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(c) DSSC Entrance Examination (Air)	Jan 2004	Jul 2004	650	350
(d) TSC Entrance Examination	Nov 2003	Sep 2004	1400	300
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THE DIRECTOR'S PAGE

It is with great pride that I address our members through the medium of this issue of the Journal. The Institution has grown in stature thanks to the participation of members in its various activities and their periodic advice to us. The President's report that is addressed to members, sets out details of these activities including the inter-action with other national and international institutions, and visiting dignitaries and delegations. Suffice it to state that the Institution now hosts a large number of foreign visitors for inter-action and briefings on strategic issues. There is also increasing interest shown by many foreign institutions in conducting joint seminars with the USI and in co-hosting important events at the USI.

At the national level we have made a beginning with the conduct of events for our members in Chandigarh/Panchkula and Pune. We are trying to put together similar events in Bangalore and other selected stations. For this of course, we require some local members for coordination and oversight. We hope to make more progress on this aspect in the New Year.

The Courses Section and the Directing Staff who contribute to its activity, continue to render yeoman service to our young members preparing for the Staff College entrance examinations and promotion examinations. They can claim credit for some outstanding results at the Defence Services Staff College entrance examinations held in September 2003 by those who took the USI course and attended the contact programmes. The Executive Committee has particularly recorded its appreciation of the work done by Lieutenant General NK Kapur, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd), Brigadiers DM Sharma, Surinder Kumar, V Bhatnagar, and Sunil Arya, and Col Hareesh Pankan as members of the Directing Staff.

The Courses Section also merits mention for the successful conduct of a ten day workshop on "Nuclear Operations and Management" at the request of the Service Headquarters. The workshop, the first to be conducted, was intended to familiarise serving officers from the three Services at the level of lieutenant colonel/colonel equivalent, with nuclear aspects that would equip

them to serve on the Integrated Defence Staff or Service headquarters, as also those who may be called upon to support the Ministry of External Affairs on arms control matters. Needless to state, since the workshop was conducted by the USI it only dealt with unclassified aspects. Even so, it was attended by fifteen officers and drew some eminent speakers from the scientific and strategic community.

The proposal I had briefly referred to last year on setting up a 'Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation at the USI has received good response from many members and from the Service Headquarters. It will be discussed at the annual meeting of the Council on 29 December 2003 and we should hopefully be in a position to take the first steps towards adding an internationally recognised research facility to the USI.

The Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping has already set the trend in this regard with the conduct of a three-week training course in October 2003 on behalf of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This Centre continues to grow in strength and recognition.

The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) has begun to steady itself after the initial teething processes. It has developed a focus that we hope will set the trend towards its development as a repository of documents, memorabilia, and material for historical research. A vision document in this regard is being prepared for consideration by the Council at its meeting on 29 December 2003. If approved this will be disseminated to our wider membership for follow-up action including suggestions for improvement or modification. Needless to say, attaining the dream envisaged in the vision document will necessitate the infusion of funds into the activities of the Centre. While on the subject, I may bring to the notice of our members the fact that Major General DK Palit, VrC (Retd) has transferred to the Centre the responsibility of managing the General Palit Military Studies Trust set up by him many years ago for historical studies and research. I have no doubt I speak for all our membership in thanking him for this gesture. I would also like to place on record our deep appreciation to the late Lieutenant General Diwan Premchand, PVSM (Retd) for gifting

to the Centre some of his treasured accoutrements and United Nations memorabilia last year, well before he passed away, as also to Shrimati M Gopal Menon for gifting to the Centre, some papers and other memorabilia belonging to her late brother, Lieutenant General KP Candeth, PVSM (Retd).

A few months back I was rather surprised to note that many of our Service officers and indeed a number of training institutions were not aware of the Journal and the publications the USI brings out from time to time, including those on various research projects. I therefore wrote to all the Cs-in-C, Corps commanders and their equivalent, and to the heads of the various Service institutions asking them to inform our Service fraternity at large about the wealth of material available with us on a variety of subjects of interest. It gives me great satisfaction to place on record the fact that the response since then in terms of demands for our publications has been quite overwhelming. Members may wish to play a proactive role in this context by bringing the availability of USI publications to the notice of Service units and individual officers they come in contact with.

An interesting and, in my view, a very encouraging tradition merits brief mention. In the last few years since I have been at the reins, I have often approved membership applications of newly commissioned officers of the Sikh Regiment in batches of six to eight. On enquiry I am informed that for many years now as a result of wise action initiated by the then Colonel of the Regiment or the Centre Commandant, every young officer commissioned into the Sikh Regiment is given a USI membership application form on arrival. The completed form is sent to the USI with a cheque covering the membership fees shared equally by the Regiment and the individual officer. I have no doubt the officers of the Sikh Regiment have found this a useful investment. Any more takers?

Finally, in all humility I wish to inform our members that I have been accorded a great honour and privilege in early November 2003. I have been nominated by Mr Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, to serve on a high level panel he has set up to examine today's global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to international peace and security, identify

clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges, and recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to, a review of the principal organs of the United Nations. The Panel is required to submit its report to the Secretary General on 15 August 2004. It had its first meeting at Princeton, outside New York, in the first week of December 2003 and will have a few more meetings at other venues around the world before finalising its report. Though my inclusion in the Panel is in my personal capacity, I am deeply conscious of the fact that it has come my way because of the good wishes of many of you. I trust I shall continue to receive your goodwill and advice in the onerous task that I have been entrusted with.

On behalf of all of us on the staff at the United Service Institution of India I would like to wish our members all the very best in the New Year.

04 November 2003

Press Release SG/A/857

SECRETARY-GENERAL NAMES HIGH-LEVEL PANEL TO STUDY GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS, AND RECOMMEND NECESSARY CHANGES

Secretary-General Kofi Annan today named Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, to chair the High-level Panel on global security threats and reform of the international system, which he had announced in his speech to the General Assembly on 23 September.

Mr. Annan announced the membership of the 16-member Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in a letter dated 3 November addressed to the President of the General Assembly, Julian Robert Hunte (Saint Lucia). He recalled that the Panel is "tasked with examining the major threats and challenges the world faces in the broad field of peace and security, including economic and social issues insofar as they relate to peace and security, and making recommendations for the elements of a collective response".

The other 15 members of the Panel are:

-- Robert Badinter (France), Member of the French Senate and former Minister of Justice of France;

-- João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), former Secretary-General of the Organization of American States;

-- Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), former Prime Minister of Norway and former Director-General of the World Health Organization;

-- Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana), Vice-Chairman, National Development Planning Commission of Ghana and former Deputy Director-General, International Labour Organization;

-- Gareth Evans (Australia), President of the International Crisis Group and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia;

-- David Hannay (United Kingdom), former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations and United Kingdom Special Envoy to Cyprus;

-- Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), President of the Inter-American Development Bank;

-- Amre Moussa (Egypt), Secretary-General of the League of Arab States;

– Satish Nambiar (India), former Lt. General in the Indian Army and Force Commander of UNPROFOR;

-- Sadako Ogata (Japan), former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

-- Yevgeny Primakov (Russia), former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation;

-- Qian Qichen (China), former Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China;

-- Nafis Sadik (Pakistan), former Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund;

-- Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity; and

-- Brent Scowcroft (United States), former Lt. General in the United States Air Force and United States National Security Adviser.

Terms of Reference of High-Level Panel

The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the range and nature of the challenges we face, and are likely to face in the future.

The aim of the High-level Panel is to recommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make, and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the United Nations.

The Panel is not being asked to formulate policies on specific issues, nor on the UN's role in specific places. Rather, it is being asked to provide a new assessment of the challenges ahead, and to recommend the changes which will be required if these challenges are to be met effectively through collective action.

Specifically, the Panel will:

a) Examine today's global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to international peace and security. Whilst there may continue to exist a diversity of perception on the relative importance of the various threats facing particular Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find an appropriate balance at a global level. It is also important to understand the connections between different threats.

b) Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges.

c) Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United Nations.

The Panel's work is confined to the field of peace and security, broadly interpreted. That is, it should extend its analysis and recommendations to other issues and institutions, including economic and social, to the extent that they have a direct bearing on future threats to peace and security.

EDITORIAL

The relevance of the United Nations (UN) in the emerging world order is a topic of contemporary debate and inquiry. This has become more pronounced after the recent US led war in Iraq. Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan delivered the Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture - 2003 on 19 September 2003 at the USI on the subject of "The Relevance of the United Nations Charter in the Contemporary World". The text of the talk is published in this issue of the Journal. He elaborated on the role of the General Assembly and the Security Council for global peace and security. He traced the history of the evolution of the UN and highlighted the weaknesses of the League of Nations. He dwelt on the nuances of non intervention, the use of force under Chapter VII and collective security. Commenting on the adverse consequences of the US led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, he felt that the UN is no more or no less relevant today than it was before the intervention. The UN is the only agency which can confer legitimacy in a crisis situation. The international community is better off with the UN with all its imperfections than it would be without it.

His Excellency Mr Dominique Girard, the Ambasador of France in India gave a talk at the USI on 29 October 2003 on the subject of "French Foreign Policy and Indo-French Relations." The excerpted text of his talk is published in this issue of the Journal. He dwelt on cooperation between France, India and Europe. According to him, the international society should be based on international law and justice. This was the main reason why France expressed its opposition to the US led war in Iraq. France attaches importance to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and has proposed the creation of World Environment Organisation (WEO). It has traditions of democracy, human rights and it recognises the cultural diversity of the human race and takes initiatives to foster solidarity between nations. France considers India and Europe besides other major powers as pillars of the 21st Century multipolar world order and to that end supports India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council. It maintains close links with India in defence and security, cultural field and science and technology. The only weak area is cooperation in the economic field, which

should look up by more trade and bilateral agreements. According to Ambassador Dominique Girard India, France and Europe share a common vision of a peaceful, stable and prosperous international society, which should be nurtured through collective actions with emphasis on partnership.

Maj General Davinder Kumar, VSM and Bar, in his article titled "Revolution in Military Affairs and Battlefield Management : An Indian Perspective" has highlighted that innovations in technology and doctrine bring about changes in warfare. According to the author improvements in technology have led to the production of precision guided munitions (PGMs) with increased lethality; fail safe command and control systems through convergence of computers and communications; availability of real time accurate intelligence based on surveillance through sensors and reconnaissance assets like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), drones, Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and space platforms. It has led to digitisation of the battlefield with increased transparency. This revolution has resulted in compression of time; distortion and expansion of space and a need for revision of notions of force level on account of force multipliers. The author is of the opinion that the Indian Armed Forces have identified battlefield management modules based on digital communications and networks and the technology can be harnessed to meet realistic user aspirations. However, there is a need to initiate actions to evolve doctrinal and organisational changes that are required to complement technological advancements. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) cannot be affected in armed forces in isolation; there has to be a national consensus and 'will' to bring about changes that complement incremental diffusion of the RMA.

The Relevance of the United Nations Charter in the Contemporary World

Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

The war against Iraq in the spring of 2003 was ostensibly undertaken to implement the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and, by implication, to uphold the credibility of the United Nations (UN). That the war produced exactly the opposite result and damaged, some believe irrepairably, the prestige of the organisation came hardly as a surprise to anyone. It has brought to the fore a host of questions of principle and practice that challenge the UN and the international community as a whole. The very relevance of current multilateral rules and institutions has come into question. We shall examine to what extent the war has affected the relevance of the UN.

There are two approaches to evaluate the UN. One is to take into account not only the UN proper but to include the entire family of UN specialised agencies such as World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and others, on the ground that the UN covers the whole range of issues touching on the daily lives of human beings everywhere. The other approach is more restricted, in that it concerns itself solely with the UN organisation which has its Headquarters in New York, which houses the General Assembly and, more importantly, the Security Council, the organ principally in charge of preserving or restoring peace and security in the world, the body which, in other words, deals with issues of war and peace. The first school of thought would

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Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, has been the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations from 1986 to 1992. He has also been the Under Secretary General, United Nations from 1993 to 1999. He is a member of the USI Council. He is also a member of the Board of Management for the USI Centre for Research.

Excerpted text of Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture-2003 delivered at the USI on 19 September 2003.

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judge the UN more broadly whereas the other approach believes that the UN must be judged by its success or failure in the area of peace and security.

There is merit in adopting the restrictive approach. First of all, the overriding purpose behind establishing the UN Organisation as a successor to the League of Nations was precisely because the League had failed in successfully thwarting outbreak of wars and, indeed, in preventing the Second World War. As Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States said at the very first session of the General Assembly of the UN in London in 1946: "The primary responsibility of the United Nations is to build a lasting system of peace and security capable of meeting the stresses and strains of the future." The second factor favouring the narrow approach is the fact that the specialised agencies do not really need the UN as such to exist and function; they could as well carry out their mandates as independent entities, each one on its own. They do not need the UN to justify their usefulness, they do not have any organic relationship with the UN.Indeed, one of them, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), predates the UN by almost three decades. But the most important consideration in favour of adopting a restrictive approach is public opinion. In the words of Mr. Atlee, the Prime Minister of England at the London session of the General Assembly, " To make this Organisation a living reality we must enlist the support...of the masses of people throughout the world." A distinguished former Secretary General of the UN said in his annual report in 1984, "the main purpose of the United Nations was, and is, to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security." To the peoples of the world, who, in theory, agreed to the Charter and established, in the words of the preamble of the Charter 'an international organisation to be known as the United Nations Organisation', the very raison d'etre of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since a reference has been made to the League of Nations and since predictions have been made in the past few months about the UN going the way of the League, it might be appropriate to bring out, however briefly, some of the important differences between the two. Under the League, unanimity was required, with a few exceptions, for decisions in the Council albeit unanimity only

of those present at the time of voting. Thus, every member of the Council had veto power. Amendments to the Covenant of the League required the ratification of all the members of the League whose representatives composed the Council and of a majority of the members of the League, which composed the Assembly. The Covenant of the League, in its Article 21, recognised the validity of 'international engagements' and 'regional understandings' like 'the Monroe Doctrine' for securing international peace. Some Latin American countries asked for clarification of this ambiguous statement but never received much enlightenment. The provisions regarding the composition of the Council were, well, original to put it mildly. The Covenant provided that the Council was to be composed of representatives of the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers'–USA, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan – the so-called permanent members, and four other members of the League who were selected by the Assembly from time to time. The Council could, however, be enlarged by the addition of members in both categories by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. The membership of the Council, consequently, fluctuated quite frequently. It would greatly astonish and amuse today's generation to learn that the number of permanent members in the Council of the League increased from four in 1920 to six in 1934-35 and declined to two at the end of 1939.Similarly, the number of non-permanent members increased from four in 1920 to six in 1922, to nine in 1926, to 10 in 1933, and finally to 11 in 1936. No doubt, many today would have wished for a similar flexibility in the composition of the Security Council of the UN. The membership of the League itself fluctuated from time to time. A member could withdraw after two years notice; there is no such corresponding provision in the Charter. Altogether 62 states were members of the League at one time or another; the largest number of members at any time was 58 during 1937-38.

The League of Nations was formally dissolved on 18 April 1946, through a resolution adopted at the final plenary meeting of the 21st Session of its General Assembly. That resolution explicitly recognised that the Charter of the UN had created an international organisation "for purposes of the same nature as those for which the League of Nations was established" and expressed the desire

to promote the 'continuation, development and success of international cooperation in the new form adopted by the UN'. The principal reason for the failure of the League, most experts agree, was the failure of the United States to join it. Few would deny that the absence of the United States was a severe blow to the League's strength and prestige, but there is no guarantee that the United States government would have always given the League hearty support. To quote Mr. Atlee again: "The old League of Nations suffered from many disabilities, most important of all perhaps because two great nations, the United States of America and the USSR, were not present in its formative stage". He thought that the UN would be different and be a success because, in his words, "the Constitution of the new Organisation is essentially realist in that it provides for the sanction of force to support the rule of law".

The framers of the UN Charter were acutely conscious of the defects in the League system and of the need to avoid them in the new organisation. The most important innovation they introduced in the UN was the system of collective security which itself was based on the concept of great power unanimity. We will come to that a little later. At this stage, it is of interest to note that this concept was looked at with great suspicion and misgivings even at that stage. Indeed, no other provisions of the Charter received as much, and as critical a scrutiny, as the articles dealing with veto. Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar, the Indian representative to the London session of the General Assembly, described what he called the 'historic fights' over the veto provisions, as the 'Madison Square Garden of San Francisco'. The delegates at the San Francisco conference, where during the course of three brief months, the Charter was drafted, challenged the veto provisions and tried to at least dilute them. One of the proposals for moderating the veto would make a distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, with matters under the former to be exempt from veto. The big power unanimity, however, was never so solid as during the San Francisco drafting exercise in defending the veto without any dilution. The task of defending the veto was entrusted to the British delegation and they did a pretty good job of it. The British representative said that this was indeed the core of the problem. "When we first began to plot the Charter, we thought it would be well to discard the rule

of unanimity which had governed the League...It was thought that seeing that we were giving the Council now proposed wider powers it was desirable that it should be able to act promptly and efficiently. But in practice it had to be recognized that it was not easy to expect that five great powers could readily accept that they should be bound by a majority of a council of 11". He went on: "Delegates representing the permanent members in future sessions of the Council will in fact represent probably more than half the population of the world and account has to be taken of that fact. ...Well, that may be a difficult provision to accept, but I personally do not think that it is unreasonable." Reminding the others that under the League every member of the Council had veto power, he said: "we are taking away the right of veto from secondary powers while retaining it for permanent members. It may be considered undesirable, but I would like to submit that it is not entirely unreasonable". He pointed out that the non-permanent members collectively had veto power and asked: "Do we, at the end of the day, want something which is on paper theoretically satisfying or something which we honestly believe will work within limitations?" His logic seems to have convinced at least the Indian representative who said that it was better to have an imperfect organisation than none at all, but he did add that there should be no illusion with the thought that the organisation could prevent wars between the great nations or even between small nations, if the great powers were divided in their sympathies.

As Mr. Atlee, said, the UN was different from the League, in that its Charter provided for the use or threat of force to uphold the rule of law. States would be deterred from embarking on errant behaviour by the threat of the international community using force against them. In case states actually engage in acts of aggression, the world organisation would mobilise not just resolutions of condemnation but also armed forces to stop and roll back the offensive actions, and to restore peace and stability. It ought to be recognised that during the almost 60 years since the founding of the UN, there has been universal acceptance of the rules of law as applicable to the use of force. Hardly any one would dispute the proposition that the use of force in today's world can be justified only in two cases: in the exercise of the right of self-defence and

on the authorisation of the Security Council. It is a tribute to the UN that every single case of the use of force is sought to be justified by states with reference to these two legal grounds. This is true even of the war launched by the United States and Britain on Iraq in March 2003. Whether the international community at large agrees with such justification or not is another matter. Does this compelling need to seek legitimacy for the use of force in terms of Security Council resolutions render the UN more or less relevant?

The Charter embodies the concept of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as well as that of sovereign equality of states. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the states that then joined in the new organisation would not have done so if these two concepts had not been enshrined in the Charter. The Charter itself has provided for exceptions to these concepts. The principle of non-intervention has been made explicitly subject to the enforcement measures of Chapter VII and the principle of equality of states is, of course, vitiated by the privileged position, which the permanent members have given to themselves. Additionally, the principle on non-intervention has been diluted by three other principles or concepts: self-defence, humanitarian intervention and the so-called right of pre-emptive action. While the first of these commands general recognition, the latter two have become controversial largely because of the effort to present them as some new theoretical innovations. Humanitarian interventions have happened over the years all over the world and by states big and small. At times, the primary justification is self-defence, buttressed by resort to humanitarian factors. India's use of force against Pakistan in the 1971 war of Bangladesh's liberation was both a humanitarian operation and an act of self-defence. The same was true of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania's military action against Idi Amin's Uganda earlier. The UN itself has authorised, indeed, pleaded for humanitarian interventions as in Somalia in 1992 and, most recently, in Liberia in 2003. The international community had no great difficulty in reconciling itself with such evidently humanitarian operations. Humanitarian intervention became a controversial, almost an ugly term, only when and after it was sought to be converted into a dogma, a new principle, a new stick to beat the third world countries with, as

perceived by them. The United Nations Security Council itself evoked this justification in 1991 when it passed resolution 686 to deal with the situation of Kurds in northern Iraq, though every one knew at the time that the French government of the day had been compelled, against its better judgement, to take the initiative in the matter by the then first lady of France.

As for the so-called right of pre-emptive strike, it too has been resorted to by states throughout history and in almost all cases, it has been coupled with the right of self-defence. Thus, it would seem that the primary justification is self-defence even in cases of pre-emptive strikes.

The system of collective security delineated in Chapter VII of the Charter was supposed to function, as the term implies, collectively. In other words, the member states were expected to unite their efforts-economic and military-in restoring peace and security as specified in Chapter VII. Article 43 requires all members to undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call, armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Furthermore, and this is crucial, Article 46 explicitly states that the plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. The sad fact is that the collective security system has never functioned in strict conformity with the Charter-either during or in the post cold war period. This is not to suggest that all instances involving enforcement measures in the name of the UN have been illegal or illegitimate but only to point out that the system has not worked as envisaged and perhaps intended. This is because member states never empowered the institution of the UN to be able to respond to threats to peace or acts of aggression. They never placed at its disposal the necessary resources, human and other. Some countries did sign agreements with the Secretary General, earmarking formations for duty with the UN but kept the actual deployment of their troops subject to their consent. It is no secret that the most powerful members never wanted the UN to acquire the wherewithal to conduct peace enforcement measures. Thus in practice, the UN has contracted out or outsourced enforcement action. This was as much true of the Korean episode as of the Gulf

War of 1991. These military operations were not conducted and commanded by the UN but by states acting under its banner and with its authorisation. [It should be pointed out that Article 48 does provide that the action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council shall be taken by all members or some of them as the Council may determine. Article 48, however, does not override the requirement of Article 46.]

All the military actions undertaken in the name of the UN during the past decade and a half, with the exception of the Gulf War of 1991, have been peacekeeping operations. It is hardly necessary to explain that the term peace keeping finds no mention in the Charter and this for the simple reason that the framers of the new organisation in 1945 did not foresee the eventuality of it getting involved in intra-state and, by consequence, domestic or civil war situations. These military interventions have been undertaken under Chapter VII and, hence, called enforcement measures, but the fact remains that the Charter did not anticipate the UN dealing with civil wars. The further fact that many of these interventions, whose commanders were appointed, at least theoretically, by the Secretary General, did not succeed in resolving the civil wars, perhaps suggests that the drafters of the Charter might have intentionally decided not to dilute the principle of non-intervention whatever the provocation. It is, however, perfectly understandable that in contemporary world, when the horrors perpetrated on innocent men, women and children in any country are brought vividly home to us in our living rooms, it is not possible for the international community not to do something; the humanitarian considerations are too compelling.

Before addressing ourselves to the Iraqi situation, a brief reference to Kosovo is essential. It is widely accepted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing of the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999 had no sanctity in international law. It was neither a case of self-defence nor of authorisation by the Security Council. Even the members of NATO did not claim legal justification for the bombing. The US and others did not even attempt to obtain Security Council authorisation since they were certain of Russian veto. They did claim legitimacy for their action in terms of

saving the Albanian population from what they described as ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Serbs. Subsequently, however, the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, which, by providing the basis for the deployment for a NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo as well as for a UN administration, conferred post-facto legitimacy to the military operation (India, for some reason, cosponsored Russian resolution condemning the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999. That resolution received only two votes in favour and effectively conferred legitimacy to the bombing!)

Iraq is a unique case in that it involves neither a dispute between two states nor a civil situation within a country. Though it started off as a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, over time, and particularly in the later phase, it assumed the character of a dispute between Iraq and the Security Council whose resolutions Iraq continued to flout. Kuwait, the original victim of Iraq's aggression in August 1991, disappeared from the scene as far as action in the Council was concerned. Resolution 678 of November 1991 had authorised countries working in cooperation with Kuwait to use all necessary means to throw Iraq out of Kuwait. Resolution 678 thus provided a legal basis for the creation of the so-called coalition. The original coalition ceased to exist some time ago and the present coalition bears no resemblance to it; for example, not a single Arab or Muslim country is its member, although some neighbours are providing logistical support. The United States would have been well advised to have Kuwait included as a cosponsor of various resolutions, including 1441 and 1483; the rules of procedure provide for non-members sponsoring resolutions in the Council. That would have kept up the fiction of the dispute as being between two member states.

Since the dispute had become one between the UN and Iraq, it was indispensable that the competent organ of the UN, namely the Security Council, should have authorised any use of force. The United Kingdom realised this better than the United States. The two of them endeavoured hard to obtain the so-called second resolution but were rebuffed by the Council. It defies credence to recognise that even close allies of the US, such as Mexico and Chile were not willing to support the resolution. The much-maligned

non-permanent members of the Council did themselves proud, no doubt about it. Since the military action in Iraq was not a case of self-defence against an actual armed attack by Iraq-a necessary condition in terms of Article 51- and since it was not specifically authorised by the Security Council, it has been widely regarded as unlawful. It is not without significance that even the United States, which had declared time and again that it would proceed against Iraq with or without another resolution, felt it necessary and useful to claim that it had the necessary authority under existing Security Council resolutions under the doctrine of 'continuing authority'. In other words, it too sought legitimacy from the UN.

Some academics have striven to make a distinction between lawfulness and legitimacy. The military action against Iraq, they say, might not be legal, but it was legitimate. The legitimacy is claimed to have been conferred by several factors such as the atrocious record of Iraq's behaviour towards its neighbours and towards its own people, its alleged links with Al Qaeda, its persistence in pursuing and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, in the final analysis, by the Iraqi people when they greeted the coalition forces as liberators. The failure to unearth WMD and the hostility of a sizeable section of Iraqis towards the occupation authorities has almost irreparably damaged the claim for legitimacy. As for links with Al Qaeda, there were none during Saddam Hussein's time though Iraq appears to be fast emerging as a hub for terrorist organisations of various hues under the watchful supervision of the coalition authority.

The Anglo-American failure to obtain the second resolution was just their failure. It was not a defeat for the UN but for those who attempted to get the UN to bless their war plans. It was surely to the UN's credit that it refused to fall in line with the demands of its most influential member. Would it have been better for the UN's image if the Council had given the second resolution to the US and UK?

The military intervention in Iraq has generated adverse consequences for the standing of the United States as well as of the UN. While we are not here concerned with the problems for the US, it is worth noting that, according to a study conducted by the

Pew Research Centre after the Iraq war, the US image has taken a beating in developed and developing countries, Muslim and non-Muslim, alike. The favourable rating for the US in the UK fell from 83 per cent in 2000 to 70 per cent now, in Germany from 78 per cent to 45 per cent, in Spain, an ally in the Iraq war, from 50 per cent to 38 per cent, in Indonesia from 75 per cent to 15 per cent, in Morocco from 77 per cent to 27 per cent, in Jordan from 25 per cent in 2002 to one per cent.

Positive views for the UN dropped by 37 percentage points in Britain, 33 in Germany and 28 in France. Majorities are negative about the UN in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Brazil, Pakistan, Russia, etc. In an unusual note of agreement, 63 per cent Israelis and 78 per cent Palestinians are negative about the UN. It is interesting to note, however, that the Secretary General, Mr.Kofi Anan personally comes out much better than the organisation he is heading. The big winner, not surprisingly, is Osama bin Laden; solid majorities in Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and the Palestinian Authority, have confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

Does a less credible UN necessarily mean a less relevant UN? I believe that the UN is no more or no less relevant today than what it was before the military intervention in Iraq last March. It has been said that the American action has brought back the pre-eminence of the rule of 'might is right'. But has this rule not been with the international community all along, all through the decades and centuries? Which country, since the establishment of the UN, has actually given primacy to its so-called belief in the UN at the cost of its national interests? Has membership in the multinational organisation prevented any nation from pursuing what it decides, unilaterally, are its national interests, whether or not the UN approves of its action? From this perspective, the UN has always been irrelevant for those who have the capability and the political will to have their way. Those who do not have such capability are, let us face it, themselves not so relevant in the realpolitik life of nations. Some, perhaps many, will protest at this cynical attitude, at the absence of idealism. Of course I am for idealism, for the ideal UN, for the rule of law governing behaviour of nations. Sentiments of idealism were not lacking in the statesmen

who assembled at the first session of the UN in 1946. Mr.Atlee said: "we want to assert the pre-eminence of right over might". No less a person than President Truman declared at the San Francisco conference: "the responsibility of great states is to serve and not to dominate the world". Trigve Lie, the then Foreign Minister of Norway asserted: "nothing would be more dangerous than if this new organisation should be used by any one power for its own particular aims". But was or is there a single country, which was and is prepared to undertake a binding commitment to abide by the UN decisions whatever their merits or politics and irrespective of their consequences for its national interests, in other words to leave all decision making in the hands of the Security Council?

According to a highly respected ambassador in the UN, henceforth the organisation will continue to have a role but for what he calls 'odd jobs' such as in the Congo or Liberia, not for vital crisis points. He may be right, but it bears repetition that, that has always been the case. The Afghan situation was not solved by or under the UN, the Cambodian tangle was dealt with in the Paris conference at which the UN was merely an observer and even the Namibian issue was handled by the contact group of five, outside of the UN.

It is, however, essential to emphasise that all these political agreements reached outside of the UN by themselves would not have been worth much ; they had to be implemented. And this is where the UN came in. The UN was the only agency, which could implement, and thus, confer legitimacy to the at times complex arrangements worked out by others to resolve particular crises situations. In many cases the UN successfully carried out the executing tasks given to it and acted as midwife to the emergence of healed and healthy nations such as in Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, etc. In several instances, the UN failed such as in Rwanda, Somalia and Angola. But even where it failed, it bears repetition to say that many attempts were made by and through the UN to resolve these crises, attempts that could not be made if there were no UN. The responsibility for failure lay with the belligerent parties in the civil war and with external players.

Mr Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General, has suggested in an article published after the events of March 2003 that work should begin to create a new international organisation even though it would take many years and a lot of patience. I have the highest respect for the intellectual prowess of Mr.Boutros-Ghali and any idea of his must be taken with seriousness. It is, however, not apparent as yet whether the international community has reached the stage of getting ready to bury the UN. Whereas the 50 odd states meeting in San Francisco in 1945 were able to reach agreement on the text of the Charter in three months, since they were still labouring under the shadow of a cataclysmic event, it would be totally unrealistic to expect for 200 odd countries to be able to draft a constitution for a new institution even in three years. Incidentally, Mr.Boutros-Ghali also used to say that the reason America gets away with everything is that other countries are not prepared to exert their combined influence to check American dominance. Does any body have problem with that analysis? We simply cannot run away from the same old factor of national interests.

The UN has a legal personality, it is a legal entity, but it is not a person. Hence, it does not have, indeed it cannot afford to have feelings. The Secretary General, for example, cannot say: ' Last time you spurned the UN, so now I will not agree to your using the UN when it suits you'. The UN cannot complain that often it has been called upon to pick up pieces left behind by member states after they have done their worst. This is what is happening in Iraq. The occupying power, while hating the idea, has had to turn to the UN to obtain at least a working legitimacy for the governing council in Baghdad. At least some members of the Security Council would have equally hated the idea of according such legitimacy, but they too realised that the interests of the people of Iraq demanded that they rose above the temptation of embarrassing the USA; of course, they too were thinking of their national interests! The US government, and the American people even more so, are desperate for other countries to share their burden, financial and human, but this is not going to happen unless the UN is given a due role in Iraq. For other countries, the UN would provide a convenient cover for doing something, which they cannot risk without it. In other words, the UN would serve as an instrument for achieving their national

interests. Whatever the motivations of the states concerned, the UN has crept back into the picture. There is clearly a moral in the Iraq episode for every one, including the mightiest. Might might take one some distance, even long distance, but might alone is not always adequate to achieve the desired objectives. Might needs help from right.

