet document called "a rough military balance"¹⁸, whence a sense of security obtained all round and member countries became more willing to consider a system of durable peace.

This state of grace was reached because it was preceded by long years of military build-up on both sides which eventuated in parity, something formally acknowledged in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The CBM-provisions of this Act also stabilized force strengths and codified acceptable military behaviour, setting the stage for the conventional and nuclear arms limitation accords and later, the arms reduction talks.¹⁹

The success of CBMs in Europe has been attributed to the existence of several "preconditions", some "contextual"--"shared history, cultural affinities and religious ties" and institutions on either side dealing with security matters, etc., others "processual", namely, the ongoing dialogues for economic and political cooperation preparing the ground for mutually beneficial military understandings."²⁰ These, it is argued, resulted in a great "potential for accommodation, despite the important ideological and other differences dividing the two blocs"²¹

Individual European countries forming the two blocs, moreover, had their basic insecurities dealt with in the most direct manner possible: an over-sufficiency of alliance forces and of military wherewithal to deal with every conceivable conventional and nuclear war contingency. It helped rid the regimes in these States of their residual insecurity.

But, the most important “precondition” that pushed the European CBM process along was the fact that no outstanding territorial disputes were involved. Both the sides had formally accepted the division of the continent along the line negotiated at the 1945 Yalta Summit—they were, as far as territory went, supporters of the status quo.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

In South Asia, two of the three sets of preconditions responsible for the success of CBMs in Europe, do not exist. The disagreement between India and Pakistan is in the main concerned with disputed territory. Partition transformed an internal political problem between the Hindus and Muslims into an international territorial dispute between States. With Pakistan making Kashmir the lynchpin of its India policy, the basis for a *modus vivendi* based on the acceptance of extant boundaries is missing.²²

Worse, Pakistan’s comparatively small size and modest military resources have proved unequal to the task of forcefully separating Kashmir from India. Islamabad has sought to correct this imbalance in power by acquiring military heft by association. It allied with the US in the Cold War in the hope that massive American arms transfers would follow. These never materialized, contingent as they were on the larger US policy of being attentive to Indian concerns. Being a potentially significant Soviet ally in the region, India was deemed by Washington as too important to alienate and push deeper into Moscow’s embrace.²³

Pakistan next turned to China, but found itself furthering Chinese interests more than it did its own. Thus, while Beijing has been liberal in arms and military technology transfers (including reportedly the design for a workable nuclear weapon) to Pakistan to divide and distract India and the erstwhile Soviet Union’s strategic efforts, which centrally helped Beijing, it refrained from opening a second front against India during the Indo-Pakistan hostilities and urged caution in Islamabad.²⁴ With the US and Chinese regional policies not being particularly supportive of Pakistan, the latter has been forced to act far more pragmatically vis a vis India than its sometimes heated rhetoric would suggest.²⁵ Still, the circumspection exercised by Islamabad has not translated into willingness to compromise, which is of the essence in confidence building.

One of the biggest obstacles to successful CBMs in South Asia is the asymmetry of power²⁶ between India and Pakistan—something neither country can do much about. The worst effect of this differential and Pakistan’s consequent feelings of insecurity is that the third, useful “contextual precondition”, which in Europe helped root CBMs, counts for little in the

region. Indeed, shared geocultural traits, like language and religion, social structure and values, ethnicity and historical experience, governmental ethos and the organization of the police and the military, have proved more a bane than a blessing for confidence-building.

It has ensured that a communalist demonology—the bedrock of the campaign by the Muslim League Party for the creation of a “separate homeland” for the Muslims of the subcontinent during India’s Freedom struggle—continues to shape Pakistan’s strategic thinking. What Pakistan apparently fears is not so much the Indian threat as the “Hindu” threat, in that this is how Islamabad rationalizes and justifies its security preoccupation with India. In the event, New Delhi’s intentions as a result of this as well as the other factors alluded to above, have always been interpreted by Islamabad in terms of the alleged majoritarian “Hindu” impulse to quash the Indian Muslim community and, by extension, to threaten Pakistan’s survival. Not surprisingly, the Pakistan military’s mindset as well as operational and force planning is based wholly on this concept of the threat.²⁷

With the Pakistani model of bilateral relations with India being, in effect, a derivative of the sometimes tense and always uneasy ties between the majority Hindu community and the largest minority community—which happens to be Muslim—New Delhi too is forced for domestic policy reasons to deal with Pakistan on the same terms. (This is not to say that Indian policymakers would do anything different on their own, but that they are politically unable to explore alternative, more imaginative, ways of dealing with Pakistan even if so inclined.)

Thus, the sense of insecurity of Pakistan vis a vis India is a virtual mirror image of the sense of insecurity that many Indian Muslims feel residing in “Hindu” India.²⁸ The worsening correlation of forces in the subcontinent has seemingly pushed the Pakistani strategic elites—principally, the senior echelons of the military and the civil services—to see nuclear weapons as the only credible means to deter India and to rely on one-self for security.²⁹

Reaching the nuclear weapons threshold has not, however, altered the asymmetry of power. Nor, has it made Pakistan feel secure and confident enough to permit bridge-building through the medium of trade and commerce or to promote people-to-people contacts by easing visa restrictions and freeing the two-way traffic in books and newspapers, etc. Islamabad has repeatedly stated that it wants the Kashmir issue settled first before it allows a more naturally intimate relationship to develop with India.

What the “Bomb in the basement” has, however, done other than

providing a minimum deterrence capability vis a vis India and the psychological comfort thereof, is to apparently enhance Pakistan's international status albeit as a nuclear spoiler and, consequently, leverage in its relations with the West, principally the United States. It has also offered political parties an issue to score points off each other.³⁰ And, in its relations with India, it has perhaps emboldened Islamabad to pursue a low-risk strategy of supporting the insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir.³¹ Further, it has persuaded Pakistan to keep the border in this province "alive" by engaging in almost daily artillery duels and exchange of sniper fire across the Line of Control.

Islamabad's calculation is that without direct evidence of Pakistan's continuously contesting the "Indian occupation" of Kashmir by opting for low level military actions (to complement its support for the unconventional war) it will weaken its case on Kashmir and the *de facto* border along the LoC could, in time, gain international recognition as the *de jure* boundary. (The Indian solution is for freezing the Line of Control into the international boundary.)

The policy of insurgency support is touted as low-risk and low-cost and as an efficient means of "draining" Indian military manpower and material resources. But it also presumes that the domestic situation within Pakistan is strong and stable enough to defeat any Indian attempts at reciprocating in kind. Or, even if the situation in Sindh and elsewhere is explosive, that India will goodnaturedly resist the temptation covertly to assist in a bad situation becoming worse. These presumptions are wrong. The fact is in the unconventional warfare field too, India would appear to have the edge.

Then again, the Pakistani belief that helping Kashmiri secessionists will under no circumstances trigger inter-State hostilities, may also be erroneous. Provocative firing across the LoC and support for the Kashmiri militants could precipitate a war if the larger Indian armed forces decided to give "hot pursuit" or to preempt what the Indian GHQ (General Head Quarters) believed, on any given day, to be preparations by Pakistan for a surprise attack in strength along the Kashmir front (as happened with the latter's Operation Gibraltar which triggered the 1965 India-Pakistan War). This is a real danger.³²

India's stance, a mix of exasperation and punitive mindedness' has only stoked Pakistan's worst fears. In the main, New Delhi has failed to address Pakistan's security concerns in objective terms, and exacerbated the latter's anxieties by its longstanding policy of simultaneously modernizing the Indian armed forces with little concern about how the Pakistanis perceived this. Much worse, India has consistently questioned Pakistan's need for armaments and tried diplomatically to scuttle weapon sales the latter considered essential for

national security.³³ This would suggest to Islamabad both that India is out not only to undermine its security but, by questioning its sovereign imperative to obtain military equipments of whatever quality, in whatever numbers and from whatever source, to impugn Pakistan's sovereign status. It strengthens the Pakistani conviction that India is unreconciled to Partition and that its long term plans hinge on "undoing" it.³⁴

With the border issue remaining unsettled Pakistan, the smaller, politically more unstable, economically weaker and militarily more vulnerable State is discovering that in the post-Cold War era, reliable allies and sources of advanced military wherewithal are more difficult to obtain.³⁵ Its sense of isolation and insecurity, therefore, grows and is becoming harder to alleviate. It has resulted in that country digging in its heels (on the nuclear weapons issue, for instance) and in dangerously raising the stake in Kashmir.³⁶

UNRIPE FOR PEACE?

Richard Haass claims that the preconditions for a peaceful resolution of conflict anytime soon are absent in the subcontinent.³⁷ While there is a strong under-current of desire for "normalization" of relations among the two peoples, the bulk of the strategic elites are not convinced and the governments are neither strong enough to weather criticism of a "sellout" nor weak enough to be pressured into a negotiated settlement. Kashmir, Moreover, has been termed "non-negotiable" by both the parties. And, finally, New Delhi and Islamabad do not agree on the negotiating track—the former insists on the purely bilateral mode (enjoined by the Simla Agreement), the latter seeks talks under UN, OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) or American aegis.

In this milieu, confidence building activity becomes a counter-intuitive exercise, a process of making paper promises. Even this is jeopardized by subcontinental politics.³⁸ No surprise then that these measures tend to be cosmetic deals which usefully fill up diplomatic space, time and effort and cover up for the lack of substantive progress. The immediate returns in negotiating such accords is that it appears to further the peace process without actually doing so and thus deflects diplomatic pressures from powerful countries, like the US, which believe in the "constructive" role of CBMs to "reduce tensions" and to prevent an inadvertent "triggering of a larger conflict", and who mistake the fact of India and Pakistan agreeing on the usual CBMs for their taking giant strides towards peace.³⁹

That leaves the Indian and the Pakistani military establishments—the pivotal players in making CBMs successful and direct beneficiaries of the wider "fire-breaks" and the like -- free to ignore them as and when it is expedient.⁴⁰

This begs the question: Why do India and Pakistan find it hard to comply with international commitments they make vide the agreements on confidence-building? The answer lies in the extreme familiarity breeding certainty that the other side will not interpret non-compliance or miscompliance of every provision in the agreement as an act of bad faith, leading to an irretrievable breakdown in relations or worse. Thus, CBMs become levers of politico-military gamesmanship and violations of CBM-provisions a means to gauge the level of military readiness, the type of response and the reaction-time of the adversary.

The less countries in conflict claim to have intimate knowledge of each other and the less they are culturally proximal (which leads them to subsume such knowledge), the more inclined they may be to stick to both the letter and the spirit of the agreements they sign, because they cannot with any certitude predict the other's reaction to treaty violations. Under the circumstances, risk is avoided by the strictest legal interpretation of every point in any bilateral agreement. It is revealing that India and Pakistan seem to have no trouble or hesitation in complying with bilateral and international agreements they have signed with other countries.

FIGURING OUT WHAT WILL WORK

If the routine CBMs are ineffectual and there remains a core dispute between India and Pakistan, what will work to reduce the risk of war? It would help if the Pakistan armed forces redefined their mission and reoriented their task. This may be more easily achieved than is ordinarily imagined, because it means following the lead given by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and by that country's first martial law government headed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

Jinnah, for example, conceived of Pakistan's foreign and military policy mission solely in terms of the security of the subcontinent and, more specifically, of the defence of India. Soon after independence, for instance, Governor-General Jinnah dispatched a memorandum to Washington asking for a two billion dollar loan expressly to strengthen the buffer state he presided over. The memorandum warned that if Pakistan owing to "the proximity and vulnerability..to Russia... yielded" to the "external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility."⁴¹

To the extent that Jinnah communalized the military's role, he did so in benign terms of "the Hindus" guarding the approaches from the West and the South and of "Muslim India" the North-Western border. Additionally, he repeatedly stressed "the vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign States to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers

both on land and sea against aggression." Ayub Khan for his part mooted a joint defence pact with India as late as 1962.⁴² Pakistan's return to these first principles of the country's defence, could be legitimated by reference to Jinnah and Ayub's pronouncements.

This change, moreover, can be effected because of the marked improvement in Pakistan's military strength relative to India over the last 20 years, a change made possible by a surprisingly non-reactive Indian policy. Thus, notwithstanding the frequent expressions of alarm by the Indian Foreign Office and the prodding by the Indian Armed Services, New Delhi has not responded to the beefing up of the Pakistani military capabilities. The Main Battle Tanks in the Pakistan Army and in the Indian Army today are in the ratio of 1:1.74, a vast improvement by Pakistan over the 1:2.28 ratio obtaining in the years astride the 1971 War, when that country, inclusive of what is now Bangladesh, was nearly one and a half times its present size. The ratio of combat aircraft has likewise changed from 1:3.25 to 1:1.86 and for capital ships from 1:4.67 to 1:2.78, all these changes favouring Pakistan.⁴³

The extant orders-of-battle may be presumed to represent the force strength and the force quality that each country believes is adequate to deter without alarming the other and provide the basis for change in the outlook of the armed forces in India and Pakistan, permitting them to adopt "strategies of reassurance".⁴⁴ More on this later.

Kashmir will remain the outstanding unresolved issue. But the insurgents are in a no-win situation and gradually the rebellion is bound to wind down owing to the sustained pressure by the Indian Army and the growing fatigue of the Kashmiri people. Once the situation in this State settles down, Islamabad can, without "loss of face", put the Kashmir issue on the back-burner without in any way surrendering what it perceives to be its "rights". There is a regional parallel. The thaw in Sino-Indian relations is proceeding on the basis that the touchy territorial issue concerning the Chinese occupied Indian Aksai Chin can await resolution at a more propitious time. And that in the mean while, the two countries can proceed to better relations on other fronts. But, in the case of India and Pakistan they can go further in the main because the militaries in these two countries are cut from the same cloth and, ironically, because they are unequally placed in their respective societies.

FOSTERING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LINKS

It is obvious that in the distribution of power in the two countries, the Pakistan Army is in a position to set not only the military but also the national agenda and the Indian armed services to only carry out the orders of the

civilian government. This may explain the more belligerent and even militaristic tenor of Pakistani policy generally and why its Armed Services seemingly have a vested interest in contesting the territorial status quo and in keeping the Indian threat alive.

But military-to-military ties, crucial for good India-Pakistan relations and for peace in the subcontinent, are realizable precisely because of this asymmetric situation. Pakistan is a military-dominated society. In the 49 years of independent existence, it has had a martial law government for 22 years and partial military rule for an additional three years (from 1985 to 1988 when General Zia ul-Haq was President and Chief of the Army Staff, but a civilian prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, "ran" the government). In Pakistan the Army is *the* decision making loop⁴⁵ in matters regarding national security; what it wants it gets, notwithstanding democratically-elected governments in Islamabad since 1989.

In India, in contrast, the armed forces are not part of the government, have no role to play in the decision making pertaining to defence other than in an advisory capacity. In fact, they can do little else except take their chances with the heavily bureaucratized system of decision-making dominated by the permanent civil service.⁴⁶

This brings us to the crucial question: If the returns on a policy of confrontation are so different, what is the incentive for the Pakistani military, to engage in genuine confidence-building or to seek a mutual reassurance regime? Let us attempt an answer.

The foregoing discussion has shown that (i) neither New Delhi nor Islamabad really wants war, (ii) Pakistan has more than adequate conventional and (threshold) nuclear military capabilities to have denatured the threat posed by India, enough in any case to permit a stable deterrence system to operate in South Asia, and (iii) such a deterrence system (variously labelled as non-weaponized, opaque, recessed, etc.) is acceptable to New Delhi. This combined with, firstly, the consistently low-key Indian policies in support of the status quo and, secondly, the fundamentalist Islamic turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran, the Gulf and Central Asia as well as at home in tandem with the seemingly uncontrollable ethnic clashes and internal disorder, may gradually compel the Pakistani armed forces to reform their threat perceptions.

This compulsion will become severe if the political situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate and the State itself starts to unravel owing to mass disaffection, sectarian violence, and separatist feelings aided and abetted by the "drug and Kalashnikov" mafias. Then, the allure of the composite

subcontinental culture may begin to draw a collapsing Pakistani polity into India. The best guarantee to contain these centripetal societal forces would be for the Pakistan military to cement links with its Indian counterpart, by giving the latter a real stake in the continuance of Pakistan as a militarily strong buffer of the kind that Jinnah had in mind. In a *Gottterdammerung* -type of scenario, this last will not only increase the Indian military's reluctance to intervene but also strengthen the Indian government's will to resist the popular demand for "interfering" in Pakistan's internal affairs that could veer from bad to worse.

This military-to-military bond is predicated on small steps that actually promote social interaction between the Indian and Pakistani militaries and act as placebos which in making each feel good about itself also generate good feelings about the other. These innocuous understandings differ in form and content from the traditional CBMs in that the former do not directly relate to either military's capabilities, but which could in time coax a less combative attitude. This may be accomplished in two stages. The first, foundation-laying stage (dealt with here) would involve refamiliarizing the two militaries with their shared history and common socio-cultural milieu and Service ethos by stressing a dialogue at the level of the basic fighting unit of the two armies—the regiment. In the follow-up stage, properly configured CBMs could deal with the operational and dispositional aspects of the two militaries.

The structure of the Indian and Pakistan Armies revolves around the regiment. The bulk of the infantry and armoured regiments have a long history which can be traced to wars, under British leadership, in the subcontinent to establish the Raj and in distant trouble spots (including Persia and the Gulf in the 19th Century, China during the Opium War and the Boxer Rebellion, France, Palestine and Mesopotamia in the First World War, and Italy, North Africa, Eritrea and South-East Asia in the Second World War) on behalf of Empire. When Partition came, the regiments were assigned to India or to Pakistan on the basis of whether the majority of the battalions in the infantry regiment or of squadrons in the armoured regiment were predominantly Hindu/Sikh or Muslim.

This had the effect of tearing up old regiments and reconstituting them in alien surroundings. These new units still owe their elan and identity, rituals and traditions to the old pre-Partition regiments. A program to allow researchers and officers on official trips or privately organized sabbaticals from both sides to visit and experience the peculiar milieus of the parent regiment, will flesh out the histories of new regiment⁴⁷, and would be hugely welcomed.

Another such program could involve exchanges of visits to hallowed

battle sites, like Seringapatnam and Assaye where Col. Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) led the East India Company forces composed of "native" regiments, many of whom "went" to Pakistan. Or, on the other side, trips to Waziristan, Gujrat, Chillianwala and Chitral (as in "raising the siege of"), where many Indian regiments experienced their "finest hour".

An equally inoffensive scheme could involve the exchange of military bands, which have a pride of place in regimental life in the subcontinent. Playing long-remembered martial tunes at formal and informal functions will at once bring back memories of joint actions fought by the British Indian Army and subliminally cement feelings of comradeship. Inter-regimental sports tournaments were a staple of military life in the pre-Partition India. These could in some small ways be revived. Joint rafting and mountaineering expeditions could be launched in undisputed parts of the Himalayas and the Himalayan headwaters.

"Regular exchanges of visits by military officers at all levels may assist the process of perpetuating or renewing a modicum of mutual understanding and even trust", conclude two American analysts. This, they maintain, will help the younger officer corps to better appreciate "the common background that tended to ease tensions and promote understanding even during crisis and conflict."⁴⁸ After all, it was the senior Indian and Pakistani officers from the same or proximal graduating "batches" of the military academies (first Sandhurst in Britain and later Dehradun in India) who in facing each other on the battlefield, set the tone for the quality of gentlemanliness which characterizes India-Pakistan wars. A scheme for these retired officers from both countries to partake of "batch" and unit reunions, and of regimental "raising days" will reaffirm the common heritage and allow them to communicate to their serving juniors the essence of this past and, by so doing, to prepare the ground for better relations between the militaries in time to come.

These are "social" programmes that neither military can find objectionable because they will eventually firm up the regimental backbone of the two Armies, without hurting the renowned fighting qualities of the Indian and the Pakistani soldier⁴⁹. Cross-border inter-regimental ties, moreover, will create understanding about each other's ways of thinking and hence promote mutual confidence during crises and reassure general staffs on both sides. It may eventuate in the proposed second stage when more substantive developments, like agreement to limit arms acquisitions, establishment of risk reduction centres and a region-wide early warning system first proposed in the Joint Defence Proposal by Pakistan Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1959,⁵⁰ could be negotiated with the militaries' consent and active participation.

The Indian Services' inclinations are apparent. They seem to desire a reorientation of their threat perspective to meet new challenges in the post-Cold War world. So much so, that a former Indian Army Chief of Staff has even called for sharing with Pakistan "nuclear and missile technology" and to "cooperate in all other spheres, to lessen the impact" of technology-denial regimes like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Missile Technology Control Regime⁵¹.

The subtext of the military-to-military linkages is the commonality in their Standard Operating Procedures, enabling the two militaries to communicate with each other in the nuanced as well as the substantive sense. It helped the Pakistani Chief of Staff of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), for instance, "handle" the Indian Army contingent in Somalia with great finesse indicating the ease with which the two militaries may be able to get along. It could be the basis for an immediate innovation which will go far in relaxing the conditions on the ground: Regular meetings between the two Army Chiefs; personal rapport between them would prevent the sometimes testy situation on the ground from getting out of hand⁵². Such meetings could also be regularized for the Indian and Pakistani Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff.

Once the militaries get to directly dealing with each other, the most discernible effect will be on Pakistani politicians who, taking their cue from the military, tend to be vociferously anti-India. There will be an almost immediate moderation of rhetoric resulting, consequentially in the two governments becoming more accommodating and conciliatory. This is likely to pave the way for a negotiated settlement of all outstanding disputes not excluding Kashmir.

Linking the armed forces of India and Pakistan in the above ways will not in any way undermine their separate and distinct identities or blunt their soldierly motivation. Nor will it hurt either country's national interests. But they will be more effective CBMs and provide the building blocks for a strong regime of mutual military reassurance.

A MILITARY REASSURANCE REGIME

Military Reassurance Measures (MRMs) primarily involve the military. With their focus on the ways to devalue military confrontation by reducing mutual hostility and mistrust, and by correcting misperceptions, MRMs seek gradually to create a vested interest for the armed forces of both countries in an Indo-Pakistani *rapprochement*. Because Pakistani politicians follow the military's lead, this will help move the politics of that country away from its anti-India orientation.

Based on the historical record of successful conflict amelioration techniques, Janice Gross Stein has formulated four reassurance strategies she believes will work in most conflict situations and have to do with the "exercise of restraint, the creation of norms of competition, the making of irrevocable commitments, and [with] regime-building".⁵³ Military-to-military socialization will hugely facilitate the accrual of assurance from these strategies.

RESTRAINT

Restraint in speech and gestures, in many respects, is the hardest thing to realize in India-Pakistan relations because it requires the leaders in the two countries to empathize with each other's predicament.⁵⁴ This they are obviated from doing because much of the bilateral relations are conducted at the level of accusations and allegations (in recent times over Kashmir), and bombast and competitive rhetoric pitched at the domestic audience. The premium is on creating *frisson*, sounding tough and otherwise making it politically as difficult as possible for the other government at home and abroad. Predictably, the leadership in Pakistan, the weaker, more unsettled State in the conflictual dyad, tends to be more jingoistic and prone to sabre-rattling.

Then again, when it actually comes down to the point of war or of serious repercussions as a result of such policies the two governments have shown commendable restraint in actions. They have proven themselves adept at defusing crisis using every possible means, including outside help (like, for instance, the American assistance in accessing sensitive information by both countries in the 1990 crisis).

Two reasons may be adduced for the success of this twin-forked policy. One, because restraint in actions is better communicated between, and intentions better read by, parties on the same cultural wavelength. And, secondly, because the militaries have acceded to tension-reducing actions. Thus, in the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, for example, India pared the size of units tasked for a massive war exercise even as Pakistan retained the bulk of its counter forces opposite the strategically critical Indian sector in northern Punjab and Jammu (in Kashmir)⁵⁵. Formal relations between the two sets of armed forces will aid in the process of routinizing restraint.

NORMS OF COMPETITION

Two countries contesting a well-defined geocultural space as India and Pakistan happen to do are by the differing nature of their polities, set on a collision course. Combined with the differential in power, this has led to India's forceful delineation of spheres of influence at Pakistan's expense. On

South Asia's periphery looking in, Pakistan, seeking to consolidate its presence by assertive military and diplomatic policies, finds itself at a disadvantage because India has won international approval for its role as the regional policeman, latterly in helping contain the Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka and in suppressing an attempted coup in the Maldives.

Worse, Islamabad finds that Iran and the Central Asian Republics are more mindful of India's size and military, diplomatic and economic heft than they are impressed by Pakistan's geographic proximity or its Islamic identity.⁵⁶ This has increasingly frustrated Pakistan, which finds itself unable to compete with Iran and Turkey for the allegiance of the tier of newly surfaced Islamic States to Russia's south and deadended by India in South Asia. This fencing in of its legitimate ambitions only sharpens Pakistan's anti-India hostility and exacerbates that country's paranoia. Indeed, India seems to have successfully restricted Pakistan's aspirations to the traditional opening Islamabad has always enjoyed with the coastal States in the Persian Gulf and prevented the enlargement of its sphere of influence, which Pakistan's "frontline" role during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan once promised it.

However, Pakistan's internationalist aspirations have found an outlet in the UN peacekeeping missions. As the country deploying the largest contingent in difficult multilateral missions in Somalia and Bosnia, Pakistan has built up a lot of goodwill. India too sent a brigade sized-contingent to Somalia, and the two countries had a complementary role.

Such peacekeeping is a healthy form of military competition, pushing the Indian and Pakistani armed forces into joint operations to maintain international peace. The more the two countries participate in such missions, the greater will be the opportunities to judge each other in the field, rid themselves of stereotyped images of the 'enemy' and to lay down mutually acceptable norms for peacekeeping conduct in the future. In time, each country will acquire sufficient confidence about the other's capabilities and intentions for India to concede Pakistan a role as partner in peacekeeping even within the South Asian region, and for Pakistan to feel comfortable in joining India to advance the collective subcontinental security interests.

