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INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- An Overview of Strategic Interest of India and Russia after the end of Cold-War - *Dr. Andrei A Kokoshin*
- UK Defence Reorganisation - *Sir Christopher France*
- National Security Management : Some Aspects - *B Raman*
- India's Role in the Future of SAARC - *Major S P Yadav*
- Nuclear Deterrence and Cost - Effectiveness - *Matin Zuberi*
- Indian Ocean Rim Trading Bloc - *Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)*

APRIL-JUNE 1995


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
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
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**UNITED
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INSTITUTION
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of National Security
in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular*

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NOTE

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EDITORIAL

Working Together For Peace

"The most effective means of preserving peace", observed George Washington, "is to be prepared for war". Implied in the above observation, is the truth that well prepared military forces of a nation, because of their deterrence value, are an instrument of peace; they will be used for war only if deterrence fails. Therefore, war fighting is their secondary role, and preventing war by deterrence and thus maintaining peace, their primary one. This is as it should be; because fighting a modern war is a colossal economic loss to both sides—unless like the United States in the Gulf War, one can minimise own war casualties and make others pay for the cost of it. Hence, it makes great economic sense to employ the age-old philosophy of deterrence by strengthening the nation with modern means of defence, as weak states always invite aggression.

Being prepared for war is a relative term; the important question is : prepared for war against whom? The answer to this would involve an analysis of the source, nature, and degree of threat: conventional, nuclear and that from low intensity conflicts. Such analysis can only be done by an integrated institutional mechanism comprising intelligence agencies, armed forces, foreign policy makers, para-military forces, and the politicians in power. Above all, the organisation of higher defence management needs to be integrated so that a holistic and long-term approach to threat analysis is possible, thus creating a base to structure a modern military machine, in relation to the threat, and to provide deterrence, and respond to challenges to India's security in the next millennium.

In this context, the organisation of management of defence in the United Kingdom, as presented in the excellent paper by Sir Christopher France, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, and published as one of the lead articles in this issue of the Journal, gives us an opportunity for a comparative study. And since our diverse institutions are designed on the same lines as those of the United Kingdom, what prevents us from following the British concept in reshaping our defence structure to the extent possible, while modifying it to meet the needs of our own security concerns ?

An Overview of Strategic Interest of India and Russia After the End of Cold-War

DR ANDREI A KOKOSHIN

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN SHRI K.C. PANT, FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND CHAIRMAN FINANCE COMMISSION

I have great pleasure in extending a very warm welcome to Dr Kokoshin. Dr Kokoshin has mastered many disciplines. He has a degree in Engineering. After his doctorate he became a Professor and a Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He has to his credit authorship of over 200 scientific publications. At the same time he specialises in International Economy. With this impressive background and interest in history in general and history of the Russian Navy in particular, Dr Kokoshin at one time worked on strategic and defence matters at the Soviet Institute for USA and Canada headed by Professor Arbatov.

In the recent years, Dr Kokoshin has been associated with the articulation of the new Russian defence doctrine in the light of the changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union. Our two countries have traditionally had close and friendly ties. It is in our mutual interest to preserve and enhance this time tested relationship. Indeed, while taking note of changes in the political landscape, we should build upon this relationship and take advantage of the new economic environment in both our countries to facilitate and promote even more productive interaction in the future.

Over the years we have developed a comprehensive and strategic relationship with your country. We are interested in continuing this relationship. We have long shared an understanding of geo-political realities and have cooperated with each other in international fora on a wide range of issues like anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid etc. The end of the Cold War has ushered in sweeping changes. The evolving situation in Asia is of natural interest to both our countries. The emergence of fundamentalist forces in areas bordering Indian and Russian territories gives cause for concern. At the same time winds of economic change and the opening up of markets all over the world represent opportunities to impart new dynamism to our bilateral and multi-lateral economic relations. As far as the long-standing defence-cooperation between our two

The texts of the Introductory Remarks by Shri K.C. Pant and a talk given by Dr. A.A. Kokoshin, first Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation to the members of the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi on March 23, 1995.

countries is concerned, it has been marked by stability and trust. We are certainly interested in enhancing our traditional relationship in the areas of defence cooperation.

Let me not stand between you and Dr Andrei Kokoshin. We are all looking forward to his address and I now invite him to deliver it. Thank you.

Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin

Ladies & Gentlemen,

First of all permit me to express my feelings of sincere gratitude for the opportunity extended to me to meet with you here in the United Service Institution and to speak on problems of strategic interest, which are or can become common to both India and Russia.

This is my first official visit to your beautiful country, a country which has always enjoyed feelings of love and respect in Russia.

Everyone, who comes to India even for once leaves a part of his heart here and many remain captivated throughout their lives to this wonderful country of yours. Such was the case with the Roerichs both father and son - world renowned artists and orientologists, whose paintings and works on Tibetology, Buddhist philosophy, and history of India underline the grandeur of India and are still considered as classic works of art and literature.

A visit to your country confirms that India has a great future. We saw a strong and a stable state, modern armed forces, business-like and free people, who are proud of their country, of her prestige in the international community, people who are ready to defend and protect their interest. We are sincerely glad for the Indian people and wish them further successes and prosperity.

Our delegation had and, I think, will still have many interesting meetings during the course of the visit. But I think the present meeting with you is indeed a very special one. You are my colleagues, highly qualified specialists, professionals. I do hope that our conversation will turn out to be useful for both the sides.

First of all, a few words about contemporary Russia. While, holding a greater part of the territory of former USSR and possessing immense natural resources, scientific and intellectual potential, the country is passing through a deep crisis at the present moment.

There are many reasons for this.

The difficulties of the reforms, the breaking down of the economic links amongst the former republics of USSR, the severity of the social, national and other problems are further aggravating this crisis and are slowing down the process of stabilisation of the situation and that of the renewal of Russia.

Problems of contemporary Russia fully manifested themselves in the events which are known to you, events which took place in one of the subject states of the Russian Federation - i.e. the Chechen Republic. This, of course, is a special topic by itself. Right now, I would only like to say that as a result of an armed mutiny, a real dictatorial regime with its own armed forces, well-trained, well-equipped and well-organised, was established in one of the regions of Russia i.e. on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

For long we could not bring ourselves to the resolution of the Chechen problem. The Russian society, as if, was remorseful of its imperial past and was apprehensive that it would not be correctly understood. Time was lost and the state was forced to use military force in order to preserve its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Summing up, I would permit myself to come out with the thought that the present internal situation in Russia, (socio-political, economic, international and others) - is the most unfavourable one since the time of the civil war of 1918-1920.

Such is the reality.

Gentlemen,

The end of the 20th Century has provided humanity with an opportunity to start a difficult joint endeavour based on common human values and mutual interest for the transformation of the entire life on the planet.

Russia has no obvious enemies. "The Cold War" has come to an end, ideological contradictions with the West have been removed. NATO has defined its new role and strategic concept. For the first time in our history the defence policy of our country is rid of the incredible burden of single-minded preparations for a large-scale war.

At the same time, the instability of the situation in Russia and the CIS, the upsurge of passions and bloodshed in Yugoslavia, in the Middle and Near-East, the dictatorial regimes with missiles in the Third World, the supply of

arms to such parts of the world, the military-political mosaic in the Arab countries, racial and religious fanaticism and terror as well as armed conflicts, are leading to an explosive situation both on the regional and global levels, making peace very fragile.

At this difficult turning point of history, a close interaction between India and Russia to ensure stability and security in South Asia, is to our view, particularly important. The difficult and complicated knots of political, socio-economic, military, ecological and other problems in the region could be undone only by making joint efforts, only through coordinated efforts made by the states and the peoples.

Such an approach demands the establishment of a new level of trust, common sense and new thinking in resolving issues concerning international relations.

Permit me to dwell on certain aspects of strategic interests that are common to both India and Russia at the contemporary stage, aspects which appear to be most important.

The first amongst these concerns is the problem of the setting up of a reliable structure of collective security in Asia with the participation of the maximum number of the states in the region. I think that this is equally important both for India and Russia.

The thing is, that the cessation of the multi-level opposition of the two socio-political systems in the past has brought down the level of global confrontation in the world, as well as in regions, including in South Asia, only to a certain extent. However, this cessation has not led to a complete elimination of confrontation, as was forecast by many a politician and military expert. The paradox, what is more, consists in the fact that there are places where the level of regional stability and security has even come down and has to a great extent lost the element of predictability. This, in the first instance, is connected with the fact, that there are no restraining factors - factors of deterrence at the present moment. In the past during the emergence of an escalation of conflicts between states of any region, and more so, when contiguous countries were drawn into such conflicts, such a restraining role was played by the U.S.A. and the USSR. The aggravating crisis in the socio-political structure of the states of the regions, caused by socio-economic, religious-confessional, national, ethnic and other contradictions, that threaten to spill over the borders of their own states and spread in the neighbouring countries also exert a far greater impact on the level of security and stability.

The urge on the part of certain states to redraw the existing state boundaries on ethnic or religious grounds and thus to organise ethnically homogenous populations, is one of the dangerous tendencies that increase the conflict forming base both in the regions as well as in the whole world.

The process of intensified militarisation of certain regions, a sharp increase of the military potential of the major states of those regions through the supply of the most sophisticated and destructive systems of conventional weapons to their armed forces serve as the other powerful factor leading to destabilisation. Prospects of near nuclear states turning into full fledged nuclear-power states have particularly dangerous consequences. Unfortunately, all that has been said above fully relates to the regions of South and Central Asia.

India, which has an immense prestige and enjoys the trust of both the developing as well as highly developed countries of the region, could, with the support of Russia, become a mediator both for initiating a more frank dialogue amongst all the concerned states as well as in the elaboration of common approaches for strengthening stability and security. Russia and India could come out with joint initiatives for convening a common regional forum on these problems.

Our countries must coordinate their efforts not only to accelerate their own economic and socio-political development but also of that of the other countries of the South. The immense gap that exists in economic development, level and quality of life between the North and the South leaves a negative imprint on inter-state relations and increases the conflict forming base. Mutually beneficial economic cooperation between our two countries and its expansion will be a contribution to the stabilisation of the situation in the region.

Russia and India could unite their efforts in South-Asia for setting up an infrastructure of cooperation. They could jointly work in such diverse spheres as communication-system building and informatics, setting up of rail, road and air links, removal of customs barriers and creation of an unified space for interaction in the sphere of banking as well as in others fields.

Strengthening of cooperation amongst the multi-lateral inter-state institutions, such as the CIS and SAARC, in particular amongst their coordinating bodies could be promoted by our states for their own benefit as well as for the benefit of the entire region.

ON THE PROBLEM OF CONSOLIDATING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Russia evaluates India's stand on this issue on its merit. She has high

regard for the initiatives aimed at the gradual elimination of nuclear arms taken by India. The plan of action put forward by your country on the establishment of a nuclear-free and non-violent world by the year 2010 creates optimum conditions for the complete elimination of nuclear arms. We also share the intermediate measures that have been proposed by you, in particular, on the expansion and perfection of trust-building measures and others.

We, in Russia, think that a voluntary renunciation on the part of both Pakistan and India to join the nuclear club and their joint acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty would promote the cause of strengthening stability and security in the region of South Asia as well as on a global level and would be a very valuable input to the strengthening of peace and stability.

Russia and India could unite their efforts in drawing up a prospective plan for non-proliferation in the region of South Asia. They could also combine their efforts in getting such a plan accepted in principle by the countries of the region as well as by nuclear-power states. We consider, that any renunciation of nuclear status must be compensated with weighty guarantees from the side of nuclear-power states and the entire world community.

In our opinion the regime of nuclear non-proliferation must be strengthened by a Missile Technology Control Regime as we intend to observe it (MTCR). At the same time we consider, that a global control regime must not be of a discriminating nature and must not serve as an obstacle in the conducting of scientific research and investigations in space research. We also think that such a global regime must not be used as a mechanism to establish monopoly in the field of space services market.

While adhering to such a position, we intend to develop in future also Russian-Indian cooperation in the sphere of research and use of space for peaceful purposes. The agreements signed during the course of the visit of V.S. Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, between the Russian Space Agency and ISRO is an important step in this direction.

Taking into consideration the peace-loving foreign policy being pursued by India, her non-participation in military alliances and blocs, her role as the recognised leader of the non-aligned countries, we consider that the Indian military potential is defence oriented and as such is an element of stability in the region.

Such policies that are being pursued by India open up great opportunities for the development of military and military-technical cooperation between our two countries. The Russian Federation as testified by the joint agreement on the implementation of the long-term programme of military-technical cooperation

for the period upto 2000 A.D. intends to implement such cooperation.

We are ready to supply to India both arms and military equipment, many models of which, such as the "Tunguska-M" - the anti-aircraft gun-missile complex, "Buk", "Tor", "S-300V", S-300 PMU" and others do not have their equals in the world. The technology of their production is also unique. This and other military equipment will be exhibited and demonstrated at the international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi (19-23 March) where the representative of your country can have a real assessment of their tactical-technical specifications.

Russia is grateful to India for her support to our efforts aimed at stabilising the situation and strengthening of the democratic secular institutions of power in the Central Asian countries, which came into being after the dissolution of the USSR. We shall welcome a more active participation by the Indian side in this process and shall also extend support to India's efforts in balancing the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in the countries of Central Asia and in particular, in Tadjikistan through her own political and economic presence. We shall in the interest of the normalisation of the situation in that country also welcome India's participation as a mediator in initiating a dialogue between the opposing forces in Tadjikistan.

Gentlemen,

These are only a few areas where the strategic interests of India and Russia are common and, therefore, need to be developed at the contemporary stage. This is, by no means, a complete list of all the problems that are encountered in this region. I think that we shall at least discuss and consider part of these problems during the course of the working of our delegation in your country. I tried not to abuse your attention and have done my best to stick to the time limit allotted for my speech.

Thank you for your attention.

UK Defence Reorganisation

SIR CHRISTOPHER FRANCE

I feel greatly privileged to be here today. We who tackle the problems of defence have much to gain from exchanging experiences and views. I welcome the opportunity to have such exchanges with colleagues here in India.

I also gain encouragement from the past. Samuel Pepys, the seventeenth century public servant and famous diarist - sometimes called the Father of the English Navy - records episodes we would recognise. On one occasion he tried to induce managers, as we would call them, in Deptford dockyard on the Thames, actually to keep records of what they were doing and spending, but could not persuade them to shift from what he called "their old, dull road". On another occasion, in Chatham dockyard, he saw a pair of horses hauling a piece of timber which, in his opinion, one man could have carried. He did what we all sometimes do. He compromised. He dismissed the team of horses and their driver, and got two men to carry the timber. How nice to know one is not the first to try to reform the management of Defence!

But today, I want to begin by outlining very briefly the UK's defence policy, roles and commitments in the world today. These provide the purposes we pursue in the management of our Defence effort. It is, however, on management that I wish to concentrate. So I will take most of my time to explain how the management of the UK's defence effort has evolved to enable us to meet these challenges within ever greater pressure on resources.

The "new world order" hailed in the aftermath of the Cold War has not materialised. Instead, we find ourselves in a world characterised by rapid change. Ethnic tension, nationalism and extremism present themselves as increasing challenges; events in Bosnia, and most recently in Chechnya, show only too starkly the human tragedy that can result. Britain cannot isolate herself from these challenges to world peace and stability for we retain historical and global interests.

To reflect these new challenges, the UK has, since 1993, publicly expressed Britain's defence policy in terms of three overlapping defence roles:

-- first, to ensure the protection and security of the United Kingdom

The text of a talk given by Sir Christopher France, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, to the members of the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi on March 9, 1995.

and our dependent territories, even when there is no major external threat.

- second, to insure against any major external threat to the United Kingdom and our allies.
- and third, to contribute to promoting the United Kingdom's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability.

Much of the first and second roles is related to what we do in cooperation with our NATO allies, including our European neighbours. For us, as for them, this is a time of reorientation and of new thinking. The work involves matters of great interest and of great importance - an importance which extends beyond Europe through, for example, our relations with Russia and the other states which emerged from the former Soviet Union. But rather than explore these complexities now - though we could return to them in questions - I want to say a little more about DR3, since it involves Britain in the wider world.

Defence Role Three allows us the greatest degree of choice - in the commitments we undertake and in the resources we make available to them. This choice will be influenced by the scale of threat to British interests; the perception of our role in the world including our responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council; our economic dependence on trade and, hence, world stability; and our historical legacy and Commonwealth ties.

Our priority remains to find the right balance between these responsibilities and the need to avoid overstretch of forces which are already heavily committed elsewhere. We believe that it is not effective to maintain a standing capacity for UN operations - the range of capabilities potentially required is too wide - and that we should be selective about where and in which operations we participate. We also consider it important that operations should have a clear mandate, an agreed timescale and a reasonable prospect of contributing to a lasting political solution.

Our forces are committed to a number of operational deployments - ranging from Bosnia through the Middle East to Africa and the Baltic - in pursuit of our interest in world-wide security. For example, in the Gulf, ships of the Armilla patrol continue to reassure and assist entitled merchant shipping as well as contributing to the enforcement of the remaining UN resolutions on trade with Iraq.

ASIA/PACIFIC

The United Kingdom will continue to take an interest in, and offer assistance with, security in the Asia/Pacific region following the withdrawal of our garrison from Hong Kong in 1997 as sovereignty is transferred to the people's Republic of China. We aim to contribute to the maintenance of stability and very much welcome the development of the ASEAN Forum as a means of supporting that same goal. We remain fully committed to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and plan to continue exercising on a regular basis with the forces of fellow signatories. We also maintain an infantry battalion in Brunei at the specific request of the Sultan.

Within the region, we place great value on the excellent relationship that the United Kingdom continues to enjoy with your country. This relationship, founded on the historical links that bind our Armed Forces, is of great benefit to us both and has, in recent years, extended into new areas in which we have a mutual interest, such as United Nations peacekeeping operations.

THE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE

I have only been able to provide a brief outline of our defence policy, but my main theme is the management of defence - how we identify and provide the defence capability that gives effect to our policies and is the UK MOD's *raison d'être*.

In today's language of management, the provision of this defence capability is our output; and we seek to achieve this by means of intermediate outputs, most obviously an effective Navy, Army and Air Force. The challenge for those who are managing defence is to ensure that these intermediate outputs form a coherent and unified whole. In the world of defence we either succeed or fail, win or lose and this compels us to ensure that we achieve a unity of defence output. This requires a coherent defence policy and, to no less an extent, coherent integrated organisational structure.

Our thinking about the management of defence and the structure required to deliver defence capability has developed much in the last ten to fifteen years. This is, of course, now also a reflection of the re-orientation of our defence policy and restructuring of our forces following the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Warsaw Pact. Another pressure for change has been the process of evolution (almost a quiet revolution) in the activities and the structures of Government in the UK.

Since 1979 the British Government has been pursuing a policy of curbing

the size and activities of the public sector, arguing that development, enterprise and personal freedoms were stifled by the involvement of the institutions of the state in matters that were not its proper concern and which it could not handle as efficiently as the private sector. There remains a powerful emphasis on efficiency generally and the introduction, whenever possible, of competition between suppliers of services, of much greater personal accountability, of defined objectives and of the review of performance.

This process of change is driven by two fundamental objectives: the delivery of the right service and its delivery in a way that provides the best value for money. This runs to the heart of the political process and is one of the obligations that lies on all of us who are responsible for managing public resources in a democratic society. We should constantly be seeking out new ways of providing more for less, or at least, more for the same. Where the taxpayers' money is being used, we have to answer and perhaps more importantly, be prepared to answer, for the ways in which we have done things as much as for what we have done.

But the British MOD has been no stranger to reorganisation since its first establishment in 1946. In its early days it was little more than a small coordinating office for the three Single Service Ministries, each of which was headed by its own Secretary of State, with its own Service Council, Chief of Staff and professional civilian head. A single Ministry, absorbing the three Service Ministries under a single Secretary of State, was formed as long ago as 1964. However, in the early 1980s it was still largely based on the individual Service organisations, though with increasing coordination and sharing of functions. And we had a central department providing services such as contracts and accounts and a unified equipment procurement executive.

In 1985, under a Defence Minister with a keen interest in management, Michael Heseltine, a more fundamental reorganisation was carried out. This laid the foundations on which subsequent reforms have been based. The guiding principle of the 1985 reorganisation was that strategic issues such as policy, resource allocation and setting priorities should be the exclusive responsibility of a stronger central staff, while the staffs of the individual Services should be left to concentrate on managing their service within the framework set by the central staffs.

The key elements of the new centre of the ministry were a defence staff concerned with defence planning and policy and an office of management and budget concerned with policy and resource planning. They were responsible jointly to the Chief of Defence Staff and to the Permanent civilian head of the Department.

The status of the Chief of the Defence Staff had been enhanced in an earlier reorganisation: superior in rank to his single-Service Chiefs of Staff colleagues, he also acts as Principal Adviser to the Defence Secretary and the Government on strategy and military operations, and on the military implications of defence policy. He has a deputy who ranks equivalent to the Chiefs of the individual Services.

As Accounting Officer responsible to Parliament for the overall and proper use of the funds granted to the Department, I have primary responsibility for financial planning and control of the defence programme and the allocation of resources and am responsible for the efficient conduct of the business of the Department, including co-ordinating advice from its civilian and military staffs and other Government Departments.

The 1985 reorganisation was inevitably disruptive in the short term in our headquarters, but the aim was to ensure that the Central staffs were genuinely strengthened in the areas where they were expected to be pre-eminent, whilst at the same time the management structures and the morale of the individual Services were maintained.

The key to its success was to ensure that the Services were persuaded of the logic of the division between a policy orientated Central Staff and management orientated Service Staffs. The processes by which the Central Staffs formulated policy had to be visible and the Services had to be reassured that they would have opportunities to contribute their own views before decisions were taken.

Conversely, although management was to be delegated increasingly to the Service staffs, the central staffs would have a natural interest in the effectiveness and economy of such management. The organisation of those central capabilities has changed in detail over the past ten years, but they established the basic design of the strong integrated civilian and military centre of the Ministry. I want to stress that word "integrated". To cite an example: the Director for International Organisations, an Army Brigadier reports to a civilian Under Secretary, who in turn reports to a civilian Deputy Secretary, who answers to the four-star military Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

The 1985 reforms had envisaged that there would be extensive delegation of day to day management outside headquarters down clearly defined chains of command to budget holders at the lowest practicable level. The MOD's management principles are as follows:

- (a) Objectives and responsibilities clear

- (b) Management accountable
- (c) Authority delegated
- (d) Work to private sector if possible

The task of completing this vision required more far-reaching work and it was not until 1991, and against the background of the "Options for Change" restructuring of our forces with the end of the Cold War, that we were ready to complete the 1985 reforms.

NEW MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

In 1991 we introduced our New Management Strategy. This was perhaps the most far-reaching change, certainly the one that has called for the greatest adjustment in our thinking about the way we do business and manage resources.

Financial authority in the MOD has mainly been passed down a parallel financial chain on behalf of the Accounting Officer, since money and the military were traditionally considered not to mix! There was a traditional attachment - on both sides - to these arrangements: the exercise of financial discipline at one remove provided a proven safeguard for the interests of Ministers and the taxpayer, and there were advantages for the military commander to be able to concentrate on military effectiveness, leaving others to answer for the use of resources.

With the increasing pressure on resources and the wider changes across the public service, attitudes had changed significantly by 1991. Better to have a budget of your own, however tightly set and hedged with efficiency targets and performance objectives, than be subject to the control of someone with no responsibility for the task.

The arrangements we introduced were designed to align management and financial responsibilities much more closely, to delegate these responsibilities down the chains of command more extensively and to set up a complete system of objective setting and performance review for each element of the organisation.

The aim was to ensure that the head of an establishment knew exactly what it cost to run and would have freedom, within reasonable limits, to decide what to spend money on, provided he met the objectives specified by his higher authority.

Managers at all levels have become more cost and performance conscious and, most importantly, they are allowed the flexibility to meet their objectives

in the way that seems best to them.

This delegation of financial and executive responsibility is not just about budgets and the allocation of resources, although that is central to it. It is, perhaps most importantly, about individual accountability and responsibility, and the concomitant authority to take decisions within clearly defined parameters without constant reference up the line management chain. This has been achieved by the creation of a vertical system of budget holders and sub-budget holders, arranged on a Service basis but -- and this is an important point - also on a functional basis.

From 1 April 1995 there will be 15 top level budget holders divided into five groups. Only three are civilian. Each budget holder within the system has a formal letter of delegation setting out the limits of his or her authority. Within that, they have the ability to make decisions and allocate resources as they see fit, to meet the requirements set out in the management plans for their area. The planning system is designed to set targets against which output can be measured and the necessary resources judged. Budget holders are personally accountable for their performance against these targets.

REBASING GOVERNMENT

The MOD has also been affected by a variety of public sector management changes that derive from the British Government's concern to raise standards of public service while containing costs. Their effect has been to start a fundamental debate about the role of Government and the functions of the public sector.

A. COMPETITION

One aspect of this approach is the use of competition as the primary route to reducing costs and improving quality. In 1991 the Government launched a programme - called "Competing for Quality - to improve value for money in the services it procures and provides through the exposure of public sector support activities to competition with the private sector. This can be taken forward by range of options including contractorisation, and where appropriate, competition between the current in-house suppliers of the activities involved and the private sector.

In response to this initiatives, MOD has produced an ambitious programme to expose many civilian and military support activities to competition with the private sector. Our over-riding aim has been to secure long-term best value for money without diminishing the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

The initiative has already produced a number of tangible benefits and these include: concentrating military manpower upon core activities, focusing on achieving outputs rather than on the process, the achievement of a more cooperative relationship with industry, a willingness to consider alternative ways of doing things, and the creation of a framework for private sector investment in defence.

B. AGENCIES

Where competition is not appropriate and for those activities which it is judged should remain within the Ministry of Defence, one possible approach is the creation of an Agency. These are units remaining within Government Departments (and directly accountable through Ministers to Parliament) which carry out, to the greatest extent practicable, the executive functions of Government. Central policy making functions and, for the Ministry of Defence, operational or front-line units, are exempt.

Each Agency has a Framework Document setting out its roles and responsibilities, its relationship with its parent Department, the business systems appropriate to its needs, and a concise and effective strategic plan.

The Agency is managed by a Chief Executive, who may be a civilian selected by open competition, or in the case of MOD a military officer, and for most Defence Agencies this post is firmly embedded within the chain of command. The Chief Executive is given the delegated authority necessary to deliver the Agency's objectives, control of the resources necessary, and is personally and publicly accountable for the day to day operation of the Agency and for the achievement of its rigorous, published targets.

The programme has had a considerable impact on the UK MOD. A large proportion of the Ministry of Defence's work is now carried out by Next Steps Agencies. There are currently 21 Defence Agencies and approximately 45,000 civilians and military personnel work within them. The functions carried out by these Agencies include for example Army base repair, central financial and accounting services, operational analysis, postal and courier services, defence research, aircraft repair and maintenance, RAF training and logistics information systems.

Our aim is to extend the Next Steps programme to most significant Defence support areas. Functions currently under review include storage, Navy and Army training, medical services, personnel vetting, recruiting and service pay and personnel management.

The benefits which have resulted from all this are immense and obvious. Because managers now hold the accountability, authority and budget for an area's output, it is far easier for them to assess priorities and thus make informed management decisions; and by making sure that we concentrate on what is of core value to defence we can maximise the resources available to the front line. While our commands and agencies are free to manage themselves internally, they are all held together by powerful forces derived from the unity of defence output and the central purpose of the MOD, expressed through the responsibility for delivering a 'Value for Money' defence capability.

DEFENCE COSTS STUDY

This brings me to our recent Defence Costs Study, launched by the Secretary of State last year under the banner "Front Line First". You might think that after nearly ten years of change we had reached a reasonable position at which to consolidate. Why did we conduct another major study only four years after the "Options for Change" exercise following the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union? I would be less than frank if I did not admit that the impetus came from the Government's drive to reduce the level of public expenditure.

Over the last two years or so, Government departments have been carrying out fundamental expenditure reviews, and the Defence Costs Study was the MOD contribution to this process. Its aim was to reduce costs without changing our defence policy or reducing the military capability available to carry it out. It was intended to be and, I would say, succeeded in being a positive exercise that would look for different ways of doing things, not just to reduce costs but also to ensure that our armed forces were receiving the most appropriate support to meet their current needs.

The Study, therefore, looked at the support areas across the board and across management hierarchies. Existing systems or procedures were designed to cope with very different circumstances. Those systems might be working at near maximum efficiency, but were they still appropriate to the changed strategic setting? Were we exploiting all the possibilities of the information technology revolution or sometimes simply seeking to automate existing manual processes? Similarly the smaller size of all the Services and the fact that operations increasingly involve all three Services working together argued for a very hard look at the scope for undertaking activities on a joint Service basis. Finally, were we providing too much of the support ourselves? Outside operational areas, military logistics are no longer unique in scale or complexity. We, therefore, investigated whether we could make more use of the private sector.

Before turning to the results, it is worth saying a few words about how the studies were carried out. We commissioned twenty major and thirteen minor studies looking at all aspects of support. Most of these were deliberately designed to look across Service and other organisational boundaries - we wanted to have maximum scope for rationalisation and for spreading best practice from one area to others.

Most of the studies were carried out between January and March 1994. Ministers were involved throughout the conduct of the studies - both providing strategic direction and taking a particularly close interest in the individual studies which they had sponsored. The study teams of military and civilian personnel with experts from other Government departments and outsiders were encouraged to think radically and to challenge established thinking. We also sought ideas from all those working in the Services and the Department - several thousand were received and fed into the studies. But we recognised the need to test the results for practicality and to ensure that none of the proposals involved risks to operational capability. Before decisions were taken, therefore, each report was considered at a special meeting, called a Reference Group, chaired by the sponsoring Minister, where senior officers and officials from the areas concerned were able to probe the evidence and the arguments and the teams could be cross-examined on their reports.

The Defence Costs study achieved, as a whole, its objective. It identified ways of saving more than three quarters of a billion pounds annually from 1996. This would be sufficient not only to sustain our planned capability within the planned reduction of defence spending but also allowed the Government to redirect some spending to reinforce key capability areas.

THE CENTRAL MOD

Where did all this leave the central MOD? Starting from the recognition that it has a dual function as a Department of State and as the Headquarters of the Armed Forces as a whole, one of the detailed studies rigorously examined the functions that should be carried out in the MOD Head Office. The guiding principle was that the role of the Head Office was to set policy, provide strategic direction and monitor performance but not in general to carry policy out.

This led to the definition of a set of core functions, which can be categorised as either functions of our role as a Department of State - advice and support for Ministers, Parliamentary and Government business, development of policy, financial planning and management - or our functions as Headquarters of the Armed Forces - provision of military advice to the Government, strategic

direction of military operations, policy for the management of the Armed Forces.

These functions provided the basis for the subsequent analysis of the Department's activities and we concluded that in practice, most of the functions of the Head Office are not only complementary but cannot be carried out separately. A further consideration was that most, if not all the activities carried out by the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces involve both military and civilian effort. Such activities can and should be carried out by integrated staffs. A unified structure - bringing military and civilian staff together - was, therefore, not only the most appropriate to support what is really a single business with common aims, but that it also offered the most effective and economical approach to business.

