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- United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Former Yugoslavia - *Lt Gen Satish Nambiar*
AVSM, VrC
- Growing Deployment of the Armed Forces in Aid to Civil Authorities - *Major Akshaya Handa*
- Confidence-Building as a Mechanism of Conflict Resolution: The European Model and its Applicability to South Asia - *Dr TT Poulouse*
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
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EDITORIAL

The United Service Institution of India: New Horizons

On April 26, 1993, General SF Rodrigues, Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, laid the foundation of the new USI Building at New Delhi, in the presence of Admiral L Ramdas, Chief of the Naval Staff and Air Chief Marshal NC Suri, Chief of the Air Staff. Speaking on the occasion, the Army Chief attributed the present excellent state of the USI to the perception, foresight, vision, and deep commitment of late Col Pyara Lal, the former Director of the USI during 1957 - 1987. He praised Maj Gen SC Sinha, the present Director, and his team, for further improving the functioning and image of the USI.

It was only fitting to the event that General Rodrigues performed this ceremony, a landmark in the history of the USI; he had himself conceptualised the framework of the USI Charter, and had, by his efforts, obtained the land and finances for the prestigious project.

The USI was established in 1870, a turning point in modern world history. In India, the British power had become paramount and nationalist feelings had begun to emerge. Outside India, the British suffered very high casualties during the Anglo-Afghan and the Crimean Wars. Fresh thinking was needed to better organise and manage the armed forces. For this purpose, the USI was to provide a forum for creative intellectual activity.

Today, in these times of rapid transformation, there is an urgent need for a strategic reassessment of expanding range of geostrategic choices based on clear-sighted and holistic analysis. To perform this function, the Army Chief announced the formation of a Research Centre for Strategic Studies, at the USI, which would open up new horizons of ratiocinative reflection and articulation and engender a full-fledged "think tank" from its new lodgings, to help-remove what the Army Chief called the "arrogance of ignorance".

DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

This issue contains a set of papers presented during a five-nation conference on global nuclear disarmament, organised by the American Centre, New Delhi. The papers are stimulating and thought provoking and will be of interest to all our readers.

Is There a Road to Peace in South Asia? An American Perspective

PROFESSOR STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN

I would like to thank General Sharma for his kind words of introduction, although I suspect that he may be tougher on me in the summing up! Let me also thank Major-General Sinha and the United Service Institution of India for the invitation to address members of the USI (and guests) today in this historic hall in South Block. I first studied in the USI in Kashmir House almost thirty years ago as a graduate student, and have been the frequent beneficiary of your hospitality ever since. I was pleased to learn yesterday (at the groundbreaking ceremony for the new USI building) that the library would be named after Colonel Pyaralal, whom we remember with great affection and respect.

During his remarks at the ceremony General Rodrigues used the phrase, "arrogance of ignorance," which struck me as especially appropriate in this post Cold-War era. General Rodrigues announced that the new USI building would include a strategic studies centre that would examine the major challenges facing India. He is correct about the need for more and better strategic thinking here, but the same problem exists elsewhere. Living in Delhi for nine months, with frequent trips to Pakistan, and receiving numerous American visitors, I have been struck at how certain *everyone* seems of the truth, but how little hard analysis has actually been done.

For *some Americans* and Europeans the "truth" is that South Asia is on the edge of war, that there is a permanent crisis in the region, and that Indians and Pakistanis need to be coerced into good behaviour. For others who view the region from afar the situation here is so bad that they advise keeping away from the forthcoming disaster.

At the other extreme, in America at least, there is a pro-India group, whose views are epitomized by the recent report of Indo-American relations

Text of a talk delivered by Professor Stephen Philip Cohen, Scholar in Residence, The Ford Foundation, to the members of the USI on April 27, 1993.

The views expressed in this talk are those of Professor Cohen only and not the Ford Foundation or the University of Illinois. Stephen P. Cohen is Professor of History and Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana, and the author of *The Indian Army* (1990), *The Pakistan Army* (1984), and editor of *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control*, among other books. He was Scholar-in-Residence with the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, in 1992-93.

issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although I signed the report, and agree with most of its recommendations, it does have its flaws. It fails to take into account the range of American interests in Pakistan, and I think it gets the cause of regional conflict wrong. The most important cause of conflict in South Asia is that *all* of the regional states, including India, see themselves as threatened and vulnerable. The parallel with the Middle East is striking. I will argue, later, that some of the solutions to the problem of regional insecurity may also lay in the example of the Middle East. The Carnegie report argues that the US should "recognize" India's status as the leading regional power, and should treat India on a par with China. This is a mistake. China is a deeply flawed country, and India has significant advantages, but as long as India must drag Pakistan along behind it, as long as Indian power is equal to India minus Pakistan, India will never emerge from South Asia as a significant state. In fact, American officials recognized India in 1972 as the regional dominant power; but this did not remove India's deep sense of insecurity and distrust of the outside world, and anti-Americanism actually intensified over the next eighteen years.

For some *Pakistanis* -- fortunately a minority -- the truth is that India has proven itself, once again, to be a deceitful neighbour, bent on blaming Pakistan for its own mistakes, for finding the Pakistani or Islamic foreign hand to replace the earlier Chinese foreign hand, and, until recently, the American or Israeli foreign hand. These Pakistanis, again a minority, cite a thousand years of history: they "know" Indians quite well, and do not need to read the Indian press, or come to India to be sure of their conclusions.

Regretfully, the same "arrogance of ignorance" is found here. George Tanham was correct in his recent RAND study when he characterized India as lacking a tradition of strategic thought. There is a lot of wishful thinking about the future and blaming one another for past mistakes, but there is not much serious debate over the new challenges facing India--the collapse of a comfortable international Cold War structure, the loss of the major arms supplier, rise of multi-national criminal organizations fueled by narcotics, and the rise of religious intolerance of all varieties. One of the tasks facing the US's new strategic studies center will be to determine priorities among this formidable list of problems, all of which are worth careful analysis.

I my case I came here thirty years ago precisely because India was the country where there was original thinking on important international and strategic issues. To me the current Indian malaise is deeply saddening, although I believe it is also temporary. India did have a great strategic thinker, Jawaharlal Nehru, who argued that the Cold War was damaging to Indian interests, who warned against moving too close to any outside power, who

was aware of the catastrophic consequences of even a limited nuclear war, and who had a secular and broad outlook. Nehru stood head and shoulders above most of his contemporaries, and rereading him is still a pleasure and enlightening.

Unfortunately, the fate of Nehru, like Mahatma Gandhi, has been that his flaws and mistakes have overshadowed his great qualities. The calamity of 1962 discredited much good that he stood for.

It is my view, after living in India for the better part of a year, that the time has come again for Nehru's and Gandhi's mixture of idealism and pragmatism. Pakistanis, Americans, and Indians have ignored the possibility of achieving a lasting peace in South Asia, one that would be based on justice, not force, and that would protect the vital national interests of all regional states, and would protect the rights of significant minorities, and minorities living among minorities, such as the Kashmiri Hindus. I think that we should be looking ahead, as Nehru did, and try to create a South Asia that joins much of the rest of the world in regional accommodation and rapid economic growth, as well as democratization. We should be thinking of the best regional arrangement, not merely of ways of "getting by," or temporizing. Whether it will be called a "South Asia House," as we referred to it in a recent US-Russian study of resolving the Afghanistan and Kashmir problems (issued by the Asia Society and the Oriental Institute of Moscow in March, 1993), or whether there is some other name, possibly an extension of SAARC, we should not be afraid of arguing for the best, even if we might have to settle for the second-best.

Any thinking about the future must be grounded in the core interests of each regional state, as well as regional interests of important outside powers, including my own country. Putting these interests in the form of questions, the major tasks facing us would seem to be:

- ♦ For the United States, how can we advance a multiplicity of interests in a region where there is no overwhelming threat to the US, nor are there vital resources-but a region which cannot be ignored?

- ♦ For India, how can it emerge, finally, as one of the four or five great powers in the world--after its economic reforms take hold? How can India restore the strategic unity of the Subcontinent that was shattered by the partition in 1947?

- ♦ For Pakistan, strategic questions are linked to its domestic political order: How can Pakistan protect itself against India, without leading to

the militarization of Pakistani society and the domination of the military? This is an issue that Pakistanis are now beginning to debate publicly as well as privately.

- Finally, *technology* has a logic of its own. As the US and the Soviets discovered, the weapons acquisition process acquires a momentum, labs keep on producing new models, and there are bureaucratic pressures, especially where there is no oversight, to build more and more weapons and missiles, the result of which has often been less and less actual security. The same dynamic operates here.

SARI : A SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE

How can we meet these overlapping (and sometimes conflicting) core interests? In this case, we need a grand strategy, or a meta-strategy, one that incorporates and accommodates the national interests of several states. In short, we need a plan, and I have called such a plan SARI-the South Asian Regional Initiative. As an American, my first responsibility is to urge a better policy on my *own* country, and I have been urging that the US move towards a coherent regional strategy. I am concerned that the United States will be whipped around from issue to issue with a policy-of-the-day; narcotics, nuclear proliferation, human rights, missile control, democratization, intellectual property rights, terrorism, and so forth. The acronym, SARI, is designed to attract *American* attention, but at least the Pakistanis have not objected!

The premises of SARI are that America has continuing interests in South Asia (democracy, non-proliferation, economic liberalization, and so forth), and potential interests in working with some of the South Asian states to pursue common strategic objectives (peacekeeping in and outside the region, possibly containment of China). The United States has no vital interests in South Asia (defined as something worth going to war over). The region ranks somewhere below the middle in terms of overall American priorities, but not at the bottom--the fate of a quarter of the world, organized into a few competing political systems that possess a potential for nuclear war and massive dislocation demands some level of attention.

What kind of strategy is appropriate for the United States? Several suggest themselves. In the case of the former Soviet Union we pursued *containment* and then *accommodation*. In the case of China there was, at first, a policy of containment, but this yielded to a *balance of power scheme*. In the case now of Russia and China we are debating the merits of a new balance of power strategy vs. some form of *cooperative* diplomacy.

None of these models are appropriate for India or for South Asia. India is not likely to become a close ally of the United States, nor will we need to contain it. We might work closely with India on one project or another, but this is also true of Pakistan.

The model that is appropriate for India lies somewhere between the South Africa and the Middle East peace processes. South Asia needs a matrix, or a template, that can shape all of the components of American policy to support the central objective of normalizing India-Pakistan relations. All important American objectives can only be reached if we work towards achieving that central objective. A South Asian Regional Initiative--SARI--is a framework that allows the United States to move the region in the direction of greater cooperation, reduced arms spending, and de-nuclearization. SARI will not require vast financial resources or a military commitment. SARI requires only one significant (but very scarce) new American asset, time--the undivided attention of a handful of policy makers over a four or five-year period.

Such a regional initiative was considered by policy makers in the Bush administration. They admitted that the idea made strategic sense, but argued that they neither had the time to devote to the region (invariably, the same people were also deeply involved in the Middle East peace process, and for the past two years, with the management of the Gulf conflict), and that the moment was not yet right for American leadership in developing in a regional process. What else should the new Bureau of South Asian affairs do other than deal with the most pressing regional problem of them all, the future of India-Pakistan relations, a problem that frames our concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and terrorism? I have told my American visitors, "The road to accession to the NPT runs through Kashmir."

Here are SARI's Main Components :

- There should be co-sponsorship of the entire process by the United States and Japan, and probably Russia, Germany and Great Britain. Japan is crucial, since Tokyo carries moral weight in the region on nuclear matters, and its investments and aid programs in the region exceed that of the United States. Smaller regional states might be invited to join, but SARI should not displace the SAARC process of regional consultation.
- These countries might work to pass a "framing" UN resolution that would place earlier UN resolutions on regional peace in a contempo-

rary context, and incorporate some of the principles of the Simla agreement (which suggests bilateralism, but does not exclude a larger dialogue). These UN resolutions would be South Asia's "242."

As in the Middle East, the SARI process should be broken down into a number of substantive committees, dealing with various components of India-Pakistan relations. These include nuclear proliferation, the conventional arms balance, the status of Kashmir, trade, environmental and ecological issues, refugees, and the free flow of people, ideas, newspapers, and books.

Simultaneously, support for "Track II" diplomacy should be dramatically increased. The few dialogues now underway have broadened and deepened regional thinking, but more needs to be done. Separate Japanese, German, and British efforts should be encouraged. The Neemrana dialogue is one model, others should target younger regional leaders, and functional specialists. *While it is true that the political leadership in both India and Pakistan might not now be capable of reaching a larger agreement, this is the time to prepare the ground for future leaders who will.*

Both the proposed five-power talks on regional nuclear proliferation and a dialogue on Kashmir should be subsumed under SARI. They are intimately linked. The same is true for the regional military balance, which is now in a state of uncertainty (it should be remembered that all of the South Asian military disasters arose from a misreading of military balances--whether between India and Pakistan, India and China, or India and the Tamil Tigers).

♦ SARI should be seen as a long-term effort. As in the Middle East and South Africa, there will be no quick solutions. The Carnegie Report was correct in arguing that India (and Pakistan) will not soon sign the NPT. SARI should look further down the road to a time when India and Pakistan will have no reason not to sign the NPT, or a variation, just as Israel will be able to de-weaponize itself if, at the end of the Middle East Process, it finds itself surrounded by reasonably friendly states.

♦ SARI should also be seen as a way to change *perceptions*. In the last US-India strategic dialogue, held in Washington, it mischievously argued for a strategy by which the US would "coopt" India, and vice versa, by influencing the perceptions of both sides. SARI's Track II diplomacy and its committee structure should be aimed at changing regional perceptions, not merely as fora for the expression of regional differences.

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• A key part of SARI will be incentives and disincentives. Some of these may require changes in American laws (MTCR restrictions on India, and prohibition on civilian nuclear assistance to both India and Pakistan). But the US has been able to write laws which allow for such packages for Israel and supportive Arab states. Much of the American legislation is intended to prevent proliferation, to promote human rights, and so forth; but it provides no *incentive* for cooperation, and may have driven both Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs deeper underground. Indeed, continued pressure on these programs, without a concomitant indication of how the security of both states might be enhanced by yielding to such pressure, is likely to drive them both into overt nuclear status. Incentives and disincentives should be *proportionate* to the actions of India and Pakistan, otherwise they lose their credibility. We might begin on Siachin. I would give India and Pakistan two years to come to a mutually agreeable solution, and then start cutting aid budgets by the amount that both countries spend on this worthless spot.

• The ultimate problem in South Asia, especially between India and Pakistan, but also contaminating the India-Bangladesh and India-Sri Lankan relationships are the existence of competing national identities. In the end, SARI can help Indians and Pakistanis (and Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans) think through the core differences between their states. In the May 15, 1993 issue of *India Today* I have argued for a new “two nation theory” for India and Pakistan, one in which two democracies, one professedly Islamic, the other professedly secular, will find areas where their identities do overlap. Both sides are interested in the protection of minorities, both sides should understand that the disintegration of one would probably lead to the disintegration of the other (and in a nuclear era, the security of each rests upon the weakest link in the nuclear chain of the other side). Above all, both sides need to understand that the rest of the world views the region with a mixture of contempt and dismay--and that if nothing else, both countries have a strong interest in altering this perception.

IF IT WORKS

I have been arguing for at least ten years that we are heading towards a world of regions. There will be no great ideological battles in the future, although there will always be the need to contain one or another expansionist power (possibly China, but even that is not a foregone conclusion, and it would be as wrong to assume a hostile China in the future as it would be to fail to guard against its emergence.) No South Asian state seems to be a likely candidate for containment, this leaves the United States with the choice

among policies of apathy (steered intermittently by such extra-regional concerns as non-proliferation and human rights), alliance (against some other region or power), balancing powers *within* the region (correctly rejected by the Carnegie Report), or appeasement of India.

What does the United States have to gain from a policy of sustained engagement in South Asia--SARI? First, the prospect of greater strategic cooperation with India in and out of South Asia; second, the cooperation of Pakistan in certain regions; third, at least the deferment of their nuclear arms race, and possibly its termination at some future date; fourth, greater assurance that the two states will not precipitate a major crisis, and might even begin to discuss the modalities of a settlement of the Kashmir conflict (which is both a cause and the consequence of their hostility); fifth, the US will have made a significant contribution to stabilizing the environment in which a very fragile Pakistani democracy is growing, and a troubled Indian democracy is struggling.

Certainly, South Asia is not yet in deep crisis. The strategic regional initiative I have outlined here might just prevent it from sliding into a conflict that will dwarf the ethnic cleansing of Yugoslavia, and the mass famine of Somalia. It would be tragic if the United States, at the peak of its influence in the region, fails to join with other major powers in a classic example of what Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali terms *preventive diplomacy*.

But, supposedly rational people do not always act on the basis of a careful consideration of their *own* interests. I return to Genral Rodrigues phrase, the "arrogance of ignorance." It nicely summarizes the problem. We live in an era where the impossible has become routine. We have witnessed enormous man-made calamities, but great advances in human dignity and welfare. We should not close our minds to the possibility of the best future for India and its neighbours, and as so many Americans have, plan only for the worst. But achieving such a future will, in the last analysis, be determined in New Delhi and Islamabad, not in Washington.

United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Former Yugoslavia

LT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, AVSM, Vr.C.

INTRODUCTION

I am indeed honoured to have been invited to speak to such a distinguished audience on the UN Peace Keeping operations in former Yugoslavia from where I have returned just under two months back, after doing a year as the force Commander. It was a great honour and privilege, and has been a unique and rewarding experience. I relinquished command with a great sense of achievement and satisfaction, particularly in regard to the response I received from my colleagues and subordinates from so many countries of the World. The respect, admiration and devotion they demonstrated towards me was in my opinion, a tribute to the professional standards of the Indian Army, and the personal characteristics of the Indian people.

I shall try and cover the subject in broad terms and as briefly as possible to allow for maximum time to focus on aspects of particular interest during the question period.

I ask your indulgence in refraining from comment or observation on certain aspects that may have a bearing on the continuing operations and could affect the credibility or security of my successor and the forces there.

BACKGROUND

The present conflict in former Yugoslavia has its roots in history, which is unfailingly recalled in all the negotiations that we had to undertake.

The multi-nation state of what was Yugoslavia was little more than 78 years old. Serbs and Croats, despite their common Slavic roots and virtually identical languages, (written in different scripts-Serbian in Cyrillic and Croation in Roman), had never lived together in the same State. For centuries, Serbia had been occupied by the Turks as part of the Ottoman Empire, while Croatia was part of the Austra-Hungarian Empire. Most of Bosnia-Horzegovina which had substantial Serb and Croat populations, was also under the

Text of a talk delivered by Lt General Satish Nambiar, former Commander of the UN forces in erstwhile Yugoslavia to the members of the USI on April 29, 1993. Before taking up his assignment with the United Nations, General Nambiar was Director General Military Operations Army HQ, India.

Ottomans. There is also a significant religious distinction which has come to play an increasingly dominant role in the present conflict in the region - Serbs are Orthodox Christians, Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholics, and in Bosnia - Herzegovina there is a substantial Muslim Slav population. An aspect which has a significant bearing in the understanding of the conflict is the presence of a substantial Serb population in the borderlands that separated the two former empires in the area that is called the Krajina.

In 1918, following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was established. Of its constituents, Serbia and Montenegro had already been independent states since the Berlin Congress of 1878; Slovenia and Croatia had belonged to Austria-Hungary (Slovenia was governed by Vienna and Croatia by Budapest). In 1925, the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was re-named Yugoslavia (meaning "land of the South Slavs"). Already during this early period of the existence of a common Yugoslav state, there were many intra-Yugoslav arguments about how power should be distributed especially between Serbs and Croats, and how a balance could be struck between centralists and federalists.

During World War II, Yugoslavia was occupied by German and Italian troops. In Croatia, Nazi Germany established a puppet fascist regime under Ante Pavelic, who was the leader of the so-called Ustasha movement. During that time, Pavelic's regime is reported to have killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia - Herzegovina. In due course, reprisal killings are also reported to have taken place.

The Communist partisans led by Marshal Josip Broz Tito emerged as the victorious political force after World War II. Supported by Britain, France and the USSR, they not only successfully fought the German occupiers, but also Croatia's Ustasha regime and the (Serbian) monarchists, the so-called Chetniks, led by Gen Mihailovic. Tito's partisan forces came from all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, and included many Croats opposed to the Quisling regime in Zagreb. Tito himself was half Croatian (with a Slovene mother).

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Following the death of President Tito, who had held Yugoslavia together through his own charisma since World War II, the only binding factor left was the ideology of Marxism. When that died, nationalism emerged naturally. Attempts were made initially to hold Yugoslavia together. When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, the Serbs, given the history of the World War, had reacted with the shelling of Vukovar and other

cities, which began the process of disintegration.

Lord Carrington was appointed Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia by the European Community (EC) with three elements in his mandate :

- (a) That the conference would not start until a cease-fire was reached.
- (b) That there would be no changes in borders except by mutual agreement;
- (c) None of the six republics would be recognised as sovereign and independent until a final comprehensive settlement was reached.

Of these three elements, two were violated even before United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was set up. The EC itself decided to recognise Slovenia and Croatia and set up the Badinter Commission to examine if these and other republics met the conditions laid down for recognition. Badinter's ruling that Slovenia satisfied the conditions, led to its recognition; but even though the Commission ruled that Croatia did not wholly meet these conditions, the EC decided to go ahead and recognise it. Macedonia was considered as having satisfied all conditions, but its recognition has been held back because of Greek objections. On Bosnia-Herzegovina, Badinter said that the conditions laid down by its own constitution - which demanded consensus on the question of independence by all three communities - had not been satisfied. A referendum was called, in which the Serbs did not participate; yet the EC went ahead with recognition on the basis of the voting result - with the disastrous consequences that followed, and the effects of which we continue to see.

Lord Carrington's view was that whatever the merits or demerits of these developments, they totally altered the Peace Conference in as much as, the republics having got what they wanted, were not interested in the Conference any more and it degenerated into a futile series of bilateral or tri-lateral interactions.

In Bosnia Herzegovina it was quite clear from the outset that the Bosnian Serbs were not willing to accept Bosnian independence. So it became necessary to suggest to the three parties that they should meet in a Constitutional Conference to which they agreed. On 18 Mar 92, all parties in Bosnia - Herzegovina agreed on the principles of a new constitution taking account of the three national communities in a federal arrangement. In the first week of April 92, the EC recognised Bosnia Herzegovina and fighting erupted as the Serbs considered this to be against the understanding.

This was the start of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina which led to

the Serbs resorting to armed actions to take control of areas they perceived as belonging to them, and the Croats doing the same in areas where they perceived their influence as dominant. The negotiating process being attempted by the EC Conference collapsed. In so far as President Izetbegovic of Bosnia Herzegovina was concerned, as his country had been recognised within the established borders, he did not feel bound by the earlier processes and in fact expressed his unwillingness to resume negotiations on the earlier basis probably because :-

- (a) he thought that there was a possibility of a large UN intervention in his favour; the Bosnian Muslim leadership continued to hope that such intervention would materialise, and
- (b) he believed that the Bosnian Serbs would lose out with the Bosnian Muslim-Croat alliance having greater chance of success.

Though developments in Bosnia Herzegovina were the focus of world attention, the problem of Serb held areas in Croatia where substantial Serb populations lived, and which were to have also been the subject of attention by Lord Carrington's Conference, remained on the back burner unattended, till Croatian Govt frustrations led to armed action on their part in January 1993.

All in all, EC initiatives under Lord Carrington failed to make any progress, not for want of effort by this gallant old man, but because of the intransigence of the parties concerned, and lack of cohesion in EC approach to the problem. Furthermore, the Serb leadership remained ever suspicious of EC impartiality. Thus it was that the 'peace-making' process also moved towards a joint UN-EC initiative in the form of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia (ICFY) jointly chaired by Cyrus Vance (representing the Secretary General) and Lord David Owen (representing the European Community).

MANDATE, TASKS AND DEPLOYMENT

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was set up under Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 Feb 92 to deploy in certain areas of Croatia designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) where special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease fire was maintained. These were areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions had led to armed conflict. The Headquarters was to be established in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The tasks primarily involved :

- (a) Securing withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) (which was achieved).
- (b) Disbandment of the Territorial Defence Forces (which was achieved, but reversed when the Croatian Govt resorted to armed action in January 93).
- (c) Storage of heavy weapons under a "double lock" system (which was achieved, but reversed due to the Croatian actions in January 93).
- (d) Deployment of UN civilian police to monitor functions of local police.
- (e) Demilitarisation; which was largely stalled due to raising of various types of militia (or armed police) by the Serbs.
- (f) Assistance to UNHCR in return of displaced persons; could not be effected as security conditions had not yet been established.

Expansion of the original mandate by the Security Council covered the following and, in some cases, resulted in force accretions :

- (a) Reopening of Sarajevo airport for delivery of humanitarian assistance (05 & 29 Jun 92).
- (b) Establishment of a Joint Commission and additional functions in certain areas in Croatia - also referred to as "pink zones" (30 Jun 92).
- (c) Monitoring of heavy weapons (17 Jul 92).
- (d) Immigration and customs functions on UNPA boundaries that run along state borders (07 Aug 92).
- (e) Deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina for escort of humanitarian aid convoys organised by UNHCR (14 Sep 92).
- (f) Monitoring of JNA withdrawal from, and demilitarisation of the Prevlake peninsula (06 Oct 92).
- (g) Deployment of observers at air fields and maintaining of "No Fly Zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina (09 Oct 92).
- (h) Preventive deployment in Macedonia (11 Dec 92).

The force strength for the original mandate was approximately 14,000 which included 15 battalion sized units, military observers, civilian police

monitors and international civilian staff for political affairs and administration; whereas the military components and the civilian police monitors by and large arrived in theatre in accordance with a given schedule, international civilian staff induction was well behind and continued to be so with each expansion of the mandate.

Expansions of the mandate entailed accretion of three small sized battalions for Sarajevo airport in July 92, four reinforced battalions for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Nov 92, one full strength Nordic battalion for Macedonia in Jan/Feb 93 and additions to the complement of military observers, civilian police monitors and civilian staff. By end Feb 93, the Force strength stood at just under 25,000 personnel, which made it at that time, the largest operation undertaken by the United Nations.

Military and police personnel for the Force came from about 35 countries around the World, and together with the civilian staff, made it a truly multi-national effort, the command of which was both a challenge and rewarding experience particularly in context of the fact that the Force had to be set up from scratch and built upon to accept further expansions of the mandate as we went along.

CHALLENGES

One of the major challenges in the execution of our tasks in former Yugoslavia was to deal with the various parties to the conflict in the region. Given the background to the conflict and most important, the reliance of the leadership on all sides on the extreme platforms of nationalism, we had no illusions about the difficulties we faced. However, the rhetoric indulged in by all sides both before and after UNPROFOR deployment, to convey to the populace at large, their interpretation of what the UN forces were being deployed to achieve, all of which was almost universally twisted to suggest that each side's interpretation was what the UN was mandated to achieve, made our task most thankless. Added to this was our first hand experience with truth being a casualty at almost all times in the Balkans. The extent to which my colleagues and I were subjected to falsehoods and, in many cases, blatant lies, was indeed an experience most of us will not easily forget; even the most generous among us became total cynics within a matter of a few months in the mission area. The only consolation we had, if we can call it that, was that we were in exalted company in this regard; at one time or another, their similar experiences were recounted to me by eminent personalities like Lord Carrington, Ambassador Cutilhiers and their colleagues in the European Conference, Secretary Vance and his colleagues like Herbert Okun, Lord Owen and his colleague Ambassador Peter Hall, and Secretary

Lawrence Eagleburger, who had apparently served for some years in former Yugoslavia.

In countering the effects of such rhetoric on the locals, UNPROFOR was severely handicapped in not having a credible and effective public information organisation for many months. In fact, we had nothing other than a spokesman with a secretary for the first couple of months, and it was only towards the end of 1992 that we had a public information organisation that merited such a name. Our experience led us to use this as one of the first tools in our preventive deployment in Macedonia. The seriousness of this deficiency becomes all the more pronounced when we allow for the fact that the republics of former Yugoslavia were reared in the cradle of Communism where the propaganda machine is one of the important state tools.

The second great challenge was to mould such a large multi-national force with personnel belonging to different regions, with different cultures and languages, different backgrounds and approaches to the problem, varied types of equipment and so on, into one cohesive force. That we were able to achieve this is something my senior colleagues and I can claim credit for, without, however, detracting from the tremendous understanding and response we received from all. Some of the more serious problems that needed to be tackled in this context however merit mention because these could well be faced in similar operations in the future and need to be recognised and countered to the extent feasible.

The first of these problems is something we are accustomed to - the intense distrust of the civilian organisation by the military components. Almost from day one, when on the flight from New York to Belgrade, my Deputy - Philippe Morillon, my Chief of Staff - Lewis Mackenzie and many other senior military colleagues were made to travel "economy class" while UN Secretariat Staff travelled in "business class", this military-civil animosity needed my personal attention as the Force Commander. The military, no matter from which country and no matter how affluent, is always resentful of privileges seized by the bureaucracy - in this case, the UN bureaucracy. Suffice it to say, that given such a situation, in addition to mediation with the parties to the conflict, I had to often spend my time on "in-house" mediation. However, to the credit of my colleagues - both military and civilian - I must say that they never allowed this to interfere with the job at hand.

Another problem that needs to be recognised is the marked variation in terms of equipment and financial remuneration provided to contingents of the developed countries of the Western World, and those from the third World, as also countries like Russia and Ukraine in regard to finances.

Contingents from the Western countries came in with more sophisticated items of equipment and vehicles, which conferred on them a better capability in execution of tasks allotted to them. Lack of such a capability among some of the Third World contingents generated a patronising attitude towards them by their more affluent colleagues which was not always made up for by their undoubted professionalism. This again required personal effort by me as the Force Commander to temper the attitude of the better off colleagues, and to assuage the feelings of my Third World friends. All in all, however, with time and better understanding, these problems did not assume unmanageable proportions. Periodic rotations of contingents, however, made it essential that the process of understanding needed to be repeated from time to time. The more serious fall-out of this particular aspect was however the tendency of the parties to the conflict to capitalise on these differences by making accusations against contingents, and praising others, thus trying to project attitudes of partiality.

Pay and allowances given to various contingents also generated its own set of problems. The better off countries and some of the not - so - well - off ones, paid their personnel well, and also ensured that administrative back up at the national level was good. Some of the Third World countries, as also Russia and Ukraine, apparently did not even make available to their personnel, allowances to the extent of the payment made by the UN towards provision of the contingents, thus causing some dissatisfaction which in turn was exploited by the warring parties to make allegations of malpractices of a serious nature. In fact, as the Force Commander, I received anonymous complaints on this aspect from a couple of contingents, which I dealt with by passing the complaints on to the Contingent and unit commanders to allow them to deal with the aspect in consultation with their national authorities.

Notwithstanding the end of the "Cold War", and the emerging close relations between the Western countries and those of the former Soviet Union, it became quite evident soon after we began deploying, that the military, particularly of the NATO group of countries, continued to be rather distrustful of the Russian officers on the staff as well as the Russian battalion; this distrust was not totally related to the historical closeness of the Russians to the Serbs and hence a possible bias, but had its origin in the years of NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. It took all the tact, patience and persuasion to overcome this reservation, to which I had to apply myself almost single handedly. Whereas I can claim to have achieved considerable success in this regard I am not sure whether I can say I was able to achieve complete success.

The United Nations system demanded a mix of almost all contributing

nations' representatives at the Force Headquarters and similar selected representation at subordinate headquarters. This obviously meant an amorphous mix of well meaning and dedicated staff, but with many of them not even being able to communicate with one another because of language and different systems or culture of work. Whereas "sign language" may work to order a pair of shoes, or get some food to eat, it cannot produce an operational order. It, therefore, took Herculean efforts to get the Force Headquarters into a going concern, and it is a tribute to the hard work and dedication of my colleagues that we were able to achieve this despite three moves of the Headquarters in five months between March and August 1992.

