


# U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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Visit to People's Republic of China (PRC)

By A USI Delegation : A Report

Beyond Elections in Jammu  
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- General K V Krishna Rao,  
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The Siachen Glacier Dispute

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Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)  
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057  
Telephone No. 26146755, 26146490 Fax : 26149773  
e-mail : [dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in](mailto:dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in)

[ciusi@vsnl.net](mailto:ciusi@vsnl.net)

[libusi@vsnl.net](mailto:libusi@vsnl.net)

[usilib@hotmail.com](mailto:usilib@hotmail.com)

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of National Security  
in general and of the  
Defence Services  
in particular*

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# CONTENTS

October-December 2002

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| <b>Director's Page.....</b>   | <b>461</b> |
| <b>Editorial.....</b>   | <b>465</b> |
| <b>Visit to People's Republic of China (PRC)<br/>By A USI Delegation : A Report.....</b>  | <b>467</b> |
| <b>Beyond Elections In Jammu and Kashmir<br/>General K V Krishna Rao, PVSM (Retd).....</b>  | <b>480</b> |
| <b>The Siachen Glacier Dispute<br/>Major Maroof Raza (Retd).....</b>  | <b>490</b> |
| <b>Uneasy Borders Distant Neighbours (Part I)<br/>Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd).....</b>   | <b>495</b> |
| <b>Evolution of the Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)<br/>and Defence of Our Island Territories (Part I)<br/>Vice Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM.....</b>   | <b>504</b> |
| <b>Operation Khukri : Joint Excellence<br/>Major Anil Raman.....</b>  | <b>515</b> |
| <b>The UK and International Security<br/>His Excellency Sir Rob Young, KCMG.....</b>  | <b>532</b> |
| <b>Confidence And Security Building Measures : From The<br/>Experience of Organisation for Security and Cooperation<br/>in Europe (OSCE) Leading to Conference on Interaction<br/>and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)<br/>His Excellency Mr Mehmet Hasan Gogus.....</b> | <b>546</b> |
| <b>Nepal's Maoist Movement and Implications for India<br/>Shri Nishchal Nath Pandey.....</b>  | <b>558</b> |
| <b>The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Implications for India<br/>Major General Ashok K Mehta, AVSM (Retd).....</b>   | <b>566</b> |
| <b>Taiwan and People's Republic of China (PRC) : A Perspective<br/>Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri (Retd).....</b>   | <b>580</b> |
| <b>Tactical Land Attack Missiles As An Instrument of State Policy<br/>Captain Sunil E David, VSM, IN.....</b>   | <b>589</b> |
| <b>Secretary's Notes on Pages 106 and 107 of the<br/>USI Journal, January-April, 1949 Edition.....</b>  | <b>598</b> |
| <b>Review Article .....</b>   | <b>601</b> |
| <b>Short Reviews of Recent Books.....</b>   | <b>604</b> |
| <b>Additions to the USI Library.....</b>  | <b>621</b> |

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## **DIRECTOR'S PAGE**

The United Service Institution of India continues to grow in terms of national and international visibility as also in the spread of its activities. The premises are at present host to a number of bilateral dialogues both at the official as also at the non-official levels. A number of institutions and organisations within India and abroad are seeking to conduct joint events with us. On 26-27 September 2002, the Centre for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, USA, held a joint seminar at the USI on the Kargil Conflict. This gave an opportunity to many of our members to hear views expressed not only by our colleagues but also by scholars and analysts from abroad. Due to the political situation prevailing at that time there was no representation from Pakistan at the event. We continue to receive a number of visitors and delegations from abroad who come to the USI for briefing and interaction on security issues. These include visiting official delegations, members of 'think tanks', research scholars, teams from institutions like the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), London, UK, the National Defence University in the USA, Staff College teams from countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and so on.

The National Security Seminar 2002 on the subject of "Vulnerabilities of Our Economy in the Backdrop of Globalisation : An Analysis of India's Long Term Economic Security" was conducted on 20-21 November 2002. It was well attended and evoked a great deal of interest.

A USI delegation led by the undersigned and comprising Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, IFS (Retd), Rear Adm KR Menon (Retd), and Air Cmde RV Phadke (Retd) visited Beijing at the invitation of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies



(CISS). The delegation also visited the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). A panel discussion with the members of the delegation was arranged on Wednesday, 18 Dec 2002. A report on the visit is included in the current issue of the Journal. Details of various events conducted at the United Service Institution of India are included in the President's Report that was presented to the Council at its annual meeting on Monday, 16 December 2002. A copy of this report is enclosed with the current issue of the Journal.

The USI Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping has blossomed into an internationally recognised organisation. The centre has conducted an international ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on "UN Peace Keeping : Best Practices and Lessons Learned" on 20-21 March 2002, capsule courses for UN Military Contingents Junior Officers (UNMCJOC-2) from 19 August to 06 October 2002, for UN Military Observers and Staff Officers (UNMOSOC-2) from 28 October to 08 November 2002, and for the first time, a UN Logistics Officers Capsule (UNLOC-1) from 09 to 13 December 2002 . Recognition of the Centre's competence and credibility comes in the form of a request by the United Nations Headquarters to conduct a course on its behalf at the Centre during 2003. A Command Post Exercise is being jointly run with the USA from 10 to 21 February 2003, and will include representatives from a number of countries.

The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research has also established itself effectively. The first two projects undertaken on 'The French Influence in India' by Lt Gen Gurbir Mansingh (Retd) and "Thimayya : An Amazing Life' by Brig CB Khanduri (Retd), are nearing completion. A second set of projects have been awarded to Air Cmde AK Tiwary on "Operational History of the Indian Air



Force" and to Maj Vivek Chadha on "History of Low Intensity Conflict in India". In addition, the Centre is in the process of recording oral history from some of our veterans. It is also making efforts to procure memorabilia, documents, photographs and so on from our senior officers to serve as reference material for history scholars.

At its annual meeting on Monday, 16 Dec 2002 the Council has accorded approval in principle to a proposal put up by the undersigned for setting up a "Centre for Strategic Security Studies and Simulation" with the purpose of improving the capacity of the Institution to serve as a 'think tank' on security related subjects. The essence of the proposal is to have research scholars working on a regular basis at the USI on various contemporary issues, carrying out detailed analysis and review of activities at the regional and global levels, and share the findings with a larger audience from time to time both orally and in writing. It is also intended that such a Centre be able to conduct gaming and simulation exercises on situations and scenarios that emerge at the regional and global levels from time to time.

We are making every effort to increase USI activities in selected stations across the country. A beginning was made last year by the conduct of talks by nominated speakers at Chandigarh and Bangalore. On 04 Sep 02 a security seminar was conducted at Chandigarh, which was most effectively coordinated by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd). Air Marshal S Kulkarni, PVSM, VM (Retd) and Lt Gen Arjun Ray, PVSM, VSM (Retd) have undertaken to coordinate USI activities at Pune and Bangalore respectively. I would welcome advice from members at other stations.