IRREVOCABLE COMMITMENT

In deterrence theory, a firm commitment by the status quo power often signals benign intentions to the challenger who "anticipates great cost both from the perpetuation of the status quo and a resort to force" and who by making a like commitment indicates the willingness to reduce the cost of the status quo.⁵⁷

The precedent here is the 1991 agreement between the two countries not to launch surprise attacks against designated nuclear installations of the other. It has permitted Pakistan to breathe easier, particularly because the possibility of India "doing an Osirac" had haunted that country's strategists since the early 1980s when the Kahuta uranium centrifuge enrichment facility was being built. It has contributed to stable deterrence in South Asia.

The ultimate irrevocable commitment may well be the telescoping of the longstanding Indian offer of a Treaty of Friendship and Pakistan's counter-offer of a Non-aggression Pact, to come up with a mutually acceptable umbrella agreement.⁵⁸ Such a document could, in turn, generate accords and agreements dealing with specific security issues, like the redeployment of troops from the Siachen Glacier, the demarcation of the Sir Creek and the settlement of the Wular Barrage dispute, joint border patrols and joint border monitoring, ban on coded radio traffic, notification of conventional and nuclear military accidents, expanded and upgraded "hotlines" and further restrictions on manoeuvres and war exercises.⁵⁹ Again, military-to-military ties will further this process.

LIMITED SECURITY REGIMES

The confidence-building measures of the kind agreed upon by India and Pakistan since the Karachi Agreement of 1949 dealing with border security taken in *toto* amount to a limited security regime. But, as has been discussed earlier, the success of many of these CBMs has been reserved for times when there was no crisis, which devalues not merely the individual measure but also sows doubt about the confidence-building process as a whole.

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which began operating in 1949 as a result of India referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN, monitored military activity on either side of the border, informing each country about changes in the military dispositions of the other along the Line of Control. UNMOGIP'S activity constituted a limited security regime of sorts because it reassured Pakistan, and may have even led to India's dropping guard enough, at least, to permit massive Pakistani infiltration of "raiders" into Kashmir, which triggered the 1965 War. But India's claim that the 1972 Simla Accord (signed in the wake of the 1971 War which begat Bangladesh) supercedes UNMOGIP has made it defunct on the Indian side.⁶⁰

A replacement security regime may, however, be falling into place owing to the US-India and US-Pakistan joint military exercises underway. According to this scheme, the US armed forces separately engage with military units from India and Pakistan on a periodic basis. There is no formal undertaking by the US as the common player to divulge information it has gleaned about the

Indian military capabilities to Pakistan or about the Pakistani military prowess to India. But, US officials say, that in the natural course of sharing experiences and drawing lessons from the joint training exercises, faulty reading of intentions and of threats and wrong assessments of capabilities of one side by the other will be sought to be allayed.⁶¹ But such information will have greater credibility if the two militaries have their own independent institutional channels of communication.

RECAP

CBMs don't solve problems. At best they can be of marginal assistance to tackle core issues. In South Asia the need is for milieu-specific confidence-building solutions and these will have to involve the military establishments more directly in the peace process. Especially so in the case of the Pakistan armed forces who can decide both the form and the content of the country's policies vis-a-vis India. If, further, such involvement is cemented by forging military-to-military links, then the foundations will have been laid for a lasting mutual military reassurance system in the subcontinent.

But it is precisely these relations and ways to go about mending them that have so far been paid scant attention in South Asia and especially in the West where thinking on CBMs for this region is premised less on the military and cultural reality than on a sense of alarm about "ancient conflicts ...between Hindus and Muslims" turning nuclear.⁶² An overlooked aspect of the subcontinental military reality is that it revolves around Mess rituals and regimental traditions, *durbars* and *bara-khanas*,⁶³ and unit reunions and the social complexities of the (military) cantonment life. And CBMs which build on this reality would at once be timely, appropriate and effective in seeding mutual trust and in preventing war by miscalculation or design.

Programmes for military-to-military socializing which solidify the regimental structure without hurting the fighting qualities of the troops, would be irresistible to the Indian and the Pakistani Armed Services, and could initiate the process of normalization of bilateral relations. Good military-to-military relations could be the centre-piece of a strong system of mutual military reassurance, of a host of meaningful confidence and security-building measures and of enduring peace in the region.

At the very least, the MRMs will amount to a limited security regime, ensuring that not every little wrinkle in the foreign and defence policies of one State is perceived as hurting the interests of the other State. Getting the armies of India and Pakistan to believe in peace and in each other is the only certain way to rid the national security policy circles in the region of their "zero sum game" mentality.

FOOTNOTES

1. The governments in New Delhi from the very beginning were wary of too intimate relations between the Indian and Pakistan militaries because of the fear that the former will be infected by the latter's proclivity to intervene in the political life of the country. This fear became palpable with the appointment of V.K.Krishna Menon as the defence minister in the late 1950s, around the time General Ayub Khan staged the *coup d'etat* in Pakistan, and was manifested in the controversy about an alleged coup attempt and the resignation (which was later withdrawn at prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's behest) by the distinguished Indian soldier and Army chief, General K.S. Thimayya. See the account of this episode in S.S.Khera, *India's Defence Problem*, Orient Longmans, Delhi, Calcutta, etc., 1968; pp. 73-74. Khera served as the Principal Defence Secretary, the highest ranking civilian bureaucrat in the Defence Ministry. More recently, there were hints of "civil-military" problems during the 1987 "war that wasn't" begat by the massive Indian Army war exercise, Brasstacks. A former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Secretary for Defence Production, K.S.Subrahmanyam, has written about them. See his "The Simla Pact: Lack of Strategic Thinking", *The Times of India*, April 12, 1995.
2. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, (New York, Oxford, etc., Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 224.
3. For a sharp and succinct view of the India-Pakistan wars by a reputed military historian, see Johan Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, *Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars*, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp.55-56.
4. John S. Sandrock and Michael Maldony, *The History and Future of Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: A Background Paper*, (Maclean, Virginia, prepared by Science Applications International Corporation—SAIC, for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, November 14, 1994), fn no.3, p. A-2.
5. All these figures for war deaths in Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1993*, (Washington, D.C., World Priorities Inc., 1993) p.20.
6. See the chapter on the 1965 War in C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India 1964-66: A Life of Truth in Politics*, (New Delhi, Bombay, etc., Oxford University Press, 1994). This is an authoritative biography by a close confidante of the Indian leader.
7. The Pakistani defence spending has averaged 7.02 per cent of GDP in the years 1982-83 to 1992-93. India's defence budget in the same period averaged 3.08 per cent of GDP. See the Tables in Air Commodore (Retd.) Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure", *Asian Strategic Review 1991-92*, (New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1992).
8. Jasjit Singh, "Trends".
9. There is dissatisfaction in the Indian Army with the lack of emphasis on a proper logistic build-up which curtails warfighting in terms of time, space and effort. The Indian officer corps is notoriously tight-lipped about voicing criticism against the establishment they have served, but murmurs are heard. Lt Gen D.V.Kalra (Retd.), for instance, has referred elliptically to the problem by criticizing what he calls "the logistics of defensive posture". See his "Logistics: Life Line of the Army" in *The Indian Defence Review*, New Delhi, Oct 1993, p.90.

10. See the devastating but also the most authoritative account of the Indian debacle against the Chinese in 1962 by Maj Gen D.K. Palit(Retd.), *War in the High Himalayas*, (New Delhi, Lancer Publication, 1992). Gen Palit (then Brigadier) was the Director of Military Operations during the India-China War.
11. See the Tables in Jasjit Singh (Retd.), "Trends"; pp. 54-55, 62-63.
12. General Mirza Aslām Beg, ex-Chief, Pakistan Army recently argued that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be deployed let alone used in the subcontinent by pointing out that both India and Pakistan refrained from attacking each other's civilian populations in their three wars. See "Beg rules out N-option" in *The Times of India*, New Delhi, July 13, 1995.
13. Consider the Muslim voter clout, for example, in the economically crucial state of Maharashtra. Of the 288 constituencies, only 69 have Muslim populations below 5 per cent. In other words, in the majority of the constituencies, Muslims have a large presence and should they vote en bloc, can decide which party wins. The fact that they did not is attributed by many as the cause of the ruling Congress Party losing in the recent provincial elections. See "The Saffron Resurgence" in *India Today*, March 31, 1995. The trend is for even the Hindu "extremist" Parties like the Muslim-baiting Shive Sena to moderate their views once they win elections and acquire power as the Sena-Bharatiya Janata Party alliance has done in the recent State elections both in Maharashtra and in the other western province of Gujarat.
14. See Rafiq Zakaria, *The Struggle within Islam*, (Harmondsworth, UK, Penguin Books, 1988), for a criticism of the evolving Pakistan polity; Mr Zakaria is a former Member of Parliament and moderate Indian Muslim leader from Maharashtra. For an Indian Muslim's disillusionment with Pakistan refer to Sk. Sadar Nayeem, "Why Indian Muslims aren't pro-Pakistan" in *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, June 16, 1995.
15. This familial view of India-Pakistan quarrels has been current since Partition. Even that most hawkish of Pakistani Generals, the late Lt Gen A.I. Akram—a close advisor to Gen Zia ul-Haq during the latter's martial law government in the 1980s—regarded Pakistan's troubles with India as those a younger brother typically experiences with the "elder brother" and "head of family" in the South Asian cultural context. See his monograph, *Wage Peace, not War* (Islamabad, Institute of Regional Studies, 1982).
16. *Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India: Stable Deterrent or Proliferation Challenge?* (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 25, 1992), p. 21. [Emphasis is mine.]
17. Michael Krepon, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures" in Michael Krepon (Ed.), *A Handbook of Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security* (Washington, D.C., The Henry L. Stimson Centre, 2nd Edition, January 1995), pp. 3-9. The labelling of measures as "conflict avoidance" or "confidence-building" is fairly arbitrary.
18. Leonard Sullivan, Jr, *Security and Stability in Conventional Forces: Differing Perceptions of the Balance*, (Washington, D.C., The Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, May 1988), p.17.
19. For a synoptic view of the Europe-related CBMs, refer the tabulation of the CBM-"stages" in East-West detente in Cathleen S. Fisher, "The Preconditions of Confidence-building: Lessons from the European Experience" in Krepon (Ed), *Handbook*; pp. 36-39.
20. Krepon (Ed), *Handbook*; p. 29.
21. Krepon (Ed), *Handbook*; pp. 29-31
22. Pakistan's perception of the Kashmir issue as "unfinished" Partition business was trenchantly

rendered by prime minister Benazir Bhutto in an interview with David Frost aired over Pakistan TV, on January 8, 1995. In it she claimed that a Pakistan without Kashmir was a country "balkanised" at birth. For a more detailed analysis of Pakistan's perceived stake in Kashmir, see Meleeha Lodhi, *The External Dimension*, (Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1994). Ms Lodhi is currently the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington, DC.

23. For an analysis of the geopolitical and strategic considerations that went into the making of the clashing Indian and Pakistani security policies and the US South Asia policy, see Bharat Karnad, "India's weak geopolitics and what to do about it" in Bharat Karnad (Ed.), *Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond*, (New Delhi, Viking Penguin India, 1994).
24. See Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, "South Asia" in Gerald Segal & William Tow (Eds.) *Chinese Defence Policy* (Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1984). For a more recent appraisal of Sino-Indian relations which emphasizes China's healthy respect for the Indian military's current strength as one reason for its seeking warmer relations with New Delhi, see Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power" in Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon (Eds.) *India's Strategic Future: Regional State of Global Power?* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992).
25. Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy", *Survival* (Summer 1994).
26. Mohammad Jawahar, a Malaysian analyst in discussing the applicability of CBMs outside of European contexts concludes that the asymmetry of power in the Asian context "complicates" confidence-building activity. See his "Implications of the Regional Environment for Regimes of Confidence- and Security-building for Asia and the Pacific" in *Disarmament*, No. 4, 1991, p. 88. India, in the '50s actually followed a policy of self-abnegation in its relations with China, but no such tolerance was shown to Pakistan. The genesis of these policies discussed in Bharat Karnad "India's weak geopolitics".
27. For an articulation of such threat perception by the former Pakistan Army Chief and still an influential in the Pakistani policy circles, see General Mirza Aslam Beg, *Development and Security: Thoughts and Reflections*, (Rawalpindi, A FRIENDS publication, 1994), chapter 12. India's malafides were, from the Pakistani viewpoint, established at the time of Partition when India denied the new State of Pakistan the means to defend itself by not transferring its designated share of the British Indian Army's inventory of equipment stocks and other military stores. This case made by General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retd.), the late President Zia ul-Haq's right hand man and Vice Chief of the Army. See his "The Roots of Conflict in South Asia: A Pakistani perspective" in Karnad (Ed.) *Future Imperilled*.
28. For an account of the fear and insecurity experienced by the Indian Muslim community, see Zakaria, *The Struggle with Islam*, pp. 259-263
29. See in particular General Mirza Aslam Beg, "Nuclear Programme and Political Ramblings" and Lt Col Muhammad Ashraf Saleem, "Nuclear Deterrence: A Subcontinental Logic" in *Defence Journal*, Karachi, No.11-12, 1993.
30. The former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, now in the opposition has used the "Bomb" issue to embarrass and politically discomfit the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party Government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. See "Nawaz Sharif's bombshell", *India Today*, North American edition, September 15, 1994.
31. A few years ago an American academic, Robert G. Wirsing, was conducted around their respective forward areas in Kashmir by the Indian and Pakistan Armies. See his balanced and dispassionate account of the Pakistani infiltration of and support for insurgents in Indian Kashmir, "Kashmir Conflict: The New Phase" in Charles H. Kennedy (Ed.) *Pakistan 1992*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1993), pp. 148-155.

32. The Indian military believes that any large scale Pakistani operations across the LoC in Kashmir will necessitate India's striking across the international boundary in Punjab and Sind as in 1965. See Maj Gen Afsar Karim (Retd.), *Kashmir: The Troubled Frontiers*, (New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 1994); pp.136-138. Indeed, the committee on foreign affairs of the Pakistan Senate in its July 1995 Report has cautioned the Pakistan Government against precipitating a war with India as an offshoot of its support for the Kashmir insurgency. Plainly, the "non-weaponized nuclear deterrent" presumably in place is not considered capable by the Pakistani Parliament of preventing another conventional military defeat in case of war. See "Panel advice to Pak. Govt. on averting war" in *The Hindu*, New Delhi, July 21,1995.
33. India's opposition to the American sale of arms to Pakistan is of long standing. Lately, it has been protesting the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan, particularly F-16 aircraft. For the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Salman Khurshid's forthright condemnation of any such move, see "India tells US arms transfer to Pak will be unacceptable" in *The Asian Age*, New Delhi, July 13,1995. India has so far also successfully pressured Moscow on this issue. For the latest warning by the foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee, see "India resents Russian attempts to sell weapons to Pak" in *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, May11,1995. In the recent past New Delhi has stopped Russo-Pakistani arms deals preventing, for example, sale on commercial terms of Su-27 fighter aircraft and a large number of T-72 tanks to Pakistan armed forces. See "Arms deal with Pakistan: India forced out Russia" in *The Financial Express*, New Delhi, July 22, 1992.
34. See Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif, "The Roots of Conflict in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective" in Karnad (Ed.) *Future Imperilled*.
35. Consider the heat generated in Pakistan over the Pressler Amendment provisions which prohibit the transfer of some 28 F-16s Islamabad has "paid" for. See "Clinton seeking to pay Pakistanis for blocked arms" in *The New York Times*, April12,1995.
36. Explaining her current hardline on Kashmir, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is on record as saying that she would not repeat the mistake of being conciliatory on Kashmir as she was during her last tenure in office, which she believes cost her her job.
37. *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 27-29.
38. I thank Michael Krepon for this observation about the penalizing of the confidence-building process.
39. CBMs began to be seriously propagated by the US beginning in the 1980s with the success of the East-West confidence building process. See the assessment by a former National Security Council staffer in the Bush White House, Richard Haass, about the applicability of East-West type of CBMs to regional conflicts, in *Conflicts Unending*, pp. 87-88. But Indians and Pakistanis apparently consider these CBMs as a means of pleasing, placating and otherwise keeping the Americans off their backs. The ACDIS Report on the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, for example, concludes that CBMs are "regarded by both the sides as an 'American' issue, i.e., of greater concern to them in their relationship with the United States than because of any utility in their own relationship." *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (Urbana-Champaign, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois), p.13.
40. Michael Krepon, "A Time of Troubles, A Time of Need", Draft Paper, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, DC, 1995; p.8. CBMs, like the hotline between the military operations directorates of the Indian and Pakistan armies have not worked as they were supposed to. In fact, they are often used to deceive by channelling wrong information, when

not actually being shut down in time of tension. This is what happened during the crisis precipitated by the massive Indian Army war exercise in early 1987. Refer the ACDIS Report *Brasstacks and Beyond*.

41. Quoted in Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security Under Zia, 1977-1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991). p 5.
42. For the quotes and an analysis of Jinnah's and subsequently Pakistan's strategic thinking, see Karnad, "India's weak geopolitics", pp. 24-28.
43. The ratios are derived from inventory figures for India and Pakistan in *The Military Balance*, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972-73 and 1994-95).
44. Janice Gross Stein, "Reassurance in International Conflict Management", *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1991.
45. Hasan Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1986* (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1986). For the Military's even more enlarged role in the Pakistani society in the Zia-years, see the essays in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, Westview Press, 1991).
46. For an authoritative description of the Indian organisation and structure of defence decision-making by a former Secretary of National Defence College, see A.L. Venkateswaran, *Defence Organisation in India* (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India). To understand the socio-political and historical basis for the Indian military's readiness after independence to accept civilian overlordship, see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1971), ch. 7.
47. For the best history of the umbilical cord connecting the subcontinental armies to the past and to each other, see John Gaylor, *Sons of John Company: The Indian and Pakistan Armies 1903-91* (New Delhi, Lancer Publications, 1993; first published in 1992 by Spellmount Ltd, UK).
48. Sandroc and Maldony, *The History and Future of Confidence Building in South Asia*, p.13. The larger significance of the personal/regimental links between the Indian and the Pakistan Armies however escaped these American authors (one of them, Sandrock, a former military attache in the New Delhi embassy) who describe "Regular Exchanges of Military Personnel" as only "Additional CBMs for Consideration".
49. The effectiveness of the Indian and Pakistan Armies and the antecedent British Indian Army, lies in the concept of *izzat*— a peculiarly South Asian amalgam of personal honour and self-respect. It is *izzat* that motivates the average Indian or Pakistani soldier unflinchingly to fire on his own people when ordered to do so. The most evocative regiment-based history which treats this concept at some length remains Philip Mason's *A Matter of Honour* (New York, Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1974).
50. Sandrock and Maldony, *The History and Future*, pp.12-16.
51. General K. Sundarji (Retd.) "Indian Military Compulsions" in Bharat Karnad (Ed), *Future Imperilled*, pp. 145-146.
52. The preliminary findings of the ACDIS team which produced the Report *Brasstacks and Beyond* were first discussed in a conference of experts, including many Indian and Pakistani participants in the Brasstacks crisis. At this Meet held in Bellagio, Italy, in September 1994, the Indian Army Chief at the time of the crisis Gen. K.Sundarji confessed that had he had the occasion personally to interact with his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Khalid Muhammad

Arif, before the crisis erupted, he would have been more sensitive to the Pakistan military's concerns; this by way of indicating the value of regular meetings between the Army Chiefs of Staff of the two countries.

[Source: a participant at the Bellagio Conference]

53. Stein, "Reassurance", p. 434.
54. Stein, "Reassurance", p. 436.
55. Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Mallik, Charles H. Kennedy and Robert C., Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, Westview Press, 2nd Edition, 1991), pp. 232-234.
56. President Hashemi Rafsanjani, for instance, has expressed an interest in Iran's having a security relationship with Pakistan, see "Rafsanjani for security ties with Pak", Reuter, in *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, December 17, 1992. But in the larger Iranian geopolitical scheme, it is India's participation he has sought along with China to form what he has called the "axis [of] inter-Asian cooperation" to counter the US-led Western alliance system in that part of the world. See Rafsanjani's interview, *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, September 19, 1993.
57. Stein, "Reassurance", p. 441.
58. See Pran Chopra, "From Mistrust to Cooperation" in Pran Chopra, Mubashir Hasan, Shamsul Haq, Shelton Kodikara and Rishikesh Shaha, *Future of South Asia* (New Delhi, Bombay, etc. Macmillan India Ltd, 1986).
59. Some of these initiatives have been articulated in Sandrock and Maldony, *The History and Future*, pp. 11-16.
60. Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 158-163.
61. The US State Department South Asia Desk officials in a meeting with the Visiting Fellows, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, D.C., January 26, 1995. Indeed, Pakistan is familiar with the American use of such "information sharing". A US Air Force team in 1987 had, for instance, gone to Pakistan to try to convince the Pakistanis to buy the E-2C airborne surveillance and battle control system instead of the E-3A AWACS the Pakistan Air Force was hankering for. For this purpose the Americans related to their Pakistani counterparts the operational experiences of the Israeli and Egyptian air forces, which employ the E-2C. [Source: A US defence official who made the trip.]
62. Barry M. Blechman and Cathleen S. Fisher, "Phase out the Bomb", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1994-95; p. 91. A part of this alarm is probably because of a misreading of the nature of India-Pakistan wars and of the South Asian conflict milieu generally, to wit, Blechman and Fisher's statement: "As weapons proliferate, moreover, the risk of deliberate nuclear use will rise as well. Many potential proliferators are actually engaged in long-standing conflicts of great violence." [The emphasis is mine.]
63. Regimental *durbars* are occasions when the commanding officers hear publicly-voiced grievances of their troops and, where possible, take immediate remedial decisions. *Bara-khana* literally means "big meal" where officers and men of the regiment or unit share in a meal.

Sino - Indian Relations : Impressions on a Visit to China

MAJ GEN S C SINHA, PVSM (RETD)

In October 1992 the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Beijing, invited a delegation of five members from the United Service Institution of India (USI) to visit China. This invitation was a fall-out of the visit of the Vice-President of the China Institute, Gen Chai Chengwen, to India during which he had been invited to speak to members of the USI. I was fortunate in being a part of this delegation. During our visits we held discussions with the CISS, with the National Defence University of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and also with the Beijing University. We visited some industrial units in Shanghai, Xian and the new city of Shenzhen. In Guangdong (old Canton) we visited the Regional Military Headquarters. The main idea of the Chinese seem to have been to show us the tremendous progress made by China ever since Deng Xiaoping had opened up their industry to foreign investors and liberalised on the economic front. From Communist centralised control they moved to a market economy, which they liked to call "Capitalism with Chinese characteristics".

In October 1995 the China Institute for International Strategic Studies again invited me and my deputy at the United Service Institution of India to visit China. This time our stay was for a shorter period and our visits were limited to Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. We were also limited to holding discussions with the CISS and the Strategic Institute of their Defence University. On this visit instead of a meeting at Beijing University we held discussions with the Shanghai Institute of International Studies.

On this visit, on our way out, we halted for a few days in Bangkok where we were able to set up a discussion with the Institute of Security and International Studies at the Chulalongkorn University. This we found most useful as it gave us some idea of how the Thais, as one of the ASEAN countries and a neighbour of China, felt about their great neighbour.

I would like to first present some general impressions I formed about China from my two visits. This, I feel, will be a good back-drop to our

Maj. General S C Sinha, the former Director of the United Service Institution of India visited China for the second time, alongwith Air Cmde N B Singh on invitation from the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Beijing in October 1995.

consideration of Sino-Indian relations in which I will try to cover the gist of the discussions we had at the various Chinese Institutions.

During both my visits I could not but help being impressed by the tremendous economic progress China has made since Deng Xiaoping liberalised the economy and allowed private foreign investments. Ofcourse, this process which commenced in the early 1980s gave them almost a fifteen years' head start over India. Before my first visit to China I had heard a lot about the tremendous progress the country was making in the economic field and the unbelievable rates of their industrial growth and the increase in their GNP. I remember attending a talk on China given by Mr Robert MacNamara at the India International Centre in New Delhi, in which he had forecast that China would, by the turn of the century, be the second largest economy in the world and by A.D. 2010 its per capita income would reach the level of the present per-capita income of the UK. This was with the present population of 1,200 million, which China, with her tremendous effort at population control, hoped to bring down to around 600 million by the middle of the next century. Even though all these were mind-boggling statistics, I was certainly not prepared for the actual progress which was visible all around when we visited the country. It reminded me of Napoleon's forecast of what would happen when the "sleeping giant awoke".

It was a visit to the Great Wall which gave a good insight into the Chinese character, which we normally miss out. Here was a huge construction, the only artificial feature which is visible from the moon, a wall built over a length of over 1,500 miles and which took several hundred years to complete. Could there be a better example of the persistence of the Chinese people to achieve a goal they had set themselves irrespective of the time it takes. Of course the utility of this wall for keeping out invaders from the North is another matter.

The Communist regime continues, by and large, to be a one party dictatorship with its centralised control that had in the past built up basic industries and infrastructure. It certainly helped to improve the lot of the poorer sections of the society, who had been exploited for years under the old feudal system. It helped to level the gap between the rich and the poor. These aspects are certainly visible on the streets and rural countryside. People look well fed and clothed and you do not see anywhere the abject poverty of ill fed and ill clad people that you see on the streets of our cities and in our villages. But somewhere along the line the system seems to have stopped delivering the goods. Mao's "great leap forward" with "backyard steel furnaces" was a disaster and resulted in a 'great leap backwards' and then the cultural revolution which started with "letting a thousand flowers bloom" brought chaos and terrible misery in its train to many innocent victims.