It has become imperative that the international community does not permit the differences of the past few months to persist. If states, while pursuing their national interests, were to show understanding for the needs of others and respect for realities of the world, it might be possible to achieve unity of purpose behind common security agenda.

The great strength of the UN lies in its legitimacy, founded on principles of international law accepted by all states. In the final analysis, there is no substitute for legitimacy and the UN is the main, the only institution for conferring legitimacy. The current gloom about the UN has produced the unintended collateral advantage of reinvigorating the debate about the expansion of the Security Council. The Secretary General himself has called upon member states to redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the enlargement of the Council to make it more broadly representative of the international community.

It has become a cliché to say that if there were no UN, one would have to be invented. The hard reality is that it would be impossible to invent a new UN in to-day's world. The international community is better off with the UN with all its imperfections than it would be without it.

French Foreign Policy and Indo-French Relations

His Excellency Mr Dominique Girard

I would first like to say a few words about the French foreign policy and the main ideas it is based on. Then I will focus on the cooperation between France, India and Europe.

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

The French foreign policy has traditionally been dedicated to the promotion of certain principles and values that should in our view shape the international society. If this goal remains our priority, the way to achieve it has substantially changed. Indeed, since the end of World War II, France has made the choice of the European integration. This evolution is of great importance because it provides a new framework to the cooperation between our two countries, France and India.

France is deeply involved in international affairs. It has always claimed the right to influence world affairs and done so. One of the main features of its foreign policy is to think that it has a message of its own to deliver to the international community. France has its own perception of the world and intends to promote certain principles and values. Thus, for France, the international society should :

(a) **Be More Balanced.** We do not want the old bipolar system to be replaced by the domination of one super power, be it our friend and ally. Only a system of checks and balances is viable in a multipolar world. Every country should have a sovereign right to have its own judgement. The globalised world has to be a world of diversity and it is not acceptable, from our point of view, to let one power decide what is good or wrong for the rest of humanity. As a matter of fact, even

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if this power is a benevolent one, it can make miscalculations, lack understanding of some countries or cultures, it is not familiar with or think first of its own interest. As French President Jacques Chirac said last month addressing the United Nations Assembly: "multilateralism is the key, for it ensures the participation of all in the management of world affairs. It is a guarantee of legitimacy and democracy, especially in matters regarding the use of force or laying down universal norms".

(b) **Be Based on International Law and Not on Unilateralism.** The international society must be endowed with common rules and with institutions able to get these rules enforced.

Political Field

In the political field, France has constantly supported the United Nations (UN) system. It has always recognised the UN Security Council as the only institution entitled to resort legitimately to the use of force. No one is entitled to arrogate to himself the right to utilise it unilaterally and preventively. That strong belief explains the French position on the Iraqi issue. France regretted that the war was launched by the United States and its allies without the backing of the UN, which embodies the rule of law in the international order. As French President Jacques Chirac pointed out, once again before the UN General Assembly last September, "the United Nations has just weathered one of the gravest trials in its history. The debate turned on respect for the Charter and the use of force. The war embarked on without Security Council approval, has undermined the multilateral system".

Since the end of the Iraqi war, the situation on the ground in Iraq has turned out to be bumpy and worrying with a succession of bloody attacks. Keeping in mind this deteriorated situation on the ground and the fragility of the whole region, France, along with Germany and Russia, decided to vote for the Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1511 even though its content does not fit with our expectations. Thus, France and its partners wanted to show their sense of responsibilities and prevent the international

community to appear divided in the current difficult circumstances. However, sticking to its initial position, France still urges the United States and its allies to provide the UN with a greater role in rebuilding of Iraq. France is of the opinion that the Iraqi people should recover as soon as possible the entire sovereignty over their own territory. It is up to the UN to give legitimacy to this process, to assist with the gradual transfer of administrative and economic responsibilities to the Iraqis according to a realistic timetable and to help the Iraqis draft a constitution and hold elections. For all these reasons, France does hope that the SCR 1511 is only a first step in an ongoing process that should see the Iraqi sovereignty quickly and fully restored.

Trade and Environment

In the field of trade, we are attached to the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This is the only way to enhance international trade rules and consequently to settle disputes through recognised procedures rather than through unilateral actions or sanctions. Even if the latest trade negotiations in Cancun finally reached a stalemate, France remains confident in this process which is a long term one and aims eventually at reducing the gap between developed and developing countries .

France tries also to promote international regulations regarding environment, which we qualify as a "common good", that is to say a good requiring management at a global level. Europe having particular obligations as an industrialised region, it must participate in the setting up of an international law on environment that will punish polluters. That is the reason why France has got involved in favour of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol related to greenhouses gases. France has also proposed the creation of a World Environment Organisation (WEO), an institution which would be in charge of elaborating adequate regulations and of settling litigation related to environmental issues.

Democracy and Human Rights

Whilst human rights are today universally recognised and defended, they have especial historical significance for France.

France's commitment to human rights goes back to the 18th century, the age of Enlightenment, and it was one of the first nations to draw up a declaration proclaiming them: the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. Moreover, it was in Paris that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly at the Palais de Chaillot. One of its chief architects was the great French jurist, René Cassin, who was later to become President of the European Court of Human Rights and be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

True to this tradition, France today is actively involved in the area of human rights. At the level of States, France constantly uses its influence to make democracy and good governance progress. In recent years, France supported the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court. It was one of the first countries to ratify the Convention of Rome signed in 1998.

Cultural Diversity

During the final phase of the General Agreement on Tarrif and Trade (GATT) negotiations, France, acting in agreement with its European Union (EU) and Francophone partners, insisted that special conditions must apply to cultural goods and services in international trade. This stand was in no way dictated by any desire to limit cultural exchanges. On the contrary, by asserting that culture cannot be considered as an ordinary merchandise, and by supporting the right of every State to encourage its own creative artists, France's intention was to help maintain the diverse traditions which make up the cultural heritage of humanity. This ambition also fuels French policy within international bodies dedicated to promoting culture, such as the Council of Europe and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). France's goal is to facilitate freedom of movement for works of the mind, while at the same time ensuring that all cultures enjoy equal dignity and are enabled to safeguard the conditions necessary for their survival and constant renewal.

Foster Solidarity Between Nations

Exactly as inside a nation, the richest countries of the world

have the duty to bring help to the poorest ones through bilateral or multilateral channels. That is why France has taken initiatives in favour of the high indebted poor countries within the multilateral institutions such as the G8 or the Paris Club. During the Monterrey Summit, which took place in March 2002, President Jacques Chirac reaffirmed that the Public Aid to Development should reach 0.7 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in each rich country. France has also always supported the aid policy of Europe which is by far the first aid donor in the world.

European Integration

Since 1945 France has made the choice of European integration. This choice has not resulted in loosening France's freedom of speech or of action on the international scene. On the contrary, this choice was made because France was convinced that European integration would result in a greater weight of its opinion and a better acceptance of its decisions on the world stage. This is why most of the progress in European integration was either initiated or strongly supported by France, most of the time together with Germany. As far as European integration is concerned, much has already been achieved.

The European construction has been first an answer to insecurity in the European continent after centuries of European conflicts ending tragically in two World Wars. The European integration initially started with economy. Since the pooling of coal and steel production in 1951, the European economic integration has kept progressing and deepening. The result is that Europe is today a single market, with no barriers to the circulation of goods and people. Since 1999, it also has a common currency, the Euro, which has become since 1 January 2002 the currency used every day by more than 300 million Europeans.

But it has never been our idea to limit the building of Europe to the development of an economic prosperity zone without any political ambition. We do not want it to be, as German Chancellor Willy Brandt once famously said "an economic giant but a political dwarf". That is why France is deeply involved in trying to build a genuine European defence as well as a European common foreign

policy which are, in our view, the next steps of the European construction. It will certainly take time to come to a complete convergence but France believes that it will be, in the future, the only way for European countries to avoid being marginalised in international affairs. Moreover, the time is over when a country could all by itself address all the international issues. With the process of globalisation going on, numerous issues are more and more regardless of borders and require cooperation between nations. Europe provides the European countries with sufficient elbow room to tackle global issues such as environmental threats, financial crisis, terrorism and so on. This European dimension of French foreign policy has to be kept in mind if one wants to grasp what we would like our cooperation with India to be.

COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE, INDIA AND EUROPE

The Indo-French relationship is an old one and has been boosted by the visit to India by President Jacques Chirac in 1998. The choice of India for his first visit as French Prime Minister outside Europe last February underlines that Jean-Pierre Raffarin and his team think that India is to be one of the main partners of France in the future and a key player on the international stage. In the future we would like our cooperation to be more and more ambitious. Much has already been achieved but we do think there is still a great room for a closer and renewed partnership between India, France and Europe.

Political and Strategic Field

In the political and strategic fields, France considers India alongside Europe as the two major pillars of the 21st century's multipolar world it is trying to promote. One of the proposals of France in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the UN is to enlarge the UN Security Council. In our view, due to its demography, its growing economic importance and its nuclear status, India naturally deserves to be a full member of this paramount body. Thanks to the strategic dialogue initiated between our two countries five years ago, France does understand India's security concerns. That is why it did not condemn Indian nuclear test in 1998. France has also welcomed the Indian stance on the Iraqi issue which is in

keeping with its own position. Finally, if Europe succeeds in implementing a common foreign and security policy, it will reinforce our common bid to create a genuine multipolar world in compliance with the rules fixed by the UN Charter.

Defence and Security

In the defence and security field, close links exist between the two countries. The French-Indian military cooperation constitutes an important aspect of the strategic partnership between France and India. It has reached a high level now. For instance, in February 2003, for the first time, both Air Forces had a common exercise, called Garuda in Gwalior Air Base. The French and Indian Navies also organised common manœuvres in the Indian Ocean. The last exercise took place this September and the next, called Varuna IV, in 2004, will be even more ambitious.

In the field of armament, France is determined to cooperate with India in order to strengthen its national independence. For 50 years, France has provided military aircraft to India and several major contracts are currently under negotiation, including transfers of technologies which will turn India into one of the few builders of submarines in the world.

Both countries are cooperating in the fight against terrorism. A working group was established two years ago and an extradition treaty was signed during Mr. Advani's visit to Paris on 24 January 2003.

Economy

Economy is without doubt the weakest point of our relationship. Both countries share the responsibility for the current situation. From the French side, we must recognise that the volume of our trade with India is not in keeping with the importance of our political relationship. Though 180 French firms already work in India (among them for instance L'Oreal, Total, Alstom, Péchiney, Alcatel, Suez, Degrémont), French entrepreneurs remain too cautious towards India. They do not seize correctly the huge economic potential of this country and often keep in mind an outdated vision of India which they have difficulties to depart from.

But from the Indian side, wrong signals have been sent too. I am thinking in particular about the recent decision of the Indian State to no longer accept the French bilateral Public Aid Development. This decision was harshly resented by French authorities since no dialogue was organised to explain this decision. In our view, the first duty of partners is to constantly explain to each other their decisions, should they be unpleasant.

Both India and France should focus on the future. India is already the first receiver of EU cooperation aid in Asia with more than 100 million Euro each year and its first trade partner. There is no reason why France should lag behind in the economic field. It has to boost its investments on the Indian market. As for India, it should lift the last administrative and cultural hurdles in order to provide a secure environment for foreign investors.

Science and Technology

In the realm of science and technology, our cooperation is largely based on a successful institution, the Indo-French Centre for the Promotion of Advanced Research (IFCPAR), created in 1987, which is in charge of promoting collaboration between scientists of the two countries in fundamental and applied scientific fields.

In the cultural field, our cooperation has been fruitful. France is very keen to promote French, which is the first foreign language studied in India, after English. Thus, the Alliances Françaises network in India is one of the most important in the world, with more than 30,000 students. The number of young Indians who study in France increases regularly and has reached 1000 this year. This is not enough of course and one of our priorities is to open more French universities to Indian students. Indo-French cooperation in art is also dynamic. It is based on age-old links and a reciprocal fascination. Recently, a programme called "artists in residence for creation" has been launched in both countries; it allows French and Indian artists to visit each other's country for a period ranging from one to six months.

From a cultural point of view, France has also welcomed the recent vote of India, within the framework of UNESCO, in favour

of the launching of international negotiations aiming at setting up a new International Convention on Cultural Diversity. It is another sign of our common commitment to promote cultural diversity, which is, as I mentioned earlier, one of the main goals of French diplomacy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the international order is currently experiencing far-reaching changes. We distinguish quite clearly what belongs to the past but we still have difficulties to grasp what will be the foundations of the world of tomorrow. In between, there are dangers, turmoil, instability but also hopes and opportunities to seize. India, France and Europe share a common vision of what should be a peaceful, stable and prosperous international society. Thus, it is up to them through their current actions and partnership to influence what the world of tomorrow will look like. So let us show even more ambition in our partnership. Where there is a will, there is a path.

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Revolution in Military Affairs and Battlefield Management : An Indian Perspective

Major General Davinder Kumar, VSM and Bar

Introduction

Innovations in technology and doctrine are the harbingers of change in warfare. Controlled changes lead to evolutions and evolution out of control leads to revolution. They render obsolete or subordinate existing means and methods for conducting war. Revolutionary ways of waging warfare has always stumped the adversary since the advent of civilisation and is not a contemporary phenomenon as hyped by many. What is new is the term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). An improvement in the combination of doctrine, organisation, technology and tactics and most importantly national will ushers in an RMA. Chanakya never knew that he had ushered in an RMA when he provided the doctrinal framework to available technology and tactics and introduced a concept of a salaried, standing army - an idea that emerged in Europe only in the medieval ages. The doctrine adopted by Chanakya led to the largest ever Hindu empire. However the Indians continued to fight the same way 1500 years later when the Mughals invaded India using 12,000 men and artillery defeated an army over a lakh with multitudes of elephants and disorganised cavalry. It was obvious that the army, the strategists and the rulers lacked doctrinal dynamism and a vision to adapt tactics, organisation and training with changing times and technology. It was not until Shivaji that Indians again learnt to adopt newer doctrines and strategy to counter technology and tactics. Some of these are epochal; these are landmarks in history of warfare and are hailed as RMA. In contemporary history, the stunning victory of German forces over the French, British, Dutch, and Belgian Armies in May-June 1940 was one such RMA. From then on, the unit of account in measuring

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any army's strength was no longer the number of soldiers or horsed cavalry it had under arms but on mobility and firepower of the tanks. The development of armoured warfare depended upon the maturation of the automotive technology. But automotive technology itself was not sufficient to effect the revolution. Several other features - supporting technologies (e.g. tank radios), organisation (combined arms formations and supporting air arm), operational concepts (deep penetrations on narrow fronts and air superiority), and climate of command (mission-oriented tactics, or *auftragstaktik*)–were essential components of the transformation launched by the blitzkrieg.

An RMA occurs when "The application of new technologies combines with innovative operational concepts and organisational adaptations in a way that fundamentally alters the character of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase – often an order of magnitude or greater – in the combat potential and military effectiveness." They are often associated with broader political, social, economic, and scientific revolutions.

The time interval between RMA is progressively diminishing to an extent that each revolution spawns several more mutually supporting revolutions and collectively they transform the contours of warfare. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are demonstrators of changes or transformations encompassing a variety of advances in information techology, precision guided munitions (PGM) technology and space technology to name a few. The technologies underlying the current RMA is characterised by :-

(a) Extremely precise stand off strikes from long ranges with increased lethality (smart weapons).

(b) Dramatic improvements in command and control techniques and quality of intelligence due to convergence of computers and communications leading to a new technology, viz, Network Centric Warfare. This convergence enables improved coherence and effective tailor-made responses by having a shared knowledge of battlefield conditions vis-a-vis traditional methods of voice control or geographical boundaries. It thus becomes an enabler for better command and control.

(c) Increase in battlefield transparency due to sensor-shooter integration enabled by network technologies and availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), drones, and space platforms. During Desert Storm, the US had no more than 15 per cent information on militarily significant targets, by 1995 the figure rose to 20-30 per cent and to 60 per cent by 2000. This figure is expected to reach 90 per cent by 2005. This leads to the truism that "everything worth seeing can be seen and hence hit".

(d) Increased lethality and smartness of munitions demonstrated by the number of rounds used per target (approximately 10 per target in the Gulf War in variance to 1.6 million rounds per man in the World Wars). 70 per cent of the nearly 28,000 bombs dropped in Iraq (in the recent conflict) were smart bombs leading to an environment where "everything that could be seen could be hit, and everything that could be hit could be killed."

(e) A high technology and influential global media environment implies that emerging technologies and media capabilities are leading to a convergence termed as information, communication and entertainment (ICE). Thus media is having an impact equal to that of a weapons system. Military operations have become spectator events watched in real time by audiences worldwide. Thus what is happening on ground impacts decision making almost immediately. Consider Somalia - the consensus that drove the US Congress and administration to support deployment of the US forces, evaporated when the image of a body of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu was broadcast. The video clip triggered national revulsion and panic to an extent that the US troops were confined to barracks and control of Mogadishu was lost. The ability to provide detailed graphic and live coverage of events is compressing time and space. Thus what is happening on ground impacts decision making almost immediately. Bridging the gap between political, strategic and tactical levels, it is causing tactical decisions being elevated

to strategic levels. We have seen the importance of media in waging war and as a potent weapon to shape public opinion (perception management) gaining momentum with the trend of embedded journalists in Iraq.

(f) The advancement in technology demands counter measures to negate the benefits leading to the emergence of anti technology. Thus to counter radars we have stealth techology, to counter missile we have chaff, to counter space assets we have decoys with authentic signatures and deception. To cripple information infrastructures we have hackers and viruses turning these assets into liabilities. The list is unending. Anti technology is here to stay and undoubtedly more advanced than the technology they negate.

(g) Finally, the new high ground that has to be held is space. Rapid and responsive military projection demands timely and accurate reconnaissance, reliable and accurate weather monitoring, precise navigation with global positioning system (GPS), geographical information system (GIS) accurate maps and failsafe all weather communication linkages. Today, more than ever before, we cannot go to war without having control of the space, which empowers assets to detect, identify, monitor, track and even destroy enemy resources.

Impact of RMA on the Battle Space

Time. In the past, commanders enjoyed a comfortable cushion of time as they approached the 'next hill'. But today notion of time has been transformed, almost beyond recognition. Identification of enemy, notification and resource optimal engagement in a target rich environment has to be made more quickly than human physiology and decision-making will allow. Sensor-to-shooter links will be increasingly automated to reduce the time lag between identification of target and decision and effective engagement. Opportunities are going to be fleeting as ranges and lethality are increased and time to target is reduced. Visibility has been relegated in importance due to night vision systems and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and millimetric (mm) wave radars. Today the 'hill' seems to be rushing on to us, as processes have been

compressed taking away time and thereby pushing the future into the present. Missions in future will not be another hill feature but a new horizon. During the First Gulf War, the sensor-shooter cycle took 72 hours, in Kosovo it came down to 36 hours and during the recent Iraqi conflict, Saddam was said to have been spotted in a downtown café and an air strike was called for, which took only 12 minutes to materialise! Thus the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop is being shortened. Recall the days as we queried or delayed a response on an urgent letter having despatched it by registered post. Today, the mailbox is filled with urgent messages awaiting responses and delivering decisions at the click of a mouse. The trend of compression of time would accelerate in future leading to a higher velocity of warfare. With simultaneous events taking place on multiple fronts, commanders will be overloaded with information and limited in options. An untrained commander will be seriously crippled because of his inability to act or even react in such situations.

Space. The battle space has expanded in all three spatial dimensions by orders of magnitude. In part, this extraordinary expansion has been the result of improved information flows. Distance in battle space is no longer constrained by communications technologies. Another factor is the development of rockets and missile technology, especially long range missiles, which has pushed the envelopes of tactical and strategic boundaries further. There is a requirement to redefine battle space in the digital era. In a non-digital battlefield, operations require a linear concept of allocating troops to face every possible threat with a host of contingencies. In a digital battlefield we have time and information and can thus dictate the battlespace, by employing options in a timely fashion and rapidly redeploying them by responding to situation. In the past the operational mobility never matched the intelligence to tell us what the enemy is trying to do.

Force. The concept of calculating conventional force levels required to achieve an objective has been radically altered on account of emergence of force multipliers. 'Smart' munitions delivered from a single aircraft or ship is more likely to accomplish certain missions a squadron of World War II could. Advancing

columns of armour can be identified from space, targeted in near real time and attacked by a handful of missiles. Enemy command and control structure can be identified and attacked with crippling accuracy. Cyberwar has joined the formidable arsenal of force multipliers. Rather than 'multiply' the value of traditional elements of force, some of the technologies increase it in an 'exponential' manner. There can be no doubt that a smaller well equipped and better trained force can cause much more devastation and accomplish more than what was possible in earlier wars. Imagine getting to know every move of the enemy through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, penetrating his decision making cycle with better OODA cycle, crippling his resources to react by blinding him and achieving absolute destruction by appropriate responses enabling placing of right resources at the right place at the right time. Do we need any more?

RMA in the Indian Context

When an army confronts new technologies and innovations, it adapts to them and often adaptation takes the form of imitation. Wholesale replication is unnecessary. The extent of emulation is governed by strategic objectives and expected opponents and their capabilities at a future date. An organisation that lacks strategic vision will be comfortable in relying on old 'milestones' or the 'crisis of the moment' to guide its journey into the future, tending to evaluate progress using irrelevant paradigms. That is not the case with our army. We wish to capitalise on the indigenous reservoir of talent to bring about incremental diffusion of RMA. Our army has identified battlefield management modules as platforms for RMA based on robust digital communications and networks. These are:-

(a) Command Information Decision Support System (CIDSS).

(b) Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS).

(c) Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS).

(d) Air Defence Control and Reporting System (AD C&R S).

(e) Electronic Warfare System (EWS).

(f) Offensive Air Support (OAS).

(g) Air Space Control System (ASCS).

Implementation Methodology

(a) **Phase I.** Development of individual modules with a mix-and- match of indigenous efforts and commercially off the shelf (COTS) technologies to meet immediate aspirations of users. This is an iterative process, with user recommended improvements and refinements being incorporated at each stage. Concurrently, the proliferation would be undertaken in a phased manner.

(b) **Phase II.** Integration of individual modules into a composite battlefield management system. This is an extremely complex task. It has taken developed countriess more than four decades of efforts and five generations to achieve this at enormous costs, despite their technical ascendancy. This phase also envisions building a pool of human resource besides undertaking organisational and doctrinal changes based on process re-engineering.

Rapid proliferation of technologies and unprecedented pace of advance are the hallmarks of the present age. The half-life of new ideas is notoriously low. It is not uncommon to witness promising technologies being declared obsolescent at prototype stage. Interestingly, pursuit of technology exploitation goes hand-in-glove with technology protection. Cryptography Vs Cryptanalysis, Radar Vs Stealth, Network Centric Warfare Vs Cyberwar etc, to quote a few examples. This introduces immense complexity in achieving state-of-the-art systems. This has major implications on management of user expectations. Users would be disappointed that the indigenous systems are not a patch on what is possible as seen in the media. Users need to be sensitised to this aspect, so that their expectations are tempered.

While we are confident that technology can be harnessed to meet realistic user aspirations, technology alone cannot usher an RMA. There is an urgent requirement now to address the issues of reviewing our doctrinal framework, re-defining our strategy, giving shape to new tactical concepts and orient our training to meet the new challenges. The manpower integration into these technologies and training of commanders to tackle complexities and high velocity warfare and their abilty to take decisions in an era of information overload is of utmost importance. Then and only then, will we be in a position to leverage on our technology gains

and usher an RMA. Failure to address any of these issues will lead to failure in bringing about an RMA.

Conclusion

Even in revolutionary times, continuity outweighs change. This is equally true for RMA. RMA is not a deadend; it is an evolutionary process gone out of control. The most important military characteristic of the coming age is not that we are witnessing RMA, but that we are entering an "Era of Military Revolutions', with the first information RMA followed by revolutions in diverse fields. The foundation of RMA being laid today will have to accommodate these revolutions. The Defence Forces will be able to leverage investments and perhaps accelerate introduction of these technologies by taking into account future concepts and emerging technical opportunities and maintain continuity in these programmes. Technologically, we cannot hope to master all the disciplines to contemporary cutting edge standards. With requisite brainpower, to evolve the correct strategies to absorb these changes, it would have to be supported by tremendous amount of research and development (R&D). This R&D too, needs to be focused and accountable to end users. This requires a national will and effort. We also need to initiate actions to evolve doctrinal and organisational changes that are required to complement technological advancements. A three pronged strategy for technical advancements could be: basic research to be undertaken by Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) laboratories, the results of which could be exploited by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for application research. For specialised niche requirement, advanced research could be undertaken by premier centres of excellence with domain knowledge being provided by Defence. As mentioned earlier RMA cannot be affected in the Armed Forces in isolation; there has to be a national consensus and will to recognise the urgency and bring about changes that complement incremental diffusion of RMA. Professional views of the Army leadership should be taken and the research laboratories be more motivated to deliver what the Armed Forces ask for. We could then seize this era which could well belong to us. For this, we will have to work jointly as a team and replace "I" with "We". We need to do it now, lest we should be blamed for not keeping with times and NOT learning from our history.

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USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION 2003 RESULTS AND AWARDS

GROUP A

Eligibility - Open to all Officers

Subject - "Restructuring the Military Hierarchy – Can it be Made More Horizontal?"

First - Name - IC-39108 N Col PS James
Unit - Director, F of S, The Inf School, Mhow – 453 441
Award - Rs. 5,000/-. (Medal NOT awarded)

Second - (a) Name - 03480 H Lt Cdr Sanjiv Kapoor
Unit - 59 Staff Course, Naval Wing, DSSC,Wellington Nilgiris (TN) – 643 231
Award - Rs. 2,500/-

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Unit - Col GS (Sys), HQ Eastern Comd, Fort William Kolkata – 700 021
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Subject - "The Armed Forces and Increasing Career Aspirations and Expectations of Young Officers"

First - Name - 04538 N Lt SS Randhawa, IN
Unit - INS Venduruthy (Addl)/ND School, Naval Base, Kochi – 682 004
Award - Gold Medal and Rs. 5,000/-.

Second - Name - 04903 T Lt Yogesh V Athawale, IN
Unit - INS Mandovi, C/o 'K' Sqn, Naval Academy Verem, Panaji, Goa – 403 109
Award - Rs. 2,500/-

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Recent Trends

Professor Prakash A Raj

Status of Maoist Insurgency

Breakdown of Talks. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal has grown from a small movement limited to a few pockets of hills of western Nepal in early 1996 to a crisis situation. Three sets of talks between the Government and insurgents have taken place. The last one took place during a six month long cease-fire period that started in January 2003. The Maoists broke the cease-fire unilaterally in August 2003 and fighting started again in the Himalayan kingdom. More than 8,000 persons have lost their lives in Nepal till now.

Spread of Insurgency to Areas in the Terai. The insurgency had spread to areas of the Terai having Madhise population with close linguistic links with people across the border in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP) in India. This is found in Maithili speaking areas in the eastern Terai situated between Kosi and Bagmati Rivers, Bhojpuri speaking areas in central Terai and Awadhi speaking areas in western Terai. There has been a large-scale migration from the hills to the Terai since the 1960s. The migrants from the hills have outnumbered the locals throughout the length of Nepal and north of the East-West Highway. Many migrants have shown a tendency to vote for the Communist-Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist CPN (UML) during the three elections for the Parliament held in the 1990s after the advent of democracy. On the other hand, Madhises voted for non-communist parties such as Nepali Congress, Nepal Sadbhavana Party or Rastriya Prajatantra Party. There were widespread Maoist activities in western Terai districts of Kanchanpur, Kailali, Bardia, Banke and Dang inhabited by Tharu population and migrants from the hills before the cease-fire in January 2003. The Nepali Congress Government freed the bonded labour known as *kamaiya*, from the big landowners without making arrangements for their rehabilitation and many of the former k*amaiyas* joined the insurgency. The insurgency

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has now spread to areas of the Terai bordering India inhabited by Madhise population. It appears that the Maoists used the six month period to consolidate. This is a significant development as it increases the prospect of "spillover" across the border to the Indian states of UP and Bihar. Many of the new recruits in the Maoist insurgency in the Nepalese Terai are Dalits and some castes speaking dialects of Hindi, Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi. The most prominent Maoist leader from this area is Matrika Yadav from Maithili speaking area of eastern Terai who was included in the Team constituted by the Maoists for talks with the Government in 2003.

"Visa" Required to Travel to Areas under Maoist Control. The Maoists have introduced a requirement that their permission is needed to travel to most of the areas that they control. Such requirement is now enforced in many districts where the government control is limited only to the district headquarters. This is also found in some districts surrounding the Kathmandu valley. In some areas such as the Maoist "heartland" in Rolpa district, permits are required to travel from one Village Development Committee (VDC) to the other. The locals in some districts are also required to get such permit to travel to district headquarters controlled by the Government. Travelling without visa could lead to detention in a "labour camp" or being forced to work on a project as directed by the local government.

Janasarkar and Jana Adalt set up by Maoists. The Maoists have set up their Government or *Janasarkar* at district and village levels. They have also set up People's Courts or *Jana Adalat* in many areas. The rationale for such courts is due to decreasing credibility of the existing court system and the fact that litigation in such courts was expensive and time consuming. The Maoists are also giving "punishments" for the crimes committed in the areas they control. Houses belonging to many ministers (both former and currently serving) and army officials have been set on fire by the Maoists. Those serving in security forces (army and police) have been warned that they should either resign or their family should leave the village. This trend was observed in Rajapur area of Bardia district where River Karnali (known as Ghagra in India) descends in the plains and divides into distributaries creating a relatively isolated area.

Forced "Contributions" and Society. Forced "contributions" from businessmen, teachers and government officials in many areas

has increased. It is suspected that many in Kathmandu valley are paying such "tax" to the Maoists. Some Maoist leaders have said that such contributions are demanded especially from smugglers and corrupt government officials. Such "tax" is now collected from tourists trekking in many parts of the country. It was reported that a sum of Rs 1000 was being collected from each trekker in the famous Annapurna trekking area in a village called Ghodepani. It was reported that Rs 2000 was being collected from trekkers in the Rolwaling area. The trekkers are given "receipt" for having contributed to the "People's War". Some trekkers in Kanchenjunga area in the far eastern hills were also robbed recently.

Migration due to Insecure Environment. Many villagers are migrating in search of security to district headquarters, the Kathmandu valley or foreign countries for security reasons. Many police checkposts located in villages were shifted to district headquarters due to lack of security and vulnerability to Maoist attacks. There are reports that the Maoists are "persuading" many households to contribute *Dhan* or *Jan*. This means that each household should either send one boy or girl to be a recruit for the People's War of the Maoists or should donate money. This trend is especially noticeable in the hilly regions in the mid and far western part of the country.

Control of Maoist Insurgency. It appears that the control of the central leadership of the Maoists over those in the field is slipping. Some of the cadres in the field are found to be involved in activities that are supposed to be banned by the central leaders.

Contentious Issues

Lack of Good Governance. The most important reason why the insurgency could spread so rapidly throughout Nepal was lack of good governance and corruption during the 12 years rule of political parties after 1990 when the people of Nepal became sovereign after the popular movement against the then Panchayati system. It was especially the politicisation of police and the intelligence network in the country that led to the current situation. As the Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai has stated that a successful Maoist attack on Argha Khanchi district headquarters at Sandhikharka on 9 September 2002 was followed by another attack at Jumla Khalanga on 15 November 2002 in Midwestern Nepal was conducted by the same Maoist team. The two places are located almost 400 kilometres away

and are walking distance for more than a week. The Government's intelligence was so poor that they were not prepared for the attack in Jumla Khalanga which resulted in heavy loss on the Government side as had happened in Sandhikharka.

Demand for Revision of Constitution. The Maoists walked away from the talks in August 2003 and broke the cease-fire because they are unwilling to accept anything less than elections for a constitutional assembly that will draft a new constitution for the country. Although the Government was willing to address some of the demands made by the Maoists, this was not acceptable to the Maoists. Any elections being held in Nepal, either for constitutional assembly or parliament can only take place when the Maoists give up their arms. Any elections held when the contestants are armed may not be free and fair and could result in drafting of a constitution such as the former Soviet Union.