The dual aspects of the business reflect the differing responsibilities of the Chief of the Defence Staff and my own position as Civilian Head of the Department. While it is important to preserve clear lines of functional responsibility to Ministers for these different aspects of the Department's business, we do not need parallel, separate military or civilian hierarchies to achieve this. We are therefore reorganising the Head Office to eliminate areas of unnecessary overlap between military and civilian organisations.

CONCLUSION

How can one measure the impact of all this change? The size of the UK Armed Forces in 1980 was 320,000. By the year 2000 that is expected to drop to around 215,000. That is the uniformed military component. If we include civilian employees at the Ministry of Defence, the totals would be 560,000 in 1980 and an estimated 325,000 at the end of the century - a reduction of more than 240,000 military and civilian jobs, or more than 40 per cent in twenty years.

Are there, then, any guiding principles that I can draw out from the British experience of change and the integration of the Services?

The fundamental principle is that which we adopted in 1985: strong central control over policy formulation, planning and resource allocation, coupled with maximum delegation of management to the individual services and executive organisations.

Any system of this sort must, however, recognise the genuine differences between the Services and their legitimate interests. The Services must feel that they have an opportunity to influence the central processes. The processes of

consultation and the information provided should be open. Ultimately, however, decisions on the central issues of policy and resources must be taken by the Central staffs and where the advice of individual services is rejected, it must be for reasons that are openly stated.

But organisational change is disruptive. It cuts across old loyalties, requires new ways of working and offers benefits that are sometimes uncertain and unproven. Of all the organisational changes, those that involve the integration in some form or another of the individual armed services are the most fiercely resisted and the most controversial. It will only work if there is strong political commitment to change. Then one must build a consensus within the Ministry and the Services in favour of change. That means free and open discussion, encouraged by Ministers, senior officials and Service chiefs, and a readiness by top management to confront these issues, engage in dialogue and explain their views.

The aim of the process is to persuade the organisation as a whole of the need to adapt. Changes are being forced on us all in the defence world at a pace that is often breath-taking. Old ideas and old working practices have to change and we must try to be more efficient with our use of money over all our activities. That is what we in the British MOD have been striving to achieve.



Service to the Services



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**IN PURSUIT OF ENHANCED CONSUMER
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ARMED FORCES**

National Security Management: Some Aspects

B RAMAN

INTRODUCTION

Amongst governmental concepts, that of National Security Management is of relatively recent origin, dating back to the period immediately before the outbreak of the Second World War. The concept as it evolved during the subsequent War in Korea was initially seen essentially as the management of the integrated application of the diplomatic and military components of State power in order to achieve national security objectives.

The resort to terrorism by the Palestinians to achieve their political objective, which started around 1968, and the application of the principle of Low Intensity Conflict by the USSR and China, each in its own parallel manner through the exploitation of the Vietcong, to sap American will and power without provoking a direct military confrontation between States underlined the need for expanding the concept to cover the integrated application of not only the diplomatic and military components of State power, but also the clandestine operational capability of the State as endowed in its intelligence agencies. What one saw in Afghanistan was the successful use against the USSR of a tool arising out of an effective integration of these three components.

As the Reagan Administration effectively used this tool in Afghanistan through the proxy of the Afghan Mujahideen and Pakistan, the realisation that a similar tool could be fashioned and used by its adversaries to harm its national security interests dawned upon it and an increasing number of American National Security experts started propounding the view that low intensity conflict was likely to become the "primary source of violence between States" in the years to come and hence deserved the attention of National Security Managers. In his last report to the Congress on the National Security Strategy of his Administration, President Reagan, therefore, said that "the balanced application of the various elements of national power is necessary to protect US interests in low intensity conflicts."

This realisation was behind the considerable attention paid by the Reagan

and Bush Administrations to the evolution of adequate strategies to deal with international terrorism, narco terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism on the one hand and to the development of the required counter-proliferation tools to prevent not only the proliferation of unconventional means of force amongst States, but also the possible acquisition of such means by international terrorist groups with the help of the considerable financial resources available through narco-terrorism. A constant fear of successive American Administrations since the 1980s has been over the prospect of international terrorist groups acquiring chemical (nerve gas) and biological weapons with which they could hold entire urban conglomerations and populations to ransom. In pursuance of this new National Security Strategy, the CIA set up a Counter-Terrorism Centre in 1986, a Counter-Narcotics Centre in 1989 and a Counter-Proliferation Centre in 1991.

The 1970s and the 1980s brought into focus the potency of two other components of State power capable of being used effectively in military as well as non-military conflicts between States. These were the economic and the information (or to put it more crudely, the disinformation and hence psychological) components of State power. The effective use of the oil weapon against the West by the mediocre military powers of West Asia and the increasing international clout of Japan because of its economic power, even though it did not possess concomitant military strength, and the role played by instruments of psychological warfare like the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty based in Munich in encouraging feelings of alienation and dissidence in the Communist States of East Europe highlighted the need for integrating the economic and psychological components in any structured response to national security situations. Thus, a satisfactory definition of the concept of National Security Management would be a concept which ensures a balanced application of the diplomatic (political), military (which would include scientific and technological also), covert (clandestine operations), economic and psychological components of State power to protect National Security interests and to achieve National Security objectives.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In May, 1994, our Prime Minister had expressed his intention of reviving the idea of a National Security Council to provide a holistic, well-integrated and well-structured response to National Security issues. When one talks of a National Security Council, one immediately tends to think of the NSC of the USA because of the high-profile (not infrequently, highly romanticised) role which it had played under different administrations since its inception in 1947 under the Truman Administration, the association of intellectual giants like McGeorge Bundy during the brief Kennedy Administration, Henry Kissinger

during the Nixon Administration and Zbigniew Brzezinski under the Carter Administration with the NSC mechanism and the embarrassment and controversy which it created under Rogue Elephants like Admiral Pointdexter and Col. Oliver North in the last years of the Reagan Administration. It would, therefore, be useful to identify the principal characteristics of the NSC mechanism of the USA before deciding whether it would be useful to have a similar mechanism grafted into our system and if so, to what extent.

The NSC was set up by Truman in 1947 mainly as a small core group in order to ensure effective co-ordination of the policies and actions of different Government Departments on national security issues. The National Security Act of 1947 which established the National Security Council, the Department of Defence and the Central Intelligence Agency, laid down that the function of the NSC shall be "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving national security." The NSC was to have a two-tier structure consisting of the Council itself presided over by the President and, in his absence, by the Secretary of State and including the Defence Secretary and other relevant Secretaries depending on the issue under discussion and a small staff of three officers to service the Council taken on deputation from the State and Defence Departments because of their reputation as good co-ordinators. The staff was headed by an official designated as the Executive Secretary to the NSC.

From these humble beginnings, due to the increasing complexities of the national security situation and issues, the direct and active role played by the US President in dealing with such situations and issues for which he needed a mechanism and a body of experts enjoying his confidence and deriving their authority directly from him and what was perceived by successive Presidents as the deeply-ingrained inertia of the permanent bureaucracy and its consequent inability to innovate and improvise, the NSC staff (the second tier) has over the years grown into a mini bureaucratic leviathan of its own, with a widely expanded role.

Starting as essentially a National Security policy co-ordinator, its staff started playing other roles as formulator of National Security policies in the strategic sense and contingency plans to deal with tactical situations during outbreaks of foreseeable and unforeseen crisis situations, as Crisis Manager and as Supervisor of the implementation of the National Security decisions and Directives of the President, whether they related to strategic and long-term issues or tactical and short-term situations. This expansion of the role of the NSC staff started under the Nixon Administration. Nixon had made it clear that

he wanted the NSC "to have a pre-eminent role in National Security planning."

Carter came to office in 1977 with the expressed intention of streamlining and trimming the role of the NSC and its staff. He ordered a re-organisation of the NSC "in order to place more responsibility in the Departments and Agencies, while ensuring that the NSC continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defence policy decisions." he abolished the plethora of NSC Committees which had come up during the Nixon and Ford Administrations and set up instead a simple two-tier structure consisting of a Policy Review Committee (PRC) whose task was "to develop National Security Policy for Presidential decision" and a Special Co-ordination Committee (SCC) whose tasks were to ensure "co-ordination in the development of options and implementation of Presidential decisions."

In practice, while the PRC dealt with policy formulation relating to foreign, defence, economic and intelligence matters, the SCC focussed on supervising policy implementation, contingency planning to meet crises and crisis management. While both the PRC and SCC consisted of Cabinet-level appointees like the Secretary of State, the Defence Secretary etc, Carter had laid down that while the PRC meetings would be presided over by the Cabinet-level appointee dealing with the subject under discussion with the National Security Adviser attending the meetings as a member, the meetings of the SCC would always be presided over by his National Security Adviser, who would also be the channel through which the deliberations of both the committees would be reported to the President for decision. In course of time, this arrangement, which was meant to restore the authority of various Departments and Agencies in policy matters, ended up by making Brzezinski as powerful under Carter as Kissinger was under Nixon.

Reagan came to office in 1981 full of scathing criticism of the way the NSC had become powerful under Carter thereby destroying the initiative of key Government Departments and Agencies and with a professed determination to change all this. He said during his election campaign. "The Carter Administration has been unable to speak with one voice on foreign policy. My Administration will restore leadership to US foreign policy by organising it in a more coherent way. The Secretary of State will be the President's principal spokesman and adviser on foreign policy. The NSC will once again be the co-ordinator of the policy process. Its mission will be to ensure that the President receives an orderly, balanced flow of information and analyses. The National Security Adviser will work closely in teamwork with the Secretary of State and the other members of the Council.

In his first year in office, Reagan showed a determination to carry out what he had promised during the election campaign. He made his National Security Adviser one bureaucrat amongst others by denying him Cabinet status as was accorded by Carter to Brzezinski. His first order, after assuming office, laying down the responsibilities of different officials, did not even refer to the National Security Adviser. By doing so, he downgraded the leadership role of the NSC staff and the National Security Adviser in the formulation and implementation of National Security policies.

After having thus trimmed the role of the NSC and its staff in the initial months of his Administration, Reagan, faced with opposition and resistance from the professionals of the State and Defence Departments to some of his ideas and desires relating to Iran, the Contra rebels in Nicaragua etc, started, like his predecessors, using increasingly the staff of the NSC for having his ideas carried out, often without the knowledge of the Secretaries of State and Defence.

There was another qualitative difference, in the negative sense, under the Reagan Administration. Reagan came to office with a strong distrust of intellectuals or the "think people". He felt more comfortable in the company of "act people". His Administration, particularly in the later years, saw the downgrading of the role of the "think people" in the NSC staff and the ascendancy of the "act people" like Admiral Pointdexter and Col. Oliver North, who were prepared to produce results, if possible, by working within the system and within the confines of that law and, if necessary to please the President, by operating outside the system and the limits of the law. Under such "act people", the NSC staff ceased to be a generator of ideas and concepts and degenerated into a breeding ground of Rogue Elephants, ultimately landing the entire NSC mechanism in disrepute and ridicule from which it has not so far recovered, even seven years after the exit of Reagan.

There could be no denying the fact that the constitution of a National Security Council consisting of a select number of Cabinet-level Ministers presided over by the Prime Minister and, in his absence, by the Minister dealing with the subject under discussion, would ensure that adequate thought is given to the task of identifying National Security issues in a constantly evolving and increasingly complex National Security situation and working out well-integrated and well-structured policy responses to them, but the ultimate effectiveness of the Council would depend upon the quality of the permanent staff at its disposal, a clear delineation of their functions and responsibilities and the personality of the individual who would be heading this staff whether he is designated as the National Security Adviser as in the USA or as something else. Keeping in view the American experience, clear-cut answers will

swers will have to be found to the following questions:

(a) Would the role of the staff be limited to policy co-ordination as it was in the USA to start with or would it also function as policy formulator, supervisor of policy implementation and crisis manager, roles presently played by the Cabinet Secretary? If it is to have an expanded role as in the USA, how would the National Security Adviser function in relation to the Cabinet Secretary?

(b) Should the staff combine in itself a strategic role with regard to long-term policy formulation and a tactical role with regard to crisis management and handling of day-to-day national security situations or should its role be confined to long-term strategic policy formulation with the tactical role remaining with the Committee of Secretaries, the Core Group and the Crisis Management mechanism, all of which are presided over by the Cabinet Secretary?

(c) How would the permanent staff of the NSC be constituted and what would be their composition? Would it consist only of permanent bureaucrats taken on deputation from other departments or would be Government tap the intellectual circles outside the confines of the Government in order to ensure a proper mix of conventional thinking and new ideas unalloyed with undue bureaucratic caution?

(d) Our system of administration, which is very much like the British system and so unlike the American system, provides for a neutral umpire in the person of the Cabinet Secretary so that he takes a broader view of National Security issues, uninfluenced by sectoral or vested interests of individual departments or agencies. Would it be advisable to weaken this role? Would it not prove counter-productive?

(e) Where would the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Cabinet Secretariat fit in the NSC mechanism?

The ultimate effectiveness of proposed NSC mechanism would depend upon well-considered and satisfactory answers to these questions.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Even if such an NSC mechanism with a competent staff is set up, its usefulness would depend upon the flow of intelligence, analyses and assessments from the civilian and military intelligence agencies in respect of hard or secret intelligence and from other Ministers and Departments of the Government in respect of open intelligence, either directly or through the channel of the JIC. There has to be a well-structured mechanism for the flow of such intelligence, analyses and assessments. What has been the American experience with regard to the collection and analysis of secret intelligence?

The US intelligence community has as many as 12 intelligence collection/analysis agencies competing amongst themselves for budgetary allocations and for the attention of the NSC and the President. Since the CIA is the most well-known component of the US intelligence community, one tends to assume that it must be the most important component of the community. It is not - at least from the budgetary point of view. It consumes only 10 percent of the total intelligence budget of the USA. In the fiscal year 1992 for which break-up estimates are available, the US Government spent US \$ 29.3 billion on intelligence collection and analysis, which was US \$ 9 billion more than the present total foreign exchange reserves of India and, according to some analysts, more than the combined budgets of the Departments of Education and Environment of the USA. This amount was distributed amongst the 12 agencies of the intelligence community as follows:

- (a) The National Reconnaissance Office of the Pentagon which operates imagery satellites.....US \$ 6.2 billion.
- (b) The National Security Agency of the Pentagon, which is responsible for protecting US communications and intercepting foreign communications.....US \$ 3.9 billion.
- (c) The CIA.....US \$ 3.2 billion.
- (d) The Directorate of Army Intelligence.....US \$ 1.5 billion.
- (e) The Directorate of Air Force Intelligence.....US \$ 1.5 billion.
- (f) The Defence Intelligence Agency, which is the analysis wing of the Pentagon.....US \$ 0.582 billion.
- (g) The Defence Reconnaissance Support Programme..... US \$ 0.536 billion.
- (h) The Directorate of Naval Intelligence..... US \$ 0.500 billion.
- (i) The Intelligence Division of the Energy Department..... US \$ 0.15 billion.
- (j) The Intelligence Community Staff..... US \$ 0.1 billion.
- (k) The FBI.....US \$ 0.1 billion.
- (l) The Intelligence & Research Division of the State Department US \$ 0.05 billion.

Note 1: The exact functions of the Defence Reconnaissance Support Programme and the Intelligence Community Staff are not known.

- Note 2: The allocation for the FBI seems to cover only its requirements for collection of intelligence outside the USA and not its requirements inside the USA.
- Note 3: The Intelligence and Research Division of the State Department prepares analyses and assessments on the basis of diplomatic and open reports.
- Note 4: President Clinton has reportedly reduced the over-all budget of the intelligence community to US \$ 24 billion, but the break-up figures are not available.

The Director of the CIA wears two hats. As Director, CIA, he is the head of one of the 12 agencies (the CIA) of the intelligence community and responsible for its day-to-day running. As Director, Central Intelligence, he acts as the Adviser to the President on all intelligence matters and is responsible for co-ordinating the functioning and expenditure of the various agencies of the intelligence community. According to many analysts, over the years, Directors of the CIA have been facing difficulty in performing effectively their role as Directors, Central Intelligence, because of the tendency of the various intelligence agencies of the Defence Department not to co-operate with them. They, therefore, claim, that while the Director, Central Intelligence, may be the de jure overload of the US intelligence community, it is the Secretary of Defence, who has emerged over the years as the "real intelligence overweight." According to retired Air Force Gen. Daniel Graham, who had worked in the CIA and subsequently became the chief of the DIA, "the Generals who spend the money literally believe it does not make any sense to take orders from the civilians in the CIA." On the other hand, the officers of the intelligence agencies of the Pentagon complain that their civilian counterparts "look upon them as a cut below par-less educated and less rigorous in their analytical abilities."

As pointed out by Senator David L. Boren, former Chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, "two separate empires have grown up over the years-civilian intelligence and military intelligence, with a lot of redundancies, duplication and overlap." President Bush initiated measures to eliminate duplication and improve inter-agency coordination and co-operation, but these measures remained largely ineffective. This constant turf battle between the civilian and military agencies has affected the quality of the inputs to the NSC staff. Any scheme, for introducing the NSC mechanism in India, would, therefore, have to clearly delineate the respective roles of the civilian and military intelligence agencies in order to reduce duplication and improve co-ordination and at the same time, make their output cost-effective.

MECHANISM FOR ASSESSMENT

The National Security Managers in the USA have also not found a satisfactory solution to the perennial conflict between the advocates of the concept of one-point assessment as is prevalent in the UK and those of the concept of competitive, multi-point analysis/assessment as is followed in the USA.

In the UK, it has been clearly laid down that analysis and assessment would be the responsibility of the JIC. The role of the intelligence agencies is confined to collecting and reporting secret intelligence. If they have any views or assessments on the basis of the intelligence collected by them, they are required to convey them only to the JIC for being considered before preparing its own assessment. The JIC's assessments then go to the Prime Minister and the concerned Ministers of his Government through the Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services.

The functioning of the JIC mechanism in the UK came in for strong criticism after the war between the UK and Argentina over the Falklands in 1982. After the war was over, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime Minister, had appointed in July, 1982, a high-powered committee headed by Lord Franks, a member of the Liberal Party, "to review the way in which the responsibilities of the Government in relation to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982." In its report presented on January 18, 1983, the Committee gave the following conclusions:

- (a) The invasion of the Falklands on April 2, 1982, could not have been foreseen.
- (b) "We would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government."
- (c) However, there was need for a review of the Government's intelligence assessment facilities. "The JIC was too passive in operation to respond quickly and critically to a rapidly changing situation which demanded urgent attention."
- (d) "We remain doubtful about two aspects of the work of the JIC. First, we are not sure that at all important times the Assessment Staff were fully aware of the weight of the Argentinian Press campaign in 1982. As a result, it seems to us they may have attached greater significance to the secret intelligence, which, at that time, was reassuring. Our second doubt is whether the JIC attached sufficient weight to the possible effects on Argentinian thinking of the various actions of the British

Government. The changes in the Argentinian position were more evident in the diplomatic front and in the associated Press campaign than in intelligence reports."

(e) "The aim should be to ensure that the Assessment Staff are able to take fully into account both the relevant diplomatic and political developments and foreign Press treatment of sensitive foreign policy issues."

In the light of these conclusions, the Committee made the following recommendations to improve the assessment mechanism:

(a) The JIC Chairman should be appointed by the Prime Minister and should be a fulltime appointee capable of playing a more critical and independent role than in the past. The Chairman should be independent in operation from the Govt. Departments principally constituting it. Till then, the practice was for a senior official of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to also wear a second hat as Chairman of the JIC.

(b) The JIC's assessments should not be based purely on secret intelligence as in the past, but should also take into account all relevant open information and diplomatic despatches. To enable this, a mechanism should be devised for ensuring a regular flow of open information and diplomatic despatches to the JIC Staff.

Both the recommendations were accepted by the Thatcher Government.

In the USA, the CIA and the DIA not only collect and disseminate secret intelligence, but also prepare their own independent analyses and assessments and send them not only to the NSC staff, but also, depending on the circumstances, to the President and other concerned Secretaries. Often, the President and his Secretaries receive separate and, not infrequently, conflicting assessments from the CIA and the DIA even before the NSC had applied its mind and given its assessment and its recommendations on policy. This often creates confusion and a dilemma for the President. Some analysts and Congressmen have, therefore, been suggesting that all assessments must be made at one point as in the UK in order to eliminate unnecessary confusion, but this has been strongly opposed by the advocates of the need for competitive analysis.

On February 5, 1992, Senator Boren and Representative Dave McCurdy jointly introduced a proposal for re-organising the US intelligence community on the following lines:

(a) The posts of Director, Central Intelligence, and Director, CIA would be bifurcated, instead of the same individual wearing both the hats as at present. Director, CIA, would be responsible only for supervising the day-to-day running of the CIA.

(b) The post of Director, Central Intelligence, would be re-designated as Director, National Intelligence. The incumbent of this post, who would be different from Director, CIA, would oversee the functioning of all civilian and military intelligence agencies and ensure better co-ordination and co-operation between them. He would be a member of the NSC.

(c) A new analysis and assessment agency to be called the National Intelligence Centre would be created in which the Directorate of Intelligence of the CIA, which is its analysis division, the analysis division of the DIA and the Intelligence and Research Division of the State Department would be merged. After the creation of this Centre, the role of the intelligence agencies would be confined to collection and reporting of hard intelligence as in the UK. They would have no responsibility for preparing analyses and assessments. As could be seen, the National Intelligence Centre would function more or less on the pattern of the JIC system of the UK.

Their proposal failed to secure majority support in the Congress because of the weight of opinion in the Congress as well as outside in favour of the present practice of competitive analysis and assessment which ensures the availability to policy-makers of a variety of points of view. Despite the past failures of the CIA to foresee the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the collapse of the Communist regimes in the USSR and other countries of East Europe, it is generally accepted in Governmental and non-Governmental circles in the USA that the CIA's assessments, unlike those of the State and Defence Department, tend to be more objective since it has no vested interest in drafting its assessments in such a manner as to justify any course of action or any policy line.

In India, we have grafted into our system aspects of both the British and American models. While we set up a JIC headed by an independent, full-time Chairman in the early 1960s, it does not have exclusive responsibility for assessments. The intelligence agencies continue to prepare and disseminate to concerned Ministers and Departments their own assessments of important developments having a bearing on national security. In the 1960s, the then Chairman of the JIC had questioned the wisdom of this practice and suggested that as in the UK, our intelligence agencies should not prepare independent analyses and assessments and that their analyses and comments should be sent only to the JIC for being considered for incorporation in the JIC's assessments. This contention was not accepted by the Government as it was felt that it would be beneficial to the Government to know how the intelligence agencies viewed a particular situation. Thus, we continue to have elements of the competitive analysis/assessment concept in our system. If an NSC mechanism is created in our country, a point to be considered would be whether the JIC

should continue to exist as an independent assessment machinery as this could create unnecessary overlap in functions.

TASKING & MONITORING THE PERFORMANCE OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

An important aspect of the role of the contemplated NSC has to be the tasking and monitoring the performance of our intelligence agencies, civilian as well as military, in order to decide to what extent their inputs have contributed to preventing or pre-empting crisis situations or dealing with such situations if no preventive intelligence was available and to successful policy formulation and how cost-effective were their inputs. At present, we do not have any structured mechanism for performing this important task. In the UK, the tasking and monitoring are done by the JIC and the Permanent Secretaries Committee on Intelligence Services and in the USA by the NSA with inputs from various intelligence-user Departments and Agencies of the Government. Even the Congressional Intelligence Committees take keen interest in this aspect.

Tasking has two aspects — external-tasking and self-tasking. External-tasking relates to the tasks laid down for the intelligence agencies by the Head of the Government after inviting the requirements of various user Departments and Agencies, vetting them and deciding on the priorities after taking into account the funds available for the intelligence agencies and their capability on the ground. The combined list of tasks is then prepared and sent to the heads of the intelligence agencies, indicating priorities. Self-tasking relates to the tasks apportioned to various field units of the agency by its head in order to comply with the external tasks projected to the agency by the head of the Government. Both in the UK and in the USA, the external-tasking is done on a long-term basis, with periodic review of the tasks every time there is a new national security situation, or every time there is a change in the Government. While this job is normally done by the JIC in the UK, sometimes the assistance of independent experts is taken. For example, in 1994, Prime Minister John Major asked Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Secretary for Defence, to draw up a report on the UK's "foreign intelligence requirements and capability" for submission to the Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services.

How the external-tasking of the intelligence agencies would be done? How would the NSA assess the performance of the agencies in achieving the tasks laid down? What would be the mechanism for ensuring that their production is cost-effective so that there is no continuous increase in their budgetary allocations unrelated to their performance in fulfilling the tasks laid down? These are also some of the important issues which have to be addressed.

India's Role in the Future of SAARC

MAJOR S P YADAV

SCOPE OF THE PAPER

This paper has attempted to highlight the geo-political setup in South Asia leading to the birth and evolution of SAARC. It has also examined the major constraints and irritants with special reference to India's relations with other SAARC members which have affected closer cooperation among the member states and has highlighted core areas for cooperation towards mutual benefit. Thereafter, it has analysed the relevance of SAARC in the changed global context and has attempted to recommend India's strategy for the future in order to make the organisation more viable and a force to reckon with in the changing world order.

PREVIEW

It is proposed to study the subject by analysing and evaluating the following important aspects:-

- (a) Evolution of SAARC.
- (b) A SAARC Balance Sheet (Successes and Failures).
- (c) Problems and Constraints to cooperation.
- (d) Potential and prospect for Cooperation Among SAARC nations, with special reference to India's role.
- (e) Recommendations and suggested strategy for India towards overall development of SAARC for the future.

EVOLUTION OF SAARC

One of the most important developments in South Asia in recent years has been the emergence of regional cooperation. It has not merely acquired a firm institutional base in the shape of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, commonly known as SAARC, but also evolved a commendable set of principles and guidelines for its future growth.

The evolution and steady growth of EEC, and the amazingly fast progress

Edited text of the essay which won the Second Prize in Group A of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1994.

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made by the neighbouring Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), brought the initially reluctant partners of SAARC together to assess what could be done by concerted effort to promote their economic and social development. The factor of geographical unity promoting such a collective effort could not be overlooked. The vast riverfed agricultural and hydel-energy resources, the interlinking network of land and riverine communications and the climatic homogeneity of the region were conducive to a coordinated, high yield exploitation of these subcontinental assets.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) emerged as a result of detailed discussion between the bureaucracies of the seven South Asian states from 1980 when the proposal was first put forward by Bangladesh President - Ziaur Rehman, and the launching of the Association at the first Summit in Dhaka in December 1985.

An integrated programme of action (IPA) was launched when the South Asian Foreign Ministers met at New Delhi in August, 1983 and signed a declaration. According to the declaration, the objectives and principles of SAARC are as follows:-

(a) *Objectives.*

- (i) To promote the welfare of the people of the South-Asia and to improve their quality of life.
- (ii) To accelerate economic growth.
- (iii) To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields.
- (iv) To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums and with other developing countries.
- (v) To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.
- (vi) To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries.
- (vii) To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems.
- (viii) To cooperate with International and regional organisations.

(b) *Principles.*

- (i) Such co-operation should be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit.
- (ii) Such co-operation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation but shall complement them.
- (iii) Such co-operation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multi-lateral obligations.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SAARC

Following the New Delhi Meeting in 1983, the organisational structure of SAARC became clear. It developed a four tier structure.

- (a) *Technical Committee.* This was at the lowest level, consisting of experts and officials formulating programmes and determining areas of cooperation alongwith all their financial and administrative implications.
- (b) *Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries.* Foreign secretaries were to review and coordinate the work of the technical committees. The committee was to meet at least once a year.
- (c) *Foreign Ministers Conference.* These were to be held once a year to grant political approval to the recommendations of the Standing Committee.
- (d) *SAARC Meeting.* This was to be held annually to give political significance to SAARC.

SAARC SUMMITS

Eight SAARC summits have been held so far and the pace of progress has been rather slow. Difference of opinion between member states on various bilateral and world issue still persists due to mutual suspicion.

A SAARC BALANCE SHEET

The fact that the South Asian countries, belonging to a clearly identifiable and compact geographical region, had to wait untill 1985 to launch SAARC, was due to primarily two factors:-

- (a) By its size, resources and technological base, India is a colossus, almost three times bigger than all its South Asian neighbours put together,

and with ambitions for a hegemonic role to match. This naturally created an apprehension that any regional association of the countries South of the Himalayas would be dominated by India.

(b) This fear was confirmed by the experience of the smaller neighbours which had seen that in all disputed issues, India did not proceed on the basis of recognised principles of international conduct but tried to dictate from a position of strength. Furthermore, India's diplomatic stance in dealing with non-regional powers left little doubt that it expected them to pay heed to its dominant position in the subcontinent affairs.

THE SUCCESSES OF SAARC

The very fact that SAARC was established at all was a positive development, for the agreement of the seven countries of South Asia to Bangladeshi proposal for a regional organisation committed them to work together for the progress and well-being of one-fifth of humanity that calls South Asia its home.

The establishment of an institutional framework and the functioning of the Secretariat have already proved their worth. The secretariat, and the periodic meetings at the heads of government, foreign ministers and foreign secretaries levels have enabled regular contacts and consultations. Apart from the formal consideration of an agenda for co-operation in agreed areas, these meetings, facilitate the informal discussion of bilateral differences and contentious issues that cannot be taken up officially. As a corollary of the regular meetings and contacts, an awareness has developed of the commonality of problems within the member countries and of the advantages of working together and learning from each other's experience. Even more valuable is the resultant trend and opportunity to look at economic and social problems in a regional perspective.

Especially valuable has been the regional interaction in the fields of culture and sports. The broadcasting of programmes of music and folk dances of various countries by radio and television in all member states, and the staging of South Asian games have already become established as popular features of cooperation between them.

Each summit has identified new areas of cooperation. While ten regional institutions have been proposed, the Regional Agricultural Information Centre has started functioning in Bangladesh and the Regional Meteorological centre is in the process of being established in India. Also the Association's goal of increasing people-to-people contacts at the regional level is being gradually fulfilled. The SAARC Audio-Visual Exchange Programme (SAVE) has already

begun its operations since 1988. Other achievements, such as the establishment of SAARC chairs and fellowships in regional education centres have also been put into practice.

The Islamabad Summit has also taken concrete steps to increase people-to-people contacts by exempting certain categories of people from acquiring visas for travel within the region. Another tangible manifestation of SAARC's progress is the establishment of the food security reserve. Some progress has also been made towards achieving the SAARC objectives of strengthening co-operation amongst the member states and with other developing countries and like-minded organisations on economic and political issues affecting the Third World.

SAARC leaders, at various summits, have identified common problems and advocated the improvement of regional trade with and terms of assistance from the developed world. Committees of experts have been formed to recommend ways and means of negotiating with multilateral agencies such as GATT and UNCTAD on problems facing the South Asian states.

Other successes are that since the initial approval of the IPA in nine specified areas of cooperation, the list has been expanded to include welfare of women, control of drug abuse, anti-terrorist measures, relief organisation to include measures to meet natural disasters, ecology preservation studies and coordinated development of human resources.

The cooperation among the SAARC member countries in holding workshops in Pakistan on water management, and in Sri Lanka on local planning, an archaeological congress in India, collection of information of different postal set ups in Bangladesh, seminars in Nepal on malaria and leprosy, has created conditions for greater regional economic co-operation.

The Regional Economic Co-operation in South Asia (RECSA) has been given a fillip during the Seventh Summit held at Dhaka on 11 Apr 93. The draft agreement on South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) has been agreed upon. Also the proposal to set up a South-Asian Development Fund has been mooted. A SAARC fund for regional projects has also been established.

