


# U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



## PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- Revolution in Military Affairs - *Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee*  
AVSM (Retd)
- Persian Gulf - Politics and Security - *Alireza Sheikh Attar*
- Security of Asia - Pacific Region - *Katsuhito Asano*  
and Japanese Defence Policy
- Restructuring of the Armed Forces - *Maj Gen Vinod Saighal (Retd)*
- Jammu and Kashmir Problem : - *Lt Gen Sir James Wilson*  
The Truth, Part II *KBE, MC, DL*  
- *Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM*  
(Retd)
- Proliferation in India.- Arms - *Lt Ashish Khurana*  
and the Man

**JULY-SEPTEMBER 1997**

---

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © Rs. 45.00 PUBLISHED QUARTERLY



## USI PUBLICATIONS

### USI NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS

Para Military Forces	
by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Defence Budgeting in India	
by Shri DS Nakra (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Possible Counter Measures Against Satellite Reconnaissance	
by Air Marshal IW Sabhaney, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Higher Defence Organisation	
by Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Leadership in the Indian Army During Eighties and Nineties	
by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
China's Strategic Posture in the 1980's (Revised)	
by Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 35.00
Intra-Regional Interventions in South Asia	
by Prof KR Singh	Price: Rs. 50.00
A Profile of Terrorism	
by Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
National Security : Integrated Approach to Policy Making	
by Lt Gen Hridaya Kaul, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
India's Defence Forces : Building the Sinews of a Nation	
by Gen V N Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00

### USI SEMINARS

Report on Armoured Personnel Carriers	
Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on the Imposition of a Manpower Ceiling on the Army	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on Recruitment into the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces	
Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on a Seminar on Cooperation in Defence	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 15.00
Report on a Seminar on Review of the Organisation Pattern of the Indian Army	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Report on the Military Threat in the Nineteen Eighties	
Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 30.00
Report on Nuclear Shadow over the Sub-Continent	
Chairman Maj Gen DK Palit, VrC (Retd)	Price: Rs. 25.00
Relationship of Military Law and Discipline with the Judicial System of the Country	
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 35.00
Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean	
by Admiral S. Prakash (Retd)	Price: Rs. 30.00
Report on Military and Society	
Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00



ISSN 0041-770X

The  
**Journal**  
of the  
**United Service Institution**  
of  
**India**

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)  
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057  
Telephone No. 6146755, 6146490  
Fax : 6149773

**Vol CXXVII**

**July-September 1997**

**No. 529**

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January.  
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 180.00. Subscription should be sent to the  
Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution. Articles,  
Correspondence and Books for Review should be sent to the Editor.  
Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be addressed to the Director.

For overseas subscriptions, trade enquiries and  
advertisements write to : Spantech & Lancer, Spantech  
House, Lagham Road, South Godstone, Surrey RH9 8HB, UK.  
Overseas annual subscription (By Air Mail) - £ 30 or \$ 60  
Tel : + 44 1342 893239 Fax : + 44 1342 892584



**UNITED  
SERVICE  
INSTITUTION  
OF INDIA**

for

*the furtherance of  
interest and know-  
ledge in the art,  
science, and literature  
of National Security  
in general and of the  
Defence Services  
in particular*

**Patron**

Shri K R Narayanan, Hon'ble President of India

**Vice-Patron**

General V P Malik, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Chief of the Army Staff

Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff

Air Chief Marshal S K Sareen, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff and  
Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee

**President - USI Council**

Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar, UYSM, AVSM, NM, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

**Vice Presidents**

Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM, Vice Chief of the Army Staff

Air Marshal A Y Tipnis, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, Vice Chief of the Air Staff

**Ex-Officio Members**

Shri Ajit Kumar, Secretary, Ministry of Defence

Maj Gen R P R C Naidu, AVSM, VSM, Officiating Director General Military Training

Air Vice-Marshal A Vikram Pethia, VrC, Director Training, Air HQ

Commodore A S Bajwa, Director Naval Training

**Elected Members of the Council**

Lt Gen Z C Bakshi, PVSM, MVC, VrC, VSM (Retd)

Lt Gen K Balaram, PVSM (Retd)

Lt Gen K P Candeth, PVSM (Retd)

Vice Adm S C Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)

Shri J N Dixit, IFS (Retd)

Brig N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)

General O P Malhotra, PVSM (Retd)

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

Maj Gen D K Palit, VrC (Retd)

Air Marshal P M Ramachandran, PVSM, AVSM, SC, VM (Retd)

General S F Rodrigues, PVSM, VSM (Retd)

General V N Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Admiral R H Tahiliani, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

**Executive Committee**

Maj Gen R P R C Naidu, AVSM, VSM, Officiating Director General Military Training

Air Vice-Marshal A Vikram Pethia, VrC, Director Training, Air HQ

Commodore A S Bajwa, Director Naval Training

Lt Gen Z C Bakshi, PVSM, MVC, VrC, VSM (Retd)

Vice Admiral S C Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)

Shri J N Dixit, IFS (Retd)

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

Maj Gen D K Palit, VrC (Retd)

**Director**

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar

PVSM, AVSM, VrC. (Retd)

**Dy Director & Editor**

Maj Gen Y K Gera (Retd)



# CONTENTS

July-September 1997

Editorial.....	297
<b>Revolution in Military Affairs</b>	
Major General Dipankar Banerjee, AVSM (Retd).....	299
<b>Persian Gulf - Politics and Security</b>	
Alireza Sheikh Attar.....	309
<b>Security of Asia - Pacific Region and Japanese Defence Policy</b>	
Katsuhito Asano.....	322
<b>Restructuring of The Armed Forces</b>	
Maj Gen Vinod Saighal (Retd).....	330
<b>Jammu and Kashmir Problem : The Truth, Part-II</b>	
Lt General Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC, DL	
Lt General M L Chibber, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).....	346
<b>Proliferation in India - Arms and the Man</b>	
Lt Ashish Khurana.....	369
<b>Central Asia - A Historical Perspective, Part-I</b>	
Lt Gen E A Vas (Retd).....	383
<b>China's Armed Forces Role in Trade and Commerce</b>	
B Raman.....	389
<b>I Participated in the Independence Day Celebrations on 15 August 1947</b>	
Maj Gen B D Kapur (Retd).....	396
<b>USI Rolls - Life Members Prior to Independence Day 15 August 1947.....</b>	403
<b>VIEWPOINT</b>	
<b>Siachin Glacier</b>	
Tahir Jehangir.....	411
<b>LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.....</b>	415
<b>REVIEW ARTICLES</b>	
<b>Battle for a Mountain Pass</b>	
Lt Gen V R Raghavan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd).....	423
<b>His Father's Son : The Life of Randolph Churchill</b>	
Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd).....	427
<b>SHORT REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS.....</b>	429
<b>Additions to the USI Library.....</b>	438

## NOTE

The views expressed in the Journal are not official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.



**The United Service Institution of India  
Centre for Research  
Board of Management**

Vice Admiral SP Govil, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	<i>Chairman</i>
Shri J N Dixit, IFS (Retd)	<i>Member</i>
Air Marshal C V Gole, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)	"
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd) Director, IDSA	"
Maj Gen RPRC Naidu, AVSM, VSM Offg DGMT Army HQ Chairman JTC	"
Professor Ravinder Kumar, Director, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library	"
Dr K Santhanam, Chief Adviser (Technologies) DRDO, MOD	"
General V N Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	"
Professor M L Sondhi, IFS (Retd) Jawaharlal Nehru University	"
Mr K Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd)	"
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, Vr.C. (Retd) Director, USI	<i>Member Secretary</i>

**USI STAFF APPOINTMENTS**

*Director and Secretary to the  
Council*

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, Vr.C. (Retd)

<i>Dy Director &amp; Editor</i>	<i>Dy Director (Adm)</i>	<i>Chief Instructor</i>
Maj. Gen. Y K Gera (Retd)	Col V K Singh, VSM (Retd)	Brig Y P Dev (Retd)
<i>Asst Director (P&amp;P)</i>		<i>D S Coord</i>
Cdr. P S Dhupia		Col H K S Rawat
<i>Librarian</i>	<i>Sr. Accountant</i>	
Mr O S Sachdeva	Mr R C Mittal	
<i>Research Assistant</i>	<i>Care Taker</i>	
Dr. Sudha Raman, Ph D	Mr H M Robertson	
	<i>Honorary Consulting Editor</i>	
	Air Cmde Dr. N B Singh, Ph D. (Retd)	



## EDITORIAL

India celebrated the Fiftieth anniversary of Independence on 15 Aug 1997. Some outsiders look towards India as a vibrant democracy, which has matured during the last fifty years. India needs to review the hitherto step-by-step policy of dealing with national security concerns as they occur, based on a decision making process, to secure its future through the creation of systems that blend with contemporaneous pressures to meet short, mid and long term threats through a coherent and flexible national security strategy.

Since the Gulf War of 1991, there has been a debate on what a Russian General has described as the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). This refers to how ways of conducting a war are undergoing a revolutionary change due to the advances in science and technology, particularly the information technology. Decisive turns in future wars may come about even before the first shot is fired. This aspect has been covered in the lead article in this issue titled 'Revolution in Military Affairs' by Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee. According to the author, there have been equally significant revolutions in acquisition and processing of intelligence and in economic affairs. The revolution in intelligence craft has enabled agencies to even manipulate computers and information systems without resorting to traditional cloak and dagger methods.

The centre of gravity of military flash points has shifted from Europe to the Persian Gulf and the Asia Pacific Basin. An article on 'Persian Gulf Politics and Security' by His Excellency Alireza Sheikh Attar, Ambassador of Islamic Republic of Iran to India has been included, in this issue. According to the author, western powers having vested interests in supply of oil at cheap rates, are causing tension in the Region and that the security can only be ensured by cooperation amongst the regional countries. 'Security of Asia-Pacific Region and Japanese Defence Policy' is the topic covered by His Excellency Katsuhito Asano, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Japan Defence Agency. Instability and uncertainty continues in the Asia-Pacific region. The author has stressed the need for continued US presence in the Region. He has highlighted the steps being taken to work for a stable and peaceful Asia Pacific Region.

An article by Maj Gen Vinod Saighal on 'Restructuring of the Armed Forces' appears in the Journal. The author has suggested that India needs to pay more attention to military operations in the



mountains and in the Indian Ocean. Highlights of restructuring suggested by the author are as under :

- (a) Restructuring of the Ministry of Defence to facilitate timely decision making.
- (b) Re-designation of Eastern Naval Command as 'Bay of Bengal Maritime Command' with tri-Service resources.
- (c) Raising of Integrated tri-Service Missile Command.
- (d) Establishment of Integrated Nuclear Command.

India and Pakistan have serious differences on the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. The two countries are locked in an automatic spiral of action and reaction. Pakistan is actively supporting terrorism in J&K through covert means. This has been going on for sometime. The article 'Jammu and Kashmir Problem - The Truth Part II' by Lt Gen Sir James Wilson and Lt Gen ML Chibber has nuggets of the 'Truth' to the problem. It is based on the memoirs of Lt Gen Sir James Wilson who was the Military Assistant to Gen Douglas Gracey, the Pakistan Army Chief in 1948-49.

Lt Gen EA Vas in Part I of his article on 'Central Asia' presents the historical perspective starting from the pre-Islamic background, through Islamic surge to the Sunni-Shia divide. The translation of the Sunni Shia cleavage into geographical terms indicates that Shiaism occupies the territory of Iran with outposts in Iraq and India. The Iranian wedge splits the Sunnis into two groups. Towards East are the Sunnis of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Towards West are the Sunnis of Turkey, Arabia, Syria, Egypt and North Africa. 'Strategic Appraisal' of the Central Asian countries is proposed to be covered in the next issue of the Journal.

Going through the membership list of the USI has enabled us to focus on our distinguished members who were on our rolls prior to Independence Day, five decades back. A short write-up together with a photograph of each of the members appears in this journal.

In this issue, there are a number of other articles connected with defence matters and national security, which make interesting reading.



## Revolution in Military Affairs

MAJOR GENERAL DIPANKAR BANERJEE, AVSM (RETD)

### BACKDROP

**T**he *Economist* of London carried an interesting though provocative cover article in its issue of 8 Mar 1997; titled "Select Enemy. Delete", it provided a glimpse of the revolutionary changes taking place in warfare today. It cited examples from the dramatic changes in information technology to show how a nation today can be destroyed by a wide array of modern and complex weapon systems. It went on to describe not merely the near surgical ability and discriminatory nature of destruction of a new generation of weapons, but a range of other capabilities as well that have the potential to revolutionize the conduct of war. This concept also goes beyond mere destruction. For, since the emergence of fission and fusion of the atom, destructive power in the hands of humankind really knows no bounds. What the world is witnessing today is the potential of an entire gamut of emerging technologies to "win a war". This promises once again to alter the course of history.

Experience from the past tells us that it is not technology alone that changes warfare. Inventions do lead to new weapons or better and more efficient ways to wage war. But, by themselves, they are not enough to achieve victory. Weapons have to be adapted to military use through imagination and innovation. The hardware of weapons have to be combined with the software of doctrine to evolve a new and more effective system for the conduct of war. Fundamental changes are introduced mainly by this software dimension. Stirrups in horses permitted the Mongols to dramatically enhance mobility. But it had to be combined with an effective logistic system in support of the mounted Army and decentralized command in the hands of trusted leaders, before it could provide that element of revolutionary change that allowed

---

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee is Co-director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997.



them to overrun the world. Tanks, wireless and dive bombers were the new inventions of the early Twentieth Century. But these were invented by countries other than Germany. Only when these were integrated by General Heinz Guderian of the German General Staff in the overall doctrine of 'blitzkrieg', that it proved a winning combination which conquered Europe in the Second World War. A revolution in warfare then is more fundamental. It is a non-linear change in the conduct of war. We are indeed now in the early stages of such a process. A process that is likely to take at least thirty years of fruition. Yet, which will affect the world substantially in the interim.

#### THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

This aspect of revolutionary change was noted first by the Soviet General Staff when a variety of new generation weapons entered combat service in the USA in the 1980's. They realised that a qualitative change was coming about in the way wars would be fought in the future. Soviet Generals appreciated that for the first time in history, it allowed military-political as well as military-strategic goals to be achieved **at the beginning of a war**. The tactical and operational phases, which were till now the necessary preludes to the strategic *coup-de-main*, could now be dispensed with. These developments were sufficient to alarm the Soviet General Staff and led to its Chief, General Ogarkov in 1984, to define the phenomenon as a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). The terminology has stuck, though it has now been adopted by the USA and is currently associated with the US Armed Forces' emerging doctrine for the conduct of future war. It has been a major project study in the US Department of Defence for several years.

Ogarkov's analysis reflected, in particular, Soviet anxieties in countering the potential of these new generation of accurate, pre-targeted cruise missiles of the US. Their potential was displayed in the Gulf War of 1990-91. It was then a demonstration of possibilities. Today, there is a move to include a wider range of technologies and actualise their full potential through operationalising them within a doctrinal framework. But already



these changes are challenging the way we think about conflict and affecting national security more fundamentally than ever before. Let us make no mistakes, the consequences of the RMA will shake many of our ideas of war by their very foundation. It will change not merely war fighting, but international alliances, security relationships and global power balance, among others.

#### EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Three types of technologies in particular will have a major bearing on the evolution of the RMA. First, in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR technologies). These permit a full situation awareness of the battlefield. Today the potential is of an area 200 kilometres square. Future capabilities are likely to be much greater and include a wider degree of real time transparency. Second, are C<sup>4</sup>I technologies including Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Intelligence. They will enable continuous intelligence acquisition, immediate command decisions, instantaneous response at a high political level and finally real time engagement of targets. Third, are Precision Force Technologies, which allow pin point destruction of targets from long distances. It is not merely that a tank can be hit, but it is possible to determine whether to do that to its front or rear portion. Other technologies too will impact on the future battlefield. Potential areas are in micro-chip developments, speed of light weapon technology, bio-technology and micro-miniaturisation.

An immediate impact of the first two technologies is the potential it has to develop, what has been termed as a "system of systems". This has been described by Admiral William Owens, originator of the RMA doctrine in the US, as providing "*Dominant Battlefield Knowledge*" (DBK) of any future theatre of war. When fully implemented, this can make a battlefield totally transparent. A capability that alone may provide the degree of asymmetry in military capability as to be a battle winning factor. Just as air superiority was a pre-requisite for success in battle in the Second World War, DBK will acquire a similar importance in the future battlefield.



A particular characteristic of the technologies described above is that they are available not on the drawing boards of defence laboratories but are already in use or planned for civil applications. The armed forces today no longer have to request scientists to develop a specific technology for possible military use. Quite likely it will be the scientists who would be chasing military planners prodding them to use technologies that are already available. Technologies that can now be converted to weapons much quicker than before through computer simulation cutting development and production cycles dramatically.

Another difference in future will be in the area of weapon production. The enormous cost of each individual system will make it difficult even for the more prosperous nations to acquire advanced systems in what might be considered as adequate numbers. The trend then may be to develop prototypes, of major systems and then explore a variety of technological options without an early commitment to large scale production. This will in turn allow greater flexibility to exploit technology that will constantly provide alternatives and upgradations. Without a heavy commitment to a particular system, other options can then be pursued more or less continuously. But, to implement this option will need innovative means of production to permit a surge capability at the time of actual conflict. Greater dependence on civil production facilities will call for carefully dovetailing their capabilities to national requirements during an impending conflict. This is a variation of another practice already in vogue, called sometimes as "just in time" (JIT) logistics. This was first pioneered in car factories in Japan, where components were delivered to the assembly lines directly by the supplier, thus doing away with the need to maintain large stocks at the plant. Not only will this be adopted in military logistics, it may well be extended to the concept of "just in time" technology. Technological changes taking place in a laboratory can be used to upgrade a crucial component at the time of its production to qualitatively improve a system.

#### IMPACT ON WEAPONS AND ORGANISATIONS

How would these technological developments affect major



weapon systems? It is likely that in future any military equipment that presents a signature will be engaged and destroyed by 'over the hill' observation and remote or space based strike systems. The main battle tank and artillery, especially its non-self propelled variety, will become vulnerable not merely to the JSTARS systems of today but also to a wide variety of unmanned air vehicles of tomorrow. The same will apply to major equipment of the Navy and the Air Force. Survivability in the future battlefield will be the single crucial design parameter of weapon systems.

In turn these developments will have a major impact on the organisation and equipment of the services. The ground forces are likely to be organised into smaller units of all arms. Divisions and brigades are likely to become redundant. A single composite unit will incorporate a wide range of capabilities. The combat soldier too will have to be a master of a number of trades. His principal weapon will combine anti-personnel, anti-tank and anti-air kill potential with minimum modifications. Tanks will find it difficult to survive in future battlefield. Or, will need such additionalities for survival as to become cost prohibitive. Mobility will be provided by fast moving lightly armoured ground systems and through air. Instead of holding ground, the emphasis will be on its denial.

The naval surface combatant will be particularly vulnerable in the future. The days of the aircraft carrier are almost over, even in large navies. The 'arsenal ship' concept may be an idea whose time has come. This is under serious examination in the US, though its acceptance is far from certain. Such a ship would be big, but with a small crew, and is likely to be able to launch a very large number and variety of missiles from fixed launch sites in an automatic mode. It will have the twin advantage of not being as vulnerable as a large aircraft carrier because it will have fewer sailors as hostage, yet, possess a significant strike capability. Still, the concept will need experimentation before it is accepted, for it too will be vulnerable. The trend in naval combatants may well be towards sub-surface ships equipped with long range tactical ballistic and a variety of cruise missiles providing it with long range strike capability from comparative safety.



Space will increasingly be combined with air to constitute aerospace warfare. Number of aircraft in an Air Force will reduce substantially in the future as a consequence of their enormous sophistication and increasing costs. Quantity will be replaced by high performance aircraft of much greater survivability incorporating stealth characteristics and combining the capability to execute a number of missions in a single plane. Even then the availability of these aircraft will be restricted to a few advanced countries because of their high costs. Others are likely to adopt tactical ballistic and cruise missiles for their air strike requirements. These will incorporate a variety of warheads with much greater lethality than at present. Advanced version of the M-9 and M-11 missiles of China may be an option for many countries. These should be capable of operating from hardened sites, exposing themselves for fleeting moments at the time of engagement. Another option may be a modern and longer range version of the old and cheap German V1 and V2 rockets that can be produced in large numbers. The main factor will be one of cost. Missile costs too are skyrocketing and may be beyond the capability of many countries to afford. In the air, a version of the 'air arsenal plane' operating at a very high altitude and with integral missile defence capability and hence less vulnerable, may emerge as an option.

#### IMPACT ON OPERATIONS AND DOCTRINES

More relevant is the question, as to how these new technologies at the end of the Twentieth Century and beyond might be harnessed to military use? No verdict is likely to be available soon. Enormous operational research as well as conceptual thinking will be necessary to develop strategic and operational doctrines to make use of their full potential. It will evolve depending on national strategic priorities and resource availability. The argument in the USA presently is over two options. One, of retaining a force structure adequate to win two simultaneous wars. The other, is to use its current 10 to 15 years lead over the world in military technology and capability to make a major shift in restructuring of forces and missions to prepare for the RMA. The Quadrennial Defence Review, finalised early this year examined the



force requirements for the first approach. There is concern that adopting the first option will not allow sufficient funds to be spared for work on the RMA. It is likely that a median approach may be adopted. The RMA will be funded but not at the cost of current strategic requirements. This will delay the RMA to a period of 30 years or so and permit the world to at least adapt to these changes, if not to match the capabilities.

A doctrinal framework is necessary to provide the rationale to weapon development. Two ideas are being floated which have the possibility of operationalisation in the next twenty or thirty years. A leading US strategic thinker has termed these as "**Pop up Warfare**" and "**Fire-Ant Warfare**".

Already precision guided munitions can destroy whatever can be detected. In future, in **Pop up Warfare**, this will be done in spite of decoys and opposing counter measures and with greater speed and they will leave behind no signature. The weapons in this type of warfare will be drones, missiles with a capability to loiter, unmanned land vehicles and small submersibles. Hardy weapon systems of today, such as tanks, manned aircraft, surface ships and submarines, already so vulnerable, will find it almost impossible to survive in the future battlefield. Their fate will be similar to that of the aircraft carriers *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* at the beginning of the Second World War, in Asia.

Another innovation in combat may be termed **Fire Ant Warfare**. A battle that will be conducted by millions of tiny sensors, emitters, microbots and mini projectiles. All possessing the characteristics of a fire ant; small, fiercely stinging and omnivorous. These will carry out a wide variety of tasks. From accurately identifying targets to destroying them through hyper kinetic weapon systems using tiny ordnance traveling at Mach 10 or more speed. Increasingly these weapon systems will be based and/or controlled from space. At sea, the next generation weapon may be a linear descendant of the sonobuoy. A small system, that can be deployed in the oceans in hundreds of thousands, activated at will and then used for locating, chasing and then destroying all types of surface and sub-surface naval combatants. Individual signatures of such platforms in the world would have been



collected and stored during peace time, enabling their separate targeting at the time of conflict.

#### IMPACT ON GLOBAL GEO-POLITICS

While some of these technological capabilities may be available with a few developed countries, it is only the USA which is likely to have a combination of most. Its lead over the rest of the world is presently about 10 to 15 years. It is also in the forefront of development, both of technology and doctrine. No other country is even getting ready to challenge it. What then will be the implications of this Revolution? The *Economist* article quotes Admiral Owens, Project Director of RMA in the US as saying that, "We'll be in a far better position to shape the world than react to it than at any time since World War II". In short it will provide the USA a military dominance that will be near hegemonic and which will continue for sometime in the future. What will be its major impact on international security relations? How will it affect military doctrines? Finally, what are the major options for India?

The US position as the sole superpower will continue. This is a reality that is accepted by the world and to which most nations are adjusting their policies. Russian agreement to NATO expansion was an acceptance both of its own impotence and US supremacy at this stage. Europe is determined to keep the US engaged in the continent and ensuring that their emerging security and political structures allow for this. East Asia's greatest fear is US withdrawal from Asia, even though there may be a reluctance to accept American forces on individual country's soil. China accepts US dominance in the world and bides its time till it can seriously challenge it sometime in the future. For the present it accepts US pre-eminence, howsoever reluctantly. At a time when the US lead, both in politics and economics, is diminishing and will continue to do so in the years ahead, its relative military capability will get stronger as the years pass. But the US cannot even attempt to manage global security on its own. It will need allies and partners to do this. But there will be hardly any international security issue in the near future where US role will not be the most significant.



How will the world cope? Major countries will attempt to find ways of challenging the US, through developing alliance and co-operating mechanisms. Sino-Russian collaboration in defence areas and their attempt at a "strategic partnership" is one such. Europe will over time attempt to develop independent foreign and security policies. Smaller countries will attempt to strengthen regional resilience. The ASEAN enlargement to a group of ten is an attempt precisely at this. Others, particularly the Islamic world, may seek answers in acquiring a deterrence capability based on weapons of mass destruction. Chemical and biological weapons in particular provide an attractive option. Though the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into force on 29 April 1997, there are a number of hold out states. Weapons of mass destruction continue to provide deterrence options that are both credible and cheap. This is a major factor why the USA will continue to push for the elimination of all such weapons in the future.

At the same time paradoxically, the role of nuclear weapons will reduce dramatically, as it already has done. It is no longer a credible weapon for any purpose, even for strategic deterrence. Its survivability will be under increasing pressure especially from new anti-ballistic missile defence systems. The costs will remain very high, not merely in terms of money, but opportunity and other indirect costs. Finally, its deterrence role can be replicated by more effective conventional systems.

Impact of the RMA will be felt by armed forces of the world, immediately. Even as General Staffs deliberate on their weapon systems today, they have to plan for their effectiveness 30 to 50 years hence. Yet, the future is unpredictable and capable of changing dramatically within that time-frame. Not merely geo-strategically but also in military technology. This will challenge the ingenuity of the General Staff to plan for future defence capabilities based on today's requirements. Predicting the future of warfare and adjusting to the changing requirements will thus remain a continuous challenge.

How should India cope? Some very serious policy options face the nation today. If India has to develop a major regional



influence, it needs to have a modern military capability, not far behind its economic and diplomatic strengths. A close look then has to be taken at military modernisation, even as the armed forces face pressing immediate problems internally. The possibility of attempting this autonomously does not arise. Beyond a stage a go-it-alone approach will just not be adequate. Who might emerge as India's strategic partner? A major policy analysis is necessary at this stage. Would it be Russia as it has been for decades in the past? It is a whole new world today where this relationship has no strategic relevance any more. Russia is no longer a power and it will take several decades for it to rise to international relevance. Yet, it is a major challenge to the intelligentsia in the country to give up the Russian option. Would China fill this role? Beyond a point 'friendship' cannot be changed to strategic alliance. Yet, perhaps this needs to be examined as well, with South East Asia? There will emerge areas of co-operation with the region and these need to be pursued, but anything beyond a shared strategic view is unlikely to materialise. Finally, the distant neighbour, the USA itself. Do our shared democracies, values of pluralism and economic cooperation have any meaning at all? Are the points of differences permanent and irreconcilable? What is the level of strategic cooperation that might be feasible? This is a major issue for all to ponder.

There is one reality that we need to face now. Warfare is indeed undergoing a process of revolutionary change. Even as we plan and prepare for it, we must at the same time evolve mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflict. This will call for bold new measures. The challenge to military strategists must then also be to evolve new thinking in this area in pace with developments in military war fighting capabilities.



## Persian Gulf - Politics and Security

ALIREZA SHEIKH ATTAR

### BRIEF HISTORY

**T**he region of the Persian Gulf has been important since the very beginning of the human civilisation. In ancient times, the Persian Gulf was the birth place of the Sumerian civilisation and has acted as a bridge for interaction among Indian, Egyptian, Iranian and Babylonian civilisations. The Islamic civilisation flourished in the region surrounding it. This was the first region where the Europeans arrived. It was approximately two centuries ago when the European colonialism spread in Asia, particularly after the British influence started increasing in the Indian sub-continent, that the attention of the English got drawn towards the Persian Gulf region as a strategic point and security corridor for India. The British gradually brought the whole region on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf under their influence. They annexed Bahrain and Islands of Abu Musa, the Lesser Tunb and the Greater Tunb at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. Iran did not recognise this officially. After the discovery of oil in Iran in the year 1905 and, later, in other places of this region, the strategic importance of this area increased. The western countries desperately needed oil and this region became a centre of their attention. During 1960s, the British who were the rulers of the region, due to economic considerations started planning for retreat. Kuwait was first to become independent. A decade or so later, Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar became independent. Eight Muslim countries having diversity, disparity and heterogeneity surround this water body. Seven countries, excluding Iran, are Arab but the population of 60 million of a non-Arab country - Iran, is 1.5 times more than the total combined population of all the seven Arab countries. Iran with a 750 miles long coast enjoys the largest presence in the Persian Gulf. The length of the coast of the UAE

---

Excerpted from a talk given by His Excellency Alireza Sheikh Attar, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to India at the USI New Delhi on January 20, 1997.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997.



is 400 miles, Saudi Arabia 300 miles, Qatar 200 miles, Kuwait 150 miles, Bahrain 90 miles and Oman 70 miles. Iraq with only 2 miles has got the shortest coast in the region.

#### SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

The countries surrounding the Persian Gulf have different systems of government. Except for Iran and Iraq, the six other countries are governed by the traditional monarchical system. While Iran can boast of a democratic system, Iraq has chosen for itself a system of one party rule which came into power through a coup de'etat. Kuwait has a parliament with limited powers. Bahrain, according to its Constitution, has got a parliament which was suspended 25 years ago by the orders of the king.

