


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- Meeting the Economic, Sociological and Technological Challenges - *Lt Gen K K Hazari, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)*
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OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1997

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
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EDITORIAL

As the year comes to an end, the USI moves forward towards attainment of its objectives. The total cost of construction of the USI building, including the escalation cost totalled Rs 5.95 crores. The Prime Minister Mr IK Gujral graciously granted Rs 60 Lakhs from the National Defence Fund and the entire costs have been cleared. The research activities are making progress. The first project report on the 'Shape and Size of the Indian Navy in the Early 21st Century' is ready. The *Professor DS Kothari DRDO Chair* has also been instituted for the conduct of research. The number of talks, seminars, and discussions have been on the rise.

While nations try to assimilate the ever changing, sometimes incomprehensible twists and turns to international politics, policy makers strive to formulate strategies for their nation's well being, based on cogent criteria. The lead article in this issue on "India in the World of 2025 AD" by General K Sundarji, is a perceptive analysis in a holistic framework of international arena. The author has discussed the likely national security imperatives for the future alongwith suggested response. The focus is on spelling out strategy for meeting external as well as internal threats. Deterring the use of force by a global power, may not be possible for India in the time frame upto 2025. However, what would be possible and desirable is for the cost of such use of force to be raised beyond a threshold that would be considered acceptable by the threatening power. This would give the Indian government the freedom to choose policies on merits. The Indian strategy for such a deterrence has to be based on :

- (a) A prosperous and booming Indian economy offering a 'Big Emerging Market'. This is the corner-stone of the total strategy as it would not only impose restraint on big power bullying, but such economic growth will also enable Indian armed force modernisation with hardly any pain.
- (b) The capability of a limited Indian nuclear second strike against the aggressor.
- (c) A strong Indian naval capability in the North Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal that would raise the potential risk to any 'Desert Storm' like concentration of hostile forces in the region, preliminary to a strike against India.

- (d) An Indian land-air capability of raising the cost to unacceptable limits of any attempt at securing ports, air heads or triphibious lodgements in sub-continental India.

India's foreign policy too has to undergo a rethink in the light of the sole super power status of the USA. They are capable of influencing a nation's political, military and socio economic policies. Prof SP Cohen presented his views on "The Critical Dimensions of US Strategic Partnership with India" under the aegis of the First Colonel Pyaralal Memorial Lecture held on the 19 Sep 1997 at the USI, tracing the Indo-US relations since the 1962 Sino-India conflict to the present. Once again there is talk in some quarters of another grand alliance against China. According to the author, there is a need to develop a dialogue about short-term and long-term strategic co-operation between the USA and India.

An article on "Formulation of National Security Policy to Meet the Challenges on the Economic, Social and Technological Fronts" by Lt Gen KK Hazari, brings out the importance of certain core issues having effect on overall security. The external factors are a consequence of the evolving international order with a fluidity that requires continuous fine tuning of national policies. The internal factors are a consequence of civilisation evolution and governance. In India the political institutions and laws are lagging behind the needs of economic and technological imperatives. Policy making is a complex task requiring deep understanding of issues involved and harmonisation of many contradictory factors that have a bearing on decision making. An essential requirement for this complex task is pragmatic leadership and effective governance, which is an area of weakness in our country. For meeting internal challenges the following need attention.

- (a) Population growth rate and Demographic pressures.
- (b) Management of Fiscal policies.
- (c) Technology Development.

Lt Gen EA Vas in Part II of his article on "Central Asia" presents the "Strategic Appraisal" of the region. Under Soviet

governance, Central Asia was modernised and demarcated on a tribal basis and given statehood as part of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left five new States with problems and places the area's future security relationship with its neighbours including India in question. Uzbekistan has emerged as a pivot state in the area. Much will depend on how they modernize the clan-based social structure and cope with Islamic fundamentalism, and on the outcome of the civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. India recognises Uzbekistan's significance in Central Asia's emerging power structure and attempts are being made to strengthen ties. Central Asia has vast deposits of oil and natural gas.

And finally, we wish all our readers, a happy and prosperous New Year.

India in the World of 2025 AD

GENERAL K SUNDARJI, PVSM (RETD)

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF WORLD POWER

At the risk of oversimplification, one may consider that historically, the following models have followed one another.

- * The Classical Model.
- * The Military Power Based Model.
- * The Economy Based Model.

The Classical Model

The classical model would include those essential ingredients of power, which have for long been recognised as such and have endured through the ages. The main ones are, population, land mass and natural resources with which countries are endowed.

The Military Power Based Model

The military power based model, in ancient times, was indeed almost indistinguishable from the classical model, as population and land mass, as inter-related ingredients, had the prime say. However, with the industrial revolution, technological quality started to have a greater role as a force multiplier and brute numbers by themselves counted far less than before. The legitimisation of 'Empire' led to small Britain becoming Great Britain.

More recently, at the end of the Second World War, imperialism was at an end, but military might still held sway; an economically anaemic USSR, could in the Sixties, by virtue of its

General K Sundarji, PVSM is former Chief of the Army Staff. He has written a number of articles having impact on the National Security and Defence matters.

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natural endowments and its military power especially nuclear, crash into the super power club of which the USA was the sole member. This indicates that up to this period, the economic factor though important, had not got to centre-stage.

The Economy Based Model

Economic capability that was till then the number two power ingredient, overtook military power as the prime factor. During this period, the rules pertaining to empire lapsed, but those relating to world economic matters were extant, with the USA as the number one super power. Japan and Germany emerged as powers to reckon with in the decades of the Eighties and the Nineties. The primacy of the economic factor also played the major part in the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.

THE KNOWLEDGE BASED WORLD

The knowledge based model has been ushered in by the advent of the Infotech Revolution and one will have to try and predict the broad contours of this power structure. In both, the military power based and the economy based models, only nation states or coalitions of nation states had the technological and industrial infrastructure to turn out the engines of war. Therefore, the world order was structured around nation states.

Easy, quick and wide access to information, along with the synergy caused by the ease of communication between individuals interested in similar fields, the rapid advance in and simplification of many technologies have all led to the phenomenon of empowerment of the individual. What does this mean in practice? Till the end of the Second World War, only a handful of countries could produce highly lethal binary nerve gases. Now a cult group in Japan produces it with impunity and gives a demonstration of its use. A small group could easily put together a nuclear explosive device, and use it for subversive or terrorist purposes by emplacing these on a space platform and holding any country to ransom. At the rate at which technology is advancing, they could acquire this space capability in a few decades. Thus, the ability

of inflicting grave damage in the world is no longer the sole preserve of powerful nations.

The elaborately designed power structure with nation states as the prime actors, and the concept of balance of power are becoming ineffective. New (non nation state) actors are entering the world stage. Examples are religious fundamentalism, the international drug mafia and transnational megafirms that do not 'belong' to any particular nation state. Nation states are also crumbling because their own citizens are increasingly questioning their legitimacy. The proud assertion "My country right or wrong!" today sounds amoral, if not downright immoral.

An effective world power structure will have to take cognisance of emerging non nation state actors and find means of taming them and making them conform to the newly emerging norms of global behaviour. Bodies like the World Court, or the League of Nations or the United Nations Organisation were all cosy clubs of nation states. These must now be restructured to reflect the new realities. Even grave security threats of the future, are going to be from comparatively small groups. These may not always be identifiable; their locations would generally be hazy and they will not offer a target that is suitable for being dealt with by armies, navies and airforces.

Future threats can only be taken care of by specially trained, sophisticated police forces with high-tech intelligence support. Organisations such as Interpol will have to be strengthened and empowered. Such forces would have to be split into specialised branches for dealing with specific threats such as narcotics, religious fundamentalism, general anarchism and new types of international crime. There would be the erosion of the sovereignty of nations inherent in the empowerment of international police organisations. Conventional armies, navies and air forces would slowly lose relevance and gradually become the ceremonial adjuncts of states. The prime moral and ethical question at the national level would be safeguarding the rights of privacy of citizens while still having access to advance intelligence for ensuring the security of the citizens.

THE WORLD'S APPROACH TO A STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

The general approach should be based on working towards as benign a world as it is possible to achieve by 2100 AD. In this exercise, comparing the state of the world in 1900 and today, which is almost 2000, will give a perspective to our views. An objective overview of the 20th Century will show that the human condition has indeed generally improved. The world is more egalitarian and less Eurocentric than it was in 1900. Political colonialism that was rampant has disappeared, but economic and technological colonialism are still alive. Nonetheless any honest estimate must accept that these have eroded in the past century and are no longer pursued with the smug self-righteousness of a hundred years ago.

Slavery has been abolished, and there is greater concern about human rights. Undeniably some countries do use so called concerns for human rights as a weapon in the armoury of the strong to maintain an unfair economic system which is advantageous to the industrialised nations. However, this does not negate the fact that genuine human rights concerns have increasingly been felt and articulated as time has gone on.

The rapacity with which natural resources have been used selfishly by advanced states representing a minority of the world's population is well known, so is the consequent ecological damage. It is undeniable that many developed countries, notwithstanding the activism of their own 'greens' are dragging their feet on the drastic measures that are called for to protect the ecology. All the same it cannot be claimed that the disregard of the ecology is today of the same order that it was a hundred years ago.

There is less overt self-righteous racism today than a century ago. There are many areas where the condition of man has spectacularly improved in the past century, health and nutrition for example. A high degree of cynicism is not called for and if anything the rate of change will be more rapid.

The possible world of 2100 could therefore very broadly be visualised as :

- * Where there is rule of law and nations have progressively, less and less need to resort to national armed strength to protect their legitimate interests.
- * With a United Nations Organisation duly and fairly reorganised and strengthened and functioning as a parliament of a loose confederation, legislating on international law, guiding the co-ordination of common functions in various member states, and giving policy guidance for inter-state activities. The UN having under its wing, international regulatory bodies such as the evolved and strengthened successors to the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; a strengthened, diversified and more specialised Interpol with an effective intelligence service, for dealing with international crime and terrorism; and an internationally contributed but UN controlled Peace Keeping and Peace Making Force.
- * With a World Court, that is an evolved version of the International Court of Justice, with teeth.
- * With sovereign states still in existence, and not as provinces under a central world government, but with somewhat less sovereignty than now. These states would maintain their cultural, religious and linguistic flavours in a diverse but co-operative world.
- * Where nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, indeed all weapons of mass destruction, have been effectively banned, and Space has been kept free of deployed weapons.

THE EARLY 2000s

For short term forecasts, say till 2025, it would be safer if they proceed on an extrapolation of the present dispensation, bearing in mind at the same time, the changes that are likely in the longer haul.

For analysis, we will use three assumed scenarios into which the USA could lead the world, under its leadership: First, the altruistic and statesman-like 'Green Option'. Second, the 'Amber Option', that is the next best. Lastly the inward-looking 'Red Option', that would not even serve the interests of the USA in the long haul, and would be the worst from the world's point of view.

Green Option

- * An UN well strengthened and more fairly composed and acting as a reliable and credible protector of all states big and small is in place which cannot be hijacked by a big power.
- * There is agreement about converting the UN into a truly democratic body and to abolish the veto at a certain future date to be set by consensus.
- * Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons have been effectively banned.
- * Space has been successfully kept free of weapons.
- * The five 'legitimate' nuclear powers, the USA, Russia, China, the UK and France (P5) cut back their nuclear arsenal to token levels.
- * The Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are made to give up their nuclear weapons.
- * The P5 accept 'Time Bound Nuclear Disarmament' (TBND). The time limit set whether it is 2035 or 2050 is not material, as long as a date has been decided upon by consensus, set and accepted. Such an agreement could have any number of safeguards and conditional opting out arrangements to ensure that a maverick power with one or two weapons in the basement cannot hold the world to ransom.
- * After TBND, all nations have signed a revised Non Prolifer-

ation Treaty (NPT) and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

- * The P5 accept a non discriminatory CTBT that has no loopholes for laboratory testing for weapon design; give up privileged treatment in production of fissile material, or avoiding intrusive international inspection of all facilities. Create suitable institutions to monitor nuclear and missile technology transfers by the nuclear five to non nuclear states, and to punish those of the five that transgress treaties in this regard.
- * The P5 agree to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and place their nuclear arsenals manned by their respective nationals, under UN control to the extent that they pledge not to use them or threaten to use them against any country without the approval of the UN.
- * Nation states still exist, but have agreed to give up that extent of sovereignty that is needed to deal with international terrorism and crime effectively.
- * Credible plans exist for further strengthening international policing in the decades to come.
- * Russia continues to have democratic government and a form of market economy and has not been isolated or 'contained' by the USA or the West.
- * China has evolved into a more democratically ruled state and has not been isolated or 'contained' by the USA.
- * Regional groupings have formed, but primarily for economic advantage and not for regional security.
- * The relations between regions are generally cordial, in spite of commercial rivalries and some hard feelings and occasional crises.
- * There has been good progress towards a more equitable New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Amber Option

- * The UN has been marginally strengthened, but states need to use their own forces for safeguarding their legitimate national vital interests.
- * States have reluctantly shed some sovereignty for empowering international policing, which is better than today, but far from ideal.
- * P5 have accepted TBND, and have signed a revised NPT, strong on inspections and hard on transgressors including themselves.
- * All nations in the world have signed the revised NPT and the restructured CTBT.
- * P5 have not placed their strategic nuclear forces under UN command. Except China none of the P5 have made a declaration of no first use.
- * Space has been kept free of weapons.
- * Chemical and biological weapons have been effectively banned.
- * Some regional groupings have emerged for economic purpose. NATO is still the only regional security institution in the world. Its use as a tool that can implement the diktat of the West has been less than effective.
- * The West is fighting a rearguard against the NIEO, but there are fissures amongst them due to commercial competition.
- * Russia has a form of democratic government, and a mixed economy. It however does not feel welcome into the mainstream and suffers from a sense of isolation. The USA has not taken any active steps to contain it, though it is somewhat wary of Russia.

- * China has loosened party control somewhat, but still does not have what can be termed a democratic government. There is a degree of domestic malcontent. The USA has not taken any steps to actively contain China. There are many serious problems in Sino-US relations.
- * In this somewhat tentative world situation, the USA has been making contingency plans for containing Russia and China, separately or together. China and Russia, are putting feelers out to each other to make common cause and obtain better leverage vis-a-vis USA.
- * The USA has been putting out feelers to Russia and India with a view to containing China.
- * China and Russia individually have been putting out feelers to India seeking common ground to resist the 'bullying' of the USA.

Red Option

- * The UN has not only not been strengthened to any great extent, but the USA is actively undermining it, as it is not willing to be a pliant tool and act as a surrogate for the USA.
- * Nation states have to rely solely on their own forces to safeguard their legitimate national vital interests.
- * States are loathe to shed any sovereignty in order to empower international policing.
- * The 'North' has been resolutely blocking any progress towards the NIEO.
- * P5 do not accept TBND, and want to retain their sovereign right to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any adversary, nuclear or otherwise.
- * The USA and Russia have made some reductions in their

nuclear arsenals, but still hold enough to destroy civilisation as we know it, many times over.

- * Britain and France have copped to hold out on the NPT and CTBT.
- * Biological and chemical weapons have been banned effectively in the case of nations, but terrorists are patently in possession of the capability.
- * There are a few private 'rocketry clubs' in various parts of the world that possess the ability to launch small space platforms that can host weapons of mass destruction (WMD). All attempts by the world community to ban such clubs have been as futile as today's efforts to regulate the possession of automatics by private 'militias'.
- * The USA makes active efforts to contain Russia and China and makes overtures to India to join it in the process. Russia and China, are similarly trying to get India into their group.
- * Following a two-track approach, the USA gives the green light to NATO to expand Eastwards. Russia is in the process of firming up its ties with China.
- * China gets increasingly concerned about the USA extending the Theatre High Altitude Air Defence Shield (THAADs) to Japan.
- * With Chinese encouragement, North Korea explodes a nuclear device.

If the USA chooses the first scenario, it will mean that the world will get as close to universal nuclear disarmament as practicable in the next few decades. It will eliminate the danger to civilisation as we know it from mass use of nuclear weapons. In the case of the third scenario, the regime would continue to be thoroughly discriminatory and cynical. The legitimacy of the nuclear weapons as an instrument of international power would be re-emphasised.

Michael Lind believes that the world's leading industrial democracies are restructuring themselves as catalytic states, while developing countries and ex-socialist states are abandoning command economics. He writes, "World politics in the Twenty First Century will be complicated not only by the rivalries between catalytic states, but by shifting combinations between catalytic states and those developmental states which remain or become great powers. In this world environment, the United States can attempt to pursue either a 'neo-internationalist' strategy, forestalling geo-economic and geo-political rivalries among North America, Europe and Japan, or a 'neo-nationalist' strategy, which would be more or less openly mercantilist and unilateral." He goes on to state that because the US lacks the economic resources and political will for the former course, it is almost certain to follow the latter strategy.¹

I will therefore, make the following assumptions regarding the **aims and policies of the USA for the period 1996-2025.**

- * Avoid universal nuclear disarmament for as long as possible. Keep the US nuclear stockpile level comfortably high, not only to ensure US security, but for obtaining a domestic consensus.
- * Prevent any country other than Russia obtaining large scale missile capability of reaching Continental United States (CONUS) with land-based ballistic missiles.
- * Keep the numbers and sophistication of Chinese ICBM as low as possible.
- * Keep the numbers and sophistication of Chinese, French and British SSBN as low as possible. Prevent new entrants to the SSBN club.
- * Accept no international commitment that would hinder the maintenance and enhancement of US technological pre-eminence.
- * Prevent proliferation of WMD, local arms races and regional wars.

- * Retain US freedom to use conventional forces to influence regional situations for safeguarding US interests, without any threat to the forward deployed US forces from WMD of regional powers. This is to be achieved by three means: first, by preventing the emergence of new regional nuclear powers, second, by nuclear deterrence, reinforced by protecting forward deployed forces from regional nuclear attack by the deployment of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) and the like; third, deter chemical attacks from regional powers by retaining the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons, this last requirement would demand that the USA should not subscribe to a 'No First Strike' doctrine.
- * Hedge against the possibility of Russian expansionism Westwards into Europe by enlarging NATO to include the erstwhile East European members of the Soviet empire, and by support to Ukraine.
- * Hedge against a resurgent China in Asia and Pacific region by reworking the US-Japan security arrangement for the next century, as the first step and next consider getting India also into the act of containment of China.

I am assuming the following would be the **Chinese aims for the period 1996-2025.**

- * As a large, populous country with an ancient civilisation, China wants to be in the major league of world powers, by right and not accepted grudgingly as an 'also ran'. With the voluntary reduction of Russian and US nuclear stockpiles and the accelerating improvement in the Chinese economy becoming near-coequal in nuclear arsenals generally, if not yet in total military terms, is seen as feasible.
- * Keep the number of nuclear weapon powers in the world restricted to the present five, but not make common cause with the USA in this regard, if that country thwarts Chinese ambitions of becoming gradually coequal. The enlargement of the nuclear club might serve Chinese tactical aims of

obtaining better leverage vis-a-vis the USA. The Indian and Japanese nuclear stance will have much weight in this regard. The Japanese would be conditioned by the North Korean or a United Korean nuclear weapons capability. This could colour Chinese attitudes to North Korean nuclear ambitions.

- * If the USA bullies China on issues such as human rights, unfair trade practices or wanting the whole world to abide by the domestic legislation of the USA, the Chinese will aim at getting leverage against the USA, by cultivating closer trade ties with West European powers. Similarly in the geopolitical sphere in order to tilt the balance of power in its favour in Asia, China is likely to cultivate Russia and India to counter balance the USA.

I am assuming that the following would be **Pakistan's aims for the period 1996-2025:**

- * Maintain a 'non weaponised' and non deployed minimum nuclear deterrent to counter India's superior conventional power potential.
- * Resist all attempts to force it to sign the NPT, or accept 'capping' and 'roll back' of its nuclear weapons capability. It may claim that it would do so if India also goes along. This would be a bargaining ploy, in the full confidence that India would never agree unless it is a non discriminatory universal regime. (If one supposes that India agrees to a bilateral Indo-Pak dismantling of nuclear weapons capability, and Pakistan also does so, Pakistan will lose the level playing field that it has obtained and will be hard put to keep up a balance with India's conventional forces; such an agreement may put India at China's mercy and hence India's refusal to accept a bilateral approach to nuclear restraint is taken for granted by Pakistan.)
- * Maintain an adversarial posture against India and work for an early pro-Pakistan solution of the Kashmir problem by

stepped up sponsored insurgency and international pressure. Only if after prolonged and frantic efforts they fail in this aim, and it also results in poor economic performance and domestic political turbulence, would a co-operative arrangement with India be considered.

- * Continue to work for the Balkanisation of the Indian Union by providing clandestine support to all secessionist Indian groups, as long as they exist, whether these are from the North, South, East or West of India. Many in Pakistan would like to see the emergence of many independent states out of the Indian Union, leaving behind only a rump constituted by the Hindi speaking heartland forming the future 'India'. The permanent solution for the bullfrog (Pakistan) which cannot possibly become a bull (India), is to convert the Indian bull into a bullfrog!

NUCLEAR THREATS

The Threat from Large Nuclear Powers (LNP). As far as the USA is concerned, there is a possibility of a clash of interests - if there is a future divergence between India's interests in our region and those of the USA. However, there is no major nuclear threat from the USA. A clash of interests between Russia and India appears unlikely, as their spheres of interest will not clash anywhere. On the other hand, there are chances of Russia soliciting India's support, if it has serious policy differences with either the USA or China in the future.

The Threat from Medium Nuclear Powers (MNP). China has made a 'no first use' declaration as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. The historical record from 1964 to date has also not shown a Chinese penchant for nuclear blackmail or coercive diplomacy. However, in extrapolating to the future, one must exercise caution. The Chinese nuclear weapon capability and delivery means have thus far been far too vulnerable to possible Soviet and American strikes. Most of the land based missiles were in soft, over-ground launchers and they have just begun to acquire a reckonable submarine launched ballistic missile capa-

bility. Once the numbers of nuclear powered, nuclear missile armed submarines (SSBN) increase, and their second strike capability improves, there may be a willingness to flex their nuclear muscle.

The Threat from Small Nuclear Powers (SNP). Pakistan poses a considerable threat in the short haul. This is due to the exaggerated expectations entertained in that country, of the moral impact of her acquisition of nuclear weapons; and the resultant exuberance in fostering and supporting terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir, the Punjab and other parts of India. As the unusability of nukes in a proactive situation becomes evident, there is bound to be a toning down of this exuberance. That a mutual nuclear deterrent situation does not mean that India loses all options of conventional reaction in response to rising levels of Pakistan inspired insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir, the Punjab or elsewhere, will also sink in with time. In the interim, there is considerable scope for Indo-Pak agreements on the mutual restrictions of the size of nuclear arsenals; once a minimum nuclear deterrent is tacitly in place, there is scope for conventional force reductions.

Even if Israeli missiles can reach India, notwithstanding India's consistent support to the Palestinian cause, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Israel may want to pose a nuclear threat to India.

A NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR INDIA

For India, the doctrine of minimum deterrence with a declared 'no first use' and a city oriented second strike capability would suffice. The required quantum will not depend upon how much nuclear weapon capability the adversary country has, but only what is required to inflict unacceptable damage in the second strike mode. Hence open ended attempts at maintaining numerical parity of weapons, or attempting to get a superiority will be meaningless. If India were to target ten Chinese and five Pakistani cities in the second strike, with three twenty kiloton warheads each, the amount of damage would be horrendous enough to deter these countries from launching a first strike on

India. Of course these number of weapons will have to survive after we receive a first strike, and therefore the starting figure will have to be higher, perhaps by three times, but it would not be open ended. Therefore, notions that once a country like India goes nuclear, it is letting itself in for an endless nuclear arms race, is not true. Kenneth Waltz says, "Those who foresee intense arms racing among new nuclear states, fail to make the distinction between war-fighting and war-detering capabilities. Forces designed for war-fighting have to be compared with each other. Forces designed for war-detering need not be compared. The question is not whether one country has less than another, but whether it can do unacceptable damage to another, with unacceptable damage sensibly defined. More is not better if less is enough."²

CONVENTIONAL EXTERNAL THREATS

These could be from a global power on its own or acting in concert with like minded countries such as in the Gulf War. It could be from India's neighbours or regional non-neighbours with adequate sea power and lastly global powers. The inimical relations between Pakistan and India made it necessary for smaller Pakistan to look for an outside patron for its own effective strategic defence, and the USA for its own reasons was only too pleased to play that role. The clout of the Indian sub continent in the councils of the world, instead of being plus Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) plus Sri Lanka plus Nepal plus Bhutan, became India minus Pakistan.

A conventional threat from the USA is unlikely, but we must guard against a 'Desert Storm' like operation against India! If regional powers are to retain some bargaining power via-a-vis the USA, they will have to maintain a technological ability to make the anti ballistic missile shields of the USA at least leak a bit! Only then can we be assured that our ability to resist arm twisting is at a respectably high level. To coin a term, I will call this the *Threshold of Torsion*, that we must raise adequately to maintain our self-respect.

Threats from neighbours can be land-air threats, or land, air and sea-borne threats. The land-air threat is the least likely, as no affluent power wants to tangle in a land war in Asia when its vital interests are not threatened by any change of the status quo. There might be a greater willingness among big powers to flex their naval muscle or promulgate an air exclusion zone in an attempt to maintain the status quo.

Conventional Threat From China

The conventional threat from China is not a classic one of invasion of India. China and India have a border problem, but India has explicitly accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet, and has no intentions of changing the status quo. Neither side has shown any intent of solving the border question by a major force of arms in the last three decades. As long as both sides are aware that the other would be no pushover militarily and clear deterrent signals, conventional and nuclear operate both ways, the chances are that the border question would be resolved by negotiations involving give and take.

There could be a major conventional border war only due to miscalculation or some unforeseen reason. Though the Chinese have large forces, due to logistics constraints the number they can deploy on the high Himalayan border is limited. With the present balance of deployable conventional forces and given the state of training, conventional equipment and morale of the Indian Armed Forces, India can adequately take care of any Chinese conventional threat. However this situation will obtain only as long as the Chinese do not have a one-sided nuclear capability. If it is one-sided, they can bring it into use to settle a conventional tactical engagement to their advantage without the fear of Indian retaliation. Even if this judgement about the Chinese and Indian conventional balance on the Himalayan border were to be proved wrong, terrain and climate will guarantee that unless the Chinese can totally capture the whole of India within the summer months - a virtual impossibility - they cannot make any deep foray into the plains of India and defend it successfully through the winter months. So, any sustainable, deep strategic penetration into India over-

land by the Chinese can be completely discounted. Air supply alone cannot sustain the level of forces that they would need. The Chinese also lack adequate naval blue water capability for launching conventional triphibious operations against India and capturing Indian ports to sustain the lodgements obtained. Hence the classic conventional threat can be taken as low provided India sends clear deterrence signals both nuclear and conventional.

Conventional Threat From Pakistan

The conventional threat from Pakistan across accepted international borders has reduced considerably after both India and Pakistan have acquired the status of 'unweaponised' and 'undeployed' nuclear weapon powers. Currently there is an existential minimum nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. There is a great danger that any conventional hostilities between them could end up in a nuclear exchange. Even if this were on a modest scale, and does not impact much on the survival of the human race or safety or ecology of the planet, the damage to the two contestants would be horrendous. Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons would give that country the confidence to face a larger neighbour with security and honour. Because, even if India were foolish enough to create a large conventional edge, it would be unusable for undoing Pakistan, or even for inflicting a decisive conventional defeat as in 1971; due to the near certainty that Pakistan would use her nuclear weapons in extremes in a Samsonian gesture. This would inflict terrible damage on India, even if India's nuclear retaliation does greater damage to Pakistan. With this new found confidence, Pakistan's past compulsion to find an external patron to counter India's superior conventional potential may not be as pressing in the future.

The other side of the coin is that Pakistan will not take the initiative and attack India conventionally across the international border even if India's conventional force structure has been permitted to decay and does not by itself deter such an adventure. What would deter, would be the realisation that such an action might well end up in a nuclear exchange. In that event India

might suffer grievous damage but Pakistan might well cease to exist as a viable state. Pakistan might attack, conventionally, only as a reaction to an Indian attack. India is a status quo power and has no reason to attack Pakistan unless it is in retaliation to Pakistan waging a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir. The threat from Pakistan will therefore decrease drastically if a fair solution is found to the Kashmir problem that is acceptable to all the parties concerned – including Pakistan.

