

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



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APRIL-JUNE 2007

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EULOGY*

Major General Indar Jit Rikhye (Retd)



1920 – 2007

A soldier dies and we remember.....

Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, a peacekeeping legend of India, expired on 20 May 2007 in Charlottesville, Virginia, USA. His wife Cynthia and family members were by his side when he breathed his last in the hospital.

General Rikhye was born on 30 July 1920 in Lahore. He graduated from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun in 1940 and was commissioned in the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers, which served as the reconnaissance regiment of the 8th Indian Division in World War II, with the British 8th Army and the US 5th Army.

After the War, he served on the North West Frontier of India. In 1947, he led armoured cars into Kashmir and thereafter commanded the Royal Deccan Horse (9 HORSE). Later he served as an instructor at the Senior Officers' School, Mhow and as General Staff Officer Grade-1 of the Armoured Division.

His association with international peacekeeping began in 1957 as Commander of Indian troops in the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) Gaza. He returned home to command an independent infantry brigade group in Ladakh. Thereafter, he was Military Adviser to UN Secretary Generals Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant in the 1960s. He carried out many special assignments in the Congo, West Irian, Yemen and Cyprus for the UN Secretary General and accompanied U Thant to

*We gratefully acknowledge the write up sent to the USI by Mrs Kavita Sharma (Major General Rikhye's niece)

Cuba to negotiate an end to the 1962 Missile Crisis. He participated in the Spinelli-Rikhye mission to Jordan and Israel in 1965 and commanded UNEF from 1966 to 1969. After retirement from military service, General Rikhye set up the International Peace Academy, New York, and was its first President for many years.

General Rikhye was a visiting Distinguished Fellow, and later Adviser on the United Nations at the United States Institute of Peace; Visiting Professor, School of International Affairs, Ottawa; Adjunct Professor, School of International Service, Washington DC; and a Senior Research Associate, Institute of Public Policy on Peacekeeping, George Nelson University, Four Fax, Virginia. He was also an Honorary Research Fellow of the South Asian Centre and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs and a member of several organisations; notably the India International Centre and the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, and the Cavalry and Guards Club, London. He was the founding President of the US-India Society, whose membership he later merged with the Asia Society, New York. He was on the International Advisory Committee of the Institute of World Order and the International Advisory Board of the 'Peacekeeping and International Relations', a periodical published by the Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre, Canada.

His honours and awards, after he left the United Nations, include the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education, 1985; The Medal of Honour from Kyung Ree University, Seoul; Doctor of Law from Carleton University, Ottawa; the Order of Merit by the Republic of Austria and the Distinguished Peacekeeping Award from the International Peace Academy. He wrote several books and articles on peacekeeping and negotiations within the United Nations system. His book on United Nations Peacekeeping : 'The Politics and Practices of Peacekeeping, Past, Present and Future' was published by the Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre, Canada. The story of his life "Trumpets and Tumults" reveals much about him along with details about the forces that shaped the major events of the world over the past seventy years.

His life's achievements have been aptly summed up as under :-

"A fighter on the battlefields of Kashmir and Italy, a peacekeeper on the frontlines of the Middle East and Africa, a trusted adviser within the highest councils of the United Nations and a distinguished educator in the art of peace -Indarjit Rikhye has never been far from the action that has reshaped our world".

EDITORIAL

My greetings to our esteemed members on taking over as the Deputy Director and Editor of the USI with effect from 01 May 2007. My predecessor Major General YK Gera (Retd) superannuated on 30 April 2007, having served the USI for ten years and four months. Major General Gera joined the USI on 01 January 1997, just six months after it had moved from Kashmir House to its present premises. He played a central role in the process of settling down in our new environment. It was during his tenure that the growth of the USI took place, as we see it today. He pioneered the publication of the USI Digest and the National Security Series which have now become a regular feature. He also headed the Research Wing of the USI, which has become 'Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation' under a separate Deputy Director since 01 January 2005. It is a happy coincidence that we have received appreciation from some of our readers on the high standard of articles carried by the USI Journal in its January-March 2007 Issue. It is a fitting tribute to the sense of commitment and dedication displayed by Major General Gera during his decade long innings with the USI. On behalf of all our members, I take this opportunity to convey our gratitude to Major General Gera and wish him the very best in the years to come. On my part, I have the unenviable task of carrying on and further build on the high editorial standards set by him. I have no doubt that with the blessings and cooperation from the members, we will carry forward our rich heritage and traditions.

At the very outset, it is my sad duty to inform members about the demise of two of our very senior members. IC-83 Lieutenant General Kashmir Singh Katoch, PVSM, MC (Retd), passed away on 25 April 2007. He was commissioned on 15 July 1936 and became a life member of the USI on 09 June 1936. In his capacity as Vice Chief of the Army Staff, he had also been the President of the USI Council. The Government

of India honoured him with a Padma Bhushan. IC-3343F Lieutenant General DK Chandorkar, AVSM (Retd) breathed his last at Pune on 04 June 2007. He was commissioned on 21 June 1942 and was a life member of the USI since 1948. I convey heartfelt condolences to both the families on behalf of the USI fraternity.

Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM (Retd) former Chief of Naval Staff delivered the Fifth Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture at the USI on 30 April 2007, on the subject of 'India's Maritime Strategy'. The script of the lecture is the lead article in this issue of the Journal. Admiral Arun Prakash started off by drawing a distinction between 'Doctrine and Strategy' and then went on to carry out a survey of India's geo-strategic environment. He dwelt at some length on the strategy in peacetime conditions and the strategy in war. Ideally speaking, maritime force structures ought to evolve from an approved strategy. However, even in the absence of an approved strategy, Indian Navy has been able to evolve a doctrine, a perspective plan and a strategy within a span of two years. The thought processes that went into the evolution of these documents has generated a need based and budget linked force structure for the next 15 years. The Admiral concluded his talk by identifying a set of five factors which should continue to receive attention of the Navy, namely; indigenisation, shipbuilding industry, foreign cooperation, networked operations, and transformation to absorb new technologies and ideas to improve combat efficiency.

His Excellency Mr Phil Goff, Defence Minister of New Zealand delivered a talk at the USI on the subject 'New Zealand's Strategic Situation and Defence Policy: A Small Player Making a Difference' on 20 April 2007. The script of the talk is being carried in this issue. Mr Goff covered in some detail New Zealand's strategic situation, its participation in the international campaign against terrorism and Defence

Forces modernisation. In his dual role as New Zealand's Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, he also mentioned that disarmament and non-proliferation were the key priorities for his government. New Zealand considers Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the multilateral treaty regime governing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this, there is perhaps a message for India.

Naxalism has assumed menacing proportions for our internal security. The previous Issue had also carried an article on 'Rise of Naxalism and its Implications for National Security' by Shri EN Rammohan. Shri BG Verghese, a renowned columnist had presented a paper on the 'Socio-Economic Dimensions of Naxalism' during the National Security Seminar held at the USI on 22-23 November 2006. The script of his presentation is published in this issue of the Journal. Mr Verghese has analysed the socio-economic causes of Naxalism in a very comprehensive manner and also suggested some remedies. He has argued that rehabilitation as a concept, should offer full employment opportunities and dignity. Development programmes in Naxalite affected areas need a different kind of delivery system and administration. In this context, Mr Verghese has cited the example of erstwhile Frontier Administrative Service in the North East many years ago. The requirement is to evolve a system of administration which will deliver.

Major Shailender Singh Arya of 30 Assam Rifles was the winner of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition-2006 in Group B. The edited version of his paper on 'Changing Socio-Economic Values and their Impact on the Armed Forces' is being carried in this issue. He has looked at various aspects of the changing social milieu and how it affects our youth. The officer has made some very pragmatic suggestions which would enable the Armed Forces to fulfill the aspirations of the young men and women joining the Forces; yet retaining the traditional values.

We have also carried a tribute to the USI by Late Mr Melville De Mellow (famous broadcaster and commentator) which appeared in Yojna Special Issue of January 2007. This was brought to our notice by Colonel Mohanjit Singh (Retd), one of our members. We are indeed grateful to him.

There is an ongoing thought process whether India needs a formal document termed 'India's Defence Policy'. As of now, we do not have one. An article titled – 'India's Defence Policy : A Conceptual Perspective' written by Dr Rajpal Budania, presently a Reader in the Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad is being carried in this issue of the Journal. The article should help in an objective analysis of India's Defence Policy in context of the current international system and the domestic environment.

Being the 150th year of 'India's First War of Independence -1857', an article titled "Did the Telegraph Save British in 1857 ?" by Major General VK Singh (Retd) is being carried in this issue. The article is the result of painstaking research and throws new light on an aspect which is generally not well known.

I am happy to inform the members that the catalogue of books available in the USI library can now be accessed through the Internet. The catalogue has been hosted at www.ap.nic.in/usiofindia. It can also be accessed through our website www.usiofindia.org. The members are welcome to use this 'on line' catalogue database for searching the books available in the USI Library. The contents of the USI Journal and the USI Digest since Jan 2000 are also available on our website. This has been made possible by the untiring efforts of Dr SS Murthy, our Librarian under the guidance of my predecessor Major General YK Gera (Retd). We would be happy to receive any suggestions for improvement in terms of accessibility and retrievability of information.

Happy Reading !

India's Maritime Strategy

Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM (Retd)

Apioneering paratrooper of the Indian Army and a soldier of great distinction, Major General Sinha, in his eventful career of 40 years, saw action in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, participated in the Goa operations in 1961 and played a vital role in the administration of post-liberation Bangladesh. In every rank, he was selected, not only for command of fighting formations, but also to hold key staff assignments. The General's military virtues were matched in equal measure by his intellectual acumen and the USI gained tremendously from his lifetime association with this institution; especially his long tenure as the Director. Today, I am here to deliver a talk on *India's Maritime Strategy* as a part of the annual tribute that we pay to this gallant and distinguished soldier.

In October 2006, the Indian Navy (IN) promulgated a document titled, "*Freedom of the Seas...India's Maritime Strategy*". This was a classified publication, to which the general public would have had no access. However, since it was desirable that sections of society, other than the defence community, should be familiar with the elements of the maritime strategy, Naval Headquarters (Naval HQ) have decided to issue an unclassified version. So now, both the Maritime Doctrine and the Maritime Strategy will be available to those sections of the civil society who have an interest in such arcane matters.

Not wishing to steal the thunder from Naval HQ, I have tried my best to ensure that the talk which follows, while adhering to the spirit of these documents, takes as little from them as possible. Therefore, as they say in the title of any movie : "any similarities that you may note are purely unintended and coincidental."

I would like to start by giving a perspective on the subject of strategy, and why one is required at all. This aspect assumes more importance today, because each Service has promulgated a Doctrine and we also have a Joint Doctrine. Often the terms

Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM (Retd) is a former Chief of the Naval Staff.

Text of the 5th Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture delivered at USI on 30th April 2007.

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"doctrine" and "strategy" get confused, or are even used interchangeably. So I think it will be useful, if I spend some time to provide a distinction between the two.

Doctrine and Strategy : The Distinction

According to dictionary meaning, doctrine is simply "that which is taught", and a NATO definition describes it as "the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives." It is also defined as a "framework of principles, practices and procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis for action." It is meant to be authoritative and yet requires judgment in application. Doctrine is based on the enduring lessons of history and experience, and the repeated success or failure of certain actions over time, tends to elevate them to the level of axioms, which remain relevant to the present and the future. On the other hand, a strategy has to be essentially based on a threat. Without a coherent threat, whether existing or projected in the future, there may not be a *raison d'etre* for a strategy. As the threat alters its form and shape, the strategy too, must keep evolving and changing in response.

Traditionally, strategy has been associated with the preparation and waging of war. However, since the nature of conflict, the fabric of society and our geo-political environment has undergone a change post-World War II, the threat has assumed different proportions. Strategy is now, more than merely a military concept since it increasingly requires consideration of non-military matters, with economic, political, sociological and environmental issues driving it into the realm of state-craft. Strategy can, thus, be summed up as an overall plan to go from the present situation to some desired goal in the face of a threat, whether in peacetime or a conflict scenario. A strategy will always be set in the context of a given politico-military situation prevailing over a finite time-frame and within the ambit of overall national aims. Doctrine, on the other hand, is a body of thought and a knowledge base, which should underpin the evolution of strategy. Without doctrine, strategists would have to make decisions without points of reference or guidelines.

In this context, the US provides a useful illustration. In pursuit of victory over Nazi Germany, it evolved a strategy for World War II which-required it to strike a Faustian bargain with the Soviet Union and make her an ally. No sooner had the war ended, that

the US launched a new strategy of "containment" to prevent a powerful USSR from reshaping the post-war world order according to its own ideology. The strategy to implement containment went through several *iterations* because the threat from Communism kept changing in intensity and geographical focus throughout the Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War brought with it, a complete change in the threat scenario, and the Global War on Terrorism that followed a decade later resulted in a flux in international affairs. All this has caused the US Department of Defense and the US Navy to continuously evolve new strategies and bring out vision documents at the rate of one every 4-5 years.

Why a Maritime Strategy?

The well known defence analyst Edward Lutwak asks the question, "What is a Navy in the absence of a strategy? It is, in effect a priesthood." Because, without strategy to guide and inform naval officers, he argues, it is all merely ritual and routine, gold braid and glitter. In the mid-1980s, I recall reading with great indignation, a statement by the editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships* in one of his Forewords, which said something to this effect: "...the Indian Navy is probably one of the few major navies which first acquires hardware and then thinks about how to use it." In retrospect, I can understand the reason for such a statement, because at that juncture, not only did the Navy lack a doctrine and strategy, but was truly a "Cinderella" Service whose fortunes were hostage to the whims and fancies of the annual budget.

A maritime strategy, however, does not concern naval officers alone, and cannot be anything but a sub-set of national strategy. *Every nation must have a vision of its place in the world, as well as the role it wishes to play in the international order.* Regrettably, in India's case, we have historically suffered from an intellectual vacuum as far as strategic thinking is concerned, and that is why, after 60 years as a sovereign republic we lack a clearly articulated statement of national aims and objectives. This is a cultural handicap which has not just deprived us of a healthy tradition of strategic debate and discourse, but also had a deleterious impact on internal security as well as foreign policy issues at the national level. We do not seem to realise that this shortcoming has often been mis-interpreted as a sign of weakness and lack of national resolve, and perhaps even acted as a provocation for aggression.

If I were to state the reasons why the IN considered it essential to generate a strategy at this particular juncture, I would sum them up as under :-

(a) Firstly, the sustained induction of hardware from diverse foreign sources that we have seen over the years, was never accompanied by any operational expertise or doctrine, because such things are not to be had for money. The hiatus that I just spoke about, has in the past often impacted adversely on doctrine, force planning, equipment acquisition and infrastructure development processes.

(b) Secondly, in the absence of higher strategic direction, the Constitution of India has given us the core national values and interests to be protected. But as notional substitutes for a national security document, we have often had to use the *Raksha Mantri's* Operational Directive, and even the *MoD Annual Report*. Thus, while the formulation of a maritime strategy was clearly considered overdue by the Navy, there was also the possibility that it might provide an incentive for the national security establishment to shake off its inertia, and get to work in this field.

(c) And finally, India's emergence as a nation of global significance has brought with it the recognition that not just our national security, but also our economic prosperity has deep linkages with the maritime environment. While a comprehensive National Maritime Strategy may take time to evolve, the Navy considered it prudent to make a start with the Military Maritime Strategy.

At one level, our decision makers are recognising the key role of the Navy in insulating the nation from external intervention, as well as its vast potential as an instrument of state power. At another level, the realisation has also begun to dawn on the intelligentsia that trade and energy, the twin pillars of our economic resurgence, are inextricably linked with maritime power. A clear cut roadmap is, therefore, necessary at this juncture to synergise our national maritime endeavours.

India's Geo-strategic Environment

The Indian peninsula juts out over 1,000 miles into the Indian Ocean, and her geo-physical configuration makes her as dependant

on the seas as any island nation. This predicates the profound influence that this ocean, the only one named after a country, will have on India's security environment. KM Panikkar summed it up neatly, half a century ago, in these words: "while to other countries- the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area; her freedom is dependant on the freedom of the sea-lanes."

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), at whose focal point India is located, has some unique general features, of which we must take note before examining specific issues :-

(a) Amongst 56 nations of the IOR, some of the fastest growing economies of the world co-exist with some of the poorest. Many of the countries are afflicted with serious problems of backwardness, fundamentalism and insurgency. Most of them are under military dictatorship or authoritarian rule.

(b) This region is the largest repository of the world's hydrocarbon resources, and apart from producing the most rubber, tin, tea and jute, is well endowed with strategic materials like uranium, tungsten, cobalt, gold and diamonds.

(c) The region is home to 1/3rd of the world's population which is regularly struck by 70 per cent of the planet's natural disasters.

(d) Most of the post-Cold War conflicts have taken place in this region. Today, the global epicentre of terrorism as well as nuclear and missile proliferation exist right next door to us.

(e) Areas of the IOR like the Horn of Africa and the Malacca Straits are rife with incidents of piracy, gun-running, drug-trafficking and hijacking.

Territorial and maritime boundary disputes, runaway population growth and the migrant labour economy of South Asia are some of the other generic factors which need to be noted as containing the seeds of future conflict. As far as the regional and other players are concerned, we need to spend a few minutes to make a brief assessment of their current and future impact on the region.

First, a look at the sole superpower the USA, which has to be

counted as a regional player by virtue of her large and ubiquitous maritime presence in the IOR.

(a) It is clear that for the foreseeable future, the US will continue to remain deeply engaged in the IOR and the wider Asia-Pacific region. The two abiding US interests in this region are: safeguarding the hydrocarbon resources of the Middle East and Central Asia; and the containment of China to protect the autonomy of Taiwan. The Asia-Pacific geographic area has been divided along the Indo-Pakistan border, between the Hawaii-based Pacific Command and the Florida-based Central Command.

(b) Currently, America's resources and attention are intensely focused on the ongoing operations in Iraq, and the requirement to keep the terrorist hubs in Pakistan and Afghanistan under check. Monitoring and finding ways to circumscribe the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, are the other two issues that have critical significance for the US today.

(c) It is now becoming obvious that while she can try and set an agenda to suit her interests, the US cannot by herself implement such an agenda world-wide. Signs of "imperial overstretch" are surfacing, as are low key feelers seeking help and support, especially at sea. Under these circumstances, a helping hand from a respected regional power like India would bring welcome relief. The stage for this has been set by the passage of the Henry Hyde Act and rapidly warming relations between the armed forces.

Next, let us take a look at China which, though not on the littoral, looms menacingly over the IOR as a rapidly emerging entity with her sights set firmly on super-power status. In the context under discussion, there are just four major points to be noted :-

(a) Firstly, China's nearest competitor in both the military as well as economic spheres is India. Since both are Asian powers, it is a historical inevitability that they will have to compete and even clash for the same strategic space.

(b) Secondly, with Sino-Indian bilateral trade having crossed the US\$ 20 billion mark, China is well on the way to becoming our largest trading partner. This is a welcome development, but one which also contains a contradiction. We must not

allow it to lull us into a sense of complacency, because the Chinese have not forgotten our territorial disputes. Just a fortnight before the visit of President Hu Jintao in November 2006, in a most undiplomatic gesture, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi reiterated an emphatic public claim to Arunachal Pradesh. It is significant that China has settled boundary disputes with 12 out of 14 neighbours; the only exceptions being India and Bhutan.

(c) Thirdly, the "string of pearls" strategy is another source of concern, due to the clear connotation of military encirclement that it conveys to India. In this context, Gwadar situated at the mouth of the Persian Gulf is probably the first in a chain of ports that China is helping our neighbours to develop, and which could provide future facilities to the PLA Navy ships and nuclear submarines. The other ports in this chain are likely to be: Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar.

(d) And finally, to all those who get dreamy-eyed about the future of Sino-Indian relations, I would put just one question. Where in the annals of international relations can one find a precedent for one nation handing over to another, not just the designs and expertise, but also actual hardware relating to nuclear weapons and a family of ballistic missiles? Even the British were denied atomic secrets by their Anglo-Saxon cousins, the Americans, using the post-War McMahon Act.

(e) By arming Pakistan with conventional and nuclear weaponry, China has, by proxy, forced India to divert scarce resources, and thus tried to checkmate her as a military and economic rival.

Coming to our immediate neighbourhood, India's attitude of detachment with regard to most geo-political developments, is often worrisome. Unless we are involved, we will have no leverage, and unless we have some leverage, we are powerless to influence the course of events vital to our national security. In this context, two examples are illuminating :-

(a) India's national security interests have suffered the most from the sinister nexus between China, Pakistan, and North Korea, to accomplish nuclear and missile proliferation, much of which has taken place by the sea route. The Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI) was meant for the specific purpose of interdicting transportation of WMDs by ship, but we have yet to make up our mind about joining it.

(b) Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in our close volatile neighbourhood, are countries where we have chosen to remain hands-off, but where things could blow up in our face overnight, and catch us unprepared, because we have no "trip-wires" in place.

Next, a brief look at Pakistan. While Pakistan will remain a factor in our security calculus for the foreseeable future, we need to be careful that this troublesome neighbour does not dominate our radar scope. It is certainly in our interest that she should remain a stable and integral nation, and outgrow the sense of insecurity which has haunted her since independence. Our national security policy should convey a couple of clear messages to the Pakistani leadership, such as :-

(a) Firstly, that India has vast resources of strength and has demonstrated the resilience to withstand whatever Pakistan could throw at us. We will, therefore, never be cowed down either by force or by terrorism.

(b) Notwithstanding threats of a "thousand cuts", India will continue her march on the road to economic, industrial and scientific progress with resolve. Engaging in an arms race with India could break the Pakistani economy's back.

(c) And finally, modern day governments need to focus energies on providing a better quality of life to their citizens through social change and economic development, rather than by breeding fundamentalism in *madarsas*.

We need to bear in mind that the drug traffic emerging from the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent on either side of India provides funding for international terrorism. Organisations like the *Al Quaida* and the *Jemmah Islamiah* find both recruits and financial sustenance here, and use the sea routes for their nefarious activities. The LTTE not only has a "Sea Tiger" wing, but also runs a clandestine merchant fleet which provides efficient logistic support for its insurgency. The emergence of an LTTE aviation component and the recent air attacks carried out by it, have added an altogether

new dimension to this insurgency. In addition, the Horn of Africa, Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits are witness to frequent incidents of lawlessness including piracy, hijacking and human trafficking. In the midst of such a scenario, the smaller island nations of the IOR are beset by a feeling of insecurity and seek reassurance from neighbouring maritime powers that their sovereignty will remain protected, and that they will receive succour in times of need.

The last word in any discussion on geo-politics must go to Lord Palmerston who so rightly reminded us that in international relations, core national interests always take precedence over sentiments like friendship or enmity. As a corollary, it must always remain etched in our minds that should a clash of interests arise between India and any other power, regional or extra-regional; the use of coercive power and even conflict remains a distinct possibility.

Security of Energy and Trade

India's own dependence on the seas, and her geographic location astride major shipping routes of the world place a dual responsibility on her. Not only does India have to safeguard the maritime interests vital to her own security and economic well-being, but she must, as an obligation to the larger world community, ensure the free flow of vital hydrocarbons and commerce through the IOR sea lanes.

India, with a merchant fleet of 760 ships totaling 8.6 million tons GRT, ranks 15th amongst seafaring nations. This fleet, operating out of 12 major and 184 minor Indian ports can carry a little less than a sixth of our seaborne trade, and has much scope for expansion. As far as our foreign trade is concerned, I reiterate three oft quoted facts to emphasise the role of the sea:-

(a) Of our foreign trade, more than 75 per cent by value, and over 97 per cent by volume is carried by merchant ships.

(b) Our exports were US \$ 100 billion in 2006. These are slated to cross US \$ 200 billion in the next five years.

(c) India's share of total world trade has been hovering around just one per cent. The government is aiming to double it by 2009.

Currently, at a very energy-intensive state of its development, India is predicted to become the world's largest importer of hydrocarbons by 2050. A new development in this context is our acquisition of oil and gas fields across the globe by Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh. While investments worth billions of dollars have been made in these overseas assets extending from Sakhalin across Africa to Brazil, little thought has been given to their protection, which will certainly have maritime security connotations. Above and beyond whatever our offshore oilfields are currently producing, the seas hold out tremendous promise in terms of oil, gas, and mineral seabed wealth, as well as organic resources. We need to, therefore, not only safeguard our vast exclusive economic zones (EEZ), but also mobilise the technologies required to exploit these resources.

Annually, over 100,000 merchantmen including bulk carriers, container ships, car ferries, oil tankers and liquefied gas carriers transit the waters of the Indian Ocean, carrying cargo worth about a trillion dollars. Both east-bound and west-bound shipping has to pass through a number of choke points where it is vulnerable to interdiction or interference by state and non-state entities. Any disruption in the supply of energy or commodities, would send prices skyrocketing and destabilise industries as well as economies world-wide. It is against this backdrop that India, as a major maritime power in this region, has to shoulder responsibilities in the maritime domain. Let us then look at how our maritime strategy envisages the employment of national assets in peace and in war.

Strategy in Peacetime Conditions

Let me start by quoting a passage from the first version of the US Maritime Strategy promulgated by the CNO Admiral James Watkins in 1986. It says "Sea power is said to be relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable component of a nation's forces for deterring strategic nuclear war. The maritime strategy provides a framework for considering all uses of maritime power. Amongst the greatest services we can provide to the nation is to operate in peacetime and in crises in a way that will deter war."

Our Maritime Doctrine has clearly outlined the four basic missions assigned to the Indian Navy, which span the full spectrum of conflict, and these are: military, diplomatic, constabulary, and

benign roles. Of these, the diplomatic, constabulary, and benign roles are undertaken in peacetime, and shall receive priority in discussion. However, from the wartime military role, I will de-link deterrence, which happens to be a peacetime function, and discuss it first of all.

Strategic Deterrence

Having crossed the nuclear rubicon in 1998, we are committed to maintaining a minimum credible deterrent under a self imposed condition of 'no first use' (NFU). Having also gone public with a nuclear doctrine, there is no room for second thoughts now, because our adversaries have designed their strategic forces and crafted their nuclear posture based on our declarations.

India's Nuclear Doctrine clearly envisages, and is based on a deterrent in the form of a "triad" with land-based, aircraft-borne, and submarine launched weapons. Of this triad, we only have the first two in our inventory at present. Nuclear weapons are not meant for war fighting, and achieve deterrence by convincing the enemy of the futility of a nuclear first strike, because the response would be so devastating that it would render the strike meaningless.

Two specific attributes are necessary to convince the enemy of the credibility of your deterrent; it should have massive destructive power, and it must be substantially survivable in the face of a sneak first strike. The only platform which can claim to be virtually invulnerable to attack, and ready for instant response is the nuclear propelled submarine armed with strategic weapons. We do have ship-launched ballistic missiles in our arsenal, but our nuclear deterrent would attain true credibility only when its underwater leg becomes operational. However, operating a submarine-based deterrent is a complex undertaking, and requires not only fail-safe communications, but also a full fledged command and control system, backed up by extensive intelligence, planning, training and maintenance infrastructure. We did operate a Charlie I class nuclear submarine on a lease from the USSR for three years, and that provided useful exposure to navy personnel and perhaps scientists. But *INS Chakra* as she was called, carried no nuclear weapons, and we are, therefore, still to learn the complexities of operating a seaborne deterrent. If we are looking forward to deploying such a weapon system in the next few years, perhaps now is the time to start putting its components in place.

The unique doctrine of NFU, does raise the threshold of a nuclear conflict, but requires us to maintain adequate conventional forces in addition to our strategic assets. And that brings us to the issue of conventional deterrence.

Conventional Deterrence

As I just said, nuclear weapons are not meant for the purpose of fighting wars, and every soldier, sailor and airman would do well to remember that these are actually political tools to be used only for sending a message of deterrence, compellence, or coercion to an adversary. But such a situation should arise only when persuasion or dissuasion by all other means has been tried without success, and herein lies the need for conventional deterrence.

The main objective of a peacetime strategy is to deter conflict, and ensure peace and stability in our areas of interest. This is best done by maintaining a preponderance in maritime capability; the idea being to never leave friends as well as adversaries or potential adversaries in doubt about India's superiority at sea. In this context, it is important to convey a clear and unambiguous message to all concerned, so that there is no room for misunderstandings. A message to convey reassurance or deterrence can have many nuances, and I shall just mention the three main elements:

(a) First of all, comes what we now call maritime domain awareness (MDA). It encompasses the ability to keep our oceanic areas under sustained surveillance so that we can compile a comprehensive picture of the peacetime merchant traffic as well as deployment and operating patterns of naval forces. The availability of such a picture not only reduces the "fog of war" but also gives us an early warning of any deviations from the normal state. MDA requires many input sources; from satellite surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, and scouting by warships, to direction finding (DF) stations and merchant ship tracking systems. Making this information available in real time to all our widely dispersed platforms at sea will call for networking of a sophisticated nature.

(b) The second element involves our ability to ensure presence, or physically position units in an area of interest, no matter how distant, and sustain them for as long as necessary. Our vision encompasses an arc extending from

the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits as India's legitimate area of interest. The presence of our maritime units not only enhances our familiarity with those waters, and boosts intelligence gathering, but also demonstrates our commitment to friends in that area, and willingness to protect our interests.

(c) The third and most important element of this message that would reinforce deterrence is one of combat efficiency and readiness. While we may consider these as inherent attributes of a professional maritime force, overt demonstrations through overseas deployments, joint exercises, training exchanges and even humanitarian relief operations are keenly observed and noted by friends and rivals alike.

Diplomatic Role

"Gunboat diplomacy", used to be considered one of the less pleasant coercive tactics used by colonial powers in the heyday of imperialism. Today, however, maritime diplomacy obviously has no such connotation, because navies are now being increasingly used to build bridges, to foster mutual trust and confidence, to create partnerships through inter-operability and to render assistance, if required. Of course, post-Cold War they are also being increasingly used to project power across the littoral of third world nations.

For our maritime strategy, this role has two-fold importance. Firstly, the Navy can discharge its peacetime functions in a far more efficient manner, if we have an atmosphere of cooperation with our neighbours and we have friendly ports and airfields available to our units. Secondly, in times of crisis or war too, operations proceed much more smoothly, if the environment has already been shaped, and a certain level of comfort established. This aspect emerged clearly during both the tsunami relief and the Lebanon refugee evacuation operations. However, this role would acquire true significance only, if it forms an integral part of the nation's overall diplomatic initiatives, and the political establishment as well as the MEA learn how to use the Navy as an instrument of state policy. On its part, the IN has accorded the highest priority to what it calls "International Maritime Cooperation" and has created structures, schemes and financial heads to pursue it vigorously. Friendly IOR neighbours, on their part have offered us refuelling and re-supply facilities in a number of ports.

Constabulary Role

The constabulary role in our context, must be seen in two dimensions; ensuring good order at sea, and managing low intensity maritime operations (LIMO).

As mentioned a little while ago, a combination of factors and an unfortunate convergence of interests, make the high seas a fertile ground for criminal organisations and terrorist activities. So when we speak of threats to "good order" at sea, it encompasses the full gamut of lawlessness: from piracy, hijacking and trafficking in arms, drugs and humans to smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In our own context, the effective sealing of land routes from Pakistan has forced clandestine traffic into the sea, and opened a new window of vulnerability all along our western seaboard. Therefore, while good order at sea is certainly an internal security imperative for India, it is also an important bilateral and international maritime obligation.

LIMO involves countering non-state entities using the sea for unlawful purposes or indulging in violent activities against states. In this context, we have a tangible threat from our west where terrorism breeds unfettered with state support, and is likely to spill over into the sea. To the south, the Sea Tiger wing of the LTTE which has attained proficiency in maritime operations, operates at our door step.