#### ECONOMY

Discovery of oil in the Twentieth Century and its large scale production brought a turning point in the development of this region. This region contains two-third of world oil and one third of global gas resources. The oil resources of the Persian Gulf region are expected to last from thirty to hundred years and can be exploited with minimum investment. Various studies have shown that for atleast next thirty years, from the point of view of price and availability, no other source of energy can compete with oil and gas. Therefore, the Persian Gulf region in the near future shall be the principal centre for supply of energy to the world. Today America receives 23 per cent, Europe receives 50 per cent and Japan receives 98 per cent of their oil imports from the Persian Gulf. For the industrial powers of the world, especially the USA, the Persian Gulf region has become an important factor in their economic life. They want to ensure secure, unhindered and continuous supply of oil at rates acceptable to them so that they are able to derive huge profits.

Though oil is the main source of income of all these countries, Iran has got other dependable sources like agriculture and industry. The condition of agriculture in Iraq is better than all other countries. Saudi Arabia has invested in petrochemical sector and



some other industries and is trying to diversify its sources of income. All other countries are mostly dependent upon oil and to some extent on trade.

As far as the per capita income is concerned, Qatar with a population of half a million enjoys a per capita income of 18 thousand dollars while the UAE with a population of 1.6 million and Kuwait with a population of 2 million have got 15 thousand dollars and 14 thousand dollars respectively. Saudi Arabia with 15 million population has got seven thousand dollars, Bahrain with half a million population has five thousand dollars. Iran with a population of 60 million and Iraq with a population of 19 million have a per capita income of less than 2500 dollars. Saudi Arabia produces eight to 10 million barrels per day (MBPD) and is the largest producer of oil. Iran with three and a half to four MBPD ranks second. The UAE produces two to two and a half MBPD and oil production in Kuwait is around two MBPD while other countries of the Persian Gulf produce less than half MBPD.

#### POLITICAL SITUATION

It was because of the hurry of the British to withdraw from the region that on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf a geographical identity was imposed. In the tribal relations of the past in the Persian Gulf, the meaning of border was not specified. Because of the continuous wandering of the Arab tribes and the presence of hot deserts, the borders shown on Atlas are meaningless lines. Country boundaries were identified through border areas and not by border lines. Moreover, the control of a government over a particular area was directly related to the increase or decrease in its power. After the discovery of oil, border problems got extended from land to the sea as well, because the oil resources were to be divided among different countries. It was a new phenomenon and almost all countries of the region were lacking in experience in this aspect. From the beginning of the Twentieth Century till recent years, about 60 border conflicts have taken place among countries of the region. Most important of these conflicts were the Iran-Iraq War and the aggression by Iraq against Kuwait.



Presently, there are 50 border disputes between countries of the Persian Gulf region. Delimitation process of two out of ten land borders and ten out of 15 sea borders has still not been completed. Four land borders have not yet been demarcated. Seven out of eight sea borders between Arab countries of the Persian Gulf are disputed. Most of the borders between Arab countries of the Persian Gulf are disputed. Most of the border disputes are among the Arab countries and most of the final border agreements signed are between Iran and the Arab countries.

#### STRATEGY OF WESTERN NATIONS

The first ever security structure in the Persian Gulf was designed by the USA and the British on the basis of Nixon Doctrine. This policy was intended to secure the passage of oil and continuous supply of energy to the West. It relied on help from Iran, Saudi Arabia and the logistical support of the USA. No attention, whatsoever, was given to the cultural, geographical and historical events of the region.

The experience concerning fluctuations in the price and production of oil has shown that real purpose of the security in the region was to safeguard the interests of the USA and her western allies. The economic interests of the Gulf countries were ignored. Contrary to the market rules, the consumers i.e. the western industrialised countries by using their power and influence used to decide the price of oil and share of profit for the producers.

Prior to Islamic revolution in Iran, the Shah of Iran played a pivotal role. He was arrogant in his behavior towards the regional chiefs and played the role of a big brother in safeguarding the interest of western countries.

#### SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE RECENT PAST

During the last 18 years in this region two significant events, namely the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Persian Gulf War, have taken place, which have caused concern for world powers, especially the United States of America. They, therefore, want to



increase their influence and think that American domination over this region is necessary.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, many a relationships were shattered. Because in Iran, the government of the Shah that ensured the interests and wishes of the Americans was toppled and a government not under the influence of USA was formed on the basis of the ideology of Islam which opposes every kind of domination. It was quite clear to the Americans that the Islamic Republic of Iran because of its dependence upon the oil income, never intended to stop flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

From the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, leaders and people of Iran had shown their lack of inclination towards slogans of the communist party of Iran. The Soviet aggression against Afghanistan took place a few months after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The position which the Islamic Republic took against the Soviet Union and the support it provided to the Afghan Mujahideen had shown that Iran shall not permit the presence of the Soviet Union in Persian Gulf. Moreover, no country of this region, except Iraq with limited access to the Persian Gulf, was ready to cooperate in the continuation of Soviet presence.

The real anxiety of America after the establishment of value based system which opposed domination of every kind was not related to the supply of oil but was concerned with imposition of its domineering system. America was particularly interested in ensuring expansionist interests of Israel and wanted to design new plans for the Middle East. America was concerned that all people of the region were Muslims and contrary to some other Islamic countries, had strong belief in the Islamic values. Because of their age old relations, they also had been under the influence of Iranian culture.

In the wake of the failure of USA in defending the Shah regime and after the support of that country to the Shah's crimes became public, the American policy planners realised that their



policies had become so infamous among the people of the region that it was no longer possible to defend them. Therefore, instead of defending their policies directly, they decided to show a dangerous picture of the Islamic Republic through the mass media. Iran was shown as a danger for the regional security and a threat for the secure and continuous flow of world energy resources. In this way America got many allies from the region to fight Iran.

#### THE US APPROACH TO HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF REGION AND THEIR MOTIVES

**Iran-Iraq War (1980-88).** A number of American researchers and politicians have revealed that the USA incited Saddam Hussain of Iraq – who was sore about border dispute with Iran over Arvand river and the signing of the 1975 accord – to attack Iran in 1980. He was assured of defeat of the Iranian government and about occupation of parts of Iran. The war got prolonged and lasted for eight years. It came to an end with the passage of Resolution 598 by the Security Council in 1988. Even during the war, Iran made efforts to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil. Despite the Iranian oil installations and tankers being attacked by Iraq; Iran did not attack the oil installations and tankers of the Arab countries supporting Iraq. Iran also did not close the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, the West could not prove that Iran was a danger for security of the Persian Gulf region. During the period 1986 to 1988; the American ships directly attacked Iranian oil platforms and ships and also shot down a passenger plane of Iran. These cases of attacks against Iran are being heard by the International Court of Justice at Hague. In some cases the USA has been pronounced guilty and that country has paid compensation to Iran.

**Operations in Kuwait (1990).** In several articles and interviews; a number of American analysts and politicians have stated that the Iraqi attack against Kuwait in 1990 took place with the prior knowledge of the American Ambassador in Iraq. It means that America which had very strong ties with Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war, gave Saddam a green signal to attack Kuwait. It appears that the United States was not unhappy with Iraqi aggression against Kuwait; because this could become a good



reason for America to have a strong and continuous presence in the Persian Gulf. The real aim behind the presence of USA in the region is to have an effective presence in the Middle East, to provide security for Israel and to prevent the spread of anti-domination thinking among the Muslim people of the region, which is fast becoming popular.

**US Military Presence.** The Islamic Republic of Iran was following the events of the region minutely. Simultaneously with its long and heroic war against Iraq and also after expelling Iraq from its territory, Iran launched its diplomatic efforts through the UN. With the passage of Resolution 598 by the Security Council and ceasefire in the year 1988, Iran caught both America and Iraq unawares. Later, in the year 1989, President Rafsanjani proposed the establishment of a new security structure with participation of all countries of the region and in a way torpedoed the American design, which once again became unsuccessful. America, therefore, decided that instead of the pretext of Iran, it should create another more plausible reason for continuing its presence in the region. The actions which USA took and the consequences of the Gulf War are enough evidence to prove this theory. It can be said that USA, by creating an imposed insecurity in the region and by making extensive propaganda in this regard, was successful in getting a foothold in several regional countries and by benefiting from their economic support could also do away with many political and economic problems which during past few years had created hurdles in the way of its presence in the region. America, thus, was successful in taking the political and military control of the region in its own hands.

**The US Support for Israel.** The real aim behind the presence of the USA in the region is to provide security for Israel and to prevent the spread of anti-domination thinking among the Muslim people of the region. The people of the Middle East define Israel, which came into being through the Balfour Declaration and the support of the West, as a tool for exerting pressure over Muslim people of that region. And as Jalal Ale Ahmed, a well known writer of Iran, once said, Israel is like a dagger in the heart of the world of Islam. The USA which is the real supporter of Israel and Britain, which is its creator, are aware of the unhappiness and



sensitivity of the Muslim people of the Middle East, about Israel. The Muslim people by having huge resources of energy and wealth of the Persian Gulf in their hands can create real problems for Israel. Therefore, control over the Persian Gulf region with a view to ensure the security of Israel is vital for the USA.

#### THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR USA

The direct presence of the USA in the Persian Gulf which aims to ensure continuous and secure supply of oil is a pretext and its real purpose is to control not only the price of this vital commodity but also the wealth of the Muslim countries of the Persian Gulf region. A large part of the cost of this presence is paid by the oil producing countries of the region and, one fourth of the income of the Arab countries of this region is spent on purchase and storage of weapons. Most of the profit of these deals go to the USA and Britain and to some extent France, as they are the largest sellers of weapons in the region.

#### DIFFICULTIES AND CONTRADICTIONS FOR USA

**Incompatibility of Political and Economic Development.** Lack of progress in political fields in the Arab countries and its incompatibility with big strides in economic field is a big paradox for America. During the last two decades or so, economic progress in this region took place with abundance of petro dollars and massive imports. In these societies a middle class has come up which has been educated in the Western Universities or in countries ruled according to the western system. This section of the society is not ready to accept the prevailing traditional system of the government in these countries. This has given rise to a contradictory situation.

**Contradiction of Western Approach to Human Rights and Democracy.** The presence of the USA in the Persian Gulf is accompanied by its unconditional support to the regional countries which have no tradition of western type of democracy and of human rights. This has posed several questions. These unanswered questions can result in a social and political crisis in the near future. The Arab countries are not ready to change their



traditional attitudes. They think that these attitudes are more compatible with their culture as compared to the democracy and the concept of human rights advocated by the USA.

**The Economic Strains of Operations.** The countries of the region, thanks to petro-dollars, launched various free welfare programmes and made their people habitual of not paying taxes. The costs of the Gulf War and extensive American presence, have brought the budgets of these countries under strain. Welfare services are on the decline and taxes are being imposed. During the last few years, oil prices were kept artificially low. Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult for these governments to undertake development work. For example the price of one barrel of oil is equal to one fifth barrel of water in the region.

**Cultural Disparity.** The people of these countries, inspite of Western consumer goods, are sensitive about their cultural and Islamic values. The ill effects of American culture are being felt in these societies. For example, in Bahrain people vehemently objected to the presence of semi-nude American women stationed in American military bases who participated in cycle races.

#### ALLEGATIONS AND RESPONSE

To justify their presence in the area, the USA has manipulated the media and other means at her disposal to convince the regional countries that they face great danger from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Allegations such as fundamentalism, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, expansionism and so on have been made.

a) **Fundamentalism.** The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its dealings with the regional countries, has patiently tried to remove their misgivings. A recent example of the allegations made against Iran are related to Bahrain. Despite initial strong reaction from Bahrain, it has become clear that the cause of trouble in that country had its root in the behaviour of the government with the people and the disrespect shown to the local traditions. The unhappiness of the Bahraini people, the



majority of whom subscribe to the Shia faith, has had nothing to do with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recently, with the mediation of Syria, both countries have stopped propaganda against each other and the relations are gradually becoming normal. In Saudi Arabia also, problems are being created by groups like Salaphis which are opposed to the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Shiism. As per the western news reports, Bin Laden has joined Talibans, which reinforces our view.

b) **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Claims regarding amassing of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction by Iran and its so called non-peaceful nuclear programme are also baseless. By analysing the data and reports prepared by international organisations like the SIPRI (Stockholm) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is revealed that Iran has focussed on defensive capability and weapons acquired are lesser than the acquisition by other countries in the region. Similarly the nuclear activities are confined to their use for peaceful purposes. It will thus be seen that the American allegations against Iran are untrue. In the year 1994, the member countries of the GCC spent around \$ 40 billion on purchases of military hardware and allocated 25 percent of their budget for defence. Saudi Arabia allocated 14 per cent of its GNP for defence. Iran allocated only 8 percent of its budget and less than two per cent of its GNP for defence. Saudi Arabia spent \$ 16.5 billion and Kuwait spent about 11 billion dollars for procurement of military hardware. Iran spent less than \$ 1 billion for this purpose.

c) **Terrorism.** Allegation regarding terrorism is also baseless. For example, the propaganda campaign of the USA about Iran's hand in the killings in American military base in Saudi Arabia is false. In fact the Saudi Home Minister, in an interview, clearly stated that the investigations made till date have not been able to discover much. This has prompted the USA to complain about Saudi Arabia not working in coordination with the American propaganda.



d) **Expansionism.** One of the allegations about which extensive propaganda has been made against Iran is related to the territorial expansionism of Iran. It has been claimed that Iran had occupied the three Islands of Abu Musa, the Lesser Tunb and the Greater Tunb in 1971. The point which deserves the attention in this regard is that this is one of the issues of border disputes in the Persian Gulf which had earlier been amicably settled through bilateral agreement. In 1971, simultaneously with the withdrawal of the British forces, a treaty document was prepared between Iran and Sharjah with the cooperation of the British which had made the position of the Islands clear. Another point which deserves even more attention is the fact that the UAE had presented a position paper in the United Nations in which it had stressed the need of minutely following the contents of the documents mentioned above. Yet another important point in this regard is the fact that till after the Persian Gulf War and before the American forces got concentrated in that region, the UAE had never raised this issue with Iran. These islands were taken away from Iran in the beginning of the Twentieth Century by the British. During the seven decades after that Iran repeatedly raised this issue and tried to regain control over them. In the year 1971, through a well defined and comprehensive agreement they were returned to Iran. Now this issue is being raised nearly five years later precisely at a time when USA wants to justify its presence in the Persian Gulf and tries to present Iran as a great danger for the region. In spite of all these nefarious efforts on the part of the USA, Iran and the UAE continue to enjoy normal relations and, with a bilateral trade exchange of more than one and a half billion dollars, are among major business partners of each other.

#### IRANIAN DIPLOMACY

It has become clear to all that it is not possible to segregate the security of the Persian Gulf and to have concern about the security of only some of the countries while making security arrangements. When the question of the security of the Persian



Gulf region is under consideration, all littoral countries, from a country having the largest coast line Iran to the one with the shortest coast line Iraq, should be included in this arrangement. Moreover, this fact also should not be lost sight of that interests of the regional countries are different from interests of countries not belonging to the region. Therefore, the presence of foreign forces cannot solve the difficulties of the region because the foreign powers cannot safeguard the interest of the regional countries. On the contrary, the interests of the foreign countries are safeguarded only by ignoring the interests of the regional countries.

It is clear to the regional countries that maintaining security is not synonymous to paving the way for the cultural or military aggression or political and economic domination by foreigners. We all know that during the last two centuries, this domination created a lot of difficulties for the political and economic development of the region.

#### REAL THREATS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

The real danger for security of the region is from foreign powers, in need of cheap energy for preserving their economic power. They present a wrong picture of the danger and divert the attention of the littoral countries, so as to find a pretext for their presence and domination and to strengthen the security of Israel as their base in the Middle East. They endanger the security of the countries of the region by imposing enmities and creating stockpile of arms.

#### ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN'S VIEWS FOR PRESERVING SECURITY

The way of preserving security of the region is to bring about a real cooperation among regional countries of the Persian Gulf. The first requirement of this cooperation is to build confidence among them. The way to build confidence is to have regular contact and exchange of views. One of the best ways for increasing these contacts is to increase the economic cooperation. The countries of the Persian Gulf, to develop their oil and gas fields,



to ensure their water supply and to increase their volume of trade, need to increase their mutual economic cooperation. The Islamic Republic of Iran being aware of this conspiracy of America and Israel to create misunderstanding among the regional countries, has patiently made extensive efforts to bring about bilateral cooperation with these countries in which it has been successful. Agreement regarding exploitation of common off shore resources of oil and gas with Qatar and the UAE, water supply project from Iran to Qatar, expansion of trade with Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, participation in efforts to extinguish fire in the oil wells of Kuwait in the wake of Iraqi aggression and expansion of air and sea transport, are examples of bilateral economic cooperations of Iran for the creation of an atmosphere of trust in the Persian Gulf. In the political field, Iran has proposed dialogue over the issues which are the cause of misunderstanding like in the case of the three islands. It has also suggested that both restrictions and transparency should be put on stockpiling of weapons in the region.

The relations of Iran with Kuwait, Qatar and Oman are quite good. Many earlier misunderstandings with Saudi Arabia no longer exist, and relations with that country have become normal and are expanding. Iran's ties with the UAE and Bahrain are comparatively normal though there are minor misunderstandings.

We are optimistic about the future. Most of the regional countries have understood that most of the misunderstandings have been baseless and that problems have been imposed from outside to secure the interests of others. For this reason the scope for bilateral cooperation between Iran and countries of the region exists. Possibility of cooperation even with Iraq is there. By taking wise steps and after establishment of confidence, scope for multilateral cooperation, even in the military field, is there; though the USA and Israel would not like such a step and would try to create problems. But the past lessons and bitter experiences of littoral countries can take care of all these problems.



# Security of Asia - Pacific Region and Japanese Defence Policy

KATSUHITO ASANO

## INTRODUCTION

**A**s a part of Japan's efforts for creating a more stable security environment, we are promoting security dialogue and exchanges with counterpart defence authorities. I hope my speech would enhance understanding and strengthen relations with such an important regional player like India.

Today, I am going to touch upon four points. First, constitutional and basic principles governing Japan's defence policy. Second, the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) of 1995 including the security situation of the Asia-Pacific region. Third, the Japan-U.S. alliance. And fourth, Guidelines for Japan-U.S. defence cooperation.

## CONSTITUTIONAL SPIRIT AND BASIC PRINCIPLES

Let me begin with the constitutional principles. Under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, exercising the right of self-defence is authorized only when it is the minimum necessary level for the defence of the nation. Exercising the right of collective self-defence exceeds that minimum limit and is not permitted. This is the reason why under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the United States is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan is not obligated to defend the United States. It is also considered unconstitutional to possess weapons that can inflict annihilative damage upon other countries, such as ICBMs and long-range strategic bombers. Furthermore, the Constitution does not permit sending Japan's forces to foreign territorial land, sea and air-

---

Excerpted from a talk given by His Excellency Katsuhito Asano, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Japan Defence Agency, at the USI New Delhi on July 09, 1997.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No.529, July-September, 1997.



space for the purpose of using force, because it would exceed the minimum limit of self-defense. The Constitution also does not allow conscription and that is why Japan maintains an all voluntary Self-Defence Force (SDF).

As for the basic principles governing Japan's defence policy, we have been shaping a moderate defence capability, by maintaining an exclusively defence-oriented policy and by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to any other country. We have also adhered to the principles of civilian control. The Japan Defence Agency (JDA) is the ministry within the Japanese Government entrusted with this task. Both the Minister of Defence and myself are civilians. We have upheld the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction in Japan. Last but not least, we have firmly maintained the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

#### NATIONAL DEFENCE PROGRAMME OUTLINE AND THE SECURITY SITUATION OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

I would now like to explain in detail the new National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) and the relevant security situation of the Asia-Pacific region. The NDPO is the basic policy guidance in shaping the necessary Japanese defence capability for maintaining peace and security of Japan. The Cabinet adopted the previous NDPO in October 1976.

In 1995, when nearly twenty years had passed since the previous NDPO, Japan conducted a comprehensive review; taking into account the major developments or changes in the security situation of the Asia-Pacific region.

In other words, with the end of the Cold War which led to the demise of the military confrontation between the East and the West, the possibility of an armed conflict on a global scale has become remote in today's world. However, various unresolved territorial issues remain and confrontations rooted in religious or ethnic differences have emerged more prominently. Complicated



and diverse regional conflicts have taken place. Furthermore, new kind of dangers, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been increasing. Thus, unpredictability and uncertainty persist in the world.

In the areas surrounding Japan, there still remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear arsenals. Many countries in the region are expanding or modernising their military capabilities, though there are changes such as the reduction in the force levels of the Russian military in the Far East. In addition, there remain uncertainty and unpredictability such as the continued tension on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, in order to achieve more regional stability, various activities have been conducted including a multilateral regional security dialogue. Furthermore, Japan believes that bilateral alliances with the United States, as well as American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region play a crucial role for regional stability.

In addition to this basic perception of the international situation, the Japanese people have begun to appreciate the important domestic role of the SDF (Self-Defence Force) through its effective rescue operations during the Kobe Earthquake in January 1995. Both the people in Japan and abroad have come to appreciate the SDF's international role through the successful participation in the mine-sweeping operations in the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War, and in UN peace keeping operations (PKOs) such as Cambodia and Mozambique.

Against the above background and after intensive discussions, the Cabinet adopted the new NDPO in November 1995. Here are some of its salient points.

First, the new NDPO reviewed the force levels and decided to make more compact the number of personnel and force structure. At the same time, the necessary functions of the SDF were maintained through qualitative improvements, thereby making possible to cope flexibly with a variety of situations.

Second, the new NDPO, while reaffirming progress of Japan-U.S. defence cooperation, outlined the importance of



specific measures for enhancing the significance and credibility of the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

Third, against the background of higher expectations, both at home and abroad, upon the SDF, the new NDPO listed response to large-scale disasters and various other situations and contributions to the creation of a more stable security environment as roles of the SDF in addition to its national defence role. In this connection, since 1991, the SDF has participated in peace-keeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique and also in the humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda. The SDF is presently in UNDOF on the Golan Heights. Let me especially refer to the very good working relations that the SDF had with the Indian units in Mozambique, and I am very grateful for India's cooperation in UN PKO.

Another facet of contributing to a more stable security environment is the web of various bilateral security dialogues and defence exchanges that Japan has been conducting recently. My own visit to India is a part of these efforts. Korea, China, Russia, ASEAN countries, Australia, Britain, France and Germany are some of the countries with whom we have these bilateral exchanges. With regard to multilateral security dialogues, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) plays a very constructive role in enhancing mutual understanding and confidence in the Asia-Pacific region. Last year, India became a member of the ARF, and we hope your participation leads to a more fruitful security dialogue contributing to the peace and stability in the ARF region. Moreover, the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) itself has taken some initiatives for multilateral security dialogue, such as the Asia-Pacific Security Seminar hosted by the National Institute for Defence Studies since 1994 and the First Forum for Defence Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region hosted by the JDA last year. Of course, we have had representatives to these meetings from India and we look forward to further constructive participation from your country in Japan's multilateral initiatives.

#### JAPAN - U.S. ALLIANCE

Let me next turn to the significance of the Japan-U.S. alli-



ance. Due to our geopolitical vulnerability as well as other factors, Japan finds it both realistic and in its national interest to establish its defence posture by combining the appropriate level of Japanese defence capability with American military capability. It is our firm conviction that the Japan-U.S. security alliance contributes not only to Japan's own security but also to the maintenance of peace and stability in Japan's surrounding region. This alliance has indeed played a crucial role for the stable prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

Around the same time when Japan was revising the NDPO, the Governments of Japan and the United States were conducting intensive studies on how to reaffirm the Japan-U.S. security alliance in the post Cold War period. This study culminated in the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration announced by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton in Tokyo in April 1996.

This Joint Security Declaration confirms that the Japan-U.S. alliance will, in the post-Cold War era, continue to play an important role for the security of Japan and for the peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific region. The Declaration identifies the need to address concretely future Japan-U.S. defence cooperation including the review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation and study of possible bilateral cooperation in situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan.

#### GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENCE COOPERATION

The Defence Guidelines of 1978 were formulated to give guidance on matters of basic importance, such as posture for deterring aggression and actions to be taken in the event of an armed attack against Japan. It also mentioned as an area of Japan-U.S. defence cooperation in situations in the Far East outside of Japan, which would have an important influence on the security of Japan. On the basis of the 1978 Guidelines, our two countries have conducted various studies including those concerning bilateral defence planning.

As a follow up to the Joint Security Declaration, the review



of the 1978 Guidelines started in June 1996. About a month ago, an interim report summarising the progress to date was made public to promote transparency and public policy debate.

Despite the demise of the Cold War, instability and uncertainty continues in the Asia-Pacific region. The maintenance of peace and stability in areas surrounding Japan has gained greater importance for the security of Japan. With this in mind, let me emphasise that the new Guidelines will be decided in accordance with the following basic premises and principles.

First, the rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.

Second, Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitation of its Constitution and in accordance with basic positions such as our exclusively defence-oriented policy and our three-non nuclear principles.

Third, all actions taken by Japan and the United States will be consistent with the basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the Charter of the United Nations.

Fourth, the Guidelines review, which is scheduled to be finalised this autumn, will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgements, in their specific policies and measures.

Let me sketch some specific items of cooperation suggested in the interim report. In addition to armed attack against Japan and situation surrounding Japan which were both addressed in the 1978 Guidelines, the interim report points out cooperation under normal circumstances as well. This means continued demarcation of roles and missions, information sharing and close



consultations on defence policies and military posture and joint and respective efforts to create a more stable security environment. However, the interim report is more substantive in addressing the situations surrounding Japan having important meaning for the security of Japan. This issue drew great public attention both at home and abroad.

At the early anticipation stage of the situation, the two Governments will intensify intelligence sharing and policy consultations and initiate early stage bilateral coordination. If circumstances deteriorate, Japan and the United States will increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, prepare to respond to illegal activities and take steps to prevent further deterioration.

Examples covering six fields of bilateral cooperation in the event of situation in areas surrounding Japan having an important influence on the security of Japan, are listed in the annexure to the interim report. They are :-

- humanitarian relief operations,
- search and rescue (SAR) operations,
- activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability,
- noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO),
- Japan's support for U.S. Forces activities, and
- Japan-U.S. operational cooperation.

I would like to add that Japan's support for U.S. Forces activities could include provision of additional bases, the temporary use by U.S. Forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports and provision of rear areas support distinguished from combat areas. Under Japan-U.S. operational cooperation, the SDF could conduct intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping. U.S. Forces would conduct operations to restore the peace and security in areas surrounding Japan.



Finally, the new Guidelines may be reviewed in a timely and appropriate manner in order to respond properly to any future changes.

Let me conclude my speech by mentioning the reactions from our common neighbours, China and Russia. Our government dispatched a briefing team immediately after the release of the interim report. China appreciated our detailed explanation and hoped that the Guidelines review would reflect the Constitution and be in line with Japan's exclusively defence-oriented policy. In his press briefing on June 11, the Chinese spokesman stated that Japan-U.S. security cooperation was a creation of the Cold War and should not be extended beyond the bilateral context. He concluded by stating that China hopes that Japan will learn lessons from history, behave itself carefully and steadily take steps toward peace. In late June, the Director-General of Defence Policy Bureau visited China and had intensive discussion with his Chinese counterparts. He explained the aim of the review and emphasised that we are not changing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and that we have no intention of interfering with other country's domestic affairs. China repeated their aforementioned position but took note of the premises of the Guidelines review to include the principle of non-interference and added that our explanations deepened their understanding.

Russia also appreciated our detailed explanation which was conducted through diplomatic channels. They said that in the context of promoting Russo-Japanese security dialogue, they welcome the efforts to ensure transparency of the Guidelines review. Russia appreciates that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty plays an important role for the security of the Asia-Pacific region and considers the U.S. military presence as a stabilising factor for the region.



# Restructuring of The Armed Forces

MAJ GEN VINOD SAIGHAL (RETD)

## INTRODUCTION

*Another war between India and Pakistan will be physical suicide by Pakistan, economic suicide by India, and a catastrophe for the subcontinent.*

## AND

*A stable subcontinent of India at peace with itself is an essential prerequisite for the global equipoise of the next millennium.*

**T**here appears to be a vague uneasiness at the heightened insecurity in and around the region. The Government strives valiantly to make the best of a far from satisfactory situation. There is a suspicion that the country may have led itself into a morass from which it finds difficult to extricate itself. Without speculating as to where our predecessors went wrong in this regard; we should make a determined effort to look ahead for making the leap into the next century.

The time may have come for India to chart out an independent world vision more attuned to meet the opportunities and threats looming on the world horizon. For this to happen, it would be necessary to carry out a realistic re-appraisal of the ground reality, de-linked from the fixations that developed in the post-independence decades.

The first major change that has taken place is that the geostrategic emphasis has shifted from the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan to the mountains and the seas, not only for the subcontinent but for the continent as a whole. We have been slow

---

Maj Gen Vinod Saighal retired from the Directorate General of Military Training, Army Headquarters.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997.*



to appreciate the change. Our adversary of yesteryear, having realised the futility of waging a conventional war against India left the middle ground and moved to the nuclear and the LIC ends of warfare. For ten years or so, the country kept on pumping resources into areas where the enemy was not and thereby missed a golden opportunity to become a global frontrunner in several fields. Having said that, it needs to be added, that the situation that has developed is not entirely an uncomfortable one for India and the strengths created will stand us in good stead during the time required to make certain strategic shifts.

India is a potential world player. Even for basic survival in the next century it must learn to be a global player. The whole of South East Asia and several other regional countries will lose their independence, in one way or the other, if India continues to whimper.