Existential nuclear deterrence has worked, in one way, to India's detriment. The fact that Indian political ineptitude in Jammu and Kashmir had created disaffection was undoubted. But that was not the sole reason for Pakistan's newly rediscovered enthusiasm for Kashmiri self-determination, open and often reckless support to the insurgents and the establishment of a string of training camps for them not only in Pakistan held Kashmir but in Pakistan as well. The injection of non-Kashmiri guerrillas and sophisticated weaponry was also a new high water mark. I would suggest that this boldness to push overt support to insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir to this level is because of their perception that with existential nuclear deterrence operating between the two countries, India would be most reluctant to reply to the situation with a conventional counter attack against Pakistan as per their declared strategy for fear of conventional war degenerating into a nuclear exchange. Even though India has not totally lost its ability to react with conventional war to this proxy war that Pakistan is waging, the threshold of its tolerance of Pakistani skulduggery has certainly been raised quite a bit.

INTERNAL THREATS TO INDIA

Internal threats to India, would arise from the break up of the multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual Federal Republic of India, which could be due to—

- * The erosion of spiritual, moral and ethical values.
- * Disregard for human rights.
- * The failure of a secular government and the installation of a narrow theocratic one.
- * Religious intolerance.

- * Linguistic chauvinism.
- * Ethnic chauvinism.
- * Large scale regional imbalances in economic growth, standards of living and quality of life.
- * Political opportunism that exploits all these for short term gains.

INDIA'S INTERNAL STRATEGY

The long term strategy for internal cohesion is best based on.

- * A spiritual, moral and ethical renaissance that should be carefully planned, and consistently fostered.
- * A secular, democratic policy, that is seen as generally clean and parties that are not blatantly self-serving.
- * Honest and continuous efforts at ensuring human rights of the citizens, even in situations of unrest, terrorism and insurgency. The temptation to use state terror to counter these will recoil on the state. Mahatma Gandhi's insistence that good ends do not justify wrong means is not often remembered or followed in today's India.
- * The restoration of true federalism and strengthening it. Almost all of India's internal problems can be traced to one basic cause - an unhealthy over-centralised federal structure, which is only nominally federal. This had its genesis when what was intended to be a truly federal constitution was made somewhat more unitary, by the founding fathers who were shaken by the partition of the country into India and Pakistan and over-reacted. Over the years, this distortion increased, due to the kind of *Command Planning* which has been practised, and which centralised the control over the purse, even more than envisaged by the Constitution. A devolution is therefore called for, which should include politico-social, economic and financial decentralisation down to not just state capitals, but down to villages. This, I believe, will be beneficial in many ways. Firstly, it will allay political disaffection and secessionism. Secondly, greater federalism,

unlike the past conventional wisdom fostered by self-serving political parties, will not encourage fissiparous tendencies. On the other hand it will bind the federation closer together, by giving people a greater participatory role in running their day to day affairs. Thirdly, it will put a damper on corruption as its effects will be seen in relation to professed goals at the grass roots level and non-achievement at that level will directly point to the corrupt individuals. It will not remain academic malfeasance by faceless persons as it is today.

- * Improving the quality of life of the people while ensuring economic growth.
- * The creation of a safety net for the weaker sections of society, and modulating social turbulence that economic progress might cause.
- * The creation of a mechanism for ensuring that regional imbalances in prosperity are kept to the minimum, without unduly reining in the initiative and enthusiasm of progressive states.
- * A compact among the political parties that they will not undermine any of these bases for internal cohesion for fostering narrow short term interests of their parties. The people must be made witness to this compact that must be openly arrived at, so that any party breaking it would face the people's ire.

INDIA'S STRATEGY FOR MEETING CONVENTIONAL EXTERNAL THREATS

Global Powers

Deterring the use or threat of use of force by a global power in total terms, may not be possible for India in the time frame 1996-2025. However what would be possible and desirable is for the cost of such use of force to be raised beyond a threshold that would be considered acceptable by the threatening power. This threshold need not be so high as to make it unacceptable under

all circumstances, but only high enough to deter action when the core vital interests of the global power, stringently defined, are not threatened. This ought to take care of most situations where a global power feels free to blackmail India into toeing a line that India considers is against its own vital national interests. This may be in the realm of security affairs, domestic including economic affairs or foreign policy. This would give the Indian government the freedom to choose policies on merits. The psychological impact by such a capability on Indian self-confidence is of considerable importance. My judgement is that this self-confidence never fully developed in India after the colonial past, and what little developed during the Cold War period has been badly eroded after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the USA as the sole super power.

The Indian strategy for this big power deterrence has to rest on four legs:

1. A prosperous and booming Indian economy offering a 'Big Emerging Market'. This is the corner-stone of the total strategy as it would not only impose restraint on big power bullying, but such economic growth will also enable Indian Armed Force modernisation with hardly any pain.
2. The capability of a limited Indian nuclear second strike against the regional forward deployed assets of the aggressor leaking through, THAADs or GPALS shield.
3. An Indian naval capability in the North Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal that would raise the potential risk to a 'Desert Storm' like concentration of hostile forces in the region, preliminary to a strike against India.
4. An Indian land-air capability of raising the cost to unacceptable limits of any attempt at securing ports, air heads or triphibious lodgements in sub-continental India.

The force structure that would be required for this purpose would not be in excess of what would be required for strategies vis-a-vis regional threats, though some fine tuning in respect of organisations and peace time locations may be required.

China

During the period 1996-2025, Chinese strength both economic, technological, industrial and military would progressively increase by a big margin, perhaps making it a global power by 2025. The aspect of enhanced military capability that would effect Indian security the most towards the latter portion of this period, would be the Chinese possession of a balanced blue water naval capability. Generally, the Indian strategy for dealing with Chinese during the entire period would have to be based on :

- * Setting the border dispute by give and take. This is important as a settled border can be more easily defended with less forces than a disputed border that has to be protected from possible 'salami slice' occupation of terrain by the adversary jockeying for a more advantageous position and improved bargaining power.
- * A strong dissuasive land-air defensive posture on the border, with a land-air counter-offensive capability of hitting up to a limited depth into selected areas of the Tibetan plateau.
- * A strong enough multi-purpose land-air reserve suitably positioned that can, among other missions, also defeat any deep trans-Himalayan penetration by the Chinese into plains of sub-continental India.
- * An Indian naval capability that can frustrate Chinese sea-borne threats to India's island territories and to sub-continental India.

Pakistan

Pakistan is a major power already and will grow progressively stronger economically, technologically, industrially and militarily, and become a full fledged regional power by 2025. Indian strategy for dealing with Pakistan would have to be based on the following :

- * Settle the Kashmir problem, to the satisfaction of the Kashmiri people, India and Pakistan, as early as possible. This is vital as

defending a settled border is easier and requires far less troops and defending an unstable 'line of actual control' is more difficult and uses up enormous number of troops especially in mountainous terrain.

* Engage Pakistan increasingly in mutual trade and commerce, and investing industrially and commercially in each other's countries under the aegis of the South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA). If this progresses rapidly from 1996 to 2025, it will be the best guarantor of peace in South Asia.

* Maintain very strong positional defences for discussion backed up by adequate land-air reserves for defence as well as for a local counter-offensive in Jammu and Kashmir till a solution is found. If a solution is agreed to and is under the process of implementation, that proceeds in good faith and mutual confidence gradually builds up, force levels can be reduced. Maintain an adequate land-air defensive posture along the Indo-Pak border for dissuasion and strong land-air reserves for counter-offensives into Pakistan territory up to limited depth.

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Meeting the Economic, Sociological and Technological Challenges

LT GEN K K HAZARI, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Introduction

To start with it is important for us to understand that there are four important core issues that have a bearing on the formulation of policies to meet the economic, sociological and technological challenges to India's well being, and therefore, to her overall security.

First, these challenges arise from unrelated but equally material external and internal factors. The external factors are a consequence of the dynamics of the evolving international order with a fluidity that requires continuous fine tuning of national policies to meet looming challenges. Internal factors are a consequence of civilisation evolution and governance that has a direct bearing on the very national fabric that provides the foundation upon which national power is composed. The core of national security management, therefore, lies in the ability of government to appreciate the peculiarity of the turbulence generated by each, external and internal factors, and harmonise the two within a single effective national matrix.

The second issue we need to keep in mind is that the Indian evolutionary environment differs fundamentally from the historical precedents set in Western societies and therefore has its own peculiarities that preclude mimicking the means and methodologies used by the latter. In the developed countries the socio-economic turbulence that accompanied the agricultural revolution, industrial revolution and now the technological revolution,

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each experienced in isolation in an era marked by the lack of instant communications, was capped by governments through harsh and oppressive measures until a new socio-economic order replaced the existing. Each of these socio-economic transformation was experienced in exclusion of the other generating single turbulence allowing for a comparatively easy management response. India, on the other hand has been beset by the agricultural, industrial and technological revolutions simultaneously in the last three decades, generating complex and unrelated sets of socio - economic upheavals running their course in tandem under the glare of instantaneous communications. And this too in an era where intra and inter state interactions have immediate, and at times a tumultuous backlash, adding further to the complications of governance. Consequently internal societal convulsions, affecting state coherence, cannot be dealt with in the traditionally recognised simplistic manner but call for new, complex and visibly benevolent means of governance.

Third, we need to take note of the fact that in the developed world "economic structures have changed, with agricultural and raw material products losing their relative value, with industrial production getting de-linked from industrial employment, with knowledge intensive goods becoming dominant, and with world capital flows becoming increasingly detached from trade patterns." While this may be true of the developed nations, it is not so for India. But what is important for us to note is that this accurately defines the basis on which new norms of governance in Western democracies would evolve and the prism through which they would project their relationships with other states. This is indicative of a serious mismatch of approaches to international interaction between developing states such as India and the developed states - with the two following unreconciled paths. Considering the growing economic and fiscal interdependence of states this mismatch would require a specially designed approach to policy formulation and implementation - adding yet another dimension to the Indian scene.

Fourth, one universal factor, historically established, is that a debilitating gap exists between economic and technological evolution and political norms that manage societies during this

transience. This syndrome applies equally to the Indian scene where political institutions and laws are lagging drastically behind the needs of economic and technological imperatives. The mix of politics, economy and technology lacks the organic wholeness on which a nation builds its national interests.

There is a need to fully understand these ingredients, internal and external, that bear on policy making before the challenges in the economic, technological and sociological fields are considered.

CHALLENGES

The Dynamics of Change and Developed Nations' Dilemma

A dynamic change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, has throughout modern history determined the position and status of nation states. The more recent manifestations of this process have been the "European Miracle" of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the emergence of the US and the Soviet Union as the two super powers of the 20th century. The "European Miracle" was the consequence of the agricultural revolution followed closely by the industrial revolution and spurred further by colonisation that made available sources of cheap raw materials. Similarly, the spectacular rise of the two continental-size states of the US and Russia [later Soviet Union] can be attributed to their rapid economic and technological progress in a period characterised by turbulence. Undoubtedly, the period 1950 to 1990 was the golden era for the United States, the Soviet Union and the middle powers of Europe. The momentum generated by the electronic revolution and the race for supremacy in the wake of the Cold War, gave them unprecedented power and prosperity as well as a dominant position in the world order.

However, while the Western societies were propelling towards these higher levels of achievement and prosperity, a new dynamic process of change was already in the making. This was a process which started with decolonisation and consequent loss of cheap sources of raw material, and was in quick succession

followed by the economic miracle of Japan and the rise of the Asia-Pacific region. There was at the same time the impact of information technology which created new levels of political and social consciousness and brought many new issues to the fore.

The world is today on the threshold of a new era, in which political and military power has lost much of its sheen, where economic factors have become predominant, and where the traditional economic supremacy of the developed nations is being challenged by the emerging economies of the Asia-Pacific region. In this situation, the developed world can be expected to use all available means to perpetuate their pre-eminent position. The emphasis on one hand would be on things like non-proliferation, weapons transfers and enforcement of human rights and civil liberties and, on the other hand, in promoting international forums and regimes which could be discreetly used to shackle growth and the progress of emerging economies.

Globalisation Syndrome

The science and technology explosion has radically shrunk the globe wherein occurrences in one part of the world have an immediate and discernible effect beyond the concerned state or region thus introducing additional variables that are material to policy management in the other states or regions. Consequences of extant policies acquire trans-national ramifications such as pollution through trans-national river, the recent spread of dangerous smog from forest fires in Indonesia, oceanic pollution affecting the EEZ, and so on.

The globalisation phenomenon has acquired significant dimensions in areas such as trade, communications, industrial competitiveness, financial markets etc., where it is now necessary for policy makers to have global vision - to think and feel globally - to formulate and manage appropriate policies. Globalisation, however, is a complex process which poses many serious challenges. While it can help to accelerate growth and thereby remove poverty, it also sharpens economic conflicts and tensions, disturbs the socio-economic equilibrium, and exposes national

economies to speculative external pressures. The recent experience of the Tiger economies of Southeast Asia is indicative of some of these problems. Fine tuning of policies to meet the demands of globalisation, therefore, poses a serious challenge to the country's policy makers.

Ecologically Sustainable Economic Development

In the process of developing their economies and achieving their levels of prosperity, the developed world has paid scant attention to resultant degradation in ecology and maintenance of the ecological balance. Excessive resource utilisation to meet their high levels of consumption, over exploitation of the earth's natural resources, excessive emissions, poor handling of pollutants and waste material has already brought us to the brink. With the spread of economic prosperity and development over a larger area, the threat to ecology has now become even greater. Thus, uncontrolled or unplanned process of development, involving large scale deforestation or construction activity, in ecologically sensitive areas or higher levels of air, ground and sea pollution can spell ruin for future generations. Policy makers have, therefore, a special responsibility to ensure that the thrust towards speedy development does not lead to further degradation of the ecology.

Population Growth and Demographic Shifts

High population growth in India, and in many of the other developing nations is a major impediment to rapid economic progress and to raising the standard of living of the people. As earlier stated, it also imposes a severe strain on our already fragile ecology. Means of reducing the pace of population growth must, therefore, be an essential part of a nation's strategy to achieve accelerated growth.

Coupled with high population growth, demographic shifts are another important factor that adversely affect socio-economic stability and progress. Demographic shifts and refugee movements are a global phenomenon, with movement taking place across and within national borders. India's problem is heightened

by the fact that it is surrounded by countries with lower level of economic prosperity and standards of living.

Social Equilibrium and Cohesion

A stable social order and a cohesive society is a pre-requisite for a smooth and speedy growth and development, as no worthwhile progress is possible in a fractured society plagued by conflict, lawlessness and administrative mismanagement. While some turbulence is inherent in a changing socio-economic order, in India's case the problem assumes serious dimensions owing largely to the inadequacies of the old established order and fissiparous tendencies arising out of ethnic and religious diversity. The creation of an equitable and non-discriminatory society with equal opportunities for all and a concerted effort to correct the current imbalances in the social and economic status of different segments of Indian society is a major challenge for Indian policy makers. The present politicised and incoherent approach to the handling of this important issue, must expeditiously give way to a more pragmatic, balanced and forward looking approach.

FORMULATION OF POLICY TO MEET CHALLENGES

Political and Administrative Management

Before dealing with actual policy formulation, it is necessary to stress that policy making is a complex task requiring a deep understanding of issues involved and harmonisation of many contradictory factors that have a bearing on decision making. An essential requirement for handling this complex task is to have a stable polity, a committed and pragmatic leadership and effective governance, which unfortunately is an area of major weaknesses in our country. For some time now, there has been an unstable political environment which has led to uncertainty and the lack of coherent decision making. Besides, parties and political leaders continue to place political expediency and personal interests before national interest or remain prisoners of ideology, theory and vested interests. There is also a serious lack of political will to develop national consensus on critical issues and to effectively implement

a comprehensive and meaningful plan of action to meet various challenges. These serious failings must be overcome if the country has to effectively meet the challenges faced by it.

Another important requirement for effective policy making is the need to have proper institutional arrangements and mechanisms for continuous and speedy evaluation of issues and for arriving at timely decisions. Mechanisms must also exist for inter ministerial co-ordination and for ensuring that national security requirements are kept in view while arriving at decisions.

Policy Making to Face External Challenges

Policy making to counter the developed world's thrust towards maintaining their hegemony over the international order is a complex task not only because they have a tremendous leverage with their domination over the international financial institutions and control over funds and technology, but also because many of the requirements of developing countries differ. For this reason, a comprehensive strategy and a detailed plan of action needs to be worked out specifying issues that must be tackled at bi-lateral, multi-lateral and collective levels, and laying down modalities of handling each issue. Foreign policy initiatives must accordingly be mounted to achieve consensus and develop a common approach. In doing so, full advantage should be taken of the existing regional and other arrangements such as ASEAN, SAARC, APEC, IORI and the G-15.

Policy Formulation for Globalisation

Globalisation is a comprehensive process which covers almost all facets of national activity having an economic content. It involves wide ranging reforms designed to put in place systems and procedures that would facilitate the opening up of the national economy and its integration with the world economy. However, as this process has inherent risks, it is necessary to weigh the pros and cons of each step and adopt a balanced approach. Some of the more important issues that require attention are :

***Integration of Markets.** A fundamental requirement for achieving higher growth rates is to promote inflow of funds and 'state of the art' technologies from the developed economies. However, investors bring in funds and technology only if the domestic market is open to trade and investment flows, and there are no barriers to entry and competition. This demands opening up of the markets. On the other hand, free trade and capital flows involve risks, as some emerging economies have learnt at considerable financial cost in recent months. The answer lies in reforming the economy further, to make it competitive and efficient in following a conservative monetary policy with low inflation and flexible interest and exchange rates, in developing, strong banks and financial intermediaries with efficient systems to minimise risks and in the meanwhile impose certain restrictions on capital inflows and outflows,

***Protection to Indigenous Industry.** While the exposure of indigenous industry to market forces is essential for making it more efficient and competitive, the speed of this process must be carefully modulated to ensue that it does not undermine the viability and growth potential of indigenous industry in an unequal global environment. Protection currently available to domestic industry must, therefore, be dismantled in a selective and phased manner.

***Trading Laws.** With the dismantling of tariff barriers under the GATT and WTO, the matured economies have now developed a propensity to use non-tariff barriers such as child labour, denial of entry to agriculturally infected products etc and other means like IPRs to gain undue advantage in trading. It is necessary for Indian policy makers to identify all such vulnerabilities and threats and evolve suitable strategies to counter them.

Policies to Meet Internal Challenges

The creation of a favourable internal environment and formulation of pragmatic policies is a pre-requisite for rapid growth. Steps required to be taken in this direction, have for long been a subject of discussion and debate within the country. All the requirements and answers are known, the difficulty lies in evolving a consensus on issues, the lack of decision making and in the

implementation of decisions that are taken. However, there are some inescapable aspects of governance which must be expeditiously addressed if the country is to move on a high growth path. These are :

***Population Growth and Demographic Pressures.** High population growth continues to have a negative impact on development. It not only negates whatever economic gains are made, but also makes the overall management and governance more difficult and unmanageable. The earlier attempts to arrest population growth, which were based largely on propagating birth control measures have shown few results, if any. The requirement now is to develop a new focus which is based more on the spread of literacy and primary education, rapid economic growth, and equitable distribution of wealth to raise the standards of living of the deprived sections rather than on the old traditional methods. In handling this issue, one must keep in mind the axiom "no society that is rich can be illiterate and no society that is illiterate can be rich".

***Management of Fiscal Policies.** Despite the professed intentions of successive governments, poor fiscal management continues to plague the economy. No concerted effort has been made to prune governmental expenditure or to improve resource mobilisation by cutting down non-merit subsidies and spreading the tax net to the agricultural sector. Substantial resources are also being lost due to inefficiencies in the transport undertakings, loss making PSUs and so on. This has over a period of time resulted in high inflation rates and poor availability of resources for investment in development and growth. There is a pressing need to evolve policies, as well as modalities of correcting this imbalance.

***Technology Development.** This is another important area which requires a major policy thrust. While some 'state of the art' technology would always have to be imported, sustained and self reliant growth is not possible without a major thrust towards building up indigenous capability in technology development. A comprehensive technology plan must be evolved making full use of the recently completed studies on '*Vision 2020*,' which has examined India's technology imperatives in its entirety.

Preparing India for the Threats of the 21st Century

MAROOF RAZA

Ideally, a country's defence policy should compliment its foreign policy, which in turn should be governed by certain accepted principles of strategic thought. That, however is not entirely the case with India. So, we must now examine the various issues that are of strategic concern to India, particularly with the benefit of fifty years hindsight. It is unlikely that India could play a global role as a military super power in the next few decades, and our military preoccupation will be with the Chinese and the Pakistanis, with some attention devoted to others in the neighbourhood - like the events in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma which could be of consequence to India.

While India has struck good deal with the Chinese, which will help in the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the Sino-Indian border - with both the nations having more or less agreed on the non-use of military forces against each other: it is important not to let euphoria cloud our vision, because China continues to sit on large chunks of Indian territory in Aksai Chin and the Arunachal - about which there was little or no mention during the visit of Jiang Zemin. So, a somewhat reduced level of troop deployment, once the agreement with China is implemented, would allow India to earmark some troops as strategic reserves, of which it currently has none.

As for Pakistan, there will be very little change in the status-quo in the near future. Infact, with the supplies of American weapons under the Hank Brown and the Harkin amendments, the Pakistani military machine remains sufficiently potent and capable of withstanding any aggressive design that India may have. But,

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as India is committed to the regional status-quo and has no intentions, nor quite frankly, the capability for any major military offensive, Indo-Pak relations have in strategic terms graduated from a 'warlike' to 'war-deterrence', as the de-facto nuclear capability of both India and Pakistan should prevent another war between the two in the future.

However, India's missile projects and their deployment remain a cause of concern both to Islamabad and Beijing, as well as further beyond in Washington. In fact Mr IK Gujral, had even gone on record as the foreign minister, to state that India may soon incorporate the Prithvi missiles within the Armed Forces. But when it does so, it will immediately elicit an alarming response from one and all, blaming India for initiating another arms race. More than the Prithvi missile, it is the Agni that causes concern across the board. It has demonstrated the ability to accurately hit targets in China, and in the Middle East beyond Iran, as also in Pakistan. Agni also places India in an exclusive club, has immense military-scientific potential, and it can even be armed with nuclear warheads. To stall further development on it, with Pakistan and China continuing to enhance their capabilities - is unacceptable.

The Financial Issues

Two separate decisions were taken over the past year, which will have far reaching effects on India's security. One was the decision to buy the state of the art Sukhoi-30 MK fighters and other military weapons - the biggest defence deal in the past decade, after the controversy that continues to surround the Bofors gun deal. So when India's military brasshats had lost almost all hope of their demands being heard, the government surprised everyone first with the decision to buy forty Sukhoi-30MK multirole fighters, and then by engaging the Russians in a high profile dialogue to buy most items on the military's wish list - to include naval submarines, 155mm guns and possibly two frigates - a deal that could cost between Rs 15,000 to 20,000 crores. The other was the initiation of a one time supplementary defence budget to cater for such expenses. From the 1996-97 defence budget,

Rs 7773 crores were available for stores and the purchase of equipment. But the unprecedented step of initiating a supplementary demand budget for defence at 1.5 percent of the GDP, provides for an additional defence purchase grant. This to some extent should fulfill most of the equipment demands of the Armed Forces for the next couple of years. But it may interest the reader to know some of the broad conclusions on 'National Security' made by the Tenth Finance Commission (for 1995-2000).

- a) A large part of the expenditure of defence is taken up by manpower costs which have grown in the past decade at 13.4 per cent per annum, as against the defence budget that has grown at 11.9 per cent per annum. So, it is important to protect funds for the purchase of spares and equipment.
- b) There is an urgent need to contain the rising pension bill, which has risen from Rs 480 crores in 1984-85 to Rs. 2706 crores in 1994-95. And linked to this is the need to reduce the age profile of combat troops.
- c) Defence expenditure should be prioritized, with a pattern of an inter-service allocation of resources best suited to obtain a balanced force structure, upgradation and a cost-effective mix in the acquisition of weapon systems.
- d) Since the military and para-military forces have quite often been used for the maintenance of internal law and order, a holistic view of internal and external security be taken, for a revised balance between the role of the police and the Armed Forces.
- f) For creating post-retirement opportunities for ex-servicemen, there could be common recruitment and training of para-military forces and of combatants to help the lateral transfer of soldiers to a para-military force, after an initial period of service, say seven years. Also, a percentage of vacancies should be reserved for ex-servicemen to be absorbed in various Central and State government organizations on retirement.

- g) And a less opaque two-part budgetary scheme should be adopted, as the present budgetary system is not conducive to information on resource utilization.

The report has finally recommended the need to set up a high powered body - such as a National Security Council to review the entire security scenario (external and internal), to determine the role, organization, equipment and funding requirements of the various agencies involved in protecting the integrity of India and for peace keeping.

Restructuring of Forces

While India's missile programme coupled with its enhanced arms inventory gives our Armed Forces the teeth to meet most external threats for the next decade or more, what must be undertaken with equal urgency is restructuring of India's Armed Forces in the light of the foreseeable commitments.

Some of our units need to be permanently structured to cope with low-intensity internal conflicts of secessionism such as in Kashmir, Assam, and in the North Eastern states. These conflicts will continue for most of our lifetime, and the ad-hoc measures that the Indian government has adopted has hardly reflected well on the performance of the Armed Forces. Low-intensity conflicts are aided often by an external force (as Pakistan has done in Kashmir and China and Burma have done in the North East), and they require a politico-military doctrine to cope with. Sadly, this dictum is rarely ever implemented and has led India's Armed Forces to operate in isolation. For one, some divisions of the army (preferably two for North India and three for the North East), need to be trained, structured and equipped primarily for a role in low intensity conflicts. This is an imperative. If we can have three Armoured divisions, without having fought a conventional war for the past 25 years, there is no reason why five such divisions cannot be created.

For troops committed in low-intensity conflicts, the answer is to prepare them for the kind of conflict that they would be up

against. If the conventional wars require the use of enormous fire power and with little care about the hearts and minds of the enemy; the proxy wars of today being fought across the subcontinent, require a soldier to use only minimum force at an escalating level - as also the need to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, and maybe even the militants. But to fight the insurgents, we must give our infantry units helicopters, Kalashnikov rifles, top class radio-sets, a good understanding on the sensitivities of the local populace and aspects of human rights.

Also a new strategic concept that should be given attention is the idea of non-offensive defence, i.e., to re-structure the Armed Forces essential for a defensive role. A certain amount of troop reductions could thus be planned and implemented by the manpower intensive Indian Armed Forces. For instance, the Indian Army strength can be brought comfortably down from its current 1,265,000 to 1,200,000 without any threat to our security. By a similar yardstick, upto five squadrons of the IAF (MIG-21's) can be phased out with the induction of the multi-role Sukhois. And the Navy should focus on providing a strong coastal defence, instead of craving for expensive aircraft carriers. (A relatively cheap Russian carrier costs Rs 1500 crores!) And once the inventories of weapon systems are scaled down, older weapon systems can be replaced; and it would be possible to overcome the perpetual shortage of officers in the Services. (The Army is short of 12,000 officers and the Indian Air Force is short of 600 pilots). We need leaner Armed Forces which are well equipped and trained.

The Nuclear Option

The issue of nuclear disarmament has caught the world's attention in the past two years, with the debates on the NPT and the CTBT, and how it affects a nations security. While India has been emphasizing the need for the world to take a planned approach to disarmament by setting targets with clarity; the nuclear powers are more comfortable with their ambiguous approach without allowing countries like India the right to exercise their freedom to associate with the issue.