The Service has to tread with a degree of caution in the constabulary role because it is very easy to become excessively involved in low end or "brown water" operations, to the detriment of the navy's prime tasks which lie in the "blue waters" or the high seas. With the creation of the Indian Coast Guard in 1978, most law enforcement aspects of the constabulary role within the Maritime Zones of India have been assigned to them. The Navy needs to stand behind its sister maritime Service and render support and assistance, when required.

Benign Role

The Navy is the repository of certain capabilities and specialist knowledge which are instrumental in the discharge of its benign role. This role involves tasks such as humanitarian aid, disaster relief, search and rescue diving assistance, salvage and hydrographic surveys, and is essentially defined by the complete absence of force or violence in its execution.

The tsunami of December 2004 provided an example of how the basic attributes of maritime power enable it to react at short notice, and respond to emergent situations. The disaster struck on a Sunday morning, and as our ships were sailing for our own East coast and the Andaman Islands we received requests for help from Sri Lanka and Maldives. We mobilised more ships, helicopters, medicines and stores, and by the same evening they were on their way to Male and Galle. Government approval came later by phone, but we knew that if there was to be a problem (government approval), our ships would just anchor 12½ miles offshore and await further directions. Similarly in June 2006, our ships were returning from the Mediterranean when the Lebanon refugee crisis arose. We ordered them to anchor in the Suez canal while the MEA pondered over the issues involved. As soon as the Government decision was received, they turned around and sailed into Beirut to commence the evacuation operations within hours.

These two operations have had a significant impact and have served to enhance India's image in the international community. It is to be hoped that the establishment has drawn the right conclusions about the employment of the Navy as an instrument of diplomacy.

Strategy in War

I have dwelt at some length on the navy's peacetime strategy, because peace fortunately prevails about 90 per cent time. But we have to remember that the prevalence of peace is an indicator that deterrence is working. Should deterrence fail, war will surely follow, and war is what navies train and prepare for. An essential element of this preparation for war is the evolution of a new maritime strategy. Apart from the other imperatives that we have discussed earlier, this evolutionary process has been accelerated by economic, geo-political and technological developments that have come about in the recent past.

Before embarking on a discussion of the strategy, I would like to make two important points, which may call for a paradigm shift :-

- (a) Firstly, under the influence of Mahanian ideas, most navies including our own, imagined that their *raison d'être* was only to engage the enemy in a big battle at sea, and plans were shaped accordingly. However, the lessons that emerged from

exercise after exercise clearly conveyed that navies cannot achieve a great deal, conducting maritime operations in isolation. Unless our actions at sea had a linkage, no matter how indirect, with events on land, the navy's potential would be wasted. There is now acknowledgement that wars are won only on land, and that the navy must ensure that its planning process as well as operations are synchronous with those of the army, so that we obtain the maximum synergy.

(b) Secondly, there is a section of opinion, especially in the army and air force, which firmly believes that all future wars in our context, should be "short and sharp". Perhaps it is a Hobson's choice for these Services because the intensity of fuel, oil and lubricants (FOL) and ammunition consumption as well as attrition can be limiting factors for them. As far as the navy is concerned, the longer a conflict lasts, the greater the pressure that it can bring to bear on the enemy. As the Vietnam, Iran-Iraq, Kosovo, and current Iraq wars have shown, short conflicts are not an inevitability, and we should retain the option to prolong a conflict, if it suits our national interests.

Maritime forces can be deployed in two ways to influence the outcome of war on land. They can be used to interdict the enemy's foreign trade lifeline in an attempt to starve his industry, economy and people, and bring his military machine to a halt. The impact of this "commodity denial" or "indirect" regime requires a finite time to be felt by a nation. Factors like the enemy's dependence on imports, his buffer stocks and ability to re-stock via land routes will decide the effectiveness of these indirect operations, and that is why a superior navy would like to prolong a war.

In the other, "direct" mode of creating an impact on the land battle, the enemy's homeland is targeted by naval platforms delivering weapons from the sea, undertaking amphibious operations or inserting special forces. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the open-ocean warfare challenge disappeared, and the USN-Marine Corps combine shifted their focus to crisis-response and interventions in the third world. Herein, lies the origin of concepts like "littoral warfare" and "naval expeditionary forces". Adapting these concepts to our environment, the maritime strategy must encompass the resolute and judicious deployment of our maritime forces in both direct and indirect operations. This will ensure that

the impact of sea power is felt on the land battle, both in the short term and long term time frames.

Neither littoral warfare nor expeditionary warfare are new functions, but essentially involve a geographic relocation of the theatre from mid-ocean to a zone extending about 50-100 miles inland and seaward from the enemy coast of interest. All the other traditional forms of naval warfare, like amphibious, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, electronic and mine warfare would retain their importance. However, there are some concepts and factors, mostly technology based, that we would need to incorporate into our new strategy :-

- (a) The littoral of an adversary is an inherently dangerous area for maritime operations due to threats from submarines, strike aircraft and mines etc. Therefore, it would be essential to impose a sequencing of operations so that the battle space is adequately sanitised and favourable conditions created prior to launching any operations.
- (b) In such sequencing or phasing, it would be imperative to first establish information dominance in order to disrupt the enemy's command and control systems and deny him information about our intentions. Thereafter, sea control, a favourable air situation, or mine counter-measures as appropriate, could be pursued before the actual operation is launched.
- (c) Although a new buzz word, all that information dominance, means is attaining superiority in the electromagnetic as well as information warfare domains for one's own forces while destroying, degrading and even deceiving the enemy's intelligence and surveillance assets. We should have no doubt that this would be a decisive factor in any future conflict.
- (d) Today, our fleets possess tremendous striking power in terms of number of SSMs, ASMs and SAMs that can be launched from our ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters. However, this punch would be wasted in a conflict, unless we can bring the enemy to battle. Our forces would, therefore, have to aggressively seek out enemy units and bring them to action, so that we can inflict adequate attrition prior to attacking his homeland.

(e) In order to obtain the maximum synergy and advantage from our superior numbers as well as capabilities, it is necessary that we fight what the Soviets used to call a "combined arms battle" at sea. By ensuring reliable and secure communications, between warships, aircraft and submarines, it should be possible to concentrate their firepower in a geographical location and inflict heavy attrition on the enemy. Shore based IAF strike aircraft would make an important contribution here. With network centric operations on the horizon, implementation of this concept should not pose a problem.

(f) Combined arms operations fit neatly into another concept termed: "maritime manoeuvre from the sea". Given their inherent mobility and the access provided by the sea, maritime forces can exploit the principles of surprise, concentration, and flexibility to deal the enemy a sudden blow which will unbalance him and shatter his morale and cohesion. Essential ingredients for such an operation include naval aviation, land attack missiles, amphibious shipping and special forces. These are all available to the IN, and manoeuvre warfare should be an important part of our strategy.

(g) In the final phase, our strategy should envisage the linking up of the three Services in a joint operation, no matter how widely dispersed these forces, or brief this phase may be.

Ideally speaking, maritime force structures should evolve from an approved strategy. But having made a late start in this domain, we will have to make some compromises, till the cyclic process in which strategy leads to capability requirements, which in turn influence the force planning progress, stabilises. Nevertheless, the IN has not done too badly; having generated a doctrine, a maritime capabilities perspective plan, and a strategy withing a span of two years. The thought process and discussions that went into the evolution of these documents has generated a need-based, budget-linked force structure for the next 15 years which has been accepted in principle by the MoD.

Epilogue

It is not entirely happenstance that the Navy as it evolves, will meet most of the demands of India's maritime strategy over the

next decade and a half. It did not happen overnight, and great deal of credit for this should rightly go to our farsighted predecessors who laid sound foundations and put the Service on the right track

This talk would, therefore, not be complete, if I fail to make mention of one last set of issues. Just as strategy forms the basis of operational plans, it must itself be supported by a philosophic underpinning which will help the Navy retain a clear vision of the future and steer a steady course. This underpinning is provided by a set of five factors which I would commend to the Navy for close attention :-

(a) **Indigenisation.** India today has the dubious distinction of being the largest arms importer in the world, having signed deals worth US\$ 11.7 billion over the past two years. Experience has shown us that every time we induct a system of foreign origin, we are entering a dangerous cycle of spiraling costs, uncertainty, and dependence on an unreliable supply source. Self-reliance should remain a key result area and, for all their clumsy ways, we should continue our symbiotic relationship with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Firmly rejecting "screwdriver technology", we should insist on the DRDO entering collaborative development and co-production arrangements, wherever we are offered transfer of technology.

(b) **Shipbuilding Industry.** Our current status as a maritime power is due in substantial measure to the 40 years of warship building endeavours of our shipyards. The shipbuilding industry is a strategic asset which must be carefully nurtured and guided by the Navy. Apart from undertaking urgent modernisation, the shipyards must be encouraged to seek partnerships with the private sector and technical collaborations abroad.

(c) **Foreign Cooperation.** The Navy's most important contribution to the nation during peacetime is going to be as an instrument of diplomacy, providing support for political objectives and foreign policy initiatives. In coordination with the Ministry of External Affairs a sharp focus will have to be retained on coordinating assistance to our maritime neighbours in the Indian Ocean littoral in areas of training hardware and expertise.

(d) **Networked Operations.** Our maritime forces currently encompass weapons, sensors and platforms of formidable range and capability. With the induction of the aircraft carrier *Vikramaditya*, systems like the Brahmos missile and new classes of submarines, our capabilities at sea will be further enhanced. In order to exploit their full potential, we will need to have a sophisticated communication network covering the entire IOR. With a dedicated maritime communication satellite and the help of our Information Technology (IT) industry we should aim to have a would class network in place by the middle of the next decade.

(e) **Transformation.** Change of any kind does not come easily to us, because we dislike the associated turbulence, and dread the thought of failure. But the choices are stark; we either look ahead and bring about an orderly sequence of change through "transformation", or get overtaken by events and react to them *post facto*. Transformation is the engine which will help the Service absorb new technologies, move towards networked operations, make organisational improvements, embrace joint philosophies and incorporate other ideas to improve combat efficiency.

That brings me to the end of my talk, and I hope that I have been able to convey an idea of our maritime aspirations and a roadmap for the future.

New Zealand's Strategic and Defence Policy : A Small Player Making a Difference

His Excellency Mr Phil Goff

New Zealand - India relations are long-standing and warm. From our common colonial heritage, we share similar institutions of governance and legal system, English language and membership of the Commonwealth. We both strongly support democracy, human rights and multilateralism. We have a common interest in the success of United Nations peacekeeping initiatives and effective global counter-terrorism efforts. However, until recently our bilateral relationship had been largely passive. Military linkages were virtually non-existent, trade flows were very small and visits at the ministerial level were rare. During the last decade, however, our bilateral relationship has deepened in the political and economic spheres, and at an increasingly rapid pace. When I first visited India in 2001, it was the first visit to India by a New Zealand Foreign Minister in 10 years. Our Prime Minister Helen Clark visited India in October 2004, with a number of other Ministers. Our Governor General Anand Satyanand, hopes to visit India at the end of 2007. India is now New Zealand's second fastest growing major export market, albeit from a low base, reaching 355 million dollar in 2007. Coal and primary products dominate, but there is also a growing diversification of trade, for example, in the area of machinery exports for Indian infrastructure and manufacturing projects. People to people links have deepened, driven in large part by the growing and vibrant Indian community in New Zealand. Students of Indian descent now make up more than a third of the enrolments in some of the schools in my electorate. Our relationship, then is clearly becoming more active. This is not surprising, given India's rapidly growing economy and increasing geopolitical importance. New Delhi's 'Look East Policy' and membership, alongside New Zealand, of the ASEAN Regional Forum and, more recently, the East Asia Summit have also brought us closer together.

Defence is an important element of any overall relationship and defence engagement should grow as the wide relationship moves

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forward. Our military links with India are long-standing. Our troops fought alongside each other in some of the major battles of the First and Second World Wars. In 1950, the Royal New Zealand Naval vessel *Achilles* which had fought in the battle of the River Plate was refitted as INS *Delhi*, which began the connection between our navies. In 1952, New Zealand officers served with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. This was our first UN peacekeeping mission but it was long-standing one, which we remained part of until 1976. We also supported the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission in 1965-66.

Though our historical military linkages are strong, our recent military cooperation has been limited. Our engagement currently, is focused on interaction between our respective navies through port calls, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and senior staff visits. Over the next month or so, the Royal New Zealand Naval Frigate *Te Mana* and tanker *Endeavour* will visit Port Blair and the Indian National Defence College will visit New Zealand. We also interact at the annual Shangri La Defence Conference in Singapore. The ASEAN Regional Forum defence dialogue process and UN peacekeeping operations also provide opportunities for our armed forces to work together.

New Zealand's Strategic Situation

New Zealand does not face presently, a conventional military threat. We are an island of only four million people, about the same as a mid-sized Indian city. Our closest neighbours are : Australia to our West, the South Pacific Islands to our North and Antarctica to our South. We are surrounded by the Pacific Ocean. Despite our geographic isolation, we do not consider ourselves, immune from contemporary trans-national security threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation or trans-national organised crime. We rely on regional and international stability for our own well being and prosperity, as do all nations.

New Zealand has never been "isolationist" or reluctant to play our part in contributing to regional and international security. In both world wars of the Twentieth Century, New Zealand suffered the highest per capita casualty rate of any commonwealth country. Commitment to collective security, the rule of law and multilateral responses to security challenges have been cornerstones of our foreign policy. Since the World War II, our commitment to these principles has been backed up by a preparedness to act.

Like India, New Zealand has made a strong commitment to peace support operations. We currently have about 400 New Zealand Defence Force and 81 New Zealand Police personnel deployed on 21 peace support missions. While a relatively small number, especially compared to India's commitment of over 9,500 troops to UN peacekeeping; for a country of our size it is a significant commitment. With regular rotations, it means that one third of our Army serves in a peacekeeping mission each year. Given our relatively small Defence Force, our focus has been multiple, small scale, niche deployments.

New Zealand's peacekeeping commitments extend beyond our own region. In addition to our larger contributions in Solomon Islands, Timor Leste and Afghanistan, New Zealand has small numbers of personnel in multinational missions in Korea, the Middle East, Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. New Zealand and India have worked together in the US Missions in East Timor and we both contribute to missions in Sudan, Lebanon and Kosovo. We also have a strong commitment to play an active role in the Asia Pacific region, which we are both part of. We participate in dialogue on defence and security issues through bilateral meetings, and in regional fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. These groupings provide an important mechanism for dialogue and cooperation on traditional and increasingly, non-traditional security issues. New Zealand is also an active member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Australia, the UK, Malaysia and Singapore.

International Campaign Against Terrorism

International terrorism remains a major scourge. The spectre of a WMD attack by a terrorist group remains our biggest nightmare scenario. The last few years have repeatedly demonstrated that no region or people are immune to indiscriminate terrorist violence. London, Madrid, Mumbai, Istanbul, Bali, New York and Baghdad are among the many places to have been targeted by terrorism. While the threat of terrorism on New Zealand is low, New Zealanders have been among the victims of attacks in New York, Bali and London.

We have strongly supported the international campaign against terrorism. Since December 2001, we have committed forces, including three rotations of Special Air Services troops, to Operation Enduring Freedom and now to the NATO led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. We have deployed ground and Air

assets to Afghanistan and the Gulf region. Since 2003, we have had around 120 Defence Force personnel in Afghanistan operating a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan province. New Zealand Police personnel provide police training in Bamyan and NZAID is also managing a range of development projects there. We recently extended our PRT commitment to late 2008. Our PRT has worked hard to make a difference to the lives of the people of Bamyan. It has facilitated the construction of schools, roads, bridges and a maternity ward. Like our other peacekeeping missions, Bamyan underscores a central, but critical point, that our efforts can only be successful, if we win the support of the local community.

Economic and social development is the key to Afghanistan's future. The Afghan people will only continue to support an international presence in their country, if they believe that it will improve their lives, security and prosperity. I asked a military commander familiar with the situation in south Afghanistan, what level of support the allied forces were receiving from the local population? He said that about 20 per cent supported them, 10 per cent opposed them, and the other 70 per cent hadn't committed themselves either way, waiting to see what the outcome was likely to be and what difference the international forces were likely to make to the reality of their daily lives. There is no doubt that our mission in Afghanistan must be underpinned by a military element strong enough to guarantee security on the ground. It is important, however, that the troops on the ground are given the tools in terms of their physical resources and training to ensure that they are able to engage effectively with the local population. Military strategies have to be developed and implemented, with a premium on winning and not alienating local support. The concept of "collateral damage" is unlikely to be viewed by a Pashtun tribesperson as an acceptable explanation for the death of a family member or a friend. The exercise of effective military force alone will not create the environment necessary to lay the foundation for a stable and democratic Afghanistan. This will only be possible through an approach that fully integrates security, economic and social development. We need to foster infrastructure development and to build government institutions that are able to deliver education, healthcare and other core services.

The international community must also commit to the development of alternative livelihood options, reducing its dependence

on poppy cultivations and enabling Afghanistan over time to become more self-reliant.

The Pacific

We have learned similar lessons from our experiences in Pacific peace support operations. The last few years have been seen serious instability across the Pacific. Sadly, much of the Pacific presently bears little resemblance to the idyllic "island paradise" post card image. Ethnic tensions, clashes of traditional values with those of globalisation, limited economic and social development, and poor governance structures have resulted in heightened tensions in many countries in the region. These tensions have sometimes resulted in breakdowns in civil order and violence. Two of the most serious cases have been in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste.

In 1999, New Zealand committed a battalion of peace keepers to East Timor, to help restore a country nearly destroyed by the militias, following the referendum over the country's future that year. We celebrated with the Timorese people when they achieved self-determination and democracy in 2002, after 25 years of struggle and an apparently successful UN transition led to independence. However, Timor Leste's descent into violence in 2006 underscored the difficulty and complexity of nation building. Defence forces from Australia and New Zealand, and police from 38 countries including India, have once again had to assist Timor Leste to establish law and order.

New Zealand is working with the UN and regional partners in the sixth UN mission in Timor to try and achieve a durable peace and an effective political system. The New Zealand Defence Force has an army company there, supported by Air Force helicopters. We have helped to restore stability and prevent a further bloodbath. But the challenge of changing the political culture to achieve long-term stability, without the need for an international presence, is a tougher one.

New Zealand, with Australia and the international community, is committed to a long term nation building effort. We have also played an important role in helping to restore stability in the Solomon Islands, as part of the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Together with Australia, Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea,

our defence personnel and police have helped prevent further inter-communal conflict and to restore law and order. The RAMSI mission has made a real difference to stability and security in the Solomon Islands. A sustainable peace requires the establishment of robust institutions of governance and sustainable livelihoods, as well as a culture that accepts and demands the proper exercise of authority.

Stability and progress are mutually dependent. Neither can be achieved without the other. Maintaining an adequate consent environment, for foreign troops to be within another sovereign country's space, however, can be difficult. One way of maintaining a strong consent environment is to foster mutual respect between soldiers and the local population. New Zealand troops are well trained and experienced peace keepers. Most have experienced a number of missions and they avoid heavy handed responses. They work well with the local community. The support of the local government is critical. As a successful intervention is made and a reasonable level of security is established, local power structures may calculate that foreign assistance is no longer as critical to their interests. Vested and corrupt political interests may regard the intervention force as a hinderance to their ambitions. The difficult balancing act that follows can lead to success or back to conflict.

Defence Force Modernisation

In order to meet our regional and international security commitments, New Zealand has placed premium on developing a professional and effective defence force. In the last eight years, we have made significant investments in ensuring that the New Zealand Defence Force is best structured and equipped to perform the missions for which it is most likely to be deployed. We have invested in new and upgraded capabilities and implemented important organisational changes, including a joint approach to structure and operation. We have also shifted towards a more focussed range of military capabilities. Given the high cost of defence technology, this is a reality for many small nations. We have hardened the Army, giving it more firepower and mobility. We are also increasing its strength. The Air Force is getting a significant makeover. Its platforms are being replaced or upgraded. The focus is on improving our surveillance, strategic and tactical airlift capabilities. The Navy will

also increase in size. A lot of investment, in seven new ships, is to enhance our ability to protect our Exclusive Economic Zone and maritime approaches. Introducing a number of new capabilities into the Defence Force is a challenging process, but it will result in an increasingly capable New Zealand Defence Force, which is combat capable and ready for peacekeeping operations.

Disarmament and Arms Control

I would like to make a few comments as New Zealand's Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control. This is not, as some might imagine, inconsistent with my role as Minister of Defence. There is no defence against weapons of mass destruction, which have the potential to destroy human beings in unprecedented numbers and perhaps humanity itself. The Defence Force is also active in areas of disarmament, such as clearing landmines and cluster munitions around the world.

Disarmament and non-proliferation are key priorities for the New Zealand Government. New Zealand is an active participant in international efforts to achieve the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and to enforce a ban on chemical and biological weapons. We strongly advocate for controls on conventional weapons. We take an even handed approach to nuclear disarmament. We strongly oppose nuclear weapons in any hands. The nexus between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is perhaps best described in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report released last year:-

"So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, there is risk that these will one day be used, by design or accident. And any such use would be catastrophic".

The continued existence of nuclear weapons, the risk that more countries may seek access to nuclear weapons, means there is no scope for complacency. We remain concerned that 27,000 nuclear weapons remain in existence today and the rate of progress towards disarmament in recent years has been negligible. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the multilateral treaty regime governing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It contains the only multilateral treaty commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear weapon states.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have outlined briefly how New Zealand sees its place in the world, our key international commitments and our defence policy. I have also touched upon New Zealand's and India's developing bilateral relationship. This relationship is becoming increasingly important to us in this dynamic region. Relationships of course, are made up of many different areas. The defence, foreign affairs and trade strands between India and New Zealand are growing. I look forward to working together to develop our relationship further, so that we can better pursue the objectives that we have in common.

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Naxalism : Socio Economic Dimensions

Shri BG Verghese

Background

The roots of Naxalism, later termed as Maoism or Left Wing Extremism (LWE) as now officially labelled pre-date independence. Tebhaga and Telengana movements in Bengal and Nizam's Hyderabad respectively, were in mid-1940s. The issues were the land and rural exploitation. Naxalism is pre-dominantly rural but has witnessed urban manifestations such as in Calcutta during the period 1967 to 1970. The LWE has extended across nearly half of India covering the hill-forest belt through middle and peninsular India.

Zamindari System

Zamindar was told that area covering so many thousands of acres or districts would form part of his zamindari for which he had to pay so many lakhs per annum to the company or to the state. The zamindar did not cultivate the land. He had various people who took entitlements, distributed them, farmed them out and they in turn farmed them out to others, and they in turn to others till to the actual cultivators or share croppers. Above the tiller of the land, there are series of rent collectors, each attempting to suck the tiller dry to produce enough for themselves and enough to pay rent for the next year. This spiral moved upward till it got to the state. The Zamindar remained a rentier and not a cultivator and several layers of sub-infeudation existed and each one extracted his pound of flesh.

Forest Management and Status of Tribals

In the case of forests, the process of reservation for forests and protected forests for conservation for scientific extraction of timber provided to the state, reduced the tribal inhabitants to intruders and encroachers. These people lived in forest which was their home, their habitat and livelihood for generations and centuries and then they were declared intruders and encroachers and their rights the way they exercised, since time immemorial, were reduced to

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privileges given by the state. He who gives can take them away and it is not he who gives but it is all the hierarchy of the state government going down to the lowest level of the forest official and contractors who exploited these people. The tribals not only lost their rights but now they have to pay for their privileges. And all this is dependant on the whims and fancies and exactions of forest officials. The symbiotic relationship between the tribal and the forest was scorned, and the process of tribal exclusion continued apace with the creation of game sanctuaries, tiger protection, nature and biosphere reserves and land acquisition for a hundred different reasons – dams, roads, refugee settlements, expansion of urban areas, expansion of agricultural domain, mines, industries and so on. All of these were at the cost of the jungle and the tribals believe this belongs to them. It was free for all, and tribals kept on being squeezed in this process.

Resettlement and Rehabilitation Records

Unfortunately, the records of resettlement and rehabilitation and payment of compensation for the lands and assets acquired from people who were then in possession of the place, have been very poor resulting in a huge credibility gap. So today when the state, corporate body or anyone else promises compensation for the dam, factory or whatever, the people laugh and scorn and say we have heard it before. For example, the people in Orissa displaced due to construction of *Hirakund Dam*, have not been re-settled and compensated. Previously, adequate legal framework for providing compensation and maintaining proper Revenue and Rights records was not there. We have cases where a generation of people were uprooted and settled in another area. After some time some factory or road or railway expansion scheme fructified and the same people were displaced the second time and again not compensated thereby; another generation suffered. Subsequently, some new factory or urban development process came about and the people got displaced the third and the fourth time. It has been a life time of displacement by the state with very little regard to the rights and the livelihood of the people displaced. There has been much illegality in all this and manipulation by process of deprivation and marginalisation.

Administration in Remote Areas

Being located in isolated areas, agency tracts, former princely states, and in partially internal excluded areas, had two implications. These areas were by definition, less developed and had poor

connectivity. The Abujmarh area in Chhatisgarh is bigger than the Manipur State. The area is totally un-surveyed. It does not have roads, schools, hospitals, and so on. Consequently, such areas are less developed, have poor connectivity and mostly unadministered. Post-Independence agrarian reforms, barring in Jammu and Kashmir have not been successful. The land reforms were poorly conceived and executed. The zamindars were given compensation which they were paid in bonds and so on. But their records of rights were not repatriated by the states and no body knew who actually held the land. The process for sub-infeudation was very complex with no clear knowledge on the part of the state officials as to what the land records were. There were no settlements, no revision of surveys for decades and plenty of snags and loopholes in the legislation for agrarian reforms leading to eviction, litigation and poor implementation.

Vested Interests

Basically, there has been a lack of political 'will' because the feudal class with vested interests is sitting on top. Bihar was perhaps one of the worst cases. There were issues like bonded labour and non payment of minimum wages. By and large, feudal class is well entrenched in the government jobs, media, judges, professors and so on. The freight equalisation policy which the government of India introduced in the 1950s, eliminated the comparative advantages of the mineral rich states which are mostly in the central tribal belt. This eliminated the location advantage and the state paid the subsidy to ensure that the price of iron or coal was same be it in Kerala or in Nathula Pass or Zozila Pass as in area where it is mined. This meant that comparative advantage of the states to industrialise these areas were considerably reduced or eliminated. Thus, all the triggering mechanisms for development—connectivity, incentive for capacity building, generation of employment and incomes disappeared.

Training of Tribals and Dalits

Where there was industrialisation and new opportunities; the tribals and *dalits* were not educated and devoid of training. They could not avail of new opportunities because of the competition. It led to widening gaps and mounting exploitation and the state and society watched helplessly but did nothing.

Agraraian Development Programme

Cosmetic solutions like *bhoodan* and *gramdan* have not been effective. In the 1960s, the Ministry of Home Affairs under Shri LP

Singh set up a Perspective Planning division and the officer Shri BS Raghavan prepared a paper on the land situation with reference to Bihar. There was a talk of Green Revolution, new hybrid seeds, fertilisers, water and so on and so forth. It did not work and instead of green acres we had red acres. Much of India's "socialism" and "*garibi hatao*" programmes were hollow or were soon hollowed out. Corruption, vote bank politics and atrocities against scheduled castes have played havoc with the economic and social fabric of the society. The schedule castes commission is treated with total contempt by everybody including the Parliament.

Socio-Economic Challenges

In the forests, tribals find their livelihoods and rights threatened. Land rights despite 5th Schedule safeguards, through disregard of due process, manipulation and impersonation, have not been preserved. Other dubious means are bogus marriages, bogus *benami* transactions of various kinds and outright fraud. Tribals depend for much of the year on minor forest produce because most areas are not fertile. Besides due to primitive kind of agriculture, productivity is very low. Therefore, in a good year, agriculture can sustain for seven to nine months. For the rest of the year need for cash income from minor forest produce is there. But tribals have been squeezed on that as well, by forest contractors and institution of various regulations and so on. This has led to very poor levels of agriculture, education, health status and so on.

Tribal Advisory Councils set up under the Fifth Schedule have been very weak bodies with co-opted members of various kinds and are totally ineffective. Efforts are being made to amend and undo damage due to new forest policy acts and the new forest rights bills. Efforts are to settle tribals on land in the forest, unless land is available outside and so on. But there is a fierce opposition to it.

Rise of Naxalism

Cumulative wrongs, deprivation and despoir have given rise to naxalism which has grown in the interior. Naxalites came as protectors and Robinhoods. They set up *Jan Adalats* and dispensed justice. Once they took control over these areas, which were lightly administered or un-administered, they became bolder. These were the protectors of the people against exploitation by what they saw as apparatus of the state and contractors. After taking control they said

that every family would contribute one male or female able bodied person to their squadrons. People came under an iron control. This in turn led to another kind of pressure. The Government is now keen to develop these areas by constructing roads, railways and so on. The naxalites do not want area development because this will give access to the state administration and threaten them and their power base.

State of Law and Order

Law and order is necessary to deal with criminal activities of the people including extortionists of various kind. Law in wider sense includes the rule of law and new processes of law. The order means not merely prevention of disorder, which it does, but what we have done is institution of laws to preserve the established order. The established order is full of violence and inequity in its operation. We have said there would be no change. Any one trying to break through that is deemed as a violator of the law and, therefore, must be punished. Our whole concept of law and order has been turned on its head as the defence of feudalistic and oppressive system. So we need social and economic reforms to ensure human dignity, fraternity, social justice, fulfillment of basic needs, education, training and equal democratic rights to exercise adult franchise. The current agitation is about displacement, about land acquisition for steel plants, aluminum plants, mines and so on. So what we need is a new paradigm of development in which we have public, private and people's participation. People mean individuals and their community whether they be *dalits*, or tribals or anybody else. All must get equal opportunities specially through education and training.

Need for Rehabilitation

I think, land is not a vital factor. We have some old fashion thinking about that. Land is shrinking because of growth of population and growth of its use. But the productivity of land can be increased and that must be done. There is a need to take people off the land and provide them with jobs elsewhere. This requires education and training. The concept of resettlement and rehabilitation should not be by giving land for land which I think is a dishonest policy because there is no land. We give land somewhere and displace someone else and really transfer the problem from place A to place B. People should be rehabilitated by providing full job employment, opportunities

and dignity. *Dalits* and tribals are not opposed to industrialisation or urbanisation or construction of dams, but only if they are equal beneficiaries and stake holders. The new industrial corporate houses are beginning to think on these terms and have come up with packages that go beyond the declared policies of the government. I think this is good, but we need to develop this on a wider scale and cover areas where the state has its responsibility to its own people.

Need to Improve Governance

The other thing we need is better delivery system. Remote areas are not popular with Government employees and consequently administration suffers. Those forced to serve in those areas are not well motivated. Development programmes need a different kind of delivery system and different kind of administration. We had the Indian Frontier Administrative Service in the North East many years ago. It was unfortunately wound up. We need a new approach and single window system for big schemes. There is need to trigger the dynamo to build the infrastructure which has not been built for hundreds of years and that will open the door for good administration and other kind of socio-economic development.