China's Role

There are also reports that the Maoists were importing arms and ammunitions from Tibet via Khasa situated on Sino-Nepal border. Those involved have been arrested by the Chinese authorities. Although the Chinese have been saying officially that they have nothing to do with the Maoists and that they do not like them using the name of Chairman Mao, there may be groups inside China sympathetic to the Maoists. If the Chinese were to get involved providing assistance to the Maoists in Nepal, it could create a major problem for India.

The former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, KV Rajan has stated that the Maoist insurgency is overtly pro-China and anti-India although he did not find reliable evidence of Chinese support. Rajan adds regarding the reaction of the Indian Government on the Maoist Insurgency as "India, too, must accept its share of responsibility - it has been a passive spectator for far too long, despite the obvious dangers it poses to its own security. There is no excuse for the fact that despite frequent communications from the Nepalese side, Maoist leaders for the past few years have been moving freely across the border, holding meetings with senior Nepalese politicians on Indian soil, without Indian agencies apparently knowing about it."[1]

Likely Spillover of Insurgency to India

There are indications that insurgency is likely to spillover to the Indian territory. The insurgency has spread to the areas in the Nepal

Terai where the *Madhise* population has close linguistic and ethnic ties across the border in Indian states of Bihar and UP. Similarly, the insurgency has spread to the hilly districts of Mahakali Zone in far western Nepal where people have close ties with those living in Kumaon region of Uttaranchal. The Maoists now control large rural areas east of Mahakali river that forms the boundary between the two countries. The control of the Government in Kathmandu is limited to district headquarters in most cases. There are reports that United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants are receiving assistance from across the border in Bangladesh. The Maoists in Nepal have formed an alliance with such separatist groups in eastern Nepal such as Khumbuwan Liberation Front. The area where this organisation is active is situated in the hills north of "Chickens Neck" where a narrow strip connects the Northeastern part of India with the rest of the country. If there is a nexus between the Maoists or their allies with insurgents in Assam or Bangladesh, it would be create a major problem for India.

Although the Indian Government has declared the Maoists to be a terrorist group, it is difficult to understand how it is possible that the Indian intelligence was unaware of the Maoist leaders living in India. There are many people in Nepal who feel that the reason for the Maoist insurgency is due to their sanctuary in India. They also feel that this problem could be solved in three months if India were to co-operate. This is in spite of the fact that India has been assisting the Nepalese Army by providing arms and helicopters that could be used against the Maoists. There is an urgent need to monitor and regulate the open Indo-Nepal border. Some kind of identity cards should be made mandatory for those crossing the border.

There was no Indian Ambassador accredited to Nepal for almost one year in the crucial period before the present incumbent was sent as the then Ambassador was terminally sick for almost six months and there was a long delay in replacing him after his death. The recent events have amply demonstrated that India needs to take the happenings in Nepal more seriously than it has till now.

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Operational Art in the Indian Context

Lieutenant General VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

Introduction

A war fighting doctrine evolved by any nation is an outcome of an assessment of factors such as the historical experience of the nation, shape and contours of future wars and the anticipated battlefield environment. This belief and conviction of the current leadership of how military forces are to be employed in support of national objectives serves as a reference, a guide to senior military commanders in the field to formulate strategies for each operational situation confronted. The doctrine gets reinforced with every successful endeavor but if the effort ends in a failure then the doctrine would have to be modified.

Such assessments along with detailed research, for over a decade, drove the US Armed Forces to adopt the doctrine of Airland Battle, which was successfully employed, with modifications in both the Gulf Wars and in Afghanistan. In their case technology was the major driving force behind their doctrine. Indian Armed Forces are also conscious of the requirement of adopting a more dynamic approach to wars in the future and are seeking a synergetic tri-service approach at the operational and military strategic levels. This mandates a study of operational art, in our context, to examine the method of war fighting that we need to adopt in the future.

Scope and Importance of Operational Art[1]

The importance of operational art lies in the fact that operational level of warfare, being the intermediary level, acts as a bridge to join policy and strategy on one end with tactical employment of forces on the other end. Hence a commander exercising operational art has to be well versed in all three levels of warfare and

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consequently it demands maximum skills from a commander who is selected to exercise command at this level. While strategy is not concerned with actual fighting, operational art and tactics are. Tactical results are useful only as a part of the larger design framed by strategy and arranged, organised, coordinated, stage-managed and masterminded by operational art. It is a fact of history that by themselves factors such as superior technology, superior numbers and tactical brilliance are insufficient to achieve ultimate success in war. A sound strategy and operational excellence are the hallmarks of mature nations and leaders who understand the art of war and mistakes in these spheres cannot be easily corrected. In fact strategic mistakes live forever. Yet for all its well documented and proven importance in winning wars decisively with least cost to own side, operational art continues to be disregarded by our military experts. The basic reason is the lack of adequate awareness about the subject within the armed forces.

Definition and Elucidation

Terms need to be defined and elucidated to share a common perspective of the subject. Essentials are :-

(a) Operational art is the employment of military forces (tri-service in our context) to achieve strategic goals in a theatre of operations or a theatre of war through a unique contextual design, organisation and conduct of operations.

(b) The intermediate level of warfare (called operational level), which connects strategy and tactics.

(c) When we use the term "operational art" for the intermediate level of war, it means that there is creativity in operational planning at this level, which requires an exclusive method (sequence) to be followed and some norms to be observed. This are elucidated as under :-

(i) Political aims set forth by political leadership are converted to military strategic aims and objectives through a regressive planning method and the art lies in designing

an operational framework to achieve the laid down strategic objectives most skillfully.

(ii) A new, unique and creative operational design is conceived for every situation confronted so as to achieve the military strategic goals with maximum efficiency and with least cost to own side.

(iii) Economy of effort is inherent and integral to the term.

(iv) The concept involves a tri-service approach to an emerging/existing operational problem and therefore advocates integration of all elements functioning in a theatre under a single commander.

(v) Conduct of campaigns (major operations), their sequence, methodology and procedures, are contextually and jointly evolved. Senior officers need to learn the method of integrated operational planning within the military strategic framework evolved at the level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in our context, based on a joint tri-service doctrine of war fighting (non existent at present).

(vi) The entire operation is thought through to its terminal state (end state) so that all possible contingencies that may arise are catered for including likely enemy reactions and our counter reactions for each contingency.

The minimum level at which this concept can be applied, in our context, is that of a Command (Integrated Theatre).

Why Should We Study Operational Art?

The reasons, which necessitate the study of operational art contextually, are numerous and these need to be understood in a wider operational perspective, in the backdrop of the strategic framework of the higher defence planning, so as to grasp the method of application of operational art in future conflicts.

Our traditional methods have favoured deliberate, set piece military operations, which are attrition oriented and hence tactically biased. These have inevitably resulted in high cost and causalities to own side with limited gains. The 1971 war with Pakistan in the eastern theatre was undoubtedly an outstanding military victory. But this was made possible due to favourable strategic factors like geography, air supremacy, people's support (in erstwhile East Pakistan) and poor enemy morale, whereby we could afford to take risks in our operational conduct. In the same war, in the western theatre, due to our proclivity for more traditional methods, the story was different and the operations remained deadlocked. Moreover we have, in the past, allowed historical experiences to create pre-conceptions in our minds about the nature of wars, leading to formulation of tactically biased operational plans resulting in stalemates. Unless we breakaway from the past methodology of planning and conduct of wars, our achievements will remain mediocre.

The enlarged spectrum of conflict of conventional war with nuclear back drop on one end and terrorism and insurgency on the other and the need to apply the multi-dimensional aspects of war (such as psychological warfare, information warfare and strategic and operational level deception) to win decisively, in a short time frame, necessitates the formulation of a new methodology of planning and conduct of wars - a doctrine based on contextually relevant principles in the future.

Nuclear backdrop, a reality in our context, infers certain concerns for the Armed Forces. The first is the strong possibility of international pressure to prevent a war in the region and if it does take place then to limit it to a short duration implying that if we wish to go to war, our political and military leadership will have to be very clear on what we wish to achieve by waging a conflict. Attempts to fight attritional battles, over territory per se are likely to result in stalemates and heavy causalities. The second aspect concerns the overall operational design evolved to fulfill the political aims of war. This operational framework must enable us to achieve the strategic objectives, in a short time frame and yet not cause escalation beyond the conventional realm. This means that the

political aims and military objectives of war are carefully calibrated and our senior military commanders are clear, confident and convinced regarding the doctrine of war fighting, which should be adopted for the future. The basic tenets adopted must also guide us in re-shaping our organisations and force structures for the future. These issues need to be debated, discussed and war-gamed at strategic and operational levels so that our political and military leaders fully comprehend the constraints under which they would be required to function in the future.

Another concern is about the procedure to be adopted when an adversary adopts nuclear brinkmanship as a strategy. Operational level commanders (Army Commanders and equivalents) must be aware of the implications of their operational decisions on the overall war effort and the likely reactions of the opponent and our counter reactions and hence have to be part of the strategic decision making process including nuclear response. Unawareness and innocence of the strategic realm can lead to operational embarrassments and even disasters.

The next motive for the study is the rapid advances in technology in recent times. Historically there are countless examples to illustrate that technology is one of the principle factors that drives the change in the method of fighting and we are facing an entirely new technology era but have not been able to evolve a suitable joint doctrine for the Armed Forces. Moreover higher technology confers the advantage of being able to hit almost anywhere, which requires even lower tactical level commanders to understand the operational and strategic level implications of their actions. This also demands a re-look at the training of our military leaders.

Economy of force and effort is fundamental to the art of war and without economy there is no art in warfare. With increasing costs, likelihood of proliferation and increasing consciousness in the society of the essential wastefulness of warfare, we must devise ways by which these age old principles of warfare are applied more dynamically. Hence joint operations must give way to integrated operations of the three Services. Moreover as we move towards greater development, the value of human life will keep

increasing. Our nation and our people will not accept unnecessary casualties, in war, in the future. Kargil controversy refuses to die down despite logic and reasoning. With technology showing the way, we should learn to win wars with the least human cost. In the past wars have been fought with pervasive ignorance on all sides and ignorance brings forth waste and imprecision. But the current and future technology era could eradicate this flaw if we learn to integrate technologies, which help us fight with greater precision.

Professional competence is a key attribute of a military leader and operational art demands the maximum skills from a military professional because it requires of him to be equally competent in all three levels of war i.e., strategic, operational and tactical. All military officers who aspire for higher ranks must study and understand operational art as an important ingredient of the art of war. This is, currently, a weak area of training in all three Services. Moreover an over centralised command and staff culture prevails in our military, which inhibits and prevents mental and intellectual growth and maturity. This calls for a change of culture in the Armed Forces.

Wars are fought for a purpose and the political leadership provides this- as Clausewitz stated, "War is an extension of politics by other means". The Indian way of going to war must be studied and formalised. The regressive planning procedure of evolving a political aim at the level of the National Security Council/ Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), and converting it to military aims and objectives at the level of COSC and the system of issuance of directives/instructions from the highest strategic bodies to the lower tactical formations must be formalised as a part of the joint operational methodology. At the tactical level, all weapons, Arms and Services are combined in the fighting organisations so as to achieve complementarities and fulfill all relevant principles of war. The aim at this level is to make the enemy react in order to exploit his reaction. This dynamic at the operational level needs to be studied where the tools are different. Operational war fighting involves integrated operations where we must strive for integration of land, air and naval capabilities. This process requires organisation of a national command post and integrated theatres. We also require

national and military war-gaming centres, where national strategic, military strategic and operational level war games based on various types of settings are conducted. This will give us the necessary experience and expertise at higher levels to face future contingencies. There is no wisdom in the current inertia and inaction.

Our respective commands are not even co-located and below that the tactical formations are in a stand-alone mode. In the 21st century, our Armed Forces are still planning for conflicts, Service wise, essentially, the way it was done in World War II. We have not even begun our journey for integrated warfare in the 21st century.

Theoretical Foundation

All operational systems must be developed from a sound theoretic basis so that all commanders concerned understand its operational logic and the mutual confidence between commanders at higher and lower levels remains undisturbed, while there is a universal commitment towards the operational aim (strategic goal), which gives adequate freedom to the subordinate commanders to exercise their initiative.[2] The criteria are :-

(a) **Cognitive Tension.** This reflects the contradiction and conflict between general orientation towards the strategic aim, which is given out in abstract terms, and the specific nature of a tactical mission. This polarisation between the abstract and the specific must be present.

(b) **Manoeuvre.** It must be based on an operational level manoeuvre, expressing the dynamic interaction between the various elements within the system as well the relationship between the general action and the strategic aim.

(c) **Synergy.** The planned action at operational level must be thoroughly synergetic and should yield a product greater than the linear arithmetic sum of its components and achievements. Moreover, in order to be regarded as operational, the act must reflect the notion of synthesis, through combined arms combat at tactical levels and amalgamation of various forms of warfare and integration of all forces (tri-service) and formations within a geographical area.

(d) **Disruption and Not Destruction.** Whereas at the tactical level the action of destruction is accepted, an operational action should aim for disruption of its opponents systems as destruction would inevitably lead to attritional warfare.

(e) **Contemplative Attitude.** Reflects a contemplative approach to the factor of randomness in war. Commanders at operational level must inculcate and acquire a contemplative approach to warfare, through introspection and meditation. This will make them more astute (penetrating) in their decision-making and confer an ability to think through the entire problem.

(f) **Nonlinear.** It should be structured hierarchically and express depth in operations.

(g) **Method of Achieving Strategic Goals.** Must reflect a deliberate interaction between attrition and manoeuvre with the latter being employed to achieve operational objectives (strategic goals) while the former is employed at lower tactical levels.

(h) **Independent Entity.** Since operational level action is directly dependant on the need to achieve strategic aim(s) of war and is allocated resources accordingly, it constitutes an independent entity and must be regarded as such.

(j) **Universal Theory.** To be regarded as operational it must be related to a broad and universal theory, which can encompass all types of operational actions and all forms of warfare.

Analysis of the Criteria

From the analysis of the above norms the following issues emerge contextually :-

(a) We need to selectively combine our operational commands of all three Services into integrated theatres, as they constitute the operational level in our case. By so doing, the directives from the COSC can go directly to integrated theatres while the Service Headquarters are taken out of the

chain of operational command. Greater synergy at lesser cost will benefit the nation as well as the Armed Forces.

(b) We need to shed our conservatism, doctrinal backwardness, and our current operational methodologies of deliberate set piece battles that are attrition oriented and adopt the manoeuvre approach to achieve strategic objectives. This is especially relevant in the mountains where set piece battles will achieve very few operational gains. Hence there is a need to develop a dynamic and focused offensive capability for the mountains by re-engineering the existing Army and Air Force resources. Suitably integrated theatres (Commands) will ensure generation of the required synergy and will also enable unity of command, which is an important principle of war.

(c) The operational design must aim to achieve strategic goals (political aims) of war in the shortest possible time frame which in turn implies :-

(i) Higher emphasis on manoeuvre than on attrition.

(ii) Acquiring new military capabilities and re-engineering of existing force levels to cater for future scenarios and settings.

(iii) Demoralising and weakening the opponent before the start of the campaign. This can be achieved through political, diplomatic and military means (psychological warfare, information warfare and deception).

(iv) Use of regressive planning methodology from CCS, COSC and Headquarters of Integrated Commands to lower levels should be formalised for executing joint operations.

(v) Joint operations will ensure synthesis, synergy and success.

(vi) Joint training, which must be given a much higher priority than the current rather flippant approach.

(d) The overall change can be brought about by appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the earliest and by giving an appropriate push to jointness and integration. This push will have to be provided at political levels through an Act of Parliament similar to the Goldwater - Nichols Act 1986, in the case of the US Armed Forces.

Operational Design and Planning Process

Operational level of warfare has resulted in new terms being introduced in the military lexicon. This is unavoidable because introduction of new concepts of warfare have invariably led to evolution of new terms, which describe the new concepts most appropriately. In the case of operational art this diachronic framework is evident in the elements (concepts), which are central to the design and conduct of major operations and campaigns. The operational level commander designs his plan of operations around a number of building blocks, which help him to visualise how the campaign will unfold from the beginning to the end.[3] The concepts are :-

(a) End state.

(b) Centre(s) of gravity.

(c) Decisive points.

(d) Lines of operation.

(e) Sequencing.

(f) Manoeuvre.

(g) Tempo.

(h) Culminating point.

(j) Contingency plans.

(k) Shaping of battle space.

(l) Operational synchronisation.

There should be a structured format for estimating an operational level problem to ensure that higher commanders and senior staff officers when lacking exposure or experience in certain types of terrain or forms of warfare do not omit essentials from their operational planning. No joint format exists currently though the Army War College has done some work in this field for the Army Training Command.

A conscious commitment to the planning process by using these concepts will ensure adequate and appropriate focus on strategic issues and the desired end state of war. An operational level commander must never get too involved with a tactical objective. The operational design evolved must enable him to achieve the strategic goals through a variety of ways. A single tactical objective should not be allowed to derail a plan.

Future Warfare and New Technologies

Certain periods in history have been watersheds in technology and change. Today another shift in technology and change is sweeping the world. Glimpses of this change and use of new technologies were demonstrated in US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indian Armed Forces need to examine the entire issue contextually in relation to our conception of future wars i.e. the new methodology of war fighting along with the use of new technologies.

Modern technology has given rise to accurate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations and technologies which exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, such as sensor and counter sensor, communication and information warfare. The latter includes command and control warfare, precision strike, precision movement and precision protection operations among others. The vital aspect of modern warfare and technology is that all information generated is integrated through digital communication network so as to facilitate movement and transfer of information. The new and emerging technologies that need to be studied are :-

(a) Transportation.

(b) Communications.

(c) Information technology.

(d) Missile technology.

(e) Laser technology and directed energy weapons.

(f) Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.

(g) Nano technologies.

(h) Biological warfare and bio-molecular electronics.

(j) Sensor technology.

(k) Precision guided munitions.

(l) Stealth technology.

The major significance of these converging technologies is that they alter the traditional theories and practices of planning for and waging wars.

Since the first Gulf War we have seen that forces equipped with precision munitions are able to strike anything they can see. Advanced technologies are bringing smaller, more rapidly deployable and flexible ground forces to conflicts. Such forces, with the benefit of situational awareness, could identify accurately the location of friend or foe, and respond appropriately. Precision munitions linked to better situational awareness allowed for rapid and surgical strikes that could engage targets while precluding collateral damage. Increased force protection for our personnel will also be enhanced by the emerging technologies. Although situational awareness is a major contributor to force protection, these emerging technologies promise much more. Soldiers can be provided with ultra-light body armour and mine resistant vehicles. Lasers and directional electro magnetic pulse weapons can destroy incoming missiles. The rapid introduction of new technologies will change the very nature of future conflict. An interesting and abiding feature of these technologies is that they apply equally well across the full range of conflicts.

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Our efforts should be to bring about the transformation faster than our adversaries so that we are in an advantageous position. We need to maximise their usefulness by synthesising technology with doctrine, training, leadership, organisational structure and force development. This will mandate cultural changes in the way we operate presently.

Guiding Principles of Operational Art

Although operational art is applicable across the full spectrum of conflict, its advantages and scope can be fully exploited in high intensity conflicts. The opinion of the US military experts seems to be veering to smaller conflicts of short duration in the future. They anticipate that in the fourth generation wars (future wars), the battlefield will include the whole of enemy society where the goal will be to collapse the enemy internally by identifying his strategic centres of gravity. Action will be dispersed through the use of small groups capable of unleashing intense violence. Emphasis will be on manoeuvre and exploitation of technology. According to their view, masses of men and firepower will become redundant. There will be decreasing dependence on centralised logistics. Such a war will be non-linear with no definable battlefield or fronts and the distinction between war and peace will be blurred. Success will be dependant on joint operations.

In our context, the fundamental causes for war in and around India have not changed after the cold war. On the other hand new threats and challenges have emerged and these have yet to be analysed contextually. Moreover with disputed borders with Pakistan and China, even the external military threat to India's territory cannot be seen as having receded. Hence our threats and challenges are more now than ever before and we have to be prepared to deal with a larger spectrum and with new dimensions of warfare. Application of operational art will bequeath the skills necessary for military commanders at higher levels, to win wars decisively, across the full range of conflict.

In this regard it is recommended that certain guiding principles, considered vital, be included as a part of the war fighting doctrine. These are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Regressive Planning Process. The method of converting political aim(s) of a conflict to military strategic aim(s) and further to operational and tactical objectives and the method of issuing directives and instructions from the CCS to COSC and from there to integrated theatres/ Service Headquarters should be formalised. This is one of the most important facets of planning and preparation for a conflict and it is termed Regressive Planning because it moves backwards from the highest strategic body to lower echelons. Currently there is no formal procedure followed in this regard. In fact our political leadership, perhaps for political reasons, shies away from giving written directives to Service Chiefs. On receipt of political directives military commanders convert abstract political aim(s) of war to achievable military aim(s) and objectives and if after analysis they come to the conclusion that the political aim set forth is not achievable, they must have the courage to say so. The nation must not go to war for an unachievable political aim.

Integration and Joint Operations. Army-Air integration for the land battle, Navy-Air integration for the battle at sea and a tri-service integration where required must become the tenet of war fighting. This involves effective joint planning, logistics, procedures and training among areas of jointness. Integrated warfare requires a type of refinement in executing integrated operations, which is lacking at present. Victory will not be feasible, in the future, without close integration at operational and tactical levels and without combined all arms action at lower tactical levels. Air power will have to be far more responsive for the type of integrated Land Air operations anticipated in the future.

Campaign Design. This takes into account the focus on strategic goals of the conflict and the end state along with a number of other factors such as the enemy, environment, own forces (including combat support and logistics), surprise and security and time. The appreciation or the estimate carried out by the operational level commander or his staff follows the normal method except that the concepts of operational design emerge as deductions, which enable the identification of innovative options (courses of action).

Non-Linearity. This calls for an attitudinal change in the military mindset. We should be able to translate our idea of fighting the close, intermediate and deep battles in near simultaneity and synchronise the destructive effects of battles at sea and in the air. Indeed, simultaneity is the essence of non-linearity.

Manoeuvre Approach. There is an imperative need to evolve manoeuvre approach as the key element underpinning our approach to war fighting, in all types of terrain including our mountainous regions. Our force development and organisations will have to cater for this offensive capability that in the future will involve close integration of air and ground troops.

Least Cost and Minimum Effort. In imbibing the concept of operational art, our endeavour should be to win the campaign and indeed the war with least possible human and material cost. This reflects on the quality and the art of generalship.

Decentralised Command and Directive Style. For successful application of operational art the command style cannot be rigidly centralised according to our current practice. A more flexible style, which encourages risk taking and maximum initiative by subordinate commanders, will have to be adopted. This will also allow subordinates to conceptually grasp the manoeuvre approach to warfare in the Indian context in all types of terrain.

Visionary Leadership. Yet another requirement of operational art is the need for effective and enlightened leadership with a large enough vision to fully comprehend the entire perspective of operational level of warfare without over identification with tactical objectives. This mandates unbiased selection procedures and sound personnel policies. The key attributes of operational level leaders are considered to be as under :-

(a) Professionally astute.

(b) Vision.

(c) Wisdom.

(d) Contemplative approach.

(e) Self-restraint and self-control.

(f) Self-knowledge.

(g) Ability to inspire as a role model.

(h) Sacrifice of personal interest.

(j) Possess all attributes of intelligence like intelligence quotient (IQ), emotional intelligence and spiritual intelligence.

Integrate Technology into Coherent Doctrines. Technology has always been the driving force behind military development and the changing nature of war. However, technology by itself is not capable of winning wars. In fact too much focus on technology at the expense of progression in operational thinking cannot ensure success. Operational concepts incorporating and integrating new technologies must be developed into coherent doctrines. We require innovative operational exploitation of new technologies to win wars. Technology can be a vital war winning factor when it is synthesised with doctrine, training, organisational structures and force development and employed imaginatively.

Close Politico-Military Interaction. Given the restrictive aspects of short duration wars, nuclear backdrop and other factors, destruction of adversary's strategic forces or capture of large tracts of territory will not be possible. War aims will have to be modulated, tempered and calibrated according to the environmental constraints. Therefore, translation of political aim(s) to achievable military objectives of war and skilful conduct of war will require a close politico-military interaction throughout.

Conclusion

The current clear lines between strategic, operational and tactical levels will become increasingly difficult to differentiate because of increased precision and longer ranges derived from new weapons and munitions and secure, encrypted and networked communications. This will bring a significant increase in combat effectiveness. However, as long as distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical objectives are not erased, corresponding

levels of war will remain, though the boundaries of each level may expand into the next higher level, which also implies that without a creative and skillfully developed operational design for a given operational situation, military forces will not be able to perform at their peak performance levels. This is where the application of operational art will make the difference.

Notes

1. In the *Combat Journal* of March 2002, I had written in detail on 'The Fundamentals of Operational Art - A Contextual Review'. I intend to limit this article to some vital contextual issues of operational art, which need our serious consideration and thought.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

RESEARCH PROJECTS

Members interested in undertaking research projects under the aegis of the Centre for Research may submit their research proposals for consideration by 31 December each year. **In case of serving officers,** the proposals should be routed through the concerned Service Headquarters. Retired officers may route their proposals through one of the Service Headquarters or send them directly to the Director USI. At present, the Centre awards five fellowships annually, subject to approval by the Board of Management. Copies of the Rules for Award of *Fellowship* Grants and Conduct of Research may be *obtained* from the USI or from our website *www.usiofindia.org.*

Visit to the Battlefield or A Staff Ride

Colonel K Surendranath

Introduction

Armed with military histories, the best way to study past conflict is to visit the field of battle or a Staff Ride. Once on the ground, it is possible to appreciate the intricacies of grappling with an enemy at close quarters, or understand seemingly dubious orders, because on seeing the lie of the land, things become so much clearer. The Staff Ride represents a unique method of conveying the lessons of the past to the present-day army leadership for current application. Properly conducted, these exercises can bring to life, on the very terrain where historic encounters took place, examples, applicable today as in the past, of leadership tactics and strategy, communications, use of terrain, and, above all, the psychology of men in battle.

Most North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) armies now organise tours as a method of formal study or as a pilgrimage to follow the footsteps of their predecessors. These Staff Rides (*Stabsritten*) were developed by the Prussian General Staff under Generals Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz in the 19th Century as an instructional tool, when officers literally rode around the battlefields with their instructors and peers.

After World War II, the traditional Staff Ride concept was reborn in the mid-1980s in Britain due to a growing unease that senior commanders received little training in the challenges of operational command at divisional and corps level. A new Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) was introduced in 1986 with a Staff Ride in the old style. In the British Army the importance of this increased after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, and in the realisation, post-Gulf War, that future operations could be quite different. The inevitability of both combined (multinational) and Joint (tri-service) operations also suggested that many valuable lessons

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about international command, control and communications (C3) could be learned from military history.

The Staff Ride concept is applicable in our context. In both conventional and counter insurgency (CI) operations, these studies would be invaluable in training. Even more important than to highlight good strategy and tactics of a successful operation, would be the emphasis on what went wrong. It is only with this transparency that the concept would translate to a success. In the Indian Army, we are now at a point where with our preoccupation with CI operations, we have a conventional army, portions of which are reasonably adept with low intensity operations, but with little experience in conventional war. A large amount of invaluable war experience is now outside the army and greying gracefully in retirement. There is an urgent requirement to tap this expertise.

The Staff Ride spectrum is vast in the time and space dimension, from the Great Himalayan battlefields, to Panipat and to the 'Watergate' of Tipu Sultan. Nearer home, it would be interesting to follow the 1971 operations in Bangla Desh, and 'participate' in the 'rushing torrent'. It would be of even greater interest to learn why in the past, some of the offensive plans never came to fruition and petered out a few miles from our borders - and to hear about this from those who actually participated in these battles while standing the ground on which they won or lost these battles. Many of these old soldiers have 'faded away' and time is running out for the others.

Different from tactical exercises without troops or from battlefield tours, Staff Rides combine a course of historical preparation with an examination of the terrain on which an actual battle occurred. This article lays out how a Staff Ride can be constructed to be made available to our officers and men, including instructional courses. With a certain amount of effort, commanders at all levels can provide a powerful impetus to the professional improvement of their subordinates, and encourage and enliven unit's esprit de corps - the objective of all commanders in times of peace and war.

What the professional soldier must achieve is what German military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz in *On War* defined as critical

analysis: determine the facts, establish cause and effect, and analyse the results. In simpler terms, the soldier must find out what happened, establish why and how events occurred as they did, and decide what these cause and effect relationships mean now. It is this last element-the answer to the question, "so what?" — that makes this approach to battle analysis different.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose and objectives of a Staff Ride are :-

(a) To provide case studies in the application of the principles of war.

(b) To develop and provide case studies in the application of CI operations through the experiences of previous commanders and units.

(c) To provide case studies in operational art.

(d) To expose students to the variables of battle, especially those factors which interact to produce victory and defeat.

(e) To expose students to the human dimension of warfare.

(f) To provide case studies in joint and combined arms operations.

(g) To provide case studies in the relationship between technology and doctrine.

(h) To provide case studies in leadership at different levels.

(j) To provide case studies in unit cohesion and morale.

(k) To provide case studies in the effect of logistics on operations.

(l) To show the effects of terrain upon plans and their implementation.

(m) To provide an analytical framework for systematic study of campaigns and battles.

(n) To encourage officers to study their profession through active use of military history.

(o) To rekindle interest in the heritage of the Indian Army.

A carefully designed and implemented Staff Ride can attain simultaneously most of these objectives. Depending upon the campaign selected, the Staff Ride can illuminate any principle or lesson at any chosen level. It helps in student involvement and better retention.

Basic Requirements of a Staff Ride

The Directing Staff (DS) Team. The main DS and his team are the central figures in the design and conduct of a successful Staff Ride. This team not only designs the Staff Ride but also conducts all aspects of it so that the goals are achieved. The specific requirements that the DS team should meet are :-

(a) Be thoroughly conversant with all the sources and material relevant to the campaign.

(b) Understand the organisational, doctrinal, and technological context in which the campaign took place.

(c) Understand the operational context in which the campaign took place.

(d) Be conversant with the biodatas of the opposing commanders and their principal subordinates and be able to visualise those individuals realistically.

(e) Know the order of battle (ORBAT) of the opposing forces and be able to characterise the main units in terms of size, armament, and quality.

(f) Be conversant with the operations of all significant units in the campaign and be able to trace the events chronologically.

(g) Be able to analyse the campaign and determine the factors significant to the historical outcome.

(h) Know the ground and campaign well to be able to guide students to all relevant locations.

(j) Be able to interpret significant events of the campaign in terms of current doctrine, terminology and technology and derive usable lessons from the comparison.

(k) Continually refine and improve the Staff Ride with records to derive maximum benefit.

Student Knowledge and Involvement. Students must have the knowledge and involvement in the Staff Ride before the visit to the campaign site. Gained through individual study and collective discussion, this will be very helpful during the field study portion of the Staff Ride. The key is that students are active participants in the exchange of information, in the stimulation of thought, and in the collective analysis of the military operation.

Field Study Portions of the Course. The preliminary study and field study phases complement each other. Without the field study phase, the preliminary study is an incomplete form of battle analysis, taught in a classroom environment. Without the systematic analysis of the preliminary study phase, the field study phase is simply a battlefield tour. Carefully integrated, the two activities generate understanding and analysis.

Site Selection

Staff Rides can be conducted wherever a historical campaign occurred, but some campaigns make far better teaching vehicles than others. Major considerations in selecting a site are :-

(a) **Level of Command.** Certain sites are well suited to bring out lessons at the unit and sub-unit levels but offer little from the operational or strategic angles. Other campaigns bring out valuable command and staff problems. Level of command for which participants are to be trained should be borne in mind while selecting site for conduct of a Staff Ride.