So what should India do with its potential, apart from 'keeping the nuclear option open'? The simple truth is that if you have a potent nuclear arsenal - as the five nuclear powers do - you carry clout in world affairs. The huge support for the Test Ban Treaty in the UN, and our principled but isolated stand on the issue, shows that our moral posturing have got us nowhere. In fact, it has put us in the not-so-distinguished company of Libya and Bhutan, as the only countries to have opposed the Test Ban Treaty at the UN. But if we do decide to weaponise - and I strongly maintain that we should - then we shall graduate into the league of global powers, with a say in world affairs. Sadly, there are many Indians who have psyched themselves, and the people they know, about the consequences, of Western economic sanctions if India did make nuclear weapons. But actually, we would only be deprived of Coca Cola, Kit Kats, and some fancy cars. Nothing more. But if there are sanctions, the question is, are we prepared to make any sacrifices? My guess is that we Indians aren't really up to it, because we are so deeply wedded to the 'culture of consumerism', that national pride takes little priority.

The advantages that accrue from nuclear weaponisation are considerable. Apart from a great power status and eventually even a UN Security Council seat (as it happened in the case of China); having 'nukes' helps to keep a smaller regular army with a greater military potency. The money saved from expenses on a large conventional army - could help offset the cost, if any of sanctions. Besides, no one dares to threaten a nuclear power with coercive gunboat diplomacy - as has become the norm these days. Let us ask ourselves, would we stand for any future American President bombarding us with cruise missiles, (like Bill Clinton did against Iraq) to enhance his re-election prospects, if we were to refuse to accept an American no-fly zone over Kashmir tomorrow? So not to make too fine a point though, it was Iraq yesterday and it might be India tomorrow. So, the choice is ours.

The Critical Dimensions of A Possible US Strategic Partnership With India

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN

The lecture cannot begin without a few words about the man in whose memory and honour it is given.

Pyara Lal epitomized the phrase, "an officer and a gentleman." He was from the old school. He pretended that the "new crop" of officers, which probably includes most of you, was not as good as those from his own era. But he did not believe that. Indeed, his professional dynamism grew out of the belief that India was capable of producing, on its own, officers of the very first quality. This marvelous building, the library that Pyaralal built up over the years, this lecture series, and the many officers he helped and encouraged through the years to meet his own very high standards are powerful evidence of Pyara's dedication to his profession.

However, many of us encountered another human dimension of Pyara Lal. He was a friend to many scholars, Indian and foreign, including myself, who sought out his guidance and the use of the wonderful USI collection. I recall many pleasant hours in Kashmir House, where Pyara would leave me to my books and journals, but every once in a while there would appear a cup of tea and a cookie. I could not at the time do much in return, except to review books for the Journal, and write the occasional short article, but there was one time when I was able to reciprocate in a most unusual way.

I believe it was in 1978 or 1979 when I made my first trip

Text of the First Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture - 1997 delivered by Professor Stephen Philip Cohen, University of Illinois, Urbana - Champaign (USA), at the USI Auditorium, New Delhi on 19 September 1997

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to Pakistan. When he heard I was going to Lahore, he spoke affectionately of his youth in that city and asked a modest favour of me. Could I take a photo of the house his family lived in. I did track down the house, and was able to ascertain from neighbours that his family had, indeed lived there. I am sure that his brother has the photo. What impressed me was Pyaralal's lack of rancour towards Pakistan. Of course he deeply regretted its formation and the partition, but he had a sensible "live and let live" attitude.

Let me begin my talk with a disclaimer. Although I once served in the US government, and have at times been a consultant to it, my views are my own. I left government ten years ago, and have often disagreed strongly with American policy towards South Asia. The following comments are my own, and certainly do not reflect in any way American policy.

I am reluctant to speak directly on a subject, that of a US-India strategic partnership, when that remains only a very, very theoretical possibility. Therefore this talk will dwell primarily on the constraints to such a partnership that exist on the American side. I would begin, however, by pointing out that Washington and New Delhi at one time in the past had a brief but close strategic tie — perhaps partnership is too strong a word. We actively cooperated after the India-China conflict, when the United States strongly supported India. The memory of that cooperation faded in Washington very quickly, and may be something of an embarrassment in New Delhi, but it would be worth someone reviewing so that we might better understand the misperceptions and misjudgments that guided all parties to that conflict, especially because in some quarters, both here and in the United States, there is talk again of another grand alliance against China. I have my own view on this issue, perhaps different from that held by most Americans and most Indians, and we can discuss it in the question period. I would also refer you to a forthcoming book by Jagat Mehta, who has written with great insight into the misperception that ruled at the time.

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union parted a number of themes tied together for five decades

in American strategic thinking. The struggles against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were characterized by a fusion of ideology, geopolitics and terrifying military technology. Both countries pursued global strategic objectives, developed weapons of the most advanced (and threatening) nature, and were propelled by expansionist, totalitarian regimes. A racial/cultural element was also evident in the parallel and sequential conflicts with imperial Japan and Communist China.

Woodrow Wilson's vision of a democratic world seemed to make good geopolitical sense in such circumstances. The greatest threats to democracy - implacable totalitarian states, in two cases culturally quite distant from the United States, armed with, or racing to acquire, weapons of mass destruction - were also the greatest threats to an international order compatible with vital American economic, strategic, moral and political interests. Three generations of Americans rallied around Wilsonianism for an unprecedented global effort. We did well by doing good.

With the end of Cold War these themes have gone their own way.

- 1) Some, such as Francis Fukuyama, argue that a democratic world would be a peaceful world because democracies by and large accepted the international status quo. A variation on this theme is the "cooperative security" school who believe that an expanding community of like-minded states, if not all democracies, could evolve minimal security assurances towards each other, and could jointly face states that sought to upset the status quo.
- 2) Others have argued that classical geopolitics would again be important, and have looked to the Nineteenth Century for inspiration. The idea of 'pivotal states' rests upon the assumption that the world could be graded into major, minor and intermediate powers : pivotal state being those intermediate powers whose collapse or disintegration might affect important interests of the world's great powers and the one remaining superpower, the United States. An updated balance of power strategy would be effective if we could identify those hard-core threats to American

interests, those states that were peripheral, and those that were on the cusp-and devote our attention and resources proportionately to each.

3) Then there is Samuel Huntington, who has argued that older civilizational faultlines have reemerged. The new threat to American and its closest allies comes from states, or clusters of states, which reject our vision of the world, and are organized around a "civilizational" principle.

4) Finally, the view has grown that America is threatened by states that might have access to weapons of mass destruction - primarily nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological devices, especially if delivered by ballistic missiles. A new category of 'rogue' states has been invented to describe countries unfriendly to America that might have access to such weapons.

American post-Cold War policy has been driven largely by a combination and recombination of these threats: totalitarian states, culturally distant (and hostile) states, geostrategically important states and states that seek to acquire or spread various kinds of weapons of mass destruction to others. None of these can be characterized as having global geopolitical ambitions, although in some cases (Iraq, Iran) they are seen as threatening vital American economic interests, especially access to energy. These states, especially if they were to combine, qualify as a new threat of significant magnitude for many Americans.

THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLICY CHALLENGE OF INDIA

For those policymakers and scholars who developed these theories of the future of international politics India has been an awkward fit. They have asked themselves several questions :

First, Is India A Liberal Power?

If there is common democratic heritage between the US and India, can the two countries work jointly on a number of global

issues? It was assumed in Washington that India, having lost its Soviet patron, and having gone through an economic crisis in 1990 would be more cooperative in dealing with global issues such as human rights, free trade, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and might even be interested in some kind of cooperative security arrangement. However, many of us were surprised by India's attempt to undercut the permanent extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, and the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. By this action, India lost one group of allies in the United States.

Second, Could India be a Strategic Partner?

Those who expected India to play a cooperative geostrategic role have also been disappointed. 'India' - when it was a British colony—dominated the approaches to the Persian Gulf and, with the assistance of the Royal Navy, the entire Indian Ocean. It seemed that India might welcome US military cooperation, but such cooperation has been furtive and infrequent. While New Delhi may again play a larger strategic role beyond South Asia, it is bogged down in the region by its chronic conflict with Islamabad. Neither state can be expected to be other than a minor player outside the region as long as strategic arithmetic requires the subtraction of Pakistani power from available Indian power. Is India ready for a 'strategic partnership'? Perhaps not, because it has yet to fully identify its own strategic role, nor has it had much experience in working in alliances, whereas for the United States, the alliance was, from 1941, the preferred way of dealing with international security problems. One of the most insightful books on this dilemma facing Americans is Richard Haass' new book, *The Reluctant Sheriff*.

Third, is India A Civilizational Power?

Huntington accords India a special "civilizational" role, as one of the few places where a religion - Hinduism - is largely coterminous with a single state. This is also the view of many Indian strategists, including Jawaharlal Nehru, who argued in the 1930s that India was one of the six or seven state-civilizations,

and hence destined to play a major global role. Nehru, like the contemporary Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), argued that there was a broad cultural sharing among Indians of all religions - Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Christian. Is this the basis for a strategic relationship? It is only if one assumes that these civilizational entities will act in alliance and counter-alliance in the way that states have sometimes acted. I find this unpersuasive, as I find Huntington's evidence of a Sinic-Islamic civilizational alliance to be unpersuasive. Further India's complexity and diversity make such "civilizational" alliances unpromising, and a so-called alliance against the so-called Islamic world would be deeply divisive within India itself.

Finally, is India A Rogue Nuclear State?

For those worried about the spread of weapons of mass destruction India seemed to have become part of the problem, not part of the solution. India is seen by some American officials not only as a possible nuclear rogue, but as a state whose actions have inspired and threatened others. This has led, they argue, to a situation in South Asia where two nuclear-armed states face each other across an armed and violent border. The contest for control over the state of Jammu and Kashmir is such a serious matter that high government officials regularly testify that Kashmir is one of the most dangerous spots on earth: the India-Pakistan conflict could slip into a conventional war which would very likely escalate into a nuclear exchange. I have not agreed with these assertions, although the region may be more dangerous than Indians and Pakistanis would admit, but in any case the possibility of a regional nuclear arms race makes an American strategic engagement with India - or Pakistan, for that matter — all the more doubtful. The forthcoming Adelphi paper by Neil Joeck, of Livermore Laboratory, should provide a useful basis for discussion of this issue both here and in Pakistan.

RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN POLICY

India now falls into a very difficult category: nothing it can do will threaten vital American interests, yet it is important enough -

because of its size, ongoing "churning" democratic revolution, its strategic and scientific potential, and its new status as a "big emerging market" - that it cannot be ignored. To me the critical questions are the United States can develop a coherent policy towards the one fifth of the world that is not a threat to US security, that does not show signs of calamitous collapse, that has not yet, and is unlikely to become a major economic partner, and that persists in expanding a political ideology that is not hostile to American values? When a country — the United States — has been engaged in a global struggle against totalitarianism for three generations, it is hard to mobilize American policymakers, let alone Congress, around a non-threat to strategic, political, economic, and moral interests. The discipline imposed by a geopolitical framework—even a flawed one—forced earlier American policy makers to treat South Asia as a whole. This has not been apparent since 1989-90.

Perhaps the most telling fact about American policy towards India is that there was no coherent policy review after the end of the Cold War — no comprehensive survey of the several American interests embedded in India, let alone the development of a strategy indicating how pressing interests could be optimized without sacrificing less urgent, but perhaps equally important long-term interests. Instead, by default, a very few 'global' issues (led by proliferation), with regional manifestations, came to dominate American policy to the exclusion of almost all other concerns.

Paradoxically, the absence today of a threat from South Asia, makes it difficult to persuade the policy and legislative communities to support a policy in which real, but limited, American interests are advanced. Three criteria suggest themselves as guides for a new American policy :

- * First, American policy must devote *proportionate* attention to America's diverse interests in South Asia. South Asia should not be moved to the top of the US foreign policy agenda, but neither should it languish as a policy backwater.
- * Second, the policy must be presented in such a way that raises neither false hopes or fears in India and Pakistan.

* Third, American policy must be achievable with available resources. There is no need for elaborate aid programmes, risky military commitments, or significant American resources, this should be easy, except for the fact that the scarcest resource of all: the sustained attention of senior policy makers and Congress, has been in short supply.

With these criteria in mind, a cluster of policy goals are suggested as an initial policy framework. They have the advantage of being internally self-reinforcing - that is, movement in one area can lead to progress in another. Indeed, American policy should be seen as advancing along a wide front : pressing too hard on a single issue will be detrimental to other important interests, and in the end could be self-defeating.

A new American policy in South Asia will have to emerge from the confluence of five different interest clusters.

The first is a new, post-Cold War opportunity : the encouragement of the process of economic liberalization, which has provided (in the words of the Asia Society study group) a new "ballast" for American relations with India and Pakistan. Market reform, tariff reduction, the elimination of state subsidies for inefficient industries and the promotion of regional free trade zones are all policies which are in American interests - and those of India and Pakistan. However, as democracies, India and Pakistan are especially vulnerable to distortions and inequalities generated by uneven economic growth. American policymakers, corporations, and investors must be sensitive to the fact that India is not China: growth without social justice will be politically unacceptable in a lively, multi-party democracy.

Second, the United States has an important ideological interest in India : the preservation and expansion of Indian democracy. A democratic India also has three important consequences.

* A democratic India is the role-model for much of the rest of South Asia. All of the South Asian states (except Bhutan), are democracies. The pro-democratic elements in each look

to India for inspiration and example, even where they may disagree with particular Indian policies. Even Pakistanis envy India's democratic record, and would like to emulate it.

* A democratic India is not only more compatible with additional movement towards market reforms, but will be sensitive to the abuses that market systems can produce. Elections are powerful ways of ensuring that economic growth will be equitable, both geographically and in terms of social class and rural and urban divisions.

* Democratic states are less likely to go to war than non-democracies. Over time, mature democracies develop political, cultural, and economic links that increase their interdependence and influence the gain and loss calculation regarding the use of force. No politicians in South Asia understand this better than the current Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers, Inder K Gujral and Nawaz Sharif.

Two other, closely linked, goals should be the promotion of strategic normalization between New Delhi and Islamabad and assist the management of their de facto nuclear weapons programmes. The former is an old objective of the United States, but still a worthy one. American administrations have for forty years been trying to arrange a deal on Kashmir, and for forty years have met with frustration. However, while change will not come quickly, there are signs that there may yet be an accommodation on the disputed Siachen territory and subsequently the large issue of Kashmir. For this to happen a process of internal debate and dialogue will have to proceed in both states and among Kashmiris. This debate has long been underway in India, and is only just starting in Pakistan; there is a new generation of younger scholars, strategists and politicians in both states that see these disputes as hangovers from the past, and as this generation comes to power (and assuming that Pakistan remains a democracy), there will be movement even on these intractable issues. The United States should not press for a quick solution to the Kashmir problem, but help create the conditions under which such a solution, satisfactory to a wide range of the political community in both countries, can emerge.

Strategic normalization has consequences for America's concerns over the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia. It is unlikely that Pakistan or India will soon abandon their nuclear weapons programmes but a realistic goal would be to create the conditions in which neither perceives any gain in moving their programmes forward. Legislation that hampers Washington's ability to maintain the present situation needs to be reexamined - America has let the best become the enemy of the good.

A fifth major foreign policy goal should be to develop a dialogue about short-term and long-term strategic cooperation with India. No such dialogue exists at the moment. There are contingencies, immediate and distant, that need to be discussed. In the short run, India may be able to expand its peacekeeping and stabilizing role in regions adjacent to South Asia. In the long run the emergence of China as an aggressive power could raise profound issues for all three states. Pakistan would have to decide whether its quasi-alliance with China might not drag it into conflicts for which it was ill-equipped; India, also must decide whether it is easier to wean a totalitarian, powerful China away from Pakistan, or whether it might attempt to wean a newly democratic Pakistan away from China. Finally, a violent, or expansionist China may not pose the same kind of threat to India and the United States at the same time. Would India allow itself to be used as a "front-line state" against China, or would Washington come to New Delhi's assistance in the event of a crisis? These are still-theoretical questions - and there is a strong possibility that they will remain so, but they need to be discussed between Americans and Indians, Americans and Pakistanis, and most importantly, between Pakistanis and Indians. Indeed, I have a very different future in mind for China than either aggressive expansion or imminent collapse.

American interests in South Asia are now more diverse than they were during the Cold War, but the policy process has not adapted to the management of this complexity. For almost thirty years America's South Asia policy has alternated between frenzied, episodic attention and long spells of apathy. The former overrates the importance of India and its neighbours, the latter

sends exactly the wrong message to them: that the United States does not care. Balancing complex interests has always been difficult for America as it approaches the various regions of the world, now without the goad and the framework of the Cold War. But developing and implementing such a policy - in regions such as South Asia, where there are some threats to American interests, but also significant opportunities — will be an important measure of the strategic maturity of the United States as it enters the next millennium.

ERROR REGRETTED

Reference : The USI Journal, July-September, 1997

The review of the book *A Star on the Mount of Jupiter : A Story of Captain Gurbachan Salaria with Indian Brigade's Account in the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation in Congo*, on page 429, has Capt Ajit Singh's name mentioned by mistake in place of the name of Capt Gurbachan Salaria, PVC. The error is regretted.

Central Asia – A Strategic Appraisal

PART II

LT GEN E A VAS PVSM (RETD)

In the 16th Century, Central Asia was composed of a number of independent and disunited Muslim tribes, separated from the two great Islamic empires in Turkey and Persia (Iran). Russia, therefore, found no difficulty in annexing the area. Britain's attempts to assert its military authority over Afghanistan in order to exercise political influence across the Amur Darya, ended in military failure. This left Russia in sole control of the region. However, apart from establishing a few trading and military posts, Imperial Russia did not interfere with the cultural and social life of the people.

At the end of the First World War, the rise of Communism in Russia changed the political scene and deeply alarmed Sir Halford J Machinder, founder of geopolitical thinking. Machinder's theory, rather grandly expressed, was that "who rules the heartland commands the world island; who rules the world island commands the world." The location of "heartland" was a matter on which he was not always precise. He placed the heartland in Eastern Europe. But the more familiar location was deep in Asia, the locale of the Huns of Genghis Khan, of the Manchus, and the scene of the Russian-British struggle in Afghanistan in the 19th Century.

Machinder's school of geopolitics gave birth to a philosophy closely associated with imperial aspirations. In Germany, it found expression in the theories of Karl Haushofer, the ideological patron of the Nazis. In Japan, Machinder's thinking is reflected in the infamous Tanaka Memorial (1927) to the Japanese Emperor; as the Memorial puts it, "in order to conquer the world we must

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begin by conquering China. In order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia."

Soviet Intervention

Under Soviet governance, Central Asia was reorganised, modernized and demarcated on a tribal basis and given appropriate names and statehood as part of the Soviet Union (See map). After World War II, a pro-Communist government was installed in Afghanistan which, however, continued to remain an independent non-aligned state.

In December 1979, there was an anti-communist uprising in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union undertook the largest military invasion of a non-aligned country since World War II. Some claim that the Soviet Union's decision to intervene in Afghanistan was made with the hope that a limited operation could achieve multiple goals quickly. Soviet political motives were probably a mixture of the following: a desire to ensure that their communist nominee remained in power in Afghanistan; a concern over instability on their frontiers coupled with a belief that Afghanistan like Outer Mongolia is a Soviet area of influence and their unwillingness for forces unfriendly to the Soviet Union to emerge in control; a response to the Afghan Government's invitation under the Soviet-Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship; a demonstration to other governments in the region that they were fully committed to their allies unlike the USA which failed to protect the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran; a warning to Islamic fundamentalists in Iran that the Soviet Union disapproves of their exporting Islamic fundamentalism.

Apart from these considerations, there must have been strong Machiavelli-inspired geopolitical compulsions. The Russians have a good sense of history and knew what a graveyard Afghanistan was, for the British. More recently, Vietnam was a quagmire for the USA. They knew that their move would upset the Muslim world and prevent the exploitation of Iran's anti-Americanism and Arab anger with the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty to Russia's advantage. They knew that no one would be fooled by the legalistic

justification on the basis of the Soviet-Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship. They knew that this would threaten the SALT Treaty and even jeopardise the success of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Nevertheless, they were compelled to act because they must have believed that their vital geopolitical interests were at stake in this heartland. And there is some justification for that viewpoint.

Whether one subscribes to Machinder's theories or not, we should note that despite its apparent remoteness, Central Asia has special strategic significance. It borders China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, and the four major cultural forces they represent. Islam is a significant force within the area. The region possesses some of the world's largest deposits of oil, natural gas, gold and uranium. The area also produces or acts as a channel for much of the heroin reaching Europe. For these reasons alone, Central Asia cannot be ignored.

Political Economic and Social Factors

Seven decades of Soviet rule and central planning distorted the politics and economics of Central Asia, each in a different way. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left five new states with problems and places the area's future security relations with its neighbours, including India, in question. An examination of each state will indicate how and why this is so.

Kazakhstan, with a population of 18 million, gained short-term diplomatic benefit by agreeing to relinquish the nuclear weapons left on its territory after the Soviet break-up. It has enormous oil reserves, liberal leadership and favourable business laws which make it attractive for foreign investors. However, economic prospects are constrained by the ethnic and territorial division of the Republic between Russians and Kazakhs, the weakness of local institutions, the absence of scientific intelligentsia and an underdeveloped industrial base and infrastructure. Its capital Almaty is located at the far edge of the Kazakh-populated zone and has limited room for expansion. The Republic's GDP has been steadily declining since 1993 and attempts of the President to resort to reform by decree suggest that Kazakhstan can-

not play a major independent regional role in the foreseeable future. Apparently recognising this, the President agreed in 1995 to allow several Russian military bases on his country's soil.

Kazakhstan is adjacent to Xinjiang province of China which is the home of seven million Muslim Uighurs, who are racially akin to those living across the border in Kazakhstan. The Turki-speaking Uighurs claim that they have always been independent, and were functioning as the Eastern Turkistan Republic from 1944 to 1949 when it was annexed to become Xinjiang and part of the People's Republic of China. Rebel Uighurs have been agitating for independence ever since. To counter this, the Chinese have inducted some nine million Han Chinese into Xinjiang over the past 50 years. Following Deng Xiaoping's death, the rebels have stepped up their violent protests. These activities are viewed with concern by China as they set a bad example to other autonomous regions like Tibet and Inner Mongolia which also have restless minorities.

Kyrgyzstan is a small picturesque mountainous nation with a population of four million. It aspires to become the "Switzerland" of Central Asia but it is poor in resources and lacks most of the requirements for independent regional power. Its public life is riddled with inter-clan rivalries, regional divisions and corruption. With Russians constituting 20 per cent of the population, it faces ethnic tensions that could eventually threaten its survival.

Turkmenistan has abundant natural gas wells. The profitable sale of this product to its neighbours enables it to supply electricity at no charge to every citizen in this otherwise poor country. But, a large desert territory, a population of fewer than four million and a small number of intellectuals, compels Turkmenistan to depend on others for security, much like the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

Tajikistan with a population of six million and 900,000 displaced persons is suffering from the full impact of the Afghan War and drug-trafficking along its southern border with Afghanistan. Internal ethnic strife is exacerbated by a rebel fundamentalist

movement, a lack of unity among its leaders, a paucity of natural resources and the presence of large quantities of Soviet weapons. The proximity of Afghanistan is another danger. Ahmed Shah Masood who ran the Army of the ousted Afghan government, is a Tajik. The Taliban accuse him of having a clandestine base in Tajikistan from where he operates an airfield. In this situation the Republic is in no position to emerge as a regional power of consequence.



Afghanistan

With a population of 18 million, Afghanistan lacks ethnic unity. The southern two-thirds of the country is composed of Pathan (Pakhtun) stock and the northern one-third of Tajik and Uzbek stock; along the north-western border and around Herat are located small pockets of Hazara Shiites and Ismailis. The country has not only been a victim of the Cold War while it raged, but continues to suffer from its fallout in the form of covert intervention by its neighbours, the spread of heroin and the Kalashnikov culture, religious extremism and tribal nationalism.

Pakistan, having failed to instal Gulbudin Hekmatiyar in Kabul and enlist his loyalty, created a Pakhtun-dominated Taliban militia (a Persian word, Taliban = student). This force, fired by medieval Islamic phobias, and backed by Saudi money, US weapons and Pakistani logistics and training, succeeded in overrunning southern Afghanistan and installing the Pakhtuns in Kabul. President Burhanuddin Rabbani took refuge in the northern provinces.

In February 1997, internal tribal quarrels broke up the solidarity of the Uzbek Army which was defending the north-western provinces under General Abdul Rashid Dostum. A rebel faction led by General Abdul Malik took support of the Taliban (some say that Malik's defection was purchased with money) and ousted General Dostum, who fled to Turkey. Taliban militia operating from Herat moved along the southern border of Turkmenistan and entered the city of Mazar-e-Sharif without a shot being fired. Uzbek soliders retained their arms; Ahmad Shah Masood still remained firmly entrenched in his mountain stronghold in Panjsher Valley in control of the road and gas pipeline to Kabul and the strategic Salang Pass, the gateway to Central Asia. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were exhuberant and joined Pakistan in extending their support to the new regime at Kabul.

This apparent victory raised fears of the spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism into Central Asia, into Chinese Xinjiang province and Jammu and Kashmir. All the five republics of Central Asia are members of the CIS. Moscow issued a warning to Taliban that any intrusion across the border will be repulsed with force. Iran sealed its borders with western Afghanistan. This cut off vital trans-nation trade from Iranian ports. India continued its recognition of the Rabbani regime. It demanded that foreign interference in Afghanistan should stop forthwith, and supported an end to the crisis through negotiations and a solution based on sharing of power by all important groups.

In the months which followed, black-turbaned bearded Taliban men poured into Mazar-e-Sharif via Herat, and began issuing eccentric dictates: a ban on the use of TV and Videos, paper bags (as these might be recycled from old copies of the Koran);

the compulsory growing of beards by men and adoption of the veil by women; ban on women working and girls going to school. Liberal Vodka-drinking Uzbeks were soon fed up and waiting for an opportunity to throw out these intolerant intruders. In May 1997 whilst several senior Pakistani and Taliban diplomats were visiting Mazar-e-Sharif by helicopter, a local Taliban commander ordered some Ismaili soldiers to disarm. A fight broke out and violence spread rapidly. Within 24 hours General Malik's forces had slaughtered thousands and captured hundreds including the visiting diplomats. Ahmad Shah Masood joined battle and attacked the fleeing Taliban forces; a few remnants were thrown back some 120 km to the outskirts of Kabul. Having lost the cream of its first line forces, the Taliban requested a return of prisoners followed by a cease fire; the request was ignored. Like Britain and Russia, Pakistan had learnt that meddling in Afghanistan can mean humiliation and military disaster.

Pakistan's grand strategy having failed, it now hopes to consolidate Taliban's control over the southern two-thirds of the country. It is attempting to win over Uzbek and Tajik leaders to form a coalition government in Kabul. But the Afghans know that Pakistan has never accepted the validity of the Durand Line, drawn by the British in the 19th Century as a frontier with Afghanistan. A current proposal to rename Pakistan's North West Frontier Province as Pakhtunkhwa (Home of the Pakhtuns) has clear implications for Afghanistan which is being divided on ethnic lines thus separating it geographically into northern-non-Pakhtun and southern Pakhtun. Some Pakistani intellectuals have questioned this policy and fear the adverse impact of Taliban on their country and a possible exacerbation of Pakhtun ethnic-nationalism on both sides of the Durand Line. Whatever that be, it is evident that decades of tribal warfare has left Afghanistan in ruins with the southern provinces under the tenuous control of fundamentalist Taliban and the northern provinces under Uzbek and Tajik control. With the return of General Dostum from his self-imposed exile, a reorganisation of the anti-Taliban forces has taken place in northern Afghanistan under the overall command of General Dostum. The Taliban regime faces hostility from three of its neighbours; Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Viewed in this

context, it seems almost certain that instability in Afghanistan will continue. Growing military pressures on Kabul from the West, North and North-East will face Taliban with an economic and logistic nightmare, and could even result in increasing instability in Pakistan.

The Anchor State

The assessment, even if given an optimistic weightage, leaves little hope that any of the above five countries could adopt an independent course and mobilise its political and economic resources to exercise overall leadership in the area in the foreseeable future. This identifies Uzbekistan as the only republic which can function as a regional anchor in Central Asia. The Republic lies at the geographic centre of the region, borders all the other five states and it alone has no common border with any major power. It is a little smaller than France and has a population of 23 million and there are politically active Uzbek minorities in all the other five countries including 1.5 million in Afghanistan. Ethnic Russians represent less than a tenth of Uzbekistan's population and are concentrated in the capital Tashkent.