Recently, one of our members had written to say that in the original charter of the USI the term 'United Services' catered for both the defence and the administrative services. I have now ascertained that this interpretation is NOT correct. To clarify this



issue which has surfaced in one form or another on various occasions in the past, pages 106 and 107 from the USI Journal January-April 1949 edition, containing the "Secretary's Notes" are reproduced in this issue of the Journal.

Finally, it is my great pleasure to inform all of you that the Council has gratefully accepted a request made by Mrs Krishna Sinha to institute an annual lecture in memory of Maj Gen SC Sinha, PVSM (Retd) who has contributed so much to the growth of the Institution over the years. On your behalf, I would like to acknowledge the contribution she has made to enable the conduct of this memorial lecture on an annual basis.

Our very best wishes to all members in the New Year.



## EDITORIAL

A four member USI delegation led by the Director visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 23 to 30 September 2002. The delegation interacted with some leading 'think tanks' in China. The Report of the delegation titled "Visit to People's Republic of China (PRC) by A USI Delegation : A Report" has been published as the lead article in this issue of the Journal. The Report contains a perceptive analysis of important issues discussed at the various meetings. Views pertaining to nuclearisation, the future of Pakistan, the Jammu and Kashmir issue and terrorism would be of interest to the readers.

General KV Krishna Rao, PVSM (Retd), former Chief of the Army Staff delivered a talk at the USI on 23 September 2002 on the subject "Beyond Elections in Jammu and Kashmir". The General focused on the need to consider the aspect of Autonomy and the importance of Article 370 for meeting aspirations of the people. He also discussed the merits and demerits of various proposals to solve the Jammu and Kashmir issue. His considered view is that other than retrieving Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), all the other proposals would not be really honourable , nor fully meet India's strategic requirement.

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd), former Director General of the Border Security Force delivered a talk at the USI on 23 Oct 2002 on "Border Management in the Context of Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh Borders". Part I of his article titled "Uneasy Borders Distant Neighbours" based on his talk is published in this issue of the Journal. India has 15,120 kms of international land borders with different countries. Border management poses different sets of problems in different sectors. In the East, border with Bangladesh is 4095 kms and with Myanmar 1458 kms. In the article, discussion is confined to the border with Bangladesh and problems concerning its effective management. Demographic change in the area has been going on ever since partition of the country in 1947. Mostly Muslim population in Bangladesh has been migrating into India. Smuggling is rampant all along the border. It is a flow from an economically



weaker zone to an economically less weak zone. The author has also commented on policies followed by the Government which aggravated the problem of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. It has attained gigantic proportions and illegal migrants have moved to a number of states in India including Delhi, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and so on. There are inherent long term national security problems woven into this complex issue which pose a big challenge.

A panel discussion on "Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, State Response, and the effects on India" was conducted at the USI on 16 September 2002. Shri Nischal Nath Pandey, Deputy Executive Director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu (Nepal), a well known Nepali writer on security and international affairs participated as a panellist. The other panellist was Maj Gen Ashok Mehta, AVSM (Retd), who commanded Gorkha troops during his active service and has travelled in Nepal extensively. Two articles based on the papers presented by the panellists are published in this issue of the Journal. Historically, India has a special relationship with Nepal. The borders between the two countries are open and Nepalese nationals serve in the Indian Army. The land border between India and Nepal is 1762 kms long. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal has been going on for sometime. The Nepalese Government has been struggling to deal with it. The situation needs to be watched very carefully by India as it can have a spillover effect into India causing grave national security problems. According to Shri Pandey, in Nepal, India's role is perceived differently by the conflicting parties. Maoists feel, India is going all out to help the Government of Nepal. The elite of Kathmandu feel India is not doing enough to help in bringing back normalcy. Speaker of the House in Kathmandu has said that India is harbouring the Maoist leaders and because of the non co-operation of India, Nepal has had to face hardship. According to Major General Ashok Mehta because of the on going insurgency in Nepal, prospects of greater weaponisation of UP and Bihar and co-operation with terrorist groups in India pose long term threat. In the final analysis, peace in Nepal is vital both for Nepal and India. Without peace there cannot be economic development and improvement in the well being of masses.



# **Visit to People's Republic of China (PRC) By A USI Delegation : A Report**

## **Background**

A delegation from the United Service Institution (USI) of India visited China at the invitation of the President of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), a year old Non Governmental Organisation (NGO), based at Beijing. The delegation also used the opportunity to interact with scholars of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CISS) another Beijing based organisation that had visited the USI in 2001 as part of bilateral arrangement established some five years ago. CACDA had also arranged meetings with scholars of the Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), an institute affiliated to the Ministry of Public Security. The delegation thus had an opportunity to meet a fairly wide cross section of Chinese scholars from different fields. All of them were very eager and enthusiastic to meet the delegation.

## **Indian Participants**

The Indian delegation comprised :-

- (a) Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Director, USI of India - Delegation Leader.
- (b) Ambassador Ms Arundhati Ghose, Former Permanent Representative to the UN at Geneva, member Union Public Service Commission and member USI (in her personal capacity).
- (c) Rear Admiral K R Menon (Retd), Former Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, (Operations) (ACNS Ops) defence and security analyst, author and member USI.

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A delegation led by Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Director USI visited the PRC from 23 to 30 September 2002.

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(d) Air Commadore Ramesh V Phadke (Retd), Current Research Fellow at USI Centre for Research on China's Military Modernisation and Power Projection Capability, former Senior Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and member USI.

### **Chinese Participants**

#### **At China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Beijing (CACDA).**

(a) Ambassador Li Daoyu, President CACDA and former Ambassador to the US and UN, and presently Member of the Permanent Committee of the People's Congress.

(b) Ambassador Ye Ruan, Vice President and Secretary General of CACDA.

(c) Dr Zhai Dequan, Deputy Secretary General of CACDA.

(d) Dr Liu Xuecheng, CISS Senior Fellow and Director of American Studies.

(e) Mr Yao Yunzhu, Director , Asia- Pacific Studies, Foreign Military Studies, Academy of Military Sciences, People's Liberation Army (PLA).

(f) Mr Wang Guoqiang, Senior Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), PLA.

(g) Ms Zou Yunhua, Senior Fellow China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre, General Equipment Department, PLA.

(h) Dr Wang Wei, Senior Fellow, China Association for International Friendly Contacts.

(j) Mr Fei Yongyi, Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament.

(k) Colonel Weidi Xu, serving Colonel PLA and Associate Professor at Institute for Strategic Studies, NDU, PLA.

(l) Some participants were from among the corporate members of CACDA covering all the fields of our talks.