(b) **Terrain.** Sites can be found which encompass virtually any type of terrain desired.

(c) **Type of Unit.** The Staff Ride can be useful for all types of units. Most campaigns provide opportunities for studying the operations of infantry, artillery, and armour units, either singly or as combined arms. Similarly, the logistics can also be studied. Some campaigns, however, are particularly useful for bringing out lessons for specialised units, such as engineers.

(d) **Historical Setting.** Some campaign sites remain relatively unchanged from their original historical settings. Other sites undergo a charge but are still recognisable and thus usable. Still others may have been virtually obliterated, leaving little or nothing of the historical scene intact. Staff Rides can still be conducted but as the degree of historical identity declines, the task of the instructors becomes more difficult.

(e) **Availability of Sources.** A Staff Ride requires the support of many sources of information. Even a simple campaign contains a huge number of facts, and the more the participants can gather and assimilate, the better they can interpret the campaign. Both written history and personal experiences must be utilised.

The Preliminary Study Phase

The purpose of the preliminary study phase is to prepare students for the visit to the site of the selected campaign. This phase is critical to the success of the field study phase. It can also take various forms, depending upon time available for study and the needs of the participants: formal classroom instruction, individual study, or a combination.

The optimum combines lecture, individual study, and group discussion. To get students actively involved, instructors may assign specific subjects to investigate and brief either in a classroom setting or during the field study phase. Useful subjects in this regard may pertain to specific leaders, specific units, critical events,

or specific functional areas such as logistics or communications. By creating 'mini-experts' on particular sub-topics, this method guarantees lively discussion and divergent viewpoints among participants.

Content

The preliminary study phase must accomplish certain tasks :-

(a) Students must clearly understand the purpose of the exercise.

(b) Students must become actively involved in the exercise and not lapse into passive spectators.

(c) Students must acquire the basic knowledge necessary for general understanding of the selected campaign. Generally, this basic knowledge should consist of :-

(i) Organisation, strength, armament, and doctrine of the opposing forces.

(ii) Biodata and personality profile of important commanders.

(iii) Relevant weapons and their characteristics.

(iv) Relevant terrain and climatic considerations.

(v) General outline and chronology of significant events.

The Field Study Phase

Design. The field study phase should be designed to visit all significant sites associated either with the selected campaign or with the portion emphasised in preliminary study. If only a portion of the field can be visited, the instructor must summarise what occurred elsewhere so that students comprehend the campaign as a whole. The route should also be designed to visit sites in chronological order. Planned stops or stands along the route should be selected for historical significance, visual impact, or logistics. If vivid personal accounts or photographs, can be linked to specific sites, those sites should be included.

Conduct. Throughout the field study phase, the instructor should make every effort to maintain student involvement and ensure that they are correctly oriented. A simple technique to enhance both student involvement and orientation is the use of first person accounts at specific stops along the field study route. These personal accounts are essential for battle analysis, since they provide important information on the attitudes, perspectives, and mental state of the participants — the vital human dimension of battle. One method is by the use of veterans. Veterans of the operation who can supply truly living examples are unmatched for encouraging and retaining interest and involvement by participating in discussions with students and instructors. Veterans must be used carefully for best effect. The DS team should screen veterans for their articulateness and accurate recollection. In some cases, screening may expose personal biases that would make the veteran ineffective. A Staff Ride which includes veterans of the selected campaign will be extremely interesting and rewarding, and can be used effectively to bring out the lessons of both conventional and CI operations.

The Integration Phase

The integration phase is an opportunity for students and DS to reflect jointly upon their experience. Several positive affects stem from the integration phase. First, it requires students to analyse the previous phases and integrate what they learned in each. Second, it provides a mechanism through which students may organise and express their impressions of the campaign and the lessons derived from its study. Third, students may gain additional insights from sharing impressions with their peers. Finally, the DS team can use this phase to get suggestions for improvement.

Sources of Information

Documents produced by participants or eyewitnesses, after-action reports, orders, messages, telephone logs, war maps, personal accounts such as letters, diaries, and reminiscences are all important sources of information. The verbal recollections of a participant would be a primary source and must be analysed critically.

Other sources are accounts of events produced by non-participants who received their information secondhand, like professional historians. No matter how well written, secondary sources lack the realism and impact of an account by a participant or an eyewitness.

Training Aids

Imaginative training aids will improve both the preliminary and field study phases. Availability and suitability of these aids will vary with the campaign period selected, the amount of time available, and the amount of resources committed to the project. The following types of training aids may be used :-

(a) **Maps.**

(b) **Photographs.** Photographs of uniforms, equipment, and commanders where available may enliven lectures and briefings. Action shots from conflicts serve a similar function. An effective technique during the field study phase is to match a historical photograph to its actual site for a then-and-now comparison.

(c) **Paintings, Drawings, and Diagrams.** When photographs are not available, illustrations may serve the same educational purpose. Diagrams created especially for the Staff Ride by the DS team may be used to good affect.

(d) **Films and Videotapes.** Film footage of conflicts is a powerful tool.

(e) **Tape Recordings.** Tape recordings may be useful for illustrating a point. Veterans can even record their recollections if they are unable to join the field study phase in person.

Other Benefits

Although military education is sufficient reason for devoting time and resources to a Staff Ride, certain secondary benefits may accrue as well. These benefits spring from the fact that, for some participants, a visit to a battlefield is an emotional experience

that may reinforce their feelings for their profession, their units, and one another. If it is a unit Staff Ride, their shared experiences during the exercise may strengthen their camaraderie and unit cohesion. Even when conferring gallantry awards, what better setting can there be for the ceremony, than the site hallowed by these deeds of sacrifice and valour.

The long and illustrious military history of the Indian Army is ideally suited for Staff Rides. Taking the most recent operations, Staff Rides can even be conducted on aspects of Operation Parakaram and Operation Vijay and run as a classified series to generate relevant lessons at appropriate levels so that the new command echelon learn from the experiences of the earlier ones and benefit from their errors. The ongoing CI operations can also be similarly used for the benefit of less experienced commanders and men.

Conclusion

The design and conduct of a Staff Ride is not a simple task. By its very nature, a Staff Ride is both time and resource intensive.

We have a number of existing institutions which have the resources for designing and executing a Staff Ride. The United Service Institution of India, has on its membership rolls a large number of eminent soldiers well suited to design Staff Rides at various levels. Our Category A training establishments too, are well geared to undertake Staff Rides for courses at various echelons of command. It can only add quality to our training system, while providing our 21st century commanders and men that extra battle-winning edge through a 19th century resource.

Joint Operations in Indian Context : Role of Air Power

Air Marshal RS Bedi, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Introduction

Ever since the aircraft appeared on the war horizon, its control remained the focus of controversy all over the world. It appeared as a subordinate weapon of the Army, for its utility could not be visualised beyond it being an aerial artillery, observation post and a communication platform. But, as the years went by, this air element developed into a multi role capable force, though still remaining largely allied to the Army. It is only after the air element came into its own with a variety of independent and support roles that it became synonymous with air power that had the potential to effectively alter the course of war.

The debate on control of air power has been going on ever since World War I. Whilst the land power advocates want to subordinate the air power to the will of the ground force commander, the air power hierarchy continues to resist and seek freedom from such tethers, so as to be able to employ air power more effectively to war winning roles.

Background

Even as the air power consciousness gained ground, particularly after World War II, close air support (CAS) remained predominant in the subconscious of most Armies the world over. As the Armed Forces have to be responsive to the needs of time and keep pace with technological advances, conceptual and doctrinal changes became necessary. As the impact of air power was realised and its importance as a viable entity recognised, it began to emerge as an independent service. Whilst Royal Air Force (RAF) came into being soon after the World War I, the United States Air Force (USAF) came into its own after the World

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War II. Thus a separate role for the Air Forces all over the world became an accepted norm.

The air power from the very inception focused on strategic operations, aiming to destroy enemy's industrial and economic centres of gravity. Air power could carry the war to the enemy homeland deeper and faster and with greater strategic impact than the Navy or the Army. Destroying vital assets of enemy's strategic calculus and his capability to wage war was considered far better than any other type of mission. Counter air and air superiority or "command of the air" as Douhet called it were significant roles that enabled to a far greater degree the success of nearly all other types of operations. "With air superiority, all else is possible, without it all else is at risk".[1] CAS was viewed, for such doctrinal reasons, inadequate and insufficient application of air power, which had the least impact on the course of the war. It is for this reason that the Army believes that the Air Force neglects CAS in its quest for counter air and air superiority operations. It is a typical army view. It fails to understand the importance of air superiority without which even the CAS aircraft like the armed helicopters and the transonic fighters can not be employed effectively.

Great advances in aviation technology led to a wide range of future possibilities. Air power has now technologically reached a stage where its fusion with space will touch new frontiers in the 21st century. Air power will soon symbolise space power. Failure to apply it as an independent power in future conflict scenarios and to tether it back to the armies once again as hitherto would be a retrograde step. It would tantamount to restricting the vast capabilities of air power for narrow ends. Air power must be allowed to flourish on its own, given its speed, range, precision, flexibility, lethality, force multiplier effect and its rapid deployment capability.

Air Power Theories

There are not many air power theorists in the field who have looked at CAS role of air power comprehensively. Most have looked at it as some thing that detracted air power from its strategic objectives, for they considered CAS impact on the course of the battle at tactical level rather limited.

British Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Soviet Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii, were two of the very few air power theorists who expressed their views on the vexed question of integration of air power with ground forces. However, both held contrasting views on the subject. Tukhachevskii viewed air power as a fire support, subordinate to the manoeuvres of ground element. He did not see its utility much beyond CAS at tactical level. He did not consider air power of any consequence at higher levels of ground operations. Liddell Hart on the other hand viewed air power as a coequal member of a team and wanted to exploit its psychological impact in order to paralyse the enemy, particularly at higher levels of ground operations.

As long as air power remains as an adjunct to the Army or the Navy, its utilisation as a national strategic asset would remain unachieved. Air power's greatest attribute lies in its flexibility and utility in surprise offensive action against enemy's strategic targets. The decisiveness of air power lies in its ability to intervene quickly and penetrate to great depths without being bound by traditional physical limits or time concepts. But this is possible only when the tenets of air power such as centralised control, decentralised execution and offensive deployment are observed, otherwise its potential to surprise and unnerve the enemy will be minimised. Air power can no doubt be used in a variety of roles but CAS and interdiction remain secondary in nature.

After World War II, arrival of nuclear weapons on the scene further reinforced the long held Air Force view that the best use of air power lay in attacking strategic targets including enemy's nuclear capabilities. The Air Forces thus remained fully oriented towards deep strikes into enemy territory. In keeping with this doctrine, for decades to come, the fighters were designed to meet these very objectives. "Attacking enemy ground forces was no more a part of their repertoire".[2] The aircraft industry concentrated on maximising speed and range and produced such aircraft as the USAF F-100 series, Navy F-4, A-3,A-4, A-7, British Harrier, Lightening, Tornado, French Mirage and Russian Mig series. Low speed, high manoeuvrability, high survivability to ground fire, redundancy and pilot protection were some of the aspects that got largely ignored by aircraft designers. A-10 Warthog is perhaps the only US aircraft

actually designed in recent past for attacking ground forces and armour.

Jointmanship - A Historical Perspective

During World War II, inter service cooperation, not necessarily jointness in the modern context reached its peak. But subsequently when force levels were reduced after the war, individual Services relapsed into isolation. In the USA, the Commanders-in-Chief (Cs-in-C) were severely handicapped by Service Chiefs restrictions on their authority. Joint structures where ever they existed were mere legacies of the past.

The reversal process began with the Israelis executing their 1967 war by securing total coordination between the three Services directly under the overall leadership of Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan. The Israeli Air Force, in a pre-emptive attack destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. Similarly, in our context of 1971 Bangladesh War, Army–Air Force cooperation heralded the fall of East Pakistan in a matter of mere 14 days. In both these cases, it was coordination rather than the so called jointness being talked about today that worked.

The Americans faced with multiple Air Forces within, and coalition combat environment outside, went in for evolving joint procedures. After long debates and extensive research work, the US Congress passed the Gold Water–Nichols, Department of Defence Re-organisation Act in 1986. The Act did not alter any of the existing arrangements within the Pentagon but empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and made the four Services work together.

After initial trials in 1989 Panama operations, the system was tried extensively during Operation Desert Storm. It needs to be mentioned here that the C-in-C "used air power in the first phase of operation to 'shape' the battle field and set conditions for decisive ground combat."[3] Later in phases II and III of the campaign, Air Component Commander, General Chuck Horner worked as an equal member of the team. "Unfortunately, the ground and the naval commanders did not understand how powerfully air power, among the sparkling array of new technologies would effect the

battle and were not prepared to take full advantage of the opportunities it presented."[4] It led to serious inter Service wranglings right under the nose of the theatre commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf. Even subsequently, the USA, the UK and other developed countries who employed joint task forces in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rawanda and Kosovo remained embroiled in tactical problems.

Desert Storm – US Experiment in Jointship

The Gold Water-Nichols Defence Re-organisation Act in 1986 was meant to improve the joint war fighting capability of the Services. This gave the theatre Cs-in-C, the responsibility for war fighting in their respective theatres with land, sea and air components of the four Services assigned to the theatre. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), a composite structure exercised operational control over all air assets assigned to the theatre. He was responsible for planning and executing operations in support of C-in-C's overall plans. Several problems came to the fore and several questions arose in respect of joint inter operability and Service specific concerns about system's implementation.

Air Force's long held view that the air power must operate under a single commander who should exercise central control of air assets and that the mission execution must be decentralised for Air Force to optimise air power's unique capabilities were upheld by the JFACC concept. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps air power assets comprising high performance fixed wing attack aircraft were pooled together under the JFACC's operational control for planning and execution of air operations in support of C-in-C's theatre campaign. The centralised control was ensured through a process of apportionment, allocation and distribution of air effort. In other words, whilst air assets were pooled for optimisation, the central control still rested with the Air Force Commanders of JFACC. Respective Services were then tasked for decentralised execution of air missions such that the CAS sorties were made available to subordinate Army and Marine Corps elements for use in their mission planning.

Air tasking for mission planning done by JFACC Headquarters in Riyad, Saudi Arabia led to serious problems in this interoperability.

Incompatible communication systems between the Air Force and the Navy precluded expeditious interaction. The Navy and the Marine Corps even complained about operational philosophy and the targeting systems followed by the JFACC. Accustomed to autonomous and decentralised control, planning and execution of their operational missions, they found it hard to go along in a subordinate role. JFACC's centralised control over target selection and planning was in total contradiction to the system followed by the Navy and the Marine Corps. Inter Service dissensions and resultant turmoil came to the fore immediately. JFACC was not taken kindly by the Navy and the Marines. Incompatibility in operational procedures, doctrines and aircraft performances also led to serious difficulties in achieving synergy.

The Army also continued to complain about lack of air effort in support of its ground operations in the overall theatre campaign plan. The Air Force on the other hand complained that air effort for ground operations diverted assets from the strategic operations. It needs to be emphasised here that in the initial phase of air campaign, the JFACC concentrated on strategic attacks to gain air superiority and to eliminate command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) facilities and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) capability in accordance with C-in-C's decision. Whilst the Air Force commanders and planners felt that diverting aircraft from strategic effort to other areas prevented the air campaign from defeating Iraq comprehensively, the Army and the Marines were not convinced that airpower alone could force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In fact, the Marine commander withheld half of his organic fixed wing assets from JFACC's control for use against other priority targets. Later, when JFACC did not allot sufficient air effort and targets to Marines, the Maritime Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander withdrew all his fixed wing aircraft from JFACC's control for use in accordance with his battlefield priorities.

This defeated the very purpose of JFACC designed for optimising and synergising air effort. Notwithstanding this elaborate and seemingly logical jointship for synergysing the effort, problems stemming from varying Service doctrines, organisation and equipment created infinite problems in implementation. Though overall aim of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait was met, it was

not without serious disputes, mistrust and conceptual differences between the Services. Besieged by their own narrow Service loyalties, the US Army, the Navy, the Marines and the Air Force were not quite able to adapt adequately to the concept of jointship.

Here I would like to quote from *Path to Extinction: The US Air Force in 2025*, "There are airmen of great skill and competence and intellect in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. But their skills and platforms are different, even if some of their munitions are same, and their missions are fundamentally different. Their concern is tactical, not strategic. Their very definition of the situation is colored by the primacy of close air support for troops ---. Their notion of air operations are different from those of Air Officers in both scale and magnitude."[5]

Doctrinal Aspects

"At the very heart of warfare lies the doctrine. It represents the central belief for waging war in order to achieve victory"[6] says General Curtis Le May of the USAF. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the doctrinal aspects of each Service. In the post Desert Storm analysis, the Americans discovered that the disparities in Services doctrines, operational procedures, aircraft and aircrew capabilities and other equipment were largely responsible in hampering the smooth functioning of the JFACC. Services differ from one another in their war doctrines and perception of the role of air power. There was constant tension between the Air Force and the Army on how to prioritise targets. The Army wanted to proceed in accordance with Air Land Battle doctrine whereas the Air Force had something else in mind. The first task would, therefore, be to even out the conceptual differences.

The Air Force doctrine emphasises the importance of counter air and strategic attacks with comparatively less focus on Army's concern at tactical levels. The Army on the other hand sees itself as the central instrument capable of forcing results in any conflict. And for that, it considers air support essential at tactical level. It sees little utility of air power at strategic level or at higher combat levels. For the Army, the centre of gravity is enemy's army in the battlefield area and nothing beyond. The US B-52 precision guided bomb attacks that decimated Taliban positions in Afghanistan

although did not fit exactly in the definition of CAS or air interdiction, were none the less meant to help the ground forces only.

The Army has to realise that the air power has come into its own as an independent high technology war fighting machinery capable of tilting the outcome of the war. In the recent air operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, US air power was extensively employed against the enemy's ground forces independent of own ground operations. "It is the only way to fight war with far fewer casualties than if it had to be done in the old fashioned way on the ground___. It would be wiser to invest in Air Power than in man power."[7] Air power has come a long way from those days of World War I when it was nothing more than an airborne artillery. The aircraft were employed for attacking enemy ground forces prior to the engagement by own ground troops. Right up to Normandy and perhaps beyond, air power has been used to soften targets prior to induction of ground forces. It can no more be considered as an extended artillery or an adjunct of the army now.

Air power has progressed technologically and in potential. Its ability to deliver concentrated firepower at enemy's vitals with devastating effect makes it today a decisive force in its own right. Air power has to be seen as future oriented because of its technological progress. Infact, space is the final frontier. Air power's strategic relevance both in conventional and nuclear environment cannot be wished away merely because CAS for army remains tactically important. The air power has today attained the stature of being a premier deterrent force. It has become the primary means of power projection for strategic purposes. Air power has the capability to project force and commit far less manpower in favour of high tech assets to defeat the adversary. Air power offers an alternative to fighting a bloody war of attrition on adversary's turf and terms. Failing to use these advantages would be foolhardy. As long as such doctrinal differences remain unresolved, varying perceptions about the role of air power in modern context will continue to create inter Service dissensions and vitiate attempts at jointship.

For jointmanship to succeed, it would be essential to ensure that one Service does not tread on the toes of the other. The unity of command and control is achieved without losing Service

identities. Otherwise, the "war" will carry on whatever be the organisational structure as seen in the case of the US Armed Forces. The US Army, Navy and Marines each wanting air power to operate under their direct control and the USAF on the other hand wants to focus on independent air campaign against strategic targets. The USA has not so far found a solution to this nagging problem. Jointship by itself is not the panacea for all ills as the Army higher hierarchy in India seems to think.

Indigenous Approach

Based on historical experience, each country may have to evolve a system of its own that will suit its ethos, socio-economic environment, culture, threat perceptions the nature and the likely duration of the war. A viable modus operandi that will not only meet the aspirations of other Services but also prevent mutual bickering and turf wars has to be worked out.

There is no cook book solution to it. Whilst the US armed helicopters in Vietnam were under the command of ground commanders directly, the Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan were part of the Air Force and were subject to more centralised control. Transplanting foreign concepts without adequate concern for own infrastructure, wherewithal and the national ethos may prove counter productive. A developing country like India still trying to fight poverty, can ill afford the luxury of creating additional air elements and forces as adjunct to other Services on the pattern of the US. The US Army has its armed helicopters, the Marines CAS aircraft and the Navy a full-fledged air arm. Yet their objectives have not been met fully. Whilst jointness helps optimise resources, it also results in significantly greater complexity and problems than single Service operations.

It is in this vein that the Indian Army has only the armed helicopters and not the full-fledged Air Force as is being propagated by it constantly. If the Army too has its own Air Force, where is the jointship then. It is a mere duplication. Can the Army then operate entirely independent of the Air Force? The answer is no. For synergistic jointship, airpower resources of both the Army and the Air Force will have to be pooled together under a single commander for unity of command and control. The Army should be content

with armed helicopters, which like the US Army are under its operational control except that these are flown by Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots.

The Army must look at indigenous and other viable options that may be more savvy to our environment. However, we must remember that the US has never fought wars at home within the continental America. They created joint multinational structures primarily to address the problems arising out of coalition wars. There is little sense in imitating such alien system that has no resemblance to operations we in India have fought or are likely to fight in the future. Let us first create a home specific doctrinal architecture that will enable inter Service cooperation and coordination. Such a war fighting doctrine must be common to all three Services at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, if synergistic effects are to be achieved.

It would be of interest to recall here how in recent past, turf wars were fought to the detriment of both the Army and the Air Force. In its zeal to acquire armed helicopters, the Army apparently gave a commitment to the Air Force that it would not ask for CAS in the future. The Air Force took the Army seriously and cut short CAS training of its fighter pilots, which was subsequently stopped altogether by the next Air Chief. Finding itself in a tight corner in Kargil, the Army sought IAF's help to relieve pressure on it. However, the Army was keen to employ helicopters and not the fighters as recommended by the Air Force for which government's approval was necessary. Apparently, the Army did not take it kindly. Sadly, but true, there have been deliberate attempts to downplay the role of the Air Force during the Kargil conflict. Former Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) has gone to the extent of claiming that the Air Force help was sought for strategic considerations and not for any tactical reasons.

I am constrained to bring out here yet another instance of rivalry. When the Army was in the process of building its force level, the Air Force also projected a matching requirement of fighter squadrons for the purpose of providing CAS to the newly raised divisions (one fighter squadron per division). In its usual fashion, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) referred the Air Force projections

to the Army. The Army disagreed and the MOD turned down the Air Force case.

These examples only highlight the narrow approach of the Army in pursuit of its broader designs. There is an urgent need to come out of this mindset. The Air Force too must shed the old baggage and look how best it can support the Army in its operations. There is a need for proper research and development on possible solution to the problem of interoperability between the Army and the Air Force. I agree with the former Vice Chief of the Army Staff that Army Training Command could be tasked to evolve the joint doctrine but with representatives from the Air Force and the Navy.[8]

The first step is to evolve a mutually coherent doctrine on how to employ air power assets wherein the requirement of one are met without unduly diluting that of the other. This is particularly important in Indo-Pak context where the wars would not last beyond weeks. In other words, not only a joint air doctrine but also a joint war fighting doctrine that will fit into our threat environment adequately needs to be worked out. There is also a need for defining CAS adequately. Presently, it is viewed differently by different Services.

In the current system, the Air Commands quantify and allocate air effort for CAS to their counterparts in the Army. Surprisingly, some do not seem to be aware of it. However, the Army sub allocates it further to its lower formations. Accordingly, the demands begin at the brigade level and rise through the organisational hierarchy till they reach the corps level. Thus application of concentrated air effort for decisive impact of air power is obviated. This procedure was evolved for tactical employment of CAS during World War II. In this, the CAS is merely an appendage of the Army. It is flying artillery. The CAS should be considered as a force more at the operational (higher) level of war than merely at the tactical level.

The CAS should be massed against the enemey's decisive points. Its psychological and physical attributes work as force multipliers. In other words, it has to be seen as a vertical fire, fully integrated at the highest level of plans so that the two are synergistic. The nature of plan or the prevalent situation will govern the extent

of cooperation. If integrated as co-equal partner to the ground forces at that level, it could have decisive operational level impact. However, it is not my case to say that tactical level use should be discontinued; because it is least effective application of air power and that it lacks direct strategic impact

Presently, each Service plans its operation in total isolation without sharing any information with each other. Marshal of the Air Force, Arjan Singh, is on record saying that the Air Force was not even aware of General JN Choudhuri's plan to attack across the international border in 1965 to relieve pressure in Chhamb-Jaurian Sector. No wonder, 15 Infantry Division was severely punished by Pakistan Air Force with no support forthcoming from the IAF. In the bargain, it was the IAF which got adverse publicity. Jointship cannot be achieved without comprehensive interaction at the highest echelon of the Services. I understand, even today the Army war plans are not disclosed to the Air Force.

Perceptions that Air Force may not show up and commit its Rs. 150 crore worth aircraft for a task that they consider may not effect much the course of war in preference to its strategic option has to be cleared. The Army also must realise that the strategic targets engaged by the Air Force also cover enemy's wherewithal in depth which has a bearing on his ability to sustain ground operations. Both in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the USAF extensively attacked enemy ground forces assets and installations far away from the battle area which had ultimately a debilitating impact of their ability to fight.

Similarly, Air Force perception that Army's proclivity to use Air Force merely as an extended artillery in tactical engagements is not entirely correct today. Such misperceptions result in widening the chasm and forcing one or the other to seek autonomy and independence for multi-dimensional capabilities. Obviously, there is a need for confidence building measures between the two.

Conclusion

If we can overcome the distrust and the fear of change, the integration can begin vertically at the higher echelons of the Services. The fundamental hypothesis is that CAS should be seen as a force at the operational level of war and not simply a few

ground attack aircraft striking a jeep or a truck somewhere in the battle field. Coordinated plans must be prepared at the top level, down to the tactical level and not vice versa, as normally happens. CAS as envisaged can act as a force multiplier and, therefore, must get integrated with overall ground plans in a manner that the two are synergistic. Dovetailing air power at the planning stage will not only help meet overall offensive plans in terms of CAS and battle field interdiction but also allow Air Force to concentrate on its primary task of air superiority, counter air, counter land and other strategic options. All this can be achieved without any drastic changes in the existing structure of command and control. All that is needed is the change of heart and the old mindset. Joint operations are based on trust. Weightage and the priorities will then fall in place. This will ensure equitable air effort to meet the requirement of the Army without unduly diluting the strategic efforts of the Air Force. The responsibility for maintaining the delicate balance between the competing demands for air power must rest on the shoulders of higher hierarchy. Being a scarce resource, air power has to be used judiciously.

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The Naga Insurgency (Part II)

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Creation of National Socialist Council of Nagaland and its Factions

With the creation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) the insurgency in Nagaland took a completely new turn. The Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) and the Naga Army had gone to East Pakistan and China and obtained arms and were trained there, but they did not link up with any other insurgent group operating in the North East. From its inception, the NSCN was linked up with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Besides these two groups, the NSCN has adopted more than a dozen insurgent groups of the North East, helped them to procure arms, trained them, and extorted money along with them. The NSCN thus extended their financial net well beyond Nagaland, and since their participation with other groups was generally in a ratio of 8:2, their share of the money extorted was generally in the same proportion.

It was the NSCN who patronised the ULFA and took them to Kaphlang's area and arranged for their training there. Later they helped the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB), the Boro militant group. The Nagas and the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group were traditional enemies. The old Naga underground and the Mizo National Front (MNF) lived in separate houses in Dacca, and never had any link in the North East. After the Mizo settlement in 1989, when the Hmars demand for a district council was not conceded by the Mizo Government, and they formed the Hmar Peoples Convention (HPC). It was the NSCN, Issac Muivah (IM) who adopted them and gave them weapons and trained them. They set up camps in the North Cachar Hills, and committed several bank robberies in the interior of Cachar district, and carried out many ambushes on security forces along with the HPC cadres.

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In Meghalaya, when the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) started minor insurgencies against the Government, it was the NSCN (IM) who befriended them and helped them with arms and trained them. Back in the North Cachar Hills, the Dimasa Cachari formed a guerilla group called the Dima Halem Daoga (DHD), because of the rampant corruption of the District Council. It was the NSCN who held their hand, gave them arms and trained them. The United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) an insurgent group of the Karbis of Assam was raised in 1999 to fight for a separate state. The NSCN (IM) armed and trained this group.

In Tripura both the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) were again armed and trained by the NSCN (IM). In Manipur the NSCN (IM) has strong links with the Kanglei Yuwol Kanna Lup (KYKL) floated by Namoijan Oken Singh, a Meithei insurgent group, which runs a big extortion net in the Imphal valley. They have also allied with the Zomi Reunification Army (ZRA), the United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) all without any ideology and purely involved in extortion. Here the share of money extorted for the NSCN is a clear 80 per cent. It is no wonder then that the NSCN (IM) is a fabulously rich organisation and can afford to maintain offices in Bangkok, Manila and the Netherlands. The NSCN (IM) is no more an ideological guerilla group. It has made a business enterprise out of insurgencies and made an export oriented industry out of it.

The NSCN set up its Headquarters in Hemi Naga country in northern Burma. Bertil Lintner has vividly described his visit to this Headquarters, marching from Longwa village, on the trijunction of Nagaland, Khonsa, and Myanmar for several days traversing several ranges.[13] Several ULFA cadres whom I had interrogated also described this route.

One fact that finds mention by Bertil Lintner and many ULFA cadres was that in the Headquarters of the NSCN, the Thangkhuls and the Konyaks did not seem to get on well, and they had established separate camps. The old devil of tribal rivalry was at work again, and ultimately it led to the break up of the NSCN into

two factions. The main feature of the NSCN setting up its camp in Hemi Naga country was the connection established with the Kachin Independent Organisation (KIO) and its army wing the Kachin Independent Army (KIA). The second feature was the link established with the PLA of Manipur, who had come to the KIO for training and arms. After the disastrous election in Assam in 1984, the militant students of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) had formed the ULFA, and they requested the NSCN for arms and training. The NSCN brought the ULFA cadres first to Kaphlangs Headquarters and then to the KIO area.

Cadres of the NSCN, ULFA and the PLA, after receiving tough training returned to Nagaland, Manipur and Assam and started operating in their respective areas. Extensive extortion from the business community in all the three states started, for the Kachins while imparting excellent training also charged high rates particularly for the weapons. Meanwhile inter tribal feelings in the NSCN camp were getting exacerbated, and in 1988 boiled over in a violent clash in which several top leaders of Thuingalong Muivah and Isaac Swu were killed. Muivah and Swu retreated to Nagaland and Manipur and the NSCN split into two factions, NSCN (IM) and NSCN Khaplang (K). Meanwhile Indian intelligence had won over Bronsen, the President of the KIO and he withdrew support to the NSCN, PLA, and the ULFA. Sensing this development, the PLA had already arranged safe houses in Srimangal, Adams Bazaar and Chotto Dhamai in Sylhet district of Bangladesh, among the Meithei settlers there. The ULFA had also sent parties to Bangladesh to see if they could get sanctuary there. All three groups had independently visited China. Though they could buy some weapons, they did not get substantial support. The move to Bangladesh was a kind of last-ditch attempt to survive. None of the three groups had any love for Bangladesh who kept exporting their population to all the states of the North East. Little did they know that the link developing with Bangladesh would change the situation drastically in their favour and they were on the threshold of an arms bonanza.