In the Twenty First century, India has to match the larger security threats looming on the region's horizon. It is axiomatic that if one is able to take care of the bigger menace the lesser threats automatically get taken care of. Pakistan must be allowed to go its way. It must be allowed to nuclearise, acquire whatever armaments it wishes to acquire, either for its own safety or as the super power's (or the emergent super power's) Trojan horse on the subcontinent. Even Pakistan's nuclear deterrent is not an independent deterrent. The project was financed by Libya and Saudi Arabia. USA and the Western world cannot wish this mortgage away. The world Islamic bomb has to be taken in its literal sense, in more ways than one. If it is ever used it will be responsible for the destruction of more adherents of Islam than any other faith. China too has an indirect lien on the bomb. The possibility of a lien on it by the great super power's clandestine agency cannot be excluded.

Therefore, India must free itself from the nuclear, missile and every other non-pacific linkage with Pakistan. Should that country wish to come into the subcontinental fold it should feel free to do so. Should it wish to remain outside the pale, either of its own volition or for circumstances beyond its control, it must again be



free to do so. It is well within India's capability to cater for threats to the nation and the region in which it must co-exist with friendly neighbours.

#### THREAT PERCEPTIONS

There is a tendency at the national level to downplay the threats to national security. While India may not be in a position to match the outlays of its potential adversaries, there is a threshold below which India cannot "ever" afford to go unless it wishes to jeopardise its security. The present outlays are already below that threshold. It may not be out of place to cite the case of a country, which has not fought a war for centuries. The country faces no threat in the foreseeable future. Yet it will not compromise on its security. Reproduced below is an extract from an interview given on 11 Feb 97 at Jerusalem by Lars Reke, Sweden's State Secretary for Defence.

"We regard the risk of an hostile attack on Sweden as being NIL currently. But you do not know what will happen in Russia. This is the reason we need strong armed forces in the future".

India is intrinsically a strong country. If a feeling of helplessness has been engendered in a nation of 980 million people, it cannot be attributed solely to the machinations of outside powers. The real demoralisation has been brought about by the incapacity of the leadership to take the right and "timely" decisions. Even if the leadership continues to be weak, the country can progress if the vital aspects of security are not neglected. No country can force India to give up on its minimum security needs. China is not only seeking parity with the leading military power of the world but has also added to its military posture against India in several ways. Not so India. Instead of creating options for the coming generations, India excels in foreclosing them. Not paying heed to one's security needs is a cardinal sin which no nation can afford to commit.



## GEO-POLITICAL TIME HORIZON POWER ASYMMETRIES

Certain asymmetries can develop with some of the key players whose activities in the region may impinge on India's security. The projections upto 2010 are given in the chart.

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Growth Asymmetries</u> (Related to India)
<u>Military</u>	
1. India - China	Factor of 8 to 10 (-ve)
2. India - USA	Factor of 15 to 20 (-ve)
3. India - Pak	Factor of 3 to 5 (+ve)
<u>Economic</u>	
4. India - China	Factor of 2 to 3 (-ve)
5. India - USA	Factor of 8 to 10 (-ve)
6. India - Pak	Factor of 3 to 5 (+ve)

The asymmetries with USA and China keep increasing - almost exponentially with the USA and significantly with China. With Pakistan the asymmetries improve in India's favour with each passing year.

India does not have to wage war against anyone. The only credible way to ensure that war does not take place is to make it clear to potential adversaries that the country has the where-withal and the "will" to inflict irreparable retaliatory damage. The perceived threats to India's security in the short, intermediate and longer time horizons are as under.



TIME HORIZON 2000	TIME HORIZON 2010-25	BEYOND 2000
1. Externally Induced LIC.	1. China	1. China
2. Demography linked to social unrest.	2. Demography.	2. Global Environmental Threats.
	3. Western World.	
3. US-induced distortions to security preparedness.	4. THI	3. THI
4. China - induced threats.		
5. Pak-related threats.		
6. Time Horizon Imponderables (THI).		

#### *Threat from Pakistan.*

A gradual diminution of the threat from Pakistan is likely. Two distinct streams are manifesting themselves in the Pakistan social milieu - one deeply rooted in the traditions of the subcontinent and the other coalescing around the traditional governing elites. The leadership is being taken over by pragmatic entrepreneurs, who are inclined towards a rapprochement with India. The latter, centred around the military establishment, are feeling increasingly beleaguered. They have been in the ascendant for fifty years. At the end they do not have much to show for it. The fissures in Pakistan society are deepening. They must find their own adjustments, both within and with India. A military hierarchy now under siege, must "never" be allowed to harbour any illusions that it would be allowed to get away with adventurism.

Pakistan might "itself" fall into the trap that it has set for others, at the behest of others, by agencies not fully under the control of the national governments. Hence, whether the Taliban succeed in unifying Afghanistan, or fail to do so, the problems for Pakistan will get exacerbated, either way. The agenda being set for Afghanistan did not originate in Pakistan. The Agency in Pakistan, sponsoring the agenda on the ground, is answerable to its foreign handlers and not the Government of Pakistan.



### TIME HORIZON IMPONDERABLES (THI)

Time Horizon Imponderables relate to events over which human agencies might not have control. As an example, much-vaunted American way of life may devastate the globe in about fifty to hundred years if the pattern of unrestrained over-consumption is not modified. The American model, is being rapidly extended to other regions of the world, notably the ASEAN and Pacific rim countries. Like the Japanese, the Chinese too are fast becoming Western - oriented in their consumption patterns.

These consumption patterns put Japan, an otherwise affluent society, in a precarious position. From domestic security perspective, that dependence on imports makes it hostage to many calamities like changes in the weather patterns, world famines and so on. Japan is perhaps the largest importer of grains. China too imports huge amounts of grain. Both nations thus contribute in a big way to the hike in world grain prices. In China the consumption of meat is increasing rapidly. In particular, the demand for beef has risen much faster than that for the more traditional pork and chicken. It takes eight tons of feed grains to produce a ton of beef whereas a ton of pork and a ton of chicken need only four and two tons respectively.

### CHINA'S EXPANSIONISM

The factors which will dictate the behaviour of China towards its neighbours, is the large size of the unemployed population which, in the next century, could reach the figure of a few hundred million. The arable land in China is being lost to industrialization and urbanisation at a rapid pace. In spite of its huge size, China has only limited space for cultivation; it has less arable land per capita than India.

China has already shown its hand. It would be extreme folly on the part of India and South East Asia to continue to harbour illusions. The ground reality is that the final solution in Tibet has been put into effect. The Han-isation of Tibet and the decimation of the native population will be completed within the first three



decades of the next century. After Tibet is fully digested the dragon's appetite will only have been whetted. The ecology of China has already been severely degraded. The ecologies of Tibet, Western Bhutan and portions of Nepal and Myanmar under Chinese sway are being systematically destroyed. The southward march of China began in real earnest a long time ago. It has taken India nearly thirty years to wake upto the magnitude of the threat.

#### DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT

The demographic threat may be linked to the social unrest. It includes political uncertainties. For India, this threat has internal and external dimensions. It would suffice to say that unrestrained demographic proliferation could destroy the quality of life and the social cohesion of the subcontinental societies more comprehensively than any military threat. India being the more vibrant democracy and economy will continue to attract the deprived segments of the populations of Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The migrations are unidirectional. Reverse migration almost "never" takes place. This problem has to be addressed urgently and concertedly by all the governments of the subcontinent and at fora like SAARC.

#### NECESSITY FOR RESTRUCTURING

Some of the reasons for the restructuring of the armed forces are.

- *No structure can be permanent.* Restructuring is long overdue.
- *Certain options that were available to India ten years ago perhaps are no longer available.* In like fashion options not exercised today may not be available tomorrow.
- *Converging geo-centricities.* With ASEAN and IOR.
- *Breaking the bureaucratic mindset to ensure India's continued viability.* Twenty five years moratorium is recommended on



the use of certain phrases like "time honoured", "withstood the test of time" etc. as an excuse for not moving ahead. Since Independence India has been boxed in "mentally", not physically.

– *Geo-strategic shift to the mountains.*

– *Non defence mutualities.* All understandings with like-minded regional neighbours to improve the region and to cater for mutual security, short of mutual defence pacts should be explored and reached.

– *Time Horizon Imponderables.* There is need to cater for cataclysmic events that could effect South East Asian security much before these countries prepare themselves for such eventualities i.e. the sudden capitulation, almost overnight, of Taiwan, contrary to all present indications. There could be several reasons for this, not excluding a secret trade off between China and the USA, or the latter not thinking it worth its while to get involved in a full-fledged fight with an emerging super power on an issue over which an impartial international body could well concede China's claim upon the territory, if not the manner of settling the claim.

– *Post Cold War geopolitical restructuring.* Super power matrix of the next century is likely to be quite different.

– *Shedding historical amnesia.* China will soon be a super power. Throughout history the strong powers have invariably attempted to exercise some form of suzerainty, over their neighbours. China is no exception. As a corollary, weak and whimpering neighbours, displaying a singular lack of courage, are invariably the first to be gobbled. India, tragically, is again developing the symptoms that kept it under the heel of foreign invaders for a thousand years. Whether this state results from an ingrained pacifism, irresoluteness, or an inability to appreciate the gravity of the situation, the result is the same. What is even more stupefying is that an entire political and military hierarchy has, over the decades, refused to face up to the reality. A millennium of suppression, colonisation and deprivation has taught the rulers of



post-Independence India no lesson. While the soldiers on the frontline have been willing to make every sacrifice, there has been a frozen immobility in the mindset of the governing hierarchies. Unless an immediate change in direction takes place future generations of Indians might be condemned to second or third class status in world affairs.

– *Sleaze as a form of Warfare.* Enough examples have emerged from Washington and some of the Middle Eastern and European countries - and more recently in Afghanistan. This form of warfare is likely to play an increasingly important role in the next century as the spread of multinationals dilute nationalism. As it is, India is plagued with a number of scams involving large sums of money.

– *Giving Clausewitz, Mahan and other Western military thinkers a well-deserved rest and concentrating instead on India's specific and palpable needs.*

– *Safeguarding India's intrinsic strengths.* The Indian Army, in spite of working under the most trying conditions, remains the most important bastion of the country's sanctity. *Where it is a question of sheer guts and grit and fighting at impossible heights, under impossible climatic conditions, the Indian Army remains one of the finest battle forces in the world.* High technology domination of the battlefield by the armed forces of the more advanced countries falls into an entirely different category. That category, referred to as force multiplication in military parlance, is actually multiplication factor based on pounds, shillings and pence. India can afford to shed a few tanks, guns and aircraft including carriers. It should never dilute its strengths in warfare spectra where it is second to none in the world, especially when there has been a geo-strategic shift to the mountains which will continue to affect world affairs for a long time to come. If anything, there is need to accentuate and safeguard these strengths - which require almost a lifetime to develop and are not amenable to degradation by the electro-magnetic spectrum.

– *Full spectrum domination elsewhere - not on India's turf.* Refers to the stated US policy. The same applies to its efforts to



“deepen and widen” its military to military cooperation with friendly countries. It could be the beginning of full scale undermining of the armed forces of the countries targeted for the purpose.

– *Comprehensive security approach.* There is hardly any informed person in the country who questions the need for the setting up of a National Security Council. If, in spite of the well-articulated and universally-conceded need, some elements have been able to consistently thwart the setting up of this body for several decades on end, the country must assume that moles of powers inimical to India’s security interests have established themselves in the corridors of power.

#### RESTRUCTURING PARAMETERS

The proposed restructuring model is based on the parameters given below :

- Optimised utilisation of “Existing” budgetary resources.
- While seeking global parity in certain areas in the longer term security horizon, obtaining force multiplication at the intermediate and lower ends of the technology spectrum in the interim.
- Not falling into the high-tech technology trap set for Third World countries.
- The ineluctable need for meeting India’s vital needs in the region-specific priority areas.
- Denial of Tibet and other regional neighbourhoods as launchpads against India.
- Containing and “adequately” dealing with emerging threats.
- Meeting, and safeguarding, regional aspirations.
- India is not a party to any containment of China at the



behest of any other power. It will take its own minimum defensive measures within the region as deemed fit from time to time.

– Catering for Time Horizon Imponderables.

#### FIGHTING THROUGH HIGH-TECH PARALYSIS

Since the domination of the West in military high-tech can hardly be challenged; it would be suicidal for developing countries to place over-reliance on high-tech warfare. The Gulf War was over even before it was fully joined. This had hardly anything to do with the relative fighting skills of the adversaries. It had a lot to do with serious miscalculations and high-tech paralysis. Prudence dictates that resource-poor countries do not allow themselves to be sucked into high-tech traps, based on doctrines which do not apply to them. For developing countries, whose economies might occasionally be coaxed to cater for certain high-tech acquisitions, it would be prudent to retain well-honed abilities to fight on through high-tech paralysis. Their short-term adversaries might be regional neighbours. Nevertheless, it would be military folly of an extreme order not to plan for the potential adversaries of the next century. While tanks and aircraft will be around in the inventories of armed forces for some time to come, countries of the developing world will have to re-evaluate their weapons mix for the emerging threats of the next century. Each developing country must carry out a reassessment of its armament needs, to ensure that it is not led meekly to slaughter by friends of yesteryear who one fine morning decide that supreme national interest mandates turning erstwhile friends into foes. Acquisition of military high-tech must relate to the threat perceptions, as perceived by the recipient and not as 'perceived for them' by the think-tanks of the countries pushing the sale of arms; and not even by the native think-tanks sponsored at their behest. Not many in the developing countries seem to be able to avoid this pitfall.

#### THE TIBET QUESTION AND INDIA'S SECURITY

India's largest neighbour is leaving no stone unturned to strangle it, should the need arise. China with a permanent



seat and veto right in the Security Council is straining every nerve to augment its not so inconsiderable nuclear and conventional military might. India's capacity to inflict any "real" damage on China would perhaps be insignificant. Not remaining content with such a lop-sided military superiority, it is continuously making inroads into every country neighbouring India. While no effort should be spared in improving relations with China, it would be both imprudent and unpardonable to leave future generations wholly at the mercy of China's goodwill.

In an unequal military relationship a portion of the country's sovereignty remains permanently impaired, if the very thought of a deepened frown impinges on foreign policy decision-making. Here, it would be pertinent to recall the statement made by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew in a recent interview. To the question, "Some Asian countries already feel threatened. Is that worry legitimate?" Lee replied "I think so. Not that they are going to be captured, but it is about freedom of action. In every decision you make you have to factor in the reaction of a very big and important neighbour". By letting China develop such an overwhelming military disparity; India will not only curtail its own freedom of action but would, by extension, become instrumental in forcing smaller neighbours, historically and culturally inclined towards India, to curtail their freedom of action as well. Whether we admit it or not, the policy followed by India's defence planners was pushing the country headlong into this corner.

Whatever future historians of the Nehru era might say; there is a suspicion that the handing over of Tibet to China on a platter without obtaining any safeguards for this country was a pure and simple act of appeasement. For the hapless Tibetan people it is settled question. That, however, should not prevent people in India from taking stock of the enormity of the changes wrought in Tibet by the Chinese over nearly fifty years of unfettered exercising of their sovereign rights over a subjugated people - genocide coupled with large scale demographic changes. If the Chinese are not checked, the Tibetans will be reduced to the status of the aborigines in Australia before the next fifty years are out. The Tibetan landscape will soon become spiritually, culturally and



ecologically sterile. Besides Lhasa and the other big cities; Han populations will soon overflow from the Chumbi Valley and other areas on the borders with India. If there is any country in the world which has the deepest historical, emotional, cultural and spiritual links with India, it is Tibet. The country can do nothing retrospectively about the historic blunder committed half a century ago. It can, however, look after its own interests and those of the region prospectively by not mortgaging its freedom of action in the future.

#### RESTRUCTURING

##### *Regional*

1. Bay of Bengal Maritime Pact.
2. IOR - Region - specific strengthening. No potential Trojan horse(s).
3. Quadrilateral of stability. (Longitudes 80° East to 105° East; Latitudes 0° to approximately 22° North).

##### *Missile Coverage*

4. Accelerated development to be maintained.
5. Short range (upto 350 kms) saturation coverage by 2000.
6. Medium range (upto extremities of Indian Ocean). Moderate to dense coverage by 2010. Separate radii of action charts.
7. If no verifiable cutbacks announced by China; provision of short range missiles to friendly countries bordering China.
8. Integrated Tri-Service Missile Command to be established by 2000. Personnel to be re-assigned from within the Services and DRDO.

##### *Nuclear*

9. Declaration of Intent.



10. Rationale for support by ASEAN and IOR.
11. Establishment of Integrated Nuclear Command.

*Armed Forces*

12. Gradually relegating high-tech, high cost weapons systems, whose utility generally is confined to Plains warfare, to lower priority with immediate effect and re-allocating resources elsewhere. Discarding dubious utility high tech ventures, or relegating them to low priority; and re-assigning resources elsewhere.
13. Establishment of high-tech, high reliability sensor belts and surveillance systems.
14. Eastern Naval Command to be re-designated as Bay of Bengal Maritime Command with re-defined roles and with dedicated tri-Service resources placed under command. To be activated by 2000.
15. Coordination of tri-Service air defence resources in Peninsular India under an Unified Command.
16. 100 percent increase in Intelligence resources. Positioning of Defence Attaches in All Asian and African countries. Essential restructuring of the Intelligence services.
17. Streamlining of MOD decision-making and establishment of structures considered essential for the prosecution of war in modern times.
18. Downsizing of MOD, MES, DGOF establishments and other such establishments on priority. Restructuring to be completed in phases by 2000.
19. Restructuring in the DRDO and re-prioritisation of research.
20. Augmenting, in a phased manner, the strength of specialist and sector-specific forces in the North and North East.



21. Quantitative increase of forces for operations in the North and North East. Offsets to be made from within the resources of the Army.
22. Priority restructuring of Air Defence.
23. The imperative of reducing casualties in LIC type operations.
24. Force multiplication by re-inforcing the morale factor of the field forces, the ordinary soldier at the business end.
25. Ecology protection as a military necessity.
26. Rejuvenation and revitalisation of the Armed Forces.
27. NO "full spectrum" domination by "any" power of the sub-continent of India. Military priorities and foreign policy to be adjusted accordingly from time to time.

#### BAY ON BENGAL MARITIME PACT

1. *First Contracting Parties* : INDIA, BANGLADESH, MYANMAR, MALAYSIA, THAILAND.
2. *Second Stage Adherents* : INDONESIA, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA.
3. *Salient Features* :
  - (a) Overriding priority to environmental Protection and Conservation of fisheries.
  - (b) Safeguarding bio-diversity and marine ecotone at the terrestrial and marine interface.
  - (c) Preferential trade.
  - (d) Maintenance of ethnic diversity.
  - (e) Customs Union.
  - (f) Safeguarding peace and tranquility in the region.



- (g) Geographical contiguity and littoral presence essential for membership of the Pact.
- (h) NOT a military Pact.

#### NUCLEAR ISSUES

India took a principled stand at the CTBT negotiations at Geneva in 1996 and again at the UN General Assembly thereafter. In its own way it might have changed the course of world history. Many great things have a small beginning. At the level of international diplomacy, especially in the case of Western governments and their allies, India's stand might have been roundly and soundly condemned. But there were others who took note of the arguments put forward by India's representative at Geneva. At the UN General Assembly, however, for reasons that have not been made clear India narrowed the scope of its objection; to the extent that the main plank of its argument that had given heart to proponents of universal nuclear disarmament worldwide was suddenly removed. The universality of the theme was abandoned for a very restricted India-specific perception. The country has to now look ahead and subtly restore the grandeur and universality of the original vision put forward by India.

Surprisingly, ASEAN countries have, in a way, already stolen a march. In a series of decisions, flying in the face of deeply ingrained Western views on the subject, these countries decided to give primacy to regional interests by admitting Myanmar into their fold. From there it is just a short step to backing India's CTBT position, again in the regional interest. For, should India decide to sign the CTB Treaty the non-aligned world will lose its leverage with the nuclear weapons states for restricting further refinements and augmentations of their nuclear weapons stocks as well as for a time bound nuclear disarmament regime. By the same token ASEAN countries would always be looking over their shoulders, sick with worry about Chinese sensibilities, before making any move in case an independent deterrent, no matter how small, did not obtain with India. The same logic applies to countries of the Indian Ocean Rim who are not irrevocably allied to the West or China.



## **\*Jammu and Kashmir Problem : The Truth**

### **PART II**

@LT GENERAL SIR JAMES WILSON, KBE, MC, DL  
£LT GENERAL M L CHIBBER, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

**S**ince Douglas Gracey was a four star General, and the Pakistan Army by far the largest of the three services, he was the obvious choice to be Chairman of the Commander in Chief's Committee. From my point of view this was a major stroke of luck, for I, despite lack of experience, found myself acting as Secretary of the Committee. It was an education, and a sphere where one had to learn quick. I shall always be grateful for the tolerance extended to me by the other two services and for the generous way in which they initiated me into their approach to life. Sometimes too, when, as often happened, Iskander Mirza found himself short of a civil servant to act as Secretary of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which Douglas Gracey regularly attended, I would be pressed into service in this capacity also. It might have been alarming, but Liaqat, as Chairman, was invariably so kind and courteous on such occasions that I did not find it so. Anyway it was a remarkable experience, and, in retrospect, am amazed at my good fortune.

A problem for visitors to Karachi lay in the lack of suitable accommodation. The city itself, though an important port and commercial centre in pre-partition India, was hopelessly overloaded, the few hotels cramped and always overbooked. Normally the Commander in Chief might have expected to get a bed in the

---

\*Chapter 11 of the unpublished memoirs of Lt Gen Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC, DL with footnotes and conclusion by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM.

@Lt Gen Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC, DL is from the British Army. He was Military Assistant to General Douglas Gracey, the Pakistan Army Chief in 1948-49.

£Lt Gen M L Chibber, PVSM, AVSM, retired as Army Commander. He has authored a number of books, USI papers and biographical sketches of Field Marshal Montgomery, Marshal Foch and Field Marshal Slim.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997*



Governor General's house, formerly occupied by the Governor of Sind. But this building, nice enough in its way, was far too small for a Head of State, as Jinnah had become on the grant of independence. Furthermore, though we did not know this at the time, Jinnah, Qaid-E-Azam as he was called, was already suffering from a mortal illness,\* which caused his death after only a year of Pakistan's existence. His sister, Miss Jinnah, kept house for the Qaid-E-Azam; understandably, she kept close watch on his engagements, and husbanded his failing strength for all she was worth. Douglas Gracey saw little of Jinnah, who, apart from fleeting public appearances when he was rapturously acclaimed by the public, operated almost entirely through Liaqat as the Prime Minister. Much of the time Qaid-E-Azam spent in Quetta, where the height provided a more bracing climate than Karachi and where he felt less oppressed and wearied by his illness.

Thus our visits to Karachi almost always involved an accommodation problem, which Wajahat and Bashir invariably managed to solve, often, however, at the last moment. Douglas Gracey was very good humoured about the various expedients to which we found ourselves forced; nevertheless he was frequently less comfortable than he deserved to be and I cannot believe he welcomed these trips to the capital, especially since, in the nature of such matters, they often came up at short notice. From my point of view, it was different. I found the atmosphere of the new capital exciting, was flattered by being asked to dinner by members of the diplomatic community and stimulated by the wider horizons opened by the work itself. (Details of tour to East Pakistan are omitted).

At this stage, I should say something about the Joint Defence Council since its meetings and deliberations took up much of our time, even if, more often than not, they were unproductive and disappointing. The Joint Defence Council stemmed from the original partition agreement; its principal task was to supervise the division of the armed forces between India and Pakistan; including the sharing out of military assets. In this capacity, the

---

\* Jinnah was in the terminal stage of tuberculosis : a closely guarded secret. The British intelligence knew about it and this fact influenced the preponing of the grant of independence from 1948 to 1947.



Joint Defence Council, under the chairmanship of Mountbatten himself, was responsible to both Governments. I imagine that when Mountbatten originally established the Joint Defence Council, he hoped it might evolve into an Indo - Pakistan Defence Community, providing for the joint defence of the sub-continent. Such a development would have been logical and sensible, since the sub-continent forms a strategic entity, with the political boundaries between India and Pakistan an irrelevance in such terms. The Kashmir dispute, however, put paid to this constructive concept and the role of the Joint Defence Council never got much beyond providing a forum for the distribution of military assets. Here again, from Pakistan's stand-point, the influence of Kashmir proved malign; understandably, the Indians were reluctant to release assets which might be used against their own soldiers in Kashmir. The more overt Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir, the greater grew Indian determination not to transfer anything significant. By April 1948, Liaqat had resigned himself to the fact that Pakistan would get nothing more out of the Indians. He and Iskander Mirza found other and more reliable means of re-equipping the Pakistan armed forces; the financial situation, so acute in Pakistan's early days was, by now, starting to ease slightly, as West Pakistan's agricultural strength and ability not only to feed its own people but also to export, boosted the economy. The April 1948 meeting of the Joint Defence Council was, therefore, the last formal encounter under the Council's original terms of reference. Wisely, however, the two Defence Ministers responded to Mountbatten's suggestion that they should continue to meet periodically, as occasion demanded, to discuss matters of joint concern. The continued existence of such a degree of joint understanding was important - it allowed informal links between the Indian and Pakistan armed forces to continue, and, as we shall see, these arrangements proved invaluable later in achieving a ceasefire in Kashmir.

Liaqat, Douglas Gracey and I stayed with the Mountbattens on our visit to Delhi for the Joint Defence Council meeting. I had never previously got further than the ADC's room in the Viceroy's House. In the Wavell days, there was always a kindred spirit around and it was a good place to go for an occasional gossip



over a cup of tea. But any idea of actually staying there would have been well above my station. Being rather naive in such matters, I had been looking forward to our visit to Delhi and greatly enjoyed our night in the Governor General's House as it was now called. The Mountbatten organisation was formidable; before every dinner party, the ADC's Room would provide a card for the Governor General on each of the guests, giving his background and interests. Mountbatten, amazingly, would absorb this information while changing for dinner, and bring it out appropriately during the course of the evening. On this occasion, I helped the ADCs to write the cards for our Pakistan party; it was fun later during the dinner party to see one's input being put to good and professional use.

The Secretary of the Joint Defence Council was Vernon Erskine-Crum, at that time a Lieutenant Colonel in the Scots Guards, whose job on Mountbatten's staff was that of his conference Secretary. I had not met Vernon before; though, like me, he had been at Oxford, where he had won a place in the University boat, he was three or four years senior to me, while our military paths had hitherto not crossed. I was very impressed by Vernon's ability and envied the speed and accuracy with which he could produce a report of the most complex meeting or discussion. I resolved that I would aim to copy his technique, and, without ever reaching his standards of excellence, have profited considerably from doing so throughout my career. Vernon himself had a distinguished progress up the Army, and was a very young Lieutenant General when selected in 1971 to succeed Ian Freeland as G.O.C, Northern Ireland in the early days of the Ulster emergency. Tragically for the Army and for his family, Vernon suffered a fatal heart attack, after having been completely exhausted by the rigours of a take-over programme which, with the advantage of hindsight, was far too comprehensive and demanding. Vernon's death was a sad loss to the Army. His experience in India, added to his other attainments, would have helped him to be outstanding in Northern Ireland and I have little doubt that subsequently even higher posts would have come his way. I remain grateful to him for his kindness to me on the occasion of our first meeting in Delhi. I learnt much of value from him in the limited time available for picking his brains.



Despite Mountbatten's professionalism and the admirable arrangements made for us in Delhi, neither Liaqat nor Douglas Gracey were susceptible to the Governor General's blandishments. Liaqat had warned us beforehand that, in his opinion, Mountbatten had been largely 'brainwashed' by Nehru and the Congress, and that the Kashmir issue had turned him completely against Pakistan. Though he might still profess to be impartial, Liaqat had no confidence in Mountbatten's good offices and, like most Pakistanis, felt strongly that he should not have remained on, after independence, as Governor General of India. Such a role, even as constitutional Governor General, made impartiality impossible, while Mountbatten's continued presence and influence with H.M.G. operated to Pakistan's considerable disadvantage. Liaqat conceded that Mountbatten had originally offered to act after independence as a constitutional Governor General for both the new states; in his view, however, such a concept had been unrealistic, while, in any event, Pakistan required its top honour and appointment for the Qaid-E-Azam, whose health did not permit him to undertake the more physically demanding position of Prime Minister. Liaqat also blamed Mountbatten, rightly or wrongly, for his failure to persuade the Ruler of Kashmir to make a decision about accession before 15th August 1947; at that time, before the disastrous inrush of the tribesmen, Kashmir would doubtless have acceded quietly to Pakistan, a decision which even Patel\*, the most communally minded of the Congress leaders, would have accepted. Liaqat further regarded Mountbatten's conduct at the time of Kashmir's accession to India in October 1947 as reprehensible; contending that even as a constitutional Governor General he had no right to have accepted such an obviously flawed decision. Here Liaqat was on less good ground. Pakistan's folly in permitting the tribal invasion had promoted a situation in which only the use of Indian troops could have prevented the sack of Srinagar and, legally, only accession by Kashmir to India could permit their deployment. (Portion about the problem Gracey had with Mountbatten in Indo-China is omitted).