Changing Socio-Economic Values and Their Impact on the Armed Forces

Major Shailender Singh Arya

The culture of consumerism has emerged as a dominant trend in today's India. It is an inevitable byproduct of the 'India story' - high growth rate, booming economy and emergence of a huge middle class with considerable purchasing power. Today the nation, after long years of industrial slumber and a sluggish economy, has finally broken free from the shackles of bureaucratic control with restrictive policies and has begun its long march towards becoming a developed nation. This profound change is bound to fundamentally alter the traditional, social and cultural values of any society in an irrevocable manner. This long march has also affected the Indian Armed Forces in ways more than one. On one hand, it is assisting in the modernisation of the forces, but on the other hand the lure of neon lights has radically shifted the values of the society, which in turn has created complex challenges for our volunteer Armed Forces, as the men in uniform are deeply intertwined with the society. This recent and marked shift in the socio-economic values in India has indeed posed some unique challenges for the Armed Forces. These unique challenges need to be identified and, thereafter, a suitable strategy to manage these changes; in consonance with the organisational requirements, needs to be evolved to retain our military effectiveness in these rapidly changing times.

Our Core Values

The present values and standards of the Armed Forces are not abstract concepts whose genesis lies solely in the demands of battle. *Au contraire*, they are the very foundations of the services upon whom the entire structure has been constructed. They reflect our rich history and the subsequent evolution over the years as a formidable military machine. These core values are time-tested, having stood us in great stead in face of formidable challenges and

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trying battle conditions. Our culture too, is visibly distinct and has evolved over a period of time as a combination of legacy and organisational environment. The roots of this distinct culture lie deep within the glorious traditions which have been carried forward over the generations of men in uniform. Our values and culture are inseparable with each complementing the other and none can be viewed in isolation.

The Chetwode motto of '*The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time*' is an apt and unchanging description of our core values. Essentially, the devotion and selfless commitment to duty, honour, honesty, integrity, and loyalty along with moral and physical courage constitute our core values. These values are absolutely non-negotiable, irrespective of any societal changes which have or may take place in the years to come. It is the unflinching devotion to duty, unquestionable loyalty and a very strong sense of honour or '*Izzat*' of the regiment or '*Paltan*' which has enabled countless men to make the supreme sacrifice in the service of the nation. All these values finally metamorphose into a very strong sense of '*Izzat*' which has bonded together men from vastly diverse backgrounds, formed unique and formidable associations and has indeed been the most decisive factor which has motivated men to go beyond the call of duty. Though, part of it may be explained as natural bonding which is inevitably formed due to serving together under difficult conditions, it is only an unflinching faith in one's duty and the supreme consideration to uphold the '*Izzat*' which enables soldiers to volunteer for risky missions in which the chances of safe return are slim or at times to show restraint, even when doing so involves personal danger; and to witness injury or death to their comrades but still continue with the task in hand. Integrity and honesty are another set of values which are vital for success in any battle as no scope for deviation exists when the life of men depends upon honest and resolute decisions by the leaders and their undiluted implementation at all levels. Lastly, physical and moral courage are the very pillars upon which the military operations are eventually conducted.

SOCIETAL CHANGES

The nation today is truly at the cross-roads of change. The rapid economic strides made in the last few years have created visible signs of prosperity and development. The glitzy malls,

gleaming highways, changing urban landscape, a bullish Sensex and the increased job opportunities in the private sector are indicators of the same. The growing Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and Information Technology (IT) industry has created a novel class of young people with their values oriented towards a western mindset. Though majority of these changes are limited to metros and other big cities, their influence has not been lost on the small cities and villages due to the deep penetration of media. The continuous beaming of various channels, accompanied with their direct or indirect hard selling of various products has created a unique awareness in the hinterland, where most of our men come from.

Consequently, the traditional values of the Indian society are undergoing a marked transition. Materialism has replaced simplicity, ambition has replaced contentment, aggressiveness has replaced modesty and a tearing hurry has replaced patience. The desire for consumer goods and impatience to achieve has transcended all boundaries including the ubiquitous urban-rural divide. The effect can be seen in increased spending habits with corresponding lower saving rates, continued migration to bigger cities and increased awareness level of the populace. Caution is being thrown to the winds and the basic values of yester-years are on the way of becoming the vain dreams of today. In an increasingly materialistic world the good old values of kindness, generosity, understanding and feeling are taken as the concomitants of failure while traits like sharpness, greed, acquisitiveness and aggressiveness are encouraged and even discreetly admired. This transition in importance accorded to values is not consistent with the glorious traditions and the core values of the Armed Forces.

The present generation in the urban areas believes in a splurge-today-pay-tomorrow philosophy and lives on roll over credit and Equated Monthly Instalments (EMIs). They consider their parents and elders as a 'sacrifice generation' which queued up for everything; from adulterated product of different environmental factors and is pretty sure of their present as well as the future. On the other hand, the previous generation, the 'Midnight Children' who grew up in the heady post-partition years with somewhat socialist influence and built their houses with their post-retirement money are gradually fading away into oblivion. An era is almost over. They will not even bother to rebel against the previous generation as they treat

rebellions or revolutions as quite unproductive activities. However, as tempting as it may be, we must resist from compartmentalising these changes as distinctly good or bad. They are merely changes and momentous they may seem as of now, changes happen all the time.

Though the nation may still be at the cross-roads with economic changes yet to affect a large proportion of our teeming millions, the winds of change which precede economic transformation have covered the majority of the country. The winds of change also have been sweeping across the last citadels of traditional social structures. Nuclear families are now the norm rather than the exception. The land holdings have consequently been reduced to almost a pittance in the rural areas. This reduction, coupled with large scale hidden unemployment in rural areas has made acquisition of a regular job as an economic necessity. This has resulted in an increased number of the small families who are devoid of the traditional support system from the extended or joint family and a rise in the number of working women. Consequently, a plethora of functional problems in sustenance and running of a family have risen, which have to be regularly addressed by the head of the family. However, practical difficulties due to exigencies of service have rendered it difficult for the men in uniform to strike a reasonable balance between his home and professional front. Though the Armed Forces as such are not incompatible with a regular family life, certain modifications and adjustments are indeed the need of the hour.

Aspirations of the Indian Youth

The average Indian youth today is an individual with some differences in perception along the urban-rural divide. The younger generation in cosmopolitan or large cities is exposed to all the essentials of developed societies; more and better services in education, health and transport sectors, work opportunities, access to modern technology, better amenities and increased competition. There have been changes in the smaller towns and villages as well, due to greater educational opportunities and increased awareness levels, kind courtesy the drastic mushrooming of mass media.

The average Indian youth is thus considerably sharper, aware, demanding, ambitious and competitive than his predecessors just a few decades back. Their aspirations too often centre around

materialistic trappings. The key aspirations may be prioritised with the financial benefits topping the charts. It consists of a well-paid job which promises good earnings for foreseeable years. Social security, including prestige and status in our class-conscious society, and ability to look after one's family are the next in the order of precedence. However, in their scheme of things, the social security is directly dependent upon the financial wherewithal.

A challenging job with good working conditions and relative freedom of decision making in which one can significantly contribute or 'make a difference' – as it is popularly called, is another priority. This is closely linked with a burning ambition to climb the ladder, even if some compromises are to be made in the means while achieving the ends. The allotted time frame for the completed wish-list is, however, quite short, and a majority of the youth are keen on achieving their desired goals and improving their quality of life in a very short span of time. They do take basic amenities like housing, education and medical cover for granted and thus, further aim for techno-gadgets facilitating a fast pace of life. These aspirations are slightly subdued among the youth from rural and semi-urban areas and are more pronounced in case of the youngsters from metros and bigger cities.

Not much is lost though. A recent *India Today* - AC Nielsen - ORG-MARG survey² of the urban Indian youth has brought out that nearly 88 per cent of them are ready to volunteer for the army, if asked to do so. Nearly half of them prefer government service to business or private sector and a large majority (nearly 70 per cent) continue to value their bonds with the family and prefer to stay in joint families. These figures can be safely increased for the rural and semi-urban areas. Thus, the overall trend in the Indian society, though marked by consumerism, is positive and a large, socially conscious and awakened youth population is more willing to strive for a better future for themselves and for their country. Perhaps, a conservative opinion may consider these ambitions trifle overstretching, they are merely a reflection of the changing times. The requirement at our end is to envisage accommodating the aspirations within the defined structures of the Armed Forces without compromising on our organisational terms of reference. The endeavour thus, is to attract the best talent and retain organisational efficiency, in spite of the societal changes. No organisation, however, regimented can ever outlive the changed perceptions of its base populace.

EMBRACING CHANGE

The rapid changes in the society and the aspirations of the youth as enunciated above, bring us to the underlying necessity to embrace changed circumstances without compromising on our core values. In fact, there is no need to even contemplate any dilution of our unique culture and glorious traditions. The Armed Forces of the country have themselves undergone many successful transformations by embracing new circumstances. Independence in 1947 brought one such massive transition, rapid modernisation and expansion post 1962 War was another transition which perhaps culminated in a brilliant campaign across erstwhile East Pakistan, and in the recent years the prowess acquired in fighting successful counter insurgency operations by an essentially conventional Armed Forces may be termed as another successful transformation. Thus, considerable flexibility exists in the organisation and our solutions can be tailored 'in-house' without looking outwards for any fancy designers or slick quick-fix experts.

India's national security objectives have themselves evolved against a backdrop of the nation's core values namely, democracy, secularism and peaceful co-existence and the national goal of social and economic development⁴. There will always be an overriding operational imperative to sustain team cohesion and to maintain trust, loyalty and the honour of the services under all circumstances in orders to accomplish the national security objectives. We may call it as our terms of reference. This ability of the Armed Forces to defend the country from external aggressions and internal disorders draws its strength from its core values and the unique traditions. There is no visible or inherent contradiction between retaining the essential values of the organisation, while absorbing a more aware, ambitious and educated class of people amongst its fold. Progress or societal changes do not dilute the national objectives. On this premise, we embrace change and we embrace it for a better tomorrow.

Imbibing Right Values

"It is the first few blows on the anvil of the life that give the human weapon the set and temper that carry him through life's battles.

- Prince Edward VIII, Prince of Wales, on 13 March 1922 while inaugurating the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College at Dehradun.³

Having arrived at a consensus to adapt to changes, it is imperative that we steer clear of any adverse societal values influencing our profession of arms. The Armed Forces already have a time tested system of training and welfare of men which merely needs to be streamlined to adapt to the changed environs. While doing so, we must not confuse honour with rigidity and we must address the genuine aspirations and needs of men. We should also start early and catch them young.

The importance of imbibing correct service ethos at the right and impressionable age cannot be overstated. While a better management of the media and encouragement to organisations like National Cadet Corps (NCC) and Bharat Scouts and Guides would help to mould a better perception of our organisational ethos and the concept of *Izzat* among the youth of the nation, the training period should also increasingly reinforce the same. The positive impact of movies like *Top Gun* or *Saving Private Ryan* on the psyche of an average western youth is well acknowledged and similar efforts in India will go a long way in conveying our ethos to the target population. A renewed focus in the training centres and the training academies on adopting correct stance, irrespective of anything else shall pay handsome dividends. A highly regimented training curriculum with its emphasis on a 'spit and polish' regime may be substituted by a more accommodative and flexible training routine, provided there is no compromise on the moral values. Offences involving moral turpitude may be dealt with even more harshly, while the strict hierarchal structures may be loosened. The concept of 'Honour Courts' which has been fairly successful at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Indian Military Academy (IMA) may also be given a try at the training centres and establishments. There is also a need to improve our basic amenities and infrastructure in order to provide decent living conditions and some materialistic satisfaction.

There is an old English adage which states, "*Once a tree is young, it takes a turn. The tree grows but the turn remains*". A paramount need, therefore, exists to inculcate and reinforce the right ethics at an impressionable age. The technical skills can be progressively built up in the later years. The overall strategy is a simple combination of an *ab-initio* emphasis on the core values and concerted efforts on improving living and working conditions.

Organisational Support

Once the right turn has been imparted in the formative years, the organisation should go an extra mile to ensure that the officers and the men consider any other influences or attractions as secondary. Though there are limitations in the Armed Forces in terms of pay and allowances which are not able to keep pace with the booming private sector, shortage of accommodation and frequent transfers to field areas; their impact can be minimised by creating positive working conditions. These positive conditions include healthy working relationships between superiors and subordinates, a positive, understating and helping attitude, transparency in dealings and delegation of responsibilities to the appropriate levels. Merely being open and accessible can itself resolve a large number of growing man-management problems. A liberal leave policy within the existing authorisation of leave will also foster a spirited working environment wherein, people feel that they are being 'looked after'. It may be worthwhile to remember that people generally leave bosses and not their jobs. We are also becoming increasingly bureaucratic in certain areas and such tendencies must be immediately jettisoned.

An upright and honest person, however outspoken must always be given his due. New ideas should be encouraged as long as they do not infringe on the basic military discipline and the core values. Games, sports and adventure activities are other fields which need to be actively promoted. Outdoors often nurture qualities which cannot be really comprehended in the class rooms. A positive atmosphere in the organisation will nullify many of the negative fall-outs of a consumerist society while strengthening the belief of its constituent people in the organisational ethos. The essence lies in imbibing right values and 'holding hands' in the times of need, particularly once a decision has been taken in good faith so that the belief in the core values is never shaken.

The much hyped 'Zero-Error Syndrome' is a Trojan horse which manifests itself in attractive forms in the services in spite of all attempts to the contrary. This may take the form of 'over-ensuring' during VIP visits, organising fall-in many hours in advance to ensure adherence to timings or over-indulgence in paper work. This leads to unproductivity and colossal wastage of time which is much resented at junior levels. This also reduces efficiency as the number

of man hours required for a perfect result are exponentially higher, as compared to those for a reasonable result which, nevertheless meets the basic requirements. However, this elusive Trojan horse is usually a novelty and often built on personal ambitions. The ruthless elimination of this 'Zero-Error Syndrome' in its various manifestations will be a yeoman's service to the Armed Forces and will directly improve productivity, working atmosphere and satisfaction levels, particularly at the junior levels. This will also be in consonance with the changed socio-economic values where such actions are contrary to the working norms.

Role of Military Leadership

The military leadership is required to play a pivotal role in embracing changes by providing organisational support and encouragement while ensuring continued emphasis on retaining core values and ethics of the Armed Forces. This role translates into different forms at the various levels. The junior leaders who are the cutting edge of military effectiveness have to adapt themselves to command a rank and file which is more inquisitive and aware. They will have to disseminate more 'could know' information to their subordinates and be open to their constructive suggestions. While operations and professional duties will be executed in a more open atmosphere, caution needs to be applied to ensure that there is no deviation from the overall aim. The infusion of new ideas at the junior levels will also help in delegation of responsibilities and increase in initiative at junior level. As men and junior leaders become more proactive, this may also help to obviate some of the problems caused by the deficiency of officers.

The middle level leadership again has a pivotal role by acting as an interface between visibly proactive, aware and inquisitive junior rungs with a senior leadership which are a product of different set of circumstances. This balancing or moderating role will also involve encouraging the age-old ethos of the armed forces while curbing any *lassiez-faire* tendencies. They would be required to lead by example and maintain a high degree of personal and professional conduct. They must be seen as the custodians of the honour and the prestige of the services, while at the same time adopting a humane face to the personal and administrative problems of their subordinates. Indeed, much rests on the middle level leadership who are exposed to the perceptions of both the generations.

The senior and the higher level leadership are required to take appropriate policy decisions based on the ground realities and the assigned national security objectives. They should be ready to accommodate changed perceptions without diluting the organisational requirements. They have to become more approachable and delegate responsibilities as well as decision making authority to the appropriate level. With an ear to the ground, they should focus their energies on higher policy decisions and not get involved in petty details. This focus also involves projecting the aspirations of the men in uniform to the political leadership of the nation and cutting across the bureaucratic maze to secure the deserved rights of the services. To engage an entrenched bureaucracy in a cohesive manner, we must present a united front and any inter-service rivalries should be abandoned for common good.

INTERNAL MANAGEMENT AND MECHANISMS

In the recent years many positive steps have been taken by the higher leadership of the Armed Forces, which will have far-reaching implications on the moral and the welfare of its personnel. An ambitious Married Accommodation Project (MAP) has been started which will considerably increase the satisfaction level in term of housing facilities. Also, the Army Welfare Housing Organisation (AWHO) and Air Force Navy Housing Board (AFNHB) have carved a niche for themselves by providing quality housing at an affordable cost.

The Army Group Insurance Fund (AGIF) and Army Welfare Education Society (AWES) are again pioneers in providing insurance cover, inexpensive loans and varied educational opportunities to defence personnel and have made significant contribution in meeting the aspirations of our officers and men. In fact, there is a requirement to further expand the educational facilities at all major stations, particularly of good schools with hostel facilities. Similarly, the Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) is beginning to make a mark for itself by providing quality medical care to the ex-servicemen. The 'in-house' examples of these professional organisations need to be emulated in other welfare related fields to meet the rising aspirations. Establishments of such autonomous bodies in other arenas like transit facilities and resettlement mechanism may also be explored.

The promotion avenues in the Armed Forces correspondingly decrease as one moves upwards on the ladder. The promotional aspirations of the officers have been addressed to a large extent by the partial implementation of Ajai Vikram Singh Committee report and the proposed Phase II will bolster the same. Similarly, some steps have been taken in form of Assured Career Progression (ACP) in respect of men which need to be further evolved. However, much requires to be still done in the field on establishing an effective grievance redressive mechanism, the absence of which is forcing an increased numbers of service personnel to the civil courts. Again, the recent approval for the Armed Forces Tribunal is a step in the right direction. Reasonable promotional opportunities, objective assessment system with some weightage to mutual assessment and an autonomous redressive mechanism will definitely enhance job satisfaction levels.

The Armed Forces are an essentially hierarchal structure where the basic grain is selection and not socialism. This is an organisational requirement and there cannot be a mass proliferation of senior ranks. Thus, there is a need to absorb its personnel at the middle level into the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) and the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs). This permanent absorption will be a symbiotic relationship as these organisations shall benefit from the varied experience and ingrained values of these ex-servicemen who are still within the working age and retain considerable enthusiasm. On the other hand, the cadre management of the Armed Forces will become relatively streamlined. These personnel should preferably be exposed to requisite orientation or management courses before they hang their uniform to begin another career. Today, the Armed Forces personnel are in considerable demand even in the corporate, industrial and services sector. While some demand is directly linked to the technical skills as in case of the pilots or in the Merchant Navy, the corporate India has now woken up to the inherent strengths including uncompromising ethics of the Armed Forces personnel which are at a premium in an increasingly materialistic society. Thus, the recent tie-up with reputed management institutes including the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) for pre-release courses is a beginning in the right direction. This will also make the Short Service Commission (SSC) an attractive option for the talented youth of the country.

Though the pay package in any government service cannot match the private sector as such, there is a need for revision of the same as the cost of living has sharply shot up in the recent years along with a tempting accessibility to other material comforts of life. It is for the higher leadership of our Defence Forces to bring the issue to a logical conclusion in the recently announced Sixth Pay Commission. However, this much hyped issue is not our *raison d'etre* as the Armed Forces are a way of life rather than merely being another job with a regular pay. We can continue to draw the right talent and retain our core values by making the right organisational changes.

There are certain other issues which need to be given due emphasis to preserve our culture and the core values in these times of change. First and foremost, we must treat every person as a unique individual who needs to be treated differently within the given constraints of service. In fact, senior officers and the organisation as such must develop positive institutional or personal relationship with the rank and file of their command. Secondly, any activities which do not constitute our core activities viz. operations and training should be curbed and men given adequate time to enhance their educational and professional skills or to look after their families. The pre-Independence concept of keeping the troops always occupied is a *passee* in the changed circumstances. Thirdly, due focus should be given on educating our personnel on financial matters. They can be guided on basic investment decisions including small savings, insurance cover and housing. These subjects should no longer be considered a taboo at any level. Last but not the least, unnecessary paperwork and 'showbiz' needs to be curtailed. It may be also pointed out that Microsoft Power Point is merely a presentation tool and not an end in itself. Thus, a reduction in these non-core indulgences will free our energies to carry out realistic training to further the military skills. The overall aim of all these proposed changes is to ensure that our efforts are focused on the 'man behind the gun' and there is a continued strengthening of his moral fibre and the technical skills.

CONCLUSION

Societal change is an inevitable phenomenon which affects all organisations with varying degrees of impact. The organisations with adequate flexibility and foresight are able to adapt quickly and

innovate means to utilise the change for furthering their aims. A young and vibrant India has begun its long march towards economic prosperity and the associated socio-economic changes have caused some turmoil in the established values of the society. This has posed unique challenges for the Armed Forces which can be turned into an opportunity by adapting to changes rather than to let the changes present a *fait accompli*. The adoption of a positive environmental culture and acceptance of new ideas, within our organisational terms of reference, can infuse more energy and dynamism in the Armed Forces. Positive steps have already been initiated in the right direction. The need of the hour is to be able to foresee tomorrow with the eyes of today and channelise the changed societal perceptions towards our unchanged organisational objective.

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United Service Institution A Centenary Tribute*

Melville De Mellow**

This month a century ago, Charles Metcalfe Macgregor founded a unique institution in India which is, even today, an unparalleled treasure house of literature on the art and science of warfare. This nostalgic resume of the 100 years of this remarkable institution makes a sad revelation that even after one hundred years in existence it is still homeless. A time came in its life when it could not afford to maintain even a bicycle and its properly had to be sold to pay back the arrears of municipal taxes.

The United Service Institution began its life in a defunct Town Hall in Simla in 1870, moved later to Army Headquarters, and then to premises above the old Scotch Kirk. In 1910 it got its own building, at a cost of twenty-six thousand rupees, near the Combermere Post Office, on land leased by the United Services Club. Membership in the year of the birth numbered 215.

The objective of the Institution was to promote the study of naval and military art, science and literature. Today, it has voluntary membership of 4,700. However, it is ironic that a hundred years after its birth, USI still does not possess a building of its own housed as it is in a few rooms of Kashmir House - the Secretary and his staff operating from what was once the Maharaja's pantry!

There were many others associated with the USI during the hundred years of its existence who added lustre to the Institution by virtue of their own eminence. Among them were Lt. General Sir Douglas Haig, the Honourable Sir Hery McMahon, Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, General Sir Phillip Chetwoode, Lt. General Sir Kenneth Wigram and Viscount Gort.

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As per the editorial of *Yojana* January 2007 Special Issue, "*Yojana* completes 50 years. We decided that we cull out 50 of our best articles to celebrate those fifty years," The article was chosen as one of the 50 best articles.

**The Late Mr Melville De Mellow was the first Hockey 'blue' at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. He served with the Royal Warwickshire Regiment and 5/2 Punjab Regiment of the British Indian Army. The Government of India honoured him with Padma Shri in 1963. He won national and international fame as a news broadcaster and commentator.

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In 1933, Ram Chandra, an ICS Officer, became the first Indian member of the Institution while the first President, after Independence, was General K.M. Cariappa who was also the first Indian Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The USI Library is a gold-mine of knowledge indispensable to the development of thinking of Service Officers on defence and warfare. The library boasts of forty thousand bound volumes, manuscripts, rare old books and prices, including one of the only-six available copies in the world of Aelian's "Tactics" published in 1616, a book that revolutionised warfare tactics in the 17th century. Tarlton's own apologia of the conduct of his operations, during the American War of Rebellion (1787) and Claude De Vauban's Military History of Marlborough and Eugene, published in 1737, are the other rare acquisitions. The printed works deal with every aspect of warfare, particularly the wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

February 1971 is therefore an important milestone for the USI. Its 100th birthday should afford a good opportunity for serious stocktaking and a reappraisal of its future functions.

In the light of today's need it must evolve into an autonomous "Think Tank", serving not only the Armed profession, but Government, Parliament and the public at large.

Thanks to Metcalfe's foresight, we have today an institution which is the second oldest of its kind in the world, with a Journal that is the oldest professional defence Journal with continuous publication in India and in Asia. May that one small candle, that was lighted by Metcalfe a century ago and which has shed light and understanding to so many who have been involved in the search for knowledge and the pursuit of historical fact, flare forth to illuminate the enquiring minds of men for many centuries to come.

India's Defence Policy : A Conceptual Perspective

Dr Rajpal Budania

Defence is a principal component of national power. Defence policy is an integral part of national security policies. The role of the armed forces is to preserve the core values of survival and political independence against any external or internal threats by deterrence or by waging a war. The armed forces with their secular base and professional ethics also contribute to nation-building process.

The purpose of this article is to impart a conceptual perspective to India's defence policy. Development of a conceptual framework for understanding and analysing India's defence policy is dependent on three tasks: First, to identify the interface between national defence and national security and the importance of defence in national security management. Second, to gauge the nature of the articulation of India's defence policy and how it operates on the military and the political and diplomatic fronts. Third, to analyse defence policy keeping in view the goals, constraints and opportunities in the given environment and the capabilities to achieve the stated goals. This article seeks to discuss these tasks and analyse their contribution in providing a conceptual understanding of India's defence policy.

Defence and National Security Interface

With the rise of realism in the post World War II period, security came to be equated with protection against external threats. The traditional concept of national security was based on military defence against external threats. This view emphasised national security policies in unidimensional terms and the terms 'national security policy' and 'defence policy' were used as synonyms. This view was based on (a) the concept of maximising national power in conflict situations, and (b) the assumption that a nation can be secure only if it increases its own power at the expense of another nation or nations. Walter Lippmann noted: "A nation has security

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when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war".¹ National security, therefore, was understood as the ability of a nation to protect its core values from external threats. In other words, national security became coterminous with military and external security. Internal threats and non-military threats were neglected in the realist conceptions of security policies.

In the post-colonial period, India's political leadership did not accept the western unifocal perceptions of security policy based on military power. India took note of the non-military dimensions of security. It followed a development oriented political economy and sought to do away with internal socio-economic causes of insecurity. A Government report admits, "India's primary strategic priority and goal even at present remain the rapid and well managed socio- economic development of its people. This requires a stable and durable environment of peace and security at global, regional, national and societal levels."² India's conceptualisation and approach to security is broad-based, and not merely defence-oriented. First, India has sought to defend its national security through building internal strengths. Second, it has highlighted the transnational threats or aspects of security, and overcoming them through non-military and collective efforts of the international community. Third, it has based its national security on the principle of 'security with each other' rather than 'security against each other.' Finally, India has consistently believed in the efficacy of political approach to managing or resolving inter-state or intra-state threats to its national security. India as a post-colonial state has essentially based its conception of security on transnational cooperation and development. Its rise as a military power is a natural reaction for self-defence in the wake of worsening international and regional security environments.³

India's defence policy is one component of the larger national security system. *The Standing Committee on Defence* in its Sixth Report, 1995-96, has observed: "National Defence Policy is an integral part of national security policy, which by its very nature, is multi-disciplinary in character and encompasses all aspects that enhance a nation's strength and thus furthering its security."⁴ Defence policy being an integral part of national security means that at times interchangeable use of the term 'defence policy' and 'security policy' becomes unavoidable.

Over the years the management of defence in India's national security system has acquired increasing importance. The importance of defence in India's national security policies is mainly due to the continuing and multiplying external threats - both military and non-military. In fact, the *Kargil Review Committee Report* and the *Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security* have emphasised the need for changes in national security system and better defence and strategic management.⁵ Both the reports have taken note of the gravity of the security environment. According to one observation of the *Report of the Group of Ministers*, "Indeed, in just the last decade, India's security scenario has witnessed nothing short of sea change as a result of the end of the Cold War, the proxy war in Kashmir, militancy fuelled from abroad in many parts of the country, the Revolution in Military Affairs and the increasing nuclearisation of the neighbourhood."⁶ This observation highlights the importance of external threats in national security policy and the need for a credible defence.

Nature of Defence Policy Articulation

There have been two divergent opinions about India's defence policy. One, the country does not have a clearly articulated and integrated defence policy. Some even go to the extent of saying that let alone a well-articulated defence policy, India does not even have a policy.⁷ Two, India is not only having a well-articulated defence policy which has stood the test of time, but also has the capacity to meeting future needs.⁸ It is worth noting what the Indian Prime Minister, PV Narasimha Rao had stated in the Lok Sabha on the matter on 10 May 1995:

"We do not have a document called India's Defence Policy. But we have got several guidelines which are followed, strictly followed and observed... This policy is not merely rigid in the sense that it has been written down, but these are the guidelines, these are the objectives, these are the matters which are always kept in view while conducting our defence policy."⁹

There may be some element of exaggeration in both the views. But what is true is that India has a defence policy and it has been formulated rationally keeping in view the several constraints it has suffered from the international system and at the domestic level. The existence of a formal document does not by itself guarantee

an effective policy nor does the absence of such a document imply lack of policy or bad policy. In India's case the absence of a formal document called 'India's defence policy' has neither hampered the process of articulation of responses to the existing threats, challenges and opportunities, nor has the country lacked in raising the level of defence preparedness.

Policy represents articulation of interests, purposes and goals. Defence policy is perennially concerned with the defence of the realm. The *Sixth Report of the Standing Committee on Defence*, 1995-96, defines India's defence policy as a very vital part of national security policy which addresses specific issues directly concerned with the defence of the nation and its territorial integrity. The Report enunciates the policy articulated since Independence thus:

"That our military capability is to be directed to ensuring the defence of the national territory over land, sea and air encompassing among others; the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes. Governments have repeatedly made it clear that it is not our objective to influence or interfere or dominate the region on the basis of *military* strength (emphasis added).¹⁰"

It may also be defined as "preserving the core values of the nation from external aggression and internal subversion."¹¹

Articulation and formulation of defence policy requires an objective assessment of a number of factors. The key factors that have influenced the articulation of India's defence policy are:¹²

- (a) Policies and capabilities of major powers and their power relationships in India's neighbourhood.
- (b) Regional security environment in a wider Southern Asia.
- (c) Military capabilities and potential of neighbours and their policies and strategies and external military linkages.
- (d) Rapid military technological developments.
- (e) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- (f) Internal security environment.
- (g) Budgetary constraints.

India's defence policy operates on two fronts. One is on the diplomatic and political front and second is on the military front. The former is "centred around building bridges of peace in our neighbourhood."¹³ Broadly, diplomatic and political aspects of defence policy include managing and resolving conflicts, and enhancing national-interests through non-military means. However, India understands that maintaining peace and stability with its neighbours in the region and even in the global context through diplomacy would be effective only 'when diplomacy is backed by credible military deterrence' and 'keeping its armed forces at the highest levels of defence preparedness with the ability to react swiftly'.¹⁴

The military aspects of defence policy are more comprehensive in scope. They include military capabilities and guidelines for operations. *The Standing Committee on Defence* highlights the latter thus: "there is a top secret document which the government has given to the Services Chiefs which is known by the term 'Operational Directive'. This clearly lays down what exactly should be the approach in the event of hostility. So, the concerned agencies are well aware of those aspects. To that extent, there is no confusion on this."¹⁵ The Ministry of Defence (MoD) prepares the operational directives after obtaining inputs from various agencies. Doubts have been raised over its limited nature or efficacy to be called defence policy document. According, to Lieutenant General KK Hazari, "Whatever its contents the Operational Directive cannot be equated to a Defence Policy document which, if it has to be meaningful, should cover all aspects to include, military objectives and tasks, force levels and force mixes, research and development, equipment management, production and acquisition, manpower policies and the short and long term defence requirements."¹⁶

According to the *Annual Report 2005-2006* of the MoD, Government of India, the military component of India's defence policy also includes strategic defence dialogue for defence partnership with a number of countries, leading to greater joint partnership towards preparations for a globally coordinated initiative to fight against the menace of terrorism, proliferation, trafficking, piracy and the nefarious activities of non-state actors.¹⁷

Though there is no national security policy or defence policy document, yet India has policies on both. It is argued that in the

absence of any document "explaining articulated policy with stated national objectives and national interests it is not possible for the policy to be analysed and modified."¹⁸ Hence, the importance of having a formal document on defence policy. But the Government of India seems in no mood to publish such a document immediately. Obviously, it sees certain advantages in not publishing a formal document, or not making it public.