It was Deng Xiaoping, the great Survivor, who as General Secretary was removed and arrested during the Cultural Revolution and bounced back into the leadership to set China on the liberalisation process and thus the Communist economic system was transformed into a market economy which today appears no different from the 'Capitalist system'. Its so called "Chinese characteristics" are difficult to discern. But inspite of the economic liberalisation there has been no let up on the political system. The Communist Party still maintains a firm grip on the Government with its one party rule. This was best brought out by the firm action taken to suppress the Tiananmen upsurge.

Today, Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are like any other European city. The Chinese industry has been expanding every year at unbelievable rates and their GNP has been increasing by leaps and bounds. Ofcourse, this resulted in a runaway inflation, which too has been brought under control. The new affluence is plainly visible especially in the coastal belt, where foreign investment has been pouring in. Since my last visit, three years back, vehicular traffic appeared to have trebled in these cities and the streams of cyclists had proportionately thinned out. Shops were brimming with all varieties of quality goods and there were any number of people who seemed to have the purchasing power to buy them. But then strict government rules prevent the movement of people from the poorer rural areas to these affluent economic zones, which is only possible to do under a dictatorial rule.

In every city we visited, new construction seemed to be coming up everywhere. In Shanghai, from the window of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, we counted some 21 highrise buildings coming up. One point, which is of interest to us, is the pace at which constructions come up. Last time, we were taken to see a newly constructed bridge over the Hwang Phu River in Shanghai. I noticed the bridge was of the same design and size as the new Howrah Bridge over the River Hooghly in Calcutta. This bridge at Shanghai was completed in two years compared to over twenty years it took in Calcutta. Last time we saw that construction had just been started on doubling the four lane 31 km road from Beijing airport to the city. This time we drove over the newly completed portion of the road. We visited a government owned shipyard in Shanghai. With twenty thousand labour of which only five thousand were engineers and technicians, this shipyard builds between fifty to sixty ships each year. I wish we could say that the Vizag shipyard, which employs a quarter of this labour force, could produce fifteen ships each year. This is something worthwhile in their work culture and discipline, which we could well emulate.

During our discussions at the various Institutes they all agreed that though contacts between India and China had been maintained for over two

thousand years, there had never been any conflict between the two countries. They felt that the conflict of 1962 was an aberration and there was no reason for this situation to recur. All outstanding disputes between the two countries, they felt, could be peacefully resolved and there should be no requirement to resort to force. At each of the Institutes the following problems came up for discussion in some form :-

(a) *The border dispute.* It was generally agreed that by recognising the Line of Actual Control and by moving troops back from eyeball to eyeball contact, the two countries had, to a large measure, defused the tension in the border areas. Then the Joint Working Group that had been decided upon during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, had been meeting regularly and dealing with problems arising in the border areas. But all this had not yet solved the main problem between the two countries which was a settlement of the boundary question. They maintain that the MacMahon Line had no legal basis and had never been recognised by China. They felt that there was no hurry in settling this issue as they appreciated that time was required on both sides to build up a favourable public opinion to move away from the rigid stand that had been taken on the issue. But still, as Gen Chai Chengwen said, during our previous visit that we should not pass on this problem to the next generation.

(b) *His Holiness the Dalai Lama.* Chinese are concerned over India giving refuge to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. They accused India of encouraging agitation amongst the Tibetan refugees and helping the so called Tibetan government in exile to destabilize the Chinese position in Tibet, which was an autonomous region of China and duly recognised by the Government of India. On our part we had pointed out that the Dalai Lama had not been given any official encouragement by the Indian Govt.

(c) *The Kashmir Situation.* There appeared a new interest in the situation in Kashmir. Till now the Chinese view had sided with Pakistan. Recently the increasingly vocal demand for 'Azadi' by certain sections of the Kashmiri militants seems to have led to a change in the Chinese attitude. They expressed themselves vehemently against Azadi for the Kashmiris in any form. Besides, some foreign elements being able to entrench themselves in an Azad Kashmir, such an event could have a chain reaction adverse to Chinese interests in this region. During our discussions the Chinese view expressed was that Kashmir was a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan which should be solved peacefully under the terms of the Simla agreement, but independence for Kashmir should be ruled out.

(d) *Expansion of the UN Security Council.* In discussions on this subject at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, they felt that certain principles about the expansion of the Council and the inclusion of new permanent members needed to be formulated. They were of the opinion that countries of Africa and South America, which had no representation in the Council, should be given preference. On this basis they felt that probably Egypt and Brazil had strong claims. Asked about the Chinese support for India's claim to a permanent seat they agreed that a country of India's size and potential should be included but it appeared that the Chinese position on this had yet to be formulated.

Overall view that was expressed over and over again was that China's main aim in the foreseeable future was to improve the economic lot of their people and to catch up with the Western economies. For this reason they wished to avoid any confrontation which detracts from their developmental activities. There was no mention of Taiwan, Vietnam or Spratly Islands. When faced with the query about their attempts to gain entry to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar, they vehemently denied this. They said that this was a part of Western propaganda to show up China having imperialistic designs.

The Chinese justified their peaceful intentions by pointing to their comparatively small Defence budget which they claimed to be only 7.5 billion US dollars. They also brought up the reduction of one million men in the Army. They did not, however, bring up the various other methods that were being used to maintain a three million Army on a budget the Indian Army found difficult to maintain a one million strong force. These points are now all reflected in the White Paper on Defence that the Chinese government has recently brought out.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that China's main objective is to catch up in the economic field with the West. To do this, they have liberalised on the economic side and gone on to a market economy with very good results. But unlike the former Soviet Union, they have kept a strict hold on the political side, in which there has been no relaxation. The Communist Party with its one party rule has maintained a very firm grip on the Governmental apparatus. Though China repeatedly professes peaceful intentions, its Middle Kingdom syndrome seems to, at times, show up as in its recent claim on Spratly Islands and its tantrums over the visit of the Taiwanese President to the USA. For India it is certainly important to come to a fair settlement of the long outstanding boundary problem. India also needs to be watchful of the Chinese activities in Myanmar and its efforts to gain entry into the Indian Ocean through that country.

China in the 21st Century - Implications for India

K K MITRA

INTRODUCTION

An Indian scholar wrote recently, quite rightly in my view, that there is "frightening complacency" in this country about China and the threat it poses to India. Our policy makers seem to be engrossed with the nuclear threat from Pakistan, but they do not blame China loudly enough for exporting nuclear technology to Pakistan. Have we forgotten that China humiliated India, took its territory by force and still claims large chunks of Indian territory? There are many in India who cite the growing diplomatic, cultural and economic interaction and the relatively tension-free border as evidence of improvement in relations between the two countries.

There is every reason to hope that bilateral relations between India and China may improve further in the coming years. The total trade between the two countries may reach \$ 4 billion by the end of this decade from the current less than \$ 1 billion. Although China does not accept Sikkim as a part of India yet, happily for India, China now takes a position of neutrality of sorts on the Kashmir issue. Nevertheless, there is no likelihood of a mutually acceptable solution of the border dispute in the foreseeable future.

In real terms, improvement in Sino-Indian relations will not bring about any material change in China's strategic alliance with Pakistan. A new and additional concern for India is China's expanding political, economic and military ties with Myanmar. Sino-Indian relations will remain essentially competitive in the 21st century and the process of on going detente will be marked by mutual suspicion. Therefore, a close look at the scenario that is likely to emerge during the early years of the coming century is in order.

China and India, the two giants of Asia, together account for over 2 billion of the world's 5.3 billion people. With their economic reform, growing military power and global integration, the two countries, by the end of the first decade of the next century, are likely to play significant roles in the Asia -

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Pacific and the Indian Ocean region respectively. Just how important and how powerful are these two countries likely to become by the early part of the next century? These are questions which defy clear cut answers because there are too many variables involved in the calculation of a country's strategic potential and acquisition of power. Nevertheless, analysts and strategic thinkers agree that sustained rapid economic development is a crucial determinant and significant indicator of a nation's potential to be a regional or global power of some consequence.

The economic importance of the two countries are often under-estimated due to reliance on the misleading conventional calculations of Gross National Product (GNP). There is general agreement now that after adjusting for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), India's per capita GNP will be somewhere around \$ 1000 to \$ 1150 which would make India's economy a little larger than Britain's. Similarly, the IMF, the World Bank and the UN PPP estimates of China's per capita GNP vary from \$ 1396 to \$ 3396 for the year 1992. A figure in the middle range would still give China an economy much bigger than Germany's and approaching that of Japan. According to the "World Development Report (World Bank)" of 1994, China's was the third largest economy after US & Japan and India's was the fifth largest after Germany in the list of the Ten biggest world economies (GDP on PPP basis).

There are many similarities in the developmental process in the two countries. Both China and India have significant technological and scientific base though millions in both the countries are still using farming techniques which have not changed for centuries. The transition to competitive market economies have created a strong nexus in both the countries between politicians, bureaucrats, organised crime and business, and corruption is rampant in both the societies. Both China and India are grappling with the common problems of inefficient public enterprises, retaining the levers of macro-economic management centrally while allowing decentralization of economic decision-making and above all, garnering political support for reform among rural population.

Along with growing economies, China and India are also steadily acquiring military strength. India has more than a million strong Army, expanding deep water fleet, indigenous missile delivery system, well-developed nuclear capability and space research programme. China's military capability is second only to that of the US and is expanding rapidly. It is already a nuclear power of global dimensions. From all available indications, both India and China will be able to sustain steady military build up in the years to come, but at the current level of rate of economic growth, China's military capabilities will be substantially greater in the coming decade and beyond.

COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE

How have the two countries performed so far? After decades of unimpressive growth, India's growth rate accelerated to nearly 5 per cent in 1993-94 and reached 6.3 per cent in 1994-95. China maintained a steady more than 9.5 per cent average annual rate from 1978 till 1992 and double digit rates from 1992 to 1994. Since 1978, the per capita GDP of China has roughly quadrupled - a truly spectacular performance.

China's high growth rate stems from its high level of domestic savings and investment. China saves and invests about 40 per cent of its GDP, whereas India, a little over half of that. During 1981-1990 China's gross domestic investment was 33.6 per cent of its GDP on the average while gross domestic savings was 34.6 per cent. In 1993, the respective figures were 43 and 40 per cent, among the highest in the world. Secondly, India is much less urbanised and more dependent on agriculture in terms of share of national output and employment; sixty per cent of the working population in India are farmers, many in small-scale agriculture which acts as a brake on rapid growth.

In two key areas of reform, namely, foreign investment and foreign trade, China's performance has been superb. By the mid-90s, China had become one of the world's largest trading nations, its trade to GDP ratio having risen from 8 per cent in 1978 to over 20 per cent in 1992-93. In 1994, China's total trade stood at \$ 237 billion. By comparison, in 1994-95, India's total foreign trade amounted \$ 5.5 billion. As far as foreign direct investment is concerned, China's record is truly impressive. In fact, FDI has been the most important instrument for lifting China's economy rapidly. In 1994, it contracted US \$ 81.40 billion and the actual investment amounted to \$ 34 billion. The average annual inflow between 1979 and 1994 was \$ 6.1 billion. According to the latest RBI figures, from April 1995 to January, 1996, India's foreign direct investment amounted to only \$ 1.6 billion. In the years 1993-94 and 1994-95, FDI in India was \$ 620 million and \$ 1.31 billion, respectively.

China's foreign exchange reserves stood at a substantial \$ 80.83 billion at the end of March 1996 as against \$ 20.89 billion for India in January 1996. Although China's outstanding foreign debt was \$ 93 billion at the end of 1994, the debt burden was modest with a debt-service ratio of 9.12 per cent on account of its massive exports which enabled China to be a large borrower from abroad. By contrast, India's external debt stood at \$ 99.04 billion in March 1995 with a relatively high debt-service ratio of 26.6 per cent in 1994-95. India's trade reform not only began much later, it has moved at a leisurely pace unlike China where sustained commitment to liberalization of external trade has paid rich dividends.

Without doubt, China has out-performed India in terms of growth, capital inflow and social dimensions of development, China has higher aggregate per capita production of goods and services, higher levels of health and education and less number of people living in absolute poverty. The World Bank's and the United Nations economic and social indicators are significantly higher in the case of China.

PROJECTIONS FOR CHINA'S FUTURE

Many in the West have wondered whether China will be able to sustain its spectacular economic record in view of various uncertainties and systemic instabilities that may slow down China's rapid emergence as an economic and military super power in the coming decades. Admittedly, China faces uncertain political future surrounding Deng's imminent succession. But there are certain vital areas in which post-Deng China will differ from post-Mao China.

The current Chinese leadership is much less divided than their "revolutionary" predecessors over the basic domestic and foreign policy issues. Though there are latent differences over the pace and extent of economic reforms, there is a broad consensus in favour of the need for economic pragmatism and links with the outside world. The majority now seem to prefer relatively slower and gradualist reform while retaining strong political control by the centre so that the various socio-economic evils caused by rapid transition to market economy-such as corruption, crime, unemployment, etc., can be kept in check. Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua and many others belong to the more conservative group which exert greater influence within the leading party and state organs than the more adventurous Zhu Rong Ji, Qiao Shi or Tian Jiyun.

As China approaches the post-Deng era, one notices a number of domestic trends which will inevitably shape and influence China's foreign policy and strategic posture in the coming years. The growing economic disparities, wide-spread corruption, unemployment, urban inflation - have all combined to give rise to public discontent and cynicism. The Communist Party's prestige has suffered a relative decline and the capacity of the Leninist state apparatus to enforce decisions has diminished. The leaders of China have realised that the legitimacy of one party dictatorship will be challenged in future if they fail to reverse the growing popular discontent. They are also aware that in the long run, economic success may generate pressures for political change as it has done in South Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere. Hence, there is a consensus at present that political reform must be given a back seat and there should be greater authoritarian control so that the change-over to post-Deng era is smooth and orderly.

More importantly, as the legitimacy of Communist ideology declines, the leaders of China today seem more and more compelled to appeal to patriotic nationalism in order to justify one party rule. The new generation of PLA leaders are younger, better-educated and more professionally trained than their predecessors. The attention of the officer Corps is now focussed mainly on modernization of the armed forces because they believe that China must acquire military strength for attaining global stature. Many within the PLA seem convinced that the West led by the US intends to weaken or fragment China by promoting dissent and separatism. The PLA advocates expansion of China's naval and air capabilities so that China can regain its historical role as the dominant power in Asia.

Unlike their predecessors, the PLA leaders of today have fewer political ties and consequently, the civilian leaders are less and less able to manipulate them for political ends as in the past. None of the top civilian leaders today have the power or charisma to disregard the military's views which has been amply illustrated by the recent hardline response vis-a-vis the US on the Taiwan issue.

The Chinese military planners today place high priority on the creation of a modern force structure consistent with rapid power projection and more combined services tactical operations doctrine employing sophisticated C³I systems. The strategic outlook is now that of a continental-cum-maritime power with much wider range of external security needs. The emphasis is on the development of air-borne drop and amphibious landing capabilities, air and naval electronic warfare systems, precision-guided munitions, communication and early warning satellites and inflight refuelling technology.

Given sustained growth, China's future military capabilities will be substantially greater. By AD 2010, China will have, according to various estimates, a strategic nuclear force with 50-70 MIRV, solid-fuel ICBMs capable of targeting all of Asia, parts of Russia and most of the USA. A fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines will most likely enable China to hit targets in Asia from under the sea. Its navy will have aircraft-carrier capability of modest scale and the Air Force will be modernized with advanced combat aircraft.

There is general agreement among China-watchers that China's impressive economic performance and growth rate can be sustained in the remaining years of this century and beyond-albeit at a slightly reduced pace. At the recently held 4th session of the 8th NPC, Premier Li Peng has indicated that China will apply moderate brakes on the fast-paced reform programme. The average annual growth rate during the 9th Five Year Plan (1996-2000) will be kept at

8 per cent as against a steady nearly 10 per cent annual growth rate experienced by China since 1981. However, this will only marginally delay, but not postpone, China's emergence as an economic super-power by early 21st century.

No doubt there are other problems too connected with the ongoing economic reform which have to be tackled with a combination of expertise and ideological flexibility on the part of the Chinese leadership. In order to sustain even the moderately high annual average growth rate of 8 per cent, China has to undertake extensive structural reforms. The fiscal system needs overhauling. The restrictive property and labour rights and the pricing structure of the State-owned enterprises need to be made more compatible with the market system.

China has been facing severe fiscal deficit which was estimated to be in the order of \$ 14 billion in 1994 - more than a quarter of government revenues. Apart from greater need for public spending in social sectors such as health care, housing, unemployment, etc. there is pressing need for expenditure in infra-structural development, environment, alleviation of regional disparities and most importantly, for funding the steadily rising defence budget. Meanwhile, the Central Government revenues have been declining as a share of GNP.

These are, however, transitional problems and are manageable. The Chinese regime is better suited to withstand serious bouts of macro-economic instability as compared to the struggling new infant democracies of Eastern Europe which, unlike China, are facing the problems of double transition viz., building of a democratic society and transition to a market economy. Though economic and political institutions ultimately interact with each other and a Marxist-Leninist state is fundamentally incompatible with a market system, China has shown that one Party dictatorship can co-exist with market reform, at least in the short-term. In fact, China's authoritarian political system has allowed the gradual development of market forces and provided a stable climate for massive inflow of foreign capital which has mainly propelled China's rapid economic growth since the eighties.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

It is reasonably fair to assume, therefore, that by the end of the first decade of the next century, China will probably be the second largest economy in the world (or, perhaps, the largest economy if one includes "Greater China") with much greater military capabilities than it has at present. It is noteworthy that unlike the frequent debate on the pace and extent of economic reform, the current leadership in China is not divided on the issue of military posturing. China's aggressive nationalist approach is evident from the way it has handled

the territorial disputes in the South China sea. It's regular resort to force in seizing islands demonstrate that it may not hesitate to use force to take what it claims as its own. The recent show of military might in the Taiwan Straits illustrates this tendency more forcefully.

It has been argued that as China becomes more and more integrated into the regional and global economy and depends more and more on foreign capital and trade for sustaining its impressive economic growth, its military posture may become less aggressive and China will be reluctant to intervene militarily in a dispute unless it perceives that its vital economic interests are at stake. But economics and politics often follow their separate course and economic interdependence may not necessarily bring about political harmony between China and its neighbours. China's aggressive military posture against Taiwan which accounts for roughly 10 to 15 per cent of its actual foreign direct investment and 20 per cent of China's total trade is a case in point.

During the remaining years of this century and beyond, the primary goal of China will be maintenance of moderately high rate of economic growth and attainment of big power status. China will carefully watch the future military postures of the US and Japan and also that of other regional players in Asia - notably India. The central element in its foreign policy will be the quest for ways and means of limiting the power of all its regional and global rivals so that it can become the preponderant power in Asia and a global power in its own right.

In the past, China has used military power on several occasions to "right the wrongs of history". It is also unique among the great powers in having territorial dispute with virtually all its neighbours. Will, therefore, a strong and powerful China, be tempted to project its military power outside its borders or overseas? It is said that when nations are weak, they cite principles. When they are strong, they invoke the artillery. Will this dictum be true of an economically prosperous and militarily powerful China?

There is no country in the world which has undergone more radical and more frequent changes in foreign policy than China. During the Cold War era, it has been alternately the friend and adversary of both the superpowers. The South East Asian countries and India have seen China's warm friendship and bitter enmity by turn. Vietnam, once the closest ally, became China's arch enemy. No wonder, therefore, that as China becomes more and more powerful, its neighbours in East and South East Asia tend to feel uncomfortable due to the potential future threat from an economically powerful and militarily aggressive China.

CONCLUSION

If India realises its full economic and military potential and develops its capabilities in the field of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, it can hope to acquire countervailing power vis-a-vis China by the year 2010. So far, however, Indian policy-makers have not been able to adequately respond to the rapid change in the post-cold war security scenario. India, in the coming years, will have to watch China not only across the Himalayas, but also in the larger Asian context and the Indian Ocean in particular where the interests of the two countries are likely to clash in the next century.

The next decade will be crucial for India. Like China, India is also passing through a political transition. If the next ruling Government in Delhi shows half-hearted commitment to the agenda for economic reform, India will fall significantly behind and will not be able to acquire the stature of a regional power of consequence, though it has the size, resource-base and technological depth to be a key player. Meanwhile, as China's economic clout grows, it will inevitably seek to expand its areas of influence because it seems all set to acquire the capability to project significant military power outside its land and sea borders within a decade from now. India's strategic focus must, therefore, remain on the challenge posed by the likely emergence of a powerful and aggressive China in the 21st century.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues and Defence and Security forces, for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by self-addressed and stamped envelope.

China's Claim to South China Sea : An Area of Instability

REAR ADMIRAL KRISHAN DEV, AVSM (RETD)

In the recent months there have been a flurry of incidents in the South China Sea and its surrounding areas which are a symptom of the power rivalry which is growing in this area. The People's Republic of China (PRC) not only lays claim to the entire South China Sea but also all the islands situated in it, which is disputed by other littoral states.


The basic cause of the dispute is that PRC like Japan, before World War II, tends to take refuge in mythical and historical memories of the distant past to claim sovereignty over various nearby waters and areas. Further, with the growing influence of armed forces and dwindling oil supplies to fuel its modernization programmes, the desire for exploiting oil has emerged as the most important element, leading to rather aggressive Chinese power projection in the South China Sea. The more immediate cause of contention appeared in 1992.

1992 LAW OF ANNEXATION

In late February of that year, the Chinese announced that a law had been passed effectively annexing not just the Paracel Islands (taken by force from Vietnam in 1974) and the Spratlys, but the whole of South China Sea. The law may not have been precise by Western standards but its political meaning was very clear. China for a long time had been committing cartographic aggression against Southeast Asia. Beijing's maps regularly showed the border of the People's Republic of China sweeping around the outer reaches of the South China Sea - infringing Vietnam's 200-mile continental shelf in the west, coming close or crossing into Indonesia's Natuna Islands to the South West; almost touching the shores of the Malaysian State of Sarawak in the South and coming close to Palwan in the Southeast. The new law merely made the cartographic aggression into an official state policy. (*See Map I*).

Four years before the 1992 law, in 1988, the Chinese had shown their seriousness by fighting with Vietnam to establish their foothold in the Spratly archipelago. In addition, Beijing's maps had included the Nansha Islands (Chi-

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SOURCE :- *Pacific Affairs*

MAP I

nese name for Spratlys) ever since the PRC was formed. The Chinese have never disguised the fact that they claim sovereignty over the whole of the South China Sea. The 1992 law was passed without any reference to the littoral states and without any sign of Chinese concern for South Asian sensitivities. This was more out of political expediency arising from the embarrassment in the wake of Beijing massacre of 1989. For most Chinese it was restoration of China's dominance in the region after two centuries of weakness.

ASEAN DECLARATION

This provoked ASEAN foreign ministers to issue a declaration on July 22, 1992 in Manila which stressed "the necessity to restore all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force." Crucially, the ASEAN declaration had no teeth. The ASEAN countries since then have continued to act more out of concern not to offend Beijing rather than with a determination to defend their interests in spite of China's blatant aggression, as they feel militarily weak. China is also unwilling to discuss this problem with ASEAN nations, which it still regards as tributary states, who have no right to stand on an equal footing with the Middle Kingdom. At the most it is willing to discuss competing claims only bilaterally and rejects all proposals for multilateral arrangements. China has also rejected all attempts at placing these controversies before any international legal tribunal and thus no legalistic solution is possible.

ISLANDS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed water body which is dotted all over with specks of Islands and atolls and is surrounded by China and Taiwan in the north, Vietnam in the west, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei in the south and Philippines in the east. These islands are sitting literally mid-ocean, making it difficult to identify these islets as being extension of the continental shelf of the concerned littoral nations.

The islands of South China Sea have been generally placed under four major groups - Paracels, Spratlys, Pratas and the Macclesfield Bank. Out of these island groups - Paracels and Spratly are worth considering. The *Paracel archipelago* is a group of 15 islands and several sand banks and reefs. They are situated less than 150 nautical miles from the southern coast of China's Hainan Island, and about 240 nautical miles from Da Nang in Vietnam. Since 1974, they have been under the control of the PRC which has built an air-strip, and other naval and storage facilities which have provided it a jumping off capability by about 300 km. into the South China Sea. The *Spratly archipelago* is a larger group with over 230 islands and falls in the southern part of the

South China Sea. Only seven islands are more than 0.1 sq. km. in area. Thity, the largest island in the Spratlys, controlled by the Philippines, is itself less than one mile long and just 625 yards wide. The Spratlys group stretches for about 500 nautical miles from north to south and by the nearest-point measures less than 100 nautical miles from the coasts of either the Philippines or Malaysia. It is about 330 nautical miles east of the southern coast of Vietnam and about 400 nautical miles from the southern tip of the Paracels.

Following the Japanese surrender of all these territories after World War II, China being engaged in fighting in Korea (1951-53), with India (1962) and the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam involved in its historic war with the USA, South China Sea lay flat calm in the fifties and the sixties. It was not until the oil crisis of 1973 and the consequent advances in oil drilling technologies that the South China Sea became a region of interest amongst the littoral states for these economic and geostrategic reasons. These powers today are not so much interested in claiming territorial sovereignty over these islands as in controlling the maritime waters and sea-bed resources beneath for the mineral wealth.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

Only documentary evidence available in support of Chinese claim is that in 1883, German surveyors in the Spratlys had withdrawn following a formal protest by the Qing government. In 1907, the Qing regime had itself despatched its senior military personnel to survey the South China Sea. There are also geological studies linking China's mainland to some of these islands. However, since the formation of the PRC and until 1970, it had done nothing more than issue statements and warnings in various international fora. For record, the first official exposition of Communist China's claims over the South China Sea was made at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. Zhou-En-Lai, the then foreign minister of China, ensured that the Draft Treaty stipulated that Japan should renounce all rights to Nan Wei (Spratlys) and Si Sha (Paracels) Islands, but again deliberately made no mention of the problem of restoring sovereignty over them.