---

\* During mid June, visit of Mountbatten to Srinagar, he conveyed to the Maharaja that Sardar Patel had assured him that if the choice of the people of the State were to be for Pakistan, Indian Government would not object to it. However Jinnah, with an eye on Hyderabad, was firm that in Princely States the decision about the future was the exclusive right of the Rulers; people had no role.<sup>10</sup>



It was the first time I had met Mountbatten and I was certainly impressed. I could understand now how his technique and powers of persuasion had swept the Congress politicians off their feet in the run up to independence. Clearly he had achieved less impact on Jinnah, though it was a great feat to have persuaded the Qaid-E-Azam to settle for the truncated, "moth eaten" as he described it, Pakistan which came into being on 15th August 1946. I doubt in fact if anyone, except Mountbatten, could have brought the operation off. Those who criticise him for the speed with which the transfer of power was executed fail to take account of the danger of any one of several groups 'ratting' on the fragile agreements so hardly won. As Mountbatten himself remarked, "It was like learning to ride a bicycle. One had to pedal harder and harder, travelling even faster to avoid falling off". This said, I was glad at the time not to be working for Mountbatten and do not regret never having served near him or under him subsequently. For all his abilities, Mountbatten was never remotely a rifleman like character.

I was also fortunate to see something of Lady Mountbatten whose astonishing work on behalf of the refugees in Delhi and elsewhere had won everyone's admiration in the darkest days of the communal violence, the previous year. About an hour before we were due to leave, I got a message to call on her in her writing room. Could I somehow get her a Jinnah hat? Clearly I should have to make my purchase with the utmost discretion, but it should not be impossible to do so and get the product back to Delhi through a diplomatic bag. Back in Pakistan, Wajahat Husain bought me the best version he could in Lady Mountbatten's head size in the local Pindi bazar. We transmitted it through Defence Adviser channels - Johnny Walker in Karachi to Walter Loring in Delhi, who delivered it to Lady Mountbatten just before she left for England. I hope she wore it, as she told me she intended, walking down Sloane Street between Harrods and Peter Jones. Liaquat would certainly have seen the joke, though it might have been beyond the Qaid-E-Azam. (Portion about being on leave in England is omitted).

There had been little change in the Kashmir situation while



I was away in England. Instead, for the next three months, the position in Hyderabad held centre stage. In a way the Hyderabad situation was mirror image of that obtaining in Kashmir, but with the communal parts of the cocktail almost exactly reversed. Hyderabad, the largest, richest and most powerful of the Indian states, had a Muslim ruler, the Nizam, reputed at that time to be the richest man in the world. He was certainly one of the meanest. Lord Wavell recounts in his diary the agonies it cost the Nizam to provide champagne for dinner on the night of the Viceroy's first dinner and his subsequent distress when all three bottles produced from the cellar were flat. Nevertheless before independence the Nizam's state was well ruled and administered - there was normally a good Prime Minister and relations with HMG, through the Resident and the Viceroy, presented few problems. Beneath the Nizam, there existed a Muslim upper class, prosperous, rich, and relatively sophisticated. Many of the men followed a career in the Indian Army, and, by 1947, were starting to do well in their profession. Abid Bilgrami, an instructor at the IMA, one of those evacuated to Pakistan in Operation Exodus, was one of them; the Baig family, army officers, polo players, and in one case, Abbas Ali Baig, an international cricketer, provided another example of the considerable influence wielded by Muslims from Hyderabad in key Pakistani circles.

But the ruling Muslim element in Hyderabad represented little more than 10 per cent of the State's population. The remainder, predominantly Hindu, had accepted their inferior position during the British 'Raj'; the settled conditions in Hyderabad permitted Hindu traders and businessmen to become prosperous, and the opulent middle class, despite their political lack of power in the State, had little reason for complaint. Congress had, however, infiltrated the non-Muslim working class, and, if in 1947 there had been a democratic election, would certainly have won a resounding victory. Significantly, too, there was a strong left wing element in Hyderabad. Some were adherents of the Congress left wing leader, Jai Prakash Narain, while there also existed a large and growing communist party.

Altogether, therefore, Hyderabad offered unlimited potential



for agitation and discontent. Had the Nizam been realistic and decisive enough to have acceded to India before 15th August, as Mountbatten wished and advised him to do, much trouble might have been avoided. But decision was not in the Nizam's nature; instead, like the Ruler of Kashmir, he procrastinated, using brilliant negotiators like Sir Walter Monckton to try and get special terms for Hyderabad's accession. Despite his advisers continuing to advise an early accession to India, the Nizam clutched at any straw offering further excuse for delay. It was Micawberism at its political worst, and, as usual in such circumstances, events soon developed their own momentum.

While Mountbatten remained in Delhi, the Nizam could be reasonably confident that the Governor General's influence would prevent the use of force by India to compel Hyderabad's accession. Sardar Patel, the Home Minister was happy to bide his time. Throughout 1948 he and VP Menon, his brilliant Permanent Secretary in the States Ministry, occupied themselves in tidying up the affairs of those States who had acceded to India before 15th August. Operating like master draughts players on a board set for their advantage, they did a brilliant job of incorporating the various states into the Indian Union. Every political expedient in the book came into play: federations, larger groupings, association with neighbouring provinces - all were used in masterly fashion. By mid-June, when Mountbatten left, and was replaced by CR Rajagopalachari, Patel and Menon were ready to deal with Hyderabad.

Inside his state, the Nizam had blended indecision with unwisdom bordering on folly. In an effort to strengthen the defences of the State, the normal Defence Force, about a division in size, was supplemented by a gang of Muslim auxiliaries known as Razakars. The Razakars' leader, Razvi, was the type of thug who flourishes in conditions of uncertainty; his followers were indisciplined, highly communal and took advantage of any opportunity to oppress and threaten the majority Hindu population. The Indian press, never slow off the mark in such a context, was able to produce a steady series of atrocity stories, all of which increased the pressure on the Delhi Government to make an end



of Hyderabad's pretensions. The attitude of the Pakistan Government made matters worse. Understandably, for communal reasons, they sympathised with the ruling Muslim party in Hyderabad. Moreover, as I have indicated, there were refugees from Hyderabad's high places inside Pakistan, who lost no opportunity of bringing the situation inside the State to the notice of public opinion. Such propaganda tended both to misrepresent the prevailing political position and, more dangerously, to exaggerate the chance of Hyderabad being able to offer effective resistance to an Indian invasion. Articles in *Dawn*, the leading Karachi daily, frequently reflected the value to Pakistan's cause of having a 'Trojan horse' inside Indian territory.\* Such absurd sentiments were, of course, quite unrealistic, besides offering Patel and Menon unique opportunities to turn the argument on its head and advocate an early invasion of Hyderabad in the overall interests of Indian security. Towards the end of the summer, Pakistan went so far as to suggest a loan to Hyderabad, and to offer the use of Pakistan territory as a base from which arms could be flown to the beleaguered state, now blockaded by India and without effective communications to its landlocked territory.

In fairness, Liaquat and Iskander Mirza, despite all the pressures upon them from press and public, remained creditably cool and constant. The Commander in Chief's Committee had earlier advised that, from a military standpoint, there was nothing Pakistan could do to help Hyderabad. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force possessed the resources to influence events; the Army, already stretched by Kashmir, would just about be able to defend West Punjab against an Indian attack, if the Indian Command were so unwise as to launch one. To invade India would be military folly and would of course, as Gracey reminded his political masters, result in the immediate withdrawal of all British officers. So far as Pakistan was concerned, our only course of

---

\* On 1 November 1947 Mountbatten flew to Lahore to meet Jinnah to resolve the conflict in Kashmir. He presented the formula "The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that where the ruler of a state does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subject belong and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the state should finally accede to one of the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people".<sup>11</sup> Jinnah replied that a plebiscite was 'redundant and undesirable'. He also refused to include Hyderabad in the reckoning.



action was to sit tight and await developments. The only crumb of comfort we could offer was to point out that, technically, an Indian invasion of Hyderabad would amount to formal aggression. If India were to be guilty of such action, their behaviour would take much of the heat out of accusations being brought against Pakistan for our earlier 'aggression in Kashmir'.

Nevertheless, Liaquat's ministerial colleagues continued to put pressure on him to do something to save Hyderabad and he found himself forced to refer the question yet again to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister took the chair himself, with Iskander Mirza beside him in support; unusually, Zafrulla Khan, the Foreign Minister, who had so eloquently advocated Pakistan's cause over Kashmir in the United Nations, was also present. I felt more than usual diffidence at acting as Secretary with so much talent around. As usual, I had inherited an agenda and supporting papers prepared by Iskander's staff in Karachi. Douglas Gracey and I had only about thirty minutes or so to read them through before the meeting assembled. The Army paper was splendid, bearing the hand of Bill Cawthorn in its preparation; Douglas would have no problems in speaking on it. The Naval paper was equally straightforward. Item 3 however appeared a very different matter. "Possibility of independent air action in support of Hyderabad", it read. "Bomb Delhi?" had been added in brackets in our copies of the agenda. Plainly we were in for an unusual session.

Liaquat opened the meeting in his calm quiet fashion. The Government, he explained, was under great pressure to do something to help the Muslim regime in Hyderabad; *Dawn* had an article almost daily complaining about our inactivity. Even the Qaid-E-Azam was starting to express his anxiety. Though Liaquat, had complete confidence in the advice given to him as Defence Minister by his Commanders in Chief, he felt honour bound to satisfy himself once more that no possibility of aid to Hyderabad had been overlooked. Hence this meeting. He asked his commanders in Chief to be as positive and inventive as possible in a renewed approach to the problem.



Joe Jefford, supported by his Pakistani Chief of Staff, Commodore Chaudhari, had no problem over the naval angle. His resources were stretched to the maximum over the link with East Pakistan; there was nothing the Navy could do to assist a land-locked state. Douglas Gracey had slightly more difficulty with the Army issue, but Liaqat and Iskander both understood the form well and realised that any land attack on India would be disastrous folly. Would it be possible to mount a limited offensive in Kashmir, perhaps in an area where the activity could be ascribed to action by the Azad forces? This was a dangerous concept, but, fortunately, Gracey found unexpected support from Zafrulla, the Foreign Minister. Any further aggression in Kashmir, or indeed any activity capable of being construed as such, would pull the rug from under his feet at the United Nations. He felt he was in a fair way to vindicate Pakistan's position, but the matter was delicate, and we could afford no conduct which was not completely above board.

There remained just Item 3. Liaqat turned to Sam Elworthy, then a Group Captain, already of obvious distinction, Commander of Mauripur Station, the Principal base of the Pakistan Air Force. He was attending the meeting in place of Atcherley, who was temporarily out of the country. Even then, Elworthy possessed the dignity and 'gravitas' which in due course, were to take him to the summit of the Royal Air Force, to the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, to the post of Chief of the Defence Staff, and finally to the House of Lords. "There are others in this room better qualified to pronounce on the moral and legal aspects of this item," he began. "I propose therefore to confine myself to the purely air implications," he continued. "Forces potentially available for the operation - three Halifaxes. Aircraft currently serviceable - one Halifax. Estimated chance of reaching target area - 50 per cent. Estimated chance of hitting any significant target - 25 per cent. Likely chance of returning safely - 20 per cent. In such circumstances, the Committee will recognise that this is not an operation I can commend to them from a professional standpoint." There was complete silence for about thirty seconds after Sam Elworthy had finished speaking. His perfect moderation of expression left even Iskander Mirza, for once, speechless. There



was nothing more to be said. It was the easiest minute in the world for me to write. "The Committee briefly considered this item, and decided it was not an option to be pursued," I recorded. I have often since admired the way senior RAF officers can put forth their points in public. Sam Elworthy's example was, however, an object lesson in the value of under - statement; it marked a stage in my politico-military education which I have never forgotten.

Shortly after this memorable meeting, the Indian Government put us all out of our misery by launching their inevitable invasion of Hyderabad. Roy Bucher considerably gave us a brief preliminary warning; the Indian General Chaudhari's armoured division made no mistakes, while the Nizam's armed forces spaced wide on round the frontiers of the state wisely offered little resistance. The Razakars, true to type, disintegrated, and Chaudhari, in a short period as Military Governor, quickly restored law and order. It was a triumph for Sardar Patel, and marked the completion, inside fifteen months, of his wholly successful policy towards the States. The invasion of Hyderabad was a relief, too, to the Pakistan Government who were now left free to concentrate on their own affairs, of which the death of the Qaid-E-Azam was the next dramatic event.

No one, except perhaps Liaqat, seemed to have realised in the early days of Pakistan that Jinnah, even before independence, was suffering from a mortal illness.\* One knew that he had periods of sickness, but these were ascribed to exhaustion; Miss Jinnah, his sister, looked after the Qaid-E-Azam carefully, conserving his energies so that he gave a false impression of vitality and vigour whenever he appeared in public. Though Liaqat was far too loyal to the Qaid-E-Azam ever to admit it, Jinnah had, in fact, shot his bolt when Pakistan obtained its independence. He was a lawyer, completely without experience of administration. I doubt if he had seriously expected to obtain even the truncated Pakistan which came into being in August 1947.

---

\* Intense efforts were made by Jinnah to persuade the Maharaja to let him spend some time in Kashmir even before August 1947 on health grounds. As is well known the best sanatorium in India for tuberculosis was located in Gulmarg area. The code name for the Tribal invasion was, significantly, given as Operation Gulmarg.



Certainly he had never expected his new country to be granted its freedom so early, nor had he remotely anticipated the administrative difficulties which so nearly overwhelmed Pakistan in those chaotic first days. After his first fateful sortie to Lahore in late October 1947, following the failure of the inrush by the tribesmen into Kashmir, the Qaid-E-Azam seldom ventured away from Karachi, except for frequent visits to Quetta, where his health seemed better, and the political pressures less demanding. He took no part in the Kashmir negotiations after the very early stages and, apart from expressing his anxiety over the fate of Hyderabad, remained in Baluchistan throughout that particular crisis. Significantly, he only once, in March 1948, visited East Pakistan, nor can I recall him coming to Pindi to visit his Army Headquarters.

Nevertheless the news of Jinnah's death in September 1948, immediately after he had returned to Karachi from yet another sojourn in Quetta, came as a devastating shock to his whole country. Everyone was plunged into the deepest mourning; newspapers appeared ringed in black, and full of foreboding about the future. It seemed briefly that Pakistan, bereft of the Qaid-E-Azam, might simply fall apart through lack of leadership. But nothing like that materialised; Liaqat merely formally assumed the political leadership he had in practice been exercising for the past twelve months and, so far as the administration of the country was concerned, no-one felt more than a tremor. Qaid-E-Azam's successor as Governor General, the delightful Nazimuddin, came from East Pakistan. Relations between him and Liaqat had always been good; thus for the next three years, there seemed a genuine prospect of unity between the two wings of the country. But the assassination of Liaqat in 1951 sadly interrupted the development of this fruitful partnership, and with the West Pakistanis increasingly inclined to adopt a patronising pseudo-colonial approach towards their Bengali partners, it was not long before the seeds of the future dissolution started to be sown. (Details related to Jinnah's funeral are omitted).

There was something of a lull that autumn after Jinnah's death. In GHQ at Rawalpindi, we welcomed the effective stale-



mate in Kashmir and began to work steadily on the military side of the Pakistan presentation to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) whose arrival to establish the facts of the Kashmir situation was expected shortly. It may have been this factor which, early in December, precipitated a last flurry of fighting. Surprisingly the Indians, for several months content to sit quietly in Jammu, began to move forward towards Poonch, a key Azad Kashmir centre and home, incidentally, of many of the best known Muslim bearers in pre-independent India. The Indian advance, parallel to the frontier with Pakistan, was threatening on two counts; not only did it seem to jeopardise a vital Muslim area, but it renewed the danger of the headwaters of the Punjab rivers falling into Indian hands. Since Pakistan's future prosperity depended to a great extent on the agriculture of the West Punjab, where irrigation was the key to further development, there was no question of allowing India to control the supply of water. Something clearly had to be done and quickly.

Fortunately the Indian advance towards Poonch provided just the right military circumstances for Pakistan to make their point. Kalwant Singh, the Indian commander in Kashmir, was a well known figure in Rawalpindi. Before partition he had been Frank Messervy's Brigadier General Staff in Northern Army. Everyone liked Kalwant, but he was not renowned for his speed of military thought, and, on this occasion, his advance was untidy and unbalanced. We learnt afterwards that Kalwant had been pushed into the operation against his will; the Indians had become alarmed at a successful operation in the far north, led by a young Pakistani Lieutenant Colonel, Aslam Khan, later to succeed me as PS(C). Aslam had brilliantly moved across the mountains from Gilgit to capture Skardu,\* surprising its garrison and threatening further trouble in an area, where, because of its proximity to China, the Indians felt vulnerable. Kalwant's move on Poonch was aimed by Delhi to warn Pakistan off further adventures in the northern sector. Jhangar was the key. A small place, it was an important road centre but not much else. The Indian

---

\* Aslam in a brilliant operation bypassed Skardu and captured Zojila Pass, Dras and Kargil simultaneously on 10 May 1948. Besieged garrison of Skardu under Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, MVC was completely isolated. However it held on for another three months and surrendered on 14 August 1948 after holding out for six months and three days.<sup>12</sup>



advance had made it a traffic shambles with far too many lorries and establishments crammed into a confined space. It was an obvious artillery target and being only just inside the Kashmir border, could be engaged from gun positions on Pakistan territory.

Quickly, a plan to exploit this situation was evolved in Rawalpindi. The whole of 7 Division artillery, Pakistan's one Army Group Artillery, and three other field regiments were quickly assembled. Soon Pakistan had some 200 guns, including three regiments of medium artillery, able to engage Jhangar. Quietly the target was registered and the necessary ammunition placed in position. Pakistan air OPs, keeping within Pakistan's air space, were available to control the fire. One morning, when the confusion in Jhangar was at its height, the Pakistan artillery opened up. The result was devastating, and the consequences immediate. That very afternoon Roy Bucher, the British Commander in Chief in Delhi, came on the telephone. He told us that he had the Indian Government's approval to suggest an immediate cease fire in Kashmir on the existing positions : he proposed a meeting in Delhi on 1st January 1949 between the two Cs-in-C and their staffs to record these arrangements and to convert the truce into a formal cease fire pending the outcome of the negotiations for the future of Kashmir through the United Nations Commission. We were at once in touch with Liaqat through Bill Cawthorn and Iskander Mirza; soon Douglas Gracey was instructing me to ring Delhi with Pakistan Army's agreement to the Indian Army's proposal.

Douglas Gracey, Sher Khan and I, representing Pakistan Army, flew down to Delhi on New Year's Eve for the proposed cease fire meeting next day. We were excited and relieved; the Kashmir operations had been running sore for the last fifteen months and it was wonderful to have the threat of a disastrous war with India lifted at last. The atmosphere in Delhi was good; we got a friendly reception and were looked after in the Governor General's house. It was the first time any of us had met the new incumbent, Rajagopalachari, Mountbatten's successor and he charmed Douglas Gracey and myself by his warmth and the



affection he evidently bore for Liaquat, a former ministerial colleague in the pre-partition Interim Government. Though at first it seemed unusual to visit the former Viceroy's house and not find a British occupant, we realised at once that "Rajaji", as everyone called him, was an ideal choice as Governor General. He had a breadth of view and sense of historical perspective which became quickly apparent. His simplicity and lack of pomposity were also attractive qualities. I had always heard that Wavell held him in high regard and it was not difficult to see why.

That evening the Indian Army gave a special buffet reception for the Pakistan party in the Gymkhana Club. The atmosphere was friendly, and one met a whole lot of old friends. From my point of view, all former IMA cadets from the Delhi area had been invited to the reception, and it was marvellous to see them all again and hear their news and latest gossip. Mahadeo Singh was obviously proving an ideal Commandant, while 'Smoky' Malhotra was equally well suited as his Adjutant. It was good to have this confirmation that the measures taken a year ago were working out satisfactorily, and that the foundations we had laid at Dehra Dun were sound. In general, morale in the Indian Army seemed excellent; the problems which fifteen years later were to culminate in the disastrous confrontation with China on the North East frontier of India lay well in the future.

Next morning, New Year's Day, we arrived early for the start of our meeting with our Indian opposite numbers. By a happy coincidence, the day was Cariappa's first in office as Commander in Chief; Roy Bucher, who was staying on for three months as a special adviser to the Defence Minister, gracefully abdicated his chairmanship of our meeting in favour of his successor and, after much photography by the press of our small conference, we got down to work on the details of the cease fire. Cariappa proved an admirable Chairman, Douglas Gracey was his usual practical self, while Chaudhari for India and Sher Khan for Pakistan were sensible and professional. Everyone knew each other well and their Staff College training. Quetta or Camberley, provided an invaluable common language. It was soon obvious that despite a formidable looking agenda, we would not run into any snags and,



by the time we adjourned for lunch, with Roy Bucher as the host in his New Delhi house, the back of the task was broken. After lunch, Roy Bucher took me aside and we walked up and down his lawn for five minutes or so. He kindly asked me about my future plans, letting slip that I would almost certainly be selected for the 1950 Camberley Staff College course. This was news to me; though I knew of course that Douglas Gracey had recommended me, I had not expected to get such an early vacancy. Roy Bucher remarked that, in his view, I would be wise to get back to the British Army, however briefly, before I went to Camberley. I was grateful for his advice, and promised I would consider its implications carefully. It was nice of Roy Bucher to have taken so much trouble; though he and Gracey never hit it off, because of their very different personalities, Bucher nevertheless had played an important role in keeping the Kashmir war within reasonable bounds, and much of the credit for the cease fire should go to him for recognising that the political conditions were right for a truce. I have always felt Roy Bucher was an underrated soldier; as an Indian cavalryman, he had little opportunity during World War II to show his ability. Afterwards, however, he performed brilliantly as acting Commander of Eastern Command in dealing with the Calcutta riots of 1946 and after independence, his influence on the Indian Army was one of moderation and common sense. Though Bucher was the reverse of charismatic, he served India well and Pakistan was fortunate that such a level headed and politically astute soldier was around in New Delhi to keep military situation from boiling over as, at times, it had threatened to do.

We soon finished off the remaining items of our conference agenda after lunch, and after an early tea, I was left with my Indian opposite number to commit the proceedings to writing. I remembered a little of what Vernon Erskine-Crum had taught me the previous year about the duties of a Conference Secretary. We soon had an adequate draft and, with the help of an excellent trace of the respective dispositions provided by Sher Khan, we had no difficulty in drawing a mutually agreed cease fire line. I have always been proud of this achievement; the cease fire line we drew that New Year's Day in 1949 has stood the test of time.



Forty years later our line remains the official demarcation line in Kashmir, having survived several and various vicissitudes during the two major Indo-Pakistan conflicts in 1965 and 1971.

Next day, Douglas Gracey and Sher Khan left early by air for Rawalpindi to make sure the necessary cease fire instructions were transmitted to the Pakistan Army troops operating in Kashmir. I was left behind in Delhi to check the production of our Conference records. After lunch, the Cs in C Dakota was to return to Delhi to collect me and the conference papers, which I was to take and deliver to Bill Cawthorn and Iskander Mirza in Karachi that evening. I would fly back to Pindi the following morning on a scheduled civilian flight. That morning, my work on the conference records was soon completed. I relaxed in my room in the Governor General's House, enjoying a rare morning of idleness and a chance to read a book. My telephone rang; it was the ADC's Room. The Governor General, Rajaji, would like to see me at midday; he had a message he wanted me to take to Liaqat in Karachi. When I called on the Governor General as instructed, he asked me to sit down and surprisingly began to talk. Our discussion covered a wide field, and revealed Rajaji's wise and perceptive vision about the subcontinent as a whole. He realised the absolute folly of continuing bad relations between Pakistan and India. His own relations with Liaqat had always been good, he told me. The letter I was to take would tell Liaqat that he (Rajaji) would do everything he could in Delhi to improve the situation; Liaqat could also write to him whenever problems arose. He asked me what I saw as the main problem. It was an easy question to answer; Kashmir was, of course, the stumbling block and I did my best to explain Pakistan's feelings on the subject and the way they felt they had been cheated out of a territory they considered as part of their birthright. The Governor General nodded his head, indicating understanding if not necessarily agreement. "The trouble is", he remarked, "Panditji (Nehru) has a block about Kashmir. His family comes from there, and it is hard for him to see the issue without emotion." He turned to the role of the British in India, remarking that we had much to be proud of, not least the way we had managed to unify the country. Our literature, too, had enriched and educated several generations of



Indians; he, personally, owed much to Shakespeare, Milton and our poets. I remarked, rather impertinently I now consider, how beautifully he used our language and how much I envied him his ability to choose exactly the right words for particular concepts. "But", I remarked, "this is rather silly of me. I expect that like your opposite number in Karachi you have a first class degree at Oxford or Cambridge". Rajaji sighed a little sadly. "No", he said, "I have never been to England. I am like a lover who has never seen his lass". It was a delightful note on which to end our conversation, and I said goodbye, feeling that I had been lucky to have been talking to a really great man for over an hour. I have often reflected since then, that if Rajagoplachari had been at the head of the Congress Party in 1947 there might have been no need for partition. Sadly, however, he had no firm political base outside his home state of Madras. By the time he became Governor General, Nehru was too firmly established to tolerate such an influential moderate, so Rajaji, much admired and respected though he was, never possessed the political clout his intellect and ideas deserved.

Back in Rawalpindi, after delivering Rajaji's letter to Liaquat, I reflected on Roy Bucher's advice and discussed the matter with Douglas Gracey. Douglas was sympathetic, if not so categorical in his advice as Roy Bucher. He suggested that I should stay until the end of April when in any event, I was due to go home for two months' leave. We could review the matter in the light of how I found matters back in the UK, and on how urgently the Rifle Brigade wanted me back. This proved as excellent compromise, and the Military Secretary, Bob Mansergh, confirmed it in March when he paid us a flying visit in Pakistan to check on the way in which the British officers on loan were being treated in the newly independent country. Douglas Gracey's compromise had the extra merit of allowing me to play a part in the briefing and handling of the United Nations Commission during their visit to Pakistan.

Dealing with UNCIP turned out an interesting assignment, and I learned much from the experience, which came in handy later in my career when I found myself on the other side of the fence in Cyprus as a UN Force Chief of Staff. By good fortune,



the UN operator given the task of establishing the facts on the Pakistan side was Belgian, Harry Graeffe. He spoke good English, but found my knowledge of French a help; he was youngish, about thirty five at most and we got on well together. From my point of view, the job of leading Harry Graeffe around gave me a chance of getting into Kashmir to see something of the military situation there for myself. Normally British officers were strictly forbidden to go into Kashmir; we got special permission in this case from the UK High Commission in Karachi and I found my visit to the Kashmir front immensely interesting.

The military position was a mirror image of a quiet sector of the front in the mountains of Italy, except that the features were very much higher and the communication problem consequently even greater. Some of the jeep tracks made by Pakistani engineers were hair raising; incredibly narrow, they perched on ledges with a sheer drop on the outward side often of a thousand feet or more. It was fatal to look down, and I admired Harry Graeffe for the stoical fashion in which he submitted himself to the vagaries of a strange driver with whom, knowing no Urdu, he was quite unable to communicate. We were at pains to point out to UNCIP the importance to Pakistan of the sector of Kashmir which our forces held; Graeffe, too, was able to understand that to expect the scratch Azad Kashmir irregulars to defend such territory was quite unrealistic. Whatever the theoretical position in International Law, in practice Pakistan had no option but to intervene as we had done.

Explaining the facts and giving the background to UNCIP presented no great problem. It was a different matter, however, when it came to persuading the Commission to try and achieve a plebiscite in Kashmir, which was the Pakistani objective. Though the Indians also paid lip service to the concept of plebiscite, one could understand their objection to implementing the idea. They doubtless felt that, at that stage, an impartial vote would certainly have favoured Pakistan; Indian public opinion, however, would never have accepted the territory's transfer to Pakistan after all the effort and casualties sustained by the Indian Army in securing their hold on the area. Moreover, as Rajagopalachari had ex-



plained in Delhi, Nehru had an emotional block on the subject which made it impossible for him to think in terms of any concession. It soon became obvious, therefore, that the best the UN Commission could hope to achieve was a perpetuation of the 'status quo', and, in effect Pakistan had to settle for just that limited solution. Only rarely, as I now realise, is it possible for the United Nations to achieve solutions to problems; almost invariably therefore, the result of U.N. interventions is to 'freeze' a situation in the state in which their intervention found it. Sometimes, as in Kashmir, such a result is of value because it avoids more serious consequences. But, as I was to experience myself later in Cyprus, to expect practical solutions from UN intervention, however good their motives, is normally too much to hope for. (Details about Cricket at Rawalpindi are omitted).

By April 1949, however, I was starting to feel that it was time for me to leave the sub-continent where I had been so happy for nearly four years, despite the tragedy of the massacres, which even today casts a shadow over the granting of independence. It was important, as Roy Bucher had reminded me, to get back to my regimental roots. Moreover, my own team of Douglas Gracey's personal staff was breaking up and it was right that a new PS(C), a Pakistani, should have the task of training their successors. First Wajahat Hussain and the following month Bashir Babar returned to their regiments. Though Douglas Gracey nicely pressed me to stay till the end of the year, I was anxious not to outstay my welcome and spent my last few weeks going around as many places as possible to say farewell to my friends. The Pakistan Air Force found room for me in a memorable Dakota flight down the gorge of the Indus to Gilgit with unforgettable views of the Himalayas and Nanga Parbat to be seen out of the porthole, and there were other nostalgic occasions in plenty before I left for home early in May.