Uzbekistan's urban centres of Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva and Tashkent have constituted the historical and cultural core of the region since the 15th century. The Mongol warlord Timur alias Tamerlane (1336-1405) was born near Samarkand and brought entire West Asia, north-western India and Afghanistan under his control. Babur was a Timurid. The Uzbeks of today differ ethnically from the medieval Timurid but the Timurids are irrevocably linked with the nation, making Uzbeks feel that they share a tradition of statehood that has no parallel in the area. This pride shapes Uzbek attitudes towards surrounding powers. When, after the Turki-speaking states of Central Asia declared their independence in 1991, Turkey briefly aspired to act as their elder brother, Uzbeks dismissed it as an upstart.

Both the Czars and the erstwhile Soviet regime confirmed Uzbekistan's place in Central Asia. The Russians, after annexing the region in 1865, made Tashkent their regional military and

administrative headquarters; the city was still the seat of Soviet military presence in Central Asia when the USSR began disintegrating in 1990. Although no nuclear weapons were deployed in the country, its numerous military bases which, once housed over 30,000 tanks, most of them today lie rusting in equipment parks. The Soviets developed Uzbekistan's economy, setting up major factories for the production of aircraft, buses and tractors, as well as refineries for oil piped from Turkmenistan. The Soviets also established a network of research institutions in Tashkent confirming the city's status as a regional centre of scientific and intellectual life. Underlying these political, economic and intellectual assets is Uzbekistan's rich natural resources of oil, natural gas; gold, tungsten, uranium and manganese. The cotton crop, though built on colonial exploitation by Moscow, enabled Uzbekistan to become one of the world's largest producers and exporters of cotton.

Uzbekistan's undoubted assets are offset by several liabilities. Cotton monoculture with its irrigation system led directly to the Aral Sea's loss of 60 per cent of its volume since 1980, one of the world's worst ecological disasters, and the resulting fouled water and windblown salt has created serious public health problems. The unbalanced emphasis on cotton has made the Republic dependent on food grown elsewhere. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan's indigenous communist leaders have remained in power and this has led some critics to accuse the leadership of being diehard communists. It would be fair to say that most Uzbeks are wary of accepting one-man one-vote democracy out of fear that this could upset the balance of powerful social forces and cause instability. They prefer the Chinese approach of slow democratisation and quick economic progress along with tight political control. With this in mind, the leadership is committed to a reform strategy but only in deliberate controlled stages; the first priority is internal stability and security, the second is the establishment of the rule of law and the very last priority is a step-by-step privatization and the growth of free markets.

When Uzbekistan declared its independence in August 1991,

the fighting in Afghanistan and a civil war in Tajikistan forced it to enter into an uneasy military alliance with Russia. Although a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Uzbekistan has expressed grave reservations about Russia's 1994 mutual security pact for CIS countries, which remains unratified. They fear that Russia's ultra-nationalists might try to exploit the arrangement to gain a foothold in the region. They also oppose Russia's proposal on dual citizenship which would have transformed Uzbekistan's two million ethnic Russians into a kind of fifth column.

The Future

Uzbekistan has begun taking steps to be self-sufficient in oil and food. With foreign investments pouring in, it hopes to be self-sufficient, in oil, within two years. It has begun shifting thousands of acres of land out of cotton into wheat, reducing food imports and addressing the ecological effects of the Aral Sea disaster. A striking feature of the economy is the state of its currency. The government has been able to control the budget deficiency and reduce inflation, making the country attractive to investors from Asia and Europe; private companies from Korea, Japan and Germany are setting up factories in the country.

Uzbek leadership fears Islamic fundamentalism. The intellectuals know that religion has always been over-valued as a political force. Catholicism was unable to unify France and Spain; neither could Islam unify West Asia or West Pakistan and erstwhile East Pakistan. They know that when Timurid Babur fought Afghan Lodi at Panipat, it was Muslim versus Muslim. Whereas Pan-Arabism, not religion, could unite Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabians. A formal religion is not a solid basis upon which to construct either a nation or a confederation of nations.

However aware of the power which religion can have on individuals, Uzbeks are not prepared to take chances. They are determined that their republic will be a secular state; religious parties and extreme nationalists have been banned. Nevertheless, conscious of the harm done by repressive atheism in erst-

while USSR, the government has recognised a politically moderate Sunni branch of Islam that predominates in the country, finances citizens' pilgrimages to Mecca and has effected a rapprochement with other Islamic countries. At the same time the government is taking steps to strengthen national consciousness. All official business in the Soviet era was conducted in Russian; now Uzbek has become the official language. The government plans to abandon the Cyrillic script for the Roman alphabet. The government has slowly been transforming its military into an Uzbek institution; the officer composition is now 65 per cent Uzbek. The government is also attempting to introduce the people to outside influences and freedoms. Recently it has allowed independent TV and radio stations to operate in Tashkent and in other provincial centres.

It would be premature at this stage to judge Uzbekistan's strategy of change as a success or failure. Much will depend on how they modernize their clan-based social structure and cope with Islamic fundamentalism and on the outcome of the civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. India hopes that Uzbekistan will remain an anchor of secular stability in Central Asia, not the head of some new union of Turkic-speaking states, but a strong independent republic which will respect its neighbours' sovereignty and foster security and cooperation in this vast rich region of geographically open borders. If, at the same time, the CIS emerges as an informal body for economic coordination among countries with a common heritage of Soviet rule, rather than a neo-imperial system perpetuating Russia's sphere of military and political influence, then Uzbekistan could play a significant role in serving the best interests of all the countries involved, including Russia.

Uzbekistan is in search of a direct outlet to the Arabian Sea, which would enable vast oil and other mineral resources of the region to be shifted to a hungry world. There are two possible outlets; one via Afghanistan and Pakistan; the other via Turkmenistan and Iran. The latter route is shorter, physically easier to develop and politically more stable. However, this route cannot become functional as long as Iran is seen to be a state which

supports terrorism and is unresponsive to human rights. In 1996, the US Secretary of Defence visited Tashkent and praised the country for being "an island of stability" in Central Asia. Uzbekistan responded by becoming the only Central Asian state to back the US trade embargo against Iran.

The areas both sides of Amur Darya, in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, are adorned with monuments and relics which bear witness to its former primacy, the paths are strewn with Aryan bones, Greek coins, Buddhist stupas, Ashokan edicts and Mughal gardens where weary transients rested. India cannot forget this historical, cultural and strategic link and has not been slow to recognize Uzbekistan's significance in Central Asia's emerging power structure. The President and senior officials have visited the country to emphasise and strengthen ancient cultural ties and discuss matters of mutual interest. The oil and gas resources of the region have begun to attract hungry international investors. Billion-dollar schemes for gas and oil pipelines to Europe via Turkey, and through China to Korea and Japan, have already been negotiated with the USA and other multi-national corporations. Despite the US trade embargo, powerful global interests are busy planning for oil and gas pipelines via Iran, and via Afghanistan-Pakistan-India to the Arabian Sea. They are waiting to see how the situation develops. India would be happy to see an Uzbek political and economic arrangement emerge in the coming years with Iran, USA and others, to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned. India has no conflict of interests with such arrangements and has had long and cordial relations with all the parties concerned. India is thus in a position to play a constructive role in the region in the coming years.

Contracting Logistics -- Opportunities for Economy and Efficiency

COLONEL P K BHOSLE

Introduction

Defence budgeting is increasingly becoming a zero sum game. Thus acquisition of enhanced combat power has to be compensated by reduction in other spheres as combat services support. There is a felt need to continually review and pare down the tail of supply that feeds the field formations. However, since armies are traditionally known to march on their "stomachs", this is an exercise fraught with risks and inexactitudes of effect on morale. It was perhaps the famed military pedagogue, Jomini who first defined logistics as the practical art of moving armies. He went on to amplify it as comprising the order and details of marches and camps and of quartering and supplying troops¹. Since time immemorial, logistics has posed the greatest challenge to masters of warfare. While in the age of the Mahabharata, dawn to dusk battles enabled administrative recuperation during hours of darkness, Alexander's campaigns conducted over extended distances, from Greece to India in 326 BC, were dependent on local resources in captured areas as a viable source of supply for sustained operations. Neglect of an important administrative facet, of contact with home and hearth on morale, so well recognised by modern armies through the importance to mail, marked the ultimate failure of Alexander's conquests. The success of Hannibal during the Second Punic War can be attributed to his stratagem of moving elephants across the Alps in 218 BC, a feat replicated by Thimayya in transporting Stuart tanks across the Banihal Pass to Zojila in 1948.

The techniques employed to organise logistics have been varied over the years. From the simplest means of plundering

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conquered territories, armies have evolved elaborate commissariats for maintaining the sword arms to an extent that logistics has come to drive strategy as well as tactics. Where military commanders failed to organise their supply system to suit local conditions of terrain, weather and warfighting, ignominy spelt the doom, be it of Napoleon or Hitler at the gates of Moscow, both having ignored the travesties of "General Winter". The importance of management of logistics in underdeveloped terrain was amply highlighted during the Second World War in North Africa and Burma. What emerged thereof was an elaborate logistical hierarchy of units with flowing tables of establishment eating into the budgets of the teeth arms which in modern days of scaling down of force levels has become unacceptable to the exchequer and professional soldier alike.

Overall development of resources and infrastructure the world over, mobility in surface and air transported communications and proliferation of radio and line circuits has rendered traditional logistics support through organisations structured around specific formations anachronistic. There is thus ample scope for exploiting the potential of drawing sustenance from situation oriented, non structured, private and public sector undertakings beyond the ambit of military organisations, rather than table of establishment units, as of date. Many modern armies have gradually transmuted to the concept of civilian provisioning at bases during peace time as well as in the field during war without loss of guaranteed support. Though the Indian Armed Forces have the unique distinction of serving in some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world such as the glacial Siachen or jungle verdure of the North East, the development of infrastructure within the hinterland in terms of agro-industrial production, the service sector, communications and resource base on the borders has rendered decentralisation of logistics to the civilian sector a distinct possibility.

History of Logistics

Supply System Used

- * Magazine fed
- * Predatory

Technical Means of Transportation Used

- Horse drawn wagons.
- Railway.

- * Supply from base — Motor transport.
- * Local system of sourcing — Air transport.

Some of the salient factors which have driven logistics reforms over the ages and what these aimed to achieve are summarised as follows :-

- (a) Greater freedom of manoeuvre.
- (b) Speed of movement.
- (c) Enhanced force levels through ability to sustain.
- (d) Extension in campaigning season thereby enhancing the ability of an army to stay in the field.

Factors Necessitating Review. The, "tyranny" of logistics over the years has shackled armies to supply trains. Thus in the garb of assured maintenance, a large many tertiary organisations have ballooned without directly contributing to the, "Schwerpunkt". The hierarchy of organisational layers to support each strata has led to mushrooming of administrative units, disproportionate to the teeth that they feed. Warfare on the other hand has miniaturised to small scale operations fought within a shorter time span with limited committal of manpower and equipment as opposed to the, material of the Second World War.

The World is also gradually moving from indigence to abundance. Of particular significance is the growth of the service sector which is the key to efficient organisation of logistical support. While infra structural development has led to incremental availability of transport, food supplies – fresh and dry – and petroleum products aplenty in most areas. The growth of the culture of privatisation has added to the ease of provisioning support to the armed forces through employment and deployment of organisation, manpower and resources from the civil sector. Thus an overall restructuring of logistics is called for.

Current Trends in World Armies

Benchmarking is a common exercise in modern management, which entails observing best practices in other organisations.

Comparing own performance and adopting reforms suitable to own systems and practices. This is deemed better than internally focussed comparisons which generally breed complacency. Based on these parameters, let us examine the current trends in other armed forces in the World. Modern armies today are increasingly shedding off excess organisational flab and veering towards privatisation for purveyance. The Canadian Army for instance is opting for an Alternate Service Delivery Project similar to its counterparts in Britain. USA and Australia, aimed at commercialisation thus providing alternate options of delivering service to reduce overheads and divert scarce resources to operations. The programme is essentially including non combat support functions such as base operations, forward services and vehicle maintenance. Johnson Controls, a US firm which has experience in operating a variety of US military bases is reported to have run a pilot project at the Canadian base at Kingston, Ontario to validate the same before its successful adoption.²

The United States Army has carried the concept of privatising logistics to the field under operational conditions through what is known as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Programme or LOGCAP, to replace the US logistics force and successfully executed the same in Saudi Arabia, Haiti and Somalia. At Haiti, the Brown and Root Services Corporation, a private firm, operated as the LOGCAP contractor relieving logistics units deployed initially to support the forces. In a period of one month, the entire logistics support to troops had been undertaken by the firm except ammunition and mortuary affairs.³

This trend in increased privatisation of logistical functions is underlined by what has now come to be known as the, "quasi services concept" wherein a group of civilian contractors are employed to fix airplanes, build bases, arrange pay of troops and cater for rations and messing thereby saving on defence and block the creation of vast bureaucracies to provide for the multifarious needs of the armed forces.⁴

Logistics Modernisation Trends in India

The Indian Armed Forces too are acutely aware of the need

for redesigning the logistical hierarchy : to reduce organisational flab, improve the teeth to tail ratio and economies on manpower and establishment costs. The line followed to achieve greater economy has been that of streamlining administrative support on a station basis rather than dedicated support on formation basis undertaken by units operating on a table of establishment. Thus station supply depots, workshops, ordnance depots and so on cater for lodger units regardless of the formation affiliation. On mobilisation, logistics establishment on the periphery of the operational areas are proposed to be enlarged to support formations and units within their jurisdiction. The basic reliance thus continues to be on uniformed personnel from the armed forces establishment, thereby preventing true economy of scale. Another concept propagated is that of the Territorial Army (TA) model for logistics units wherein a thin skeleton during peace is proposed to be expanded on mobilisation, by embodying personnel from the civil sector just as the Territorial Army personnel are being called for duty. On similar lines, the US Army had called up 48,000 reservists on mobilisation for the Gulf War essentially to supplement its logistics units.⁵ This again cannot be called as a measure towards full scale economy as there is a need for embodiment of personnel on a periodic basis having financial implications of pay and allowances as well as pensions where accumulated service leads to the same. There are also justifiable fears of resistance from sourcing sectors, either public or private, from which these personnel will be drawn every year for fixed periods and thus depriving the parent organisation of their services. The lead time required for embodiment and its effect on surprise is another facet of contention against the TA concept.

It would be apparent that these measures towards logistics re-organisation cannot achieve realistic savings. Benchmarking has demonstrated to us the economy achieved through privatisation of logistics functioning by other armies of the world and would be worth emulating, given the ability of the private sector to fulfill our administrative needs. To effect greater economy, privatisation and thinning down the present logistical hierarchy in line with trends evident in other armies of the World is essential.

Infrastructure and Service Sector in India

The opportunity for reforming the administrative support structure through privatisation is justified by the developed infrastructure and the more efficient service sector in the country today. Thus it is seen that proliferation of organised transport agencies in the civil sector has led to reduced reliance on second line transport and shifting dependence on hired transport. Similarly army vehicles are being procured exclusively from the civil sector which had an enlarged capacity of manufacturing 128,580 commercial vehicles in 1992-93.⁶ The captive armed forces vehicle factories have thus been virtually closed down. The automobile manufacturers maintain service workshops in all major townships. These can be easily availed for periodic maintenance and repair, rather than maintaining a long chain of army workshops. The responsiveness of the service sector has also improved and is reputedly better than the public sector as well as more economical than the armed forces sector. This implies greater credibility, reliability and dependability in times of crisis. Economies of scale and modern management techniques have led to flatter organisations in the private sector, eliminating the flab traditionally associated with bureaucratic government organisations.

The armed forces of our country particularly the Army is deployed in underdeveloped areas on the extended frontiers in a sickle from the Rann of Kutch-Punjab - Jammu - Kashmir - Ladakh - Himachal Pradesh - Uttar Pradesh - Sikkim - Arunachal Pradesh and the North Eastern States. Of this frontier, approximately 1000 kms of the border in Rajasthan and Kashmir respectively and virtually the entire length of the 4000 kms Sino-Indian border and the Indo-Burmese border rests on an hinterland devoid of natural resources. The past two decades of development has however altered the resource scenario in this hinterland. Some of the states have not only become self supporting but can also sustain military forces deployed therein. Sikkim is an example where the local government co-operative is able to supply the fresh requirements of the army garrisoning the state. Rajasthan is another case in point, where the milk co-operatives have revolutionised availability of milk and milk products to the troops. Another impor-

tant factor is the extension of the national logistics infrastructure to the border states. Thus Food Corporation of India's godowns and Indian Oil Corporation depots span the entire landscape of the border region reaching even such remote locations as Towang and Kohima, established under the Integrated Tribal Development Project.⁷ This entails ability of these agencies to supply to the consumer far forward rather than from the mainland as hithertofore. Reliability of these agencies is also bordering on guaranteed assurance with enhanced stock levels particularly in food supplies, India being the second largest producer of fruits and vegetables in the world and having gained self sufficiency in foodgrains for over two decades now. India's stable food situation at the 1992-93 levels is as shown in Table 1.⁸

Table 1
India - Foodgrain and Fresh Production 1992-93

Item	Production (Lakh Tonnes)
Rice	726
Wheat	561
Other Cereals	369.2
Pulses	146.9
Vegetables	580
Fruits	280

Better management of sourcing and marketing in the border states through co-operatives has also eased the problem of procurement. The story of success of the National Dairy Development Board and Amul has thus been repeated by states as Sikkim and Rajasthan, thereby easing the problems faced hithertofore of availability of local resources. Given the assurance level of the national logistics infrastructure and extension of marketing by the co-operative sector in some of the border states, organisational redesign of the army logistics chain with greater scope for privatisation can be envisaged.

PROPOSED MODEL OF RESTRUCTURING

The Concept of Privatisation

The concept of privatisation of logistics proposed envisages downsizing through outsourcing to private agencies with minimal dependence on dedicated army logistics units. The role of the latter would be essentially to co-ordinate the support being provided by the civilian agencies, carry out liaison on behalf of the consumer with the private firms for procurement and supply of requirements and act as an intermediary for supervision and quality control to the services being provided by the civilian organisations. The logistics support could be drawn from a single civilian firm as the famous Brown and Root Services Corporation of the USA or a number of varied agencies providing a separate segment of logistics support. Thus the concept envisages a shift from dedicated logistics support by services units to task oriented services, liaison agencies arranging administration through civilian private firms, autonomous co-operative bodies or public sector undertakings.

The Proposed Organisation for Logistics

The proposed organisation for logistics support envisages three tiers. The first tier is a Base Logistics Centre, to co-ordinate logistics at each cantonment or logistical node through the agencies stated above, either single or multiple under static peace time conditions with capability to take on additional units and formations during operations. The second tier would be a formation level, "Operational Logistics Cell" which would facilitate administration of formations on mobilisation as also assist the formation commander in his administrative function during peace and war. The third tier would be that of the logistics units which are essential to provide support to units and formations for out of area contingency operations, offensive tasks, as well as to support specified operational areas as Siachen where civilian infrastructure is non existent. The endeavour would be to gradually scale down the third tier to the barest minimum to support existing and envisaged operations beyond the capability of adminis-

trative management by the civilian sector. The organisational tree is as per Figure 1 below :-

First Tier

Base Logistics Centre

Liaison Co-ordination
Private Firms and Civilian Agencies
Maintenance of Units in Peace.

Second Tier

Operational Logistics Cell

Liaison and Co-ordination On
Mobilisation.

Initial Support

Base Logistics Centre or Logistics units on brick system based on operational requirement. Gradually replaced by private firms and civilian agencies through operational logistics cell.

Third Tier

Logistics Units

Support units and formations in locations where civilian agencies cannot operate due to operational constraints or infrastructural shortcomings.

Figure 1

Functioning of Proposed Logistics Model

Peace Locations. Every cantonment, station or base would be having a base logistics centre meshed in with the station headquarters and would be responsible for co-ordination and provision of administration to units, irrespective of formation affil-

iation through civilian firms either a single agency dealing in all facets of logistics or a multiple agency handling each separate requirement such as transport, supplies, repairs and so on. The Base Logistics Centre will also establish a central collection and distribution point wherein supplies, FOL and general stores can be parcelled out to units in situ without any store holding capability as such, which would rest with the trade. However this can be done away with in case trade is able to deliver the consumer at source, thereby avoiding multiple handling.

The system would function with the requirement of second line transport being met by hiring of civil vehicles. Maintenance of equipment will be contracted to the firm supplying the equipment which would have to establish workshops and provide customer service support through a network of maintenance engineers and personnel. The military engineering services requirement will be privatised through contract for repairs and maintenance of government assets on an yearly basis. Supplies will be delivered by contractors while Fuel, Oil and lubricants will be contracted directly from the oil corporations establishing kerbside petrol pumps operated by trade personnel rather than troops as at present. Hospital services could be contracted through doctors attending sick report as per fixed schedule in units in peace stations or station M I Rooms, also catering for ex-servicemen, thereby reducing the patient load on military hospitals which can be converted into referral and research establishments with limited capacity for handling emergency and hospitalisation cases. The present crunch of skilled medical personnel can be thus overcome. Procurement of clothing and ordnance stores can also be contracted to large firms who will be more than willing to purvey the same once the procedures are streamlined as the orders will be substantial. The base logistics centre would be coordinating these support activities. The staff required to man these will be minimal as compared to the present hydraheaded services organisation in each station, be it a supply depot, an ordnance depot or a station workshop and a military hospital. Since the base logistics centre would not be required to hold supplies, material and stores, which will be stocked by the trade, establishment costs will also be reduced.

Operational Conditions. During operations on mobilisation, the task of liaison and co-ordination will be that of the operational logistics cell of each formation which would be responsible for provision of logistics support either through dedicated third tier logistics units or civilian contractors. These would also draw support from the existing base logistics centres where located within their operational jurisdiction and would also assist formation commanders in co-ordination of administration. These would also perform the all important function of logistics planning beyond the immediate future both during peace and war, thereby anticipating problems and forecasting requirements to enhance logistics proactivity. The operational logistics cell would be an extension of the Quarter Master General's branch of the headquarters, controlled by the colonel administration at the divisional or equivalent at other levels. At the division or equivalent level one officer representative dealing with each aspect of administration along with a skeleton staff for liaison would be essential. The organisation of units of all services operating independently would be cut down, thereby achieving economy in manpower and establishment costs. On mobilisation, the logistics paradigm that would emerge with this concept would be as follows :-

- (a) **Initial Phase.** Administration will be through the base logistics centres where applicable. In case the base logistics centre is unable to provide support as in the case of offensive operations in enemy territory or contingency operations during assignment of units on United Nations missions or in underdeveloped terrain, the initial dependency will be on a logistics base established by dedicated services units.
- (b) **Subsequent Phase.** The dedicated logistics units will be relieved as soon as possible by extension of facilities from a base logistics centre with the civilian contractors taking over the administrative functions as soon as feasible.
- (c) **Logistics Units.** Logistics units would be scaled based on envisaged operational requirement. Once relieved by civilian contracted agencies these would be redeployed to take on logistics functions in other theatres of operations where required. Thus there would be inherent flexibility in employment and optimal utilisation of resources.

The luxury of logistics units dedicated to support every formation as at present would become redundant in the new concept as the functions would be undertaken by civilian contractors providing the necessary services at the doorstep. However, a minimum scale of units of all services would continue to be maintained. Scaling of logistics units would be based on theatre wise assessment.

Restrictions in Applications

There would be a number of restrictions in application of the concept, as envisaged below :

- (a) Application in remote operational areas would not be feasible in the near future.
- (b) Functions of ammunition supply would continue with dedicated army units.

Analysis of Concept

Advantages. A detailed analysis of the concept would reveal the following advantages.

- (a) Reduction in manpower and establishment costs as the number of logistics units would be reduced.
- (b) Reduction in provisioning and procurement costs as has been demonstrated by the master American logistician of the Gulf War, Lt General William Pagonis who contracted the Arab firm, Astra Foods to provide fresh meals to coalition troops in the Gulf at the rate of \$ 1.95 per meal against the Meals Ready to Eat or MREs provided by the logistics organisation at the rate of \$ 4.00 each, thereby enabling a saving of over 50 percent.
- (c) A favourable teeth to tail ratio would envisage more effective employment of manpower than at present.
- (d) Value addition in the services being provided to troops

through the hire or fire phenomenon prevalent in the service sector.

(e) Development of infra structure and markets for local goods at competitive prices in the border states would provide a boost to their economy, foster enterprise and generate employment.

(f) An unified logistics system for all the three Services where located within the same station can be implemented. Thus the base logistics centre would have representatives of the three Services to support the units through common contracting at competitive rates.

Disadvantages. The salient disadvantages would be as follows :-

(a) Permeation of a corrupt contractor nexus down to lower levels can be envisaged. However, with greater accountability of unit and formation commanders down the chain rather than the Services at present, the system will be less enmeshed in malpractices.

(b) Initial implementation would be beset with problems in assessing financial outlays as a large number of sources over the entire spectrum would have to be addressed.

(c) The inherent resistance to change especially in administrative echelons would require acceptance.

(d) The civil sector may not be organised to fully provide logistics support to the desired degree of assurance as the concept is relatively new. However a longer implementation span can overcome this.

(e) Private entrepreneurs are known to unjustified profitmaking based on opportunistic market conditions. Thus during the Gulf War, refrigerated vans were initially rented at \$ 1000 per day but later the hiring charges crashed to \$100

per day. Thus underlining the fact that this phase is likely to be temporary and market conditions would eventually lead to stabilisation of prices.¹⁰

Implementation of Concept

The concept would have to be introduced in a phased manner as a detailed analysis of various facets of logistics resourcing over the entire national spectrum would have to be undertaken. As also it would provide the private sector adequate lead time to undertake such a task. The introduction is thus proposed to be in the following phases :-

- (a) **Phase 1- 1997-2003.** The initial phase which corresponds to the next army plan; envisages a lead time for in depth analysis of the proposal by various agencies, establishment of base logistics centres and gradual transfer from the dedicated administrative hierarchy to a core logistics structure, supported by private sourcing and maintenance. This would entail drawing up detailed contracts with manufacturers for repair and maintenance of vehicles and equipment on procurement for the entire life span in service, including disposal as salvage. Shortlisting firms for specific logistics tasks would also be undertaken. This should enable savings by reduction of a large infra structure which though station based in most cases is unformed and thus uneconomical due to pay, allowances and pension overruns. Given the deliberations endemic in the government decision making process, the time span may appear ambitious but it is envisaged that the obvious advantage of financial savings should motivate implementation of the decision with greater speed and alacrity.
- (b) **Phase 2 - 2003 AD to 2008 AD.** Establishment of operational logistics cells and maintenance in the field through private agencies thereby further reducing dependence on dedicated logistics units.
- (c) **Phase 3 - 2008 AD to 2013 AD.** Final phase of transfer

of administration to base and operational logistics cells with scaling down to minimum number of dedicated logistics units. Based on the progress of the reforms, this phase could well be merged with Phase 2.

Establishments Providing Logistics Support

Presently supply and services contractors are catering to specific needs such as supplies, spares, clothing and so on. Thus no single firm or agency is likely to undertake the assignment of providing holistic logistics support at a base or to an operational logistics cell. It is inevitable that the base logistics centres would have to interact with a number of dealers providing a variety of services rather than a single agency underlining the importance of liaison and co-ordination to ensure timely support to units. Besides undertaking the change - over in a phased manner as enumerated above, to enable the required quality of entrepreneurship to develop, additional impetus to the process can be provided by the following :-

- (a) **Ex-Servicemen Co-operatives.** Ex servicemen co-operatives can be organised to undertake logistics support in specific areas with assistance from state governments as well as the Directorate General of Resettlement. Experience of the ex-servicemen in service related matters can thus be suitably exploited with added advantage of providing post retirement employment to servicemen superannuating at an early age.
- (b) **Private Firms by Ex-Servicemen.** Encouraging ex-servicemen to establish their private firms for logistics support with loans which are easily available through various schemes such as the SEMFEX series can also be examined.
- (c) **State Co-operatives.** State co-operatives, some of which have already undertaken contracts for supply of milk, fruit and vegetables in some of the states such as Sikkim can be inducted to undertake the task.