The real assertion of Chinese authority over the South China Sea began only in 1970 when the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) launched its survey operations in the Amphitrite Group, the easternmost cluster of two island groups making up the Paracel archipelago. Meteorological, topographical and geological surveys were conducted and finally a meteorological station was set up on Woody Island, the largest in the Paracels. Later in January 1974, the western cluster of the Paracels, the Crescent Group, was also annexed by the Chinese from South Vietnam, which was then engaged in a fight

for survival with North Vietnam. This was later to emerge as the major forward base for future Chinese expansion into the South China Sea. On November 8, 1980, for the first time, two Hong-6 bombers patrolled the Spratlys area, on orders directly from the Central Military Commission (CMC). By 1983, these air patrols and aerial photography had become a routine affair. This was then followed by extensive oceanographic surveys and in late 1986, China built an observation station in the Spratlys. This was strongly contested by Vietnam but after a brief encounter on March 14, 1988, China occupied seven islands in the Spratlys.

Of the fifteen military actions conducted by Beijing since the founding of PRC, China considers only two - the Korean War and its 1979 incursion - to have been on foreign territory. The others including the snatching of Paracel islands (1974) and occupation of part of Spratlys (1988) simply as operations to resume control of "illegally occupied" Chinese territory. It has thus not hesitated to back up territorial claims by naked force. According to Hashim Dzalal, Indonesian Foreign Ministry expert "they don't argue, they just talk about Chinese dynasties. They tell us this is the national heritage of China and that this is all clear. Thus Beijing's lack of precision is frustrating." Michael Swaine, a RAND Corporation expert says "you have to start from the basic fact that China is not a status-quo power. She is not satisfied with its role in the region.

CURRENT RAISON D'ETRE FOR THE CONFLICT

Howsoever logical be China's legal-historical justification, its claims to the South China Sea at present, in the post Cold War order, is based primarily on the following four security concerns.

- * As mentioned earlier, in 1992 China's National People's Congress had passed legislation declaring sovereignty over the South China Sea.
- * China is today interested in this area also for strategic reasons. Twenty-five per cent of the world's shipping passes through the South China Sea, including the super tankers carrying fuel oil that provide energy for the economies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. China wants to control this region's shipping lanes that will significantly enhance its influence and power. It also wants to keep other regional powers out of the South China Sea to ensure its own security and peace.
- * China requires the South China Sea for meeting the surging domestic demand for petroleum products which, as a result of its rapid modernisation, increased by 8.5 per cent in 1991 and by 9 percent in

1993. In 1994, this fifth largest producer of oil had started importing oil and analysts suspect that by the year 2000, China will be importing 20 per cent of its oil requirements.

Finally, in the face of growing protein shortage on the mainland, the fish harvest from the South China Sea has become increasingly attractive. According to one estimate 2.5 million tons of fish were harvested in 1990 from the waters off the Spratlys alone.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL

Thus contrary to the general post Cold War environment of diffusing tension, Southeast Asian regional balance of power has been disturbed. This started with Nixon Doctrine of gradual withdrawal of U.S. from the region. The withdrawal culminated in early nineties with the U.S. exit from the Philippines. The 1974 Chinese occupation of Paracel indicated the impact of the initial shift in the balance of power and led to the 1988 confrontation with Vietnam in Spratly. It marked the beginning of a much more volatile situation involving virtually every member of the ASEAN and Taiwan and indicated Chinese approach to settlement of disputes.

The States have responded to this instability by enhancing their military capability to maintain the option to use force to strengthen their respective foothold in the disputed territory, and, if necessary, forcefully deter other States from doing so. This has made the region "an arms sellers paradise". In recent months, Malaysia has acquired 18 Russian MIG 29's, FA-18s and two corvettes and Singapore and Taiwan are receiving and will coproduce Lockheed F-16 fighters. The Gulf War, with its dazzling display of hitech weaponry, came as a shock to PRC. The collapse of the USSR turned Soviet Union into a vast warehouse of high-tech arms available at fire-sale prices. The easy availability of Russia's sophisticated weapon systems and the U.S. "access relationship of military exercises" etc. with ASEAN Nations have further complicated the general uncertainty of power equations.

China's long-term interests in South China Sea islands are driving Beijing's efforts to become a maritime power so that it can effectively claim sovereignty over the area. For the past century, although China has indicated its keen interest in the South China Sea, yet only in recent years has she achieved the economic and technological capabilities to deploy a navy and project force into the region. Despite the fact that Russia and the U.S. no longer dominate the South China Sea, while they exercised a counter balancing effect in the 1970's and 1980's, yet China's relative strength in the region continued to increase dramatically. Beijing continues with its naval build-up and modern-

ization. China's naval modernization was not initially motivated by strategic considerations during the Cold War, but rather by the growing confidence of Beijing as a regional power, and even a global power, and the desire to fulfil this role militarily. Interests such as control over the South China Sea were more of a driving force in the Chinese naval build up than the Soviet or American naval threats. China thinks it now can build a navy without the fear that this will provoke a response from Russia or the U.S.

DEVELOPMENT OF BLUE WATER NAVY

Accordingly, China is acquiring the capability to project its power far from its shores. China has acquired kilo class submarines from Russia. Orders are confirmed for 10 and 12 more are in the pipe line. China realized that without effective air cover, the expanding Chinese Navy was vulnerable to air and missile attack. Accordingly, it bought SU 27 long range fighter bombers. It has also acquired air-refuelling technology from Iran and Israel. China is also negotiating with Russian Pacific Fleet to purchase two aircraft carriers and a recent China News Agency publication called for increase in defence budget so that she can build an aircraft carrier to 'secure oil resources in waters surrounding the disputed Nansha (Spratlys) Islands.' It has been carrying out vigorous amphibious and naval exercises. China has today the capability to conduct operations involving the equivalent of two divisions at a good distance from its shores. China considers that in order to be a global player it must control South China Sea to have access to the Indian Ocean.

CHINESE HEGEMONY

China's long term objective in the South China Sea, a Western intelligence official theorizes, is to control the area well enough to exploit any resources it contains, specially oil and gas. For this purpose, it is taking a two track approach, flexing its muscles through military exercises and at the same time calling joint development, without meaning it. "As far as neighbours are concerned this shows an arrogant hegemonistic China" says Godwin of the U.S. National Defence University. China can be expected to divide its neighbours, to intimidate some and sweet talk to others. Lieut. Col. Cui Yu Chen, a Chinese writer on military affairs, in his book, *A New Scramble for Soft Frontiers*, mentions that China's area for survival is shrinking. "Therefore, where will our new borderland be?" Actually, we have to reclaim sovereignty and sovereign interests in the oceans - territorial seas, continental shelf and exclusive economic zones - a total area of 3 million sq. kilometers, an area which it claims was lost to the Imperial powers like Russia, France and Britain before World War II. "Watch what we do, not what we say" said former Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, to American President Richard


Nixon. China continues to carry out nuclear tests, the last one being in mid-May, estimated at between 50 and 95 kilotons in strength, inspite of 178 nations having agreed to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for an unlimited period.

SLEEPING DRAGON

"There lies a sleeping giant" begins Napoleon's well known remark about China. "Let him sleep. For when she wakes, she will shake the world". Today with 1.2 billion people (every fourth person in the world will be Chinese by the end of the century) and a 2.9 million strong army, China can cast an ominous shadow without even trying. Fortified by a fast growing economy, China shows distinct signs of rising from its slumber. It is existential threat. They are just so damn big says Jonathan Pollock, a Chinese specialist at the RAND Corporation in California. Some of the neighbours, uncertain of Beijing's intentions, are indeed cautious. To make matters worse, China hides its budget and defence doctrine behind a veil of secrecy (See estimates of Chinese defence budget Fig 2). China's might does not need hitech forces to threaten its neighbours. For example, it needs only a couple of kilo class submarines, with their mine laying capability, to lay siege to Taiwan. It hopes thus to frighten its rulers into submission. It considers that the time for action is now. It was keen to stop elections to Taiwan's national legislature which were held in early December 1995. Similarly, it wants to interfere in Presidential elections due to be held in March 1996. Kuomintang has again attained majority in the national legislature. This comes out vividly in a recent best seller - *T Day* - (August 1995)" written by Cheng Lang-ping, which depicts an imaginary invasion. The strategic imbalance in the region is obvious as is apparent in Fig 3, besides supremacy in man power.

ROLE OF JAPAN

But Beijing has not taken into consideration how Japan will respond to the new situation particularly as South China Sea is Japan's "umbilical cord" and vital to its economic survival. It may draw Tokyo into the regional power vacuum, if it feels that free flow of resources through the area cannot be ensured. This in turn would only further agitate the Southeast Asian States and encourage them to further build-up their military strength. ASEAN States will not merely standby while China pushes ahead with its naval build up. With Vietnam becoming a member of ASEAN, this may encourage ASEAN countries to exclude Chinese influence and unilaterally move forward with joint development of the South China Sea resources. The possibility of such an eventuality was demonstrated by the 1988 agreement between Manila and Hanoi to resolve their dispute peacefully, and, a Kuala Lumpur - Hanoi



agreement in 1992 to jointly develop areas where their claims overlap. A Japan-ASEAN alliance may well cause Beijing to seek a multilateral solution to the disputes. Recent recognition of Vietnam by the U.S. and a likely U.S. return to South East Asia may result in a Chinese counter move, such as a quick settlement of the territorial disputes to reduce tension in the region and thereby prevent other littoral states from seeking greater U.S. presence and closer co-operation to prevent Chinese domination.

CONCLUSION

"Our policy is engagement, not containment" asserts Winston Lord, America's Assistant Secretary of State. "If you treat China as an enemy, China will become an enemy" says Joseph Nye, his colleague at the Defence Department. However, as China continues with nuclear tests, fires missiles off the coast of Taiwan and refuses to discuss the question of sovereignty of Paracels and Spratly's islands with ASEAN countries, it is difficult to pretend that it is not, potentially, a source of instability. Western and Asian countries need to recognize this.

"Under Mr. Clinton, Americans have sometimes given the impression", writes the *Economist*, "that after the Cold War, economics is all that matters. Strategic concerns about the balance of power in Asia now seem to be regarded as anachronistic. In fact any attempt to deal with growing Chinese power must combine economic openness with strategic firmness."

"If you can rule your whole country," declared Confucious, "who dares insult you." Territorial unity is what has always bestowed legitimacy upon a Chinese ruler. Chinese leaders ridden by succession crisis, seem to be looking for traditional sources of strength. Even before Deng's passing away, military has gained power in decision making. "Jiang Zemin has already promoted hundreds of young generals and has allowed the military to take part in politburo meetings" says Andrew Young of Taipei's Chinese Centre for Advance Policy Studies.

General Tetsuya Nishimoto of Japan recently told *Strait Times*, after a visit to Beijing, "How China plans to develop its military strength, what will be the results of such efforts and what action it will take are matters of great concern and interest to all of us."

Already a Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore & Britain has been formed. FPDA recently (September 95) conducted an exercise, code named STAR FISH 15/95, in South China Sea, an area of overlapping territorial claims. FPDA is stressing

the military and political value of continued cooperation. The Philippine Navy has also recently conducted exercises with U.S. Fleet near Spratlys. It is to spend \$ 2 billion on acquiring aircraft and patrol boats in the next few years.

Although all ASEAN nations play down fears about China but in realpolitik they can see the big danger looming ahead. Singapore's erstwhile Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has said that some people would interpret China's activities in the Spratlys as a big dog "lifting his leg against a tree, so that smaller dogs will know that a big dog has been there and take note of that." It is a relatively benign analogy. Unless of course you happen to be a tree.

One can only forecast arms race and growing tension in South China Sea in the times ahead, unless powers involved can peacefully settle the questions of sovereignty and development.

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PLA in the Deng Era

MAJ GENERAL DIPANKAR BANERJEE, AVSM

BACKGROUND

The Deng Xiaoping era began with his return to power for the third time in 1976 when Mao Zedong went to keep his appointment with Marx. The last nearly twenty years in the life of a nation of 1.2 billion have been dominated by Deng. He has made his indelible mark in China's history like many that have gone before him. His period in particular has been characterised by momentous developments; such as the Four Modernisations, China's emergence as a major global economic player and the improved capabilities of its armed forces. A conjunction of these factors has the potential to make China a leading nation in the world by the second decade of the 21st Century. This is a major contribution by any standards. An area where Deng's imprint will last for a long time is in the nation's security policy and on the PLA. As the era draws to a close it is time to assess this contribution.

The PLA has always been a dominant institution. It was officially founded on August 1, 1927, some six years after the Communist Party of China (CPC) was formed. But, in the initial years, till perhaps as late as the 1940s, it was the PLA that held the premier position in the organisation and was the unifying factor. It has been said, perhaps with some exaggeration, that it is neither the Party nor the Government that set up the Army, but the PLA that set up both. In the period of transition to the third generation leadership, after Deng finally passes from the scene, it is again the PLA that can be expected to play a dominant role.

Long years of continuous conflict have honed the PLA into a formidable fighting machine, but essentially for the type of wars that it was required to fight in its own special operational environment. This capability was effective perhaps till the mid 1960s. With Marshal Peng De Huai's fall in 1959 and Lin Biao's rise, there was a sharp downturn. Professionalism was downplayed and instead political correctness was emphasised. It was better to be Red than an expert. Though the Cultural Revolution did not affect the Army perhaps to the same extent as the rest of society, the PLA was not entirely isolated. As a result of this and with the break with the Soviet Union, by 1975 the PLA had

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reached its nadir. Deng was quick to spot this. In July 1975 when he was the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) he launched an attack on the complacency and factionalism in the PLA. He accused it of being 'overstaffed, lax, arrogant and lazy'. In his assessment, the PLA was "in considerable disarray" having lost its fine traditions and had become a bloated outfit. "unable to make a good showing in combat".¹

Less than a year later Deng was purged again, unable to improve the PLA. His words proved prophetic. In the war to "teach a lesson" to Vietnam in early 1979, when Deng was ironically back again in power, as the PLA's Chief of General Staff and Vice Chairman of the CMC, it suffered a major military set-back. The immediate analysis after the war blamed the PLA's backward state of weapons and equipment, due to which it was unable to "conduct a modern war".² But a detailed assessment by Marshal Xu Xiangjian the then Defence Minister, concluded later by asserting that;

"We must admit that our Army cannot meet with the demands of modern war. There are many questions concerning the use of modern weapons, the organisation of joint operations, and bringing the various armed services into play.... These are acute contradictions before us and we must make arduous efforts to resolve this. Otherwise, even if our Army has modern weapons, it cannot use them and bring these into full play....We must equip ourselves with advance military thinking to meet the needs of modernising our national defence and the needs of future war".³

Marshal Xu's report put the onus of military reconstruction not on acquiring weapons and equipment but allotted priority to modernising national defence thinking and on updating military doctrine. This was in tune with Deng's own assessment of the world situation in the late 1970s. Even though there were many unfavourable developments, the overall situation was favourable to China. In any case, a major world war was not likely.

DENG'S STRATEGIC REASSESSMENT

This allowed Deng to make a major reassessment of the world strategic environment. From Mao's earlier dictum of preparing for "an early war", a "major war" and a "nuclear war", Deng made a major departure. He said that a major war between superpowers was not likely in the near future. Instead, competition between nations will be more in the sphere of "National Defence Construction".⁴ What was important at this stage was to develop "comprehensive national strength". This concept of "comprehensive national strength" was to be the foundation of China's security policy in the first decade and more of Deng's rule. According to this formulation, military power is but only

one component of overall national power. Other and even more important elements are political stability, ideological purity, cultural prosperity, educational, scientific and technological achievements and economic growth.⁵ It was this logic of Deng that allocated priorities to the Four Modernisations programme in 1978, with Military Modernisation as the last priority. According to Premier Zhou Enlai's earlier plan of June 1975, defence modernisation had been accorded third place, ahead of science and technology.⁶

The benign strategic environment that China now enjoyed for the first time since the mid nineteenth century allowed Deng Xiaoping a more relaxed view of the need to modernise the PLA. But the areas that needed to be addressed were clear. First, was to be doctrinal changes that would guide the conduct of war. Next, would come organisational and structural changes in the PLA. Finally, would be the need to modernise its weapons and equipment.

CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military doctrine is generally accepted as a system of views that a State holds at a given time on the purposes and character of a possible war, on the preparations of the country and its armed forces for it and in the methods of waging war. In the case of Marxist China its military doctrine evolved based on historic experiences and the characteristics of its conflicts since the 1920s. Mao Zedong had synthesised these experiences into the People's War Doctrine.

The essence of People's War Doctrine is contained in the article "On Protracted War" written by Mao in 1938. A fundamental essence of protracted war was that it was a method by which a weaker side would tackle a stronger one. This has been a recurring phenomenon in Chinese history and one which has been deeply analysed in the past. Mao borrowed and expanded on these concepts. He wrote that a protracted war has to be conducted in three stages; the Strategic Defensive, the Strategic Stalemate, and the Strategic Offensive. Such a war would also help mobilise the people, which was both a requirement and central to the goal of fighting a successful People's War.⁷ Mao believed that war must be protracted at the strategic stage but brief at the campaign and tactical stages.⁸

This broad strategic doctrine was eminently successful in China's Revolutionary Wars and the War Against Japan. It incorporated the principles of "Strategic Retreat" and "Luring the Enemy in Deep". This was necessitated by the Red Army's relative weakness as well as to conserve its strength for the ultimate battle. But it was not a passive approach. Even in retreat the enemy must be guided to selected areas and then "compelled to take on heavy

burdens⁹ The tactical essence of Mao's doctrine is incorporated in six principles that remained valid for quite some time :-

- To withdraw in the face of an enemy advance.
- Advance if the enemy withdraws.
- Relative strength at the strategic level one to five will suffice.
- Tactically, five to one is needed.
- Live off the enemy; ie depend on the resources that you get from him after his defeat.
- Ensure close cohesion between the Army and the People.¹⁰

CHALLENGE TO PEOPLE'S WAR DOCTRINE

The relevance of People's War in post liberation China should have become a major area of debate. Was this relevant in its entirety in the strategic environment that China confronted in the early 1950s? It can be argued that as a strategy of the weak against the strong this continued to have relevance. Yet, in all the actual wars that the PLA has fought since 1949, these principles have never actually been adopted. None of China's conflicts were within its own territory. From the Korean War (1950-53), to the war "to teach a lesson" to Vietnam in 1979, all were fought outside China's borders. No efforts were made to "lure the enemy in deep"; instead the doctrine followed was one of "striking the enemy in his nest" or "defending beyond the gates", where the People's War Doctrine was hardly applicable. Instead the strategy adopted was one of "self defence counter-attack".

Mao's "People's War" doctrine was challenged during his lifetime. More important was the debate to modernise the PLA in the late 1950s. Here the main protagonist was Marshal Peng De Huai, the Commander of the Chinese Communist Volunteers (CCV) in Korea in the mid 1950s. He and his group termed Mao's People's War Doctrine as "romantic nostalgia". He was soon purged not as much for his opposition to military doctrine, but for his criticism of the "Great Leap Forward".

The doctrine of "People's War" survived till Mao's death. To challenge the Great Helmsman during his life was to commit political suicide and worse. Another reason was that the concept of People's War encompassed a fairly wide spectrum of activities. It could be interpreted both as specific instructions for strategic planning as well as broad principles concerning war. One such interpretation was made by Yang Shangkun, the then Vice Chairman of the CMC when he said that the doctrine of People's War, "....is by no means the

end of the truth. On the contrary, it has opened up a correct and wide path for us to understand new problems in military spheres".¹¹ In a general way, the People's War can be extended to mean almost anything. Thus, Mao's thoughts can be considered of permanent value much in the manner as Sun Tzu's "Art of War" or Clausewitz's "On War".¹²

Deng's second reincarnation in the mid 1970s already had an effect on PLA thinking. Therefore, soon after Mao Zedong's death, even before Deng was reinstated again for the third time, the People's War doctrine was challenged vigorously. By the end of the 1970's the Soviet threat did not loom as large. Detente with the USA had already taken place. These new conditions required a fresh analysis of China's strategic environment and the formation of a new doctrine for the PLA. In an article in the Beijing Review in August 1977, Su Yu a leading military theoretician said :-

"(There must be) continuous development of our tactics under new conditions and flexible approach to the various methods of fighting according to objective conditions.... Our methods of fighting should change and develop.... We must be flexible in deploying our troops and in revising and changing our tactics, and we should constantly study and acquire up-to-date tactics resulting from the development of techniques and equipment....(therefore) future wars against aggression will be People's War Under Modern Conditions".¹³

PEOPLE'S WAR UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS

The final abandoning of People's War doctrine came much later. A review of the global security conditions was a pre-requisite. The Conference took the form of an enlarged CMC meeting in May-June 1985 with Deng Xiaoping in the chair and all senior military leaders of the PLA present. The final report that emerged was titled "Strategic Changes to the Guiding Thoughts on National Defence Construction and Army B".¹⁴ The main spirit behind the impending change was Deng's reassessment of the global strategic situation. He noted that:

"There should be a cognitive change in the basic assessment of the international situation for the present and the future; in accordance with this scientific understanding and judgment, there should also be a change in policy; there should also be a change in the guiding thoughts for national defence construction".¹⁵

In Deng's assessment a world war was unlikely to break out. Hence a more pragmatic approach needed to be adopted to military construction. Competition in the new era will emerge from economic conditions. Priority should

then be accorded to economic development and science and technology. Only when China's economy became more powerful would money be devoted to weapons acquisition for the military. It was on the basis of this new thinking that the China Academy of Military Sciences prepared a monograph on Strategy which became a text book for the higher echelons of the PLA. In this the doctrine was "People's War Under Modern Conditions" and the strategy came to be known as "Active Defence".¹⁶

STRATEGY OF ACTIVE DEFENCE

The first reference to the Strategy of Active Defence is to be found in Mao Zedong's article, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" written in December 1936. Even here it was clearly spelt out that active defence is essentially "offensive defence", that is "defence through decisive engagements".¹⁷ This was further elaborated in an article by Mi Zhenyu, "China's Strategic Plan for Active Defence", when he stressed that, "Active defence is not just defence, but offence as part of defence"; a dialectic synthesis of offence and defence. He went on to say that "Strategic counter-attack is the most vigorous and most lively stage of defensive warfare".¹⁸

The basic assumption of Active Defence is that China will still have to fight from a position of comparative weakness. Therefore, in order to prevent the enemy from achieving a quick decision, China will still have to wage a protracted war. But there is now an acceptance that a protracted war will result in a tremendous loss to China. A China today that is increasingly industrialised can ill afford a devastation of its infrastructure that a modern war implies. Therefore, it will be imperative to win victory as rapidly as possible.¹⁹

It has been assumed that China's forces will be comparatively weak in the initial stages. But use of inferior strength to triumph over a superior enemy has been considered a traditional strength of the PLA. There is also an acceptance that modern war was more fierce, complex and more destructive. More manpower and material are likely to be consumed. Hence there will be greater reliance on the masses and their mobilization. At the same time every effort must be made to improve the technology of weapons and equipment for the future. There is also the need to evolve new strategies. There is a new interpretation to Mao's thinking in the new approach :

"You fight in your way, and we fight in ours; continue to fight when winning, and get out when one is not; change as the enemy changes and never stick to a set pattern".²⁰

Active Defence visualises three kinds of war that might involve China.

A world war; a large scale war of aggression against China by a foreign power; and border conflicts or limited war. The most likely war would be of the third variety along China's borders.²¹

The adoption of the People's War Doctrine and the strategy of Active Defence led to significant changes in the PLA. First, was a major reduction in forces, both by eliminating the numbers of Military Regions and other static formations, as well as cutting down on the strength of the PLA. This was essential in order to direct money towards military modernisations. Second, was in professionalising the PLA through enhancing academic qualifications, enlarging the scope and numbers of military institutions and finally by reintroducing military ranks as well as regularising service conditions. There was little if any acquisition of weapons or modernising the defence arsenal. Throughout the 1980s PLA budget remained largely static and in actual terms came down by about 40 per cent.²²

Deng Xiaoping's particular contribution was in laying down the broad formulation of overall policy. In his judgment, "peace and development are the two main issues of the modern world". In this condition peace-time construction will be the centerpiece of new strategic guidance. Hence military struggle must be subordinate to the Party's basic line. Also the building of the armed forces must be subordinate to the goal of national economic construction.²³

POST GULF WAR CHANGES

The 1990-91 Gulf War shook the PLA out of its complacency. There were two major consequences. One, was the end of the Cold War. With Soviet Union's dismemberment China lost its leverage in the bipolar global confrontation. The USA emerged as the sole superpower. China recognises this US pre-eminence, but qualifies it by saying that the world situation is in transition to multipolarity, implying that it will not last long. Second, was the enormous military technological superiority of the US. China assessed that it was 40 years behind the USA in military technology and needed to catch up fast. Accordingly, the PLA budget increased by 15-20 per cent annually in the 1990s.²⁴

To assess the lessons of the Gulf War the PLA undertook a number of studies. Most of these brought out the enormous strides the PLA had to take to catch up with the West in military technology. In particular, some of these lessons were :-

Electronic warfare was decisive to the result of the entire war.