**At Asia Pacific Centre of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).**

- (a) Professor Zhang Yunling, Director Institute of Asia Pacific Studies.
- (b) Sun Shihai, Deputy Director and Professor.
- (c) Liu Jian, Associate Professor.
- (d) Han Feng, Associate Professor.
- (e) Professor (Retd) Wang Hongwei, Major General (Retd), former Defence Attache (DA) to India in the 1960s.

**At CICIR.**

- (a) Dr Yang Mingjie, Director and Senior Research Professor Arms Control and Security Studies Division and Head of Centre for Crisis Management.
- (b) Professor Ma Jiali, Research Professor and old India and South Asia expert.
- (c) Ms Ouyang Liping, Deputy Director and Associate Research Professor and part time researcher in counter terrorism.

**At CIISS.**

- (a) Zhang Changming, serving Major General PLA and Vice Chairman CIISS.
- (b) Cai Bingkui, former PLA Major General, Vice Chair CIISS.
- (c) Cheng Kaizeng, former PLA Major General and Vice President CIISS.
- (d) Lu Guangye, former PLA Major General and Senior Consultant CIISS.
- (e) Wang Shixi, former PLA Colonel and DA to Bangladesh; now senior research fellow, CIISS.
- (f) Tang Luiyi, Senior Research Fellow and Chief Editor, *International Strategic Studies* (ISS).



- (g) Ms Gao Junmin, Retired PLA Colonel and Research Fellow.
- (h) Chen Wei, Serving PLA Colonel and Associate Research Fellow.
- (j) Miao Shuchum, former PLA Major General and DA to India; now Vice Chairman CISS.
- (k) Jiang Weiqing, serving PLA Colonel, Assistant Research Fellow.
- (l) Yang Chaoying, serving PLA Colonel and Research Fellow; was also escort for the delegation.
- (m) Some other retired PLA officers and at least two lady officers, both Colonels also attended.

### **Summary of Discussions**

There were four formal sets of discussions, each led on the Chinese side by one of their institutes. But representatives of other institutes were often present and they took part in the discussions that followed any presentations made by either side. As a result, the Chinese institutes in Beijing were party to all discussions, except the last one with CISS. The representation from the CISS was largely ex-PLA, but there were also a number of ex-diplomats present, particularly those posted to India and Pakistan. The newly formed CACDA do not appear to have their own premises, at present, and therefore, field the largest number of representatives from other disciplines. Since the views conveyed to the Chinese were in a composite manner, irrespective of the venue, the summary of discussions are presented according to subject, rather than chronology. The subjects discussed will, therefore, be covered under the following heads :-

- (a) Issues between the two countries.
- (b) Perceptions of the two countries.
- (c) South Asian Security.
- (d) Personalities.



## Issues Between the Two Countries

**Nuclear Weapons.** The Chinese were of the view that the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is worth pursuing and that lack of interest in multilateral fora by the USA might prejudice what is essentially a good treaty. We disagreed with the Chinese, pointing out to them that the guts of the NPT was, and will remain article VI. Commitment to total disarmament had moved even farther away after the NPT 2000 conference. In any case, many of the countries had come to New York to the NPT conference with a commitment to the treaty while their governments were in the process of issuing security doctrines that supported the continued emphasis on nuclear weapons. India was a nuclear weapon power and was China's neighbour. It was impossible that the two countries can progress their relationship without discussing nuclear weapons in the region. The Chinese replied that when the Indian tests took place their reactions had been deliberately muted. They had taken a much harder stance only with Shri Fernandes's statement. The Indian side replied that Fernandes could answer for himself, and the best way that this could be handled is for him to be invited to Beijing. The Chinese replied that they were waiting for an indication that he was desirous of coming to Beijing. The Chinese gave strong indication that they needed someone 'at a high level' to come to Beijing to explain the Indian nuclear stand. This indication seemed to amount to a Chinese willingness to discuss the nuclear issue at a working level once the high level exchange had taken place.

The Indian delegation then attempted to put the Fernandes statement in perspective. The Raksha Mantri (RM) had been merely articulating the widely held public perception that the Chinese had assisted the Pakistanis to acquire nuclear weapons, so as to contain India, south of the Himalayas. Since the democratic process needed that the politicians articulate the public sentiment, Shri Fernandes had mainly stated the public mood. It was in final answer to this explanation that the Chinese suggested the 'high level' visit to set the ball rolling on the nuclear talks.

**Confronting the United States.** The Chinese were quite clear that economic growth was their first priority, which precluded their diverting any attention to rearming. They articulated their economic



aspiration as raising per capita income to \$ 5000 by 2015. At the same time they disagreed with a number of US policies against which they plainly needed the support of other nations. There was a continuous attempt to question India's foreign policy, to ascertain how far we were willing to go with the United States. Their questions to fix our position were built around our stand on Iraq, our joint exercises with the US armed forces and our stand on Taiwan. While they were plainly expecting our support to their views on these issues, we refused to give them any comfort on any of the three issues. On Iraq, we put a question back to them asking why they needed to support Saddam Hussein. If the UN sanctions could be lifted in a post - Saddam scenario, and Iraqi oil came into the world market, the price of crude might fall to \$ 22 a barrel, the price that India is comfortable with. So, if the Chinese were keen on economic development, why were they averse to getting oil at \$ 22 a barrel post-Saddam? On Indo-US exercises, we stated that our relationship with the US was independent of friendship with China. On Taiwan, we stated our view as being that we had no objection to the Chinese policy of 'two systems one country'. But at the same time, the people's will in Taiwan could not be ignored. Moreover, our friendship with the USA was based on our interests, just as the US overtures to India were based on their interests. We were quite alive to the possibility that their requirement for a friendly India might be transitory, but we would follow our national interests, but not at the cost of our friendship with other countries.

**The Future of Pakistan.** The Indian side raised their anxieties about the future of Pakistan. We explained that eventually we preferred to see Pakistan continue as one viable country rather than fail economically. Such a failure would result in centrifugal pulls and a possible breakup of Pakistan, which would inevitably drag India in. The reasons for Pakistan's problems lay in their lack of emphasis on economic issues, and their absurd desire to match India. To some extent they had sought comfort in this objective from China. As a sensible and mature country would it not be possible for China to persuade Pakistan to tread a path to modernity rather than concentrate on religious issues? The Chinese replied, in more than one forum that the friendship with Pakistan had grown during the Cold War days and reached its zenith during the Russian



invasion of Afghanistan. Today, the Chinese no more equated India and Pakistan.

**Jammu and Kashmir.** Many Chinese scholars brought out that the sub-continent was unsettled primarily owing to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which was the core dispute. Unless the dispute was resolved there could never be lasting peace in the sub-continent. The Indian delegation disagreed that Kashmir was the core issue, which was really the unsuccessful Pakistani search for its own identity. Tomorrow, even if Jammu and Kashmir was handed over to Pakistan, the need for that country to create its identity on an anti-India basis would continue. In any case, thinking of Jammu and Kashmir, as not being a part of India was impossible, as religion was an irrelevant issue, when linked to 140 million other Muslims in India.