The SAPTA agreement during the seventh summit at Dhaka in April 1993 is a milestone. However, no agreement on the time frame for its implementation could be reached due to the negative stance adopted by Pakistan. Also for the success of SAPTA steps need to be taken to identify commodities which become eligible for preferential treatment. There is a need to also decide

on the degree of preferential duty to be levied on commodities coming under SAPTA.

Lastly, the establishment of SAARC has produced an international reaction that is broadly favourable. With regional cooperation assuming an increasingly significant role in other parts of the world, major powers (such as China, USA and Russia) as well as regional organisations have welcomed the emergence of SAARC as a means of promoting economic development and political conciliation.

FAILURES OF SAARC

In the context of the degree of economic integration and political understanding achieved by other regional organisations, SAARC's record of achievement thus far is seen to be much less impressive. In contrast to the satisfactory progress and pace of developments in 'short-term' activities, little progress has been registered in substantial fields of co-operation falling in the 'long-term' category. Intra-regional trade has not recorded any increase either in value or in variety of goods. No coordinated measures have been initiated to influence the world's markets for securing more favourable terms for the sale of regional products like jute, tea, cotton textiles etc. No schemes have been initiated on the planning boards of the engineers to harness the tremendous hydro-electric potential of the region for integrated economic and social uplift of its population. The integration of inter-country and trans-region rail and road communications, essential for the growth of economic interaction, has not been paid any attention.

Real hard core economic areas like trade, industry, money, finance and energy are outside the SAARC cooperation. Pakistan is strongly opposed to the inclusion of these areas as she feels that this will be advantageous to India. Pakistan is interested in building a military economic nexus with some Islamic states in the face of dwindling US economic support viz OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries). Also new regional grouping of ten South-West and Central Asian Countries under the banner of economic cooperation organization (ECO) comprising Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Tazakistan held their ministerial level meeting at Quetta in Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan's dichotomy of trying to join more than one regional bloc is an impediment to the progress of SAARC.

PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS TO COOPERATION

Two divergent perspectives exist regarding SAARC. First is inclined to build SAARC as a multilateral instrument of harnessing the cooperative potential

of the region in socio-cultural and economic field. This in turn could moderate political and strategic divergences among the member countries and improve the climate for bilateral interaction as well. The other perspective is based upon the assumption that SAARC needs India more than India needs SAARC, because the best way for India to interact with its neighbours is through the bilateral channel.

Obstacles in the Path of SAARC

- (a) Political relations are not cordial among SAARC countries, especially among the two main neighbours, namely India and Pakistan. The prevailing political climate in this region is not so conducive for socio-economic cooperation among them.
- (b) Even though, the countries in the SAARC are developing, in the real sense, there is a lot of divergence in their relative stage of economic development.
- (c) Lack of balanced interdependence within SAARC is another major obstacle. Also lack of payment arrangements and inadequate transport and communication facilities constitute other obstacles to SAARC.

The worst part of it is that common political understanding is lacking significantly among the member countries. The security concern of India's neighbours are different from those of India's whose major security concern is China, whereas Pakistan and Bangladesh have very friendly relations with that country. On issues like Afghanistan, Kampuchea, nuclear arms race, Indian Ocean etc, there are wide divergences in views between India and other member countries. Other regional groupings of nations such as EEC and GCC were started with a political and security consensus before they adopted economic co-operation among themselves. But in SAARC, the reverse process has been adopted. A beginning has been made in economic and technical cooperation with the expectation that over a period of time a political consensus will emerge.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

The major reason for lack of economic cooperation and the small magnitude of intra-trade among SAARC members alongwith high levels of instability in trade flows among the member countries can be attributed to the following factors:-

- (a) The long historical domination of the region by the colonial rule of UK not only constitutes the well developed and enduring trade ties

with South Asian nations but also makes infrastructure in these countries in such a level that it can continuously facilitate trade with Britain without strengthening the need for mutual interests and complementarities within the region.

(b) Disparities in the level of economic development of different countries in the region particularly in case of developed members like India and Pakistan, on the one hand, and the undeveloped members like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives on the other, has created the feeling that economic cooperation in augmenting the expansion of intra-regional trade within the region will not be as beneficial as that with other developed countries.

(c) Almost every country in South Asia is in the grip of the vicious circle of the shortages of foreign exchange resources, obligation of rising interest payments on foreign debt as well as huge deficits in their balance of payments. In this given background they can hardly afford to lose their revenue by redesigning tariff structures for promotion of economic co-operation as well as intra-SAARC trade. Hence, restrictions on import continue with high custom duties including both the tariff and non-tariff walls have created serious obstacles in the path of economic cooperation and in the promotion of intra-SAARC trade within the region.

(d) In addition, most South Asian countries have deliberately adopted a restrictive import policy to promote import substitution as a strategy of their developmental planning.

(e) The lack of proper financial and institutional framework provided by banks for the countries of the region as well as the non-establishment of capital market of regional importance in extending medium and long-term credit facilities to member countries has constituted a barrier in the expansion of intra-SAARC trade.

(f) Besides these major causes, the high cost of production because of lack of technologies and lack of economies of scale along with the inadequate quality of goods not only make manufacturers uncompetitive within the region but also in international market.

(g) The most serious hurdle has been the lack of political will on the part of the member countries to augment economic co-operation among themselves.

(h) The expansion of intra-regional trade and commerce is also hindered

by the presence of competitiveness in the South Asian regional economies. This element of competitiveness is visible, for example, in the Indo-Bangladeshi competition to capture the same foreign markets for their jute products, in Indo-Lankan Competition over the export of tea and between Pakistan and India in the field of textiles.

(j) There is a huge information gap among the members regarding the existing trade opportunities and the SAARC nations do not possess clear knowledge about each other's economy. The lack of effective information system among the countries of the region has led to many economic distortions.

Need and Importance of Economic cooperation. At present, the developed countries (DC) are interested in maintaining their level of economic growth and they cannot any longer be interested in the economic development of less developed countries (LDCs). Therefore, the regional and international economic cooperation among LDCs will be the only viable alternative and SAARC is an excellent forum for such cooperation.

Today, it is a well known fact that many countries in the world are facing serious problems such as recession, inflation and rising unemployment. In this situation, political solidarity among the LDCs needs to be supported by economic solidarity through regional cooperation like SAARC.

INTRA REGIONAL DISPUTES

Indo-Pak Disputes. Indo-Pakistan relations continue to pose by far the gravest threat to the evolution of regional cooperative endeavours under the aegis of SAARC. Both the nations continue to play the role of clients in the international power game. The two nations trade charges of interference in each others internal affairs. India accuses Pakistan of abetting terrorism in J & K and Punjab while Pakistan strongly believes that dissensions in Sind and NWFP have India's support and sympathy.

India and Pakistan have already been to war three times earlier and their differences on the Kashmir issue are a major obstacle to normalisation of relations. Other areas of conflict are the Siachin glacier, Pakistan's self-confessed nuclear programme and its support to the terrorists in J&K. The more dangerous aspect of the Indo-Pak rivalry is their continued arms race. Bitter relations between India and Pakistan are the greatest obstacle to the rapid growth of regional cooperation in South Asia.

Indo-Bangladesh Tension. A number of issues have contributed to strain

Indo-Bangla relations. The most persistent is the problem of sharing waters of the common rivers. Other unresolved issues causing strains in their relations include border disputes involving coastal islet of Talpatty and the 'Swadhin Bangabhumi'. India has also been complaining constantly of large scale infiltration by Bangladesh nationals and Chakma tribesmen into bordering Indian states. India's decision to build a barbed wire fence along India-Bangladesh border to check illegal immigrants has been opposed by Bangladesh. Also Bangladesh has charged India with violating maritime boundaries by floating an international tender for the exploration of oil and gas in the Bay of Bengal without demarcating these boundaries.

Indo-Nepal Discords. The extreme hostility of 1988-89 which had resulted in suspension of trade, denial of transit right and discontinuation of vital petroleum product supplies to the Himalayan kingdom has given way to the resumption of facilities under new arrangements ever since the Nepalese Prime Minister's visit to New Delhi in December 1991. Nevertheless, India continues to exercise a tight control over Nepalese trade with other countries of the world by denying adequate and efficient two-way transit facilities for goods between the Indian seaport of Calcutta and the borders of its Northern neighbour.

The presence of a large number of Indian nationals in Nepal who control trade and commerce in the kingdom is also a source of mutual friction. Divergent approaches of the two countries to the exploitation of the fast-flowing Nepalese rivers for irrigation-water storage and hydroelectric generation are not only hindering the utilisation of these vast and vital resources for economic betterment of this food hungry and energy-starved nation but are also resulting in grave ecological damage to the region as large scale destruction of forests by fuel-seeking Nepalese continues unabated.

Indo-Lankan Discord. Unlike Indo-Pakistan relations, those between India and Sri Lanka were almost tension-free during the early years, but have deteriorated of late due to the ethnic strife in the Northern peninsula of Jaffna. The ethnic violence in Jaffna and the Tamils demand for EELAM has found support from India's coastal state of Tamil Nadu due to ethnic compulsions. The bitterness generated by the prolonged presence of IPKF in the island had prevented the holding of the 1988 SAARC summit in Colombo. The internecine bloodshed in northeastern Sri Lanka continues unabated and a political solution to the ethnic problem does not appear likely in the near future.

Mercifully, there are no disputes between India and Maldives. In fact, when the tiny archipelago-state was subjected to a surprise attack in 1989 by a terrorist group of Tamils from Sri Lanka - ERPLF a bitter opponent of the LTTE, for securing it as a base in their struggle against Colombo as well as

rival Tamil factions, India rushed in a small contingent of its armed forces and crushed the bizarre attempt.

Indeed, the nature of the problems in bilateral relationship of the smaller states of the region with India, especially in terms of mutual threat perception, can overshadow the prospects of SAARC. At the moment, a perception of threat from India is the only element common to all its neighbours. While India perceives its SAARC neighbours as being integral to its own security, the neighbouring countries perceive India as the predominant power against which security is necessary. India should work towards removing the prevailing perception. If the bilateral political irritants are left unresolved they are certain to create bottlenecks for the unilateral forum at SAARC.

SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND SUPER POWER INVOLVEMENT

There is a development of diametrically opposite approaches to the problems of national security between India and other nations of South Asia. India regards the entire region as forming its security parameter and wants the other nations of the region to collaborate with it in keeping the external powers out of the region's political and military affairs. The latter welcome the presence of the external powers because they see the principal threat to their security from India.

South Asian policies of external powers, particularly the USA and China further add to the tensions in the region; they have consistently sought to limit India's role in the region by bolstering up Anti-India sentiments of the ruling elites in the various South Asian countries. Weakness and insecurity of the smaller South Asian countries have been and continue to be exploited by extra-regional powers, who see advantages in a divided South Asia whose weaker members would be willing to play the role of surrogate of the advanced industrial nations.

The geographic realities of the South Asian region are such that the constituent states would eventually have to reconcile themselves to a security doctrine that would view the entire region as a strategic area. Simultaneously, they would also have to realise that if they try to make political capital out of one another's integrational problems they themselves will have to bear the fallout. Such a realisation would invariably lead to a confederacy of South Asian states.

AURA OF MISTRUST

Traditionally the region has been divided within itself on unresolved

issues. As a result, persistent aura of mistrust pervades the region's strategic scene. The geographic centrality of India and its gigantic size and power have led the ring of neighbouring countries to suffer from chronic Indo-phobia.

The degree of mistrust in South Asia is so acute that countries sometimes think about, or look for opportunities to associate with extra-regional groupings than trust their neighbours. In this context Pakistan is a classical case and wants to become a member of ECO in addition to OIC and other regional groupings. At one time, Sri Lanka also wanted to be a member of ASEAN. India itself has expressed its interest in a dialogue with ASEAN nations to explore all avenues to work with them.

POTENTIALS AND PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

GENERAL

Countries of South Asia, who constitute one-fifth of humanity, are afflicted with poverty, underdevelopment, low levels of production, un-employment and pressure of population which call for a common outlook on socio-economic development for the whole region. They are bound by common ties of more than one type in that they were all either former colonies of the British empire or within her political sphere of influence. Further, they have common cultural, religious and language heritages binding them with one another, besides the natural geographic linkages in the sub region providing a natural resource base which transcends national boundaries and thus offers scope for sub-regional cooperation.

The need for a regional cooperation organization like SAARC is obvious in the South Asia region. It possesses great potential and could, if properly utilized, provide both economic and political benefits to the economically handicapped and politically divided member states.

POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION

Human Resources Development. SAARC can through its gradual and step-by-step approach, adopt effective and institutionalized arrangements to fully utilize the existing human and material resources of the region. The large pool of trained manpower could be exploited fruitfully and the larger South Asian states, India and Pakistan, could put trained educationalists, scientists, technologists etc, at the disposal of their less advanced partners. Such exchanges would not only help promote SAARC's objectives of people-to-people contacts but would also help accelerate the pace of regional development.

Communication Links. Efforts should also be made to overcome the political stumbling blocks which have so far presented the development of a regional transportation and communications infrastructure to the extent feasible. The Telecommunications network can be suitably upgraded with state of art technology including the provision of satellite links. Also special emphasis should be placed on the provision of more economically viable transport links to land-locked member states such as Nepal and Bhutan.

Sharing of Water and Energy Resources. Considerable potential exists in schemes for the equitable and profitable sharing of regional water resources to prevent natural disasters and boost agricultural production. Also information can be shared about the monsoon which wreaks havoc on the economies of SAARC countries. Fickle as the monsoon seems to be, sharing of information and giving advance warning can help diffuse some of the effects of too much or too little rain from the region as a whole. The formation of a Regional Meteorological Research Centre in Bangladesh is the first step in this direction. An area of tremendous potential that needs to be taken up urgently is the regional management of water resources and integrated development of the Himalayan river systems.

Another vital area of future regional cooperation is energy. Currently, per capita levels of energy consumption in South Asian countries are among the lowest in the world. Complementarities exist in that some countries are surplus in certain fields of energy while some have a potential surplus in others. India is rich in coal, Pakistan and Bangladesh in natural gas, while the Himalayan states have an excess of hydroelectric potential. Some of the areas for regional cooperation could be petroleum exploration, substitution of petroleum by coal, power generation, micro-hydel projects, bio-gas production and development of wind and solar energy. Regional exploitation of energy resources will also provide immediate benefits, leading to the growth of South Asian agriculture and industry.

Economic Integration. The region provides ample scope for economic co-operation and integration. The land and topography of the region is such that it is practically one geographical unit. Cooperation can take the form of supply of inputs for production and a market for the outputs, under arrangements which are mutually beneficial. The economies of the nations of the region can be made complementary for balanced inter-dependence through proper production planning. Each country can specialise in the production of a particular commodity and exchange among themselves.

Intra Regional Trade. Among the core areas that can put regional cooperation on a solid footing, the most important is trade. The South Asian

countries should concentrate on regional cooperation in trade "to increase the level of growth of trade in the region and to generate higher rates of growth in the economy through the expansion of intra-regional trade". Various ways of stimulating trade within the region can be adopted, starting with preferential trade agreements, accompanied by measures to keep the bilateral arrangements equitable and to prevent excessive benefits to the more advanced economies. Such efforts will assist in South Cooperation.

The low growth intra-regional trade flows may be due to the following conditions prevailing in the SAARC countries:-

- (a) Most of the exportable items are common and the member countries compete with one another in the international market.
- (b) A large number of imports are linked to credit packages from outside the SAARC region.
- (c) There is an inadequate flow of economic and commercial intelligence on trade and investment opportunities.
- (d) Paucity of direct trading channels and land based trading routes increases transport costs.
- (e) There are inadequate institutional arrangements for credit and payments.

At present the intra-SAARC trade is just 2.5 per cent of the total trade. Hence, there is considerable scope in increasing mutual trade which is even more cost advantageous due to geographic proximity and overall reduction in transport costs. Some of the potential areas are as given in the succeeding paragraphs.

India produces 15 per cent of the world's iron ore and is a major exporter. Pakistan imports iron ore from Australia, Canada, Brazil and Liberia. India can export iron ore to Pakistan at lower cost because of geographic proximity. Sri Lanka exports 1,20,000 tonnes of natural rubber every year. India on the other hand is a net importer of 40,000 tons and except for a small quantity from Sri Lanka, India imports rubber from Malaysia though prices of Sri Lanka's rubber is lower than Malaysia.

India can also export tea and coffee to Pakistan, and Bangladesh and instant Coffee to Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Sri Lanka imports instant Coffee at present from Ivory Coast. Considerable scope also exists of regional trade in viscose filament yarn and viscose staple fibre as Pakistan imports these

items from other countries. Cotton textile industry in India and Pakistan can benefit by exploiting complementarities i.e. free movement of cotton, yarn and fabrics.

Considerable scope also exists for intra-SAARC trade in metal products, plastics and laminates, electric and non-electric machinery, consumer electronics, telecommunications, dyes, medicines and pharmaceuticals, agro-chemicals etc. India produces a wide range of transport equipment and commercial vehicles. It is in a position to meet part of the requirement of the SAARC countries on a competitive basis. India can also supply diesel locomotives, automotive components, bicycles etc to its SAARC neighbours. With some adjustment in the local economies in the SAARC, India can also meet most of her needs of pulp, waste paper, pulpwood, newsprint and paper boards from within the region itself.

Other Possible Areas of Cooperation. The SAARC countries can share the essential services like flood control, groundwater survey, oil exploration know-how developed in India, which is showing tremendous strides in this region. A centralised information system which could give a correct idea about the inventory of capabilities available within the region and technologies could be developed in future.

Science and Technology. There is considerable scope and potential for undertaking joint ventures for exploiting the resources of the sea-bed. The countries of the SAARC region could pool their resources to develop regional capabilities to produce technology of their need. Cooperative research projects may be undertaken among the nations. Bio-technology, bio-gas and small scale food packagings are a few such areas. In the area of jute manufacture, it is possible for India and Bangladesh to have collaboration in research to different blends of jute, new designs in jute fabric etc. The genetics engineering and certain forms of bio-technology are other areas, where research projects could be set up to develop own technology. To avoid the buying of obsolete technology from the suppliers, a technology monitoring and intelligence cell may be set up at SAARC level so that all the countries of this region would be benefitted. SAARC has rightly recognised the role of technology and they have already launched a Science and Technology Exchange Programme (STEP).

Immense possibilities for regional cooperation also exist in areas such as shipping, and transport, infrastructure development, small scale sector, banking, anti-dumping measures, finance development, joint regional productions, technology transfer, consortium approach for commodity exports, deep sea fishing, off-shore exploration, research & development, housing and construction, port and railway management, travel and tourism and above all exploration and exploitation of mineral resources.

Advantages of Regional Cooperation. Regional cooperation will be immensely useful from two stand points. First, through this framework South Asian nations can enhance their bargaining power with the industrialised North, reduce their dependence on it, expand their horizontal linkages with the developing world and thus create a new set of equitable relations within themselves in the region. Second, being more inward looking, the South Asian nations can exploit the regional resources more effectively in an environment of mutual trust and cooperation.

A number of benefits are likely to accrue from the greater trade and economic cooperation. These are:-

- (a) Importing goods from distant countries raises the cost of freight and insurance. Greater regional trade cooperation would reduce each member country's foreign exchange payment on account of these two items, and thereby produce some beneficial effects on one's balance of payments position.
- (b) Unforeseen pressures on balance of payments caused frequently by drought or untimely rainfall raises cost of production due to shortages of raw materials, intermediate goods and fertilizers. These can be largely overcome by an integrated intra-regional trade practice.
- (c) Intensification of intra-regional trade would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources resulting in high productivity, greater demand for goods and services, higher employment and economic growth in each of these countries.
- (d) Trade intensification can open up opportunities for horizontal and vertical co-operation in industrial production for joint bidding for international tenders and for establishing joint consortium to promote regional economic development.
- (e) Trade cooperation would necessitate improvement in transport and communications between the regional countries, and greater contacts among people, it would also provide a strong boost to tourism.
- (f) Greater trade cooperation will also reduce political tension, thereby considerably undermining the need for increased spending on defence. The resources thus released could be used for other development activities in priority areas.

SAARC : SUGGESTED STRATEGY FOR FUTURE AND INDIA'S ROLE

While examining the measures desirable to ensure a better future for

SAARC, it is necessary to recall that the other successful regional organisations, such as EEC and ASEAN, went through periods of tension and suffered setbacks owing to bilateral differences between member states. Regional cooperation cannot be a substitute for bilateral or international cooperation, consequently bilateral endeavours to promote understanding and to create greater trust and confidence must supplement efforts to foster collective action at the regional level.

In strengthening SAARC and making it more effective, the most important role has to be played by India which needs to reform its attitude towards the smaller countries. While all bilateral relationships in the region are important, the most essential element in the future evolution of SAARC would be an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement.

There are the following possible alternatives open to SAARC region in the medium as well as long-term for counter-balancing their responses to the emerging structural transformation in the world economic environment. First, the SAARC region should have to redesign their target of exports so that intra-regional trade linkage among the member countries as well as with other developing countries may be strengthened. The countries of SAARC region should formally establish a custom's union, especially when the benefits of such system are apparent in other regions. Secondly, the countries of SAARC region should co-ordinate and rationalise their concentration on exports especially in respect of agricultural and allied products, professional marketing strategy and development of catalytic institutions to enter into new areas not only to get some strength of bargaining power but also to avoid mutual undercutting of prices.

Despite these diverse initiatives and strategies for facing the challenges in 1990's the countries of SAARC region will have to set in motion a gigantic plan of technological advancement of their export-sectors as well as to transfer technology among themselves with a view to improving their share in global trade.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The SAARC is still in its early stage of growth with no organised and valid dimensions reflected so far to revamp, inter alia, the promotion of intra-SAARC trade at the cost of economic cooperation among the member countries. The future of regional cooperation in South Asia will be dependent on the political goodwill of all the participating nations. Therefore, rapprochement or hostility between India and Pakistan which are the two major South Asian states will indeed determine SAARC's future course.

The constraint on the growth of SAARC resulting from the enormous disparities in the size of member states also needs to be tackled with imaginative and innovative steps. Broadly, three lines of action suggest themselves:-

- (a) If SAARC were expanded, the overwhelming preponderance of India would be diluted. The countries that have been suggested on account of their contiguity to the region are Afghanistan and Burma. Though at present, there are objective considerations relating to the internal situation in these countries that prevent an early expansion, this possibility should remain in the forefront of attention for the future.
- (b) SAARC, should enter into contact and interaction with other regional organisations such as NAFTA, GCC, ASEAN, EEC etc, to benefit from their experiences.
- (c) Major industrial powers should be invited to become regular observers at SAARC summits, as is the practice of ASEAN, whose summits are regularly attended by representatives of USA, Japan, European Community and Australia. In the case of SAARC, China could be invited for it is contiguous to four of the member states.

Yet another area for innovative action to strengthen SAARC would be to promote people-to-people contacts. The establishment in October 1991 of SAARCLAW, an association of lawyers and jurists of the South Asian countries, constitutes the kind of step that can help bring the people of the region together.

The experience of the working of the SAARC Secretariat has revealed that some measures to restructure and strengthen it are desirable. The role of the Secretary General should be broadened and made more substantive. The SAARC Secretariat should also be strengthened, notably its documentation wing, and an information wing should be added.

Cooperative Regional Foreign Policy. Main elements of a regional foreign policy which need to be endorsed by India for the rapid development of SAARC are as follows:-

- (a) Acknowledgement of each state as a unit of regional cooperation and the regional states should insulate themselves from direct foreign influences.
- (b) Coordination in grappling with the problems of nation building, particularly relating to terrorist activities fuelled by another state.
- (c) Adherence to the broadly outlined and acknowledged principles of

political and economic freedom and acceptance of balanced economic interdependence and obligation towards promoting this goal.

- (d) Regional monetary cooperation and investment regulation.
- (e) Greater cultural interaction involving intellectuals, academicians, journalists etc.
- (f) Strategy of market integration and protective measures for smaller states.

Main focus needs to be given on overall economic development to cure the socio-economic ills faced by the region. Maximum emphasis should be given to poverty alleviation, removing unemployment, illiteracy etc. For the economic development of South Asia and its constituent states, SAARC has to ideally play three major roles:-

- (a) It must help develop a South Asian perspective on an appropriate development strategy.
- (b) It has to evolve into a medium for coordinating trade policies, harmonizing investment and generally facilitating the eventual emergence of a South Asian common market so that its benefits are equitably distributed among countries even while maximising economic efficiency and welfare in the region as a whole.
- (c) It has to be an instrument of designing a collective strategy for negotiating with donors, creditors and trading regimes and blocs outside the region.

The most obvious and commonly acknowledged menace facing the region is demographic explosion. It is the essential need of the moment that ways and means should be collectively found to decelerate and control the rate of population growth and accelerate the generation and growth of the means for meeting the expected increase in the demand for life-sustaining essentials for the masses.

Another crisis threatening the South Asian continent is that of energy scarcity. Even at the present levels of restricted supplies, the region is heavily dependent on imports of hydrocarbons from abroad. There is an urgent need to draw up plans for expeditious exploitation of hitherto untapped conventional-energy potential of the region. Simultaneously, efforts to survey and develop the abundant non-conventional sources of renewable energy in the subcontinent (Solar, wind, and sea-waves) should also be undertaken without delay. Apart

from the afore-mentioned problems of grave importance for the sub-continent, the universally dreaded, fast spreading maladies of narcotic addiction, terrorism and AIDS affliction can also be tackled more efficiently during the coming years by concerted regional plans made at the collective SAARC platform.

Some of the specific policy measures recommended for increase in trade and regional cooperation are preferential trading arrangements, establishment of a South Asian information and data bank, forming common support services for the region, setting up joint ventures with buy back facilities. The member governments should develop the trading organisations. The channels of trade should be strengthened both in the public and private sectors. The member countries should fix a target for their mutual trade and should endeavour to achieve it.

Another important area is to redesign the tariff as well as non-tariff structure. Tariffs need to be reduced and in some cases completely abolished. These countries should strive for drafting measures on the lines of the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). It would be advantageous if they formally create a customs union.

The member states of SAARC should negotiate for domestic postage rates in order to facilitate increased communications between the nations. Direct transport linkages need to be established between the countries in South Asia by using multi modal means of transport by sea, rail and road on the basis of a single freight rate. There is also considerable scope for the development of the shipping industry since the existing shipping tonnage is small compared to the foreign sea borne trade of the region.

South Asian countries can undertake collaborative research in the fields of biotechnology, genetics, biogas, solar energy, computer software etc. There is an urgent need for greater cooperation in the fields of flood control and exchange of information on forest development and protection of the Himalayas and the water of the rivers for irrigation and power development.

Political will, jointly exerted at the very top, must give SAARC a vigorous push without waiting for the brick by brick approach of smaller minds to build the necessary bridges. Some bold and imaginative political level initiatives are needed for releasing the cooperative economic energies. Ways must be found of tackling the political obstacles which stand in the way of cooperation. Any plans for regional cooperation must satisfy two basic criteria ie, it must conform to the interests of the regional countries and it must respect the sovereignty of the involved parties.

CONCLUSION

One of the most significant developments in South Asia in recent years has been the emergence of regional cooperation. It has not merely acquired a firm institutional base in the shape of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, commonly known as SAARC, but also evolved a commendable set of principles and guidelines for its future growth. However, it cannot yet be described as fully geared to the task of promoting the welfare of the people of South Asia and improving their quality of life, the most important objective enshrined in the SAARC Charter. For such key areas as trade, industry, money and finance which constitute the warp and woof of regional cooperation in the economic field are still outside the scope of SAARC activities.

SAARC is an area-wide coordinated attempt for the eradication of the all-pervading poverty and deprivation amongst the teeming masses of the subcontinental countries through self-reliance and promotion of planned interdependent all-round development. It has been undertaken inspite of the serious and chronic intra-regional bilateral disputes and differences, complicated by prevailing apprehensions of hegemonic domination by the powerful, and the restrictive ganging-up by the weaker states of the organisation.

The consequential hesitant approach to the development of regional plans and actions has, therefore, produced only minimal results in peripheral sectors without substantially affecting the vital core problems of the region. Attempts for the evolution and promotion of a collective approach to fulfil the aspirations of South Asian people have been impeded indirectly by sour bilateral relations between India on the one hand and most of its neighbours on the other. The stunted cooperation in core area of common benefit has highlighted all the more the need for a reappraisal of regional priorities which would recommend amicable and expeditious solutions of inter-state disputes to provide an atmosphere of trust and amity essential for the success of concerted SAARC endeavours.

Looming dangers of demographic explosion, environmental degradation and energy famine, alongwith the growing menace of AIDS, terrorism and drug abuse, call for an urgent, unbiased and unified bid to ward off the approaching dangers to the very survival of millions in South Asia. SAARC is now in a transitional phase of its existence. Its future course will depend on sustaining the momentum achieved so far by giving practical shape to the resolve of the summit leaders to widen its scope and improve its functioning. It is hoped that, regional cooperation in the non-political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields will not only help the SAARC states to overcome problems of backwardness but will in turn generate a climate of goodwill and understanding which would lead to cooperation also in the political sphere.

It is the continuance of the low-key pragmatic approach in disparate sectors, agreed upon by all, proceeding step by step in unison and always in unanimity, exploring, consolidating, and only then advancing, evolving a regional dimension independently of truly bilateral relations, that can create a firm basis for the permanency of SAARC. Given the fact that democratic upheavals are sweeping critical Third World regions, it is perhaps not too optimistic to hope that changes in South Asia will be for the better.

Regional cooperation among South Asian countries will reinforce and strengthen non-alignment. It will provide an effective forum to deal with the rest of the world. It will consolidate the common desire of each country to live and let live, strengthen the friendship, reconcile or minimise differences, and safeguard their independence and sovereignty. It will be the beginning of a new economic and political order in South Asia. India by virtue of its size, location and resources will have to play a key role towards making South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) a success and role model for other regional blocs.

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Nuclear Deterrence and Cost-Effectiveness : Fiscal Frugalities and Wise Dishonesties

MATIN ZUBERI

The United States emerged at the end of the Second World War as the most powerful country in the world. Almost the entire industrialized world was in ruins—bombed, attacked, occupied and liberated. The United States had the benign experience of having escaped from such destruction. Her economy was stronger in 1945 than it had been in 1939. Her index of industrial production rose from 100 to 196 and gross national product from \$91 billion to \$166 billion. Her casualties were about 30,000 dead. The Soviet Union had lost 20 million dead and there was almost an equal number wounded. The devastation of her economy can be gauged from the fact that 1,700 towns, 31,000 factories and 100,000 farms were destroyed. One of the most remarkable features of the post-war era has been the extraordinary manner in which the United States managed to overawe itself by the Soviet threat. All subsequent developments have followed from this initial assessment. Throughout history the weak have been afraid of the strong. The United States, which had emerged as the most powerful country in the history of the world, having a monopoly of nuclear weapons, could not feel secure. How could it have happened?