(d) **Private Firms.** Private firms active in the field of procurement and provisioning of supplies, ordnance stores and other items to the Army can be encouraged to expand their network laterally for mutual benefit.

(e) **Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs).** PSUs as the Indian Oil Corporation would have to be involved per se as these have exclusive distributorship of FOL in the country.

Conclusion

Logistics will continue to occupy the centre stage in planning and execution of military operations in the years to come. Every man in the field has to be fed, clothed and paid. Every vehicle fuelled, every formation and unit moved by varied modes of transportation and the gun supplied with ammunition. Thus administration would continue to be an important principle of war. However development of infrastructure in the country followed by growth of the service sector has provided us an opportunity to recast our logistics chain in peace and war to reduce dependence on military structuring of administrative units and greater reliance on the private sector which has a latent assured capability to support the Armed Forces in the field. Such a potential can be effectively exploited to substantially cut down the hierarchy of our logistics chain and base it on independent, self supporting privately enterprised ventures thereby reducing the costs of maintaining a large tail. This restructuring would have to be undertaken in a phased manner, extending over a period of the next fifteen to twenty years, so that the downsizing is undertaken sans major organisational disarray.

NOTES

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5. Lt. Gen Willam G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains* (Harvard : Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 100.
6. Dalip Singh, ed, *India-1993* (New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Government of India, 1994), p. 542.
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Major Thomas' Attack on Karpola : The Only Defeat Inflicted on the Chinese in 1962

MAJOR GENERAL D K PALIT, Vrc

Not many officers today will remember the trauma and the humiliation that our Army suffered nearly forty years ago, when the Chinese came down from Thag la ridge and slapped our forces back from the Indo-Tibet border, occupied Se la without a fight and, finally, captured most of Kameng Frontier Division - almost down to the Assam plains. Wherever there was a confrontation, our forces were either overrun or they ran away. The politicians, ignorant about military affairs, had forced under-armed and under-equipped formations up into roadless Himalayan heights against saner advice - and when war came the Army was delivered a slap in the face which it has never lived down; but our Generals were equally to blame, for having spinelessly accepted the Prime Minister's misdirections.

I was the Director of Military Operations during that war : and it was galling to know that nowhere, either in Ladakh or NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh), did we get the better of the Chinese in any single engagement.

It was therefore with some surprise and no little gratification that I read an account of a skirmish in which a small body of escaping Indian troops, with no supporting arms and with only pouch ammunition on each man, attacked and threw back a Chinese force defending a high mountain pass south-west of Lumpu, near the Kameng-Bhutan border. And they did it with disdain for Chinese tactics and training. This is the story :

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Last winter (1996-97) I received a copy of a book sent by Lt Col Oscar Thomas, formerly with 4 Grenadiers and now leading a retired life in Perth, Australia. Entitled *The Mountain and the Men*, the book describes the escape of his battalion (less a company) under his leadership, from their riverline position on the Namkachu after the Chinese overran 7 Brigade on 20 October, 1962.

He published *The Mountain and the Men*, (written in fact shortly after his return from the battle-front) thirty years later, as a private enterprise. It is a heroic saga in the classical, epic mould. He published it in the 1990s in a limited edition, most of which was sold in Australia, but part of it he sent to the Grenadier Centre in India, for sale in the Regiment. All proceeds from the book were earmarked for the alleviation of the hardships of widows and orphans of his Regiment. It is a riveting account, modestly written, about one of the most enduring feats of sustained courage and stamina in modern times, in which he led a part of his battalion back from the Namkachu disaster, over high and often snowbound Himalayan heights, to India — a 25-day back-breaking trek, up and down the peaks and passes and freezing wintry heights — on empty stomachs and with only one blanket for each man.

Despite all the hardship and deprivation, Oscar Thomas was nevertheless able to mount an attack on the high Karpola Pass, held by the Chinese, and to evict them against all odds, thus breaking through the encirclement the enemy were planning for the escapees. This was the only occasion on any front in 1962 when we got the better of the Chinese in an armed encounter : and it needs to be made known.

4th Grenadiers (less 'C' Company) were strung out along the Namkachu River as the right hand Battalion of 7 Brigade, 9 Punjab and 2 Rajput were to the left of them - also strung out on the riverline, overlooked and dominated everywhere by the Chinese deployed on higher features on the north bank. ('C' Company of the Grenadiers were with HQ 4 Division, deployed on the Khinzemane track). Only 1/9 GR of the Brigade were tactically sited on a slope behind the riverline. Furthermore, while the

Chinese were well-entrenched and served logistically right up to the front line, the Indian troops had no mortars, no MMGs, no entrenching tools, no mines, no barbed wire — in fact no defensive stores of any kind — no winter clothing and with only 50 rounds of pouch ammunition per person. Thus ill equipped and sited, they were expected to take on the mighty PLA, the same army that only a dozen years previously had thrown the Americans almost all the way back to the sea, in Korea.

On the morning of 20 October, 1962 the Chinese attacked the Indian positions, the main weight of the attack falling on the left of the river-front (against the Rajputs and the Gorkhas). There was only sporadic shelling and machine-gun fire on the Grenadiers' front, causing a handful of casualties. The Rajputs, on the other hand, suffered very heavy casualties in their exposed positions. The Gorkhas on higher ground, fared somewhat better, but were soon forced to make for the hills, towards Tsangdhar.

In the early afternoon, the GOC (Niranjan Prasad) came directly on the line to his COs and ordered the Grenadiers and the Punjabis to withdraw eastward towards the Nyamjang River (on the Divisional axis) to escape southward, towards Towang. Orders were issued accordingly : the men were to carry their rifles and pouch ammunition just two days' dry rations and only one blanket each (because they were expected to reach Towang in two days.)

One of the Companies was sent off along the track eastward as the vanguard (and eventually reached Towang, Tejpur and home, safely). But before the rest of the Battalion could follow the vanguard company, the CO (recently posted, a moody, unpredictable and unpopular officer) unaccountably changed the plan and ordered the rest of the Battalion to veer off to the right, strike due south — straight uphill — and make for the Karpola-Tsangdhar ridge. This was a disastrous decision that eventually misled 4 Grenadiers into a 25-day hunger-march across some of the most forbidding heights of mid-Himalaya.

On the fifth day of starvation, the column started on its

march at 3.30 a.m., unable to sleep in the shivering cold dawn. At 7 a.m., when it was light, the column halted for a drink of water, "the only thing that will fill the void that is our stomachs" (comments Major Thomas). They climbed up a steep precipice, then descended "down a rockface, where footholds are often just inches wide ... literally hugging the rock as we go down. Suddenly there is a shout, which builds up to a scream — and then silence. A Dogra other rank of 9 Punjab, who had somehow joined up with the Grenadier column, has lost his footing and plunges to his death below. The body can be seen and this unnerves us."

When the column reached below the Lumpu-Karpola-Tsangdhar ridge, which they must cross at Karpola, the CO suddenly decided to push on ahead on his own with elements of 9 Punjab. He did not want to wait for stragglers to catch up with the column. Oscar Thomas (Adjutant) insisted on retaining one company with him — 'A' Company, and just as well — as we will see shortly.

I will now let Oscar's narrative take over.

4 GRENADIERS ROUT A CHINESE AMBUSH PARTY

Ahead of us is a huge basin studded with two large lakes. These lakes lie at about 12,000 to 13,000 feet. All round the lakes is marshy land. The basin is surrounded by high mountains on all sides. On the western side there is a massive range which runs from north-west to south-east. The north-west ridge appears to be an extension of the Tsangdhar range which runs through Karpola Pass and on to Lumpu. If we are to avoid contact with the Chinese right hook, we need to get across this Pass before the Chinese reach and hold it. If they get there before us then we shall have a tough fight on our hands, as we shall have to climb 2,000 to 3,000 feet to attack them. Given their superiority in weapons and the dearth of the same with our force, it will be a very difficult task. The Pass is still some three miles away.

When most of the Battalion has reached the bottom, the CO

decides to move on [leaving me behind to collect stragglers]... I agree, provided I keep a rifle company. "A" Company, with Captain Chander Nagrani, with me. Whilst waiting for the stragglers to come in, I take time to study the ground ahead in a little more detail. The Pass has two shoulders. The right (north-west) is about 200 to 300 feet above the Pass and dominates the Pass but NOT the entire approach to the Pass. The right shoulder has a series of spurs that run from the crest to the valley below. These spurs provide an approach, with partial cover from view as also, to some degree, cover from fire. Movement up these spurs is difficult but possible. They allow an approach to the rear and above the actual Pass.

The left shoulder (south-east) though lower than the right shoulder, covers the Pass and the approaches to the pass more effectively than the right shoulder. The left shoulder drops very sharply, almost vertically, to the valley below. Any thought of an attack from the left side is therefore ruled out. Military training is a very good aid to an appraisal of a tactical situation. It appears to sift all the details of ground in quick time. The brain logically sorts through all the unnecessary facts and leaves you with a clear and concise picture. Any force of the Chinese once ensconced on the Pass could make it very difficult for us to force them off, particularly as they have the weapons to engage us at long range, whereas we only have personal arms with which to respond. Since the Hatungla-Lumpu track is already dominated by the Chinese, it is of vital importance to control the Pass before them. This Pass is our very LIFE LINE to survival. By the time this ground appreciation has been made most of our stragglers have come in, so I am inclined to move on. Sitting in this open patch leaves us open to view by any enemy on the massive ridge in front of us. I see Subedar Narpal of 9 Punjab come in. He is doing for his Battalion what I am doing for mine. I tell "A" Company to rise and be prepared to move. The words are hardly out of my mouth when a long burst of automatic fire is heard from the area of the Pass. God Almighty, it is from the very area I had feared most. Our movement has been seen and an ambush has been set up for us. Now it will be akin to getting out of a bottle with the stopper on! I quickly order the men to load

a round in the chamber and put the safety catch on. Havildar Kashi's platoon is to lead, Jemadar Ami Lal's is to move slightly to the rear and right of Kashi's. They are to be followed by Company HQ and the stragglers. Finally Subedar Randhir's platoon is to bring up the rear. I take my pistol out of the holster, quickly check and replace it but leave the flap open. We move off fast.

We move fast despite our fatigue and hunger over the last four days. The threat of being trapped, the prospect of battle and coming to grips with the Chinese, dispel all other problems, leaving an intense desire to get at the enemy quickly, beat or be beaten, but be done with it once and for all. I make a quick assessment of the probable strength of the enemy in occupation of the Pass, who appear to be the advance elements of the main force. Alternatively the Chinese could have established a force at this Pass, appreciating that this Pass was the focal point of all routes leading back from the Namkachu River and thus expecting remnants of 7 Brigade troops to follow this route on their way to Lumpu. A number of figures are seen running towards the Pass. These could be additional advance elements who have seen us and decided to engage us. The sound of gunfire we first heard was well before these figures were seen running towards the Pass, so it is prudent to assume that Karpola Pass is already held, but and a big but is IN WHAT STRENGTH? All told it would be safe to assume that it would be a minimum of a platoon if not more.

In all training exercises, whether on a sand model or on the ground, the directing staff always seem to be able to pin-point the exact strength of the opposition, through a variety of factors, such as the extent of frontage, ground, type of fire detected, and the like. In the actual context it is a very different matter. None of these factors seem to apply and there is little or no time to deliberate over these factors. It is a case of advance as fast as you can, think and plan whilst you advance and attack, regardless of the enemy's exact position or strength and irrespective of whether it is an impromptu or a preplanned ambush. I only hope that they have not had too much time to properly set it up, such

as dig in site weapons with integrated fire, and place a cut off force on withdrawal routes. The only consolation is that mountains swallow up troops, yet allow an attacking force the latitude to slip through unmarked gaps and launch their attack. Speed and audacity in attack, in certain cases, can be successful whilst some deliberate and well-planned attacks can flounder. Well it is of little consequence as to what strength they have up there. We are filled with an intense but cold anger, determined to make them pay for all the discomfort we have endured over the last four days and also for the losses our Battalion has suffered at Khinzemane and Hatung la.

When I move forward my mind is cool and my brain active, working out alternatives to my tentative plan of attack. I propose advancing a platoon up with the aim of clearing and securing the pass. The platoon on the right and to the rear is, on a field signal given by the leading platoon, to move across the right flank and help clear the ambush. The remainder will then pass through followed by the leading platoon and finally the platoon on the right flank. My alternative plan is, if the Pass is held in greater strength then I estimate, for the platoon on the right to help extricate the leading platoon and we to make a wide detour from the right. I am compelled to avoid the left approach because of the unnegotiable terrain. Besides, any movement to that side will take us closer to Lumpu where the Chinese are in strength. This action recalls to my mind the setting given me during my Part C promotion examination where as a Battalion Commander I was required to clear enemy opposition from astride the road. I did it to the satisfaction of my examiner, Brigadier MM Badshah, and I passed. I have every hope of doing so now. The measure of pass marks I get, will be the number of men I can get out of this situation and with the least possible casualties.

The exchange of fire is really sharp, ricochets are plenty, which means that 'B' Company is in the thick of it. I am glad of this situation because it means that we already have a force on the ground which is engaging the Chinese ambush party and hopefully pinning them down too. Movement with a big pack is difficult at this speed, besides we are climbing and breathing is

difficult. So packs are cast aside left, right, and centre. I want speed and not packs. We surge on. We are still a mile away and on the ridge several figures can be seen running towards the Pass. They are waving their arms and shouting. The sound of their voices carry. It is obvious from their behaviour and shouts that they are Chinese. The Gorkhas who are with us tell me that it is their typical pattern of attack. I assure them that there is nothing to worry about as between 'A' and 'B' Company we can sort them out. I hope that they do not bring their mortars into action as we would really be outgunned. As it stands, it is small arms against small arms, Whoever has more guts, determination and tactical flexibility will win the day.

We are approaching the Pass. Kashi's platoon is moving along the track almost in single file. I shout out to him to spread out-open out a bit. It is a strange feeling when in such a situation; there is fear mingled with bravado, a desire to live mingled with a feeling of could'nt-care-less. It is like being an automation, a compelling action. As we approach the Pass the sound of fire is still heard. I see figures shouting and gesticulating, they appear to be saying, 'Dahine se jao — Dahine se jao (go from the right). I am not sure whether I hear correctly, they may even be the Chinese. I am hesitant but quickly decide to carry out my original plan. Almost as an echo to my thoughts Havildar Major Kalia shouts out to me! 'Woh shaid chinni hoga, Dahine mut jao, sahib, sidhe jao'. (Maybe Chinese, don't go to the right, Sir, go straight). I wave my hand in acknowledgement of his advice and pull my pistol out. What consolation is this ridiculous weapon with its limited range and ammunition in a battle where automatics with greater firepower and range are being used?

In the brief lull, Kashi's platoon has made it to the Pass but do not seem to move through it. There is a huge rock around which the track winds. The men have taken position. "This is no place to take position", I shout out to them. I am a couple of feet behind them and I shout out to them to move forward and follow me. They are hesitant. Taking shelter behind this rock is the mess cook Prem Bahadur and mess waiter Govind. In a deep depression to the left are two men. One from the Mortar Platoon

and one from Battalion HQ. I shout out to them to get out of that hole and follow me. I take a decision and plunge round the corner of this rock and move along the left of the track. I meet a few of 'B' Company men in position. Empty cartridge cases litter the area. The other elements of 'B' Company are manoeuvring across the right flank using fire and movement, the basic of Infantry tactics. They are bringing down withering fire on the Chinese. 'A' Company is now following closely behind me. We surge forward, bayonets gleaming in the sun. The men of the leading platoon had, on the earlier orders of their platoon commander, Kashi, fixed bayonets. He obviously anticipates close-quarter battle.

As I go round another bend in the track I find the body of a Grenadier lying in a grotesque position, off the track, amongst some shrubs a little way down. I stop to investigate, waiving the men on. Hearing the crunch of boots, this wounded Grenadier calls out pathetically and in a very feeble voice, 'Oh Grenadier walo, mera patti bando' (Oh Grenadiers. Tie a bandage for me). Chander has joined me and he throws the poor man his handkerchief. The grenadier is incapable of using it, but it is all Chander has got. I ask him his name and he replies 'Gajender Singh'. There is a large wound in his back just above the right hip. Blood is pouring through it. It is obvious that he has caught a heavy burst which at this range must have gone through cutting up his intestines. I think of putting him out of his misery but just cannot make myself do it. There is nothing I can do to help him. He has fallen over thirty feet to this position. In any case he will not live long. I quickly make up my mind. Dreadful as it sounds, I tell him that wounded the way he is, death is inevitable. In any case we are incapable of carrying him to the top of the mountain and beyond. More importantly there is a fire-fight going on and we have to break the Chinese hold on this Pass first before we can think of attending to the wounded. We have no first aid equipment nor stretcher bearers. I tell him, 'I am sorry my friend but we will have to leave you'. Though my conscience feels clear, my heart wrenches. I turn around very deliberately and stumble away. God forbid that any one who is responsible for the lives of men, should find himself in such a dreadful situation and be compelled

to make such a decision. It takes a deliberate attempt on my part to cast this incident out of my mind. It is something that I shall live with for the rest of my life. Even as I write this two months later, the incident is still fresh in my mind and I relive every moment of those few tragic moments.

There is still a very heavy exchange of fire going on. Under cover of this intense fire, Subedar Darayo Singh gets hold of some light machine gun magazines and Naik Jiwan grabs a light machine gun and they start up the spur to the rear and above the Chinese. Grenadier Dayanand seeing this movement also does the same. Meanwhile Lt Ravi Kahlon urges the men on from fire position to fire position. Major Balbir Singh in typical fashion, as demonstrated on the hockey field, encourages the men to attack, shouting 'Dahine se jao, Maro Bahin Chodo ko'. (It has an English equivalent but it sounds very effective in its native state!) The men are spurred on by such "soul-stirring" language. The Chinese now find themselves under fire from the rear and do not seem to have the stomach for it. They abandon the right shoulder (NW) and move to the left shoulder (SE). They have made a grave error in appreciation of the ground, the disposition of their men and the ferocity of the attacking Indian troops of 4 Grenadiers. And to add to their misery, they see a large body of troops coming straight up the mountain slope, seemingly oblivious to the danger from their fire.

The Chinese appear to have placed the greater part of their strength on the left shoulder (SE) believing that the ridge north-west of the right shoulder did not pose any greater threat, as their own main force was due from that direction. This tactical mismanagement lends credence to the theory that the Chinese level of command was very low and also supports the belief that it was only a platoon or thereabouts. The situation facing the Chinese was a new one for them as hitherto they had had numerical superiority and greater fire-power, which enabled them to carry all before them. Now they were facing a greater number of troops who were displaying superior tactical ability and determination. They were not prepared for this and as their main force still had not shown up, they break off the engagement and RUN. The

Indian troops were well led from the front, consequently they responded gallantly.

When I finally cross the last bend I see Subedar Darayo Singh and Naik Jiwan standing at the Pass urging all the elements of 'A' Company on. I see a rifle on the ground, less a bolt, probably belonging to the Grenadier who was shot. I throw the rifle down the mountain side and sit down to regain my breath. In gasps I enquire from Subedar Darayo as to what had happened. He explained that an unknown strength of Chinese had taken up positions on the heights astride the Pass and had opened fire from both directions. The outflanking move by the Grenadiers and the light machine gun numbers plus the frontal assault by 'A' Company, had dislodged the Chinese from their positions and they had fled towards Lumpu. God, I feel so proud of our boys: the Fighting Fourth has dispelled the bogey of Chinese invincibility. Even though the Chinese were in a tactically advantageous position and had the element of surprise, their ambush had been broken, split wide open, with the loss of only one Grenadier. **THE CHINESE HAD BEEN PUT TO FLIGHT.**

We were not in a position to ascertain their losses in terms of killed or wounded as it would have required a lot of time to get up to their positions, time which we did not have. Ammunition with 'B' Company was very low and we could not afford further delay and the possibility of getting involved with any reinforcements of Chinese who might follow. The head of our column under Lt Ravi Kahlon had meanwhile taken a diversion straight down the mountain side, slipping and sliding on the seat of their pants. Subedar Onkar Singh with "A" Company is directed to follow "B" Company. Whilst I am still regaining my breath, the Gorkha Havildar who had come to NEFA to take his promotion examination, comes up to me and seeing me still breathing heavily, attempts to pull me to my feet saying 'chalo Sahib, yahin par mat thero, hum madut karenga' (Come Sir, don't stop here, I will help). I thank him and rise to my feet. Darayo and Jiwan tell me to carry on with "A" Company. They aim to stay on till all our men are clear of the area. I gratefully acknowledge their consideration and follow "A" Company.

The route we take is a very dangerous one. There is a landslide of 100 feet, down which we have to go. We negotiate this very slowly, slithering down a rock surface, fortunately only gradually descending, some 15 feet at a time. We do this on our stomachs, the men beneath break the fall. We traverse scrub and innumerable streams. With our breath coming in gasps we push on, desperately seeking to put as much distance as possible between us and the Pass we have just crossed. Suddenly a rifle shot rings out behind me. I turn round and enquire what this fresh development is only to find that a Grenadier in sliding down has accidentally squeezed the trigger. I get him to reload and put the safety catch on. The route down is very steep and dangerous. We cross a number of wide and swift-flowing streams. We clamber over huge rock, each man assisting the next, till we are all through. After an hour or so of such dangerous descent, we stop to survey the Pass we have just left.

As I endeavour to get to the head of the column, the men hush me up. On looking at the direction they are pointing, I see on the sky line, scores of Chinese, brazenly walking along the ridge we have just crossed, towards Lumpu. We have made the Pass just in time. Another hour and we would have either been shot up or put in the bag. I notice three groups who appear to be setting up something. I fear the worst, their mortars. I take up my binoculars and focus it on these groups. My fears are proved correct. I tell the men not to move. I start my crawl towards the head of the column, hugging the ground closer than a worm. An open patch stops me for a while, but I move on very very slowly. A snake could not have done better. A distance of 30 yards takes me all of half an hour. When I am half way across, the whump of a mortar round is heard. I freeze to the ground. After a long pause the round bursts about a thousand yards ahead of where we are. By the time I complete the distance, three more rounds have been fired. They are probably laying their mortars on a route they believe we are likely to take. They continue to fire intermittently. I am not worried as I know that they are not aware of our position. The question I ask myself is, how do they know in what general direction we have gone? I can definitely say they are aware that we have *not* taken the Lumpu track, nor for that

matter have we gone back on the route we had originally come from.

They knew that we had not gone up the ridge or else we should have exchanged pleasantries with their main column. Since there was no other route or track to follow, the direction we had taken could only have been noticed by one of their men who might have been wounded (but incapable of firing his weapon at us, for we had been standing in a group at the Pass for some time and were an easy target.) Hence my conclusion is that he would have noticed our direction of move and told their main body of our move down the mountain side.

N.B. Those who may wonder why we did not deny the Chinese the use of the Pass, must remember that we originally started off with only 50 rounds per rifle, of which a lot had been spent in this attack. In fact when on the Second of November we ran across another Chinese ambush beneath the track we were using, the thought of attacking this force was shelved because amongst other considerations, a check revealed that after a re-distribution of ammunition there was only about 20 rounds per rifle left with the column.

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An Analysis of The Indian Way of Waging War

COL P K GAUTAM

Introduction

There is no denying that the western countries have the first word and the last laugh when it comes to interpretation of Indian history, culture and thought. After all, we owe it to the westerners to have "discovered" and translated the Indian epics for the western readers, helped in excavating the Harappan ruins and the Ajanta caves and write and interpret the history of the subcontinent from their point of view. Our education and administrative system too is the near mirror image of the western model. The railways, the telegraph and industrialisation of India from the 19th century, is due to the effort of the British rulers. Even our public administration and democratic ideals are imported.

Besides, due to our ancient oral traditions there is nothing much as historical evidence in India; the way the Greeks recorded their history. It is a paradox to the Western mind that the accounts of ancient and medieval Indian history have not been written by Indians but by foreigners like Megasthenes, Hu Shien, Fin-Shien, Alberuni and others. Even today, at the turn of 20th Century we have a number of Western scholars who have shed a different and illuminating light on our weaknesses and strengths in the field of strategic thought and military power.

Rand Studies

Two RAND studies will be considered. The first one was done by George K. Tanham in 1992 under the title "Indian Strategic Thought"¹ and the second is "Strategic Appraisal 1996-Project Air Force", on South Asia by Ashley. J. Tellis.²

Col P K Gautam is the Director, Concept and Induction Group with PMO ACCCS, Army Headquarters.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 530, October-December, 1997.

Tanham

Tanham has commented upon the absence of strategic thinking in India and has surveyed the passivity in military affairs,³ viz :-

(a) The weakness in strategy and planning has been attributed to India's historical and cultural developments. The author attributes it to lack of political unity; Hindu concept of lack of sense of time and considerations of life as a mystery and not entirely under man's control.

(b) The absence of long range planning has been attributed and linked to the rural and agriculture based Indian culture.

(c) When commenting upon the effect of modern weapon on Indian strategic thinking, Tanham states :-

"In the absence of a strategic plan, modern military technology is beginning to shape India's strategic policy, weapon programmes are driven by technological opportunism and the institutional interests of the defence science community, not by specific strategic requirements."

Tellis

Tellis has been forthright in his observations when he concludes :-

"The truth of the matter is that Indian Armed Services have barely perfected the art of fighting wars of attrition at a time when the best western combat armies are on the verge of leaving even manoeuvre warfare behind in favour of long range precision interdiction based on information dominance ... The US performance in the Gulf War came as a shock to the Indian military. The technological inferiority of Soviet weaponry, combined with the operational flexibility of western combat arm, suggested that attrition strategies followed in the sub-continent would be fatal against an adversary armed with modern technology, doctrine

and tactics... Indian armed forces are large and diversified, but their war fighting doctrine is antiquated; and their domestic research, development and innovation base is hardly state-of-the-art. Even if Soviet Union had not disappeared as a steady supplier, the Indian Armed Forces would still be equipped with relatively inferior weaponry."⁴

Analysis of Observations

Lack of Political Unity. The Indian civilization has had ups and downs in history. The nation had political unity under Chandragupta Maurya, Ashoka and Akbar. Interestingly, none of the Indian rulers had hegemonic tendencies to conquer and annexe foreign soil save for Mohammed-bin-Tughlaq who, in his eccentricity, had a desire to lead an expedition to Khursana in Central Asia but could not do so due to economic reasons. After attaining independence, our strategic performance had a set back, when on our request, UN ceasefire was declared on 01 January 1949; leaving J and K divided though, militarily, the liberation of entire J and K was possible. Another set-back was the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin and the border war of 1962. However, liberation of Bangladesh demonstrated a fine political unity of purpose.

Hindu Concept of Lack of Sense of Time. This is an area of misperception in the Western mind. Time as explained by Romila Thapar⁵ is both linear and cyclic. The former is historical and latter cosmological. She (Romila Thapar) has argued that historical consciousness existed in early India. It is obvious that the western mind accustomed to the datum of Greek civilization finds it difficult to fathom the varying depths of time in the Indian context when even the origin of Vedas varies from 6000 BC to 1200 BC, from one Indian historian to the other.⁶

Consideration of Life as a Mystery and Not Entirely Under Man's Control. Hinduism is a way of life. Even an atheist is a Hindu. Dr S. Radhakrishnan has explained this in his book the *Hindu View of Life*.⁷ There are six schools of philosophy to choose from. Yoga is one of them, the others being Nyaya (school of logic), Vaise-sika (atomic realism), Samkhya (atheistic), Mimamsa

(Inquiry), and Vedanta (absolute soul). Further, the four ideals or ends of man are clearly defined as Dharma (duty, religion and social law), Artha (economic well being), Kama (pleasure inclusive of art, music and literature) and finally Moksha (spiritual freedom or salvation of the soul).⁸ Even the purely materialistic school of Carvakas is in existence.⁹ Western physicists like Fritjof Capra have drawn parallels between modern physics with eastern mysticism and Hinduism wherein atomic and subatomic physics with its theory of creation and destruction of matter has been compared to similar beliefs in ancient wisdom of the ocean called Hinduism.¹⁰ How can then one accept the colonial interpretation of the Hindu considering life as mystery and not entirely under man's control when 'new' aspects of Hinduism are now being rediscovered through quantum physics by Western scientists themselves?