**The Indo-Chinese Border Settlement.** This issue was never raised by the Indian side as all members felt that there was little choice but to continue on the present road of 'peace and tranquility' while moving towards an eventual geographical settlement. The Chinese brought in the issue, mostly in the same vein, that they were quite happy with the peace and tranquility on the border and also pointed to the successful series of Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings. The CICIR, however, broke away from the general trend and stated their unhappiness with the glacial progress on settling the boundary. They felt that the recent exchange of maps indicating the respective Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the western sector did not constitute adequate progress and wished to move faster.

**The Tibetan Issue.** This issue was also not taken up by the Indian delegation as the international consensus was that India could do little about the re-population of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) by Han Chinese. Moreover, the accounts of rapid economic development of Tibet and the regional infrastructure being built made the Chinese case stronger with the passage of time. The CICIR, however, again raised this issue by saying that the Chinese government had apprehension about the economic development in TAR proceeding smoothly, owing to attempts at sabotage by Tibetans living in India. The Indian delegation replied to say that the Tibetans in India were dispersed all over the country,



with many of them settled thousands of kilometres away from Tibet. The Tibetans were happy and content in India, were proceeding with their lives and were subject to the laws of India. These laws did not permit creating terrorist activity across the border nor did we have any evidence that they were so involved. There was some brief reference at the CICIR to Tibetan groups being involved with terrorist groups in Central Asia. They even referred to a web site that apparently indicated participation of some India-based Tibetans at a meeting of such groups.

**Maritime Issues.** The Chinese were curious to know why the Indian Navy wished to operate in the South China Sea and what its objectives were. The Indian delegation replied that navies operate across the oceans and South China Sea had no special significance. The incident referred to was a sequel to an Indian ship's visit to China and other South East Asian countries. These visits necessitated traversing the South China Seas. Similarly the Chinese Navy had operated in the Indian Ocean in the 1980s. At another forum, the Chinese suggested an 'Open Boundary' in the sea areas between China and India. Since the idea obviously stems from a continentalist approach from a person with no maritime background, the Indian delegation did not think the issue worth pursuing.

**Increasing the Pace of Getting Closer.** Practically every Institute laid great stress on the need to establish closer relationship, for the obvious reason of the two countries being giant Asian neighbours, the old cultural links etc. The Chinese had only one concrete suggestion about how this could be done, and that was economic cooperation. The Indian side pointed out that India had already carried out its study of the effects of China entering the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and did not in any way feel threatened by this event. The Chinese said that the goal set by the two governments of \$10 billion was alright in principle but the figure could be achieved by 2006 if both sides put their minds to it. The Indian side stated that eventually it was private sector capital that would flow into each other's countries and governments had little control over this flow other than to facilitate it. The Indian business groups were represented by eight regional offices in Beijing and six more in other cities. The Chinese complained that the entry of



Chinese capital and Chinese business houses into India was blocked by severe red tape and bureaucratic hurdles. The Indian side could not answer this issue. The Indian side suggested that one of the ways of increasing the pace of rapprochement would be to place on the table the apprehensions of each side in a frank and friendly atmosphere. Reticence at the bilateral security dialogue could only delay the process of rapprochement. The Chinese side agreed that this could be done.

**Terrorism.** The Chinese felt that all nations had agreed to cooperate in the field of terrorism despite their underlying suspicion that the US would use this goodwill for its own individual interests. The Indian side felt that with the collapse of the Taliban, the only geographical areas which offered refuge to the terrorists was the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan. The Chinese should not underestimate the damage that these terrorists resident in Pakistan could do to China, in the form of support to the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) which relied on arms and funding from the same sources that fuelled Islamic fundamentalism. The fact that some mercenaries from Xinkiang had been killed in Jammu and Kashmir was brought to their notice. So it was necessary to support the international movement against terrorism as China was as much a victim as many other countries.

### **Exchange of Perceptions**

The current global and regional situation was marked by uncertainty and non traditional threats. The US led counter-terrorism campaign was far from over. The majority of the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership was still at large. There existed regional flash points. China was said to be adjusting its Asia Pacific policies with greater emphasis on its immediate neighbourhood. Rather than adopting a unilateral resort to use of force, it was felt that security should instead be sought through multilateralism. A Chinese scholar's view that Sept 11 had resulted in profound changes in the global security was not shared by the Indian side which felt that unilateralism had existed earlier too. Cooperation between China and Russia as also with Japan, and other countries of the region had shown substantial improvement. China's relations with Taiwan had also improved with the broadening of economic and trade contacts as also in the field of counter terrorism. China is also



happy about the cooperation arrangement under the Shanghai Cooperation Forum. Its charter comprised non-alignment and non-confrontation and was aimed at building mutual trust, benefit, cooperation and coordination. China believes that the Forum gives priority to security and economic issues and was confident that non-traditional threats could be addressed through cooperative efforts. Some opined that the tri-lateral relations between China, the US and Japan will largely influence the situation in the East Asian region as each of these powers had an interest in the region.

It was pointed out that there was a tendency to restrict the definition of the term 'Asia Pacific' to exclude South and West Asia; this needed to be corrected. There was a view that the ambit of security studies needed to be expanded further to not only include the threat posed by international terrorists but also those arising from energy security, demographic shifts, water disputes, environmental issues and drugs and international crime. It was once again reiterated that the modern-day terrorist was techno savvy and had very cleverly adapted sophisticated cyber technologies to meet his own evil purpose. What with the current century having been dubbed as the Asian century and the likely massive increases in the energy consumption of major players like China, India, Japan and Korea, and sea-lanes of communication would have to be secured against traditional and terrorist threats. Further, the air waves, surface communications and banking and financial channels would also have to be protected from the predatory attacks by international criminals and terrorists. Intelligence sharing between neighbours would be crucial. A comprehensive and cooperative security arrangement would have to meet all these needs. Current trends indicate coalitions would hence forth be temporary to meet a specific threat and dissolve thereafter. There is thus an element of cooperation even when there is fierce competition in other areas.

Though most participants acknowledged that relations between China and the USA were improving, some expressed the fear of US hegemony and of China being a nuclear target for the USA. Particular mention was made of the US troop presence in countries around China with presence in Central Asia being added to that in Japan and South Korea. A view was expressed that the USA was



using the excuse of terrorism to strengthen its presence in South East Asia.

The talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as also the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to North Korea were seen as harbingers of a more peaceful and stable region. The hallowed and widely accepted concept of Panch Sheel was the most appropriate doctrine to conduct international relations. Some scholars felt that the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of non-state actors have been somewhat over rated, but terrorists could, however, threaten the peace with improvised chemical, biological and radiological or 'the dirty bomb' type of weapons. There was a greater likelihood of the terrorists targeting nuclear facilities with devastating results.