The explanation may be found in the American conception of national security. It was a grandiose conception which encompassed a strategic sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere, domination of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, an exhaustive system of outlying bases to enlarge her strategic frontier and to project her power globally, and the maintenance of her nuclear monopoly. It required a favourable balance of power in Eurasia as well as control over the Eurasian rimlands and a global economic open door. This conception of security, entailing as it did an overwhelming preponderance of economic and military power, postulated the interrelatedness of political, economic and military factors. Developments in any part of the globe seemed to have automatic and direct impact on American vital interests. An adverse turn of events anywhere endangered American security. Problems which other countries would have viewed as the routine of diplomacy became urgent threats which required an immediate American response and a posture of military preparedness. Conceived as a truly global responsibility and an

imperative of 'Manifest Destiny', this conception of security was expansive and covered ever more problems in ever more regions of the globe.

Having interpreted American vital interests in this manner, the United States considered the Soviet Union as a threat because, in spite of the ravages of war, the Russians had the largest assembled armed force, the potential of growing into a major competitor, and an ideology which seemed to threaten the existing economic and political order. The United States faced a world of unprecedented turmoil and upheaval and was alarmed by the prospect of hunger, disease, anarchy and revolution. There was political ferment, social turmoil and economic upheaval in the impoverished and devastated lands of Europe and Asia. The colonial powers, major allies of the United States, had to cope with an unprecedented colonial unrest and the days of colonial rule seemed to be numbered. Thus the geopolitical foundations and the socio-economic structure of a large part of the world seemed to be in a state of collapse. Long-term American prosperity was, therefore, dependent on the rehabilitation of much of the devastated economies along liberal capitalist lines. It also necessitated open markets and unhindered access to raw materials.

This grandiose conception of national security led to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, the rehabilitation of West Germany and Japan and military alliances and arrangements all over the world. Having conceived American interests in truly global terms, those responsible for the military underpinning of American policies considered it imperative to develop American military capabilities to meet a host of contingencies in various parts of the globe and found themselves constrained by tight defence budget ceilings imposed by President Truman.

American military planners were fully cognizant of Soviet weaknesses. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, in their estimates of November 1945 and August 1946 respectively, forecast that the Soviet Union would require approximately 15 years to overcome losses in manpower and industry, 10 years to redress the shortage of technicians, 5-10 years to develop a strategic force, 15-25 years to build a modern navy, 10 years to improve military transport, 10 years or less to quell resistance in occupied areas, 15-20 years to establish a military infrastructure in East Asia, 3-10 years to produce the atomic bomb, and an unspecified number of years to remove the vulnerability of Soviet railway system and petroleum industry to long-range bombing. This view prevailed during the period 1945-48. Military intelligence experts believed that Soviet agricultural, economic and technological backwardness would discourage any tendencies towards military adventurism. Moreover, the Soviet Union did not have long-range strategic air forces, nor a substantial navy. Her air defences were meagre and she did not have the atomic bomb.

Despite these military intelligence estimates, the Soviet Union was depicted as a threat which required an overwhelming American response within a few years after the war was over. Starting as routine contingency military planning, the Soviet threat soon developed its own momentum as it got entangled in the American domestic political process and in the inter-service rivalries made acute by Truman's ceiling on the defence budget.

Concerned about the dangers of spiralling inflation in the country, Truman announced on May 13, 1948 a ceiling of \$ 14.4 billion for the defence budget for fiscal year 1950. He lowered it further to \$ 13 billion for fiscal year 1951. These ceilings provoked an uproar within the armed forces and led to bitter conflicts between the Air Force, the Navy and the Army regarding their respective shares of the defence dollar and roles and missions in defence strategy. The defence budget had dropped from \$ 81 billion 1945 to \$ 13 billion in 1947. Demobilization had reduced available manpower from 12.1 million in 1945 to 1.6 million in 1947. This drastically reduced diet of appropriations intensified conflict regarding roles and missions. The acrimonious debate considerably influenced the role of the services in implementing the American conception of security and the place of nuclear weapons in American defence planning.

The role of the Air Force in any future conflict was at the core of the controversy. There was, as one observer noted, a "war over who won the war". The Air Force emphasized the role of strategic bombing while the Navy and the Army naturally highlighted their respective contributions to the war effort. Inter-service rivalry, therefore, resulted in a proliferation of conflicting military doctrines. Each service staked its claims and entrenched itself in something like an elaborate medieval castle with ramparts, watch-towers and moats. The ferocity of this struggle, made intense by budgetary ceiling, created an environment in which the services were at daggers drawn and the civilians had a hard time maintaining control over them. The more extravagant the demands for funds made by the services, the more determined Truman was to keep the lid on defence expenditure. It was only after the outbreak of the Korean War that allocations for defence increased substantially.

Budgetary restraint on military expenditure was again enforced by the Eisenhower Administration which believed in fiscal restraints and balanced budgets. The Soviet Union was credited with the Machiavellian intention of forcing the United States to spend itself into bankruptcy. President Eisenhower's military budget for fiscal year 1955 was reduced to \$ 31 billion which was \$ 3.5 billion less than that of the previous year. There was also an attempt to lower manpower requirements. The growing nuclear arsenal, consisting of fission and fusion bombs and tactical nuclear weapons, was considered an asset which could be used to release funds and manpower for General Purpose

Forces. The doctrine of Massive Retaliation propounded by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in early 1954 was designed to achieve "more security at less cost". There was nothing new about it except the fact that the new administration had dressed it up in Sunday clothes. From the beginning of the nuclear era American policy was designed to achieve "more bang for the buck".

As early as 1946 it was calculated that atomic bombing was 10-100 times less expensive than conventional strategic bombing. Reliance on nuclear weapons offered a satisfactory solution to the budgetary problems. It became all the more attractive because it was the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission to produce these weapons. The Commission had its own budget which was not subject to Truman's ceilings on the defence budget. It could expand its activities without necessitating cutbacks in other military programmes. The armed forces could build an arsenal without paying anything for it and were, therefore, happy to order as many bombs as they could get. The Atomic Energy Commission could, for its part, enlarge its scale of operations and its standing in the powerful Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy by performing the role of munitions maker thereby facilitating release of more funds for its other activities.

The expansive conception of American national security which necessitated an augmentation of military capabilities, coupled with low defence budgets, resulted in reliance on nuclear weapons as conventional alternatives were beyond reach. This reliance on nuclear weapons created a sense of unease within the services. It was particularly unwelcome to the Navy. Shortly after the cuts in defence budget announced by Truman, Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery protested against a strategy based on nuclear weapons. This was a "strategy of desperation". He continued: "For a civilized society like the United States, the broad purpose of war cannot be simply the destruction and annihilation of the enemy." There occurred in 1949 what is called the 'Admirals Revolt'. They condemned reliance on nuclear weapons as a "ruthless and barbaric policy" which would lead to the "random slaughter of men, women and children in the enemy country". The Navy was effectively silenced by the administration and adjusted itself to a strategy based on nuclear weapons. It is, however, interesting to note that the first moral protest within the close circle of decision-makers against a strategy of annihilation was lodged by the American Navy even if it was conditioned by the lowered status of the Navy envisaged at that time in nuclear strategy.

Inter-service rivalry for funds, roles and missions in American defence planning has been a recurring feature since then and significantly shaped the American perception of the Soviet threat. It has influenced funding for the

various services, the procurement of weapons, as well as the evolution of strategic doctrines. Once the Polaris submarine became available to the American Navy, it happily adjusted itself to what it had previously described as a "strategy of desperation". The Air Force has played the dominant role in nuclear strategy from the very beginning. The Army did not develop an expansive view of its role; but, with the development of tactical nuclear weapons, it also asserted a significant role in nuclear strategy. Each service established linkages with industrial firms; inter-service rivalry therefore promoted industrial competition, which, in turn, aggravated the competition between the services. For their roles and missions, the services established what are called "think tanks" thereby bringing to the forefront the tough-minded defence intellectuals who evolved arcane theories suited to their service patrons.

Table 1 : Growth of American Nuclear Stockpile

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of warheads</u>
End of 1945	2
July 1946	9
July 1947	13
July 1948	50
1950	300
1953	1000
1958	6000
1960	18,000
1965	30,000

Source : Adapted from David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960", *International Security*, Spring 1983, pp. 3-71; and Robert S. Norris, Thomas B. Cochran, and William M. Arkin, "History of the Nuclear Stockpile", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 1985, pp. 106-9.

The table shows a slow increase in the stockpile in the 1940s and an accelerated pace of production in the late 1950 and early 1960s. Truman was completely unaware of the number of weapons in the stockpile until April 3, 1947 when the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission gave him the figures. He was shocked by this bit of information. The rate of production was increased and when in February 1949 he was told where the United States stood in January 1949 and the expected figures for the next two years, Truman exclaimed: "Boy, we could blow a hole clean through the earth".

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested in December 1947, 400 nuclear weapons by January 1, 1953. The Atomic Energy Commission, which was spending 98 per cent of its funds for nuclear weapons production, confidently

predicted in October 1948 that because the more efficient core design developed by scientists in its laboratories required a smaller amount of fissionable material for bombs, it would be able to supply 400 bombs by January 1950. Truman ordered 3 successive increases in the fissionable material production facilities - October 1949, October 1950 and January 1952. There was a 50 per cent increase in plutonium production reactors and 150 per cent increase in enriched uranium production plants. Nuclear weapons production could be put on a standardized assembly-line basis.

Parallel with the expansion of nuclear weapons production was the elaboration of war plans. The war plan BROILER of 1947 called for 34 bombs to be dropped on 24 Soviet cities. FROLICK and HALFMOON proposed dropping of 50 bombs on 20 cities. There were other war plans like TROJAN and OFFTACKLE. By early 1950, 6,000 separate target sets had been prepared by the Air Force, which had developed a vested interest in locating as many targets as possible; its target lists determined the size of the nuclear stockpile which generated demands for delivery systems and military appropriations. The larger the number of targets, the greater the number of bombs needed and the more enhanced the role of the Air Force. The Strategic Air Command, whose first director was General Curtis LeMay, evolved a strategic doctrine which required an atomic blitz within a compressed time-scale. By March 1954 the Strategic Air Command's War Plan called for 735 bombers hitting the Russian early warning system and a massive attack reducing the Soviet landmass to "a smoking radiating ruin at the end of two hours". The target lists went on increasing parallel with an exponential growth in the nuclear stockpile. Soldiering is, after all, about hitting targets. The number of Soviet targets increased from 70 in 1947 to 25000 in 1974 and 40,000 in 1980, 60 of which were located in Moscow alone.

This fantastic increase in the number of targets was partly the result of improved surveillance techniques which enabled a detailed analysis of militarily significant locations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the early stages, the targets were major cities and the number of such cities was finite. With improved surveillance, it became possible to shift emphasis from cities to weapons, command and control systems and military-related installations. This shift in emphasis was welcome to the Air Force because there are more weapons and their related infrastructure to be attacked than cities to be incinerated.

Robert S. McNamara was Secretary of Defence between 1961 and 1968 serving the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations—crucial years for American nuclear strategy. He brought to his office methods and techniques of systems analysis, programme planning and budgeting, and cost-effectiveness criteria.

He was, therefore, keen to bring about a sense of priorities in American nuclear strategy to limit the incessant and insatiable demands of the American armed forces. 'Assured Destruction' was, in one sense, a formulation devised by McNamara to cap the budgetary demands of the services.

The critics of McNamara's policies coined the term "mutual assured destruction" with its acronym MAD. McNamara himself also began using the new term. It laid down the criteria for assessing destruction of Soviet industrial and population centres as follows :

Table II : Soviet Population and Industry Destroyed
(Assumed 1972 Total Population of 247 million,
urban population of 116 million)

Megaton Equivalent Delivered Warheads	Total population killed Million	Per cent	Per cent industrial capacity Destroyed
100	37	15	59
200	52	27	72
400	74	30	76
800	96	39	77
1200	109	44	77
1600	116	47	77

Source : Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough?* (New York, N.Y., 1971), p. 207.

The basic reason for these criteria of destruction was the rapidly diminishing returns of destruction for each additional dollar invested. Strategic logic seemed only secondary. In strategic terms, it was cost-effectiveness at any cost! As an Assistant Secretary in the American Department of Defence explained the position: "First we need enough Minuteman to be sure that we destroy all those Russian cities. Then we need Polaris missiles to follow in order to tear up the foundations to a depth of ten feet.... Then, when all Russia is silent, and when no air defences are left, we want waves of aircraft to drop enough bombs to tear the whole place down to a depth of 40 feet to prevent the Martians from recolonizing the country. And to hell with the fallout."

The criteria laid down by MacNamara did not substantially influence the targeting policies of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) continued to devote a substantial portion of the stockpile for hitting weapons and related facilities. Mutual Assured

Destruction itself become a target of attack by those nuclear warriors who wanted removal of any restraint on the development of the American nuclear armoury and who were unhappy about the restraints incorporated in arms control agreements. It is ironic that the new cold warriors suddenly developed conscientious objections to the slaughter of "innocent bystanders" entailed in the execution of targeting strategy based on Mutual Assured Destruction. Their standard argument in favour of a declaratory shift towards targeting weapons and command and control centres was that the increasingly diversified and more accurate weapons and delivery systems made it possible to conduct nuclear strikes without the slaughter of innocent men, women and children. The fact remained however, that the command and control centres were located near major Soviet population centres. As Anthony Kenny, the former Master of Balliol College, Oxford, observed such a nuclear strike would be "like claiming not to be responsible for the death of a friend if one shoots a bullet to kill a mosquito perched on his throat."

III

American nuclear strategy began as extended deterrence providing a nuclear umbrella to her West European allies who later became members of NATO. The Soviet Union posed no military threat to the continental United States. Initially the economic chaos and social turmoil after the war was feared to provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to extend her area of influence. NATO was designed as a military bulwark while the Marshall Plan restored the economic health of West European countries. The integration of West Germany into the alliance and the conventional build-up of West European forces raised the question of the quantum of NATO conventional forces. The force goals of 96 divisions were agreed upon, at Lisbon in 1952.

Britain faced her darkest economic hour in February 1949; factories were closing down for lack of coal and the people were shivering in the cold. The demands on scarce resources for the nuclear weapons programme, decided upon in January 1947, and the manpower requirements of policing the farflung imperial outposts necessitated a fundamental reappraisal of British global strategy. The Conservative Government, which came to power in 1951, faced with continuing economic crisis, was determined to reduce defence expenditure. Its policies were spelt out in the classic "Global Strategy Paper" of 1952. The central thesis of the paper was that nuclear weapons had revolutionized war and that the Western powers should use the threat of nuclear retaliation as a deterrent against any possible Soviet conventional attack. Reliance on such a strategy would permit substantial reductions in conventional forces. The Lisbon goals were unrealistic and would place a great strain on the fragile economies of Western Europe. This paper was discussed at the highest level in Washington

where it was considered as a rationalization of British intention not to make her promised contribution to NATO. It, however, became a precursor to the Massive Retaliation Doctrine proposed by John Foster Dulles in 1954.

Apart from the strategic rationale provided in the 'Global Strategy Paper', the British had other reasons as well for putting their eggs in the nuclear basket. A substantial portion of skilled British manpower was employed in defence industries; this adversely effected the civilian economy. British influence in the world depended on the strength of her economy and the success of her exports. This necessitated diversion of skilled manpower to civilian industries. The Defence White Paper of 1957 made reliance on nuclear weapons the mainstay of British defence policy. It contained a classic statement of the vulnerability of the British people to nuclear attack "It must be frankly recognized that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons." The most extraordinary feature of this Defence White Paper was that this frank confession of the impossibility of defending the British people did not lead to a reappraisal of reliance on nuclear weapons but a tighter embrace of them. The paper promised the end of compulsory military service by 1960. This politically popular step was presented as a consequence of the British nuclear deterrent.

Thus British reliance on nuclear weapons was determined by the need to reduce defence expenditures and to divert skilled manpower to civilian pursuits. Harold Macmillan triumphed in the 1959 elections on the slogan: "You never had it so good." Britain continued to spend less than 10 per cent of her defence budget on nuclear weapons. Her contribution to NATO's 'flexible response', according to General Sir Hugh Beach, former Director of Army Staff Studies in the Ministry of Defence, cost her as much money as the British people spent on drink every year. And we can say that this was not a bad bargain !

IV

One of the myths of the Cold War had been that while the United States demobilized after the war the Soviet Union did not. In May 1945 Soviet armed forces had reached the peak of 11.3 million. Stalin ordered rapid demobilization in order to give much-needed rest to the Russian soldiers and also to transfer manpower resources to rebuilding the country's shattered economy. Moreover, 2.5 million people were homeless and about 65,000 kilometers of railway track had been destroyed. By early 1948 the total strength of the Soviet armed forces was reduced to 2.8 million. This figure can be compared to the July 1947 ceiling for the American armed forces - 1.07 million in the Army, 558,000 in the Navy and 108,000 in the Marines. The British armed forces consisted of

well over a million people. The Russian armed forces were Stalin's only deterrent at a time when the United States had monopoly over nuclear weapons.

Stalin's demobilization ruled out any possibility of Soviet blitzkrieg. The inadequacies of the Soviet transport system made it impossible for Soviet armed forces to attain mobility required for such an action. American military intelligence estimates took account of these problems. In fact the Department of State expressed concern regarding the American diplomatic moves in Europe being considered too provocative in Moscow. The Truman Doctrine, was after all, a response not to any precipitate Soviet action but to a British note sent to Washington in the bleak month of February 1947 expressing Britain's inability to honour her commitments to Greece and Turkey. By 1948 rearmament had started on both sides. The United States embarked on increasing its nuclear stockpile; and the Soviet Union, in addition to a crash nuclear weapons programme, increased her armed forces which, by 1953, consisted of 5 million men. General Marshall, then Secretary of State, cautioned the American government in 1949 against plunging into "provocative war preparations".

The alleged overwhelming conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact had been a recurrent theme in Western strategic literature. NATO strategy of first use of nuclear weapons in a conventional combat was predicated on this assumption. In the early 1960s the whiz kids of Robert McNamara, however, came to the conclusion that "the 'alleged' facts of the conventional balance were not facts at all". Later force comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact pointed to the same conclusion.

Even if the alleged conventional inferiority were a fact, the reluctance of West European countries to field more soldiers for their own defence needs an explanation. These countries had double the population and four times the productive capacity of their East European neighbours, But they wanted defence on the cheap--a militarily credible deterrent at a socially acceptable cost. And the quantum leap in destructive power stored in nuclear weapons does not require a quantum leap in military expenditure. The immediate costs of nuclear deterrence seemed acceptably slight. Resort to nuclear fires in case of extreme emergency provided cheaper defence; and conventional defence was both economically and socially expensive. Preoccupied as the West Europeans were with their unprecedented prosperity and aware of their diminished status on the global stage, they were content to enjoy the peace of deterrence, leaving the task of managing it to the American thermonuclear Jesuits. Their position was in some respects similar to that of the European bourgeoisie of the 18th century who were happy to leave the business of war to military specialists while enjoying the benefits of peace made possible by such a division of labour. Moreover, the exaggerated melodrama of the Soviet threat did not

impress them very much. The Soviet Union had her hands full managing her unreliable East European allies, and after the Sino-Soviet rift, she was surrounded by unfriendly socialist neighbours. The West Europeans felt effectively reassured. Michael Howard of Oxford University pointed out the curious phenomenon that the West Europeans, most threatened by Soviet military might, were confident of their ability to handle the superpower through normal diplomatic and political discourse while the most distant, the most powerful and the least threatened of the allies, the United States, viewed the Soviet Union as a figure of almost cosmic evil with which no normal dialogue was possible.

By mid-1950s the United States started the process of making tactical nuclear weapons an integral component of NATO's European strategy. This was done with the connivance of her allies who promptly reduced their contribution to the conventional defence of NATO. They were happy with this arrangement because it rescued them from the servitude of industrial mobilisation for military purposes and enabled them to reduce the share of their economies devoted to combat. They could enjoy their bourgeois comforts and the luxury of millions of automobiles in the shadow of the nuclear apocalypse.

While new institutional structures were designed for strategic nuclear forces, tactical nuclear weapons were incorporated into the existing military organisations and thus became inseparable components of force structures. The great diversity of these weapons came under the control of seven separate national command systems. The European NATO command structure thus became, according to Paul Bracken, "a regional doomsday machine". A war game code-named *Carte Blanche* was played in Europe in 1955. It simulated an attack with 335 nuclear weapons, 80 percent of them exploding in German territory. Immediate casualty estimates were around 1.5 million Germans killed and 3.5 million wounded during the first two days of a nuclear war in Europe. Casualty figures from fallout were not included in this estimate. These figures represented more than five times the number of German civilian casualties during the Second World War. The sensational press coverage given to this war game made NATO government realise that their strategy was not a fit topic for public debate. Civilian destruction of such massive proportions could not be explained in terms of any rational foreign policy objectives. Helmut Schmidt, who later became Chancellor of West Germany, wrote that the use of tactical nuclear weapons "will not defend Europe, but destroy it".

But these weapons, scattered throughout Europe, bridged the gap between conventional and nuclear warfare. Their potential for triggering a nuclear holocaust was precisely the characteristic of this peculiar species of weapons which commended them to the West European allies. They served as a security

blanket for their nervous hosts caught between nuclear entrapment and nuclear abandonment. And the role of conventional weapons was reduced to that of a tripwire for the short period needed by the American Strategic Air Command to reduce the Soviet Union and her allies to "a smoking radiating ruin at the end of two hours".

The Byzantine nuclear debate centred on the incompatibilities of American preferences and West European presentiments. NATO strategy was based on two sets of hopes. The Americans hoped that a conflict with the Soviet Union could be limited at the lowest rung of the ladder of violence and presumably confined to the European continent. The West Europeans hoped that a tactical nuclear exchange would promptly escalate into a strategic nuclear holocaust in which the two superpowers would incinerate each other over the heads of a slightly damaged Europe. While the West Europeans suspected American insistence on increasing conventional forces as an attempt to make their continent safe for a bloody war, the Americans were wary of their partners' efforts to shorten the nuclear fuse. Both sides, however, tried to maintain a link between the defence of Europe and the American strategic nuclear stockpile. Problems of nuclear control and the contentious issue of sharing the burden of defence continued to provoke acrimonious exchanges across the Atlantic.

NATO strategy was based on what Thomas Schelling called "the threat that leaves something to chance". It ultimately rested on the threat of irrational actions in a military situation getting out of control. It had another extraordinary feature. The policy of first use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional Soviet attack promised to destroy Europe in order to defend it; this was like catching a burglar by burning down the house. Moreover, while the NATO countries intended to be crazy, the Russians were expected to be sensible. Even after the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO countries, the Russians were supposed to respond in a restrained manner without turning the conflict into a global nuclear slaughter. And having escalated the conflict from the conventional to the tactical nuclear level, NATO was then supposed to resort to the measured cadences of limited nuclear war. Neither side, it was assumed, would think of climbing the ladder of violence. Both the antagonists were, in other words, expected to observe the rules of a non-existent code of nuclear chivalry.

Seemingly foolish, the behaviour of West European members of NATO was actually shrewd. Their tax-conscious governments had come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was not going to pounce on them and were, therefore, reluctant to squander their resources on conventional defence. They had put all their defence eggs in the nuclear basket. They got defence on the cheap and enjoyed the longest period of peace in their history since the peace of Westphalia in 1648.

As the Soviet threat receded and European detente brought tangible rewards in relaxation of tensions and lucrative business deals, new tensions developed between the United States and her NATO allies. There were pursed lips and furrowed brows in Washington when nuclear strategists criticised the West European governments for their reluctance to share the American perception of the Soviet threat. This reluctance was attributed to indolence born of prosperity and eagerness to enrich themselves through trade. The West Europeans were accused of preferring nuclear peril over higher taxes. President Pompidou of France emphasised the incompatibility between American and European security concerns. "We want to be protected, not avenged", he told Henry Kissinger and added: "Revenge would be a small consolation in the cemetery".

The twin-track decision of 1979 recommending the emplacement of Cruise and Pershing missiles in some West European countries along with arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union was taken in order to remove West German anxieties over the possible decoupling of American and European security. An avalanche of protest greeted this decision and a pan-European peace movement mounted a challenge to the underlying assumptions of the Cold War and the basic tenets of NATO strategy. The nuclear pundits continued to calculate the possibilities and probabilities of escalation control, but these calculations only succeeded in elevating military trivia into sensitive issues in the trans-Atlantic dialogue. Nuclear weapons had simply become too terrifying a symbol of alliance cohesion. Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative further exacerbated tensions and again raised the spectre of the decoupling of European and American defence.

Distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, it has been pointed out, is as difficult as the distinction in medieval theology between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. For arms control negotiations, strategic nuclear weapons were those based in the United States and the Soviet Union (or placed in their submarines) and capable of hitting targets in the heartlands of the two giants. Tactical nuclear weapons were located in regions away from their heartlands or stored in their territories. According to some cynics, tactical nuclear weapons were those which exploded on the German soil. The distinction between these two categories of weapons was complicated by geography. For the Soviet Union nuclear weapons located in Western Europe and capable of hitting Soviet territory were strategic, while for the United States they were tactical weapons. This problem complicated arms control negotiations.

The advent of Michael Gorbachev radically transformed this dismal picture. Making asymmetrical concessions on behalf of his country, he paved the way for the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 which for the first time in

the history of arms control provided for the elimination of a category of nuclear weapons. This was followed by the proclamation of a 'nuclear Monroe doctrine' by West German Foreign Minister Genscher. He declared in the Bundestag on April 27, 1989 that short range nuclear missiles were no longer acceptable because they could destroy Polish and Czechoslovak people and because they could reach "into the other part of the fatherland". Thus the link between West European security and the American nuclear stockpile, which had been the major preoccupation of NATO strategy, was now being rejected as too frightening to contemplate.

NATO was viewed as a community of interests in which security relationships were supplemented and reinforced by a web of political and economic ties. American military presence in Europe was welcomed not merely in the negative role of a deterrent to possible Soviet aggression but in the positive role of reassurance as well. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, was based on a coercive relationship between the Soviet Union and her East European allies. It resembled the Athenian alliance system which was also forged after a protracted war in which the victor imposed its own control over liberated territories. In both cases governments favourably disposed toward, and dependent on, the support of the victor were imposed for fear of an anticipated challenge from the recently defeated adversary; and the hegemonic powers were also worried about the future intentions of their wartime allies— Athens in the case of Sparta and the United States in the case of the Soviet Union.

While the bicentenary of the French Revolution was being celebrated in 1989, a major upheaval was taking place within the Warsaw Pact countries. Popular upsurge in Central and Eastern Europe culminated in the overthrow of communist regimes. Willy Brandt had once referred to the unification of Germany as "a dream which fades when you wake up". The dream became a reality on October 3, 1990 through the common consent of all the major powers. The political arrangements on which the Cold War had been conducted in Europe had finally collapsed.

The NATO response to the political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the elimination of the Soviet threat was in the form of the London Declaration of July 6, 1990. Describing NATO as "the most successful military alliance in history", it extended to the former adversaries its "hand of friendship". The promised withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territories of the Warsaw Pact countries and the agreement on reduction in forces in Europe led NATO, the Declaration stated, to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. This commitment was followed by two sentences containing an uneasy mix of two propositions inserted at the insistence of American and British delegations regarding the future role of nuclear weapons. These weapons would continue

to perform the essential role of prevention of war by threat of retaliation; however, NATO's new nuclear strategy would make them truly weapons of last resort. This formulation was designed to preserve the option of first use of nuclear weapons.

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 necessitated further institutional innovations. A North Atlantic Cooperation Council was set up towards the end of 1991, consisting of all members of NATO and of the former Warsaw Pact (including all the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States). NATO also adopted a new Strategic Concept in November 1991 which proposed reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The unilateral initiatives of George Bush, Michael Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, announced in the last months of 1991, resulted in the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from forward locations in Europe—from surface vessels, attack submarines and land-based aircraft. The cumulative impact of these initiatives was to reduce the size of NATO's arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by about 80 per cent. According to Gregory Shulte, director of NATO's Nuclear Policy Directorate, the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is political—preservation of peace and prevention of coercion. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to countries on the Atlantic periphery, he says, requires that NATO forces should be effective, flexible, survivable and secure. It is now being suggested that nuclear deterrence is the product of an era when the threat came from a well-organised, rational group of countries which were part of European civilisation and culture. It may not be easily applicable to what are christened as 'rogue' states. Ethnocentrism has been ingrained in the literature on nuclear deterrence.

Alliances have to meet four basic conditions: defence against a common danger; policy coordination, at least sufficient to define the *casus belli*; some technical means of cooperation in case of need for joint action; and penalty for non-cooperation so that protection is not taken for granted. Without a perceived threat, alliances do not last for long. When NATO was established in 1949, the West Europeans were faced with two unpleasant prospects: the danger of Soviet aggression and the prospect of American withdrawal from Europe. Now the Soviet threat has evaporated and consequently, the fear of American withdrawal has been reduced. However, during a period of transition and uncertainty American military presence in Europe within the NATO framework is viewed generally as a stabilising factor. One argument in favour of prolonging the life of NATO relates to nuclear weapons. It is maintained that because Britain and France insist on retaining their status as independent nuclear weapon powers, dissolution of NATO would sharpen the distinction between these powers and Germany. This may generate demands within Germany for a nuclear military capability. But as long as the United States

continues to play a leading role within the alliance, there will be no such pressures. NATO is thus seen as an instrument of nonproliferation. There is merit in Germany being locked into the European Union and NATO rather than bouncing around like a loose cannon in Central Europe. This arrangement ensures, in Thomas Mann's words, "not a German Europe, but a European Germany".

Ever since Peter the Great, Russia has been endeavouring to become a member of the European system instead of being a victim of it. Gorbachev's slogan of a common European home represented an old Russian aspiration. Russia is now in an unusual situation: its former adversaries are more or less friendly but its old allies are deeply suspicious of Russian expansionism. They would like to join the European Union as well as NATO. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev has, however, bluntly declared that "Russia cannot allow Poland to be admitted to NATO". Through the Partnership for Peace mechanism, NATO countries have skilfully steered the course between seeming indifferent to the aspirations of the East Europeans and antagonising nationalist elements in Russia. Having failed to obtain special status, Russia became the 21st country to join the Partnership for Peace on June 22, 1994. Its former allies suspect a Russian effort to crowd them out and to use its heavyweight status for its great power claims. But NATO countries realise that Russia has to be accommodated and even stroked a bit within a new security architecture for Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has warned that NATO's enlargement could lead to "a nightmare of renewed confrontation"; it may devour him and result in his writing his memoirs from "the gulag". However, on May 31, 1995 Kozyrev endorsed his country's joining NATO's Partnership for Peace programme which provides for broad political and military cooperation. The former Soviet Union, in a note of March 31, 1954, had requested the United States, Britain and France to agree on Soviet membership of NATO. This request was summarily rejected; and this led to the formation of the Warsaw Pact. Now the alliance and Russia have agreed "to develop an extensive Individual Partnership Programme corresponding to Russia's size, importance and capabilities".

Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, once observed that the alliance served three main purposes: it kept the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War the future of NATO seemed bleak indeed. Some supporters of NATO now suggest that Lord Ismay's threefold rationale has not lost its relevance in the changed circumstances.