Policy Analysis

Three sets of questions need to be considered for analysing policy:

(a) First, what are the goals? Is it just a question of self - defence or defending from external threats, or do we envisage more ambitious goals of prestige, power and hegemony?

(b) Second, what are the obstacles that threaten the realisation of these goals? What are the opportunities that can be utilised to further these goals? Do these threats and opportunities have an environmental explanation? What is the nature of relationship between the variables of environment - international and domestic?

(c) Third, what are our capabilities to achieve the stated goals? What are the perceptions of others (regional and global powers) of our capabilities? What role have they played, or can they play, in enhancing, balancing or undermining these capabilities?

These questions are typical of any policy analysis and they can help us to understand important aspects or patterns of the events of past and present, and make predictions for the future.

Policy analysis must take into account not only the new and continuing threats and challenges but also the opportunities for enhancing policy goals. Threats, challenges and opportunities "change with time and environment; and that is why the defence policy must have the capacity to remain flexible and responsive to change."¹⁹ Threats, challenges and opportunities are not the same; hence their accurate assessment and policy response are not simple. Threats always require immediate addressing; challenges can be dealt with over a period of time. Opportunities in international politics come rarely; therefore, they require immediate attention of the policy-makers.²⁰

Defence policy involves decisions in the context of the international security environment and the domestic constraints and motivations. Policy-makers, therefore, make two kinds of decisions for dealing with international and domestic environments respectively. Samuel Huntington has distinguished between the two kinds of decisions and terms them as *strategic and structural*. Strategic decisions are made in the context of international politics and structural decisions are made in the domestic context.²¹ Strategic decisions deal with threats and challenges of the alliances, balance of power, nuclear weapons, transnational terrorism, and war and peace.²² Structural decisions mainly deal with the issues of modernisation of armed forces, procurement of weapons, allocation of defence budget and decision-making structures.²³ These strategic and structural variables are not independent but mutually interactive. For instance, India's arms acquisition and nuclear deterrence involve both the strategic and structural constraints, ie, at the strategic level, decision makers think of enhancing the credibility of deterrence and at the structural level they are faced with problems of resourcing and lack of institutional support or speedy decision making.

India's defence policy making involves both strategic and structural dimensions of decision-making; hence, the importance of the study of the role of international strategic environment and domestic constraints in conceptualising defence policy.

Over the years importance of defence policy in India's national security studies has increased a great deal because of the continuity and multiplicity of external threats - both military and non-military. India is feeling the pressure for having a well articulated policy that can meet not only the present day threats and challenges, but also has the capacity to meeting future needs. Threats and challenges from the emerging international security system dictate better political and strategic management of defence.

External and domestic environments in the context of India's defence policy making are not competing but mutually interactive influences. Over the years, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the predicament of India's defence policy-makers has grown due to (a) the worsening geo-strategic environment in the region and (b) no significant change in the continuing domestic constraints. In other words, India has faced several external strategic challenges,

yet India has been guided by several domestic constraints, such as institutional constraints, lack of adequate resources, lagging behind in self-reliance in defence production, slow pace of modernisation of armed forces, increasing burden of internal security management and lacking in a sound strategic culture. Multiplicity of these domestic constraints indicates the failure of domestic policies or structural decisions. These constraints have also tended to confine India's area of influence to the South Asian region.²⁴

Determining relative importance or primacy of international environment or domestic variables in decision-making is a difficult proposition. The question of relativity or primacy has twin interfaces; one is between the two environments and the other is within the respective environment. Policy-makers in India have faced an overriding role of domestic constraints. Often strategic decisions are either not taken or delayed due to domestic constraints. It is easier to establish the relative importance of influences within a particular environment. So far as the international security environment is concerned, primarily the regional security environment in South Asia influences India's policy-making. Within domestic constraints, the problem of resourcing has acted as a recurring and an overriding influence on the policy makers.

Formulating an effective defence policy will require articulation of interests and purposes, and means to achieve them within these limitations. To overcome its domestic constraints, India has taken some structural decisions such as the establishment of National Security Council, Integrated Defence Staff and integration of Service Headquarters with the MoD. Also the Indian economy has grown impressively over the past one decade. There is a likelihood that India will emerge as one of top five economies of the world in near future. Then even about 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product as defence allocation will help in solving the problem of resourcing to a large extent. A credible and an affordable defence will depend a great deal on the success of these structural decisions for better political and strategic management of defence.

Conclusion

National interests and objectives and also political aims drive defence policies and strategies. India's defence policy plays the

most critical role in the country's national security management by addressing external and internal threats to national core values. An objective study of India's defence policy is possible only in the context of current international security system and the domestic environment.

Change in the nature of international security environment can bring about a change in a nation's defence and security policies. The post- Cold War security environment adversely impacted upon India's national security interests. Therefore, it decided to go nuclear. Similarly, a change in domestic variables can also alter the nature of a country's defence policy. We have often witnessed that changes in administration, say, for example, in the United States, had brought about redefinitions of national interests; hence the changes in security policies. This applies to India as well. If India redefines its national interests and objectives and its strategic horizon, then its defence policy or policies will change accordingly. Also, as India's domestic constraints are transforming and it is seeking to play a greater role in international affairs, the importance of defence as an instrument of national power will increase.

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"Op Khukri" – The United Nations Operation Fought in Sierra Leone Part-II

Lieutenant General V K Jetley, PVSM, UYSM (Retd)

CONDUCT

Build up on 13 and 14 July 2000 (D Minus 2 - D Minus 1)

Build up was successfully completed on 13-14 July, using UN contracted and Indian aviation unit helicopters. Artillery ammunition was initially dumped at Kenema using the available road as much as possible and was, thereafter, heli-lifted to Daru. In order to maintain secrecy and surprise, troops were moved at the last moment from Freetown to Kenema by air using C-130 Hercules and all available helicopters. Move from Kenema to Daru was also done at the last moment by helicopters. See Sketch P.

Operations on 15 July 2000 (D Day)

The two Chinooks, which had the ability to operate in bad weather, carried out their task of inserting the pivot at Kenewa and, thereafter, evacuating military observers, sick peacekeepers and essential warlike stores, as planned. The strikes planned by attack helicopters were slightly delayed due to bad weather. This was followed by a pre-emptive strike by attack helicopters and artillery at Kailahun, Pendembu, Mobal and Kotuma. After this, the advance was commenced by 5/8 GR and the mechanised company from Daru on schedule.

At around 0800 hrs helicopters of the IAF landed one company sized pivot ex 18 GRENADIERS at Geihun. Simultaneously, another company sized pivot of the quick reaction company (QRC) was landed by them in the 3 Bridges Area. Around this time, the Kailahun column broke out from its location and linked up with the pivot of 2 PARA (SF) at Kenewa. Subsequently, by 1100h they linked up with the 18 GRENADIERS pivot at Geihun. An impromptu air head was established here and 65 personnel were heli lifted out to Daru.

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Further link up was delayed due to cratering of road between Geihun and Pendembu by the RUF and stiff opposition by them enroute to Pendembu and at Pendembu itself. To facilitate the link up, I ordered heli dropping of bridging equipment (FOB) in the affected areas North of Pendembu. This helped the Kailahun column to get their vehicles, laden with warlike stores, across these obstacles. From the south, 18 GRENADIERS cleared Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai by 1300h. However, 5/8 GR advance did not progress as per schedule due to stiff opposition by the rebels. They could eventually clear Pendembu after heavy fighting only by 1900h D Day. Link up was established with the Kailahun column North of Pendembu, by 1930h. Due to the delay in the establishment of the airhead at Pendembu and due to the fact that the Russian owned MI 26 helicopters returned to their base at Freetown by noon the same day, the planned heli lifting was postponed to 16 July 2000. Due to lack of opposition from the rebels, the Ghanaians were able to advance and secure Bendu Junction by 1300h D day. As planned, it resulted in keeping the RUF theatre reserves tied down.

Operations on 16 July 2000 (D Plus 1)

The major operation conducted on D Plus 1 was the air evacuation of 316 personnel from the airhead at Pendembu. Despite problems of refuelling, this was achieved by the Indian Aviation helicopters in a record time of three hours by resorting to "hot-refuelling", an activity never attempted by them before. Tactical withdrawal was, thereafter, conducted by 5/8 GR from Pendembu to Daru. This was met by stiff opposition from RUF who resorted to road denial and ambushes. One of the RUF ambushes was successful at a place 4 kms North of Kuiva when, at 1330h, the rebels shot at a vehicle of ours using RPG missiles. In this attack one driver and a co-driver were seriously wounded. Although, they were evacuated immediately by air to Daru and treated by the mobile surgical team, one of them, Havildar Krishan Kumar of 14 Mechanised Infantry, succumbed to his injuries.

18 GRENADIERS and 5/8 GR groups including the composite battery and vehicle column ex Kailahun reached Daru by 1900h. At about the same time, the Ghanaian companies also returned to Kenema and the operation was completed successfully.

Fortunately, at that point of time, a TV team from India was visiting Sierra Leone. They captured first hand some of the action during 'Op Khukri' and this has been made into a film called "Operation Khukri". It is a film worth seeing.

PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS

Terrain

The biggest problem in the conduct of operations was the terrain, as the single road axis available between Daru and Kailahun forced extrication along the same axis thereby compromising surprise. Lack of local knowledge of terrain vis a vis the rebels, put us at a disadvantage. Due to dense overgrowth and undergrowth, attack helicopters had problems of target identification. The densely wooded country allowed the rebels to effectively snipe at our road columns.

Intelligence

Lack of real time intelligence was due to organisational constraints of the UN which does not cater to gathering intelligence in a host country. We could obtain hard intelligence of limited value through intercepts during the operation itself. Coupled with this was the fact that ELINT and HUMINT capabilities were non existent. Despite being in Kailahun for 75 days, the satellite imagery of the areas was not made available.

The exact location of their reserves was also not known. Nor, did we have any knowledge of the type and quantity of weapons and ammunition that they possessed. It was subsequently revealed that they had a substantial amount of warlike stores and equipment with them. Another advantage that the rebels had, of which we were not aware, was their good radio communications, which enabled them to use their reserves effectively.

Weather

As the operations were launched in the middle of the rainy season, it impacted adversely on own observation, mobility and added to the logistic difficulties. Further, bad weather seriously hampered strikes by own attack helicopters at first light on D Day. Insertion of troops by helicopters to their locations as pivots was delayed due to bad weather. High humidity during the day led to severe exhaustion of troops due to dehydration.

Paucity of Troops

The operation had to be phased due to paucity of troops and helicopters for establishing pivots along the road. All troops of Daru garrison were launched for the operation at the cost of denuding Daru defences. Elements of Nigerian battalion, untried and untested by me and own Engineers were, thus, employed to man these defences.

Collateral Damage

To avoid collateral damage, artillery was initially tasked to fire smoke shells a little off the target to enable civilians to escape. All efforts were made to target only known confirmed RUF held buildings and huts and to avoid collateral damage.

Artillery.

It was probably for the first time that 105mm Light Field Guns (LFG) were used in any UN mission. The difficulties faced in the employment of artillery were as under :-

- (a) A battery, which is designed to fire as a single entity from one location, was required to be divided into four segments, each firing from a different location. The authorisation of fire control equipment and technical instruments in a battery was a major problem in this regard.
- (b) Prime movers for guns were not available in the operational area and, therefore, 2.5 ton vehicles had to be modified to serve as towers.
- (c) The desired speed of operations necessitated speedy movement of guns by keeping one or two guns within the battery on ground to cover the move of advancing infantry.
- (d) Limited available artillery resources were used to cover a very large number of targets spread in all directions, over large distances, in order to achieve deception and surprise.
- (e) The problem of communication and observation in undertaking shoots in jungle terrain was partially overcome by employing Air OP.

Air

Air effort was a very complicated part of the operation as it entailed coordinating the efforts of the British Chinook helicopters,

the helicopters of the Indian Aviation unit and the helicopters of the Russians who were flying as per their own rules. To highlight this further, the initial plan was to strike at the rebels at Pendembu and Kailahun with the attack helicopters and, thereafter, use the Chinooks to land 2 PARA (SF) as pivots after which they were to land at Kailahun to pick up Military Observers (Milobs), unfit peacekeepers and warlike stores. This plan had to be modified due to the reluctance on the part of the British to fly after the surprise was given away. As Indian attack helicopters did not have night flying capabilities, I had to accede to this change of plan. Further, the Chinooks who were to do additional sorties after the initial insertion of pivots and evacuation of Milobs and others, chose not to do so and flew off to Freetown leaving us in the lurch.

The Russians, on the other hand, did not wait for the link up to take place on D Day but flew back to Freetown around noon. This foreclosed my option of completing the operation in one day. Additionally, the lack of flying in all weather conditions, except for the Chinooks, was a problem for the other helicopters; thus delaying operations. Refuelling of helicopters was also a problem as facilities for the same did not exist at Daru.

Other problems pertaining to air operations were as given below:-

- (a) UN helicopters lack all weather capability, which is so essential for such operations undertaken during the monsoons and bad weather.
- (b) Operational area being covered by thick jungles offered limited landing zones to insert and extricate troops.
- (c) Secure radio communication with the ground forces elements was lacking.
- (d) Due to the non-availability of fuel pumps at Daru and Kenema, fuel bowsers had to be transported between Hastings and Kenema/ Daru by using MI 26 helicopters.
- (e) Lack of armour plating and integral self-defence measures on MI-8 made the helicopters extremely vulnerable to ground fire by the rebels. The terrain which is highly undulating with wide spread hillocks all around posed major problems for Nape of the Earth (NOE) flying. Terrain following radars and ground proximity warning systems would have been of great assistance in these kinds of operations.

(f) At any given time, there were more than eight helicopters operating from a makeshift helipad measuring 300m x 100m at Daru making the helipad space extremely restricted.

(g) Air space management with 12 helicopters operating in a very restricted area in adverse weather conditions was extremely difficult.

(h) Only the Special Forces team possessed gloves for slithering. This restricted the options for troop insertion in the area where no landing sites were available. Under slinging of loads could not be carried due to absence of slings.

(j) The civil contracted MI 26/17/8s restricted their employment to specific areas and specific situations at the discretion of their crew. This aspect severely affected the extrication of foot columns by air from Pendembu.

Logistics

One of the biggest problems was providing logistics support for this operation. To put it mildly, it was a nightmare. This was mainly because of the paucity of resources, made worse by the secrecy which had to be maintained to conceal buildups till the last moment, so that the plan was not compromised. It took dedicated and professional staff work to evolve the logistic plan to support Operation Khukri.

Engineers

Engineer effort was a major problem as the only axis along which the operation was to be conducted was a predictable one and the RUF laid ambushes on it and cratered it, necessitating air dropping of bridging equipment i.e Flexible Duck Boards (FDBs) to assist the Kailahun column in their rearward movement to Pendembu to effect a link up.

Special Forces Operations

In case Special Forces units are inducted into a hazardous UN mission where it is envisaged that they would, in all probability, have to conduct military operations, it is essential that they come well equipped for the same including satellite based Personal Locating Systems (PLS).

Media

The importance of media in the conduct of military operations cannot be over emphasised. In Sierra Leone, the only effective media was the BBC who made much of the so-called assistance provided by the British to the UN forces, which, in fact, was restricted to making two Chinooks available for one sortie. It is well known that the primary aim of the British was evacuation of all the British nationals in Sierra Leone and, during Operation Khukri, the British participated with two Chinooks and a handful of SAS personnel, only because they wanted to ensure the return of a British Officer Major Andy Williams, who was incarcerated along with 233 other peacekeepers at Kailahun. To quote Michael Fleshman "The UK dispatched warships and a battalion of elite paratroops to secure Freetown and the strategic international airport. The UK action, taken to permit the evacuation of UK citizens from Sierra Leone, is widely credited with stabilising the defence of Freetown and buying time for the deployment of more and better-equipped UNAMSIL contingents".

ACHIEVEMENTS

Selection and Maintenance of Aim

The aim of the operation was to safely extricate all the personnel, vehicles and military hardware from Kailahun with minimum collateral damage and without violation of Human Rights. This was achieved successfully.

Maintenance of Momentum

Due to extremely poor conditions of road and its cratering by the rebels, mobility of our troops was enhanced by using bridging equipment such as FDBs, which were dropped at these locations by MI-8 helicopters.

Momentum was maintained by the speed of induction and near simultaneity of contact at Kailahun, Geihun, 3 Bridges Area and by the ground forces at Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai. Innovative use of air, artillery and speed of movement by 2 PARA (SF) and foot columns threw the RUF out of gear.

Tactical Surprise

At the macro level, one of the major achievements was being able to maintain tactical surprise by resorting to secrecy in planning

and build-up, simultaneity and speed of the operations, bold execution and imaginative use of bad weather. All these factors and more, contributed towards this achievement.

Flexibility

Contingency planning was done in a detailed manner to cater for interruptions due to weather, terrain and lack of intelligence and air resources. Plans were continuously modified with the changing operational scenario.

Planning and Preparation

Planning for extrication of the troops at Kailahun was being done from mid May 2000. The British were involved at the last moment on a need to know basis, due to their interest in the British Milobs. The same was the case for the Ghanaian and Nigerians who participated in this operation. Planning, preparations and rehearsals were carried out secretly, concurrently and in a coordinated manner.

Functioning under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

Traditionally, the UN forces do not conduct bold and audacious military operations. There is, therefore, a marked hesitation to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was evident, time and again, since the evolution of UNAMSIL, when rebels got the better of peacekeepers of many nationalities forming part of UNAMSIL. Participation in 'Operation Khukri' resulted in a credible psychological change of the commanders and the troops involved in the operation who switched over from traditional peacekeeping to the more robust peace enforcement role under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Use of Mechanised Infantry and Engineers in Infantry Role

Mechanised Infantry and Engineers from the Indian Contingent were utilised in infantry role to make up the shortfall of infantry manpower. They performed this role superbly.

Casualties

Despite constraints of terrain and bad weather, stiff opposition from highly motivated, determined, well equipped and well led rebels, the casualties to own troops in two days of intense operations

were minimal. Only one soldier was killed and seven wounded. As against this, the rebel casualties were 34 killed and 150 wounded.

Recovery of Rebels Arms and Ammunition.

This operation yielded a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition which was a major loss for the rebels. As per records, as many as one SAM-7 launcher, 4 x RPG launchers, 12 x AK 47/56 rifles, 6 x GPMGs, 3 x HMGs and a whole lot of ammunition including anti-personnel mines were recovered from the rebels. This broke their back militarily as all this was acquired by them over a long period of time. The strike in their heartland also had a highly demoralising effect on them.

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Unorthodox Use of Single Guns and Attack Helicopters

Due to paucity of equipment, we resorted to the unorthodox use of single guns and attack helicopters to provide rear and flank protection to our columns. This paid rich dividends.

Heli - landing In Virgin Territory and Hot Refuelling

The heli-landing of pivots in virgin territory in small clearings, without the benefit of any reconnaissance was another major achievement. Also, hot refuelling (refuelling without switching off the engine) by helicopters was resorted to for the first time successfully.

Coordinated Multinational Operations

It is preferable that all offensive operations in the UN environment are conducted jointly by participation of two or more troop contributing countries. Such operations then have greater international acceptance. Dissemination of plans should be done on a need to know basis in order to avoid loss of surprise.

Despite differences in training, equipment, leadership and motivation, good coordination was achieved between troops of different nationalities, and between various arms and services.

Jointmanship

A high standard of jointmanship between ground forces, aviation units, UN helicopter units and the civilian staff at the

mounting bases was one of the major contributing factors towards success of this operation.

Use of Helicopters

In the terrain as obtaining in the Area of Operations (AOR), helicopters are a key asset for achieving speed of operations, contributing to flexibility of plans and medical evacuation. There is a need to maintain one company heli-lift with night capability at all times.

Communications

Fast moving operations involving different contingents require use of a large variety of communication equipment. A pool of radio sets would have greatly assisted in the execution of the operations. It would also have ensured compatibility of equipment. Despite these problems, we succeeded in keeping contact with each other.

Administration and Logistic

The Chief Administrative Officer's Office is required to provide logistics support by way of water and Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) etc. Units operating on wet lease system, however; run into problems in case their equipment is out of action. There is, therefore, a requirement to institute procedures in such special circumstances for the repair and replacement of such equipment. Similarly, the UN aircraft should have an inbuilt clause in the contract for operating in the AOR in case of such operations. In the instant case, the UN hired aircraft having assured me of their arrival back to the area of operation on 16 July at 0800 hrs, failed to report till 1100 hrs pleading that they needed rest on account of the work done on 15 July 2000. Despite these logistic constraints, the operations were conducted smoothly.

CONCLUSION

Operation Khukri established the professional competence of the Indian Army and the Air Force internationally. The other spin offs were, it broke the myth of RUF supremacy and brought them to the negotiating table. It enhanced the prestige of UNAMSIL internationally. It also resulted in improvement in response to orders, brought in cohesiveness in the Force and bolstered the morale of the civil population. Finally, it has also paved the way for further expansion of the UNAMSIL Force.

On successful completion of 'Operation Khukri', accolades poured in from all over the world including from Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary General UN, who in a letter addressed to me on 17 July 2000 stated, "I should like to extend to you my gratitude and admiration for the thoroughly professional manner in which you, your military staff and the troops on the ground have planned and executed the extraction of the surrounded peacekeepers at Kailahun. The fact that there were only a few casualties on our side is a clear indication of the determination of the force, as well as of its robustness in dealing with any threats emanating from the RUF. I am particularly pleased that this was a truly international operation with the participation of troops from a number of countries, which all played an essential and vital role in the operation".

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Visit of USI Delegation to Tokyo - A Report

Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd)



The Background

In pursuance of the annual trilateral dialogue between United Service Institution of India, Okazaki Institute of Japan and the Institute of Taiwan Defence Strategic Studies, the third in the series of dialogues on Regional Security was hosted in Tokyo on 26 and 27 January 2007 by the Okazaki Institute of Japan.

The trilateral dialogue between the Institutions from the three countries was initiated in 2005 to discuss issues of common security

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concerns to ensure better understanding on shared perspectives. The first trilateral meet was held at Taipei in July 2005, where the three Institutes decided to discuss *issues of regional security* on a common platform, on a regular basis. The second dialogue took place in Delhi on 16 and 17 March 2006, with the same objective.

The Delegations

The Indian delegation was led by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Director USI; delegation members included Vice Admiral Inderjit Bedi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd); Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak, AVSM, VSM (Retd), Joint Director, Centre for Air Power Studies; and Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd), Deputy Director (Research), USI-Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation. The delegation from the Okazaki Institute, Japan was led by Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda (Retd), Director; included Lieutenant General Masahiro Kunimi (Retd); Rear Admiral Sumihiko Kawamura, Vice Chairman of the Okazaki Institute; Dr Hiroyasu Akutsu and Mr Akihisa Nagashima, former Defense Minister in the Shadow Cabinet of JDP. The delegation from the Institute for Taiwan Defence and Strategic Studies (ITDSS) and Taiwan Strategy Research Association (TSRA) was led by Dr Parris Chang, Representative, ITDSS; and comprised Dr Michael M Tsai, former Deputy Defence Minister; Dr Ming-Shang Wong, Representative, TSRA and Chief Secretariat of the dialogue; Mr Jiann Yan; Mr Lee Hsi-Min; Major General (Ms) Huei-Jane Tschai. Also present was a special representative from the USA, Rear Admiral Robert Chaplin (Retd), former Commander of Naval Forces in Japan.

The Deliberations

The main focus of this dialogue was to exchange views and ideas on three important topics – "Assessing the Rise of China and its Strategic Implications", "Security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) from the Indian Ocean to Western Pacific" and the "Impact of Changing Global Security Dynamics on Indian and Pacific Regional Security". The leaders of the three delegations highlighted the importance of the deliberations and exchange of ideas in a free and frank manner.

The leaders of the Japanese and Taiwanese delegations alluded to changing security environment marked by the rise of

China and its growing political and economic salience. Their concern was that as the Chinese economy grew, it would develop voracious appetite for raw materials and energy resources. They also pointed out to China's growing sphere of influence which included the increasing Chinese-Russian rapprochement.

Concern was expressed about China's military modernisation and its emergence as a strong economic power with growing leverages in the international system. In the context of growing Chinese strategic foot prints, fears were expressed with regard to domestic Chinese politics, orientation of next generation Chinese leadership and competing demands of socialism with market economy particularly in the context of increasing socio-economic divide between coastal areas and the hinterland.

The issue of maritime security was highlighted in the context of growing energy demand in Asia, with particular reference to China, India, Japan and South Korea. In this context, Chinese Navy's inroads into Indian Ocean was voiced as an aspect of concern. The Japanese were particularly concerned about competing interests and talked about building regional consensus on the use of oceans.

Rise of China and it's Strategic Implications

On the issue of China's rise and the manner in which China was leveraging its economic and political power and its implications, there was general consensus that a rising China posed a serious challenge. This was premised on the fact that China was projecting itself as a traditional power, that is a major player in Asia and the world. The manner in which a strong and resurgent China leveraged its power potential in the region was a matter of speculation in almost all the presentations on the subject. The issue was accorded importance in the backdrop of declining American power in Asia and the fear that strategic space was being usurped by China through its soft power approach based on economics, trade and political influence. This was highlighted by detailed trend analysis on how China was incrementally using its growing power potential for regional ascendancy through aggressive moves in energy sector, growing military power and a desire for creating "greater neighbouring region" (euphemism for extended strategic neighbourhood that included West Asia among others).

Increasing Chinese economic orbit wherein China has emerged as number one trading partner of almost all the states in Asia; growing foreign exchange reserves and consistently high performing economy were seen as part of increasing Chinese leverages and unipolar propensities. Another important trend highlighted was the recent Chinese stress on multilateralism and use of regional instruments, be they security oriented like the SCO, economic like the East Asia Summit or political like the Six Party talks. Chinese growing inroads into South Asia and its increasing focus on the Indian Ocean in terms of developing maritime oriented partnerships with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and littorals like Maldives were also focus of discussion. Attempts to create strategic land bridges to address the Malacca Straits dilemma as also to break the isolation of China's western areas notably Xingjian and Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) were seen as matters of concern. Interestingly, while there was much speculation and concern about the rise of China, there was no consensus whether it constituted an opportunity or a challenge. Dominant perception among the Taiwanese and Japanese scholars was that a unipolar China posed a challenge and needed to be met through so-called coalitions of democracies and a nuanced military build up within the overall American security umbrella.

Chinese attempts at development of naval power, militarisation of space and its voracious appetite for strategic raw materials were sited as particularly destabilising. Another issue of focus was that an unbridled China could become a major force beyond 2020, within the perspective of declining American power. Consequently, unless adequate containment strategies were developed, Asia could see the emergence of a more assertive China in a unipolar Asia. This had to be dealt through dissuasive military power and garnering coalition of the willing, based on collusion of democracies, comprising Japan, Australia, Taiwan with the possibility of including India, Vietnam and South Korea.

Building inclusive multilateral relationships and working together with all regional players towards common agenda was a priority from the Indian perspective. In contrast to the views of Japanese and Taiwanese, the Indian position was consistent with the stated stand that while India remained wary of Chinese increasing influence, it was important to engage China and develop mutual

dependencies to prevent hegemonic propensities. It was highlighted in clear terms that India was not in the game of joining any coalitions or anti China strategies.

India's focus remained on growing trade and economic linkages to enhance political and strategic influence of India – a model similar to that of China's peaceful development. India's strategic thrust is underscored by sustained economic growth and trade relations to propel India to a similar position; basic premise being that an economically strong India would be a strategically strong India. It was further stressed that the main question was whether these developments mean peace and stability, or bring about a new set of dependencies. Question is not so much about containment or confrontation but of the ability to make balanced choices based on national interests. An economically, politically and militarily strong India, it was highlighted, could make the difference. To this end, India believed in engagement through employing soft power-rather than confrontation.

Indian delegates also highlighted that China would be operating sub optimally to its potential; biding time for economic, social and military consolidation. This was likely to change in the medium term ie beyond 2015, by when China could emerge as the most dominant Asian power with greater assertive connotations in pursuance of its national interests. This period will be marked by the glow of confidence, post successful conduct of Olympic Games and the Shanghai Expo. By 2025, it was opined, that China would be well on its way to becoming an important player on the world stage, having developed its comprehensive national power including a modernised PLA. The factors that could derail China from its growth trajectory included dissensions leading to disunity, within the next generation leadership, on how to manage rising China, liberal socialism allowing market forces to operate freely or command economy with structured freedom, to enhance trickle down effect and address the growing youth bulge. Second issue of concern was the growing gap between the rich and the poor, coastal areas and hinterland, rising corruption, and land reforms, which could lead to uprising among the masses. The third was the impact of environmental degradation, global warming, ecological challenges as also, shortages of raw materials and resources, particularly in the energy sector.

The Japanese delegates speculated that China was likely to exhibit bare knuckled resource diplomacy in order to maintain momentum of economic reforms. Secondly, Chinese military modernisation was likely to continue apace with PLA incrementally becoming a modernised net centric force with increasing effect based capability. Japanese were concerned about the stability of the Chinese economy. They looked upon it as a bubble economy driven by foreign capital investments. They highlighted the inherent instability of the model particularly, as capital has the habit of up-sticking and going to more lucrative destinations, which in the case of Asia could be India, Vietnam, unified Koreas among others. Such an unstable economy was vulnerable to internal and external shocks. In the Japanese perspective, an economic decline of China would have global impact with much stronger shock waves in Asia. It was necessary to hedge against such a possibility. Last, but not the least, they highlighted that unification of Taiwan would remain an important part of the future Chinese strategy.

Security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) through Indian Ocean to Western Pacific

In the backdrop of rapidly growing energy and resource consumption, population, and global environment effects, this session focussed on oceans becoming intricate tangles of national interests, focussing on the need for regional maritime security cooperation based on multilateral agreements.

Within the construct of this session, the issue of building cooperative security architecture of democracies in Asia Pacific region repeatedly came up for discussion. This was emphasised by Mr Nagashima, Member Japanese Diet and Shadow Defence Minister who proposed establishment of 'Rimland Maritime Cooperation'. In his perception, Rimland referred to littoral states that surrounded "the Heartland", comprising essentially China and Russia. He underscored the need for creating a cooperative architecture of maritime nations of East and South East Asia including India, based on shared democratic principles and dependence on maritime trade, as the means of influencing the Heartland. Similarly, during the deliberations, alliance of democracies based on shared ideals of freedom, transparency, respect for human rights etc was repeatedly brought to the table by both the Japanese and Taiwanese delegates. The logic of such proposals appeared

to be based on the following:-

(a) Contain growing Chinese economic and political influence in Asia-Pacific and their appropriation of strategic space in Asia, through alliances or cooperative arrangements of nations sharing democratic ideals.

(b) Echoing sentiments of American strategy of creating alternative security architecture in East and South East Asia to contain rising Chinese influence through "Coalition of Democracies".

Another aspect repeatedly stressed was the importance of Taiwan not only for the security in East Asia but also in containment of Chinese hegemonic aspirations. It was pointed out that Taiwan was not only part of central architecture of containing Chinese Naval power projection ambitions beyond the First Island Chain, but also a strategic SLOC through which nearly 70 per cent of Chinese maritime trade passed. Thus, dominance of Taiwan Strait formed an important part of the overall Taiwanese coalition design for restraining Chinese influence. This was further underscored by the fact that recently Taiwanese have upgraded their deployment on an Island in South China Sea called 'Taiping' that is part of the Paracel Island chain, in terms of building an airbase and deploying naval marines replacing the existing Coast Guard contingent.