I found it hard to collect my thoughts as I flew back to Europe again using the admirable KLM service to Amsterdam. I was more optimistic then about the future of Pakistan than subsequent events have proved. In the event, of course, Liaquat's assassination by a fanatic in 1951, coupled with the deaths, in an



air accident earlier, of Iftikhar Khan and Sher Khan removed too much talent too suddenly for Pakistan's promising start to be fulfilled. These losses were not only disastrous in themselves, but they produced gaps at the top of the country's affairs which meant people being employed in spheres for which they were not suited. Mahomed Ali, for example, brilliant civil servant and masterly Secretary General, was never meant to be a political leader, and predictably found the task too much for him. If Iftikhar had survived to become Commander in Chief, I doubt if he would have permitted the Army to get involved in trying to achieve political solutions\*. Sher Khan, too would have proved a badly needed force, working for sanity and moderation.

### CONCLUSION

India and Pakistan will do well to take a note of the irreversible mega trend in the evolution of mankind towards unity of man, global economy and earth citizenship. This trend has been summarised in the following words by an eminent scholar :

"The world capitalism is in a crisis. Crisis might take 25 to 50 years to play itself out and at the end of it we will see some new system created. ... The days of nationalism of hope (leading to the end of Colonial era) and nationalism of despair (noticeable in the experience of the USSR and ethnic/religion based national liberation movements) are also over".<sup>14</sup>

This surge of humanity towards a new age is supported by another eminent American playing a daily role to move the world towards a global economy. Rober Bartley the Editor of *Wall Street Journal* in a seminal essay on America's future role, opines that it should play a leadership role to "build international institutions appropriate to the world order waiting-to-be-born and to manage the friction it will create. It surely does not mean creating a new United Nations or other world-government-at-a-stroke. But it may well mean a broader application of the slow, step-by-step, eco-

---

\* In April 1992 when I presented a copy of my book "Military Coup"<sup>13</sup> to another excellent professional General Asif Janjua at a dinner hosted by him in his house at Pindi, it evoked great deal of laughter and jokes among the Army brass invited for dinner.



nomic first evolution towards unity we are already witnessing in the European Community".<sup>15</sup>

What is the new age waiting-to-be-born? The blue print for this era has been articulated in unambiguous terms by a man of infinite wisdom in India:

"There is only one nation, the nation of humanity;  
there is only one religion, the religion of love;  
there is only one language, the language of the heart;  
there is only one God, and he is omnipresent".<sup>16</sup>

Indians and Pakistanis owe it to their children and grand children to give up their hurts and hang-ups and work towards reconciliation. Once this happens Kashmir will become a bridge rather than a battle ground between India and Pakistan.

#### NOTES

10. Philip Ziegler in Biography of Mountabatten quotes Lord Birdwood's article in *International Affairs*, Vol XXVIII, No.3, (July 1952).
11. Quote by Noorani; from 'Sardar Patel's correspondence 1945-50', published in 1971.
12. M L Chibber, Lt Gen, *The Saviours of Ladakh*, under publication.
13. M L Chibber, Lt Gen, *Military Leadership to Prevent Military Coup*, (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1985). The central theme of the book is the case study as to why, with common heritage, the Indian Army has stayed apolitical and Pakistan Army under practorian.
14. Prof Immanuel Wallerstein, Director of Fernand Braudel Centre for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems and Civilisations at the State University of New York, Binghamton and President of World Sociological Congress in conversation with Mohamad Asif published in the *Sunday Times of India*, 6 April 1997.
15. *The New American Vision* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1991), is a collection of sixteen essays by eminent thinkers of America's role in the world after winning the Cold War. The quoted view is of Robert Bartley, who as the Editor of Wall Street Journal, was seeing virtually the daily progress in the integration of the global economy.
16. Sathya Sai Baba who spent a life time in a mosque and is now operating from a global centre to promote human values of truth, love, right conduct and equanimity. He is the Chancellor of Sathya Sai University at Puttaparthi near Bangalore, India.



## **Proliferation in India – Arms and the Man**

LT ASHISH KHURANA

### **INTRODUCTION**

**T**he relationship between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the effects of globalization and societal disintegration has been greatly under-researched. The dearth of serious inquiry into this phenomenon is all the more significant because such weapons continue to be commonly used in the violent civil and ethnic conflicts of the post-Cold War era. All the 34 major armed conflicts, documented during 1993 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), were fought with light weapons. 'Light Weapon' has been used as a generic term to describe all conventional munitions and explosives that can be carried by an individual or by a light vehicle.

Most light weapons do not require complex training or operational expertise, making them suitable for insurgents and irregular forces, which lack the formal infrastructure of a professional army. While organized groups, normally described in terms of their military activity, use the whole range of light weapons, criminal and other non-military requirements have traditionally involved only small arms.

The states are increasingly being dominated by internal conflicts, involving irregular as well as regular forces. In these conflicts major weapon systems are of less significance. It is a matter of national shame that India is enumerated amongst the countries worst hit by the illegal proliferation of weapons including machine guns, rocket launchers, anti - aircraft guns, missiles, grenades and explosives.

---

Edited text of the Essay which won the Second Prize in Group B of the USI Gold Medal Competition, 1996.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997.*



Many of these arms are the remnants of those provided by the USA to Afghanistan rebels via Pakistan. When the Afghan war ended in the 1980's, Pakistan's ISI began supplying them to militants in Punjab and Kashmir. China is said to have supplied arms to India's North Eastern states via Burma and, in the South, the LTTE smuggled in huge amounts of arms through the Tamil Nadu coastline.

The most significant development has been a shift away from AK-47s to RDX, in Punjab and Kashmir. Kashmiri militants declared last year as the 'year of explosives'. It is a potent terrorist weapon as it enables terrorist groups to suffer minimum injuries and inflict maximum casualties and create widespread terror.

#### BURDEN OF THE PAST

Since the early 1980s the CIA operatives had been buying hardware to feed the Mujahedin fighting machine. In 1983, 10,000 tonnes of weaponry was supplied to Afghan fighters and it rose to 65,000 tonnes by 1987. An estimated \$9 billion was spent by the US National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA to arm the Mujahedins. These arms were bought by CIA from different sources—Romania, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, China, Israel and East Germany. The arms were routed mainly through the ISI to Afghanistan. Massive amount of this weaponry was pilfered by the ISI functionaries and, according to an estimate, the agency had access to nearly 3 million Kalashnikovs two years ago. The rest of the arsenal ended up in the markets of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) where Islamabad's writ does not run. After the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, Mujahedin commanders and ISI intermediaries have made a profitable business out of this deadly stock. The markets of Darra and Landi Kotal on the Afghanistan - Pakistan border are awash with shoppers. There are MQM activists from Karachi and entrepreneur gun-runners who cross the border into India through the Rajasthan and Kashmir sectors. Guns are in fact the new gold of smuggling market. An AK-47 which costs about \$500 in NWFP can easily fetch \$1500 in Bihar or Bombay.



The collapse of the eastern bloc has also generated problems for the international community. Russia and other east European countries have curtailed their defence expenditures on call of their crumbling economies, but their small - arms manufacturing factories are still running. With state subsidies cut drastically, desperate factory managers in these countries are striking deals with anybody who can sell their wares, and many of these deals struck by middlemen end up in supplies to the subcontinent.

#### THE CONFLICT WITHIN - STATE SPECIFIC SCENARIO

The past fifty years have been marked by opposing socio-political trends in the national polity. On one hand, the country has become increasingly unified through globalization and modernization. These processes have promoted a sense of national integration and induced the spread of a universal culture. On the other hand, the state-system has experienced the growth of particularism and constructs of localized violence, accompanied by the empowerment of groups seeking socio-political fragmentation. Although there is a tenable correlation between these two phenomena, there is no simple cause-effect. Nevertheless, the question of a link must be posed since these contrasting images appear to be two sides of the same geopolitical coin.

In some states, Clausewitz's maxim that war should be regarded as "nothing but the continuation of politics by other means", is a stark reality. In many areas government has become the manager of conflict, opposition the insurgency and guerrilla activities a life-style. Unravelling the problem requires analysis of proliferation of weapons in these states, first in isolation, and then in contrast to each other:

- (a) **Kashmir** : A glance at a national daily or at the news, shows huge stocks of arms and ammunition seized by security forces on a regular basis. However, this is only a fractional part of the astounding cache of 20,000 assorted weapons seized by the security forces to date. This is enough to equip 24 battalions. Even more deadly is the seizure of



10,000 kg of explosives including RDX, which is sufficient to blow up all of India's major dams. The figures of the year gone by are indication of the phenomenal increase in the holdings of terrorist outfits: 1,689 kg of explosives, 2,348 AK-47 rifles, 3,746 grenades, 587 remote explosive devices and 100 rocket launchers. Such huge seizures notwithstanding the influx of weapons from the 778 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC) stretching along the Pir Panjal mountain range shows no sign of abating. Heavy troop deployments along with better LAC management have reduced arms smuggling to some extent, yet security forces continue to discover arms and ammunition from the militant hideouts. Of a plethora of over 100 Kashmiri militant outfits, four viz. Hizbul Mujahedin, Tehreek-ul-Mujahedin, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Ansar, are known to be fiercely pro - Pakistan and are understood to have large quantities of weapons. The modus operandi is:

- (i) Each outfit has its own conduit in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).
- (ii) The conduit liaises with the ISI for channelising weapon consignments through the vulnerable Baramulla and Kupwara sectors on the LAC.
- (iii) The Gujjars and the Bakarwals who live close to the LAC are conversant with the routes and act as guides.
- (iv) Once a weapons consignment reaches on the Indian side, it is dumped either in the Gujjar's house or in the forests.
- (v) The weapons are retrieved in small numbers depending upon the presence of security forces.

Of late, Jammu has become the country's most vulnerable stretch to arms smuggling. Especially since both Rajasthan and Punjab have undertaken massive fencing operations to demarcate their borders with Pakistan, Jammu is reported to be virtually flowing with smuggled arms, gold and narcotics. Difficult terrain and adverse climatic conditions make



physical domination of every inch of land impossible. An ambitious Rs 200 crore project to fence the 189 km stretch of border has been regularly thwarted by regular firing by Pakistan troops at construction personnel. Pakistan opposes a fenced border because it maintains that the Jammu stretch is not an international border as claimed by India.

(b) **Punjab** : The Punjab border, probably the country's most well guarded border, was financed with a huge Rs. 200 crore project during the height of Punjab problem. At that time it plugged a vulnerable point, in the flow of weapons. Yet the Punjab border is not peaceful for those guarding it. The pressure from gun-runners and narcotic smugglers trying to exploit the gaps is tremendous. What makes it more vulnerable is the damage caused to it due to constant efforts by Pakistan to change the flow of the Ravi and the Sutlej and most of the infiltration is carried out from these gaps. A recent change has been the increase of smuggling of RDX explosives instead of AKs. Although the internal security scenario in the state is brightening, a lot needs to be done.

(c) **The North-East** : For the last 40 years or so insurgency has been simmering due to well organized network for smuggling weapons. The jungle terrain, the three not-so-helpful neighbours and ethnic ferment have all been contributing to the success of the arms merchants. Recent seizures of and statements by arrested extremists clearly indicate the growing menace of arms trade as a threat to the stability of the region. A large number of insurgent groups and the shifting political scenario makes it very difficult to plan and implement a consistent security policy. After the Army's three operations in the region, viz. Operation Bajrang, Operation Rhino and Operation Golden Bird, there had been a temporary lull in the activities of ULFA. However, recent reports indicate not only regrouping but also a nexus being formed between various insurgent outfits; which is bound to make things more difficult for the security forces.

(d) **Bihar** : The Indo-Nepal border is 1,800 km long and porous with only 18 check posts existing along its length.



Across this, all possible contraband flows into Bihar. The regular seizure of locally made revolvers has not been new to the police, but what is alarming is the increasing seizure of AK-47s and other arms from criminals and political hoodlums. It is difficult for the law enforcing agencies to keep a check on violence, particularly during elections when private armies run by local politicians and musclemen roam at large. Nepal remains a crucial link in the chain of supply of arms to the state as it is easier to use it as a transit point rather than the heavily guarded western frontiers. Given the advantages, many international terrorist outfits have opened shops in Nepal and their goods continue to raise violence to alarming levels in the state.

(e) **Southern States** : Gun-running is an obvious factor that has helped sustain the Naxalite insurgency in the forest and hilly stretches of northern Andhra Pradesh, southern Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Of late these groups have acquired more sophisticated arms—a gift of LTTE, which extended its tentacles beyond Tamil Nadu after the former Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. Strong local support, difficult terrain and strict secrecy of sources by the Naxalites have been contributing factors to the unabated low intensity insurgency being waged in these regions.

#### ROOTS OF REGIONAL ARMS PROLIFERATION

The driving principle of terrorist movements is the belief that only through violent revolution can society be sufficiently changed to accommodate the interests of the disadvantaged. In such cases religious, cultural, ethnic and ideological factors act as points of focus and encourage popular mobilisation. Consequently, citizens and groups which either, no longer feel part of the state due to a lack of political participation and marginalisation from the society's legitimate economic activity or who perceive the state as being unable to provide them with personal protection, seek alternative security guarantees. This may be satisfied by an ethnic or political allegiance which supports an armed struggle against central authority. In other circumstances it may represent an illicit



activity, often centered on drugs and associated with increasing levels of criminal violence.

The overlap between these two areas of activity is becoming increasingly evident. The possession of firearms by private citizens can be a response to these developments. Where states are unable to provide a secure environment for their citizens or meet the prerequisite demands of basic needs, the proliferation of weaponry is both a principal consequence of, and a key contributor to, weak and ineffective governance.

#### OMINOUS TRENDS OF PROLIFERATION

The end of the Cold War has created a glut in the arms industries of Europe and North America, resulting in arms being dumped in the world market where demand is strong. The societal effects of these trends can be illustrated in terms of military and non-military developments in weapons proliferation.

(a) *Military Trends* : On the supply side, many of the stockpiles and weapons flow, initiated by the superpowers prior to the end of the Cold War, have been released from controls. A number of case studies illustrate the difficulty of controlling the transfer and spread of small arms once they enter the free-flowing supply and demand markets of the international arms trade. For instance the single important factor in the militarisation of Afghanistan, Pakistan and northern India was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the US pipeline of arms established in the mid-1980s to assist the Afghan Mujahedin insurgency campaign. In the post-Cold War era weapons from the pipeline have accumulated in the arms bazaars in and around the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and have reached as far as Bombay and the state of Bihar. The armoury of any terrorist organization today mainly includes:

- (i) AK or Kalashnikov type automatic rifles mostly of Chinese origin.
- (ii) Rockets and Launchers of the RPG 2, 7, 18, types of Chinese or Pakistani origin.



(iii) Grenades.

(iv) High explosives of TNT, PETN and RDX variety, especially plastic explosives that can pass undetected by metal detectors.

(v) Simple detonating electrical devices that can be assembled with minimum training.

(b) *Non-military Trends* : Non-military demand for weapons has traditionally come from criminal elements and private citizens. The type of weapons acquired have normally been small arms with limited levels of firepower. Numerous trends have now emerged against which the authorities and security forces must work hand in hand.

(i) Kashmir and Punjab militants are increasingly using RDX and other plastic explosives instead of AK-47s to cause maximum damage with minimum loss to themselves.

(ii) Naxalites and underworld dons are arming themselves with sophisticated weapons including assault rifles.

(iii) Fundamentalist groups in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh are acquiring AK-47s and explosives.

(iv) Reports of building up of a nexus between arms smugglers and drug peddlers is a major problem for the administration.

#### SOCIAL IMPACT OF PROLIFERATION

The extent to which light weapons have proliferated has been consistent with the changes in the nature of conflict, and the security priorities which determine modern trends in human development. However, the scope for killing is not subject to the calibre of weapon possessed, neither is the inclination to kill predetermined by the possession of weapons. As highlighted by Deng Xiaoping, "Civil war does not necessarily require guns and artillery; fists and wood bats can also be wielded ferociously." In other words, if people are determined to kill, they will use whatever means are at hand. One of the bloodiest conflicts in the



period since World War II was between Hindus and Muslims at the time of India's partition. Millions were slaughtered with no more than pitchforks, knives and bare hands. However, what has become apparent is the creation of greater opportunities for the use of lethal weapons. The changes which are thus emerging in the society due to unchecked abundance and availability of arms and ammunition are :

(a) *Erosion of personal security* : Protracted social conflict and violent crime resulting from failed or failing social structures, erodes personal security by posing a constant threat to life. The fear of violence becomes pervasive, altering communal psyche and changing the behavioural patterns of individuals. To varying degrees, freedom of movement is restricted. The threat of violence widens the gulf between rich and poor, and erodes respect for human rights. Militarisation and brutalization destroy levels of tolerance and normative perceptions of human dignity, inviting increasingly widespread acts of rape, torture and other forms of repression.

(b) *The breakdown of law and order* : The availability and use of sophisticated weapons has contributed to the erosion of state authority. It is clear that the proliferation of arms is, in part, a response to demand for personal security when normative social relations collapse.

(c) *Nexus with narcotics related crimes* : Law and order problems have been increasingly linked to the proliferation of drugs and the empowerment of drug gangs. Drug related violence is evident at a number of levels. At the social level, the violence takes three forms. The violence of criminal gangs determined to protect their interests. Violence against people and property by drug users to pay for their habit. The violence perpetrated by individuals under the influence of drugs. The gun culture which has developed around drug traffickers, is due to the need for arms to protect the vast profits to be made from the trade in narcotics. Drugs and guns are transported using the same clandestine routes. Further, the proceeds of drug trafficking provide easy financial assistance to the terrorist outfits for buying arms and explosives.



(d) *Militarisation of daily life* : With the widespread availability of weapons, the society is becoming increasingly militarised. Militarisation includes the presence of heavily armed policemen or soldiers patrolling streets, military personnel occupying high government posts, military censorship, armed guards in schools and public buildings, armed checkpoints along roads and curfews. The most overt consequence of societal militarisation has been the realisation of cultural militarism and the horizontal diffusion of weapons throughout communities.

(e) *Emergence of the reign of terror* : The easy availability of modern weapons and the changed nature of the use of violence has polarized ethnic, religious, economic and political differences in regions of spiralling structural collapse and blurred the distinction between civilian and combatant. The rapidity of firepower and the ability to expend more ammunition in a shorter span of time offers a new set of tactical options, as killing capabilities become more efficient, subsequently resulting in a greater sense of civilian terror. This effect was utilised during the 1980s by the Khalistani movement in Punjab. In a region where the ethnic balance between Sikhs and Hindus had traditionally been even, a strategy based on a campaign of terror and murder, was aimed at tilting the balance in favour of the Sikhs. This was made possible after 1984, when Sikh militants became better equipped with more sophisticated armaments.

#### THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROLIFERATION

Salvadorian psychologist Ignacio Martin-Baro suggests that the excessive militarisation of a society leads to a 'mental militarisation', by which violent responses to social problems become the norm. The highly militarised nature of communities can profoundly colour individuals' perceptions of reality. The dual sense of fear and empowerment, which the widespread use of armaments brings to groups and individuals, can disrupt rational decision-making processes and destroy perceptions of non-violent options to conflict resolution. The result is societal brutalisation and the collapse of traditional value systems.



The gravest direct consequence of this is the number of human rights violations that are committed in regions of extreme structural violence, particularly where state forces are waging counter-insurgency campaign. Militarisation - both actual and perceived - has meant both sides in Kashmir have the erosion of respect for human rights. The nature of guerrilla warfare and the perceived widespread proliferation of weapons in areas known to be havens for insurgents, obscures any distinctions that could be made by government forces between armed terrorists and innocent civilians. The greater militancy illustrated by Kashmiri insurgents resulting from better supply of arms has prompted the security forces to use harsher methods in maintaining control.

Social disintegration, linked to gun-culture is reflected in areas affected by militarisation. It is poignantly illustrated in the behaviour and response of children. The militarisation of future generations which have known little else, other than processes of brutalisation and conflict, makes the rejuvenation of societies an even greater task to achieve.

#### CONTROL OF LIGHT WEAPONS

There are two ways of stemming the proliferation of light weapons. The first involves policy directives, aimed at establishing legislation which could stop or deter the supply of weapons; tackling the means of the weapons circulation problem. The second approach focuses upon the demand side of the light weapons equation; what is referred to as thinking about 'big' solutions and the interlocking aspects of security. Both approaches demand political will at the highest level.

The continued effectiveness of light weapons is dependent on a plentiful supply of ammunition. So far the emphasis has been to control the flow of arms, and ammunition continues to be freely available. Efforts to control the market of ammunition could be given due thought. Indeed such a policy could extend to choking the smuggling of light weapons themselves. The most effective aspect of such a policy would be in stemming the tide of increasing narcotic - arms' interrelations. To what extent can



any gun-control regime be effective unless the political will exists to enforce it ? And to what extent can governments, which lack the institutional capacity to promote national cohesion, be expected to enforce any such regime? In this context more information is required concerning the trends in supply and demand and the conduits through which light weapons are transferred. This endeavour will have to be a pre-requisite to any effective control regime.

There is a need to re-examine the existing laws dealing with those in possession of arms illegally or those convicted in their dealings. The efforts of the previous government to implement TADA were viewed widely as a tool to harass all and sundry who got on the wrong side of any gun yielding policeman, and hence failed miserably. Fresh thoughts and efforts will, therefore, have to be put in, to come up with fool-proof legal solutions within the existing framework of democracy. At the same time it is necessary to ensure that the implementers of these laws do not misuse their powers.

This brings the discussion to the 'big' solutions. In general terms, it is evident that degrees of national stability, the strength of democratic institutions and levels of human development are key factors in determining levels of societal violence and trends in the demand in weaponry. These considerations beg for a policy which addresses the root causes of the conflicts. The 'big' solutions require government to look at the system in a way that departs from traditional concepts of state - centre policy and narrow party interests. As a result, one of the main issues is eliciting sufficient 'political will', to address these structural problems.

Ultimately, the 'big' solutions are concerned with addressing the factors which cause a crisis of sovereignty in the national system. Increasingly, this has meant developing strategies which will prevent the conflicts in which light weapons proliferation becomes endemic and, consequently, deter the corrosive societal effects which are associated with their use. In these terms the authorities must engage to make preventive diplomacy and pre-



ventive development twin agents in a holistic approach to establishing a more stable national environment. It is clear that the major political parties have a duty, borne of humanitarian obligation and ultimately, an awareness of their own self-interest, to putting such a strategy in place.

## CONCLUSION

While it is obvious that there is a correlation between light weapons proliferation, societal violence and the general weakening of the social fabric, identifying the exact nature of this relationship in any one situation or universally is problematic. In addition, very little is known about the international trade in these weapons and the true extent of societal militarisation. Two observations have come to light in this connection. Firstly, the proliferation and use of light weapons and small arms within societies can be seen as symptomatic of deeper problems within the fabric of these societies. Secondly, the availability and use of these weapons affect the pace and direction of societal violence.

The *intensity* of 'low intensity warfare' is highly destructive and corrosive, and strikes at core elements of societies. The loss of life and burden of casualties add further stresses to weak health care systems, demanding rehabilitative structures that are difficult to furnish readily. The need of the hour is to view these developments in a broader context and not in isolation. There are, for example, many multi-ethnic states which have successfully managed the unrelenting forces of terrorisation and whose integrity has been maintained, while there are incidents of localised violence in which the ethnic or ideological element plays no part.

As Dharam Ghai and Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara suggest : "The combination of institutions, laws, procedures and norms, which allow people to express their concerns and fight for their interests within a predictable and relatively equitable context, forms the basis of good governance." Efficient administration of public resources is an additional element in this definition. And the entire edifice of good governance ultimately rests upon a legiti-



mate use of power. Public authority must be sanctioned by the consent of the governed.

#### REFERENCES

- i) *India Today*, 15 Feb 1996.
- ii) *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 Sep 95.
- iii) "The diffusion of small arms in Pakistan and northern India", *The Economist*, 24 Mar 94.

### NOTICE

Members interested in undertaking research projects under the aegis of the Centre for Research, may submit research proposals through respective Service Headquarters, or to the Director, for consideration by 31 Dec. each year. At present, three chairs have been instituted for one year projects, namely Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair, Admiral RD Katari Chair and Air Marshal Subroto Mukherji Chair. A fourth chair, the Prof DS Kothari DRDO Chair is intended to be instituted shortly. Final approval of projects will be the prerogative of the Board of Management, taking into account the views of Service HQ and DRDO, where necessary. In due course, it is hoped to increase the scope for research activity, including some two-year projects undertaken by serving officers on study leave. Copies of the Rules for Award of Fellowship Grants and Conduct of Research, may be obtained from the USI.



# Central Asia

## A Historical Perspective

### PART I

LT GEN E A VAS (RETD)

In 328 BC, Alexander's Greek army, on its way to India, referred to the lofty hills lying on the north-western approaches by its oldest recorded name, Paropanisus: "higher than the ceiling of an eagle's flight". At that time, the crossroads of civilization were not through Rome to Europe, but the area around the Oxus (or Amur Darya) and the Indus rivers. This region, known as Transoxiana, has been the theatre of decisive events in mankind's affairs from the dawn of history. Men have been crossing the arduous passes in the region in both directions on every kind of errand: as migrants, refugees, travellers, invaders, merchants, missionaries and as pilgrims. Alexander obtained the submission of the area lying south of the Oxus river; a region which was referred to as Bactria (see Map 1). He planted a Greek colony here. The historian Herodotus mentions that the region was occupied by tribes which bore the name Pactyes, a word that is almost identical with the present-day name Pakhtuns (alias Pathans).

In the age of aeroplanes and cars, this ancient route is less frequented. This has led some to assume that the region's remote location no longer gives it any major role in world affairs. However, events in the latter part of the 20th Century have proved otherwise. An examination of the past may help to explain why this is so.

#### PRE-ISLAMIC BACKGROUND

By 70 BC, Menander, one of the most powerful of the Greco-Bactrian kings, had established his capital at Kabul which had once been part of the Ashokan Empire. Menander is referred to

---

Lt Gen E A Vas, PVSM retired as Army Commander. He is the author of six books on various subjects such as Terrorism, Insurgency, History and Geography. He is an associate member of the Pune Initiative for Peace and Disarmament (PIPAD).

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, USI CXXVII, No 529, July-September, 1997.



as Melinda in Buddhist works of that period. He was a pious follower of the Dharma. The social situation in Baktria and West Asia was changed by the appearance of the Sakas (Scythians) a tribe of Turki nomads who were pushed out of their pastures around Samarkand by another northern nomadic tribe called Kushans. Saka emigrants began trekking southwards and over the next 100 years, spilled over into Partha and Baktria, crossed the Indus and established themselves in the Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujrat; some claim that their blood and spirit has been inherited by the Marathas.

During the Kushan era, the north-western defences of Hindustan ran along the hills of modern Afghanistan; these ranges came to be named the Hindu Kush. There are two versions of the origin of this name. According to the Afghan scholar Rabbi Pazhwak, "when the Aryans moved from the plains of Bakhtar and reached the Himalaya (sic), they saw many rivers of clear water flowing from these ranges... they named the mountains Hindu Kush. (Hindu=sindu=river; kush=originator of)." This theory is not supported by Greek historians who make no mention of the name Hindu Kush and named the range Paropanisus. There is another version in which the word "kush" means "death" (as it still does in Pashtoo). Thus this battlefield was named Hindu Kush (death to the Hindus) by the invading Huns in memory of the Indo-Aryan defenders who thwarted their initial aggressive ambitions on this strategic frontier.

But it would be wrong to look upon all the early immigrants from Central Asia into India as invaders. The Saka, Kushan and other Turki tribes of Transoxiana were probably those to whom Ashoka's missionaries had carried the message of the Good Law. Buddhism did not, as Ashoka hoped, prevent war, but it made India of that period the most religious country in the world. Thus, many of the nomadic migrants must have entered India, not as barbarous conquerors, bent on rape and plunder, but as disciples of the Shakya Prince pressing forward to their holy land, as the European Jews towards Palestine.

By the middle of the First Century BC, the Kushans had won



political supremacy over Afghanistan and all the mixed population of the Indian border lands. They brought law and order to that unsettled region which formed the half-way house between India and Europe on one side, and India and China on the other. The Mongolian connections of the Kushans gave impetus to the spread of Buddhism in China and at the same time, the Hellenistic culture of West Asia imbibed Buddhist idealism which influenced the ritual and folk-lore of Christianity. Because the Kushans were always under military pressure from the warring tribes of Central Asia, they shifted the centre of their political power from Kabul to Purushapura, modern Peshawar.

#### ISLAMIC BACKGROUND

Islam has been a powerful historical nation-making agency; the Arab, Berber, Indo-Aryan, Afghan, the Seljuk Turks of Anatolia, Greco-Roman Albanians and unruly Central Asian tribes were all reborn as nations under the impact of Islam. From that point of view, Islam's influence has been more powerful than Hinduism and Christianity in the medieval period. This is because Islam offers a strong religious, social and cultural framework to a backward people and furnishes a common goal to mutually antagonistic tribal elements. But we would recognise that Islam's rigid frame functioned less effectively when this was imposed upon sophisticated cultures and societies as was evident in India and Persia (Iran). History shows that the cultural and social influences of man have always proved stronger than any religion or ideology, and it was no exception in Islam. In West Asia we have seen a Turkish revolt against Arabicism under Mustafa Kamal; from all that turmoil emerged the twin streams of Arab and non-Arab Muslim nations each with numerous sects and rival groups within the fold of Islam. Nearer home, the predominance of the social and cultural factors was evident in Bangladesh where the power of the mullah was muffled by the growth of nationalism which made the Bengali language its chief weapon.

Apart from social and cultural factors, there were ideological differences arising from succession issues which resulted in the great divide between Shia and Sunni. The latter maintain the



validity of the first four Caliphs, the Shias pronounced them usurpers and assert the claim of Ali. When the House of Ali lost the competition for the Caliphate, Shias still perpetuated their own existence as an embodiment of frustrated ambition. They attempted to broaden their base by identifying themselves with the non-Arab subjects of the Caliphate against Arab ascendancy. The Persians were the most important and advanced non-Arab Islamic community. Thus, from the 8th Century onwards we find Persia producing a Shia dynasty.