ULFA Cadres. The Assamese were the first to strike gold. They were able to get in touch with a group that took them to the Pakistan embassy. Very soon they were talking to the Inter

Services Intelligence (ISI) man in Dacca, who immediately realised it as an opportunity to subvert India in a sensitive but wholly unexpected quarter. With the help of the Bangladesh Directorate General Forces Intelligence (DGFI), 10 of the ULFA cadres were given Bangladeshi names and passports and found themselves bound for Karachi. They were taken to Peshawar and put in a camp of the Afghan Mujahideen of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. This was in 1991. Three such groups were trained on medium weapons, rocket launchers and mortars. Back in Bangladesh in a safe house arranged by the DGFI, the ISI gave a task to the ULFA to send its cadres back to Assam and blow up the refinery at Narangi. The young Assamese boys who were given this task objected and said they were not willing to damage their own assets. There was a fight with Paresh Barua, their self styled chief, and the 10 boys who had been given this task, slipped out of the safe house and deserting Paresh Barua returned to Assam. As Inspector General Operations in Assam some of our sources informed me of this transaction and asked me if I would meet with these boys. Very soon we were debriefing them and the whole story was pieced together. The NSCN (IM) leaders soon joined the ULFA in Bangladesh, and Thuingalong Muivah and Paresh Baruah had Bangladeshi names and passports given to them. Meetings with the ISI followed, and they were told that after the breakup of the Khmer Rogue, in Cambodia, a lot of Russian small arms were available with arms dealers in Thailand. These could be purchased and brought in local trawlers that sailed along the Myanmar coast. One of the ULFA cadres who had been arrested and agreed to work with us, told us of a meeting held in Sayeman hotel in Cox's Bazaar where Thuingalong Muivah, Paresh Barua along with ISI and DGFI officers, finalised this deal.

Some time towards the latter half of 1991, the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Operations Mizoram informed Assam Police Headquarters, that a party of Nagas had marched south along the eastern border of Mizoram, in Myanmar and turning west at the southernmost point of Mizoram, Parva, had entered Bangladesh. The party had generally marched through Myanmar, but sometimes entered Mizoram border villages to buy rations. No force was deployed along the eastern border of Mizoram, and no spare troops were available. Hence no interception was attempted. The reason

for the movement was not known at that point of time. Sometime later 10 Naga insurgents surrendered to the Border Security Force (BSF) post at Parva. They were brought to Massimpur and interrogated, and then the real story came to light. The 10 Nagas who were all NSCN (IM) cadres revealed that a party of 250 cadres of the group had set out from Paren sub division of Nagaland, and marching through Tamenglong, Churachandpur crossed south into Myanmar, and then followed the Tiddim road, skirted the eastern border of Mizoram, and finally crossed into Bangladesh south and east of Parva, and reached Bandarban. After a long wait the 10 got fed up with the harsh conditions of the march and the living conditions and decided to return to Nagaland. They ran away from the camp, but were chased by their colleagues, and hence decided to surrender to the BSF at Parva. They further added that they were sent to collect a consignment of arms, which was to be landed at Cox's Bazaar. It was later on collaborated that these arms had been purchased from arms dealers in Thailand with the help of the ISI and brought to Cox's Bazaar by a coastal vessel. The arms were collected by the 240 NSCN (IM) party and taken back to Nagaland along the route they had followed when coming down. Incidentally the DIG Operations Mizoram tracked their return movement, but since there were no troops they could not be intercepted. The NSCN (IM) had got its first consignment of arms from Thailand with the help of the ISI and the DGFI. Subsequently at least three more consignments of arms were brought. The later consignments were for the NSCN (IM), ULFA, PLA and the NDFB. The weapons brought were AK rifles, RPD 7.62 LMGs, RPG-7 rocket launchers and Chinese grenades. During this period, the DGFI helped the NSCN (IM), ULFA and the NDFB to set up camps for training their cadres in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). All these three organisations set up safe houses in Dacca, Cox's Bazaar, and other towns along their routes of ingress into Bangladesh. Evidence of the weapons received by the three insurgent groups was clearly manifested by enhanced operations by all three groups in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur.

Expansion of Operations by NSCN (IM)

It was during this period that the NSCN (IM) began to expand its operations. In Meghalaya, an underground group called the

Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) had come up. The NSCN (IM) had safe houses in Shillong, to facilitate movement of their cadres to Bangladesh, through Naljuri and Dawki, and further west through Nongstoin and Garo Hills. The HALC soon split up into Khasi and Garo groups called Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC). Both the groups contacted the NSCN (IM) for help, which was immediately given. Both groups were helped to set up training camps in Diengling for the HNLC and in the thick jungles of east and west Garo Hills for the ANVC. The NSCN's main interest was in the money to be garnered from this link. Shillong was a rich area for extortion. There were extensive collections from the rich Marwari traders. A series of kidnappings by the two outfits also yielded rich dividends. The politicians acted as go betweens in the release of kidnapped officials and business heads and took a share, but the major share went to the NSCN (IM)

We have already seen the link between the NSCN (IM) and the HPC in the North Cachar (NC) Hills. The HPC took to arms because they felt that the Mizos were discriminating against them in development in Mizoram. The Hmars were a part of the larger Kuki–Chin-Mizo group. They did create problems in Mizoram, but then had no reason to extend their operations to the NC Hills of Assam. There was a considerable population of Hmars in the NC Hills, and a few villages in Cachar district, including Hmarkhollian - one of the largest villages in Cachar. There was no love lost between the Nagas and the Mizos. The Naga insurgency started in 1955, while the Mizo insurgency started in 1966. Though both parties went to East Pakistan for help, there was never any axis between them. When the Hmars decided to take up arms against the Mizos, the NSCN (IM) extended a hand. The real reason for this was that the NSCN (IM) wanted to get a foothold in the NC Hills, where there was a small Zemi Naga population. NSCN cadres with a few HPC cadres led the small guerilla bands that operated in the NC Hills and in Cachar. The NSCN (IM) cadres never operated in Mizoram. The other reason was the scope for extortion. There were a number of good tea gardens in the lower slopes of the NC Hills and in the foothills in Cachar. The NSCN (IM) cadres led the HPC in kidnapping tea garden managers, and issuing ransom

notes. They even tried to rob some small banks in Cachar district. The countryside of the NC Hills was poor, but the NSCN (IM) did not hesitate to extort money from small traders in the towns. Much later when the Dimasas started their own insurgent group, the Dima Halem Daoga, in NC Hills, the NSCN (IM) again backed them, training them and equipping them with arms, and of course extorting money from corrupt government officials, and kidnapping for ransom. The major share of the extorted money went to the NSCN (IM). It is only when the demand for inclusion of NC Hills in greater Nagaland came up that the Dimasas realised that they had been taken for a ride. There are a few Zemi Naga villages in NC Hills. Population wise the Zemi Naga are the smallest; the Kukis and the Hmars are much more in number. The Dimasa are the major community. There is no case for the whole or even a part of NC Hills being included in Greater Nagaland. When the UPDS of Karbi Anglong asked for help, the NSCN (IM) was only too glad to help. This suited their objectives since there was a small minority of Rengmas and Zemis in Karbi Anglong. Here again the ratio of pay offs to the NSCN (IM) from the moneys extorted from the non-Karbis and traders was 8:2. Later, when the NSCN (IM) laid claim to the Karbi Anglong district for Greater Nagaland, the UPDS cut off relations.

NSCN (IM) in Manipur. It is in Manipur that the NSCN (IM) has played its biggest games. The Meithei from the valley and the Naga from the hills have not been well disposed to each other ever since the Naga insurgency started in 1955. The Meitheis uneasily watched as the Nagas got a state in 1963, while they still remained a Union Territory. Later as the NSCN (IM) gained strength the Meitheis who had ruled over Manipur and a major part of Nagaland for hundreds of years, began to feel threatened. The Manipur valley and particularly Imphal was a rich ground for extortion. The pickings from Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenglong were meagre. So, when Namoijam Oken Singh left the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and later formed the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), the NSCN (IM) sent a feeler that they could supply arms and also train their cadres. Oken accepted the offer, thereby giving a foothold to the NSCN (IM) in Imphal.

Naga-Kuki Rivalry. The Nagas and the Kukis were ancient foes. The Meithei kings effectively used the Kuki as a buffer against the Nagas. The British later picked a leaf from the Meitheis and continued to use the Kukis as a buffer. When the NSCN (IM), was getting strong, Indian intelligence fell back on the same idea and propped up the Kukis as the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), and the Kuki National Army (KNA) to fight the Nagas. The ploy turned out to be a disaster as it unleashed an ethnic war, and a number of Kuki villages which were in Naga areas in Ukhrul, and Tamenglong were burnt and the Kukis became the victims of ethnic cleansing. Leadership squabbles split the KNO into several groups - Kuki National Front (KNF) Military Council (MC), KNF (Presidential). During the election of 1998, two more groups were spawned due to tickets being denied to two Kuki leaders who promptly formed two insurgent groups, the United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA). Both these organisations needed weapons and training, and they had no choice but to go to the ancient enemy the NSCN (IM). Both these groups operated in small bands, generally in a ratio of 8:2. The money collected in extensive extortion operations was also divided in the same ratio, 8 for the NSCN and 2 for the UKLF or KRA.

The third penetration of the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group was of the Zomi Reunification Army (ZRO), which was formed in 1993 with the objective of unifying the Chins living in Myanmar and India. The KNA was set up to take on the NSCN (IM). The bait offered was control of the rich spoils of smuggling in Moreh, the border town of Manipur in Chandel district. The reaction of the NSCN (IM) was unexpectedly fierce. The KNA was battered, and the fight was taken to the villages. There were a number of Kuki villages in Ukhrul and Tamenglong, and these were attacked, burnt and the hapless Kukis rendered homeless. The KNA approached their brethren in Churachandpur for help. While some of the related tribes agreed to help, the Paites, a sister tribe of the Zomi, refused, saying that the Kukis had no business to take on the NSCN (IM). Infuriated, the KNA attacked the Paites. The internecine fight went badly for the Paites. They generally lived on the southern borders of Churachandpur with Myanmar. South of the border was NSCN (IM) country. Driven to the wall the Paites who had formed the

ZRO had no choice but to ask the NSCN (IM) for help. The ZRO, which till then had only a few arms, now got a good supply of arms and training from the NSCN (IM). The Paites were the best businessmen of all the tribes of the Chin-Mizo-Kuki group, and they were good smugglers. The objective of the NSCN (IM) was well achieved. They had penetrated the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group, and they got a share of the smuggling and trade revenues of the Paites.

Situation in 1990s

By the mid 1990s, the NSCN (IM) had a well-oiled extortion net in place in Nagaland, Manipur, including the non-Naga areas, in the NC Hills, and in Meghalaya. In Nagaland and in Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong and part of Chandel district, standard collection of house tax and ration contribution of paddy was routinely being collected. Besides, all trucks and buses going from Dimapur to parts of Nagaland and to Manipur were taxed. All development projects were also monitored and government officials and contractors had to pay a share. They also had an annual supply of arms coming in from Thailand brought in coastal vessels to Cox's Bazaar, and brought overland via Bandarban, Parva, along the eastern border of Mizoram, north on the Tiddim road, through Churachandpur, Tamenglong to Paren sub division of Nagaland. The considerable extortion revenues coming in from several sources helped them to open offices in Bangkok, Manila and Holland. They also had several camps in the CHT and safe houses in Dacca, Chittagong. Then they had a big setback.

Operation Golden Bird. The Indian Army along with the intelligence agencies had carefully been monitoring the collection of arms from Thailand being shipped to Cox's Bazaar and carried overland to Nagaland, by the NSCN (IM). In the winter of 1995, when probably the fourth or fifth consignment was being carried they ambushed the convoy west of Parva in a well-planned operation that caught the NSCN (IM), ULFA, and the NDFB, who comprised the party by surprise. Several cadres of all three parties were killed, some were captured and a sizeable number of arms were seized. Altogether 58 cadres of the three groups were killed, and 40 captured. The operation was aptly named Golden Bird.

Meanwhile the Government of India at the political level was trying to get the NSCN (IM) leaders to come to the negotiating table. Thuingalong Muivah and Isaac Swu laid three conditions. The negotiations should focus on security, the talks must be in a third country and there should be a third party mediator. The government agreed to the first two conditions, but not the third. After several discussions, the NSCN (IM) agreed. Talks commenced and they agreed to a cease-fire from 1 August 1997. A ceasefire monitoring group was set up, and ground rules framed. There was to be no killing kidnapping or extortion by the NSCN (IM) and no active military operations against NSCN (IM) by the security forces. NSCN (IM) camps in notified places could be maintained, but the group would not patrol with arms. They could move from camp to camp concealing their arms. The cease-fire was for Nagaland. Unofficially it was allowed in the Naga districts of Manipur. This concession was a cardinal mistake, and was to cost the Government later.

Failure of Ceasefire Monitoring Group. From day one, the ceasefire monitoring group was a farce. The operations of the security forces discontinued, as also of the NSCN (IM). Extortion by them, however, continued unabated, though there were no killings for failure to pay, at least by the NSCN (IM). It is here that the NSCN (IM) played a clever trick on the Government of India. In Manipur they had alliances with the KYKL, UKLF, KRA, and ZRA. In all their operations NSCN (IM) cadres operated along with them. When accosted by the ceasefire monitoring group, the innocent reply was that it was an operation of the KYKL, or UKLF. The incident which took place in Chandel in November 2000 is a clear example of the perfidy of the NSCN (IM). On Friday the 24 November 2000, a group of 30 NSCN (IM) and UKLF cadres, kidnapped the Deputy Commissioner (DC) Chandel, disarmed and then locked up his Manipur Rifles escort, and forced him to call five of his Block Development Officers (BDOs) and made them sign five cheques totaling Rs 44.8 lakhs, District Rural Development grants coming directly from the Central Government. Since by that time the bank was closed, the brigands kept the DC, the BDOs and the DCs escort confined through Saturday and Sunday, and on Monday cashed the cheques and releasing the DC, BDOs and

the escort, disappeared with Rs 44.8 lakhs development grant. Chandel was the most backward and the poorest district in Manipur. When the Central Government was informed, the Cease Fire Monitoring Group was asked to ensure the money was returned. When the NSCN (IM) Headquarter took it up with their Chandel unit they refused to return the money and took cover behind the UKLF, stating, that this was their operation.

Role of Assam Rifles. As per the ceasefire agreement, the NSCN (IM) was not to procure any arms. A number of incidents and interrogation reports of NSCN (IM) cadres reveal that this insurgent group has steadily been procuring arms from abroad, right from 1997, when the ceasefire agreement was signed. The Assam Rifles had set up a platoon post in February 1999, near Amchurimukh in Mizoram because of the activities of the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF). This was the first post on the Mizoram Bangladesh border after Tripura. On the night of the 3 March 1999, the post received information that a group of NSCN (IM) of about 110 cadres had crossed from Bangladesh between the last post of Tripura, Kanthlang and the first post of Mizoram, Amchurimukh. They were moving in five groups and two had already crossed, and entered the Lengai valley and were proceeding north. The Assam Rifles organised an immediate ambush, and managed to get the third group, who after marching through the night had stopped for a rest. The Assam Rifles managed to surprise them and killed six of the NSCN (IM) cadres, a collaborator and injured one who was taken and admitted in the civil hospital at Agartala. They recovered weapons from all the cadres killed and captured. A few days later a party of NSCN (IM) from their Headquarters at Dimapur met the Assam Rifles Brigadier and objected to the attack on their cadres during the ceasefire and asked for the return of the seized weapons. Here was a blatant case of bringing weapons from a neighbouring country, and when ambushed, accusing the security force of violating the ceasefire. What is most interesting is the last part of the episode. Instead of reinforcing the post, which lay bang on this route of bringing weapons from Bangladesh, the Assam Rifles withdrew this post. When I was visiting Tripura after this incident, the Chief Minister Manik Sarkar told me that the Assam Rifles had done an excellent

job in ambushing the NSCN (IM) party while they were bringing arms, but inexplicably withdrew the post after the ambush. The mystery of the withdrawal of the post from Amchurimukh could never be solved.

Developments in 2001 and Onwards

NSCN (IM) Camps. Some time in the latter half of 2001, a group of five NSCN (IM) cadres surrendered with their weapons to the BSF post at Parva. They were brought to Masimpur and interrogated, and they told a most interesting tale. One of the five was a senior seargent of the Gallilee camp near Alikadam, Bandarban. He said that a large party of the NSCN (IM) had moved from Nagaland via the Tiddim road, Parva to Bandarban for collecting the arms consignment expected by the end of the year. Tired of the harsh living conditions, 10 of the cadres had defected and run away with heir arms, hoping to make it back to Nagaland. The main group had chased them and killed five of them, and so they surrendered to the BSF post at Parva. Their interrogation revealed that the NSCN (IM) had the following camps :-

(a) Jortan camp near Cox's Bazaar. Strength 250.

(b) Vaital camp near Rangamati. Strength 300.

(c) Galilee camp near Alikadam. Strength 50.

(d) Mauni transit camp near Sylhet.

(e) Headquarters of NSCN (IM) at Dacca. A four storey building near New Market.

The arms collected from Cox's Bazaar were supplied by China. Collection of weapons is generally done once a year. The route adopted was Cox's Bazaar, Alikadam, Kasalang Reserve Forest, Mizoram, Silchar, Jiribam, Tamenglong, and Paren. In July 2001, they delivered a consignment of 35 weapons- AK56-10, Sniper Rifle-8, M21–17 along with ammunition. The weapons were brought on foot upto Mizoram near Amchurimukh. From here these were sent by a Gypsy vehicle of the NSCN (IM) via Silchar, Jiribam, Tamenglong, Paren, and Dimapur. It has been subsequently verified

the NC Hills of Assam. Does it mean that the whole of NC Hills is to be given to a Greater Nagaland? The case of Karbi Anglong is the same. In Manipur it is a fact that successive State Governments have discriminated against all the hill districts. The answer is to extend the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to the hill districts of Manipur, not dismember it.

The great mistake done by the Government of India was that they did not study how the insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines were tackled in the 1950s. In the entire hill states of the North East the first priority is to build fair weather roads so that all villages are connected to the towns. Unfortunately in Nagaland and Manipur, hundreds of kilometers of roads were built on paper. Roads are the first enemies of the insurgents. Denied of a hinterland he has no place to retreat. Today this is the first step to be taken by the Government of India. This task must be given to the Border Roads. The second task is to ensure clean administration for the people. The policy adopted by the party in power at the Centre, in the 1950s and the 1960s, to flood the area with development funds and corrupt the politicians and the bureaucrats was a disaster. It only lined the coffers of the followers on and lackeys of the party, the Delhi Durbar. The common man of Nagaland and Manipur is fed up with paying up house tax, ration tax, a percentage of his salary to bandits masquerading as insurgents. The task is not difficult, only the will to do it is required.

For Thuingaleng Muivah, the Thangkhul from Somdal and Isaac Swu, it has been a long journey. They were in China when a section of the NNO defected and signed the Shillong agreement in 1975. It must have been particularly difficult for Isaac Swu, for it was the Semas who had defected in general and surrendered to the Government. With the formation of the NSCN with Kaphlang, the fight continued from Myanmar. The old devil of tribal rivalries caught up with them again, and the NSCN split. It was after this and with the movement to Bangladesh and the link with the Pakistan ISI, and the Bangladesh DGFI, that the horizon of the group expanded beyond their expectations. They could internationalise the problem to some extent, though ultimately, they could get no significant leverage from it. They have given in on two items before

and during the dialogue with the Government of India. They gave up the demand for a mediator, and they agreed to release the Deputy Commissioner of Chandel without getting their arms, seized by the Manipur police, released. Regis Debray has written that once an insurgent group agrees to talk that is the beginning of the end to the insurgency. There have been no operations in Nagaland and Manipur since 1997, and that is a long time. Though Muivah continues to make brave statements, I think he has begun to realise that he is not going to get much more. That is why a statement was made that there has to be a dialogue with the concerned states or districts where there is a Naga population. Muivah was probably hoping that as in the case of Mizoram, and Assam, the ruling group may step down and he could lead an over ground party to power in a Greater Nagaland. That is a faraway dream now, unless he has to go back to the jungles, and I do not think that is what the Naga HoHo, or the Naga Baptist Church wants. He has to carefully slip out of the impasse with some skillful verbiage that will salvage an honourable settlement.

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Border Surveillance – Can Technology Help?

Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Brief Overview

Borders are considered to be sacrosanct and the safety of borders is the responsibility of every government and its armed and paramilitary forces. Everything must be done to ensure the country's territorial integrity is not threatened and for that an utmost and constant vigil of country's borders is required. Borders are essentially arbitrary creations and they neither necessarily follow physical features, nor are they always straight lines. Take the Indian example. We have nearly 5422 kilometres (km) of main coast line. There is nearly 3310 km of border with Pakistan and another 3917 km with China. We also have borders with Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh. The terrain on these borders varies from marshlands in the Kutch, deserts and its shifting sand dunes in Rajasthan, plain areas with a wide network of canals and rivers and man-made obstacles in the Punjab, snowbound rugged hilly terrain in the Jammu and Kashmir (J and K) with hill features at an average altitude of 12,000 feet and the famous Siachen Glacier where average altitude is 18,000 feet the great Himalayas in the North and the jungles along Myanmar, hilly tracts and rivers and rivulets all along Bangladesh.

With this varied nature of terrain, we have various systems for surveillance of our borders and observation of activities across it. The coast is guarded by the Navy and the Coast Guard. They use ships, crafts and aircraft for this purpose. In addition, state police and the Border Security Force (BSF) take on the task of patrolling the coastline. On land, there are permanent border check posts and border observation posts. Some of these are manned round the year while others are manned when weather permits and when there is higher likelihood of infiltration. There is a system of

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patrolling using vehicles, animals like camels, and foot soldiers. Since the infiltrators still manage to come across, a system of obstacles like barbed wire fencing has been installed in some areas and some areas are mined when and where chances of conflicts are high. Fencing and obstacles deter but they do not always stop a determined infiltrator to get across. Aerial reconnaissance and satellite imagery are also used for surveillance of selected areas. In spite of all these measures, infiltration continues. It is just not possible to have a person posted every few metres to ensure that there are no gaps and not a soul can intrude into our territory. It is both impractical and extremely costly. When Pakistan announced in 2002 that there was no infiltration across the Line of Control (LOC) in spite of India's allegations, there was no let up in infiltration across the LOC. The US authorities suggested use of various technological means to verify the exact situation. This idea did not find favour with the Indian military mainly because the terrain in J and K would not permit use of such technical devices. This lack of confidence could also be because these devices had not been tried out; the past experience of their use elsewhere had not been very encouraging.

The obvious question that arises is can technology help in border surveillance and, if so, to what extent? What are various tools for this purpose which are either already operational or are in the pipe line?

Types of Technologies

There are a number of technologies that can assist in border surveillance. These can be on board aerial or space platforms, or be ground based, and can be placed under water. Each has its own advantages as well as limitations and for maximum effect more than one technology may have to be used depending on terrain and the exact situation on ground.

GROUND BASED TECHNOLOGIES

Unattended Ground Sensors

The most important ground based technology for this purpose is the use of Unattended Ground Sensors (UGSs). These were

first used during the Vietnam War. Since then, quite a bit of research has gone in development of sophisticated and advanced UGSs. These sensors utilise infra red (IR), sound, seismic, magnetic and other sensing methods to do their tasks and relay information to the control station mostly through satellites.

There are also networked UGSs. In this network a cheap, low powered 'tripwire sensor' detects a possible 'target' and sends a warning message to other nearby sensors. These nearby sensors with more capabilities 'wake up' and use IR, sound, seismic, magnetic and other sensing methods to classify the target. A local hub acts as gateway, gathering information from nearby sensor clusters. The gateway then alerts other clusters and the force commanders. Further research is in progress in this field.

The UGSs can be implanted in the enemy lines by aircraft, artillery shells and by hand placement. A need exists to deploy several UGS devices in the vicinity of one another to ensure continuous monitoring of detected targets. UGSs consist of a variety of sensor technologies that are packaged for deployment and perform the mission of remote target detection, location and/or recognition.

Ideally, the UGSs need to be small, low cost and robust, and are expected to last in the field for extended periods of time. New power management techniques have made it possible for these sensors to have long on-task-life.

In order to support varied missions of UGS systems, robust and reliable communication links must provide timely message transmissions back to a command and control centre. Optimum performance of UGS systems is based on terrain, weather, and background noise estimates. How will they perform in the extremes of weather conditions and the terrain available in J and K and what would be the effect of their being covered by snow or sand can be gauged only by actual physical trials. It is presumed that this aspect must have been taken into consideration by the system designers.

These devices could be used to perform various missions including perimeter defence, border patrol and surveillance, target

acquisition, and situation awareness. Application of UGSs include detecting helicopters from their rotor noise; measuring local radiation levels; confirming presence of chemical and biological contaminants; meteorological observation and most importantly, detecting enemy movements. They are particularly useful in sensing intrusion into restricted areas. For example, Rafael's Gamma 2000 system includes IR sensors which provide real-time imagery covering 15-km long perimeter. Other uses of UGSs are battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, night observation, battle damage assessment and electronic warfare.

It will thus be seen that the UGSs have a great potential and need to be fully exploited. This is one technology which is relatively cheap and can pay rich dividends in border surveillance.

Ground Surveillance Radars

Surface-based ground surveillance radars have been traditionally used to monitor forward edge of battle area and detect movements of enemy forces. These radars also have a role with forward observers. In this role, radar assists in target acquisition by registering and correcting the fall of shot from friendly artillery and mortar fire. As in the case of all radars, these operate on the principle of line of sight.

Elta and Thales are dominant manufacturers of these radars and the more prominent of these are Elta EL/M-2129 MDSR/ Telephonics ARRS, Elta EL/M-2140NG AGSR, Thales (A) MSTAR, Thales BOR-550 and Thales SQUIRE. All these are pulse Doppler radars except for SQUIRE which is frequency modulated continuous radar. Operating in I and/or J band, the typical detection ranges for personnel vary between 10 to 15 km while for the vehicles these are between 20 and 30 km. Main battle tanks (MBTs) can be picked up at longer ranges. These radars can detect impact of artillery shells. Typical range for detecting impact of 155mm artillery shell is 15 km.

There are also perimeter surveillance radar systems which can detect intruders up to 500 metres (m), but these have limited application in border surveillance.

SPACE AND AIRBORNE TECHNOLOGIES

Space and airborne technologies can assist the ground commanders in detecting activities along and across the border as well as for detecting infiltration. Some of these are described in subsequent paragraphs.

Satellites

Satellites cannot provide imagery of the border in real time as their revisit rate varies from 24 hours to a few days. However, they operate non-obtrusively and can provide both electro-optical (E-O) and radar imagery of sub-metre resolution. E-O imagery can be executed only in good weather and during day light hours. The solution is to use IR or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors. The latter can capture images of the earth through clouds, fog, haze, and darkness. However, resolution of the radar images is not as good as that of E-O images. Presently, most countries are using remote sensing satellites meant for earth observation for military purposes on as required basis. Our Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) series satellites are also used in a similar manner.

Satellite imagery can provide a visual representation of the Earth. This representation can be combined with information from ground and aerial survey and models of border areas can be prepared. By using Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, a computer model can be prepared indicating position of armour, infantry and other information. This image can be fused with estimates of where enemy forces might be to present a picture of the battle. Information taken from satellites can be used to map out border areas in the same way.

Further, satellite images can help border patrols keep track of what happens to an area over time. There would be certain activities taking place on either side of the border that one would like to monitor on a regular and periodic basis. The satellite could go over the same area on the required periodicity and take high-resolution images. In some cases where revisit period is high, a constellation of satellites can be used. The images can be taken from different angles if the situation so demands.

The latest information tool is the space based radar system. A system of space based radar constellation coupled with GPS will be able to provide round the clock surveillance of the area of interest. Thus it is possible to obtain images from satellites which may not be available through an aircraft as it may not be allowed to fly into the enemy territory.

Aircraft

The most important airborne application for border control is the use of surveillance aircraft using optical photography and SAR. With digitalisation of E-O photography, it is now possible to capture images other-than-visible wavelengths, such as IR, enabling day and night operations. Digitalisation also permits compression of large imagery data and its transmission in real time to the ground commander and other recipients and thus reduces sensor to shooter time. Unlike in the past, one does not have to wait for aircraft to land, time taken to develop films and preparation of prints. The airborne surveillance aircraft can operate on own side of the border without exposing itself to the enemy air defences. The SAR technology has been in use now for a number of years to detect mobile and fleeting target systems with E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Systems Radar (J-Star) being the most prominent platform.

Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) of the United States has developed a highly successful programme called Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE). This is a networked target approach to find and follow in real time and all weather moving targets trying to evade detection and thereafter destroy them with relatively cheap satellite-guided bomb or glide weapon – all from stand-off ranges beyond the reach of most air defence systems. The AMSTE concept uses multiple ground-moving target indication (GMTI) radars on J-Star. These GMTI radars can look deep into hostile territory from standoff positions and can detect convoys and vehicles moving on ground over long distances. AMSTE fuses data from a number of GMTI sensors. The programme has been able to produce terminal accuracy of 10 m or less and has been able to track moving targets. Actual trials have indicated very high success rate in tracking and destruction of mobile targets.

Visual reconnaissance from helicopters and fixed wing aircraft has been in use ever since aircraft came into being and this form of reconnaissance continues even today. The main limitations are the capability of human mind to absorb all the information and its dependence on good visibility.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The other platforms that can be used are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). An UAV flies automatically between points and at high altitude is difficult to be located. Once there is intelligence that there is a force coming from a certain direction, all one has to do is put in the coordinates to show the area. The UAVs will thereafter give real-time image by day and night.

Normally video imagery is used by the UAVs but this does not permit determining GPS coordinates, thus preventing the use of pre-programmed Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). This shortfall will be overcome by use of laser ranging and high accuracy inertial navigation systems, wherein the target location will be calculated directly from measurement of the camera location and altitude and the range of the target. This system, called direct geo-referencing is expensive and is some years away from becoming operational.

The other problems with the UAVs are the initial cost and the poor flight safety record but these are bound to improve as more experience is gained and the economies of scale are available.

The experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and during Operation Prakram shows that the UAVs with their E-O and SAR with moving target indicator (MTI) payloads will have a significant role in border surveillance as well as in signals intelligence (SIGINT) tasks. The potential of UAVs can be assessed from the fact that the SAR system onboard Global Hawk UAV scans from either side of the vehicle to obtain 10 km swath-width radar images with 1 metre resolution in the wide-area search mode, 0.3 m (1 foot) resolution in the spot mode and 4-knot minimum detectable vehicle velocity in the MTI mode – all from ranges greater than 250 km from the target area. Global Hawk can operate at high altitude for

35 hours continuously without aerial refueling and can be used to cover wide areas. If a specific area needs to be investigated by the personnel who are on the border either at static locations or on patrol, they can utilise tactical and mini UAVs for this task.

Aerostats

One of the cheapest methods for continuous observation of area of interest is the use of aerostats. For instance, Lockheed Martin's Tethered Aerostat Radar System is a balloon-borne radar system that the US federal agencies use for drug interdiction and which could also potentially be used for other kinds of border patrol missions. The biggest advantage of the system is the cost of acquisition as well as that of operation. An aerostat can stay aloft for weeks at a time at very nominal cost and a fraction of operating cost of an aircraft on a similar mission.

An aerostat equipped with a surveillance system like the Lockheed L88 radar can observe over a radius of around 200 nautical miles. The system could be deployed in areas of armed conflict to get a good picture of the ground. The problem with aerostats is their limitation of operating in high wind conditions and a tendency to break tether in hilly terrain like that of J and K. Another example of the system is Elta of Israel displayed at the recent Paris Air Show. The high altitude surveillance aerostat was equipped with long range movement detection radar. In this system targets are displayed in the ground based command post, but only in the predetermined areas of interest, thus making the monitoring task that much easier.

High Altitude Airships

A system that is immune to wind and weather and can stay in the air almost indefinitely and that too outside the range of most air defence weapons including manned aircraft is the helium filled high altitude airship (HAA). The US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) has awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin and StratCom International as well as the Aeros Company for development of the HAA Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) programme. There are a number of other companies like the UK's Advance Technology Group with its StratSat programme working

on a similar concept. All these firms are trying to construct a prototype cum production HAA that would operate at about 70,000 feet in a geostationary position by 2005-2006.