Rural and Agricultural Base of India Inhibiting Long Range Planning. The strength of India is its rural and agricultural economy. The arable land is enough to feed its population. The yearly monsoons provide the water for crops. A rural farmer thinks in terms of seasons and crops. Mahatma Gandhi also had exhorted the Indians to seek and nurture rural economy as the basic building block. He had envisioned 'small as beautiful' and had forewarned the miseries the Indian masses would face if all development was in big cities. The Western countries, due to their high income are maximum consumers of resources and energy and are 'materialistic'. Due to this, undercurrents of spiritual unrest in the West is growing and they themselves are discovering the answers in simple and ancient Indian eco-friendly remedies for a happy and contented life. The rural and agricultural base is in fact the backbone of India. It is as close as possible to nature and from which ideas and concepts like yoga and meditation have emerged and are now familiar in the West. More and more Americans have read the works of Deepak Chopra¹¹ who is trying to revive 'Ayurveda'. The fact of the matter is that strategic thought has no link with our rural and agricultural base. Strategy as the world knows it is a relatively new field of international relations and it only began to be taken seriously as an academic enterprise in the late 1950s.¹² The link of a neglected long range planning due to our agricultural economy is not a clear one.

Weapon Programmes being Driven by Technological Opportunism. The relationship between technology and strategy or tactics is as old as warfare. There have been instances where technology shaped strategy like the invention of railway and telegraph changed the face of warfare in Nineteenth Century. Similarly, strategy and tactics shape technology. A requirement of a weapon system first gets expressed as a General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) and then the R and D scientists create the weapon. The Indian space, nuclear and satellite programmes are examples of our scientific achievements not driven by technological opportunism but the desire for technological freedom and independence.

Perfecting the Art of Fighting Attrition Warfare. India will fall in a technology trap if it blindly apes the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War. When comparing the logic of technology and war, Martin-van-Creveld explains that technological superiority is misleading. The best military technology is that which masks or neutralizes the other side's strengths, even as it exploits his weaknesses.¹³ The relationship between attrition and manoeuvre as applicable on our borders is well understood. Our terrain in the North is mountainous, the East is mountainous with forests, Punjab is obstacle ridden, Rajasthan and Gujarat have potential for conduct of classical manoeuvre warfare. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) by way of information dominance and precision guided munitions is not neglected. It is the relative weaponry of the two sides that matters and though termed 'reactive' - our weapon acquisition philosophy and tactical doctrines are constantly updated. India is well balanced to engage in a conventional battle and is also waging a successful low intensity conflict. Creveld, a well known strategist, has opined that in the foreseeable future Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) will replace conventional wars.¹⁴

Observations by Tanham Needing Attention

Role of the Military. Tanham made the observation that, "the military play only a minimal role in decision making on matters of national security. If allowed, many well educated and thoughtful

military officers could contribute, under civil direction to the formulation of national strategy and defence plans". Service officers being posted to Ministry of Defence and its integration is a live subject. Even the Fifth Central Pay Commission's Report has made a mention of this aspect. However, it appears to have been turned down. The "existing system" according to the Ministry, "allows continuous interaction between the Ministry and the Service Headquarters and the professional and technical expertise available in the Service Headquarters is made use of for examining defence related matters. Further integration beyond this point will have two main disadvantages : (i) the system of independent analysis will be lost; and (ii) the military discipline would deter the service officers manning Ministry posts to modify any proposal forwarded by the Service Chiefs."¹⁵ Tanham's observations are further reinforced by K Subrahmanyam, a leading strategist. According to Subrahmanyam, strategic planning is a multi-disciplinary affair and "those tasks cannot be attempted unless the present traditions and inhibitions which have resulted in preventing the growth of strategic literature and debate in this country are tackled and armed forces officers are encouraged to contribute to strategic thought and to become professionals not only in terms of battle management but in the wider sphere of national security management."¹⁶ Rakesh Kadian when surveying the Indian Army has touched upon the neglect of scholarly and intellectual inquiry in the couplet "damn your writing, mind your fighting."¹⁷ General SC Sardeshpande, writing on his Sri Lankan experience had observed that; "Strategy and strategic thinking in the Army have remained on furlough for a long time. This is particularly noticeable in low intensity and counter insurgency operations."¹⁸ Two issues, therefore, need to be addressed by the Services. The first is in military institutions; the emphasis at an appropriate level can be shifted to strategic studies to include international relations, area studies, intelligence, defence and economics. This will give the intellectual framework for the serving officers to contribute to defence planning, preparedness, administration and management. Simultaneously, the existing training establishments must continue to train officers in the complex art and science of defence operations. This will result in a stream of intellectually educated serving officers who can contribute. The

reservoir of human resources of service officers must be co-opted in defence, directly or indirectly to become a repertoire of strategic thought process. In future, we should have a balanced mix of strategists, young, middle aged and wisened, contributing to the defence of India - all under our time tested and democratic civilian control and not civil service control. Even in our ancient history, we have legendary sages like Vishwamitra, who though a Kshatriya (soldier) underwent penance (rigorous education) and assumed the consciousness of a Brahmin (strategist). With this paradigm shift to education and participation by serving officers, it is hoped that strategic innovation will emerge from outside the government bureaucracy and paradoxes of Indian strategic thinking will diminish.

Nuclear Issues

Tanham assumes that the situation is awkward, where the military has not participated in the nuclear policy making, but evidently some military commanders may have instructions on the use of nuclear weapons in war under certain circumstances, though these are sealed until ordered to be opened by the civilian government. The military, according to Tanham, maintains that ¹⁹ :-

- (a) They are unaware of the programme.
- (b) Can make no plans.
- (c) Have received no general guidance for the use of weapons.
- (d) No command and control system appears to exist.

In the US study titled "Strategic Assessment 1997", analysts have observed that the Indian Military have virtually no role in Indian nuclear weapon programme.²⁰ Similar military sentiments have been quoted by Chris Smith in his book "India's Adhoc Arsenal."²¹ Interestingly, Indian analyst Varun Sahni concludes that; "most military officers do not appear to be particularly pro nuclear. From the military perspective, there are three good reasons why nuclear weapons would be objectionable, viz:-

- (a) They are not usable in military combat.
- (b) They increase civilian control over the military machine during the time of war.
- (c) They reduce the money available for conventional weaponry."²²

Although, the observations of these analysts set one thinking, it is difficult to agree on the 'cluelessness' and reluctance to go nuclear' portrayed on part of the military. General K Sundarji, ex Chief of the Army Staff in a convincing and simple manner has 'Wargamed' nuclear battle in his book "The Blind Men of Hindoostan."²³ Brigadier VK Nair also has authored a book "Nuclear India."²⁴ Both authors are retired though active members of the nuclear debate and both are products of the Indian Armed Forces. Nuclear warfare is a subject prescribed for various levels of promotion examinations and is also covered in middle and higher level courses of instructions. What is important to understand is the 'defence against nuclear attack'. Troops must be able to operate in and through a nuclear environment with mechanisation and mobility. Targeting in any case has to be based on political considerations and only a miniscule population of troops or 'civilians in uniform' would need to arm and supply the warhead to the platform meant for delivery. The delivery, in any case would be by the armed forces. The bulk of the strike or holding formations would still need and continue to fight in a 'conventional' manner.

All this is 'virtual reality' - so that due to the threat and horror of mass mutual destructions of mostly civilian targets, the armies do not engage in combat and war is avoided - such is the 'divinity' of deterrence. The fighting troops need to master the drills and tactics of 'defence against nuclear attack'. It is in this context that the military has to be co-opted in the nuclear strategy. In any case, there is a need to improve command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability (C⁴I²) both at strategic and tactical levels. This would be a force multiplier both in conventional and nuclear environments.

Conclusion

Purely imitating Western models of strategy and being influenced by an occidental way of world view would not be the right approach for the development of strategic thought for India. At the same time, the criticism, comments and observations by foreign sources need to be analysed for whatever they convey. Ignoring it in the age of internet would be worse than what Alberuni had to write about India 900 years ago.

"... The Indians believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no king like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs... They are by nature niggardly in communicating what they know, and take great care to withhold it from men of another caste from among their own people, still more of course from any foreigner."²⁵

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Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

Dear Sir,

I read Lt Col JK Dutt's letter commenting on Brig RD Law's article on Light Armour, published in your Jan-Mar'97 and Apr-Jun '97 issues respectively.

I feel that we require dedicated units of battalion strength with each infantry division and of three battalions in each armoured division that are totally dedicated to reconnaissance and tactical battlefield intelligence gathering. These units should be equipped with both wheeled and tracked light armoured vehicles designed for the specific role they are meant for. The present recce and support units are "recce" in name only, since they are not equipped properly for the role. Nor do they train much for that role, the emphasis being more on the "support" part.

The divisional recce unit should be a composite force, comprising Armoured, Mechanised Infantry, Signals and Artillery personnel. Engineers personnel should also be posted, depending on the sector of deployment of the division. Such a unit should be commanded by any officer of the fighting arms who is qualified. Later on, officers who have served at least for six years in a battalion could be given the command.

We are ignoring the value of this force presently. Any armoured regiment or mechanised infantry battalion Commander, who has taken pains to nurture the recce troop or platoon of his unit will vouch for the value of these troops. The recce force is the eyes and ears of the main force. Today, we blunder around blindly in our exercises. Everytime I have gone on exercise, I felt that due to the stage management of these exercises, we take too many things for granted - especially that information which, in

actual operations, can only be obtained by a dedicated recce unit.

Let us learn from history. The Germans, Americans and the Russians, all have invested a lot of resources in the reconnaissance elements of their field armies. Fifty Years ago, Rommel won his victories in the African desert because the months between the big battles were spent doing painstaking and thorough reconnaissance.

We put too much faith in our set piece plans and drills expecting the enemy to behave himself by being where the "Pinks" put them. So many times our advances are held up even during peace time exercises, by unexpected obstacles unless the exercises are "stage managed" by the participants. Let us remember the defeat of the Pakistan Combat Group at Longewalla in 1971. Had they put a recce company ahead, they would never have got held up at the defended locality and the dummy minefield till daylight. They learnt the hard way that there is no "stage management" in war, that any field or fence needs eyes and ears up ahead to give them time to act.

Yours Sincerely,
Capt KS Ghuman

II

Dear Sir,

I was in Bangkok last month and paid a visit to the Bridge on the River Kwai. It will not be out of place to give a brief history of the Bridge, which formed a vital link on the Death Railway, which was constructed to link Thailand with Burma during World War II.

It is 263 kms long in Thailand and 152 kms long in Burma. Both parts of the railway joined together at the Three Pogodas Pass (known as Hell Fire Pass) Sangkhlaburi district, the uppermost part of the Kanchanaburi province. The construction began on 16 September 1942 at Nong Pladook, Thailand, by approxi-

mately 30,000 prisoners from the aforementioned allied countries and more than 100,000 of impressed labours from India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and Thailand. Of these, more than 16,000 prisoners and most of 100,000 of impressed labours died of many diseases, starvation and lack of medical equipment.

It is said that the first survey by the Japanese engineers predicted that it would take at least five years to finish this railway line, but the Japanese Army forced the prisoners to complete it in only sixteen months. It was completed on 25 December, 1943.

I do not intend to give the history of this famous bridge which has now become world famous through books and films, but bring to light some little known facts of the role played by the Sappers in this operation. It is not even mentioned in their Corps history. At the entrance of the magnificent war graves cemetery near the Bridge, one has to pass through an arch on which are inscribed the names of the regiments that were connected with the building of this Death Railway across the Kwai River. There were about thirty regimental names, of which, I was surprised to find, that, the third one from the top was that of 'QVO Madras Sappers and Miners'. Surprising as it may seem, the rest of the names were only British, Canadian and Australian regiments - at least I could not find the name of any other Indian regiment except QVO, but I may be wrong.

The Commandant MEG was kind enough to supply me with some details of the QVO regiments, which I give below :-

- (a) 46 Army Troops Company.
- (b) 13 Field Company.
- (c) 15 Field Company.
- (d) 6 Bridging Platoon.
- (e) 14 Bridging Platoon.

The above units were employed in Singapore with effect from 08 August 1941, and later, in different phases. They were

under the Command of 11 Division which was responsible for the protection of Malaya - Thailand border where the main road and rail communications crossed. These companies suffered large casualties due to the enemy ground and air action and were responsible for following scorched earth policy during their retreat from Burma. They destroyed the ALORSTAR airfield, numerous bridges, the JOHORE CAUSEWAY and the multispan reinforced concrete bow string girder bridge over the Muda River. The exact details, of the casualties suffered by the units, is not known. All those whose whereabouts could not be traced were officially treated as dead with effect from 01 November 1948. Their number was, unfortunately, in the neighbourhood of 450.

The visitors book at this world famous cemetery has scores of British, Australian and Canadian names. The only solitary Indian one, now, is mine - a Madras Sapper 'Thambi'.

Brig N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)

III

Letter Regarding Campaign Study for Promotion Examination Part D

I am appearing for the Part D Military History paper in Jan 98 and am subscribing to your correspondence course on the subject and I am a life member of your prestigious Institution.

Since your Military History pamphlet had not been despatched, I decided to go through one of the prescribed books on the subject by Maj Gen D K Palit, Vrc - War in High Himalaya.

After having gone through the book, I find there area lot of irrelevant issues in the book which I feel are beyond the scope of Sino-Indian Conflict. These chapters are :-

- (a) **Chapter 1 - The Indian Army.** It deals primarily with the evolution of Indian Army through British rule and subsequently after Independence.

(b) **Chapter 5 - operation Vijay.** It entirely deals with the Goa Operations.

(c) **Chapter 11 - The Price of Defeat.** It deals mostly with the political level negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir issue except in the later part of the chapter where perceived threat of China from Nepal is discussed and issues relating to expansion of the Indian Army.

In other chapters too the author has deviated from giving out the actual battle scenario to his personal accounts. There is no detailed map depicting battles of Sela or Kameng or Namaka - Chu.

You are requested to clarify with the Military Training Directorate (MT2) as to the scope of this book since it is one of the prescribed books and also details of Sino-Indian conflict to be covered.

I think it is pertinent to mention here that last year your booklet on Vietnam Campaign totally ignored the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Infact your booklet started with period after the Dien Bien Phu campaign, while in the promotion examination there were around 100 marks worth of questions on this battle.

I would submit that since your institution has a number of senior serving and retired officers, your institution must have some interaction with the Military Training Directorate (MT2) so that officers who subscribe to your courses and have faith in your organisation are not at looser's end at the time of the promotion examination.

Major Ranbir Seth

Text of the Reply dated 6 Oct 97 sent to Maj Ranbir Singh

by Maj Gen IAN Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd),
Directing Staff of the USI for Military History

Thank you for your letter of 04 Sep 97. The issues raised by you in your letter have been examined. Whereas the points you have

raised are relevant to some extent, you need to also see other issues at this stage.

The Campaign. It has been a bold but wise decision taken by Army Headquarters to select this campaign for middle level leaders of the Army to study. Bold, because the campaign exposes the deficiencies and weaknesses of the political and military hierarchy of that time. Weaknesses that heirarchial systems would normally like to down play. Wise, because the student of military history can learn much from defeat. A country tends to learn more from defeat than from victory - so let us at least salvage something from this defeat. It would also be pertinent to mention that 'the wheel of time has moved full circle' and the situation today is very much similar to 1962. There are striking parallels for those who have the eyes to see them. The Indo-China border issue has not yet been resolved. Who knows where and when China will choose to raise this issue once again. Perhaps those who have learnt the right lessons from this war will be able to avoid past mistakes.

The Concept of Military History. When a student of military history studies a campaign he usually is able to come to grips with battles - how they were fought, strength of opposing forces, strategy and tactics of each side, the description of ground over which the battles were fought, the characteristics of opposing commanders and how they used time and circumstances to carve out a victory or to ensure a defeat. Regretably in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 except for the battle of Namka Chu (Battle of Thag La) no detailed accounts are available. The battle of Se La was never fought and the battle of Walong and Razang La have not been written about in detail in any book except perhaps in the regimental histories of the battalions that took part in these battles. So we are left with the planning that led to victory and the lack of it which led to defeat. This is the key area of this war which perhaps it is desired that you must focus on.

War In The High Himalayas - The Book

I am glad you read the book for the following reasons :-

- (a) It would have given you an excellent overall picture of what actually happened. The author as ex-Commander 7 Infantry

Brigade and later on as Director Military Operations (DMO) was close to the scene - political, bureaucratic and military - where important decisions were taken.

(b) If it has taught you how to skim through a book, noting down what is important, and how to skip those areas which have no direct connection with the campaign - then you would have learnt something useful.

(c) Officers of your seniority need to read more widely.

The book is interesting and enlightening. You need to learn to see "what is there" and benefit from it and not try to look for "what is not there" because "what is not there" in this book is not there in any other book except perhaps the regimental histories of some of the battalions who had fought these battles. So you need to adjust to the existing situation. A negative analysis will be of no help to you now or in the future.

In light of the above, I would recommend that you read the other prescribed books as well. It will not only increase your knowledge quotient of this war but will also help you to interpret their meaning rather than relying on someone else's knowledge and views.

In the 'Guidelines' for this subject, which you must have received some time ago a brief analysis of each book has been given. Together they make a composite whole. The knowledge that you will gain will help you not only for the examination but also thereafter.

Your views have been communicated to the Military Training Directorate of the Army Headquarters.

Review Article 1

Infantry in India®

LT GEN S L MENEZES, PVSM, SC* (RETD)

In 1993, the author was asked by the then Director General of Infantry to conceptualise and write this book as the Colonels of the Infantry Regiments felt it necessary to record the evolution of the Infantry arm of India, for while there was much published material on Infantry Regiments, there was nevertheless a need for a perspective on the Infantry as a whole, as the essential combat arm of the Indian Army. This well brought-out publication is the result of this endeavour. The foreword by the Chief of the Army Staff, General VP Malik, is felicitous. *Inter alia*, he records, "I am delighted that the book is published in this 50th year of India's independence. There is no better moment to take stock of what Infantry has contributed to independent India's history." He adds, "The defining quality of the Indian Infantry can be aptly described in one word, i.e. dependable."

The encapsulation is in chronological parts : Part I - Evolution of Infantry; Part II - Beginning of Modern Infantry; Part III - Infantry in the World Wars; Part IV - Independence and Its Challenges; Part V - Wars with Pakistan; Part VI - Special Operations by Infantry; Part VII - Indian Infantry - Present and Future; Part VIII - Regimental History. The author's exposition is crisp, and the style lucid.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the Indian Army, since Independence, by circumstance finds itself to be the largest military laboratory in the world with the Infantry always cooking in the crucible. The percentage of casualties suffered by the Infantry, since 1947-1996 has been given as 84.17 percent. Since this

@ *Infantry in India* by Lt Gen V R Raghavan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, New Delhi : Vikas, 1997, p. 317, Rs. 395.00, ISBN-81-259-0484-0.

*Lt Gen S L Menezes, is the former Vice Chief of the Army Staff. He has written a number of articles on Defence and National Security. He is the author of the well known book *Fidelity and Honour : The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century*, New Delhi: Viking, 1993.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 530, October-December, 1997.

book is dedicated to the Infantry, it would have been preferable for the actual physical breakdown of Infantry casualties, category-wise, conflict-wise, counter-insurgency theatre-wise to be given. While our successes in 1948 have been rightly emphasised, our failures in the Jammu and Kashmir operations, e.g., withdrawal from the Jhangar and Pandu Features and the failure to save Skardu have not been mentioned, whereas the Pakistan Army latterly places great emphasis on learning from all its failures. The question always arises, as to how our Infantry can learn from its mistakes, without knowing what they were. Since this book is intended for posterity, and outlines the development of our Infantry in the last fifty years, it would have been appropriate to have prepared a summarized table of the evolution of the War establishments of the Indian Infantry progressively since WE I/29/C4 of World War II, encompassing officers, JCOs, NCOs, OR, weapons, vehicles and the gradual elimination of the NCsE.

While highly recommended in relation to substance, for a book intended to have a wide circulation, better proof reading and checking should have been possible in the time frame of the evolution of this book. There are repeated spelling mistakes; e.g. de Boigne is spelt variously "DeBoine" or "Deboine" and Liddell Hart constantly as "Liddle Hart." There are also avoidable factual errors, e.g., in World War II, on page 51, the Assam Regiment is shown both as "revived" and newly "raised". It was a new raising. On page 54, it is stated "Thirteen Indian infantry divisions fought in the Burma campaign", but twelve are listed, i.e. "3,5,7,10,14,15,20,23,25,26,36 and the 71st". For the record, the 3rd Indian Division was a cover name for Wingate's Special Force. It did have both British and Gurkha Rifles battalions, but no Indian Infantry per se. The 10th Indian Division did not take part in the Burma campaign. The 36th Division was initially, on raising, an Indian, but later a British division. There was no 71st Indian Division, but a 17th Indian Division. On page 132, the comment attributed to this reviewer in Note 2, in 1971, was in relation to the 10 Division Sector, and not the 25 Division Sector. For the sake of pride in the heroism of their Regiments, the units of the awardees of the VC, PVC and the AC₊ should preferably have been shown alongside their photographs. The photographs of the

awardees of the George Cross should have been included as for the VC. Also, there is doubt whether the listing of the Ashoka Chakra awardees is both correct and complete. In Part VIII, the new histories published in 1995 by the Grenadiers and the Garhwal Rifles have not been mentioned, nor the earlier history of the Bihar Regiment. The Index could have been polished up, e.g., unnecessary entries (Muzzle); duplication (Parsad, Kamta; Prasad, Kamta); names without specifying initials (Atal, Brig); ranks not given (Cariappa, KM); incorrect spelling (Cassiono), and so on. For a lay reader, a Bibliography should preferably have been included.

**RESULTS OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF GOLD MEDAL
ESSAY COMPETITION-1996-97**

Group I (*Open to all*)

The Fallout of Indefinite Extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Impact on India's Nuclear Options.

First	Capt Sachin Puri 45 AD Regt (SM)
Second	Maj MC Pant 9 Guards (Mech)
Third	Maj SK Singh HQ 38 Inf Bde

Group II (*Open to Colonels and Below*)

Emerging Trends in Information Technology and Repercussions on Command Style.

First	Lt Col A Bannerjee HQ AMC Centre & School Lucknow
Second	Lt Col SK Khanna MCEME Secunderabad
Third	Maj VPS Khatana HQ 2 Sig Gp

Review Article 2

Japan's Road to the Pacific War : The Final Confrontation - Japan's Negotiations with the United States, 1941[@]

MAJ GEN SC SINHA, PVSM (RETD)*

Napoleon once wrote, "What is history but a fable agreed upon". Thus one tends to be wary approaching yet another book on the Second World War. However this book is different for a number of reasons. It is the fifth and final volume of selected translations from "Taiheiyo sense no michi" available for the first time in English as 'Japan's Road to the Pacific War', covering the final negotiations between Japan and the United States, which led to the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941. The Japanese authors were given access to a wide range of primary material from the Japanese government, the Imperial Army, Navy as also the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

The study brings out how, inspite of many influential leaders on both sides of the Pacific, including the Emperor himself being against war, both the countries still could not avoid the disastrous clash. Again the blame for the war can be laid on certain individuals in both the countries. In Japan, the Imperial Army and the Navy were hawkish on going to war with the USA.

In their negotiations with Japan, Hull, the Secretary of State was equally hawkish in demanding Japan's withdrawal from China and recognising Chiang Kai Sheik government as the only legitimate one. Japan's dilemma is best brought out in what Tojo confided to Shimada on 23 October 1941, after becoming the Prime Minister :

[@] *Japan's Road to the Pacific War : The Final Confrontation - Japan's Negotiations with the United States, 1941*. Ed by James William Morley, New York : Colombia University Press, 1994, p. 437, £ 34.00, ISBN 0-231-08024-7.

*Maj Gen S C Sinha, is the former Director of the United Service Institution of India.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 530, October-December, 1997.

"The two hundred thousand souls who died in the China incident would never forgive me if I were to turn back now. And yet if it comes to war between Japan and the United States, great number of officers and men will have to be sacrificed. I am truly in the dark about what to do."

The study gives the events of the actual attack on Pearl Harbour and explains how the assault became a surprise attack as a result of blunders on the part of the United States and how the surprise attack became a surprise attack without notification as the result of the blunders on the part of Japan. The book is worth reading for the new light it throws on these events.

USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION-1997 : RESULTS

On the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, the USI Council during its meeting on 11 December 1997, selected the following officers for the award of prizes in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition - 1997:

Group 'A' - "NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON INFORMATION WARFARE."

- | | | | |
|-----|--|--------------|-------------------------------|
| (a) | Maj Gen Y Deva, AVSM
(Retd) | First Prize | Gold Medal and
Rs. 2,000/- |
| (b) | Col Narinder Singh
SC Wing College of
Combat, Mhow | Second Prize | Rs. 1,000/- |

Group 'B' - "INDIA'S CHINA POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE 2020"

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-------------|-------------|
| (a) | Maj Manvendra Singh
School of Artillery,
Deolali | First Prize | Rs. 2,000/- |
|-----|--|-------------|-------------|

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Politics : The Basis. By Stephen D. Tansey, *London : Routledge, 1995, p. 283, £ 7.99, ISBN 0-415-10263-4.*

The author, Stephen D. Tansey has gone to a great length to plan the book which touches all aspects of the important areas of not only politics but also issues such as tribal, feudal, dynastic and local societies. Complex and abstract concepts like power, as given by Hobbes, Locke, Machiavelli and Lenin, have been dealt with simplicity and can be understood by beginners as well. The book is neatly divided into nine chapters covering issues such as human nature and politics, monarchism, Marxism, radical theism, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnicity, political pluralism, causes of political changes, class conflict (recommended to be read by Indian policy makers) and contemporary issues such as human rights. The author finds many aberrations in the prevailing political system and in the process raises in the minds of the reader questions such as, why should I obey the state? Is democracy a good thing?

A very interesting and informative book on the basics of politics.

-- Maj Sunil Chandra, Ph.D.

Discourses of Power : From Hobbes to Foucault. By Barry Hindess, *Oxford : Blackwell Pub. Ltd., 1996, p.183, £12.50, ISBN 0-631-19093-7.*

Power is a ubiquitous phenomenon in human affairs. Being the currency of politics, it is the basic problem of political thought. Barry Hindess, who teaches at the ANU, in the short volume under review, deals with the concepts on 'power' in the modern and post-modern period. The work deals with the two strands of power: capacity and legitimacy. Hindess abbreviates for the reader of the sound-bite age the views, competing and complementing and across the conservative-radical spectrum, of the realists, rationalists, critical theorists and deconstructionists. The conclusion that emerges is power, being all-pervasive, requires techniques of management that result in a minimum of domination.

The book is worth perusing for gaining a theoretical acquaintance with the issue that most readers of this journal have dealt with as part of their professional responsibility of exercise of state power. Its prose is neither dense nor intimidating, which makes the book a fair intellectual diet.

— Maj Ali Ahmed

Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought. By Ken Morrison, *London : Sage Publications, 1995, p.361, £12.95, ISBN 0-8039-7563-5.*

Ken Morrison's text on modern sociological theory has relevance for readers of this journal in so far as it would help deepen their understanding of society and state. Being essentially practitioners in the security field, our comprehension of the state-society relationship is inherently limited. To develop a

greater sensitivity to sociological issues, a grounding in theory is a prerequisite – a need this book eminently fulfils.

Much misunderstood, Marx had probably the greatest influence on events this century. Our misconceptions from partial acquaintance with his work can be cleared by perusing through Morrison's treatment of Marx's philosophy of dialectical materialism. Durkheim's theorising is worth familiarising ourselves with if we are to come to grips with latter day critical theorists and post-modern deconstructionists. Weber's work on bureaucracy in gaining an insight into our professional experience, given that we have at some point in our careers been part of the bureaucracy.