Since the conflict in former Yugoslavia was taking place in the backyard of Europe, it was inevitable that the media in Europe as also of North America, would focus on it to a greater degree than to the conflicts in other regions of the world, on which more objective and detached views could be taken. Moreover, sophistication levels of media in Europe and North America posed an imposing challenge to us in the field. This focus of the media and trends to reporting based on editorial policy or perceived national interests, brought with it the need to be able to respond appropriately at various levels. Whereas my senior colleagues and I learnt to deal with the media, we were soon convinced of the need to build up an effective information system within the Force, staffed by professionals. This took some time but was more or less in place by the time I left. One of the lessons, however, for future operations is the need for such an organisation to be in place at the commencement of the operation.

ACHIEVEMENTS

In Croatia the main achievement besides securing the withdrawal of the JNA from the UNPAs, was the fact that UNPROFOR presence has prevented resumption of the war between Croatia and Serbia, despite the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the positions adopted by the Croatian Govt authorities and the Serb leadership in the UNPAs on the status of the Serbs in Croatia. Though the Croatian Govt's resort to use of armed force in the Southern Krajina in January 1993 was a serious set back to the ongoing efforts, even that and its fall out remained largely localised, mainly due to UNPROFOR presence and efforts at preventing escalation.

In so far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, it must be remembered that the UNPROFOR mandate is restricted to assistance in the provision of humanitarian aid; UNPROFOR never had nor does it have even today, a peace keeping mandate in that unfortunate republic. I make this point because it is largely not understood, or is misinterpreted. Therefore, in so far as its

mandate in the republic is concerned, UNPROFOR has achieved remarkable success. By the end of February 1993, efforts of UNPROFOR and UNHCR had enabled over 2500 aid flights into Sarajevo carrying up to nearly 30,000 tons of supplies, and UNPROFOR escorted convoys in other areas of Bosnia - Herzegovina had enabled induction of many hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies by road. In fact, in September/October 1992 there were dire predictions that thousands of lives would be lost in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the ensuing winter due to hunger and cold. That did not happen due to the concerted efforts of UNPROFOR and UNHCR.

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE KEEPING ON WHICH THE OPERATION WAS BASED AND SOME OBSERVATIONS

The UNPROFOR operation was largely based on the principles evolved over the years which encompassed the following :

- (a) A basic agreement between the contending parties and the Security Council, which the Secretary General implements on the ground through the peace keeping operation; the premise being that the UN presence is there to assist the parties in the execution of their agreement.
- (b) A Security Council mandate with continuing supervision and support.
- (c) A Special Representative or Force Commander in the field answerable through Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) to the SC for implementation of the mandate.
- (d) A force of military and police provided by Governments, blended with UN civilian staff members.
- (e) Back-up support provided by the UN Secretariat in New York.
- (f) Funding by the General Assembly on assessed contributions.
- (g) Minimum force to be used by lightly armed peace keepers in Chapter 6 operations with each mission's rules of engagement. (While some missions have had authority to use force against persons seeking to prevent the implementation of the mandate, the usual principle has been related to an extended concept of self defence).

While the mission's task is to carry out a mandate, its members need to be scrupulously impartial in its implementation, as variance from this will undermine the essential moral authority on the basis of which the UN can obtain the cooperation of the parties on which it must rely for its success. The

maintenance of this authority is often difficult; yet deviation from it is incompatible with a Chapter 6 mandate as that would tend to turn the UN operation into a participant rather than a mediating presence. Impartiality is important both in fact and experience.

The Yugoslav experience in its first year has thrown up a number of questions which merit attention, analysis and discussion.

The first relates to the use of regional bodies in support of UNPROFOR. Both positive and negative aspects of this have been evident. Regional bodies have a direct neighbourly concern, and are, therefore, likely to have a stronger commitment, especially in terms of the resources made available to support the UN. The negative side is that neighbours may be less dispassionate, or be seen to be; and can thus undermine the credibility of the UN's need for an objective, supra-national role and image, if not operating in very close coordination with the UN. In the case of former Yugoslavia, the involved regional bodies are moreover, not ones to which the former country itself belonged, and are not, therefore, wholly familiar to it. In fact some of the countries on such bodies have an adverse historical image relating to the Second World War, whose memories are still recalled.

Whereas the initial elements of UNPROFOR operated under the traditional mode, the additional commitment for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Oct 92 was, as a unique experience, provided by some member states of the European Community on a self financing basis. This led to a number of problems particularly related to the lack of core UN Secretariat personnel in political information, legal and administrative areas, and the tendency of some national authorities to deal directly with their personnel. In recognition of these problems, the Secretary General, in his report to the Council in Feb 93 recommended funding of the complete operation from the assessed budget of the UN.

Under UNPROFOR rules of engagement in the context of Chapter 6 of the Charter, force can be used in self defence, or in the defence of persons or property under UNPROFOR protection. In practice, the interpretation of such ROLE in given circumstances depends on the judgement of the sub unit or detachment commander on the spot; in his assessment, many factors need to be considered - especially purely military considerations of relative strength and likely outcome, both at the time and in due course, at that location or elsewhere. Not least because of the relative weakness of UNPROFOR capability in comparison to that of local forces, but also because the UN is committed to being a peace keeping, not a war making body, negotiation is the usual method of progress and attainment of designated objectives. However, issues of judgement habitually arise, and the media especially, have often criticised

UNPROFOR for failing to use force to achieve objectives. In virtually all instances, these criticisms have been misplaced or even irresponsible; with UNPROFOR sometimes pilloried for failing to do what neither mandate nor resources permit it to do. In some cases, such comments have been echoed by Govt quarters despite the fact that the very same Govts may themselves have indicated reluctance to permit their national units to incur casualties or even to participate at all in an operation. To an extent never before seen in peace keeping operations, the media - especially television - has driven Govts to appear to be "doing something", and many Govts have had to take some kind of action even if this may not rationally advance the objectives of the peace keeping operation.

It must be recognised that a more rigorous use of force by UNPROFOR would risk higher casualties on the part of its armed contingents, and to unarmed elements (like the military observers and civilian police monitors) who could become "soft targets". The use of force would also require a commitment of resources, both material and personnel, which Govts had shown little willingness to make.

Such a commitment to a greater use of force in the particular circumstances of former Yugoslavia entails a level of political commitment, especially in the matter of accepting casualties, which is not yet characteristic of UNPROFOR troop - contributors. Many are extremely wary of the depth of possible commitment to helping in the ex Yugoslavia situation, despite the inflamed condition of public opinion.

On the other hand, it may be legitimately suggested that a protection role, as distinct from the original peace keeping concept of policing a cease - fire, could require more vigorous action. If UNPROFOR had greater resources (material and personnel) and the political backing of the troop contributing Govts, it would be more successful in several aspects of its protection role, being able to adopt a more muscular stance, provided that, as in all it does, it fulfills its tasks with scrupulous impartiality; and bearing in mind that the great preponderance of stand-offs can be resolved by negotiation supported by firmness.

In fact, I have no doubt that a more substantial UNPROFOR deployment could have deterred the use of force by the Croatian Army in January 1993 in South Krajina. UNPROFOR in most sectors in Croatia was grossly undermanned, its strength being based largely on the principle that, under the Vance Plan, every one would do as they had promised, and overnight, become "Perfect little gentlemen".

UNPROFOR has had a rather unique experience of the dichotomy

between peace making and peace-keeping. The European Conference, and later the International Conference on former Yugoslavia, were charged with finding longer term solutions to the underlying questions arising from the break up of former Yugoslavia, while UNPROFOR has had the responsibility, under the Secretary-General, who in turn reports to the Security Council, for the operational tasks conferred on it in a series of frequently expanding Security Council mandates. Negotiating the solutions to political problems, and implementing such solutions, is a logical division of functions. However, there are obvious riders to the distinction - solutions cannot be found without reference to realities on the ground; and the process of implementation of agreed solutions is not a mechanical one - it invariably requires an ongoing process, *in situ*, of consultation and negotiation with the parties.

The inter-related, mutually supportive, nature of peace keeping and peace making has been seen in rather vivid terms in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Though the UN had a limited humanitarian mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid 1992, it had neither resources nor mandate to embark on large-scale peace-making which, in some respects did not get fully under way until September 1992. This made the position of UNPROFOR on the ground virtually untenable, at times. Furthermore, the Vance Plan for Croatia and the UNPAs, always envisaged a parallel peace making/peace keeping role for the International Conference and for UNPROFOR *in situ*. Because however, of the deteriorating Bosnia-Herzegovina situation, no peace-making was, in effect, being undertaken in regard to the Croatia/Serb enclaves issue until after the fresh outbreak of conflict in January 1993. Yet many of UNPROFOR's mandated tasks were simply unattainable in the absence of political movement and direct high-level negotiations, as envisaged in the Vance Plan. This in fact, is one of the best examples in current international practice of the inter-relationship between peace keeping and peace making.

A question occasionally posed was whether there are limits to the range of tasks to be performed by UNPROFOR. It may be observed that the UN is currently undertaking an impressive array of functions, in the context of peace keeping missions, ranging from provision of security for humanitarian aid, to controlling a no-fly zone, preparing to run border control operations, reconstructing police organisation, supervising governmental functions, drawing up constitutional frameworks, running elections, "nation building" activities, and so on. The great majority of these were virtually unthinkable a few years ago, and the UN is still adjusting to this new reality. The short answer to the question is, that if Govts provide both mandate and support, both material and in terms of personnel, on a continuing basis, there is no reason why the UN should not continue to expand its functions. But it will need enhanced help.

However, it may be relevant here to express one reservation and one corollary. The reservation is that the Security Council could, in theory, confer upon UNPROFOR a mandate which is impossible of attainment in practical terms. This could arise perhaps from popular pressures built up as a result of press coverage of sensational events, in such circumstances, the Secretary General may consider whether he should inform the Council of the factual situation on the ground. A problem could also arise if the Council wished to confer a mandate whose implementation was incompatible with some other mandate currently being exercised. Then the Secretary General might again wish to consider informing the Council that, as a matter of practicality, such inconsistency existed, and that the Council would therefore, have to choose which task it wanted UNPROFOR to fulfil. For example, it would be impossible even for UNPROFOR to both, keep the peace and make war at the same time. Setting a task within a time frame which is impossible, perhaps because of resource limitations, or conditions on the ground would be another example.

The corollary is that the UN is not much more than the sum of its parts. If Govts will it the means, it can probably do the job. If they withhold the means, whether in terms of resources or in terms of political support, it cannot. The UNPROFOR experience also underline that, to carryout its functions, it requires not only an initial, but also a continuing support. If Govts are more comfortable with some other mechanism, for whatever reason, that is a matter of their sovereign judgement. But it has to do with their approach, not with the intrinsic nature of the UN, whose Charter potential has at this time, by no means been fully exploited. It cannot be over emphasised that the success of a UN operation will depend very much on whether continuing political support is provided to it after the mandate has been given.

The number and range of countries contributing to UN peace keeping operations has been increasing rapidly in recent years as demands have risen. All permanent members of the Security Council have participated in peace keeping operations, but China and the USA have not yet contributed battalions; the USA has, however, provided a hospital, and officers on the staff at Force Headquarters and HQ Bosnia-Herzegovina for UNPROFOR. In the past, there was some reluctance regarding the involvement of the permanent members in peace keeping operations, perhaps because of a concern that this could affect the balance and impartiality of the operation, its most important feature.

The UN has always sought to achieve a good geographical balance for its peace keeping operations and this has proved important, in conjunction

with a mission's impartiality, and the fact that it acts under Security Council instructions.⁵ Thus, as more nations have become involved, the authority of peace keeping operation as expressing a truly universal commitment to international security and global solidarity has perceptibly increased.

It would, however, be unrealistic to ignore some of the problems that have arisen, and could arise, with an increasing involvement of the major powers, but these should be analysed and confronted in a practical manner. Three main problems can be foreseen with a truly essential commitment to UN operations in former Yugoslavia :-

- (a) The danger that very powerful nations could use the UN as a front behind which to fulfil purely national objectives, and that their contingents in the field would take directions from national capitals rather than the command of UNPROFOR acting on the Secretary General's instructions, thus tending to undermine the value of globalism *in situ* and indeed the credibility of other contingents not so acting.
- (b) The danger that the above would be the perception even if it were untrue in practice.
- (c) The parallel problems which some countries might have in terms of their current traditions and domestic politics, in placing national contingents under a UN command.

Each of these issues would need to be met. The alternative, that powerful nations would not participate in UN peace keeping operations but, instead, act unilaterally or in cohesion with allies, is real and could be damaging to the future of UN peace keeping operations. It might tend to marginalise the UN role, and create two kinds of international action - one in which a number of developed nations acted under a notional UN umbrella but, in fact, independently of it, and another perhaps in other parts of the world, or in situations deemed of lesser importance, in which the UN would be enabled to act, perhaps in a "poor relation" role. This would be most unhealthy development.

The point that could be made is that the active involvement of the major powers alongside the rest of the world in UN peace keeping will have a most healthy effect on the evolution of UN peace keeping; as the experience, sophistication, might and logistical resources of such powers are brought to bear upon the established philosophy and structures of peace keeping. This might not be a comfortable process of operational and conceptual dialogue for the UN, or possibly for such countries; but it would certainly stimulate necessary growth, as well as other adjustments.

SOME LESSONS FOR US

Some of the major lessons that can be drawn from the UNPROFOR experience in so far as India's contribution to peace keeping operations is concerned, are in regard to selection of contingents, provision of equipment, training, pay and allowances and communication, both within contingent and to India. From all accounts, based on conversations with those who have operated with Indian troops or military observers, there is unreserved respect for our professionalism, discipline and dedication to work; this we must build upon in our future contributions.

In so far as selection is concerned, it is a matter of in-house discussion and analysis in context of the nature of the commitment, type of contingent required and so on. Whereas it would be inappropriate to try and superimpose any model adopted by other countries, it may be of interest to note the variety of approach adopted. For instance, the Argentinian battalion was composed of selected NCOs in the ranks as only NCOs and above are professionals in their Army; hence it was a composite battalion which was put together and trained together for a period of time before joining UNPROFOR; they performed well. The Jordanian battalion was again a selected lot to include standard infantry personnel, personnel trained in anti-terrorist duties and other specialists. Many of the European countries draw their personnel from a number of battalions or regiments and were formed into a composite battalion which underwent UNPROFOR oriented training for a period before induction. The French, British and Canadians retained the Battalion structure except in terms of specialised sub units which were attached to the Battalion.

Needless to say, there are advantages and disadvantages to the detailment of organic units, and formation of composite ones. However, what may be of significance is that when the UN today asks for an infantry battalion, the assumption is that it has a mechanised capability in terms of armoured personnel carriers or infantry combat vehicles. Hence in our context, a degree of mix between standard infantry and mechanised infantry would be inevitable. The quality of officers, JCOs, and senior NCOs must be above average and to that extent it would be advisable to carry out detailed screening; equally, any unit that we despatch must be upto full strength particularly in regard to officers, JCOs and NCOs.

Equipment provided to the units, no matter of which arm or service, must be of top quality available to us. All vehicles and equipment should be given adequate spares back-up and replenished where required. - the UN pays for all this. Whether the UN specifies it or not, units earmarked for operations like those undertaken by UNPROFOR must be equipped with items like night observation devices, night vision devices, warning devices,

helmets and flak jackets for all personnel, and so on, in generous quantities. Similarly, to the extent feasible we should provide maximum administrative back-up equipment like kitchen trucks, toilet facilities developed by our R & D, good quality emergency rations, effective medical aid equipment and so on as the UN machine moves rather slowly.

The training that we provide our units in the normal course, supplemented by essential features of counter insurgency training and aid to civil authorities, is quite adequate as the base. However, a couple of months prior to despatch, the units should be given comprehensive packages on the situation in the area concerned, experiences under similar conditions, local habits and customs and so on; provision of some personnel who are familiar with the local language would be invaluable.

As mentioned earlier, pay and allowances can be a serious morale factor, and while accepting that we cannot match the allowances paid by the developed countries, we must pay our contingents well, at least to the extent that the UN re-imburses us for provision of the contingent and equipment. This is a substantial amount to the individuals, and the country need hardly try and make a profit out of the contribution of the force. It must be remembered that many of the commitments today carry with them an element of danger, and considerable physical and mental strain.

Whereas it needs no emphasis that communication equipment within the units must be state of the art and liberal, what merits emphasis, is the need for an effective communication link between the contingent commander and Army HQ in New Delhi. This is an absolute necessity not only for operational reason, but also from the point of view of welfare and morale.

There are of course a number of other aspects but the ones explained are the more important ones.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to cover in broad terms the UN commitment in former Yugoslavia, the challenges and achievements, the scope for review of the traditional concepts of peace-keeping operations, and have finally highlighted some aspects we may bear in mind in the despatch of our contingents for such operations.

Finally, before I take on questions, allow me to reiterate that it was an honour and privilege to have had the opportunity to command UNPROFOR. It was a unique, unforgettable and satisfying experience from which I came away with a great sense of achievement the credit for which goes to the wonderful set of colleagues, contingents and other staff who worked with me for a year.

Growing Deployment of the Armed Forces in Aid to Civil Authorities

MAJOR AKSHAYA HANDA

INTRODUCTION

Centuries back Nostradamus had predicted thirty years of war and violence around the world, towards the end of the twentieth century. The students of astrology date the beginning of this period from 1968. This was the year when Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King had been assassinated, Vietnam had its "Tet offensive" and students in Paris had their May on the barricades. Andreas Baeder burnt his first departmental store in Frankfurt before heading the dreaded Baeder-Meinoff gang. Zengakwen led uncontrollable violence in Tokyo, before creating the Japanese Red Army under the alias of Rengo Sekigun. Street fighting broke out in Turkey while Spain was rocked by the Basque rebellion. Ireland drifted closer to civil war and George Habbash started exporting terrorism when his commandos hijacked their first El Al Plane. Feltrinelli issued Europe's first open call for an armed guerrilla war while Carlos Marighella's "Mini Manual for the Urban Guerrilla" appeared for the first time. However, 1968 is inadequate to study insurgency as the major danger to internal security. In fact the techniques and tactics of guerrilla warfare are probably the oldest form of warfare known. But the uses to which these have been put and, the context in which they have operated in the last twenty plus years, do bestow an element of novelty on them.

In the past it was a means by which one nation fought another, but since the Second World War it has become a means to resolve internal political dispute and thus a problem of internal security.

In our country too, this is an ongoing phenomenon. Not only has the sophistication improved but the increase in numbers has transformed it from a problem limited to the North East into a threat to internal security. Our dissimilarities in the ethnic, economic, linguistic and religious aspects have manifested into the form of communal riots, insurgencies, parochial demands and attempts by radical groups to effect revolutionary social change.

The basic cause is discontent arising out of a desire for change.

Violence, instability, population explosion, unemployment, urbanization leading to social and economic disparities have combined with an erosion of values, heightened aspirations and corruption. Criminalisation of politics and interference in functioning of civil administration and law enforcing agencies deny the fulfilment of people's genuine aspirations, thus leading to discontent. If not handled properly it allows the populace to play into the hands of leaders with vested interests, thus leading to unlawful activities like rioting and insurgency.

In India, law and order problem is a state subject. Thus each state has created its own machinery to deal with it, giving rise to a number of forces both at the state and national level - as the centre too has got machinery to deal with it like CRPF, BSF, NSG etc. However, still the army finds itself involved in this aid to civil authorities, to its displeasure, moreover, it mostly finds itself in fire brigade actions leading to only short term results.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURGENT AS A WEAPON

The history of the development of weapons begins from the pre historic times when men fought with clubs and stones. However, soon the necessity of standing away from the enemy for self protection was realized and bows and arrows were developed. Speed was next in priority and led to the emergence of the swords and cavalry. But soon, a situation developed where opposing cavalries were too busy equating themselves off to have a decisive effect on the battle. Gunpowder then appeared to hold sway for a while. The American civil war is supposed to be the first war where both the opposing sides were equally equipped. The infantry then quickly realized the importance of digging in and trench warfare was born. This phase reached its zenith in the First World War when the trench deadlock ensured. In Blocks words it signalled the superiority of defence over attack. The initial response to this was the attempt to blast a way through by using artillery. Given the infantry fire power in defence this was seen as a progressive advance under a series of detailed artillery fire plans. This was countered by citing two to three defensive lines out of direct artillery observation. Tanks then appeared and were used to crush wire and enable the troops to cross enemy defences. However, before their full potential could be realized the war was over. Another new weapon to make its mark as a promising method of interdiction was the aircraft. After the First World War the British took the lead in search of a fresh concept to restore battle field mobility. General Fuller envisaged the use of a concentration of medium tanks to sweep through the enemy lines and attack the enemy HQ before fanning out to disrupt communication and supply; thus causing a collapse of the defended line. Capt BH Liddell Hart, prefixed it by an infantry attack all along the front to look for weak spots

through which, the tank concentration supported by aircraft can break through. However, it was left to the Germans, to prove that almost any front could thus be turned. Armies then started building up their tank and aircraft concentration but this came at a considerable cost to themselves. Even as the Second World War was closing the victors found themselves in the midst of an economic crisis which left them no better off than the vanquished. They were to take half a decade plus to achieve even a semblance of recovery. Hence, once more the race was on to look for cheaper weapons likely to provide a quick battlefield solution. One option was offered by the nuclear club. But soon its membership was colossal enough to destroy humanity, if resorted too. The insurgent was the second option. Cheap to train and equip, the insurgent held all the advantages of surprise of time, place and strength. Moreover, he could be used not only in war but could destabilize the enemy without any visible repercussions while the politicians propagated peaceful coexistence. It was a weapon which had the capability to destabilize a country, hit at its economic base, inflict a sense of insecurity and threaten the very territorial integrity of the nation.

STRATEGY OF THE INSURGENT

Popular Base. Violence is used to capture media attention and it is justified by citing popular causes. The insurgent claims government repression and thus tries to win a popular base. "Later" - in the words of Carlos Marighella, - "the government has no alternative but to increase repression. The police round ups, house searches, arrests of innocents, make life unbearable in the city. General sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation is transformed into a military one in which, the militants appear more and more responsible for errors and violence. When pacifiers and opportunists see the militants on the bank of an abyss, they join hands and beg the hangman for elections and other tripe designed to fool the masses. Rejecting the so called political solution, the guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without let up to sabotage, terrorism, extortions assaults, kidnapping, and executions thus heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act".

Aim. His aim is to wear down the government in the hope that a stage would come when to combat the small band of insurgents, the nation has no choice but to commit most of its reserves. Thus escalating the costs of internal security to unbearable limits to the exchequer. It is hoped that this, in conjunction with a systematic attack on commerce would destroy the economy and force the nation onto its knees. Mao was one of the first to pro-

pogate this strategy against Japan. To summarize Maos writings , "the revolutionary's only chance of defeating a superior enemy lies in the ability to raise the population. Once this is achieved space and manpower provide time. Time was the equalizing factor between the sides since...in spite of.. her (Japan's) industrial progress, her raw materials and her resources, she was still not equipped to face a protracted war". Thus Mao rightly appreciated the need for an industrial society to force the issue quickly; his intention thus was to avoid a decision, ensuring the governments tactical success could not be translated into a strategic victory. He thereby prolonged the war to a point where it became politically and economically unacceptable to Japan. That, the insurgents in our country too have adopted this strategy is rather clear from the systematic intimidation of commerce in the affected areas. From the murder of non Punjabi engineers in Punjab to the attacks on tourists, Swedish engineers and electricity dept., Mahura's engineers in Kashmir or for that matter ONGC engineer's murder in Assam, all point to this trend. The writ not to sell the produce to government agencies in Punjab and other threats to commerce only reinforces this statement. This studied with Carlos Marighelas advice in the previous paragraph and the rejection of elections in Punjab and the subsequent escalation of violence there, will also provide a clue to any such attempt anywhere else.

Murder, extortion and kidnapping are major weapons in the arsenal of the insurgent. He thus aims to draw the security forces into the urban areas so that the rural areas are free for him. There he finds sanctuaries and imposes his own writ thereby demoralizing society by exposing the impotency of a "repressive government regime." He may even use religious and social factors to divide the society against itself and aims to create a situation where the population has no choice but to turn to the insurgent as the only means. To create this situation the insurgent uses the media.

Role of Media. While individual actions may vary in aim and may be mounted for a specific purpose, a lot of emphasis is placed on their psychological impact and value. Every action is thought of in terms of its effect on the morale of the population and its ability to catch a place in the evening television news or, the next morning newspaper headlines. Sometimes they may even resort to threat to the media in order to make them fall in line with them. In case they fail, their elimination is also not ruled out. The murder of Lala Jagat Narain is such a case in point. The official media, on the other hand is viewed as a mouth piece of the government and its credibility dwindles with the masses. The local vernacular press meanwhile gets intimidated to speak the language of the dissidents.

Writs. The militants in order to gain popularity and prove their

supremacy over the government enforces measures which are close to the heart of society's intelligentsia. Most of their edicts, which are fundamentalist, revivalist and reactionary in nature are aimed at achieving legitimacy and respectability for the militants. Compulsory education, hundred percent attendance of teachers, prohibition, tobacco ban, enforced religion are all examples of such writs.

Arms and Ammunition. A small percentage of their arms are looted from the security forces or the local population. However, most are either purchased in the open market or supplied by friendly countries. Even the purchase of arms is usually financed by the latter or sometimes banks or locals may be looted. To actually carry out the deal organisations like the Henri Curriel's Aide et Amitié (Help and friendship) come in handy. Not only do, these organisations provide facilities to purchase arms but also help insurgents on the run.

Prosperity. One of the greatest misnomers about the strategy of insurgents is that they appeal to the poverty of an area for popular support. Thus the administration tries to counter them by trying to eradicate poverty. However, the failure of such measures can be explained by the fact that German Bader Meinoff gang, Japanese Red Army, Italian Red Brigade were all born in areas which were quite prosperous. Hence the administration should find the causes of such movements elsewhere and try to eradicate that cause.

On getting apprehended, the militants try to secure their release by resorting to acts which will enable them to blackmail the government e.g. kidnapping and hijackings. If this fails they project themselves as martyrs on the altar of the popular cause. They may even go to the extent of winning elections at the point of a gun. Yet when free they may not bother about popular support. Any semblance of opposition is usually crushed with a heavy hand. As one provisional IRA leader has even been quoted to remark "A revolutionary does not depend upon popular mandate as a basis for its actions. Its mandate comes from the justness and correctness of its cause".

Nexus with Petty Criminals. This usually takes two forms :

- (a) Across the border smuggling of arms, ammunition and heroin may be done through them. Sometimes lucrative items like drugs etc are also traded to provide finance.
- (b) A number of petty criminals too take advantage of the situation by extorting money in the name of the militants. Not only does the

population succumb to the ruse, but it also spreads panic amongst them.

The general environment prevailing under such circumstances is characterised by a sense of insecurity among the populace which manifests itself by way of silent obedience and support to militants, migration to safer areas and reluctance to cooperate with forces engaged in combating the situation. The militants ride on an overpowering cult of the gun and defiance of authority and, often establish a nexus with powers inimical to the state, and in the process they acquire sophisticated and lethal weaponry. The general climate amounts to collapse of administration and the authority of the government gets eroded while the writs of the militants reign supreme. Bureaucrats appear shaken, demoralised and become mere onlookers. The politicians, some of them having fuelled the situation may withdraw from the scene as the militants now threaten their existence. The police are the first to be marginalised through intimidation, lynching and other forms of retribution. Being demoralised and subverted they prefer to learn to live and let live and consequently their credibility gets eroded. The sum total, therefore, is a confused state of affairs with little respect for law of the land and writs of the militants reigning supreme, virtual breakdown of Government machinery, a discredited media and demoralized bureaucracy and police force. All this together ropes in the armed forces to combat the situation.

Mob, Riots and Unlawful Assembly. To a lesser extent the armed forces are also used to curb riots and unlawful assemblies. The latter usually comprise of a large group of people feeling strongly for a cause and whose emotions have been whipped up to a frenzy by a few vocal personalities. Initially they can be termed as an unlawful assembly and when they turn threatening, a mob. The same mob when it turns violent and goes into a rampage is called a riot. The degree of control of the leaders reduce as the unlawful assembly deteriorates. A number of times, opportunists and petty criminals try to convert a mob into a riot to have an opportunity to loot and plunder. The basic cause of these may vary from labour management problems to the Mandal Commission; however, they are all characterised by political opportunism and an attempt to sensationalize by the fourth estate.

The armed forces are usually called in only when the situation is already out of control of the state and para military forces. By then the riots are already well under way and the armed forces have little choice but to restore to short term measures to achieve normalcy. Also, by then the political opportunists and the fourth estate are already established on the scene and it is thus easy for them to look for reasons to embarrass the administration. The armed forces personnel are thus used by them as a mere tool for this.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF INTERNAL SECURITY : A REVIEW

As per entry No. 1 of list II of the seventh schedule of our Constitution, public order and its maintenance is a state subject. However, entry No. 1 of list III in the same schedule lists criminal law under the concurrent list. The armed forces are placed under the union list by entry No. 2 of list I in the same schedule. Further entry 2A states "deployment of the armed forces of the union or any other force of the union subject to the control of the union or any contingent or unit thereof in any state in aid to civil power" thus placing this power with the union.

This Effectively Implies the following :

(a) The states have to create their own forces for internal security. These are over and above the armed forces and the forces under the home ministry for internal security. While the former may create their own armed, unarmed and elite units, the latter remains in business with the CRPF, at times BSF, Assam Rifles, Rashtriya Rakshya Rifles, NSG etc, not to mention the armed forces. Apart from these all these have their own intelligence agencies like the BSF G sec or the states IB superimposing the Army's I&FS and centre's R&AW, SIB and SSB.

(b) The very large number of forces defeats the very purpose for which they are created. Personal ambitions and inter service rivalry may result in keeping intelligence to oneself and not sharing it thus resulting in many groups working at cross roads. This tunnel vision is visible also in varying ideologies which may even seem as varying shades of sincerity resulting in a lot of bad blood and senior commanders losing faith in some forces. Situations where armed forces are asked to operate in areas of responsibility of the para military forces are not thus really uncommon.

(c) Created, trained and answerable only to the state governments the state forces are subject to all the allied political and bureaucratic pressure. Situations where such pressure is brought to bear on them in favour of the insurgents are a known secret in our country.

(d) Raised from the area where they have to operate, the state forces are subject to blackmail for their lives and property as also that of their near and dear ones. Thus they can be intimidated and forced to live and let live - such a passive response reduces their credibility with the masses and converts them into passive observers.

(e) A number of insurgents may avoid the security forces by operating around the inter responsibility borders and simply crossing over when pressure from one side increases. The situation along the Punjab Haryana border is such an example.

(f) Only when the state forces accept their inability to handle a situation are the armed forces called in this. By then it may be too late.

(g) By the time the armed forces become effective this situation is explosive enough to demand short term measures to restore public confidence and order.

(h) All the while, the prerogative of which organisation is to be considered unlawful and banned lies with the centre. A typical case in point is Tamil Nadu where operations against the LTTE were going on since the beginning of OP Pawan, however, it has been banned only in 1992. This enabled it to take advantage of the interim period to generate funds and restore to propaganda creating popular support unhindered.

(j) Actions by the state forces before the armed forces move in, may have added to the alienation of the masses.

(k) Even while the army is operative the state forces are not under command of the armed forces. Neither are they answerable to the army nor are they under any obligation to co-ordinate their efforts with the latter.

(l) The intelligence collection agencies usually pass information to their HQ from where it flows down to the forces resulting in no real time information.

(m) In case of any apprehension the army is supposed to hand him over to the police for prosecution. Experience shows that while the army complains of inadequate follow up by the police, the latter claims that the army brings inadequate evidence.

(n) A number of petty thieves and criminals might escape the dragnet and continue helping the insurgents.

(o) The general public loses faith in the law and order machinery. For them the police are incapable of providing protection and the Army will not always be there. The harrassed population then has no choice but to turn to the militants for protection who seem to be the only constant factor.

(p) The army is to leave the scene as soon as the situation is normal enough to be handled by the state forces. Hence the militants have an option to lie low or cross over to a neighbouring state in view of army pressure thereby portraying normalcy and returning once the army returns to barracks. Thus avoiding the conversion of tactical victory into a strategic victory and a long term solution.

(q) Not having any check in the form of Army Act the state forces tend to misuse the vast powers granted to them under the various acts such as TADA, NSA etc. Not only does this allow the vocalists of human rights and the fourth estate to sensationalize the issue, they also tend to alienate the population.

REASONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY

(a) *Loss of Faith in Law and Order Machinery.* With a spiralling increase in violence and other unlawful activities the population tends to lose faith in the government law and order machinery. When the latter fail to be the protectors of society and the innocents, time is ripe for the militants to step in and portray themselves as their guardians, thereby taking the place of the legitimate government and imposing their writ. At such a stage the army is called in as was done in Assam.

(b) *Over Commitment of State Resources.* A number of times other forces are so over stretched in the defence of vital installations that they are not available for any offensive action against the UGs. Thus the latter get a free hand and the civil administration has to turn to the armed forces for help. In Kashmir the state and a large number of para military forces are exclusively guarding administrative and commercial installations or VIPs and their relatives thereby creating this situation.

(c) *To Maintain Control.* When, the militants are powerful enough to run a parallel government and to intimidate the state forces then armed forces are usually called in.

(d) *To Instil Confidence.* A number of times when the battle of supremacy is on between the state forces and the militants, army is usually called in, to instil confidence in the locals in the ability of the administration to prevail. The aim, thus, is to put pressure on any fence sitters to fall in line with the security forces as also to break the morale of the militants. This was the basic reason for their deployment in Punjab before the 1992 elections.

(e) *Less Confidence in State and Para Military Forces.* A number of commanders do not have required faith in the ability of the Para Military forces and tend to make a bid for the armed forces. Even at a number of places where both are deployed side by side, the armed forces are asked to operate in the area of responsibility of state and para military forces. Considering their own responsibilities this is a massive strain on their personnel.

(f) *Fear.* Fear of the militants or the attempt to force a show down with a particular political party usually results in the vocal demand for army's deployment.

(g) *Prestige.* For atleast quite a few persons security guards provided by the security forces elite is becoming a matter of prestige in society. This has the effect of tying down elite offensive forces and requiring more than necessary other forces. Not that they achieve much, for their value is more of a deterrent than anything else. All they can do even if they are from a unit like the NSG - is strike back once the assailant has had a shot at the VIP. For this value, tying down of so many forces is certainly not justified.

ADVANTAGES OF STATE AND PARA MIL FORCES IN INTERNAL SECURITY

(a) *Knowledge of Legal Procedure.* The militants can be expected to invoke renowned lawyers to come to their defence on being apprehended. In such legal procedures, even a small procedural error may result in the former escaping scot free, thereby nullifying the efforts of many a soldier. The state and para military forces by virtue of their frequency have a much better knowledge of such legal procedures.

(b) *Power of Prosecution.* These forces have the power of prosecution and detention. Thus they can follow up a case till its logical end.

(c) *Intelligence.* By virtue of the fact that they operate in contact with the locals much longer, the police and the para military forces are certainly in a better position to collect intelligence.

(d) *Local Language.* A decisive factor in winning local support and intelligence collection is knowledge of local dialect. Having been recruited from their area of operations and due to their longish stay these forces have a distinct edge in this.

(e) *Petty Criminals.* A knowledge of the local criminals combines with

their jurisdiction over them to give the state forces an advantage to deal with the militant-criminal nexus.

(f) *Communication.* Certain para military forces like the BSF and Assam Rifles (AR) - thanks to better and shorter system of procurement - have better and more communication equipment than the army at the functional level of a unit. Also, the state forces no matter where deployed are automatically authorised a telephone, an important instrument to maintain contact with the locals and obtain real time information.

(g) *Early Warning.* Due to all these factors put together these forces get much more early warning for any impending trouble compared to the army.

(h) *Advantages in Riot Control*

(i) The state forces are usually there much before the riots start and are in position to take preventive measures whereas the armed forces move in later.

(ii) Having better coordination with the civil administration the state forces can impose measures like curfew etc more easily.

(iii) If situation gets out of hand the state forces can restore to lathi charge and firing without looking over their shoulders whereas the armed forces have to take prior written permission and even then to account for each and every round.

(iv) Crowd dispersal equipment like tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons are available with them and not the armed forces.

ADVANTAGES OF THE ARMED FORCES IN INTERNAL SECURITY

(a) *Training.* An average army jawan is certainly better trained than his counterpart in state or para military forces in "minor tactics". This advantage in minor tactics usually proves to be decisive.

(b) *Morale.* Higher morale - resulting from better training and better looking after - is quite an important factor. It is not uncommon to find a CRPF company hundreds of miles away from its Bn HQ while its platoons are in some other corner of the country. What decisive effect can an individual - whose basic needs like letters and clothing are unfulfilled - play in an encounter.

(c) *Small Arms.* Compared to an average state or para military force unit the army unit is certainly better equipped in small arms.

(d) *Discipline.* The strict imposition of the Army Act forces the army to maintain a high standard of discipline and not get a feeling that "power flows from the barrel of their guns". This ensures better relations with locals and prompt obedience.

(e) *Unity of Command.* A unified command ensures, better coordination, more exchange of information and quicker decisions. It also does not allow the militants to take advantage of any real or imaginary boundaries.

(f) *Rotation of Units.* Timely rotation of units ensures not only field and peace tenures but also that units do not remain long enough in one place to form any nexus or get corrupted.

(g) *Reputation.* Its reputation of being able to restore order is usually enough to instill confidence in the locals on induction. This does go a long way to restore normalcy, force fence sitters and make the people come out against the militants. However the army would certainly do well to build up upon this. The feeling amongst some is that if they help the army the militants would retaliate once the army leaves. This needs to be combated and the feeling that the army is always there for them to turn to, should be instilled thereby improving their sense of security.

(h) *Independence from Pressure.* Not being directly answerable to them, political or bureaucratic pressure cannot be brought to bear on a unit commander in favour of any one.

(j) *Armed Forces Special Power Act-1958.* Wherever applicable this act provides powers to the armed forces to deal effectively with a threat to internal security and normalize a situation.

(k) *Advantages in Riot and Mob Control*

(i) *Firing for Effect.* Unlike the police and other state forces the armed forces are supposed to fire only for effect and not in the air or over the heads of the rioters and mobsters. This results in a lot of fence sitters breaking ranks on the appearance of the armed forces.

(ii) *Minimum Force.* Unlike the others, the armed forces resort

to only that much force which is the bare minimum required. This saves them from being dragged into any controversy as also by portraying a picture of impartiality it stops a lot of persons who are not too sure of their stand from joining the mobsters and rioters.

(iii) *Impartiality and Necessity.* The non politicised and disciplined armed forces are able to implement these two principles, and thus separate out the opportunists and fence sitters from the mob without entering into any unnecessary controversy.

WAYS TO CURB OVER EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN INTERNAL SECURITY

Late Activity Entry. Lenin had once said that, the soundest strategy is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy". In a protracted war of internal security the army too should only be brought in at such a late stage, when the situation is about to get out of hand of the state forces. However, even while the battle of supremacy between the state forces and the insurgents is on, intelligence collection must start. More so, this work should carry on at the operative level of a unit and not be limited to HQ only. A typical case is that of Jharkhand. Although, the situation as yet does not warrant deployment of the armed forces, the latter must be prepared to strike at short notice and for that they must develop their contacts for information collection now.

Coordinated Actions. All forces combating insurgency must coordinate their actions at the lowest level to be effective. Hence early in the battle of supremacy all of them must be put under a unified command. As the army would be the ultimate weapon in this protracted war, as also, as at this stage only, the latter has to start its intelligence collection, hence, this unified command should be of the armed forces as far as possible.

Political Will. The administration and its political masters must possess a political will to resolve the issues leading to a threat to internal security. They must realise that the cause of this protracted war is political and so should be the cure. The fact that all around the country when militants are challenging the constitution, the politician's call for them to come to the negotiating table within the constitutional framework may be a trifle unjustified. Time may well be ripe for an introspection as to why our constitution has left so many aspirations unfulfilled leading to discontentment and a threat to internal security throughout the country.

Visible Administrative Gains. The administration has to realise that the militants can appeal to a popular cause only by issuing writs which show immediate and visible gains to the intelligensia. They force prohibition but do not offer anything to eradicate poverty. Their answer to unemployment is to force workers from outside the area to flee but for them economic development is not an issue. These are all issues which effect the individual in the short run and show results which are immediately visible. Any issue which has only long term effects does not merit their consideration, no matter how important it is. In fact they use them only to blackmail the administration. In order to sideline them the administration would have to beat them at their own game. While continuing the long term projects, they would have to resort to measures which would show short term results too. Simultaneously, it has to prove, that, it has a back bone to stand up to the militants blackmail, for, any policy of appeasement would be viewed by the public as a victory for the militants. Transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab or slowing down of Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal or continuation of Article 370 are all such measures of appeasement which would portray a moral victory for the militants and make them stronger. On the other hand, the administration would certainly do better to meet the insurgents writ of prohibition with an official clamp down and their writ on language to be sanctioned officially. All this without giving publicity to the insurgents writs.

Citizens Force. Insurgency is a war aimed not at the minds of the enemy commanders nor at the body of it's soldiers but rather on the minds and bodies of the population. To win this war the target has to be given the capability to strike back. This is all the more important considering the fact that the insurgent would be visible only for a few minutes when he himself is attacking. At that time he would be most vulnerable to any retaliation. Otherwise, to search and destroy him would be a rather laborious, time consuming and mostly non productive task for the armed forces. Also, a partially successful retaliation by unarmed or poorly armed civilians would demoralize the insurgent much more than a highly successful operation by the security forces. However, this needs to be viewed with caution, for a poorly armed regular organised force, can be an asset to the insurgent if it decides to live and let live - as also provide a ready source of arms. Hence, the need is for a force which would live with the people, feel strongly for them, is armed and has an obligation to fight the insurgent. To further increase their effectiveness it has to be ensured that they are not prone to blackmail; the organisation of Mashavat's Hashomer in Israel is an example of one such organization. In our own country the Assam Rifles and such other organizations can effectively play this role especially when trained and officered by regular army officers. Another good, though relatively unknown example is that of the Village Defence Parties in Mizoram. Equipped with

vintage weapons and meagre ammunition these are under the loose control of the district officials. The government pays them some remuneration for their efforts but they do play an important role in making the people feel secure and thereby choose their own independent path.

Concentrating the Armed Forces only in Active Insurgency Area. Once such citizens forces have become strong enough in a particular Zone (e.g. Assam Rifles for the north east) the passive insurgencies can be safely handed over to them and the armed forces concentrated only in areas of active insurgency. In our country today the North East minus Assam can safely be handed over to Assam Rifles and army deployed elsewhere.

Riot and Mob Control. Use of the armed forces in this aid to civil authority cannot be justified in most forums. This must be avoided at all costs for this not only gives a wrong impression to the masses, but with increased awareness a situation might arise when our troops might question us. Its remedy lies in inculcating the principles of impartiality, necessity, minimum force and firing for effect in the force actually responsible for them. However, if it cannot be avoided the army, must only be brought in at the last stage and pulled out at the first.

Anti Insurgency Measures. These are measures which are aimed to create an environment where insurgency cannot survive or for that matter be born. Aimed at the root causes these measures are intended to act like preventive medicine.

(a) *Political Education.* The first prerequisite for this is a government which has a will to counter insurgency and not support it for their own short term gains. Ours being a democratic country we get the government we deserve. In a place like the USA presidential candidates got lost in the oblivion on a sex scandal. But in our country criminals and dacoits can win elections and rise to unprecedented levels. Its about time that the masses be educated to drop such leaders. Only a deliberate mass effort can possibly bring about such an education to make the masses conscious of their power and duties as the electorate.

(b) *National Spirit.* The nationalistic spirit of the thirties and forties needs to be revived so that individuals place the nation before self and contribute to the overall development of the nation. Thereby removing the desire for a change away from the established system.

(c) *Media Offensive.* A powerful and well orchestrated media offensive will:

- (i) discredit the trouble makers on the international scene,
- (ii) expose their narrow interests to the nation thereby weaning away public support,
- (iii) win support for the security force, and
- (iv) educate the population for a need to retaliate.

(d) *Tackling Unemployment.* Unemployment is a major cause of discontent which arouses the desire for change. Hence unemployment has to be tackled. The government should use its limited resources to promote small scale industry - as the latter has the potential of many more jobs in a competitive market than the public sector. Further, import of cheap technology would be much more beneficial than a couple of super computers.

(e) *Curbing Population Explosion.* The population explosion is another major cause of unfulfilled desires leading to discontent and desire for a change. This needs to be curbed.

(f) *Redressal of Grievances.* Justice delayed is justice denied they say. In our country it is fast becoming a cause for the population to turn to the militants for an early solution. This position needs rectification at the earliest.

(g) *Civil Administration.* To remove discontent there is just no alternative to an efficient administration. All efforts must hence be made to streamline it and remove corruption. Worldwide experience shows that perhaps decentralization and removal of curbs and licences are the best remedy to corruption. Logically, too removal of licences would remove chances for corruption.

FORMULATING A COUNTER INSURGENT STRATEGY

The basic counter insurgent strategy remains the same as what the security forces had followed in Malaya. Hence, it would be interesting to study the French counter insurgency operations in Algeria - where military victory was gained but still the government had to withdraw, and the successful counter insurgency operations in Malaya.

Counter Insurgency in Algeria. The fact that they were fighting on what was considered to be home soil and from where there was no place to withdraw made the French commit five lakh men and in military terms win the war. Algeria was isolated from external sources of succour by the creation

of massive barriers along her frontiers and by intensive patrolling of the coast. French resettled the population and garrisoned the country in strength. In the countryside, aggressive light units were used in scouting operations characterized by an unprecedented use of helicopters. At one stage 600 of them were deployed. The step produced quick results by dropping of fresh forces to maintain constant relentless contact with the tired insurgent. The very elite of the Paras, Foreign legion, Marines and Chasseurs were used for these actions. Though extremely costly the tactics worked and by 1961 the military strength of insurgency was spent. But in making this effort the population was alienated and political advantage dissipated forcing President de Gaulle to concede defeat.

Counter Insurgency in Malaya. The basic tactics of these operations were ambush and intense patrolling, the aim being to control the jungle around settled areas up to a depth of five hours marching time. In time this proved very successful as the jungle craft of the security forces improved and outstripped that of the insurgents. It was the accumulation of this pressure which led to the communist's breaking off their struggle. Foremost amongst the political tactics was the resettlement and concentration of the population under close and increasingly effective surveillance, material and psychological inducements to the population, liberalization of the naturalization laws and a tightening denial programme of all types of supplies to the insurgents. Added to these was a streamlining and extremely close co-ordination of administration, police and military efforts. Gradually, recovering from a shaky start and growing in effectiveness with an influx of new weapons, equipment and manpower - the unified command identified and eliminated the communists. This was achieved by a systematic clearing of the countryside, area by area, concentrating on the weakest area before moving on to the more badly effected areas.

From the study of these we can say that the most effective technique for counter insurgency is the Jeff and Mutt technique. Using the armed forces to hit hard against the insurgents and thereby driving their supporters and the population into the arms of an administration which seems oversensitive and over concerned to the problems of the people. For this to succeed the following are important.

- (a) *Friendly Ties with Neighbours.* No strategy against insurgents can succeed till the time they are receiving support and bases in our neighbouring countries. Hence an all out diplomatic effort has to be made to improve our ties with them. However, before doing that we must also be sure that we do not support any insurgency against them from our soil otherwise retaliation is bound to be there.

(b) *Offensive Action.* In case the diplomatic efforts fail to neutralize the bases in neighbouring territories offensive action to eliminate the same may be considered. Israel has already shown the way in Lebanon time and again and more recently a tiny country like Myanmar has been launching raids to destroy Kachin and Karen bases in Thailand. They were audacious enough to even launch raids in Indian territory (New Samtal region of Manipur) to capture and/or kill their army deserters. To take on and destroy NSCN, PLA, ULFA, UNLF, HPC, PREPAK etc bases in Myanmar and Bangladesh is certainly within our capabilities, though, yes, Pakistan and China might be a different matter. However, action against the smaller countries would certainly remove some thorns from our side. As a compromise between friendly ties and offensive action a treaty can be entered into jointly to search and destroy suspected insurgent camps in both countries.

(c) *Preparation for a Long Protracted War.* The population has to be made mentally prepared for a long protracted war. They must be ready to be ever vigilant, protect themselves from stray bomb attacks, for helping the security forces and if possible strike out against the terrorists. As brought out earlier one partially successful retaliatory action by unarmed/poorly armed civilians would demoralize the terrorists more than a few highly successful operations by the security forces.

(d) *Force the Militants to the Negotiating Table.* The security forces must realize that military action is secondary to administrative and political action. Their job is to restore law and order and apply constant pressure on the militants thus forcing them to the negotiating table. For any successful negotiation some leaders powerful enough to mobilize the masses have to be spared so that they can come to the negotiating table. Hence the security forces must spare the moderates and the top rung leaders. In Punjab where repeatedly the moderates have been placed behind bars the Akali Dal has passed into the hands of extremists, forcing the moderates too to make a call for Khalistan.

(e) *Unity of Command.* Considering the need for extremely close coordination and real time information all operating groups must be placed under one commander. As a rule, any commander whose area stretches more than twelve hrs walking time corner to corner - must have all the forces operating in his area under command to include all Army, Para Mil, State forces and intelligence collection agencies. All of them must report only to him and should be dependent on their own HQ's only for technical support.

(f) *Coordination with Administration.* Close coordination of all actions between the security forces and the local administration is necessary. The two must complement each other. But considering the fact that restoration of law and order must precede any negotiation and confidence building, when there is a conflict action of the security forces should have priority.

(g) *Restoration of Confidence.* To win over the local population it is important that they have confidence that the army would always be there and they can turn to them whenever they feel insecure or when threatened by the militants.

(h) *Confidence in Law and Order Machinery.* To maintain normalcy, the armed forces must remain in position till the state law and order machinery achieves total confidence of the locals.

(j) *Judiciary.* This is important from two points of view.

(i) *Militants.* Any apprehended militant's case must be finalised within a maximum of seven days thereby denying him any undue publicity or the chance to be proclaimed a martyr.

(ii) *Local Grievances.* Often when the legal battle drags on endlessly, the aggrieved turn to the militants for quick jungle justice. In order to counter this trend our judicial system must be revamped to decide any case within one or two hearings and not later than two months from filing.

(k) *Defence of Public Services.* Installations providing service to public are the VA's in this war. Their relative importance may be measured only in terms of relative discomfort to the public in case of disruption. Electric sub stations and banks fall in this category but not their head office and certainly not their officers. One of the main objectives of the insurgent is to tie down the maximum security forces to static defences, leaving the countryside free for them. Hence only those installations which are high on the discomfort degree should be committed to static defences. Certainly elite troops should not be used for protecting mobile targets like the VIP's. Maximum troops should be kept free to dominate the area.

(l) *Area Domination.* The country side should be dominated by patrolling and ambushes. In fact troops should be so stationed so as to give a feeling of being omnipresent.

(m) *Urban Areas.* In a country like ours, measures like relocation and grouping of population are not possible. Also the security forces do not have enough strength to cover all areas simultaneously. Hence area by area clearance should be done. Considering the need to protect commerce and economy the urban areas will get priority as also because of the concentration of public service installations and media attention available there.

(n) *Use of Helicopters.* Once contact has been achieved all efforts have to be made to maintain it. For this, use of helicopters though expensive would produce results.

(o) *Countering Popularity Writs.* The administration must do its best to counter the popularity writs of the insurgents. If this is not possible whole hearted support must be given to them portraying to the people that the administration is as concerned about them as the militants and their differences are something else rather than such fundamental issues. As they say if you cannot beat them join them.

(p) *Psychological Operations.* These should be carried out with the aim to educate the people to the vested interests of the insurgents. Also all efforts must be made to denounce and discredit the latter internationally.

(q) *Stopping the Supply of Arms and Ammunition.*

(i) *Blocking the Border.* Our border need to be sealed against the smuggling of arms and ammunition.

(ii) *Reducing Weapons in the Public.* Weapons must be removed from individuals as they are easy meat and are made targets for them. This would also reduce petty dacoity.

(r) *Leaving the Infantry Free for Operations.* The infantry is the basic arm for this war. They have to cover large areas, often, conventionally beyond their capabilities. Hence all efforts must be made to leave them free to carry out their task and not be committed elsewhere. One usually experiences that the major portion of an infantry Bn is being used as unskilled labour from transit camps to ceremonial guards. ALA, CEME and other inspections still take majority of the time as they need to be gone through with the same old paraphernalia. The officers still have to worry about ceremonial dresses for parties when all they should have is the combat dress. State of equipment in the unit is still poor and

a shame to be compared to Assam Rifles or the BSF. Goodwill with the locals may have to be bought at the cost of an infantry soldier as intelligence collection may have to be done by disbursing their rations or meagre resources. Lately, the trend of Sainik Samellans by senior officers and politicians is almost the last straw. Based on large scale preparations these do not even achieve the basic aim of a free interaction and, if interaction is so important let the VIP visit a patrol base acquired by a week old unshaven and tired patrol. All that they achieve is a taking off of a large number of troops from the area of responsibility. Further to beef up the infantry, other arms like arty or armoured can be put under command - say a battery or a squadron for a Bn to be employed in static guard duties or like in stops for cordon and search and raids.

CREATION OF COUNTER INSURGENT ENVIRONMENT BY CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Increasing the Role of the Army. Considering the fact that insurgency is a total war - for atleast a few years the armed forces have to take an active part in it. Whenever deployed, full law and order must be placed under it alongwith all the forces. It's advantages would be :-

- (a) The confidence of the people in the law and order machinery will be restored.
- (b) The potential informants against the militants will be reassured that the Army will not, just go away after a few days leaving them to the mercy of militants.
- (c) The nexus of militants and criminals would be broken.
- (d) A situation where the army is called in, in the end, when situation is already explosive will not be allowed to develop.
- (e) Police and para military forces will be used to their full potential.
- (f) Any case will be followed to its logical legal end.

Law and Order to be made a Central Subject. The seventh schedule has to be amended to make law and order a union subject. This would,

- (a) remove any ambiguity,
- (b) curb a tendency to have too many forces, and
- (c) unity of command will be easier.

Unity of Command. Atleast for a few years, all the counter insurgent forces must be placed under one command, Army Act imposed on all and training to be guided by the army. This would achieve the following :-

- (a) Better training of minor tactics for all.
- (b) A boost to the morale.
- (c) Oneupmanship will be done away with.
- (d) Better discipline because of the Army Act.
- (e) Insulation from bureaucratic or political pressure.
- (f) When 'elegated to the level of operational commander it will ensure
 - (i) better coordination of operations, and
 - (ii) coraboration and exchange of real time information.

Actions to Reduce the Gun Culture. The gun is today becoming an essential part of many a household and a headache for the law enforcing agencies. In a place like Punjab where till a few years back family disputes, land and water brawls were sorted out by clubs and fists today guns are ruling the roost. A number of such murders are later reported as terrorist violence. On the one side, it is giving the latter undue media attention, on the other, it is demoralizing for the public. Also, these weapons are always a ready source for the militants. Hence, this fashion needs to be curbed with an iron hand. Exemplary action should be taken against any one found with an unlicensed arm. Also in areas where Armed Forces Special Power Act has been enforced power of issuing licenses should be exclusively with the army and old licences should be ratified by them. Any one failing to do so within a specified period should be considered and dealt with as in possession of an unlicensed arm.

Press. Freedom of the press - though a sacred cow in principle, has to be curbed when the situation so demands. Not being accountable to the armed forces nor under any threat from them, the press is free to scrutinize each of their actions and, on their whims and fancies sensationalize an issue. On the other hand under constant threat from the militants for their and their near ones lives a large number of media personnel fail to stand up to the militants. Not only do they change their dialect but also fear to report anything adverse to the insurgents. In Punjab today many newspapers are afraid to even use terms like terrorists and have replaced it with militants and martyrs. Hence, some kind of censorship would be in order in the affected

areas. Also, exclusive public relation departments have to be organized at not higher than brigade level to ensure pro-armed forces reporting.

Militants Blackmail. A favourite tactic of the militants is to resort to actions which will provide them an opportunity to blackmail the government. Not only does this enable them to win concessions (like release of colleagues) but the media attention generated shows the government in a bad light. If the latter do not concede, they are portrayed as a cruel, heartless, repressive regime and if they do concede, they are impotent and unable to stand up to the militants. Hijackings and Kidnappings fall in this category. Before formulating any policy on this the authorities must realize that any concessions to the militants is not only undoing the work of soldiers and giving a boost to the militants morale but also on obtaining concessions once, the frequency of such actions would only increase. Hence the best policy would be to stand up to the militant. Also a standard countrywide policy should be implemented against this.

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS

All efforts must be made to raise the morale of the state forces. A major revamping of their image - both in the public and their own eyes is required.

Standard of training of the state forces - especially in minor tactics needs to be raised. If required these could be done under the supervision of instructors from the armed forces.

To increase their effectiveness in riot and mob control the principles of impartiality, minimum force and firing only for effect should be inculcated in the state forces.

A three tier defence system should be created with a force between the State and armed forces. Based on similar lines as our Assam Rifles this should be created on a zonal basis. Each zone comprising of group of states thus allowing the personnel immunity from blackmail by deploying them away from the area of recruitment. These should be deployed in all towns and villages even when internal security is not under threat. Thereby ensuring that they do not have to move in at the last moment for fire brigade actions. Also, when trained and officered by the armed forces personnel on deputation it will provide a viable second line and a launch pad from where the armed forces can move in. The tendency to have a plethora of forces would then be curbed as all the forces would be brought under them. The aim being to create this line as the main defence line for internal security; they have to

be guarded against any false sense of security and complacency. For this the army would have to shed its best and most high profile officers and instructors on deputation to this force.

Once the zonal force becomes strong enough, passive insurgency areas like Manipur and Nagaland should be handed over to them thereby leaving army free for its primary task and for areas more badly effected.

The tendency to have too many forces even at the state level has to be curbed. These should be limited to only two, one the state police and the second should be the citizens force. The latter should be on the lines of the village defence parties and designed to thwart the insurgents/terrorists before the police or security forces reach.

The actual entry of the armed forces into the insurgency area should take place at a later stage; however, collection of intelligence and creation of sources should start early e.g. this activity should be in swing in potential area of Jharkhand by the end of 1992.

As early as possible a unified command should be established. The commanders of the army should take priority over others including state, zone or intelligence agencies. As a thumb rule a commander whose area extends more than twelve hours walk - corner to corner - must have all the forces in his area under command.

Army Act should be imposed on the second line of internal security to maintain their discipline and when the armed forces move in, it should also be enforced on the state forces for that period.

In the defence of public service installations only those whose disruptions would cause inconvenience to the public should be defended. Troops should not be committed for defence of others like head offices, VIP's or other civilians.

Borders must be blocked against smuggling of arms and ammunition.

All arms should be used for internal security and counter insurgency.

The infantry being the major arm for this war should be left free for operations. They should not be committed in guard duties and other working duties. Also ceremonies requiring major arrangements by infantry units should be avoided to keep the maximum troops committed.

State of equipment at the unit level needs to be improved. There is no point in having large reserves if units are working on an adhoc basis due to lack of equipment. Also quality of equipment should be improved to improve efficiency.

All commanders must try and understand the problem at the troops level in operations.

To avoid complacency from setting in the infantry too, operations should be launched only on firm information.

Our relations with our neighbours should be improved to stop them from helping the insurgent movements.

Offensive action against bases in neighbouring countries should be contemplated.

To win over the locals, a clear and uncorrupted administration has to be provided. Decentralization of powers would reduce power concentration in the hands of one person and involvement of more personnel in the overall decision making. This connected with removal of excessive control would reduce the chances of corruption and ensure quicker decisions.

Roads - the harbingers of growth, prosperity and, communication must be built to the remotest areas at the earliest, thereby removing the desire for change.

A conscious effort has to be made to counter the insurgents popularity writs.

Moderates amongst insurgents should be left free to stop the movement from falling into the hands of the extremists.

Psychological operations need to be planned and meticulously carried out to show the insurgents in a poor light both within and outside the country. A well planned media offensive should be launched for this.

A major revamping of the judiciary should be carried out to ensure quicker justice. The maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied" should be remembered and a delay of not more than sixty days should be acceptable in deciding cases.

Exemplary punishment must be meted out to extremists who are apprehended. It is only in our country where a known extremist like Bisheshwar Singh - the convenor of PLA in Manipur - is left off lightly only to whip up communal tension.

In areas, where the army has started operating, full law and order machinery must be brought under its command.

Law and order must be brought on to the Union List to remove any ambiguity.

Firm measures - in the form of legislations - must be initiated forthwith to reduce the gun culture.

The administration should learn to stand up to militants blackmail rather than buckling under pressure.

A certain amount of press censorship is required in the affected areas. Also, public relations departments should be activated to show the army in a better light.

CONCLUSION

Insurgency does not erupt as an impulse nor dies down instantaneously by fire brigade actions of the security forces. It is a long protracted war requiring long term planning. It is battling against your own people within your own population. It is a battle not only to capture and kill insurgents but a battle to win over the people so that they sever their link with insurgents. The challenge is to induce them to give their free consent to the government. Provision of security and material benefits is not enough nor any amount of economic or industrial packages would induce the population to freely support the government. In fact, there are just no quick fix solutions to this war. While constant unrelenting military pressure is necessary to bring the militants to the table, it has to be complemented by long term social and confidence building measures. In the final analysis, granted that counter insurgency is a total war, the military effort has eventually to become secondary to political efforts. The essential struggle is for the control and loyalty of the population. In this, economic, social, educational, health, and welfare programmes and the evaluation of a meaningful administrative programme in the long run are more important than the security situation, though, these ideas cannot take birth in a society where security is under stress.

Confidence-Building as a Mechanism of Conflict Resolution: The European Model and its Applicability to South Asia

DR TT POULOSE

The renunciation of War as an instrument of policy is a resolution which promises to be as fruitful as it is noble and wise and whenever it is taken with sincerity, it always arouses high hopes."

Arnold Toynbee, *War and Civilization* (1951), P.143

Some scholars believe that the European model of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) is neither "generalisable" nor "exportable"¹. However, the suitability of the European paradigm in South Asia is not an *a priori* question but an empirical one. This paper is an attempt to examine this hypothesis. First, the parameters of the analytical focus have to be defined. It is a widely shared view that the structure of peace, stability and security of South Asia is Indo-centric as India is the South Asian colossus surrounded by smaller neighbours. Pakistan is the only South Asian State which challenged India's pre-eminence while others demurred. This resulted in three wars between the two and a local cold war which is still continuing.

The *raison d'être* of this study is that CBMs are a workable proposition in South Asia. It will be centered round the adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, the conflictual situations and their resolution through graduated steps. Their policies based on mutual mistrust, fear and suspicion provided the matrix for endemic conflicts. Any hope of political stability in South Asia is predicated on the psychological transformation of layered misperceptions.

The success of the experiment of CBMs in Europe as a technique for dismantling the enemy images created by the mythology of the Cold War is a convincing proof for CBMs to be considered in South Asia, though there is a section among the Third World experts who do not² believe in the CBMs. But the recurring cycle of armed conflicts numbering over 140 in the Third

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World after the Second World War and the conditions for potential conflicts still prevailing there in the post-Cold War period are compelling reasons for the advocates of CBMs to find their usefulness beyond Europe.

THE EUROPEAN MODEL

The basic assumption of the European model of CBMs is that it provides a framework of security and stability for the post-Cold War Europe. This view is regarded as valid despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ethnic conflicts based on "suicidal" nationalism erupting in some parts of Europe. The *genre* of European CBMs was the outcome of a single variable namely the Cold War myths. The unstable East-West military relationship and the fear that it might lead to an irreversible, catastrophic nuclear war was the original inductive basis of European CBMs. "The goal of the confidence-building exercise as initially developed was to help correct faulty perceptions of threat and the conditions (widespread military secrecy) that created them within the European context."³ ... Actions and measures which contribute to peace by reducing the levels of mistrust, misunderstanding or uncertainty which often engender or sustain war or other forms international hostility⁴ are treated as confidence building measures.

The European model of CBMs grew out of the pre-Helsinki experiences of the 1950s and 1960s. But, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) brought the CBMs into the Helsinki process between 1973 and 1975. These CBMs have undergone four stages of growth and refinement. The first generation CBMs are embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, 1975. These were modest beginnings of CBMs. "Their meaning in the European reality was more symbolic than substantive. They were just an overture, leading to more far-reaching agreements at later stages."⁵ According to the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, the participating states agreed to notify military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops 21 days or more in advance. States could also voluntarily notify smaller scale military exercises. The two-fold purposes of these CBMs were: (1) to eliminate the threat of the use of force; and (2) to reduce the danger of surprise attacks.