According to the manufacturers, the HAA can be manoeuvered and repositioned if the situation so demands. It will have a payload of 4,000 pounds though the bigger version of the airship will have capability to lift 20,000 pounds. Surveillance coverage extends over the horizon and it monitors a diametric surface area of over 775 statute miles. The sensors could be E-O, SAR, millimetric radar etc. The system could be brought down to lower altitudes if the demands for higher resolution so dictate. One or two such systems would provide adequate round the clock cover of the most areas of interest. The extent of coverage of the airship sensors can be gauged from the fact that mere 11 of these HAAs would provide overlapping radar coverage of all maritime and southern border approaches to the continental US.

TECHNOLOGIES FOR MONITORING SEA BORDERS

Sea borders are as important as the land borders and their surveillance also needs as much attention. Some of the technologies described above can be used equally effectively at sea as well. Needless to say that there have to be conventional patrols for detection of hostile vessels and Marine Security and Safety Teams (MSSTs) to tackle them and technology can only assist and augment their effort.

As in the air, there is the problem of identification of various vessels. This problem becomes a nightmare when one is confronted with large number of ships, pleasure boats and fishing vessels near the coast. There are two systems that have been developed to meet this challenge at least in peace time. First of these is Automated Information System (AIS) in the US that uses satellite-tracking devices to automatically broadcast identity of ships and their position. Presently the system is mandated for ships over 300 gross tons. Vessels entering the US waters are required to inform their details at least 96 hours in advance to help the system keep track of the shipping.

For keeping track of smaller vessels and boats, there is radar but while it can see all, it has problem sorting out each one of

them. One system that can perhaps help is a radar system that was originally developed by Canada and now being tested by the US Coast Guard. This radar system can detect fast boats, fishing boats, large support vessels up to a distance of 200 nautical miles and stores their movement pattern for the previous 24 hours and passes information to the concerned agencies for them to take a decision whether a patrol boat or aircraft needs to be dispatched for closer scrutiny of the track. By tracking movement over time, suspicious vessels can be identified. The system is akin to the identification friend or foe (IFF).

A lot of work has gone in for providing security to the ports and offshore rigs. For example there are remotely operated underwater vehicles with cameras that are used to inspect the subsurface areas of vessel hulls or facilities within a port area. MSSTs use thermal imaging and night vision technologies to guard and inspect facilities in the port areas. To detect the presence of swimmers and divers within security zones, an automated underwater system using sonar technology has been successfully tested in the US. The software is such that it can differentiate people from marine life and other objects in the water.

CONCLUSION

Technology can assist in the task of border surveillance. One does not know what resources the Americans have deployed along the US-Mexican border. They have not been able to stop smuggling and illegal immigration. As any person involved in counter insurgency operation will tell you that there is no substitute for actual troops patrolling the border areas and manning vital posts. Technology cannot replace the patrolling soldiers or policemen. Man is the most lethal weapon and the most advanced sensor on the battlefield. We must put man in the arena to employ technology as an extension of his natural senses. We must give him a new set of eyes with which to see the enemy in all types of weather and in all conflict environments. Only man can look at all available information and make an informed decision as to whether a target has been destroyed or is, in fact, a legitimate target and not a decoy. In other words, the better informed the soldiers on patrols are, the better they would be able to complete the mission.

Needless to say there are other ways in which technology is assisting and can assist soldiers in this difficult task. For observation during the period of darkness and adverse weather, there are sophisticated night vision devices and thermal imaging albeit with limited ranges. The detection ranges of this system are claimed to be 500 m for personnel and 1,000 m for vehicles. Another problem that the soldiers face in such hostile terrain is that of navigation. Hand held GPS receivers both for navigation as well as for passing target coordinates have solved this problem. Another technological asset which is absolutely essential for survival and quick reaction is fail safe secure communication which modern technological advances can provide in rugged and miniaturised form. Technology is also there to help in the form of lighter and more effective personal weapons, lighter and more effective clothing to protect one from weather as well as enemy's fire, and specially prepared and packed food that can be carried by the soldier and preserved for weeks and months at a time.

Border control is difficult but an essential task. It is boring, routine and fatiguing but one can not afford to let one's guard down. This task has to be done both in peace and war. The technologies are there to assist soldiers in performing these tasks efficiently and without too many casualties. Technology does not come free. Equipment will cost a hefty package. The question is whether the countries are willing to invest for better border control?

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The Imperial Service Troops and Indian States Forces (Part I)

Mr AN McClenaghan

At the time of Independence there were some 560 Indian or Princely States, comprising approximately half the geographical area and accounting for a quarter of the population of what was then the Indian Empire. Each was responsible for its own internal administration, though under British 'supervision' to one degree or another through Residents or Political Agents. States varied in size from Hyderabad, an area equivalent to France with a population in 1947 of 15.8 million, over whom the Nizam held the power of life or death, to estates covering no more than 1 square mile with a population of less than 100 where the powers of the chief were virtually non-existent. Needless to say, financial revenues varied enormously.

It is not intended here to discuss the history of the States themselves, merely to note that many of them maintained sizeable armies that had often fought each other. These continuing conflicts among Indian rulers on the one hand, and between Indian rulers and the newly arrived European interests, particularly those of the French or British, on the other, led to the arrival of other European or American adventurers who formed regular corps in the service of Indian Princes - Bussy, Lally, Raymond and Perron who in turn commanded Scindia's troops between 1750 and 1803, others who raised and commanded units during the period of the Maratha wars including De Boigne (1784), Filoze (1792), and Gardner (1798).

The East India Company had started to make treaties with the Indian States as early as January 1730, but these were aimed at no more than the maintenance of the Company's privileged position of trade against its rivals. Such British imperial strategy was not,

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of course, limited to India. At that time in Britain's overseas expansion the aim was to enjoy the benefits of trade without the responsibility, or expense, of governance. Indeed, in many cases, such as Malaya, Burma and China, Britain was a reluctant occupier of territory. The ports were the real prize. Within India the Company's early adherence to such a policy seemed actively to discourage closer ties with the Indian States. For instance, in 1788 the Government of Madras informed the Raja of Travancore, in answer to a request for British officers to train and command his troops, that it was not their policy to allow officers to command any troops except their own.[1]

It was the Marquess of Wellesley, appointed Governor-General in 1798, who set about introducing a policy of subsidiary alliances with the rulers, though this was not a peculiarly British concept. India's history is scattered with such alliances. For example, if we look at the early relationship between the Dogra rulers of Jammu and the Sikh rulers of the Punjab we note that:

> The *taluka* [district] of Jammu is granted to the Mians [Kishore Singh and his three sons], the devoted servants of the *sarkar* [Maharaja] on the condition that they offer 400 cavalrymen to the *sarkar* and hold themselves in readiness, for rendering suitable services whenever called upon to do so.[2]

Wellesley started the process of forming alliances and Lord Hastings completed it, a process that saw the stationing of Subsidiary Forces, as they were called, in or near States. These were composed of troops of the Indian Army drawn from Madras, Bengal and Oudh but officered by the British, and paid for by the States, usually by the cession of lands but occasionally by monetary payment. Ostensibly these Subsidiary Forces were raised for the purpose of protecting the governments of the States concerned against both external and internal enemies, but in fact they were also intended for use by the British Government for the coercion of the State itself if necessary.

Localities chosen for Subsidiary Forces were important because they were distant from the centres of British power and yet allowed the British presence to be felt. Subsidiary Forces were stationed in or near Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, Indore, Travancore, Cochin and Cutch. The system was not without its faults. Generally the Ruling Princes were deemed to have lost prestige under this British surveillance, and in later years the British were to deny the use of the Subsidiary Force for suppressing disturbances, suggesting in one case that the ruler form his own yeomanry for such duties.

Contingent Forces, on the other hand, represented the reformed troops of the States themselves, kept ready to preserve internal order and to act with British troops if the need arose. At least that was the intention in the original definition and in that regard they mirror the much later introduction of Imperial Service Troops and Indian States Forces. On occasion the British used the terms Subsidiary and Contingent to mean the same thing. Generally these troops proved not to be particularly efficient. Many of them joined the Revolt of 1857 and were subsequently disbanded but some formed the nucleus of regiments incorporated into the Indian Army. For instance, the Sikh element of the Bhopal Contingent later formed the nucleus of the Central India Horse whilst the Bhopal Levy, raised from elements of the Bhopal, Gwalior and United Malwa Contingents, was re-designated the Bhopal Battalion in March 1865 and finally became 4th Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment. The Hyderabad Contingent had a somewhat different history. It remained a unified corps of all arms under the orders of the Government of India until 1903 when various components were integrated into the Indian Army. Their descendants are currently the 9th Deccan Horse, 8th Light Cavalry and the Kumaon Regiment.

The formation of Subsidiary and Contingent forces had not led to the disbandment of the remainder of the State Ruler's private armies. The large size of some of these armies was the cause of some anxiety, partly because of a drain on State resources, partly because of a British fear that they might prove a danger in the event of disturbance. "They, however, represented an outward and visible sign of power ... to their rulers and as such were naturally dear to them."[3]

Once the Contingent Forces had been disbanded following the events of 1857 the States no longer actively contributed to the defence of the Empire, although discussion had often taken place as to what a fair contribution might be, if any, of the States towards the expense of the protection under which they, or at least their rulers, flourished. Some argued that the States owed some assistance to the government; others were not so certain.

In 1873 Major Owen Burne prepared a report on the State armies drawing on a paper by the Foreign Secretary of Calcutta of July 1871, and from later documents. His general tone was to come out against the use of these armies, a view echoed five years later when the Governor-General in Council considered the matter but admitted

> ....the impracticability, under present conditions, of working out a scheme for associating the troops of the Native States with the Imperial Army. Since, therefore, the armies of Native States cannot be utilized along with the Imperial forces for the defence of the Empire, it follows that, if they are in excess of internal requirements, they ought to be reduced.[4]

He went on to call for a return, by 31 December each year, of the strengths, armaments and organisation of the State armies.

It was the fear of an invasion of India by Russia, or at least the perception of such a threat, so forcibly brought home to all in India by the Panjdeh incident in 1885 that changed the perceptions of both the Government and the rulers of the States towards their role in the military sphere. Following the end of the Second Afghan War in 1880, and having established what it considered to be a buffer zone between the Indian Empire and the expanding Tsarist Empire through the establishment of a pro-British Amir in Afghanistan, Britain became increasingly alarmed at the steady Russian advance towards Merv, close to the Afghan border. This the Russians occupied in February 1884, much to the consternation of London. A joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was scheduled to meet in order to attempt a resolution of the dispute

but the Russians delayed this as further moves took place towards the Panjdeh oasis, which they seized on 31st March 1885. As the retreating Afghan troops moved to Herat the Government of India was instructed to mobilise an army to move to the Afghan's assistance should the Russians attack the Herat fortress and make war inevitable. Sensing that the British were serious the Russians withdrew from Panjdeh and the Boundary Commission resumed its task, finally agreeing to the boundary.

With half the army in India on the move in 1885, and with the immense sums of money being spent on preparing for a war that seemed inevitable, the Nizam of Hyderabad offered a large sum from his revenues to the government in aid of the war chest, an example which was promptly followed by others. The government, however, did not feel that a contribution to the war chest was so desirable as an entry into some share of the Empire by the maintenance of a portion of the troops required for its defence. Gradually the idea began to gain ground that some scheme for utilizing the military resources of the rulers ought to be worked out. Principal proponent of this idea was Colonel George Chesney[5] who, having witnessed the Punjab Contingent at the Rawalpindi Camp, proposed that they be trained and brought up to first line standards so that, if called upon for assistance, they need not remain in the lines of communication where they would soon tire of playing a secondary role.

A couple of years later Major Melliss[6] of the Bombay Staff Corps was selected to visit the States and study the actual condition and probable future capabilities of their armies. He concluded that a portion of the troops belonging to the States could be equipped and trained for active service and by January 1888 a variety of offers had been received from the rulers. Details were forwarded to London while, in India, a committee consisting of Sir Frederick Roberts, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), George Chesney, principal architect of the scheme, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, and Sir James Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, met to consider the proposals, reporting on 26 September 1888.

Without waiting for clearance from London the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, set out his proposals at a durbar held on 17 November 1888 to celebrate the marriage of the Maharaja of Patiala. He emphasised that no State would be asked to maintain a larger force than it could well support; promised the appointment of a few English officers as advisers and inspectors, and Drill Instructors to be lent from the Indian Army. The selected troops would be armed with breech-loading weapons presented to the several States by the British Government - carbines for the cavalry and Snider rifles for the infantry. He concluded by expressing the hope that each force would remain a purely State force recruited in the territories of its Chief.

The scheme was eagerly accepted by the rulers and the detailed units became known as Imperial Service Troops (IST). By 1889 the movement had made a start with regiments of cavalry, battalions of infantry, companies of sappers, the Camel Corps of Bikaner, and units of mule and pony draught transport being formed.

The primary objective was to organise units trained and equipped to Indian Army standards and capable of taking part in campaigns alongside the Indian and British armies. It was essential, therefore, that the levels of training and equipment were monitored on a regular basis and that experienced officers of the Indian Army should be made available for this role. The officers were seconded for fixed tours and were usually experts in their arm or service. When the Indian States Forces Scheme was introduced over thirty years later the same overall objective and the same standards were maintained.

The British officers, usually majors and captains, were designated initially as Inspecting Officers and Assistant Inspecting Officers but these titles were later changed to Military Adviser and Assistant Military Adviser, a more politically correct designation. In time of war the Inspectors/Military Advisers often went with the units with which they had been working, either as Special Service Officers or occasionally as commanding officers.

At the head of this organisation was an Inspector-General, later known as Military Adviser-in-Chief, who was either a Major-General or Brigadier-General. He had overall responsibility for all matters dealing with the troops for whom he was responsible. The duties included preparing annual reports on each unit covering all aspects of its state and readiness for its war role such as strength, morale, quality of officers and men and level of training. He also had the authority to recommend that new units be allowed to join the scheme or that others be removed from it. The role obviously called for an element of diplomacy as Ruling Princes could be very sensitive to criticism in matters affecting their dignity, especially when the Troops were commanded and officered by Indian gentlemen, many of them members of the Princely families, and maintained entirely at the expense of the rulers and Durbars of the States concerned. Nor were rulers likely to take kindly to allegations that their administration might not be fulfilling its obligations.

The States were grouped into Inspection Circles with an Inspecting Officer and Assistant Inspecting Officer (later Military Adviser/Assistant Military Adviser) presiding over each Circle, and visiting each State in turn.

The scheme was not without its opponents in London, but the arguments were countered from India and the scheme progressed, in many cases better than had been anticipated. Within a few years of its inauguration Imperial Service Troops were taking part in many operations, some of which led to the award of Battle Honours, some of those, which I readily acknowledge here, are now considered repugnant. Nevertheless, under the system existing at the time, the award of such Honours to the Imperial Service Troops must be seen as an indication that they were doing well.

My first example, the Hunza Nagar campaign of 1891-92, did not lead to the award of a Battle Honour, but it did lead to the creation of a medal by the Maharaja which in turn led to one of those curious spats between the British and the Indian Rulers over their rights and privileges. The tribesmen within the areas of Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar had failed to live up to promises to allow

unhindered travel through their areas, continually attacking road-making parties, so an expedition had been mounted under Lieutenant Colonel AGA Durand to rectify the situation. It was said of the campaign:

> The greater part of the troops engaged in this thoroughly successful expedition were supplied by those corps of the Kashmir Army which His Highness the Maharaja has loyally reorganised for Imperial Service .....[7]

All participating troops, including those of the Maharaja, were entitled to receive the British issued India General Service Medal 1854 with clasp HUNZA 1891. In addition to this, however, the Maharaja wanted to recognise the service of his own troops by the creation of his own award. The British felt this was unnecessary, an attitude largely driven by their view that the Sovereign was the fount of honour, and the British Empire had only one sovereign, the Queen Empress. Rather than upset the Maharaja completely, however, the award was originally sanctioned to be worn only as a badge on the tunic collar, the Maharaja had actually distributed the badges in November 1894. Subsequently it was authorised to be worn as a medal.

Following the Chitral operation in 1895 it was reported that the Gwalior and Jaipur Transport units had been particularly effective. They first worked the Nowshera-Dargai stage, then left their carts at Nowshera and took ponies to Dir for daily convoy duties. They returned to the Nowshera-Dargai stage but when the Chakdara suspension bridge was completed they took their carts over the Malakand Pass and worked the Khar-Sarai section, probably the first wheeled transport ever to be employed on this route. The Order of British India, 2nd Class, was awarded to Rai Bahadur Danpat Rai, Superintendent of the Jaipur Transport Corps, and to Pandit Suraj Pershad, Commandant of the Gwalior Transport Corps under authority of the Gazette of India Military Department Notification, Nos 75 and 76 dated 25 January 1896.

In the Mohmand campaign of 1897 it was said:

> The Cavalry escorts of the Patiala and Jodhpur Cavalry did good reconnaissance work.....In the operations in the Mittai and Swan valleys, the 1st Patiala Regiment covered the retirement of the brigade under fire.[8]

Other campaigns, such as the Tirah expedition, Somaliland and China earned plaudits. Indeed, a British Officer of 4 Gorkha Rifles (GR) attached to the Bikaner Camel Corps won a Victoria Cross (VC) in the Somaliland campaign. That decoration was not available to be awarded to Indian soldiers at the time and so Subedar Kishen Singh of the Ganga Risala, who was wounded in the same action, only qualified for the Indian Order of Merit, but I would maintain that the Imperial Service Troops ought to be able to "claim" that VC award as their own – or that it should at least be shared with 4 GR. In the South African war horses and equipment in the charge of State Forces personnel were freely sent. Some 1,200 horses were eventually supplied and, with few exceptions, the Imperial Service Troops accompanying them remained until the conclusion of the war.

As Lord Dufferin had made clear in his speech of 17 November 1888, it was intended that the Imperial Service Troops should be recruited from the State whose name they bore. There were a few exceptions to the rule, notably in Kashmir where it had long been the custom for Gorkhas to be recruited into the State Army in considerable numbers, but then Kashmir was in a peculiar position in other ways. It not only formed a part of the outer boundary of the Indian Empire but also shared a part of the Russian frontier, which was an entirely different condition to that pertaining in any other State. Her troops garrisoned her own frontier districts and were constantly engaged with tribes on the border. The Kashmir troops played a significant part in the defence of Chitral and, as has already been shown, they bore a considerable share of the Hunza Nagar campaign.

Apart from the IST the States continued to maintain their "regular troops", numbering collectively 16,000 cavalry, 7,000

To each Imperial Service unit as it was mobilised were attached two or three British "Special Service Officers" to advise and help the Indian commandants. The troops in the first instance could not be looked upon as other than Second Line with the exception of one or two units. Later, as the war progressed, criticism of the Indian commandants, especially with regard to their lack of experience, led to the appointment of additional British "Special Service Officers", many of whom were given executive command.

Several units distinguished themselves. By way of example let me focus on a composite formation, by which I mean one in which the component parts were provided by different States. The definition of composite could encompass something as simple as the reinforcement of one state's unit by troops from another state. For example, the Mysore Lancers had troops from both the Bhavnagar and Kashmir Lancers attached to it whilst it was on active service. Nevertheless, this policy was not totally successful as rulers were not always happy to see their troops under the control of another ruler. At a more complex level the definition of "composite" would encompass higher-level formations and several brigades were raised from IST; the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade; the Imperial Service Brigade (East Africa); 20th (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade and 32nd (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade. It is on the first of these that I would like briefly to concentrate. By a happy coincidence my visit to India coincided with the 50th anniversary parade of the founding of 61st Cavalry. This unit was originally formed in 1953 from several of the former Indian State Forces (ISF) mounted units. The Regiment celebrates Haifa Day as its regimental day, a commemoration of a most gallant charge against the town of Haifa by the Jodhpur Lancers and Mysore Lancers on 23 September 1918. Both regiments at this time formed a part of the 15th Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade.

The Brigade was raised in mid-October 1914 at Deolali, India, as the Imperial Service (IS) Cavalry Brigade, preparatory to embarkation for service overseas. It moved to Egypt in November 1914 as an independent brigade, the principal units being 1st Hyderabad IS Lancers, Mysore IS Lancers and the Patiala IS Lancers. The Bikanir IS Camel Corps was already in the country and was attached to the Brigade for administrative purposes.

As with the Imperial Service Troops, so the ISF were regular troops of the States, trained and organised to Indian Army standards. Those identified as being fit for Field Service would, after a short period of re-equipment and additional field training, have been ready for active service. For political reasons they could not be used on internal security duties in British India and the number of units that could be available for service outside the state depended on the state's own internal security requirements. In effect, they formed a ready reserve for the Government of India in time of need at a relatively cheap cost. The only major cost incurred by the Government of India was the first issue of arms and equipment, after which the running costs were the liability of the princely states. Again, as with the period of the IST scheme, some states also maintained troops outside the ISF Scheme. These State troops, often lacking adequate weapons and training, did provide a useful force in times of civil unrest and some were upgraded into the ISF Scheme during the Second World War.

The principal feature of the new ISF scheme was that troops were divided into three categories as under :-

(a) **Class A.** Organised according to the Indian Army system and establishment and, with some exceptions, were armed with the same weapons as corresponding units of the regular Indian Army. Most were earmarked for active war service.

(b) **Class B.** Consisted of units which were in most cases somewhat inferior in training and discipline to troops of Class A. They were not organised according to the Indian Army establishment and as a general rule they maintained their pre-war formations. Their standard of armament was lower than that for Class A units and they were not earmarked for active war service.

(c) **Class C.** Mainly militia-type formations not permanently in service. Their standard of training and equipment was generally lower than either Class A or B troops.

As time went on the number of troops increased to an unexpected extent, war stocks of arms dwindled, free issues of arms fell into arrears and, in 1932, at the time of a financial crisis, the Government announced its inability to meet further commitments towards the State Forces. States were told that they could

purchase arms, but the Government could undertake no liability to refund money expended. Despite such setbacks, however, the professionalism of the Forces increased and, on 4 June 1935, four State Forces cadets graduated from the second course ever to be held at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun. A further eight State Forces cadets graduated from the third course on 21 December 1935, and so the pattern was set. These officers were commissioned into their respective States Forces and gradually helped to build up the cadre of professional officers. I have heard it said, though I have been unable to verify it, that in some States they were differentiated from non-IMA graduates by being referred to as State commissioned officers, as opposed to Maharaja's commissioned officers.

(to be concluded)

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The Role of Indian Judge Advocates in the War on Terrorism

Major General Nilendra Kumar

Introduction

The Indian Army, the Navy and the Air Force are governed by their own separate laws, enacted by the Parliament of India. The basic acts are identical. All the three wings of the defence forces in India have their own Judge Advocate Generals. In addition the Ministry of Defence exercises operational control over the Assam Rifles (governed by the Assam Rifles Act, 1941). The Coast Guard is regulated by the Coast Guard Act, 1978.

The Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Army is the legal adviser to the Chief of the Army Staff in matters of military, martial (in its fighting service aspect) and international law. He also assists the Adjutant General in matters relating to discipline, involving applications of military law.[1]

The prevailing security situation in the Jammu and Kashmir (J and K) and the seriousness of the terrorist threat is well known. The need to ensure the security of the citizens and the state in its comprehensive dimension requires action across all sections. The unabated militant activity in J and K and other parts of our country continues to be a serious security concern. Terrorism in India is no longer an abstraction or something associated with J and K alone. India had significant terrorist activities during 2001. In a chronology of 123 major terrorist incidents across the world as many as 38 pertained to India.[2] More than 60,000 civilians and 9000 security personnel were reported to have died in terrorist attacks. The terrorists have struck at American Consulate at Kolkata, the Raghunath temple in Jammu and Akshardham[3] in Gujarat and at countless other places. Recently, the General Officer Commanding in Chief (GOC-in-C) and other senior officers of Northern Command

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were targeted at Tanda near Jammu. Mercifully all survived except Brigadier VK Govil.

The Indian Army has been deployed to combat the acts of terrorism on the Western and Northern borders for over two decades. The troops have been continuously on the vigil to counter the violence unleashed in proxy war and low intensity conflict situations.

While discussing the role of Indian Judge Advocates in the war against terrorism certain relevant features of military law need to be reiterated. Firstly, the Army Act provisions are only applicable to the Armed Forces personnel who are subject to the Army Act. These do not extend to the terrorists and militants. Acts or omissions of military nature of which cognizance has been taken are to be reserved to be dealt by military justice statutes. A person in uniform can be made answerable for a lapse which amounts to an offence under the Army Act. Alternatively, he is liable to trial under the local law which is applicable to all citizens. The domestic laws contain adequate provisions needed to resolve the conflict of jurisdiction which may arise when the court martial and the criminal court are both competent to deal with an offender having regard to the nature of offence.[4] Secondly, being a signatory to the Geneva Conventions and having incorporated the same into our domestic law, India is committed to the international humanitarian law concepts. Thirdly, Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) is one of the recent laws enacted by the Indian Parliament specially to tackle the threat of terrorism.

Advisory Role

The JAG Department officers posted at headquarters (HQ) Commands and Corps primarily carry out the task of rendering legal advice to the commanders and staff. All issues relating to employment of troops on counter terrorism duties and warranting legal advice are projected to them for opinion. The duties involving rendition of legal advice to the commanders and staff officers encompass a wide range. The authorities and powers available to the military officers are quite different when the provisions of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act have been invoked

(Appendix A). In other situations, the troops can be pressed into action under the mode of "aid to civil authorities" envisaged under the Criminal Procedure Code. In the latter case, the legality of an operation carried out will be sustainable only if the Magistrate concerned has requisitioned assistance of the military authorities. The actual situation in this regard is verified by the JAG departmental officers.

The advantage of initiative and surprise is gainfully exploited by the terrorists. To counter their threat, flexibility is needed on the part of security forces. Quite often there is grouping and regrouping in the composition of force. Newly raised units are also inducted in the area of operations. They are at times not fully conversant with rules, regulations and instructions. They approach the integral military legal expert for advice and assistance.

The legal experts are called upon to advise in situations involving admissibility of disability benefits and terminal entitlements. There is an obvious necessity to promptly settle claims of the next of kin of the soldiers injured or killed while posted to units and formations deployed to deal with the terrorists. Delay in expeditious disposal of such matters may adversely affect the motivation of others in uniform.

Not infrequently military legal advisors are approached by the volunteers of Army Wives Welfare Association (AWWA) for help in rehabilitation of families and widows. The issues warranting legal scrutiny pertain to succession, property laws, marriage, divorce, adoption and monetary entitlements.

Legal fallout of psychological stress and combat fatigue also need a careful study. Instances come to light relating to soldiers running amok, insubordination and excess use of alcohol. These matters call for careful investigation and follow up action in accordance with laid down legal provisions.

The other area where legal advice is not infrequently rendered relates to land use. The operations against terrorists involve moves and relocation of units at short notice based on functional imperatives. The deployment in civil areas involves legal

connotations like acquisition of land and payment of compensation. Besides the land owners, interaction is warranted with the defence estate department representatives and State Government officials on issues warranting application of legal provisions like prior notice, valuation and speaking order (an order which shows reason) etc. Newly raised units and formations regularly approach JAG department officers posted at Force HQ seeking advice on different matters having legal and procedural implications.

Role as Judge Advocate

While taking on courts martial duties, the officers of the department are nominated as trial Judge Advocates. At all General Courts Martial, presence of a Judge Advocate is a legal necessity. At Summary General Courts Martial and District Courts Martial his presence though statutorily not mandatory but he is invariably in attendance.

The definition of an enemy under the Army Act includes any person in arms against whom it is the duty of a person subject to the Army Act to act. Therefore, a terrorist squarely falls under the definition of an enemy. A terrorist is not amenable to the military law jurisdiction. So far legislative sanction does not exist for JAG departmental officers to qualify for inclusion in the definition of "special courts" envisaged for the trial of terrorists under the POTA.

Role in Litigation

JAG departmental officers are actively engaged in defence of court cases filed in various High Courts against military personnel alleging human rights violations. Litigation of this type is being handled by the officers posted with the Force HQ under the guidance of Deputy JAG at Corps Headquarters and also at the Headquarters of the Northern Army.

The officers of the JAG department play a pivotal role in the litigation concerning the Army matters of Union of India (Ministry of Defence). This load is shared by the Litigation Section of the JAG's Office and chiefly by the Legal Cells set up at the location of the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts.

The contribution of military lawyers in the case of Naga People's Movement of Human Rights versus Union of India[5] was quite profound. The case dealt with legality of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and the extent of authority available to the Army officers operating in an area where the provisions of the said Act were invoked. The military law experts were involved in extensive consultation to prepare the case on behalf of the Government. The court was called upon to decide whether the administrative orders issued by the commanders to their subordinates were legally enforceable. A number of vital questions arose. Do the military personnel have the authority to interrogate the security suspects? Could the arms, ammunition and explosive seized by the Army soldiers be retained by the units? What are the powers available to the Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) in comparison to the officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs)?[6] Can troops strike at the hideouts harbouring the militants? In other words, is a pre-emptive operation justified? In a landmark judgement by the Supreme Court all these aspects were squarely addressed by the court which held that :-

(a) **Legality of Administrative Instructions.** When rules do not contain any guidelines, directions or criteria, the instructions issued by the Government furnished an essential and statutory procedure for the purpose of securing uniformity in application of rules. The instructions in the form of Do's and Don'ts (Appendix B) have to be treated as binding instructions which are required to be followed by the members of the Armed Forces exercising powers under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and a serious note should be taken of violations of the instructions and the persons found responsible should be suitably punished under the Army Act, 1950.

(b) **Power to Interrogate.** The Army authorities need not consider themselves restrained from eliciting information for operational intelligence from an arrestee at the time of his arrest.

(c) **Retention by the Security Forces of the Arms and Ammunition Seized.** After affecting seizure, the Army authorities should report to the nearest police station about

the fact of arrest and seizure. At the same time furnishing a list of all confiscated articles and an undertaking to produce the same before the Magistrate concerned. It shall also be necessary for the Army authorities to thereafter obtain orders from the concerned Magistrate for custody of the impounded articles including their interim custody. The custody of the seized property by the Army authorities shall, however, be on behalf of the police concerned, and the same shall be produced by the Army authorities in the court as and when required for the prosecution.

(d) **Powers of NCOs.** Having regard to the status and experience of NCOs in the Army and the fact that when in command of a team in a counter insurgency operations they must operate on their own initiative, it cannot be said that conferment of powers under Section 4 (of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act) on a NCO renders the provisions invalid on ground of arbitrariness.

(e) **Destruction of Hideouts.** Absconders wanted for an offence are persons who are evading the legal process. In view of their past activities, the possibility of their repeating such activities cannot be excluded. The conferment of power to destroy the structure utilised as a hideout by such absconders in order to control such activities cannot be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable.

The officers of the JAG Department are aware of the peculiar problems and difficulties experienced by the formations and units deployed to combat challenge imposed by terrorism. They discharge their duties effectively being fully conscious of expectations from them (Appendix C).

Prosecution

Terrorist acts are subject to criminal prosecution by the competent State authorities in accordance with national laws. There are problems and challenges in this area. Poor conviction rate at the trial of militants and terrorists usually demoralises the troops. Unsuccessful prosecution is characterised by the failure of witnesses to accurately recapitulate the events. The evidence is

tampered and diluted. Witnesses are terrorised and are reluctant to come forward to depose. A feeling of hesitation and fear is encountered. Accused persons generally manage to secure bail. There is shortage of experienced and competent lawyers to conduct prosecution.

Military Operations

The military personnel lack the authority to carry out search, seizure and effect arrests in their areas of responsibility unless the provisions of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act have been invoked. This results in loss of valuable time. The element of surprise is lost in trying to seek help from civilian agencies. The instances of the local civil police and prison officials having been compromised are not infrequent. The counter insurgency operations are vulnerable to the hyperactive role of media and the glare of human rights.