Mention was made at CASS of what was termed as China's new security concept being based on Mutual Trust, Mutual Benefit, Non-Interference, and Co-ordination, namely peaceful settlement of disputes.

### **South Asian Security**

This was a unique case since India was surrounded by many small countries that each shared a border with India but not with each other. As a result, their problems were naturally with India, giving rise to the impression that it could not get along with its small neighbours. India had existed as a single entity for many thousand years and hence there were bound to be ethnic, religious, linguistic and even kinship bonds and affiliations between the peoples across the borders. For example, the Tamils lived both in Sri Lanka and the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. People of Bengal too shared cultural and other links with each other. In fact, a very large number of Bangladeshi nationals were routinely living in India and the influx of illegal migration to India continued apace due mainly to the economic differential between the two countries. In the case of Nepal, its border with India was open and there was free movement of people between the two countries. A large number of Nepali nationals lived in India and further, the Gorkhas had traditionally served with the Indian Army. This meant that at any one time there were about 60,000 Gorkha soldiers in India who



after retirement returned to Nepal. Thus, the Indian ex-servicemen formed an important portion of the Nepal society. Nepal had been facing a Maoist insurgency for a long time but the situation had taken a turn for the worse in 2001. India extended full cooperation to Nepal but obviously could not do more.

Many people in the Western border areas had close relatives in Pakistan and the train that ran between the two countries catered essentially for these people to move between the two countries. Another important factor impinging upon regional security was the attitude of the Pakistani government. Having been carved out of India on religious basis, Pakistan had no option but to promote the so called two - nation theory. It could thus not accept the fact that India was the only country in the world wherein lived a larger number of Muslims under a secular and democratic framework than in Pakistan. As a result the very success of India's democratic and economic experiment constituted a threat to Pakistan. It was reiterated that even if India were to give Pakistan the state of Jammu and Kashmir on a platter, it would not solve the problem. It was Pakistan that had to come to terms with its identity and seek a future. India had not only accepted the reality of Pakistan but wished its people well. The Indian Prime Minister had, after all visited, Minar-e-Pakistan during his February 1999 visit to that country, but yet what India got in return was large-scale intrusions by Pakistani regulars in Kargil. It is thus extremely difficult to trust General Musharraf, the self-styled President of Pakistan who was the main architect of Kargil. Despite the many commitments, to India and the international community, his government continued to support Jehadi fighters and Islamic fundamentalists to destabilise India.

India has a long history of very close relations with Myanmar, Vietnam and other countries of South-East Asia. India's cultural bonds with these people go back into history. Similarly, Iran has also been an important neighbour and friend of India. India looks forward to developing the old ties into a new energy based relationship. India's extended neighbourhood also covers the Middle-East or West Asia where over 4.5 million Indians work. The region's stability is thus of great importance both in economic and security terms.



India is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual democracy with a long historical tradition of secularism and has consistently followed a "live and let live" approach towards its neighbours. India has played host to many different civilisational and cultural influences and has assimilated and absorbed these in its own unique way to become a kaleidoscope of cultures. India is well on the way to rapid economic growth despite the ups and downs of a free democracy. It looks forward to building trust and understanding with all its neighbours including China. It has faced the challenge of state-sponsored terrorism for over two decades and is confident of handling it on its own.

### Personalities

A number of Chinese academics write extensively on South Asia, some of them in English also. It would be advisable to engage them, as at present, most of their writing, while not exactly anti-Indian, is definitely not pro-India. A list of such scholars is appended below :-

(a) Wu Hua - author of *Nanya Zhi Shi Yindu* (India: A Lion in South Asia), Beijing, 1977. Not encountered in this trip. Most extensively quoted author on India by Chinese scholars.

(b) Chen Yali - writes for *China Daily*.

(c) Cui Yangsheng-- was present.

(d) Ma Jiali - was present, very active, speaks frankly.

(e) Luo Renshi - met on this trip.

(f) Zheng Ruixiang - met on this trip. Excellent English - flexible and willing to listen.

(g) Yan Xuotong - *China Daily* - not pro-India.

(h) Yang Haisheng - met on this trip. Neutral.

(i) Zhang Yunling - well educated, good English, speaks boldly and frankly, head of Asia-Pacific Studies in CASS.

(k) Ambassador Li Daoyu-does not write on India but has good access to Beijing government and has an open mind on India.



# Beyond Elections in Jammu and Kashmir

General K V Krishna Rao, PVSM (Retd)

## Introduction

The last time that I spoke to the USI was on 11-12 December 1997, on the subject of 'Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North East and Future Prospects'. I have now been asked to talk to you on 'Jammu and Kashmir – Beyond the Elections'. I propose to take off from where I left the last time. You will recall that in my last talk, I had brought out the background, the wars that we fought and won, the new Pakistani strategy of Proxy War, our successful response to it, the restoration of democracy after about seven years, and the challenges facing the State and the Centre in the future. The State government that came to power after the 1996 elections, is about to complete six years in power, and the next election has started.

## Progress since the Restoration of Democracy in 1996

During this period of six years, a number of developments have taken place, at different levels. I thought that a brief review of these would bring us up-to-date with regard to the prevailing situation. However, before I do that, I would like to reiterate, that J and K and the peripheral states of the North East, are strategically vital for the national security of India. With regard to the developments, I propose to start off at the State level, and then go on to the Centre, Pakistan, and the international community.

**Developments at the State level.** The National Conference government under Dr Farooq Abdullah lasted throughout this period, and sustained democracy within the State. They had several

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General K V Krishna Rao, PVSM is former Chief of the Army Staff. He has been the Governor of Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Jammu and Kashmir.

*Text of the talk delivered at the USI on 23 September 2002.*

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challenges to meet, and have made some progress. The major changes are :-

- (a) Some reconstruction of damaged schools, dispensaries, bridges and so on, has been carried out.
- (b) Some development, within the funds available has also been carried out.
- (c) Some employment opportunities have been created within the State, but unemployment continues to be a serious problem.
- (d) Attempts have been made to significantly improve tourism, but there has not been much progress, due to unsettled conditions.
- (e) Panchayat elections are yet to be held in the whole State.
- (f) The Administration leaves much to be desired. The competence of the administrators will depend on the extent to which alienation is minimised.
- (g) The Police force has been expanded and is showing better results, but needs to be more professional.
- (h) The migrants are all still out and better conditions need to be created for their return.
- (i) The question of Autonomy from the Centre, as also within the State, had been gone into. However, the Autonomy Report submitted to the Centre had been rejected. After considerable time lapse, talks are now being held on the subject between the Centre and the State. Here, it should be remembered that, while the secessionist elements have strongly projected merger with Pakistan or Independence, the National Conference (NC) has only asked for restoration of Autonomy that was eroded over a period of time.
- (k) The Government's Resettlement Bill has created considerable consternation among the people of Jammu.
- (l) On the Proxy War front, it was expected that, in the light of the earlier crushing of militancy, the residual militancy in October 1996 of about 300 to 500 militants would be eliminated by the State government within about three to six months or



so. However, this had not hapened, and Pakistan, recovered itself and restarted infiltration, more of foreign militants. A large number of major incidents have taken place, of which, the attacks on the State Assembly and the Indian Parliament stand out. Further, there was a major confrontation in Kargil which was ultimately sorted out by the Centre. In the present elections, militants will no doubt do their best to disrupt the polling.