VI

"Our grand children may well wonder", observed American historian

Arthur Schlesinger, "what in heaven's name those disagreements could have been that drove the Soviet Union and the United States to the brink of blowing up the planet". A post-Cold War history of the Cold War is now being written. Nuclear weapons were the primary catalyst of this curious episode in modern history. They facilitated the stationing of American troops in Europe on a long term basis; without the doctrine of their first use in case of a conflict, American Congressional leaders would have been most reluctant to sanction such a major departure in foreign policy. As nuclear weapons are in the long run cheaper than a sophisticated conventional defence capability their cost-minimising role made the arrangement acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic. Reliance on nuclear weapons had another attractive feature--their unobtrusiveness. A conventional defence establishment commensurate with American global responsibilities would have been costly and massively obtrusive; it would have generated fears about the possible growth of a garrison state and, therefore, could not have been sustained for long. It can thus be stated that nuclear weapons prolonged the Cold War by making its cost bearable on both sides of the iron curtain. They extended deterrence not only in space but also in time. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union without a major military disaster were also made possible by the presence of these weapons in Eastern Europe and in the USSR.

Despite its terrible toll in human misery in the developing world and periods of peril, the Cold War evolved into a fairly workable international system. It was essentially a controlled contest in which all the major participants could be accommodated. Only during the Cuban missile crisis did the decision makers stare into the nuclear abyss. The arms race became a substitute for war. Neither major shifts in alliance loyalties nor weakening of the ties that bound them disturbed the stability of the Cold War system. China was an ally of the United States when the Cold War began; it later had a military alliance with the Soviet Union and again shifted its alignments in the early 1970s without precipitating a major upheaval. France, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania, Cuba and several other countries demonstrated the elasticity of the system. The collapse of colonial empires and the emergence of newly independent states were also facilitated by the presence of two rival centres of power. In the pre-nuclear era, such major upheavals in the structure of world power would have led to violent outbursts. Scenarios of an imaginary war in Europe were certainly prepared by the nuclear pundits; and these arcane exercises occasionally frightened the general public. To increase the credibility of nuclear deterrence, NATO strategy was to reduce the RISK of war by increasing the THREAT of it. And the West Europeans succeeded in resisting Americans attempts to make nuclear war more calculable and therefore less catastrophic. The Americans controlled the Germans and the European members kept the Americans in check.

The Cold War ended not as a result of some accommodation between the contestants. It was Gorbachev who triggered a process of reform which culminated in the disintegration of his country. Then, in the words of Henry Kissinger, he "wandered into the limbo reserved for statesmen shipwrecked by striving for goals beyond their capacities". The sudden end of the Cold War left all major powers rather breathless. It was as if one of the horses in a race broke its leg; the American horse kept running for a while before realising that the race was over. According to Kissinger, the Cold War began when Americans were expecting an era of peace and it ended at a moment when they were girding themselves for a new era of protracted conflict. The question now being asked by American historians of the Cold War is whether it was right and proper for their country to get so worked up over the Soviet threat and whether a diplomatic resolution of Soviet-American differences was possible without resort to global military containment.

The arms control—mandated reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia have been hailed as the "end of the arms race". Warren Christopher has, however, assured the American Senators that even after the full implementation of START-II by the year 2003, the American arsenal "will have a capacity to destroy civilisation as we know it several times over". Both the United States and Russia will have strategic nuclear weapons in four figures.

There has been a revival of the debate on the requirements of minimum nuclear deterrence. Herbert York, former director of the Livermore laboratory, has observed that the number of survivable nuclear warheads is "somewhere in the range of one, 10 or 100" and "close to one than it is to 100". Three American nuclear experts, Jerome B. Wiesner, Philip Morrison and Kosta Tsipis of M.I.T., have suggested in what they call "a conservative and cautious plan" an American arsenal of no more than 780 strategic nuclear warheads. According to Robert McNamara, the American Navy proposed in the late 1950s an invulnerable retaliatory force of about 464 nuclear warheads. There is, therefore, no military justification for the obscenely large nuclear armouries that will be maintained in conformity with arms control agreements.

These large stockpiles provide a rationale for the secondary nuclear weapon powers—Britain, France and China—for their reluctance to join the arms control process. British Defence Minister Tom King declared in January 1992 that the British deterrent should be preserved for 30 years or more. His French counterpart Jacques Mellick told the U.N. Security Council in February 1992 that France would proceed with its nuclear plans and added: "The world has entered the nuclear era and it's not near leaving it". And a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman unsurprisingly maintained that any reductions in his

country's arsenal would have to await much deeper cuts in the American and Russian forces. He asserted: "China possesses a very small number of nuclear weapons and they are entirely for defence purposes". Paul Nitze, an influential member of the American nuclear establishment, however, suggests that the United States should retain a strategic reserve as large as the combined strategic arsenals of all other nuclear weapon powers. In terms of international status, nuclear weapons will be considerably more important for Russia than for the United States.

There is a mainstream nuclear consensus in the United States and in Western Europe regarding the cost-effectiveness of nuclear forces compared with a conventional weapons capability, thereby enabling governments to meet the fiscal demands of a modern welfare state. It has been pointed out by Michael Mandelbaum that the social burden of being a great power, especially a nuclear superpower, has been lighter for the United States than for the great powers of the past--Athens of 5th century B.C. or Great Britain of the 19th century. The cost of being a nuclear power for the United States in the fiscal year 1979, for instance, was around 0.5 per cent of the total social product. One of the many reasons advanced by Kathleen Bailey of the Livermore laboratory for the United States to retain her nuclear military capability now is the extremely high cost of conventional weaponry. Advanced conventional weapons are even more expensive to manufacture and operate than the old ones. Tomahawk missiles, for instance, cost \$ 1.5 million apiece. When the United States decided to destroy an Iraqi facility suspected to be engaged in nuclear-related work in January 1993, it was necessary to fire 40 Tomahawk missiles against it. Conventional operations also are very costly now. Desert Shield and Desert Storm cost the United States \$ 61.1 billion. Then there is loss of human lives to be considered. Bailey, taking all these factors into her analysis, comes to the startling conclusion: "If you were to ask American parents whether they would rather sacrifice a son or daughter in a ground war, or use nuclear weapons to end the confrontation early, the answer might well be the latter." This is certainly a formulation with which many Americans may not agree; but it represents a deeply ingrained belief in the cost-effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. The French Defence White Paper issued in February 1994, for example, states that nuclear weapons allow elimination of a conventional arms race "that would be contrary to our defence policy and unacceptable from a financial viewpoint".

Nuclear deterrence has been glamourised as the instrument through which the Cold War was not allowed to degenerate into a global massacre. The unconditional and unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 11, 1995 has draped the five permanent members of the Security Council in the vestments of nuclear guardians. Thus nuclear weapons will remain a reality of the human condition for the foreseeable future.

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Indian Ocean Rim Trading Bloc

VICE ADMIRAL MIHIR ROY, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

The Indian Ocean has for nearly 4000 years linked the Mediterranean, Middle East, South and South East Asia with the Western Pacific by a network of maritime trade routes which encouraged trade and people-to-people links which paradoxically attracted European economic penetration resulting in the conquest of India. Europe was thereby able to utilise 86 percent of the wealth of this region which became the brightest jewel in the Imperial Crown. The Indian Ocean thus became the global highway for Britain to attain her economic and empire related objectives.

Pax Britannica hence deliberately encouraged Asia's sea blindness by monopolising all the ingredients of sea power - both warships and merchant ships, enabling the British Indian army to subjugate territory from Mesopotamia to Malaya. The non-use of the seas by Asians, (other than Japan) continued even after decolonization largely due to the preoccupation of the Subcontinent in their conflicts in the killing fields of the North West and North East.

Moreover, the superpowers in their global confrontation also perceived the geostrategic importance of this soft underbelly of the three continents, which not only contained the bulk of the proven oil resources and strategic minerals but in addition provided the underwater topography for locating nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. A scramble for naval bases ensued which led to the prominence of Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Reunion, Socotra, Aden, Bahrein, Karachi, Singapore and Subic Bay.

India, with her inward looking economy, and continental mindset, failed to exploit her commanding position in the Indian Ocean. Her merchant shipping remained below 2 percent of the world's tonnage; her 12 major ports lagged behind in modernisation; smuggling and poaching became lucrative and the region remained a prisoner of the Cold War environment which stymied creative thinking for regional cooperation.

Again, with the demise of bipolarity in 1989, violent ethnicism and fundamentalism intensified low level conflicts by sustaining the proliferation of small arms. The ensuing politico-strategic shift coincided with global recession which forced nations to amend their fiscal, trade and aid policies which got linked to other issues such as environmental degradation, intellectual property rights, nuclear proliferation, missile control, cryogenic engines and arms registers.

Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, a senior naval aviator, was the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of an Operational Naval Command. He has also been a Nehru Fellow. He has been responsible for the establishment of the Department of Ocean Development, Government of India, New Delhi.

Hence, there was a dialectic duality affecting the global security scene. On the one hand, there were forces that were moving the overburdened international system towards peace and stability as witnessed by the ending of the Cold War, the unification process as in Europe, Yemen and Vietnam, the West Asia peace negotiations, and the reduction in tactical and strategic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. On the other hand, there were destabilising forces in both developed and developing countries leading to terrorism and subnationalism encouraged by petro dollars and the arms bazar. This attracted the intervention by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank and other funding institutions of the Bretton Woods vintage.

INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL FORUM (IORF)

The genesis for creating such a regional forum of Indian Ocean states can be traced back to the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung. Sri Lanka and Tanzania later proposed the 'Indian Ocean Zone of Peace' (IOZP) concept which was aimed at keeping the superpower confrontation from spilling into the Indian Ocean.

These proposals, however, lacked the consensus of the basic objectives in spite of the non-aligned states adopting a declaration at Lusaka in 1970 calling upon all States 'to exclude great power rivalries and competition from this region'. The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) was formed in 1982 by the island nations of Mauritius, Madagascar, Scyelles, Comoros and Reunion for fostering economic development through regional cooperation but failed to broaden the ocean agenda. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) remained circumscribed.

The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation Council (IOMAC) was initiated in 1985 to provide a framework for dealing with marine resources, science and environmental issues but could not gather the requisite momentum.

In addition, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was grounded due to Indo-Pakistan disagreements. Only during the recent Summit meeting at Delhi, SAARC was given more substance and effect by resurrecting the Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) which will hopefully come into effect by the end of 1995.

The tempo of oceanic regionalism only speeded up with the end of the Cold War, the abolition of apartheid, the setting up of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the liberalisation of the market economy. The European Union (EU), Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), North American Free Trade

Association (NAFTA) and the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), therefore, found new economic complementarities and ways for expanding trade and investment. Nations began to recognize the mutual advantage in discussing common problems such as terrorism, environmental pollution, refugee flows and narcotic trafficking across multiple borders. The necessity for dialogues, the networking of summit and ministerial meetings, two track diplomacy and business association have all encouraged regional cooperation. Tourism, business travel, education, and new information made significant strides. But the Indian Ocean continued to remain the only major region without a viable economic grouping.

INDIAN OCEAN RIM TRADING BLOC

President Nelson Mandela during his state visit to Delhi in January 1995 declared that "the natural urge of the facts of history and geography that Nehru spoke of should broaden itself to include exploring the concept of an Indian Ocean Rim for socio-economic cooperation and to improve the lot of the developing nations in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement".

INTER - GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AT MAURITIUS - MARCH 1995

An inter governmental conference was held in Port Louis from 29-31 March 95 which was attended by seven Indian Ocean rim countries (M-7) - South Africa, Australia, India, Mauritius, Kenya, Singapore and Oman. In the spirit of open regionalism, it was agreed to promote sustained and balanced growth with clear linkages to human resource and trading institutions. The need to formulate and implement programmes of economic cooperation including, inter alia, expansion of trade, tourism, direct investment, scientific and technological exchanges along with the necessity to lower barriers towards the free and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment and technology was spelt out. It was also agreed to encourage close interaction of trade and industry with academic institutions to strengthen cooperation and dialogue among members in international forums on global economic issues. And lastly, there was a concurrence to build and expand mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus-based evolutionary and non-intrusive approach.

Therefore, trading and joint market strategy was the central theme for ocean trading blocs. The big three were India, Australia and South Africa. India and Australia are the world's top ten exporters of natural textile fibres. Similarly, the three countries are exporters of iron ore. Moreover, Australia had built up an expertise in processed foods, pharmaceuticals, waste management, telecommunications, energy technologies and down stream mineral processing.

South Africa, on the other hand, has the know-how for energy generation, aluminium production, mining, liquid gas, newsprint and construction industries.

India has a good track record for setting up of small and medium units for agro processing, textiles, leather as also components for heavy and light industries besides having considerable knowledge in computer software, health care and tourism.

Mauritius and Singapore have already structured off-shore financial and international business centres. Oman has the trading infrastructure for hydrocarbons. Kenya will synergise the development of East Africa.

The guiding principle adopted at the conference was that cooperation should be based on the respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence. It should not be a substitute for multilateral cooperation. It was further agreed that bilateral and other issues likely to be an impediment to regional cooperation shall be excluded from the deliberations.

It was felt that such a small group of countries should take the lead to build up the norms of cooperation, say over a period of five years instead of a large initial membership which will make the institution a talk shop for endless conferences that seldom get translated into action. It was also decided that while all sovereign states along the Indian Ocean rim would be eligible for membership, the expansion beyond the initial seven participants would necessarily be consensus based.

The participants at Port Louis set up a working group to develop the initiative and to prepare a report for discussions within a year. In addition, the private sector representatives were to set up an Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum with the Academic group pooling their resources to identify ways and means for effective economic cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IFIOR) - PERTH

Australia initiated a 'Second Track' conference for exploring the scope for regional cooperation at Perth from June 11-13, 1995 to which 23 Indian Ocean countries were invited. The conference was attended by 123 participants drawn from academic, business councils and officials in their personal capacities.

The 'Economic Working Group' identified two broad agendas - the first, on business facilitation including the regulatory environment, visas, taxes, currency, convertibility, trade promotion and a regional business directory. The second encompassed technology transfers, transport, telecommunications and human resource development.

In the 'Other Issues Working Group', the subjects included education, health, law and justice, sports, environmental issues, drugs, terrorism, maritime cooperation, economic opportunities and comprehensive security approaches including their applicability to maritime resource protection, defence cooperation, non-proliferation, security of small island states, safety at sea, anti-piracy, UN peace keeping and preventive diplomacy. In a way, this has overflowed into security related issues which were meticulously kept away at the Mauritius meeting so as not to divert the Indian Ocean rim countries from effective regional economic cooperation. The Australian Government announced liberal funding for a new Indian Ocean Centre at Perth for pursuing the 'Indian Ocean Business Forum' as also for establishing an 'Indian Ocean Research Network' for promoting the exchange of information, data and joint research projects. Further, the conference, while recognizing the decision taken at Mauritius, advocated the throwing open of the membership to all interested countries in the Indian Ocean region.

Jenelle Bonnar, of the Australian National University writing in the Financial Review of June 13 was critical of Australia, a comparatively recent entry into the Indian Ocean community, inviting a large number of asymmetrical nations such as Somalia, Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mozambique, Myanmar and Yemen who hardly contribute to the trade in this ocean region. Australia's share of 66 percent in the Asia-Pacific is a pointer to where Canberra's interests lie. Moreover, the trading pattern in this ocean is not intra-regional with the United States being the largest trading partner of many of the Indian Ocean States. Hence, without the presence of the United States, the structure of the Perth Forum, according to Bonnar, was 'ill conceived and is likely to achieve very little'

Again, issues such as nuclear proliferation, cooperative security and sub-regional approaches to security raises doubts among the Indian diaspora regarding the objectives of the Perth Forum. But there is no doubt that several new ideas have been aired which could be identified and given priority by the Mauritius inter-governmental members based on total consensus as later agreed by Australia. This will avoid the fate of earlier forums in an ocean named after India which the eminent historian Pannikar described as "a telephone directory than an historical entity"

The Consultative Business Network is scheduled to meet at New Delhi in December 1995 with the Chambers of Commerce identifying specific areas for regional economic cooperation. This will hopefully link the Indian Ocean Rim Forum, presently an economic dwarf to ASEAN, APEC, NAFTA and EU trading blocs akin to interlocking olympic rings. The result could will be the emerging of dynamic ocean trading blocs which may be the last frontier to alleviate poverty and economic imbalance in a water planet paradoxically called the Earth.

The Relevance of Kautilya's Strategy in the Present Context

SQN LDR AJAY SINGH

"An archer letting off an arrow may or may not kill a single man, but a wise man using his intellect can kill reaching into the very womb".

-- Kautilya

BACKGROUND

According to ancient Hindu tradition, the four supreme aims of human endeavour were "dharma" (duty), "artha" (pursuit of wealth) "kama" (physical desire) and "moksha" (self realization). Of these, "moksha" was considered the highest followed by "dharma", artha" and "kama". Though "artha" literally meant wealth, it has a much wider significance in that, the wealth of a nation was considered to comprise its territory and the inhabitants who followed various occupations.¹ In order to maintain prosperity of a state, new territory had to be acquired by alliance, contest or claim of virgin lands. In this function, the state had a vital role to play, which was defined in the Arthasastra. Primarily written for the guidance of the king in dealing with matters of the state administration, the Arthasastra encompassed subjects such as foreign policy, defence and conduct of war as well. The Arthasastra has been explained as the science dealing with state affairs in internal and external spheres. In other words, it is the science of statecraft.² The Arthasastra has three objectives which flow from one another, ie, promotion of welfare of subjects leads to acquisition of wealth (of a nation) which in turn makes it possible to enlarge territory by conquest.

Although many Arthasastras have been written, the most widely accepted author of the work is Kautilya, (also known as Chanakya) who is believed to have done so around 300 BC. This was the period when the Maurya empire was at its height in India. The Arthasastra was written for a specific purpose with a well defined state and society in view. Much of what is stated in this 2,300 year old work is still relevant today in the fields of politics and warfare. Perhaps, Kautilya's greatest contribution is in the field of strategy which is in keeping with the role played by him in progressing the Maurya empire.

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The state in Kautilya or Chanakya's time was well defined. The world as seen by him, did not extend much beyond the borders of the Maurya empire and it was in this framework that he laid down his doctrine on state administration and warfare. The centuries that have passed since, have seen the state metamorphize and with it the means, methods and organisation of warfare have also inevitably undergone changes. Some underlying elements, however, remain unchanged and therefore, if we examine the two end points, ie, ancient India when Arthasastra was written, and modern times, we could attempt to establish linkages and draw the military relevance of the strategy outlined in Arthasastra.

ROLE OF FORCE IN STRATEGY

Concept of National Power. According to Kautilya, national power could be deemed to consist of three basic ingredients. "Mantra sakti" or the power of deliberation was the intellectual strength that a state possessed.³ In essence, a high degree in mental power, whether expressed openly or indicated subtly, could influence other states to follow a desirable course of action. Throughout history, strategy has had its roots in intellectual power which is also necessary for threat assessment and planning. In modern warfare, the intellectual input is essential especially for the command and control structure. Another example of power through intellectual strength is the Gandhian strategy of non-violent agitation which forced the British to come around and accept the Indian viewpoint. The second ingredient, "prabhu sakti" was based on the possession of a large treasury and strong army. This constituted the physical assets necessary for the application of force without which the state was a toothless tiger. In modern terms, a country needs a healthy economy besides the strength of its armed forces if it is to be considered a viable power since a single dimension of strength rarely manifests into credible national power. The third ingredient, "vikrama-bala", connoted the spirit of general bravery of the nation. This in a way referred to the national will or conviction to stand united for a cause. Wars in the recent past are testimony to this aspect of national power wherein the will of a population could withstand the physical onslaught of a belligerent and finally cause him to reconsider his actions. Thus, Kautilya's concept of national power which revolved around intellectual depth, eco-military strength and character of the people is applicable today wherein these basic ingredients are required to a great degree. One only has to look at the powerful nations of this century to validate Kautilya's concept in this regard.

Strategems of State Policy. The four "upayas" of state policy were "sama" (conciliation or treaty), "dana" (concession or reward), "bheda" (dissension) and "danda" (punishment).⁴ Any or a combination of these could be used to overcome opposition and these were to be used in the order of

listing or in other words a form of graduated response was advocated. It is quite apparent that war was considered the last resort which was to be used only if all other means failed. The relationship of diplomacy and war was understood clearly and postulated in the Arthashastra. In fact, this revelation came to the western world largely through Clausewitz, the father of modern strategy, who considered war to be a continuation of politics by other means.

Six Methods of Foreign policy. With two basic conditions of peace and war, Kautilya advocated "sadgunya" or six methods of conducting foreign policy. These were "samdhi" (peace by concluding a treaty), "vigraha" (policy of hostility), "asana" (policy of remaining quiet), "yana" (marching on an expedition), "samsraya" (seeking shelter or protection), "dvaidhibhava" (double policy of alliance with one and hostility with another).⁵ From this, it is clear that great thought was given to the method of conducting foreign policy wherein the military content in foreign policy was remarkable which is perhaps closely matched by the USA today whose foreign policy has a significant military dimension. The level at which the defence and foreign policy operate in an integrated manner is one of the reasons behind the power status of the USA. The Maurya empire practising "Sadgunya" was indeed the most powerful state in the region in those times. It only serves to reiterate the close relationship between defence and foreign policies with the exact relation being dictated by domestic and international compulsions. A military backed foreign policy was well understood by George Kennan the US ambassador to Moscow in 1946, when he said that "you have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little, quiet force in the background."⁶

Power Projection. Kautilya advised that subsequent to building a power base, a country needed to project its power in order to acquire more territory and therefore, more power. Power projection, essentially offensive in nature, required battles to be fought in enemy territory. Careful planning and an emphasis on expeditions was the manner in which power projection was conceived. Prior to the expedition, there were detailed analyses and rational calculations of costs and benefits carried out. Kautilya understood the importance of power and its relationship with place and time in a strategic framework. If we were to reflect on the present situation, US strategic policy is close to the teachings outlined in the Arthashastra. Their "Forward deployment" in Europe and East Asia is a case of understanding the strategic relationship of power, place and time wherein power management is facilitated by the inter-changeability of place (or space) and time on a strategic plane.

The value of deliberate planning for an exercise in power projection was emphasized by Kautilya. It may be useful to recount the Indo-Pak War of 1971

where the aspect of meticulous planning in liberating Bangladesh served the aim well compared to another case of power projection by India in 1987 where peace-keeping forces were employed, the operations came under severe criticism by the media for its supposed inadequate planning.

METHODS OF WARFARE

Coercive Diplomacy. Kautilya advocated “mantrayuddha” or war by counsel.⁷ This type of warfare amounted to cajoling, warning, threatening and other such means.⁸ The “mantrayuddha” as outlined by Kautilya is similar to the use of coercive diplomacy today wherein military power is employed without resorting to active war to achieve one’s objectives. This method of warfare has to be conducted with a degree of restraint as it requires operation on the fringe between diplomacy and war. One the one end of the scale are the examples of the “rice bombing” of Jaffna by India and the enforcement of a “no fly zone” in Iraq by the Allies. On the other end of the scale is the threat of use of nuclear weapons more commonly known as nuclear coercion/blackmail.

Open Warfare. Open warfare or “prakasayuddha” was to be resorted to when the warring king was superior to the enemy in terms of power, place and time. It was expected that under conditions of favourable asymmetry, open and declared war was the most suitable for an offensive. In accordance with “dharma”, the time and place of battle was to be specified. Though not so frequently practiced today, perhaps the most outstanding example of this method of warfare was the Gulf War in 1991 where, in accordance with the UN resolutions, the stage for war between the multinational forces and Iraq was set with the date of operations that was promulgated well in advance. It is pertinent to note that Kautilya’s condition of a more powerful state carrying out this type of warfare was similar to the conditions prevailing in 1991 where the Allies were in a strong position and could dictate the place and time of war.

Concealed Warfare. Concealed warfare, or “Kutayuddha”, involved the use of common battlefield tactics such as feints, sudden assaults and attacking vulnerable areas of the enemy. It also included psychological warfare and instigation of treachery in the enemy camp. Some of these could appear immoral, but according to Kautilya, there was nothing objectionable where the interests of the state were involved. Modern examples show that this form of warfare is perhaps even more relevant in the present scenario where strategic surprise may be difficult to achieve thereby increasing the emphasis on battlefield tactics. Psychological warfare was carried out by the Germans in World War II, the aim being to target the minds of enemy population. More recently, in the Falklands Campaign, the Gurkha forces (in the British Army)

were depicted as blood-thirsty and ferocious warriors which had a tremendous impact on the Argentinians and finally expedited their actual surrender. "Kutayuddha" is also similar to the "strategy of indirect approach" propounded by Sir Basil Liddell Hart.

Clandestine warfare. "Gudayuddha" or clandestine warfare included covert methods to achieve the objectives without actually waging battle. In fact, this method of warfare is akin to the proxy war that Pakistan has waged for a number of years in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This type of warfare could be resorted to in case the military power of a country was weak or faced limitations in waging a direct military-to-military fight. Insurgency, being faced in the north-eastern states of India is another expression of "gudayuddha" by the insurgent forces. The Chinese warfighting doctrine of "Peoples War" outlined by Mao Tse Tung was yet another example where a militarily weaker China relied on the concept of an attrition war against the invading forces through means of guerrilla warfare. Another manifestation of clandestine warfare is the setting up of the US Special Operations Command in 1983 meant to cater for low intensity conflicts. Infact, this level of warfare is now gaining importance all over the globe.

OFFENCE AND DEFENCE EQUATION

In the Arthashastra, of the six methods of foreign policy outlined, "vighraha" or the policy of hostility embodied an offensive as well as defensive content which shows that Kautilya had a clear grasp of the relationship between offence and defence.⁹ At the strategic level, he envisaged expeditions forming the offensive element and while the "durga" or fort was the defensive element. Adequate emphasis was laid on a strong defence and the ability to repel enemy attacks while undertaking an offensive at the same time was considered important in this concept. At the operational level, chariots with better agility constituted the offensive element while elephants, which essentially were not as mobile formed the defences bearing functional similarity with forts at the strategic level.

In order to focus on the relevance of the offence-defence equation in modern times, it would serve well to broaden the historical scope. It can be seen that most of the invasions into India after the Mongols consisted of largely offensive strategies with little defensive content. These invasions succeeded largely because the inadequacies of defence were not exploited by the local rulers. In the Second World War, the German "blitzkrieg" succeeded under similar conditions wherein a highly offence oriented strategy was not really tested for its defensive content by the conquered states. Exploitation of the lack of defensive strategy by the overrun countries could well have pro-

duced different results. In fact, in the earlier war, the Maginot Line was built purely as a defence obstacle which was considered impregnable. The failure of this strategy too, was a pointer that, the balance between offence and defence is crucial and reliance on only one may not be sufficient. Successful application of a balanced strategy was seen in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 wherein India had an offensive strategy in the East, while maintaining a defensive posture in the West.

The relevance of this aspect of Arthasastra can also be seen by the fact that Pakistan and China have changed their doctrines in the last few years to gain a favourable balance between offence and defence. In the 1965 war with India, Pakistan had launched an offensive without giving due weightage to defence and, therefore, was unable to cope with the offensive launched by India across the Punjab border. It was to correct this imbalance that, in 1989, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the COAS Pakistan Army, put forward a doctrine of offensive defence. In his new vision, the balance of offence and defence was established and tested in the largest peacetime Pakistani exercise "Zarb-e-Momin". Even in China's case, its "People's War" doctrine was largely defensive at the strategic level. China recognised this imbalance and changed its strategically defensive "Peoples War" doctrine to "War Under Modern Conditions" in 1982 and has further refined it to the "Modern Warfare" doctrine since 1992 embodying greater offensive content.

CONDUCT OF WAR

War Preparations. Once the other strategies of dealing with the opposition had failed, Kautilya advocated war. The aims of the war had to be clear before embarking upon a campaign. A careful assessment of the situation was carried out in which a number of factors were considered such as power, place, season and duration of campaign.¹⁰ The duration was important from the point of view of logistic support to be catered for in the campaign. Some of the other factors also considered were composition of the force to be employed and calculation of the probability of success. The process of selecting an aim while considering various factors is a basic requirement applicable in all respects today. It is commonly believed that Israel went through two years of planning before undertaking a strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. On planning for the choice of objectives Kautilya favoured attacks to capture the rear of the enemy and penetration into the deep. According to him, this action would disable the enemy forces, create confusion in the ranks and weaken them tremendously. In modern times, Clausewitz's "shwerpunkt" or centre of gravity concept, is similar wherein application of force at a decisive point in space and time could cause a strategic imbalance in the enemy forces. An example of effective selection of objectives in the rear is the Inchon landing made by

General Douglas MacArthur in 1950 which made the North Koreans reel back as a disintegrated force.

War Termination. Perhaps, one of the most important contributions on war by Kautilya was on the topic of war termination and its incorporation at the planning stage itself. War was to be terminated on definite terms once the objectives envisioned were achieved. A number of options on war termination were spelt out by Kautilya which essentially depended on the relative strength of the warring sides.¹¹ When faced with a routed army or one which was fighting for its survival, he advocated caution, for this force could fight ferociously. The aspect of war termination is extremely important even today when victory is measured or determined by the ability to control war termination on favourable terms. This can be made possible by retaining control over engagement/disengagement and escalation/de-escalation in a conflict. It may be worth noting that China has fought most of its wars in modern times on these lines an example of which was apparent in 1962 when China unilaterally decided to put an end to the Sino-Indian War. In 1971, it was the turn of India to accept a cease-fire, thus retaining the control of war termination. There have been cases however, where this was not followed and the instances speak for themselves. In Vietnam, the USA won all battles but lost the war due to its inability to control war termination and the erstwhile Soviet Union met a similar fate in Afghanistan. It could be argued that a side which plans for the termination of war in the planning stage is in a better position to ensure it and thereby achieve victory.

Future Peace after War. Closely linked to the aspect of war termination is the issue of future peace. Once territory was conquered, Kautilya called upon the conqueror to display magnanimity towards the defeated ruler and his population. He accordingly advised the conqueror to undertake measures which would ensure the well being and welfare of the native population. By re-installing the king in his own land, the conqueror could win the loyalty of the conquered state and its head.¹² This aspect is relevant even today, although conquests of territory are not as common. Failure to understand this phenomenon has led to unrest where the USA and the erstwhile USSR intervened and did not allow the natural process of native leadership to take root. The attempts by these powers to install puppet governments in countries have resulted in prolonged periods of disturbance. The USA did not accept the reality of Saddam Hussein as the ruler of Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 and soon found that the situation in Iraq was far from desirable from its point of view. The USSR tried to install its confidants as the rulers in Afghanistan and left behind a situation which is far from peace. On the other hand, India accepted terms of the cease-fire in 1971 making all the concessions while it held a strong position. Although criticized by many, the Simla Agreement of 1972 has given

our country the longest period of peace with Pakistan. Two more glaring example of not ensuring peace after war are the terms at which the two World Wars ended. The first led to the Second World War while this itself led to the Cold War.