However, the breakthrough came with the second generation CBMs contained in the Document adopted by the Stockholm Conference on Security and Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) or Stockholm Document, 1986. Three major achievements⁶ are often mentioned about these second generation CBMs. These are the following:

- 1) the participating states adopted a set of militarily significant measures which were a substantial improvement on the Helsinki Final Act;

- 2) the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was included in an arms control agreement and;
- 3) for the first time, on-site inspections without a right of refusal were incorporated in an East-west accord.

The Stockholm Document required that notification of military activities involving more than 40,000 troops had to be given two years in advance. If such notification was not possible, activities exceeding 75,000 troops were not allowed. Every participating State had the right to conduct inspection on the territory of another participating State whenever it had doubts about compliance with the CBMs.

The third generation CBMs formed a part of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE, signed by the 35 participating States on 15 January, 1989. The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) by 23 States and the negotiations on Confidence and Security-building Measures involving all 35 participating States were the outcome of the Vienna Meeting. The CBMs included in the Vienna Concluding Document were within the framework of the CSCE process, with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence and security-building measures designed to reduce further the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The fourth generation CBMs were the product of the Paris Summit of 34 States participating in the CSCE. It also resulted in concluding the historic CFE Treaty in November, 1990 which was a crowning achievement of the European CBMs and CSBMs. The CFE Treaty aimed at lowering the force levels of NATO and WTO and eliminating the large numerical superiority. It also contained a series of CBMs to augment the openness and predictability of military activities, military structures and reducing military budgets of the participating States and accessibility to mutual observation. The CFE Treaty not only reinforced the on-site inspection and inspection by challenge regimes but also established several standing Committee of the CSCE with the avowed objective of conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

The European CBMs undoubtedly introduced much greater transparency in the military manoeuvres of the NATO and WTO troops by notification of military activities, exchange of information, restrictions on military activities, communication, consultation, contacts and a verification regime. "Confidence-building measures have been created in order to communicate credible evidence that there are no threats, to reduce uncertainties about the military situation in another country and to constrain opportunities for exerting pressure by military activity."⁷ They also contribute to the reduction of the

risk of armed confrontations due to miscalculation of events taking place in the territory of the adversary nation.

However, the European CBMs have yet to cope with naval and air exercises by bringing them under the purview of the CSCE. The CFE has left these out from its ambit.

Simultaneously with the progress in moving towards a safer and secure Europe through CBMs and CSBMs, mind boggling changes were overtaking Europe. The WTO, the primary source of tension in Europe disappeared from the strategic map of Europe. This has led to a rethinking about the future role of NATO. Its military role will become increasingly questionable with the extinction of the former Soviet enemy. In the final analysis, one may be tempted to ask whether the singular historic role of Gorbachev with his glasnost and perestroika or the CBMs succeeded in providing the European security and stability. Will the United States, with its self-appointed role of the guardian angel of a unipolar world, allow Europe and the rest of the world, to live in peace and tranquility? George Kennan is sceptical because of the US military extravaganza, which according to him is "a species of national-economic addiction - a habit which we could not easily or rapidly break in fact, in the course of anything less than several years, even if the entire external justification for it were to disappear - even if the Soviet Union were to sink tomorrow with all its armies and missiles, to the bottom of the ocean."⁸

CBMS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

Notwithstanding these fears, the success of the European model of CBMs evolved as a step-by-step and graduated reciprocation in tension reduction, over twenty years by 35 nations cannot remain unnoticed by other regions afflicted by endemic political instabilities and military confrontations. Moreover, the United Nations has been vigorously promoting the concept of CBMs with the adoption of a resolution at the UNSSOD-1 in 1978. The Guidelines of the UN Disarmament Commission on CBMs were endorsed by the UN in 1988. One of the UN General Assembly Resolutions (45/62F) recommended "appropriate types of confidence-building measures" at the regional level. In another resolution (45/58M) adopted by the UN General Assembly, all States were encouraged "to recognise the value of confidence-building measures - military or non-military - taken in the framework of initiatives of regional disarmament." According to the Palme Commission "confidence-building is necessary if the spirals of suspicion and fear are to be broken." It, therefore, recommended that at the regional and sub-regional level, periodic regional conferences on security and cooperation, similar to the one launched in Helsinki for Europe in 1975 could provide an overall framework for co-operation and "consider such matters as adoption of codes of conduct and

confidence-building measures, establishment of zones of peace and nuclear weapon free zones and agreements on arms limitations and reductions.⁹

SOUTH ASIAN CBMs

How the poor nations of the Third World, (unlike the affluent European States) plagued incessantly by inhuman sufferings, squalor, poverty, disease; death and devastation by periodic wars, military confrontations, structural and institutional violence, terrorism, communal carnage, tension, mistrust and fear, look upon CBMs? More precisely, are the European type of CBMs germane to the South Asian context? India and Pakistan, the two known adversaries sundered by historical rivalries have been mainly responsible for the insecurity in South Asia. They have fought a few wars, built up considerable conventional might, and are engaged in a nuclear arms race. They accuse each other of building weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological). Both are accusing each other of aiding and abetting terrorism and secessionist movements undermining the unity and territorial integrity of India and Pakistan. If these trends are not reversed, by evolving an indigenous mechanism of restraint, they will be condemned to fight till eternity. They cannot afford to squander away scarce economic resources for buying or building costly and sophisticated weapons instead of utilizing them for improving the quality of life of their people stricken by widespread poverty. Next only to the highest human suffering zone in the world (Mozambique, Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan) South Asia is a zone of extreme human suffering according to a report of the Population Crisis Committee (PCC) based in Washington. According to Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan: "The sub-continent is crying out for a solution that will give economic freedom to the masses who struck out for political freedom on the historical night on August 14, 1947. The leaders of both sides of the divide need to rise and meet this challenge or they will be waylaid by history and by time."¹⁰

The feudal-capitalist combine constitutes the ruling class and power-elites in India and Pakistan. They are an outward-looking segment which is more interested in the power game than ameliorating the sufferings of the people. Their pride and prejudices often mistakenly identified as "national interest", are the root cause of the conflicts between India and Pakistan. We have our own cold warriors, mythical enemy images and synthetic adversarial relationships. Much of the tensions, mistrust and fears in the sub-continent are created by this breed of power elites. To cite only one example, K. Subramanyam, India's defence expert wrote: India, with its population, size, resources and industrial output, "Will be a dominant country of the region just as the US, Soviet Union and China happened to be in their respective areas..." He added that India's "neighbours will be prepared to grant it a big

nation status to obtain what they want but in all other respects insist on treating it as equal... There is no reciprocity of commitment between India and its neighbours in regard to each other's security."¹¹ A South Asian scholar insisted once that only with the Balkanization of India, there can be security in South Asia. An eminent Indian historian, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in 1949 describing India as a "world power".¹² The military manoeuvre code-named "Brass Tacks", when Gen. Sundarji was India's Army chief, conducted close to the borders of Pakistan involving thousands of Indian troops brought both the countries close to the brink of war. Pakistan responded in kind soon. These brazen and arrogant behaviour and pronouncements of the power elites have been the source of several irritants aggravating Indo-Pakistani relations.

While some of the power elites are sceptical or contemptuous of CBMs, India and Pakistan have demonstrated that they have at least informally accepted CBMs as a procedural expediency if not as a policy. Interestingly enough, the Panchsheel agreement signed between India and China in 1954 embodied some of the principles embodying CBMs in Basket-I of the Helsinki Act, 1975. These include:

- 1) Inviolability of frontiers
- 2) Territorial integrity of States
- 3) Peaceful settlement of disputes
- 4) Non-intervention in internal affairs

India and Pakistan have established a "hot-line" to deal with any provocative incident developing into a war. There is some informal understanding about notification of military exercises close to the borders of both. The agreement on Non-Attack of Nuclear Installations has been ratified by India and Pakistan.

Considering the long-standing nature of Indo-Pakistani hostility, and the tacit approval of several steps amounting to CBMs by both, the applicability of the European model of CBMs arising from a totally different political context, as a mechanism of conflict resolution to South Asia, particularly to India and Pakistan conditioned by multiple variables of a complex socio-political milieu, is beyond doubt. There are several outstanding issues which can be considered under a regime of CBMs:

1. Border issues
2. Kashmir/Punjab
3. Terrorism
4. Wullar Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project

5. Sir Creek question
6. Siachen issue
7. Air Space violations
8. Notification of military exercises
9. Budgetary reductions
10. Balanced force reductions
11. No - first and non-use of nuclear weapons
12. Nuclear weapon free zone
13. No - first use of ballistic missiles
14. No - war pact
15. Chemical / biological weapons.

India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan agreed on a No-War Pact which was to be signed in June 1964. But Nehru died in May, 1964. The Tashkent Agreement and the Shimla Agreement contained elements of CBMs to resolve some of their disputes bilaterally through peaceful means. There were attempts to revive the spirit of bilateralism at some stage or the other, but the powerful bureaucratic lobby of the power elites thwarted such moves. In order to build personal level contacts as a step towards confidence building, the Defence Minister of India announced recently that he had invited the Pakistani Army Chief to visit India. The same policy is pursued with the Chinese government. While the political leadership in India responded more favourably to CBMs, the power elites were cold-shouldering them.

It is a truism that "as long as nations feel insecure about their neighbour's intentions and military capabilities, they will have a strong incentive to acquire even more powerful arms."¹³ The heavy military burden broke the backbone of the Soviet Union. The same thing is beginning to happen to the United States. Neither the military might nor even a single nuclear warhead could prevent the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is not the only lesson for India and Pakistan. Another lesson they should not forget is that sometimes the convulsions of social dynamics and the internal fragmentation threats to national security can be even more perilous than the bogey of external threats. The only way of avoiding disintegration is by effecting a breakthrough in the psychological barriers created by false enemy images of each other in a shroud of misperceptions, fears and suspicious over the years.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the power elites are trying to reduce CBMs to mere cliches, the political leadership in India and Pakistan should waste no time in breaking out of the old mindset and initiate new policies according to the dictates of

the changing realities of their security environment. If only they could re-evaluate their old threat calculus, they will be convinced that new forms of external threats like pressuring and bullying, not to mention about nuclear targeting against both of them by foreign powers, have already begun to appear. It is therefore of paramount importance that they should join hands with the other Third World nations against these incipient common threats to their security. This indeed requires a psychological transformation. The European model of CBMs will provide the necessary means of transformation through a changed security perception. Because India and Pakistan could not agree to sign the NPT, and because of India's refusal to accept South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and mutual inspection of their nuclear facilities, it has been hastily concluded that there is no chance of any arms control or disarmament agreement between India and Pakistan. These pessimistic views are reinforced by the support given to the terrorists in their secessionist activities. However, the attitude of the political leaders seems to be more encouraging. They are chipping on with the CBMs, much to the chagrin of the power elites, with the hope of transforming the adversarial relationship into one of friendship and cooperation.

NOTES

1. See, James Macintosh, "Confidence and Security - Building Measures: A Sceptical Look", *Disarmament: Confidence and Security - Building Measures in Asia* (New York: United Nations, 1990), pp. 77-78.
2. See, Charles Flowerree, "CBMs in the UN Setting", in John Borawski, *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability* (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 107.
3. Willaim L. Richter, "Confidence - Building Measures For South Asia : An Extraregional Perspective", *Disarmament*: op. cit., p. 90
4. Ibid., p. 170
5. Peter Hohenfellner, "The Achievements and Drawbacks of the Helsinki/Stockholm CSBM Process", *Disarmament: Confidence and Security - Building Measures in Asia*, op. cit., p. 22.
6. See, Anton Rossbach, "The Security-Enhancing Role of Confidence and Security-Building Measures", *Disarmament: Confidence and Security-building Measures in Asia*, op. cit., pp. 44-45. Also see, Peter Hohenfellner, op. cit., p. 26.
7. Peter Hohenfellner, op. cit., p. 31.
8. George F. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 13-14.
9. *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament*. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues Under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1982), pp. 161, 168-69.
10. *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), 18 May 1992.
11. K. Subramanyam, *Indian Security Perspectives* (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1982), pp. 221-24.
12. *Foreign Affairs*, No. 4, July 1949, p. 540.
13. Cathleen S. Fisher, "Build Confidence, Not-Weapons", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, p. 11.

Paths to Nuclear Disarmament

K SUBRAHMANYAM

(In an effort to explore the wider dimensions of the problems involved in getting to the goal of global nuclear disarmament, the American Centre sponsored a conference recently and invited experts from Russia, Pakistan, China and the United States to participate. These included K. Subrahmanyam from New Delhi, Lou Ren Shi from Beijing, Professor ZI Cheema of Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University, Mitchell Reiss of the Wilson Centre in Washington DC and Elina Kirichenko of the Moscow's Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

The participants gathered in New Delhi on February 23-24, 1993 for the conference. Unfortunately Lou Ren Shi, of China Institute of International Strategic Studies, whose paper appeared in this Journal's last issue, was unable to attend. We then invited well-known China watchers Prof GP Deshpande and RR Subramanian to stand in.

What follows is the presentation portion of the two-day conference. Needless to say, we are grateful to the USI for publishing the conference papers. To the readers, we welcome your comments. Please address them to the Editor, USI Journal.

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First let me thank the American Centre for organizing this symposium and I do hope that this is only a beginning and we would have in future more and more such multinational interactions, so that we would be able to develop better understanding of the issue of nuclear disarmament than we have been doing so far. Till now one of the problems we have been facing was a nuclear theology that developed over the last 40 odd years. One could say that theology started unravelling after the joint declaration of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November, 1985 that a nuclear war could not be won and therefore should not be initiated. But unfortunately the conditioning of 40 odd years cannot be wished away and nuclear issue is still strongly influenced by that overburden of nuclear theology of first four decades of nuclear era.

Therefore, I was pleasantly surprised to find the title of this symposium as "PATHS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT". After Zorin-Macloy statement in the early '60's, the term "disarmament" went into disuse and more fashionable term "arms control" came in. The term "disarmament" was derided

Text of a paper presented by Mr K Subrahmanyam, a former Director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, and at present Consulting Editor, *The Economic Times* at a Conference at the American Centre, New Delhi on February 23-24, 1993. Texts of presentations by Prof Z I Cheema and Dr R R Subramanian could not be included in this issue due to space shortage. They will be published in the next issue of the Journal.

as 'utopian, unachievable and, therefore, it was concluded all that we should aim to achieve was "arms control" and not "disarmament". Then "arms control" was twisted to mean sometimes two sides agreeing to produce agreed quantities of arms, even in additional quantities. Therefore, I was particularly happy to notice that today we are going to discuss paths to nuclear disarmament, not arms control, not regional arms control or regional non-proliferation.

The globe which is afflicted by this disease of nuclear proliferation has got to be treated globally and can have some temporary palliative treatment for some areas as local remedy. I am not saying we should not have such local treatment, but the disease has got to be treated at its origin.

Now in the last five years, ever since the signing of the INF treaty, we have been through almost a revolution in terms of nuclear armaments. What the most fervent advocate of nuclear disarmament hesitated to propose at one time has come about. Rajiv Gandhi plan talked in terms of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons over a period of some seven years. They were eliminated by one stroke of pen on one day thanks perhaps, to some extent, the attempted Moscow coup. We must realize the tremendous significance of the arms reduction that has taken place, which also in one sense proves the utter fallacy of the conventional nuclear theology. People used to say they required so many hundreds and thousands of warheads in order to counter the other person's hundreds and thousands. One required a specific category of weapons in order to match up with a similar category of weapons on the other side. All those arguments have now been rendered totally meaningless by the political steps that have been taken by the two major powers and therefore it highlights given the political will, nuclear disarmament is not out of reach. It is not utopian as some people used to say. Others in an earlier era used to argue that colonialism was there to stay. It could not be wished away. It used to be asserted that slavery could not be wished away, because it had been there for 3,000 years. Similarly in respect of universal adult franchise or women's rights there was a lot of resistance, on the part of the people wedded to status quo. In this century we have seen all of them being swept aside and it is in that spirit one has to approach the problem of nuclear disarmament. It's something achievable provided we have the necessary political will.

Having said that, having congratulated the two great powers for eliminating tactical nuclear weapons almost totally (the United States still has some air to surface missiles) and having agreed to bring down strategic warheads by 2/3rds we have to now ask ourselves - what is the present situation? Does it mean that we have made tremendous progress towards

nuclear disarmament? Unfortunately even after congratulating the major powers for the reductions they are carrying out our answer has to be - not much has changed.

The five nuclear weapon powers still keep their nuclear weapons. Two of them have agreed to reduce their arsenals to 1/3rd mainly because they found that levels of arsenals were anyway meaningless. They could not use them. They were only incurring unnecessary expenditure by keeping them and therefore they made a virtue of cutting them down and now they go about advertising that as great virtue. In respect of the other three powers there is absolutely no change. In fact Britain is proliferating further and is tripling its nuclear arsenal. Mr. Reiss has said that nuclear weapons do not exercise any influence. I would say to him - please tell that to the British, to the French and to the Chinese; please tell that to the Americans and the Russians also who still want to keep three thousand weapons too many.

Russia has been acknowledged as a partner and the WARSAW PACT is dissolved. The Eastern European countries and Russia are now a party to the CSCE process of the Atlantic Co-operation Council. Then why do these Countries insist on keeping their nuclear weapons? For what purpose? Against which adversary? In the answers to those questions lie the key to nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms control and nuclear restraint. Now in a sense one can say it is a more dangerous situation today because earlier the nuclear weapons had a justification. They were keeping nuclear weapons to deter each other. The justification they provide for keeping these weapons now is far worse than the earlier nuclear theology.

There are three justifications : First - Nuclear weapons are necessary because they exist. One does not understand then why it is necessary only for five powers. If that is a logical argument it is necessary for everybody. Secondly Nuclear weapons are necessary as a last resort of defence. That is the NATO doctrine. If nuclear weapons are necessary as a last resort of defence for countries which do not have any adversaries, would not they be necessary for other countries which have adversaries? Thirdly nuclear weapons are necessary against a possible future Saddam Hussain. If we are to accept that as a logical argument, then logic would require that people who live closer to possible future Saddam Hussein would require nuclear weapons much more urgently than people who live 10,000 miles away from future Saddam Hussein.

In other words there is absolutely no justification for nuclear weapons to exist in the world and still people try to justify them. They do so even while they preach virtues of non-proliferation to everyone else. One is compelled

to exclaim, preachers, why do you not practise what your preach.

In pragmatic terms it has to be accepted that 40 years of conditioning by nuclear theology is going to take some time to unlearn and that dismantling, decommissioning of nuclear weapons and to dispose of the fissile materials is quite a cumbersome and time consuming process. Therefore, it needs to be accepted that nuclear weapons nations need time to adjust themselves to the new realities and to get rid of the weapons. First they would have to get rid of 2/3 of arsenals on which there is already an agreement. That itself is going to take perhaps many years and thereafter they will require more time to get rid of the rest of the arsenal which they have. Even while allowing them to take time we should get a commitment from the nuclear weapon nations that they do not regard nuclear weapons as weapons of war. They are weapons of mass destruction and General Assembly resolution No. 1 of 1946 said that all weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated. Therefore our goal should be to eliminate them and meanwhile let us try the No First Use agreement. Between a No First Use Agreement of Chemical weapons which was the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the agreement to ban and eliminate them, it took almost 67 years. Therefore, even if we accept we are living in an era where understanding process is quicker, it is going to take quite some time and therefore let us begin with a No First Use. That will make sense.

Those who argue that they need nuclear weapons are the real proliferators of the world. These are United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. The others are all minor actors, who react to the theology of these five. Only when the nuclear five are prepared to say -- these are not weapons of war, these cannot be used militarily, these do not generate influence and keeping them is only a waste of money and therefore let us get rid of them - then only they will be making a real contribution to non-proliferation.

Britain is proliferating, France is proliferating, because it has not announced a cut off of fissile material production, or cutoff of weapon production. Atleast Britain and France can still claim some credit that they have joined United States and Russia in eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. But not our neighbour - China. What makes it all the more intriguing is the Chinese were the first to proclaim No First Use in 1964 when they conducted the first test. Now a country which has proclaimed No First Use - why does it require tactical nuclear weapons, when others have given it up, since tactical nuclear weapons are essentially first use nuclear weapons. They have not explained their reasons. Secondly when all over the world the standard warheads are today at 125 to 150 kilo-tons, the Chinese tested a mega-ton warhead on 21st May 1992, when President Venkataraman was in Shanghai.

One must assume that the Chinese were trying to communicate a message to the world with that one megaton test. What were they trying to tell us? Definitely they were not trying to highlight the virtues of non-proliferation. Thereafter the Chinese conducted a smaller test in September and this appeared to be a tactical nuclear weapon test.

China happens to be India's largest neighbour with the longest border with India.

I was present in a conference which was convened by the French Defence Minister Mr. Pierre Jacques, to which they invited almost all the European countries and US. In that conference all the four nuclear weapon powers argued -- their official spokesmen the French Defence Minister, British Defence Minister and Deputy Under Secretary of State (United States) and Marshal Shaposhnikov of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) did - that they all needed to keep their nuclear deterrents. Each one pointed to the others to explain why they needed nuclear weapons. They could all get together to eliminate them. But they did not think in those terms. Earlier I mentioned the three justifications for nuclear arsenals which they also put forward. But I could sense that for the British and the French, nuclear weapons meant something else. They are going to live in a Europe in which Germany will be the dominant power. It is quite obvious they are trying to use their nuclear arsenals as a kind of political bargaining chip vis-a-vis Germany. This may not be a realistic proposition but yet it appears there is a view that nuclear weapons constitute a currency of power. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said yesterday here in Delhi, he was not going to link up the issue of India signing Non-Proliferation Treaty, with aid to India. The German State Secretary said that there was a need to look at Non-Proliferation Treaty and take into account the reservations expressed by various nations of the world. We all know NPT was designed especially against Germany and Japan and also Germans resent the discrimination under which they have to function. 60 percent of the IAEA budget is used to monitor Germany and Japan and I have heard a Japanese scholar saying - look, here is a transaction of 500 tons of weapon grade uranium moving from Russia to United States and nobody speaks about nuclear safeguards, or IAEA, and we are getting a small consignment of 1.2 tons of plutonium shipped from France to Japan and there is so much noise in the world.

So we are not the only country which has resentment about this discriminatory aspect. The others of course are keeping more quiet because they happen to be allies, but we have been shouting about it because we are nobody's allies. So the doctrinal position in regard to possession of large nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon powers today is far worse than ever before.

In this world today, if we are to grade the nuclear problems - in order of gravity, what is the most important threat? It is the threat arising out of breakdown of former Soviet arsenal. We are assured all tactical nuclear weapons of all former Soviet Republics have been collected into Russia. Marshal Shaposhnikov said so in Paris Conference. I have been asking the Russian friends - what would you say to bringing the tactical nuclear weapons under international safeguards regime and demonstrate to the world that all nuclear weapons which you have collected back tally with the original register of nuclear weapons issued out? If that can be proved to an international verification team the whole world can breathe a sigh of relief. To which one of my Russian friends said in private conversation, he would not say it in public, "supposing it does not tally what shall we do? It would worry all of us and therefore we do not propose to do any such international verification."

Ukraine is still to ratify the START I and the NPT. Ukrainians are at the same time screaming to high heavens that the safety standards of their weapons are deteriorating because Russians have stopped servicing the warheads in Ukraine. The Russians say the Ukrainians have taken over the administrative control and so it is their responsibility. What are we doing about this major issue? The world is talking about proliferation in areas where the problem is not all that serious while neglecting such major problems.

Leonard Spector whose zeal for non-proliferation is unrivalled writes an article on repentant proliferants in *Foreign Policy*, in which he lists out the problems in verifying the situation in regard to fissile materials in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. In Germany, people have been arrested for possession of small quantities of weapons grade fissile materials. Whether these are samples which are being offered before finalization of a bigger transaction one does not know. So what do we do about possible seepage of weapons grade fissile material and the scientific talent from former Soviet Union? Let us all remember that the ex-Soviet Republics are much closer to India than they are to United States of America or Britain or France. Marshal Shaposhnikov himself gave a warning - in the Paris conference in which he talked about the new Southern Grouping which was being formed which included the Central Asian countries. He said that if we remember that some of those countries have their own nuclear programmes it becomes a matter of great significance. It is difficult to disagree with that statement. It is of great significance to India.

Then we come to the question of what is known as undeclared nuclear weapon powers - Israel, Pakistan and India. First thing that should strike anybody is that these undeclared weapon powers evidently are not votaries

of nuclear theologies of the West. Because nuclear theology of the West emphasized the flaunting of weapons. The nuclear theology required that the adversary should be overly threatened with certainty of destruction and vast capabilities and sophistication of one's own arsenal. These three undeclared nuclear weapon nations do not seem to believe in flaunting the weapons. Israel still today will not confirm whether it has an arsenal or not; it only offers puzzle. Israel shall not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, nor shall it be the second. Pakistan says it has all the components to assemble atleast one nuclear weapon, but its policy is to pursue peaceful nuclear programme. Indian leadership says that they have no intention of making any nuclear weapon inspite of Shahriyar Khan's statement. It is clear that the thinking process of these three countries is not same as those of the other five nuclear weapon powers. Therefore let us not attribute to them all the behaviour patterns derived from the literature written on nuclear strategy in the West.

Many Indians and Pakistanis themselves go about repeating the derivations from the nuclear theology of the West, without bothering to understand that in their own behaviour their countries have not followed the nuclear theology. Leonard Spector makes a distinction between these three undeclared weapon countries which according to him have developed their capability for nuclear weapon because they have genuine security problems and other nuclear aspirants. It is not like the cases of Britain and France which have nuclear weapons for prestige. Therefore, unless their genuine security problem is addressed there is no point in just preaching non-proliferation to these three countries.

What is going to happen to NPT in 1995? I hear in some quarters there are fears that extension may not be that easy. Countries like Germany or Japan would like a limited period of extension of 5 years or 10 years. Meanwhile they would like to renegotiate the treaty which would remove the discriminatory aspect. This is not a reference to the discrimination that some have got weapons and others do not have. The more serious discrimination is the countries which have got the weapons are totally exempt from all other verification process. This discrimination is what the Japanese highlight - Why should 500 tons of weapons grade uranium transfer from Russia to America be free of safeguards regime and why should Japan be subjected to harassing safeguards, when it comes to 1.2 tons of reactor grade plutonium, which can not be used for weapons? That is the discrimination countries resent.

It is not certain how many Arab countries will vote for extension of the treaty. Some Arab countries have already abstained from Chemical Weapons ban and elimination treaty. The Arab countries may insist on bringing in

Israel before they sign the treaty. If a treaty acceded to by 154 nations drops some 40 to 50 votes in its extension, legally there will be extension. However the legitimacy of the treaty would suffer a setback. India is totally disinterested because anyway India is not going to sign the NPT.

Today it is recognised that nuclear weapons are not weapons of war. A nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should not be initiated. We are better educated in nuclear matters than in the sixties, seventies and eighties. Under these circumstances we have to tap all these new springs of better understanding to aim to proceed further forward towards genuine nonproliferation. The NPT was a product of 1968 cold war and is unlike the Chemical Weapons ban and elimination treaty which is a post cold war universally applicable treaty. The NPT was meant to freeze the division between the nuclear weapon powers and nonnuclear weapon powers. The NPT has succeeded in its primary objective. It has prevented Germany and Japan from going nuclear and it has succeeded in ensuring that most of the industrialized nations did not exercise nuclear option. The fact that there are only three undeclared nuclear weapon powers, and only two suspect states with nuclear ambitions - North Korea and Iran is also a measure of its success. All that highlights the utility of NPT. Let the NPT be extended and let us think beyond that.

It is recognised that the danger of fissile materials, weapons and talents seeping out of former Soviet republics, is the most potent one facing the world. Therefore, one has to go into various territories and nation to find out whether there is any clandestine fabrication and that cannot be done under present discriminatory NPT which nests legitimacy in nuclear weapons. Use of intelligence information obtained from some biased sources is not likely to be acceptable or fully effective to meet the threat. If the weapons are banned and eliminated over an acceptable time frame with the weapon countries given time to eliminate them then it will be legitimate to go and search for weapons in other nations. That is what is proposed to be done in the Chemical Weapons Treaty. If that is our goal would it not be rational for all nations to sign a No First Use Treaty? Therefore, the world should aim at a treaty beyond NPT. The new treaty should comprise following :-

1. It should declare that the aim is to finally ban and eliminate nuclear weapons from the world over a period of time and in the meantime they would agree to No First Use.
2. No more testing
3. No transfer of nuclear technology
4. A universal non-discriminatory verification regime which would ensure.

5. That there will be no more fissile material production, and
6. No more weapon production.

That is the model of the Chemical Weapons Treaty. That kind of treaty will accommodate Israel, India and Pakistan. The fissile material production of Israel, India and Pakistan can be capped and also any weapon production by them. Testing by them will be prevented and they will all come under universal non-discriminatory verification.

The US has stopped fissile material production. So also have the Russians. The Americans have stopped weapons production. They do not need, any more weapons. They have got thousands of surplus weapons and the problem is how to get rid of them. Therefore, Americans and Russians cannot have any objections to agreeing to capping of fissile material production and of weapons production. The Americans used to object to test ban. Now the American Congress has also passed legislation that they would allow only 15 more tests between now and 1996 and from 1997 onwards America should agree to a test ban - total test ban. The Americans are not anyway transferring nuclear technology to anybody else. Since it is accepted that there are no more nuclear adversaries and weapons are needed only to deter people like Saddam Hussein then what is the difficulty in agreeing to a no first use arrangement?

Nondiscriminatory universal verification regime means no more new nuclear weapon production. Weapon research in laboratories cannot be prohibited. But they cannot be productionised and tested. I find from today's newspaper Mr. Mitchell Reiss has said, why should not India propose such a treaty. I wish India would. I even dangled before the Prime Minister the possibility of his getting a Nobel Peace Prize. But then our Prime Minister is more interested in what is going to happen on 25 of February in the Boat Club rally than in Nobel Peace Prize and in India nuclear weapons issue is not a high priority one because nobody is thinking about nuclear weapons in this country.

The Americans are not able to understand that in India nobody is thinking about nuclear weapons. I am saying this as a person who has been trying to push this country towards such thinking for the last 25 years. I just could not get people to devote attention to this issue. You can ask Gen. Sharma. The military people are not thinking about it either.

People are asking about the five power conference. I have been in favour of five power conference. The very first day when our foreign office spokesmen said we cannot agree to it, I wrote a very strong article saying that

was wrong. But the problem is, it is not five power conference which is important in the Indian perspective. What is going to be important is the agenda for five power conference. Pakistanis are worried about Indian nuclear - according to them "weapons", we say "capability". I for one would say that such a fear on the part of the Pakistanis is quite normal and genuine. So I grant that Pakistan has a genuine security problem vis-a-vis India. But Pakistanis must understand we have similar problems vis-a-vis China. Pakistanis seem to have a very peculiar view of geography. They appear to think that China does not exist in this part of the world and is in a different hemisphere. But they have a road connecting them to China and we have our longest border with that country. Since Pakistan is worried about India and India is worried about China any solution to this problem will have to include China. We are - you may say, very devious people or you can say it is oriental courtesy - some one gave me that term yesterday and, therefore, we do not refer directly to China. We say the problem should be solved globally. When we say globally we do not mean United States, we do not mean Britain and France. We mean China. Therefore, if this problem is at all going to be solved, it has to be solved by China coming in and the Chinese nuclear arsenal being laid on the table for discussion. Unfortunately, we cannot even get through to them at the academic level as is evident from their absence from this symposium. The question is not whether there is to be a five power conference but what is it we are going to discuss in such five power conference.

Secondly, if proposals which we know very well that the other country has rejected again and again are pressed, that may be good diplomacy but not helpful to address the real issues. Nuclear weapon free zone proposal was denounced by Morarji Desai from the platform of the United Nations and he gave his reasons why it is not acceptable to India and Morarji Desai is the most respected of Indian Prime Ministers in Pakistan. He is the only one who has been honoured with the highest civilian decoration of Pakistan. Now it is not even courtesy to Morarji Desai to go on repeating the proposal without taking into account what he said. That becomes a gimmick. It does not enhance confidence. It reduces confidence.