(m) At the highest level in the State, Omar Abdullah has become the President of the National Conference, and is also a Chief Ministerial candidate, with Dr Farooq Abdullah receding into the background.

**Militant Level.** Overall, militancy has been extended to the Jammu region, and more foreign militants have been, or are being inducted. Thus, the entire State more or less, is affected by the Proxy War. With suicidal attacks, militancy has been on the up-swing and as per reports, not only the strength of militants has gone up to over 2000 or so, but also a substantial number of about 5000 militants are awaiting induction. It would appear that Pakistan is not going to abandon this practice. Some efforts have been or are being made by India, to hold talks with different groups, including the Hurriyat, but these have not succeeded, particularly after the assassination of Abdul Gani Lone. Here, it may be mentioned that the secessionist Parties never got more than six seats in any elections, and are, therefore, chary about participating in the election and demonstrating the so called support that they enjoy. They are also scared of being eliminated by Pakistan. Overall, their influence is very limited, and even this they try to demonstrate by the use of the gun.

**Central Level.** As far as the Centre is concerned, its negative attitude towards Autonomy appears to have created considerable alienation among the people. In fact, the people are wondering, as to what the Centre is prepared to give to the Hurriyat and to Pakistan, if it is not prepared to restore to the National Conference the eroded Autonomy. On the other hand, a Lahore Accord envisaging restoration of peace was signed with Pakistan, and later, even talks were held with Pakistani President at Agra.



However, with the increase in militancy and attack on the Parliament in December 2001, the situation entirely changed, with the Centre having deployed the Armed Forces against Pakistan, and refusing to talk till cross border terrorism was stopped and certain top grade militants were handed back by Pakistan. Therefore, the situation has reached a stage, where the low intensity conflict could reach a hot war stage, with both sides possessing nuclear weapons. Diplomacy is essential and must be pursued unless the Armed Forces are in a position to win the war, but such long term deployment of forces in the name of coercion has its own disadvantages. Many of the incidents have also indicated that Indian Intelligence needs considerable improvement. In fact, it is hoped that the lessons learnt from the Proxy War and Kargil, are being implemented, with particular reference to greater cooperation and coordination.

**Pakistani Level.** The main thing that happened in Pakistan was the successful counter-coup staged by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, and keeping the top political leaders out of the country. With the support of the Supreme Court, the military in Pakistan have evolved a National Security Council, which will be superior to the Central Cabinet, as well as, restored the President's power to change the Prime Minister or even dissolve the Parliament. The President got himself elected through a dubious Referendum and is due to hold elections for restoration of so called democracy in October 2002. With his ditching of Taliban and joining the Americans in the war against Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, he has gained the close support of the Americans. To that extent, Musharraf's statements about stopping cross border terrorism, do not seem to fit in with what is actually happening on the ground in J and K. He is not in favour of elections in J and K, and in any case, he refuses to recognise the result of the elections, as a step towards finding a solution to the Kashmir problem. Pakistan may even try to interfere with the elections, with some secessionist parties having already given a call for the boycott of the elections. Apart from the Kashmir problem, statements made in Pakistan from time to time, that even if the problem is resolved, antagonism will continue between the two countries, confirms the view held by strategic experts in India, that Pakistan wants to fragment India. Here, it has to be remembered that Pakistan has never honoured any agreements that India entered into.



**International Level.** With the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, a considerable change has come about on the international community's attitude towards terrorism. The USA formed a coalition with the support of a large number of countries including Pakistan and India, and had launched operation in Afghanistan. The Taliban has been replaced by a moderate government under Hamid Karzai, but it would appear that operations will have to continue against the terrorists for some considerable time, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan to where they have escaped. In these operations, the USA is appreciative of the close support that Pakistan is supposed to be giving. In view of this, the steps which the USA will be prepared to take against Pakistan in respect of cross border terrorism in Kashmir, appear to be limited. People in Pakistan themselves, are wondering what kind of democracy they are going to get, in the light of the support that Musharraf enjoys from the USA. As far as the other members of the international community are concerned, while they support India in holding peaceful elections in J and K, they do not appear to be in favour of any strong action against Pakistan. Further they are all keen that a war between India and Pakistan should be avoided to obviate a nuclear clash, and that the two should talk to each other, to resolve the Kashmir problem.

### **Elections in J and K**

The elections in the State are being held in four phases, on 16, 24 September and 1, 8 October 2002. These present the same problems as before, and I trust that effective arrangements have been made, to enable people to exercise their franchise without fear or favour, and that they turn up in large numbers. As on the last occasion, Pakistan will try to terrorise the people and keep them away from the elections, but it is the duty of the State and the Centre to ensure that effective security arrangements are made. The enemy is ruthless, and some Ministers and others have been eliminated in the recent past and as such, even greater attention needs to be paid to the security aspect. Based on past experience, I may mention that people will be only too keen to participate in the polls, and, therefore, the security arrangements have to be perfect. In this connection, apart from the requirement of having a reasonable turnout, it should be remembered that the international community,



particularly the USA, attach considerable importance to these elections. In fact, on the last occasion, responsible leaders in the USA recognised that the elections (1996) were credible. The Election Commission of course has to ensure that the elections are absolutely fair, as they did on the last occasion.

It is really difficult to predict the exact outcome of the elections. However, reports indicate that the other (Opposition) parties are unlikely to be strong enough to secure a large number of seats, while the National Conference itself may get a lesser number of seats than last time, owing to the alienation among the people. However, with good luck, the National Conference may get enough seats to form a government. Omar Abdullah, with his successful experience as a Minister of State in the External Affairs Ministry, is being projected as the Chief Minister. There are also views that if hard pressed, the National Conference may have to form a coalition government.

### **The Future**

Kashmir is not merely an internal issue, but is a problem with international ramifications. Three wars have been fought and a proxy war is still going on. It has defied a solution for the last fifty five years since independence. At the moment, troops are deployed all along the Border and Line of Control with Pakistan, and it may take time for conditions to return to reasonable normalcy. As such, you can not expect any immediate solution. However, it is hoped that with reasonably good elections and some international pressure, things will move in the right direction.