- High tech weaponry was the key to victory in future wars.
- Air and naval power were critical arms in modern warfare.
- Overall capability is measured by rapid response and fast deployment.
- Logistical support capability is as important as actual fighting strength.²⁵

Jiang Zemin was even more emphatic in supporting the cause of science and technology in war. In August 1991 he said that :

“The Gulf War makes us further see the functions of science and technology in contemporary war. Even though we do not believe in weapons as a decisive factor in war, we do believe in human beings as a decisive factor. Nonetheless, advanced weapons are after all important. The functions of science and technology cannot be ignored.”²⁶

The importance of military modernisation as a key component of Active Defence Strategy was further emphasised by Liu Huaqing in 1993. He said that :

“The mission of our armed forces is to safeguard our territory, sea, air and sea rights and interests, to maintain national integrity and to defend national security. Therefore, we pursue on active defence strategy; ie, military modernisation serves the needs of territorial and off-shore defence and of defence readiness and combat effectiveness under contemporary conditions in order to win high tech local and limited war with the available weapons and equipment”.²⁷

The challenge for the new era then is to be able to deal with local wars in a high technology environment. The CMC meeting in January 1996 called on the PLA to make “preparations for military struggle”, to set its eyes on local warfare under modern technology conditions, stress operational preparations by key arms, services and units, and to study new tactics and new methods of fighting based on existing equipment. PLA training must especially emphasise winning local wars under modern, high-tech conditions.²⁸

But local wars are essentially limited wars, and limited wars impose both political and military restrictions. The importance of political objectives has remained uppermost in Chinese thinking. Victory in high-tech limited wars will not be measured in terms of territory occupied or casualties inflicted, but on a wide variety of political objectives. These objectives may vary from “imposing a military and economic embargo on the enemy”, “deceiving him”, and “waging psychological warfare on him” to “destroying his key political and economic installations”.²⁹

DENG'S CONTRIBUTION TO RESTRUCTURING THE PLA

Deng made a number of major changes in restructuring the PLA. In 1985 he decided to reduce one million soldiers from its strength. No doubt much of this was cosmetic. But this enabled him to get rid of many old and unfit soldiers at all levels. By 1988 ranks were reintroduced in the PLA. A number of other laws were enacted formalising recruitment policies, service conditions, reserve liabilities etc. By these and other measures Deng managed to reduce the age of all commanders from platoon to army level by an average of about 10 years over a 5-year period.

A number of steps were taken to improve education standards. All officers now were required to be high school graduates and qualify from a service academy. Within the PLA training was expanded. Well over one hundred training institutions were recommissioned, restructured or expanded. All senior officers were required to undergo a number of training courses, some of long duration.

Senior ranks in the Army were now changed regularly every five years along with the five-yearly meetings of the Communist Party and the National People's Congress. High positions in the PLA have been changed regularly in recent years based on professional competence and political reliability. The Tiananmen incident had exposed chinks in PLA leadership. Many senior commanders expressed deep reservation about employing the PLA against the people. Some objected outright. Deng used the Yang brothers to purge these elements.³⁰ Having done their work they too were eliminated in 1992. In their positions he placed two thoroughly reliable long march veterans, Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen. They were then both in their late 70s and became the Vice Chairmen of the CMC. Liu also became a permanent member of the Politburo, the first PLA man in some years. The post of Secretary General of the CMC was left unfilled.

A new generation of leaders have been chosen from the PLA to hold key positions from autumn next year. That these positions can be selected and earmarked from so early reflects the confidence of the current leadership. General Zhang Wannian will take over from Liu Huaqing as the first Vice Chairman of the CMC and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This may well indicate that the military will from now on be permanently allocated a position in the supreme decision making organ of the nation at the Politburo level. It also reflects efforts at coopting the PLA to facilitate Jiang's succession after Deng. Zhang's sudden rise is largely due to his closeness to Jiang Zemin. Chi Haotian, the present Defence Minister, will be the second Vice Chairman of the CMC. Deng's long term military secre-

tary, General Wang Ruilin has been accommodated at two senior positions. He will be both the deputy secretary general of the CMC as well as the Director of the General Political Department of the PLA. Changes at other levels have also been made, to be carried out next year.

CONCLUSION

Deng's health is fading. He is slowly but surely passing from the scene. But till such time as he is in this world, his influence on the nation and in particular over the PLA will remain great. For seventy years he has been closely associated with the PLA at a high decision making level, even though there were many breaks. In the last two decades he has directly shaped the PLA. During this time the PLA was entirely under Party control. Its aspirations for military weapons upgradation remained checked. Apart from occasional shifts, such as the Tiananmen incident and the recent Taiwan crisis, the PLA has generally played a positive role. It is to be seen as to how the PLA reacts, over time, when Deng is no longer on the scene.

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The Izzat of the Man Behind the Gun

BRIG N B GRANT, AVSM (RETD)

As soon as it became clear that, come what may, USA and China intend continuing supplying of arms to Pakistan, we rushed to the Russian camp to supply us with more fighter planes, and enter into a defence treaty for other military hardware to follow. Simultaneously, a large part of the Defence budget is now being channelled into updating our existing equipment and improving its effectiveness. This is as it should be, however, while doing this, we seem to have completely lost sight of correspondingly increasing the numbers and quality of the men to handle this hardware. In epitomising the gun, we have neglected the man behind the gun, and even more so in the officer class. The German blitzkrieg of 1940 in France, the Battle of Britain of 1941, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 in the Golan Heights, and the Indian offensive in Bangla Desh in 1971, are classic examples of the superiority of the man when pitted against the preponderance superiority of equipment. No amount of Russian planes, and stock piling of other military hardware, will ensure success in battle, unless we first make sure that, the quality of the officers and men who will command such hardware, matches it, in the way of high morale, motivation, and in an indomitable fighting spirit.

Addressing the conference of vice-chancellors, while inaugurating the Chhatrapati Shivaji Defence Chair at the Pune University, the late Gen B C Joshi, Chief of the Army Staff, had touched upon the quality of cadets entering the National Defence Academy (NDA), and the overall shortage of about 12,500 officers in the Army alone, not counting the other two Services. He went on to clarify that, even those who joined the NDA, preferred soft option units like the Army Service Corps (ASC) and the Army Ordnance Corps (AOC), to the fighting arms like Engineers, Artillery, Armour and Infantry, because of relatively comfortable life and perceived opportunities for making money. The fact that, the minimum standard of the NDA entrance exam and the passing out grade for commissioning have also been reduced, aggravates the quality of our officer corps even more so. To overcome this, it has been suggested to further dilute selection standards by promoting outright 13,000 JCOs to officer rank to make up the deficiency. Coming straight from the mouth of a Chief of Army Staff, this is a very serious and alarming situation.

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A recent survey conducted by a well known Marketing and Research Group, has put this down to the very low pay scales in the military when compared to those in industry, or for that matter, in the civil services. It also revealed that, 30 per cent of the cadets were sons of JCOs and NCOs, and of the balance, 20 per cent were sons of civilian parentages from Sainik Schools, 40 per cent were those who did not make the grade for a university education, and only 10 per cent were sons of Service Officers. Even of the latter 10 per cent, nine fell under the category of those who could not make the university, and only one per cent volunteered for the Services in spite of getting an entry into a University. Thus 99 per cent choose the Services for failure to get anything better, either socially or academically.

With the recent exponential increase in emoluments of managers in industry, and the consequential demand for a huge increase in pay and perks for government civil services, such as the suggested sum of Rs. 75,000/- pm to a Secretary to the Government, the military, not to be left out, has also started demanding a substantial enhancement in its present pay and allowances structure. This is the first sign of the aftermath of the free market economy bringing in its wake a spiral inflation of salaries, which would be difficult to contend within the civil services in general, and in the military organisation in particular.

No country in the world, can afford to pay its military personnel as much as they would earn in industry. However, the civilian society of those countries see to it that, the military officer, in spite of his meagre salary, is automatically accepted in the highest of society and best of clubs at a nominal subscription, and enjoys the top privileges which his country could afford. To give a recent example, during the Victory in Europe (VE) Day commemoration ceremonies at Hyde Park, London, the Prime Minister in Waiting of the British Conservative Party, paid our Indian Subedar (Hony Capt) Umarao Singh, VC, the ultimate respect, when he alighted from his car, saluted Umarao, and gave him the right of way, stating, quote "How can I drive my car ahead of a VC" unquote. During the commemoration week, separate ceremonies were held by individual countries, where Kings, Queens, Presidents and Prime Ministers rubbed shoulders with soldiers. President Jacques-Chirac decorated French commandos returning from Bosnia and President Bill Clinton congratulated US Marines for rescuing the downed US pilot in Bosnia.

Unfortunately, in our country, it was the reverse, as the Indian society has never accepted the honouring of its soldiers, and more so after Independence, as it is still suspicious of, and holds a subconscious grudge against the army, because of the 'preferential' treatment they enjoyed during the British regime. Again during the commemoration week, India was the only country that did

not celebrate its soldiers part in the World War II. The fact that, we had 2,50,000 men in the field, had suffered 1,06,843 killed and wounded and won 31 VCs, 131 MCs, 4GCs, 252 DSOs and 347 IOMs, the highest percentage of awards won by any Commonwealth country, did not rouse even the slightest emotion in our government and our civilian society.

Again in sharp contrast to the way all other countries honour their fighting men, when our IPKF boys returned from Sri Lanka, the Tamil Nadu CM, leave alone not making any attempt to ceremoniously receive them and give them a hero's welcome, went out of the way to insult them. It is unthinkable that even to date, the IPKF casualty list of honour has not been published or made public. Recently in our Central Hall of Parliament, its honourable members denigrated the Chief of Army Staff, for repeating what his Prime Minister and other ministers have been saying about fighting an undeclared war in Kashmir. Finally, if there is one event on which we must hang our heads in shame is, when last year, at the 49th anniversary of the founding of the UN, at a function held at Sapru House in New Delhi, after several Indian dignitaries had spoken, it was left to a UN British representative to ask the audience to stand in silence in tribute to the seven Indian soliders killed in Somalia. There can be no greater shame, than for our erstwhile rulers to remind us to venerate our own soldiers.

While the relative importance of different motives for a man joining the armed forces is difficult if not impossible to reconstruct, a recent official questionnaire study of graduates of West Point, USA, and the Military Academy at Sandhurst, UK, concluded that, "relative to compelling factors for entering West Point, almost all indicated that honour and prestige was the most important reason." No amount of monetary inducement will make the better class of youth take to the profession of arms. The proposed huge increase in the existing emoluments by the Fifth Pay Commission may perhaps have a temporary affect for one or two years, but the graph will again plummet to the existing level very soon after.

Honour and prestige, which were of fundamental value to the soldier two decades ago, and I presume still are the most important dimensions of the self image of the present day military officer, have been over the years greatly strained. For example, after the 1947-48 war, the service chiefs were made junior to the judges of the Supreme Court.

They further dropped in their status after the 1962 war and became junior to the cabinet secretary. This decline continued unabated and the Service Chiefs were made junior to the Attorney-General after the 1965 war. Yet again, after the 1971 war, they were put next to the Comptroller and Auditor-

General. Even today, almost all the IAS and IPS Officers with about 10 to 15 years of service, reach a level which only a microscopic minority in the defence services, after a stiff selection and much longer service of even 20 to 25 years, can dream of reaching.

No amount of increased armaments from Russia, or an increase in the emoluments of the soldier, will make any difference in making the army more battle worthy as an efficient fighting machine, unless we ensure that, it is led by men who will put 'Country', 'Honour' and 'Glory' above all other considerations. If we want the better type of youth to take to the profession of arms in large numbers as he once used to, we must create conditions of honour and prestige as his most important forte. We have miserably failed in this.

In any emergency, the soldier will once again gladly make the supreme sacrifice to safeguard the security of the nation, as he did in the three wars with Pakistan and also in Sri Lanka. The nation in turn owes it to the soldier to give him not only a good career and security of service during peace, but much more than that, to enhance his sagging social prestige. Even after 200 years of the formation of the Indian Army in its present form, we still have not learnt that, economic models, no matter how attractive they may be, cannot be the basis of motivation and morale in the Armed Forces, where the stakes are life and death. Nothing will inspire men to make the supreme sacrifice, except leadership, both military and civil, which is prepared to place the 'izzat' of the soldier as the foremost battle winning factor. Whereas all other countries, including Pakistan, have gone out of their way to foster this, our country has still not grasped the significance of the word 'izzat'. In the ultimate analysis, it will always be the Izzat of the man behind the gun, and not the gun by itself, that will boom the sound of victory.

Brigadier Grant's Article : A Response

LT GENERAL S N SHARMA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Brig N B Grant writes on the loss of "IZZAT" in the Defence Forces over our years of independence, and of its consequences on the indomitable fighting spirit for which the Indian Soldier was (and is) reputed. He quotes the incredible shortage of officers, their wide choice of soft options rather than risks and dangerous assignments, the creeping corruption in the armed forces, all of which reflect much lowered esteem for the defence in the eyes of Indian people. He has several comments on men, Junior Commissioned Officers and officers, right upto the status of the Chiefs themselves; he implies that the forces are not performing as they should when compared to the past, unable to compete with a society changing from feudal to a market economy, where the accepted norm is "each man for himself".

I cannot but agree with his views on "Izzat" as it affects the Indian Soldier, and we, within and outside the defence, should take heed of his warning before our country again pays a high price for denigrating the man behind the gun. But I do disagree with other aspects, and specifically with his implications that the much reduced prestige of our volunteer defence forces in public perception, judged by intake and support, has so lowered the quality of officers and men, that performance in operations is suspect. Possibly the best way to present this counter view is to compare actual performance when the army (representing the services as a whole), was led by the cream of Indian Society, with the successive performance as the bulk of men progressively came from lower, and yet lower, strata of society. We may find different view points on the concept of Izzat, which so deeply affects our combatants in battle, and reassess how to maintain the quality of men our country needs for volunteer armed forces.

Possibly Brig Grant sets his standards too high, linked to our freedom in 1947, and war soon after. A tropical jungle oriented Army, in cotton clothing, with ridiculously insufficient logistics, fought ferociously in mountains and snow against tribal invaders, and then the Pakistan army itself; equally matched, equally trained, old comrades cheerfully willing to kill each other, but possibly to lose more casualties to the physical environment of mountain and weather. A miniscule IAF threw its all into air support, taking risks well beyond

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specified performance of man and machine, accepting its casualties from a total lack of infrastructure and inexperienced ground support. Today's Army, IAF and Navy, would surely refuse to fight in those conditions; but equally surely they would perform with better skills and much better resources. Our days of "Jai Hind", meaning "we give you nothing, but you get on with it somehow" have gone. A good thing too. No amount of armament and material can substitute for quality of fighting men; but the best fighting men will falter under political and military leadership which ignores, and so tends to deprive them of the means to fight.

In our country, transiting from colony to parliamentary democracy, the rules are self seeking, falling values, short term gains preferred to future returns, party before nation, self before party: none of this is new or strange in the growth of democratic countries. What is strange in India is how the Defence Forces, Army in particular, have remained apolitical. All around them, within the nation, and in surrounding countries, the ethos has been self seeking, along with politicians. Management gurus rate the defence as "the one supreme management success" of our government: almost without exception all other government organisations, National democratic institutions, Non-Government Organisations, involved in aid, have failed to achieve rated performance; sadly, many vital elements, such as the key administrative services and police forces, have deliberately and steadily led the way to political patronage; governors, and even presidents, have sometimes lost their impartiality; the total government performance has not yet reached the levels of quality and efficiency which "We, the People", are rightfully entitled to receive and to demand. In this melting pot of a growing democracy, struggling to stand erect, much credit is due but not given to the fighting men and their immediate leaders, who try to remain strictly "national", meaning as per our democratic constitution. And this in spite of repeated efforts of political leaders to change them from their inherited impartial ethos: the most infamous was the patriotic but misguided combination of Krishna Menon and Kaul, supported by Nehru himself; the country paid a heavy price for this in 1962 and after, with defence expenditure at the cost of development. A comparison of what Brig Grant experienced at that time in army performance, to what has been the performance over later years to now, will show our Defence having steadily lowered status, but yet striving to perform well, not only by Indian standards of government, but even by the more ideal British standards of old soldiers, Brig Grant and myself included.

In 1947-48 we learnt fast, fought on morale and spirit rather than material, but lost out on a politically evolved ceasefire forced on a winning team. Today our men at Siachen, well trained, well equipped, fight a physically impossible battle, unmatched for its dogged courage (on both sides), but mil-

itarily quite unnecessary: the politicians (on both sides) seem unable or unwilling to settle the matter. Fighting men do not question this; governments and public of both sides pay patronising lip service, but essentially look the other way at a constant drain of casualties. This sacrifice is more to the Izzat of their Regiments, remembered and commemorated by them alone, but casually forgotten by their fellow countrymen. Brig Grant can rest assured our Army still has fighting spirit in ample measure where it counts most, though we must take heed of his warning to sustain it.

In the 1950s, the Army suffered by neglect and deprivation of essentials, even though led by the cream of Indian Society. Kaul, described by Nehru as his best Army Officer, and Menon played politics: where their politics led, men broke and ran, mainly unbeaten in actual battle. Where fighting men had the opportunity, they fought to the death, despite the arctic environment and dithering high commanders. Our chiefs in this decade were officers and gentlemen of high standing in every sense, Rajendra-Singhji a battle decorated hero, and Thimmaya a combat commander of international repute; but they were patriots, democrats, disciplined, and so lost out in growing politics of our country; they were not allowed or able to help us lowly soldiers.

We had in 1962 quality military leaders, right down to the junior officer, with high social status, public esteem, tough selection and training, hardened by war, and the toughest environment; but professional competence and demonstrated performance came second to political and social favouritism, creating commanders who could not and would not lead in war, their credo fixed on faith that politics would avoid any real combat, that unlimited "Jai Hind" as a slogan would substitute for material, including modern armament and vital battle equipment. As one of the ex-lowly, give me today's professional army any day - even with lowered status we would have clear orders, reasonable equipment and arms, and certainly not be expected to keep the arctic out with fur of stray cats and dogs, supplied by Srinagar traders. (that too on "Jai Hind" basis). The Izzat of fighting men and most did fight to the limits of endurance and resources - lay in the Regiments, where it always has been. No status of Chiefs and highly placed commanders, remote from the combat soldier and his immediate officers, really worries men - they sense the regard and respect given to them by their peers, lowly fellow Indians, which is what Brig Grant very rightly wants to sustain.

In 1965 the Army and IAF fought as well as they could, strengthened by young officer volunteers from all social strata; and even more by Shastri, a pillar of strength and political confidence in war. "Jai Jawan - Jai Kissan" was more than a slogan: it reflected a new unity between fighting men and the common people, a boost for Izzat, a new confidence of the Jawan and his

junior leader. It was these junior officers who led from the front, fought hardest and best, feeling the restraint of their cautious seniors, the veterans of the Second World War, and the wars of 1948 and 1962. In 1971 there was a repeat of this high morale and performance from junior leaders; with the odd marked exception, a repeat of cautious seniors chastened with experience of political leaders, willing to shed their "last drop of blood" on the floor of Parliament, but certainly not outside it.

It seemed the Izzat of the soldier rested in good hands, the young men who today are the top military leaders. There was also a change from the past in bureaucratic attitudes: earlier death and disability in war deserved no more than workmen's compensation, specially since there was no publicity or labour union to push for it. For once war widows and disabled were recognised; aid to them was good political publicity. Yet that nebulous "Izzat", so talked of by combatants, carried no political payoff, and so could well be ignored - afterall, a volunteer in the armed forces was just another paid government servant; and if he was foolish enough to accept risk, hardship, separation, lack of Union support, and an Army Act depriving him of free speech, that was his look out; so why this vague complaint about Izzat? Chowkidars were paid to do a job; the soldier was just another paid hightech guard; even if he became the chief, he deserved no greater attention than any other government servant. Brig Grant is right to warn us - pat your watch dog with love, make much of your horse, they will unhesitatingly die for you: just house and feed them, and they live only to feed again.

The ultimate combat stress is that against insurgency, terrorism and the like; what we have, and continue to experience, in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, Assam, Punjab (and specially Blue Star), Kashmir, Sri Lanka. Always the army is called to restore order when high minded noble leaders and their followers use violence as the last resort to gain their political ends. The civil government and endless resources of para military, the BSF, the Armed Police, and others seem to be unwilling and incapable of sorting out problems of their own political making. Why should the Army be considered the final answer, the last resort, when the para-military and Police are as well equipped, better trained, better paid in such operations, with better resources of close intelligence, liaison with local authority and concerned politicians. Yet without Army backing they seem unable to progress; a strange situation when the same "little Indians" fill all the forces, with perhaps an even lower social strata in the army than in the Police. When enemies, friends, legitimate and illegal protest, killing of opponents, the very law itself, all lose their clearcut boundaries, normal peace keepers evade their responsibilities for decision and action. The modern world and public opinion treat crimes against humanity as the direct responsibility of the individuals perpetrating them, and expect even

soldiers to refuse direct orders, which may be a crime: but this leaves open the not so obvious future. When blood has cooled, when near normality blankets violent disturbance, emergency, and even self-defence, those who stayed away, those who avoided responsibility, come back to judge those who do their jobs as best they can under pressure and personal risk. The Army does just this in emergency, each man accepting that he must act alone when circumstances leave him without timely superior orders - his Izzat and that of his Regiment demand he will not run away or shirk what faces him. So we find the Indian Army backing up, and in the extreme even replacing, an equally well armed police, recruited from Indians with more local knowledge and political skills, but also wisdom and ethos to evade what can have adverse repercussions.

And finally, Izzat itself. A very Indian element in the ethos of our fighting men, dating back centuries. It parallels several ancient fighting cultures in the Orient; it has no exact parallel in the West, a near approximation being what Philip Mason calls "A matter of Honour". All these fade under the impact of Western culture and modern management. A market economy and society can have the best managed defence forces, impersonal, pushing buttons, zero defect culture (no risk - no error), all filling desirable career slots, polishing service records, keeping updated, alert, and above all, keeping alive to reach the ambitious top. These are the very elements prized in our competitive computer world, so easily absorbed and pursued as "excellence in management." Yet these were the very elements which led one of the finest armies to virtual defeat in Viet Nam: these very elements do not face the final level of "excellence" in military management: which is not merely to send a man, cheerful and willing, to this death, but to go with him to your own death with equal good cheer. Experts will find the solution to this last requirement lies not in "Management" but in "Izzat" (for the Indian), and comparably ill defined concepts for organised fighting men of any democracy, any where.

But let us and Brig Grant, take hope. Demonstrated performance of our Army, IAF, and Navy, shows forces still deeply committed to their duties and to democratic ideals. Creeping corruption, evasion of hard duty, searching for soft options lowered intake standards, better quality of men not volunteering, whatever the ills Brig Grant has correctly foreseen, have not yet affected the willingness of our defence to function without politics and in the national interest. Commanders of today, at various levels, have refused to obey orders from civilian and military higher authority, and have got away with it because they were right; very different to our high level commanders when the Menons, the Kauls, and their successors, held sway. The lowest levels, the men who hold the "barrel of the gun", still sustain their past cultural binders in the Izzat of their regiments, their squadrons, and their ships. We still have the reputation of being amongst the finest fighting men in this world, traditionally unwilling

to kill, reluctant to die, but happily still able to do both for our country.

Demonstrated performance is the main and most critical criteria to assess any body of people or organisation; by this standard the Defence Forces were at their lowest ebb when led by the most reputed and highest levels of Indian Society, politicians and military officers included. In contrast, the Forces were at their best when led by young "little Indians", drawn from every corner of our country out of those who do not count in our society, with a handful of those who see the services as a vocation rather than a mere profession. Common Indians have always been stronger than their masters: it is amongst them that we have to find the Izzat of the man behind the gun.

JOIN

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New Delhi - 110057

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Dear Sir,

INFANTRY DAY

We in Infantry are grateful to Brig NB Grant, AVSM (Retd) to remind us of our infantry ethos and traditions; specially the fact that in Infantry allegiance always has been to a particular Regiment. Now Infantry has added a new tradition of celebrating 'Infantry Day' on October 27, the date on which in 1947 Infantrymen landed in Srinagar to fight against well planned Pakistani military operation to capture J & K State. It is in the highest tradition of the Army and particularly Infantry that Army Headquarters has not justified the rationale for the decision, as traditions need no justification and are based on human emotional attachment to an event. In any case this event cannot have the privilege to be included in Guinness Book as Indian Navy has some time back started the tradition of celebrating 'Navy Day' on December 4, the day it raided Karachi harbour.

Infantry was airlifted into the battle zone. Had the infantryman given a choice, he would have preferred to march on foot but then history of Kashmir and India would have been different today. On this day when Sikhs and Kumaonies were being airlifted to fight a battle in the unknown territory, another infantryman, Brig Rajinder Singh who happened to be Chief of the Army Staff of Princely State of J&K had personally led all available reserves from Srinagar Cantt to fight offensive defence at Uri to delay the Pakistani advance into the Valley where he sacrificed his life and was the first person to be awarded MVC in Independent India. It is the infantryman who is required to capture and hold ground physically and bears the brunt of fighting. Indian infantryman is bearing the brunt of fighting since October 27, till date in the valley to keep the flag of Independent India flying high. Emotional value of his cause may not be very relevant to others, but ask any infantryman or widow who has lost her near and dear one while fulfilling this task undertaken by infantry on that fateful day which we now call "Infantry Day".

As no country can do without an Army, no Army can do without infantry and infantryman lives and dies on traditions. The difficulty is that all other than infantrymen consider themselves experts on all aspects of infantry including the right to decide on Infantry Day. We in infantry deal with so few concrete elements and to motivate and train dynamic minded infantry is to exercise an art whereas to train the man in other arms is to apply a science to execute a concrete task in a definite manner. But to the infantry, use of his tools is only complementary to the use he makes of ground and guts, while believing in courage and cause. Is it that others have taken more technical reasons into consideration while deciding their Corps Day.

Each Regiment, Corps or Service has its own reason to decide on a tradition. Infantry believes more in carrying out the operational tasks and citations read out on each Republic day are ample proof of Infantryman's resolve in his courage and reinforces our faith in new tradition of 'Infantry Day', for which all ranks from Rifleman to General continue to make supreme sacrifice for the Infantry, Army and Country.