Then we come to the problem of verification. I would again recommend to everybody the article of Leonard Spector. There are serious problems of verification, even in countries which say they are prepared to give up their nuclear ambition - Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. If that is so, what tremendous problems will be there in countries which are not enthusiastic about giving up their nuclear weapons or nuclear capability? Therefore, one has to concentrate on problem of verification. Then we have problems of asymmetry. In 1988, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi went to Islamabad and an agreement on nonattack of nuclear facilities was signed. Thereafter, there was a press

conference. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi said this to Ms. Benazir Bhutto and we all saw it on T.V. which was covered in both the countries. He said - "Madam Prime Minister, we understand the nuclear programme in your country is not under the control of the Prime Minister, but under the control of the military", words to that effect. Ms. Bhutto denied it. Now on 1st. Dec., 1992 in the N.B.C. programme in the United States, Ms. Bhutto says that the nuclear weapons programme was pursued behind her back and weapons were fabricated without her knowledge. It was perhaps a part of the conspiracy to overthrow her. This is from a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, a Prime Minister who was there just before the present Prime Minister. It is therefore a legitimate question who is in control of nuclear programme in Pakistan? Now we all know Dr. A.Q. Khan does not function under the control of Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan. If the Indian Prime Minister is to discuss with Pakistani Prime Minister, how does he reach an agreement? Is Pakistani Prime Minister in a position to deliver the goods on the nuclear issue. Now there is no point in proposing a conference between the Pakistani army chief and our army chief because our army chief has nothing to do with nuclear weapons. So, before we convene a five power conference, should we not sort out this problem of who is going to represent Pakistan in the conference on the nuclear issue?

In my view a practical solution would be to aim at a treaty, which goes further than NPT, which will bring Israel, India and Pakistan into a restraint regime rather than attempting to solve this problem through measures which cannot be verified. The world has had no experience of taking nuclear weapons away from countries which had crossed the nuclear Rubicon. In the case of South Africa we do not know what the solution is going to be. Again Mr. Leonard Spector says, a small group of whites may try to keep a few weapons in order to use it later on politically if they are pushed. Just as there are religious fundamentalists, there are nuclear fundamentalists. Unless we get out of nuclear fundamentalism based on the NPT we cannot tackle realistically the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

China's World View and Nuclear Weapons

PROF. G P DESHPANDE

Professor John W. Garver has provided us a useful summary-statement on China's nuclear strategy and thinking. He says :

China has consistently followed a strategy that Western analysts would call minimal deterrence. According to this doctrine, a lesser nuclear power can effectively deter nuclear attack by a superior nuclear power by threatening to retaliate to a nuclear first strike with an attack adequate to devastate a number of the industrial and population centres of the superior power. It is not necessary that the deterring power have an arsenal large enough to destroy the more powerful aggressor. All that is required is that the inferior nuclear power, in this case China, be able to retaliate by destroying several enemy cities - or, in the case of the United States in the 1950's, U.S. military bases in various East Asian countries. While China would suffer destruction for heavier than it inflicted on its super power enemy, the losses suffered by the superpower would also be heavy and might critically weaken that superpower in its rivalry with the other superpower. This would be adequate to deter a potential nuclear aggressor.¹

The following table would give some idea of China's capabilities as of 1991 : 2

	<i>Weapon System</i>	<i>Number Deployed</i>	<i>Year Deployed</i>	<i>Range (km)</i>	<i>Warhead Yield</i>	<i>Number in Stockpiles</i>
Bombers	B5 (IL-28)	15-30	1974	1,850	20KT	15-30
	B6 (Tu-16)	100	1966	5,900	20KT-3MT	100-130
IRBM	DF-2 (CSS-1)	30-50	1966	1,450	20KT	30-50
	DF-3 (CSS-2)	75-100	1970	2,600	1-3MT	75-100
ICBM	DF-4 (CSS-3)	10	1971	4,800-7,000	1-3MT	--
	DF-5 (CSS-4)	10	1979	13,000	4-5MT	--
SSBN	Xia class	1with 12 tubes	1983	2,800	200 KT-1MT	--

Text of a paper presented by Dr G P Deshpande, Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, at a Conference at the American Centre, New Delhi on February 23-24, 1993.

One can refer to other sources and books on the matter of Chinese capabilities. But there would not be major differences with Prof. Garver's understanding of the Chinese doctrine on security and nuclear weapons. We shall return to this "general understanding" in this paper. But I should introduce a caveat here. I am no expert on military and nuclear matters. I am basically a political analyst. I am looking at the "Chinese attitude towards nuclear weapons," to borrow the title of Jonathan Pollock's useful article in the *China Quarterly* (April-June 1972), from the perspective of the politics. Weapons are a political device in the last analysis. My purpose in this paper is to seek an answer to what appears to me to be the central question: namely how does one relate the Chinese World View to the nuclear question? I think that is very relevant and important.

It may not be out of place here to reiterate that this relationship between world view and nuclear power is also central to the U.S. and (the erstwhile) Soviet perspectives. The dissolution of Soviet Union and socialist camp was in the main due to the "political" pressure that the American and western alliance foreign policies brought to bear on the socialist camp, and nuclear and missile deployment in Western Europe, quite often in spite of the pressure built up by the Peace Movement in the U.S. and Western Europe throughout the seventies and the eighties. Judged exclusively in terms of the final objective of defeat of Stalinist socialism, the U.S. and the western policies were eminently successful and the so-called "balance of terror" was in no small measure responsible for the same. Looking back it seems that the American and western strategy was to force the Soviets to over extend their meagre resources and aim quite high in terms of nuclear weapons. It is thus clear that a certain kind of politics was implicit in the American nuclear strategies and its near total incomprehension, among other reasons, was responsible for Soviet collapse.

If this is at least plausible the centrality of "weltanschauung" (the world view) to understanding of nuclear weapons policies should become relevant. It is not "tradition within evolution" which really explains China's (or of any other power for that matter) nuclear weapons and strategies as Chong-pin has tried and suggested in his book³. It is futile to undertake a nuclear programme unless it is a part of a carefully worked out "weltanschauung." China has done so. This is the thrust of this paper.

II

".....It is indeed a sign of the times that this play (The Tempest) has risen to such prominence in contemporary studies. Long languishing in relative neglect in the academy, The Tempest has recently become one of the 'most commonly taught of Shakespeare's plays....'"⁴

This is Prof. Paul A. Cantor talking about teaching of Shakespeare on American Campuses. No, it is not my intention to take you to Shakespeare. I was struck by Prof. Cantor's remarks that "it is indeed a sign of the times" that *The Tempest* be the most commonly taught of Shakespeare's plays in the American departments of English literature. It is indeed a sign of times. *Hamlet* is no longer popular. There was a *Hamlet* phase in American Foreign policy in Asia when the successive administrations were never certain of what to do especially in Asia. At times they opted for tough posture towards their clients. At times they insisted on and tried to cajole their clients into reforms. Douglas Macdonald has recently published an interesting study of this *Hamlet*-like attitudes (He does not use the analogy though) and indecision with reference to the last years of the KMT-ruled China, the Philippines and Vietnam. He appropriately calls this phase as "adventure in chaos."⁵ Whereas the international situation has indeed become tempestuous or to use the Chinese term "turbulent." For the Chinese (and Prof. Cantor would have agreed with them had he been interested in the Chinese descriptions of what he calls "sign of the times") "the world has entered an historian era of turbulence and uncertainty" as Professor Wei Shiyan has put it in a recent article.⁶

It is easy to see that the Chinese have been trying to come to terms with a given world-order. To begin with that world-order was dominated by "the US imperialism." Later it was the "Soviet social imperialists" and "hegemonists". One can multiply these examples of the earlier Chinese descriptions of the world-order and China's relationship with it. the Chinese leadership has always tended to think, or so it would seem that the world-order itself has been its adversary. Now the world-order is more of disorder in as much as turbulence characterises it. Therefore one could make almost a blanket statement that the Chinese Nuclear Programme was based not so much on the assumption of a given power being the adversary but rather world-order as an adversary. This is the starting point of Chinese nuclear program.

The Chinese have been steadfastly pursuing one goal to change the distribution of World Power which does not at the moment give China its due into another which will. To achieve this the Chinese Communist Party tried and experimented with several things. There was a time when they thought that they could jump the stages of socialism and could within the space of three years enter communism. Nothing else would explain almost wild experiments of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) or the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Whatever might have happened to these wild experiments one thing is certain. We cannot fully understand either the domestic or international politics of China without reference to its determination to treat the world distribution of power as its adversary.

This is the reason, I think, that the Chinese nuclear programme was not essentially aimed at one power or the other. Its thrust is bound to be decided by China's relationship with the world distribution of power at any given point. China is unique among the Asian States for that very reason. China is the only developing state which takes the world order or the world distribution of power as an adversary.

In other words the world distribution of power is lined up against the Chinese and that they have been exploring the possible ways of changing that world distribution of power and came to the conclusion that nuclear strategy or a nuclear weapon would be one to them. This view has persisted for a long time. There is a remarkable continuity in all this right from the times of Chen Yi's statement on nuclear weapons which is very famous. But we have also the famous Pakistani statement that they will make a bomb even if they had to eat grass if the Indians were to make it. That is the discourse at sub continental level. The sub-continental level discourse has always been a circumscribed discourse for various reasons. We are much, too much victims of history. We have no desire to understand history in order to overcome it. And I think what the Chinese have done probably with some degree of success is that they have understood history in order to overcome it. Chen Yi's polemical reply to Khrushchev on the question of nuclear weapons is quite remarkable. Khrushchev had taken a position that the Chinese - they eat watery soup and dream of making a nuclear weapon. In other words he was trying to juxtapose the typical liberal Marxist view - if you like - where, because that is how the discourse goes on in India as well, that you have some kind of a necessary contradiction between defence preparedness of one kind or the other and economic development and that is the argument that Khrushchev was making. At one level it could be argued that Khrushchev was employing a global liberal/marxist discourse against the Chinese and to which Chen Yi gave a reply that let alone eating a watery soup, we shall go without pants if necessary, but we shall make a nuclear bomb". Now it would be an error to link this particular statement with either the Soviet Union or United States or any other power. What Chen Yi's argument amounted to was asserting that this was China's perspective and that whatever price that may have to be paid for this perspective, China will pay it because there is a certain relationship between the world distribution of power which China wished to change and nuclear weapons programme was a part of that project.

Chen Yi said it in so many words. He told Japanese newspapermen in October 1963, "Atomic bombs, missiles, and supersonic aircraft are reflections of the technical level of a nation's industry. China will have to resolve this issue within the next several years; otherwise, it will degenerate into a second-class or third-class nation."⁷ Marshal Nie Rongzhen's remarks in October

1966 on China's first test of a nuclear armed rocket that he "was proud of our country, which had long been backward but had its own sophisticated weapons"⁸ appear sentimentally patriotic but basically reflect the same concern about the interrelationship between the world power system and China.

One must mention here that there has been an international (and world power distribution) dimension to the way some of the internal factional fights and problems were settled and described. Some of the domestic events and their timing were related to the way in which world politics was moving. China's first nuclear test occurred one day earlier to Khrushchev being deposed in Moscow. Or think of another example from the non-nuclear example. During the early days of the Cultural Revolution there were fierce attack on capitalist roader no. 1 and capitalist roader no. 2. They were never named to begin with but every one knew that the reference was to Lin Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping respectively. It was immediately after Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1967 that Lin and Deng were actually named. The Cultural Revolution example that we have cited is meaningful in one more sense. The Cultural Revolution is generally taken to be a period of anarchy and chaos. No body is interested in explaining (whether in China or outside) how such neat examples of timing a political measure occurred in times of turmoil.

This is also true of the nuclear programme. If we look at the table given at the beginning of this essay, it would be clear that the years 1966 to 1974 were quite productive as far as China's capabilities were concerned. These were precisely the years of the Cultural Revolution and the rule of the 'Gang of Four' and what have you. Deng and Li do not talk about this because it is not convenient for them to do so. And they probably know that the memory of the rest of the world is definitely shorter. We cannot comprehend China's world view and its international politics including the nuclear programme without making the due allowance for long historical memory of the Chinese people, especially of their leaders.

Now I would like to draw your attention to the other related fact that China's nuclear programme (especially in the years since 1957-58) was accompanied by very high rates of savings. That is, you say if you somewhere date the beginnings of the nuclear programme in China roughly around 57, 58. From 58 onwards right till the end of the Cultural Revolution the rate of savings in China has been as high as 32 percent. The estimates vary. I am not suggesting any causal connection between the successful nuclear programme and the high rate of savings. But there is no doubt about it that China's nuclear programme and, indeed, its military preparedness as a whole cannot be separated from a very high rate of domestic savings. In other

words, it is not a simple question of economic development versus defense preparedness as many a liberal commentator puts it. But there is also the other question, that there is a certain relationship between the rate of savings or the rate of primitive accumulation within a given society and the defence preparedness as a whole and you have this kind of a thing obtaining within China.

III

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and eastern European Bloc or the erstwhile socialist camp has had a very typical impact upon China and it has taken two forms. One of the descriptions of the so-called post-Soviet world. One phrase which has become very popular the world over and certainly so in India that it is the end of the cold war. It has become almost a cliché phrase with all media, all analysis etc. etc. The Chinese, however, I notice in the last two or three years, or even more particularly so the Deng Xiao Ping's famous speech of 1988⁹ onwards, certainly if not earlier do not use the term the "end of the cold war" at all. They are instead using the term 'end of bipolarity' which is a more descriptive statement and does not at all indicate the happiness or the pleasure that the cold war has ended and that the God is in Washington and all is well with the world. So that kind of feeling you do not find in Chinese writing at all. And, in fact, as cited above in Prof. Wei's view the world has entered "a historical era of turbulence and uncertainty." So the Chinese emphasis seems to be that what we have now entered is really an era of turbulence and uncertainty and once you say that you have entered an era of turbulence and uncertainties it is obvious that it is near-impossible to predict if any changes might take place and if they did what would they be like. Because the world that awaits you is a totally unknown world. We do not know what it is like. And Deng Xiao Ping's speech in 1988 to which I made a reference a while ago he said that it was necessary to establish both a new international economic order and a new political order. In other words what Deng Xiao Ping has been saying since 1988 is that we have to see what has happened in Eastern Europe and the erstwhile Soviet Union and the kind of world that we are witness to currently has now thrown open the question of the new political order. There is much talk about the new economic order but there is hardly any talk about the new political order. Can we take it, for example, that the political order as it obtains today is the final order, that it has come to stay and that it is within the framework of that political order that we have to make these decisions? And I think that somewhere one has to begin to relate these issues to this perception of the world and all turbulence and uncertainty might eventually create a new world order, although it is not here yet. Then the question which naturally arises is how do we define our position in that new order. In other words the point

that I am driving at is that in Chinese view no matter what strategies a given state, China in this case, has, having nuclear weapon or not having them makes sense only in terms of international political order and a certain struggle to carve out a place for China in that new international order. This would pose the problem of nuclear weapons not in the conventional sense of whether nuclear weapons are dated, whether nuclear weapons are legitimate weapons of war, whether they are a deterrent or not or whether there is some other use of nuclear weapons at all. I think that the Chinese are drawing attention to right from 1964 is that for them it is neither offensive weapon nor a weapon of deterrence. But over and above everything else it is an attempt to carve out a place for themselves in the new international order. Logically it would follow that part of the reason that there is no Chinese delegate participating in this symposium is that China probably suspects that India has no desire to discuss the world distribution of power as it obtains from the breakup of the socialist world. What is there to discuss? We are discussing politics and if there is no understanding of politics or of the politics of the new international order in Delhi then what is the point of travelling all the way here? Let one G.P. Deshpande do the job of unravelling the politics of China's nuclear programme whatever it is worth. The other thing that is to be noted about this is that China politically represents a curious sort of an animal. Let us go back to the article published in *Peace*, a journal of the Chinese peoples association for peace and disarmament (Dec. 92 issue) cited above which talked of this very turbulence and uncertainty as "a historical era." But this historical era is an interesting phrasiology for two reasons. One is, that it is somewhere a hangover of the Marxist way of discussing things. One thought and talked in terms of epochs, e.g. Lenin talked of the epoch of imperialism clearly that is one implication of describing this as "a historical era." But then you must also remember that the last time this reference to historical, occurred in the Chinese press to the best of my knowledge was following the Tiananman Square incident in June 1989. That incident was a counter-revolutionary uprising and that this was "historical inevitable." This assessment of the Tiananman incident was given by the Chinese communist party itself. In a like manner the reference is quite clear and if I appear to be dwelling too much on semantics of it all I can offer only one example by way of justification for doing so. That example is from Zhou Enlai's letter to Yahya Khan in April of 1971. It was immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence in Bangladesh, and Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Yahya Khan, which was short and very neatly drafted I must say, and there was one sentence therein which was quite interesting. It said that if the Indian reactionaries and their allies, which need not be mentioned here, were to invade Pakistan, "China will, as always, support you."¹⁰ But that "as always" is the crucial phrase. This was in April 1971 mind you. This letter of April 3, 1971 you could have seen immediately the English of the letter could have been

perfectly alright if this "as always" had not been there. The meaning would have been clear and he could well have said that we would support you. But he did not say that, he said that we will as always support you. Basically it meant that China would support Pakistan the way it had done in 1965. In other words China will not intervene South of the Himalayas. That was clearly the implication of that letter. I cite this example only to make the point that the semantics of foreign policy is extremely important. Rarely have their statements on foreign policy not been meaningful in terms of the international distribution of power. We have already cited a couple of examples. With every single detonation of the bomb has always gone an analysis of international situation and more importantly where China stands vis-a-vis the United States, American imperialism, Soviet revisionism, hegemonism, but rarely if at all in terms of a smaller and weaker power.

The next point that I might submit for your consideration is that if this is the case then, if this is at least reasonably plausible, we must also keep another thing in mind. There is probably no problem which the Chinese have with their neighbours, whether it is Pakistan, India, Soviet Union; the solution of which will need either the deployment of nuclear weapons or even the threat of the use of nuclear forces. In other words I'm of the view that the Chinese nuclear-weapons no matter how you look at them politically, simply cannot pose a threat to India or to any other nation in their neighbourhood.

But for an occasional reference, Arunachal Pradesh the Sino-Indian border for e.g. is effectively settled in favour of the Chinese already. If you look at the defacto situation, the border settlement has already occurred in a manner of speaking. It is simply a question of whether India wants to put a signature to it or not - is a matter of detail. Even if this assessment were debatable it should be beyond doubt that there is nothing in the defacto situation on the Sino-Indian border which would force China to use nuclear weapons or any kind of military threat in order to really upset what obtains today. That brings us back again to the international order. Till such time as China does not find a place for itself in the world distribution of power Chinese are likely to be very difficult on the nuclear weapons question. And the Americans are going to discover it before long. In fact they are going to discover that more than Tiananman, it is the nuclear weapons and, of course, the human rights generally speaking which are going to be two major problems with the Chinese.

I would like to draw your attention to three different reactions to the human rights problems in China with special reference to the case of the Tiananman incident. The three variations of the Tiananman incident are particularly relevant here. One is British understanding, I do not mean official British understanding, I mean to say the British intellectual academic

understanding of what happened at Tiananman. You have the German understanding of what happened at Tiananman and you have the American understanding of what actually happened at the Tiananman. There is the China briefing which comes as a series every year. The 1991 China briefing which is all American scholars writing about that particular year in China. The book opens with a reference to a placard which was shown at the Peking University hostel and which said that the Tiananman shall not be forgotten for many more years.¹¹ That is how the book opened. Various essays in that book are completely dominated by the impact of the Tiananman that how many people were killed and massacred, this that and other and the entire discussion is really coloured as it were by what happened at Tiananman square. That is the American understanding.

The other understanding was an article that the *London Review of Books* carried in November 1992 which was done by a British-China expert. It was called "Tiananman Revisited" and there you have a different kind of tone already. And you have the Institute in Hamburg, Germany coming up with a 500 page volume on the Tiananman incident giving you week by week, day by day, hour by hour account of what happened at Tiananman and the general conclusion is that the western estimates of the loss of life at Tiananman was probably exaggerated.¹² There is a rising tension between United States and China over the last two years at least. A tension which the Chinese do not have with any other power in the western world and Japan. But then the Chinese response to the U.S. on the one hand and to other states has been markedly different. If the Chinese are a little accommodating with the Americans it is obviously in a hope that the U.S. will not force a confrontation on them. A good example of their circumspect behaviour would be their response to the Americans selling the F-16 aircraft to the Taiwan, and France selling mirage aircraft to Taiwan. The French were asked to close their consulate in Guang Zhou. Obviously China cannot afford to take such a strong position vis-a-vis the Americans. The point I am trying to make is that you have therefore a remarkable use of the nuclear capability as a tactical weapon, "a tactical political weapon" vis-a-vis the United States. We shall play it low if you agree to do the same on the questions of China's vital interests, China seems to suggest. After all nuclear states respond to each other in a low key especially if one of them is a nuclear super-power. I am suggesting that China's nuclear capability would be a tactical weapon which might persuade the Americans to climb down on the human rights case or the Chinese climb down on the nuclear issue as a quid-pro-quo perhaps. Nuclear capability is useful for China in terms of bargaining in "a turbulent situation." It is not only question of Human Rights in China. There is, I think, increasing uneasiness as far as the Americans are concerned, particularly in regards to the political pattern in China is concerned. That is why you have

the case where the economic liberalisation is not accompanied by political liberalisation. You have a parallelism here which should be noted, that when Soviet Union was the adversary and there were political problems within China, Chinese nuclear capability helped the Chinese to keep the Soviets at bay, preventing direct kind of Soviet intervention within China and that is precisely the reason why Lu Shaoqi was naked only after, as an answer almost, as a rejoinder almost to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. And that is where the Chinese nuclear capability helped them to make a political point, that it might be all right with Hungary; it might be all right with Czechoslovakia etc. etc. but when it comes to big and grand China you cannot play games with it and that is where the nuclear capability helped them make a political point. In other words there is no question of the Chinese being bogged down by the American pressure and part of it would be due to China's nuclear capability. I will again go back to history to illustrate the point that I am trying to make. You will all recall the Taiwan straits crisis of 59 and, after this crisis began the Soviets kept quiet for some time in short there was no editorial/statement in the *Pravda* or the *Izvestia* on the Taiwan straits crisis for quite some time. During this intervening period Mr. Zhou Enlai made a statement that he was willing to meet the representatives of the American government at any time at any place to sort out all outstanding bilateral issues. The moment this statement was made, of course, I will not be able to say whether there was a necessary casual connection between the two, but I will tell you the chronological order in which it happened. You have the Taiwan straits crisis beginning, no. 1. For sometime there is no statement from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, no. 2. This was followed by Zhou Enlai coming out with this statement no. 3 and immediately you have a very angry and very strong editorial in *Pravda* on the Taiwan straits crisis defining the Chinese position, no. 4.

An earlier example of this kind of open-ended diplomacy on the part of China can be cited. This was the time when the second term of Eisenhower as the President of the U.S. had just begun. He came out in his first or second press conference specifying four conditions as not sufficient but the necessary conditions for the normalisation of relations with China. And the important thing is not what those 4 conditions were but rather the fact that within 6 months of the Eisenhower press conference the Chinese met with all the 4 conditions. That it did not lead to normalisation is another matter. So I think somewhere the Chinese understand how superpowers react or are expected to react. It is possible that their understanding might be dated or even incorrect. As it turned out it was wrong. But this might be more due to the U.S. foreign policy was much too busy in its "adventures of chaos" to borrow Macdonald's graphic phrase. But the point simply is that the Taiwan straits crisis put the Chinese firmly on the nuclear path; not as a deterrent

weapon nor as an offensive weapon but essentially as a political strategy. I think what I said really boils down to the following. No. 1: In the Chinese perspective nuclear weapons make sense if your major contradiction is with the world distribution of power. No. 2. Europe has got all the peace and freedom because there was a balance of terror. Prof. Shen says in his article and also the Chinese proposal to the United Nations last year (April 92) puts it down in so many words that all nuclear disarmament questions can not be limited to Europe alone. That Asia and Africa will have to be made a subject of that understanding otherwise it is really not possible to reach any kind of an understanding on nuclear disarmament. This is from the tentative proposal. Third point one should probably bear in mind as far as this particular aspect of the Chinese understanding of the nuclear weapons is concerned that they have proposed a conference of nuclear weapons states. That is a separate club altogether. So already they think they have made the grade. That is the first move towards nuclear disarmament has to be a conference of the nuclear weapons states. The Chinese argument simply put is that they belong as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. So this would be the three points or three stage understanding of the Chinese attitude on the nuclear question and the Chinese world view. I am not, therefore, saying that the Chinese are right on this. I think the Chinese are wrong on several grounds. But before they are proved wrong politically or in terms of international politics they are going to be proved wrong on the economic front already and that is why I made the point to being with that we have got to remember that the Chinese nuclear program developed at a time when the rate of domestic savings was very very high. From 1988 onwards particularly it has been rapidly falling. With the falling rate of domestic savings, it is extremely doubtful that the Chinese can make really much headway in terms of their nuclear programme apart from proposing a conference here and a conference there. This might explain their newly found interest in nuclear disarmament and, of course, in disciplining of the non-nuclear world.

NOTES :

1. John W. Garver : *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*. Prentice Hall. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1993. pp. 262-263.

There are, of course, full-length studies of China's nuclear strategies which Garver also cites. See, for example, Morton Halpern, *China and the Bomb*, New York - Praeger, 1965; Alice Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*, Prentice Hall, 1962; Chong-pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy - Tradition within Evolution*, Lexington, Mass. 1988.

2. This table is also extracted from Garver cited above. On pp 262. He compares Chinese capability with that of the British and the French. I have omitted the comparative part. The sources for the information in the table are two :

1. *SIPRI Yearbook* 1989 and
2. *Military Balance* 1990-91

3. Chong-pin Lin's book is cited above. See footnote 1.
4. Prof. Paul A. Cantor "Shakespeare - "For all Time?" *Public Interest*. 110. Winter 1993. p. 41.
5. Douglas J. Macdonald. *Adventures in Chaos*. Harvard University Press Cambridge. Mass. 1992.
6. See excerpt from Wei Shiyang's article "Adherence to the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," *Peace Beijing*. Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, no. 28, December 1992, p. 8.

I have discussed this aspect of China foreign policy in my paper at the joint workshop of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the School of International Studies. The text of that paper is due to be published in the *International Studies*, New Delhi, Summer 1993.

7. Cited by John Garver op: cited, p. 260.
8. Cited in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Libai, *China builds the Bomb*, Stanford, Calif: Standar University Press, 1988, p.238.
9. Cited by Prof. Wei Shiyang op-cited. Emphasis added.
10. For the text of Zhou Enlai's letter and my discussion of the same see my article on "Chinese and Soviet Response" in our jointly co-authored book *Bangladesh - A Struggle for Nationhood*. Vikas. New Delhi, 1971.

This book was published *before* the Indo-Pak war of 1971. My argument here thus does not have the benefit of hindsight.

11. William A. Joseph (Ed) *China Briefing*. 1991. Westview Press. Boulder, 1991.
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The Nuclear Option and India's Future

MITCHELL REISS

Despite enormous reserves of talent, resources, and energy, India finds itself today on the margins of international affairs. With 880 million people and a strategic location between Asia and the Middle East, India's true destiny is that of a Great Power. The ethnic and political problems which currently beset India, albeit serious, are not all that much different from ones faced by the United States or by many other countries around the world.

The difference between India and the first tier of countries is found in the *economic sphere*. India's per capita income is only \$ 340. Yet South Korea, which was devastated at the end of the Korean War in 1953 and has few natural resources, now has an annual per capita income of \$ 6,500. In this comparative sense, India is a "Shackled Giant."

How can India pull itself out of this malaise and realize its potential -- to achieve an Indian Renaissance? There are two essential elements for this Indian revival.

First, India must have cheap electrical energy to run its factories and power its cities. Not only is the production of electrical energy difficult and expensive, but the energy that is generated is not transmitted or distributed efficiently.

India's civilian nuclear power program produces only 1 percent of the country's electricity. According to the India Atomic Energy Commission's own reports, the program has encountered difficulties with its heavy water plants, and its power reactors at Madras, Dhruva, and Narora. The official target for electricity output for the year 2000 has been scaled back by 40 percent. In South Korea, on the other hand, nuclear power accounts for almost half of the entire country's electricity needs.

The second key element for an Indian renaissance is access to Western technology, including dual-use technology such as supercomputers. It is especially ironic that Indians are responsible for writing over 50 percent of the software for U.S. computer companies, and yet face restrictions on the export of computers and related technologies to India.

These two obstacles - cheap electrical energy and access to Western technology - prevent India from taking its rightful place in the global arena. Both can be eliminated quite simply; by India changing its nuclear policy.

The United States, Western Europe, and Japan would eagerly sell India civilian nuclear technology and sophisticated technology if it altered its nuclear policy to accept international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. (These are usually referred to as "full-scope" safeguards.) Some Indian scholars, such as K. Subrahmanyam, have advocated other measures -- a freeze on the production of fissile material, a pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons, and adherence to a comprehensive test ban treaty. All of these would be useful steps, but I would go further and urge Delhi to take the lead on creating a universal agreement in these areas. I am confident that Washington would welcome such an initiative from India.

But full-scope safeguards are crucial. The initial and understandable reaction to this proposal among Indian scholars and officials with whom I have spoken is that acceptance of full-scope safeguards would mean the end of India's nuclear option, something India could never do.

However, a great deal of misunderstanding surrounds the phrase "nuclear option." When people use this phrase, they seem to think that a country either has a nuclear option or it doesn't -- a black or white situation. This is not only misleading, it is incorrect. A more sophisticated way to look at this issue is to imagine what might be called a "nuclear option time-line," which represents the time it takes a country to develop and build a nuclear device once a political decision is taken. In the United States, this time period is known as the "critical time." *All countries are on this nuclear option time-line-all countries, in theory, have a nuclear option.*

At one extreme end of this nuclear time-line may be a country like Fiji, which has no nuclear facilities and no nuclear scientists. It would take decades, if ever, for Fiji to build a nuclear weapon. A country like Japan is a party to the NPT, but is also on this time-line and also has a nuclear option. Under the provisions of the NPT, Japan would need to give the other NPT parties 3 months' notice to withdraw from the treaty, and then it would need roughly 3-6 more months to build a nuclear device. Japan's nuclear option can thus be measured in terms of less than one year. Finally, the U.S. and Russia, which still have the most sophisticated nuclear arsenals, are at the opposite end of this time-line from Fiji. During the Cold War, it would have taken the superpowers less than 15 minutes to launch their nuclear weapons once the political decision had been taken.

In the past few years, the positions of U.S. and Russia on this time-line have changed - with both countries moving in the direction of Fiji and Japan. In September 1991, for example, President Bush announced that all ground-based tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Europe and South Korea and returned to the U.S. and these weapons would no longer be deployed at sea. Russia, likewise, removed all its tactical nuclear weapons from ships, gathered in the tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, and consolidated them in 3-4 storage depots.

With respect to strategic nuclear systems, within the last year or so, Washington has removed its nuclear bombs from its bombers and put the bombs in storage. 450 Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have been taken off alert status. It would probably take days, maybe as long as a week, before these weapons could now be fired.

Russia has adopted the same policy. All Russian bombers are off alert status. Almost all its nuclear subs are in port. All ICBMs outside of Russia have been taken off alert. It might take Moscow weeks to launch these missiles.

Even China has taken some of its nuclear missiles off alert status.

No one would say that the U.S., Russia and China are no longer nuclear weapons states because of these measures. It is more accurate to say that each country has a type of nuclear option. The U.S., Russia, and China have adjusted their positions on the nuclear option time-line, increasing the amount of time it would take to actualize their nuclear options. Additional steps can, and should, be taken by Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to further increase this amount of time.

India, of course, also has a nuclear option. According to the recent testimony of Jim Woolsey, the new Director of the CIA, India is thought to have a stockpile of 25-50 nuclear weapons which could be assembled within a very short period of time.