In order to comprehend the problem reasonably well, it has to be viewed broadly at two levels - internal and external. It may be emphasised that, if internally the Country resolves its problems within a reasonable time frame, and becomes strong, it will definitely help in the approach to the external problems. These are dealt with in the succeeding paragraphs.

**Internal Problems.** Internally, as on the last occasion, the people's requirement will be a competent, clean, and responsive government. A great deal will depend on the calibre of the new government. A number of challenges, such as rehabilitation,



reconstruction and restoration, as well as employment will engage the attention of the new government, and they must show definite progress. The State government would need considerable help from the Centre, in the way of forces, finances and employment. Both will have to work closely. The vital need for adhering to the composite culture of the Nation and following the concept of unity in diversity, cannot be overstressed. Any residual militancy must be dealt with very firmly.

A very important aspect that needs to be settled is the Autonomy issue. It would include Autonomy for the State from the Centre, as well as internal Autonomy within the regions of the State. Here, it should be remembered that, as a Muslim majority State, the people are deeply concerned about their identity and interests. This has become even more acute, after irresponsible talk of doing away with Article 370 of the Constitution, not restoring some of the eroded autonomy, and completely merging the State with the rest of the Country, as in the case of the other States. It must be remembered that the Founding Fathers had provided for certain special provisions and given a separate Constitution to the State, in order to take care of their apprehensions, and to get them into the main stream of their own accord, however long it may take. All the same, the Autonomy was eroded to a considerable extent, after 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested. The people feel that the erosion has taken place due to the Centre having imposed Chief Ministers and governments of its choice. During discussions when other parties were in power at the Centre, it was agreed that any reasonable demands would be met. The Indira-Sheikh Agreement of 1974 and the talks held by Narsimha Rao in 1995, support this. However, since a lot of developments useful to the State have taken place in the intervening period, the Centre should hold early talks with the State and concede any thing reasonable. Where certain demands cannot be accepted for reasons of national vital interests, these should be explained to the State. It should also be remembered that, such special provisions as Article 371, have been incorporated by the Founding Fathers for the other states also, particularly in the North East. It may be emphasised that the Autonomy issue, if resolved once and for all, will help a great deal in running the State more efficiently. The importance of carrying the people with the Government cannot be overemphasised.



**External Problem.** There is no doubt that it was Pakistan which had committed aggression and captured part of the State. After protracted debates, two resolutions were passed in the United Nations on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were mutually accepted by Pakistan and India. However, as Pakistan did not implement the first part of the resolutions dealing with withdrawal of its forces, the other two parts could not be proceeded with. Yet, Pakistan keeps propagating that India has not permitted a plebiscite in Kashmir, although the fault lies totally with Pakistan. Of late, the international community and the United Nations have expressed themselves against the relevance of the UN Resolutions after passage of such a long time, and have been wanting the two countries to hold talks bilaterally as per the Simla Agreement.

Another aspect that needs to be remembered is the territory in the adverse possession of the Chinese, mainly Aksaichin, and the Karakoram area ceded to it by Pakistan. In the case of both Pakistan and China, there are Indian Parliament Resolutions, which expressed the determination of the country to retrieve the areas, but peacefully if possible.

Several ideas are being floated on the question of resolving the Kashmir problem with Pakistan. The spectrum broadly includes, claiming the area in occupation of Pakistan, agreement for a permanent border based on the Line of Control, agreement to cede some more area to Pakistan, and in the odd cases, even giving independence to Kashmir. Keeping in view the strategic importance of Kashmir, the merits and demerits of these proposals should be generally obvious. Briefly, these are :-

- (a) Retrieving Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) from Pakistan can only be achieved by going to war, and will not have the support of the international community. Further, there are very few Kashmiris as such in POK. Unless the country is prepared to wait till Pakistan becomes weak sometime, there is no prospect of implementing the proposal. However, there are countries like China, which has not given up its claims to Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan, and looks prepared to wait indefinitely.
- (b) With regard to an agreement based on the present Line of Control being accepted as a permanent boundary, Pakistan



has been consistently rejecting it. However, according to a disclosure by the then Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan had agreed to the idea, but wanted more time, and not incorporating it in the Simla Agreement. If ultimately Pakistan accepts this proposal, it still means India losing all of POK. However, the international community generally appears to accept this.

(c) What Pakistan wants is the entire State based on the principles of partition if possible. Failing that, it would insist on getting all the Muslim majority areas, in addition to the Kashmir Valley. These include generally the districts of Rajouri, Poonch, Doda, Kargil and the Northern part of Udhampur. India would then be left with Kathua and Jammu and part of Udhampur. Apart from the people not desiring to merge with Pakistan, as demonstrated during numerous elections held in the State, this proposal will be from the Pakistan point of view, will fit in with the principle of the 1947 Partition, and they will insist on it. Here, it should be reiterated that the Two Nation theory got demolished long ago, when Bangladesh comprising mostly of Muslims, fought and separated itself from Pakistan in 1971.

(d) As far as independence is concerned, there are a number of alternative proposals put across. For instance, an American think tank feels that the Kashmir Valley only be given this facility, while the other areas remain with India and Pakistan. Once again, in numerous elections, the Kashmiris threw their lot with India. Further, even at the time of partition, Jinnah was rebuffed, and Kashmir never showed any interest in joining Pakistan. As for the future, such an independent country, continuing to remain independent, poses a debatable proposition. Further, strategically, India cannot afford to lose this territory. The feasibility of this proposal is, therefore, minimal.

### Conclusion

What I have analysed above are the broad ideas, and there could be other variations also. The main question is whether there is any need for a compelling arrangement in the near future. Other than retrieving POK, all the other proposals would not be really honourable to India, nor fully meet its strategic requirement.



However, there is no harm in talking to the adversaries and keeping the situation under effective control. It may also be remembered that most of the wars with Pakistan took place when a military man was incharge of the government there. The present one is hoping to carry on till 2007. The country should, therefore, be fully prepared to successfully deal with any untoward situation that may arise, while at the same time talking of peace.

Despite its efforts to pursue a more beneficial global policy serving its own interests, India has got too involved with Pakistan. It must spare no efforts to put Pakistan in its place. The Constitution envisages India strengthening itself not only to be able to take care of itself, but also to help the international community in maintaining peace and security. India richly deserves to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and this objective must be pursued vigorously. Further, India must attain its rightful place in the comity of Nations by following wise policies more resolutely.

### **USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION 2002**

#### **RESULTS AND AWARDS**

##### **GROUP A**

Eligibility - Open to All Officers

Subject - "Psychological Impact of Protracted Service in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) on Armed Forces Personnel : Causes And Remedies"

First - Name - IC-50579 F Major Praveen Badrinath

Unit - WARDEC, EDP Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg, New Delhi Cantt-100010.

Award - Gold Medal and Rs. 5000/-.