The rise of several rival Sunni and Shia Islamic dynasties in West Asia also saw the rise of a non-Muslim nomadic dynasty in Mongolia which lies north-east of Transoxiana. This geographically remote area fulfils a strategic function which belies its isolation. It is what Sir Halford J. Machinder, the founder of geopolitical thinking would have called a true "geographical pivot of history". Mongolia is the heart of the Asian continent. Thus, when due to a combination of circumstances (the organising ability of Genghis Khan, a cycle of favourable weather with a resulting improvement of the Mongolian pastures, an increase in fodder and a sharp rise in the nomadic herds of horses), the Mongols launched their military campaigns in the 12th Century, they succeeded within 50 years in overrunning the newly formed Muslim emirates of West Asia and conquering most of the known world. It is only when they reached the threshold of Central Europe, that they found themselves too extended for their primitive and nomadic form of organisation and supply.

#### THE SUNNI-SHIA DIVIDE

It took the Islamic world several decades to recover from the shattering effect of the Mongol invasion. When the dust settled down, two centres of Islamic power emerged: the Turk (Sunni) Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and the (Shia) Persian Empire. Some Mongols, when they withdrew to Transoxiana, took Islam with them. In due course, a Muslim descendant of the Mongols, Timur or Timurlane (1336-1405) established a Transoxianian Empire and proclaimed himself champion of the Islamic tradition against the paganism and barbarism of the lesser nomads. The main



cause of Timur's failure to impose Islamic civilization upon the Eurasian Steppe was his inability to stick to his aim. Instead of turning north and westwards he turned southwards to loot the neighbouring Muslim powers in India, Syria, Persia and Angolia. He sacked and destroyed prosperous cities that he met on his way. With the passing away of Timur in 1405, his Transoxianian Empire disintegrated into several small kingdoms. However, the Ottoman and Persian Empires revived.

In the 16th Century, the Turks of the Ottoman Empire in Angolia wanted to link up with their Turki ancestors in Transoxiana. Their southern approach was blocked by a hostile Persian Empire which had expanded its Shia rule northwards into Parthia and Baktria. They, therefore, attempted to open a route north of the Caspian Sea, across the Volga River, through the area of modern Stalingrad. This attempt was foiled by the Russian Army. (By this stroke, the Russians isolated Transoxians until they found it convenient to annexe this relic of the Islamic world to the Russian Empire some 300 years later).


At the start of the 16th Century, the Uzbeks occupied Baktria and Samarkand and began expanding their rule. Under Uzbek pressure a minor Timurid prince, Zahir-ud-din Muhammed, nicknamed Babur (lion) was forced to abandon his small inherited fiefdom of Farghana, east of Samarkand and flee to Afghanistan as a refugee. Ismail Shah of Persia sent an envoy to Babur with an offer of friendship and military aid. Ismail seems to have made his military aid conditional upon Babur's conversion to Shiaism. The details of these negotiations are not known as Babur's Sunni descendants have drawn a discreet veil over these transactions and these relevant sections of Babur's Memoirs are "lost".

In 1511, Babur supported by Persian forces went on the offensive and reoccupied Samarkand. In his over-confidence, Babur returned Ismail's auxillaries to Persia. But Babur's public display of Shiaism shocked the Sunni public, and he found that his subjects were against him. Babur's forces were defeated by a Sunni faction and he was once again forced to flee to Afghanistan where he established the Kingdom of Kabul. From here he



turned towards Hindustan when invited by Lodhi's Muslim chieftains to reassert his right to the sovereignty of Delhi derived from his grandfather Timur. Thus was established the Mughal dynasty and its eventual domain over almost all of India for 300 years.

When we translate the Sunni Shia cleavage into modern geographical terms, we find that it cuts right across the Islamic zone. Shiaism occupies the whole territory of Iran with outposts in Iraq and India. This Iranian wedge splits the Sunnis into two groups which are geographically isolated from one another: to the east are the Sunnis of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India; to the west are the Sunnis of Turkey, Arabia, Syria, Egypt and north Africa.



Map No. 11



## China's Armed Forces Role in Trade and Commerce

B RAMAN

**C**hina's budget for 1997-98, approved by the National People's Congress on March 2, 1997, has projected the total revenue at US \$ 101 billions, an increase of 14 per cent over the preceding year and estimated the expenditure at US \$ 108 billions, an increase of 13.3 per cent, thus leaving a deficit of US \$ 7 billions as against US \$ 6.5 billions in the preceding year.

The budget has provided for a defence expenditure of US \$ 9.7 billions as against US \$ 8.6 billions in the previous year, representing an increase of 12.7 per cent. Part of the increase was meant to neutralise the expected rate of inflation of 6 per cent during the year.

The total value of China's GDP during 1996 was estimated at US \$ 816.81 billions, an increase of 9.7 per cent over the figure for 1995. The total State revenue during 1997-98 would thus amount to about 12 per cent of the GDP.

A curious aspect of the Chinese economy is that while the GDP growth rate has been steadily sky-rocketing, the proportion of the tax revenue as a percentage of the GDP has been taking a nose-dive, declining from 26 per cent in 1978 to 12.8 per cent in 1993, 10.7 per cent in 1995 and a meagre 9.8 per cent in 1996. It remains to be seen whether it actually goes up to 12 per cent this year, as anticipated in the budget.

This steady decline in State revenue since the launching of the economic reforms in 1978 has been attributed partly to the various tax exemptions granted to foreign investors and partly to the reluctance of the affluent coastal provinces to contribute more to the central tax revenue in proportion to their increasing wealth.

---

Mr B Raman is the Director, Institute of Topical Studies, Chennai and a former Additional Secretary, Government of India.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997.*



Short of funds to meet the increasing demands of the armed forces, the Chinese leadership has been constrained to let them enter trade and commerce through companies floated by them in order to augment their budget.

Explaining this policy, Mr. Andrew Tanzer, an expert on China, says "It was a sophisticated way for the army to revert to the ancient military practice of living off the land. The Chinese military has a long tradition of self-sufficiency dating from pre-Revolution time."

Mao Zedong made the People's Liberation Army (PLA) live off the land to meet its needs and Deng Xiaoping made it live off trade and commerce in order to meet the shortfall in resources.

Analysts believe that the defence allocations as revealed in the budget released to the public constitute only the tip of the iceberg and that major items of defence expenditure such as those on procurement of equipment abroad are not fully revealed.

Their assessment, therefore, is that China's total defence spending is not less than 5.4 per cent of its GDP. The lack of transparency in budgetary figures has resulted in widely conflicting estimates of what could be its real defence expenditure.

A Pentagon study of 1995 had tabulated the varying estimates of China's defence expenditure by different sources as follows:

SOURCE	ESTIMATE
(a) The US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency	US \$ 50 billions.
(b) The Pentagon	US \$ 38 billions.
(c) The International Peace Research Institute of Stockholm	US \$ 10 to 28 billions.
(d) The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London	US \$ 22 billions.
(e) The Central Intelligence Agency	US \$ 18 billions.



In a recent book *The Coming Conflict With China*, Mr. Ross Munro and Mr. Richard Bernstein, former *Time* magazine journalists, have claimed that China's actual annual defence expenditure should be around US \$ 87 billions. This, however, appears unrealistic.

Assuming that the actual defence expenditure is definitely more than the figure shown in the budget, many analysts have been undertaking enquiries and research to establish wherefrom the balance of the expenditure is met, at least partly, if not fully, and identified a large number of companies floated or controlled by the Chinese Armed Forces whose profits and other earnings supplement the funds available for the procurement of new weapon systems and technologies abroad, the welfare of ex-service-men and their families and other defence-related purposes, as well as companies and establishments controlled by the State Council and not by the PLA, a part of whose profits is added to the defence expenditure without being reflected in the state budget released to the public.

There are conflicting estimates of the total number of companies controlled by the PLA and its subordinate units and their earnings. According to a study by Mr. Michael Sheridan, the Hong Kong correspondent of the *Times* of London, the PLA operated about 50,000 business enterprises in 1996 with annual earnings of Pound Sterling 3 billions.<sup>1</sup>

Amongst its business enterprises identified by him were private nursing homes for foreign businessmen, hotels for foreigners such as Beijing's luxury Palace Hotel, the franchise for the sale of Baskin Robbins ice cream all over China, telecommunication services, pagers and mobiles etc.

According to him, the company Xinxing, controlled by the PLA's General Logistics Department (GLD), was the joint venture partner of Western companies in 17 ventures and it ran all over China more than 100 factories employing over 100,000 workers in sectors ranging from steel to cosmetics. The 999 Enterprise Group, also controlled by the GLD, runs 25 manufacturing units in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone across Hong Kong.



Mr. Tai Ming Cheung, a Hong Kong-based China analyst of the Kim Eng Securities of Singapore, has estimated the total number of business enterprises controlled by the PLA as about 15,000 only, but with an estimated annual revenue of US \$ 10 billions and profits of US \$ 3 billions.

According to Mr. Abraham Rosenthal of the "*New York Times*", "the great part of US business in China is with companies and cartels controlled by the Chinese military." Ms. June Teufel Dreyer, a specialist on the PLA at the University of Miami, has described the PLA as "an entrepreneurial army".

No figures are available regarding the total number of business establishments directly controlled by the State Council and not by the PLA and their annual earnings and profits. However, experts surmise that about 30 to 40 per cent of their net profits is diverted to supplement the defence budget.

The State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of China are well known for their inefficiency and wastage and authorities admit that only a half of them make profit. The efficiency and profitability levels of the PLA and State Council owned enterprises cannot be much higher than this. It would, therefore, be reasonable to estimate that the total flow of profits from these enterprises to the defence budget cannot be more than at the most US \$ 4 billions—US \$ 3 billions from the PLA-run enterprises as estimated by Mr. Tai Ming Cheung and another US \$ one billion from the enterprises controlled by the State Council.

Conservative circles in the US allege that in addition to these business profits, these companies have also been raising large amounts from the bond markets in the US and other Western countries and Japan, a part of which goes to meet the procurement needs of the PLA.

Mr. Roger Robinson, a former member of the staff of the US National Security Council during the Reagan Administration, estimates that between September 1989 and December 1996, Chinese companies raised at least US \$ 6.75 billions from the



bond markets in the US and US \$ 17.2 billions in Japan. Mr. Thomas J. Bickford, Professor of Political Science at the Wisconsin University, has alleged that "accessing the US bond market is just one way the PLA can raise the money to purchase the most modern military equipment".

It is believed that of the amounts raised in the bond markets, not more than about US \$ one billion was meant for companies controlled by the PLA. If one adds all these-US \$ 3 billions per annum from the profits of PLA-owned enterprises, US \$ one billion per annum from the State Council controlled enterprises and another US \$ one billion per annum from the funds raised in foreign bond markets—the actual defence expenditure should be at least about US \$ 15 billions-US \$ 9.7 billions reflected in the budget and the balance from the business enterprises not reflected in it. Presuming that some of the proposed defence expenditure from the tax revenue might be concealed in the demands for grants of other Ministries, the total defence expenditure should be around US \$ 18 billion as estimated by the CIA and the much higher estimates made by other agencies and analysts could be wide off the mark.

It is not only the PLA which runs a vast business empire to augment its funds. The Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), which collects external intelligence, has its own business enterprises too which are used for adding to its budget as well as for providing a business cover to its intelligence operations.

However, only very few of the enterprises controlled by the MSS have so far been identified. Among these are the China Resources (Holdings) – ostensibly owned 100 per cent by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation but reportedly controlled by the MSS and the First Bureau of the Chinese Military Intelligence Department; the China Resources Enterprises, Hong Kong – owned 57 per cent by China Resources (Holdings); Beijing and the Anran Company – reportedly owned 100 per cent by the MSS.

The *Sunday Times* of London had quoted Mr. Nicholas



Eftimiades, reportedly a China expert of the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), as follows: "A Vice-President of the China Resources Holding Company in Hong Kong is traditionally a military case officer. This officer co-ordinates the collection activities of other intelligence personnel operating under (China Resources) cover."<sup>2</sup> The name of the Anran Company figured in September 1996, in reports regarding its attempts to acquire a gambling casino monopoly in Macau.

All these companies, whether controlled by the PLA, or the State Council or the MSS, play an important role in the procurement of technology from abroad and collection of scientific, technical and technological intelligence. For this purpose, they float a number of smaller companies registered abroad.

In his book *War By Other Means*, Mr. John J. Fialka of the *Wall Street Journal*, has stated that about 450 Chinese companies are under investigation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on suspicion of economic espionage. Mr. Jeff Fiedler, a US trade union leader who has been carrying on a campaign against the alleged overseas business empire of the PLA, has alleged that at least 1,200 front companies floated by the PLA operate in the US.

US trade union organisations have alleged that many of these front companies operate from the same address and are manned by the same staff. During enquiries last year, US authorities were reported to have found that the Asia-Pacific Services Inc, the Poly Technologies Connections, the Dynasty Holding Company, the Dynasty Holding Company of the USA, the Dynasty Holding Company of Atlanta, the H & D International Inc, the J.F. & D International Inc, the N.C. & D International Inc, the Novell International Inc, the Poly, USA, and the PTK International Inc, all registered by Chinese companies, had the same address and the same staff.

The Atlanta branch of Poly Technologies came under investigation for allegedly selling a large number of Chinese-made AK-47 rifles to individuals and gangs in California. Its President, Mr. Robert Ma, who fled the US before he could be arrested, had



reportedly served in the PLA for 16 years before resigning and joining the company.

The PLA's companies in China and their overseas branches also closely network with other business companies run by different departments of the Chinese Government and often have common officers, with PLA background, serving them.

The most active State-owned company of China is the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). It has two branches in Hong Kong called CITIC, Hong Kong, 100 per cent owned by it and the CITIC, Pacific, which is owned 45 per cent by CITIC, Hong Kong, with the other shares held by Hong Kong businessmen.

The CITIC, Beijing, and the Poly Technologies of the PLA are both headed by Mr. Wang Jun, son of the late Mr. Wang Zhen, former Vice-President. Mr. Wang Jun is a former naval officer, who was transferred to the CITIC, Beijing, when it was founded. As head of the Poly Technologies, he works under Mr. He Ping, a son-in-law of Deng Xiaoping, who is the head of a conglomerate called the China Poly Group. Mr. He Ping, who was also in the PLA, had reportedly worked for some years as one of the Service Attaches in the Chinese Embassy in Washington. Ms. Liu Chao-ying, a daughter of Gen. Liu Huaqing, senior Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has recently come under media scrutiny in the US for alleged association with some of the PLA front companies. She was reportedly a Major in the PLA before she went to the US.

In view of the large-scale and systematic use of business companies by the PLA and the MSS not only for augmenting their funds, but also for the procurement of technology and collection of intelligence, it is important that our intelligence agencies responsible for counter-intelligence, carefully build their data base on these companies and their modus operandi and their personnel.

#### NOTES

1. *Times*, March 9, 1997.
2. *Sunday Times*, November 10, 1996.



# I Participated in the Independence Day Celebrations on 15 August 1947\*

## *A Review of Events Thereafter*

MAJ GEN B D KAPUR (RETD)

**15** August 1947 was declared as Independence Day leading to many festivities. Among them the acme of all joys was the hoisting of the Indian National Flag for the first time and the person who was given the signal honour to carry out this function was Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten of Burma, assigned by the Prime Minister of Great Britain to liquidate the Indian Empire.

My wife and I were hustled along by the seething mass of humanity that had collected in the maidan to witness the ceremony. The excitement of the crowd became unmanageable; it broke through all police barriers and swamped Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the gilded horse-drawn carriage of Lord Mountbatten, the first Governor-General of Independent India. In the tumult neither of them could reach the Flag pole. However, as it was unfurled, the Governor-General gave a Royal Salute and the Prime Minister stood to attention to the strains of *Jana Gana Mana*.

The air reverberated with a sing-song of 'Mountbatten ki jai' (hail to Mountbatten) and 'Jawaharlal ki jai' and the crowd moved along with Mountbatten's carriage, who stretched out his hands to touch the fingers of all pushed towards him. Lady Mountbatten was seen hauling into the carriage not only Prime Minister Nehru but also many old men, women and children saving them from being crushed. All around, the day was celebrated with joy and fervour, shadowed only by the fact of Partition. Everyone awaited

---

\*Extracted from the book *Building a Defence Technology Base* (New Delhi : Lancers 1990) authored by Maj Gen B D Kapur (Retd).



the beginning of the new era with the hope that it would be an era of prosperity and plenty.

#### CHANGING PATTERNS UNDER THE NEW REGIME

The new regime came into full power. Everything must, therefore, change, change not because a change was required but because it had the sting of the British *Raj*, every vestige of their rule should be removed, Queen Victoria's statue must go, King George's adornment of the Kingsway should be removed, the Kingsway should be renamed: the Kingsway became 'Rajpath' and the Queensway the 'Janpath'. The Indian aristocracy should be abolished. The princes should go although it took the Congress many years to remove them. The Nawabs of Hyderabad should vacate their villas and palaces. With the loss of pomp and lustre of living by the privileged few of the country, after so many years of Independence, the same lustre is reminiscent in another form: now the Cabinet Ministers of the socialist government enjoy those privileges and grandeur of living in the houses built for the Executive Councillors of the Viceroy, and the President of India continues to live in the presidential estate of the erstwhile Viceroy of India.

Luckily for India, Jawaharlal Nehru became its first leader, a leader of towering strength and wide vision, an aristocrat among the 'Jail-birds', the latter's only aim being to evict the British from India. Nehru's strong and tender handling of his companions led to compromise in formulation of policies. But where the defence forces were concerned, even he was being swayed by his colleagues that the British traditions of officers' messes, where the officers sat at shining tables with a display of glittering silver, taut and upright in their tight and stiff uniforms and lived in cantonments, the special preserves of the British in the main towns of India, to segregate the officers and troops from the general run of masses, should be abolished. In fact, the political stigma about the Congress among the British was so strong that when I was commanding a regiment of trainees in Sialkot in 1942-44, it took me a long time to realize that if a recruit found that he had made a mistake by joining the Army, all he did was to have an anon-



ymous letter sent to me stating his affiliations with the political party, and I had to dismiss him according to the orders of my superiors.

In General (later Field Marshal) KM Cariappa, the first Indian Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the politicians found an equal. 'Kipper' as he was referred to generally, as an institution of British discipline and traditions having had his military training in Sandhurst in the early 1920s, a model of an officer, always meticulously turned out, who spoke every language with an English accent!

When 'Kipper' was fighting these 'battles' with the politicians, I happened to accompany him on a tour of Central India. Whilst carrying on a monologue on the subject he would rattle on "can't be done! can't be done!. These *dhotiwallahs* [referring to politicians] want us to sit on floors and eat our meals with hands and abolish the officers' messes? They want to do away with the cantonments there will be no discipline, there will be no Army left..."

True to his words, he not only retained the Officers' Messes and cantonments but designed very gaudy ceremonial uniforms for the general officers to sit at dining tables with mirror-like shine, in the sparkle of expensive silver trophies some of which bespoke of history, and, our ears blown out with bellowing bagpipes circulating round us! The cantonments now look more flourishing as the rich community has been permitted to build new bungalows with flowery gardens.

Kipper however did not find much favour with Prime Minister Nehru. He once showed me the rude letter the Prime Minister had written to him when he had sent him an assessment of the border situation cautioning the Prime Minister against the *threat from the Chinese and not Pakistan*. The latter, he maintained, with our superior forces we could easily contain. The loud slogan those days was 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' with photographs of Chou-En-Lai putting his arms round Nehru. Nehru had told Kipper to leave political matters to him. Events in 1962 when the Chinese caused the Indian debacle proved Kipper right.



Although we had senior Indian officers in the Army, the first two Commanders-in-Chief of independent India were British. The reason for this was revealed to me by Sardar Baldev Singh, the first Defence Minister of India. The Army abbreviations puzzled him: "I do not know what they keep talking about AG, QMG, CGS, etc." He said to me once, "Why don't you come and educate me". During one of these discourses, I asked him as to why he would not appoint an Indian as the Commander-in-Chief. He replied smiling: "You know every one of your senior officers if asked who should be nominated as the first Army Chief, would answer back that he would be the best choice! So I thought let us have British for some more time so that the Indians may settle down a little more". Hence General 'Bob' Lockhart and General Roy Bucher were the two that succeeded Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck before General Cariappa took over.

However changes in India were taking root; to be independent was not an easy task, its implications were too deep and serious to be realized.

#### BUREAUCRACY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

The momentum of wartime procedures maintained by a series of unexpected events - the local wars between India and Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir, in the Rann of Kutch and later the 'police' action in Hyderabad - kept the tempo of decision-making in the Army and the Government high. The relationship between the Services Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence was close and convivial, neither trying to dominate the other. With Sardar Baldev Singh as the Defence Minister in a democratic Indian Government, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck was the first to declare publicly his allegiance to him and so did his successors, General Bob Lockhart and General Roy Bucher. Auchinleck, dethroned from the position of the second key member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, subordinated his place to a Ministry of the Government.

Thus the Ministry of Defence became the administering Ministry of Services Headquarters, whose affairs and budgets it



coordinated, and took under direct care departments common to them and the Chiefs became responsible to the Ministry. So long as the British officers held the posts of the Chiefs or of Advisers and Directors, little change was noted in decision-making. However, as individual power politics began to emerge some changes became inevitable.

Another principle established on a strong basis and patterned on Whitehall practice was that a recorded *consensus* at a Director's meeting was the final say in so far as the professional decision was concerned. A superior officer may overrule (at his cost) or defer the decision, and the Government may delay consideration but few dare reject such recommendations.

On the other hand, at working levels the cooperation between the Ministry and the Services Headquarters could not have been better. Those days we had a simple device of pushing things through; when a case was held up in the Ministry, we would persuade the British Adviser or Director to give the due support required and the case would have a smooth sailing through the Secretariat chain!

Just as the Directors' recommendations were *sacrosanct*, due deference was given to General Staff Grade One (GSO-I) Officers' meetings, where again all attending would be of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or higher, the Chairman being a Lieutenant Colonel.

The above procedures established basic practices which not only expedited decisions but saved the time of senior officers who devoted themselves to policy matters. Having been a GSO-I during the tail end of the last War, the bulk of the routine decisions were taken by us. Once having obtained the confirmation of the senior officer concerned, we obtained financial approval at our level from the Assistant Financial Adviser, we processed the case with the Under Secretary in the Ministry and had the Government orders issued. In fact the system developed a pleasant atmosphere in that the *Services HQ Staffs were integrated with the Ministry at all levels. If it worked then why should it not work now? There was no such thing as equivalent ranks or levels between the Army and the Ministry.*



A major failing in our secretariat system, which has been the subject of open discussion in the Ministry and also of observation by an American Consultancy Team, led by Mr Appleby, needs elaboration. This particular deficiency did not show up in the early days when officers representing their Chiefs could discuss matters at all levels of the Ministry. Later when the dominance of the civilian secretariat subordinated the Services HQs and decisions could be taken only at the Chief's and the PSO's level, this shortcoming showed up. The reason was that any case emanating at top levels in Service Headquarters descended in the Ministry to the level of the Assistant 'to examine and put up'.

The pattern of operation of this system is exemplified in a story told of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. When he could not follow the noting on a file he sent for the Secretary, who expressed his ignorance of the subject and felt that the Joint Secretary concerned had examined the case fully. Accordingly the Joint Secretary was sent for, but he also could not explain the case satisfactorily. So down the chain the Deputy Secretary and then the Under Secretary, the last being the lowest officer in the secretariat chain, came in to say that although he had signed the first note, actually it was the Office Assistant who had prepared the note; others had dutifully initialled in their turn and passed the file up! Whether the story is true or not, it certainly brings home the failings of the present practice in the secretariat system.

Further, to smoothen the workings of complex and highly technical organisations, it is not unusual to integrate the staff from the Department concerned with the Ministry. This could be achieved by posting technical officers, who show secretariat capability, to the Ministry. The author of this Article, has had direct experience in this.

The decision-making machinery has deteriorated since independence. There is too much diffused authority. The major claims of democracy and bureaucracy lead to delaying matters. A complete overhaul is required of the present system which still attempts to operate on a worse plane than the Whitehall procedures it has inherited. Of course it would be incorrect to ignore



in a democratic system the role of the Minister in charge of decision-making.

#### CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the present political leadership is attempting to bring in fresh and young blood into politics. Some of the Ministers' appointments are a hopeful sign.

Whether such expedients in themselves are the answers to the direction of a society which is half-starved, hardly literate, which can be influenced by personality cults, into hopeful dreams of a future that may never come, only time will show.

*The 'Dawn of Freedom' has led to inevitable experimentation both in politics and the organization of bureaucracy. Everything new the first time raises hopes but frustrations follow when these do not materialize. Sometimes one felt that amateurs were at the game they had not quite learnt to play yet. Fumblings directed by common sense were common. Rather than draw on the lessons of others who had tried and failed in national emergencies, we have continued the bureaucratic games of hit and miss.*

Our rate of economic progress has been satisfactory for a developing country but with the enormous resources we have, some not yet fully exploited, we could achieve much higher standards. And this has not been because we have tried to become organizationally strong but because strong personalities have been imposed on the organizations and their direction, willy-nilly, was concerned with results. I have tried to analyse the role of these personalities as a management problem. It is the key to our march forward.




## **USI Rolls - Life Members Prior to Independence Day 15 August 1947**

India celebrated fifty years of independence on 15 August 1997. Those of us who have lived through the earlier days of free India, will recall how the entire nation looked forward with zeal, fervour and with a feeling of national pride, to the future. We have every reason to be reasonably satisfied with what the country has achieved during these five decades.

The United Service Institution of India was founded in 1870. The story of the growth of the USI is the story of the growth of the Armed Forces. Perusal of the membership list of the USI enabled us to focus on our distinguished members, who were on the rolls prior to 15 August 1947. It is considered appropriate to place on record their participation, in the activities of the USI of India. A write-up together with a photograph of each of these honoured members appears in this column of the Journal.

### **Gen K V Krishna Rao, PVSM**



Born on 16 July 1923, he was commissioned into the Army on 9 August 1942. He graduated from the Defence Services Staff College and the Imperial Defence College (now Royal College of Defence Studies) London. He served in Burma and NWFP during the Second World War, participated in the J & K Operations 1947-48, and commanded a battalion there. He commanded a brigade in Ladakh, an infantry division in the Jammu region and a mountain division in Nagaland and Manipur, which also participated in the operations leading to the capture of Sylhet and the liberation of Bangladesh. He was awarded the PVSM for "dis-



playing outstanding leadership, courage, determination and drive during the 1971 War.”


He has been an instructor at the NDA, General Staff Officer Grade I of a Division in J & K, and Instructor DSSC, Wellington. He was Chief of Staff, Western Command; Chairman of an ‘Expert Committee on Reorganisation and Modernisation of the Army’; Deputy Chief of the Army Staff; and General Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Command. He became the Chief of the Army Staff in 1981 and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1982. He retired from Service in July 1983.

He has been the Governor of the North Eastern States (Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura) and Governor of Mizoram. His second tenure as the Governor of J & K commenced in 1993 when the state was in turmoil and he is still there. He has been Colonel of the Mahar Regiment (1968-1983), Colonel of 61 Cavalry, Honorary Colonel of the Mechanised Infantry Regiment and the Brigade of Guards. He has served on a number of Committees including the special organising committee of the Asiad 1982 as the Deputy Chairman. He was Vice Patron of the USI during 1981-1983. He has served as an elected member of the USI Council.

He has visited Europe, USA, Canada, USSR, Africa and South East Asia, in addition to the neighbouring countries on different assignments.

His Book ***Prepare or Perish - A Study of National Security***, is considered a masterpiece by many in the field of national security.

#### **Lt Gen DS Kalha, PVSM**



Born on 5 April 1917, he was commissioned on 5 Oct 1940



in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (now ASC). He has held a number of diverse and vital command and staff appointments. He was the Military Attache to Afghanistan from March 1954 to August 1956 and an Instructor at DSSC Wellington, from Sep 1957 to October 1959. He took over as the Director Supplies and Transport at Army Headquarters on 20 May 1970 in the rank of Lt Gen and retired from Service on 4 April 1973.

During World War II he went for overseas Field Service (Iraq, Egypt and Italy) in July 1941. He was taken prisoner of war (POW) by the Germans in 1941 at Marsa Matruh (Egypt) during service with 25 Infantry Brigade Transport Company (10 Infantry Division) and was shifted to Italy. On his second attempt at escape, after hiding in the country-side for nine months, he was able to join the Allied Forces - 'New Zealand First Division' after the battle of Casino in Italy. He returned to India in 1944.

An outstanding sportsman, he played Hockey and Golf for the Combined Services teams. He was appointed the Manager of the Indian Hockey team for the Mexico Olympics in 1968, where India won the Bronze Medal. Later he served as Vice Chairman of the Indian Hockey Federation. He now resides at 861 Rajpur Road, Dehra Dun.

#### **Lt Gen B N Das, PVSM**



A King's Cadet at the Indian Military Academy, he was commissioned as a pre war regular officer in the Corps of Engineers in Dec 1940. He served in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) now in Pakistan, and in Assam during the Second World War. He was on the Directing Staff at the College of Military Engineering and the DSSC, Wellington. He took over as the



Director General Works in August 1967 and the Engineer-in-Chief Army in 1971. He coordinated and directed engineer support during the 1971 operations. He was appointed Honorary Army ADC to three Presidents of India from 22 June 1970 to 31 August 1975. He was awarded the PVSM on Republic Day in 1975.