Despite apparent strategic overstretch being experienced by the Americans in terms of involvement in West Asia and Afghanistan, both the Japanese and Taiwanese lay great stress on the US Asia-Pacific commitments. However, such optimism was underscored by the fact that increasingly American commitment is being seen in diplomatic rather than hard core security terms ie America is not seen as a power that will raise the ante in East Asia, should "push come to shove". Both appeared to be using the USA more as part of hedging strategies wherein; it was important to remain engaged than looking upon the US as a serious guarantor of security.

Seen in the above context, Japan appears to be groping for a strategic role in Asia commensurate with its economic and latent power potential. An impression gained was that the Japanese community were now seriously looking towards India as a possible strategic partner in realising this goal. It was, however, clarified

that this is not so much as part of China containment strategy but reflection of balance of power perceptions that continue to pervade the thinking of the regional players in East Asia. Simply put, Japan wants to be a reckonable player in Asia rather than simply being seen as a rich donor with little or no strategic clout. These are ominous developments, whose shaping is likely to cause consternation in the existing balance of power; an aspect which India will need to focus in its own strategic calculations.

In so far as Taiwan is concerned, it appears to have reconciled to the prevailing status quo in the belief that at least in the short to medium terms American regional strategic interests will prevent any change in the situation. Notwithstanding the above, the current Chen Shui-Bian regime is attempting to upgrade overall defence posture ahead of 2008 general elections wherein, pro mainland KMT party that eschews open confrontation with China is expected to fare much better. Taiwan is planning to increase its defence spending from current 2.5 per cent of GDP (approximately) to three per cent including, induction of eight additional submarines.

In context of the prevailing geo-strategic scenario and its future contours, Taiwan is keen for closer partnership with India under the overall rubric of common democratic values and shared interests. Within the above construct, it was nuanced that China's rise could pose a serious challenge to India, if the power gap between the two was to increase or become unbridgeable. The central theme was that all nations who are potential competitors in Chinese hegemonic designs should come together to fight a common challenge.

It was apparent that broader strategic thinking of both Japan and Taiwan is driven by balance of power relations vis-a-vis China backed by salience of the US alliance in containing China's growing geo-economic influence. Attempt is to carve out an alternative architecture to support SE Asian countries as part of their hedging strategies. Towards this end they are focusing on common concerns, like security of SLOC, shared maritime interests, the growing influence of their diaspora, shared perceptions on Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and of course economic issues. Within the above thinking, an economically resurgent India with growing markets and trade is looked upon as a befitting partner in both strategic and economic terms.

India is being looked upon as a country maximising strategic options in the obtaining regional and geo strategic environment. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership further strengthens this perspective. Although repeatedly clarified by the Indian delegation that India is unlikely to countenance being partner in any strategic coalition or alliance, howsoever laudable the objective, it appears that efforts to draft India as a partner or supporter of such a framework are likely to continue. Although not specifically stated during the dialogue, such an effort is likely to be subsumed in the wider perspective of our 'Look East' policy along with membership of major economic groupings like Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea) as possible inducement.

Changing Global Security Dynamics: Impact on Indian and Pacific Regional Security

The issues raised and discussed in this session were—global power shift, emerging polycentric order, and implications of polarisation on security and how strengthened multilateralism (including a reformed UN and restructured Security Council) and cooperative security institutions were a pressing need. Concepts like mutual and equal security, peaceful resolution of disputes and adoption of less threatening defence postures were underscored. Expectedly, some Japanese and Taiwanese scholars persisted with the refrain of threats posed by accelerating rise of China and the resurgence of Russia and how the China-Russia nexus through or outside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) constitutes a threat to the US-led alliance in East Asia. The counterview projected was that Russia's resurgence was inevitable, as it was sought to be treated in the post Cold War period like Germany after Versailles; while the eastward expansion of NATO only served to exacerbate Russia's concerns. Whether such resurgence could spark conflicts remained a questionable proposition, was highlighted by the Indian delegation.

The North Korean nuclear tests and the six-party talks featured in the discussions. North Korea's apparent success in weakening deterrence in East Asia and leveraging nuclear weapons as tools for furthering its geo-political game plan of ending isolation and safeguarding regime security served to dispel possibilities of its comprehensive de-nuclearisation. While this poses a huge challenge

to Japan and Taiwan, it was pointed out that Russia, South Korea and China may not be too unhappy with the developments in North Korea. (The ramifications of the North Korean agreement after our visit are yet to unfold in their entirety). China's apparently successful anti-satellite weapon test in space, in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis, figured in the discussion. The test, timed soon after the East Asian Summit, was perceived as yet another signal of China's determination to be a global power that does not lag behind the US and Russia in the capability to weaponise space. Significantly, there were reports that in the latter part of 2007, China would launch a joint Asia-Pacific Space Project for cooperation in research, manufacture and application of small multi-mission satellite capabilities with Islamic countries. Pakistan and Bangladesh, as also South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand, Indonesia and Turkey are envisaged to be incorporated into this project subsequently.

Economically Resurgent Russia. An interesting aspect of the dialogue was the discussion on the rise of Russia and its impact on the security environment in Asia. The following points emerged :-

- (a) Japanese were particularly concerned with emergence of strong Russia and growth of its energy potential. This was underscored by the growing importance of Sino-Russian relations that are assuming increasing strategic contours. Growing cooperation was seen as undermining Japanese interests particularly; the manner in which Japan has been done out of its stakes in Sakhalin I, where it had invested huge sums.
- (b) The issue of absence of basic human rights in Russia and autocratic tendencies also came up for discussion. A pointed issue raised with the Indian delegation was on how India would deal with an increasingly authoritarian Russian regime. Traditional Indian ties with Russia were highlighted, particularly the fact that Russia had stood by India through the troubled period of the Cold War. To date, it remained crucial to India's growing energy, technological and armament needs. On the issue of dealing with authoritarian regimes, it was pointed out that given the record of the Western world and the countries like Japan condoning the overthrow of

democratic regimes in countries such as Pakistan, there was little need for India to be apologetic about the manner in which it deals with Russia. It was highlighted that it was more important to engage, rather than adopt a confrontational approach.

Other Important Issues

Some other important issues that emerged in the deliberations were:-

(a) Strategically, the global balance of power would entail accommodation of competitive and contradictory trends of an asymmetric hexagon, the USA, Russia and the EU in Europe, and India, Japan and China in Asia. In the emergence of a multipolar global order, the way the Six manage international peace and security would constitute the key to stability in the international system.

(b) Primary drivers for an India–Japan cooperation in maritime security and criticality of SLOC were – dependence of Japan an island-state having to import nearly all its food and energy supplies; and in the case of India, land route feasibility was precluded by geo-physical topography or Pakistan. India's growing interest in security of far flung SLOCs made for upgradation of force levels to acquire a blue water capability and acquisition of oceanic power.

(c) There is intense speculation in Japan on its future security orientation; particularly, in the context of growing geopolitical and geo economic significance of China and challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea. While elements from liberal political establishment like Shigeru Ishiba, former Defence Minister and Nagashima, Member of the House of Representatives of Japan would like a more independent security role in consonance with their national interests there are those who believe that having invested so heavily in treaty obligations and payment for American troops on the Japanese soil, the USA must continue to underwrite its security.

(d) Alternative view, however, was that America chastened by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, will not have the stomach to get involved in a future crisis in the region or raise the ante, should such a need arise. Consequently, it was important for Japanese to look at their self defence.

(e) On Japan becoming a nuclear power, an impression gained was that while Japanese continued to be pacifist in their approach and depended upon American umbrella, they have seriously begun to debate the relevance of nuclear weapons and their practicality in the changing security environment. This is not to suggest changes in the Japanese mindset but to highlight the impact of developments in North Korea on the Japanese psyche.

Conclusion

The dialogue was marked by free and frank exchange of views. An impression gained was that East Asian security dynamics was increasingly getting impacted by the rise of China and its increasing geo-strategic imprints. Tendency to build politico-military influences based on coalition of interests as part of containment strategy were discernable. Similar fears about rise of Russia were also expressed. What appeared to concern regional powers, was the profound impact of these developments on their security; particularly, in the context of the US involvement in West Asia and Afghanistan and its consequent effect on the balance of power in Asia.

The dialogue concluded with drawing up of a road map for future dealings, including research in areas of global and regional concern, particularly in the context of increasing globalisation and information revolution.

Defence Procurements : Need for Independent Oversight

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Every major defence deal has been put to public and media scrutiny in the recent past, generally with adverse fallout. Numerous aspersions have been cast directly or indirectly. Almost all major deals have been referred to enquiry commissions or investigative agencies. Extensive media coverage, both informed and uninformed, has fuelled doubts about the probity of the whole procurement regime.

The above state of affairs has had a highly debilitating influence on the modernisation of the armed forces. Some other discernible effects are as follows:-

(a) There is a perceptible lack of faith in the uprightness of the whole system. People appear to be convinced that all defence deals are tainted and view all procurement functionaries to be lacking in required integrity. This has come to affect national morale, wherein a degree of despondency and resignation has set in.

(b) As all procurement activities come to be viewed with suspicion, functionaries become wary of taking decisions. Deferring decision making is considered a more intelligent course of action than having one's integrity questioned later on. Hence, the whole procurement process suffers due to delays and vacillation at various levels.

(c) The environment gets vitiated to the extent that vendors feel compelled to factor in illegal commissions in their commercial quotes, under the mistaken belief that they would lose out unless they resort to such practices.

(d) Reputation of many upright leaders and functionaries gets tarnished with adverse media reporting, based on conjectures and stories planted by losing vendors.

(e) And most seriously, troops tend to lose faith in the leadership. They wonder if the equipment being procured meets

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qualitative parameters or they are being saddled with sub-standard or unreliable hardware that may fail them in war.

Major Initiatives Taken

The Government is seized of the matter and has initiated major steps to overhaul and strengthen the complete procurement procedure. Defence Procurement Procedure - 2006 (DPP-2006) is an extremely comprehensive document. It is perhaps the only document of its kind in the whole world that covers the complete gamut of all procurement activities. The Government's intent to infuse transparency and impartiality is clearly discernible in various provisions of the procedure. With a view to generating competition, tenders are now issued to a much larger number of vendors. Formulation of qualitative requirements has been made more broad-based to widen vendor participation. Two-bid system has been adopted to prevent subsequent raising of commercial quotes by successful vendors.

In a bold move, vendors have been permitted to attend field trials of their equipment and results are conveyed to them at the trial site itself. Price negotiations have been eliminated in competitive bids. Single-vendor procurements have been minimised to the barest inescapable ones. And finally, an innovative *Integrity Pact* has been introduced for all high-value contracts.

Pre-Contract Integrity Pact

As per DPP-2006, 'Pre-Contract Integrity Pact' would be signed between government department and the bidders for all procurement schemes over Rs 100 crores. It is a highly laudable step. It is a binding agreement between the Government procurement agency (buyer) and the vendors (bidders). Salient features of the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact are as follows:-

- (a) The buyer undertakes that no official of the buyer will demand or accept any bribe, directly or through intermediaries.
- (b) The bidder undertakes not to offer, directly or through intermediaries, any bribe, commission or inducement to any official of the buyer.
- (c) The bidder commits to refrain from giving any complaint directly or through any other manner without supporting it with full and verifiable facts.

(d) The buyer will appoint independent monitors for this Pact, in consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). As soon as the Monitor notices, or believes to notice, a violation of this agreement, he will so inform the Head of the Acquisition Wing.

(e) The following set of sanctions can be imposed by the buyer for any violation by a bidder: -

- (i) Denial or loss of contract.
- (ii) Forfeiture of the bid security and performance bond.
- (iii) Liability for damages to the principal and the competing bidders.
- (iv) Debarring for an appropriate period of time.

(f) The decision of the buyer to the effect that a breach of the provisions of this Integrity Pact has been committed by the bidder shall be final and binding on the bidder. However, the bidder can approach the monitor(s).

Deficiencies in the Integrity Pact

Though well intended, the Integrity Pact appears to have been incorporated in a hurry. Some of the major infirmities are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Limited Applicability

Integrity Pact is required only in cases where the contract value is above Rs 100 crores. Interestingly, most of the contracts signed normally are of value less than Rs 100 crores. For example, a total of 123 contracts were signed in the wake of the Kargil War and their gross value was Rs 2163.09 crores. Almost all of them were less than Rs 100 crores. The much publicised casket contract was for under Rs 6 crores. Contract with Denel for anti-material rifles and ammunition was for Rs 23.22 crores (Denel has since been debarred for using undue influence).

It will thus be seen that the newly introduced *Integrity Pact* will apply to a handful of big ticket contracts only. Majority of procurements cases will stay outside its purview. It is an odd provision and conveys an impression that it is not essential to ensure integrity in cases of lesser value.

Pact is Loaded against Bidders

The *Integrity Pact* is between the buyer and the bidder. But all the provisions are loaded against the bidder. The bidder has to give numerous undertakings and also agree to accept sanctions as imposed by the buyer. Interestingly, it is for the buyer to decide that a breach of *Integrity Pact* has taken place. On the other hand, the buyer undertakes to initiate disciplinary criminal proceedings against his defaulting officers. It is an infructuous undertaking. Even under the existing criminal laws in force and service rules, the Government is duty bound to initiate action against delinquent officials, even for lesser value contracts which are not covered by the Pact.

Ineffective Independent Monitors

Independent Monitor will be nominated by the buyer on case to case basis, albeit in consultation with CVC. In all probability, it would be a well connected bureaucrat seeking post retirement rehabilitation. He will neither be independent nor, effective as it will be prudent for him to remain 'amenable' to secure repeat assignments. Additionally, the role assigned to him is totally imprecise and perfunctory. He is required to inform Director General Acquisition (the buyer) if he notices, or believes to notice, a violation of this agreement. It is for the buyer to proceed as deemed fit. As there is no mention of his functioning, it is a matter of speculation as to how a monitor shall detect violations.

Another interesting aspect relates to the power given to the buyer to rule that the bidder has violated provisions of the Pact. Such a decision is 'final and binding'. The Pact, however, permits the aggrieved bidder to approach the Monitor. But there is no mention as to what the Monitor can do when the decision of the buyer is already 'final and binding'.

Lack of Complaint Redressal Mechanism

No arrangement can be credible unless an effective and prompt complaint redressal mechanism is put in place. The *Integrity Pact* has overlooked this critical requirement totally. An aggrieved bidder has to report the matter to the buyer 'with full and verifiable facts'. Thereafter, it is for the buyer to initiate action against the accused official for alleged misdemeanour. The Pact is totally silent as regards dispensation of justice to the wronged bidder.

Every pact has to have an independent adjudicator to resolve disputes between the contracting parties after hearing both sides. However, in the Integrity Pact this authority has been abrogated by the buyer to himself. Such an arrangement dilutes the value of the Pact and makes it appear as a pretense rather than a serious attempt to promote probity.

Necessity of a Credible Probity Assurance Mechanism

The primary aim of the government should be to convince the nation that it is serious about ensuring probity in defence procurements and restore people's faith in the system. As has been discussed earlier, India needs an arrangement with the following essential imperatives:-

- (a) Ensure probity and uprightness in all defence procurements of capital nature, irrespective of their value. The system should be acknowledged by all to be transparent and principled.
- (b) Dealing officials should fear punitive provisions for their subjective decisions.
- (c) Bidders should have total confidence in the fairness of the system and should be convinced that their competitors would draw no inequitable benefit, even if they attempt to resort to iniquitous practices.
- (d) Aggrieved parties should be able to get redressal speedily.
- (e) The armed forces must feel confident of the quality of weapon systems provided to them.

The recently introduced Integrity Pact falls woefully short on all counts and the probity of defence procurements will continue to remain suspect.

Defence Procurements Oversight Commission

India needs an oversight system which enjoys the confidence of all and which acts as a watchdog. India should set up a Defence Procurements Oversight Commission (DPOC). It should be a semi-judicial ombudsman and be of permanent nature.

Constitution

DPOC should consist of a Chairman and three members : Technical, Commercial and Legal. They should be selected by a committee consisting of the Defence Minister, Leader of the Opposition and a sitting judge of the Supreme Court. As the entire success of this mechanism depends on the credibility enjoyed by the Commission, all politically aligned personnel must be scrupulously kept away.

The Chairman should be a retired judge of the Supreme Court. He should be a man of impeccable reputation and standing. His name should invoke respect and confidence. All members of the Commission should have a fixed tenure of five years. Member Technical should be a retired service officer with experience in defence procurements. Member Commercial should be an economist of repute from academic field or an expert from private financial sector. And Member Legal should be a specialist in contract management and international trade. It will be prudent not to have retired bureaucrats, as their erstwhile long association with the Government may compromise their independence in the eyes of the people.

Role

DPOC will perform three major roles:-

(a) **Monitoring Functions.** It will monitor and oversee that all procurement activities from evolution of parameters to post-contract implementation are carried out as per the laid down procedures and in the true spirit of the Integrity Pact. It can ask for any file and attend any meeting being held between the buyer and the bidders to keep itself abreast of the developments. On noticing any violation by either party, it could take immediate remedial measures to correct the infirmity. Such a timely intervention will prevent the whole process getting vitiated beyond redemption.

(b) **Advisory Functions.** The Commission can be of immense help in rendering pre-activity independent advice to the buyer. Presently, the Ministry of Defence is devoid of any pre-audit advice. It has been requesting that either CVC or any other statutory body should render probity advice to it before a contract

is signed. DPOC will fulfill this need ideally. When in doubt about the correctness of an intended action, the buyer can approach the Commission for advice. Such an arrangement will help officials take well-considered decisions without vacillation.

(c) **Adjudicatory Functions.** Both sides (the buyer and the bidders) should be permitted to bring violation of the Integrity Pact to the Commission's notice. It should be for the Commission to seek full details and carry out its assessment of the issues involved. However, adjudicatory proceedings should not impinge upon the normal progress of the case. Depending on the gravity of the violation, the Commission could either, call involved parties to reconcile differences or, suggest remedial action. The power to recommend action against delinquent official or imposition of sanctions on defaulting bidder(s) should rest with the Commission which should send its report to the Defence Minister. The Commission may even recommend abrogation of a procurement proposal, if it suffers from major irregularities.

Reporting Channel


DPOC should submit its reports to the Parliamentary Committee on Defence through the Defence Minister.

Functioning

DPOC is not intended to be a super Acquisition Wing. It must not interfere in routine procurement functions and decision making. Procurement officials should never feel constrained and curtailed. They must have full freedom of action.

The Commission should generally stay out of allocation of priorities to various proposals, acceptance of necessity and quantity vetting. Its interest in the formulation of parameters should be restricted to ensuring that they are broad based and not any vendor-specific. Similarly, it should leave the modalities of field trials to the Services. Ideally, the Commission should place itself as an advisory and protective body to save the officials from subsequent harassment for decisions taken in good faith. The current provision for technical oversight by an independent committee in respect of contracts of value above Rs 300 crores should be dispensed with.

Defence Procurements Oversight Commission (DPOC)



Likely Opposition

The opposition to the constitution of DPOC should not be underestimated. It will be strident and vehement. Change is the very anti-thesis of bureaucratic inertia. Additionally, old mindsets and intellectual apathy spawn numerous arguments to stress non-viability of all new ideas. Opposition to DPOC is anticipated on the following counts:-

- (a) **It will curb freedom of officials.** On the contrary, the presence of the Commission will embolden the officials as they would know that they have a protective shield of the Commission to vouchsafe their conduct. Additionally, when in doubt the officials can seek guidance from the Commission in complex cases.

(b) **Additional tier will cause delays.** This is a misplaced apprehension. The Commission will perform its functions concurrently. It will not be another link in the official hierarchy. The Acquisition Wing will continue with its regular activities. In fact, the Commission will facilitate speedier progress of cases as officials will have to justify excessive time taken over files. Oversight by DPOC will also save months and years spent on rescinding flawed procurement cases and re-initiating proposals.

(c) **Additional set-up will entail extra expenditure.** Undoubtedly, there will be additional expenditure. However, it will be miniscule compared to the expenditure presently incurred on various commissions of inquiries set up, after almost all defence deals. Most importantly, strict adherence to integrity and probity norms will enable India to obtain best value for money. Even a nominal five per cent reduction in contracted prices will result in a saving of USD 1.5 billion during the 7th Plan Period (2007-12), as India is likely to spend USD 30 billion on defence procurements during that period.

The Commission should be seen as a facilitator rather than as a meddling irritant. It will act as an effective interface, especially to resolve differences. It will provide a platform where the bidders can air their reservations, while the officials will get an opportunity to explain the underlying rationale of their decisions. That will enhance transparency. It will also force officials to take duly considered and defensible decisions. Most of the complaints arise due to misunderstandings and misapprehensions due to lack of effective communication.

Conclusion

Regular questioning of the uprightness of Indian defence procurements has caused immense damage to the national psyche and the morale of the armed forces. Media has been highlighting irregularities and creating doubts about the sanctity of the complete procurement process. Another fall-out has been tardy modernisation of the armed forces. It is an extremely grave situation and requires drastic steps.

The Government has taken a number of commendable measures. But the people continue to be skeptical. Therefore, the government needs not only to ensure probity but also, and may be more importantly, convince the environment of its earnestness. The

system must be accepted and acknowledged by all to be impartial, transparent and objective.

Pre-Contract Integrity Pact is a move in the right direction but needs to be made more equitable and stringent. Any worthwhile complaint resolving authority has to enjoy widespread credibility and all parties involved must have full faith in its impartiality. It should be easily approachable and should be able to dispense justice speedily.

Formation of an independent and credible oversight Commission is essential to provide reassurance that defence procurements are above board. The Commission should act as a watchdog and an ombudsman on behalf of the public. That will be the only way to strengthen public confidence in the genuineness of the Government's commitment. Inadequate measures will prove illusory and wasteful.

ARTICLES FOR THE USI JOURNAL

1. Members are welcome to forward original articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. Articles should preferably be around 2,500 words. These should be forwarded in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a floppy disk (1.44 MB diskette) as a Word document. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternately, articles may be sent through e-mail on dde@usiofindia.org. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations. Articles should not have been offered for publication to other journals or media.
2. It is mandatory that the author furnish complete details of the book/journal referred to in the article as end notes. This includes full name of writer of article/book referred to, title of book/article, journal in which published (in case of articles); issue details, and page numbers. Besides end notes, if the author so desires, a bibliography may also be included, though not mandatory.
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4. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers should enclose '*no objection certificate*' signed by their immediate superior for publication of their articles.
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Unification of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force Act

Wing Commander UC Jha (Retd)

Introduction

The military is a specialised society that has developed laws and traditions of its own. The object of military law is to provide for the maintenance of good order and discipline among members of the armed forces and in certain circumstances among others who live or work in a military environment. This is done by supplementing the ordinary criminal law with a special code of discipline and a special system for enforcing it. Such special provision is necessary to maintain, in time of peace as well as war, the operational efficiency of an armed force. Military law also regulates certain aspects of administration-aspects, which affect individual rights in spheres such as enlistment and discharge, terms of service, promotion and forfeiture of and deduction from pay. Most often in practice, however, the term "military justice system" is used with regard to disciplinary provisions rather than administrative ones.

The Supreme Court did the first major scrutiny of the military justice system in 1982, in the case of *Lieutenant Colonel P P Singh v Union of India*. Besides observing other deficiencies in the system, it held that the absence of even one appeal with power to review the decisions of courts-martial was a distressing and glaring lacuna in the military justice system. It urged the government to take steps to provide at least one judicial review in the case of service matters. However, due to political and bureaucratic apathy, nearly twenty-five years passed before the Minister of Defence introduced the Armed Forces Tribunal Bill, 2005 in the Parliament. This Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence for making a report.

The Standing Committee has submitted its Tenth Report to the Parliament on 23 May 2006. The report contains various recommendations for making changes in the proposed Armed

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Forces Tribunal Bill. The Standing Committee is of the view that an 'expert committee' be constituted urgently to review thoroughly the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, and the Navy Act, 1957, and bring them at par with the norms followed in other democratic countries. The Committee has also recommended the framing of a common disciplinary code for the three Services.

This paper examines the issues relating to a common code of justice and discipline for the Armed Forces. It will also discuss the changes made by other democracies in their military justice system, which could be considered while modernising our system.

MILITARY LAW IN INDIA

Indian military law has its origin in the military law of England. It was conceived to discipline a 'mercenary' force after the Mutiny of 1857. Under the British system, military justice was a command dominated system. The system was designed to secure obedience to the commander, and to serve the commander's will. The independence of India and the resultant constitutional changes necessitated the revision of the Indian Army Act, 1911 and the Regulations. The Army Act came into force on 22 July 1950. The Government framed Army Rules, 1950, which was replaced by the Army Rules, 1954. In 1993, certain amendments were incorporated in the Army Act and the Army Rules.

The Air Force Act came into force on 22 July 1950. The Air Force Rules, 1969, were made as per the provisions of Section 189 of the Air Force Act, 1950. The Naval Discipline Act in existence at that time differed from the laws relating to the Army and the Air Force in many respects. In the UK, a special committee had been set up to examine the question of revision of the British Naval Codes, and the Government of India awaited the committee's report. The Navy Act, 1957, came into effect from 1 January, 1958. In 2005, certain amendments were made in the Navy Act.

DIFFERENCES IN THE THREE SERVICE ACTS

The provisions contained in the three Service Acts are not similar. Under the Air Force Act, 1950, only three types of courts-martial, i.e., general court-martial, district court-martial and summary general court-martial have been provided. The Army Act, 1950 in addition to the above three types of courts-martial also has summary

court-martial which can try personnel below the rank of Junior Commissioned Officer and can award punishments of dismissal and imprisonment upto one year. However, the Navy has only one type of court-martial during peace time and a disciplinary tribunal during war. Unlike the Army and the Air Force, where the senior-most officer of the court-martial becomes the presiding officer, in the Navy the convening authority always nominates the president of the courts-martial. In the Navy, the findings and sentence of courts-martial do not require confirmation of the convening authority or any superior authority and become operative the moment they are pronounced, except in the case of a sentence of death which requires prior confirmation by the Central Government. The verdict of acquittal is final in the case of the Navy and not subject to confirmation or revision as in the Army and the Air Force.

In the Army and the Air Force the presence of a judge advocate in the district and summary general court-martial is not mandatory. In the Navy, every court-martial is required to be attended by a judge advocate. In the Army and the Air Force, the judge advocate remains present when the court deliberates on the findings, whereas in the Navy the judge advocate does not sit with the court when the court is considering the findings.

Unlike the Army and the Air Force the commanding officer of a ship may summarily try any person belonging to the ship, other than an officer, for an offence not being a capital offence and can award imprisonment or detention up to three months. This power of summary trial is limited in the Army and the Air Force where punishment up to 28 days of imprisonment can be awarded to persons below the rank of NCO.

The proceedings of a court-martial or disciplinary court are reviewed by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy either on his own motion or on application made by an aggrieved person. The JAG is to transmit the report of the review together with his recommendations to the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) for his consideration. In the Army and the Air Force, the officers of the Department of the JAG, before confirmation, review the proceedings of courts-martial and may make recommendations. These reviews are advisory and not binding on the Chiefs of the respective Service.

Notwithstanding these differences, the will of the Chiefs of the three Services, rather than the rule of law reign supreme in the Indian military justice system.

NEED FOR UNIFICATION

The Indian Army Act, the Air Force Act, and the Navy Act, enacted during 1950-57, are more or less derived from the Indian Army Act, 1911. Though these Acts have been amended, they are unable to answer the needs of the modern soldier, and are at odds with the liberal interpretation of the Constitution. The three Service Acts also differ on various safeguards available to their personnel. The uncertainty and potential for delay in the present military justice system and the discontent associated with applying separate systems within such structures leads one to conclude that it is necessary to have a single system of law that would operate equally well in single, bi-Service or tri-Service environments.

Following the creation of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and India's tri-Service Strategic Forces Command in 2001 and uniformity in the functioning of the three Services at various levels, there is a need for a uniform disciplinary code for the three services. A modern and fair system of Service law is as important to supporting operational effectiveness as having the best-trained and equipped forces as possible. A harmonized approach to Service law would enhance operational effectiveness.

A uniform code would be more appropriate in view of the fact that the three Services are increasingly deployed on joint operations in India and abroad, for which they train together. Within joint command and units the basic principle should be that Service personnel are subject to the same systems and the same rights and penalties, except where a special rule applicable only to the member of one Service is essential.

The law is not static and needs to be amended at regular intervals to keep pace with the changes in the international norms and domestic law of the country. The piecemeal amendments over the years have brought about few changes but they have not been helpful in keeping service law in line with developments in civilian law. Due to bureaucratic apathy and non-priority to issues of military justice, amendment to the Service laws has taken inordinately long. The existence of separate Acts makes the use, interpretation

and amendment of the Acts more complicated. It would be easier to modernise and amend a common code for the Services than to do so individually.

The Armed Forces Tribunal Bill, 2005 is likely to establish a common appellate tribunal for the Armed Forces. Creation of a common tribunal for the three Services necessitates that the protection of the rights available to a soldier, sailor and airman are similar under the three Services. This can only be ensured by subjecting them to a common code of conduct. An appeal from a common forum to the proposed appellate tribunal would provide equality to all the members of the Armed Forces.

The modernisation and unification of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force Act should be undertaken keeping in view our own experiences as well as developments in other democracies. We cannot insulate ourselves from the changes in systems followed in other countries, especially because our forces are internationally recognized and are part of peacekeeping missions the world over. Therefore, there is a need to create a common code of justice, which will promote discipline in the Armed Forces.

UNIFICATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

There are large number of democracies in the world which are following common code of discipline and justice for their armed forces. The United Kingdom has recently gone for overhaul of its military justice system and its Armed Forces Bill, having a common code for the three Services is awaiting Royal Assent to become the Armed Forces Act, 2006. The process of unification of the military justice system of some of the countries is discussed in brief.

The United States

Before adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) on 31 May 1951, the US Army operated under the Articles of War for about 175 years. The Navy, during this period, operated under the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Under the Articles of War, military justice was a command dominated system. The system was designed to secure obedience to the commander, and to serve the commander's will. Courts-martial were not viewed as independent, but as tools to serve the commander. They did a form of justice, but it was a different justice than that afforded in

civilian criminal trials. Military justice had few of the procedures and protections of civilian criminal justice, and protecting the rights of the individual was not a primary purpose of the system.

In the late nineteenth century, a few efforts to reform the military justice system arose. Some changes in procedure, such as allowing an accused to have counsel present in the court-martial (and, later, allowing counsel to speak) developed in the late nineteenth century. World War I generated greater interest in changing the system. In 1917, thirteen black soldiers were hanged for mutiny in a mass execution conducted one day after their trial ended. The case drew national attention, and in January 1918 the Army established the first system of appellate review in the military. Henceforth, capital and certain other sentences could not be executed until after review by the office of the Judge Advocate General.

In World War II, there were over two million courts-martial. Many people, from all walks of life, were exposed to the military justice system, and many did not like what they saw. The system appeared harsh and arbitrary, with too few protections for the individual and too much power for the commander. The criticisms against the military justice system became widespread. After the war, interest in reforming the system continued, and in 1948. Congress passed the Elston Act (named for its sponsor, Congressman Charles Elston of Ohio), amending the Articles of War. By 1948, the US defence infrastructure itself was reorganised with the creation of separate Air Force, and the establishment of the Department of Defence. This led to a perceived need for greater protection for men and women who would serve in the armed forces, and a desire for a common system for all the Services.

In 1948, the Secretary of Defence appointed a committee, to draft a uniform code of military justice. There were disagreements during the drafting process, and not all the Services, or all the judge advocates general, supported every provision in the final package. Secretary of Defence resolved disputes. The House of Representatives held about three weeks of hearings in the spring of 1949 and President Truman signed the UCMJ on 5 May 1950.