ARTHASASTRA'S GEOPOLITICAL THEORY

The "rajamandala" or "circle of kings" theory was the basis of inter-state relations in Kautilya's time. Considering the existing concept of national power, it was obvious that these relations would rely heavily on the equation of military power between the states. The Arthashastra sought to show how a state desirous of extending its domain should conduct its relations. The circle was centered around the "vijigishu" (would-be-conqueror).¹³ The other states included the "ari" (enemy) whose territory was adjacent to that of the conqueror and was more or less equal in strength. "Madhyama" was the middle king, who was stronger than the "vijigishu" and "ari" with territory adjoining both. Therefore, this state, by virtue of its position could interfere directly in relations of the other two. The fourth in the circle was the "udasina" who was not adjoining any of the others, was neutral, and the strongest of them all. Each member of the circle has a "mitra" (ally), and "mitramitra" (ally's ally). This basically provided the strategic landscape for furtherance of a state's interests, in the which the conqueror was required to defeat the "ari" first while placating the "madhyama". Once the "ari" was subjugated, the "madhyama" could be addressed. Kautilya visualized a circle in which neighbours were enemies, with the state adjoining the neighbour being a natural ally. With this background, today, similar circles could be drawn with Pakistan being considered as the "vijigishu" (ascribing to it inherent aggressiveness), Iran being the natural enemy, China the middle state, while the USA could qualify as "udasina". While it may not hold true for all situations, the relevant aspect of this theory is that it provides a basis for long term, strategic interests while retaining sufficient dynamism to suit short term goals. It can also be used to a certain extent, to assist in defining potential adversaries and plan accordingly.

Another important contribution of Kautilya was dynamic neutrality.¹⁴ This concept was to be practiced mainly by the "udasina". He advocated neutrality without losing dynamic character in the furtherance of cordiality within the "mandala" (circle). Kautilya iterated that states could develop intermediate relations with each other without actively being an ally or an enemy of the members of the circle. This condition of dynamic neutrality is nothing different from the non-alignment of today which constitutes the bed-rock of India's foreign policy since independence.

CONCLUSION

The Arthasastra, believed to have been written around 300 BC by Kautilya was basically a treatise on statecraft. Kautilya had visions of a great Maurya empire which would cover the entire world, and within this framework, the Arthasastra was meant to give guidelines to the King on how to run the state, acquire and manage more territory. A part of this great work relates to the conduct of defence affairs. Although, the Indian state has changed much since Arthasastra was written the topic of defence still bears importance for us in the modern world. The essential features of this topic as covered in the Arthasastra are relevant today and merit attention.

In the teaching of Kautilya, there is a heavy reliance on the concept of force. Force was the ultimate instrument of the state which was to be used if other methods of persuasion had failed. The state relied on force to implement its policies and maintain law and order within itself. The role of force outside the state basically ranged from coercion to outright military action to an extent that even the foreign policy of the state was backed by military might. Much of this is relevant today in the international arena where might not be right but certainly helps in establishing right.

Kautilya did not rest at building a substantial power base alone and advised the King to venture out in order to expand his domain by systematically conquering states in the vicinity. He emphasized the need for power projection and the importance of place and time on a strategic canvas. This aspect remains relevant in today's context as well. On the methodology of conducting war, Kautilya outlined different types of warfare which could be employed to suit various situations. The nomenclature may have changed but one can see manifestations of Kautilya's thoughts on warfare in ongoing conflicts today.

The Arthasastra spelt out, in great detail, the crucial relationship between offence and defence. It is equally important in the present scenario where excess attention to either could lead to an undesirable result. Possibly, one of the most significant contributions of Kautilya is the area of war termination and future peace after war. This is pertinent today, when wars have been terminated without sufficient thought process on the post-war picture, which in turn has continued to haunt the involved states. The genius of Kautilya has not dimmed despite 2,300 years that have passed since this work was written. Some of the specific aspects of Arthasastra may have changed, but in essence, the means to acquire power still remain the same.

NOTES

1. L N Rangarajan, *Kautilya - The Arthasastra* (New Delhi : Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 13-15.
2. R P Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthasastra -Part III* (Bombay : University of Bombay, 1965), p 2.
3. Nagendra Singh, *The Theory of Force and Organization of Defence in Indian Constitutional History* (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1969), p 30.
4. *ibid*, p 34.
5. S Kangle, n. 2, p 251.
6. Quoted in Kalevi J Holsti, *Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648 - 1989* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991), p 306.
7. Rangarajan, n. 1, p 676
8. R P Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthasastra - Part II* (Bombay : University of Bombay, 1972), p 462.
9. P Kangle, n. 2, p 253.
10. Rangarajan, n. 1, p 625.
11. Kangle, n. 8, p 442.
12. *ibid*, p 491.
13. Kangle, n. 2, p 268.
14. M V K Rao, *Studies in Kautilya* (New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1979), p 100.

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Maj Gen Ajit Anil Rudra

LT COL GAUTAM SHARMA (RETD)

Maj-Gen Ajit Anil Rudra, OBE, the grand old man of the Indian Army breathed his last on 3 November 1993 at the ripe age of 97. He had every intention of touching the 100th mark but that was not to be. A person of indomitable energy and drive he was very industrious and loyal, humane and religious. Very devoted, affectionate and lovable he was popular with the men. He was the only Indian officer in the battalion to begin with, and stayed in it for 21 years, the longest over for an infantry officer. He preferred to be the Adjutant of his battalion than hold the prize post of Adjutant of the newly formed Indian Military Academy (IMA) in 1932.

Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck had watched Rudra from his early days as a Second Lieutenant when he was Commander Peshawar Brigade in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in undivided India and had, according to Gen Rudra, "earmarked him to be the Commander-in-Chief after independence". There was no one equal to him in the Indian Army in operational experience in World War I and then in the NWFP. But Rudra refused. Cariappa was senior to him in the passing out order. He retired as a Maj-Gen in 1951 and settled at Dehra Dun.

His eventful career would be the envy of many an army officer. He had quite a few milestones to his credit. The only Indian to have fought during World War I in the British Army when Indians (darkies) were excluded. He was enrolled in the Royal Fusiliers and served for four years. He had gone to the UK for study and play in 1914. War started soon after and all the young men there volunteered for the army. Rudra did the same.

He was in the Battle of Somme in France soon after, where severe fighting had been taking place. He was notified as 'killed' as a German shell had landed in his trench killing almost every one. He was later 'discovered' in a hospital among the wounded. He reached the highest rank for a Private - and won three stripes of a Sergeant. For his excellent record in battle he was selected to attend the course at the 19th Officers Cadet Battalion (equivalent to an officers training school - OTS). He qualified but could not be granted a King's commission in the British Army as he was an Indian. The war was also over by then. He was later sent to India to attend the Temporary School

Lt Col Gautam Sharma retired in 1969 and has carried out considerable research on the Indian Army. He has some twelve books to his credit.

for Indian Cadets (TSIC) at Indore opened for the first time for Indians. He qualified again, and was granted a King's commission from 1 December 1919, later dated to 17 July 1920, along with 38 others.

A good horseman, Rugby and hockey player, six footer Rudra was posted to 28th Punjab and later to 4-15 Punjab Regiment. The battalion was then in Jerusalem area. Having already been in the thick of battle in France he was once more on active service in the Middle East desert. Travelling by ships he reached Qantara after a tortuous train journey. Leaving his civil orderly and kit behind he walked for four hours to reach his unit in a tented camp. He was the first Indian officer to be posted there.

On the second day of his arrival Subedar Major Mohd. Nawaz Khan (a Pathan) came to see him. "I am glad that an Indian officer has come to the paltan. We will serve you. You will have no complaint. I will send you a good batman". While the men were happy no one spoke to him in the officers mess, except 'good morning' or 'good night' no words were exchanged. Recounting those days Rudra said : "I was completely lost for the first ten days or so of my arrival. I had no work to do"

He over-heard the Adjutant who was an international Rugby player and collecting men from the unit to play a British regiment for a match. He was short of the 15th man. Rudra offered himself. Everyone was surprised to learn that he could play the game. When asked for the position he played his reply was 'Scrum half' This was another surprise for them as this was an important place in Rugger. It was a good performance at the match where he played on the Back-line. He also played hockey and cricket. He had been a captain of the college hockey XI. He was placed in the half line in a match against the Frontier Force (3 Sikh) and scored a goal.

There was another trial a few days later. He was told to read a map and go to a place twenty miles away where he was to meet an officer and then return. The mount allotted to him was Afghan a *badmash* horse. The quarter-master havildar had great respect for Rudra and offered him another horse. "No I will take Afghan, I have been ordered to ride that horse" Man and horse were at each other for about ten minutes and Rudra was finally able to establish his mastery as a rider. There was no trouble after that. Every one was surprised when he returned safely, without breaking a bone.

Once while the battalion was being paraded under the Adjutant, the CO who was a little distance away called Rudra and ordered him to take the parade. He had picked up a good word of command from his British sergeant major with the Fusiliers. The men were not used to his word of command and

were at sea for the first few minutes. They were happy to be drilled by an Indian officer for the first time. Rudra was able to hold them together for just two or three movements only. It seems he was finally accepted after these tests. His name then appeared in the battalion orders. The CO called him to his office and asked him to sit down. He was glad at his performance and gave him a bit of advice:-

“You have joined a very glorious service. Avoid wine, women and song. Avoid all temptations. Always keep things under control. Be the master. Learn your profession thoroughly. Read and learn. The men are your masters. You learn a lot from them. Give them the credit always. Never sign a thing without reading or understanding it”.

Indian officers were not popular in the units from the early days of Indianisation which were staffed by British officers. Indians were subjected to ‘discourteous, contemptuous treatment meted out to them by many British officers who should have known better’ was mentioned by Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck while commuting the sentence of transportation for life on the Indian National Army officers after their trial in late 1945.

The first step taken in this direction was to segregate units holding Indian officers. The 8-Unit Scheme thus came to be introduced in 1922. Henceforth newly commissioned Indian officers were to be posted to these selected units to ensure that British officers did not have to serve under Indians. These units were:-

- (a) 7th Light Cavalry
- (b) 16th Light Cavalry
- (c) 21st Madras Pioneers, late 64th Pioneers
- (d) 4-19 Hyderabad Regiment, late 98th Infantry (Hyderabad)
- (e) 5th Royal Battalion the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, late 117th Royal Mahrattas.
- (f) 17th Rajput Regiment (Q.V.O.L.I.). late 2nd Q.V.O. Rajput Light Infantry
- (g) 1-14th Punjab Regiment, late 19th Punjabis and
- (h) 2-1st Punjab Regiment, late 66th Punjabis.

As his battalion was not in the list of units to be Indianised Rudra was ordered to leave. Subedar Major Mohd Nawaz Khan, strongly put up for his retention. The CO agreed with him. “The whole battalion did not want Rudra

to go and he agreed with the men", said the CO in his report. Rudra's posting order was cancelled. Although he mixed with the men (Sikhs, Dogras, Punjabi Musalmans and Pathans, Jats came later) and spoke their language, he kept the highest standard of discipline.

During World War II he was posted to General Headquarters (GHQ) and promoted Lieutenant Colonel. He served as Director of Welfare and later Director Public Relations (Brigadier). He knew Field Marshal Auchinleck very well having served under him in the NWFP and then at GHQ when he was Commander-in-Chief India. While there he served as the eyes and ears of the Chief.

The Indian Army had performed exceedingly well during the war in North Africa. The Government of Sudan in appreciation of these services had placed a sum of £ 100,000 at the disposal of the Viceroy of India "to be used for purposes connected with the great contribution which India was making towards the common war effort". It was decided to utilize it for a national war memorial in India.

In early 1945 the Chief sent out a letter according to which the end of the war was in sight and there was no question who will come out victorious. The Indian Army had fought wonderfully well, the letter said, and "we should now think of having a suitable war memorial so that future generations would be enthused". It was also stated in the letter that this was just an idea and if any one had any firm suggestions of the form such a memorial should take these could be sent to him.

As part of his duties Rudra used to visit units and discussed this with individual officers, commanders and even with General Slim. The general reaction was : Let us finish the war first and talk of the war memorial later.

The Chief called Rudra for tea one day after his return from such a visit. He cycled past the War Memorial (now called India Gate) to the Chief's residence, later called Teen Murti House. Rudra conveyed to the Chief what he had heard on the subject of the war memorial. On being asked for his personal opinion he said that he wanted a 'live' war memorial and mentioned about a wing his regiment had donated to the Jalandhar Military Hospital in memory of their dead. He also referred to the hospital built in Richmond Park London as the Prince of Wales Hospital for disabled soldiers of the war. That very morning the commandant of the United States Military Academy at West Point had given a talk about the formation of West Point.

Recalled Rudra : "Then both of us came out with an idea and simulta-

neously said : What about an Indian West Point. The Chief said that there could not be a better memorial to all those who had gone and laid down their lives for their country. It would be most suitable memorial for them".

After a few moments the Chief said : "You have given me an idea. You start from your end. This would have to be sanctioned by the Viceroy".

A month later Rudra went to the Chief with some papers and asked : "Sir have you had a reply to the letter regarding the war memorial". The Chief immediately took out a paper from the tray in front of him : "How strange. You asking me this. I have just received a letter from the Viceroy sanctioning it". The Chief was very happy, recalled Rudra, like a child who had a new toy to play with.

A *communique* was issued on 2 May 1945 and a high powered committee with the Chief as Chairman and Dr Amar Nath Jha, Vice Chancellor Allahabad University as Vice Chairman. Rudra accompanied the Chief to a number of places for reconnaissance of a suitable site. There were many claims and counter claims : Bangalore, Satara, Bhopal, Belgaum, Deolali, Dehra Dun, Patna, Ranchi, Jabalpur, Lonavla, Pachmarhi, Vizagapatam, Secunderabad, Karachi and Khadakvasla. Rudra went over the whole of the area at Khadakvasla with the Chief and the final decision was for that place.

Rudra was present at the foundation laying ceremony of the National Defence Academy by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in October 1949 and then again for its inauguration. He was proud of the fact that the idea of having the National War Memorial in the form of the Academy was his and that of the Chief.

Rudra was fearless in the expression of his views and opinions and never minced words. He was against the policy of segregation of units holding Indian officers. Both Pandit Motilal Nehru and M.A. Jinnah appreciated his views when he was examined by them at the Skeene Committee (1925). He was all for the starting of an Indian Sandhurst and improvement of the system of education in India.

He knew the army since 1911. "The British hated the B ... Bengali and cared a damn for India" he told the author. On arrival in the unit as the first Indian officer he was given a cold shoulder. However he made his place with diligence, hard work and excellence in sports. His CO Lieut. Col J.C. Philip though against 'Indianisation' swore by him as an exceptional case, even though he did not belong to the martial classes.

The Defence Services Club was his idea and he wanted to name it the Fighting Services Club to cut out all civilians. As the Muslim officers were leaving for Pakistan in 1947 Brigadier Raza, a family friend, wanted Rudra to come to Pakistan. He refused. "I can't raise my hand to salute the Pakistani flag", he said.

Rudra had happy memories of Mahatma Gandhi who used to stay at the St. Stephen's College where his father Prof. S.K. Rudra was the Principal. When asked for advice whether to join the Army as a King's commissioned officer Gandhiji asked him to follow his own conscience. Gandhiji used to attend the church services and that is where he came to like the hymn *Abide with me*. Rudra was responsible for introducing it in the 26 January musical extravaganza. It is still played every year on the occasion.

A staunch nationalist, Rudra had great sympathy for the men of the Indian National Army (INA) under trial at the Red Fort. It was at his residence that Bhulabhai Desai was prevailed upon to defend them. He was an institution by himself and remained so until the end.

USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION-1994 : RESULTS

On the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, the USI Council during its meeting on 23 December 1994, selected the following officers for the award of prizes in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition - 1994:

Group 'A' - "INDIA'S ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF SAARC"

- | | | | |
|-----|--|--------------|-------------------------------|
| (a) | Lt Col KS Ramanathan
SIGNALS (Retd) | First Prize | Gold Medal and
Rs. 2,000/- |
| (b) | Maj SP Yadav
29 AD Regt | Second Prize | Rs. 1,000/- |

Group 'B' - "HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ARMED FORCES IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS"

- | | | | |
|-----|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| (a) | Maj Harcharan Singh
3 MADRAS | First Prize | Gold Medal and
Rs. 2,000/- |
| (b) | Capt D J S Chahal
75 Armed Regt | Second Prize | Rs. 1,000/- |

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Sir,

BOOK REVIEW - SONS OF JOHN COMPANY

This refers to the book review of Sons of John Company - The Indian and Pakistan Armies 1903 - 1991 reviewed by Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi (Retd.) in the October - December 1993 issue of the Journal.

I had reviewed the book for The Economic Times (23 May 1993) and I agree with Gen Sondhi that "this book provides excellent knowledge of arms and services in both (India and Pakistan) armies in an encapsulated form". However I feel offended when the British author calls free India's army the "Son of John Company". Also he had the impudence to say "These two armies are still today much the same as we left them - the same regiments, the same titles, the same uniforms to an extent. The same traditions are observed and similar bugle calls ring out above the old cantonments."

In fact, the book itself is an updated version of an older one - India's Army by Major Donovan Jackson published just before World War II. Though the author has not given the credit to Major Jackson, Field Marshal Sir John Chapple in his Foreword has said: "It will serve a companion volume to Major Donovan Jackson's India's Army... In a sense it brings that work, invaluable as it has been, up to date..."

42 - B, Pocket I
Mayur Vihar I
DELHI - 110091

Yours Sincerely,
Sub Maj N. Kunju (Retd.)

II

Dear Sir,

TRADITION OR RANK

Apropos, Letter Serial V, "Tradition or Rank" in the Letters To The Editor, USI Journal, January-March 1994, by the venerable military thinker of

our times, Brigadier N B Grant (Retd). Brig N B Grant has been the conscience of our army over the years and has thus been performing the role of a self appointed, "ombudsman" with great credit and definitely for the betterment of the organisation. It would be easy to dismiss, Brig Grant's observations on various issues from time to time in numerous forums as those of a military idealist, incongruous with the needs of the times, but this would be gross injustice to an old soldier who has always operated with an ear to the ground, at the grass roots level and has given us deep insight into important facets of all aspects of military life.

Thus Brig Grant's observations on violation of tradition and giving greater importance to rank in the present day military ceremonial functioning should be noted with alarm. Is it that established moral values have lost their relevance in an era which fosters the baser instincts of man for survival in this nether world? Is this a manifestation of the signs of decadence in an era of sycophancy and obsequiousness? Is it that senior commanders are displaying increasing tendency to usurp the ceremonial role of their juniors? These are the questions raised by Brig Grant in his letter and would be the issues on which we would deliberate herein.

It should not be our intention to blindly copy British customs and traditions which we are unable to co-relate in time as well as norms, but adapt these keeping the propriety of the occasion in mind. While the analogy of the Indian Wedding Card is appropriate to the occasion of issuing invitations in the name of the Colonel Commandants being, "Grandfathers" of the Regimental household; though here too we can fault this theory, as the true "grandfather" of the Regiment would be the oldest living Colonel Commandant and thus the invitation should be rightfully issued in his name; it should be observed that the master of ceremonies at the Indian wedding remains the, "father" and not the "grand father". However Brig Grant finds today's regimental "grandfathers" usurping the role of the "father" as well.

The factors which have resulted in eruption of this phenomenon are as follows:-

- (a) *Varied Interpretation of Indian ethos.* The Indian ethos has very clear and matured norms for each social interaction. While there is greater emphasis on respect for age and authority than in the Western culture, the same has never been at the cost of usurping the rights or authority of the younger generation at any cost. However, we tend to interpret the Indian ethos to suit our own inclinations. If we believe so much in the Indian ethos, then as soldiers we should be touching the feet of our seniors and elders and not salute them, but we obviously do not do so as we realise that it violates the dignity of the individual in

uniform. The litmus test for adopting the Indian ethos in the army would to my mind be to ask ourselves, "Does it violate the dignity of my superior, subordinate or self in any way?" If the answer is yes, then we have to evolve alternate means of social exchange.

(b) Erosion in self worth of individuals due to upgradation of rank structure over the years. At one time, the ultimate ambition of every regimental soldier was the command of his company or say maximum the battalion. Today the battalion command is regarded as the base for success. The self worth of command appointments and thus the officers holding the same has considerably been lowered. Curiously staff appointments have come to assume greater importance than command appointments. As a result commanders frequently abdicate their role primacy to staff officers at higher headquarters and senior commanders at times encourage this phenomenon as it simplifies their functioning. Upgradation of ranks has added to this confusion.

(c) Increasing tendencies towards aping our civilian counterparts where obsequiousness and sychophancy is the order of the day. This culture permeation has also resulted in a total disregard for the status of the subordinate in some cases and increasing tendencies to usurp his rights as one's own in the hierarchy.

(d) The eternal truism of clash of personalities and ego which frequently results in impaired social interaction.

What then is the solution to this malaise in which we as soldiers find ourselves today? Normally we tend to blame the senior hierarchy for all our ills. This would be farthest from the truth. The army hierarchy has very little role to play and has already done enough by means of issue of elaborate instructions on such like issues. There are detailed directives on say gifts and presentations as also the number of dishes to be prepared for formal dinner menus in the officers mess. It is also the first time that the role of army wives has been formalised. The grey area lies in the implementation of these specific instructions and the blame for it rests on the shoulders of unit and the formation commanders at the rank of Colonels and Brigadiers. It is this strata of our army hierarchy and society which has to ensure that the directions given by the army hierarchy are implemented in letter and spirit and the age old traditions which honour an individual's as well as organisation's dignity are maintained. Some other measures suggested are as follows:-

(a) Preparation of a uniform code of conduct for the army. While at present there are a large number of policy letters giving guidelines on the subject of social interaction, protocol and various forms to be observed at military functions, a summary of these in the form of a booklet to be

prepared and issued by the Adjutant General's Branch could act as a ready reckoner cum reference book. In this we could include alteration of certain norms, congruent with prevalent Indian ethos after due deliberations and obtaining the considered opinion of all concerned. This would formalise the customs and traditions, force those who have proclivities to suborn traditions for the sake of own image building to follow these and provide support to the middle level officers as commanding officers of units in implementing the same without being brow beaten into submission by their superiors.

(b) Assertiveness training should form a part of our leadership training in the army. This would enable the junior and middle level commanders in the army to firmly say no to any coercion of their rights by the seniors. Assertiveness training enables individuals to recognise their self esteem and stand upto their own rights without necessarily being aggressive or antagonising the superior authority.

3 JAKRIF
C/O 56 APO

Yours faithfully

R K Bhonsle
Colonel

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues and Defence and Security forces, for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by self-addressed and stamped envelope.

Review Article 1

Iran Under Khomeini

AIR MARSHAL H K OBEROI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

Iran was exploited by the West for well over a century. The West was not averse to intervening in its internal affairs. Alongside, the Czars and later the communists had threatened its borders from the north. Where the West left off, the Shah and his coterie took over. The development programme launched by the Shah enriched only his friends and relatives. The Shah acquired a large military establishment. Most of the revenue from the oil wealth disappeared into western coffers for payment of unwanted military hardware. Shah's attempts at modernisation of Iranian society were seen by the common populace as crude attempts to uproot them from their millenia old culture and traditions. The common man was looking for salvation and he thought his hour had finally arrived when Ayatullah Khomeini returned home triumphant. Khomeini was seen as a messiah a liberator and a benefactor. But soon enough, the euphoria abated and people realised that not much had changed. In fact now they were being exploited in the name of religion. As the head of the state Khomeini virtually became a spiritual and temporal dictator. A school of clerics controlled by him held veto power over the decisions of the new Majlis. Khomeini's main programme was Islamisation of the state and export of Islamic revolution. Even sixteen year olds were forced into the so called holy battle against Iraq. Support for international terrorism was seen as a handy tool against perceived enemies of Islam. Precious resources were wasted and little was left for the reconstruction of the economy and welfare of the common man.

Against this background, Ervand Abrahamian proposes, that "Khomeinism" in essence is a populist movement. He has written five essays to convey this message. In the first essay he contends, that Khomeini broke sharply with Shia traditions borrowing radical rhetoric even from Marxism. His platform was economic, social and political. That in all this Khomeini brooked no political opposition and the fact that he destroyed it brutally fails to find any recognition. In the second essay, there is an effort to highlight, that Khomeini was a greater radical than even the Marxists as he proposed to redistribute property. The threat of course was never put into practice, and in any event, it did not apply to the "bazaar" the middle class of Iran. The only people whose property had been confiscated are those who opposed Khomeinism.

Khomeinism : Essays on the Islamic Republic : by Ervand Abrahamian, Berkeley, University of California, 1993, p. 188, \$ 45, ISBN 0-520-08503-5.

Air Marshal H.K. Oberoi is a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief and a Principal Staff Officer of the Indian Air Force.

Essay three emphasises, that the Islamic Republic celebrates "May Day", an idea that originated from western socialism. The author suggests, that it is a facet of populism with social and religious appeals for gaining popular support. But the other side of the coin is that this is an ideal method for capturing labour unions which by their past showing could have been ideal launching pads for anti Khomeini forces.

Essay four focusses on treatment of Iranian history and how it is being manipulated to bolster the regime's image. Fudging history cannot be construed as populism. In any event, the role played by past secular Iranian heroes like Mossadegh is too well known, to be kept under the wraps. Essay five describes the role of "posht-e-pardah" or the foreign "foreign hand" as we know it in India. All ills facing Iran can be assigned to "posht-e-pardah" but, to get rid of political opponents or honest dissidents by labelling them as foreign agents cannot be regarded as populism.

The author fails to draw a clear line between populism and religious fundamentalism. Winning public support by subterfuge is one thing but subduing people with threat of physical violence to say the least is reprehensible and to do it in the name of religion deserves even greater condemnation. Semantics cannot hide the fact, that Khomeini exploited populism to mow down his opposition. It was a tool that he used extensively to perpetuate the rule of clergy.

ADVERTISE
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Review Article 2

The Fall of Singapore, 1942

LT GEN S L MENEZES, PVSM, SC (Retd)

The author's earlier book (along with Michael Smith), *Odd Man Out - the Story of the Singapore Traitor*, had portrayed with skill the life and spying activities of Captain Patrick Heenan, 16th Punjab Regiment. In his way, Heenan was actually the Odd Man in the Indian Army of the time. The present book is an even more compelling one with a moral on every page, the title itself encapsulating the ingredients of the recipe for this particular disaster. The word 'if' undoubtedly is the central word in the word 'life', and manifestly so far those who fought in Malaya and Singapore from 7 December 1941 to 15 February 1942, and then endured three and a half years of brutal Japanese captivity.

On September 10, 1940, Prime Minister Churchill had recorded in a Minute, 'The prime defence of Singapore is the Fleet..... The probabilities of the Japanese undertaking an attack upon Singapore are remote.... They are not likely to gamble.' Thereupon the author postulates, why, in view of its importance, was there never an inquiry into the loss of Singapore, despite Churchill stating on 23 April 1942, 'I do not at all wonder that requests should be made for an inquiry by a Royal Commission, not only into what took place upon the spot in the agony of Singapore but into all the arrangements which had been made beforehand. I am convinced, however, that this would not be good for our country, and that it would hamper the prosecution of the war. Australian accounts reflect upon the Indian troops. Other credible witnesses disparage the Australians..... there is an endless field of recrimination.....'

Wavell's Report on Operations in Malaya and Singapore of 1 June 1942 had stated, 'for the fall of Singapore itself, the Australians are held responsible'. Lt Gen AE Percival, GOC Malaya, after his release from captivity and subsequent retirement, published his account in *The War in Malaya* in 1949. Lt Gen Sir Lewis Health, GOC 3rd Indian Corps, who died in 1954, was senior to Percival and had more recent battle experience. He was to write to Percival in 1949 itself 'The discerning reader only will appreciate that you yourself or you and Brookham (Brooke-Popham, C-in-C), were so greatly responsible for the hole in which the poor 11th Indian Division was to find itself enmeshed in the first days of hostilities. Hitherto, loyalty to you and the decision to avoid

Singapore : The Pregnable Fortress; A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion. By Peter Elphick, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1995, p. 441, £ 20.00. ISBN 0-340-613165.

Lt Gen S.L. Menezes is a former Vice Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and author of the recently published book *Fidelity and Honour : Indian Army from the Seventeenth to Twenty - First Century*.

unpleasant disclosures has constrained me from ventilating the errors which led up to the serious and unnecessary mauling which the 11th Division received in the opening days of the campaign'. The official British history, *The War against Japan* by Maj Gen SW Kirby and others was published in 1957. However, much important information that the historians had to hand about the Malayan campaign was excluded for political reasons. Though not quoted by the present author, this official History did say about the performance of the newly - raised Indian units, "What is surprising is not that the new units in the early stages of the Japanese war failed to stem the enemy's advance; but that they fought as well as they did." The official Australian history by Lionel Wigmore *The Japanese Thrust*, was also enjoined to leave much unsaid.

However, one of the best-written of the earlier books, *Spotlight on Singapore* (1965) was by an Indian Army officer, Denis Russell-Roberts, 5/11 Sikh, who took part in the campaign. This author highlighted the events in which the Indian Army did well, and records several courageous feats. He had recounted then, with reference to personnel of the Indian Army who subsequently joined the Indian National Army (INA), 'it should be recorded here, that one regiment, 2/10 Baluch Regiment remained loyal to a man'. In the light of the above, the last British CO Lt Col Phillip Parker's account (he had taken over only in the first week of February 1942, having just come from the Frontier Force Regiment), written in Changi Jail while a prisoner, as to the alleged defection on night 14/15 February of three companies of 2 Baluch, 'Furthermore, the Subedar Major's denial of any knowledge of disaffection was, to me, unconvincing and I felt that though he might not be affected, he was at least aware of some seditious movement', needs to be reconsidered. What Denis Russell-Roberts states is an historical fact even though the present author contests this in that four of the Indian Commissioned Officers had joined the INA. (In general military usage the term 'men' excludes officers). The previous CO, Lt Col JG Frith's opinion apparently differed. He, on completion of a full tenure in command, had been ordered to India to raise a new unit. He, however, also became a prisoner. He obviously ensured the Subedar Major was subsequently awarded the MBE, and became Honorary Captain and Sirdar Bahadur, as recorded in the Regimental history (1980).

There are some avoidable editing mistakes, eg on page 67 it is stated, 'Ahirs are an ethnic community of Rajasthan; then in northern India, now part of Pakistan.' This is not so, Rajasthan is part of India. Similarly on pages 54 and 64 the Indian nationalist was Rash Behari Bose, not Ghose. As to the German woman living with Lt Zahir-ud-din, 4/19th Hyderabad, the author comments, 'no explanation is given in the official file as to why a German national was living free in Singapore in May 1940'. Actually she was employed by the British. There is a reference also to a Capt Mrs "Lakshmi"

by implication an undesirable nationalist influence. This is, of course, Dr Lakshmi Swaminadhan, later Mrs PK Sahgal, who raised the Rani of Jhansi Regiment. It should not be forgotten that she did splendid work in the INA hospitals in Burma in 1944/5, and, when the Japanese collapsed, with Force 136, earning British admiration and gratitude.

Overall, this painstakingly researched book is compelling in its poignancy, encompassing both bathos and pathos, and is unquestionably an important contribution to the history of the period. The surrender of Singapore was a macabre finale, for, from the point of view of subsequent Japanese accounts, a final British counterattack on 15 February could have eliminated the Japanese lodgement on the island. Possibly, the most objective among all the quoted encapsulations is by Major JC Westall, Royal Marines (a Staff Officer, Naval Intelligence, who had escaped before the surrender, all intelligence officers having been ordered to escape), who has stated, 'with regard to the much discussed Australians, I can only say that on 11 February the waterfront was a mass of demoralised troops looking for any means of leaving the island. I should say that at least 80 per cent of them were Australians, the remainder British and Indian, the latter appearing more lost than broken'.

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Short Reviews of Recent Books

The Los Alamos Primer : The First Lecture on How to build an Atomic Bomb. Annotated by Robert Serber, Ed with an introduction by Richard Rhodes, *Univ of California*, 1992, p. 98, \$ 23.00, ISBN 0-520-07576-5.