He is a graduate of Staff College Quetta and National Defence College; Fellow of Institution of Engineers (India) and a Life Member of the Institution of Military Engineers. He organised the Centenary celebrations of the USI in 1970.

After retirement from the Army, he was appointed the Chairman and Managing Director of Indian Road Construction Corporation Ltd. He executed road construction contracts in Libya and Iraq. He visited UK, USA, Afghanistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and some of the countries in Africa and West Asia on different assignments.

#### **Major General BD Kapur**



Commissioned in the Indian Signal Corps in 1937, he was amongst the eight pre-war Indian officers in the Corps of Signals. The Signal Regiments then comprised 30 per cent British ranks, who held key technical appointments. He commanded 'B' Corps Signal Regiment, and was later posted to Sialkot in 1942, to raise a 'Signal Technical Training Regiment'.

He served in Burma during 1944-45. He was posted to the Armed Forces Headquarters in New Delhi in 1945 as Staff Officer, Grade I in the Signal Officer-in-Chief Directorate. As Chief Signal Officer (CSO) Southern Command, he made the Signal Plan of the Hyderabad "Police action". He was selected to lead



a team of inter-service officers with the object of "assessing the strategic importance of the Islands lying off the Western Coast of India."


After a brief stint in UK and Europe, he was instrumental in modernising the communication systems both in Southern Command and the Western Command.

In February 1952, he was appointed Director of Weapons and Equipment (DWE) at the Army Headquarters. He led a mission for purchase of weapon systems from UK, France and the USA for the Army.

He was appointed the first Executive Secretary of the Defence Production Board. On 1 January 1958, he was appointed the first Chief Controller of Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO). He was instrumental in the raising of 29 Defence Research and Technical Establishments in three years.

After retirement from the Army, in July 1964, he took up assignments with the UNIDO, FAO and Commonwealth Secretariat. The latter sent him to the East Caribbean countries to build up their economy. He was there for nine years. He has published a book on the genesis and build up of the DRDO - **Building a Defence Technology Base** - in 1990. A review of events after 15 August 1947, extracted from his book appears in this Journal.

### Brig GIS Kullar



Commissioned into the Indian Army in 1934, he graduated from the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. He served in eight different infantry battalions and commanded an infantry brigade and a parachute brigade. He was GSO-1 at Headquar-



ters Western Command and BGS at Southern Command at Poona. During the Second World War, he served as the Field ADC to a British divisional commander, and was the Brigade Major (BM) of 123 and 63 Infantry Brigades in South East Asia Command (SEAC). He took part in the fighting in the Kashmir Valley in 1947-48. He led the vanguard of Indian troops over land to get to the Srinagar airport before the Pakistanis did. In 1955, he served with the International Commission in Indo-China as the Deputy Chairman and Military Advisor to the Commission in Cambodia. He also served as the Executive Officer, American Peace Corps, in India during 1970-72.

Brig Kullar reminisces about those painful partition days, as he was posted in Montgomery in Punjab. He was in Command of 1 PARA in the Punjab Boundary Force. During the communal riots of 1947, he dealt with Muslim marauders firmly.

Brig Kullar is actively involved with many cultural and social organisations and is a committee member of the Indian Ex-Services League. He lives at 1512, Sector 33, Chandigarh-160031.

### **Brig R B Chopra**



Commissioned in mid 1936 from the IMA Dehradun, he was attached with 1 Battalion, the 22nd Cheshire Regiment for one year. He joined 1 RAJPUT in mid 1937. He has been an Instructor at Staff College, Quetta, during 1946-47. He was the first Indian Commandant of the 4GR Regimental Centre, in 1948. He was the DDMT from Nov 1948 to Dec 1949 and later the Director, Military Operations, at Army Headquarters. He attended the Joint Services Staff College course in the UK.



After taking premature retirement in March 1957, on medical grounds, he joined Tatas. Subsequently, he took over as the Chairman of Reckitt & Coleman of India Ltd. Once in the Corporate sector, he worked for a number of companies.

He is a keen Golfer, and was the President of Indian Golf Union from 1970 to 1972. He has been honoured by the Cheshire Regiment as an Honorary Life Member of its Officer's Association. Currently, he is the President of the 4th Gorkha Rifles Officers' Association.

**Brig SK Bose**




After serving as Commandant of the CME, Pune and IIT Bombay and IIT Kharagpur as Director, he has dedicated himself to the service of Sai Baba, in the Sri Satya Sai Institute of Higher Learning. He served a short term as UNESCO Consultant in Nigeria in 1962 and established an Engineering College in the University of Lagos. He also helped in setting up the Institute of Technology in Colombo, Sri Lanka. He was also responsible for preparing the project for the establishment of a College at Warangal which was later converted to the Jawahar Institute of Science and Technology, receiving UNESCO aid. He served as a member of the UNESCO team to advise the Government of UAE and Egypt on the feasibility of converting some of the technical Institutes into Universities. He was also involved in the establishment of a College of Engineering in the University of Monrovia in Liberia. He has worked as the President of Association of Indian Universities. He received a Degree of DSc (HC) from the famous MADI Institute in Moscow. He worked as a member of the World Federation of Engineering Organisations.



He is involved with the Sai Institute and his (Sai Baba's) teachings and has written numerous pieces on moral and spiritual education.

### **Lt Col NG Kulkarni**



Born on 15 Nov 1920, he was commissioned on 16 Jan 1944, in the then Royal Indian Army Service Corps (now ASC). He held various regimental and staff appointments and was actively involved in the 1962 operations. He also served with the International Commission in Vietnam.

He is now settled in Belgaum.

Other distinguished members on our rolls prior to the Independence Day, whose bio-data and photographs, we have not been able to get so far, are :

- |                            |            |
|----------------------------|------------|
| a) Lt Gen KS Katoch        | - LM 8803  |
| b) Maj Gen SC Mishra, PVSM | - LM 8420  |
| c) Maj Gen SC Chhachhi     | - LM 13798 |
| d) Brig Gurbux Singh       | - LM 9092  |
| e) Lt Col Teja Singh       | - LM 13732 |



## Siachin Glacier\*

TAHIR JEHANGIR\*\*

It was 8:30 in the morning as we were ushered into a small room at the brigade headquarters at Dansum near Siachin. An officer of the Pakistan Army began the briefing. He was pleasant, articulate, good humoured and in no way pompous or overbearing. There was no talk of our "invincibility" and the enemy's "cowardice". Just a straight forward recital of the situation on the ground - the difficulties faced by the army, its response and achievements.

The Siachin glacier is in the North East corner of the Northern Areas in our control. To the North is the Chinese border and to the East the Indian held Kashmir. The cease-fire line, or rather the "line of control" runs North from the Pakistan border to a reference point on the map called NJ9842. The original line then went from there across the Siachin to the Karakoram Pass and the Chinese border. The entire area (about 240 sq kms), now under dispute, was neither inhabited nor manned by either side.

In the late 70s the Indians sent mountaineering and skiing parties on to the Siachin - and we were blissfully unaware of it - at least officially. My friend Patti claims to have been on the Siachin in 79 and has photographs to prove it! The Pakistan army freely admits that its first information of the Indian forays on the Siachin came from international alpine magazine. In the summer of '84 the Indian Army launched an unannounced offensive and captured the Bilafond La and Sia La (mountain passes) and thereby were in full possession of the Siachin Glacier. These passes are in the Saltoro range which is to the South West of the

---

\*Extracted from *The Friday Times* (Pakistan) Aug 1-7, 1997, pp. 13-16.

\*\*The article is captioned-Tahir Jehangir visits the "death zone" where more troops are killed by the extreme weather conditions than by enemy action.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol CXXVII, No. 529, July-September, 1997.



Siachin Glacier. Now the front line or the 'line of contact' is actually along the Saltoro ridge - the Siachin is already in Indian hands.

"Our job is to hold the Indians where they are and make life as difficult for them as we can", explained the briefing officer. "When did you last engage the Indians?" asked a foreign journalist. "At this moment we are in battle at two points since early morning. On an average day we exchange 800 rounds of fire," explained the officer. "And why do you fire these rounds", inquired a female journalist - quite innocently. "To cause the maximum casualties", came the terse reply!

This brought home to us the gravity of the war. At Siachin two organised armies have been at war for the last ten years - and it is not a toy war - it's a real war with people dying and getting maimed on both sides.

"Our biggest problem is not the enemy but the environment" - meaning the weather and the terrain. The troops are deployed at heights of 16,000 to 21,000 feet. The highest mountains of Europe are lower than that! The IHEC camp, where troops are trained to operate at high altitudes, is at 19,000 ft. Most mountaineers, even Reinhold Messner, call the mountains above 6,000 meters (19,500 ft) a "death zone". They say the maximum period a human can survive without contracting cerebral or pulmonary oedema is 4 to 7 days. So they plan their assaults in such a way that they don't have to stay above that height beyond that period. In fact, Messner, while on his solo Nanga Parbat, was trapped by a storm at 22,000 feet on his descent. On the fifth day he got so desperate that he threw away the tent, store and food and made a "do or die" descent to base camp. He says he was hallucinating and could feel a crowd outside his tent trying to talk to him. Yet our troops, or for that matter the Indians, have manned posts like the Conway Saddle at 21,000 feet for over 10 years - winter or summer - and even slugged it out with each other! Of course, unlike Messner, the troops have access to oxygen, food supplies and medical care. Yet the toll is heavy. The officers freely admit



that most of the casualties were due to the weather - not enemy action.

The officers explained that medical science did not know much about oedima - why some people get it within hours at even 16,000 feet, and some don't for months. There is no cure - except to come down quickly off the mountain.

"One of our jawans spent three months up there without any problems, came back from leave, went back upto his post and displayed symptoms within hours," explained an officer.

"What are the symptoms?" we asked.

"A dry, racking cough is the first sign of pulmonary oedima. Loss of appetite, disorientation and a tendency for insubordination is a sign of cerebral oedima", explained the officer. I don't know about Siachin but I think there are plenty of cerebral patients around Lahore!

We were taken by a high altitude helicopter to the snout of the Belafont glacier - the chopper keeping low for fear of a missile attack. On the way to Dansum from Skardu, we flew over the Indus, Shyok and Saltoro rivers. As we flew over Gomal, the last settlement, we saw the patchwork of fields in hues of yellow, browns and gold as the crops ripened. Women were drying apricots, chillies and onions on roof tops, and there was a school with children sitting in neat rows out in the open. All blissfully unaware of the life and death struggle going on a few miles away. Soon we were over the glacier with its magnificent crevasses, lakes and debris of rocks and ice. The mountains on both sides were sheer and stark. So steep that climbing them seemed an impossibility, let alone conducting a battle after the climb.

The helicopter landed at Ghazeri (12,689 feet) and we were taken to a small officer's mess with a neat lawn in front. A marquee shaped like a parachute billowed in the wind. Regimental and Pakistani flags fluttered behind it adding colour to the stark mountains. We saw the troops perform mountaineering exercises like belaying, jummaring, traversing crevasses etc., with the help



of ropes and pitons familiar to mountaineers. Let us hope that from amongst our army personnel we will find a crop of mountaineers who will climb and explore our peaks.

At all times we were carefully herded to make sure we do not stray off. Photographs were permitted of select areas only. I can quite understand the army's fear of adverse publicity of any sort especially by foreign reporters. There is also the obvious security risk. In fact, it did not appear that the reporters were trying to find chinks in the facade. To their credit the ISPR Colonel and the field officers handled questions with such openness and in such a matter of fact manner that we were thoroughly disarmed.

After lunch talk returned to the difficulties and dangers of living at high altitudes. I decided to sneak off to see the every day life of camp - to find out what lay beyond the fence. To my delight I found patches of vegetables being grown and the jawans repairing and improving their dwellings - partially underground - as is the custom at these heights. Beyond the fence the streams meandered through the valley devoid of grass. There were hardy rose bushes, in bloom for the summer, everywhere. Lost in thought about men, mountains, and madness I was jolted by a breathless captain running after me.

"Sirrr...Sirr..., you are not supposed to go off like this... I am most worried about you", he said. He was obviously worried.

"The onset of cerebral oedema, Captain", I explained - and left it at that!



## Letters to the Editor

*Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.*

Dear Sir,

It was interesting to read the article "MIRROR MIRROR ON THE WALL" by Lt Gen Vijay Madan, who has dwelt on the issue of leadership in the June 1997 issue. The author has touched upon one of the critical issues that needs to be addressed urgently if we are to avoid military disasters in any future wars or engagements, both internal and external.

To say that the present day young officers are not as good as their seniors of yesteryears is not only escapist, it is also way off the bull's eye. Today's young officer is definitely professional and competent. He has been able to grasp the complex nature of counter insurgency operations, the prevailing geopolitical environment in the subcontinent and adjust to the switchover to high technology weapons and equipment being introduced into the Army. Thus he for his age, service and experience is certainly better qualified than his predecessor two generations before.

However, what must concern us is that while the young officer today is quite professional and competent he is also calculative. He wants to run before he can walk and higher echelons must accept that they are solely responsible for this state. For it is they who by their work culture, conduct and patronage to sycophancy have led him to believe that the way to prosper is to get good chits, good postings, find a Godfather and push ahead. The challenges of soldiering and the finest of all arts to lead men has been lost on him.

It may not be entirely true to say that the army man today is dissatisfied. His pride has been hurt and needs to be restored. No doubt his services, in keeping this nation together, are not



being acknowledged even by the so called knowledgeable sections of the society. Perhaps in years to come someone with sanity and voice will document and acknowledge the contribution of the Armed Forces in nation building.

There is a need to evolve attractive entry, wastage, promotion and respectable retirement pattern. The suggestion of reducing the entry level at NDA to 10 or 11 standard, extending the training duration accordingly and ensuring that the award of degrees is kept alive is worth pursuing. The aim should be to catch them young. Towards this end the 25 odd Sainik Schools, five Military Schools and RIMC should all be taken over and funded by the MOD and a curriculum so designed as to motivate the boys. This along with an attractive OTA short service package and the IMA direct entry, both technical and non-technical, can provide some answers to the officer problem in the Armed Forces.

No doubt the need to motivate men and JCOs to opt for commission must be realised and pursued vigorously. The unit and formation commanders must initiate steps to identify men with potential and groom them. The officer cadre must also learn to accept this entry of officers with grace respecting them for their experience and competence and not isolating them for their inability to speak English or for lack of social graces. All these measures, if progressed simultaneously, can provide the answers to this vexing issue.

The article by Lt Gen K Balaram on the "Problems of the Officer Cadre of the Army" provides for and makes some valid observations. Perhaps what is needed is a mix of the essence of both viewpoints and a speedy implementation.

Yours faithfully,

Colonel MR Pattar



## II

Dear Sir,

The article "Problems of the Officer Cadre of the Army" by Lt Gen K Balaram in the Apr-Jun 1997 issue has been very nicely thought over and written. However, I would like to bring up a few points.

The author says that the Armed Forces have lowered their recruiting standards. But till date neither the Armed Forces nor the Government of India have officially admitted this. In such a situation, how can the Armed Forces make this claim. But if what he says is true, then why the Armed Forces and the Government of India have been denying it all these years ?

It is the prerogative and responsibility of the Government to fix the terms and conditions of service of the Armed Forces personnel. There is a separate ministry (MOD) for this purpose headed by a cabinet minister. The soldiers should only concentrate on carrying out the orders that have been given and let the Government do its job the way it thinks correct. If the people are still not satisfied, then they should speak louder and ask for the stars, so that at least they get the moon.

Yours sincerely

Flt Lt SS Gahlaut

## III

Dear Sir,

The article "Problems of the Officer Cadre of the Army" by Lt Gen K Balaram, published in your Apr-Jun' 97 issue, made an interesting and thought provoking reading. But, I do not agree with the author's generalisation that the Direct Entry (Non Tech) officers by and large have never been of a good standard because the intake consists of people who could not make the grade elsewhere and joined the Army as a last resort, whereas 10 plus 2 type of intake into the NDA has been of a uniformly high standard.



Though one does not have access to the dossiers of officers maintained by the Military Secretary's Branch at Army Headquarters, one has analysed the latest results of No 4 selection board for 1980 batch Infantry officers; wherein the percentage of direct entry officers, who have been approved for the rank of Lt Col is higher than those of Ex NDA. Since the promotion criteria is essentially OAP (Overall Performance) based, it would not be incorrect to deduce that the direct entries are as good—if not better—as the Ex NDA.

Undoubtedly there has been a gradual decline in the quality of both the entrants ie. direct entry as well as NDA, for obvious and oft repeated reasons. However, it is also a harsh fact that the cream of the nation's youth has neither flocked to join the Armed Forces in the past, nor will it do so in the future. But then, do we really need the cream ? We basically need young men — or even women — who are physically fit, mentally robust and have the essential OLQ (Officer Like Qualities) to join us. Thereafter, it is our responsibility to train them hard and mould them into good officer material. Besides, charismatic senior officers like Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who can motivate the fresh intake by their personal charm and impeccable social and professional behaviour, may also help the cause.

Yours Sincerely

Maj Sunil S Parihar

#### IV

Dear Sir,

The article "Problems of the officer cadre of the Army", by Lt Gen K Balaram, in the Apr-Jun' 97 issue was thought provoking. He has analysed, very succinctly, the reasons for the shortage of officers in the Army. The suggestion to do away with the degree courses for technical arms and impart technical training at the NDA itself, is workable and merits consideration. However, the major problem remains the low intake in the short service cadre, for which no solution seems to be in sight.



There have been several suggestions, to encourage young men to apply for short service commission in the Army. They range from a 'Golden Hand Shake' to reservation of jobs in the public sector, or para military forces. Another option is to make it obligatory for all civil servants to serve in the Armed Forces, before joining the service. All are viable options, but unfortunately, none has been given serious thought.

The problem would be solved if five years service in the Armed Forces was made a mandatory requirement, for entry to all Central Government Services, such as the IAS, IPS, IFS etc. Today, the normal age of entry in these services is 28 years. Officers in the Army get their commission at about 22 or 23, so it would not have any effect on the age of entry. Obviously, the scheme will have some advantages, as well as drawbacks.

The Army would also get better material, for its officer cadre, than it gets at present. The civil services would also benefit, in many ways. Instead of a raw graduate, they would get a young man, who has spent five years in uniform, baked in the oven of hardship and adversity and, apart from self confidence would have imbibed the unique ethos of the military profession. He would be more disciplined, dedicated and loyal, than the freshman who joins the Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy at Mussourie today. It would also effectively screen out the doctors and engineers who are joining the civil services, and wasting their precious education and talents, in administrative jobs. Finally, he would have a little more backbone, than the bureaucrat of today, and be better able to resist the pressures exerted by corrupt politicians.

Let us now come to the drawbacks. Frankly, there aren't any. There may be a view that the overall quality of the civil services would deteriorate, but this is not really true. Once it is known that there is no other way to join the civil services, any serious aspirant will willingly go through it. Those who shy away may be regarded as unsuitable, and it is fair to assume that they were not serious contenders. Another argument against the scheme may be that it will reduce the chances available to a



candidate, for entry into the civil services. This can also be solved, by permitting the short service commissioned officer to continue serving for a maximum of ten years. He can start appearing for the entrance examination as soon as he completes his mandatory five years service, and will thus get five chances, which should be adequate.

The solution may appear to be simple, but it is likely to face opposition from the politician as well as the bureaucrat. The IAS lobby may feel that many brilliant students would be deterred, and may not opt to join the civil services. This may be true, but then it is debatable whether the civil services need the best brains at all, or they would be more useful in other professions. As for the politician, his opposition may stem from the fact that a bureaucracy with a military background is likely to be intractable, and more difficult to manage, than at present.

In the ultimate analysis, what is involved is not just the shortage of officers in the Army, but the security of the Nation, and there can hardly be two opinions about that. Unfortunately, it is 25 years since we last faced a threat on our borders, and had to shed blood to safeguard it. This has led to a sense of complacency, among the public, as well as the Parliament. Unless we want 1962 to be repeated, we must get out of the stupor and act. The problem will not be solved by increasing the salaries of Army officers, as some people advocate. In a democratic society, Army officers can never expect to be paid as well as executives in private companies and neither can the Nation afford it. But the Army needs officers, and the Nation needs the Army. This is a simple enough equation, which should not be difficult to understand, even for our politicians.

Your Sincerely,

Maj Gen VK Singh



## V

Dear Sir,

Lt Gen K Balaram's exposition on the shortfall in officer cadre of Indian Army in Apr-Jun'97 issue of USI Journal is very enlightening and timely. The factual position about the 'shortfall' over the years cannot be faulted. However, the annual rate of shortfall in its historical perspective has not been clearly projected. Present situation could well be due to a wrong diagnosis and corresponding approach and line of action.

It is admitted that there is NO shortfall of applicants but the 'suitable' material is not available or opting for Armed Forces as a career. Due to a very large number of applicants for 'direct entry', the type of material called for interview, perforce, has to be restricted due to the capacity of Services Selection Boards (SSBs) which invariably sets off a percentage cut off limit. Considering the widely accepted lacunae in our education and examination systems and availability of 'cultured' or 'coloned' percentages and degrees, the more suitable ones - with all round developed personalities in the middle level - 50 per cent to 65 per cent bracket never get called up for the interview. This is equally true in respect of lady officers recruitment. For recruitment through the UPSC, the malpractices in the examination centres preclude the more suitable ones from interview. The real genuine stuff would not be tempted to copy.

Perhaps the remedy for the malady lies in screening greater number of applicants through 'preliminary interviews' by scrutinising and assessing their apparent worth, the calibre, medical fitness and the genuineness of their degrees and percentages. After all no one can fault the system which was followed during World War II with a 'FILTER' of Permanent Commission Board at YOL Camp, which produced a post Independence cadre of well trained and competent hard core officers, without any shortages, who stood the test of time, till we lowered our guard and gauge as panic measure during post 1962 era - for recruitment as also for training.



Personally, I am cynical and skeptical about the multi-media hype, so thoughtfully worked out by the Armed Forces. Defence Services must remain voluntary options and the youth need not be tricked and trapped through short lived multi-media hype or pop music chorus. The Services need not envy the other professions that attract the 'talent' but improve their own intrinsic value. In addition, I strongly recommend the absorption of full merit list by adjusting the capacity of training establishments or carry over the left overs to the next batch subject to age and medical eligibility. After all, interviewing is also an expensive proposition.

I have not dilated on pay, perks and status, which are foregone conclusions and purely an internal matter of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces.

Your Sincerely,

Air Vice Marshal SS Malhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

#### ADVERTISEMENT RATES IN THE USI JOURNAL

Outer Cover Page (per issue)	Rs. 3,500/-
Four consecutive outer covers (four issues)	Rs. 12,000/-
Inner Cover Page (per issue)	Rs. 3,000/-
Four consecutive inner covers (four issues)	Rs. 10,000/-
Full Page (inside) per issue	Rs. 2,500/-
Full Page (inside) four issues	Rs. 8,000/-
Half Page (inside) per issue	Rs. 1,500/-
Half Page (inside) four issues	Rs. 5,000/-

*Type size of advertisement page*

11.5 cm X 20 cm

*Screen for half tones*

80

*Published quarterly in April, July, October and January*



## Review Article 1

# Battle for a Mountain Pass\*

LT GEN V R RAGHAVAN, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (RETD)\*\*

**T**he famous quote about a battle being lost for want of a nail never fails to fascinate soldiers. That immense possibilities of winning or losing a battle hinging on a lowly nail, is a sobering thought. Neither a weapon nor part of tactics or strategy, the inability to plan for it can also make it the last one in the coffin of military reputations. Not unlike the nail, terrain features sometimes assume a role wholly disproportionate to their intrinsic value. A hill or stream, a bridge or turning in the road, can become larger than itself if the needs of battle place a premium on it. A mountain pass like Thermopylae became a legend by the courage of a band of soldiers who preferred to perish rather than give up the battle.

In India's wars since independence no battle was more vital than for securing the Zojila Pass in Jammu and Kashmir in 1948. Once the Indian Army and Air Force had combined to secure the Srinagar airfield by the rapid response on October 1947, it was only a matter of time before Pakistani raiders and soldiers disguised as raiders, would be evicted from the valley. What could not be prevented was the fall of Skardu and Gilgit which were Kashmiri territory and had been taken by treachery and murder. That British military officers were involved either directly or indirectly, is now beginning to be known after confidential documents have become public in recent years. The loss of what are now called the Northern Areas, to Pakistan, created a catastrophic situation by opening the easiest and shortest land route from it to Ladakh. Consequently, Ladakh and its predominantly Buddhist population had become hostage to Pakistan while the Indian Army had been "locked out" of that land mass. In the process, the Shia muslim dominant areas of Kargil were also cut off from

---

\* The Battles of Zojila : 1948, Sudhir S. Bloeria, New Delhi : Har-Anand Publications, 1997, p. 247, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-241-0509-X.

\*\*Former DGMO. Currently, Director Delhi Policy Group.



the valley and taken over by Pakistani armed elements. These forces had reached and occupied the Zojila. Thus the only motorable route into Ladakh from the valley had been cut and Pakistani forces were moving on to Leh, the capital of Ladakh. On the other side of the Indus Valley, such forces were closing in on Nubra along the Shyok river. If Ladakh had to be saved, the route over the Zojila had to be opened. That was not going to be possible without a fight and a very dogged one at that.

At 11,578 feet, Zojila is one of the lower passes in the tangle of mountains that lead into Kashmir from the Pamir Knot in Karakorams. It remains heavily snowed under and impassable to vehicles from November to June. By the time Indian operations to clear and secure the valley had gained momentum in 1947, the Zojila had closed. Some relief columns had been sent on foot to Ladakh by the long and difficult route from what is now Himachal Pradesh. They were too small in size to make a meaningful impact on the situation. It was absolutely essential to evict the Pakistanis from the pass and open the land route. Leh at over 11,000 feet, had enough open space for a makeshift air strip and that was taken in hand through the dynamism of the local engineer and the public. Men, women and yaks struggled to get a rough hewn strip ready by April 1948. The GOC, Maj Gen Thimayya himself flew in the first aircraft to hazard a landing there with the intrepid flier Meher Singh, after persuading him — by one account — with strawberries and cream, to take risk. The reinforcing of Leh with a small but capable force was commenced. Before long, the foot columns also fetched up and commenced the move towards Kargil. Zojila, however, remained the key to retaking Kargil and securing Ladakh.

It is interesting to note the way the mind of a great commander works. Thimayya proved himself a great captain of war in this campaign. He kept Army Headquarters, always seeking early results, at a safe distance from his subordinates, built an excellent rapport with the redoubtable Sheikh Abdullah, was constantly in the combat zone to be seen and heard by the troops (in the era before helicopters made walking, an annoyance for senior commanders), was constantly thinking and planning not



weeks and months ahead but seasons ahead. He got the Leh airfield work going in the winter of 1947, anticipated the need of tanks to tackle the well dug in enemy at Zojila, got the road and technical support into place, and understood the burden the men carried. When plans failed either due to human failures or impossibly difficult terrain, he stood by his officers and men. The air bridge to Leh and the ground operations against Zojila were the twin elements of the pincer he conceptualised. Either could have failed to come off. In the event, each succeeded less than fully but combined to gain a famous victory. The land column supported by the air bridge at Leh remained short of Kargil. Zojila was won in early November but shortly after the forces reached Kargil and linked up with the forces from Leh, the snows descended on the pass and buried the supply column of nearly 400 vehicles and mules. Leh was cut off for the winter but the force ratio was clearly in India's favour. It was, however, as the Duke of Wellington said in another context, "a damned close run thing." It is also the way bold and decisive generalship gains victories. The scope of Thimayya's achievements can be gauged by the fact that, fifty years down the line not much has changed in the areas under Indian control. Zojila is a chapter in military history, of which all Indians can be proud.

The battle for the pass had commenced as early as the snow conditions permitted in 1948. It was not before November, however, that the pass was captured. That long battle against a determined enemy and the unrelenting terrain and climate is a great story. It has all that makes for a great battle, - initial failure and tactical errors, but also great commanders, outstanding courage and perseverance of soldiers, ingenuity and brilliant success. The story is competently told by S Bloeria, an IAS officer of the J&K cadre, and a former army officer. The wealth of details from diverse sources may make a lay reader feel swamped, but is a delight to the professional reader and historian. If one needs to understand the details which have inevitably to go into combat and operational planning at high altitudes, one can do no better than to read this book. The understanding would have been enhanced by a better quality of maps in the book. That notwithstanding, the book would hopefully provide some



sobering thoughts to those who clamour for quick results in mountains. The totality of effort mounted in Kashmir comes through the text eloquently. The book is also the first of its kind to so thoroughly research a battle through war diaries, official records and individuals who fought it. This makes it a very worthwhile beginning to battle studies in India.

**ADVERTISE**  
in the  
**JOURNAL**  
of the  
**United Service Institution**  
of  
**India**



## His Father's Son : The Life of Randolph Churchill\*

LT GEN M L THAPAN, PVSM (RETD)\*\*

Literary talent and a fascination for history has been the gift of Providence to three generations of Churchills. The eldest, Sir Winston Churchill, researched the life of his great ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough. This was followed by his masterly six volume History of the Second World War, in which he played a prominent part and the History of the English Speaking Peoples. He was apart from his other qualities, a prodigious writer - a talent which was passed on to two successive generations. The first Randolph, the subject of biography under review, was brought up in an environment of politics, in his father's house. Although he did not achieve the political distinction of Sir Winston Churchill, nevertheless he felt, amongst other ventures, it was his duty to record his distinguished father's life. A labour of love, he was able to complete the first two volumes before his untimely death. The rest were completed by Sir Martin Gilbert, a member of his team. Randolph's son Winston took it upon himself to write his father's biography. This is a cycle of recording of lives, unique in biographical history.