In passing the UCMJ. Congress gave power to the President of the United States to establish military criminal procedures. The

President did this by publishing the Manual for Court-Martial (MCM). The UCMJ marked a distinct, but not complete break from the past. Most significant was its acceptance of the idea that discipline cannot be maintained without justice, and that justice requires, in large measure, the adoption of civilian procedures. The Code was an effort to combine elements of two competing models the old command-dominated military justice system and the civilian criminal justice system with its heavy emphasis on due process. In the words of Edmund Morgan, "We were convinced that a Code of Military Justice cannot ignore the military circumstances in which it must operate but we were equally determined that it must be designated to administer justice."

The Code underwent two major changes in 1968 and 1983. The Military Justice Act of 1968 substantially increased the independence of courts-martial and the authority of the military judiciary. It provided for military judges to preside in special as well as general courts-martial. The Military Justice Act of 1983 streamlined pre-trial and post-trial processing, and abolished the practice of having the convening authority detail judges and counsels to courts-martial. Pre-trial agreements, rights of a suspect and accused, independence of military judges, functioning of the JAG branch and the appellate court review are hallmarks of the US military justice system. The UCMJ has made essential contribution to military justice, and to the effectiveness of the US Armed Forces.

The UK

In the UK, the legislation for the Services disciplinary and criminal justice system is provided for in the three Service Discipline Acts; the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the Army Act 1955, and the Air Force Act 1955, collectively known as the Service Discipline Acts (SDAs). Since 1950, the SDAs have been reviewed every five years and amended piecemeal to reflect changes in civil law and the requirements of the Services. In 1996 and 2000 there were some significant changes to ensure that the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights were met.

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) presented by the Secretary of State for Defence stated that there would be advantages from combining the three SDAs into a single Act. The SDR acknowledged the key principle that a system of service law

is essential to operational effectiveness. But it concluded that there would be advantages to be gained from combining the three systems into a single Act, while recognizing that this would be a substantial and complex undertaking.

Following initial work, a Tri-Service Act Team was set up in September 2001 to conduct a thorough review of the Armed Forces' discipline policies and procedures and non discipline-related legislation in the SDAs. The team comprised service and civilian legal and policy staffs. The initial focus of the work was on the Services' disciplinary systems. This involved a critical review of operational requirements justifying the retention of current legislative and policy differences between the Services. In reviewing these, for example the differing powers of Commanding Officers (COs) in the three Services, all relevant factors, including recent operational experience of the COs were taken into account. This was also an opportunity to modernise service legislation. Areas such as redressal of grievance procedures and the framework for holding Service Boards of Inquiry were given due importance.

The Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons has undertaken initial pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill based on written and oral evidence. The Committee published its report in March 2005 and the Government published its response in July 2005. The new legislation in the form of the Armed Forces Bill was introduced in Parliament on 30 November 2005. The Bill was given Royal Assent in November 2006 and full implementation of the Armed Forces Act, 2006 will be by the end of 2008.

Key Areas likely to be Changed

(a) **Summary Discipline.** The power of the CO to enforce discipline through summary hearing has been retained. The main proposals include a range of harmonized powers to deal with some offences summarily. The accused will have the right to elect trial by the court-martial and appeal to the Summary Appeal Court.

(b) **Prosecutions.** There will be a joint Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) which will replace the current single Service Prosecuting Authorities. The SPA will continue to remain independent of the chain of command and will be staffed by

lawyers from three Services. The SPA will determine whether to prosecute an offender under Service law and will be responsible for conducting the prosecution at trials by court-martial.

(c) **The Court-Martial.** The court-martial will remain the means of dealing with more serious offences. In future there will be a standing court-martial. There will not be any distinction between the district court-martial, general court-martial or field general court-martial. The court-martial will comprise a civilian judge advocate and a panel of 3 or 5 Service members depending on the seriousness of the offence charged.

(d) **Reviewing Authority.** The current ability of the Reviewing Authority to amend findings or sentence will cease. The convicted persons will have a right of appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC).

(e) **Redress of Complaint.** Service personnel will retain the statutory right to complain on any matter relating to their Service. The proposals on redress are aimed at speedy resolution of complaints through pro-active case management and delegation of powers from the Defence Council to an empowered panel independent of the chain of command.

South Africa

During the years 1912 to 1957 British military law was applied in the Union of South Africa. The military law contained in the first schedule of the Defence Act, 1957, was called the Military Discipline Code (MDC). Since the beginning of the 1990's, the South African laws were amended and a new constitution promulgated, affecting all spheres of society including the military. On 23 April 1999, the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (MDSMA) 16 of 1999 was passed by the Republic of South Africa. The MDSMA as read with its Rules of Procedure and the Military Discipline Code (MDC), is aimed at maintenance of discipline essential for a fighting force that is necessary in peacetime as it is in wartime. The MDSMA has made certain important changes in the military justice system. It has established the Court of Military Appeals having full appeal and review competencies, the Court of Senior Military Judge, and the Court of Military Judge. In addition, the commanding officers

have been authorised disciplinary powers for minor offences. The system of *ad hoc* military tribunals (courts-martial) has been abolished.

The experiences of countries like the United States, the UK and South Africa brought up to the fore the desirability of making the rights and duties of members of the armed forces ascertained by reference to a single statute. These democracies have carried out large-scale revisions of their respective military codes to bring them in line with changes in international standards and the concept of the rule of law.

EFFORTS IN INDIA

The Government of India in 1965 had set up a Committee, consisting of officials from the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Law, the Judge Advocates General and Directors of Personnel of three Services, for drafting of a uniform code for the three Services. The Committee was to analyse the difficulties being faced in operating the then military laws of the three Services, and study military codes of developed democracies. The Committee was tasked to draft a uniform code to rationalise the three Service Acts making special provisions for each Service separately with due regards to their peculiar requirements.

The Committee completed its task of drafting a uniform code in 1977. It was vetted by the Ministry of Law in 1978 and given the shape of a bill—The Armed Forces Code Bill, 1978. This Bill was re-examined by the three Services. It was felt that since the three forces were not unified and working problems of each were different, amendments as recommended by Harris Committee Report (1964), be carried out in the existing Acts. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in 1979 rejected the adoption of a uniform code and instead recommended amendments to the existing Acts to make them more progressive individually.

However, the changes were made only when the provisions went strikingly opposite to the civilian justice system and the military could no longer justify that the continuation of contested provisions were needed for maintenance of discipline. Here also we made changes in a piecemeal manner at a snail's pace.

COMMON DISCIPLINARY CODE

Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., in his book, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Vietnam War*, said that the people, the politician and the army—the "trinity"—must all have the will to win if war is to be successfully conducted. Modern military men and political leaders have to develop a mind-set to think strategically. Similarly national defence strategy must have the support of the people, the politicians, and the military in order to be successful. This idea applies equally to other national issues like development of weapons, size of our military, employment of women in combat roles in the Armed Forces and so on. We need to address these strategic considerations to answer the question, "What type of military justice system should we have to maintain the morale and discipline within the Armed Forces?" We can no longer leave it to the military to decide. It has to be viewed from the perspective of politician and people. Once the people, the politician and the military agree on the strategic aspects of military justice, the other related issues can be evolved. So far we have considered military justice system in a very narrow sense and left it to the armed forces.

For drafting a common code, it is imperative that the government constitutes an 'Expert Committee' headed by a Member of Parliament. Each Service should detail a representative who would be responsible for providing the day-to-day link to his own Service on policy matters. In addition, incorporating a member from the Ministry of Law and Justice would ensure that time is not lost in future scrutiny. The drafting of a common code has to be a time-bound task where minor differences within the Services are thrashed out on day-to-day basis.

The Expert Committee would be required to gather information about discipline systems in the Armed Forces of other countries. It would also have to get the view of a cross-section of personnel of all ranks in the military units (including field areas) and Headquarters staff, and training institutions like Defence Services Staff College, College of Defence Management and the National Defence College on the improvements considered necessary. Other relevant factors, including the most recent operational experiences and developments in civilian law would also have to be taken into account. This could be achieved in about six months, followed by the actual drafting of the Bill, which may take another twelve months.

No doubt it will be a challenging task, but if pursued earnestly, the Bill could be submitted to the Parliament within a time frame of about eighteen months. A new orientation and a greater level of activity from the government, academic institutions like the USI and the legal fraternity would be required to achieve this goal.

While modernising our system, the following issues need consideration:

- (a) The Judge Advocate General branch must not be in the military chain of command.
- (b) Provisions relating to summary general and summary court-martial must be abolished.
- (c) Increase in the power of minor punishment, its applicability to higher ranks with a provision for review by judicial authority.
- (d) Procedural rights to a suspect or accused must be ensured.
- (e) Right to bail and legal aid to the accused must be at par with the civilian system.
- (f) Role of convening authority in the disciplinary process is required to be reduced.
- (g) Provision for plea bargaining needs to be introduced.
- (h) Process of redressal of complaints needs to be streamlined.

Encroachment of fundamental rights of members of the Armed Forces is not permissible in matters which do not relate to the discharge of their duties or to the maintenance of discipline. The models followed in the US, the UK, Australia and South Africa, could be examined to see how these countries have resolved the issues related to the applicability of individual rights and constitutional guarantees to military personnel.

ROADBLOCKS

The biggest roadblock could be the attitude of the military hierarchy. The military has the reputation of being encumbered by

its traditions and fixed ideas. The views of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, a military thinker and a soldier, would be relevant in this context:

"There was only one thing more difficult than getting a new idea into the military mind and that was getting an old idea out."

The military carries the grave responsibility of protecting the nation and its ideals. It has to prove itself in the extreme confusion of war, when a single error may jeopardize the existence of a country. Perhaps this is the reason why the military mind relies so heavily on time-tested methods and practiced routines, whether it is dealing with immediate problems of the battlefield, details of the logistics or the manifold difficulties of long- term planning.

Usually, a debate is held before the enactment of an Act or amendment to it. Political parties, academics and interested parties take part in such a debate. The background information and the proceedings of discussion are available for public scrutiny. In the US, the UK and South Africa, where changes in the military justice system have been made in the recent past, the civil society has made important contributions to the development of military law. Unfortunately, in the case of India, the information relating to military law remains 'secret' and not available for public scrutiny.

Since we do not have an enlightened civil society or a lawyers' forum that could be entrusted with the task of giving inputs for the modernisation of military law, military- related research institutions would have to play a greater role in bringing changes in the system. Once agreed to by the Service HQ, these research institutions could undertake certain tasks, like creating awareness on the advantages of a unified system of military justice, collecting the views of retired military officials, and gathering data related to the new system.

CONCLUSION

Since its inheritance in the 1950s, no serious attempt has been made towards the modernisation of the military justice system in India. Some piecemeal amendments were made as and when the civil laws underwent change. However, the law still denies service personnel certain basic rights on the pretext that Article 33 of the Constitution abrogates their fundamental rights.

What we have failed to understand is that the military justice system is about maintaining discipline as well as delivering justice. This is not an either-or proposition. A fair military justice system is vital for upholding the morale and discipline of the Armed Forces and for retaining public confidence in the Armed Forces. A system that fails to protect adequately the rights of those accused of misconduct will undermine discipline just as much as a system that fails to enforce the rules and protect the law abiding. In either case, the system's failure will have an adverse effect on morale, mutual trust and respect for authority. A system that does not take care to assess guilt or innocence carefully and to punish fairly and appropriately is a system that is not tied to accountability. The system must be based on two basic principles :

- (a) Every soldier, sailor or airman, regardless of rank, must be responsible and accountable for his actions.
- (b) Every soldier, sailor or airman, regardless of circumstances, must be entitled to being treated fairly and with dignity and respect.

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Did the Telegraph Save the British in 1857?

Major General V K Singh (Retd)

Introduction

The story of the Great Mutiny of 1857 or the First War of Indian Independence has been told many times. The success of the British in subduing the revolt has been attributed to many factors including the courage and fortitude of the English; the lack of leadership and cooperation among the Indians; the non-involvement of the Madras and Bombay Presidency armies; the disinterest shown by many Indian rulers and the active support of the Sikhs and Gurkhas. Perhaps the most important reason-the use of the telegraph - has not been given its due importance. Had the rebels understood the value of this technological marvel, and made efforts to disrupt it, British rule in India might have ended ninety years earlier.

Brief History of the Telegraph in India

The first attempt at visual signalling making use of alphabets was the semaphore telegraph developed in 1792 by Claude Chappe, who established a system comprising twenty-two stations between Lille and Paris, known as the 'tachygraphs'. Four years later the Admiralty approved the construction of a 'semaphore' system developed by George Murray between London and Portsmouth. In 1813 William Boyce submitted a plan for establishing a telegraph system across the Peninsula of India. The plan was to construct two routes, one linking Bombay to Calcutta and the other from Bombay to Madras. Boyce was summoned to Calcutta in 1816 and asked to construct an experimental line between Fort William and Barrackpore. In 1817 the Government approved the construction of a telegraph line from Calcutta to Chunar. The responsibility for carrying out the survey was assigned to Captain George Everest of the Regiment of Artillery, who was destined to become the Surveyor General of India and give his name to the tallest peak in the World.

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Assisted by Lieutenant Fergusson of the Ramghur Battalion, Everest finished the survey in 1818. Work on the first semaphore telegraph system in India began immediately and was completed in 1821. It had 45 stations, separated by a distance of about 10 miles. Each station was manned by five to seven *tindals* (workers) and *qasids* (messengers). The system used four large balls, about five feet in diameter, numbered from one to four. These were suspended by pulleys from a yard, which was mounted on top of a mast or a tower, about 100 feet above the ground. The balls were raised or lowered in accordance with a simple code, which was known to the person at the next station, who used a powerful telescope for sighting the balls. The total expenditure on the system came to about a thousand rupees a month and it took about an hour for a message to traverse the distance of over 400 miles between Calcutta and Chunar. Compared to the existing arrangement of *harkaras* (runners) who carried the *dak* (post), this was a huge improvement. (The beat of a *harkara* was eight miles, and the post travelled about 70 miles in a day). Unfortunately, there was only one telescope at each station, which had to be turned round from one side to the other, often leading to the instrument being damaged. In 1828 the Superintendent of Telegraphs, Captain CTG Weston made a strong bid for a second telescope. However, Sir Charles Metcalfe felt that the system had no military value and was wasteful, and recommended its closure. When it was found that the monthly expenditure had increased to about two thousand rupees, the Governor General-in-Council ordered that the system be closed down. On being informed of this, the Directors in London gleefully reminded the Bengal Government that on first hearing of the project they had expressed great doubt as to its practical value.¹

The electric telegraph came to India almost ten years later, when Dr. WB O'Shaughnessy, an assistant surgeon who held the appointment of Professor of Chemistry in the Medical College at Calcutta, set up 21 miles of experimental line from Calcutta towards Diamond Harbour in 1839 and began conducting experiments. This was just two years after Cooke and Wheatstone had worked the first telegraph line in England along the railway track between London and Slough in 1837, and only a year after Samuel Morse had demonstrated his telegraph system between Washington and Baltimore in 1838. O'Shaughnessy was soon joined

by Seebchunder Nandy, a young Indian with exceptional technical aptitude who became his personal assistant. Their efforts impressed the young Marquis of Dalhousie, the Governor General of India, who, having been the Post Master General in England where the telegraph was making rapid progress, saw the immense possibilities in India. Responding to Dalhousie's urgent plea, in March 1850 the Court of Directors of the East India Company sanctioned the first experimental line between Calcutta and Diamond Harbour. The first message on the line was successfully transmitted in October 1851.

Enthused by the success of the experimental line, Dalhousie asked O'Shaughnessy to work out a telegraph system for the whole of India, based primarily on military requirements. In April 1852, the Governor General-in-Council approved the network linking Calcutta to Peshawar, via Agra, which was also to be connected to Bombay, Ootacamund and Madras. Considering the importance of the work, Dalhousie despatched O'Shaughnessy to London to personally explain the scheme to the Court of Directors, who granted their approval in June 1851. O'Shaughnessy was appointed Chief Superintendent of Telegraphs and spent the rest of 1851 and the greater part of 1852 in England, collecting and despatching to India the huge quantity of stores required for the project. Work on the line started in November 1853, and by the time Dalhousie left India in February 1856, the job had been completed. More than 4,000 miles of wire had been laid, the total cost being twenty one lakh rupees, or a little over five hundred rupees per mile; that the Governor-General could receive reports and send instructions to the Governors of the three Presidencies within minutes, was a remarkable achievement in those days. O'Shaughnessy was knighted in appreciation of his services and appointed the first Director General of the Indian Telegraph Department. By the end of 1856, and on the eve of the Sepoy Mutiny, there were 4,250 miles of telegraph lines in India and 46 receiving offices.²

On 28 February 1856, while laying down his office Dalhousie penned his famous Minute on the administration of India, which enumerated several examples of the military utility of the electric telegraph. Adding a note to the Minute, he wrote:

I venture to add another and a recent instance of the political value of the electric telegraph which has occurred since this Minute was signed. On the 7th February, as

soon as the administration of Oude was assumed by the British Government, a branch electric telegraph from Cawnpore to Lucknow was forthwith commenced. In eighteen working days it was completed, including the laying of a cable six thousand feet in length across the River Ganges. On the morning on which I resigned from the Government of India, General Outram was asked by telegraph: 'Is all well in Oude?' The answer: 'All is well in Oude' was received soon after noon, and greeted Lord Canning on his first arrival.

The Outbreak in Meerut

As is well known, the insurrection started in Meerut on 10 May 1857. On Saturday, 9 May 1857, a parade was held in Meerut to announce the sentences awarded to eighty-five troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who had refused to use the greased cartridges in April. After announcing the sentences of rigorous imprisonment, the men were stripped and put in fetters, in front of the entire garrison. Under a burning sun, the men of the three Indian regiments - 3rd Light Cavalry, 11th and 20th Native Infantry - watched in sullen silence as black smiths put leg irons on the ankles of each prisoner. The men being shackled implored the Divisional Commander, Major General William Hewitt, to have mercy, and when this failed, loudly called upon their comrades to come to their aid, heaping insults on their commanding officer, Colonel GM Carmichael Smyth, whose folly in holding the parade on 24 April had triggered the crisis. To deter any untoward incident, two British regiments - the 60th Foot and 6th Dragoon Guards - had been placed behind the native troops, in addition to some artillery guns. After the parade, the prisoners were sent to jail, the troops being marched back to their lines. The British officers went back to their bungalows, remarking on the salutary effect the punishment must have had on the natives. As they went to bed that Saturday night, nothing was farther from their minds than a mutiny, in which most of them were to lose their lives. Among them was Colonel John Finnis, commanding the 11th Native Infantry, who had retired after dining at the residence of another officer, where Mr. HH Greathed, the Commissioner of Meerut was also present.

On 10 May 1857, the European community in Meerut was enjoying a lazy Sunday, after the morning church service. Due to

the excessive heat, most of the day was spent indoors, in rooms whose doors and windows had been sealed with *khus tatties* (cooling mats, made of 'khus', a scented plant), which had to be sprinkled with water every few minutes by water bearers sitting outside. The hot winds passing through the *tatties* dried them quickly, the evaporation bringing down the temperature, so that the air passing through them was much cooler when it reached inside. The larger rooms had a big *punkha* (fan) hanging from the ceiling, to circulate the air inside. Motion to the *punkha* was provided by means of a rope passing through a hole in the wall, which was pulled by a coolie sitting outside in the verandah.

The mutiny started in the evening, when members of the British community were getting ready to go to evening church service. As the 60th Rifles, a British unit then in Meerut, was assembling for the church parade, a cry was raised that the British soldiers were intending to descend on the Indian troops, disarm and put them in chains. This caused a panic, precipitating the outbreak. Some Indian troopers galloped to the jail and released their comrades who had been imprisoned the previous day. The whole of the 3rd Cavalry then joined the soldiers of the two Indian infantry regiments who had assembled on the parade ground. Colonel Finnis, commanding the 11th Native Infantry, rode to the parade ground as soon as he heard about the outbreak. He harangued the men, and asked them to return to their duty. His own men had been the last and most hesitant of the rebels: Finnis was confident that his men loved him and would listen to him. But the men of the 20th had no such compunctions. They fired a volley and Colonel Finnis fell, riddled with bullets. He was the first victim of the Great Mutiny.³

The Soldiers were soon joined by a mob of civilians from the *bazaar* (market), who proceeded to murder Europeans and set fire to their houses. Though the troopers of 3rd Cavalry started the mutiny, they did not harm any of their officers. When they set free their colleagues from the jail, they did not release the other prisoners, who were later set free by the mob from the town. They also did not harm the British jailor. In fact, many of the British officers and their families escaped death only because of the help given by Indian soldiers and servants, some of whom risked their lives for this. Among them was the Commissioner, Mr. HH Greathed and his wife, who had moved to the terrace of their bungalow, along

with two British women who had sought shelter with them. When the mob reached his bungalow, it overpowered his guard, set fire to the house and began looking for the occupants. The Greatheds' servant, Golab Khan, assured the horde that he knew where the Commissioner and his family were hiding and offered to take them there. The mob agreed and followed the servant to a haystack, allowing the Greatheds to come down and escape into the garden. The mob returned, infuriated with the deception that had been practiced on them, Golab Khan's life was in danger, but he managed to escape. The mob burned down the bungalow, which soon came down with a crash. The Commissioner and his companions spent the night with the gardener, who concealed them till the morning, when they made their way to the Dragoon Lines.⁴

The Telegraph at Delhi

The telegraph office at Delhi was under the charge of Charles Todd, who was assisted by two Eurasian signallers, Brendish and Pilkington. During the hot weather, the telegraph office remained closed between nine and four on Sundays. All three had been at work since daybreak and were about to close the office at nine and return to their bungalows for rest. As Brendish rose from his desk, the telegraph needle began to move. It was an unofficial message from Meerut that described the excitement that prevailed there on account of the sentences that had been passed on the men of the 3rd Light Cavalry for refusing to use the new cartridges. It stated that eighty men had been imprisoned and were to be blown away from guns. (Actually, eighty-five men had been given sentences ranging from five to ten years). However, there was no indication that an uprising was in the offing, and the telegraph office was closed at the usual hour, at Delhi as well as Meerut.

When Todd reopened his office at four, he discovered that the line to Meerut had been cut. He sent Brendish and Pilkington across the bridge of boats to check the line at the point it entered the River Jumna, from the north-east. They found that the line was working with Delhi, but not towards Meerut. Since it was getting dark, Todd asked them to come back. Meanwhile, at Meerut, the mutiny erupted in the evening, but the information could not be passed to Delhi because the line was not working. However, at midnight the postmaster at Meerut managed to send a private telegram to his aunt in Agra: 'Cavalry have risen setting fire to houses having

killed or wounded all Europeans they could find. If aunt intends starting tomorrow please detain her.'¹⁵ This telegram was shown to the Sir John Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra, who immediately conveyed the information to Lord Canning, the Governor-General in Calcutta.

Next morning at about eight, Todd set off in a *gharry* (carriage) drawn by two ponies to locate the break in the line. When he did not return for several hours, his assistants began to assume the worst. This was confirmed by news picked up by the messengers attached to the telegraph office, who informed that the mutineers had crossed the bridge of boats and entered Delhi. Very soon, they met fugitives from the city who told them that mutineers were looting and murdering shopkeepers, and any European they came across. Brendish and Pilkington proposed heading towards the Flagstaff House Tower on the Ridge, where the officers and European refugees were congregating. However, Mrs. Todd was reluctant to leave without her husband, and it was only at about 2 p.m. that she finally agreed. Before leaving his office, Brendish sent the following message to Ambala: 'We must leave office. All the bungalows are on fire, burned down by the sepoy of Meerut. They came in this morning. We are off. Mr. Todd is dead, I think. He went out this morning and has not returned yet. We heard that nine Europeans were killed.

When Brendish, Pilkington and Mrs. Todd reached the Flagstaff Tower at around three in the afternoon, they found it overflowing. The main circular room was crammed with European refugees and their Indian servants, making it so hot and airless that one observer dubbed it the Black Hole in miniature. Pilkington had a withered leg that needed a special boot, but was relieved when an officer asked if he could return to the telegraph office with an escort and send another message to Ambala. He agreed, and sent the following official telegram from Brigadier Graves, Commanding at Delhi, to the Brigadier Commanding at Ambala: 'Cantonment in a state of siege. Mutineers from Meerut - 3rd Light Cavalry - numbers not known, said to be one hundred and fifty men, cut off communication with Meerut; taken possession of the bridge of boats. 54th Native Infantry sent against them refused to act. Several officers killed and wounded. City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down, but nothing known yet. Information will be forwarded.'¹⁶

This was the last message from Delhi. Later that afternoon the signaller at Ambala noticed the telegraph needle moving as if someone was trying to send a message. But as the sender refused to identify himself, the signaller assumed it was somebody unfamiliar with the apparatus and that all the staff of the Delhi telegraph office had been murdered. Within hours, the message reached every major British cantonment and garrison in the Punjab. The telegraph line had not been extended to Simla, where the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir George Anson, was convalescing. The commander of the Sirhind Division, Major General Sir Henry Bernard, despatched his son, Captain Bernard on horseback from Ambala to Simla with a copy of the telegram. Having warned the various British detachments en route at Kasauli, Dagshai and Subathu, Captain Bernard reached Simla late in the afternoon on 12 May. In spite of his illness, Anson immediately set out for Ambala, where he established his advance headquarters, and began collecting the relief force. On his way to Delhi, Anson died of cholera at Karnal on 26 May, and Major General Sir Henry Bernard temporarily assumed command of the field force. Later, General Sir Colin Campbell was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. The subsequent operations for the suppression of the mutiny are well known and will not be described here. However, the story of two stations where the telegraph played a major role - Lucknow and Lahore - will be recounted.

The Telegraph During the Siege and Relief of Lucknow

The telegraph line from Calcutta to Delhi passed through Varanasi (then called Benaras), Allahabad, Kanpur (then called Cawnpore), Agra and Meerut. The British garrison at Kanpur had surrendered on 27 June, but had been recaptured by Havelock on 17 July. In Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, finding himself hopelessly out numbered, withdrew his troops into the Residency and the Machhi Bhawan. After a few days, Lawrence decided to abandon the Machhi Bhawan, and hold only the Residency. The distance between the two buildings was about 1500 yards, and since both positions were surrounded, it was impossible to send the message through courier. A primitive semaphore had been erected, comprising a post with a bar at the top, from which were suspended a row of black stuffed bags, each having a pulley to raise or lower it. Captain GWW Fulton, Bengal Engineers, assisted by two

volunteers, operated the Residency terminal, 'under a most tremendous musketry and round shot which knocked the post down, jammed the pulleys and cut the ropes several times'. It took Fulton three hours to pass the short message to Lieutenant JJ Macleod-Innes, also of the Bengal Engineers, who was manning the terminal at Machhi Bhawan: 'Spike the guns well. Blow up the fort and retire at midnight.'⁷

Though Lucknow had been linked to the British telegraph network before Dalhousie left India, the line had been destroyed by the rebels, 'who cut up the wires, hammered them into bullets, used the wooden telegraph supports for firewood and adapted the cast-iron tubing into rifled barrels'.⁸ Without the telegraph, Lawrence had considerable difficulty in communicating with other British garrisons. In fact, he had no news of the fate of the British, and whether he was likely to be relieved at all. Messengers had been sent, but most of them had been caught, and killed, after being tortured. The exceptions were Angad Tewari, a pensioned sepoy, and Missar Kanauji Lal, a minor employee of a mofussil court. The exploits of these two master spies, and the ingenious means used by them to convey messages to and from the besieged garrison in the Residency have been documented in *Memories of the Mutiny* by Lieutenant Colonel FC Maude.

On 25 September, a force under Brigadier-General Havelock and Sir James Outram fought their way into the Residency. Angad had made five trips outside the Residency, carrying messages between Lawrence and Havelock, during one of which he had been captured, but was able to escape. With Havelock's entry, the garrison in the Residency was reinforced, but the siege continued. It was only on 7 November that a messenger arrived with the welcome news that a strong army led by the Commander-in-Chief himself was likely to reach Lucknow in the next few days. On 12 November Sir Colin Campbell reached Alam Bagh, just south of Lucknow. Once again, a semaphore was established between Alam Bagh and the Residency, to exchange messages. However, before this could be done, it was necessary for both sides to have the same code. The job of conveying the code from the Residency to Alam Bagh was performed by Kanauji Lal, after the first messenger, a *qasid*, was captured and killed.

Captain P Stewart had taken over as Superintendent of the Electric Telegraphs in India after the departure of O'Shaughnessy. Stewart was in Ceylon when the uprising began, but had rushed back to India, to complete the coastal line linking Calcutta with Madras and Ceylon. On 2 November, he joined Campbell's column at Allahabad on its way to Lucknow. After reaching Kanpur on the 3rd, he immediately began construction of a telegraph line to Lucknow, and by 5 November had managed to lay almost 20 miles. By the time Campbell reached Alam Bagh, the telegraph line had also reached, but unfortunately, the rebels soon destroyed it.

Lucknow was relieved on 17 November but subsequently evacuated, leaving a small force under Outram at Alam Bagh. The Commander-in-Chief returned to Kanpur and established his headquarters there. Preparations began for the reduction of Oudh, and the capture of Lucknow. He also gave orders that the telegraph line linking Kanpur to Lucknow should be made functional, so that he could get regular reports of the progress of convoys and troops. Stewart not only had to re-construct and repair the line over a distance of 53 miles, but open telegraph offices at several places en route. By 19 February 1858, the line to Alam Bagh had been repaired, and offices at Banni Bridge, Nawabganj, Bantera and Alam Bagh had been established.

By the end of February, the army had concentrated at Alam Bagh, and operations against Lucknow commenced on 2 March 1858. Dilkusha was occupied on the 4th, and the telegraph line extended up to Bibiapur, just short of Dilkusha. On the 6th, Outram crossed the River Gomti, and after making a detour, camped at Chinhat on the Faizabad road. As this was not on the direct line of attack, it was decided not to extend the line further until the Martiniere was captured. However, communication with the force at Chinhat was essential, and it was decided to use the semaphore for this purpose. Working round the clock, two double-armed semaphores were constructed by Stewart within the next two days. One was erected on the roof of the Dilkusha, while the other was dispatched to Chinhat, along with the codes. Stewart personally took the semaphore to Chinhat on 9 March but circumstances precluded their use. Describing the incident, Stewart writes:

"The one on the left bank of the Gomti was never erected, for I found on arrival at the Chucker Kothee, the only

prominent building in the neighborhood of the advanced position that morning taken up by General Outram, from which communication with the Dilkusha could be readily carried on, that the lower story of the house was still held by a few of the so called rebels who had already caused a number of casualties by firing from the dark cells they occupied. Shortly after I arrived, an order was given to vacate the building to allow of using guns against it. Part of the building was soon afterwards on fire and I found it too late to commence the use of the semaphore".⁹

Meanwhile, La Martiniere had been occupied, and the objection to the extension of the telegraph removed. In Stewart's absence, inspector McIntyre had erected the line from Dilkusha to the entrance of La Martiniere within two hours of the capture of the latter. The headquarters moved into the building on 10 March. During the day, a telegraph line was taken across the Gomti to a building on the left bank close to Outram's headquarters. On the 12th, the telegraph office was moved from La Martiniere to a tent next to the one occupied by the Commander-in-Chief, enabling him to be in constant touch with Outram, as well as with the rest of the Army. Lucknow fell on 18 March 1858, and the telegraph office moved into the city, with the others at Alam Bagh and at Outram's headquarters closing down.