Yours faithfully

AGI Directorate
Army Headquarters
New Delhi-110057

Col Amarjit Randwal

II

Sir

Apropos the letter by Brig NB Grant (Retd) (USI Journal : Oct-Dec 95) regarding the appropriateness of celebrating the INFANTRY DAY, and his eagerness to be "enlightened...." [by some subscriber] on the issue, without mincing words".

The letter by Brig NB Grant (Retd) exemplifies a mindset, which thrives on raising issues without any consideration for it's 'organisational relevance'.

Hence on the 'issue' of the INFANTRY DAY, Brig NB Grant (Retd) will be 'enlightened' if he takes heed of the sagely advice by the King in 'Alice in wonderland', who said : "If there is no meaning in it, it saves a world of bother, for we need'nt look for any".

Your sincerely

110 IFSU
C/o 99 APO

Lt Col G. Kumar

III

Sir,

ONE RANK ONE PENSION

Regarding "One Rank One Pension" (Jul-Sep '95), Lt. Gen. K.K. Nanda has argued very convincingly why the Government should accept the formula for ex-service pensioners while implementing the 5th Pay Commission Report. However, I would like to submit some more facts to show how successive political and bureaucratic committees had snuffled, if not sabotaged, this legitimate demand of ex-servicemen.

The Jafa Committee did recommend an adhoc, one time increase in pensions for the men. As Gen. Nanda says, "a similar scheme was also in the offing for the officers but it was forgotten with the ouster of the National Front Government." In fact, even the recommendations of one time increase for men were not implemented. These were printed and kept ready for despatch in the Defence Ministry, but never despatched. So, neither officers nor the men got any increase from this Committee's exercise.

It was not only V.P. Singh but also all other political parties who had promised to implement "One Rank One Pension" formula. For example, the Congress election manifesto said : "The Congress holds ex-servicemen in the highest esteem and recalls with gratitude their services to the nation... Their demand for 'one rank one pension' will be examined and an innovative solution will be found." The BJP manifesto promised one rank one pension to ex-servicemen and also assured them service upto 58 years of age.

However, after the elections, the innovative solution to the demand of 'one rank one pension' to service pensioners was forgotten by the Government. Also it failed to implement the ad hoc increase announced by the earlier government. In August 1991, the opposition parties, both of the right and the left, stood unitedly for the implementation of 'one rank one pension' formula. They threatened the very existence of the then minority government by a cut motion to the Defence allocation in Parliament. But all this high drama had its anti-climax when the Prime Minister pleaded with the opposition leaders and suggested the constitution of a high power committee to consider the proposal.

The Committee headed by Defence Minister Sharad Pawar rejected the one rank one pension demand and instead recommended a one time increase (OTI). It fell far short of the expectations of the ex-servicemen. What is more,

it had such conditions that many of the pensioners were made ineligible for the OTI. For example, OTI was not applicable to "Military pensioners who are/were employed/re-employed re-enrolled in departments/offices of Central or State Governments, company, corporations/undertakings or an autonomous body or in a national bank, including Reserve Bank of India or State Bank of India or in a local body." Bereft of bureaucratic verbiage, it meant any military pensioner who had worked even for a day in civil service after retirement, was ineligible for the OTI. It was tantamount to punishing the ex-soldier with a monthly fine for the 'crime' of serving the government for a second time.

The uproar of ex-servicemen against such unjust clauses to deprive them of the OTI, made the Government to constitute an Empowered Committee in the Ministry of Defence, which included an additional secretary each from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Law. The committee was to deal with the anomalies of the OTI.

After much delay, the 'anomalies' committee of secretaries too submitted their recommendations. But these too were full of anomalies. For example, it decided that only those military pensioners who had less than 10 years of civil service were eligible for OTI. What is more, the amount of OTI will be reduced by 10 per cent for each year of re-employed service.

It is only a matter of natural justice that pension earned by soldiers for their military service should not be deducted arbitrarily on flimsy reasons. Now it is not known if the Government will appoint another committee to look into the anomalies of the recommendations of the Empowered Committee to remove anomalies.

Yours sincerely

42-B, Pocket I
Mayur Vihar
Delhi 110 091

Sub. Maj. N. Kunju (Retd.)

IV

Sir,

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCES

A friend of mine has sent me a copy of your kind review of my book on BCOF in recent issue of the *USI Journal*. I am glad you found it a good read, and I thought I would respond to a couple of the points you made.

First of all, with hindsight it is indeed difficult to justify our participation in the occupation in the light of the very limited role allowed to us by MacArthur. At the time I think it was felt that after the humiliation of the Malayan campaign and the fall of Singapore, there should be some public recognition of our part in the final defeat of the Japanese. It wasn't a question of the British "accepting" to participate; Churchill and others were determined that we should be there, and of course the Australians even more so. It was only later that the hollow nature of our role became apparent. However, I tried to show that there were some military achievements and political milestones which gave our participation some meaning.

I am conscious that the photographs lacked any Indian theme, apart from that one showing ratings from HMIS Sutlej viewing the ruins of Hiroshima. There were a few others available from the Imperial War Museum showing Indian troops, mainly bands, and I myself had some snaps from my time with I Mahratta, but I'm afraid the publishers had the last word on the selection to be included, taking into account the limitation they laid down on the total number.

When I met my old friend General Eustace De Souza (also ex-Mahratta of course) last year, he berated me on the relatively high price of the book. I could here again only blame my publishers, who resisted all my attempts to get the price down to what I thought would be a more reasonable level. The result was that most of my own friends borrowed the book from various libraries rather than buying it!

With best wishes and thanks again for friendly and generous review.

Yours sincerely

Peter Bates, CBE

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Review Article 1

War in the Mountains : A Worm's Eye View

LT GENERAL S L MENEZES, PVSM, SC (RETD)

In relation to the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict, there have been several books, but none from the point of view of a battalion adjutant, in this case, of 4th Grenadiers (the author was then Adjutant, and is now settled in Australia after retiring from the Indian Army in 1970). This is the first worm's eye view account of this conflict, and inevitably is both an emotive and saddening one. Insofar as the long suffering Indian soldier is concerned, one perforce must first invoke the unfortunate late Brigadier John Dalvi, Commander 7th Infantry Brigade on the Namka Chu who was taken prisoner by the Chinese in 1962. "The Gurkhas, the Rajputs, the Sikhs, the Dogras, the Bengalis (of the Rajput Regiment), the Mussulmans of the Grenadiers, the Jats, the South Indian Signallers and all others from the four corners of India had nothing to sustain them but their regimental pride and traditions. They had done what they had done, because they were soldiers, for no-one can do more than give his life for his country".

As to the causes of the failure, the late Brigadier Dalvi was most succinct, "1962 was the national failure of which every Indian is guilty. It was a failure of the higher direction of war, a failure of the Opposition, a failure of the General Staff (myself included); it was a failure of responsible public opinion and the Press. For the Government of India it was the Himalayan blunder at all levels.' Of Dalvi's book *Himalayan Blunder*, Neville Maxwell later recorded 'This may come to be regarded as a classic of military literature, epitomising the predicament of the officer under orders which he knows must lead to the destruction of his command".

After the ceasefire, Lt Gen. T. Henderson-Brooks was asked to undertake an inquiry as to this 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. His report, often referred to in the Indian media as 'The Henderson-Brooks Report', is still classified, and, therefore, not yet released by the Government of India. In a personal memoir, in an Indian Armed Forces issue of *The Indo-British Review* (Vol. 16, No. 1, Madras, March 1989), he did encapsulate, "as regards the conflict with China

The Mountain and the Men. By Lt Col OJ Thomas (Retd), Western Australia, Oscar Thomas, 1962-1995, p. 164, ISBN 0 646 25706 4

Lt. General S.L. Menezes is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army and author of the well known book on the Indian Army *Fidelity and Honour : The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century* (New Delhi : Viking, 1993)

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on which I had to report, in my opinion it was not really a war. One Indian division had to cover a front of 500 miles. To have a section in position, it was necessary to use the remainder of the platoon to maintain them. The section was only flag-flying. When the clash occurred, the unfortunate reinforcements were not properly clothed or armed, and without supporting weapons. They were not acclimatised, having been rushed into position (in one battalion alone, there were 300 cases of pneumonia). On the other side, the Chinese soldier was suitably dressed, well-armed and supported by heavy weapons, with excellent lines of communication, attacking downhill. The unfortunate Indian soldier was rushed up from sea level to heights ranging from 12,000 to 16,000 feet. I am not breaching security in writing this; it is all in Neville Maxwell's *India's China War*".

The travails and tribulations of the 4th Grenadiers in the withdrawal recounted in the book under review more than bear out what Lt. Gen. Henderson-Brooks has encapsulated, in poignant detail. Mr. A.M. Khaleeli, the former Indian High Commissioner in Australia, deftly sums up what this book is all about in his Foreword. "It is not so much an account of political miscalculation at a high level or of poor leadership by the senior army brass, though one cannot avoid this conclusion; it is more the account of a dignified officer, proud of his country and of his men, who in the midst of a debacle, succeeded in fighting their way out of an impossible situation in harsh and little-known territory".

"Ill-equipped as they were and virtually abandoned, this group of about 250 men and some officers, maintained their morale, camaraderie and discipline. The saga of survival for nearly 18 days with hardly any food, in bitterly cold and forbidding terrain, is a tribute to their *esprit de corps*, leadership and the legendary courage and tenacity of Indian soldiers when properly led. The love and respect with which Col. Thomas, then just a young officer, regarded his wonderful NCOs and jawans is reflected throughout the narrative and in no small measure contributed to their success."

"In the midst of danger and suffering, one catches glimpses of humour and humanity in the midst of tragedy when men so close to each other die, or are casualties in a struggle. While reading this relatively unknown episode of a military action in 1962, it is unfortunately an inescapable conclusion that many dedicated, brave and long-suffering Indian jawans and officers were made to confront a prepared adversary without the slightest fore-thought regarding what war is all about. It is a tribute to these men that despite the senior military and political leadership being found wanting, that their coolness and courage showed those qualities which, with better leadership, would ensure that such accidents would never happen again to India."

The 4th Grenadiers had entrained at Delhi on December 6, 1962, detraining near the foothills of the North East Frontier Agency on September 11, 1962. It moved off for Tawang with 50 rounds of ammunition per man, two blankets per man, some extra issue clothing but with no extreme cold clothing, with light entrenching tools and three days haversack rations. The rest of the battalion's clothing, ammunition, digging tools, tentage and cooking equipment was to be airdropped at Tawang but never was. The battalion in this state eventually reaches its allotted positions on the Namka Chu near the McMahon Line on October 11, 1962. On October 20, the Chinese over-ran the brigade's improvised defences, and the traumatic withdrawal of what is left of the 4th Grenadiers, some 250 in all, commences. This is a narrative of indomitable courage during a withdrawal in extremely difficult and arduous conditions, necessitating cross country moves in mountainous terrain, and thereby also suffering fatalities, in order to avoid Chinese outflanking moves. They eventually reached safety, ultimately through Eastern Bhutan. On November 7, 1962, the survivors with frostbite for which they were to lose portions of their limbs, including the author, are put in a hospital train at Tezpur for Lucknow which they reached on November 9, and then onto Delhi, where their terrible ordeal ends. From the profits of the sale of this book, half will go to the Grenadiers Regimental Centre, to bolster the Oscar Thomas Scholarship Fund for the education and care of deserving children of the Regiment, and the balance to families of those men who gave their lives in the defence of their country and in the honour of their Regiment.

Published by the author, Noranda, Western Australia. Available through the Commandant Grenadiers Regimental Centre, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh 482001, India.

Review Article 2

Industrial Reforms in China and India : A Comparative Study

COL R RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

Sun Yat-Sen, the father of modern China had pointed out in 1924, when he had started the daunting process of reforming China by pulling the country out from the chaotic condition in which it was as a result of internal dissensions, that "China was no more than a collection of loose sand". It lacked cohesion and unity and hence was unable to stand up to external forces which were intervening in its affairs, having established safe footholds in the country.

The Communist Revolution supported by the Soviets, succeeded, after a fairly long period of internal strife, in unifying the country; but its economy was far from sound. Real and rapid-economic development came about only after Deng-Xiaoping came to power in the early 1970s. In a document prepared by him in 1975, after coming into power, he pointed out that "rising production was the prime necessity in Chinese society even to achieve the aims of communist revolution". Study of theory and ideology was downgraded and a concrete programme for raising production was prepared which advocated the introduction of technology, machinery and equipment from foreign countries. Mao was far from pleased and got Deng expelled from the Party a second time.

Although Deng was in the dog house for sometime, he soon got back into power and despite China's virtual defeat by Vietnam in the early 1970s, when he (Deng) was running China's affairs, stayed in power and concentrated his attention on developing China's productive resources and its economy generally. China's political philosophy remained Communist. Deng's contribution to China's economic progress - and in step with that, its military strength and influence - can be fully appreciated only when one remembers the state of affairs that prevailed earlier, as recounted by Sun Yat-Sen.

The degree of centralisation in China was far less than in Russia. At the height of the centralisation drive, the production of about 600 items of goods were centrally controlled as well as about 10,000 industrial enterprises. This was at the peak of the drive for centralisation. In 1984, China had about

Contrasting Styles of Industrial Reform : China and India in the 1980s. By George Rosen, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago, 1992, p. 168, \$ 29.75, ISBN 0-226-72646-0.

Col R. Rama Rao is a well known defence analyst and has written several books and articles on defence related issues.

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4,35,000 industrial enterprises, an impressive figure by any standards and far more than even in Soviet Russia. Small plants produced products which contributed 40 to 50 percent of the country's GDP. Industrial enterprises also were widely dispersed in order to ensure that no part of the vast country was neglected. Even so provinces endeavoured to achieve self-sufficiency and reduce dependence on Central aid and intervention to secure much needed equipment or materials. It also helped in providing job opportunities for all, although workers in most factories had not more than 4 hours work per day. This meant low productivity and comparatively high costs.

As early as 1901, Chinese officials had noted, in a report written by them that :

"Three things are essential to a nation: the first is the government; the second, wealth; the third, power. If a nation has good government, it can strive to achieve prosperity and strength. The way to attain good government is to reform native institutions; the way to attain wealth and power is to adopt Western methods".

It would seem that Deng Xiaoping in his own way followed this line of action to achieve China's economic and political progress.

INDIA

Since 1950, India's economic policy was based on the creation of a three tiered industrial structure - the Public Sector, the large scale and medium scale Private Sector and an extensive small scale sector. Pursuant to this policy, Central Government owned plants increased from 5 in 1950 to 223 in the early 1980s. In 1983, approximately two-thirds of the value of all capital assets in manufacturing area was in the Public Sector. These government owned plants produced 30 percent of value added products in total manufacturing and over 40 per cent in the factories sector of industry. However, production by private sector industrial units fell from about 25 percent of national industrial output in 1949-50, to about 10 percent by 1984-85.

Until the late 1980s, most of the Public Sector Units were over staffed, failed to replace in time equipment that, in comparison with other countries, had become outdated and hence continued to produce goods not easily marketable outside India. Units in the private sector too, with the exception of certain well established ones owned and operated by leading manufacturers, had outdated machinery and were consuming more fuel/electricity than more recent ones and hence production costs were higher.

Even so by the 1980s India's industrial units had got over many of the difficulties and were able to raise the country's total industrial output significantly.

George Rosen's book, *CONTRASTING STYLES OF INDUSTRIAL REFORM : CHINA AND INDIA IN THE 1980s*, discusses the subject in detail bringing out the salient points pertaining to the two economies clearly and objectively.

A CORRECTION

The following typographical errors may please be corrected in the January-March 1996 issue of the *USI Journal*

Page 32	For	Read
Line 20	Towned Artillery Pieces	Towed Artillery Pieces
Line 22	410 x 130 mm	410 x 155 mm

Errors are regretted.

-- Editor

Review Article 3

Hong Kong : Past, Present and the Future

BRIG S K ISSAR (RETD)

This is a fascinating book written by Frank Welsh, who after reading history at Cambridge, worked in banking and industry, including service on boards of nationalised industries and on the Royal Commission on the National Health Service. Frank Welsh has been writing books since 1982.

The author's interest in Hong Kong was first aroused by a visit there in 1970 as a banker, and later the acquisition of the historic Westmoreland House by his family in 1972. This led to a painstaking research by the author with a view to avoid the pitfalls of one-sided accounts. In the 24 months between March 1991 and March 1993, the political developments in the island were rapid and of historic proportions, when the book was in the process of being written.

The author refers to the birth of Hong Kong as the "natural child of Victorian Britain and Ch'ing China in 1842. Initially, it was embarrassing for both parents to acknowledge the legitimacy of the infant: closely associated with notorious drug-smuggling trade, the circumstances of the birth were disruptable. Ever since, Hong Kong has presented Britain with a series of irritations, scandals concerning opium, prostitution, gambling, flogging and corruption, together with quarrels between Governors, Civil Servants, Government Departments, and also the community, erupted and arrived in Whitehall - and have not yet ceased to arrive - with depressing frequency."

Nor were Chinese rulers much pleased with the loss of the island. It may not be more than an inconsiderable pimple on the great empires extremity, but it has remained of symbolic significance to the rulers, and people of that Empire. The fact that Hong Kong was ceded to Britain as a result of an armed clash between China and a Western Power from which the mighty empire of China emerged decisively and rapidly as the loser. By the end of the nineteenth century, China had been defeated, indebted and humiliated. Many myths have become encrusted around this first foreign encroachment (the secession of Hong Kong) and have invested the subject of Hong Kong with a powerful emotional charge. As the loss of Hong Kong initiated these depredations, its recovery in 1997 will, it is believed, mark the end. The History of Hong Kong

A History of Hong Kong. By Frank Welsh, London, Harper Collins, 1993, p. 624, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-00-21-5852-3.

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is, therefore, closely linked with that of Chinese relations with the West and reciprocal Western attitude towards China.

At a point of time when the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese Empire is not far off, the unique diversity of Hong Kong needs to be understood. Apart from the well established Indian and Portuguese elements, its population is mainly Cantonese, with millions having come from all parts of Communist China to this British Colony in search of security and prosperity. The author, in order to explain the evolution of Hong Kong, has, out of necessity, made some reference to the political history of Britain, Europe and China during the last two centuries.

Many students of history would want to know as to why did the British Government in 1898 only required a 99-year lease of the new territories rather than outright ownership : the author has given detailed explanations in chapters 3, 7 and 11, which attribute it to the changing policies of successive British Governments : a course of history in China has also been analysed while arriving at the settlement for handing over this British territory back to China. How will Hong Kong assimilate itself with the mainland will be seen on July 1, 1997, when 156 years of British Colonial Rule will end and the Chinese sovereignty will be restored. The transition is already felt in many small ways. Though China has promised to keep the colony capitalist and autonomous for 50 years, but in a society of refugees from main land, Beijing's intentions are inevitably regarded with misgiving.

Frank Welsh's vivid historical account evokes the characters of those on the British and Chinese sides, who were responsible for shaping it. This single volume history, of one of the most remarkable and intriguing places, is an essential document, to understand and analyse the course of events which will affect the transfer of this British territory to the Chinese control in 1997.

Review Article 4

A Prime Minister's Prison Diary

AIR MARSHAL S D TULLY, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Edouard Daladier was the French Prime Minister at the time of Chamberlain, Hitler and Mussolini. A son of a Baker, a brilliant student, a High School teacher, he joined the Radical Socialist Party, became Mayor of a small town in 1911, was a sergeant in WWI, elected Deputy in 1919 and President of his party in 1927. He was several times a minister in the 1920s, specialising in foreign affairs and defence matters. Prime Minister in 1933 in a coalition with the Left, he resigned after nine months; PM again in January 1934, he was forced to resign in February. Elected in 1936 on a Popular Front (a coalition of Communists, Socialists and Radical Socialists) ticket, he was the Defence Minister. A split in his own party saw him replaced but, on the fall of the government, the President of the Republic called on him to form the new government in 1938, a government which lasted two years. He signed the 'Munich Agreement', declared war on Nazi Germany one year later and his government fell in March, 1940. He then became the Defence Minister and, a short while later, the Foreign Minister as well in the Paul Reynaud Cabinet -- a cabinet which presided over the collapse of France in May-June 1940 and resigned. A WWI French hero, General Petain, formed the new government and signed the armistice. Daladier was arrested and imprisoned together with Leon Blum and the Supreme Commander, General Gamelin. Tried inconclusively by a special court, he was later handed over to the Germans and imprisoned in Tirol till liberated by the Americans. This journal was written in prison but only published in France in 1991; this English edition has been published in 1995.

How did France, a then world power, a large colonial power, a WWI victor and a comparatively large, developed European country, collapse so disastrously and capitulate so quickly? Why was the war not continued from the colonies in North Africa? Daladier does not answer these questions and does not blame himself: He states that he recognised the threats and the dangers and, whenever in a position of power, had initiated policies and issued directions but these were undone by a successor government or rendered valueless by the military. This view is probably right as Daladier defends himself very ably at his trial. So, in spite of wise higher direction, France was unprepared. Why? What comes through was that France had no real leader-

Air Marshal S.D. Tully is a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of an Air Force Command and an experienced fighter pilot.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVI, No. 524, April-June, 1996.
Prison Journal 1940-1945. By Edouard Daladier, Colorado, Westview Press, 1995, p. 376, £ 24.50, ISBN 0-8133-1905-6.

ship; Politicians, military leaders and media persons, jockeying for power and influence, formed cabals, horse-traded and were corrupt. Daladier's comment on Laval, a previous Prime Minister, a minister in the Vichy Government and a Nazi collaborator: "A poor socialist in 1914 and a rich fascist in the 1930s". France had politicians and no leaders : "those in power had forfeited the trust of the people, there was class competition and class distrust" It is probable that a well-off French-man felt more comfortable with a fascist German than a communist Frenchman. Petain still had the greatest influence on military thinking still mired in WWI; Daladier says he recognised the fallacies, had been impressed by some younger officers but did nothing about it. How quickly a nation can deteriorate under short-sighted leaders and corruption can so easily sap the morale of the people. France needed a Hitler and a defeat to cleanse itself : grave maladies require a strong medicine.

Daladier is an intelligent and a well meaning man, possibly, in any other circumstances, a good role-model for youth but there are times when a country needs strong leaders and not "nice guys". He could see far into the future but was uncertain in the present: "The present war marks the end of a period in history that began in 1792— the era of independent nations. Nations will now have to be integrated into federations and, above all, vast economic systems — the partitioning of Germany, which certain Britons and Americans have been talking about, is an absurd proposition." An interesting journal to peruse, especially Appendix B—The Riom Trial. Daladier may have failed France but he doesn't fail as a human being.

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Short Reviews of Recent Books

A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World : Desirable? Feasible? Edited by Joseph Rotblat and Others, *Colorado, Westview 1993, p. 228, \$ 49.95, ISBN 0-8133-8718-3.*

This book is about nuclear disarmament, a subject very dear to us, the panel of contributors includes two Indians. Being weapons of mass destruction they could be banned. Their elimination would lead to economic benefits. Non Nuclear world would be able to conserve resources, spent by them on acquisition of nuclear technology.

Biological and Chemical weapons disarmament having been agreed to, next effort must be made in this field. There are technical problems of disposing of the nuclear materials, Weapon grade Uranium 235, could be mixed, and used for power plants; tritium has limited life of 12.3 years, but presently there is no answer to disposal of plutonium-the danger from it's aerosol (PuO₂), which can result from a single point detonation is grave.

In case of a treaty, the main problem would be in enforcement by verification. This is because a 90-95 per cent effectiveness is meaningless, the weapon has enormous destructive power. Societal verification, where each citizen has a duty to inform and scientists and technicians act as whistle blowers is suggested. The informers to be given large cash prizes and asylum!

A time frame of 15 years is suggested.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A (Cantab)

Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1994. Ed by the Centre for Defence Studies, London, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1994, p. 360, ISBN 1-85753-033-0.*

This Annual publication, edited by the Centre for Defence Studies, an organisation established in 1990, contains 23 top class papers, by knowledgeable persons — including one by the Secretary of State for Defence. Written from their perspectives, all are thought provoking, some - mentioned below have a relevance to our problems.

Air Power - Applications of technology. With lesser problems of manning, the quantity trade off option, multi role aircraft, lower risk technologies, and military and scientific staffs working in concert - are worth following.

South Africa. India's role in training their officers, and the thrust of exports by "Armcor" - their production organisation will be of interest.

The proliferation of small arms trade, which is excluded from SIPRI reporting system, and the last two articles on the population displacements and a U.N. military force are of general interest.

An excellent book which should be possessed by all defence libraries.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab)

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol 18. By Centre for Disarmament Affairs, *United Nations, New York, 1994, p. 419, ISBN 92-1-142204-3.*

An excellent reference book, with information on various aspects of disarmament, with extensive details in appendices. The following should be of interest to a general reader :-

Register of Arms-transfers instituted by the U.N. in 1991, covers only tanks, APC's, large artillery, aircraft, helicopters, warships, missiles & launchers. Twenty nations responded in 1992, including India, there is a proposal for including information on military holdings and production.

Nuclear. S Africa reported having destroyed its six bombs, and facilities. Indonesia on behalf of NAM-sponsored a resolution against dumping of Atomic wastes. Bangladesh, Pakistan sponsored nuclear free zone in S.Asia, voting was 125 for, and three against--Bhutan, India and Mauritius, 12 abstentions. Our view was that this was a global issue, there was no proper geographical extent of the area.

Maintenance of International Security. Pakistan supported, India abstained? Pakistan also submitted its traditional draft on regional disarmament--by conventional arms control.

MTCR has been extended to include all missiles, capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The technical agreement is between 27 states with seven others who agree.

A book worth keeping in defence related libraries.

-- Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab)

Men, Women and War. Ed by T.G. Fraser and Keith Jeffery, *Ireland, Lilliput Press, 1993, p. 242, £ 25.00, ISBN 0 946640 96 3.*

This book scrutinizes and interprets the military conflicts over the ages - from the Middle Ages in Ireland to Vietnam. The study of women in war makes interesting reading. Armies have been traditionally masculine; some commanders like Frederick the Great were openly misogynist. In many armies, women were no more than "Feldhure" ie camp followers. But the women's role in the fighting front is fast changing as was seen in the Gulf War. This compilation of papers by fourteen eminent scholars, is a valuable contribution to the history of warfare.

— Lt Col. Daljit Singh (Retd)

Islam and Democracy : Fear of the Modern World. By Fatima Mernissi, *London, Virago Press, 1993, p. 195, £ 7.99, ISBN 1-85381-700-7.*

This book discusses the tussle in the Arab World between obscurantism and democracy. Author explains the two schools of thought- '*din*' (religion); '*i'tiqad*' (belief); and *ta'a* (obedience) on one side and '*ra'y*' (personal opinion); *ihadath* (modernization); and *ibda* (creation) on the other. In the Arab World, push towards democracy, generally, is viewed as negative and blasphemous because, as the author, emphasises that some Muslim regimes find their interest better protected on cultural and symbolic grounds rather than on democratic principles. Author, a woman herself, has written that the Arab population increasing at the rate of 3.9 percent annually, has brought forward women as a force to reckon with. The Arab world in trying to use '*hijab*' (veil) as a weapon to push the women back to the kitchen.

This book is bold not because it writes for or against but *about* Islam.

— Lt Col. Daljit Singh (Retd)

The Cold War : A History By Martin Walker, *New York, Henry Holt and Co, 1993, p. 392, \$ 30.00, ISBN 0-8050-3190-1.*

The history of the Cold War is a contemporary history of the world since almost end of World War II / the great Patriotic war which is extremely nicely and analytically presented by the globe trotting, award winning political commentator Martin Walker. The Cold War like the endemic European wars emerges from the ashes of the previous one (WW II), which was actually contemplated to checkmate its recurrence. Commencing with the Soviet expansionism into Eastern Europe in the forties, technological ascendancy in the fifties, American reverses in Vietnam in the Sixties and economic crisis in the seventies, the cold war culminated with the complete rout of totalitarian forces vis-a-vis free market economies - a victory of consumerism over militarism.

While making a useful addition to the already burgeoning literature on the subject like a lighthouse the author has climaxed the entire political commentary into the Montesquieu gospel, that Republics end with the luxury and monarchies with poverty. The book is recommended to all the students of politics and current affairs: policy makers and supporters.

-- Air Cmde S.K. Bhardwaj (Retd)

Arms Control without Negotiation : From the Cold War to the New World Order. Ed by Bennett Ramberg, *Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 281, \$ 42.00, ISBN 1-55587-376-6.*

This collection of studies is from the ULCA Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, since renamed the Centre for International Relations. It offers a general view of the total material, summaries for each group of detailed studies, and finally conclusions; the book is easy to read selectively for reference, offering facts, analysis,

and comments, based on the series of workshops which led to the book itself. The implications of these studies are that arms control during the Cold War and after it is much more complex than negotiated agreements; the need is unilateral actions, covering not just numbers and limits, but all aspects from research, development, procurement, to deployment. The aims of reducing the probability of war, overall defence costs, damage limitation, with confidence building in parallel, all have been better served by nations acting unilaterally in their own interest, than by series of agreements negotiated and subsequently undermined. Arms control and defence planning are not conflicting objectives; self denial and denial to others are economical and effective: domestic politics, feminism, cooperative security structures and processes, combined political and military considerations, and confidence building, are all discussed. The conclusion offered is that arms control is not bargaining, but "just something to be done". A book worth reading, with much that applies to the presently changing world environment including the NPT.

-- Tindi

Verification Report 1991 : Yearbook on Arms Control and Environmental Agreements. Ed By JB Poole, *London, Vertic, 1991, p. 276, £ 20, ISBN 0-9517458-0-5.*

Verification Report 1992 : Yearbook on Arms Control and Environmental Agreements. Ed By JB Poole and R. Guthrie, *London, Vertic, 1992, p. 372, ISBN 0-9517485-1-3.*

Verification Report 1993 : Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the Environment. By JB Poole and R. Guthrie, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1993, p. 340, ISBN 1-85753-083-7*

Verification 1994 : Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment. Ed by JB Poole and R Guthrie, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1994, p. 340, £ 35.00, ISBN 1-85753-110-8.*

VERTIC (Verification Technology Information Centre) is a non-profit making organisation of scientists, which publishes year books as well as regular updates and research papers on these vital subjects of our post Cold War world. The yearbooks sandwich skilled and expert papers on a wide range of matters concerning the three main subjects, placing them between a brief summary and a reference section. The quality of information analysis, and comment is of a distinctly high order, very professional and without noticable bias. The ongoing concept of presentation, linking past present and future, makes these yearbooks an excellent source of compact information; they are a "must" for libraries and institutions concerned with Defence and Strategic Studies, and most useful additions for those dealing with Arms Control, Peace Keeping and Environment.

-- Tindi

The Practice of Diplomacy : Its Evolution, Theory and Administration. By Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *London, Routledge, 1995, p. 279, £ 32.99, ISBN 0-415-10475-0.*

The book is a historical narration of the practice of diplomacy from the early seventeenth century to the modern era. The peaceful conduct of international relations through dialogue, persuasion and accommodation for gaining advantage and expansion of territory and influence has been transformed from transactions within a small group of nation states to international diplomacy due to emergence of new states after decolonization and balkanization of larger states, say the authors.

Tracing the historical evolution of diplomacy, the book recounts the diplomatic systems of ancient Greece, the Roman and Byzantine empires, canon law and transformation from nuncius to consul, resident ambassadors, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and the formation of foreign ministries or departments to control and exercise authority on representatives abroad. It was a game of high stakes to satiate the appetites of princes for daily politics of other states, to divide the enemies, gain time, extract information, even resorting to bribery and engaging in matrimonial alliances. Richelieu further refined diplomatic activity and stressed, in his 'Testament Politique', that both the quality of ambassadors and the control exercised over them by the ministry was of profound importance. Negotiators should, he said, be 'persons who can weigh the meaning of words exactly and who are natural drafters'. Thus evolved the professionalization of diplomacy with its further refinement by Bismarck who set standards of a three year university training, passing of examinations of the civil service and eighteen months experience in state civil service.

With the improvement in communications and increase in trade, economic diplomacy came to the fore which, in turn, required safeguarding a country's trade routes and commercial activities leading to the incorporation of military attaches with embassies.

Modern diplomacy further expanded its scope with the incorporation of technical experts, specialists, secret services, use of subversion and propaganda, assisting in revolutions and resorting to conference diplomacy to resolve international conflicts. World War II ushered in a high point of diplomatic activity where heads of states got together in summits to untangle difficult issues. The United Nations became the centre-stage of diplomatic activity with permanent representatives and delegations negotiating across the table bilaterally, in small groups or among members of specific regions concerned with a particular issue. The diplomatic corps was further divided into area specialists who had detailed knowledge of the language, historical background, political, economic and social climate of the country to which they were accredited to.

An exhaustive account of the evolution of theory and administration of diplomacy. However, the authors could have done better if they had incorporated some teachings, practices and maxims of ancient Asian thinkers and practitioners like Kautilya and Sun Tzu.

The Structure of International Society : An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. By Geoffrey Stern, *London, Painter, 1995, p. 314, £ 11.99, ISBN 1 85567 266 6.*

The book is an introduction to the evolution of societies, states and nations, and their interaction in the field of international relations. The author traces the role of societies from ancient times categorizing them theoretically to realism (Thucydides, Kautilya, Machiavelli), rationalism (Locke, Montesquieu, Mill) and revolutionism (Kant, Marx, Lenin), the latter believing in the maxim "end justifies the means", and a permanent state of hostility with those having different ideals. Stern describes the structure of ancient societies of near and Middle East, Chinese, Indian, Greek, Roman, Islamic and that of Medieval Europe and defines the sovereign state - one which was legally free from outside interferences, having legal rights and duties including self defence and duty bound to honour their treaties and obligations. There are, however, constraints to sovereignty due to geographical location, social and ethnic homogeneity, political orientation and economy.

Chapter 7 elucidates the concept of nationalism based on language, religion and ethnicity and subsequent formulation of a foreign policy dependent on national interest. This foreign policy was further projected as "balance of power" by powerful nations to preserve the international system, maintain order, deter war and lastly, to retain ascendancy and influence for their personal economic dominance. As regards diplomacy, the author spells out the basic functions of representation, communication, negotiation, integration and extraction of information. As the societies evolved, conflicts also took new dimensions. Wars ranged from the localized civil war for liberation, limited, by proxy to what we now classify as total and nuclear. To prevent such a catastrophe, regional and inter-national organizations like League of Nations, United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement and their subsidiaries came into existence. Attention was also focused on under-developed nations but, ironically, aid was provided with strings attached.

In the concluding chapters the author narrates the various threats to international society due to industrialization, capitalism, nuclear proliferation, environmental degradation and pollution, depletion of resources and overpopulation, although the prescription for remedial action needs detailed analysis.

An invaluable text-book for students of international relations.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd)

NDC Papers : 3/95 : United Nations - Peacekeeping and Diplomacy, New Delhi.
National Defence College, 1995, p. 123, Rs. 70/-

A useful book of information on three vital issues 1. The UN peacekeeping efforts, the inherent problems of the operation, the possible solutions to resolve the same; 2. The human rights situation especially in India, the organisations dealing with it, the use of human rights as a mode of coercive diplomacy; 3. an overall assessment of peacekeeping efforts with India's role in the same in the future, and the role of NGOs in these peacekeeping efforts.

The book provides valuable data on peacekeeping operations of the UN and India's contribution to it. It would be of great interest if human rights could be dealt as a separate issue in a future NDC paper.

— Dr Sudha Raman

An Intelligent Person's Guide to History. By John Vincent, *London, Gerald Duckworth, 1995, p. 122, £ 11.95, ISBN 0-7156-2682-5.*

A controversial and provocative study of history by John Vincent of the University of Bristol.

The book gives an original and out of the ordinary view of history that is, in effect, because of the range of vision, and analysis of the elements of history are so refreshingly different. Professor Vincent provides a comprehensive examination of the philosophy and evolution of history, and the effect that power, physical force, war, wealth, social order, organisation, and religion have had on human activity through the ages.

The documentation of history, the factors that constitute evidence, the effect that modernisation has had on the written word, the inescapability of conflict, and the cyclical nature of history are some of the meaningful aspects that he has analysed, and as he pertinently says, "history is about winners - not losers. In broad terms, this is because it is the winners who write history".

A penetrating, incisive, and thought provoking book, that would be of stimulating interest to the historian, and the scholar.

— Maj Gen I.A.J. Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd.)

A Round Table with Sharp Corners : The Diplomatic Path to German Unity. By Frank Elbe/ Richard Kiessler, *Baden-baden, NOMOS Verlags Gesellschaft, 1996, p. 256, DM 36, ISBN 3-7890-4211-0*

The historic reunification of Germany has produced many excellent books; most of them are based on official briefs or investigative journalism. But this book has more merit as it is written by an insider, Frank Elbe - the Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gensher (and presently the German Ambassador to India) and Richard Kiessler, then an editorial director of the *Der Spiegel*, who covered the two-plus-four talks. Consequently, this mixture produces an insiders account fortified by a newspaperman's acute observations.

The book's title is based on an apt remark made by the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward Shevardnadze describing the tortuous negotiations that took place to bring about the unification. It describes how the Soviet objections about the reunited Germany remaining in the NATO were overcome. How the British reservations were removed and the French fears allayed.

Probably the most difficult question was the guarantee of the Polish German border demarcated after the end of the Second World War. Without that being guaranteed, the unification would not have been possible. The book also sheds light on the secret negotiations which took place between the German, US and Soviet representatives outside the scope of the two-plus-four negotiations, which ultimately resulted in Germany regaining its full suzerainty and becoming one nation once again.

The foreword for the book has been written by the man most responsible for the negotiations, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in which he remarks that the book "...describes how the two-plus-four negotiations were firmly rooted in world political and especially European developments." A truly fascinating book which is highly recommended to those interested in current history.

— Cdr S. Varma, SC, IN (Retd)

The Review of Dictionary of Military Abbreviations. By Norman Polmar, *Mark Warren & Eric Wertheim, Annapolis Naval Institute Press, 1995, p. 344, ISBN 1-55750-680-9.*

The authors have compiled a lexicon of current military abbreviations / acronyms pertaining to a decade of services and agencies - US Armed Forces, NATO, NASA, JCS, DOD and DIA - pursuant to the Goldwater - Nicholas Defense Reorganisation Act passed by the US Congress in 1986. The book has been divided into six chapters; Military abbreviations, Aircraft Designations, Aviation Unit Designations, Military Ranks, Missile & Rocket Designations and Ship Designations.

The book is especially useful to Military staff Officers on a joint/unified staff, Defence & Foreign Ministry's officials and all defence students and planners.

— Air Cmde S.K. Bhardwaj (Retd)

Operations Analysis in the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force in World War II : History of Mathematics (Vol IV). By Charles W. McArthur, USA, *The American Mathematical Society, 1990, p. 347, \$ 36.00, ISBN 0-8218-0158-9.*

An interesting study on the advent of Operational Research in the U.S. Air Force, with particular reference to bombing of enemy targets. Published as a series under the History of Mathematics, it is a very fair analysis; it quotes the opinion of Dr Alexander who left the organisation, saying that "he was convinced that he would not be required to employ his specialised knowledge in higher Mathematics. "The teams included Lawyers, who wrote clear reports for the operations staff.

The selection of targets was at the highest level, there was a controversy, regarding priority between synthetic oil plants and railway marshalling yards — Zuckerman's British plan to attack transportation. Final directions came from the heads of states. Amongst industrial targets, ball bearings, and abrasives factories are of interest, ball bearings had become a major bottleneck in German defence production.

The defence against V-1, meant attacking launching sites - it was important from P.R. point. Experiments in Florida, proved the effectiveness of P-47's. These fighter bombers achieved Cat-A damage which would take months to repair. Eventual respite was when the allies overran the launching sites in France.

V-2 sites had five meters RCC protection; these were dealt with by 4,500 pound, rocket assisted bombs, two of which could be delivered by a B-17.

Details of bombing aids - Gee -H, Oboe, H2S - and electronic counter measures - Carpet, Windows and Chaff - are mentioned. There is a brief description of the German jet fighter M.E 262, which came into service at the end of 1943. The performance of the short range M.E. 163 has not been mentioned.

A useful and informative book.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab)

Modern American Diplomacy (Revised and Enlarged Edition). Ed By John M. Carroll and George C. Herring, *Wilmington, Sr Books, 1988, p. 293, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-8420-2555-3.*

The book is a compilation of thirteen essays by eminent academics spanning a century of American diplomacy. In the late nineteenth century American leaders resorted to a form of aggressive imperialism based on questions of superiority, civilizing the uncivilized, domination of the weak for economic advantage and following European colonialism. Territories were annexed and made protectorates and in their quest for an orderly and stable world the U.S. became harbingers of chaos, disorder and misrule.

At the time of World War I Wilson declared neutrality but his foreign policy tilted towards the British by permitting credits and loans, continuing arms trade to belligerents (the Germans suffered due to blockade by the Royal Navy) and turning a blind eye to an economic stranglehold of Germany in the North Sea. Later, making German submarine warfare an excuse, Wilson convinced his people that "honour and security of the civilized world was at stake". From his earlier axiom of democratizing the world, he changed his stance of not only democratizing but Americanizing it. Kissinger rightly comments that after the Treaty of Versailles "Germany came to be surrounded by weaker states of uncertain strength, none of whom were capable of resisting Germany".

As Hitler rose to power the American administration under Roosevelt refused to shoulder any legal or moral responsibility in Europe, keeping out of any involvement in World War II with a policy of assessing what was "undesirable" and what was "intolerable" till they were shaken by Pearl Harbour. As regards the Soviets, the author points out that seeds of suspicion and animosity in Stalin's mind were sown by inaction of the allies to provide a second front to help the U.S.S.R. To Stalin the real enemy was pre-war Europe and his insistence of having only friendly governments on Russia's borders led to super power rivalry and the Cold War. On the other hand,

America followed a policy of containment of communist expansion leading to the Domino Theory and involvement in North Korea and Vietnam. To help free people threatened by totalitarian regimes, rejuvenate war-ravaged economies and contain Soviet expansion, the U.S. resorted to economic diplomacy which was ushered in by the Marshall Plan.

In his Afterword, Herring writes that for Americans "the world was less threatening but more confusing with new players, alignments and issues but as yet no new rules". New conflicts in the form of ethnic rivalries, nationalism, religious differences, secessionism, and North-South antagonism have come to the fore. America has to decide whether to take the path of isolation, intervention or pragmatism. A middle path of "selective intervention" may be the answer.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd)

Zhirinovsky : The Paradoxes of Russian Fascism. By Vladimir Solouyou and Elena Klepikova, *London, Viking, 1995, p. 256, £ 18.00, ISBN 0-670-85961-3.*

Zhirinovsky sprang on the Russian political scene as suddenly as a genie from a bottle, in 1990, when he organised an alternate party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), thus becoming a pioneer in establishing a multiparty system in Russia.

In recent years, he has been ridiculed and taunted, not that Zhirinovsky has been affected by it. He has been called an eccentric, a political jester, buffoon, an upstart, a loudmouth, a fascist, a Russian Hitler and many more names. But the world was shocked, when he won 24 percent of the votes in 1993 elections.

Now as the appointed dictator of the LDP, he is pursuing the 1996 elections, with tremendous determination and skill. He holds very radical views and wants Russia to rise and become 'Great' again and he wants to achieve this by ruling the country, with an iron fist. He wants to establish a new world order, give a push to the South and regain the old status and glory that Russia enjoyed earlier.

The Western countries are watching the rise of Zhirinovsky, with concern and misgivings. Gorbachev has already become a historical figure. Will Yeltsin who has been supported by the West, follow suit? And will Zhirinovsky assume absolute power by popular vote?

The authors, a husband and wife team, now live in New York. They have used their deep knowledge of Russian politics and culture, to explore the life and views of Russia's dangerous, eccentric and popular rising political star, who may assume power in Russia in the near future.

The book makes very absorbing and interesting reading and deals with a very important topical subject.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

Lenin's Final Fight : Speeches and Writings, 1922-23. By V I Lenin, *New York, Pathfinder, 1995, p. 320, \$ 19.95, ISBN 0-87348-807-5.*

The book covers in detail the last 400 days of Lenin's fight in establishing the 'new order' of Russian Union & Peasants power since the advent of October 1917 revolution. The contents revive the memories of 1950 when the publicity material of Russian origin started flooding the Indian book stalls. However, this 'condensed' version of tumultuous occurrences is very well chronicled and authenticated; the cross references provide the desired background for important events leading upto this last year of Lenin's activism in post Czarist period and emergence of the erstwhile U.S.S.R.

The events described generate greater interest for the Indian reader as the events in India also followed more or less the same pattern barely 25 years' later e.g. the voluntary merger of princely states into the Indian Republic and the subsequent economic developmental models/socialistic pattern of society, role of national leaders, the struggle and hardships of the masses, the rural and urban divide, disparities between the elite and the poor, the hunger (near famine) conditions to food surplus, etc.

The harsh realities of leadership struggle among the hierarchy and self proclaimed rival successors have been brought out in sharp focus and without any bias or concealment. The interpretations of various statements have been logically deduced and the English translation is free from any ambiguities; infact where-ever there is a possibility of such an ambiguity either due to Lenin's physical disability or the quirks of English grammar, explanatory notes provide the required classifications. The appendices and the introductory notes act as the gap fillers to complete the history of 1917 revolution, internal conflicts and their resolution. Some of the facts which were clandestinely concealed for a long time, more so pertaining to the 'murderous regime' of Stalin and the clever bureaucracy, have been brought out for the first time in any language.

— Air Vice Marshal S.S. Malhotra AVSM, VM (Retd)

An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence : A Report to the Trilateral Commission. By Yoichi Funabashi and Others, *New York, The Trilateral Commission, 1994, p. 84, \$ 9.00, ISBN 0-930503-71-6.*

This is a concise report that seeks to improve public understanding of issues that concern China.

The authors, who are experts from Japan, Western Europe and North America have worked under a common umbrella provided by the Trilateral Commission not only to identify areas of concern that affect China and the Western world, but also to suggest solutions to handle them jointly.

The study has carried out a detailed analysis of China's quest for Great Power status as a "comprehensive power". It emphasises China's prodigious potential in the military and economic spheres and also highlights her weakness with regard to social justice, governance and lack of compatible financial institutions. Speaking on behalf

of Western interests and the Trilateral nations, the authors attempt to suggest what China ought to do to achieve 'balance' in her pursuit of comprehensive great power status. The tragedy is that the West fails, as usual, to fathom the Eastern ethos. The inscrutable Chinese mien, Chinese emphasis on 'face' and China's desire to lead and not merely to follow. Whereas they do harp on China's sensitivities and the need not to 'talk down' to her, the overall impression regretfully is that they succeed in doing just that.

A must for scholars on China and for all those interested in balance of power situations in the international arena.

— Maj Gen I.A.J. Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd.)

The Japanese Economy. By Takatoshi Ito, *London, The MIT Press, 1992, p. 455, \$ 39.95, ISBN 0-262-09029-5.*

Takatoshi Ito is professor of Economics at Hitotsubashi University's Institute of Economic Research in Tokyo and at the University of Minnesota. He is also a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research.

This book is based on lecture notes to American economic students and is, therefore, an economic text-book, but it does explore, with great clarity, the Japanese economy from 1603 onto more detailed modern times and issues, comparing it constantly with the American economy. The book has been highly praised by professional peers and highly recommended to economic students. Hence, it's accuracy and authenticity are beyond doubt. What is exceptional about this book is that it is written with such lucidity and clarity that even a reader with a non-economic background can learn a lot; afterall, it's just short of five hundred pages. Chapters 11 to 14 are recommended reading for students and commentators of current affairs as they deal, with candour and supporting data, with international finance, US-Japan economic conflicts, the distribution system and asset prices : for example, it's interesting to learn of the control portfolio managers have on short term exchange rates.

A superb explanation of the Japanese economy for students of economic and a good reference book for those interested in related subjects.

— Air Marshal S D Tully
PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Children of the Atomic Bomb : An American Physician's Memoir of Nagasaki, Hiroshima, and the Marshall Islands. By James N. Yamazaki with Louis B. Fleming, *Durham, Duke Univ Press, 1995, p 182, \$ 16.95, ISBN 0-8223-1658-7.*

'Children of the Atomic Bomb' is Dr James N Yamazaki's uncommon memoir described in personal and moving terms, of the human toll of nuclear warfare, an account of dropping of atomic bomb on Japan in 1945. The book is an account of a life long effort of the author to understand and document the impact of nuclear explosion on children, particularly the children conceived but not yet born at the time of explosion.

The author very vividly brings out the discoveries that helped the dangers of nuclear radiation and presents powerful observations of medical and social effects of the nuclear bomb. The book offers an indelible picture of human tragedy, a tale of unimaginable suffering of those mentally retarded children and a dedication to their healing, that is ultimately an unwavering impassioned plea for peace.

Today, over half century later, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are barely remembered outside of Japan as the target of the 'other' bomb. In the United States there has emerged an almost pathological aversion to confronting what actually took place beneath the mushroom clouds. Infact most people think that the atomic bombs helped to bring World War II to a merciful end. However, the indiscriminate use of lethal weapons against entire populations that World War II unleashed is appalling. The question to ponder is: have we learnt any lessons from this incidence and is there a remote chance that such incidences will not be repeated again in future to end yet another war, whenever and wherever it occurs?

— Col R P S Malkan

Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia. By Earl H. Tilford, Jr. *Washington, Centre for Air Force History, 1992, p. 212.*

Search and Rescue is a very noble cause which flourished during World War II. Almost all the countries have their own Search and Rescue organisation both during peace and war.

Though rescue from the water dominated search and rescue activities in World War II, rescue from land areas increased as the war progressed.

Earl H. Tilford in his book describes in a simple language the development of search and rescue during World War II and upto 1960, the operations in South East Asia, the period when the operations were escalated during 1964-70.

In the Forward Richard P. Hallion has stated that the USAF continues to place top priority on Search and Rescue seeking better ways to perform their functions through better use of advanced equipment, ships and aircraft. This is equally applicable to the other countries as their missions are very important both afloat and ashore.

An interesting and informative book of particular interest to the Indian Coast Guard officers.

— Cmde R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, By Peter Duus and Others, *New York, Princeton University, 1995, p. 376, \$ 49.50, ISBN 0-691-04382-5.*

This book is the third volume in the series on modern Japanese colonialism and imperialism, during 1895-1945. This volume contains 12 essays and a lengthy

introduction by 13 eminent scholars, ably edited by a team of editors cum contributors. The introduction highlights the problems and issues of Japan's wartime Empire which generates interest and prepares the reader for easy grasp and absorption of more complex problems related to the wartime industrialisation, Socio-economic, geo-political issues, and integration, consolidation and management of the newly acquired territories and ever expanding empire.

International relations and intended territorial occupation have been dealt with in depth. Co-operation, submission, resistance and revolts of 'indigenous elites' within and outside the empire as well as the strategic considerations have been researched in detail and information presented in clear and precise language. Even the darker sides of wartime conduct of imperialism have been resolved with utmost transparency, based on proper documentary evidence as well as logical deductions. The data provided is very informative and relevant. Even though the topics discussed are complex and complicated, yet the narration is simple and absorbing.