Unfortunately, India's current nuclear policy hampers its growth both domestically and internationally and prevents it from achieving its destiny. India should consider modifying its nuclear option to accept full-scope safeguards which are intended to ensure that nuclear facilities and material are used solely for peaceful uses and are not diverted to military uses. A safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna would be negotiated, just as has been done in the past. The two parties would agree where to install cameras, locate remote sensing

devices, and apply seals. Every few months or so, some inspectors would visit to ensure that the cameras and seals had not been tampered with.

This would not represent a sea-change in India's policy, but merely an extension of the existing safeguards system to cover the country's entire nuclear program. Delhi already accepts safeguards on its two Tarapur light-water reactors, its two Rajasthan heavy water reactors and, at times, the Tarapur reprocessing plant.

Even if it accepted safeguards on all its nuclear activities, India would not have to stop producing fissile material. It would not have to stop research and development on nuclear weapons. It would not have to destroy the non-nuclear components of its nuclear weapons program. Further, India would have the right to deny any particular inspector, such as a Pakistani national, the right to visit an Indian nuclear facility.

How much would this add to India's critical time - the time between the political decision and the assembly of a nuclear device? How long does it take to break a seal to gain access to the fissile material? A few minutes? A few seconds? That is the total amount of time that would be added by accepting full-scope safeguards.

Of course, Pakistan must also accept full-scope safeguards. While Delhi may have to add a few minutes to how quickly it can realize its nuclear option, so would Islamabad. Because full-scope safeguards would apply to each country equally, there would be no net time loss. India would not be surrendering any comparative military advantage or risking strategic surprise.

It should be clear that the real issue is where on this nuclear option time-line India should be situated. *The adoption of full-scope safeguards is entirely consistent with India's preserving its nuclear option.* But a different type of nuclear option will allow civilian nuclear cooperation with the West and access to Western technology. With this cooperation and access, India can take its rightful place as a world leader in the 21st century.

International Dialogue : Paths to Nuclear Disarmament

ELINA KIRICHENKO

I. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND NUCLEAR OPTIONS

The collapse of so called "old order" based on bipolar confrontation came with such suddenness that it has left the world in the state of flux and in need of new visions of the national interests. It is a period of transition not only for the former communism oriented states but for the world. And such period of transition promises hopes and perspectives but also poses some threats and challenges.

Now global community faces dual challenge or even triple challenge of nuclear chain reaction :

- a) peaceful atom activity challenges are beyond the scope of this presentation, though it is very important problem of contemporary life.
- b) chain reaction of nuclear weapons,
- c) chain reaction of nuclear proliferation.

I should like to sum up the researchers' main concerns about the key factors and motivations behind nuclear weapons spread.

In the nearest future the danger of this nuclear chain reaction cannot be reduced to zero. Internationalization of national economics and scientific knowledge, science and technology development, international diffusion of dual-use technology facilitate this process. In such environment even physical elimination of mass destruction weapons could not once and for ever prevent the possibility of their return.

Era of Soviet - American nuclear confrontation is over but there can begin the era of mass destruction weapons dissemination.

The international community may face

- dispersion of nuclear threats owing to fragmentation of the world and multiplying increase of regional conflicts.

- the increasing possibility of anonymous nuclear attacks.
- the transfer of the epicentre of the nuclear confrontation from the zone of developed countries (West-East) to the zone of developing countries, from global level to the regional level. Some scholars state that the East-West Cold War can transform into North-South Cold War. I think it is unrealistic forecasting. But any local nuclear conflict can grow beyond the confines of the region.

If any new country declares a nuclear weapons state status it does stimulate the chain reaction. It can push other threshold countries to acquire nuclear weapons perceived as a long - acknowledged deterrent. Under conditions when the defence umbrellas provided by the traditional alliances are eroding aspiration of political-military establishment of developed countries to have nuclear weapons capabilities against "weaponization of the third world" can increase. It is not a secret that some states that had given up nuclear option (Japan, Germany, Sweden and others) have technical and technological capabilities to begin production of nuclear weapons facilities.

At the same time, fortunately, there are strong motivations behind nuclear non-proliferation after the post cold-war period.

A new global security environment urges national leadership on redefining such term as "interdependence". The interests of each nation are closely interwoven. Measures of internal macroeconomic policies affect other economics. It sounds as a trite. But it is a reality.

National security cannot be defined in only traditional terms of defence and deterrence. Other issues such as the quality of life of people, technological development, environment, energy resources, education are competing with defence in the package of security interests. At this juncture of things considerations of nuclear weapons maintenance costs is to be of great concern for all nations leadership. An expression "the more, the better" does not correspond with nuclear weapons arms. The problems which the former USSR republics have succeeded can be a striking example.

The political establishment of the "West and East" begins to be liberated from constraints imposed by ideological concerns and group decision - making processes. It creates favourable conditions for elimination of ideological and double standards approaches. It is not a secret, that the confrontation of the USSR and the USA to a significant degree promoted nuclear proliferation. For example, responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the constraints under Glenn/Symington Amendments of the Foreign Assistance Act of the USA have been waived for Pakistan five times.

Deterrent conception still remains to be a cornerstone of military-political strategy but the process of its revision has begun.

II. INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

The existing nuclear non-proliferation regime involves several international components; 1) the Treaty on the Non-proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, 2) the International Atomic Energy Agency activity, 3) nuclear and missile export controls, 4) regional agreements on nuclear weapon free zones, 5) nuclear test limitations, 6) nuclear arms disarmament agreements, 7) the UN activity in the disarmament sphere.

The Treaty became one of the pillars of an international nonproliferation regime governing nuclear weapons. Some experts state that the NPT and regional agreements work to codify rather than create restraint. But the main achievement of the NPT is that it put not only political and legal obstacles in the way of overt nuclear armament but it originates an appropriate climate. Its principles have become an integral part of contemporary international law.

The NPT is the international legal document under which declared nuclear weapons states are specifically committed to negotiating nuclear disarmament.

Russia is strongly committed to strengthening all components of both national and international non-proliferation regimes. I am convinced that Russian leadership is sensitive not jeopardising in any way the NPT as one of the main pillars of non-proliferation regime. And it continues to work forward universal adherence to the NPT. Though Russia understands some problems and arguments of non-parties states.

In spite of all weaknesses and shortcomings of the NPT, an analysis of its activity discloses many positive changes..

-- Not a single state has withdrawn from the NPT.

-- Now all five, the declared nuclear-weapon states (the Russian Federation, the USA, the UK, China in March 1992, France in August 1992) have joined the NPT.

-- As a whole, by the end of 1992 the NPT attracted 150 states (almost 85 percent of the UN membership). There will certainly be further growth with the expected accession of some other states (Byelorussia has ratified the NPT in February).

-- North Korea which joined NPT in 1985 at last has ratified its safeguards agreement. In January 1992, South and North Korea signed a declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

-- Pretoria joined the NPT in July 1991 and submitted its nuclear facilities to NPT verification measures.

-- A number of amendments to articles of the Tlatelolco Treaty were unanimously adopted at a conference in Mexico. Those amendments reinforce the role of the IAEA.

-- Brazil and Argentina agreed to place all their nuclear materials and facilities under bilateral inspections and allowed full-scope IAEA monitoring to ensure non-production of military nuclear devices. Although Argentina and Brazil have not yet joined the NPT both countries pledged to follow nuclear non-proliferation international law.

Undoubtedly, the NPT is imperfect and to a definite degree discriminatory as well as any internal or international law limiting the freedom of activity of an individual or a state.

But the NPT has more advantages than disadvantages for the global community. The temptation to raze an imperfect regime to the ground and build up perfect one is understandable but dangerous because only its first part can be easily implemented in practice. It is safer to strengthen the NPT provisions through supplementary agreements without changing the language of the Treaty.

The NPT is one of the pillars of nonproliferation regime. Not less important, but sometimes less addressed, are other components of this regime.

Dr K. Subrahmanyam suggests to gather these other components under the common umbrella of the Universal Treaty. Six components outlined by Dr K. Subrahmanyam are certainly important elements of nuclear disarmament process.

At the same time in the framework of the existing international structures a number of important steps have been undertaken that strengthened this process.

Russia and the USA reached an agreement on massive reduction of nuclear forces. START I and START II are a good contribution to the Article XI of the NPT.

In January 1992, the leaders of the Security Council states issued an unusually strong joint communique that reaffirmed their commitment to stop

proliferation of mass destruction weapons. The communique declared that the spread of such weapons was a "threat to international peace and security", alluding to the UN Charter's Chapter VII, which authorizes the Council to impose economic sanctions or even use military force.

As to technology transfer the Nuclear Suppliers Group established a set of guidelines to constrain exports of nuclear items which used or can be used for production of nuclear weapons. These guidelines are implemented through national export controls mechanisms. During its last meeting the NSG, including 27 members, declared that it was open to all states.

But in order to make the nonproliferation regime more sufficient the existing restraints on supplies of nuclear items need to be complemented by restraints on supplies of nuclear delivery systems. It is partly put into practice by establishment of the MTCR. Some scholars in Russia consider to be helpful to develop a Universal Missile Technology Transfer Treaty in terms of using experience of the NPT and the IAEA activity.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 has played a definite role in preventing nuclear proliferation. Approximately 125 states are its parties. This Treaty has restricted states that are seeking nuclear military capabilities from obtaining design information from nuclear tests. Since October 1991 the USSR and now Russia have been implementing moratorium on nuclear testing. The USA and France followed this moratorium. A total ban on nuclear explosions would help to accelerate nuclear disarmament. It is invariable goal of official Russian foreign policy.

Moscow abandoned production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in 1987 and halted weaponry plutonium production in 1992. The US administration announced that USA is forswearing production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons in hope of encouraging other countries to do the same. It opens the possibility to reach a universal agreement to ban weaponry fissile materials production.

With the end of the Cold War the declared nuclear weapon states may be ripe to review the Resolution 255 and strengthen the security assurances in the framework of the Security Council.

III. CIS AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES

Among other USSR successor states Russia is quite explicit on the point of nuclear nonproliferation policy. It has succeeded the USSR as a nuclear weapon state assuming the former Soviet Union's obligations and rights. Russia is the first successor state which began to create its national non-proliferation export control system.

Two presidential Decrees opened a new stage in the formation of nonproliferation export control regime in Russia. The Decree 312 of March 27, 1992 revealed that Russia intended to follow the policy of insisting on full-scope safeguard as a condition of nuclear export to any non-nuclear state.

On April 11, 1992, B. Eltsin signed a primary Decree 388 providing the legal basis for non-proliferation export controls. It set up control on export (transfer or exchange) of a number of specific categories of raw and other materials, equipment, technologies, scientific and technical information and services which are used or can be used in the creation of weapons and military equipment and also materials, equipment, technology and services which have a peaceful purpose but could be used in the production of missile, nuclear, chemical and other types of mass destruction weapons.

To ensure a unified state policy in above-mentioned sphere as well as to coordinate and provide organizational support for export controls activity an intergovernmental Commission on export controls of RF (Export control of Russia) was formed under the authority of First Deputy Prime Minister. The export control office of the Ministry of Economics has been authorised to function as a working group of the Export Control Commission.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Export Control Commission was authorized to begin negotiations with the governments of the other successor states on the issues of multilateral coordination of non-proliferation export control policy. On July 26, 1992 the heads of governments of the CIS member states signed an agreement on coordination of activities concerning export control of raw materials, equipment, technologies and services which could be used for production of the weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.

The Ministry of Justice drafted proposals of measures of administrative and criminal responsibility for non-proliferation export control rules violations. An appropriate bill provides an imposition of fines and imprisonment for violations of export control rules.

In accordance with Presidential Decree five Control lists have been constructed :

- materials, equipments, technologies and scientific research findings which are military critical,
- the most dangerous precursors, dual-use chemicals and technologies which can be used in the production of chemical weapons,
- the items which can be used in the production of bacteriological weapons,

- nuclear-related export items ("The nuclear list" has been constructed in compliance with the London Group guidelines.),
- items used in missile production.

The main prerequisite for the authorization of export license on above-mentioned items is guarantee-related commitments of the recipient country not to use them directly or indirectly for military objectives as well as not to reexport or transfer them to anybody without a written authorisation of an exporter.

The collapse of the monolithic superpower raised several problems; control of strategic nuclear forces, the threat from the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons, the possible dissemination of the sensitive technology through brain-drain, illicit sales etc, the participation of all former republics in international nonproliferation arrangements.

Tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from all ex-Soviet republics to Russia.

Under the Lisbon Protocol, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine pledged to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states "in the shortest possible time" but no deadline has been set for accession. The challenge is that the original bilateral START agreement has been converted into a multilateral one. After some contradictory declarations leadership of Byelorussia and Kazakhstan reaffirmed their commitments to START agreement and the Lisbon Protocol.

During his visit to Great Britain, L. Kravchuk underlined that Ukraine did not want to change strategic balance of power in the world and reaffirmed the nuclear - free status of his country in the future. According to official explanations delay of the NPT ratification necessitates by wish "to examine the procedures of nuclear weapons dismantlement, sites of dismantlement, costs, ecological effects, safe guarantees". But in fact, there are four reasons why Ukraine is tempted to have a nuclear weapons capability: status, leverage, security and economic motives, Last Kravchuk's declarations disclose that he realizes that the costs of such status will outweigh the benefits.

During his visit to London L. Kravchuk paid attention to the fact that the costs of nuclear weapons destruction approximately equaled the cost of its production. The USA suggests 175 mil. dollars for the purpose of nuclear weapons dismantlement. The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development reportedly agreed to create a special fund for nuclear disarmament. In his interview to "Independant Newspaper" of 11.02.93. the deputy minister

of foreign affairs of Ukraine, the chairman of National Committee on Disarmament, B. Tarasuk clarified a situation in this sphere: Ukraine need much more than 175 mln. for its nuclear disarmament. Ukraine does not call the exact sum, because as it was said, some technologies for missile destructions do not exist, they must be developed and Ukraine needs money under such technologies, not vice versa.

At the International Forum in Davos, Kravchuk pushes an idea of creation of international fund for nuclear disarmament which gives a possibility for all interested nations to get financial assistance for nuclear weapons destruction. Ukraine considers itself to be the owner of warheads and it wants to use the fissile materials from dismantled strategic and tactical weapons for its atomic power stations or to get financial compensation. It was an issue of Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Irpen.

Ukraine wants to get security guarantees from all permanent members of the UN Security Council and special security guarantees from Russia.

Ukraine requires from Russia to include in guarantees three main provisions : 1) guarantees against any possible aggression from nuclear - weapons states with use both nuclear and conventional weapons. 2) non-use of economic pressure to get economic or political benefits, 3) unconditional recognition and respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of existing borders.

Russia tries to meet requirements of Ukraine. Two weeks after Irpen meeting Russia submitted required information concerning fissile materials from dismantled weapons. In spite of some discrepancies with Ukrainian military authorities Russia continues to implement guarantee service of strategic missiles located on territory of Ukraine.

Russian leadership reiterates its belief that bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.

The global community must do its best not to return to the barbarism of the cold war period. During some stage of transition, unfortunately, nuclear weapons will be regarded as a means of deterrent. But deterrent policy is a policy of menace. It must be replaced by the policy of collective global defence. It is necessary to abandon highly militarized approach and try to solve the problem by political means. What is needed is to give up the motto "all or nothing". Elimination of ideological concerns and double standards, goodwill, and common sense are the best motto for discussions.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Sir,

THE PRESENTATION OF THE SHATRUJIT GOLDEN JUBILEE - INDIAN AIRBORNE FORCES - (1941-1991)

On Saturday, 31st October 1992, the Indian Airborne section of the Airborne Forces Museum at Aldershot, was the focal point for the final event of the celebratory year, which had brought together British and Indian serving and retired members, at events in both India and the United Kingdom; the occasion was for the presentation of The Shatruijit.

The Museum was the ideal venue for this function, since the Indian Airborne Section - which was established on 30th June 1989 by members of 50/77th Indian Parachute Brigades Association, at the invitation of the then Museum Director, Major Geoff Norton and the Trustees, ably co-ordinated by Curator Diana Andrews - embodies the life of the original 50th Indian Parachute Brigade since its inception at Delhi in October 1941, its emergence into the 2nd Indian Airborne Division, and until its final demise as a formation of the 'British Raj', on the Partition of India 1947 when, happily to say, the Indian Government then decided to continue with its own Parachute Regiment, which has robustly flourished to this day, under its cherished emblem and formation sign The Shatruijit.

The Jubilee Year had started with a traditional 'Regimental Weekend' at Agra on 26/27th October 1991, sponsored by 50th (Independent) Parachute Brigade commanded by Brigadier B N Kaul, where the chief guest of honour was General P P Kumaramangalam, DSO, who had commanded 12 Para Fd Regt in earlier days before Partition. The occasion brought together the youngest recruits of today, with the oldest Indian and British veterans of yesteryear, with many members of their families. 20 British guests attended, accompanied by five of their wives, from the original formation, some of whom had travelled from as far afield as Australia, Canada, USA and the United Kingdom, whilst Indian veterans converged from far and wide.

At the final event that weekend, the Golden Jubilee Dinner held in the

officers' Mess at Agra, gifts and souvenirs were exchanged between our association and the Parachute Regiment of India. They included a handsome statuette in bronze, on a marble base and weighing some 70 kilos, of the Shatrujit - the Indian equivalent of Pegasus - from Major-General R P Limaye Colonel Commandant and his officers to Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Gray and officers of the British Parachute Regiment, which on their behalf, was accepted by Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. 'Joe' Whyte, seniormost Association Officer present, for onward transmission to the Museum. Eventually Shatrujit, directed and propelled by sympathetic friends in the FCO and RAF, duly arrived quite unscathed despite his fragility and prodigious weight.

Thus it was that at Aldershot last year, Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Gray and his officers very kindly hosted an impressive and most enjoyable Ceremonial, at the Museum, where the Shatrujit was formally handed over. In Colonel 'Joe' Whyte's excellent address he stated that 'As the Pegasus of British Airborne Forces is a fabled winged horse, so Shatrujit is a fabled Hindu King - so seldom without his beloved horse Kunalaya that they merged into one - famous for his triumph of good over evil in battle' to which General Sir Michael responded in his own inimitable way, accepting the gift and graciously thanking all concerned.

The Shatrujit was then installed in a place of honour in the Indian Airborne section of the Museum.

Present at the ceremony, and representing the Parachute Regiment of India, we were pleased to welcome Lieutenant-General MSI Narachari, PVSM and Brigadier Bhopal Singh Malik, AVSM, Military Adviser from the High Commission of India, in London, accompanied by his charming wife. The Association was well represented, and included Mrs Anne Hope Thomson, widow of the late 'Brigadier Tim' who put up the gallant stand in 1944 at Sangshak in the defence of Imphal, with 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, about which the late Field-Marshal Sir William Slim wrote "I shall always remember the days you gained for 14th Army, at a critical time, by the magnificent stand at Sangshak".

The days proceedings included a group photograph at the well-known Browning Barracks Dakota, followed with an enjoyable 'curry lunch' appropriately in the 'Raj Room' of the Royal Aldershot Officers' Club.

Also to mark the Golden Jubilee year, a sum of money equivalent to some Rs: 40,000 was contributed by Association members and presented to the Parachute Regiment of India for their Welfare and Educational Trust funds; duly acknowledged with grateful thanks and much appreciation.

Members of the 50th/77th Indian Parachute Brigades Association, present on this occasion, express their gratitude to the Colonel Commandant and officers of RHQ and the Parachute Regiment, and to Curator Mrs Diana Andrews and her staff for the detailed arrangements, and for their great hospitality and comradeship on this historic occasion, promoting goodwill and understanding across the oceans. As if to 'round-off' the Jubilee Year, in Autumn 1992, the Arms and Armour Press published Peter Harclerode's brilliant book "PARA! Fifty Years of the Parachute Regiment" which generously includes a chapter, faithfully reflecting a potted history of 'Indian Airborne' including concise and extremely accurate details of all operational activities, with a fine account of the battle at Sangshak and events which led up to it; the best definitive record published in the last fifty years, and a 'must' for 'Army Indophiles'!

Yours Faithfully

-- Brigadier L F Dicky Richards, CBE (Retd)

II

Sir,

APPEAL FOR MATERIAL FOR BOOK ON LEADERS OF THE INDIAN ARMY

I am writing a book, entitled "Leaders of the Indian Army". The leaders I intend including in the book are the following :-

- (a) FM KM Cariappa
- (b) FM SHFJ Manekshaw
- (c) Gen KS Thimayya
- (d) Lt Gen PS Bhagat
- (e) Lt Gen Sagat Singh
- (f) Lt Gen Hanut Singh
- (g) Maj Gen Bikram Singh
- (h) Brig Hoshiar Singh
- (i) Brig Sawai Bhawani Singh

There must be several officers, among your readers, who may have served with these or have first hand knowledge about them. I would be grateful if they could send me anecdotes, which they feel would interest others. Subject to the limits of security, I would like to have names, places and dates. In addition to the personalities mentioned above, if any of your readers would like to suggest some others, they are welcome to do so.

Your faithfully,

Headquarter
12 Corps
C/o 56 APO

Brig V K Singh
Chief Signals Officer

ADVERTISE

in the

JOURNAL

of the

**United Service Institution
of
India**

Review Article 1

The Story of the French Foreign Legion

LT GENERAL M L THAPAN, PVSM (RETD)

This is a fascinating story of a corps, unique in our age, made up of men from different countries, all volunteers, speaking different languages, drawn from varying social strata, who chose (and still do), to serve France, in what was once her colonial empire, and in the defence of her motherland.

Understandably, classic histories of the foreign legion have so far been published in French. This is, perhaps, the first attempt to gather in one volume, in English, a history of this corps from its inception in 1831, to the present day. It focuses on the linkage between its recruitment, training, rituals and social environment, to its combat performance in various theatres of operations.

The polyglot composition of the force was exemplified in that, at various periods of its history, apart from Frenchmen (less than 50%) it included Germans (the largest number). Swiss, Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Dutch Greeks, Belgians, Swedes, Danes, English, Irish, Scots, Americans, Koreans, Filipinos, Chinese and, (so the book recounts) some who spoke Sanskrit. There were no social barriers to recruitment. Ex-officers, deserters, men on the run from the law in their own country, students, lawyers, solicitors those with a love for adventure - all found their way into the legion.

The book describes in some detail, and in chronological sequence, the combat deployment of the legion, in various parts of the world. It fought in Algeria, Spain, Mexico, Indo-China, Dahomey (modern Benin, which occupies the Western frontier of Nigeria on the Gulf of Guinea is West Africa), Madagascar and in France in World War I and II. The casualties suffered by the legion, in all their engagements were severe. In World War I, the overall estimate was 11,000 out of a total of 44,150 men, who served in it. The aggressive spirit displayed by units and sub-units was formidable. Losses in smaller engagements elsewhere, were of even higher proportions.

The research that has gone into the preparation of this history is phenomenal. The author spent the summers of several years in archives in France, looking for undiscovered documents, diaries and memoirs, and consulting excellent monographs, and theses, which are as yet unpublished. The result

is a most readable account of the life of the legionnaire. It was a hard existence. Pay was low - lower than that of equivalent ranks in the regular Army; the reason put forward being that the authorities did not wish the legion to be regarded as a band of mercenaries. Nevertheless, there was never any dearth of recruits. Training was tough and discipline harsh. A big problem was communication; the official language French, being spoken by only a fraction of those serving. However, business got done. Rations were poor by today's standards. Drink was a curse; so much so that uniforms and accoutrements were peddled in the market to procure it, when the pittance which passed for pay ran out. Desertion was endemic in the legion; partly because of hard living conditions, aggravated by the stress of operations, especially in an atmosphere of national and political tension. Units with a large proportion of Germans obviously, could not be employed on the western front in the two world wars. Many legionnaires saw desertion as a challenge, a dramatic gesture, which often ended up in re-enlistment under another name. Loyalty, in the legion, was not so much to France as to one's comrades and one's units, particularly if the unit had distinguished itself in battle in the past. The author's answer to the question, how beneficial has the legion been for France, is worth quoting: "the existence of the legion is itself a reflection of French attitudes towards foreigners. It testifies to the view that France must always pay some price for the political turbulence of Europe in the form of refugees; because the attractions of her universal culture at the centre of which stands Paris, her democratic institutions and her traditions of asylum, have made her an obvious destination for the uprooted."

Douglas Porch's history of the foreign legion is a work of great scholarship. He writes with sympathy, but is objective in his judgments. He quotes extensively from the records of former commanders of the legion, as well as those who have served in its ranks, as officers and common soldiers. The mosaic which emerges is as true a portrait of a force, as is humanly possible to depict.

Readers will find the chapters on the French withdrawal from Indo-China and Algeria, after the second world war, of absorbing interest. Not only does the author relate the part played by the legion; he also tells, us why the French found themselves in an impossible situation, and describes the military actions vividly.

An excellent work of reference, fully authoritative.

Review Article 2

A Soldier's Story

MAJ GENERAL L S LEHL PVSM, Vr C (RETD)

An autobiography of a soldier normally brings to mind a story of his victories in wars and sometimes the circumstances of defeat which the writer wishes to share with his readers. General Sinha's book does not fall into that category. The author writes, "A thought occurred to me that I should leave an account of events which I have witnessed so that future generations can get a glimpse of them through this book". He has succeeded eminently in this.

Early in his military career, Lt Gen Sinha was spotted as an officer of high calibre. He was soon selected to be on the General Staff Branch at the brigade and higher headquarters. In these appointments, he worked intimately with Senior British and Indian Commanders and got an insight into the working of the higher military hierarchy. He played an eventful role as GSO2 (Operations) at the Command HQ during the turmoil in the Punjab following the Partition. He was intimately involved in the conduct of military operations in J&K from the start to the end. He was the Secretary of the Indian Delegation which negotiated and signed the Karachi Agreement which ended the hostilities in J & K.

He has commented on the working relationship between the British and the Indian Officers and the military and the bureaucracy in the pre-Independence period. A spirit of comradeship generally prevailed amongst military officers, and the seniors guarded their juniors from the overbearing behaviour of the bureaucrats. Even though there was a natural conflict in the mutual relationship due to the uncertainty of Independence, most of the British officers showed understanding and a sense of fairplay towards Indian officers. General Sinha has given the example of one of his superior British Officers who worked till midnight and told him, "This was my last day with the Indian Army which I served for twenty years. I go home with a clear conscience. I am leaving nothing pending on my table"

The author has been a crusader of the unified command and control system of the Defence Services which has been found unacceptable by the government due to political, bureaucratic and inter-service reservations. He has given his views on protocol, status, service conditions and pay of the Defence personnel. At a presentation of the cadre review, Mr Subramaniam,

the Defence Minister was impressed by the merit of the case as advocated by Gen Sinha and remarked, "General, you joined the wrong profession. You should have been a lawyer". His unexpected supercession came as a surprise and his dignity, discipline and poise in accepting it gracefully won him stature and respect in the Army and the public.

The book touches on a large number of matters concerning the Defence Services who continue to be kept out of the policy making machinery of the Government of India. Even decisions on matters connected with national security are taken without a proper scrutiny and contribution by the Defence Services. It has led in the past to painful situations like the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Sri Lanka and Blue Star.

An interesting and well written book which gives a balanced account of the events. The book should be useful not only to the Defence Services but also to the general public.

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Review Article 3

Top Level Decision Making Process

AIR MARSHAL M L SETHI, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

The *NSC Staff*, published in the United States of America in 1991 in the wake of Iran Contra Affair and dealing with an exclusive American organisation is a timely reminder to us that the National Security Organisation of a country must keep pace with external and internal changing environments. Administrative machinery in India has remained static as we inherited it from the British in 1947. The decision-making is painfully slow and cumbersome at the highest echelons of the government. In fact, even this institutionalised system has often suffered from neglect and disuse. No effort has been made to evolve a well defined responsive and fast reacting organisation for national security. The Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, and Home operate in water tight Compartments with minimal interaction and coordination. At present an organisation to plan, coordinate, and oversee, an integrated national strategy to achieve national aims and objectives is lacking. Both the Janta government and the present regime have made noises about establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) but the concept has yet to take practical shape. The book under review should help our top planners to clear the cobwebs in thinking on the subject.

Christopher Shoemaker, a professional military officer who served on the staff of the NSC has provided a fine insider's analysis of the functioning of the NSC Staff which has grown from an Administration and Clinical Support Group established in 1947 into an extremely powerful staff in the US Government. He has defined its roles, brought out its weaknesses, and suggests an organisation which would be good enough in the future.

The author has defined US National Security "as the protection of the United States from major threats to our territorial, political or economic well being. The National Security System and process are primarily concerned with the integration and coordination of defence policy, foreign policy, international economic policy and intelligence policy and the procedures associated with each of these areas.

The performance of the National Security Staff since its inception forty five years ago has been assessed in relation to seven functions - administrative, policy coordination and integration, policy supervision, policy and

adjudication, crisis management, policy formulation and policy advocacy. An indepth analysis of the NSC Staff during Carter and Reagan eras has been made and found deficient in many areas. In his assessment the NSC staff have played an important role in the formation of National Security policy but the extent of its influence has varied from time to time depending upon the style of functioning of the President. Each President invented his own system, varying an extremely flexible organisation to a stratified bureaucratic set up. The personality of the National Security Adviser and his relationship with the President also had important bearing on the role and importance of the NSC Staff. Thus a clear cut organisation with well defined channels of responsibility and authority was lacking. Iran-Contra Affair seems to have developed in the absence of clear lines of authority in the NSC Staff.

In the author's view the existing structure of NSC staff must change if the US is to protect its national security effectively. He is of the firm view that neither the Secretary of Defence nor the Secretary of State should have a dominant role in the NSC. "Rather National Security is seen as an over-reaching interdisciplinary dynamic paradigm embracing the elements and responsibilities of a number of departments". He opines that "every administration since that of FDR has either moved to a White House central management structure or created a chaotic national security process. It is now time to formalize what has been a de facto system and create the sort of structure that will guarantee the proper and efficient management of national security into the next century".

Shoemaker has recommended that all elements of power of the United States should be integrated at the Presidential level and the seven functional roles of the NSC Staff should form the foundation of the NSC System. The NSC Staff would thus have a dual role of serving the NSC as an institution and the President's personal staff. He has quoted Carter regarding the people who are selected as staff of the NSC since it is the quality of the personnel on whom the efficiency of the system will depend. "The most skillfully designed national security system will fail utterly when it is not staffed by men and women of great character, intellect and commitment -- The President must therefore select his NSA with the knowledge that it should be his most important - and careful - appointment".

The book is recommended as essential reading for all those connected at higher levels with national security. Hopefully it would impel them to devise National Security System that will suit our polity and meet not only our present requirements but in the twenty first century too.

Review Article 4

Conceptualising Warfare in the Indian Context

BRIG J NAZARETH (RETD)

General Sardeshpande has unique credentials for writing this book. He is a highly principled professional officer of great sincerity to soldiering and he has had the advantage of experience of command in war and in prolonged counter insurgency operations. He seems to have had an insatiable thirst for knowledge for both the Western type of warfare, and what is most unusual, a grounding of Sanskrit, ancient Indian philosophy and Indian warfare and culture. This has enabled him to relate his subject to Indian conditions. One striking feature of his thinking is his tendency to analyse all concepts with which he deals down to their essential ingredients which gives him a basis for his cogitations.

The book is a collection of his articles published over the last twenty years. It reveals his professional intellectual growth. It falls logically into two parts : the philosophy of warfare and the practical principles of military command. The first part would appeal to those who are interested in a conceptual study of warfare. It deals with the various aspects of warfare: anthropological, social, psychological, and political, and ends with the consideration of the distinction between the science and art of war.

In his anthropological view, he attributes the rise of soldiery chiefly to a surplus economy, as retainers to guard surplus wealth. Economic systems which produce no or marginal surplus, produce no warriors but only hunters since there is no surplus wealth to guard. This is a simplistic view applicable to the Egyptian and Western European civilisations. There are other factors that produce soldiery. One is patriotism. With the Spartans and the early Romans the bearing of arms was a privilege accorded only to citizens. It had no relation to guarding surplus wealth. Tribal loyalties produced soldiers even in a subsistence pastoral economy. They created wealth through warfare and sustained their warfare through conquest and they ruled over the greatest empires in the world. The empires of Ghengis Khan, his son Sabutai and grandson Kubla Khan extended from China to Hungary.