Winston acknowledges his indebtedness to his father and grandfather, for safeguarding for posterity, the magnificent exchanges of correspondence between them, as well as the right as their heir, to reproduce their letters. Without this intimate material, "the richest seam of gold sought by biographers" as Winston puts it, biography would be dull reading. Fortunately for us this book gives us an insight to an extraordinarily gifted family, and because of the intimacy of the correspondence, holds the reader's interest throughout. As a comment, Winston records,

\*His Father's Son : The Life of Randolph Churchill. By Winston S. Churchill, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996, p. 514, £ 20.00, ISBN 0-297-8164-03.

\*\*Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM is former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.



with great prescience, that 'tragically for the biographers of the future, the practice and art of letter writing has effectively been killed off by that ephemeral instrument - the telephone, with which observation one could not agree more.

Randolph packed into his fifty seven years, a life as colourful as his father's, sadly without achieving the power to wield authority. Although he fought several elections, it was his misfortune never to win one. In this regard his only consolation was to obtain a nomination to the Conservative seat in Parliament during the Second World War. Young Winston has drawn the portrait of his father in this lively biography with great fidelity. Whilst portraying Randolph's sterling qualities of forthrightness, trust, loyalty and perseverance, he does not attempt to hide his weaknesses. Randolph had an unhappy domestic life. He had a broken marriage. By nature he was perhaps too generous, with the result that he was often in financial trouble. He smoked and drank heavily till such time that the Doctors forbade him to do so, but by then it was too late. None of these affected his literary genius. He received the highest of accolades from the highest to the lowest in the realm of arts, politics and the media.

Its historical value apart, this book is eminently readable. One also gets an insight into the working of the British political system and an idea of how individual personalities could fashion the course of events in the world. The author is to be congratulated for letting his readers travel back in time with him, holding their interest throughout.



## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**A Star on the Mount of Jupiter : A Story of Captain Gurbachan Salaria with Indian Brigade's Account in United Nations Peace Keeping Operation in Congo.** By Maj Gen R P Singh, Dehra-Dun : Bishan Singh, Mahendra Pal Singh, Post Box 137, 1997, p. 151, Rs. 195, ISBN 81-211-0140-9.

India has been called upon by the UNO to provide troops for a number of peace missions in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. A Star on the Mount of Jupiter is the story of the part played by 3/1 Gorkha Rifles while serving with the United Nation's Force in the Congo in 1961-62.

Units and officers are carefully selected by Army Headquarters for such international assignments and old units with excellent service records are given preference over younger battalions. 3/1 Gorkha Rifles' excellent performance in the Congo operations proves that even a young battalion can achieve success provided it has professionally sound and dedicated officers as exemplified by Capt Ajit Singh who was awarded the PVC. Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Maitra, the Commanding Officer was also an exceptionally good leader who was ever ready to accept any challenge. Officers of many other continents and UN observers had great faith in his ability to solve even the most difficult and complex of problems.

It is not generally known that powerful nations play an important part in all international conflicts, which are of some concern to them, politically or economically. Apart from the Belgians, the Americans worked silently to find a solution which was acceptable to all the parties.

The author, Maj Gen R P Singh, has given a very authentic account of the UN operations in which his battalion played an important part. His book will be a great help to those who are faced with similar challenges.

-- Lt Gen Z C Bakshi

**Sky Was the Limit.** By Wg Cdr Murkot Rammunny, IAF (Retd), New Delhi : Northern Book Centre, 1997, p. 124, Rs. 250.00, ISBN 81-7211-084-7.

"Sky Was The Limit" — makes very interesting and informative reading for most of us - in or out of Air Force and in the age group of 55to75, who have witnessed the growth of Air activity in the sub-continent. For the younger readers it may have a historical appeal. Personally, I enjoyed every bit of it as it describes those places, personalities, and events and actions with which I have been associated.

The author has done well to recount his days with the Air Force but has left out major portion of his autobiographical account as a civilian bureaucrat



and his interaction with the parent service(s) - the support, sustenance, development and maintenance of the North Eastern areas i.e. hills, valleys, rivers, bridges, helipads and air strips, during peace, hostilities and natural calamities. After all, terrestrial events of astronomical magnitude can transcend the celestial limits. The sky can surely be made limitless.

Air Headquarters have done well in updating the MSS, but the publishers could have provided better editorial support in proof-reading, eliminating minor unintentional grammatical errors, misspelt names and captions, sticking the coloured plates out of context and appendices, probably to convert a 96 page pamphlet into the shape and size of a book, to justify its price, could have been avoided. Some factual errors need to be rectified to make the book a real collector's volume instead of PR brochure.

A few important events which occurred during the author's service with the Air Force, like the award of first "Ashoka Chakra" to Flt Lt Biswas and a standing ovation to Flt Lt Bhimrao by both houses of the Parliament must have skipped his mind - certainly not from the memory. Likewise, the Air Headquarters while "updating", have mentioned only a few squadrons which received President's colours and have omitted many others. The information provided in the Appendices needs to be scrutinised.

-- Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra, (Retd)

**The CTBT and the Rise of Nuclear Nationalism in India: Linkage Between Nuclear Arms Race, Arms Control and Disarmament.** By T T Poullose, New Delhi : Lancers Books, 1996, p. 309, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 81-7095-061-9.

Professor Poullose's work under review is a broadside on the nuclear lobby that comprises the nuclear hawks. His contention is that the nuclear hawks have commandeered the nuclear agenda and cornered the nuclear debate in the country and in doing so have driven weak coalition governments to renege on the long standing Indian policy plank with regard to comprehensive nuclear test ban. He opines that the disruptionist role of India in the runup to the signing of the CTBT was not in Indian security interest.

The inherent philosophy is introspective and has at its centre economic security and human dignity, as against the realist perspective that is anchored in state and regime security. Given this understanding of security opting for a nuclear based deterrent, with the attendant risk of nuclear arms race, is economic folly. Pursuit of a nuclear capability, despite this, is prompted by populism, the prestige factor, and political expansion of the scientific and nuclear lobby, that has acquired the support of the right wing of the Indian political spectrum.

On CTBT, the author, who headed the Disarmament Department at the School of International Studies at JNU, presents his case that India has deliberately misconstrued an arms control measure for a disarmament one. In doing



so the credibility of its contention, that it is upholding the principle of universal nuclear disarmament, is suspect - given its missile programme and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Professor critiques this with both erudition and passion. The book is, on account of this, a lone voice amidst the nuclear nationalist propagandist cacophony.

-- Major Ali Ahmed

**The Nature of Future Conflict.** By Richard Connaughton, *London : Les Cooper, 1995, p. 239, £ 19.95, ISBN 0-85052-460-1.*

Connaughton took premature retirement from the British Army to pursue his academic ambitions. These had some scope for fulfillment while in service for he was head of Defence Studies at Camberley and had been Defence Fellow at Cambridge. He has, in his book expanded on the current preoccupation of the British Army, which, given the absence of a threat, is in search of a role. Being no longer a great power, but wishing to preserve its seat at the high table into the next century, the UK is being assertive in the sphere of multilateral peacekeeping. This time it is in the form of spear-heading thought, and where possible, practise on multilateral intervention under UN auspices - that incidentally is what ethnocentric Connaughton considers the "core" of the future conflict.

His idea of the future is a neocolonial military embrace of the "white man's burden". Coalition operations to prevent the onset of chaos and to redeem anarchy is his recipe, and he reflects on the legal, technical-military and command and control aspects of this, as also highlights the principles that should govern them. He draws on Yugoslavia, Somalia and the Gulf War for illustrative lessons to buttress his thesis that multilateral operations are of a different order given the intricacies involved.

This book is for the peacekeeping enthusiasts to keep abreast of the latest incarnation of peacekeeping - the handling of peace enforcement. Clearly given its intent and bias - to keep the UK in circulation - the book predictably deals with how to grapple with the consequences of localised strife rather than the structural and external factors on the supply side that cause such degeneration in the first place.

-- Major Ali Ahmed

**Peace Research for the 1990s.** Ed by Judit Balázs and Hakan Wilers, *Budapest : Akademiai Kiado, 1993, p. 271, \$ 35.00, ISBN 963-05-6620-6.*

The post 1990 peace research, trends and thinking has been given detailed treatment in the book under review. The seventeen contributions to this volume, generally coming from various disciplines, like political science, history, economics, medicine, law, education, mathematics and philosophy have converged on one theme that is "peace research". The book is divided into six



parts covering the theory in its first part itself. An interesting chapter by Johan Galtung is rather thought-provoking as it examines the woman- man- peace relationship. The book goes to explain further dissolution of the blocs, future for the new market economies, the spectre of ethnic conflict, old and new conflicts in the Middle East and concludes with the building of peace in different time perspectives. To sum up, the book offers a comprehensive treatment of a difficult subject like conflict. Those in need of a thoughtful analysis of these issues should read it.

-- Major (Dr) Sunil Chandra

**Anti Submarine Warfare.** By WJR Gardner, London : *Brassey's Power Series*, Vol. II, Rs. 160, £ 25.00, ISBN 1-85753-120-5.

"Predicting the future is not easy : it is simply too complex a problem".

With these thoughts, Gardner has attempted to describe a host of factors which will determine or chart the trajectory of the future of anti submarine warfare (ASW). He has tried to analyse the implications of the revolutionary changes in maritime warfare imposed by submarines, nuclear propulsion and SLBM's versus the still evolutionary changes in torpedoes. ASW, despite the end of the Cold War, has assumed newer dimensions in the wake of the concern of western powers with the conventional submarines of many littoral states gaining additional mobility with fitment of air independent propulsion systems.

Highlighting the evolution of ASW and the characteristics of the ocean affecting submarine detection in a sheltering sea ( which still remains opaque), Gardner has covered a vast subject in a readable manner by dwelling on equipment techniques, sensors, weapons, and supporting equipment and then putting all these together on board platforms and systems in a block assembly method. The intricacies of ASW both past and present are well covered. The absence of any mathematical analyses to quantify the extent of progress in the field of ASW is not altogether missed.

A readable and interesting book with an easy style for both the general and professional reader.

-- Capt (Dr) MS Mamik IN

**Infantry Combat : The Rifle Platoon,** By John F Antal, Novato, CA : *Presidio Press*, 1995, p. 365, \$ 14.95, ISBN - 0-89141-536-X.

Infantry is the queen of battle and is known all over the world as "poor bloody Infantry" because these foot soldiers are distinguished from mounted arms like armour, artillery, air and so on. Since ancient times, the infantryman has been on the frontline to bear the brunt. Infantrymen are always asked to accomplish tasks in the face of enemy.



This book is an interactive fiction designed to teach as well as to entertain readers. As per the setting, you are Second Lieutenant, Bruce Davis. You are twenty three years old and recently commissioned as an officer. You have also done U.S. Army Airborne and Ranger Courses. You look forward to taking over your first platoon and leading soldiers. Unfortunately, after taking over you have no time to orientate yourself in war in Northeast Asia. Simultaneously, a crisis develops in the Middle East that forces the US to rapidly deploy military forces. The stakes are high. The odds are against you. Your knowledge and judgement will determine your success. If you are wrong, defeat may be your lot. If you are right, success will be yours. The scenario is realistic and is supported by maps and appendices with detailed specifications of the equipment. You must earn respect of your troops, ensure security of your positions, obtain intelligence and survive and win in a hostile environment.

The author is a Commanding Officer of a tank battalion in Korea. He has written this realistic fiction to make combat soldiers feel that it is not a joke to be an infantryman. He is the one who sweats during peace to avoid shedding of blood during combat. The book is recommended to be read by all soldiers of the Armed Forces.

— Col. P.K. Vasudeva (Retd)

**Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence**, By Robert L Taylor and William E Rosenbach, Boulder, Co. : Westview Press, 1996, p. 237, \$ 19.95, ISBN 0-8133-3024-6.

We have the third edition of a comprehensive review and comment on military leadership, something which every army tries to teach and develop in its leaders. Recorded history of battles from early myths to the present day describes and comments on examples of excellence in leadership, but as Patton said "It wins battles but I am damned if I can define it". There are basic guidelines and rules, but many more intangibles varying with the people, their values, and even the time, place and situation. The book presents effective combat leadership as a combination of "plumbing and poetry", part possible to learn and apply systematically, part dependant on the individual and his personal, almost inspirational ability to influence his command.

The book deals with a democratic culture of individual freedom, equality, with no inherited elite domination or leadership. A volunteer military must serve the society which it protects; it must have a politically correct agenda, becoming a platform for social issues in multi racial modern USA. All must share responsibility with equal opportunity to women, lesbians, homosexuals, recognise no dynastic leaders, no privileged sections, no permanent hierarchical authority, but only proved performance. The volunteer combatant functions best in a transformational leadership environment, developing trust, faith, confidence, bonding and unquestioned personal commitment in the leadership following relationship from lowest levels to highest. The cumulative effect of the system



instills purpose and motivation, provides direction and sustains effectiveness. Modern management concepts create standard patterns for efficiency and profit, but military leadership has no single pattern due to the many intangibles, with the bottom line being combat performance. The volunteers need example, sincerity and dedication to the team with far lesser individual recognition and rewards as compared to the civilian world. Irrespective of cyber space and push buttons, man management (HRD) remains the most vital factor, with the personal element added to achieve excellence. The Indian military, recruited from widely different ethnic backgrounds, religions, social values, political opinions and even languages, manages to weld these into homogeneous combat teams. We and the US military have much to learn from each other on excellence in leadership more so as our own diverse society inexorably drifts to the universal democratic norms of individual choice.

This book falls short where it fails to appreciate military leadership in different and opposing societies and environments, particularly those which may come into conflict with the USA. Vietnam is a past example, which cannot be attributed merely to US failures in political and military leadership, but also to excellent leadership within the Viet Cong against great military odds. We still have much to learn, as applicable to insurgency and small scale wars. Still, this is an excellent book, worth reading and worth use in teaching leadership.

— Tindi

**Arrogant Armies : Great Military Disasters and the Generals Behind Them.**  
By James M Perry, New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996, p. 314, \$ 27.95,  
ISBN 0-471-11976-8.

A very readable book in a flowing style. An excellent exposé of a dozen engagements by Generals leading "Arrogant Armies" of Western Nations, against armies of the developing countries and colonies—equipped with primitive arms—is described with the drama attached to their failures—due to their incompetence. The accounts of the operations are historically correct. These include interesting facts and details, of the commander's thinking; which led to their failures.

On the whole a fair assessment, except of General Elphinstone in the First Afghan War. Whilst agreeing that he was not very capable, to place the blame for the debacle on his shoulders is unfair. He inherited, the basically unholdable position only six months before the rebellion broke out. His opponents, the Afghans, have not yet been tamed by any nation.

The case of GORDON's mission to Sudan is also different. It would be wrong to dub him as leader of an "Arrogant Army". Called back from retirement, by the war office, he went to Sudan. Single handed, he organised the defences of Khartoum and held for over three months. He as a fearless person, was killed at his post. He did not withdraw.



Of interest to us, is the story of Theodore Roosevelt- future President of the USA. He gave up his job as the Assistant Secretary to the Navy to take part as a Lt Col of the Cavalry in the war in Cuba. He acquitted himself well.

A book which should find a place in all military Libraries.

-- Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

**Military Capacity and the Risk of War : China, India, Pakistan and Iran.** Ed by Eric Arnett, *SIPRI : Oxford University Press, 1997, p 367, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-19-829281-3.*

The concept of relating technology and industrial base with ability to wage war is not new, but the study of the four countries is of interest to us. A well researched publication, except for its diabolic complaint of suppression in Kashmir.

China-the R&D and production budget, being under the COSTIND is not published. The Russian connection for transfer of high grade technology, in the past six years; purchase of SU 27's and proposed licensed production has been highlighted. Their problem of not being able to produce engines is similar to ours. China's strategic forces are replacing their liquid fuelled boosters with solid fuel propellants, to save on their vulnerability during preparation time.

The chapter on Indian technology development by the DRDO, which exists mainly at the lowest technological level, should be read by all persons involved in the running of Indian defence. The term used "rhetorical self sufficiency" and warning on page 20, the present plan to double the DRDO budget, induct the LCAs could lead to the IAF finding its ability to gain air superiority undermined; are ominous.

The treatment of Pakistan is, in the usual Western view, biased against India. It states that Pakistan was robbed of its share of infantry regiments at partition. On page 157, it says that whereas India received 21 infantry regiments-Pak only got 8. The book by John Gaylor (Lancer International), lists out the eight regiments to Pakistan and eleven to India -out of a total of 19 pre war regiments. Pakistan's strategic vulnerability has been highlighted. Information that only eight Pak scientists are working with 2000 Chinese on the Karakoram trainer, is revealing.

Iran -these chapters are of interest, as we know little about it. Technology to maintain and replace present equipment appears adequate, the Managing Director of Defence Industries Organisation, claims that apart from replacing losses of the Iraq war, they are producing ammunition, light and heavy artillery equipment and mines. The development and production of tank transporters, followed by production of a 40 ton tank *ZOLFAGAR*, enabled Iran to help Pakistan in the overhaul of its tanks.



The development and production of RPVs, in hundreds, is revealing. They presently lack Electronics - to be able to send back real time information.

The last chapter-correlating the fear of coup psychosis, leading to the Armed Forces being kept on a tight leash - can lead to inability and lack of will - to utilise technology, has been discussed in the two cases of Iraq and Vietnam.

Highly recommended, it should be compulsory reading for students of the Defence Industrial College, if and when we establish one.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

**Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31.** By Harumi Goto-Shibata, *London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995, p. 196, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-333-64324-0.*

Ms Harumi Goto-Shibata has very elaborately and logically brought out the inter state relationships between China and Japan and China and Britain and between Britain and Japan during the years 1925-1931 including the complexities, intricacies and interactions among their traders, diplomatic communities and the security forces. The see-saw battle went on. The Chinese wanted to throw away the shackles and become economically independent - a part they played very dexterously and intelligently by taking on Britain and Japan one-by-one and also playing the one against the other.

Organisationally the book is divided into seven chapters. First - gives the historical background; second - the May Thirtieth incident and its aftermath - narrates the Chinese nationalist initiative vis-a-vis the resolution by Britain in 1925 by accepting the former's demands; third - Northern expedition and Shanghai - describes the deterioration of Sino-British relations inspite of British avowed concessions and Japan keeping away from British strategy; fourth - role reversal - the circumstances leading to the radical changes during May-Sep 1928 and the British and Japanese perceptions; fifth - new government in Nanking - examines the independent perceptions and deductions by the Chinese (economic independence), British - non compromise of trade interests and Japan - trade augmentation and status maintainability; sixth - the Shanghai incident - considers the after-July 1931 time when the Japanese relied on their naval power and its after effects; and last chapter concludes with an in-between-the-line deductions of an otherwise, apparently simple, triangular relations among China, Britain and Japan.

The maps, bibliography, index and notes have enhanced the usefulness of the book. The comprehension and clarity of thought of the treatise is increased not only because of the concluding chapter but also concluding paragraphs at the end of each chapter. The book is recommended to the students and scholars of history, politics, geography and trade unionism.

— Air Commodore S.K. Bhardwaj (Retd)



**Utopia Lost : The United Nations And World Order** : By Rosemary Righter, New York: *The Twentieth Century Fund Press*, 1995, p.421, \$ 29.25, ISBN 87078-359-9.

The book is a detailed account and analysis of the functioning of the United Nations. Rosemary Righter has explored recent international events and offers survey of the history, evolution and activities, of the United Nations. Righter has asked questions about the future of the United Nations and offers thought provoking replies by focusing on the advantages of the United Nations as a global actor. The investigation of institutional ills faced by the UN are based on three premises. The first is that multilateralism, a term encompassing all the multifaceted interactions across frontiers among nation - states, business people, financial markets, research groups and private citizens, is an established part of international life. The second premise is that multilateralism by itself is not enough to secure the future of the UN created as the foundation stone of world order after World War II. The third premise is that excessive fidelity to institutional moulds will inhibit the development of multilateral collaboration.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I analyses the thinking that went into the creation of the UN and discusses the conceptual and structural contradictions. Part-II outlines the paralysing impact on the UN of decades of political and ideological tension, as Cold War confrontations were exacerbated by challenges. Part-III discusses the prospects of positive global diplomacy in the light of different case studies of U.N. reforms on the basis of what has been attempted in the past and is indispensable for successful innovations in the future.

The book is lucid, analytical and highly readable. It should be of great interest to diplomats, academicians, media persons and students of international affairs.

— Mohun Kudaisya  
Senior Research Scholar, J.N.U.



## Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending September 1997

*(The books reviewed in April - June 1997 issue have been added  
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

Ser No.	Author's Name	Title	Year
<b>Assam – Muslims</b>			
1.	Kar, M	Muslims in Assam Politics	1997
<b>Autobiography / Biography</b>			
2.	Oza, BM	Bofors: The Ambassador's Evidence	1997
3.	Sharma, SS (Brig)	Citadel Of ICE : Dakshin Gangotri :- The First Indian Wintering in Antarctica	1997
4.	Bose, Sisir Kumar and Bose, Sugata	Netaji : Collected Works Vol. 1 - An Indian Pilgrim – An Unfinished Autobiography Vol. 2 - The Indian Struggle 1920-42	1997
5.	Chadha, Yogesh	Rediscovering Gandhi	1997
6.	Bhatia, Prem	Witness to History	1997
<b>Computer – Science</b>			
7.	Barrett, Neil	The State of the Cybernation : Cultural, Political and Economic Implications of the Internet	1997
<b>Environment</b>			
8.	Sheth, Pravin	Environmentalism : Politics, Ecology and Development.	1997



9. Shukla S.P. and others (eds) Planet Protection: Biodiversity, Conservation, Environment Education and Degradation and Socio-Economic Development 1997
- Indian Army**
10. Sodhi, H.S. Whose Army is it Anyway? 1997
- Indo-Pak Relations**
11. Travis, Thom A India Pakistan and the Third World In the Post-Cold War System 1997
- India - Foreign Policy**
12. Rasgotra, M and Chopra, V.D., (eds) India's Relations with Russia and China : A New Phase 1997
13. Rajan, M.S. Recent Essays on India's Foreign Policy 1997
14. Mishra, Madhusudan Bharatiya Janata Party and India's Foreign Policy 1997
- India-History**
15. Grover, Verinder Aurora, Ranjana (eds) India: Fifty Years of Independence (3 Vols) 1997
16. Bajpai, K. & Mattoo A. Securing India : Strategic Thought and Practice – Essays by George Tanham 1996
17. Sharma, S.K. and Dhoundiyal, N.C., (eds) Studies on Kumaun Himalaya 1997
18. Datta, Prabhat India's Democracy: New Challenges 1997
- India-Nepal Relations**
19. Ray, Jayanta Kumar (ed) India-Nepal Cooperation Broadening Measures 1997



20. Khadka, Narayan Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, 1997  
Major Powers and Nepal

### **Nepal**

21. Karan, Pradyumna Nepal: A Himalayan Kingdom 1996  
Ishii, Hiroshi in Transition

### **Reference Books**

22. Sarkar, S (ed) Hindustan Yearbook and Who's Who 1997  
- 1996
23. Haq, Mahbub-ul Human Development in South Asia 1997
24. UNDP Human Development Report 1997
25. Sohan Lal Perspective on Current  
Affairs, Part-I 1997
26. World Bank World Development Report 1997 1997

### **Srilanka - Foreign Policy**




27. Yatanoor, Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy 1997  
Chandrakant Under the Presidentship of  
J.R. Jayewardene

### **Terrorism - India**

28. Gill, KPS Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood 1997
29. Karan, Vijay War by Stealth : Terrorism in India 1997



# One Stop Shop For Hi-Tech Electronics



It's Bharat Electronics - India's premier electronics company, with a reputation for quality and leading edge technology that goes back four decades.

Bharat Electronics is geared to meet your demands. In **Defence, Radars, Defence Communications, Sound and Vision Broadcasting, Opto-electronic Equipment** and in a variety of sophisticated **Semiconductor Electronics**. Even to help you source PCB assemblies manufactured in our state-of-the-art SMT assembly line. Or finding Total Systems Solutions as per your individual requirements.

Bharat Electronics, certified by the ISO 9000 series is a short cut to your hi-tech electronic needs.



QUALITY, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION


**Bharat Electronics Limited**

(A Govt. Of India Enterprise)

116/2, Race Course Road, Bangalore 560 001.

Ph:2267322 Fax:080-2258410





*Service to the Services*

# **CANTEEN STORES DEPARTMENT**


**"ADELPHI"**  
**119, MAHARSHI KARVE ROAD,**  
**BOMBAY - 400020**

**IN PURSUIT OF ENHANCED CONSUMER  
SATISFACTION TO OUR VALIANT  
ARMED FORCES**



# Towards National Growth and Self Reliance

As a defence shipyard, GRSE is currently engaged in the construction of a series of various types of Ships/Craft for the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.



GRSE has the capacity to design and build ocean going ships up to 27000 DWT. Presently building Frigates, Corvettes, Fleet Tanker, Landing Ship Tank, Survey Vessels and Inland Patrol Vessels. GRSE also produces a variety of ship board equipment.




GRSE builds a range of diesel engines for marine propulsion and for power generation—the most efficient in the country.



Portable steel bridges built by GRSE are the best product of its type.

GRSE also manufactures submersible/turbine pumps for agriculturists.

The list of GRSE products is endless and GRSE's pursuit of progress is matchless.



**Garden Reach Shipbuilders  
& Engineers Ltd.**

(A Government of India Undertaking)  
43/46 Garden Reach Road, Calcutta-700024  
Phone : 469-8100-13, Gram : COMBINE  
Fax : 469-8150, 8144/479-2146, Telex : 021-8514, 8556



# JOIN USI Correspondence Courses And Plan Your Career

## Courses Run by the USI

Courses	Dates		Tuition Fees*	
	Course commen- cement	Exa- mina- tion	All subjects (Rs.)	Each subject (Rs.)
1. DSSC Entrance Examination (Army)	Nov	Sep	900	200
2. DSSC Entrance Examination (Navy)	Jan	Jun	—	275
3. DSSC Entrance Examination (Air)	Jan	Jul	450	250
4. TSC Entrance Examination	Nov	Sep	500	200
5. Promotion Examination Part D	Jun	Jan	700	150
6. Promotion Examination Part B	Sep	Apr	450	125

\*Membership of the USI is compulsory for all Courses. The fees given above do not include membership fees which are as follows :-

### Membership Fees

	<i>Life</i> (Rs.)	<i>Ordinary</i> (Rs.)
Entrance	150	150
Subscription	1500	150(annual - 1 Apr to 31 Mar)

Bank Drafts/Postal Orders and Local Cheques ONLY will be accepted.  
(These may be made out in the name of Director USI)

*For further details write to the Chief Instructor,*

### UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)  
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057



Report on Foreign and Defence Policies for India in the 1990s	Price: Rs. 50.00
The Impact of the Gulf Crisis and the New World Order on South Asia	Price: Rs. 75.00
Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Impact Upon the International Political System with Special Reference to South Asian Security	Price: Rs. 75.00
Challenges to India's National Interests in 1995-2010 and Indian Response	Price: Rs. 75.00
Non-Military Threats to Security in South Asia	Price: Rs. 100.00
Security Concerns in Asia in the Early 21st Century, Global Disarmament and the Indian Ocean Rim	Price: Rs. 100.00

#### **USI NATIONAL SECURITY LECTURES**

India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies by Gen JN Chaudhuri (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since Independence by Shri PVR Rao, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Some Problems of India's Defence by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, DFC (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Defence and Development by Shri HC Sarin, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
The Indian Ocean & India's Maritime Security by Adm SN Kohli, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Internal Threats and National Security by Shri Govind Narain, ICS (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
National Security and Modern Technology by Dr Raja Ramanna	Price: Rs. 50.00
India, Pakistan and the USA by Shri S Nihal Singh	Price: Rs. 50.00
Higher Defence Organisation by Lt. Gen S K Sinha, PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
The World Power Structure in Transition by General K Sundarji PVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 50.00
Affordable Defence In the 1990s by Abid Hussain	Price: Rs. 50.00
Threats to National Security Due to Internal Problems by General V N Sharma PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	Price: Rs. 75.00
Combating Technology Control Regime by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam	Price: Rs. 75.00

#### **USI JOURNAL CENTENARY NUMBER (OCT-DEC 1970)**

Contains informative and authoritative articles	Price: Rs. 50.00
(Postage & Packing extra)	

*Ask for your copy from:*

**DIRECTOR, UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA**

Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)  
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057



# USI

(Estd. 1870)

## OUR ACTIVITIES

### Library and Reading Room

**T**he library holds over 50,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material.

### Correspondence Courses

**T**he Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

### USI Journal

**T**he USI Journal is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum,

without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

### Centre for Research

**A** Centre for Research has been established to enable nominated scholars to undertake comprehensive study of selected subjects of topical interest on national security matters.

### Gold Medal Essay Competitions

**E**very year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions; one for Officers below 10 years of service and the other for all members. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

### Lectures and Discussions

**A** series of lectures and discussions on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

### Mac Gregor Medal

**T**his medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.

### Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services and all Central Services Gazetted officers Class I (including Retired), Cadets from NDA, other Services' Academies and Midshipmen shall be entitled to become members on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.
2. Life Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of Rs. 1650/- which sum includes entrance fee.
3. Ordinary Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee of Rs. 150/- on joining and an annual subscription of Rs. 150/- to be paid in advance.
4. The period of subscription commences on 1 April each year and shall be operative till 31 March of the following year.

*For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave) Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057*