Human Rights Violations

Human rights and terrorism are poles apart. By no stretch of imagination terrorists can claim human rights for they snatch away human rights of their victims and their families. No terrorist act can ever be justified.

The Indian Army has traditionally been epitome of discipline. It is an essential part of its ethos. The military discipline does not expect mere obedience of orders but goes beyond to demand proper action even in the absence of orders. Deliberate ill treatment of any individual is considered an act of indiscipline and all personnel involved in such acts are punished under the Army Act. No human rights violation is accepted. This has been made explicitly clear to all ranks by way of the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) Ten Commandments on human rights. The Do's and Don'ts at Appendix B are binding and lay down the code of conduct for combatants while deployed in aid to civil authorities. However, occasionally aberrations do take place under combat stress. These are promptly investigated and exemplary punishments awarded to those found guilty.

The JAG department is actively involved in the monitoring of strict adherence to human rights provisions. Its officers posted to the low intensity conflict (LIC) areas are assigned specific role in this regard. Their charter of duties involves:-

(a) Monitor, analyse and respond to situations of alleged human rights violations (Appendix D). The complaints alleging human rights violations may come to surface based on reports lodged by the victims, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), State Governments, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), media, parliamentary references or from on the spot visits by officers posted at higher headquarters.

(b) Where needed courts of inquiry are convened of which terms of reference and composition deserve careful scrutiny. Quite often civil officials are co-opted to join the probe. In situations relating to allegations of sexual offences, effort is made to detail at least one lady officer to be a member. There may be a need to depute experts on explosive and forensic science. The venue and time frame should facilitate collection of necessary evidence. Speed, transparency and accuracy of fact finding tasks involve close co-operation with military legal experts.

(c) Monitor and progress all cases filed in the courts relating to human rights. Comments have to be obtained from all concerned agencies and compiled to draft comprehensive counter.

(d) Dissemination of requisite information to the troops.

(e) Press notes and releases may need to be vetted from legal angle. Often rejoinders and rebuttals are to be carefully worded, calling for the legal scrutiny.

Human rights cells have been set up at the Command, Corps and Force HQ levels. These cells function in close liaison with other branches of the Army, Police and civil authorities. The methodology adopted is based on simple and prompt intervention. On receipt of an allegation or report, the cell seeks necessary details from the Sector HQ concerned.

The factual inputs and investigation report is examined and advice rendered to the General Officer Commanding (GOC) for seeking suitable directions. Follow up action where needed is duly monitored. Some of the necessary aspects that are indicative of nature of duties assigned to military law expert are shown at Appendices E to J.

Compensatory Justice

Monetary compensation cannot undo the physical and mental trauma of violence causing bodily harm. But nevertheless, pecuniary amend may partially take form of appearing as a solace and rehabilitation effort. The Indian judiciary has been quite vigilant to firmly deal with situations involving human rights violations. In the case of Tekarongsen Sir and Others versus Union of India; Guwahati High Court (Kohima) dealt with a case of injuries caused due to indiscriminate firing. It firmly stressed that "nobody is authorisd under the mandate of the Constitution to take away the right to life and liberty of a person except according to procedure established by law. Respects for the rights of individuals is the bedrock of true democracy. It is the bounden duty of the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the individual's rights. In order to prevent the violation of such right reasonably and also to secure the due compliance of Article 21, it is needed to mulch its violators in the payment of monetary compensation".[7]

Custodial Death

In another matter of Solomi Shingnaisui, Ms versus Union of India; the same High Court commented that, "the authorities are duty bound to pay compensation for the custodial death of a citizen. Compensation can be granted under the public law by the Supreme Court and High Courts in addition to private law remedy for tortuous action and punishment to wrong doers under the criminal law for established breaches of fundamental rights".[8]

Disappearance of Detenu

In one case contingent of the infantry commanded by a Major had conducted search in and around the house of the husband of

the petitioner. He was placed under arrest at gun point and taken away to the Army cantonment. Thereafter he continued to remain untraceable. The outcome of an enquiry presented absence of evidence that the detenu had left Army camp or was ever released.

The High Court held that the respondents were squarely responsible with regard to the mysterious disappearance of the detenu. "Now what remains to be seen is as to what relief the petitioner is entitled to. Missing of precious and valuable life from the custody of the respondent is definitely an act of infringement of fundamental rights. Although precious life cannot be measured in terms of Rupees, in the light of various judgements of the Apex Court, the petitioner is at least entitled to adequate compensation at this stage". Accordingly the High Court directed the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioner in the nature of palliative. It held that, "the Union of India is vicariously liable for any acts or commission of its instrumentality even if they acted beyond their authority".[9]

Military Law Experts as Trainers

Experts in military law are expected to assume the role of qualified training personnel. Military Law advisors are used to undertake general dissemination activities. Training courses are organised at the Institute of Military Law both as part of in-house training and for the officers belonging to the Arms and Services. In addition, JAG department officers are regularly nominated as guest faculty to cover legal overtones of terrorism related operational matters that come up for discussion at the Defence Services Staff College, Army War College and other training establishments.

Production of a Training Film

JAG Department is the nodal agency for production of a training film on "Law of Armed Conflict". The film to be produced in Hindi is meant to depict the essential component of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the form of an introductory lecture, Do's and Don'ts and culminating in a summary of message propagated. The lessons are proposed to be disseminated through a simple tactical situation based on section or platoon level military operations.

The film of approximately 30 minutes duration is meant for dissemination to all training establishments and units. It will have sub titles in English.

Conclusion

The units and their men need to be provided with the desired legal protection for their actions done in good faith. A complainant against the Army gets away without any responsibility even though it is the unit which is on the receiving end; and after putting in considerable legal and mental efforts it may turn out to be a motivated complaint. Adequate legal safeguards are warranted to provide retrospective justiceability.

There is a need to strengthen legal framework against terrorism. Existing differences in perception in accepting the jurisdiction of International Criminal Court must be resolved to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist crimes are firmly dealt with. The process of extradition should be made simpler for adopting bilateral arrangements. The involvement of military law officials in the prosecution of the offenders should be more direct and pronounced.

Notes and References

1. Defence Services Regulations (Regulations for the Army) paragraph 33 A.
2. S. Rajagopalan, 'India tops List of Terror Incidents'; *Hindustan Times*, 22 May 2002.
3. A place of worship.
4. Army Act, Section 69.
5. AIR 1998 SC 431 read with Order dated 7 August 2001 in Cri MP No. 500 of 1982.
6. A cadre that exists in Indian Army which is between the officers and NCOs.
7. Civil Rule No. 115(k) of 1997, Order dated 26 September 2002.
8. Gauhati High Court (Imphal) WP No. 591 of 1999; Order dated 24 April 2001.
9. Zukheli Sema, Smt V Union of India; 1999 *Criminal Law Journal* 40 (Gauhati).

Appendix A

POWERS AVAILABLE TO ARMY UNDER ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT

1. Power to arrest.
2. Power to search.
3. Destroy hideouts etc.
4. Authority to use force.

Appendix B

CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF (COAS) COMMANDMENTS

1. No rape.
2. No molestation.
3. No torture.
4. No military disgrace i.e. loss of arms, military post or surrender or imbibing of un-army culture.
5. No meddling in civil administration i.e. land dispute or quarrels.
6. Competence in platoon/company tactics with innovations.
7. Willingly carry out civic action with innovations.
8. Develop media interaction modus - use it as a force multiplier and not as a force degrader.
9. Respect human rights.
10. Only fear God, uphold Dharma (ethical mode of life) and enjoy serving the country.

Appendix C

ROLE OF MILITARY LAWYERS IN OPERATIONS INVOLVING ARREST OF TERRORISTS



Appendix D

MATTERS WARRANTING LEGAL ADVICE

1. Disposal of dead body.
2. Disposal of arrested persons.
3. Disposal of seized property.
4. Recording of evidence.
5. Briefing of soldiers for appearance as witnesses in courts of law.
6. Preparation of case file in cases of death/arrest/seizure.

Appendix E

ROLE OF MILITARY LAWYERS ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION ALLEGATIONS



Appendix F

CARDINAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING USE OF FORCE

1. Minimum force. Care should be taken for quick disengagement of force after completion of the task.
2. Good faith.
3. Impartiality.
4. Necessity.

Appendix G

ARREST OF PERSONS

Only those persons who

(a) Have committed a cognizable offence.

(b) Are about to commit such offences.

(c) Are suspected to have committed such acts.

(d) Are members of a terrorist organisation.

Appendix H

DOCUMENTS TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE POLICE WHEN HANDING OVER AN ARRESTED PERSON

1. Report on circumstances occasioning arrest to be mentioned in FIR (First Information Report).
2. Seizure Memo.
3. List of witnesses.
4. Confessional Statement, if any.
5. Medical certificate.
6. Handing/Taking over certificate.

Appendix J

ITEMS OF EVIDENCE

1. Arms, ammunition including explosives and empty/fired cases.
2. Clothing and equipment.
3. Photo evidence.
4. Incriminating documents.
5. Movable property.
6. Bank documents including cash.

Param Talented

Ms Priyadarshini Sharma

It was a discovery I happily chanced upon, thanks to the ever-popular television quiz KBC.

Mr Amitabh Bachchan's deep voice posed this query to a Rs 50-lakh answer. The contestant by now was sweating excitedly and the audience waited with bated breath, "Who designed the Param Vir Chakra?" Sarojini Naidu, Aruna Asaf Ali, Savithribai Khanolkar or Annie Besant?

The contestant quit the game, having exhausted the three lifelines. But the right answer, Savithribai Khanolkar, made me wonder if my friend, Mr Mahesh Khanolkar, the Mullasery Canal Roadwala, had any clue to the lady mentioned, he being a Khanolkar himself.

I rang him immediately.

"Mahesh, who is the Savithribai Khanolkar, the lady who designed the Param Vir Chakra? Any one from your family tree?"

"Well, she happens to be my mother," was Mr. Mahesh's nonchalant drawl.

Needless to say, I was dumb struck.

"She also designed the Vir Chakra and the General Service Medal," he added.

"Tell me, tell me her story," I pleaded excitedly, and this is how her story goes.

Eve De Maday was born with a title in 1913 to a Russian mother and a Hungarian father. A beautiful child, Eve met Lieutenant Vikram Khanolkar in France as she was there on a holiday with her parents and the dashing Gentleman Cadet had taken a break from Sandhurst.

Reprinted from *The Hindu, Metro Plus* (what's on in Kochi), 3 December 2001, with permission.

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The meeting between the two was to change their lives forever as they fell deeply in love and despite parental objections, Eve came away to India in 1930.

Soon, they were married and the kanyadan or the giving away of the daughter was performed by no less than Dr Wrangler (Title given to first in the class of first in Mathematics Tripos), Sir Appa Paranjpe, the vice chancellor of the Allahabad University.

While they sailed to India, this young and beautiful couple was in the company of distinguished royalty and literary personalities. On board they grew close to the eminent physicist Sir CV Raman.

Mr Mahesh narrates how the great scientist sent a saree on the occasion of the wedding of his parents, by post, which was insured, for Rs. 900 (imagine such a sum in those days) and was made of beaten gold. The family fondly named the gift as "The Raman Effect Saree."

The young and adventurous Eve had an innate love for India and its culture. She turned vegetarian long before she arrived here and on arrival, she quite naturally looked all around for tigers, panthers and vipers!

She was horrified at 'large scale tuberculosis' all around as she saw people spitting blood everywhere. Only later did she find out that it was chewed betel leaf, paan! The young girl slowly settled down to raising a family and travelled with her husband to the far-flung corners of India.

Quetta in Northwestern province (now Pakistan) became their hometown, but a transfer to Trivandrum as the Commander in Chief of Travancore State Forces brought her to Southern India. It was to be a turning point for her as she got to study the Indian scriptures. Here she learnt Kathakali and Bharatnatyam under the famous Guru Gopinath. The year was 1939.

Widespread uncertainty prevailed with the beginning of the Second World War and Savithribai moved to Shantiniketan while her husband fought at the frontiers in Burma.

By now the spiritual call within her was too great to ignore and she found a guru in Swami Abhedananda. He inspired her to learn Sanskrit and she became a scholar in the vedas. Soon she began writing: a Sanskrit dictionary of names and on saints of Maharasthra.

She studied the Mahabharata and wrote a book, 'Mahabharata Retold'. All this had seasoned her to give India the right insignia for the highest award for bravery accorded to the Indian soldier.

Savithribai Khanolkar designed the Param Vir Chakra, the Vir Chakra and the General Service Medal. The Param Vir Chakra which is circular in shape, is made of bronze, and has Indra's vajra with the state emblem.

It was natural for Lieutenant General Atal who was entrusted with the task of symbolising the face of bravery of the Indian soldier to choose this Indophile, Mrs. Khanolkar for the job. It was quite another matter that the friendship of Savithribai's husband and the General went back to Sandhurst days.

In a letter to Lieutenant General Atal, she describes the meaning and symbolism of the vajra.

She writes, "Vajra in Sanskrit, meaning Lord Indra's powerful thunderbolt, is the symbol of the sacrifice of a great sage Dadhichi in Vedic days who gladly and voluntarily gave up his body to let the God's use his own thigh bones in order to make the fiercest weapon of all, the vajra. The vajra was always victorious in battle, being a symbol of human self-sacrifice for the good of humanity. It is also a symbol of power and speed of action, both born of the rishi who gave his all in order to rid the world of evil."

The Vir Chakra has the heraldic star with the lotus behind and for the General Service Medal, she introduced Shivaji's sword, Bhavani (divine sword) and lotus with leaves and bud.

It is a strange coincidence that the first recipient of the award was her son-in-law's brother Major Somnath Sharma.

Mr Mahesh who came to Cochin 14 years ago on a job transfer for the tea company, JP Advani & Co has become part and parcel

of Kerela. Modest about his family's illustrious contributions to the country, he unabashedly says that he 'worshipped' his mother.

Her vedantic leanings, her scholarly work, left little or no time for formal child raising but Mr Mahesh is quick to defend that times were different then, heroic deeds and a spirit of self sacrifice moved one and all.

This young Hungarian girl took to foreign soil, custom and religion, went on to give her adopted country its most meaningful insignia. Proof of the resilience of human spirit, of its adaptability and its grit to perform, anywhere and at all times.

Mr Mahesh continued, "she was mentioned in MASTERMIND and also features in the Limca Book of Records. She was a truly remarkable woman." No disputing that!

ADDRESS UPDATE

ALL MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO INTIMATE CHANGE OF ADDRESS ON OCCURENCE

Letters to the Editor

I

THE WOMAN SOLDIER

I have read Captain Deepanjali Bakshi's excellent article "Combat Exclusion : Women in the Indian Armed Forces" in the July-September 2003 issue of the Journal. It is the best I have seen on the subject, even when compared to those published in foreign journals, like the US's *Military Review* etc. However, I wish to offer the following comments.

Firstly, let's face it that, we are only copying the induction of women in the forces on the American experiment. How far they fit in with our security requirements is yet to be assessed. To begin with, in the American society, military service is a hallmark of citizenship, and dodging the draft is a serious blot on a man's standing and even in his future career. In fact this is the very charge which was brought against the last US President, Bill Clinton, who was accused of shying out of Vietnam. This is not the case in our country, where we have a volunteer army, and the military is still not held in high esteem careerwise by the civilian society, inspite of Kargil.

The question is not whether the Indian woman should be allowed to make a career in the forces; it is also not whether she will make a good soldier, sailor or airwoman, as the answers to all three of these are in the affirmative. The specific question to be answered is, whether by women joining the Services, will it increase or enhance the existing efficiency, morale and the fighting spirit of the combat unit in the trenches, or on a battle ship, or in a fighter aircraft. If the answer to this is 'NO', then all other arguments concerning the women's role in the armed forces are irrelevant, and of an academic nature only.

After the incidents of sexual harassment in the Gulf War, four years back, and the serious case of sexual assault which took place at Tail Hook on a US Naval establishment involving officers, which resulted in the resignation of the then Naval Secretary, and the fact that as of date there are 1200 cases of sexual harassment pending investigation, even the US Government is re-considering the whole pattern of women in the armed forces.

However, notwithstanding the above, let's examine the role of women in the purely managerial jobs of the Services. A recent management study has indicated that, contrary to popular beliefs, women do even better than men in management tasks of the military. A recent study also indicates

that, women do a better job than men in 28 to 31 key military management categories, including increasing productivity and generating ideas, but they do poorly in handling frustration. This was a departure from traditional presumptions, which credit women with being mature team players at work, but not with skills associated with top leadership.

The 31 areas of military management ability surveyed were broken down into seven categories like, problem-solving, planning, controlling, managing self, managing relationship, leading and communicating. While women did better than men in 28 of the 31 and excelled by a wide margin in 25, they were behind in a key area, namely self-promotion.

As Captain Bakshi has quite rightly brought out, women in the Indian Army are not justified by military necessity of manpower shortage, as is the case in the USA and more so in the UK. The specific question which we should ask is, whether, for the sake of satisfying a constitutional requirement of giving equal opportunities in all spheres, including the armed forces, for both sexes, are we creating unnecessary new problem, but which does not result in any furtherance of national security?

In the final analysis, women in the military have to be more assertive in demanding recognition of their rights and efforts. Men will not give them this on a platter, whether in the military or even in industry.

Brigadier N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)

II

INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Dear Sir,

The article on "Reflections on India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control" by Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd) in the April-June 2003 issue deserves accolades for its well formulated exposure of an issue concerning vital security implications. Its contents may prompt further serious reflections on the need for detailed policy in this regard. Apart form technological, financial, strategic, political and diplomatic angles, the legal aspects of the matter too warrant requisite scrutiny.

The recommendations in concluding part of his paper have laid bare the need for introspection on certain connected legal issues. The legitimacy and accountability of the alternate decision making authority to follow the Prime Minister in line of succession is to be unambiguously spelt out. In a parliamentary democracy like India, the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister is answerable to the Parliament which in turn is elected

by the people. A viable solution could, therefore, be nomination of a few Members of Cabinet to form part of the alternate decisional hierarchy. Such an option would be on a better legal wicket as opposed to an extra constitutional authority. This becomes apparent from certain directly connected issues. How would it be ensured that a major decision like use of a nuclear weapon is in best interest of the nation? In the absence of a clearly enunciated policy, how would it be ascertainable that the nuclear response was justified in terms of timing, target and quantum? Utmost care may be needed to avoid launching a strike on a non-military target. Any error on this count may subsequently trigger investigation and accompanied prosecution on offences relating to crime against humanity, genocide, aggression or grave war crime. Non-ratification of the Rome Statute 1998 notwithstanding, blanket judicial immunity may not be forthcoming for major violations.

Absence of or deficiency in accountability in crucial decision making may induce a sense of over-action or early or inadequate response. Such an eventuality should be guarded against because of the enormity of repercussions and accompanied impact on national security.

The other suggestion calls for maintenance of regular record (audio/ video) in relation to decision-making process at the nuclear command post. This could take the analogy of instruments commonly referred as black boxes in the aircraft. The obvious advantage would be documented transparency and accountability in response formulation.

Major General Nilendra Kumar

III

JAMMU AND KASHMIR CEASEFIRE

Dear Sir,

The article "Nehru and the J and K Cease Fire" by Col SK Bose (Retd) in the July-September 2003 issue is interesting. The author has concluded that the cease-fire in January 1949 was 'manipulated' by the British Cs-in-C of India and Pakistan, Generals Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey. I feel that the idea is far-fetched, and does little credit to Nehru and his intelligence.

The conclusion of the author, based on General Wilson's account, that "Early in December 1948 the Indians, for several months content to sit quietly in Jammu, began to move towards Poonch," is not entirely correct. Major General Kalwant Singh; GOC JAK Division had issued orders for the relief

of Naushera, Jhangar, Mirpur, Kotli and Poonch on 16 November 1948. He could not do this earlier because 50 Para Brigade reached Akhnur only on 13 November 1948. According to his plan, 50 Para Brigade was to relieve Naushera by 16th, Jhangar by 17th, Kotli by 18th, and Mirpur by 20th November. Another column from Uri, consisting of two battalions of 161 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier LP Sen, was to move on the Uri-Poonch axis on 16 November, reaching Poonch the same day.

The second assertion that Kalwant was pushed into the operation against his will is also wrong. In fact, Kalwant himself made the plan. It was ambitious and had several flaws that were pointed out by the officiating C-in-C Lieutenant General FRR Bucher, who felt that the advance of two columns was 'positively dangerous', and the despatch of a column from Uri to Poonch, with the enemy still in position, was 'almost foolhardy'. Brigadier YS Paranjpe, who was commanding 50 Para Brigade, also had several objections. Apart from the dates being unrealistic, he felt that after establishing a firm base at Jhangar, Mirpur should be relieved first, so that the raiders did not interfere with the advance to Kotli.

The operations commenced on 16 November and Naushera was occupied on 18 November. Paranjpe had just three companies with him, and wanted to wait till the rest of the column fetched up. However, Kalwant was in a hurry to reach Kotli, and ordered him to continue. Much against his wishes, Paranjpe resumed the advance on 19 November and occupied Jhangar the same day. From Jhangar, two roads forked out, one leading to Mirpur and the other to Kotli. Paranjpe was in favour of relieving Mirpur before going for Kotli, so that his flank was secure. However, Kalwant did not agree and ordered him to head for Kotli, which was relieved only on 26 November, after negotiating 47 roadblocks. By this time the fate of Mirpur had been sealed. It could not be relieved, and was torched by the raiders the same day. The Pathans killed several hundred soldiers and civilians and captured hundreds of women, who were taken away to the Frontier as war booty. En route, the exultant Pathan tribesmen sold many of them, after parading them naked through the streets of Jhelum.

On 27 November 1948, the day after it had been relieved, Kalwant decided that Kotli could not be held, due to the vulnerability of the long line of communication and ordered the troops to fall back on Jhangar. Soon after this, Brigadier Paranjpe was hospitalised and Brigadier Mohammad Usman ordered to take over command of 50 Para Brigade. If Kalwant's decision to rush to Kotli without securing his open flank by securing Mirpur was surprising, even stranger was his decision to fall back to Jhangar immediately after its capture. In the event, Mirpur was lost. And thereby hangs a tale concerning a lady and a treasure. Kalwant Singh's haste to relieve Kotli was probably attributable to these two factors, rather than

tactical reasons: The lady and the treasure were probably saved, but the lives of thousands of men and the honour of hundreds of women was lost.

1 Para Punjab, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel GIS Kullar, was holding Jhangar when it was attacked at dawn on 24 December, a day before Christmas, which was also the birthday of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Though Jhangar was lost, its loss was not 'devastating' as General Wilson contends. It was certainly not serious enough to cause panic in the Indian camp and prompt them to ask for a cease-fire. In March 1949, Osman was able to re-capture Jhangar, where he later lost his life.

The contention that General Sir Roy Bucher pushed Nehru into asking for a cease-fire assumes that the latter had considerable influence on the Indian Prime Minister, which is totally incorrect. Other than Gandhi, the only person who could influence Nehru was Mountbatten. Bucher had neither the standing nor the rapport with Nehru to achieve what the author claims he did. Also, Cariappa was GOC-in-C Western Command, and Nehru would certainly have consulted him on the military significance of the loss of Jhangar. General Wilson was then a very junior officer on the staff of the C-in-C of Pakistan and his knowledge of what was happening in India could only have been superficial.

Major General VK Singh (Retd)

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Disarmament Sketches : Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law. *By Thomas Graham Jr (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 2002), pp. 362, $ 35.00, ISBN 0-295-98212-8.*

The book contains some interesting episodes related to several agreements and treaties. There were hectic parleys to draw concurrence of India, Pakistan, and Israel. Various developments of political and military nature jeopardised the participation of India and Pakistan. In 1999, there were serious problems in Kashmir and thereafter a race for testing various delivery systems for missiles by the two countries. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty also ran into trouble.

This book is an absorbing collation and compilation of various episodes of international diplomacy and haggling. Some of the episodes portray dual moral standards of the United States disarmament policy such as the violation of Pressler Amendment. The US was required to cut off all foreign aids, including military aid to Pakistan unless the President each year could certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear explosive device. Every year, from 1985 until 1991, President Reagan and Bush duly made the certification, even though by the late 1980s it was clear that the conditions for certification could not be met. The war in Afghanistan was going on during most of that period and every year the Department of State recommended that the President sign the certification because the State Department wanted to maintain good relations with Pakistan so as to better influence the course of war.

President Reagan said in early 1989 that he was certifying Pakistan again, but this was the last year he would be able to do so in good conscience. President Bush, after certifying once, refused thereafter to do so. But, of course, the war in Afghanistan had ended by that time. The writer has intended to present a chronicle of the US arms control and disarmament policy-making process during the late 20th century. The book written largely from his recollections rather than research, therefore, makes an interesting reading. An abridged presentation could have been more penetrating and of lasting value.

Shri VK Gaur, IG BSF (Retd)

A Future Arms Control Agenda : Proceedings of Nobel Symposum 118, 1999. *Edited by Ian Anthony and A D Rotfeld (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 371, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-19-924505-3.*

As arms proliferate, so is the need for evolving effective and institutionalised mechanisms for their control, especially in times when

technology diffusion, emergence of a nexus of proliferating states as Pakistan and North Korea and proclivities of states as the USA to employ and control, as a coercive as well as a motivating tool, to suit its own national interest rather than a global agenda for peace, is continuously upsetting the disarmament apple cart. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, has been performing a stellar role in generating information and debate on disarmament and arms control over the years. The proceedings of the Nobel Symposium on, "A Future Arms Control Agenda" held in October 1999 have been published to provide us an overview of the trajectory of arms control in the years ahead with a view to establish a co-operative security order.

Part I is a survey of the security environment and arms control measures. The problems of pursuing the arms control agenda in present times are highlighted along with the state of compliance and emergence of non-state actors. Part II provides us an overview of the role of major powers with particular reference to Russia, the USA, China and Japan. While identifying inertia of the nuclear disarmament process as a cause for growth of India as a nuclear capable state, the need for non nuclear weapon use by China and India is highlighted. Part III attempts to establish new parameters for arms control with a view to create a new security order and a cooperative security system. Part IV denotes compliance with arms control commitments providing us a survey of how cheating can take place and the system subverted. Part V is a detailed survey of arms control to include conventional, nuclear, chemical, biological weapons as well as anti personnel mines. A detailed list of arms control and disarmament agreements has also been included. The book provides some effective recommendations such as establishing a co-operative security system, engaging the USA as a responsible leader of the world order, establishing rule based framework for legitimate use of force and revitalising the institutional framework for arms control. A useful contribution to the arms control and disarmament repertory.

Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM

Culture and International Conflict Resolution–A Critical Analysis of the Work of John Burton. *By Tarja Vayrynen (Oxford : Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 164, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-7190-5900-3.*

This book scrutinises Burton's socio-biologically slanting conflict theory, conflict resolution theory, and its relation to the human needs theory. The authoress looks to review the idea of 'problem-solving workshop conflict resolution' way by an unsympathetic investigation. She goes on to suggest an option of a methodology based on a societal constructionist outlook. She contends that culture has constitutive role in international conflict and

conflict resolution as it offers syntax for acting in and construing humankind and affords perceptions of discord and its end. The object of this book, therefore, seems to be, to develop a non-totalistic understanding of international conflict resolution broadly, and of problem-solving conflict resolution in the specific.

A general idea of the central content is covered in the opening chapter in order to situate problem-solving workshop conflict resolution within the ambit of passive third party participation. Various approaches of international import are evaluated and their fundamental postulations studied. An analysis of human needs thinking and its congruence with Burton's thought process follows. The aim appears to be to examine the raison d'etre of Burton's case in the light of metaphor analysis by examining those that can be found in the human needs theory. In another chapter, Burton's views on action and rationality are desiccated in depth. Here, Vayrynen questions the very forms of behaviour and structures of prudence that Burton takes for granted when elucidating conflict and conflict resolution. Moving on to phenomenology and social constructionism, the author studies Schutz's values in order to develop her alternative based on the ontological abstract framework. Burton is confronted on the basis of social construction of veracity, wants and individuality. Culture is placed at the very hub of conflict resolution. In the chapter following, she stresses the need for finding a shared reality between the protagonists. This idea is dovetailed into the discussion on relevance structures, deifications and discursive reality. The role of the facilitator is played up in conflict resolution scenarios and a new allegory of a 'filter' is coined for him or her. Ten practical recommendations for resolution of conflict are listed in the concluding chapter.

Students of conflict and peace studies as well as those of international conflict resolution will find this book useful and absorbing despite its purely theoretical stance. Ms Vayrynen could have interpolated her discourse with case studies and examples. This would have gone well with the run of the mill serious-minded reader. As of now she has barely made passing references to workshops for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian, northern Ireland, and Cyprus conflicts, and the 'Oslo channel' only in the preamble and opening paragraph on the first page.

Lieutenant Colonel AK Sharma (Retd)

Conflict Resolution, Human Rights and Democracy. *Edited by DD Khanna and Gert W Kueck (Delhi : Shipra, 2003), pp 298, Rs 550.00, ISBN 81-7541-125-2.*

The book is the outcome of a workshop organised in India International Centre, New Delhi, from 5 to 7 April 2002. Dr Karan Singh delivered the

inaugural address and twelve scholars made presentations suggesting how democracy, human rights and conflict resolution have a bearing on each other. The workshop was a joint venture of the Society for Peace, Security and Development Studies and Konrad Adenauer Foundation for discussing fundamental changes in human society and need for new approaches, concerning proper functioning of democracy, respect for human rights and conflict resolution. The scholars have made indepth analysis of emerging threats to democracy, human rights and terrorism, conflict generation and conflict resolution. The role of the United Nations, global challenges, co-existence of civilisations and the Indian perspective have also been discussed.

The authors have done full justice to their themes. The book is a welcome addition to the literature available on the subject.

Dr Raj Kumar

Reflections on Humanitarian Action. *Edited by Humanitarian Studies Unit (London : Unit Press, 2001), pp. 203, £ 14.00, ISBN 0-7453-1726-X.*

Globalisation and the triumph of Western liberal thought in the 1990s led to the growth of the phenomenon of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is perhaps the apogee of liberalism where human interest triumphs over national interest. Thus, organisations such as Medicins Sans Frontieres jump into the conflictual fray purely to provide humanitarian aid and assuage frayed tempers of the parties involved in the conflict. While United Nations has a judicial mandate for conflict resolution, these transnational non governmental organisations (NGOs) have only a humanitarian mandate. Examining the complexities of principles, ethics and contradictions of humanitarian aid in the 1990s is a group of scholar-activists of the Humanitarian Studies Unit of the Transnational Institute based in Amsterdam. Commencing with a survey of the humanitarian principles in the 1990s, the main conclusion is that there is a need to legalise human intervention. Broad ranging issues such as the ethical framework for humanitarian action, given the lack of universal acceptance of its principles, are then considered. The complexities of humanitarian action, in particular co-ordination and the all-pervasive influence of the media are also discussed. A case study of the Medicins Sans Fontieres aid action in Sudan in 1998 has been provided to put things in perspective.

This book not only highlights the diverse complexities of international humanitarian action but also the contours of modern post cold war conflicts and how humanitarian aid can act as a factor in such strife, ironically, at times exacerbating the same. The book underlines the need for espousing the principles of multiple peace-keeping as sponsored by Boutros Ghali and

establishing an "international human order" in a world where national interest based proclivities of states as the Untied States has led to their avoiding global obligations. This is a very significant contribution to conflict resolution and role of humanitarian aid in the same.

Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM

Social Justice and Human Rights in Islam. *By NK Singh (New Delhi : Gyan Publishing House, 1998), pp. 291, Rs 450.00, ISBN 81-212-0592-1.*

The book, as its title suggests, has dealt with the subject in a systematic and lucid manner. The book has been divided into seven chapters dealing with the concepts of Islamic justice and human rights, spiritual nature of social justice in Islam, social evolution in the Middle East with the advent of Islam which emphasised on equality of all human beings, including slaves if they became believers of Islam. The author has highlighted that all relationships, whether personal, social or political, are contractual in nature in Islam. Relationship with Allah can also be viewed as contractual as early Muslims pledged their faith with the Prophet stating that they 'will not worship any but Allah' failing which they would be considered non-believers and shall suffer the same fate as laid out for them. It remains so even today. The author has done a commendable job of compiling all relevant verses pertaining to the subject for easy reference which, otherwise, are quite dispersed in various *Surahs* in the Quran.

There are several typographical errors which could have been avoided in editing. Chapter seven titled 'The Social Justice in Modern Perspectives', gives an impression of having been lifted from somewhere as it reads more like an enunciation of state policy of some Islamic state. It contains statements like "we are confronted by the specific constitutional enactments which wil ensure a sound form of Islamic life" or "we must utilise all possible and permissible means which fall within the general principles and broad foundations of Islam". For scholars of comparative study of jurisprudence and social laws in Hindu dharma and Islam, reading of *Manusmriti* and Kautilya's *Arthashastra* would reveal several similarities of detailed explanation of actions to be taken in various similar circumstances, including laws for social interaction, duties of rulers and so on.

The book is a valuable compendium of Islamic laws and should be read by all those who wish to understand the true meaning of Islam, in simple language.

Major General Dinesh Chandra (Retd)

The Role of the G8 in International Peace and Security. *By Risto EJ Penttila, Adelphi Paper 355 (New York : OUP Inc, 2003), pp. 104, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-19-852891-4.*

In the comity of nations, G8 comprising the USA, the UK, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, and Canada occupies a unique place. G8 does not have a charter, a phone number, a secretariat or a website nor is it listed in the *Yearbook of International Organizations.* Yet it has a presence in world politics. G8 deals with a wide variety of issues ranging from smooth functioning of the world economy to reforming the United Nations. G8 has an impressive record in the field of international security policy making with regard to cross border hijacking, hostage situation, drug trafficking and refugee flows. The G7 played a significant role in anchoring Russia, the eighth member. The withdrawal of Russian troops, denuclearisation of Ukraine and the 'carrot' of membership largely persuaded Yeltsin to accept a compromise with the USA. The Kosovo Crisis of 1999 again proved the worth of G8 in international peace and security. The weaknesses of G8 are that it has neither crisis management capabilities nor any long-term policy making capabilities. Since it has no institution, it suffers from a lack of institutional memory and absence of a formal consultative structure. However, these points are common with most international organisations.

The first Summit of five nations comprising of France, the UK, the USA, Germany and Japan was held in 1997 and the visionary leader was Giscard d'Estaing who was convinced that nations had become too embroiled in bureaucracy to find creative solutions to the problems faced by the West. Canada and Italy were added later to form the G7. The entry of Russia has made it G8. Each nation is required to select a personal representative called a *'sherpa'* who has full trust of his leader. The *sherpas* meet regularly and 'Contact Groups' provide answers to problems which international organisations have been unable to solve. Typical examples are Namibia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Contact groups are more flexible and potent than international organisations and rely on diplomacy and statecraft. A noteworthy aspect is the hegemonic attitude of the USA towards G8. It has rejected G8's call to be the pivot in combating terrorism after 11 September 2001. The paper discusses in detail the attitude of Russia, Germany, the UK, France, Japan, Canada and Italy. In fact the author suggests that Australia, India and China could perhaps replace the latter two.

An extremely well researched; analytical and comprehensive paper covering various nuances of the subject. It is well worth a study by anyone interested in international politics.

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. *By Trevor Findlay (Oxford UK : Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 486, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-19-829282-1.*

Peace-keeping is a delicate, sensitive and, often, a challenging task since the operations have the potential to detail or destroy a mission entirely if not handled properly. UN intervention in civil wars poses multi dimensional problems in restoring peace. The situation becomes more intricate where the consent to the presence of UN forces is fragile. The peace-keeping posse has frequently been attacked by the belligerent groups without provocation. When and how should they use force in self-defence? There is hairline difference between peace-keeping and fighting a war. The western media has often criticised the UN for un-impressive peace-keeping. The Security Council has the prime responsibility for proper use of force in UN operations; however, it has been accused of abdicating the responsibility on several counts. The writer has raised several questions relating to mission leadership, the composition of peace keepers, the use of force in self defence, asserting the right of freedom of movement, defence of the mission, and mandated use of force beyond self-defence. There are positive notes on improving the operations, mandates, mission planning and force management, providing greater capability and ability for rapid deployment, use of civil police, steamlining effective command and control, acquisition, analysis and dissemination of timely intelligence, rules of engagement and training. The writer has recalled the experiences of peace-keeping in Congo, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Balkans, East Timor and Sierra Leone.

An interesting collection of ten chapters and numerous appendices for the officers of the armed forces who are called upon to perform peace-keeping operations.

Shri V K Gaur, IG, BSF (Retd)

Executive Policing Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations, SIPRI Research Report No. 16. *By Renata Dawan (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 144, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-19-926267-5.*

This research report by six highly competent and experienced authors examines various aspects of the challenge of executive policing for enforcing law in peace operations. It is based on experiences in Kosovo and East Timor. The project studies the way in which the expansion of international engagement in inter-state conflicts has focused attention on the rule of the law as the foundation for order and stability within societies. Main focus of the study has been the actors, the policies and the tools which are developed to help establish the sustainable rule of law in societies emerging from a conflict.

The report has been initiated with a view to achieving excellence for creating a peaceful world. The appendices make the study a valuable contribution on various counts. An Asian viewpoint on this subject might have further enhanced the quality of the report.

Dr Raj Kumar

Terrorism : An Instrument of Foreign Policy. *By Kshitij Prabha (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 2000), pp. 185, Rs 185.00, ISBN 81-7003-248-2.*

India's immediate neighbourhood bristles with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes engaged in covert actions in breach of international law. Our on-going grave experience with regard to state sponsored terrorism from across the Line of Control in J and K, the cross-border one in the Punjab and the Northeast and even earlier in Tamil Nadu speaks for itself. It clearly brings out the fact that, whereas terrorism promoted by a group can be contained, that sponsored by an inimical state cannot be, without restructuring foreign policy. Therefore, this study by Dr Prabha is undoubtedly, as topical as it is relevant.

The author has followed up the conceptual analysis of terrorism with its impact on foreign policy with particular reference to Pakistan sponsored terrorism. A portion of the book, dealing with terrorism as the chosen instrument of Pakistani foreign policy, is quite well taken and the role of the ISI, its field Intelligence units, the activities of non-military groups, and tactics of the militants, have been adequately dealt with. She concludes that : (a) Terrorism is not akin to fighting for freedom from subjugation; (b) Mandatory extradition treaty amongst members of the United Nations Organisation is a must; (c) Leverage, at the UN and other international fora will assist in bringing defaulter countries to book; (d) Specific proposals for India include a set up for real time Intelligence, an apex body like the NSC, and the use only of minimum possible force in counter-terrorist operations etc.

The writer has undoubtedly put in a lot of effort in research; the long lists of primary and secondary sources in the select bibliography are testimony of this. She, however, appears to be out of her depth when it comes to her grasp of the subject per se and, what is more, she has not been able to mesh ideas and themes central to the matter either. All this goes to make for jerky reading. Besides, possessing only a rudimentary command of the language and terminology relevant to the topic hampers her written expression. Therefore, generally, the book makes for a tedious perusal. However, Indian policy planners would do well to go through Dr Prabha's book, particularly heeding her notes of caution. Overall, therefore,

the author has made a useful contribution to a subject that will exercise the minds of policy-makers the world over for quite a while to come.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

Air Power and Counter Insurgency : A Review, J&K as a Model. *Air Commodore AK Tiwary (New Delhi : Lancer Books, 2002),* pp, 202, Rs 430.00, ISBN 81-7095-093-7.

The author has traced the emerging patterns of air power employed in various counter insurgency operations in the past, its successes and failures and the future options in dealing with militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. In doing so, the author has been very candid in enumerating various constraints of conventional air power in tackling insurgency. The first part of the book is devoted to brief recapitulation of the history of Kashmir, its geographical and demographic make-up and the genesis of present militancy. In this section, the origins of present malaise and various contributory factors such as deprivation, isolation, mounting discontent, political mismanagement, ineffective strategy and emergence of Jihadi culture have been well enumerated and examined. This well written initial opening does, however, suffer from a conceptual incongruity. It appears that while talking of air power, the author has become focussed entirely on its offensive application at the cost of other attributes such as better mobility, re-supply, surveillance, evacuation, cordoning and so on. This singular focus on offensive application alone has led the author to erroneously conclude that air power can be effectively employed only during the final stage of insurgency when it turns into a conventional war. This incongruity, fortunately, does not reappear in the remaining part of the book as the author has himself gone on to suggest numerous avenues for air power application in Jammu and Kashmir in the latter part of the book.

The second part is devoted to the role of air power in various counter insurgency operations viz. the Somalian insurgency (1920), the nomadic trouble in Transjordan (1920-30) and the NWFP tribal insurgency in the 1930s. The analysis of subsequent insurgencies, however, shows a progressive decline in the effectiveness of air power to end the insurgency, entirely on its own. The Palestinian war (1936-39) marks the point from where the emphasis shifts in favour of joint land air operations, with air power playing a greater supportive role. The bock tracks this gradual change as well as the evolution of better tactics to counter various terrain and political constraints through the Greek Civil war (1944-49), the Malayan insurgency (1948-60) and the Algerian War (1954-62). Unfortunately, the Chechen insurgency, which has thrown up many lessons about the role of air power finds no mention.

The third part of the book deals with the prognosis of insurgency in general. Of significance is the conclusion that, given the failure of the strategy thus far adopted for eliminating militancy, time had come for discarding it in favour of pro-active punitive strategy. This would allow for initiative to be wrested from the militants.

The core issue of role of air power in countering the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir is addressed in the third Part. He has rightly deduced that the bedrock for pro-active action has to be timely availability of actionable intelligence. Primary thrust of the author is to make out a case for small, low performance prop-driven aircraft for armed action in preference to high performance agile armed helicopters. This is debatable. Of the various aircraft suggested by him as possible options, none other than Bronco perhaps can meet the highly demanding requirements of hot and high operating conditions. A low performance aircraft, inherently suffers from inadequate power reserve, which depletes rapidly with altitude and temperature. Hence, such aircraft would not be highly manoeuvrable at altitude. With Srinagar, Leh and Thoise being the main airfields in Jammu and Kashmir, the suggested aircraft may not even take-off in summer, especially with the proposed sensor suite, weapons and armour plating. It is this very limitation of the slow speed low performance aircraft that led to the production of A-10 and Su-35 aircraft. Much of the author's choice seems to be driven by the perceived risk from man pestable air defence systems (MANPADS). While in theory, perhaps, he is right, in practice, however, not a single aircraft has been lost to MANPADS in Jammu and Kashmir except during the Kargil operations over such territory then under the control of Pakistan regular army.

Overall, the book makes a good reading for the students of air power and counter insurgency. Errors of spellings and syntax have to be corrected in its next print out.

Air Vice Marshal SC Rastogi, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The Kargil Conflict 1999 : Separating Fact From Fiction. *By Shireen M Mazari (Islamabad : Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 162, Rs 350.00, ISBN 969-8772-00-6.*

At the outset the author admits that she is only focussing on military aspects, as the personalities involved in political decisions of the conflict are not available.

In 162 pages supported by a few maps, Shireen argues that it was India which violated the Shimla Agreement and occupied heights not only in Dras Sector, but also in Siachin Glacier, in 1984. Thereafter, she relies on official briefings arranged for her and the team from Monterey in 2003

by senior officers who orchestrated the Kargil conflict. Without any analysis and cross checks, she supports their stand that as they perceived an offensive by the Indian Army in Shaqma region (across the Line of Control (LoC) in Dras Sector), Pak Army planned a defensive deployment to thwart Indian designs and deployed two reserve Northern Light Infantry (NLI) units (Para Military Force) on their side of the LoC. However, she admits that in some cases they may have 'innocently' violated the LoC, as there are differences in maps between Pakistan and India. As regards occupation of positions deep across the LoC dominating the NH1A, she reinforces Pakistan's earlier stance that this was done by the Mujahideens supported by local guides and porters, who wanted to draw Indian forces away from the Valley, where they were facing difficulties in waging their war of independence.

As regards the political and diplomatic dimensions of the conflict, she quotes Pakistan Army's briefings to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief to prove that "everyone was on board", and lays the blame on the failure of the system to counter Indian diplomatic victory. According to her, before going to Washington, Nawaz Sharief had already ordered Pak Army to pull back and the process had started. Her claim is that by then only 10 per cent of the intrusion had been evicted by the Indian Army which had suffered heavy casualties, compared to Pakistani casualties. After the briefings by Pakistan Army, Shireen conducted a seminar on the topic, whose findings are realistic, as contained in Chapter VI—'Lessons Learnt'. Her statement that Kargil was a military victory for Pakistan is partially correct, as in the beginning they were able to achieve surprise. However, she leaves it half way, without completing the military operations till July 1999, in which they suffered heavy casualties. She would know of the 70 odd honours and awards given by Pak GHQ on 14 August 1999, mostly posthumously, for the operations.

One expects that an author and chairperson of a reputed institute will do a critical analysis, compare information and then draw her conclusions, rather than just copy briefings. In this, Ms Mazari has been selective, even of Pakistan writings. For instance, she is aware of the book *Pakistan-Leadership Challenges,* by Lieutenant General Dad Jahan Khan, who was General Officer Commanding (GOC) 10 Corps and was given the task by General Zia to occupy Siachin Glacier in 1984, but was beaten by India by a fortnight. She would also be aware that Brigadier Azizuddin (who commanded the Sakrdu Brigade in 1980s) had stated that the Kargil intrusion had been planned by him in 1987, but was shot down by Lieutenant General Shahabzada Yaqub Khan, Zia's Foreign Minister, on the grounds "that while it may succeed militarily, it will be difficult to manage it's diplomatic fallouts".

Having participated in the Monterey Seminar and met Ms Mazari, I am not one bit surprised at her anti-India stance. However, in this book she does not do justice to her analytical ability or status as Chairperson of an international institute. Nearly 80 pages are devoted to appendices, including her old article on Kargil, which could have been more usefully utilised. The book does not bring out either any new facts or analysis from across the LoC.

Lieutenant General Y M Bammi (Retd)

War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-49. *By C Dasgupta (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 239, Rs 250.00, ISBN 0-7619-9589-7.*

The book is a macro-analysis of Kashmir issue during 1947-48. The author claims that his book sheds new light on the genesis of the problem on the basis of documents that are declassified. He gives an account of British policy towards the two dominions based mainly on British archival material. The author argues that the studies conducted so far on the subject ignore the fact that the British officers commanded the Armed Forces of Pakistan and India. He examines the role played by Mountbatten and his British Service Chiefs in India and Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War of 1947-48. An analysis of the role of the great powers in the third world conflict is interesting. The author's competence to handle the subject of diplomacy cannot be disputed. The end notes to the fourteen chapters throw light on some of the recently declassified sources on the subject. Both the publisher and the author deserve praise for such a reasonably priced, handy and useful book.

Dr Raj Kumar

Travels in Kashmir and the Panjab. *By Baron Charles Von Hügel (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. xxii, 423, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 0-19-579857-0.*

This book forms a part of the excellent *Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints* series being published by OUP, Karachi. The author was an Austrian nobleman and had a distinguished career as a soldier and a diplomat. The book was originally published in German language as *Kaschmir und das Reich der Siek* in 1840, an English edition from London followed in 1845 under the title *Travels in Kashmir and the Panjab,* containing an account of the government and character of the Sikhs. This delightful travelogue is as engaging, informative and fascinating as when it was first compiled during the author's travels in north India in the 1830s, albeit for somewhat different reasons. When first written, the British East India Company had gradually coloured the greater part of the map of India red. The kingdom of Lahore, under Maharaja Ranjit Singh was the last independent Indian

state still in existence and Von Hügel's account added greatly to European knowledge and awareness about Panjab and North India. Hügel was a keen observer, with an eye for detail. His accounts are well written, even humorous, and do not suffer from the tedium or flights of fantasy usually associated with many similar European works.

Hügel is a 'must read' for anyone interested in the social or political history of the independent kingdom of the Panjab and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, since these figure prominently in the author's concerns. Also very thought provoking are his reflections, as an outside observer, on the state of Indian polity and society, his analysis of the reasons of British successes in India, and his almost prophetic observations regarding the character of the 'Lion of the Punjab' and the lack of ability or interest in fostering any strong institutions that would outlast him and provide permanence and stability to the State after his demise.

Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd)

Economic Management in Pakistan. *By Ishrat Hussain (Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 271, Rs 395.00, ISBN 0-19-579970-4.*

The book is a subjective analysis of economic management in Pakistan in the period after General Musharraf assumed power in October 1999, and upto the formation of the civilian government in October/November 2002. The author, the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, not only had a ringside view of the impact of economic measures taken, but also was party to their formulation. The work covers the very poor plight of the Pakistani economy in October 1999, and the multifarious structural and economic reforms implemented. Possibly, the best part of the book covers what needs to be done to effect a near permanent cure. The prescription represents a worthy and comprehensive wish-list based on sound economics and well accepted principles of national building. The extent to which the principles will be adopted is moot, but the more important consideration must be the degree of success that is achieved.

The author has fulsome praise for the Musharraf 'government'. After the coup, the immediate requirement was to harness additional foreign exchange reserves, which were then sufficient for a mere three weeks import bill. The government desperately needed IMF funding and accepted all IMF demands. Privatisation, free float of currency, introduction of market economy, removal of all restrictions on foreign investors including clearance to remit profits and even capital, etc followed. Such measures raised the prices of petroleum products, utilities etc. The decisions were unpopular, but the military government was able to keep any serious dissensions under

check. On the other hand, higher rates of currency conversion were offered by the banks, and inward remittances through banking channels increased markedly. The foreign exchange reserves increased substantially. However, it was the Al Qaeda attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 that cannot but be viewed as fortuitous for Pakistan. In return for the needed support, the external debt was rescheduled on favourable terms, and more grants were received. The rescheduling of the debt gave Pakistan a bonanza as the discounted value of the debt reduced by nearly three billion dollars. Since then, the foreign exchange reserves have grown at a healthy rate.

Historically, the savings rate in Pakistan, at about 13 per cent is low. The investment rate is only slightly higher but the difference has to be funded by external loans. External and internal deb is extremely high at 47.6 per cent and 49.1 per cent of GDP, respectively. Debt servicing takes away a substantial chunk of investible funds. The rescheduled external debt is only a temporary reprieve; in fact the total debt burden in absolute terms has increased. Much work needs to be done to ensure adequate growth in the next few years.

The author admits that "...economic growth has eluded us so far..." The endemic problems remain. Social indices are poor. 33 per cent of the population is below the poverty line earning less than one dollar a day; half the population is illiterate; a large number are unemployed and a greater number underemployed; far more investment is required in education, particularly in the science and technology fields; investment is also needed for programmes promoting security, health, sanitation, water supply, development in infrastructure and such. Economic development needs the all-embracing virtue of good governance; as well as capital, human resources and entrepreneurship. Now Pakistan has some capital and that should be used to develop human resources and entrepreneurs. It will be a rough road ahead and Pakistan will need much more than a military rule to ensure adequate progress along the road.

The book is by a noted economist, and those interested in Pakistan or economics will find its perusal worthwhile. Facts and figures are often repeated but possibly this has been done so that each chapter is complete by itself.

Air Marshal Vinod Patney, SYSM, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

European Union Foreign Policy : What It Is and What It Does. *By Hazel Smith (London : Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 275, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-7453-1869-X.*

The post Second World War peace dividend and the Marshall Plan led to common enemies in Europe becoming common friends after five

decades. The emergence of collective foreign policy thinking in Europe has been a story of two decades plus of cooperation and co-optation of divergent national interests into a common bond based on issues of convergence. This book examines development of a common foreign policy for the European Union (EU) from an analytical and empirical perspective. It commences with an exploration of the basic premise, does the EU have a common foreign policy? For the first union of nation states rather than a union of states, a congruent foreign policy for states with differing ideals and constitutions appears an alien precept. But the author succeeds in proving that with considerable commonalities in security, trade, development co-operation, inter regional co-operation and enlargement, the EU does have a common foreign policy. Having established this, subsequent chapters give an outline of the groundwork laid between 1945-68, its institutionalisation and practice. The EU's relationship with various segments of the World divided in economic and geographical groupings, the North, neighbouring South, the Mediterranean Rim and the Gulf, and the rest of the world are discussed. The role of the EU in New Europe defined by the Scandinavian countries, Russia, eastern and south eastern Europe has also been covered. The final chapter on guns and butter discusses the options for an expanding role for the EU by employing hard options as sanctions, trade and aid concessions or soft options as trade and development cooperation. The recent US proclivities for unilateralism, feels the author, will provide the necessary impetus for a resurgence of EU's common-look foreign policy. Indeed Operation Iraqi Freedom seems to support these conclusions. An incisive analysis of the past, present and future course of EU's involvement in international relations, well worth studying by diplomats and students of international relations alike.

Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM

The Mission : Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military. *By Dana Priest (London : WW Norton & Company, 2003), pp 429, Rs 26.95, ISBN 0-393-01024-24.*

This one is about the growing dependence of the US administration on the military; especially the 'CinCs' (pronounced sinks); to sort out problems arising out of the mismanagement of international relations. She has examined the issues first hand and has done so with the insight of a seasoned reporter. As a result, she has come up with an incisive account of the clash of cultures between the perceptions on Capitol Hill and the US military. What emerges makes one wonder whether the 'quick-fix solution' policy of the US administration is indeed good or what? And whether the sinks; out of which only Zinni, Wesley Clark, Dennis Blair and Charles Wilhem have been profiled; with unrestricted funds and time at their disposal

had; indeed; not exceeded their briefs when they set out on parallel routes to shape the world as commanded by the US President and his Secretary of State.

The sinks did not always have a 'lets-get-on-with-it-and-be-done-with' attitude. On the contrary, they saw the world as a connected whole, which is not such a bad thing considering the shrinking of the world down to a global-village. Their bottom-line was that their governments understand, that it was their responsibility to make the world a peaceful place to live in, as perceived by them. They had their secret weapon in the form of the 'quiet professionals' as the US Special forces allude themselves to. They were already operating in 125 countries till operations in Afghanistan made them famous. They were a tool of default, when everything else came a cropper. As the US Army's experience in Kosovo shows, that there, indeed, was a mismatch between the US objectives and the credos of its soldiers because the outlook, decision-making, and training of infantry soldiers seldom blends well with the intrinsic bedlam in civil society. This mismatch of culture and mission can distort the goal of rebuilding a country.

From apex executive-management to the paradoxical realities for soldiers in the field, this lively, first hand account tells the story of today's unitidy wars, like only Ernest Hemingway could and Dana Priest now has. Strongly recommended for those in the top rungs in the military and the administration.

Lieutenant Colonel AK Sharma (Retd)

Japanese Governance: Beyond Japan Inc. *Edited by Jennifer Amyx and Peter Drysdale (London : Routledge, 2003), pp. 208, £ 60.00, ISBN 0-415-30469-5.*

The last decade of 20th century has been described as Japan's' lost decade'. Japan's 25 years of rapid economic growth after the Pacific War made it the world's second largest industrial power. However, the bursting of asset bubble of the 1980s was followed by long years of economic stagnation. The book has contributions from nine scholars. The subject matter covers wide range of Japanese institutions and policy processing areas including electoral system, legal reforms, coalition politics; functioning of the corporate sectors and the government; deliberation councils; and the agricultural sector. The resistance to change through the political system has been the root cause of failure of Japan to deal with national policy formulation. Nonetheless, Japan has brought about several reforms and changes in its economic and political systems.

A process of coalition politics began in Japan in the 1990s. The economic and political turbulence of the 90s has continued into the new millennium. The formation of two party system and the creation of a new political order continue to be elusive.

Accountability, accessibility and transparency have been promoted through a series of changes in the organisation of Japan's financial authorities, and public and corporate sectors. Amid positive changes in financial governance, there have been several politically motivated moves which are considered retrograde. A major problem the new financial regulatory authority faces relates to non-performing loan problems. Besides, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan clearly stand at crossroads which has hampered recovery from a languishing economy.

Japan has gone for several administrative reforms and transparency in the functioning of ministries and other government departments. The bureaucracy consequently is much stronger than ever before. Despite transparency in public life, law reforms and corporate control of workplace, the nation's transition to transparency in public law fails to extend to gender equity and anti harassment policy.

Radical changes in the agricultural sector have not taken place in recent years. It is not government inspired policy change that will induce major structural reform in the agricultural sector, but demographic changes and the corporatisation of farming in all its forms.

Shri VK Gaur, IG, BSF (Retd)

Letters from the Border and Other Less Told Stories. *By Brigadier Lakshman Singh (Noida : BLS Publishers, 2003), pp. 199, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-901855-0-0.*

This book is a narration of the author's command of an infantry brigade signal section during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, against the background of letters written by the author to his wife. Through these letters, he portrays the feelings and mental conflict a young officer undergoes, torn as he is between pangs of separation from his young wife and duty to his country. The book also amalgamates stories of whichever participants in the operation that he could get hold of. A very well edited book. Written in simple language and lucid style, this is an unputdownable book. There are numerous books written by higher commanders on NEFA operations, mostly to blame others for the debacle. This book, by a junior signal officer, simply describes the war as he perceived it. He writes, "Our efforts in providing communications in almost impossible circumstances were hardly appreciated by anyone, since no one that mattered was left." That makes this book very rare.

This book could be categorised as a rarity. It would be a valuable addition to all unit and formation libraries for general reading. A must for all signals officers of the Indian Army.

Major General Yatindra Pratap (Retd)

Unlikely Beginnings-A Soldier's Life. *By Major General A O Mitha (Oxford UK : Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 443, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 0-19-579413-3.*

The book profiles the memoirs of Major General A O Mitha of Pakistan Army and spans the fascinating as well as critical times of the last century.

Major General Mitha was born in Bombay in 1923 in a wealthy Momen family with good political influence. But he was brought up in a conservative background. On passing out from the Indian Military Academy in 1942, he was commissioned into the 2nd/4th Bombay Grenadiers.

The book presents the relationship between senior and junior officers through lively anecdotes. The observations of the author on important landmarks in the history of Pakistan are thought-provoking. The life in the unit and its routine problems though well illustrated are infact avoidable in most cases. Politicisation of the Pakistan Army, and the hold of the ISI and the military Intelligence, get reflected in the book clearly. The language of the book is simple. It is an interesting and absorbing reading. It will be of immense value particularly for the Service officers to understand better the problems faced by the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

Major General Samay Ram, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending December 2003

(The books reviewed in July-September 2003 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: The Great Game Replayed: An Indian Perspective. Edited by Nirmala Joshi, Delhi, New Century Publications, 2003, pp. 294, Rs. 670.00, ISBN 81-7708-058-X

Central Asia: A Gathering Storm. Edited by Boris Rumer, Delhi, Aakar Books, 2003, pp. 442, Rs. 1050.00, ISBN 81-87879-13-0

ENVIRONMENT

Environment and Human Security. Edited by Purusottam Bhattacharya, New Delhi, Lancer's Books, 2003, pp 298, Rs. 580.00, ISBN 81-7095-098-8

GULF WAR

Gulf War II 2003. By R N Sharma and YK Sharma, Gurgaon, Shubhi Publications, 2003, pp. 342, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-87226-85-4

The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. Edited by Micah L Sifry and Christopher Cerf, New York, Touchstone Books, 2003, pp. 715, $ 10.25, ISBN 0-7432-5347-7

INDIA - FOREIGN POLICY

China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? By Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing–dong Yuan, New Delhi, India Research Press, 2003, pp. 204, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-8794338-6

India and Australia: New Horizons. Edited by PV Rao, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 2003, pp. 358, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-7099-886-7

India China Boundary in Kashmir. By HN Kaul, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2003, pp. 343, Rs. 820.00, ISBN 81-212-0826-2

India and Tajikistan: Revitalising a Traditional Relationship. Edited by Mahavir Singh, New Delhi, Anamika Publishers, 2003, pp. 208, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-7975-064-7

Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India's Look-East Policy. By Prakash Nanda, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2003, pp. 663, Rs. 1195.00, ISBN 81-7062-297-2

INDIA - POLITICS

Dynasties of India and Beyond: Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh. By Inder Malhotra, New Delhi, Harper Collins Publishers, 2003, pp. 363, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7223-448-1

India: New Security Challenges and Vulnerabilities. By Kalyan Rudra, Delhi, The Bright Law House, 2003, pp. 102, Rs. 180.00, ISBN 81-85524-85-8

Inside an Elusive Mind. By MR Narayan Swamy, Delhi, Konark Publishers, 2003, pp. 290, Rs. 400.00, ISBN 81-220-0657-4

Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. By Victoria Schofield, New Delhi, Viva Books Private Limited, 2004, pp. 297, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-7649-417-8

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ethics and Foreign Intervention. Edited by Deen K Chatterjee, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 301, Rs. 895.00, ISBN 0-521-00904-9

Global Peace and Anti–Nuclear Movements. By Badruddin, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 2003, pp. 273, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7099-887-5

KARGIL

Trishul, Ladakh and Kargil 1947-1993. By Brig Ashok Malhotra, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2003, pp. 186, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7062-296-4

MARITIME HISTORY

Essays in Maritime Studies Vol II. Edited by B Arunachalam, Mumbai, Maritime History Society, 2002, pp. 244, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-9 01000-4-1

Heritage of Indian Sea Navigation. By B Arunachalam, Mumbai, Maritime History Society, 2002, pp. 334, Rs. 500.00, ISBN 81-901000-3-3

The Heritage Sites of Maritime Maharashtra. By Wg Cdr M S Naravane, Mumbai, Maritime History Society, 2001, pp. 210, Rs. 650.00, ISBN 81-901000-2-5

Sea and Hill Forts of Western India: Aerial Views and Historical Perspective. Edited by Wg Cdr M S Naravane, Mumbai, Maritime History Society, 2002, pp. 64, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-901000-0-9

MEMOIRS

Letters From the Border and Other Less Told Stories. By Brig Lakshman Singh, Noida, BLS Publishers, 2003, pp. 199, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-901855-0

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Demystifying Military Leadership. By H B Kala, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2003, pp. 267, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7049-172-X

NARCOTICS

The Politics of Drugs and India's North East. By Soma Ghosal, New Delhi, Anamika Publishers, 2003, pp. 219, Rs 350.00, ISBN 81-7975-065-5

PAKISTAN

Pakistan at the Crossroads. Edited by Vice Admiral K K Nayyar, New Delhi, Rupa, Co. 2003, pp. 415, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-291-0227-7

STRATEGY AND WARFARE

Information Warfare and Cyber Security. By R C Mishra, New Delhi, Authors Press, 2003, pp. 218, Rs. 500.00, ISBN 81-7273-143-4

Modern Strategic Thought Machiavelli to Nuclear Warfare. By Shekhar Adhikari, New Delhi, Kilaso Books, 2004, pp. 368, Rs 790.00, ISBN 81-7908-010-2

Stray Voltage: War in The Information Age. By Wayne Michael Hall, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp. 219, Rs. 1950.00, ISBN 1-59114-350-0

The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare. By Michael Russell Rip and James M Hasik, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp. 552, Rs 2613.00, ISBN 1-55750-973-5

The Third World War: A Terrifying Novel of Global Conflict. By Humphrey Hawksley, London, Pan Books, 2003, pp. 514, £ 6.99, ISBN-0-330-49249-7

SOUTH ASIA

Japan's Role in South Asia. Edited by M D Dharamdasani, New Delhi, Kanishka Publishers, 2003, pp. 353, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-7391-566-0

TERRORISM

India and Israel: Against Islamic Terror: Old Nations – New Leaders. By Brig BN Sharma, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2003, pp. 387, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-7049-169-x

THE COMPLETE NEWSMAGAZINE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

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







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