Morrison ably condenses the theory, covers the attendant critiques and reviews the contributions of his subjects to sociological thought. His style is student friendly, without condescension and therefore makes the ideas accessible to the lay reader. It is a book for the discerning reader to help widen his comprehension of social matters-an imperative for the readership of this journal.

— Maj Ali ahmed

Theories and Concepts of Politics : An Introduction. Ed by Richard Bellamy, *Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1993, p.301, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-7190-3655-0.*

Bellamy has done well to compile the various facets of political theory in one accessible volume. The contributors, on the various faculties of Edinburgh University, have given focussed pieces enlightening politics as a concept in theory. The book is essentially for the undergraduate, in other words for someone wanting to divine the depths of such a familiar word and ubiquitous phenomenon as politics. By that yardstick this is a book that may help the readership of this journal understand the context of their professional preoccupation-politics-more intimately.

The writing styles are varied but never dense or academically condescending. The content is uniformly comprehensive. Familiar ideas as freedom, equity, citizenship and democracy, the lifeblood of social existence acquire the salience that is their due. Realism and power, that are central to state executive, are discussed with theoretical vigour. The post-modern fleshing out of politics by inclusion of feminism and environmentalism completes this segmented view of politics. A select bibliography appended with each facet of politics explored can serve as a map for those intending to travel further in self education.

— Maj Ali Ahmed

Government And the Armed Forces In Britain 1856-1990. Ed by Paul Smith, *London : The Hambledon Press, 1996, p. 324, £ 35.00, ISBN 1-85285-144-9.*

This is a masterly product of research, by eminent scholars, into the relationship between civilian Ministers and the high command of the Armed

Forces, during the period 1856-1990, in Britain. No formal or regular arrangements existed, either during the Napoleonic Wars, or subsequently, for the discussion of strategic issues in either of the Services, or for decision making in government. The evolution of consultation, between the Services themselves, and with government, leading to the creation of the Ministry of Defence, was a long and slow process. This has been described in twelve chapters, with great scholarship, by twelve distinguished researchers.

In his introduction, Brian Bond, an acknowledged military historian of repute, says that to "make cooperation really effective, politicians would have to acquire some of the knowledge of soldiers and sailors (and airmen), whilst the latter had to demonstrate some of the politicians' skills, such as fluency in debate!" In October 1916, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, CIGS, explained the terms upon which he believed soldiers and statesmen could best cooperate, insisting that "politicians and soldiers must each keep within their respective sphere.

"Where the politician goes wrong is in wanting to know the why and wherefore of the soldiers' proposals, and of making the latter the subject of debate and argument across a table. You then have the man who knows but who cannot talk discussing important questions with the man who can talk but does not know, with the result that the man who knows usually gets defeated in argument and things are done which his instinct tells him are bad."

The chapter dealing with civil-military relations in Britain in the Second World War is of great interest. Winston Churchill was not only Prime Minister but also Minister of Defence. As a soldier, he had seen active service and his forays into matters of strategy were legion. Clement Atlee credited him with solving "the problem that democratic societies in total war find crucial and may find fatal: relations between the Civil and Military leaders.

An authoritative and important book which deserves study by all those aspiring to high Service Command. Amongst other things, they will learn the necessity of standing up to politicians on issues of national security, which the latter, through ignorance, or political expediency, may wish to gloss over. Strategic wisdom is not the prerogative of any single person.

— Lt Gen M L Thapan (Retd)

"Whose Army Is It Anyway?" By H S Sodhi, *Kalam Dawaat Publications*, 1997, p. 324, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-86559-01-9.

Following up on his earlier books, Brig H S Sodhi, offers a compilation of his articles and commentaries on military subjects published in the *Defence Review*, *Defence Today* and some newspapers, through the years. Bold and plain-speaking, the author has commented upon, expressed his views and suggestions on numerous systems and modalities within the Indian Army as well as overall governmental interaction with the military.

While provoking thought and discussion on controversial issues, some of his suggestions and criticisms may sound irrelevant, particularly where these ignore the prevailing socio-economic compulsions and ethos in India. However, the discerning reader would be free to develop his own responses.

The publication is an interesting critique of politico-military history of post-independence India.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar

The Asean Region in India's Foreign Policy. By Kripa Sridharan, *Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996, p. 277, £ 39.50, ISBN 1-85521-608-6.*

Regional grouping like SAARC or ASEAN, have emerged for economic, political and security benefits to the region. ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), consisting of six countries came into existence in 1967, which coincided with Indira Gandhi's new government in New Delhi after the fourth general elections.

Very few works so far, have dealt with Indian policy vis-a-vis ASEAN region. The Book deals with India's foreign policy regarding ASEAN, since 1967 to present time, a period in which there have been different governments in India, and lately the countries comprising ASEAN, have acquired considerable political and economic clout.

The work brings out regional attitudes towards India's actions and India's attitude and reaction to it. The focus remains on India's foreign policy, towards the region. The book touches on other relevant developments in the region and South Asia, that have a bearing, on the relations between India and ASEAN.

The students of foreign relations in particular and others in general, will find this book useful and interesting.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath SM (Retd)

The National Question : Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the 20th Century. By Berch Berberoglu, *Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1995, p. 329, £ 17.95, ISBN 1-56639-343-4.*

Nationalism, which, in the 18th Century emerged as a historical phenomenon alongwith capitalism, has re-emerged in the 20th Century as part of the struggle for national liberalisation and self determination in the Third World countries. In the world community from Middle East to South Africa, to Europe, to North America and to former Soviet Union, nationalism, ethnic conflicts and struggles for self-determination have overtaken internationalisation of capital.

The primary aim of this volume is to provide a comparative-historical perspective on nationalism through case studies of nationalism - ethnic conflict and struggles for national self-determination. The editor has traced the historical development of some of the important national movements of the 20th Century

in different geographic and socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural set ups, though theoretical discussions on the nature of nationalism, has not been dealt.

The book has been divided into three parts. Part I on the nationalism, ethnic conflict, the struggles for national self-determination in the Third World countries. The nationalist struggles of the Palestinian, Kurdish, South African and Indian movements and also the role of women in national liberation movements in Africa, the Middle East and Central America have been examined. Part II – the struggle in the advanced countries, nationalism, and national movements in Puerto Rico, Northern Island, the Basque country and Quebec have been examined in detail and Part III on the struggle of socialist states as in the former Soviet Union, China and the former Yugoslavia.

The case studies in the book are interesting and give an insight of nationalism, ethnic conflict and self-determination in the world in the 20th Century. The book is useful for researchers on the socio-political aspect of nations especially the Middle East, Europe and some of the African countries.

— Professor (Col) P K Vasudeva (Retd.)

Nation Against State : A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty. By Gidon Gottlieb, *New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 148, \$ 14.95, ISBN 0-87609-156-7.*

Professor Gottlieb directed a discussion group on "A Changing World Order" at the American Council on Foreign Relations in 1991. Virendra Dayal, Henry Kissinger, Patrick Daniel Moynihan and Thomas Pickering led the group's discussion. A novel approach to questions of *state, nationhood, ethnicity, et al* wisely begins with sane, logical definitions and then goes on to consider the effectiveness of statecraft developed in the nation state wars of fascism and communism in dealing with today's ongoing conflicts in Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Pathans and our disturbed states-Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and the North East. The erosion of the authority of the states as these emerged at the close of the colonial era, suggests a new kind of accommodation-space-to fit the aspirations of the emerging minorities – states within states.

The great civil wars of the 20th Century in Russia, China Spain were not waged for ethnic *cleansing* or secession. Neither are today's conflicts in Somalia, Kurdistan, or Afghanistan triggered by ethnic or religious passions alone. The brutal response of the Doctrinaire State often brings in the 'Human Rights, the UN and the Security Council.

A refreshing and serious book; it is written with clarity and precision. It offers no solutions and in that lies its merit-the state can no longer invoke sanctity of inviolate national boundaries or dangerous, congealed thought processes.

— Colonel Balwant S. Sandhu

The Colors of Violence : Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict. By Sudhir Kakkar, *Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 247, \$14.95, ISBN 0-226-42285-2.*

Communal conflict is unfortunately for India, a long standing problem that periodically rears its head causing much physical damage and putting at naught efforts at the formation of a national identity. It is, naturally, a subject that is widely discussed. Sudhir Kakkar, a practicing psychoanalyst has brought to bear, in this eminently readable book, a scientific way of looking at the problem. He starts by examining two rival viewpoints, first of the secularist (both Hindu and Muslim) viewing traditional Hindu-Muslim relations as one of harmony and the conflicts as being recent phenomena born out of the imperial policy of divide and rule. On the other hand are the Hindu nationalists for whom there exists a fundamental divide between the Hindus and the Muslims as a basic fact of history. The conflict, they aver, is squarely religious and its roots lie in Islam's exclusive claim to truth and its refusal to grant equal status to any other doctrine. The author identifies himself with the 'optimistic realists' who believe that both viewpoints are tenable at varying points of time and in specific situations.

Kakkar has used the tools of his profession to construct interview, questionnaires, psychological tests and speech transcripts to analyze the fantasies and group identities of "We" and "Them". Methodologies like the Gissen Test Statements and the Morality Interviews are used to draw interesting sketches of the main protagonists, the warriors of these conflicts.

For those who would be expecting some sort of a solution to emerge out of the rigorous analysis would, however, be disappointed. Kakkar ends the book on what can be only called a pious hope that the way out is to recognise and respect essential difference between the two communities rather than attempt to assimilate them in a composite culture. This is also, of course, what any common sense analysis would show.

— Brig J S Oberoi

The Bosnian Muslims : Denial of a Nation. By Francine Friedman, *Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p. 288, \$ 21.95, ISBN 0-8133-2096-8.*

It is strange that a country held together under the leadership of Tito one of the greatest dictators should, in 1991, disintegrate so quickly and highlight its ethnic minority the Bosnian Muslims; who have become a separate nation.

The book covers a much wider aspect, the states and their ethnic composition before the First World War, between the two World Wars and till very recent times. The book traces the history of the Bosnian Muslims, including the mass conversion of Christian slaves into an indigenous Muslim elite under the Ottomany Turks. Professional soldiers also converted to Islam to ensure rapid promotion, specially under the Ottomany during the 16th century. Bosnians who did not convert to Catholicism or Islam were exiled to Herzegovina.

This book will help us understand the complete history of multi ethnic people of the area - a useful background to what is happening today. A useful addition to any University library.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Asia Pacific Regionalism : Readings in International Economic Relations. Ed. by Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, *Australia : Harper Collins, 1994, p. 443, ISBN 006-312140-9.*

Asia Pacific Regionalism is a study in international trade in the Pacific basin region on the western rim as it has evolved during the past two decades. This trade activity has been spurred by the most favoured nation and special treatment among the European Community constituents and the market process, bringing the newly industrialised economies of the Asia Pacific region into an intra-regional understanding on trade and manufacture. The developing economies of the area are also making a determined bid to ingratiate themselves into a trading consortium. The indices and formulae have provided accurate evaluation of the exactness of the proportion of the trade transacted and likely to be transacted.

The book is recommended to the students, scholars and policy makers on international trade for establishing the principles, practice and precepts of regional idea in trade among the developing nations.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan : South Asian Perspectives. Ed by P.R. Chari and others, *New Delhi : Manohar, 1996, p. 236, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-7304-153-9.*

The recent debate has focussed more closely, on South Asia, especially the two traditional rivals, with a history of hostilities, capable of emerging as nuclear weapon powers. Both India and Pakistan acknowledge that they have the capability to build nuclear weapons and the need to retain nuclear option but deny having actually done so. Neither country has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This book is one of the first research projects that the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (based in Colombo), has undertaken since its inception. The focus is on aspects of technology and perception and policy-postures. It presents Indian and Pakistani perspectives, contributed by some of the leading experts of South Asia. including scholars from Bangladesh, Nepal and Srilanka.

The book makes interesting reading.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

CHINA and Other Matters. By Benjamin I. Schwartz. *Mass : Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 292, £ 12.50, ISBN 0-674-11863-4.*

A book for the China Watchers. The author goes into great details giving

his personal account of Chinese thought and development with particular reference to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist view.

Mao's China required Science not so much for theoretical discovery, but for its practical application. He, therefore, went in for a large number of paramedics and professionals without the full mastery of theoretical knowledge. He also followed the Confucius thought of simplification of administration. His theory of the Chinaness of the Yen-an experience. References to Mao's early thought of 'The Great Leap Forward' 1958-60 'have affected the development of China of the 20th Century.

Leaders studied include Lin Piao proven implementer of the Maoist line in the Army. Chou En Lai the indispensable resource man. With the death of Mao, emerged Deng and his four "Modernisations". He wanted a wealthy transformed China. It is achieving his goal. A recommended book for all libraries.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain, (Retd)

Leaders of Straw : India's First 50 Years. By A.D. Moddie, *New Delhi : Harper Collins, 1997, p. 226, Rs. 145.00, ISBN 81-7223-277-2.*

In India's fiftieth year of Independence, the former Prime Minister, Mr H Deva Gowda, in a revival meeting of India's dormant Planning Commission asked "what has gone wrong and where?" He asked the Planning Commission to do some soul searching. Neither a Prime Minister nor a Planning Commission can be expected to do this, as they have all been participants in the game of what went wrong. Despite the daunting nature of this task, Mr A D Moddie, manages to give an indepth overview in response to Mr Gowda's rhetorical question in his fascinating book, 'Leaders of Straw - India's First Fifty Years'.

The book starts with Churchill's famous 'men of straw' prognostications, viz 'Power will go into the hands of rascals, rogues, free booters and scamsters - all men of straw'. Although 50 years later, Churchill's prophesy has come 100 percent correct, Mr Moddie has tried to analyse this from the point of view of all aspects of our national life, such as market and polity, our spastic economy, our infrastructure sinews, our environment, public accountability and the country's security, both internal and external. In all this, the central thread which runs throughout the book is the endemic and all pervasive corruption. Every facet of illustrated by facts and figures and personal examples from his varied experience in the Army, the Civil Service and industry, which makes this book not only authentic, but easy and interesting reading.

He has updated the book in the postscript dealing with significant developments of the year 1997. Although to begin with the book leaves the reader in a pessimistic frame of mind, at the end Mr Moddie has put together in the form of an agenda for the future, as to what we can do to rise, from the ashes of the past, provided we have the political will and courage to do so. The pertinent question asked by the author is, how to inculcate this in the present leadership, made of straw.

— Brig N B Grant (Retd)

Europe from the Balkans to the Urals : The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. By Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, *London : Oxford University. Press, 1996, p. 436, ISBN 0-19-829200-7.*

This book is a comparative study of the developments and disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union as multinational, federal communist states and the reaction on Western Europe and United States. The authors detail the account of the impotence of United Nations, the European Community and the United States in particular in the face of violence and crimes against humanity in these former communist states.

Where federal boundaries of ethnic states coincided with demographic boundaries, the "velvet divorce" was achieved peacefully in USSR and Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia, the authoritarian streak of its Serbian President Milosevic to preserve the communist federation, combined with the failing of coinciding of federal and demographic boundaries resulted in its brutally violent disintegration.

An interesting political-cum-historical coverage of break up of USSR and Yugoslavia.

— Maj. Gen. J N Goel, (Retd)

The New Great Transformation? Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe. Ed by Christopher G A Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki, *London : Routledge, 1994, p. 228, ISBN 0-415-09250-7.*

A fascinating, though academic, study of the changes in East-Central Europe after the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1989. A collection of analytical articles by leading professors, many of them teaching in Western universities, on the disruptive arrival of capitalism in these countries.

The articles deal with the return to democracy and the perils of unfettered capitalism. The people were free to make money, but the social net – guaranteed jobs and accompanying benefits - suddenly disappeared.

Three articles stand out. In "Values and the Welfare State in Czechoslovakia," the authors discuss the relatively stable cultural factors of Czech society and debate its usefulness in the building of the welfare state after the 'Velvet Revolution.' "Privatisation in Poland" by Tadeusz Kowalik is a well-argued piece on the impact of the about turn from socialism to capitalism and its problems. The articles on the changes in the Hungarian power structure is also enlightening.

— Srinay Chowdhury

A Concise History of the Middle East. By Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p. 465, \$ 16.95 (PB), ISBN 0-8133-2593-3.*

The study of the current affairs in the Middle East countries compels a reader to learn the history of this region. Arthur Goldshmidt Jr. has portrayed the events of many centuries of these countries with changing geographical

boundaries and rulers, right up to the situation currently prevailing. With a brief description of the Middle East before Mohammed, the founder of Islam, the author describes the increasing influence of Islam over the constituents of the Middle East. The split of Muslims into Shias and Sunnis, emergence of the states and monarchies based on these factions and sub-factions and their internecine fights did not reduce the spread of influence of Islam by conquest or otherwise not only in Middle East, but also to Europe, India and other countries. Even the Mongols who captured most of Middle East finally came into the fold of Islam. As a reaction to conservative beliefs, liberal, social and economic movements emerged but these did not dilute the role of clergy and spread of Islam.

The author describes this phenomenon with historical accuracy and brings the reader to the prevailing issues in the Middle East, i.e., Arab-Israel conflict, Iran-Iraq confrontation, Gulf War and other tensions. The economic realities and the development with the oil boom and its effect on relations of the Arab countries with world power amidst Arab nationalism has been analysed in depth.

The book ends with a comprehensive chronology, glossary and bibliography essay. The work should interest a reader wishing to know Middle East and a scholar for research and reference.

— Brig Satjit Singh, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The Middle East and the United States : A Historical and Political Reassessment. Ed by David W. Lesch, Colorado : Westview Press, 1996, p. 460, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-8133-2405-X

David W Lesch has edited a thought provoking and incisive treatise in an authoritative and chronological manner through a cross section of 25 writers from across America, the Europe and the Middle East. This virtually is the evolution of the foreign policy of the United States towards the Middle Eastern countries during the Twentieth Century, especially from the isolationist stand of the US to a stage of active involvement in global affairs. The reasons are not far to seek - the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, relevance of oil from the Middle East for economic boom in the United States, and development of inter-continental communications. It is considered as Russia's southern doorstep by the Washington policy makers and hence the contemporaneous linkage of the Region in the Cold War phenomenon during the interregnum of the Second World War and the Gulf War.

The book has been divided into five parts and 25 chapters. The five parts deal with idealism to realism (Wilsonian interest to Cold War practice); the Cold War in the Middle East ; the acceleration of super powers conflict and the snowballing effect; War and peace - examining the US role; the Gulf-crisis and the reassessment - a case study in superpower cooperation and the new US policy for Middle-East.

The book is considered invaluable for policy makers, teachers and students of geo-politics not only in the affected countries but the world over.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

The Military & Political Succession in China : Leadership, Institutions Beliefs. By Michael D. Swaine, *Santa Monica : RAND 1992, p. 270, ISBN 0-8330-1296-7.*

This is a Project Report prepared by the RAND Corporation for the United States Airforce on the military and political leadership in China. The object of the Report is to study the potential role of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in the political leadership succession struggle in China during the post Deng Xiaoping era.

The Report argues that inspite of the separation in career paths, political authority in China remains highly personalized, militarized and contentious. Similarly, military leaders are also prone to seek political leverage through personal relationships with key party leaders to their mutual advantage. The author further states that the absence of an institutionalised structure of leadership succession is apt to generate a situation of intense factional competition at the apex of the Chinese politico-military leadership. The Report goes on to examine detailed profiles of the elder leaders, the various factions they have formed and their relations with the military leadership. Following up on this conclusion the author has used the Field Army concept for the origin and the formation of the different factions that exist in the Chinese politico-military system. The author goes on to make a very incisive and interesting analysis of the relative importance of the various Field Army factions. The analysis brings out that the Second Field Army, to which Deng Xiaoping once belonged, clearly emerges as the dominant faction. It is followed next in importance by the Third Field Army faction. For the purpose of the analysis the Report examines the career profile of most of the senior military leaders of the PLA, which serious students studying Chinese military system, will no doubt find very useful.

In conclusion the Report offers an evaluation of various scenarios of PLA involvement in the succession struggle that is likely to occur in the post Deng era. In this, of course, events have already overtaken the scenarios stated in the Report. So far the scenario of non-intervention by the military, which the author felt was the least likely, seems to have prevailed for the present. This was probably due to the elimination of powerful Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing faction during the 14th Party Congress, the implications of which are added as postscript to the Report. But possibly it is, as yet, too early to be certain of the final outcome of the succession struggle. Therefore, the other more probable scenarios of military intervention, evaluated in the Report, could still happen.

— Maj Gen Samir Sinha (Retd)

Britain's Wars with Iraq. By Raghid El-Solh, *Berkshire : Ithaca Press, 1996, p. 289, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-86372-176-1.*

Strategically located, the Middle East has been one of the most volatile regions of the world and of immense importance to Britain. This area, especially Iraq, served British strategic interests in the safety of her imperial communications with the Far East especially India. This led her to seizing and holding the region to fend off successive challenges by other world powers.

In the 1940's during the Second War, it provided air routes and waterways complementing the transport work. It, therefore, became the main theatre of war between the Allies and the Axis. Britain's imports of Gulf oil were small in the 1940's but became one of the major factors in 1991. Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 disturbed the established order of the Middle East and economic order of the world especially strategic British interests. Britain was instrumental in prevailing upon the US for taking a tough stand and assembly of the Multi-National Force (MNF). The reasons behind the two wars in essence was to decrease Iraqi and Arab influence in the region.

The book has outlined in detail, the British strategic interests in the region not only in the 1940's and 1990's but also the intervening decades. The author has done a commendable job in documenting all the historical facts. A good book for all students of Military History.

— Maj Gen Prem K. Khanna, MVC (Retd.)

From A Dark Sky : The Story of U.S. Air Force Special Operations. By Orr Kelly, *Novato : Presidio Press, 1996, p. 340, \$ 24.95, ISBN*

This book gives details of almost impossible special operations undertaken by individuals or small groups during the Vietnam and Korean Wars and Operation Desert Storm.

As mentioned by the author, most of the books usually give details of the leadership of senior officers, but this book is different in that most of the operations which were not only difficult but almost impossible were undertaken by relatively junior officers and airmen. Of particular interest to the readers are the chapters on the hostage rescue efforts to rescue 53 American hostages held captive in the American Embassy in Tehran since November, 1979. The requirements were precise timings, co-ordination and secrecy.

An interesting and absorbing book of particular interest to the junior officers and airmen to whom it will provide a valuable guide. They may aspire to follow the deeds of these brave men who were prepared to risk their lives to achieve the almost impossible. A good addition to all defence libraries.

-- Commodore R.P. Khanna AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Nato - Identity Crisis and the American Experiment in Europe

The collection of very well thought out essays and papers in "NATO in the post-Cold War Era" by the Lemnitzer Centre for NATO and European Community Studies at Kent University in the US, goes into what might have been or could have been if NATO did not come into being, or if it did get through the traumatic and nail-biting changes in its structure, both political and military and continuously updated its strategies to keep the chosen few countries together. It is interesting that NATO never defined its "enemy", though USSR was the

target made clear in the various training and other experiences, some of which this reviewer had been fortunate to take part with the British Army on the Rhine and simulated bombruns by the RAF (I believe this reviewer was the First Indian to ride in a Canberra in such a run over "imaginary targets" in the USSR). It was quite amusing at times to watch commander and staff officers trying to work out their operational plans in simulated battles with the tactical nuclear arsenal - as the main "toy" round which they played their game.

NATO and Interlocking Institutions expounded in Chapter III is interesting on how UN has been "allergic" to NATO throughout the last four decades culminating in Boutros not devoting even one line in 182 pages report on the role or effect of NATO on European affairs. In Chapter IV the special relationship between the UK and US throughout the period of formation and existence of NATO, so far, has been brought out in detail. In Chapter V the complex problems of the former Warsaw Pact countries and other Eastern European countries in their polyglot attitudes and ideologies besides linguistic and almost bigoted and faulical parochialism are brought out in a subtle manner. The report brings out the London Declaration of 1967 and how its basic thoughts were referred to by NATO in its strategic changes in 1991 for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Such dilution from military aggressiveness to subtle diplomatic changes are bound to take place in the changed atmosphere and environment in the world, particularly in Europe.

On the whole an excellent analysis of the NATO from its inception to its new form today. An ideal book for reference and for the scholars; a bit heavy reading for the ordinary reader. Views of different people contributing their individual ideas are sometimes conflicting and repetitive which cannot be helped in a book of this nature. The Editor has done an excellent job for the military and political historian.

— Maj Gen P Choudhary

Political Issues in America Today : The 1990's Revisited. Ed by Philip John Davies and Frederick A. Waldstein, *Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 275, £ 10.00, ISBN 0-7190-4226-7.*

A book with extremely well articulated contributions from scholarly academics on a host of issues confronting the US internally and externally. It is in three sections covering domestic policy, government and governance and role of the US in a redefined world.

The assessments reveal as to how constructive reforms get derailed because they are perceived as anti-capitalist and why budget deficits become a key issue in political and economic election debates. The factors leading to an increased representation of women in all spheres are convincingly argued. An attempt has also been made to suggest, that if a polity does not know how to answer complex questions, then it should search for people who can and in such an exercise media could play a meaningful role. The existing views on elected representatives is scathing, where they are generally seen as self

serving, scandal ridden, dishonest and overly concerned about their privileges. As a breed, it does appear that politicians are the same the world over. On International issues the poser is whether, as the sole superpower, the US can create a just and stable international Order that can sustain economic progress with tolerant societies.

A volume that is commended for understanding American polity and society as it stands today.

— Air Marshal K D Chadha (Retd)

Contemporary American Politics. Ed by Alan Grant, *Aldershot : Dartmouth, 1995, p. 249, £ 15.00, ISBN*

The book provides an indepth analysis of the key themes and issues surrounding the working of the American political system. It talks of factors that go into the selection of presidential candidates, their styles of leadership, and the compulsions that shape strategies.

The best chapter is on supreme court nominations by Reagan and Bush which illustrates the pulls, pressures and preferences that influence the nomination of incumbent to the judicial body and how judicial activism becomes partisan of constructionist as a consequence. If we in India feel that we have a notoriously intractable political system, it is more so in the United States where government and all forms of authority are regarded with scepticism and suspicion. The book reveals another similarity, on how, the US Congress has abdicated its role in monitoring and controlling the bureaucracy which it painstakingly spawned and how it fails to question the system. The conclusion is that political systems can only be as good as these are worked.

A highly educative and instructive book on dynamics of US politics.

— Air Marshal K D Chadha (Retd)

Nepoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War. By Robert M. Epstein, *Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 1994, p. 215, £ 11.95, ISBN 0-7006-0751-X.*

This expansive study discusses the remodelling of La Grande Armee of France by Napoleon for his war strategy of distributed manoeuvre and essentially, his victorious campaigns during the first decade of the Nineteenth Century against Austria, Prussia and other Allies. Whereas the latter upstages Napoleon's military genius from battle zone commander to the plane of strategic intellectualism, the organisational model of larger formations with integrated staff, logistics and fire support and capable of independent strategic missions, set the frame-work of present day armies. Napoleon also laid out a 'doctrine' for the soldiers and field commanders, besides delegating authority to his force commanders through directives and instructions, which throw new light on his leadership style.

Epstein has made a valuable contribution to the history of modern warfare

and the concept of strategic mobility through this book which provides for a highly enjoyable reading.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The Somme 1916 Crucible of a British Army. By Michael Chappell, London: Windrow & Greene, 1995, p. 128, £ 35.00, ISBN 185915-0071.

This book gives succinctly the multifarious aspects of the Battle of Somme 1916. This battle fought from 1 July 1916 to 19 November 1916 between British Fourth Army, French Corps and Germans was one of the most ferocious and fiercest battles of the First World War. The casualties suffered on the first day of the battle were approximately 57,000. All Ranks out of a total of 6,30,000 during the entire war by the Allies. 51 Victoria Crosses were awarded during this battle. Valour was not lacking on either side. This battle has also been described as one of the most senseless battles which foundered on the German barbed wire initially for a few days; a total failure and did not achieve any strategical or tactical advantage to the Allies. The area captured at a maximum depth was 10 km on a frontage of 25 KM.

A large number of photographs, colour plates of historical value and "stills" taken from perhaps the first original war movie titled 'The Battle of the Somme', shot during the battle itself enhances the value of the book manifold.