But what is certainly true is the contention of the author that soldiery developed to guard wealth and today armies exist to prevent the depredations of wealth by outsiders.

The social view is well analysed, starting with Nature's basic law of survival which involves struggle and procreation, the former requires aggression and the latter seeks peace. The interplay of these two factors and their implications in warfare in all their various facets have been lucidly brought out.

The psychological view deals with two instincts; the basic one is flight from danger, and when man developed his principles and values, there was the superimposed one of facing the confrontation by fighting instead of fleeing. The implications of these two influences have been developed from basic concepts and their corollaries - group action, discipline and morale-are discussed. The author is correct in stating that fighting needs uniformity in response and the soldier has to merge his individuality, his personality and his very identity with his colleagues. The author accepts a milder form of ragging as desirable towards this end. This view is highly questionable and needs to be examined in depth. It was true in the armies of Frederick the Great. But this approach was revolutionised by Sir John Moore who trained the armies used by Wellington in the Peninsular War at Shorncliffe, and also by Nelson who created his 'band of brothers.' By 'ragging' we should understand the collective 'baiting' of a group against an individual to break him into conformity by humiliating him. The best soldier is the one who retains his individuality in all respects but is emotionally integrated with the group. The army discipline is more than sufficient to ensure uniformity in the soldier. It is objective whereas 'ragging' is personalised and would tend to build resentment.

The political view is a competent analysis - again from basic concepts. It carries the study of warfare beyond conventional thinking and shows the less catastrophic forms of warfare - limited war, local war, cold war, war of brinkmanship, insurgency war and war of nerves (Psychological war). This is well worth a study, not only by the military profession but also by political leaders.

The practical aspect of soldiering starts with the study of morale - a hackneyed subject in military writing, but the merit of this chapter is that it avoids the normal platitudes and again carries the study with the author's penchant of resorting to fundamental concepts which makes his analysis comprehensive. Thus he deals with the main aspects of human anatomy, religion and morale, tradition and morale, motivation and professionalism in morale, discipline and leadership in morale, and changed circumstances. Under each of these headings the subsidiary aspects are fully covered.

The analysis of religion and morale is useful because it is related to Indian thinking and culture - an aspect not normally covered in articles which

one reads on the subject. The author rightly holds that evoking religious fanaticism as was done in the past is undesirable and unhealthy in our secular conditions of today, and morale should be concerned more with moral education and spiritual values. Morals strengthen the individual mind and soul for morale, but collectively, morals are discarded when self interest intervenes. Here we see the pragmatic approach of the author.

In his analysis of tradition he calls for a re-assessment of past practices which the army has inherited, and creating new traditions that must rise from the soil. He has compared the British and American regimental traditions and states that what the Americans lack by way of regimental traditions they make up by national motivation and a high standard of professionalism. This is not quite correct. In the Vietnam War the lack of cohesion at the unit level was very marked, and there was also poor professionalism. The book 'Crisis in Command' reveals the extent of the rot that had taken place because of this. All studies of war show that the soldier fights basically for his comrades and his unit. Patriotism and national tradition, though providing general incentives are too remote as motivating factors in the area of combat. The lack of regimental traditions is a serious handicap in the American Army. The strength of the Indian Army lies in its regimental traditions and these have to be sedulously nurtured; this does not have to exclude the wider national traditions.

The author's treatment of morale under 'Changed Conditions' reveals his pragmatic approach which is necessary in our present transitional period of the higher education of the soldier but there is much in his views that need serious evaluation. He says "we should marshal our motivational strains around the nation in preference to the regiments...It is doubtful whether our continuing restrictiveness of mere regimental loyalties will indeed make us a fully national army." There seems to be a confusion of concepts in this view as one does not necessarily militate against the other. Regional pride can never be eliminated and it contributes to the diversity of the nation except when distorted by self-seeking politicians. Regimental pride is an enhanced form of regional pride and it is the expression of the soldier's pride that he, primarily, and his unit are the best and are invincible. This is the basis of the fighting spirit. The British, German and even the American army thrive on regional pride. Rommel always made it a point to meet Swabian soldiers from his area. The Indian Army can foster regimental pride even with multi-regional recruitment.

In his chapter on Initiative the author has rightly stressed the malaise of rigid centralised control in the Indian Army which kills initiative at the junior leadership level. Today the Indian Army is afflicted with the 'No Mistake Syndrome Commander' who has risen because mistakes of all kinds are treated as a reflection of command ability. Hence he follows the beaten

track of precedence and over-insurance to avoid mistakes. This creates an environment for the careerist officer. Good officers who exercise their command through initiative find themselves eliminated for mistakes made in trying, and the 'No Mistake Syndrome Commander' proliferates to perpetuate the system.

The ideas of the author on Decision Making follows the long recognised pattern of the 'Appreciation of the Situation' taught in military training establishments. A view questioning this procedure will be found in 'The Analysis and Solution of Military Problems' by the present writer. This stresses the instinct and innate judgment of the military commander as opposed to the logical process of thinking.

The Chapter on 'Indian Military Tradition' is an unusual one which is very relevant to our Army set in the mould of the British Army and nurtured on Western military traditions. The starting point has been taken as the Vedas and the author shows his versatility with his knowledge of Sanskrit and the early period of Indian history dealing with thinkers like Chanakya and Kautilya. He follows this up with the totalitarianism of the Islamic period, the Renaissance of the Maratha and Sikh period and finally the scientific development under the British. From this background he analyses our weaknesses and the lessons to be learnt particularly since the advent of Independence.

There is a chapter on a sample survey of psychological and motivational factors affecting all ranks of the army. This is interesting since it reveals the thinking of the Army under our present conditions.

The Chapter on 'Soldiering - A Personal View' reveals an officer with a very sincere and dedicated love for the Army. It is a useful guide and should be an inspiration for the young officer on how to develop himself professionally. The author makes a distinction between the 'good officer' and a 'successful officer' and the two do not necessarily coincide though in the case of the author it has happened to a large extent. The young officer has to make his decision on which type he wants to be - in short a decision of character. The last chapter deals with 'What Ails the Officer Class?'

Of late there has been an increase in military literature dealing with descriptions and analyses of campaigns but hardly any on the cogitational aspect of military study. This book forces the reader to think seriously on all the basic concepts that have been analysed. One may not agree with some of the ideas that may have been expressed, but that is immaterial. What is important is that one is forced to evaluate them. Cliches and platitudes have been avoided and whatever is written is related to the author's thinking and experience, and vast erudition. For this reason it is a valuable contribution to military literature.

Review Article 5

The Good and Bad in International Relations

COL R RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

The subject elaborated in this comparatively slender volume is obviously of profound interest to all those in charge of national affairs and diplomats besides those concerned with framing and execution of national defence plans. National leaders as well as diplomats and defence planners have to remember the classic saying that 'a nation has no permanent friends or permanent enemies but only permanent interests'. Diplomacy consists essentially in framing policies that will enable the country to pursue its national interests and safeguard them. Prevention of war, without compromising or sacrificing national interests in an indication of successful diplomacy.

A nation's interests come first, always and everytime, to its policy makers and to its people. Hence national survival and safeguarding its interests must be ensured at all costs. Careful study and analysis of what others are doing and planning to do, is of importance as that is the first step towards the evolution of a workable foreign policy. Alternative policies that would further national interests would also need to be considered and evolved.

In this context, morality may not be a relevant consideration Hans Morgenthau has rightly observed (P 40) that "the State has no right to let its moral disapprobation -- get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival" George Kennan, well known American diplomat had likewise noted that (P 40) the needs i.e. the object of national interest, have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either 'good' or 'bad'.

Oliver Wendel Holmes too had observed that 'the conduct of States is not susceptible of moral assessment as far as such conduct consists of the pursuit of national interest'. This could also mean that so long as a country pursues its national interests and in the process tries to subjugate other countries (which are seen to be weaker or without support from other countries who could come to its rescue) it can act as it deems appropriate.

American leaders have consistently followed this policy i.e. doing what is best for furthering their country's political and economic interests, and rightly so. Where it serves or seems to serve American interests, American leaders have been guided by the principle enunciated by Hans Morgenthau. Building up its strength, that is its military might, is the next step since this besides ensuring national survival could enable the country to deter some countries which may have plans to dominate smaller powers in their neighbourhood. At the end of the Second World War, there were only two militarily powerful nations. First, the United States which became by far the most powerful nation in the world not merely by its economic strength and industrial base but equally by its possession of the nuclear weapon whose destructive power it had demonstrated during the final stage of the war by using two specimens of the horror weapon against Japan. This clearly showed other countries, friends as well as foes of the United States, what the latter could do, to further its own interests or in support of friends and allies. Predictably West European countries, allies of US during the Second War, posed no problems. Russia, an ally of the West during the War, had suffered serious losses. It had to rebuild its economy which was all but ruined by four years of devastating war. Further Russia's dictator Stalin soon realised that yesterday's allies need not necessarily continue be today's allies too. Hence Russia retained its vast army and took steps to preserve its dominance over East Europe. Further, it was building its own nuclear weapons.

It was in this global scenario, that President Truman requested US Congress to permit him to provide military and economic assistance to Turkey and Greece so that these countries could resist Soviet pressures (P 47; the Truman Doctrine). USA's objective was to prevent Soviet Russia from having free access to the Mediterranean. Russia's free and unmonitored access to that Sea Via Istanbul and Aegean Sea would, US Policy makers felt, have enabled Russia to move into the Mediterranean at will and secure a foothold at least in some West Asian and North African countries.

Truman Doctrine also provided for US intervention in any country where free people were resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Also "I believe (said President Truman) that we must free people to work out their destinies in their own way" (Ref: 'Vital Speeches of the Day' 15 Mar 1947, pp 322-324). However a military intervention tends to be risky and costly and therefore rational only if it is from the point of view of national interest, the lesser evil in comparison with leaving imperialism unchallenged. In either case, moral considerations are beside the point".

The nuclear era in which, the people of the world, particularly the weaker countries, the developing nations, have to exist, created its own problems.

Countries had to align themselves with one or the other dominant power, or remain strictly neutral, provided such neutrality was recognised by the countries that mattered. Nuclear weapons still pose threats, where non-nuclear States are concerned besides acting as deterrents to rival nuclear States. Given the overwhelming strength of the United States in comparison with its rival of yester years and the general recognition of the irretrievable damage that a large scale nuclear war can cause to the Earth and its environment, a general nuclear war is, hopefully, out of the question. But nuclear deterrence however works.

For India, the lesson is clear. It is flanked by two countries that have attacked her in the past and seized parts of its territory. One is a declared and recognised nuclear power; the other is also a nuclear power, which admits that it is 'nuclear-capable' which shorn of its diplomats cover means that it does have the horror weapon. American intelligence agencies had recognised that quite some time ago. Hopefully the dominant global power will cease pressurising India to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty till the clandestine nuclear powers discard their horror weapons and accede to the Treaty. This is precisely what our Prime Minister declared recently.

Oppenheim's book "The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy" is good reading material for all students of international affairs.

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Book Reviews

The World Atlas of Warfare : Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History. By Richard Holmes, *New York, Penguin, p. 304, \$ 40.00.*

Though military history and warfare are quaint subjects for an atlas the editors and various experts (the majority from Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst) in these fields have made landmark contributions in this book which stresses on the geopolitical significance of war. What with intricately drawn sketches, original maps, time charts showing development of battles and campaigns, eyewitness accounts, thumb nail sketches of prominent military commanders, rare photographs, and the brilliantly arithmetic text, the end result is indeed an atlas! Interwoven with description of warfare is the description of crucial military innovations and inventions which altered the course of campaigns and later were turning points in history itself.

— Lt Col A K Sharma

Before the Battle -- A Commonsense Guide to Leadership and Management. By Lt Gen Edward M Flanagan Jr., *New Delhi, Lancer International, 1985, p. 228, Rs. 140/-. ISBN 81-7062-098-8.*

The author who held both field and staff appointments has narrated his own experience in highlighting the various aspects which make a good leader and a manager.

Although the book is primarily for the army, it would be of equal value to the officers of the navy and airforce who could adopt the various suggestions to fit in with the environments prevailing in their service.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Commanders and Commanding. By Air Marshal K K Sen, Pran Chabra & Wg Cdr S N Bahl, *New Delhi, Inst. of Flight Safety, Air HQ (VB), p. 66, Rs. 50/-.*

This book describes in concise and clear form the Utilising of Resources, Time Management, Staff Work, Management by Objectives, Developing Human Resources, Delegation, Decision Making, Leadership and other aspects which make a good leader.

An excellent book which should be read by junior and senior officers alike and find a place in all the service libraries.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Leadership - Quotations from the Military Tradition. Ed. By Robert A Felton, *Boulder, Westview, 1990, p. 382, \$ 19.95. ISBN 0-8133-7867-2.*

Leadership is a vast subject and has attracted tremendous research. Traits and functions of leadership are well known, yet, some who possess all of them and in plentitude fail to realise their potential. What is perhaps lacking is commitment, faith and inspiration. The quotations provided in the book are an endeavour to fill this gap at least partially. They cover all facets of military leadership particularly courage, communication and the needs of subordinates. Even a mere browse through the book is likely to ring many emotions in the hearts of veterans. It can set the young looking at themselves more critically. Quotations about duty, honour, military ethics and patriotism are bound to grip their imagination.

The collection of papers on Military Leadership in the second part of the book is readable.

— Air Marshal H K Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

World Affairs. *New Delhi, Lancers International, Biannual (June and December) 1991, p. 97, Rs. 125/- per issue.*

"World Affairs" is a very welcome addition to the not very crowded field of quality political and international journal being published in India. The Lancers International is indeed doing yeoman service by bringing this out in addition to the Indian Defence Review, an older and more established Defence Journal. The format is the same and production in soft cover quite attractive and convenient. The price at Rs. 125/- a copy is not too much considering both the quality and variety of articles.

The Editor-in-Chief is Mr. T N Kaul who is among the most eminent diplomats of India with his very long active career of over five decades and his enormous knowledge of world affairs. The contributors represent an international spectrum who bring to the articles their personal perceptions and insights.

The Journal is divided into a number of sections, mainly covering international relations in different parts of the globe. An attractive aspect is the Review of important books. These are written by eminent people who comment on the book from the background of their own rich experiences.

The Journal would make a very attractive collection for all major libraries and will contribute to a better understanding of this complex world.

— Maj Gen D Banerjee, AVSM

Great Sieges in History. By William Seymour, *London, Brassey, 1991, p. 339, ISBN 0-0803-7696-7.*

History has always provided invaluable lessons. The modern day 'Dronacharyas' of mechanised warfare have dwelled time and again on the annals of naval battles

to scoop out precious lessons. 'Great Sieges in History' too holds a wealth of experience. Opinion may vary on the relative merits of the sieges featuring in the book, but unquestionably the account is vivid. It is well researched and illustrated. Interest in history and the knowledge of military history is imperative to fully comprehend the book. The accounts bring out the difficulties and the horrors of the experience in no uncertain manner. The exhaustive bibliography of the book will be a boon for those conducting research. On the whole a worthwhile book indeed.

— Major B K Jain

Terrorism and Politics. By Barry Rubin, *London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 174, £ 35.00. ISBN 0-331-56647-5.*

A book of a very topical interest to Indian readers as it deals comprehensively with Terrorism. It is a combination of seven articles covering various aspects such as Intelligence, airlines safety, mercenaries (employed by political parties) and legitimisation of Terrorism. Author of each article is a specialist in the respective field and as such coverage is analytical and detailed.

Chapters on the Israeli approach against Terrorism is highly instructional as that country has taken Terrorism in all seriousness and has developed units, techniques and decision making process to effectively check above menace. By contrast the US (and to a certain extent India) responses to Terrorism lack the thoroughness demanded at various levels. Politician's reluctance to risk striking at terrorists has, in many cases, prevented a decisive action, thereby encouraging Terrorism.

A good book for serious students as well as the affected bureaucrats who are interested in genesis of Terrorism, knowing the method adopted by them and for evolving effective means to counteract the same.

— Col R N Khanna (Retd)
FBIM (UKI, MIIIE)

Insurgency & Terrorism Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. By Bard E. O'Neill. *Washington, Brassey's (US) p. 171, \$ 19.00. ISBN 0-08-037456-5.*

The author has analysed insurgency in all its connotations and has presented the components of the framework of insurgency separately and distinctly commencing from definition, graduating to causes and their ramifications, to strategic perceptions of ultimate goals and the relative importance to the environment, popular support, organisation, external support and the government's response.

The erudite exposition of theories is brilliantly illustrated by examples of the successes and failures of insurgency in various countries thus making it easier for a layman to understand the multifarious implications.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Common Ground on Terrorism : Soviet American Cooperation Against the Politics of Terror. Ed. By Igor Beliaev and John Marks, *New York, W W Norton, 1991, p. 183, £ 15.95.*

The subject of this book is easily the most talked of current topic of the day. Eight concisely written essays, by eminent participants of US - Soviet Task Force to prevent terrorism - a non official body started in 1988, examine the various forms of terrorism, especially delving on religious fundamentalism, narco and technological terrorism. It also suggests counter measures to combat the menace. The book was written in 1990 when the cold war was nearing its end. Since then new world order has changed the geo-political situation from East West confrontation to North South unequal equation, with US emerging as the sole super power. Notwithstanding the changes, the conflicts in foreseeable future are likely to be regional and based on low intensity conflicts and terrorism, flaring sometimes to local wars. Hence the importance of this likely form of warfare.

The main authors have tried to give perception of the USA and erstwhile Soviet Union on terrorism and have rightly blamed them equally to be perpetrators of terrorism for political reasons in the cold war era.

The book suggests seven proposals as to how super powers could help in various fields to combat terrorism. They could as well be the basis for bilateral or regional agreements. Legal implications of the cooperation between USA and USSR have been given out in detail.

All in all an excellent collection of essays on terrorism. Though some of the events are now outdated due to emerging new world order, yet the main theme is relevant. The book is recommended for study by military and civilian scholars interested in eradicating evil of terrorism.

-- Col B K Khanna, SM

Nationalism and International Society. By James Mayall, *Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1990, p. 175, £ 10.95, ISBN 0 521 38961 5.*

Yet another attempt to analyse the concept of international society, Mayall's study is different insofar as its focus is on, as he himself claims, "the consequences of nationalism for international society." Mayall argues that modifications in the perception of international society have been primarily influenced by the impact of confronting the nationalist ideas.

The twentieth-century experience has expanded the scope for multilateralism and exclusive unilateral decisions or interpretation of issues are increasingly becoming difficult to secure world-endorsement. More-over, concern for human rights transcends national existence today and improved international arrangements for economic and political cooperation among states have been established. Still, the nation states are, and will remain, the basic political unit and Mayall finds no immediate

prospect of the theme of popular sovereignty generally making way for a kind of supra-nationalism to set in. International society may grow in ways compatible to the continued existence of sovereign states as separate entities. This international society at any rate retains the age-old elements of its perceived character : it recognizes each nation's sovereignty, believes in regular diplomatic relations and gives due respect to international law.

Mayall has an easy-flowing style of arguing and his analysis appears to be competent and comprehensive. But the most commendable feature of the book is perhaps the absence of impractical suggestions so often found in writings of this kind.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar, J.N.U.

The Principles of War by Marshal Foch. Introduction By Lt Col Gautam Sharma, text translated from French by Hilaire Belloc, New Delhi ,Reliance, 1992, p. 351, Rs. 400.00.

The book was first published in 1903 and the present edition in 1918. Marshal Foch asserts, "the art of war, like every other art, possesses its theory and its principles. The doctrine is to extend Warfare by seeing, thinking and acting".

War, like all other human activities, undergoes changes, it does not escape the law of evolution. The art of economy of force consists in securing the numbers, in having the numbers at the selected point of attack. This created moral superiority.

This is a useful book.

— Maj General B D Kale (Retd)

The Search for Security in Space. By Kenneth N Luongo and W. Thopias Wander. New York, Cornell University, 1989, p. 334, \$ 10.95. ISBN 0-8014-2145-4.

The articles contained in this book provide and draw an analytical treatment of the contentious issues with regard to weaponisation of the outer space by United States and the erstwhile Soviets. They provide a comprehensive overview of the essentials of the historical background of space weapon, arms control issues, ABM Treaty restrictions and more importantly the strategic ramifications of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

Even after the end of the cold war between the two Super Powers, use of outer space for military purposes continues to remain an area of considerable significance for global peace. Therefore, stipulating the appropriate usage of outer space for defence will continue to be an agenda for debate in international fora.

Notwithstanding the above, passive use of outer space, even for military purposes such as the use of satellite to provide early warning of adversaries' deployments and intentions, to facilitate better communication, verification of arms control agree-

ments etc are the various usages of outer space which are stabilizing in nature and therefore contribute positively for global peace. It is the active military usage of space, of weaponization of space which needs to be watched with caution.

The articles contained in the book have addressed questions of both technology and policy with regard to use of space for military purposes and is a useful study material for professionals involved in perspective planning and security affairs.

— Maj Gen M M Walia, AVSM, SM

War - Peace - Survival : Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis. By Robert C. North, Boulder, Westview, 1990, p. 297, \$ 58.50. ISBN 0-8133-0682-5.

After the Second World War and the establishment of the UNO, the world has been getting more and more complicated. Accepting the need for all the nations to come together, Prof Robert C North ably puts across a conceptual framework for a global system. He accepts that, "none of us can escape the influences of our respective cultures, the history of our nations or the conventional paradigms to which we have been exposed directly or indirectly", but recommends that an international system first has to be developed in which two or more states interact with each other positively in each region. The process should progressively be expanded to bring in all the states together in each region and then encompassing all the regions of the world.

— Lt Gen K K Nanda

Fallen Stars : Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disasters. Ed. By Brian Bond, London Brassey's, 1991, p. 264, £ 22.50. ISBN 0-08-040717 X.

A book refreshingly different from the general run of military studies, it is a collection of articles by eminent historians of eleven generals of the two world wars whose high reputations were destroyed through command failures. The authors have attempted to carry out a reappraisal of their subject's performance in the context of the operational and political compulsions then obtaining and in the process, high-lighting the enormous pressures of military command and the high price of failure. The Generals selected for study include Samsonov (Russian), Hamilton, Gough, Hobart and Ironside (all British), Nivelle and Gamelin (both French), MacArthur and Lucas (both American), von Rundstedt (German) and Mutaguchi Renya (Japanese).

Victorious Generals win accolades, fortunes and often a place in history, but the lot of fallen heroes is generally pathetic. MacArthur and von Rundstedt are two exceptions that survived to restore their tarnished reputations. Why do some of the 'shining stars' fail the crucial test? Is it their lack of ability in terms of capacity or experience to command? Were they given impossible missions in relation to the resources placed at their disposal? Were they let down by their superiors or subordinates, or merely made scapegoats of by their Governments or superiors? These are

some of the aspects considered and the subjects selected are representative of all these categories.

The book is based on the premise that lost battles could be as interesting and instructive as resounding victories. Well researched and lucidly presented, the book provides absorbing reading.

— Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM

From the House of War. By John Simpson, *London Arrow Books, 1991, p. 394, £ 6.99. ISBN 0-09-996670-0.*

John Simpson, the Foreign Affairs Editor of the BBC, was fortunate to be in Baghdad during the crucial months of 1990-91 which witnessed the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and its subsequent liberation by a coalition of UN members led by the USA. As the author avers in his introduction, the book is based on his first hand observation and does not constitute a history of the war. He portrays a vivid and authentic picture of conditions in Iraq before the crisis broke, the ruthless repression and fear psychosis of the people, the effects of Allied air strikes and the aftermath of the Allied ground offensive.

Simpson's lucid and interesting narration presents a balanced view of the Allied action and its effectiveness. A useful addition to our library.

— Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM

Understanding War : Its Implications and Effects. By Lt Col Thakur Kuldip S. Ludra (Retd), *Chandigarh, The Author, 1992, p. 420, Rs. 600/*

In this book on philosophy of war the author has made a valiant attempt to corroborate profound correlation between War and Economics.

A comprehensive study of aspects like basics of war, various terms in use, the principles of war, unconventional including Nuclear, Biological & Chemical warfare and higher direction of war entails easier understanding even for a layman. A brief insight into each Arm & Service gives explicit picture of the war machine. The historical facts from Second World War to collapse of Germany and USSR lucidly support each point. A summary of deductions at the end of a chapter give a vivid and discernable account of each facet.

'Economics is the blood of war life without it war dies or nation loses' and 'War is not impetuous but a culmination of economics tensions' statements like these aptly focus on the author's main contention, War Economics. The relationship of India with 'important' nations has also been touched upon, however, it should have been linked to enunciate our 'War Philosophy'.

— Major R S Gujral

The New World Order. Ed. By Sundeep Waslekar, *Delhi, Konark, 1991, p. 214, Rs. 200.00. ISBN 81-220-0241-2.*

The theme of this book is that through knowledge we can establish grey areas and also find remedies of the maladies existing in the universe today. The author has adopted a new approach that "the world clearly needs a concept to govern itself which would go beyond immediate crises of any given moment". In search of that he trotted the globe, met world leaders/personalities and invited articles from them. Forty of the hundred odd articles have been published in original form or excerpts. Interviews and other papers have been used to draw final conclusion. Generally deviations/new policies emanate from Commission's report/recommendations whereas this book aims "at generating a new way of thinking about the world encompassing development and security issues as well as questions of nationalism, ethnicity and individuality" and yet allowing the contributors free play.

— Air Comd S K Bhardwaj, VSM

The Military Revolution : Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800. By Geoffrey Parker, 1988, *Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 234, £ 8.95.*

Geoffrey Parker, in his book *The Military Revolution*, has first charted out the tussle between the erstwhile fortress and siege warfare as it transformed during the 16th century, consequent to innovative and cost-intensive battle inputs by the defenders and the attackers. He, then, focusses on diverse human, social and economic pressures on governments & the people in an enlightening chapter - "Supplying War", before going on to the changing battle-ship design and the art of naval warfare. Finally he discusses the orthodoxy and consequent inadequacy of Islamic empires, India and the Far East against the economic and military onslaught of the Colonisers from the Continent.

Although the author has trapezed across centuries, regions, issues and statistics, he offers the dedicated inquisitive reader a global panorama of the military process during the modern age.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

American Presidents and the Middle East. By George Lenczowski. *North Carolina, Duke University, 1990, p. 321, \$ 17.95, (p), \$ 40.00 (Cloth)*

American Presidents and the Middle East is a book addressed to the role and attitudes of the successive Presidents since World War II in the formulation of major policies concerning the Middle East, a region of key strategic importance. In the review, the striking point is the continuity in the Presidents thinking and their basic approaches to the area and the persistence of three main themes that emerged, namely the Soviet challenge, the Arab - Israeli feud and the role of oil. Yet with this continuity, considerable differences existed in their perceptions and actual policies es-

pecially as to how to cope with the Soviet challenge and the resultant chain of defensive alliances such as NATO and CENTO.

— Maj Gen Amarjit Singh (Retd)

Strategic Power : USA/USSR. Ed. By Carl G. Jacobson, *Hants, Macmillan, 1990, p. 519, \$ 19.99.*

"Strategic Power : USA/USSR" is a collection of studies by a number of scholars on five broadly defined subjects, namely, 'Strategic Culture in Theory and Practice'; 'Comparative Concepts'; 'Processes', 'Use of Force', and 'Contemporary issues'.

The Editor of the volume Carl G. Jacobson has provided as may be expected, a short but useful introduction besides discussing separately 'Soviet Strategic Policy since 1945', 'Moscow's Military Industrial Complex: Its Nature and Impact', 'The Impact of Neighbours' and 'Allies : The Soviet Case', 'Soviet Naval Doctrine'. He has also provided a short resume of the themes discussed by contributors in his 'conclusion'.

— Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd)

Politics in the United Nations System. Ed. By Lawrence S. Finkelstein, *North Carolina, Duke University, 1988, p. 503, \$ 22.50.*

The book is a compilation of case studies which focus on how politics in the UN have changed in the last forty years. They take account of the institutional differences among the agencies in the system, the functions they perform, and the roles of relevant actors. An understanding of these intricacies is vital to evolve a workable system of interaction between nation states and this international body.

— Brigadier V B Batra

The Second Socialist Revolution : An Alternative Soviet Strategy. By Tatyana Zaslavshaya, *London, Tauris 1990, p. 241, £ 19.95.*

This book gives an insight into the proposals of one of the most influential sociologists in Mikhail Gorbachev's land. A serious attempt has been made to analyse the social crisis and dire economic strait of the Soviet Union to-day. This change to 'perestroika' though fully justified entails in itself consequences of the changed economic scenario which needs to be grasped properly.

— Major Rakesh Sharma

New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy. By Christoph Bluth, *London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p. 118, \$ 14.95, ISBN 0-87609-086-2.*

This book, written in 1990, surveyed the recent Soviet Military Doctrine and capabilities (nuclear and conventional) and their relationship to foreign policy objec-

tives and East West relations. The author analyses the new Soviet concepts. Such as "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive strategy" and explores the implications for Soviet force posture and Western assessment of the Soviet threat. He also examines Western arms control options and the broader issues for the international security order.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath SM (Retd)

Red Star Rising - Soviet Fighters By Doug Richardson.

Battle Zone - Fighters of the NATO Allies. By Doug Richardson.

Hot Jets - Supersonic Fighters of the USAF. By Jerry Scutts.

Jolly Green Giants - US Combat Helicopters. By Jerry Scutts, *London, Hamlyn, 1989.*

These are a series of slim hard bound and half size booklets, beautifully illustrated and presented for aviation buffs of all kinds. However, the written matter is expertly analysed and meets the needs of those who want more than what such colourful books usually offer. The selection is limited to the more important types, with comment on development, service history of performance and numbers, user reactions and economic/political considerations connected to their selection and manufacture. They are common coloured books with routine factual data.

Red Star Rising includes a comparison of NATO and WARSAW PACT philosophies on combat fighter aircraft. It compares the traditional assessment of NATO reliance on individual pilot skills, supported by utmost sophistication and quality machines, with Soviet concepts of reliance on simplicity, standardisation, needing skilled fighting Pilots without too much other sophisticated training. There is the ultimate accolade of Pilot opinion that he would rather "fight" in a Mig 21 in real combat than the equivalent Mirage III, because, even with its comparative inferiorities, there is more reliable performance where it counts most - in war. The Mig 21 is described as an aviation classic, with the largest production numbers of any jet fighter.

Battle Zone covers fighters of NATO Allies and the USA. The conflicting problems of national industries needing economic support shared designs and manufacture, high costs for limited production quantities after development of the designs, all against the large USA industry, create situations where exclusively military and combat characteristics cannot lead to selection of the best aircraft eliminating others. In Europe, the Mirage designs seem to have done better than others, though the Jaguar, Tornado and long standing Harrier have spread to several countries. However, the F4 Phantom was the backbone of NATO for nearly two decades; it is now being replaced by the F16 Falcon, numerically the most important fighter in NATO and also a cheaper version of the F 15 Eagle, the 'Ultra Design' concept. The conclusion is that astronomically high development costs favour the US industry, which can have more economic bulk production of the final aircraft.

Hot Jets gives insight into the development of fighter tactics from the propel-

ler days into the present. Experience of Korea and Vietnam show the evolution of concepts and designs which led to the F 15 Eagle, the Lighter F 16 Falcon, and the Navy F 18. (The even newer jets of the Gulf War are not covered here). The conclusions show the pilot is the critical and also an essential component of the system, not replaceable by a robot even in this age of missiles and electronics. Training to exploit the flight envelope of the craft and limits of weaponry allow individual skills to achieve more than mechanical perfection; and this in a combat environment in all weathers, over all terrains, against sophisticated opponents.

Jolly Green Giants describes the application of helicopters to war, starting from the early Sikorsky. There are endless functions, from gunships, observation and troop carrying, to support functions leading right into the combat zone. New combat techniques and new aircraft types are described, which seem to be overcoming the inter-service struggles for control and operation of resources. In the continuous development of vertical envelopment and three dimensional "land" war, there is bound to be an overlap between Army and Air Force in their combined operations; this the USA seems to be working out with practical usage in trials, combat and further Aircraft development to meet the performance demands of the combined air-land war. It is interesting to find that, more than ever, it is human factor, and not the robotic or mere mechanical, which drives the high performance levels, inspite of the ever increasing sophistication of the machines.