An excellent book for understanding the basic science —Physics behind the Los Alamos project. This is explained in simple language by Richard Rhodes in the introduction. It started with Lise Mertner -a Jewish girl, Otto Hann the two German chemists and Fritz Strassman an Austrian Physicist, they found that on bombardment of Uranium nitrate, they obtained Barium, instead of Radium. Lise fled Germany, met her physicist nephew Frisch, in Sweden, consulted Bhor who had visualised the nucleus as a drop of liquid. She developed the first understanding of nuclear fission. The nucleus splits into two parts and that about 1/5th of the mass of the nucleus is released as energy. The outcome of this discovery was unprecedented, it's development in the period 1938, onwards by various nations is mentioned.

The discovery was brought to the attention of President Roosevelt, by Einstien & other scientists, though his equation, $E=mc^2$, had little to do with it. The U.S. Govt took up this multi million project. The number of scientists employed doubled every 9 months, till it reached 5,000. The book contains the material used by Serber, for his five lectures to the new scientists entering the Los ALAMOS labs—to give them basic information on the subject. This has also been explained in simple language, including the system of scientific notations.

-- Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)
M.A. (Cantab)

Peace/Mir : An Anthology of Historic Alternatives to War. Ed by Charles Chatfield and Ruzanna Ilukhina. *New York, Syracuse University Press*, p. 386, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-8156-2602-9

A rare collaboration between Russian and American historians presents selected writings on peace, dating from antiquity to the United Nations Charter. This covers Philosophy and political thought of Western Civilisation, which today dominates the world; the editors comment that a global concept of peace would need similar contribution from Asian, African and South American cultures. However, there is ample here to indicate trends in our "one world" of developed, emerging and backward peoples; we have a wide and deep scan of ideas linked in historical sequence by editorial narrative, which leaves merit to be judged by the reader.

Ancient deep rooted feelings underline tribal, social and national values, which rule human affairs. Questions are raised: are war and peace a never ending cycle, or does mankind have other choices: Nationalism, patriotism, ethnic, and religious values, make war an integral part of human development; do we have alternate values and social orders which may make possible a deliberate choice for peace as an option to war? Is peace only a condition imposed by the powerful on the weak? War remains a savage competitive instinct, which has now expanded with destructive weapons to a

world stage; man has become a world warrior, and himself must change for survival of his world. Any war is a crime against mankind; peace is possible only with social justice; World War II was a diplomatic and moral failure of leaders and not a clash of ideologies held by masses of people.

One could wish that this study have continued beyond the UN charter, which has had a regular battering with armed conflict over all these years. The hopeful indication from the editors is that the 20th century belongs to the common man, with trends towards a world conscience and universal peace enforced by law. This is a book for serious study and thought, going beyond the somewhat modest aims of the research scholars and editors who compiled it.

—Tindi

Submarines. Ed by Rear Admiral John Hervey, C.B., O.B.E., London, *Brasseys (UK)* 1994, p. 289, £ 14.00, ISBN 0-08-040971-7

A submarine has no peace time role as she can neither be used for flag showing nor for carrying dignitaries nor for aid to civil power. Therefore, its commanding officers can aptly be called the Captains of War as described by Winston Churchill at the outset of the war. It is therefore, appropriate to classify submarines in major war vessels category.

Rear Admiral John Hervey with 13 years experience in sea going submarines including a nuclear one, in his book "Submarines" has covered in depth the roles of a submarine, its construction, the equipment and weapon including the communication and radar sets as also propulsion and generation systems.

An educative and easily understandable book of interest to all naval officers in particular the submariners. Also the constructors and the manufacturers of weapon and equipment for the submarines.

The abbreviations peculiar to a submarine and the technical terms are a welcome addition.

-- Captain R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation: With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region. Ed by Trevor Findlay, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1991, p.177, \$ 34.00, ISBN 1-55587-269-7

Though not commonly known, recourse to chemical weapons of one type or other, in the battlefield, has been frequently undertaken during the twentieth century. Despite the Hague Convention, nations big and small have developed and stockpiled such weapons - about 22 of them as stated by the US assistant Secretary of State in 1989. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology amongst some of them would be a matter of great concern.

Studies compiled in this book tackle diverse issues and suggested countermeasures and, a universally accepted prohibitive protocol or Convention backed up by a

monitoring system to checkmate the threat of CW capability. The earlier chapters not only highlight factual information about various chemicals and their possible weapon-profiles, but also discuss the considerations/motive compulsions behind developing CW capability, by Less-Developed Countries as a viable and concealable option.

This book would be a useful addition to institutional and unit libraries.

-- Maj Gen S.K. Talwar (Retd)

Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (RE) Introduction to International Relations. By Jim George, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 266, \$ 18.95, ISBN 1-55587-446-0

This is a comprehensive account of how global politics is subject to the control of diverse forces as operated upon by countries big and small. Some forces may cancel each other, and some reinforce each other. Yet despite these odds, countries have endeavoured to and, in varying measures, have managed to achieve progress in providing for the welfare of their people and their economic growth. Politics, however, is an area where it is hard to assess in arithmetical terms, the extent of progress achieved. Yet, progress or stagnation in economic or political planning and achievements is easily seen by knowledgeable observers, within country as well as outside.

After the end of the 'Cold War', the world has become 'unipolar', that is, there is only one power which to a large extent has acquired a dominating position in international relations. Other countries can attend to their needs and improve their economic standing, provided the way they attain their targets are not seen by the dominant power as something against its own interest.

'Discourses of Global Politics...', is an interesting and useful book by Jim George which merits careful study by students of International Affairs.

-- Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

Military Leadership : In Pursuit of Excellence 2nd Ed. Ed By Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, Boulder, Westview 1992, p. 204, \$ 58.00(hc), \$ 19.95 (pb), ISBN 0-8133-1362-7

Leadership is of ultimate consequence to society's progress. Military provides the best opportunity for exposing the bedrock of character that underlies leader behaviour. The Gulf War induced new energy into search for answers to questions about leadership. A large number of articles and books have been written since the Gulf War.

The book Military Leadership is a collection of articles compiled in four parts viz Leaders and Leadership, Followers and Followship, Leaders and Followers and Contemporary Perspectives. The editors have correctly recognised that the leadership is both an art and a science.

The book gives a rich insight of different disciplines and perspective of effective leadership. Different varied articles to stimulate about challenges and opportunities for effective leadership in today's complex military and non-military world. The subject is more relevant to India where the economic resource is scarce and expectations and

responsibilities are large. An effective and dynamic leadership is the answer. A book worth including in the institutional libraries.

-- Col J.L. Sharma (Retd)

Contemporary Political Systems : Classifications and Typologies. Ed. By Anton Bebler and Jim Seroka, *Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990, p. 384, \$ 46.50, ISBN 1-55587-147-X.*

The book is a comprehensive editorial of typologies of contemporary political systems. The basis of discussion is traced to the historical writings of Herodotus who classified regimes on the question "who rules"- the one, the few and the many? There is, as per Machiavelli, a constant struggle to rule and to be free. In the chapter on authoritarianism the author explains the dynamics following the breakdown of previous regime transition, installation, consolidation, persistence and crisis. The socialist pattern where the state holds a monopoly of power, controls the means of production and manages the society as a whole, is explained quite lucidly. The authors have also brought out the relevance of the constitutional system, with checks and balances provided by the executive, legislature and the judiciary.

Democratic regimes have been classified into three systems - presidential, parliamentary and single-party. Further, typologies have been discussed on the basis of political parties and whether dominated by civilians or the military. In the chapter on African political systems, tribal politics (Inkatha, Biafra, Ruanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, etc.) which assumes significance even to this day, should have been discussed more in detail. In the final analysis, an informative capsule on the world political systems.

-- Col Valmiki Katju

Biological Warfare in the 21st Century : Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons. By Malcolm Dando, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1994, p. 278, ISBN 1-85753-064-0*

The author very clearly provides the reader with necessary information to judge the dangers of proliferation of Biological weapons, control their progress and restrict its spread by various Biological Weapons Control meetings, suggesting methods of control of Biological Weapons within the wider ones of arms control.

The book also discusses the effect on humans of Plague, Influenza, Leprosy, Measels, Small Pox, TB, Typhus and Yellow Fever, all these being potential weapons for Biological Warfare. The ideal delivery system being a low flying aircraft, undetected by Radar. Such aircraft could affect an area of 1,50,000 square miles. Infected plague fleas could be carried in 25 kg porcelain bomb/containers and dropped over an area, Tetanus, Anthrax and other diseases could also be carried.

-- Brig Y.P. Dev (Retd)

A World Divided : Militarism and Development After the Cold War. Ed. by Geoff and Kath Tansey and Paul Rogers, *Earthscan 1994*, p. 142, £ 10.95, ISBN 1-85-383-196-4

This is a book that ought to be studied and studied again by all those interested in the welfare of people in this world and in their political, economic and industrial development.

The most powerful nation in the world is updating its nuclear arsenal and ensuring that it can effectively deal with other countries with declared or clandestine nuclear and or space weapons. As of now USA has its nuclear arsenal which is being steadily updated and refined. The Former Soviet Union now Russia retains a modest nuclear arsenal for its self defence and the defence of its associate States. Others, notably China is modernising its nuclear arsenal as is evident by its frequent testing of nuclear weapons, and arming its close allies (such as Pakistan).

Thus in this post Cold World War era, while some form of peace and order prevails in Europe and will continue to prevail because of the convergence of views of the United States and Western Europe and fair amount of agreement on nuclear issues between USA and Russia, the danger of a nuclear war is fortunately very remote.

"A World Divided : Militarism and Development After the Cold War" provides an excellent summary of what has happened after the end of the so called "Cold War" or economic and political rivalry between the World's most powerful countries-USA and Russia.

A book worth careful study.

-- Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

Worth it all : My War for Peace. By Jim Wright, *New York, Brassey's (US) 1993*, p. 322, \$ 22.00, ISBN 0-02-881075-9

Jim Wright became the Speaker of the US House of Representatives in 1987. In 1989, he resigned after a long career in Congress spanning thirty-four years. An experienced politician, he is also a prolific writer and has the knack of describing political events in lucid style and easy-flowing manner much to the delight of the reader.

Here he tells a personal story - his involvement in the peace process in Central America in the 1980s. He reveals, how he was used by the Reagan administration and subsequently dumped and how his peace-plans were implemented despite opposition at highest levels. He claims that his plans were instrumental in bringing peace in the region and effectively stopped the killing in Central America. In the process, he provides an insight into the functioning of the Congress, power-politics and US foreign policy making.

Full of anecdotes and facts (with a selection of relevant documents), Wright's book is an addition to the controversial interpretations of the US policies in Central America. His first-hand analysis and engaging style of story-telling are added attractions.

-- Anindyo J. Majumdar

Islams and Modernities. By Aziz Al-Azmeh, *London, Verso, 1993, p. 157, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-86091-626-X*

In the essays included in this volume, Aziz Al Azmeh, Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, critically examines the origins and development of reformist and revivalist trends in Islam as well as the position taken by Western Scholars on Islam on the one hand and Western democracy on the other. Starting with a survey of the situation of Muslim minorities in U.K. the author highlights the antagonisms based on racism, tribalism, heterophobia and Islamic exclusivism which have led to ghettoization in Britain and to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Among the subjects examined closely are Arab nationalism and Islamism, Wahhabism and the reformist and extreme radicalist streams in modern Islamic revivalism. The use of Islamism and Pan Islamism by U.S.A.'s clients Saudi Arabia and Gulf States to counter the threats of Nasserism, Baathism and Communism has been mentioned. The Chapter on Wahhabite Polity provides useful insight into the structuring of Saudi Society and the working of the partnership between the Saudi ruling house and the clerics. In the last chapter the author highlights the prejudice which has all along afflicted the approach of Western Scholars towards Islam.

Most of the essays included in the book were originally presented by the learned author to specialist audiences of scholars. The text is, therefore, naturally full of terminology, concepts and references which will be fully intelligible only to those having an adequate grounding in the disciplines of philosophy and political science. However, ordinary readers who are keen on improving their understanding of the current developments in the Islamic world and are willing to put in the extra effort required will find their labours well rewarded.

-- J P Sharma

Former Additional Secretary to the Govt.

Power and Conflict : Toward a General Theory. Ed By Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *New Delhi, Sage 1989, p. 266., \$ 46, ISBN 0-8039-3594-3*

Simplifying complicated social processes into models and sub-models and attempts to quantify issues which are essentially qualitative, constitute a simulating intellectual exercise. Unfortunately, practical applications of these models are very rarely effective. These models are often superficial and limited in nature since they fail to include two important factors in their combinations - human ingenuity at times of provocation and human idiosyncrasy.

Prof. Blalock's interests include applied statistics, sociological theory and conceptualisation and measurement. In his attempt to provide a general theory of two elusive concepts of social and international politics - power and conflict - he has surveyed the existing literature and sought to present a synthesis through models and sub-models.

This book is useful for the academicians who are inclined to express socio-political issues in statistical terms and for debate and discussion. But as the author himself has repeatedly said, one should be careful to avoid premature over-simplifications.

-- Anindyo J. Majumdar

The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War. Ed by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Alabama, Air University, 1992, p. 374*

The editors have, on the basis of experiences gained in Operations Desert Storm and Instant Thunder, reached a conclusion that Air Power is strategically decisive, contrary to the earlier belief. To attain it the Air Forces of the future must hold the edge in the realm of payload, range, speed, penetrability, and feedback regardless of weather, camouflage and stealth backed by vibrant R & D Organisation and Industrial infrastructure. Air power is the most outstanding among the combative forces/commodities because with air superiority the inadequacies of surface forces can be compensated but vice versa may not be true.

The book deserves reading by students of Air Power & national policy makers and must find its rightful place in all Services libraries, Military Science Departments of Universities and colleges etc.

-- Air Commodore S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Airforce Bases : Vol II, Air Bases Outside the United States of America. By Harry R. Fletcher, *Washington D C, Centre for Airforce History, 1993. p 219 (United States Air Force Reference Series)*

Volume II of the USAF reference series, this volume contains data of historical nature about 44 air bases located outside the territorial limits of United States in 15 countries; the format and contents more or less conform to the previous volume i.e. easy to refer, substantiate or authenticate events, locations, and personalities. "All these bases, stations or airports were of vital national significance as America grappled with the challenges of the Cold War". Scholars, Military students or Staff Officers may not find definite account of each base but can definitely acquire Historical data of value about these bases. Some of the names/details throw up sheer nostalgia for those who had been associated with the study of Military History. For sensitivity of inter nation relations, no graphic or pictorial illustrations are available. The publishers have maintained the technical excellence just as the author and his associates have laboured to keep up the academic excellence. A welcome and desirable asset for all libraries/defence institutions.

-- Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Command and Control : Support Systems in the Gulf War. By M.A. Rice & AJ Sammes, *London, Brassey's (UK) 1994, p. 139, £ 11.50 (Land Warfare Vol. 12) ISBN 1-85753-015-2*

The Gulf War 1990-1991 (Operation Desert Storm) was a model of high-tech warfare, more a live-fire demonstration of the War of the Future witnessed by people across the globe on their TV screens. Amongst the multifarious technological "first - evers" in the combat zone, the extensive and intricate communication systems as the vital back-up for combat forces, would be an awe-inspiring exposure.

Restricting the scope of their exposition to the refurbishing/up-dating of the command & control, communication and information system of British 1 Armoured

Division for its combat role in the Gulf War, the authors have described the entire process of the evolution of the Desert Interim C I S System - DICS, - existing CIS systems as available to the British Army of the Rhine in Germany (from which, first the 7 Armoured Brigade was moved out to Al Jubayl in Saudi-Arabia as part of Operation Granby and later, on 15 November 1990, the force level was increased to an armoured division), conceptual planning for DICS, under a Steering Committee, development of new integrated systems and appropriate hardware, 5-phased trials under ACISA (Army CIS Agency) and finally the deployment of DICS in the combat zone.

The book provides illuminating insight into the multi-functional CIS system for a high-tech war of the future. Illustrative sketches, graphics and tabulated inserts, as also the staff structuring make it a thought-provoking and useful study.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

WARTHOG : Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War. By William A Smallwood, *Washington, Brassey's (US), 1993, p. 241, £ 22.00, ISBN 0-02-881021-X*

The book describes the operations of the A-10 during the Gulf War, 1991.

The author interviewed over 100 pilots of A-10 immediately after the war to know their first hand experience. The hangar talks of Fish, Gator, Growth and Fan speed and other Hog divers tell the story of the plane's great achievements and its rise to glory.

WARTHOG is a story of the pilots who flew the A-10 in the Gulf War successfully.

-- Col P K Vasudeva (Retd)

The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law. Ed By Peter Rowe, *London, Routledge, 1993, p. 465, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-415-07520-3*

The international law was of major importance during the Gulf War of 1990-91. All military and other actions were repeatedly justified through reference to international law. This book provides a legal analysis of the conflict, with reference to both international and English law. The 1949 Geneva Convention came into operations between Iraq and Kuwait on 2 August 1990 when the former invaded and subsequently occupied the latter's territory.

The question as to whether the British, Americans and other nationals held hostages between 16 August and 13 December were protected under the Geneva Conventions has been explained by Michael Meyer. It will be interesting to note that the First Additional Protocol 1977 to the Geneva Convention was not binding on Iraq, France, UK and USA as a treaty, since none of these countries were a party to it. Many of the provisions have been discussed reflecting customary international law, by Christopher Greenwood and Francoise Hampson and also by Adam Roberts.

-- Col P K Vasudeva (Retd)

The Gulf Crisis and its Global Aftermath. Ed By Gad Barzilai and Others, *London, Routledge, 1993, p 304, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-415-08002-9*

By invading Iraq on 2nd August 1990, Saddam Hussein delivered a devastating blow to the entire world community by disturbing the established order of the Middle East and due to the resultant oil blockade, economic order of the world. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, it did not visualise the entire world body turning hostile against it including some of its staunch supporters in the Arab world.

The crisis in the Gulf affected many more than the regional players alone. Each one of the chapters of this book deals with a particular facet of the Gulf War written by an expert on the subject. The book covers four main areas; the Middle East proper; Israeli domestic and security concerns; Great power policies and worldwide forces. The purpose has been to focus on various issues involved and thus must be studied by all students of Military History for a thorough understanding of the Gulf War.

-- Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC
(Retd)

The Rickover Effect : How One Man Made a Difference. By Theodore Rockwell, *Annapolis, Naval Institute, 1992, p. 411, \$ 21.95, ISBN 1-55750-702 -3*

This is the story of how one man who believed in himself and in an idea succeeded in changing the world. It is the story of how Admiral Rickover and his team developed nuclear power against all odds in the brief span of ten years.

The account of the humour and fury of this remarkable man, and his incredible ability to get things done, is told to us by Theodore Rockwell, one of his close associates and longtime technical director. He tells what it was like to be with this admirable and dedicated individual day and night as he accomplished his miracles, and why he was bitterly opposed by so many powerful people.

A perusal of the book outlines how Rickover built on the scientific breakthrough of the atomic bomb project, and made nuclear power a reality; how he built the world's first commercial atomic power station, and created the nuclear navy of the United States almost overnight when everyone else thought his dreams were pure fantasy. A testimony to the greatness of the work of this man is that the technological development, and design concepts of nearly all the world's nuclear plants are direct descendants of the Rickover programme.

The book also brings out the systems Rickover devised to educate and foster the pursuit of excellence in his teams of scientists, technicians and designers. His ultimate satisfaction was the success of his system of educating, training, and changing people by making quality, professionalism, and accountability a priority in their lives. This in essence is the 'Rickover Effect'.

An engrossing account of how a dedicated officer fought, and overcame the 'system'.

-- Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Dawn Over Suez : The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957.
By Steven Z. Freiburger, *Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1992, p. 286, \$ 26.50, ISBN 0-929587-83-9*

This book makes startling revelations regarding desire of U.S.A to replace U.K as the dominant power in the Middle East from 1953 onwards. Between 1953 and 1956 in London's view, the greatest obstacle to an agreement over Suez on its terms was not the Egyptian desire for sovereignty and independence but American designs to extend its influence over Egypt and Israel's refusal to hand over Negev desert and Beersheba to Arabs. Americans found in 1955 that the British objectives were far from realities on ground and Eisenhower went to the extent of pressurizing U.K Government to replace Eden from Prime Ministership. The British resented being informed about events in the region by Americans but wished to be consulted.

Pan-Arabism, nationalism and neutralism when suited to them ensured defeat of, first, U.S. perception of flourishing democratic institutions, free trade, national self-determination under "American moral, political and economic leadership" secondly, U.K desire to continue maintaining its dominant and colonial status; and thirdly Soviet's perception of Communization and Sovietization of Middle East.

An interesting book which brings out the overt and covert manipulations of big and small powers on Middle East canvas.

-- Maj General J N Goel

New Perspectives for US-Asia Pacific Security Strategy : The 1991 Pacific Symposium. Ed By Dora Alves, *Washington, National Defence University, 1992, p. 197*

A slim scholarly compilation of the post Cold War US perceptions for Asia-Pacific region, highlights salient features of the future problems & participation of the sovereign nations during the nineties. Regrettably three years have already elapsed between the enunciation of the new perspectives & its review, but elapsed time has substantiated some of the points, projections and predictions made.

The thrust of the symposium is on the denuclearisation of the 'US Umbrella' and self reliance of the nations that enjoyed US patronage/protection. The tensions & threats, treatise & tactics, have already reduced; trusts & tie-ups have secured greater mutual confidence & participation in promoting sustaining regional/global peace.

-- Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Kenneth Clarke. By Malcolm Balen, *London, Fourth Estate, 1994, p. 302, £ 18.99, ISBN 1-85702-206-8*

A biography of the once Chancellor of the British Exchequer who might have a dream mix of qualities needed for political survival in our own arena: bad in maths, combines toughness and unreasonableness, loves roughing people, is untidy and volatile and politics is like sport : 'you survive if you relax and let the adrenalin run'. The biographer is a TV news editor and the period is the fall of Mrs M Thatcher. Credits to the Biographer - Mr Clarke comes out of the covers abristle and vinegry. Rather apt chapter quotes add interest to this book of political biography.

From Globalism to Regionalism : New Perspectives on US Foreign and Defence Policies. Ed By Patrick M. Cronin. *Washington, DC, National Defence University, 1993, p. 259*

The end of the cold war caused analysts all over the world to speculate on the shape of things to come in a unipolar world. Scholars of the victorious super-power too had to examine the impact of the change, both in the national and international terms. In 1991 the National Defence University of U.S.A. organised a topical symposium entitled "From Globalism to Regionalism - New Perspectives on U.S. Foreign and Defence Policies", at which the keynote address was delivered by Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Besides Gen. Powell's address the present volume includes some essays based on papers presented at the Symposium and some others specially written for the book. The seven essays included in Part I of the book offer case studies of potential trouble spots in the regions of Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Part II of the book contains six essays contributed by eminent scholars on international and transnational dimensions of security including America's role in the post Cold War world. The contributions of Professors W.W. Rostow, N. Eberstadt, Patrick Cronin and William Woodruff are of special interest. This book should prove a very useful addition to the U.S.I. Library.

-- J P Sharma

Former Additional Secretary to the Government

The Chinese at the Negotiating Table : Style and Characteristics. By Alfred D. Wilhelm, JR., *Washington, National Defence University 1994, p.281, ISBN 0-16-035888-4*

It is generally acknowledged that in international parleys the Chinese have a distinctive diplomatic negotiating style. This book in the main talks of the US experience in this regard. The author is of the view that if the underlying characteristics which influence Chinese attitudes during negotiations are understood, then the process of dialogue with the Chinese would not be as trying as it has often tended to be.

The Chinese belief is that negotiations are a form of struggle and conflict situations are bargaining premises. The consistency is on the principle of equality. In this context Chinese intransigence often stems from the parallels of historical humiliations heaped on China by the Western World in the past. One US observer describes that the negotiator could either be a messenger or a mediator depending on what sort of a position the Chinese government wants to take at a particular time. Only if the representative is a mediator can there be a possibility of compromise. There is of course a great deal of frustration because of the differing political cultures of the two sides.

The author feels that though scenarios may have changed, the tactics and techniques of the Chinese have remained the same though there may be some adaptations on accommodation on the basis of lessons learnt. The latest round of trade negotiations with the US is a classic case in point.

Though this book recounts the US exchanges at various fora, the conclusions drawn could serve as a useful guide to our mandarins in the foreign office.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

China in the World Economy. By Nicholas R. Lardy, *Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1994, p. 156, 16.95, ISBN 0-88132-200-8*

Ever since the Chinese adopted an open door policy of foreign investments and privatisation for their economic development, the whole world has been wanting to ascertain its effects because till recently the Communist China had been having all industrial establishment under state control. The Chinese have been living under tight state control for the past four decades or so. Under such circumstances, the transition from a state owned industry to a free foreign enterprises was fraught with many dangers and pitfalls. However, the Chinese have shown great resilience and managed to combat internal dissensions enabling them to encourage more and more collaborations for industrial development for acquisition of the latest state-of-the-art technology.

This book examines the implications of China's emergence as a major player in the world economy. Its integration into the international economic order poses major difficulties for the rest of the world, bringing China's mixed market/centrally planned economy into the GATT, adapting to competition from labour intensive Chinese exports, encouraging further market-oriented reforms and accommodating its demand for international capital. But China's global participation also offers important opportunities for trade, investment, and international cooperation to promote world peace and stability.

-- Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Storm from the East : From Genghis Khan to Khubilai Khan. By Robert Marshall, *London, BBC Books, 1993, p. 256, £ 17.99, ISBN 0-563-36338-X*

Robert Marshall has to his credit some of the most stunning documentaries the BBC has televised. On such serial, 'Storm From the East' recorded the steppes of the nomadic barbarian, Genghis Khan and amazing mongol conquests, forging for the first time the idea of a one World government.

Battles and events described in crisp clear prose, shorn of hyperbole lend to the book a clear clinical quality, improved much both by period paintings and today's camera. It is not hard to accept Genghis Khan as one of the greatest Generals and administrators when one notices that he forbade urinating and washing in rivers (in the 13th Century!) our own minions can neither legislate against nor enforce! A delightful book worth every penny.

— Col Balwant Sandhu

The Media and the Gulf War. Ed by Hedrick Smith, *Washington, Seven Locks, 1992, p. 438, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-932020-99-2*

There is no gainsaying the fact that 'media-military relations' is not only a topical subject but requires much more attention than it has received in the past. It is gratifying to note, therefore, that the Services have become increasingly aware of its importance and now not only have dedicated staff for the purpose but also participate in seminars and so on, where they can inter-act with the modern, all-prevading media.

The Gulf War, as the most recent, extant example of such inter-action is obviously worth studying by both sides. The compilation of articles under review - by an eminent writer, journalist and correspondent - could well be regarded as mandatory

reading, giving as it does the views of prominent personalities in the media (Walter Cronkite, Peter Arnett, Thomas Lippman et al), the military (Lt Gen Thomas Kelly of the daily briefings fame, among several others), the government (Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, Senators and Representatives) and even the judiciary (as judgment in a court case). Also of particular interest are the media management measures like pre-determined guidelines, pool system, periodical briefings and speedy censorship.

In simplistic terms, common ground has to be found between the two cultures, both of which have individuals who are "idealistic, bright, totally dedicated, technically proficient, willing to work long hours under arduous conditions, crave recognition, have strained family life and feel they are underpaid", but are widely divergent in their aims. The book suggests the need to narrow the gap by laying down mutually acceptable ground rules so that our operational success is not jeopardised, especially in the key areas of morale and secrecy. Indeed, it would be wise to "carry" the media to our advantage, as news nowadays is not only real time but also visual and available to all our families and civilians back home.

— Maj Gen M M Rai, AVSM (Retd)

The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955. By Aryeh Shalev, *Jerusalem, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies*, 1993, p. 255, £ 23.50, (JCSS Study No. 21), ISBN 965-459-006-9.

The Arab-Israel conflict which remained at the centre-stage of the international politics for over 45 years is coming to an amicable end, very few of us know the grassroot issues which became the major cause leading to the subsequent conflicts in that region. For the benefit of readers interested in this subject, this book provides an archival account of the era in which Israel and Syria got into serious business under the Armistice Agreement to resolve the issues which came up following the War of Independence of Israel.

Though the study deals with the 50 years old issue, yet it has relevance in the Third World scenario and highlights that any vagueness in drafting such accords and ineffective monitoring could lead to an avoidable disaster and increased confrontation between two nations.

— Col Ramesh Davesar

Summing Up : An Autobiography. By Yitzhak Shamir, *London, Weidenfeld*, 1994, p. 276, £ 19.99, ISBN 0-297-81337-4

Yitzhak Shamir's autobiography is an interesting account of the birth of Israel and its quest for survival. Having seen his family wiped out, it is but natural for him to exclaim right at the beginning, "I cannot forget and will never forgive". Shamir is critical of the Bernadotte Plan of 1948, and his involvement with Mossad gives an insight into the formidable Israeli Secret Service and its relentless pursuit of enemies of the state. The destruction of Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq is a striking example of "action first and then dialogue from a superior bargaining position". The book also elaborates on Israeli politics - the division amongst European and Sephardic - Oriental Jews, horse - trading between parties, the influence of American Jews in military and economic aid, etc. Overall, an interesting reading.

— Col Valmiki Katju (Retd)

The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. By Heather Deegan, *Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 152, \$ 15.95. ISBN 1-55587-455-X*

The author opined that the rule of law and the democratisation process in the Middle East are distant possibilities. The indications of democracy - political parties elections, rights and duties of citizen and secularism and opposition are not present in all countries in the correct measure which are again moulded by the histories of these countries and their present state of affluence. The author goes on to enumerate commonalities and peculiarities of these nation-states and the evolution of the present form of governments vis-a-vis the development of democracy there. The monarchical Jordan faces the problem of rising indebtedness - increasing unemployment and potential political polarisation. The end of Cold War and the nearing outcome of the Arab-Israeli dispute may usher in an era of democracy. The problem of the rentier state Kuwait emanates from demographic composition, citizenship and political rights. Theocratic Iran has a one party democracy and concedes no opposition which is equally essential for a real democracy. Israel on the other hand is a multi party pluralistic state based on the basic minimum denominator characterised by Self Survival. The confessional Lebanon has survived a Civil War thrust upon it due external penetration consequent to the Arab Israeli conflict and has come out with its own brand of democracy admirably with coups and counter coups and revolutions around.

The process of democratisation is on. Despite the "guarded" negativism of the author, the advance of time will witness the enthrallment of democracy in the Middle East in stages - Islamised, liberalised and then 'Secularised'.

The maps, statistical diagrams/tables and demographic data coupled with notes, references and index have enhanced the usefulness and understandability of the treatise.

The book is interesting from the beginning to the end and is recommended to those who wish to understand the Middle East countries in the right perspective and their march into the 21st century democratic globalisation.

— Air Cmde SK Bhardwaj (Retd)

Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel. By Raphael Israeli, *London, Brassey's (UK), 1993, p. 203, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-08-041793-0*

The creation of the Jewish State of Israel in 1948, the defeats it successively inflicted on its Arab neighbours and the aggressive and provocative stance it has taken on several issues like Jerusalem and Jewish Settlements in occupied Territories have contributed very significantly to the rise of fundamentalism in the Muslim World. In the initial stages, opposition to Israel was predominantly based on Arab nationalism. With the end of the Nasser era, Islamism gradually became the most serious threat to Israel.