This was perhaps the first time that the telegraph had been used in battle, to provide minute-to-minute communications. A correspondent of the London Times wrote:

"Never since its discovery has the electric telegraph played so important and daring a role as it now does in India. Without it the Commander-in-Chief would lose the effect of half his Force. It has served him better than his right armso much for its importance. As to the daring action of the telegraph, which includes of course those who direct it, I need only observe that in this war, for the first time, a telegraph wire has been carried under fire and through the midst of a hostile country. *Pari passu*, from post to post it has moved on with our artillery and scarcely has the Commander-in-Chief established his headquarters at any spot where he intended to stay for

a few days when the post and the wire were established also. The telegraph was brought into communication with the Governor-General at Allahabad, with Outram at Alam Bagh, with Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and the most remote districts over which the system is distributed."¹⁰

The Events at Lahore

The story of Lahore is no less interesting. Punjab had become part of British India in 1849 after the end of the Second Anglo-Sikh War, which marked the end of the kingdom established by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the transfer of the Kohinoor diamond to the crown of British monarch. The news of the mutiny reached the telegraph office at Anarkali in Lahore, the capital of Punjab, on the morning of 12 May 1857. Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Punjab was then at Rawalpindi, en route to the Murree Hills, to join his family. The senior civil officer present in Lahore was Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner, whose grandson, BL Montgomery, was later to attain fame as the victor of El Alamein. Shortly after the arrival of the telegram from Ambala conveying the news about the mutiny, Montgomery received the alarming information from a spy that the four native regiments at Lahore were about to join the uprising. Without wasting any time, Montgomery rushed to the cantonment at Mian Mir and conveyed the information to Brigadier Stuart Corbett, the commander of the Lahore garrison, suggesting that he should confiscate the sepoy's ammunition.

Corbett quickly appreciated the danger. There were four native regiments at Lahore - the 16th Grenadiers, the 26th Native Infantry, the 49th Native Infantry and the 8th Light Cavalry. The European troops comprised the 81st Foot and some European horse artillery. The 2,500 Indian soldiers outnumbered the 600 Europeans more than four times. Half a regiment of native infantry and one company of Europeans garrisoned the Lahore Fort. If the native troops rose and took possession of the Fort, it was quite likely that the Sikhs and Muslims in the city, numbering almost one lakh, would join them. Montgomery's suggestion to disarm the native troops appeared to be sound, but he knew that it would cause outrage among the officers. Even as Corbett was pondering over his options, further intelligence was received from the cantonment magistrate that the four native regiments were planning to seize the Fort on

15 May, when the monthly relief took place, doubling the number of armed sepoy in the Fort to over a thousand. It was also revealed that simultaneous mutinies would occur at other stations in Punjab. Corbett decided to go all the way and disarm all native troops in Lahore.

Corbett ordered a general parade of all troops on 13 May. So as not to raise any suspicion among the native troops, it was decided that the ball hosted by officers of the 81st Foot would be held on the previous evening, as planned. Most of the Europeans, including the ladies, knew about the plan to disarm the native troops next morning, but kept up their smiles as they performed their waltzes and quadrilles, so as not to alarm the Indian bearers and mess servants. Early on the morning of 13 May, the four native regiments were drawn up in columns on the grand parade at Mian Mir. Facing them were ten 6-ponder guns and two 12-pound howitzers of the European Horse Artillery. Behind the cannons were six companies of the 81st Foot, their muskets loaded. Riding to the middle of the parade ground, in front of the European officers at the head of the native columns, Brigadier Corbett addressed the men. After praising them for their past deeds he told them that what he was doing was only to keep their name unsullied; he was going to order them to show their loyalty by laying down their arms. The scene has been described by Saul David, who writes:¹¹

Then came the critical moment. 'Order the 16th to pile arms!' commanded Brigadier Corbett. All European eyes were on the tall, black-faced ranks of the 16th Grenadiers - one of the 'beautiful' regiments that had fought under Noli at Kandahar - resplendent in white trousers, tight red coatees with white cross-belts and black shako headdresses that resembled inverted coal scurries. 'Grenadiers, 'shouted their commanding officer, 'shoulder arms!'. They did so. 'Ground arms!' It was done. 'Pile arms!' A few complied, most hesitated. But a quick glance at the black artillery muzzles must have proved decisive. All muskets, bayonets and swords were placed on the ground. 'Stand away from your arms.... Right about face...Quick march!' And away they went unarmed.'

The 26th Native Infantry, which had been made a Light Infantry Corps for sterling service in the First Afghan War followed suit, as

did the 49th. It was then the turn of the 8th Light Cavalry, whose *sowars* were ordered to drop their sabres, pistols and carbines. They obeyed, backed up their horses and rode off the parade ground. While the native troops were being disarmed at the parade ground, the weapons of those in the Fort were removed by the remaining four companies of the 81st Foot. As it soon became clear, the quick action of Montgomery and Corbett had been taken just in time. It was discovered that the disarmed regiments were planning to march that night to Ferozepore and seize the magazine. The previous evening an Indian regiment at Ferozepore had mutinied when it saw the guard on the magazine being replaced by European troops. However, they failed to secure the magazine and fled. (Two months later, the 26th Regiment met an unfortunate end when it mutinied after killing its commanding officer. Many were drowned in the Ravi River being chased by villagers; while the rest were put to death by Sikh levies at Ajnala, under the orders of Frederick Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner).

According to a senior Punjab official, by enabling the authorities at Lahore to disarm the native troops before they had received one word of the uprising at Meerut and Delhi, the telegraph played a key role in the preservation of British India. '*The Electric Telegraph has saved us*' wrote Donald Macleod, the Financial Commissioner of Punjab. He was right. If Lahore had fallen to the rebels, the rest of Punjab would probably have followed suit. And if Punjab - where the majority of European troops were stationed - had been lost, British India might not have endured.¹²

Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of Punjab, whose timely action saved the day at Lahore, also gives credit to the telegraph. Using almost exactly the same words as Macleod, Montgomery wrote to C Raikes, ICS, in Agra on 18 August 1851: 'Under Providence, the Electric Telegraph has saved us'.¹³

Conclusion

If it were not for the foresight of Dalhousie, the telegraph would not have come to India when it did. Had the uprising occurred ten years earlier, it would have been extremely difficult for the British authorities to crush it, without the means of rapid communication like the electric telegraph. Fortunately for the British, the rebels failed to appreciate the value of the telegraph. If they

had, it would not have been difficult for them to disrupt the system as they did at Meerut, Cawnpore and Lucknow, where they cut the telegraph wires. Who knows what would have happened if the British did not have the telegraph in 1851, or had been denied its use? In truth, as far as the revolutionaries were concerned, the telegraph was the accursed string that strangled them.

END NOTES

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6. Saul David, *The Indian Mutiny - 1857*, (London, 2002) p. xxi
7. Diary of Captain G. W. W Fulton, quoted by G. W. Forrest in the *History of the Indian Mutiny*.
8. Dr. Rosie Llewellyn-Jones, 'Reflections from the Lucknow on the Great Uprising of 1857', *USI Journal*, (Oct-Dec 2005), p. 670.
9. Barreto, *History of the Corps of Signals, Volume I*, p. 33, quoting 'Report by Lieutenant P. Stewart, Deputy Superintendent of Telegraphs in India to C. Beadon, Secretary to the Government, Home Department', 8 April 1858.
10. Barreto, *History of the Corps of Signals, Volume I*, p. 33
11. Saul David, *The Indian Mutiny - 1857*, pp. xxii-xxiii.
12. Saul David, *The Indian Mutiny -1857*, p, xxiii.
13. Barreto, *History of the Corps of Signals, Volume I*, p, 34, quoting 'Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North West Province of India during the Mutiny of 1857', p. 491.

Letter to the Editor

Sir

In his very informative and analytic article *Beyond the 123 - Is There A Plan B?* (January-March 2007) General Shankar Roychowdhury has most aptly pointed out the need for fall back strategies to cater for a possible failure of the on going negotiations over the Indo - American nuclear deal. He has hit the nail on the head by suggesting *Swadeshi* nuclear power as the ultimate and the most reliable alternative. He is also very right in saying that "given the necessary focus and *will*, *Swadeshi* nuclear power is definitely do-able". The *will* of the nation, no doubt, is the one single factor that can make anything do-able. It is this *will*, that opens up ways and means for mustering up resources and it is only this *will* that can eradicate corruption and tax-evasion, ensure proper use of funds and produce self-sacrificing, honest and hard-working manpower, so necessary for taking up any national project. It is also this *will* that enables the people to bear the great hardships and sacrifices involved during the initial stages of the project without demurring. But it is exactly here that the problem starts. Lack of "necessary focus and *will*" has, in fact, been the bane of the nation in all major matters pertaining to the nation's development, growth and defence all through the country's post Independence era.

The need for retaining proper focus and exercising strong *national will* first arose in 1962 when we suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. No doubt, we raised the strength of our armed forces three-fold, but was that enough? Even to those of us who witnessed the tragic events from the lowest rung of the ladder it was apparent that not enough was being done*. The strength of the armed forces that a country requires is dictated by the enemy and not by what is convenient. Considering the combined threat from China and Pakistan, hardly anyone can dispute that we are still far short of the required armed strength for facing such a

*Some of us of the younger lot asserted ourselves by writing about it in the USI journal. I for one wrote an article *Act or Perish* (April-June 1964) stressing the need for developing the national will for preparing against the Chinese menace. Interestingly, the NATO Fifteen Nations sought permission of the USI for reproduction of this article, which did not materialise for some reason or the other.

threat. Evidently, the *national will* tends to wilt in the face of the colossal effort required to prepare for the eventuality of having to prepare against both China and Pakistan at the same time. Consequently, an easier course based on convenience continues to be preferred - preparing against the weaker foe and hoping for the best against the strong.

Let alone China, we would not appear to be adequately prepared even against Pakistan. The effectiveness of the deterrent that we believe to have developed against the threat from Pakistan should be judged more from the way Pakistan has continued to be tempted to go to war with us again and again than the fact that it has been prevented each time from achieving its military objectives. An effective deterrent would leave no doubt in an opponent's mind as to the outcome of a war. Like China has left no such doubt in our minds. Had we been to Pakistan what China is to us, Pakistan would never have gone to war with us more than once. When Mr. Altaf Gauhar, Information Secretary to President Ayub Khan in the 1960's wrote in *The Nation*, an English daily of Pakistan, that all Pakistani operations against India 'were conceived and launched on the basis of one assumption: that the Indians are too cowardly and ill organised to offer any effective military response which could pose a threat to Pakistan', he was probably referring to miscalculations by the military junta before going to war with India as an alibi for Pakistan's failures. But it certainly shows our deterrence in poor light.

It does not look as if the Kargil Committee Report would make the status of our deterrence against Pakistan any better. According to the report, "the alternative [to 'Siachenisation'] should be a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violations of the sanctity of the LOC". While one cannot dispute the inherent wisdom of the suggested policy, it would be well to remember that for such a policy to be 'credible' and effective it must be backed by adequate military strength. In fact, where is the need for any declaration of this policy, if the country concerned possesses the matching force level? The military strength would speak for itself. We have the example of China before us. It has left the Indo - Tibetan border more or less unoccupied and yet no one can think of violating it - not even for intruding into territory

under its illegal occupation. India, on the other hand, does not seem to possess a military deterrent strong enough to enforce such a policy.

Obviously, the *will* of the nation required for pushing through a cause cannot be taken for granted. Special efforts on the part of the government are required for inculcating it by educating a lot many people, on what is required to be done and convincing them of not only the do and die aspect of the cause, but also its own sincerity in the matter. This is easier said than done and considering that there is no precedence of any Indian Government embarking upon the task of creating the *national will* for any cause whatsoever; asking the present one to do so in respect of the proposed *Swadeshi* Nuclear Power may prove to be a rather tall order.

Yours sincerely

Major Brahma Singh (Retd)

FROM THE EDITOR

I need to inform members that the *review* of the book titled - 'Followers of Krishna : Yadavas of India', authored by Major General SDS Yadava (New Delhi : Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2006), published in the USI Journal January-March 2007, had some factual errors. This was pointed out by one of our members, Colonel NN Bhatia (Retd). I have, subsequently, also exchanged communication with the author.

Through this column, I would like to clarify that there are no errors in the book itself. However, the Reviewer has mentioned Lt Col TP Raina as the Commander of the Kumaon Regiment. He perhaps meant - Brigadier TN Raina, MVC (later rose to be the Chief of Army Staff) who was the then Commander of 114 Infantry Brigade responsible for the defence of Chushul. Similarly, the Reviewer, though mentioning Major Shaitan Singh as the Charlie Company Commander, refers to 'his platoon' subsequently. All the same, such errors in the USI Journal are regrettable.

Through this note, I would request the *book reviewers* to ensure that no factual errors are allowed to creep in. Should any factual mistakes or inconsistencies in the book itself come to their notice, they must point these out. I would like to end with the words - to err is human, but a mistake which is avoidable ought to be avoided.

Guidelines for book reviewers are published on the next page of the Journal.

GUIDELINES FOR BOOK REVIEWERS

Definition

"A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarise, set in context, describe strengths and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is in his duty to discharge with reason and consistency".

Admiral HG Rickover.

Guidelines

A book review is a critical evaluation of a work or a book to help the reader by your assessment. For a reader to be guided by your evaluation, it must be objective. A few guidelines are given below :-

- (a) Is the information factually correct ?
- (b) Criticism is not a review.
- (c) Is the book going to be an addition to the existing knowledge on the subject ?
- (d) Present the reader what the book contains.
- (e) Author's previous writing experience and performance; has he done better this time or otherwise.
- (f) Some quotes from the book can be given to illustrate the point. These should be limited and the whole paragraph should not be lifted.
- (g) How is the presentation ? What impact does it make ?
- (h) What does the book say ? (the main theme). How does it say it ?
- (i) Price – is it reasonable or high ?
- (k) The length of the review should be kept within 200-300 words.
- (l) *Complete details of the book (s) reviewed to be given at the top of the review in the order specified below. It may be noted that the order specified should be followed by a coma or colon as specified here.*
 - (i) Title and subtitle of the book (first letters capitals).
 - (ii) Author's name(s) (if it is an edited version then it should be clearly mentioned as - Edited by...).
 - (iii) Place of Publication : Name of Publisher, Year (all in brackets), pages (to be written as pp.), Price (to be specified as Rs or \$ etc. only, without writing the word 'Price'), ISBN-

Example - State Building in Europe : The Revitalisation of Western European Integration. Edited by Volken Bornschier (Cambridge UK : Cambridge University Press, 2000)/ pp..326, £ 15.95 (if it is a round figure/ it should be £ 15.00)/ ISBN 0-521-781035.

BIMSTEC : A Subset of India's Look East Policy*

Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)**

One of the cornerstones of India's strategy has been to develop India economically and technologically. Another facet of India's policy has been to seek partnerships on the strategic, economic and technological fronts to widen its policy and development options in order to safeguard its interests. The strategy adopted to meet these policy objectives is to restore our traditional links and integrate India with its immediate and extended neighbourhood, besides responding positively to the imperatives of globalisation. This translates into an Indian vision of being well connected to Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian Region and beyond on the western flank, and to Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and beyond on the eastern flank through a network of multi-nodal transport corridors. These networks would facilitate trade, exchange of energy through oil and gas pipelines, promotion of tourism and increase of communication links leading to what can be termed as a zone of co-prosperity. Therefore, a number of regional and sub regional initiatives have been undertaken to promote economic and technical cooperation.

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is one such initiative for sub regional integration. The need for BIMSTEC and its progress has to be seen in the context of a number of other regional and sub-regional initiatives present in the region. For instance, BIMSTEC contains most of the major SAARC countries other than Pakistan. Further, India also has a trilateral dialogue with Myanmar and Thailand addressing the same issues. It can also be said that because SAARC has not made any progress due to intransigence of Pakistan, BIMSTEC was another alternative to engage most of the other the South Asian countries to promote economic cooperation. There is also a Ganga – Mekong Initiative to link countries of Mekong Basin (Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) with India. All these are in addition to the major organisation in South East Asia, i.e. ASEAN. Even though there is an overlap in goals and objectives of a number of regional and sub regional groupings, BIMSTEC remains an important sub set of India's 'Look East Policy' set in motion in the mid 1990s.

*Towards BIMSTEC - Japan Comprehensive Economic Cooperation. Edited by Crispin Bates (Anthem Press : London, New York, 2006); 539p, price not indicated, ISBN 1-84331-720-6 (Pbk).

**Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd) is a Senior Research Fellow at the USI.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVII, No. 568, April-June 2007.

The book is a comprehensive treatise on the evolving relationship between Japan and the sub regional grouping. It is an edited volume of well researched papers by eminent authors who are specialists in their fields. The book has been divided into three parts to include emerging patterns of comprehensive economic cooperation in the first part and sectoral issues in the second part. Some development experiences, emerging issues, the trend and direction of future cooperation between Japan and the BIMSTEC have been plotted in the third part. Most of the essays are very informative, easy to read and give definitive recommendations and conclusions. Some authors have also used economic models which are more appropriate for consideration by technical experts. For example, in Chapter 6, the author uses the Gravity Model, which has been used for analysis of NAFTA and South Asia to examine prospects of BIMSTEC-Japan cooperation. In Chapter 7, the author uses econometric modelling to establish that geographical characteristics of a region also play an important role in facilitating trade. Thus, the book bears the stamp of rigorous research and technical analysis of the subject.

The initial chapters include a broad survey of the cultural contacts between Japan and the countries of the region. The need for working towards economic and trade cooperation which would lead to a mutual win-win outcome for all the involved entities both in the spheres of political as well as economic engagement has also been analysed. Complementarities in the economics and other fields are also highlighted. It is also visualised that such cooperation may lead to a broader strategic cooperation between Japan and BIMSTEC.

According to its charter BIMSTEC covers 13 priority sectors identified by member countries in a voluntary manner; namely, trade and investment, technology, energy, transport and communication, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, cultural co-operation, environment and disaster management, public health, people-to-people contact, poverty alleviation, and counter-terrorism and transnational crimes. However, six of the predominant sectors have been taken up for discussion in Part II of the book. Individual chapters in this part cover the areas of trade, investment, technology, energy, transport and tourism.

Trade and investment issues have been elaborated upon in six chapters; thus forming the major portion of the book, while technology takes up two chapters and discussion on energy, transport and tourism are taken up in one chapter each. Chapter 5 gives the Japanese perspective and recommends a number of measures for improving economic cooperation and trade. The author acknowledges that multi-lateral arrangements would be ideal. However, he concludes that given the current realities, bilateral

arrangements between Japan and BIMSTEC member countries may yield better results. Chapters 6 and 7 foresee a more hopeful and bright picture provided infrastructure is improved upon and foreign direct Investment especially, through Japan and other entities is injected into the region. Chapters 8 to 10 build up on some of the arguments advanced in the previous chapters to make a case for enhanced cooperation between Japan and BIMSTEC.

Part III of the book deals with future directions of BIMSTEC-Japan cooperation, emerging issues and two case studies of Japanese investments in India. Complementarity of Information Technology sector between India and Japan has also been emphasised upon in this part of the book. The book, therefore, covers a lot of ground in dealing with issues associated with BIMSTEC-Japan cooperation. Some comparisons with other regional and sub regional groupings have been done very succinctly throughout the book. Yet, a separate Chapter on a comparative analysis with the other regional and sub-regional organisations would have made the book more comprehensive.

Overall, the book has carried out an in-depth analysis and looks at barriers prevalent in the member countries and offers practical solutions to the same. It is a valuable book for researchers, policy makers and serious students of the mechanics of regional integration.

Nuclear Strategy – Reconsidered*

Colonel Ali Ahmed**

The author of the book under review, Dr Sudha Raman, is the Research Coordinator at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation at the USI, New Delhi. Her book is the outcome of her doctoral thesis at the Disarmament Wing at the School of International Studies, JNU where late Dr M Zuberi, the renowned thinker on nuclear question, was her supervisor. The book deals with a compelling, though relatively ignored, angle on the nuclear issue - that of the morality of nuclear weapons. She approaches this challenging issue through the perspective of 'Just War' doctrine. Thus, within the covers of the book are two vast subjects, Nuclear Strategy and 'Just War'.

The author copes with the matter by first reviewing the development of nuclear deterrence in the USA during the Cold War years. She takes a particularly close look at nuclear targeting as it developed in pace with the evolution of doctrine from that of massive retaliation, through flexible response to assured destruction. Thereafter, she moves on to discussing the Christian Doctrine of 'Just War' as it developed over the millennium. Finally, she examines the implications of Just War doctrine for nuclear deterrence. This chapter relies on her M Phil thesis 'Ethics and Nuclear Strategy' based on the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the US of 1983 that is rightly excerpted as an appendix. Her refreshing reflections bring the arguments up to date from the Cold War to the age of terrorism. Her conclusions form the remainder of the slim volume made bulky by forty pages of bibliography, one that could be improved by grouping references under appropriate sub-headings.

Just War theory has seven principles to guide reflection on legitimacy of waging war. These are relevant to the starting of war or *jus ad bellum* - criteria for permissibility of war. The seven considerations for waging war are: legitimate authority, just cause, peaceful intention, last resort, reasonable proportionality, hope for success and after due declaration. In so far as *jus in bello* - permissible conduct in war - considerations are concerned, these are proportionality and discrimination.

Against these nine principles of the two streams of 'Just War', Raman engages with deterrence strategies over three decades, from containment dating from the Truman period to the Strategic Defence Initiative of Reagan. In doing so, she tackles deterrence and the possible consequences of its

***Nuclear Strategy : The Doctrine of Just War**, Sudha Raman, (Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2006); Rs 495.00, 242p, ISBN 8-17049-269-6.

**Colonel Ali Ahmed is Commanding Officer 4th Battalion, The Maratha Light Infantry. *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXXVII, No. 568, April-June 2007.

breakdown into strategic nuclear war or limited nuclear war. In the course of her discussion on deterrence she grapples with terms such as counter value, counter force, decapitating, collateral damage, targeting sets and lists. These are set against more demanding concepts related to Just War such as peace, justice, moral limits and legality. The book, therefore, requires to be re-read for the pay-off of clarity on the arguments.

The Pastoral Letter gives out the position of the Church on the nuclear question. The specifics of this position include the general inadmissibility of nuclear war; striving for nuclear superiority must be rejected; and nuclear deterrence must be a step closer to eventual nuclear disarmament. Certain policy relevant observations till today are : halting of testing, production and deployment of new weapons, negotiated cuts in arsenals, support for a comprehensive test ban treaty, removal of short range nuclear weapon systems and strengthening command and control. The major recommendations are : adoption of a 'policy of no first use' and for development of an alternative defence posture.

The Author's conclusion is that nuclear weapons are incompatible with the 'Just War' doctrine. Ambiguity attends her assessment of deterrence as strategy in light of its desired consequences of keeping war itself at bay and in case of war, limiting it to the lowest levels of nuclear use and destruction. Even the Pastoral Letter admits to the necessity of deterrence, but is against vertical proliferation in its support for the concept of 'sufficiency'. Her pragmatic acceptance of the seeming contradiction is best explained in her own words, "It has never been really easy to come up with a clearly defined policy that would contain nothing regrettable or destructive."

Morality of nuclear weapons has been utilised by both their votaries and denouncers to forward respective arguments. The nuclear maximalist Bharat Karnad devotes some space in his voluminous '*Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*' to the morality of these weapons in the *Kautilyan* tradition of indigenous realist thinking. Noted nuclear abolitionists Bidwai and Vanaik are equally persuasive in citing Indian tradition on the amorality of these weapons in their book, '*South Asia on a Short Fuse : Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament.*'

Raman avoids the subcontinental context in restricting her treatment of deterrence of the Cold War only through the Just War lens. That this area has already been covered by Western writers as evidenced in the bibliography, should spur the Author into tackling the two issues in their context closer home. The book, however, is ground breaking in so far as the subject not having been comprehensively addressed by any Indian writer so far. Thus, she is uniquely positioned in light of her grasp of the twin subjects to add another to her corpus.

Governing Pakistan*

Lieutenant General A M Vohra PVSM (Retd)**

Mohammad Ayub Khan became the country's first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief in 1951 and subsequently served as the Defence Minister, as well, in the second cabinet of Mohammad Ali Bogra. Iskandar Mirza, the President of Pakistan, declared martial law on 7 October 1958 and appointed Ayub as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Three weeks later, Ayub deposed Mirza and took over as President on 27 October 1958. He maintained personal diaries covering a turbulent period in Pakistan's history from 2 September 1966 to 30 October 1972, which included his presidency until 24 March 1969 (when he yielded to Yahya Khan), period of Yahya's rule, as also the appointment of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President and Martial Law Administrator on 20 December 1971.

The diaries were kept under wraps for more than 30 years. Indeed, in the author's note, the Field Marshal mentions that as the contents are sensitive material affecting personalities and events "having a bearing on or relationship with, or influence on, the affairs of Pakistan", these cannot be used for long time to come.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto features prominently. He left President Ayub Khan's cabinet in July 1966. "He went because during the last year or so, something perceptible went wrong with him.....He was working fast in the direction of becoming another Krishna Menon or Subandrio (Indonesian Foreign Minister 1960-66). Besides, he started drinking himself into a stupor and led a very loose life. It is a pity that a man of considerable talent went astray." On 18 Nov 1966, Ayub on a visit to UK, records that the British PM, Harold Wilson said, "I am glad you got rid of Bhutto. He was not trustworthy". On 23 May 1967, Ayub records that Said Hassan, one time Pakistan's representative at the UN, told him that when Bhutto came as the head of Pakistan's delegation to the General Assembly, he asked to see Christian Herter, the US Secretary of State. At this meeting, he volunteered to spy for the USA on all the delegations to the UN. When he met Lord Gore, the British representative, he extolled the role of the Commonwealth and said that Pakistan had no use for the Soviets or the USA.

*"Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972". Edited and annotated by Craig Baxter, (Karachi : Kagzi Printers, Oxford University Press, 2007), 599p, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 978-0-19-547442-B.

**Lieutenant General AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd) is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff. *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXXVII, No. 568, April-June 2007.

Apart from such observations on Bhutto's factitious behaviour, the diary spells out his activity against Ayub and what was in Ayub's eyes, against the State. On 13 September 1968, Ayub records, "Bhutto, since leaving the Cabinet, has been indulging in every form of mischief and disruption directed at me, of course," but not sparing the vital interests of the country." Earlier on 6 February 1967, Ayub wrote, "Bhutto has had a long run in talking nonsense. Time has come when his pretensions should be exposed....." Another personality that claims Ayub's ire is Asghar Khan, former C-in-C of the Pakistan Air Force "who belonged to Bhutto's group for a long time.....has seen fit to make a vile attack on the government and its policies based on half truth and down right falsehoods. This neurotic and unreasoned person may surprise strangers but those who know him well, are well aware that it is nothing but fulminations of a shallow, frustrated and shut in introvert not above cunning and deceit", writes the Field Marshal on 17 November 1968.

Having assumed Presidency in October 1958, Ayub instituted Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in August 1959. This disqualified a substantial number of politicians from the pre Ayub period from electoral activity. He introduced 'Basic Democracy'. The Diaries do not go into the details of this political experience but it obviously failed to satisfy the people and there was political unrest. The EBDO had to be ended in December 1966. The unrest grew, opposition parties met in Dacca in Jan 1969 and demanded full democracy through direct election based on adult franchise. On 21 February 1969, Ayub records, "law and order situation has deteriorated everywhere. In Dacca and surrounding areas there were sporadic cases of looting and burning of private property....."

"I have been going over the events of the last few weeks in my mind. The situation is that whilst the opposition has been whipping up lawlessness, our own party (Muslim League) is disintegrating." In these circumstances, he spells out the choices before him as under:

- (a) Stick out whatever the cost and fight but would that cool the situation?
- (b) Declare that he was not a candidate for the next presidential election, this, he felt may help cool the situation somewhat, enable the elections to be held and leave him some power to influence the election of a good man, if the presidential system was to stay.

On 23 February 1969, Ayub records, "held a cabinet meeting and explained reasons for my decision not to contest the next elections.....when the others had left, the C-in-C, Gen Yahya Khan was definite that the time had come for the imposition of a countrywide martial law to save the country."

On 24 March 1969, Ayub records, "today, I have written a letter to General Yahya explaining how the civilian machinery has ceased to be effective and why it is necessary for me to step aside and hand over to him so that normalcy and decency can be brought back." In this letter Ayub writes, "I am left with no option but to step aside and leave it to the Defence Forces of Pakistan, which today represent the only effective and legal instrument to take full control of the affairs of the country."

It is interesting to note that Ayub genuinely believed that Pakistan was not ready for a proper democratic dispensation. While on a visit to his daughter and son-in-law in Swat, he records on 13 April 1969, "General Yahya has stated that, at an appropriate time, elections will be held on the basis of direct adult franchise and chosen representatives of the people will be given the task of framing a constitution. This is the height of wishful thinking." Again on 28 August 1969, he records that Sabir, the Chief reporter of Pakistan Times, came to see him and spoke despairingly of the politicians. "He felt, we are just not capable of running any form of democracy. On 27 November 1969, Ayub records apprehensions about Yahya's constitutional plans: undoing of one unit; representation on the basis of population; elections commencing 5 October (1970); Assembly to frame the constitution within 120 days; political meetings allowed from 1 January 1970. He concludes, "I have been spared the agony of dismembering the country (from one unit to two: East & West).

The Field Marshal continued to observe political developments and pen his observations till 30 November 1972 when he stopped recording due to his ill health. He passed away on 20 April 1974.

The Diaries are absorbing for those interested in political developments on the sub-continent.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

The State, Democracy and Anti-Terror Laws in India. By Ujjwal Kumar Singh (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2007), 345p, Rs 695.00, ISBN 10:7829-670-5 (India-HB).

Laws like the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) are enacted to address what the state deals with as extraordinary situations. These emerge as exceptions to the ordinary legal and judicial procedure. The book has attempted to examine public debates surrounding extraordinary laws like POTA and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) by enumerating facts of specific cases, procedures adopted at trials and judgements under the above two statutes.

The author has argued that extraordinary laws have ramifications for people's life, political institutions, the rule of law and democratic functioning. He has shown how such laws assume 'normalcy' and acquire a place of permanence in state practices. He has examined the pattern in which such extraordinary laws manifest dominant configurations of political power and ideology. While exploring the unfolding of POTA in specific contexts, the book shows how the law was enmeshed in the politics of *Hindutva*, electoral and coalition politics. It takes into account complexities of centre-state relations and the politics of repression. It focuses on impact of reconciliation against nationality struggles while negotiating issues of poverty and development.

The concluding paragraph brings out that substantive liberty, which holds out the promise of weaving rights into legal formalism, based on the assumption that citizens have moral and political rights, the latter to be enforced by and through courts, remain inadequately realised, precisely because the safeguards are sought to be woven into laws founded on principles of procedural exceptionalism.

The effort comes out well-researched, thought-provoking and topical. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of politics, law, security studies and human rights.

Major General Nilendra Kumar, AVSM, VSM

Managing South Asia's Waters. Edited by Imtiaz Alam (Lahore : South Asian Policy Analysis Network, 2006), 230p, price not indicated, ISBN 969-9060-07-7.

South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network came up with the initiatives of South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) and the South

Asian Journal in 2005. In April 2006, 14 working groups of scholars from South Asian countries met at Islamabad at a conference organised by South Asian Journal. They deliberated on issues which included trade, tariff, investment, commerce, energy, water, cooperative security, conflict resolution, nuclear stabilisation, human security, political integration, South Asian Parliament, and rewriting of history. A SAPANA declaration (given at the end of the book) addresses the process of evolving a holistic and integrated South Asian vision to face challenges of the 21st Century. The publication is in 14-volumes. The book under review is the sixth volume dealing with the topic of 'water issues' in South Asia. Agriculture, urbanisation and industries are competing as drinking water becomes scarce.