-- Tindi

Wingate : His Relevance to Contemporary Warfare. By Prithvi Nath, *New Delhi, Sterling, 1990, p. 86, Rs. 90.00.*

Much has been written about Wingate and his exploits, in conducting operations behind enemy lines. This publication makes valuable contribution, towards understanding, a great leader and soldier. Though the book covers Wingate's tenures in Palestine and Ethiopia, it deals in greater detail, with operations in Burma. Wingate was an out-spoken and controversial figure, with an excellent military mind.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath

Struggle for Survival : The History of the Second World War. By R.A.C. Parker, *Oxford, Oxford University, 1989, p. 328.*

This excellent book gives a potted history of the 2nd World War, starting from the rise of Hitler to the economic problems of the peace. Some of the interesting observations are mentioned hereunder, there were almost two separate wars; in the east and the west, with the U.S. fielding half of its forces in the Pacific.

Inspite of the fact that the German Blitz on London had failed, the British expected Germans to be defeated by bombing alone. In night bombing raids only about 6 percent of the bombers got within 5 miles of the target. The numbers of bombers employed; 1046 against Cologne, 1000 against Essen and the huge tonnage

of bombs, destroyed 50 percent of built up area of 70 German towns. Bomber losses rose from 4.3 percent in Dec. 1943 to 9.1 percent in March 44. The Americans joined with their Flying Fortresses in Jan 43. The development of four mile range LICHTENSTEIN S N2 radar by the Germans which was immune to Window; the accidental landing of a Junkers 88 plane with its electronics on a British runway in July 44, led to a technology match. The strategic bombing of Japan in 1945, 334 B 29's using incendiaries destroyed, 16 square miles of Tokyo.

The role of production power of the U.S. and the supply of more than a 1/4 of the munitions requirements of Britain under lend lease during 43/44; of 300 Shermans and aircraft which turned the tide at El Alamein. The supply of Trucks and Jeeps to U.S.S.R. and the tremendous organization which enabled the production of 8,685 Liberators at a newly set up factory at a rate of one per hour; the production rate of one Liberty ship in 14 days are mentioned. A tribute is also paid to the production of the successful T 34's by the Soviet, the move of a tank factory from Karkov in October 1941, and its getting into production on 8th December is illustrative.

The war in the east, the American effort in the Pacific area, and the fact that more than 50 percent of their effort was in this theatre is of interest; the two pronged attack via the Philippines and the Marianas, the Naval battle of LEYTE and IWO JIMA where the Marines suffered over 30 percent casualties, the fanatic Japanese defence. Monty's self advertising, the Jewish problem have been given rather undue importance.

-- Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

The Price of Admiralty. By John Keegan. *New York, Penguin, 1988, p. 353, \$ 9.95.*

The book gives in detail the battles of Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the Atlantic describing the tactics and strategies necessary for both the offensive and defensive manoeuvres and the role played by the commanders.

A well presented book with full facts and illustrations which should find a place in all naval libraries. Recommended reading by all naval officers.

-- Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Battalion at War - Singapore* 1942. By Michel Moore, *Norfolk Gliddon Books, 1988, p. 164, £ 6.95.*

The book is not unit history of the traditional kind-heavily laden with statistics and photographs of ferocious looking Colonels of the Regiment. In a three day battle-it was the last unit to cease fire-15 officers, 160 other ranks died and another 100 were wounded; a similar number died during captivity.

It is the quality of the saga of those who died, led in battle and captivity, gave orders or wore red tabs and survivors of the infamous prison camps, cruelty and rare compassion of the guards through blunders and disasters of the garrison that make the book extremely readable and a rare book of a soldier's war.

— Colonel Balwant Sandhu

The British Empire as a Superpower 1919-39. By Anthony Clayton, *Athens, Univ of Georgia*, 1986, p. 545, \$ 30.00.

Superpower terminology had not yet emerged in the inter-World War decades of the 1920s and 30s but it would have been fully apt for Great Britain and her Empire of that era. War weary and economically drained, she nevertheless still remained an international power-centre, though the tide of history was inexorably setting against her. British interests were preserved by a surprisingly mature and sophisticated concept of power projection, but with minimum actual use of force, based on a world wide network of imperial garrisons. Comparisons with American security doctrines of the NATO period are obvious.

Anthony Clayton has written a comprehensive and absorbing narrative of Britain's efforts to preserve her imperial glory during the sunset years of the Raj. A book of interest to the service officer, student of history, as well as the informed general reader.

— Lt Gen S. Roy Chowdhury

Twilight of Empire : Inside the Crumbling Block. By Robert Cullen. *London, Bodley Head*, 1991, p. 310, £ 18.00, ISBN 0-370-31456-5.

Robert Cullen, a former Newsweek Moscow Bureau Chief and later New Yorker correspondent, writes of happenings inside the crumbling Soviet Block. With insight and rationality are described the terror, the faint rumblings and the eruptions in Moscow, Romania, the Baltic Republics and across Caucasus. The autocratic practitioners of the system stand indicted: not Karl Marx.

— Colonel Balwant Sandhu

Restructuring of Arms Production in Europe. Ed. By Michael Brzoska & Peter Lock, *Oxford, Oxford University for SIPRI*, 1992, p. 240, ISBN 019-829147-7.

This very interesting book is about the restructuring of armament production, in Europe arising out of the three recent changes in the armament scenario in the world. The pressure of complex technology, East West detente - Gorbachev's unilateral arms cut offer of 1988 and the emergence of a single European market.

The result has been increased competition in exports to a dwindling export market. This has generally been met by merger of armament producing firms. The authors who are very familiar with the subject have used a panel of researchers to

write about structure of the arms industries in the FRG, France, U.K., Sweden and others.

This book-unpriced-should find a place in all libraries dealing with Defence, and should be read by all those connected with procurement of armament.

– Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945. By Ian. F.W. Beckett, Manchester, Manchester University, 1991 p. 340, £ 35.00. ISBN 0-719-02912-0.

The book under review is an investigative historical review of the constitution and complexion of auxiliary military forces in Britain through four centuries of the Modern Age (16th century onwards). Starting with the medieval military liability of able-bodied males for service under the Crown when called upon, the author explains the formation, upkeep and roles of the National Militia and its regulatory and constitutional back-up, since the year 1558, and leads on to the Yeomanry and later the Home Guards. Time and again, he refers to various countries and constabularies, not easily discernable or identified by the reader, in order to bring out changing response and attitudes in different regions of the country, thereby focussing on the targetted theme of the book namely the amateur military tradition.

– Maj Gen S K Talwar

Command on the Western Front. By Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 421, £ 40. ISBN 0-631-16683-1.

This book is not a classic biography of General Sir Rawlinson in its traditional sense but a narration of events encompassing the First World War from strategy, to an approach, to command at corps and above level, with the central figure as Rawlinson. Being close to Kitchener, Rawlinson took full advantage and intrigued against French, his own Commander-in-Chief.

A well researched book with comprehensive maps, it is easy to assimilate and follow.

– Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Hitler's War Aims : Ideology the Nazi State and the Course of Expansion. By Norman Rich, London, Norton, 1973, p. 352, ISBN 0-393-00802-9.

Hitler's War Aims is an in-depth review of the build-up, stoking, and fuelling of the tornado of German Lebensraum and its ravaging course across continental Europe during the 1930's and the 1940's, till it floundered and collapsed under its own over-reach.

Professor Norman Rich, the author has meticulously analysed Hitler's concept

and projections on a New European Order under the Nazi master race as outlined in his famous book *Mein Kampf* and the consequent unfoldment of his Grand Strategy. He critically examines and explains the logical course of the historic events, starting with the resurgence of Nazi German nationhood, wherein racial ideology initially, and, thereafter, economic and political factors injected themselves into Hitler's military programme.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar

Japan's Foreign Policy. By Reinhard Drifte, *London, Routledge, 1990, p. 112.*

The study analyses the major lessons of Japan's foreign policy during the 1980's against a background of three concepts, bilateralism, regionalism and globalism, to examine and assess the problems and prospects for the future, the final chapters assess Japan's likely role in the 1990's as an increasingly important political, strategic and economic world power.

The study lays emphasis on the growing military potential of Japan and where it will draw the line, especially since the US may hand over its regional security to Japan.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

MacArthur's Japanese Constitution : A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making
By Kyoko Inoue, *Chicago, University of Chicago, 1991, p. 378, \$ 39.95, ISBN 0-226-38391-1.*

The author deftly explains how she came about doing a study of this nature and to make it easier for the general reader to understand, the inclusion of a chronicle of events and an account of the Meiji Restoration is very helpful.

A historic perspective of the Meiji Restoration and the role of the Emperor and his contribution is elaborated. In order to understand the arguments advanced by the author, this is essential background.

The Western Powers, particularly the USA regarded freedom of religion and separation of religion and state as critical to the democratisation of Japan. While insisting upon this aspect in the formulation of the new Japanese Constitution, little did they realize that, traditionally, the Japanese State never imposed a State religion - but the teaching of moral and spiritual values, as derived from the practices of Shinto was essential in the rebuilding of Japan.

The position of the Emperor was preserved, a crucial decision as far as the Japanese were concerned in the continuation of Japan as a Sovereign nation - mainly by the decision of Gen MacArthur. It is interesting to conclude, after reading all the intricate linguistic explanations of the author, that this decision vital to the survival of Japan was based almost entirely on the individual respect the General developed for the Emperor.

Individual liberty and equality of the sexes was insisted upon by MacArthur's framers of the Japanese constitution. It is to the credit of Japanese society that the traditions and values did not change mainly due to the differences in the Japanese version of the Constitution.

The entire book is an accurate documentation of cultural and linguistic barriers which made the task of negotiation so difficult, yet resulted in the acceptance both by Japanese and the occupation Government of the new Constitution. This acceptance was possible without agreement on the fundamental meanings of the various clauses, entirely due to these same barriers.

— Col R Subramanyam

Beyond Afghanistan : The Emerging US-Pakistan Relations. By Leo E. Rose and Kamal Matinuddin, *Berkeley, University of California, 1989, p. 335, \$ 20.00; ISBN 1-55729-017-2.*

This book is a compilation of 'Conference Papers' from the third and final US-Pakistan bilateral forums held in San Francisco from 10 to 14 October 1988, as a part of a series of joint cooperation with the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad and the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley.

In all, there are seven main parts of the book, each dealing with a separate significant issue concerning USA and Pakistan, viz security and economic imperatives, mutual perceptions, the Indian factor in South Asia, the implication of the Gulf War and the Israeli - Palestinian dispute, the Afghanistan conflict and the USSR factor. The views expressed in these articles are those of American and Pakistani delegates who represented their respective institutes.

The presentation of these papers took place at a time when series of very important developments had taken place in the South Asian Region. The decision to withdraw Soviet Troops from Afghanistan and announcement of general elections in Pakistan, after the accidental death of their President General Zia, forms the major backdrop scenario of all the discussions.

On the whole, the book is interesting in parts and does bring out the reality amongst a few perceptions which were predicted about four years ago.

— Brigadier S C Chopra

Under Siege in Kuwait : A Survivor's Story. By Jadranka Porter, *Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p. 250, \$ 8.95, ISBN 0-395-60580-6.*

A number of books have come out in market on Gulf War. These mostly confine to political and military aspects of the war. Jadranka Porter, a Western political writer for 'Arab Times', who opted to stay back in Kuwait during Iraqi occupation, has come up with a book which delves with human angle to the conflict

It gives a vivid and intimate first hand account of mental and physical turbulences and apprehensions and hopes of early liberation, which the Westerners and Kuwaitis underwent during Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It also describes operation of resistance movement by Kuwaitis and 'Warden system' adopted by the Westerners under hiding. The exploits of the writer are daring and above the call of duty.

-- Col B K Khanna, SM

Echoes of the Intifada : Regional Repercussion of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.
Ed. By Rex Brynen, *Boulder, Westview, 1991, p. 314, \$ 44.00, ISBN 0-8133-8171-1.*

This book is a study of the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation and its implications for the future of the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts.

-- Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

Regime Change in Afghanistan : Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy.
By Amin Saikal and William Maley, *1991, p. 190, \$ 39.50, ISBN 0-8133-1326-0.*

The book contains a well researched account of the historical evolution of the Afghan polity from the middle of eighteenth century emphasising the way in which the process of state building was affected by the importance of micro-societies to the maintenance of regime legitimacy. Historically Afghanistan has been marked by a weak state and a strong society with a web like character in which various tribes have retained their identity within their respective territories.

Detailed reference notes at the end of each chapter, a Bibliography and an Index show the extent of research done by the authors to compile this highly readable account of the tragedy of 13 million Afghans.

-- Brig K Narendra Singh (Retd)

The Bear Trap : Afghanistan's Untold Story. By Brig Mohammad Yousef and Mark Adkin, *Lahore, Jang Pub, 1992, p. 243, ISBN 0-85052-267-6.*

The book is probably the only recorded acknowledgement of direct and full involvement of ISI and CIA in Afghanistan and therefore merits reading. The book covers very adequately the politico-strategic thinking in USA and Pakistan which was mostly dictated by the perceptions prevailing in CIA and ISI essentially. In the case of CIA it centred around creating Vietnam type situation for USSR and overcoming the humiliation suffered by them there. ISI Policy perceptions were essentially guided by the Islamic fundamentalistic fervour then prevalent under Zia. The author has also covered the air crash resulting in Zia's death and raised some issues indicating involvements of certain agencies.

From professional point of view, a more detailed discussion of the operational and tactical aspects would have added to the value of the book. The main aspect of

the inability of the USSR to wage a counter guerrilla war at the ground level against Afghanistan inspite of their technological superiority has been pointedly brought out. A lesson relevant in our present context.

An interesting reading.

-- Lt Gen V K Nayyar, PVSM

Jerusalem Blessed, Jerusalem. Cursed : Jews, Christians and Muslims in the Holy City from David's Time to our Own. By Thomas A Indinopulos, 1991, p. 368, \$ 30.00. ISBN 0-929587-66-9.

The book is about 'Jera-Sualem' named by the Canaanites in the 15th Century BC - meaning the "Place of God Shalem". In the fourteenth century BC when the Israelites appeared, they confused the name 'Shalem' with the Hebrew word 'Shalom', meaning peace. "History made a mockery of the 'city of peace'. The city has been besieged, defended, conquered, damaged or destroyed and rebuilt forty times in thirty centuries - always in the name of God".

The author traces the fate of Jerusalem under Jewish, Babylonian, Persian, Greek and Roman rule - Byzantine, the Crusader Franks, Egyptian and Turkish Governors, the British and eventually, the Arab and Jewish struggle culminating in the liberation of Jerusalem from Jordanian hegemony.

Jerusalem, seat of the three of the oldest religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam has been aptly called "A Golden Bowl filled with Scorpions".

The author's presentation is vivid and explicit in detail and would be of interest to those interested in the past history of Israel and its effects on the geo-politics of the Middle East.

-- Major Gen Nirmal Sondhi,
AVSM & Bar (Retd)

The Gulf War : Documents and Analysis. By A G Noorani, Delhi, Konark, 1991, p. 402, Rs 295/-. ISBN 81-220-0250-1.

This book is a treatise on the genesis of the 43 days Gulf War. The author has branded Iraq and USA as aggressors - Iraq for annexation of Kuwait and USA for the coalition led war against Iraq - and has practised a novel technique for establishing his points-of-view by introducing to the reader the documents on US interests in the Gulf, background of Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Kuwait terrestrial disputes. In so doing he has systematically and logically, simply yet convincingly, brought out his aim successfully. The author painstakingly goes on to edit and compile the documents in a simple and abbreviating manner and propagates the open-ended approach for the reader to draw the final conclusion.

-- Air Commodore S K Bhardwaj, VSM

Military Powers - Encyclopedia : The Indian Sub-continent - Vol. 5. Ed. By Jacques de Lestapis. Paris, *Impact Information International* 1990, p. 273, 1,500 French Francs.

The usefulness of this reference encyclopedia for our military and defence planners would be enhanced if it is updated periodically. The encyclopedia contains a brief history about the countries of the Indian sub-continent, including their ethnic origin. The historical aspect is however cursory.

— Brig Y P Dev

The State, Political Processes and Identity : Reflections on Modern India. Ed. By Zoya Hasan & others, New Delhi, *Sage Publications*, 1989, p. 324, \$ 13.75.

This book is a compilation of seventeen essays on diverse subjects of Indian political life contributed by eminent scholars of political science during a seminar on "Explaining Indian Politics" held in Feb 1986. The focus was on the state, political process and the problems of national class and caste/communal identities and the two major themes that emerged in the course of discussions were the nature and character of the Indian State and the challenges raised by identity demands.

This book will be of immense interest to the students of political science and those associated with the socio-political and socio-economic changes in India.

— Maj Gen Amarjit Singh (Retd)

Military Law in India. By OP Sharma, Bombay, *N M Tripathi*, 1990, p. 451, Rs 189, ISBN 81-7118-020-5.

This book is of much contemporary interest since military law has long been treated as the Holy Cow-immune to criticism, scrutiny and changes. Over the years, military trials have been marked by age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice. This book discusses five aspects of military law in detail. Firstly, the historical development of our legal system from the East India Coy days to present day MIML. Secondly, it analyses the close link between the military law and the principles of natural justice. This is evident from the large number of army petitioners seeking redress of their military grievances from the civil courts. Thirdly, the author with his long experience with the JAG branch probes the deficiencies in our legal system. Fourthly, he suggests useful measures for reforms in the military law. Finally, this book reinforces the views of military legal pundits world over that military law, within the constraints of discipline and operational efficiency, should march in step with the natural justice and fairplay. Three assessments should particularly interest the readers. First is the idea of constituting a Court of Military Appeals to provide a 'truly judicial review'. This may be on the lines of American Unified Code of Military Justice 1950. Second is doing away with Field Punishment (Army Act Section 75). Third is about the Summary Court Martials (SCM). We may agree that SCM should be just and fair but experience proves that SCM has stood in good stead in the maintenance of discipline in our army.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

Blue Print to Blue Water. By Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, *New Delhi, Lancer International*, 1992, p. 549, Rs. 550/-.

A well researched book which gives the history of the Indian Navy from 1951 to 1965 with a forward by Admiral L. Ram Das the Chief of the Naval Staff.

The book starts with a chapter on the Peep into our Maritime Past and is followed by A Maritime Resurrection Gets Underway. These cover not only the maritime heritage but also record the events that occurred during that period.

The book gives in a chronological order the details of the acquisition of ships from UK, USSR and Germany, their commissioning, Work Up and their final return to India. This is followed by a write up on the development of submarine and air arms of the Indian Navy.

The Goa operation and the 1965 war are well covered. The story about the crippling of Alfonso-de-Albuquerque (A Portugese Frigate) by I.N.S. Betwa is of particular interest to the reviewer of this book as he was the Executive Officer of Betwa.

What is most interesting in the book is the reminiscences of some of the officers who were witness to the events during this period as these bring many happy memories of the very fine service to which they had the pleasure to belong.

An excellent book which should find a place in all libraries. Recommended reading for all in particular the young Naval Officers.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Monsoons, Cyclones and Floods in India. By Admiral A K Chatterji, *published by Birla Economic Research Foundation at Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, p. 68, Rs. 65/-.*

Admiral Chatterji an ex Chief of the Naval Staff and a seaman officer who in 40 years of naval service has experienced number of monsoons and passed through some of the cyclones at sea is to be congratulated on his well presented book which covers in a simple language "Monsoons, Cyclones and Floods" and what effects these have on the mankind in India.

The author has highlighted the need for provision of adequate protection against both floods and cyclones which year after year cause havoc to the property and lives thereby weakening the economy.

The book would be of interest to the students of meteorology, oceanography, economics and those who go out to sea.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Assam Challenge. By KML Chhabra, *Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1992, p. 175, \$ 175.00, ISBN 81-220-0273-0.*

A well written book which traces the history of the Assam Problem and explains, in details, various issues involved. His focus on the gut issue and indepth weakness of the administration in resolving the problem, in the initial stages, is sharp and convincing. The response, according to him, has been characterised by "tentativeness and equivocation".

Absence of a firm and committed administration (and more so the political leadership), in this case, contributed, to a large extent, to the escalation of the problem. An effective administration, with an imaginative financial help from the Centre, to counteract the large influx of migrants could possibly have, in the initial stages, assuaged local grievances. Sardar Patel letter dated 7 June 1950 gives one indication of clarity of vision and a courageous response to an explosive situation - something lacking, at present, in political leadership tempted with short term, soft and popular options.

— Col R N Khanna (Retd)

Government and Politics in South Asia. By Criag Baxter and others, *Boulder, Westview Press, 1987, p. 415, ISBN 0-8133-7905-9.*

The team of authors has done justice to their aim of filling the void in textual information regarding the theme of their effort as summed up in the book's title. The content is admirably suited for the foreign student - the book's intended primary readership.

However, it is worthwhile reading for anyone inhabiting the geographical expanse that is the book's concern. It is readable, interesting, objective and emphasises the broader picture as against facts and statistics. It does serve to brush up one's knowledge of the political process in one's own country. Its greater contribution is in the dispelling of ignorance and prejudice with regard to the Systems in the neighbouring countries. A fair measure of understanding of the problems and prospects of political development is reached through perusal of its simple prose.

— Capt Ali Ahmed

Pakistan's Security Concerns : A Chinese Perspective. By Liu Jinkun, *Australia Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1992, p. 15, (Working Paper No. 263), ISBN 0158-3751.*

This is one of the papers produced by Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National University of Australia which examines the defence policies of Pakistan govt. both under military dictators and in a democratic set up. It also describes its relations with US, China and with the former Soviet Union.

The author rightly points out that with the end of the cold war and disappearance of U.S.-Soviet confrontation as also withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the strategic alignment of US-Pakistan vis-a-vis USSR-India no longer exists.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Principles and Practices of Value Added Tax : Lessons for Developing Countries. By Mahesh C Purohit, *Delhi, Gayatri, 1993, p. 225, Rs. 250/-, \$ 30, ISBN 81-85930-007.*

Though of recent origin Value Added Tax (VAT) has come to assume much importance in the fiscal armoury not only of most industrialised but of Asian, African and Latin American countries also. During the last decade alone some 35 countries have adopted this system of taxation. This book examines the evolution of VAT and its economic effects on various countries particularly of France - a pioneer in this direction, of which a detailed case study has been undertaken. It is also stated that the Harmonised Tax system could go a long way towards bringing the unification of the EEC countries. Within the two hundred pages Dr. Purohit has compressed much useful information including its general features and management of information system for the administration of VAT. The list of Tables and Exhibits are an asset to the study. This work is a pioneering effort and should go a long way in further tax reforms which are under discussion in the country.

— Lt Col Gautam Sharma

John Masters : A Regimented Life. By John Clay, *London, Michael Joseph, 1992, p. 372, £ 20.00, ISBN 0718129458.*

The earlier part of John Masters' life, including his career in the Indian Army and his subsequent emigration to USA, is already known to readers through his three autobiographical works viz *Bugles and a Tiger*, *Road Past Mandalay*, and *Pilgrim son*. John Clay's biography, therefore, covers this period only broadly and most of the book is devoted to Masters' later years in America and his career as a writer.

Masters, as portrayed by John Clay, emerges as an ambitious and highly organised man. The author feels that his almost obsessive desire to be a success and be accepted may have been due to his being secretly aware all along that he was part Indian (1/32nd to be exact). This may have been further fuelled by the feeling of not belonging which he had always experienced in respect to the British upper class. This was certainly an important factor in his decision to settle in the USA.

The title of the book is apt. John Masters' was indeed a regimented life. Everything he did, whether it was organising a party, preparing for a family outing or undertaking a trek was done systematically. In writing also, he was meticulous and disciplined. Each book was planned, researched and written according to a precise schedule. Little wonder then, that he averaged almost a book a year as an author. Yet Masters was by no means either dull or a prude. On the contrary, he had a keen sense of humour and was something of a connoisseur of food and drinks. Walking in the hills was his great love and he continued to enjoy it till almost the very end.

An enjoyable book which would be of interest to those who would like a deeper insight into John Masters, the man. The print is comfortable to read and there is an index and detailed notes at the end.

— Maj Gen P K Pahwa

In and Out of Cockpit : Yadein Memories. By Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra and Group Capt Ranbir Singh, *New Delhi, Ebouz Classics, 1993, p. 250, Rs. 350.*

YADEIN, a compilation of 38 experiences is basically about Com Sqn. It covers a span of half a century of military (mainly Transport) flying in the country.

It starts with the reminiscences of the great fliers who framed the destiny of IAF in its formative years. You have the gist of IAF history in these chapters.

It is a fact that no other Transport Pilot of IAF has been so closely associated with the Com Sqn as AVM S S Malhotra and it is in the fitness of the things that he has captured those events for the sake of posterity in the form of an excellent Book.

-- Gp Capt D C Bakshi, VSM (Retd)

Profiles of Courage. By Ranbir Singh and S S Malhotra, *New Delhi, Konark, 1993, p. 267, Rs. 350/-, ISBN 81-7050-151-2.*

Lionel Trilling once wrote about *Mansfield Park* that it was a great work of literature, the greatness being commensurate with its power to strike an instant note. This is particularly true of "Profiles of Courage" by Ranbir Singh and S S Malhotra who have attempted to resurrect the images of air-heroes from the debris of past. The fact is that we as a nation are a poor chronicler and on matters-military still worse. If at all there have been attempts to write the battle narratives hitherto the air force exploits have remained mostly unsung. Ranbir Singh and S.S. Malhotra picked up the threads and one notices in this book a serious attempt to salvage the saga of heroism and individual acts of bravery of our "magnificent men in the flying machines" who ruled the airspace during critical times/hours. It is a valuable compilation of the gallant episodes of heroism and daredevilry.

-- Gp Captain D C Bakshi, VSM (Retd)

Top Brass : A Critical Appraisal of the Indian Military Leadership. By Brig H. S. Sodhi, *Noida, Trishul Publications, p. 300, Rs. 295.*

Brigadier Sodhi, an old timer of the Indian Army, and now retired, has carried out an indepth analysis of all the operations and functioning of the bureaucrats as well as the army and brings out a number of errors made by the army and policy makers who lead the nation. The author does this in detail by recounting the strategies followed and the tactical methods employed in wars after independence.

The basic theme of the book is that although by and large other ranks and junior officers are good, the top brass lacks the leadership, experience and maturity. He says that the top brass is neither alive to the induction of new weapons nor the anticipated requirement of training for the next war. He further states it suffers from a degree of ambivalence amounting to a dichotomous situation. These observations are debateable as other authors on military subjects feel that good leadership, sound

planning and intensive training have brought us success time and again.

The other point which has been highlighted is that prolonged exposure internally of the army is neither good for the army nor the country and the top brass is reluctant to tell the politicians firmly that it is neither practicable nor desirable for the army to be deployed for such roles.

The question about civil supremacy over the Armed Forces has also been discussed by the author and one point is clearly brought out is the bureaucrats must realise that if running of the Armed Forces is left in the hands of professionals who are familiar with the weapons and equipment and the men they command, the better it would be for the nation.

A well researched book, of interest to the army officers and civilians. A good addition to the libraries of units, formations etc.

— Captain R. P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Pangs and Pleasures of Flying By Air Marshal S S Malhotra, *New Delhi, Ebouz Classics, 1993, p. 231; Rs. 300.*

A collection of articles, highlighting unforgettable events in the life of an Indian Air Force pilot, from the early beginnings to the satisfying end, as seen through the experienced eye of an Air Vice Marshal, who spent most of his active flying career in the VIP Communication Squadron of the IAF. The author's own growing up is against the backdrop of the growth of the IAF and the evolution of the post-independence Indian society and its deteriorating ethos.

-- N B S

Dialogue of the Deaf : The India-Pakistan Divide By Prof D D Khanna and Dr Kishore Kumar, *New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1992, p. 215, Rs. 200, ISBN 81-220-247-9.*

The authors of the book have made a commendable effort in analysing the causes of the present deadlock in Indo-Pakistan relations. What is indeed refreshing is the methodology, which mainly involves interviews with political leaders, diplomats, academics and journalists on both sides who provide their own insights into the stalemate which continues to exist despite the Shimla Agreement.

Prof Khanna and Dr Kishore Kumar have succeeded in highlighting the primary cause of confrontation in Kashmir, on Siachen, and the nuclear issue: fear and distrust of each other; and call for the need to build bridges of understanding by people to people contact at all levels. A work of sound scholarship.

-- N B S

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending June 1993

*(The books reviewed in Jan-Mar 1993 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list.)*

- | | | |
|--|----------------------------|--|
| Bangladesh - Army | | |
| 1. | Ahmad, Borhanuddin | The Generals of Pakistan and Bangladesh 1993 |
| Bangladesh - Politics & Govt. | | |
| 2. | Sobhan, Rehman | Bangladesh : Problems of Governance 1993 |
| Bofors | | |
| 3. | Subramanian, Chitra | Bofors : The Story Behind the News 1993 |
| Biography | | |
| 4. | Billiere, Sir Peter de la | Storm Command : A Personal Account of the Gulf War 1992 |
| 5. | Bullock, Alan | Hitler and Stalin : Parallel Lives 1991 |
| Delhi | | |
| 6. | Kohli, Narinder | India : A to Z Road/Street Guide for Delhi 1993 |
| Encyclopaedia | | |
| 7. | Chris Cook | World Political Encyclopaedia 1993 |
| Economics' | | |
| 8. | Kennedy, Paul | Preparing for the Twenty First Century 1993 |
| 9. | India. Planning Commission | Eighth Five Year Plan 1992-1997 |
| Ex-Servicemen' | | |
| 10. | Khanna, AK | Resettlement Opportunities for Ex-Servicemen and Dependents 1992 |

Fighter Aircraft-History

11. Park, Edwards **Fighters : The World Great Aces and
Their Aeroplanes** 1990

India - History

12. Blomfield, David **Lahore to Lucknow : The Indian Mutiny
Journal of Arthur Moffatt Lang** 1992

India-Military History

13. Sodhi, H. S. (Brig) **Top Brass : A Critical Appraisal of
the Indian Military Leadership** 1993

14. Joginder Singh **Behind the Scene : An Analysis of
(Maj Gen) India's Military Operations 1947-1971**

Indian Ocean

15. Satish Chandra and **The Indian Ocean and Its Islands :
others, eds. Strategic, Scientific and Historical
Perspectives** 1993

International Relations

16. Bozeman, Adda B. **Strategic Intelligence and State Craft:
Selected Essays** 1992

Japan - Military Policy

17. Chinworth, Michael W **Inside Japan's Defense : Technology
Economic and Strategy** 1992

Jungle Warfare

18. Perrett, Bryan **Canopy of War : Jungle Warfare :
From the Earliest days of Forest Fighting
to the Battle Fields of Vietnam** 1990

National Security

19. Sinha, Sureshwar D **Security in the New World Order** 1992

Nepal-Politics and Govt.


20. Baral, Lok Raj **Nepal : Problems of Governance** 1993

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- | | | |
|---|---|------|
| | Nuclear Proliferation | |
| 21. Chellaney, Brahma | Nuclear Proliferation : The US-Indian Conflict | 1993 |
| | Nuclear Warfare | |
| 22. Martin, Laurence | The Changing Face of Nuclear Warfare | 1983 |
| | Pakistan - Politics and Government | |
| 23. Kapur, Ashok | Pakistan in Crisis | 1993 |
| 24. Hussain, Mushahid | Pakistan : Problem of Governance | 1993 |
| | Regimental History | |
| 25. Singh, Hanut (Lt Gen) | Fakhr-e-Hind : The Story of the Poona Horse | 1993 |
| 26. Ranbir Singh and Malhotra SS (Air Vice Marshal) | Profiles of Courage | 1993 |
| | Srilanka - Politics & Govt. | |
| 27. Silva, KM | Srilanka : Problems of Governance | 1993 |
| | United States - Army Manuals | |
| 28. United States Dept of the Army | Blue Print for the Air Land Battle | 1991 |
| | U S - Military Policy | |
| 29. Aspin, Les and Dickinson, William | Defense for a New Era : Lessons of the Persian Gulf | 1992 |
| | Warfare - Technology | |
| 30. Jackson, Robert | High Tech Warfare : The Weaponary Explained | 1991 |
| 31. Richardson, Doug | High Technology Warfare | 1991 |

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