Besides being surrounded by hostile Muslim populations in its neighbouring countries and the occupied Territories, Israel has a sizeable Muslim population of its own - estimated at 15% in 1993 and growing much faster than the Jewish majority. The situation of Israeli Muslims is singularly unfortunate. The loss of their original country is compounded by the humiliation of having to live as nominal citizens of a Jewish state, whose ideology they cannot accept. While Israeli Muslims remained

generally quiescent till the seventies, the successful Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Intifada in the Occupied Territories brought about a sea change. In the Elections of 1989, young hardline Islamists were elected mayors of several towns and immediately started implementing the fundamentalist programme in their respective areas.

In this short volume the author traces the origins and development of the Muslim fundamentalist movement within the territory of Israel and highlights the most intractable domestic problem that Israel will have to face for a long long time.

— J.P. Sharma

Former Additional Secretary to the Government.

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. By Anthony H. Cordesman, London, Brassey's (UK), 1991, p. 224, £ 26.50, ISBN 0-08-040989-X

Recent decades have witnessed some gruesome conflicts between societies and nations in North Africa and the Middle East, including effective use of chemical weapons - by Iraq against Iran and the Kurd rebels, and by Russia in Afghanistan. There has also been a gross - frantic and covert acquisition and development of arms, missiles and non-conventional weapon technology by the Third World countries.

To arrive at the consequent threat to global peace and any effort by external powers to contain or neutralise the same, the author - Anthony Cordesman, has reviewed this portentous trend, the compulsions and motives of the concerned regimes, and the impact of this indulgence on the economy of the Arab nations. He has also discussed the fallibility of monitoring and control of arms/technology proliferation by international authority here-to-fore, to suggest some viable modus operandi for the future. He has rightly pointed out the risk of such high-kill capability in the hands of international terrorist organisations, particularly those covertly sponsored by some States.

Highly educative with capsuled statistical data and inherently thought provoking, the book commends itself for study by inquisitive readers as well as State institutions concerned with National Security.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. By Mark Tessler, Bloomington, Indiana University, 1994, p. 906, \$ 27.50, ISBN 0-253-20873-4

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has captured the imagination of the world and defies solution. For conflict resolution both the contenders have to make a distinction between compromise and capitulation. For one of the belligerents it is the promised land of Abraham while the same patriarch, Hazrat Ibrahim, is also recognized as the ancestor of the other. It is as if God himself sowed the seeds of animosity. Besides mythology, the author traces the early migration of Jews to Russian pogroms in 1881 and Zionism movement led by Theodor Herzl for the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine. To further complicate matters, after World War I, the British felt their own interests precluded an improvement of Arab-Jewish relations and they colluded with France to prevent Arab unity and used Zionism as a vehicle to facilitate their own entry into Palestine. This paved the way for the Balfour Declaration and the presentation of a White Paper on Palestine, with the two salient features, one the acceptance of a Jewish home in Palestine and two, the British would govern the mandate with the help of indigenous legislative council of Jews, Arabs and Christians.

Professor Tessler has carried out exhaustive research and marshalled all the data in a logical sequence. With his deep knowledge of the subject, it would have been interesting to read a chapter on his views on how to break the impasse and reach a permanent solution acceptable to both the parties, even if they were imaginative but feasible. For, after all, diplomacy has failed to make real headway since the last fifty years, and it is worth trying for preventing further tension in the Middle East.

A well-documented book, with detailed maps, it provides the reader with all the facts of Arab-Israeli conflict and the aspirations of the Palestinian and Jewish communities.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd)

Approaches to the History of the Middle East : Interviews with Leading Middle East Historians. Ed by Nancy Elizabeth Gallagher, *Reading, Ithaca Press, 1994. p. 197, £ 24.95, ISBN 0-86372-185-0*

The approaches to understand and analyse the socio-economic and political history of the Middle East have progressed through never-ending debates among the scholars. A search for objectivity in the Middle East studies have generated sharp criticism of the traditional Orientalist methodologies. Revisionist suggestions are being increasingly adhered to. Since a historian is a product of his socio-political environment and his work is greatly influenced by his own values, attitudes and belief systems, many feel that they should explain "themselves" first.

In an attempt to facilitate the understanding on Middle East historiographical evolution, Nancy Gallagher has interviewed eight leading Middle East historians. They have talked about their backgrounds, experiences, academic influences, their initiation into the field of study and consequent developments.

Any inquisitive Middle East reader will find the book useful in many respects.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar

Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment. Ed by Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite, *Boulder, Westview 1994, p. 253, \$ 39.00, ISBN 0-8133-2221-9*

The quest for a durable peace in the Middle East necessitates a comprehensive, multi-pronged approach. Arms control as a means of ensuring security and stability is a relatively contemporary development. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University (Israel) organised a conference in January 1992 to probe into various aspects of arms control in the context of the Middle East primarily for the benefit of Israel's policy elite. A collection of the papers presented at the conference now in a book form caters to wider readership.

Continuing arms race in the region, threat perceptions of the Arabs and the Israelis, the nuclear issue, possibility of arms control and lessons from the experiences of other actors beyond the area have been discussed. The papers are not purely academic but very much dependent on the personal evaluation, understanding and beliefs and values of the participants. That the inductive factors of arms control in the Middle East are weak - is perhaps the inevitable conclusion.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar

Latin America Between The Second World War and The Cold War 1944-1948. Ed By Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, *Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1992, p 350, £ 30, ISBN 0-521-43032 1*

The book is composed of a series of essays, by experts, on each of the eleven Latin America Republics. The book is intelligently introduced by Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough. Leslie Bethell a Professor of Latin American History at the Institute of Latin America Studies, University of London and also the editor of the Cambridge History of America - has written about Brazil. Roxborough is a Professor of Sociology and History at the State University of New York and an expert on Mexico. These two have also written the concluding chapter in the book.

Besides language and social customs what the countries have in common is that each of them passed through a period of dictatorship, communism, democracy, back to dictatorship and so on. The only truly communist country till date is Cuba. The USA has been trying hard and played a crucial role in installing democratic norms in the Republics; not always with success. El Salvador Dictator was overthrown in May 1944; however, the election in October the same year was aborted and back came the Dictator.

A well researched book from the historical, economic and political point of view. A useful addition to any library.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Wellington and Napoleon : Clash of Arms 1807-1815. By Robin Neillands, *London, John Murray, 1994, p. 264, £ 19.99, ISBN 0-7195-5151-X*

This is a story of two great warriors, one a Corsican and the other an Irishman. Napoleon was a strategist, a warlord, a man of vision who propagated the concept of one United Europe with its Capital at Paris, whereas Wellington was a superb tactician, a cautious pragmatist and an excellent administrator where logistics were concerned. The magic of Napoleon's name, charisma of his presence and weight of his prestige saved the French from annihilation during the retreat from Moscow from 19th October, 1812 as Russian Generals Wittgenstein, Tschitschagov and Kutusov were afraid and reluctant to come closer to the French Emperor. This charisma resulted in notorious lack of confidence in Prussian C-in-C Marshal Bluchar and Austrian Supreme Commander Prince Schwarzenberg throughout Napoleonic Wars. The shouts of "Vive L'Empreur" by Frenchman announcing Napoleon's presence on the battlefield trembled the knees of his adversaries. Out of sixty battles, Napoleon lost only two, Leipzig in October 1813 and Waterloo in June 1815 resulting in his exile to Elba and St Helena respectively.

Wellington learnt the art of command from ground upwards in India. His campaigns in Spain and Portugal brought home the importance of logistics and about campaigning in a hostile environment. Being a member of Parliament since 1790, he used the knowledge of Westminster to his advantage. Wellington said that "his (Napoleon's) presence on the battlefield is worth 40,000 men". A great tribute to an opponent, interalia, it shows the greatness of Wellington.

An interesting book worth reading.

-- Maj Gen J N Goel

Between Mutiny and Obedience : The Case of The French Fifth Infantry Division During World War I. By Leonard V Smith, Princeton, *Princeton Univ*, 1994, p. 274, £ 30.00, ISBN 0-691-03304-8

Over the turn of the nineteenth century, the conscript and politicised soldiery of Republican France, and the army hierarchy living down the public criticism consequent to the Dreyfus episode, were not fully primed for the battlefields of World War I. The strength and weaknesses of such a fighting force and the responses of citizen soldiers to the dictates of military authority are the underlying theme of the book under review. As the author observes - "By definition, the citizen soldier will not entirely relinquish the rights of the citizen. Authority and obedience will be thus constantly subject to questioning and negotiation from below".

The French Fifth Infantry Division, whose battle record vacillated grotesquely between ignominy and glory has been adopted by the author as the subject of a clinical case-study.

After a critical discussion of theories of social interaction, authority versus military obedience and of internal conflicts inherent in war setting, the author builds-up factual accounts of successive actions fought by the elements of the Division. Drawing extensively upon first-hand observations and comments/official reports by participants/survivors, the author has projected the human factor in each win/lose situation throughout the five gruelling years of the war in France.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

War and Reform : British Politics During the Second World War. Ed By Kevin Jefferys, Manchester, *Manchester Univ*, 1994, p. 170, £ 29.99, ISBN 0-7190-3971-1

Two World Wars in the 20th century brought about more changes for the mankind globally in Science & Technology, Socio-Economic & Geostrategic spheres than any other event in its entire history.

This thin volume throws light on almost every aspect of British Politics during the war years, the roots of the problems no doubt dating much before the out-break of the war. The layout of the information lends itself to quick reference; the language being un-ambiguous is easily comprehensible; the source material for additional information is mentioned side by side.

The information is absorbingly interesting, more so where it is 'off the record'. It is interesting to know that briefing the Air Marshals was considered as a 'course of life' (page-57) even during the war days wherein Air Power/Warfare was the decisive factor in achieving 'victory'. Almost every page makes it a nostalgic reading catapulting the mind to our school/college days newspaper headlines/radio broadcasts.

-- Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Genesis of The French Revolution : A Global-Historical Interpretation. By Bailey Stone, Cambridge, *Cambridge Univ*, 1994, p. 268, \$ 49.95, ISBN 0-521-44570-1

Louis XVI and his Government's grandiose vision of domination of geo-strategic spheres on European continent against Prussians and Catherine the Great, Tsarina

of the Romanov empire and over high seas against the "nation of shopkeepers" simultaneously could not be fulfilled because of royal bankruptcy, insistence on adherence to various privileges by the clergy and the nobles including those nobles who had purchased nobility - a custom then in vogue. This was coupled with the socio-political-absolutist-attitude by the Sun God himself both in domestic and foreign policy objective, denial of power to the representatives of the masses and dismal mismanagement of fiscal policy which in turn not only sowed the seeds of revolution but also fructified it.

Were international forces responsible for socio-political changes within Bourbon France? Yes, and the author analyses these international forces and their repercussions on France of 1780s in great detail.

An erudite presentation of the genesis of French Revolution from a different angle.

-- Maj General J N Goel

Central and Eastern Europe : The Challenge of Transition. Ed By Regina Cowen Karp, *Oxford, Oxford University, 1993, p. 322, ISBN 0-19-829169-8*

The demise of Communism in the erstwhile Soviet Union and Central and East European countries has led to a flood of literature analysing as to why this came about and what the future shape of things could be.

The book under review sets out the challenges and uncertainties stemming from the ferment in the ex-Communist states of Europe. The book focuses on the social, political, economic and security developments and points out that many of the present day problems have their origin from age-old ethnic, religious and linguistic divides of history and geography. The countries are discussed collectively as well as individually through essays by scholars associated with SIPRI. These are undoubtedly the product of not only deep research but outstanding scholarship. The great merit of the essays is that authors have not hesitated from making forecasts on likely developments. Though the book was published in 1993, much of what has happened since substantiates the prognosis made.

A volume which will indeed enrich the social scientists and more particularly students of geo-politics.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Fragile Lives : Violence, Power and Solidarity in Eighteenth-Century Paris. By Arlette Farge, tr by Carol Shelton, *Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993, p. 314, £ 13.95, ISBN 0-7456-1243-1*

Translated from the French, "La vie Fragile" (Pub. 1986) the book records the violence, power and solidarity in the eighteenth century Paris.

Its sources are the city archives - municipal, records, documents, fragments and cuttings of the period. From these emerges the life of a city, the ways, mores, loves, quarrels, roits, theivery, prostitution; One journeys as across a peepshow, obliquely looking at life of its citizenry. It is not a definitive work on the urban mores nor is it a social history of the age of Enlightenment. The author manages to challenge our

concept of the everyday life based on sources of historical, racial bias. An unusual book of flowing prose that is a delight to read.

-- Colonel Balwant Sandhu

War Diary. By Hugh Dormer, Kent, Fisher Press, 1994, p. 142, £ 7.99, ISBN 1-874037-11-6

Most published accounts dealing with clandestine operations tend to romanticise the subject. Not so this authentic first hand account gleaned from the diary and after action reports written by Hugh Dormer of his two sojourns in occupied France during World War II in 1943-44. He led raiding parties, the first unsuccessfully, to destroy the largest shale oil manufacturing plant in France which must have hampered the German war effort to some extent.

His unvarnished account not only gives us an insight into the planning and conduct of such small scale clandestine operations, but also, into the motivations of persons, who volunteer for such special forces. The accounts of his travel through occupied France and over the Pyrenees make interesting reading and tell us something about the pressures faced by people on the run and of the prevailing conditions in occupied France.

This book goes on to document his reasons for rejoining his regular Regiment despite the award of a DSO and the offer of a leading role with the Special Operations Executive. It ends abruptly with his account of the Normandy landings and the subsequent armoured break in as he was most unfortunately killed in action while leading an armoured squadron. A good read for the young officers with an interest in the subject of unconventional operations.

-- Col Deepak Sinha

Big Week : The Classic Story of The Crucial Air Battle of WW II. By Glenn Infield, Virginia, Brassy's (US), 1993, p. 125, \$ 15.00, ISBN 0-02-881068-6

The book describes the thousand bomber raids against Germany during World War II. Read the book to know why the bomber raids were important and the 'Big Week' was the crucial period beyond which the Luftwaffe just buckled. 20 February to 25 February 1944 was the 'Big week'.

A well written book by Glenn Infield; it makes good reading and is an authentic account of Bomber operations. It was imperative that Air Superiority be obtained for "Operation War Lord" - the counter offensive in Europe. This task fell squarely on the shoulders of Britain's Bomber Command and the United States Eighth and the Fifteenth Air Forces. The task was in fact to destroy the Luftwaffe in the air and on the ground. Priority targets and aims were laid down. The battles were bitter and fiercely fought, finally achieving the aim.

-- Group Capt D Yadav, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Barrack-Room Ballads of Rudyard Kipling. Ed by John Whitehead, Shropshire, Hearthstone 1995, p. 167, £ 9.50

This is a truly splendid edition of the Barrack-Room Ballads, approximately one hundred years after they commenced appearing. The first collation appeared in 1892,

and the second in 1896. The introduction is evocative, and the notes quite definitive, both by John Whitehead, a WW II officer in the Marathas. As is known Joseph Rudyard Kipling was born in Bombay in 1865, where his father, at the time, was a professor in the Sir J.J. School of Art, which still exists, his mother's elder sister being married to the painter Edward Burne-Jones. The second Christian name, Rudyard, was chosen after a lake in Staffordshire, where his parents had first been introduced at a picnic. Sent to Britain in his seventh year, after a happy childhood, by the time he returned, aged seventeen, his father was Curator of the Lahore Museum and Principal of the School of Art there. When Kipling returned, he first became a journalist of the Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, and then on *The Pioneer* of Allahabad and Lucknow, thus becoming well acquainted with northern India. In 1890 the first Ballad that appeared was the haunting 'Danny Deever', written when Kipling was twenty-four, describing the ceremonial hanging of a private soldier who had shot a sleeping comrade.

TS Eliot had described this Ballad as 'a poem which is technically (as well as in content) remarkable'. What comes out in these Ballads is Kipling's message that 'the backbone of the Army is the non-commissioned man', the officers coming across as ineffective. Kipling himself had never heard a shot fired in anger, though soldiers and soldiering provided him with inexhaustible materials. Nonetheless death is never remote as the numerous cemeteries in India bear witness. As Kipling records 'We have got to die somewhere, some way, some 'ow/We might as well begin to do it now.' It will always be a matter for some regret that Kipling did not portray Indian troops as well in some of his memorable Ballads, often composed with the inspiration 'If you've eard the East a-callin', you won't never 'eed naught else', vividly describing temples, peacocks, parrots, monkeys roadside trees, kites wheeling overhead and brainfever birds. This centenary edition is verily an inspired publication, revivifying the potent magic of these Ballads.

-- Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC

A Peace Agenda for Indian Foreign Policy. By ML Sondhi and Shrikant Paranjpe, *New Delhi, Har -Anand Publications, 1995, p. 69, Rs 125/-, ISBN 81-241-0292-9*

When one speaks of a peace agenda for foreign policy in India-as done by Prof Sondhi and Dr Paranjpe in this booklet - one is reminded of the Panchsheel. One begins to imagine if the authors were trying to resurrect that somewhat abstract exercise in foreign policy of the Nehru days. Not really. For, as one goes through the book it begins to unfold ideas and concepts - in outline, indeed - of a foreign policy model for the 21st century.

No foreign policy is effective without adequate strength behind it. So is the security. It is the strength with its nuances that the world has respected from time immemorial; so shall it do in future. This strength generates interalia from internal cohesiveness, an efficient system of governance, first class defence forces and a people with a will to sacrifice for the nation. The essence, therefore, is strength at home so that it is felt and applied through purposeful diplomacy, outside.

The authors examine the larger dimension of security vis-a-vis future policy of India. National integration figures first. They proffer "national dialogue" on issues

like J&K. Understand the cultural background and apply a via media of "Art 370 and example of the Darjeeling Hill State", they suggest.

Globalisation of economy inevitably follows (not in the same sequence). They warn not to follow the Mexican type of experimentation! NPT was a hot topic then and the authors have offered some useful clues to view the issue pragmatically. Unilateral extension of the NPT over which India and her likes demurred have left us twiddling our thumbs; but its ramification has to be watched. That's where their recommendations perhaps remain valid. Organisations like SAARC, though doubtful of its ability to handle conflicts such as J&K, should, in due course, develop and promote "concrete measures for regional security and peace".

India is known from the olden days to be a reservoir of spiritualism; it should now, in the words of the authors, "promote arms control and confidence building through non-offensive military strategies". A big task indeed but hopefully India would be able to generate adequate base for it and solve some of the bickering problems like Kashmir!

Following a fixed format where every agenda is discussed with recommendations, the booklet stimulates thought on issues relevant and futuristic. Fresh and even visionary, it is a welcome addition to the prodigious field of diplomacy.

-- Brig Chandra B Khanduri
Sr Fellow ICHR

The Indian Air Force : Trends and Prospects. By George K. Tanham & Marcy Agmon, *Santa Monica, Rand, 1995, p. 106, ISBN 0-8330-1556-7*

The Authors have done a remarkably good assessment of the IAF considering that no real official documents were available to them and most of the observations come from interviews with retired Air Marshals, to some extent a reflection on them for they were in the seat of power which could have been exercised, most important of which was the disinclination to face the Politico-Bureaucratic combine.

The authors take you through the Air Force History necessarily limited to an overview in the absence of official historical information - 1947, 1962 and 1971 Wars, induction of aircraft and various systems. The failures are reasonably well brought out. Surprisingly this research has been carried out under contract of the USAF. Perhaps a similar study by our own people could clearly spell out what needs to be done to prove the authors wrong at the turn of the century. MOD surely needs to read this book. It is well written and documented leaving no doubts of the failures in the past. Will our present leadership be able to take corrective actions?

-- Group Capt D Yadav, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Indian Ocean : A History of People and the Sea. By Kenneth McPherson, *Delhi, Oxford, 1993, p. 318, Rs 350/-, ISBN 0 19 563374 1*

A fascinating story of the Indian Ocean and its people by Kenneth McPherson whose own family history is closely linked with the region.

It is a chronicle about the people who have inhabited the shores of the Indian

Ocean from the earliest times to the present era. It paints refreshing pictures for the reader - whatever his interest. History, geography, sociology, economics, politics, warfare, religion, trade, commerce and maritime technology are skilfully interwoven to present an enchanting story. McPherson skilfully handles the narrative by bringing to life a kaleidoscopic view of events as they unfold with time. The canvas is wide, and illustrates how the ocean has influenced the worlds oldest civilizations i.e. the Phoenicians, the Persians, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Indus Valley civilizations, the Chinese and also the lesser known nation states that flowered and flourished at that time.

The book throws up interesting linkages between the Indian Ocean and the rise and fall of important powers that fringe it's shores. The questions that need to be answered are - what are we doing in this era of commercial imperialism to enlarge our maritime fleet, to improve our port facilities, and strengthen our navy?

An authoritative and engrossing narrative illustrated with interesting maps which should hold the readers interest from start to finish.

-- Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Restructured Indian Economy in Global Setting. By Prof TN Rastogi, *New Delhi, Anmol Publications, 1994, p. 130, Rs 150/-, ISBN 81-7041-975-1*

The beginning of a turn-around of the Indian economy took place rapidly after the introduction of structural adjustment into programme as part of the Economic Reforms through the New Economic Policy announced by the Government of India in 1991 (NEP 91). Policy changes have been directed towards freeing industrial development from the shackles of administered control. Post liberalisation phase in gaining momentum at a fast pace. Government policies which controlled the industrial development and foreign investments are going through wide ranging transformations.

Industrial modernisation especially the creation of internationally competitive industries requires a massive expansion and qualitative improvement in infrastructure. With the introduction of NEP 91, multinational companies from abroad are competing against each other for seeking an entry into the Indian market.

Prof. T.N. Rastogi has portrayed the profile of the emerging Indian economy in the global context. It is an excellent exposition of the philosophy to accelerate the growth of the Indian economy in keeping with the international economic atmosphere. It is a pioneering book which will be useful not only to planners, administrators, politicians, diplomats but also to academics in pursuit of learning the new economic order.

-- Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Hindoo Holiday : An Indian Journal. By JR Ackerley, *London, Penguin, 1960, p. 276, £ 6.99, ISBN 0-14-018794-4*

This book was first published in 1932. The second edition came out in 1952. The book is based on the experience of the author's visit to India, for five months, in 1923, when he served as Private Secretary to a Maharaja of a princely state. He was a friend of E.M. Forster, who influenced him to visit India.

It is another story of the days of the Raj & typically glorifies the British Empire; has a dig at the poverty, superstitions and peculiar customs/practices of the Indian people, as seen through his eyes, in the short period of a few months. He also records idiosyncracies of the Maharajas and no doubt the British would have found these funny and humorous, at that time.

The book has very limited value today and is unlikely to be popular with the reader in general.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

Four Decades of Indo-U.S. Relations : A Commemorative Retrospective. Ed By AP Rana, *New Delhi, Har-Anand, 1994, p. 296, Rs. 395/-, ISBN 81-241-0156-6*

After the Cold War, Indo-US relations are on the upswing. This development is of great importance to both countries, as also, for peace and stability in the world.

The fortieth anniversary of the Fulbright program was celebrated by USEFI (United States Educational Foundation in India), by hosting a binational conference of distinguished scholars from both countries on the theme of "History of Indo-US relations during the last four decades".

The papers collected in this volume are the outcome of these deliberations. The papers are thought provoking and well researched and though the focus is on the past, the concern in equal measure, is of the future.

The contents of this book are topical, important and of great interest to the thinking people of both countries.

The book is highly recommended.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

The Arms Trade and Medium Powers : Case Studies of India and Pakistan 1947-90. By Ian Anthony, *New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 216, \$ 72.00, ISBN 0-7450-0529-2*

The title of the book tended to suggest that it would perhaps reveal the behind the scene goings on between governments and arms vendors on sale of weapons systems to countries like India and Pakistan and on which there was a great deal of controversy in India in the late 1980s. It is however, a straight forward comparative account of weapon acquisitions by the two countries which resulted in the ORBATs obtaining by the end of the eighties.

The book is well researched and according to the author, militarily India has a significant superiority over Pakistan. He is also of the view that while India has an institutionalised weapons acquisition process and a semblance of defence planning which is documented, in the case of Pakistan the system and processes are obscure and much less transparent.

The author questions India's claim that it can be self reliant in advanced sophisticated systems and is not surprised that projects like MBT, LCA, ALH have been false

markers. Even on screw driver technology of licence production, the author says that the Services were being short changed as they had to pay twice as much for indigenous examples in comparison to imported copies.

The book also contains a chapter on Nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan and this should be of particular interest to NPT buffs whose number is ever expanding in India.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Lt Gen PS Bhagat, PVSM, VC : A Biography. By Lt Gen M Thomas and Jasjit Man Singh, *New Delhi, Lancer International, 1994, p. 517, Rs. 450/-, ISBN 1 897829 60 4*

Gen Prem Bhagat was a highly decorated and popular leader who is remembered most for his charismatic leadership, his relentless pursuit for excellence in everything he undertook and for the great dignity he bestowed on his subordinates. He is perhaps one of the best exponents of the truth that loyalty is a two way street. A biography of such an effective leader who functioned during the crucial formative years of our Army in the period immediately following our independence should both be a record of the eventful period and a source of inspiration for successive generations of young officers.

The authors have carried out extensive research and have contacted many senior and junior army officers who had interacted with Gen Bhagat during his service. Yet, the book has failed to rise above the mundane; it provides neither a useful record of contemporary events nor does it rise to level where it could enthuse or inspire generations of young officers to follow.

-- Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff : The Role of the United States. By P.R. Chari, *New Delhi, Manohar 1995, p 256, Rs. 350/-, ISBN 81 7304 110 5*

Issues relating to Nuclear Non-proliferation have figured prominently in our media and an indefinite extension of the NPT has been legitimised by the world community at a recent conference, despite the opposition of some Third World countries including India. Even before the ink has dried on the Agreement reached at the conference, China had conducted a nuclear test and France has announced her intention to resume a new series of tests. Even within the US, there is a lobby which advocates resumption of limited low-yield tests. All these proclaim in unambiguous terms the arrogance of the 'Nuclear Haves' and their determination to retain their monopoly of weapons of mass destruction.

Both India and Pakistan have refrained from falling in line, obviously for different reasons. PR Chari's book under review which clarifies the respective stands is, therefore, most opportune. The book is a well researched and balanced analysis of the postures and pronouncements of India, Pakistan and the USA and offers with commendable clarity the rationale for the postures adopted by India and Pakistan. It also brings out clearly how American efforts to equate India and Pakistan were dictated by her political and strategic perceptions which have fluctuated with the changing international equations.

Hitherto, American efforts to contain the nuclear standoff in South Asia have persistently been at a bilateral level, by imposing a constraints and denials regime. The Author avers that the expanding web of dual purpose technology that has equal military and civilian applications renders constraints on the transfer of nuclear and missile related technology virtually impossible to implement. He further avers that besides the direct bilateral approach, there are several indirect approaches such as pressing for unilateral undertakings of say, 'not to conduct weapon tests' or 'not to be the first to use nuclear weapons', or other regional solutions for defusing the situation through organisations like SAARC, or even through international initiatives for enhancing regional security and stability.

Altogether, the book is a balanced and unbiased analysis presented with commendable clarity and lucidity of expression.

-- Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Air Power : A Concise History by Robin Higham Third Edition 1988, *Manhattan, Sunflower University Press, p 204, \$ 18.95 ISBN 0-89745-115-5*

The author, a Second World War pilot, and a military historian of repute, has published several well-known books, dealing mainly with air power. The present revised edition of the book under review, originally published in 1972, is a panoramic presentation of the origins of air power in the early years of this century, its rapid growth during the First and Second World Wars, and finally, its apotheosis in the jet and aerospace age armed with precision guided weapons, and electronic warfare systems.

The book contains a large number of excellent photographs of the First and Second World Wars and ends with a comprehensive bibliography which would be of immense value to research scholars working on air power.

- N B S

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending June 1995

*(The books reviewed in Oct-Dec 1994 issue have been added
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| 1. Gandhi, SS (Ed) | India's Highest Gallantry Awards
and Men who won them 1947-1995 | 1995 |
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Biography

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| 2. Gilbert, David | Curzon | 1994 |
| 3. Ranbir Singh (Gp Capt) | Footprints of Courage in the
Sands of Time | 1995 |
| 4. O'Neill, Robert J | General Giap : Politician and
Strategist. Indian ed. | 1995 |
| 5. Seshan, TN | A Heart Full of Burden | 1995 |
| 6. Nanda, BR (ed) | Mahatma Gandhi 125 Years :
Remembering Gandhi; Understanding
Gandhi: Relevance of Gandhi | 1995 |
| 7. Kaul, TN | My Years Through Raj to Swaraj | 1995 |
| 8. Dutta, Krishna and
Robinson Andrew | Rabindra Nath Tagore :
The Myriad-Minded Man | 1995 |
| 9. Malhotra, SS
(Air Vice Marshal) | Winged Memories | 1995 |
| 10. Pradhan, RD | Working with Rajiv Gandhi | 1995 |

Democracy

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| 11. Alexander, PC (Dr) | The Perils of Democracy | 1995 |
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Germany

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| 12. Fritzsche, Peter | A Nation of Fliers : German Aviation
and the Popular Imagination | 1992 |
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Hong Kong - Politics & Government

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| 13. Roberti, Mark | The Fall of Hong Kong : China's
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India - Bangladesh Relations

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| 14. Ghosh, Suchita | China - Bangladesh - India Tangle
Today : Towards A Solution? | |
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India - History

15. Chatterji, Joya Bengal Divided : Hindu
Communalism and Partition 1932-1947 1995
16. India, Ministry of India : Bilateral Treaties and
External Affairs Agreements. 6 Vols 1994
17. Das Gupta, Ashin Indian Merchants and the
Decline of Surat C 1700-1750 1994
18. Naqvi, Mushtaq Partition : The Real Story 1995

Indian - Navy

19. Arasaratnam, Sinnappah Maritime India in the
Seventeenth Century 1994

India - Pakistan Relations

20. Jasjit Singh (ed) Pakistan Occupied Kashmir :
Under the Jackboot 1995

Indian Ocean

21. Roy, MK (Vice Adm) War in the Indian Ocean 1995

India - Politics

22. Kashyap, Subhash C. History of the Parliament 1994

India - President

23. Kohli, AB First Citizens of India : Dr Rajendra
Prasad to Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma 1995

Internal Security

24. Sinha, Rajeev Kumar Crimes Affecting State Security :
Problems and Recent Trends 1995

Islam

25. Rai, Baljit Is India Going Islamic? 1994

Kashmir

26. Tavleen Singh Kashmir : A Tragedy of Error 1995
27. Madhok, Bal Raj Kashmir : The Storm Center of the
World 1995

Mizoram

28. Chatterjee, Suhas Mizo Chiefs and the Chiefdom. 1995

National Integration

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| 29. Engineer, Asghar Ali | Lifting the Veil : Communal Violence and Communal Harmony in Contemporary India | 1995 |
| Nepal - History | | |
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| Nuclear Proliferation Treaty | | |
| 32. Alam, Mohammad B.(ed) | Essays on Nuclear Proliferation | 1995 |
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| 35. Vaux, Kenneth L. | Ethics and the Gulf War : Religion Rhetoric and Righteousness | 1992 |
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| US - Foreign Policy | | |
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| Vietnam | | |
| 41. Patti, Archimedes L. | Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross | 1995 |
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
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


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



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
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


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