An interesting book worth decorating a coffee table.

-- Maj Gen J N Goel

A Strong Showing : Britain's Struggle for Power and Influence in South-East Asia 1942-1950. By Rolf Tanner, Druck Franz Steiner Verlag : Stuttgart, 1995, p. 299, DM 94, ISBN 3-515-06613-6.

This doctoral dissertation examines in detail the British foreign policy towards South East Asia from 1942 to 1950. The options discussed are to abandon the classical world power role; renounce it in favour of the USA and the USSR to continue with the prewar colonial status thus having access to the raw materials from South East Asia and also have pretensions to being a great world power. Yet - other options - to play a second fiddle to the USA because of economic reasons or adopt pragmatic realism of Asian nationalism by different nation-states and depart in a dignified manner or form a commonwealth where strategic, economic, cultural and political interests of Britain could be safeguarded.

How UK ensured that the USA got involved in Cold War initially in Europe and later throughout the World makes a fascinating reading. The South East Asian countries had an inherent suspicion of dictation and domination by the colonial powers even if their intentions were honourable. The British policy, therefore, had to tread on a very slippery path.

An interesting book covering the broad spectrum of political development in South-East Asia from 1942 to 1950.

— Maj Gen J N Goel

British Fighting Methods In The Great War. Ed by Paddy Griffith, *London : Frank Cass, 1996, p. 191, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-7146-3495-6.*

The fact that a book like this is published after eighty years, is in itself of interest. Eight British historians, have contributed, and thrown new light on the tactics, use of artillery, tanks, cavalry, chemical weapons and medical facilities, in the Great War. The controversial employment of cavalry-of which India contributed a Corps of two divisions - in terms of the logistics involved, is interesting.

Artillery achieved its importance as an offensive arm. At Valenciennes on 1st November 1918, 1,500 Canadian troops were supported by one gun to every six men on a frontage of 2,500 yards.

A project to evaluate the performance of British Divisions in the war, SHLM Project, — named after the initials of its prime movers, is proposed. This will take into account - weather, terrain, going, nature of enemy resistance - separately for offensive and defensive operations. It will restore a degree of praise to them. The launch of the above study — is intended to balance the, accounts of technical brilliance and genius of the German Army. The essence of the argument is that the British could claim more achievements than usually assumed.

The book is of limited interest to Indians. The role of the Indian troops which took part was, secondary to the British and Dominion troops. It is only mentioned in passing.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

The Echo of War : Home From Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-45. By Sian Nicholas, *Manchester : Manchester Univ. Press, 1996, p. 307, £ 45.00, ISBN 0-7190-4608-4.*

Sian Nicholas has done a detailed and well organised investigative study of Radio as a weapon of war during the Second World War. The treatise brings out categorically the role of the British Broadcasting Corporation and its impact on the British masses and listeners. One of the BBC's most important contribution was its attempt not simply to describe the war but to put the official news into the right perspective. War Commentary's - success lay in its presentation of a military - but not official - perspective on the war. In order to safeguard its credibility the BBC had to do a lot of tightrope walking. Taking listeners into confidence is what the BBC did with its unrivalled reputation for impartiality. By a combination of caution, good sense and obduracy it weathered early storms to gain for the BBC a reputation of integrity that became part of the mythology of the corporation.

The book is recommended to all those who are interested in the history of propaganda as a weapon of war at the same time maintaining corporational integrity and reliability.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj

Overlord Coastline : A History of D-Day with Special Emphasis on What Can Be Seen Today. By Stephen H Chicken, Kent : Spellmount Ltd., 1993, p. 104, £ 11.95, ISBN 1-873376-6.

The event about which more books have been written than any other during the Second World War were the landings on D-Day, the 6th June 1944. This is a book written, as the title correctly suggests, more for the visitors to Normandy to see the site of the famous landing than for a serious military historian.

The author has taken great pains to paint a picture which will enthuse both the sightseer as well as those who are interested in finding out the technical details of such things as the Atlantic Wall prepared by the Germans. There are copious pictures and diagrams to make life very easy for the visitor in locating the landing sites of both the US and British divisions as well as various German guns and bunkers built to throw them back into the English Channel. He has also included the histories of the fighting units involved on both sides.

Another aspect of the landings that have been covered are the actual action plan and what eventually transpired. The author has also included the locations of various museums that have sprung up after the war.

This book is highly recommended to those visiting Normandy.

-- By Cdr S Varma SC. IN (Retd)

The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race : Arms, Embargo, Military Power and Decision in the 1948 Palestine War. By Amitzur, London : Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 287, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-333-63240-0.

The partition of Palestine under the UN auspices was followed by the first Arab-Israeli War of May 1948. The Arabs invaded Palestine in May 1948, an attempt to erase the lately established Jewish State.

The Arabs paid heavily, for obsolete armaments, including aircraft, tanks and guns. Iraqis acquired 60 aircraft which were grounded due to lack of spares. Egyptians who purchased a mixed squadron of 82 aircraft, only 12 were airworthy, same was the case with shopping done by the Syrians and others. Israel was supplied weaponry by Australia, South Africa and Czechoslovakia. They were also able to produce essential war material at home which was an added advantage. The author has carried out a detailed analysis of the subject and is able to give us the background on why the Israelis hold such a superior position even today.

The book covers the order of Battle of the seven states who opposed the Israelis in the Palestine war and also the establishment of permanent observer group. The book also brings out the ineffectiveness of the UN embargo on arms supply to the Israelis and Arabs.

-- Brig YP Dev (Retd)

New Perspectives On Israeli History: The Early Years of the State. Ed by Laurence J. Silberstein. *New York : New York University Press, 1991, p. 281, \$ 20.00 (PB), ISBN 0-8147-7929-8, ISBN 0-8147-7929-8.*

This volume presents a new perspective of Middle Eastern states, Palestine and Israel. Although the principal focus is on the early years of the Israel state, the narratives go as far back as the Ottoman empire during which period the foundation of the Arab refugee problem was laid. The scholars take unbiased and humanitarian view of the developing situations. The analysis of available archives by Avraham Sela and Yehuda Reinharz on the social problems, products of the historic past, which if unresolved, would affect the historic future in all undeveloped countries and his obiter-dicta on India are interesting. He is a supporter of the policy announced by Zionists to admit and integrate the exiled jews with *Yishuv* community (pre-state jewish community).

The divide among Zionists about Diaspora jews was no less serious. The Zionist proclamation before the rise of Israel was for the admission and assimilation of Diaspora jews. After the end of the war, the Zionists were divided; the leftists retained their feelings and regards for the survivors of the Nazi tyranny. Others discriminated between *Yishuvs* and the broken-hearted and spiritless surviving jews in Europe. Even the Prime Minister Ben Gurion asked "Those jews, (survivors) are they a hindrance, an obstacle to Zionism or a benefit." The worst case is of Dr. Yisrael Kasztner, a leader in the Zionist-organised rescue efforts in Budapest. He was accused of cooperating with Nazis in order to save his relations and friends. A libel trial against his accuser went against Kasztner. The district court judge held that he was guilty of the crimes of which he was accused. Shortly thereafter he was murdered. Later the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the district judge on the ground that the realities and unique circumstances were not taken into account. But the innocent activist was dead! Only the truth lived!

An interesting though painful truth about Israeli history.

-- K L Pasricha

Burying Mao : Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. By Richard Baum, *New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 489, \$35.00, ISBN 0-691-03639-X.*

A brilliant account of the life and times of Deng Xiaoping, the last emperor of China. The book begins with the death of Mao Ze Dong and the rise of Hua Guofeng. But then, the wily Deng slowly takes command and eases out Hua in 1977 and begins a reign that lasted till his death this year. It was an important time when free-market economics reaches China and brings prosperity to large parts of the country, though at a price.

Baum, a university Professor in the USA, speaks about Deng's centrist stand. His two reformist proteges are Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang but he doesn't isolate the conservatives like Deng Liqin and Wang Zhen. Xiaoping's

politics moves in cycles. He supports one side first, but just as he sees them running away with it, he supports the other side. His preeminent position ensures that the side he supports, gets the crucial, additional strength.

There is an analysis of the Tiananmen crack down and how the Chinese Communist Party survived it though Zhao Ziyang did not. In the long run however, Deng is the Victor. He allowed the market economy to flourish but the stranglehold of the Communist Party continues. Mao would not have been pleased. Mao's revolution has been eclipsed by the Deng revolution, Baum says.

— Srinjoy Chowdhury

A Soaring Eagle : Alfred Marshal, 1842-1924 : By Peter Groenewegen : *Edward Elgar, 1995, p. 874 + XIV, Price £ 59.95 (Pounds Sterling), ISBN*

Edward Elgars have published the most comprehensive biography of the most versatile Economist, who left an indelible imprint on the socio-economic philosophy and affairs of the nations of the free world during the last quarter of the 19th century and first quarter of the 20th century. His theories not only tickled the imagination of contemporary scholars but also got embedded amongst the intellectuals and dons. He has brought out every aspect of the 'Soaring Eagle', with the help of data charts, illustrations, quotes, references and documents, tracing out and recording pronouncements, the evolution, the acceptance and absorption of Nineteenth Century economic thought, amidst emerging geo-political situation well into the 20th Century; changes, due to clash of TITANS and their ideologies, monetary systems, gold and silver standards, slumps and recessions, inflation and famines.

The biography, despite its bulk and weight, makes interesting reading and the 56 plates spread over 16 pages make a special appeal to the sentiment of the reader. The index and reference spanning over 75 pages and archival notes at the end of each chapter lend themselves to quick reference. The book will have a special appeal to research scholars and find a high pedestal in any archival gallery of the Library.

— Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra (Retd)

Adolf Galland : The Authorised Biography. By David Baker, *London : Windrow & Greene, 1996, p. 316, £20.00, ISBN 1-85915-017-9.*

A legend in his own lifetime, the late Adolf "Dolfo" Galland, was without doubt, the most famous fighter pilot of the Second World War. He did not have the most kills, that record was held by yet another German, Hartmann, yet he got the highest respect from both his own side and the enemy. He was essentially an old warrior who found himself serving a most vicious and brutal Nazi regime. He was too much of a gentleman to have come to terms with it.

He went to Spain as a part of German Condor Legion and gained experience of fighter combat which he made full use of during the Polish and

Western campaigns. He was brilliant during the Battle of Britain becoming one of the leading aces in the West. He was decorated by Hitler with Germany's highest award, the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds. At the age of 30, he became the youngest General in the Wehrmacht while holding the appointment of the head of fighter arms of the Luftwaffe.

He tried his best to gear up the fighters to meet the challenge of RAF and the USAAF heavy bombers which were taking heavy toll of German industries and cities but was not always successful. The senior Luftwaffe officers with Hitler's backing managed to sideline him, particularly his cleverly planned 2000 fighter counterattack against the USAAF. Hitler used and wasted his fighters in the Battle of the Bulge in Ardennes in December 1944. Luftwaffe fighter arm was destroyed once and for all.

Since the middle of 1943 Galland had tried to accelerate the production of the Me 262, world's first operational jet fighter. Hitler again came in his way and wanted it to be developed as fighter bomber - needless to add it was a failure in that role. Galland was dismissed but friends persuaded Goering to make him Commander of the Special Me 262 Squadron. He finished the war as he had started, as a Squadron Commander, perhaps the first to be commanded by a Lieutenant General!

After the war Galland wrote his autobiography which, because of the then existing conditions, was very selective. Therefore, this fascinating biography by David Baker, who is a space expert and knew Galland well, is comprehensive and absorbing.

— By Cdr S Varma SC IN (Retd)

Einstein : A Life. By Denis Brian, New York : John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1996, p. 509, \$ 30.00, ISBN 0-471-11459-6.

The biographical volume is highly provocative, thoughtful and captivating account of Albert Einstein's life. Einstein changed the world we live in. It was he who sired, for better or for worse, the nuclear age.

Brian worked for almost two decades to collect data and information about Einstein's professional and personal achievements. His name is synonymous with genius. Brian vividly probes the private, public and scientific person as of the enigmatic man behind the legend. Examining this astounding legacy in conversation with many of Einstein's contemporaries, Brian penetrates the veil of formulas, theories, and experiments to expand our understanding of their meaning with incisive, intimate detail, and recreates the world in which Einstein worked, in solitude and with others, revered by his juniors and enjoying warm relationships with other physicists.

Also included in Brian's comprehensive portrait are FBI's investigation of Einstein's alleged communist connections, as well as his efforts on behalf of

Europe's Jews during Hitler's rise to power, and his ardent support of the formation of the state of Israel.

A complex man of many contradictions - a scientist engrossed in his work yet with a roving eye for women, a humanist whose compassion for the children of others did not extend to his own, a pacifist who helped create the most destructive weapons known to mankind-Albert Einstein is revealed as never before in this lucid, rewarding biography. With rare photographs, many appearing here for the first time, in history's hall of eminence, he will live along side Copernicus, Newton and Darwin. *Einstein : A Life* is, as befits its subject, a great achievement.

— Mohun Kudaisya
Senior Research Scholar

Imperial Warrior : The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby 1861-1936. By Lawrence James, *London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993, p. 279, ISBN 0-297-811525.*

Field Marshal Edmund H.H. Allenby, a product of the Victorian society and the military culture of the pre-World War I era, emerged as the most successful General of Imperial Britain. In sharp contrast to the gruesome stalemate of trench warfare in Europe during the Great War, Allenby's campaigns in Palestine demonstrated the art of manoeuvre at its best.

In 1919, Allenby was the natural choice to head the newly formed "Special High Commission with Supreme Civil and Military control" to safeguard the Imperial interests, particularly the Suez Zone. This politico-military role, particularly his uncharacteristic laissez-faire approach prompted anger of the European community in Egypt and criticism from the hardliners at home.

Author Lawrence James has portrayed the character, individual traits and conceptual skills of Allenby, both as a career soldier and as a statesman, vividly and also placed the successive stages of his career in correct historical perspective. The author has highlighted the professionalism Allen as a Palestine, and the proconsul in post-War Middle-East during 1919-1925.

The book is a commendable contribution to the military and political history of Imperial Britain.

— Maj Gen SK Talwar (Retd)

Wartime Missions of Harry L Hopkins. By Matthew B Wills, *North Carolina : Pentland Press, 1996, \$ 17.95, ISBN 1-57197-012-6.*

Major events, which changed the course of history and orchestrated by leaders, were given the "quodos" they deserve. But there were other unsung heroes, who made profound impact on world events and perhaps did not get the recognition due to them. One such person was Harry L Hopkins.

This American, occupied centre stage during the two great challenges of

U.S.A. in the 20th Century, the Great Depression and World War II. During the course of World War II, major differences occurred between the allied countries (USA, U.K. and Russia). Noticing the calibre and negotiating skills of Hopkins, President Roosevelt sent him on various sensitive missions to Stalin and Churchill, which he accomplished with great success.

This short volume, the result of extensive research, provides fascinating insight of the darkest days of WW II, the political, philosophical and military issues and problems involved, his special relationship with Churchill and his contribution, inspite of failing health, to salvage the crumbling relationship between USA and Russia. The author after a stint in the Army, practised law and now writes history. The author succeeds in making the reader "re-live" through those momentous days of World War II. The students of history will enjoy reading this book.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath (Retd)

Taken Captive : A Japanese POW's Story. By Ooka Shohei, New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1996, p. 330, \$ 27.95, ISBN 0-471-14285-9.

There are not many Japanese World War II prisoners who wrote about their experiences. Ooka wrote *Furoky* in 1952. A reservist, he joined the Imperial Japanese Army in 1944 and was soon captured in the Philippines, still a private.

Ooka, an easy observer and writing easily introduces us to prisoners inventing both circumstances and names, an all round dodge among one's colleagues for folks 'back home' and the captors. Luckily our recorder kept his notes, wits and now there is a fine account of mundane soldiering and life, as an American Prisoner of War, so little documented.

The translation would have been no small thing for Wayne when mental images of an oriental language refuse to slip in to crisp world pictures in English. Ooka is lucky in his translator and editor. Strange, I am yet to see as credible a book by an Indian POW.

— Col Balwant Sandhu

Personal Memoris of US Grant. By Ulysses Simpson Grant, New York : Dover Publishers, 1995, p. 514, £ 11.95, ISBN 0-486-28587-1.

Lieutenant General US Grant's personal memoirs give his early life when after 11 years of service in the Army he resigned his commission. He tried his hand at various occupations but failed. However, at the outbreak of the Civil War he rejoined the Army.

The memoirs give in a simple language the first hand account of all the Campaigns in which he took part, primarily of the Civil War. The details are accompanied by sketches and six photographs which make the reading easy

and enjoyable. An interesting and absorbing book which is a must of all Army officers who aspire to reach highest ranks and learn tactics which are applicable even now.

A good addition to all defence libraries.

-- Cmde R P Khanna AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Scapegoat: General Percival of Singapore. By Clifford Kinvig. *London : Brassey, 1996, p. 278, £ 25.00, ISBN 1-85753-171-X.*

The fall of Singapore on 15th February 1942 was a great shock to Britain and its Allies. The shock was all the greater because public opinion in Britain had been generally led to believe that Singapore was a fortress and thereby impregnable.

In May, 1941, Lt Gen Arthur Percival took over as GOC Malaya with an outstanding record as a fighting Commander and as one of the ablest of Britain's younger Generals. His military career spans almost exactly two World Wars. In the second conflict, his combat experience was brief, intense and unique. This biographical book on Percival evaluates him in detail as a military commander from the time he joined as a volunteer on 4th August, 1914 till his retirement 32 years later on 31st August, 1946. The book covers his early career in general alongwith the Malaya Campaign in detail, including his early years in captivity. Percival is unnecessarily blamed for the disaster wherein he fought with scarce resources and under political neglect.

A very good and well documented book for all students of military history.

— Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

A Most Diplomatic General : The Life of General Lord Robertson Of Oakridge BT GCB KCMG KCVO DSO MC, 1896-1974. By David Williamson, *London : Brassey, 1996, p. 265, £ 25.00, ISBN 1-85753-180-9.*

As a soldier one need not only excel in the art of fighting but there are other qualities which make a General great, directly or indirectly. This is exactly what General Robertson had in regard to his ability as an able administrator and excellent diplomat.

The book describes the General as a gifted staff officer and an able administrator who master minded the organisation of supplies to the Western Deserts of North Africa during the Second World War. General Robertson was also an able diplomat and was Deputy Military Governor from 1945 to 1950. With his administrative capability and diplomacy he assisted in the birth of German Federal Republic.

Later as Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Land Forces, with his

diplomatic skill and the art of negotiations, he brought to fore the withdrawal of British Forces from the Canal Zone in 1953.

The General's tenure as the British Transport Commissioner from 1953 to 1961 was most challenging. His desire to modernise the railways was marred by the pressure from the government to hold down the price structure. This resulted in his taking controversial and expensive decisions thereby cutting corners to achieve the results.

An interesting biography of an able administrator and a skilled diplomat. Of much interest to officers of the defence forces and civilians alike. A good addition to all libraries.

— Comd R P Khanna AVSM (Retd)

The New Spies : Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage. By James Adams, London : Hutchinson, 1994, p. 378, £ 17.99, ISBN 0-09-174063-0.

This book is mainly about the changing role of intelligence services throughout the world due to the end of Cold War. The author James Adams has been Defence Correspondent of the *Sunday Times* for nearly a decade and has been privy to working of intelligence agencies and had the opportunity to interview directors of CIA, FBI and the head of SVR in 1994. He has been thus able to get insight into changes to policies that may be made to cope with the challenges facing the intelligence community.

The book is structured in three major sections comprising a total of 24 chapters. The New World section covers USA, Russia and UK. He conveys that this branch of bureaucracy threatened with fund cut backs has created reasons to justify its continued existence by bringing in its protective role in national security, terrorism, international financial crimes, proliferation and drugs. However the spy business between Russia and the west continues nearly as usual. In the Challenges section, the author tackles economic espionage, terrorism, proliferation and drugs. These chapters are replete with likely factual stories and bring out the problems generally faced by the spies.

In the opinion of the author the future James Bonds will first have to get approval of Congress, then each step they take will be monitored by in house lawyers and finally results will be scrutinized to ensure that no national or international laws have been trespassed, while gathering information.

The author concludes that the reforms induced due to end of Cold War would produce a leaner, more efficient and responsive intelligence community, which will enable policy makers to take right decisions.

This is an immensely readable book, which explodes a lot of myths about the working of spies shorn off the glamour adorning their movie counterparts.

— Cdr S. Kulshrestha

Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy During the First World War. Ed by Michael Dockrill and David French, *London : The Hambledon Press, 1996, p. 207, £ 35.00, ISBN 1-85285-099-X.*

Strategy and Intelligence deals with aspects of British policy and strategy during the First World War (1914-1918), the effective and efficient organisation and management of British internal resources and coordination of its war efforts with its allies.

Of the eight chapters, first, by Josephine Howie essays with the civil-military relations in Ireland second by John Ferris describes the role of intelligence in the air; third by David French, dwells on intelligence on the Western Front with its pitfalls; fourth and fifth by Keith Neilson and Kathleen Burk define the organisation of economic resources - food and raw material in the broadest sense - so very critical for final victory; sixth, by Chris Wrigley narrates the impact of the First World War on labour movement; seventh, by Michael Dockrill, examines the role of intelligence in war - diplomatic and political; and last, by Brian Holden Reid sums up the role of Generals and the art and attributes of Generalship in the First World War as visualised by General 'Boney' Fuller.

The book makes an interesting reading and is recommended to all echelons of the Armed Forces for imbibing the positive aspects.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj

Intelligence Power in Peace and War. By Michael Herman, *Cambridge : Cambridge : University Press, 1996, p. 414, £ 16.95, ISBN 0-521-56636-3.*

Intelligence is a vital element of national power. Great nations have been served by omniscient intelligence agencies at the zenith of their power be it Great Britain, the United States of America or the erstwhile Soviet Union. Ironically, the land of Kautilya, the first known proponent of the use of intelligence as a source of power in polity has neglected development of this vital element. The use of intelligence as a tool of power does not fit into the liberal self concept of the modern Indian intellectual and yet without a thorough understanding of the entire process of intelligence functioning, it would not be possible for the country to achieve its desired objectives in the international arena.

Michael Herman, a British intelligence officer with impeccable academic credentials has produced a voluminous account of the intelligence community and its structure under the aegis of the Royal institute of International Affairs. The work provides valuable insight into rudiments of modern intelligence and would prove to be an illuminating introduction to the military amateur and a refresher to the military professional. The wide canvas of intelligence organisations and processes in the international, strategic, military operational and combat contexts is covered in detail by the author to include evolution of the modern intelligence process, effects, problems of intelligence judgement, improving performance, achieving efficiency and a brief look at the icons of future.

The most valuable contribution of the present work would be the paradigms of source sensitivity, quantity and values suggested in the form of a pyramid

by the author, to increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence collection, thereby addressing the eternal problem of sifting the desired pin from the haystack of information abundances. The all source analysis brought out in the book will necessitate a fresh approach to the intelligence cycle.

The work, however, is not without its shortcomings, particularly related to the emerging dimensions of intelligence given the proliferation of information technologies and networked structures as opposed to hierarchies. How will these affect the intelligence process? Will it lead to a revolution in intelligence? With his wealth of experience in this specialist field, the reader would have expected the author to define the future trajectory of intelligence and thus would be disappointed. The silence on significance of intelligence in low intensity conflict is also surprising, given the successful British experience in effective use of intelligence during the Malay insurgency in the 1950s.

Overall the book is a balanced background on intelligence at the functional level and to a nation beset with numerous instances of intelligence failures - of collection as well as analysis.

— Col Rahul K Bhonsle

Falcons : A Novel. By Ray Rosenbaum, *Novato : Lyford Books, 1993, p. 404, \$ 9.95, ISBN 0-89141-559-9.*

Falcons by Rosenbaum is a psychological description of flight line scenario of pilot's life and approach towards the service duties on a day-to-day basis, nay, on a minute-to-minute basis. He has so vividly and aptly described the aviation tactics and shooting sprees of the Allied and Axis pilots that shuffling the pages of voluminous Falcons is an extremely interesting and fast moving experience till one reaches the end of the 404 paged novel.

A must reading by all fighter pilots, aircrews, staff and those as well who have something or the other to do with flying and aviation and warlike operations.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Do your Ears Pop in Space? And 500 Other Surprising Questions About Space Travel. By R. Mike Mullane, New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1997, p. 240, £ 14.95, ISBN 0-471-15404-0.

The author is a veteran astronaut of three space missions and a qualified aeronautical engineer. He has undertaken great efforts to compile curious questions by laypersons on space programmes. The author has covered technical, economical, physiological and psychological aspects of space travel in a lucid manner. The author has detailed the next generation of manned launch vehicles. However he opines that humans may never fly at the speed of light though conventional interstellar travel still remains a distinct possibility.

The book would be quite entertaining for persons with even passing interest in space travel. Students would find it a good source of general information on space.

— Cdr S Kulshrestha

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending December 1997

(The books reviewed in July-September 1997 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Ser No.	Author's Name	Title	Year
Autobiography/Biography			
1.	Dixit, J.N	Assignment Colombo.	1998
2.	Nanda, Ravi (Col.)	The Final Irony.	1997
3.	Tharoor, Shashi	India from Midnight to the Millennium.	1997
4.	Sahgal, Lakshmi	A Revolutionary Life : Memoirs of a Political Activist.	1997
5.	Verma, Ashok (Maj. Gen.)	Rivers of Silence : Disaster on River Nam Ka Chu 1962 and the Dash to Dhaka Across River Meghna During 1971	1998
6.	Chaudhuri, Nirad C	Three Horsemen of the New Apocalypse.	1997
7.	Sinha, SK (Lt. Col)	Veer Kuer Singh : The Great Warrior of 1857.	1997
Confidence - Building Measures			
8.	Ganguly, Sumit and Greenwood Ted (eds.)	Mending Fences : Confidence and Security Building Measures in South Asia.	1997
Indian - History			
9.	Khilnani, Sunil	The Idea of India	1997
10.	Narayanan, V.N. and Sabharwal, Jyoti (eds.)	India At 50 : Bliss of Hope and Burden of Reality.	1997

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| 11. Swamy, KRN | Mughals, Maharajas and the Mahatma | 1997 |
| 12. Mishra, Surendra | Presidential Addresses to Parliament | 1996 |
| 13. Read, Anthony and Fisher, D. | The Proudest Day : India's Long Road to Independence | 1997 |
| 14. Taylor, PJO | What Really Happened During the Mutiny. | 1997 |

Indo-Pak War

- | | | |
|--|---|------|
| 15. Lechman Singh (Maj Gen) | Missed Opportunities : Indo-Pak War 1965 | 1997 |
| 16. Ranbir, Singh (Gp Capt) and Pal, RK (Sqdn Ldr) | Operation Cactus Lily (3 Dec - 17 Dec 1971) | 1997 |

India - Regimental History

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|------|
| 17. Ahmad, Mustasad (Lt. Col.) | Living Up to Heritage : History of Rajput Regiment 1947 - 1970. | 1997 |
| 18. Raghavan, VR (Lt. Gen.) | Infantry in India | 1997 |

Journalism - Defence

- | | | |
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| 19. Saxena, Sangeeta | Defence Journalism in India | 1997 |
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Kashmir

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|------|
| 20. Bhim, Singh | Flames in Kashmir | 1998 |
| 21. Naqash, Nasir A | Kashmir : From Crisis to Crisis | 1997 |

Nepal Cultural History

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|------|
| 22. Karan, Pradyumna and others | Nepal : A Himalayan Kingdom in Transition | 1996 |
|---------------------------------|---|------|

Reference - Books

23. Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Asian Strategic Review 1996-97 1997
24. Chopra, PN (ed) The Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Vols. X & XI 1997
25. SIPRI Yearbook 1997 Armament, Disarmament and International Security. 1997
26. Fifth Central Pay Commission Report - Pension and Other Retirement Benefits with Ready Reckoner Tables and Govt. Order

SAARC

27. Grover, Verinder Encyclopaedia of SAARC 1997
(ed) Nations (3 Vols)

South Asia

28. Sahai, Shashi B. South Asia : From Freedom to Terrorism. 1998

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
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
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
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The library holds over 50,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material.

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