— Air Vice Marshal S.S. Malhotra, AVSM, VM
(Retd)

Allied War Diplomacy and Strategy 1940-45. By C. Kondapi, *Madras, Woodside Books, 1994, p. 556, Rs. 495/-, ISBN 81-86357-00-9.*

The history of the World War II projects a baffling exercise of power-gaming by some towering personalities of the era like Churchill, Roosevelt, DeGaulle, Stalin and not the least, Hitler. On the one Hand, the theatres of war spread out over land and across high seas and sucked in new regions and nations, and on the other, new alignments of warring nations kept emerging. Evolution of opposing strategies, therefore, followed an uneven and spasmodic pattern.

In this latest addition to the vast repertoire of historical literature, on the Second World War, C Kondapi has vividly collated and reviewed the complex exercise of path-finding by the leaders of the three great power conglomerate, albeit with divergent political philosophies, strategic objectives and domestic pressures. He, first, gives a broad over-view of the salient events/developments during 1940-1945, and the crucial meetings and conferences. In the process, he has successfully portrayed the personalities of a large band of political leaders who influenced the evolution of the Allied grand strategy at respective stages.

Overall, the book offers a useful insight into the decision-making and divergent national perceptions which guided the diplomatic and strategic thrusts during the Second World War.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The Rise of the Nazis. By Conan Fischer, *Manchester, Manchester Univ Press, 1995, p. 194, £ 8.99, ISBN 0-7190-3503-1.*

Over sixty-two years ago, Hitler and his Nazi cohorts came to power in Germany bringing with them, after Stalin's, probably the most brutal government in the history

of mankind. This book by Conan Fischer examines the reasons for the advent of the Nazis and how they consolidated their power to hoodwink the hapless Germans. Starting with a history of Germany in which Nazism grew after the Great War, the author goes on to examine the set up of the party and how Hitler successfully converted the party into accepting the Fuhrer Prinzship.

Thereafter, the author explains the reasons of how an obscure Corporal could flummox a nation into following him! As he states, "If Hitler's contribution to the intellectual history of post-Enlightenment Europe was, to put it kindly, dubious, his record as a propagandist and communicator was outstanding." Here lay the secret of his success in bringing three distinct classes of people, the elite, the working-class and the middle-class into the Nazi fold. Here also lay the reason why Hitler was able to form and fund his party in a very short time. He has also examined the anatomy of Nazism, its organization, its motivational forces and its inherent brutal character which it imbibed from fascism.

This book is a part of a new series to keep up with the expansion of history syllabi which provide up to the minute new researches in the field. It is an extremely useful book for all those interested in modern European history and the effect of Nazism on it. It is all the more useful for researchers as it carries an excellent documentary appendix.

— Cdr. S. Varma, SC, IN (Retd)

Remembering Pearl Harbor : Eyewitness Accounts by U.S. Military Men and Women. Ed by Robert S. La Forte and Ronald E. Marcello, *Wilmington, Scholarly Resources, 1991, p. 303, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-8420-2371-2.*

This book is a story narrated by enlisted personnel and junior officers who were present on that fateful "day of ignominy" for US i.e., December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. It is not a tale of strategy or airborne landings or well planned and expertly, executed manoeuvres by armoured columns sweeping countries after countries but how the individuals reacted to war, their depth of emotions, anguish, despondencies, hopes and despairs.

This book is a result of over 350 interviews conducted with the survivors of Pearl Harbor and took 15 years. The recollections of 40 interviewees is given in the book along with their bio-data bringing out all the facets of the Japanese precision attack, the Americans unpreparedness and casualness, destruction of equipment and sufferings of human beings; some mentally paralysed after the sudden and surprise attack, some gathered their wits and took charge; and inevitable looting on abandoned ships from all sectors of Pearl Harbor. The wealth of knowledge as given out by other interviewees is available at the University of North Texas Oral History program for further research.

An interesting and absorbing book bringing out human reactions under adverse circumstances which should be taught to green soldiers, sailors and airmen.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Cold War Casualty : The Court-Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow. By George F. Hofmann, Kent, *The Kent State Univ Press*, 1993, p. 251, \$ 26.00, ISBN 0-87338-462-8.

A Russian agent had photo-copied the personal memoirs and views recorded through the years by Major General Grow in his personal diary. The General was US military attache in Moscow. These were exploited by the Russian propaganda machinery to denounce America as a war-mongering imperialist society. The home and foreign media also sensationalised the incident.

As a consequence General Grow was tried by a General Court-Martial and convicted in mid-1952.

After a rational and clinical review of the relevant course of the Grow episode, his career profile, the post war hard-line stance of President Truman's government vis-a-vis Russia, and the military command, the author critically examines the conduct of the investigation and trial. Even though the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency had recommended counter-propaganda to refute Russian charges, the Army brass General Taylor and Boling, went ahead with the trial. Submissions of the General and his Defence Counsel regarding non-jurisdiction of the Court and the non-validity of the alleged breach of information went unheeded.

The review of the trial proceedings by the author develops into a Case Study of the military judicial system, its intransigence and susceptibility to command prejudices and bureaucratic pressures.

Overall the book makes very interesting and thought provoking study.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

Not Mentioned in Despatches : The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green. By Spencer Fitz - Gibbon. Cambridge, *The Lutterworth Press*, 1995, p. 208, £ 17.99, ISBN 07188-29336

The Falkland war between Britain and Argentina in 1982 was fought and won by the former even with the longest ever logistics line and a tiny garrison mainly because the aim was crystal clear. War to obtain political mileage even to the extent of killing the Goose Green civilians they wanted to liberate and last but not the least the delegation of decision making by the Bde Cdr to the Bn Cdr. The Second-in-Command (after the killing of the OC Col Jones) went onto issue the ultimatum to the Argentine Task Force Commander and eventually succeeded in persuading the adversaries to the latter's mistaken impression that they were out-numbered and could not possibly win. The Argentinians chose honourable defeat rather than renewed fighting. The Argentinians on two occasions missed golden opportunities to counter attack and unhinge the British offensive due to doctrinal blocks - Schwerpunkt and training tactics. Notwithstanding the 2 Para's superior performance, the Mercedes Forces' defeat was due to Argentinian military doctrine (extreme form of positional warfare) than to the quality of the British Command and tactics. The book gives a deep insight into the

military versions of the despatches - a special case in point is the citation for the posthumous award of Victoria Cross to the Bn. Cdr - which does not at all times truly reflect the ground realities, and hence the title of the book as "Not mentioned in Despatches".

Appendices, bibliography, index, maps and sketches have all enhanced the usefulness and comprehension of the book. It is recommended to all interested in military affairs.

— Air Cmde S.K. Bhardwaj (Retd)

Beech Aircraft and Their Predecessors. By AJ Pelletier, *London, Putnam Aeronautical Books, 1995, p 223, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-85177-863-1.*

This is a book in the series - Putnam Aeronautical Books. It deals with the history of the Beech Aircraft Company of the U.S.A. and its predecessors.

The book gives complete details of the various types of aircraft that the company has built from the time it was called Travel Aircraft Manufacturing Company till the present day.

During the Second World War it manufactured small but fast transport and training aircraft for the US Army Air Corps and the US Navy. Additionally, almost 90 per cent of bombardiers and navigators were trained on its Model 18 aircraft. Multi-engine pilot training was also imparted to a majority of US and Allied pilots during the Second World War on Beech aircraft. It is interesting to note that a company which is famous for manufacturing small civilian aircraft (who in India has not heard of the Beechcraft Bonanza?) has manufactured air to air refueling equipment and drone aircraft as well.

This well produced book, full of splendid photographs, should be of great interest to those who are interested in the history of Beech aircraft.

— Cdr S. Varma, SC, IN (Retd)

Have a Nice Day : From the Balkan War to the American Dream. By Dubravka Ugresic, *London, Jonathan Cape, 1994, p. 241, £ 9.99, ISBN 0-224-03885-0.*

"Respect the madness of a madhouse as normal behaviour", writes the author, presenting a deceptively simple childlike narrative of contrasting experiences through the break up of Yugoslavia, through Europe, and the USA. The outcome is a devastatingly understated indictment of modern civilization, where human values crumble under conflict, where unwillingness to face the truth resorts to comfortable rationalisation and evasion, where hallowed causes conceal struggles for personal power, and where the highest public regard for humanity casually and thoughtlessly acts with inhumanity. This gentle and brief collection probably loses some of its impact in translation from the original Croat, but the thought, philosophy and experience are the universal worms eye view of what underlies heroic conflicts to advance noble causes by vio-

lence. Many victims and observers world wide will understand when she writes, "I no longer know who I am nor where I am nor whose I am "....." reality no longer exists".

This is not a book for everyone, "It is for those few who survived and still can think".

-- Tindi

The Battle of Britain : New Perspectives : Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War. By John Ray, *London, Arms and Armour, 1994, p. 222, £ 16.99, ISBN 1-85409-229-4.*

A number of books have been written on the Battle of Britain but this is different in that it brings out in detail the part played by Air Chief Marshal Lord Hugh Dowding when resources of the British Navy, Army and Air Force were stretched to the limit.

In spite of the differences with the Air Ministry and his uncooperative attitude towards his own colleagues, Dowding pressed his plans and delivered the goods and saved the country from defeat. However, he was held in high respect by his pilots whom he called "Chicks".

A number of those who had worked with Dowding had found him to be intransigent and unimaginative. But Dowding never hesitated to speak his mind, a quality not universally admired.

All the above and tactics followed by Dowding including the Night Air Defence have been examined in detail.

A well researched book of much interest to the air force officers. A good addition to all the libraries.

-- Cmde R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Change in South Africa. Ed by J.E. Spence, *London, Pinter Pub, 1994, p. 114, £ 9.95, ISBN 1-85567-1-35-2.*

The end of apartheid and lifting of the international sanctions imposed on South Africa led to the first ever general elections in April 1994 and the formation of the new Government of National Unity headed by President Mandela. The essays presented in this volume by eminent scholars, bring into sharp focus the immense task of social and economic reconstruction of the racially fragmented country, facing the government.

The issues analysed are, the framework of a democratic constitution, defence and internal security, the economy, education and health. These are lucidly and concisely put for an understanding of the problems that apartheid and the consequent sanctions imposed by the international community caused in South Africa, what led to

the end of apartheid and how the challenges now facing the new democratic government may be tackled.

With the developing economic, cultural and other ties between India and South Africa, it is of considerable interest to us to watch the transformation under way in that country and to see whether democracy will take root and succeed in solving the multitude of problems. These issues are dealt with very perceptively in this book.

— Maj Gen N M Sobti (Retd)

Gulf Logistics : Blackadder's War. Ed by Major General MS White, CBE, *London, Brassey (UK), 1995, p 262, £ 30.00, ISBN 1-85753-089-6.*

Gulf Logistics subtitled as the Blackadder's War is a lucid and absorbing narration of the provisioning of the right material at the right place, at the right time, in the right quantities for the effective prosecution of the military operation by the British Forces, especially No 1 (UK) Armoured Division during the Gulf War 1990-91, codenamed Operation Gravity, Sand Storm, Desert Shield and Desert Sabre. The deft handling of men and material involving 146 cargo ships and some 12,000 air sorties into the Forward Force Maintenance Area (FFMA) dwarfed even the Berlin Airlift effort, further compounded by an intervening distance of four thousand miles and from there up the supply line i.e. the FFMA to Divisional Maintenance Area (DMA) right upto the Distribution Points (DPs) in a smooth and predicted manner, albeit under no opposition from the enemy on the ground or in the air. The creation of a Blackadder's Formation was the need of the hour, which handled the most complex deployment and support operations since World War II.

Abbreviations, figures and photographs, military symbols and chapter-wise notes have greatly increased the intelligibility and the usefulness of the treatise. The book is recommended to all officers of the Armed Forces and policy makers alike.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

First Light : Modern Bahrain and its Heritage. By Hamad Bin isa Al Khalifa, *London, Kegan Paul International, 1994, p. 152, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-7103-0494-3.*

Bahrain is a small country, lying strategically in the Arab Gulf and is made up of an archipelago, consisting of 33 islands. It has an area of 687 square kilometers, with a population of only about 550,000.

This work presents the past history, present conditions and future prospects of this country from military and strategic points of view. Historically, the book goes back to the advent of Islam, to the Portuguese invasion in the sixteenth century, the British rule in the Gulf, till the achievement of independence in 1971.

The country now is a member of the Gulf Co-operation Council and maintains close relations with the wider Arab World. Seeing the importance of Arab Gulf and Bahrain's location, the country has a significant role to play in the region.

The country has been ruled by the Al Khalifa family for the last two centuries. The author is the Crown Prince of the state of Bahrain. He is also the founder and C-in-C of Bahrain Defence Forces. He did his schooling as well as his military training as a cadet in England.

For Gulf watchers, this book is another source of information and contains interesting observations on the region.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

The Arab League and Peacekeeping in the Lebanon. By Istvan Pogany, *Aldershot, Avebury, 1987, p. 214, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-566-00758-4.*

This book covers almost everything about Lebanon - right from ancient times till the date of publication. The main subject dealt in detail is of course the Arab League, the composition of its security force, with special emphasis on its functions, control, organisation, finance and performance in Lebanon.

Lebanon occupies a unique place in the region by virtue of its geo-political importance, being a buffer as well as the focal point of various civilisations. Therefore, it became imperative to provide it collective security to prevent the 'hawks' from exploiting it. Hence the formation of the Arab League Peace Keeping Security Force for Lebanon.

The details given in the book can easily serve as a ready reckoner for a scholar and a wealth of information for a student. The drafts and adaptations of resolutions & judgements among the participants in the process of war and peace, as well as of UNO & international court of justice, will provide useful inputs to scholars interested in Lebanon.

— Air Vice Marshal S.S. Melhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Dynamics of Regional Politics : Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim. By. W Howard Wiggins and Others, *New York, Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 338, \$ 40.00, ISBN 0-231-07860-9.*

The book explores the pattern of international conflict and cooperation in four geographical sub-systems :

- a) Horn of Africa,
- b) Persian/Arabian Gulf,
- c) The South Asian Sub-continent, and
- d) Southeast Asia

All these were theaters of Cold War rivalry, and had to cope with numerous regional conflicts determining the future international order on each of these sub-systems. The end of Cold War had an effect on each of these sub-systems and the author had made a very comprehensive study of the importance of their individual

dynamics. The book was published in September, 1992 and has been structured to test hypotheses about international alignments and conflicts across a number of Third World Countries. It also highlights the strength and weaknesses of some of the realities of the Third World - arbitrary colonial borders, weak state structures, civil conflict, ethnic/seciarian/tribal ties across frontiers - which are different from the European and American scenarios.

This book is very useful for students of International Relations to understand the geo-political and economic compulsions of the region, which will continue to draw the attention of Western powers for economic gains, particularly the role of the USA in the post Cold War scenario.

-- Brig S K Issar, VSM, MA IA (Retd)

South Asian Drama : Travails of Misgovernance. By Sundeep Waslekar, *New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1996, p. 372, Rs. 395/-, ISBN 81-220-0416-4.*

Inspite of nearly 50 years since independence, South Asian region, remains one of the poorest in the world, with dismal record in education, health, corruption and sectarian strife. Some feel that the region is heading for chaos.

Is the present state of affairs due to misgovernance? Or is it the mindset of the people who need to change the concept of good and evil, smart and stupid, tolerable and intolerable and should consider poverty as a fraud and not as fate, corruption as distortion of social structures and not as an act of smartness? Or is it both misgovernance and mindset.

Sundeep Waslekar in his book, South Asian Drama, has tried to answer these questions and has handled some of the burning social, economic and security problems facing the region, with insight and scholarship. His conclusions and opinions are well researched and convincing.

The author, a former scholar at Oxford, currently heads the International Centre for Peace Initiative, Bombay. He has written a number of articles for periodicals all over the world. Indian Express described him as a man with a Vision for Peace.

A well written, topical book which the reader will find most interesting.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance : Indo Pak Relations 1970-94. By J N Dixit, *Delhi, Konark Pub, 1995, p. 339, Rs 395, ISBN 81-220-0404-0.*

Since independence, Indo-Pak relations, have been turbulent and strained. A few wars have been fought and tension exists, till date. An arms race continues, diverting scarce resources from development. In the world at large, Cold War is over, the Berlin Wall has come down and there are attempts by countries to 'mend their fences', but India and Pakistan continue to be at loggerheads, thus affecting the lives of millions of people of the sub-continent.

Do the contradictions in Indo-Pak relations go beyond the issues of politics, security, territorial integrity and Kashmir or is it a question of failure to overcome the trauma of partition and the complexes and prejudices inherited from it?

The author has attempted to answer these questions in this book. It covers the period 1970-94. Having had the privilege to see the drama first hand, and as to what actually transpired behind the scenes, the author puts the whole problem in the correct perspective.

The author, a former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambassador to Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, dealt directly with Pakistan four times. He is thus, an authority on the question of Indo-Pak relations.

The layout of the book is well conceived, the subject matter put across in a lucid, easy style and with wit. I, for one, found the book fascinating. A 'must' for any library.

— Major General Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

The Military in British India : The Development of British Land Forces in South Asia 1600 - 1947. By TA Heathcote, *Manchester, Manchester University 1995, p. 288, £ 40.00.*

The book under review is part of the nine-volume Manchester History of the British Army edited by FW Becket. This volume authored by TA Heathcote is a study of the conflicts which established British rule in South Asia and the contribution of the military in the constitution of British India. The book outlines the causes and the courses of the various campaigns fought by the British and Indian rulers and the European rivals who also came on the scene.

A well researched and highly readable book which makes a clear break from the Eurocentric approach of writers of British Imperial History.

— Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Moved by Love : The Memoirs of Vinoba Bhave. Tr By Marjorie Sykes. *Wardha, Paramdham Prakashan, 1994, p. 303, Rs 30.*

Vinoba Bhave said "I am a seeker along one path only. The whole business of my life has been a search for non violence." How true it is of a man who dedicated himself by getting land from the rich farmers and distributing it to the poor for them to live a decent life.

The author has described the life of Vinoba Bhave in great detail including the long march of 100,000 miles going the length and breadth of India preaching the path of non violence and true life as advocated by the father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi.

An interesting book which should be read by all and in particular, the younger generation, to know the values of life and the aim to live for the benefit of the poor people.

-- Cmde R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia. Ed By SD Muni and Lok Raj Baral, New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1996, p. 245, Rs. 275, ISBN 81-220-0420-2.

The phenomenon of refugees, is as old as the emergence of nation-states. The refugee generating factors are many and there are serious ramifications, both for the refugee promoting states, as well as the receiving states, from social, economic and security angles.

Regional relations in South Asia have always been afflicted by movements of people across the boundaries of other states. During the last couple of decades, the growing dimensions of refugee flows, has affected the security and stability of states of South Asia.

The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo, for its first seminar project, selected the theme, "Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia." Eminent Scholars from countries of South Asia read their papers in the seminar, on important case studies. eg Tibetan refugees, Afgan refugees in Pakistan, Chakmas to India, Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and Sri Lankan Tamils in India. The editors have provided a comparative frame work, to put the whole issue in a perspective.

The book has been edited by Dr S.D. Muni, Professor of South Asian Studies JNU, who has authored and edited twelve other books. The second editor is Dr L.R. Baral, professor of Political Science, at Tribhuwan University, Kathmandu. He has edited various other volumes and is author of five other books.

A book, highly recommended, for understanding, the growing security problem due to refugees in South Asia.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

Bajirao I : An Outstanding Cavalry General. By Colonel RD Palsokar, MC, New Delhi, Reliance Publishing House, 1995, p. 248, Rs. 295/-, ISBN 81-85972-94-X.

In the galaxy of Indian generals Bajirao I stands very high and has hardly any equals. A Brahmin trained to be a minister (Peshwa) he had learnt the art of statesmanship as a close observer at the Maratha court under his father. Assuming the mantle of authority as a Peshwa at the young age of 20, Bajirao practised the art of diplomacy and war to perfection for the next 20 years until his death at the early age of 40. He was able to make up for the deficiency of his forces by the judicious use of his mobile arm - the horse cavalry, eye for ground, avoidance of confrontation, if need be, and striking at the weakest spots of the enemy. He had perfected Shivaji's

methods and made ample use of this aggressive and mobile form of fighting and took to its zenith.

He very well knew how to get a headstart of his adversary and forestall him. He did this most successfully more than once particularly against the Nizam, the biggest adversary of the Marathas in the south. The Nizam was a veteran of many a battle and had not faced defeat but lost to this young paradox of battlefield mobility. Bajirao's quick manoeuvres against the Nizam at Palkhed forced his adversary to his knees and the negotiating table. Bajirao obtained the most favourable terms while at the same time being magnanimous in victory. He did this again at Bhopal.

Long after the death of Bajirao when deterioration had set in, experienced British generals had to eat dust at the hands of the Marathas. This was so as he had left his legacy in safe hands and an expanded and stronger confederacy from far south deep into north India right up to the Moghul emperor's citadel and court in Delhi. Even though Bajirao had experienced commanders and much older to him they all had great respect for his judgement and gave him full support. Like all good generals he was intensely human and a good judge of character. Himself highly talented, he recognised talent and gave ample opportunities to his subordinates, irrespective of caste or creed.

Colonel Palsokar, a doyen among military historians has rendered valuable service to the study of our very recent history. A well produced work.

-- Lt Col Gautam Sharma (Retd)

Expert Witness : A Defence Correspondent's Gulf War 199-91. By Christopher Bellamy, *London, Brassey's 1993, p. 252, Rs 994.00, ISBN 0 08 041792 2*

We have a rare combination of a Defence Correspondent who also has a PhD in military studies looking into the future Bellamy's personal record of the build up, the execution, and the aftermath of the war against Iraq will be a classic for study by military students assigned this campaign in future years. He combines the journalist's eye for interesting detail, the analytical penetration of the scholar, the background knowledge of the historian, and the communication skills of a professional, to present a racy account attractive to all readers; with this come excellent maps, diagrams, photographs, reference notes, orders of battle, personal accounts and an index, making it a book for serious reference and study.

Written after January 1993, the author has the advantage of hindsight in analysis; events after the war, time to strip the "hype" and glamour off immediate action, more reliable facts to replace estimates, lead to better based conclusions. Iraqi fatalities were nearer 5000 than the estimated 50,000; the govt. recovered fast enough to deal with the Shiites in the South and Kurds in the North; what was the aim the USA had in mind, and what was achieved? We have a fascinating "insider" record of the future information war" of

modern technology applied to ancient conflict. We have strength and weaknesses highlighted, with "human intelligence" and "language" marked as "shortages"; we learn how commanders were "fighting" equipment rather than "equipping" men; how fire power and even guns were ahead of manoeuvre brigades; how the use of GPS, automatic coding on communications, precise control on target selection and fire, all allowed rapidly shifting boundaries of responsibility and manoeuvre, never before achieved in such complex and intense warfare. The predominant success of a devastating air war created a situation where Individuals could survive but not an Army, which led to the Iraqi debacle on the ground.

This vision of future war high lights some telling points, somewhat different to past practice. In a democracy, if the military are to be effective they must "Advertise". The aim is not to exterminate the enemy, but to limit his power. Mistakes will take place at all levels and scales - enquire, learn, and correct, but they can never be covered up. The intellectual war can deal with rogue regimes, but is not so certain with terrorism and protection of ethnic minorities. Altogether a worthwhile book.

-- Tindi

The Craft of Research. By Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams, *The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995, p. 294, £ 19.95 or \$ 25.00, ISBN 0-226-06583-9.*

A very useful guide to the methodology and mechanics of scientific research whether "pure" or "applied", as a part of a creative process. The three distinguished professors have together used their vast academic experience in the field of research to highlight the essential features of good research, from the initial planning of a project to organising and finding primary and secondary sources, taking notes, and finally drafting and revising the project. The craft of research is simply explained giving useful examples of correct and incorrect usage at every stage making the book valuable to research students as well as experienced researchers.

-- N B S

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending June 1996

(The books reviewed in January-March 1996 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Ser No.	Author's Name	Title	Year
Air Power			
1.	Vallance, Andrew GB	The Air Weapons : Doctrines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art	1996
Bangladesh			
2.	Zaheer, Hasan	The Separation of East Pakistan : The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism	1995
3.	Islam, Rafiqul BU	A Tale of Millions : Bangladesh Liberation War - 1971	1995
Biography			
4.	Prasad, Ishwari (Dr)	The Life and Times of Maharaja Judha Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana of Nepal	1996
5.	Powell, Collin L with Persico, JE	My American Journey	1995
6.	Ralhan, OP	Subhas Chandra Bose : His Struggle for Independence	1996
7.	N K Singh	The Plain Truth : Memoirs of a CBI Officer	1996
Defence - Production			
8.	Chatterji, Manas, (ed.)	Arms Spending : Development and Security	1996
9.	Hussain, Nazir	Defence Production in the Muslim World : Limitations and Prospects	1989
India			
10.	Kataria, de ve (Col)	Facts in Fact : A Bitter Truth of India of Yore and Today	1996
11.	Ghatate, NM Dr (ed)	Four Decades in Parliament : Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 3 Vols	1996

12. India, Finance Commission Report of the Finance Commission 1995-2000' 1994
13. Lewis, John P. India's Political Economy : Governance and Reform 1995
- Indian - Army**
14. Omissi, David The Sepoy and the Raj : The Indian Army 1860-1940 1994
- India - History**
15. Qureshi, IH The Administration of the Mughal Empire, Rep. 1966
16. Burke, SM and Quaishi, Salim-Al-Din The British Raj in India : An Historical Review 1995
17. Amin, Shahid Event, Metaphor Memory : Chauri - Chaura 1922-1992 1995
18. Ikram, SM Modern Muslim India and Birth of Pakistan, 6th ed. 1995
19. Noorani, AG The Trial of Bhagat Singh : Politics of Justice 1996
- India - Russia Relations**
20. Marvin, Charles The Russian Advance Towards India 1984
- Islam - History**
21. Whead-Uz-Zaman and Akhtar, MS (ed.) Islam in South Asia 1993
22. Ahmad, Sayed Riaz (Dr) Maulana Maududi and the Islamic State 1976
- Kashmir**
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