At the operational level, it is a matter of use of rivers and ground water. The Indus basin is shared by India and Pakistan. The massive Ganga, Brahmaputra, Meghna Basins are shared by Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Nine scholars from India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh have penned 12 papers on issues pertaining to water. The topics such as hydro-nationalism, different perceptions of upper and lower riparian, and untapped hydro potential of the Himalayas are covered. Irritants and opportunities on bilateral treaties such as the Indus Water Treaty (India and Pakistan), Ganga Water Treaty (India and Bangladesh) and Mahakali Treaty (Nepal-India) are included. The choices that emerge are : multi purpose and multilateral cooperation, decentralisation and local management, long term ecological well being of water bodies and human security.

This is a good effort to demolish the myth that future wars will be over water.

Colonel PK Gautam (Retd)

The Eagle Strikes : The Royal Indian Air Force 1932-50. By Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (New Delhi : Ambi Knowledge Resources, 2006), 340p, Price not indicated, ISBN 819035910X.

As the name implies, the book covers the history of the IAF from its inception to the time India became Republic. The book is in the form of a 'coffee-table book', lavishly produced and profusely illustrated with some really rare photographs of the era gone by. Chhina has a remarkable way of telling the story and he has more than succeeded in captivating the readers' interest throughout the book. The book, along with photographs, has some very relevant excerpts of '*the RIAF Journal*' of that period, which have made the book even more absorbing. All in all, this is a well researched book.

The book consisting of 340 pages is divided into sixteen chapters and six appendices. These chapters can be divided into four distinct parts. The first describing the birth of the IAF and its baptism in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) is covered in the first four chapters viz., 'Birth of an Air Force'; 'Baptism of Fire on the Frontier'; 'Prelude to the Battle'; and 'More Frontier Warfare'. Starting with the recommendations of the Skeene Committee and the dispatch of the first batch of pilots to the United Kingdom for training, good two years before the IAF came into being, its induction into the NWFP and how the newly formed No.1 Squadron matched more experienced RAF units, the eagerness to take on each and every challenge and then coming out with flying colours are all covered in these chapters. The environment in which the IAF operated in this hostile region has been very well brought out. This part also covers the formation of coastal defence flights and the role played by them at the outbreak of the Second World War.

The second part deals with the role played by the IAF in Burma and its growth and expansion during the period between 1942 and 1945. This period is covered in seven chapters and naturally forms the bulk of the book. The deeds of various squadrons have been described in detail and in most absorbing manner. The chapters: 'The Second Arakan Campaign,' the Battles of Imphal, Kohima and Central Burma,' and 'Arakan Triumph,' really stand out amongst others.

The third part consisting of one chapter describes the role played by No.4 Squadron during occupation duties in Japan. In this Chapter, Chhina has covered fresh ground as most of the air force historians have paid little or no attention to this vital task that IAF was asked to share with the Allied Forces.

The fourth part of the book covers the era immediately after India became Independent. Chhina has covered it adequately though one wishes that the process of division of the assets of the unified Royal Indian Air Force into the air forces of India and Pakistan had been also covered. It is an integral but not very widely known fact of the IAF's history.

The fifth part of the book covers the two operations that the RIAF was involved in immediately after Independence- Kashmir and Hyderabad. Unfortunately, Chhina falters in this pan. The RIAF played a decisive and very significant role in Jammu and Kashmir. This very vital part of the IAF's history has been covered in just six pages. Chhina does not mention about the only aerial engagement with the Pakistani Dakota and the attacks by the RIAF over Gilgit. On the other hand, Operation Polo-the name given to operation against Hyderabad has been covered adequately; again this

has been an uncharted territory as far as the history of the IAF is concerned.

The final chapter is on personalities of the period. This is a welcome addition as the chapter highlights the deeds of some of the lesser known persons along with some of the most outstanding personalities of the IAF of that era. It is indeed an interesting and a unique chapter.

The appendices cover the honours and awards from 1937 onwards till and including those awarded for action in Jammu and Kashmir, list of all war casualties from 1939 to 1947 (surprisingly, the list does not include those killed in the Jammu and Kashmir Operations-these are included in Chhina's earlier book) and other data regarding achievements of the RIAF in Burma and strength of personnel from 1st July 1933 to 1st August 1947.

All in all, Chhina has done a remarkable job. The collection of photographs is indeed unique. The book- 'The Eagle Strikes' is a book that must be read and possessed by every person who has anything to do with the IAF.

Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Islam in the European Union : Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror. Edited by Yunas Samuel and Kasturi Sen (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2007), 251p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 0-19-547251-9.

The book is the result of a Conference on "Youth, Gender and Transnational Identities and Islamophobia" conducted by the European Commission under its Fifth Framework Programme in 2003. It consists of a series of essays and papers by different scholars giving a comprehensive view of Muslims in the European Union, their socio-economic conditions, identity crisis, problems of transnationalism and multiculturalism. These issues have assumed greater significance in the aftermath of London bombings of July 2005 and terrorist attacks in Spain and some other countries of the European Union.

Europe has a history of democratisation of Islam and its founder which goes back at least a millennium, though the term Islamophobia is of a recent origin. Subsequent decline of Islamic power, ascendancy of European Civilisation since the 16th Century and a spirit of scientific and scholarly enquiry triggered by the Renaissance contributed to a better understanding of Islam, but unfortunately it remained confined to the intellectual class and popular prejudices still persist, inspite of common origin of Islam and Christianity. The book effectively counters the superficial clash of civilisation thesis and hackneyed view of Islam, while highlighting serious problems of racism, social discrimination and political marginalisation

faced by the European Muslims; specially source of the so called "War on Terror" has been embarked upon. Section 4 is particularly important as it effectively illustrates how established civil liberties have been curtailed which disproportionately affect Muslim minorities, ostensibly to ensure security. All in all, the book carries a timely warning to rectify some of the deep rooted problems of discrimination, prejudices and faulty legal framework in achieving European aims of egalitarianism and a multicultural, harmonious Europe.

Commodore M R Khan, VSM (Retd)

Trade, Tariffs and Customs in South Asia. Edited by Imtiaz Alam (Lahore : South Asia Policy and Analysis (SAPANA) Network, 2006), 248p, Price - not indicated, ISBN - NA.

This book, Volume II, is part of a series of 14 works published by Lahore based South Asian Policy Analysis Networks (SAPANA). It examines "the problems of standardizing customs laws, improving trade facilities and encouraging regional cooperation in trade". South Asian Journal, together with South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), organised a conference titled 'Envisioning South Asia' in Islamabad (Pakistan) on 29-30 April 2006 which led to publication of a 14 Volume series titled South Asian Studies with the support of Dutch and Norwegian Embassies. [Two of these, Volume XIII and VII on issues related to "SAARC" and "Security and Nuclear Stabilisation in South Asia" were reviewed in our January-March 2007 issue by Lt Gen RN Kapur, PVSM, AVSM and Bar (Retd) and Ms Arundhati Ghose, IFS (Retd) respectively].

It dreams a well laid out road map for South Asia-Tariff and Customs Union. Economic union leading to eventual political union of SAARC Countries from the previous South Asia Preferential Trade Association [SAPTA] to the present South Asia Free Trade Area [SAFTA] that came into force in 2006 and also go for Monetary Union and South Asia Parliament in the process. Recently concluded SAARC Summit in Delhi in April 2007, carried the agenda further with putting in place South Asia Development Fund, South Asia University and to work on poverty, water, energy, environment amongst others.

Basic technical papers are by Amir Ullah Khan, SJ Mohanty and Nisha Taneja from India; M Sulaiman Khan from Pakistan; Dilli Prakash Ghimire from Nepal and Douglas Jayasekera from Sri Lanka. But it is the contributions by Shahid Burki ex-Vice President, World Bank and Finance Minister of Pakistan, Dr S Akbar Zaidi, a leading Pakistani Social Scientist and SAPANA Conference Declaration at the end that merit a read by the Policy Makers here. Mr. Burki advocates a model for Pakistan to draw on

the Indian experience initially and then go on to a new approach. That is to say, start with Information Technology Communication model of ours and to then become hub of North-South and East-West Commerce [with road, rail, airways and ports networks] for China, Central Asia, Iran with the rest of South Asia. Afghanistan is now a member, though Myanmar is still out but China, Japan, the EU and the USA enjoyed Observer status in this Summit. Dr Zaidi accepts the paramount importance of globalisation and liberalisation forces and to some extent privatisation that prods South Asia Countries to come closer in trade. The increase in trade need not wait until a certain level of development has been achieved by these developing countries. The SAPANA declaration added at the end, has fine prints that are alarming. Whilst propagating universal disarmament, it says that South Asia should start to transform into a nuclear weapons free zone. They want to rewrite History, having a few lines on religion, extremism, minorities, women's concerns with human rights, people to people contact, human security making up the scenario.

To conclude, all in all, it is a stupendous effort at NGOs and people to people levels of SAPANA Network to take SAFTA to its logical conclusion.

Commander Prem P Batra (Retd)

History of the Corps of Signals, Volume II : From Outbreak of World War II (1939) to Partition & Independence (1947). By Major General VK Singh, (New Delhi : The Corps of Signals Association, 2006) 392p, Price not indicated, ISBN-NA.

This is the second volume of History of the Corps of Signals being published by The Corps of Signals Association. The third volume is being compiled at present. The author Major General VK Singh, is well known to our readers. An active member of the USI, he is currently holding Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair (2006-07) at USI for carrying out research on "Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Freedom Movement in India". Two recently published books by the author are, *Through-Saga of the Corps of Signals* and *Leadership in the Indian Army- Biographies of Twelve Soldiers*, both master pieces in their own right.

Military historians as a genre suffer from a peculiar predicament. If they base their work entirely on available records, it becomes a dreary read. Any attempt at basing it on hearsay, brands them with questionable credibility. Major General VK Singh has very successfully overcome this by interposing his writing with personal accounts of whichever veterans of that vintage that he could come across. That makes this book a very

absorbing account of happenings from 1939 to 1947, with particular reference to activities of the Corps of Signals.

The Book covers expansion of the Corps of Signals from mere 6,411 to 82,192 all ranks during World War II. List of units raised during the War is quite impressive. In a very short period, this portion of the Indian Army had to be converted from animal transport to mechanised transport. Mechanisation brought in new technologies in desert and jungle communications which, thanks to Indian ingenuity, were successfully adopted. War in Africa, Europe, Middle East and South East Asia is covered very comprehensively. World War II was followed by Independence and traumatic partition of the Country resulting in crucial voids, which were very successfully filled, getting the Indian Army ready for ensuing Indo-Pak War of 1947-48.

A result of very extensive research, one is repeatedly impressed by the hard work put in by the author in various archives of the Government of India. This book is of immense value not only to personnel of the Corps of Signals, but to every student of Military History and World War II. Written in simple language, the General's hallmark easy style shines through dreary accounts of battles lost and won.

Major General Yatindra Pratap (Retd)

The Asian Defence Review 2006. Edited by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VSM, IAF (Retd) (New Delhi : Knowledge World), 279p, Rs. 620.00, ISBN : 81-87966-53-X.

This is the first issue of the annual publication planned under the aegis of the Centre for Air Power Studies. China's economic progress and modernisation of its armed forces, India's strides towards achieving regional and global status, availability of petroleum reserves amongst other aspects, are increasing Asia's stature and bringing it centre-stage in global affairs. The volume is a compilation of eight articles dealing with various topics related to the strategic and security dimensions of Asia. Articles written by research scholars at the Institute are well researched and contain numerous details including statistical data.

'The Lebanon War 2006' recapitulates the events leading to the war and major events. It however, highlights the aspect that a regular well equipped and trained Israeli Army could not defeat the *Hamas*! It ponders over the possibility wherein, conventional forces of a state(s) may be challenged by suitably equipped groups employing guerilla tactics. The possible emerging scenarios need to be evolved and analysed; adequate responses to them need to be worked out; its feasibility in our context

cannot be denied. The articles "Trends in Defence Spending" and "China's Military Modernisation and the Russian Connection" highlight the fact that if present trends continue, the balance of military capability would continue to tilt in China's favour and that modernisation of the PLA is not merely a consequence of economic development but should be viewed in terms of it having enhanced capabilities. What emerges is that China has the capability to exercise any option, especially with the accretion of its infrastructure in Tibet; we can ignore the implications only at our peril! The article "The Fissile Material Fuss: India, Indo-US Relations and the FMCT" raises pertinent questions, viz, how much fissile material is required for a credible second strike capability? Will the FMCT constrain India achieving its need of fissile material? It suggests that India needs to focus on enhancing survivability and reliable means of delivery rather than producing more fissile material; these merit consideration.

Other articles on Energy Security, Pakistan's Economy : Trends and Prospects, Technological Requirements of Network Centric Warfare and India's Defence Procurement Policy provide good background material for those interested in further research. The publication fulfills its avowed aim of providing relevant reference material and would be a useful addition to libraries.

Lieutenant General Arvind Sharma, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The Deadly Embrace: Religion, Politics and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947-2002. Ed. by Ian Talbot (Oxford University Press, 2007), 189p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 9878-0-19547364-3.

The first seven chapters of the book are devoted to the growth of communal violence in India, and the last two to Islamic violence within Pakistan. The first chapter deals with the violence, which accompanied partition in 1947 on both sides of the Punjab. It convincingly argues that this violence was not spontaneous but deliberately engineered by political forces with the full connivance of the civil and police authorities. These, so called riots, had "functional utility" for politicians and the same pattern can be seen in subsequent "communal riots" in India in various places. The book examines riots in Meerut from 1961-1982, the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and the 2002 Gujarat riots. In each case, the author reinforces that the violence served specific political goals, was carried out with the tacit (and sometimes open) support of the civil and police authorities and that the guilty lumpen elements were never brought to book. It argues that there is an institutionalised "riot production system" existing in many parts of North and West India which can be activated at short notice when political compulsions demand. Both the main political parties use these riots for their political advantage, whenever required.

The book also examines the relative absence of communal violence in Malerkotla in 1947 and how the communal violence was not allowed to spread in Uttar Pradesh during 1947-48 by firm police and civil action as it was in the interest of the political masters that violence did not occur. In fact, the spread of violence would have harmed the rulers' interest in both these cases.

The two chapters on Pakistan trace how various military regimes, particularly those of General Zia and Musharraf have strengthened Islamic militant forces in their quest to gain political legitimacy. The USA by stepping in to organise the so-called *jihad* in Afghanistan allowed the ISI and the Pakistani establishment to implement its own agenda. This had the effect of a sharp rise in violence in Pakistani society at every level - community, sectarian and domestic violence. The growth of violence and its impact on the informal economy in Pakistan, rise of Islamic militancy, flow of sophisticated weapons, narco-terrorism and rising crime and deterioration in the condition of religious and ethnic minorities and violence against women are touched briefly.

The book is a must read for any serious student of violence in India and Pakistan. However, the reader must keep an open mind and draw his own conclusions.

Shri Kulbir Kishan, IPS

India-Security Scope 2006 : The New Great Game. By Brigadier Rahul K Bhosle (Retd) (Delhi : Kalpaz Publications, Satyawati Nagar), 297p, Rs. 720, ISBN : 81-7835-512-4.

This is a year book in which the author seeks to analyse the events of the past to forecast the security threats that may confront India beyond 2006. The analyses includes all types of threats-terrorism, Naxalism and those that may emanate from the neighbouring countries namely Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It is an all encompassing work that throws light on India's security challenges as the country positions itself to its rightful place in the world polity of a resurgent regional power.

The author focuses on the likely flash points within India and its neighbourhood. The issues like Kashmir, North Eastern States with Assam in particular, have been deliberated upon in great detail. The author has provided some definite conclusions with regards to the prospects of progress and peace with Pakistan, the settlement with the Maoists in Nepal, the continued strife in Sri Lanka and the growing concern with Bangladesh. There is a caution for the Muslims to resolve the conflict within and advice to the nations not to raise the Frankenstein as it could strike back. The chapters on the Indo-US Nuclear deal and acquisitions of arms by India are very informative.

The book is a product of detailed research by the author. It is remarkably well written. It addresses India's Security concerns. The issues contained in the book have long term implications for the security of India. Therefore, the utility of the book would have been better had the prognosis looked at a horizon of at least ten to fifteen years.

Major General Samay Ram, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Acquisition and Competition Strategy Options for the DD (x) The US Navy's 21st Century Destroyer. By John F. Schank et al. (Santa Monica, Rand, 2006), 136p, Price not indicated, ISBN 08330-3870-2.

The DD(x) (since redesignated DDG 1000) programme of the US Navy, originated out of their requirement for a new destroyer type ship for projecting power ashore in littoral operations. This is part of their programme initiated in 1994 to develop a new surface combatant fleet for the 21st Century.

Concept studies for the new ship were authorised in early 1995 and acquisition approval given in early 1998. Two industry teams led by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and Bath Inou Works, the shipyards selected for constructing these ships, competed to develop the "initial system design". Northrop Grumman Ship Systems was selected in 2002 to act as the lead design agent to programme a three-year "system and sub-system design and technology development effort". It was soon apparent that acquisition and contracting decisions for the "detailed design and production phase" for this new class of ships shall have important implications for the US shipbuilding industry which had already shrunk considerably. The challenge before the Department of Defense was, threefold : designing a way to support the desired shipbuilding industry base in the country, adopting an appropriate strategy to sustain competition throughout the production phase of these destroyers, and meeting the DoD objectives with respect to cost, schedule and performance of the programme. RAND Corporation of the USA was, therefore, commissioned in 2003 to analyse different acquisition and contracting strategies and recommended how these issues could be best resolved.

This book describes the various issues that the research team from RAND Corporation addressed, the manner in which the analysis was conducted and major findings of their study. The complex and unique nature of defence acquisitions, the reasons why they cannot follow typical business practices of price competitions and yet, how a variety of competition enhancing arrangements can still be introduced for such acquisitions have been well argued.

The book is a particularly useful reading for all those associated with weapon acquisitions, ship design and constructing acquisitions.

Vice Admiral Inderjit Bedi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book: 2007. *Executive Editor K Santhanam, Edited by Colonel Harjeet Singh (New Delhi : Panchsheel, 2007) 301p, Rs. 1750, ISBN-81-86505-85-7.*

This is the first issue of the Yearbook, which contains a mix of articles on various security related issues. The articles are topical and cover a wide range of issues that are relevant to South Asian region and in particular to India, while others have wider perspective and focus on threats and challenges and the nature of war in future.

The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan in 1998 has had a profound effect on the security concerns in the region and these find expression in some way or the other in the articles. There are conflicting views amongst authors on its fall out. One view is that the nuclear parity has foreclosed all possibility of a conventional war between the two antagonists; it is argued that Pakistan will take advantage to this parity by opting to wage war by other means, like proxy wars through sponsored insurgencies and trans-border terrorism. The termination of Operation *Parakram* without India achieving any tangible advantage is quoted as an illustration. The other view is that there is still space for a limited conventional war provided, the nuclear threshold is factored in and escalation of the conflict is calibrated. There is no finality and the debate is wide open.

The nuclear issue is examined from yet another perspective, i.e., the prospect of strategic stability in nuclear environment. The author argues that India's interest lies in pursuing universal nuclear disarmament, even while developing a minimum credible deterrent. This is also the government's view but what constitutes 'minimum credible deterrent' has been conveniently left unanswered.

Refreshingly, Claude Apte has examined the recent Chinese consolidation in Tibet with great clarity in his article. For too long, Tibet has been absent from the radar screen of India's security concerns. The article brings out India's naivete in dealing with China. The article revisits the past and warns against falling once again in the Chinese trap. There is renewed 'romanticism' about China. The recent apprehension of India's Defence Secretary as reported by a TV channel that China was preparing to win the regional war reinforces the apprehensions expressed in the article. It would be prudent to take note even as the countries are engaged in high-level talks on the border issue.

The internal situation in India is grim. The articles dealing with the subject draw our attention to the causes and consequences of spiralling violence in India's hinterland. The author (Lieutenant General R Subramanyam) cautions against deployment of the army to deal with left wing extremism in '*Madhya Bharat*' and warns that such a course would be a monumental blunder.

There are external factors that impinge on India's internal security. The rapid Islamisation of Bangladesh has far reaching adverse consequences for India's internal security, particularly in border states of the Northeast, Bihar and West Bengal. A large migrant population, mostly infiltrators indoctrinated by religious extremism is a dangerous cocktail. This has been adequately analysed in the article on militancy in Bangladesh. Equally illuminating are the articles on recent events in Nepal and Afghanistan.

There are other articles on South Asia's contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions, threats to national security posed by migration and displacement of population due to environmental degradation and unplanned development, threats to maritime security by piracy and terrorism at sea, and the course of the peace process between India and Pakistan, all of which are very well researched.

The value of the Yearbook is greatly enhanced by inclusion of country-wise information and military balance of states in India's larger neighborhood, a directory of think tanks in the countries of South Asia, a brief survey of nuclear and missile capabilities of India, China and Pakistan and trends in military technology. The Yearbook is a goldmine of information for security analysts and policy makers alike.

The printing, production and quality of photographs at the end of the book are of high quality and eye catching.

Brigadier SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending June 2007

(The books reviewed in January-March 2007 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

AFGHANISTAN

Afghan. By Frederick Forsyth. London, Corgi Books, 2006, 349p, £ 2.90, ISBN NA.

Afghanistan : The Challenge. Edited by K Warikoo. New Delhi, Pentagon, 2007, 377p, Rs. 995.00, ISBN 8182742544.

ANCIENT VOYAGE /DESCRIPTION AND TRAVELS

A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and other Papers of Importance Related to British Affairs in Malabar. By William Logan. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 1989, 2nd ed. 402p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 8120604490.

A Journey from Madras Through the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar for the Express Purpose of Investigating the State of Agriculture, Arts, and Commerce; the Religion, Manners, and customs; the History Natural and Civil, and Antiquities. In the Dominions of the Rajah of Mysore, and the Countries Acquired by The Honourable East India Company, in the Late and Former Wars, From Tippoo Sultan v.1-3. By Francis Buchanan. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 1999. Rs. 2995 (set) ISBN 8120603869.

A New Account of the East-Indies Being the Observations and Remarks of Capt Alexander Hamilton From the Year 1688-1723 v.1-2. By Alexander Hamilton. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 1995, 2nd ed., Rs. 995.00 (set), ISBN 8120610105,

A True and Exact Description of the Most Celebrated East-India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel and also of the Isle of Ceylone. By Philip Baldaeus. New Delhi : Asian Educational Services, 2000, 901p., Rs. 1695.00, ISBN 8120611713.

Alberuni's India : An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Geography, Chronology, Customs, Laws and Astrology of India About AD 1030 v.1-2. By Edward C Sachau. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 2004, 2nd ed. Rs. 1195.00 (set), ISBN 8120608623.

The Book of Duarte Barbosa : An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and Their Inhabitants, Written by Duarte Barbosa and Completed About the Year 1518 AD v.1-2. Edited by Alexander Hamilton and Mansel Longworth Dames. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 2002. 2nd ed., Rs. 1495.00 (set), ISBN 8120604512.

Madras Government Museum Bulletin Vol III No. 3: Anthropology Nayars of Malabar. By F Fawcett. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 2004, 322p, Rs. 265.00, ISBN 8120601718

Malabar Manual V.1-2. By William Logan. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 2004. Rs. 1595.00 (set), ISBN 8120604466.

ARTILLERY HISTORY

Artillery the Battle-Winning Arm. By Jagjit Singh. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006, 144p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 8176021801.

ASIAN RENAISSANCE

Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan. By Brahma Chellaney. India, HarperCollins, 2006, 348p, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 8172236506.

BIOGRAPHY - INDIANS - GREAT MEN AND WOMEN

The Great Indians. By One India One People Foundation. New Delhi, Authorspress, 2006, 594p, Rs. 650.00, ISBN 8172733186.

CHINA - POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Policing Chinese Politics: A History. Edited by Michael Dutton. Durham, Duke University Press, 2005, 411p, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0822334895.

CHINA - RELATIONS - ASIA

China in the 21st Century. By Naunihal Singh. New Delhi, Mittal, 2006, 189p, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 818324131X.

Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics. Edited by David Shambaugh. Berkeley, University of California, 2005, 383p, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0520245709.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

Conflict in Kashmir and Chechnya: Political and Humanitarian Dimensions. Edited by Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra and Seema Shekhawat. New Delhi, Lancer's Books, 2007, 209p, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 8170951133.

Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention. Edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006, 209p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 8130900777.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective. Edited by Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006, 363p, \$ 35.00, ISBN 0262524546.

ECOLOGICAL SECURITY

Ecological Security: The Foundation of Sustainable Development. By Samar Singh. New Delhi, India International Centre, 2007, 208p, Price NA, ISBN 8575413212.

ECONOMY

India's Economy: A Journey in Time and Space. Edited by Raj Kapila, Uma Kapila, New Delhi, Academic, 2006, 390p, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 8171885810.

Introducing Global Issues. Edited by Michael T Snarr and D Neil Snarr. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2007, 3rd Ed. 348p, Rs. 995.00, ISBN 8130904225

ENCYCLOPAEDIA

Encyclopaedia of North-East India v.1-5. By Ved Prakash. New Delhi, Atlantic, 2007, Rs. 950.00 (each), ISBN 8126907037.

Encyclopaedia of Southeast Asia v.1-5 (History, Society, Culture, Geography, Environment, Tourism, Economy, Commerce & Trade). Edited by Brajendra Kumar. New Delhi, Akansha, 2006, Rs. 4,500(set), ISBN 818370073X.

EUROPEAN UNION - INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The European Union in World Politics. Edited by Rajendra K Jain, Harmut Elsenhans & Amarjit S Narang. New Delhi, Radiant Publisher, 2006. 324p, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 8170272637.

India, Europe and the Changing Dimensions of Security. Edited by Rajendra K Jain & Harmut Elsenhans. New Delhi, Radiant Publisher, 2006, 309p, Rs. 750, ISBN 8170272629.

FOREIGN POLICY

Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities. Edited by Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta. Delhi, Academic Excellence, 2007, 1149p, Rs. 1495.00, ISBN 8171885934.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005. By Abdul Sattar. Karachi, Oxford, 2007, 329p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 0195473452.

INDIA - DEFENCE

Aerospace Power and India's Defence. Edited by Jasjit Singh. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2007, 317p, Rs. 620.00, ISBN 8187966483.

Changing Economy, Exports and Career in Armed Forces: NDC Papers 2006/3. New Delhi, National Defence College, 2006, 155p., Rs. 100.00, ISBN NA.

Defence From the Skies. By Jasjit Singh. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2007, 280p, Rs. 2300.00, ISBN 8187966513.

Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India 1978-1993. By Kripal Dhillon. New Delhi, Penguin, 2006, 394p, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 014310036X

Sky is the Limit: Signals in Operation Pawan. By Yashwant Deva. New Delhi, Pentagon, 2007, 371p, Rs. 990.00, ISBN 8190371908

The Sinking of INS Khukri: Survivors' Stories. By Ian Cardozo. New Delhi, Roli Books, 2006, 197p, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 8174364994

INDIA- CHINA BORDER DISPUTE

Essays in Frontier History, India, China and the Disputed Border. By Parshotam Mehra. New Delhi, Oxford, 2007, 306p, Rs. 625.00, ISBN 0195683757.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Beyond US Hegemony: Assessing the Prospects for A Multipolar World. By Samir Amin. Delhi, Daanish Books, 2006, 191p, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 8189654276.

Canada's Global Engagements and Relations with India. Edited by Christopher Sam Raj, Abdul Nafey. New Delhi, Manak, 2007, 354p, Rs. 1000.00, ISBN 8178271680.

India Japan Relations: Partnership for Peace and Security in Asia. Edited by N S Sisodia, GVC Naidu. New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2006, 144p, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 8185002762.

The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations. Edited by E Sridharan. London, Routledge, 2007, 326p, Price NA, ISBN 0415424089.

Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal v.1-2. Edited by Rahul Bhonsle, Ved Prakash, KR Gupta. New Delhi, Atlantic, 2007, 226p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 8126907134.

Korea in Search of a Global Role. Edited by Sushila Narsimhan and Kim Do Young. New Delhi, Manak, 2007, 222p, Rs. 700.00, ISBN 8178271702.

IRAQ WAR

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. Edited by Michael R Gordon & Bernard E Trainor. New York, Pantheon Books, 2006, 603p, \$ 16.00, ISBN 0375422625.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

An Incredible War: Indian Air Force in Kashmir War 1947-48. By Bharat Kumar. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2007, 374p, Rs. 780.00, ISBN 8187966521.

Jammu and Kashmir After the Earthquake. Edited by Dipankar Banerjee, D Suba Chandran. New Delhi, Samskriti, 2007, 131p, Rs. 275.00, ISBN 8187374497.

Kargil: From Surprise to Victory. By General V P Malik. India, Harper Collins, 2006, 435p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 8172236352.

Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches. Edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu Bushra Asif & Cyrus Samii. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2007, 292p, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 8130904314.

War Against Insurgency and Terrorism in Kashmir. By Lieutenant General YM Bammi. Dehra Dun, Natraj, 2007, 410p, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 8181580737

PAKISTAN - LABOUR POLICY

The Labour Movement in Pakistan: Organization and Leadership in Karachi in the 1970s. By Zafar Shaheed. Karachi, Oxford, 2007, 350p, Rs. 550.00, ISBN 0195473450.

INDIA - LEGAL SYSTEMS

India's Legal System: Can It be Saved? By Fali S Nariman. New Delhi, Penguin, 2006, 173p, Rs. 195.00, ISBN 0144001055.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Globalisation and Regional Security: India and Australia. Edited by Dennis Rumley and D Gopal. Delhi, Shipra, 2007, 264p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 8175413271.

India's National Security Annual Review 2006. Edited by Satish Kumar. New Delhi, India Research Press, 2006, 607p, Rs. 990.00, ISBN 8187966602.

India's Security Dilemmas-Pakistan and Bangladesh. By Sashanka S Banerjee. London, Anthem Press, 2006, 300p, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 1843317109.

National Security and Information Management: NDC Papers 2006/2. New Delhi, National Defence College, 2006, 166p, Rs. 100.00, ISBN NA

NATO - MILITARY OPERATIONS

Emerging NATO: Challenges for Asia and Europe. Edited by V P Malik, Jong Schultz. New Delhi, Observer Research Foundation, 2006, 188p, Rs. 650.00, ISBN 8170621240.

POLICE - RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Police and People: Role and Responsibilities. By Dalbir Bharti. New Delhi, A.P.H., 2006, 232p, Rs. 300.00, ISBN 8131300455.

SOUTH ASIA

Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia 2006. Edited by D Suba Chandran. New Delhi, Samskriti, 2007, 333p, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 8187374899.

Explaining Growth in South Asia. Edited by Kirit S Parikh. New Delhi, Oxford, 2006, 495p, Rs. 675.00, ISBN 0195677927.

TERRORISM

Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America. By Walid Phares. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 310p, \$ 11.00, ISBN 1403975116.

Psychology of Terrorism. Edited by Bruce Bongar, Lisa M Brown, Larry E Beutler, James N Breckenridge, & Philip G Zimbardo. New York, Oxford, 2007, 492p, Rs. 995.00, ISBN 0195172493.

The State Democracy and Anti-Terror Laws in India. By Ujjwal Kumar Singh. New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2007, 345p, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 8178296705

UNITED NATIONS

The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005. By David M Malone. New York, Oxford, 2006, 398p, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 0199219681.

UNITED STATES

Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance. By Noam Chomsky. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2007, 300p, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 1741145007

WAR TRADITION

Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq. By Alex J Bellamy. Cambridge, Polity, 2006, 280p, £ 17.00, ISBN 0745632831.

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Price - Rs. 75, Year 2006

My Service in the Royal Indian Navy

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