Second - Name - 13623 F Wg Cdr NN Aggarwal

Unit - 31 Squadron, C/o 9 Wing AF, C/o 56 APO

Award - Rs. 2500/-.

##### **GROUP B**

Eligibility - Open to Officers of rank upto Maj with not more than 10 years of Service

Subject - "Managing Technology - A Challenge for Military Leadership of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century"

First - Name - SS-38327 H Capt Rakesh Vadhyar

Unit - 1 Sikh LI, C/o 56 APO

Award - Gold Medal and Rs. 5000/-.

Second - Name - 04279-Z Lt Neeraj Malhotra, IN, SO (Works)

Unit - HQ Andaman & Nicobar Command, Port Blair - 744 102.

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# The Siachen Glacier Dispute

Major Maroof Raza (Retd)

The India Pakistan stand off on the Siachen glacier is likely to continue indefinitely for three reasons. One, because it is politicians and not soldiers, who have made the fight over the glacier region a matter of national honour and prestige and are, therefore, in no mood to compromise and suffer a loss of face domestically. Two, because the Pakistan Army has led Pakistanis to believe that their army is in a commanding position on the Saltoro ridge - where the conflict is actually taking place - when in reality it is the Indian Army that dominates the glacial battlefield. Therefore, any peace agreement would eventually require a Pakistani acknowledgement that their military establishment and their politicians have misled their people about their role at Siachen. And three, because the dispute is essentially about the alignment of the Line of Control (LoC) north of its terminal point at NJ 9842. Pakistan insists that it goes northeastwards and therefore, the glacier lies in Pakistani territory, while India says that the LoC must follow a geographical feature, ie, the Soltoro ridge and so, Siachin glacier is within India.

The origins of the dispute lie in a cartographic controversy. In the 1970s and 1980s several international maps had begun to depict the Siachin Glacier as part of Pakistan . This included the National Geographic Society's *Atlas of the World*, University of Chicago's *A Historical Atlas of South Asia* and *The Times Atlas of the World*, published in London. All of these showed the Cease fire Line (CFL)/LoC clearly extending from NJ 9842 in a northeasterly direction right up to the Karakoram pass and onto the Chinese border. This, until then, not even the Pakistani maps had done! And in 1985, Pakistan published the official *Atlas of Pakistan* - the first such publication in Pakistan - that removed the Gilgit Agency from the status of a disputed territory, as it had been hitherto always shown, and gave it an entirely separate standing. It left only Baltistan's status (on whose eastern edge, Pakistan claims, stands

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Major Maroof Raza is a Visiting Professor at Middlesex University, London.

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the Siachen glacier) as a disputed territory, untouched. But some Indian writers cannot be absolved of the responsibility of adding to this confusion, either. Two books by Indian authors - *The Fourth Round: Indo-Pak War in 1984* by Ravi Rikhye (map facing page 68) and Lieutenant General KP Candeth's : *The Western Front: Indo-Pakistan War in 1971* - had maps, that only strengthened Pakistan's claim.

The source of this cartographic encroachment is said to be some maps that were initially produced by the US Defense Mapping Agency, which depicted the LoC running from the vicinity of NJ 9842 northeast to the Karakoram pass, in the 1970s and the 1980s. The best explanation for this error by America's map makers, appears to lie in the possible "translation" of Air Defence Information Zone (ADIZ) markings, which provides zoning boundaries for air controllers in civil and military aviation, into an extension of the LoC from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram pass. These have become an article of faith for the Pakistanis. However, there can be several ADIZs that could pass through one country, and these do not necessarily identify a boundary line. But the publication of such maps by many of the world's leading atlases, further encouraged the Pakistani Army to contest sanctity of the LoC. And so, General Zia-ul-Haq decided to occupy Siachen glacier, in the 1980s, as a means to alter the status quo, of the LoC. But understandably sensitive to the implications of cartographic ambiguity after the 1962 Sino Indian conflict, the Indian Army took pre-emptive action in April 1984 and occupied the Saltoro Ridge which marks the western wall of Siachen glacier. As Lieutenant General M L Chibber, formally Northern Army Commander who initiated the Indian presence on the glacier has admitted, "the strategic importance of the area was not a major consideration, nor was our purpose to capture any territory. It was simply to ensure that we were not presented with a fait accompli like that in Aksai Chin in the early fifties".

The Government of India approved this action on the clear understanding that the definition of the CFL (now LoC) from the original Karachi Agreement of 1949 to the Simla Agreement of 1972 places the Siachen Glacier on the Indian side of the alignment from NJ 9842, as the LoC runs" thence north to the glaciers". Further east, the International Boundry (IB) gives way to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China in Ladakh. And gives its



interpretation of the Simla Agreement. It is no surprise that Pakistan subsequently stepped up its efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue and seek third party intervention, projecting the LoC as a temporary arrangement.

The LoC, which is essentially a political variant of the 1949 UN CFL - that defines the position of Indian and Pakistani troops in Jammu and Kashmir - ends abruptly at NJ 9842, a point on the map, south of the Siachin glacier. The dispute however, is based on the interpretations of India and Pakistan on whose territory the glacier lies. And as the control of the glacier has strategic implications for each country, the conflict does have a military dimension. Therefore holding on to each post is now a matter of national pride. But that, however, has been left, in some instances, in the hands of just a section of ten men, since steep cliffs on the Saltoro ridge line can only accommodate that many. India's infantrymen fight on heights ranging from 17,000 to 20,000 feet in icy weather and sub zero temperatures, where few armies in the world would dare to venture. A General once said "decorated or not, with a gallantry award, every man who has served at Siachen, is a hero." How true. But the infantrymen who have braved isolation and cold, could not do so without the tenacity and professionalism of the helicopter pilots, who in their small Cheetah helicopters have lifted troops to the highest posts, evacuated casualties and most importantly, braved it all to provide rations and medicines that keep our soldiers going.

India's initiative, however, at the glacier has become Pakistan's military nightmare. Several Pakistani commanders-including General Musharraf- have been unable to come to terms with the ability of the Indian soldier to hold out despite their repeated attempts to dislodge Indian troops from the Saltoro ridge, where most of the troops are deployed. And on being asked to explain by Pakistani journalists, as to how Indians had been able to capture posts from the Pakistani Army in such a difficult terrain, Pakistan's officers had to resort to unconvincing excuses as answers. Their defeat in Kargil, has only strengthened Pakistan's resolve to link resolution of Siachen to the Kashmir issue.

In fact, an eminent Pakistani writer, Altaf Gauhar, has



suggested that the contingency plan for a Kargil type operation was formulated as far back as 1987 during the period of General Zia-ul-Haq. The plan was, however, vetoed by the then Foreign Minister Sahibzaba Yakub Khan as being militarily untenable and internationally and politically indefensible. But a decade later, with General Musharraf keen to avenge his own humiliation at Siachen as a brigade commander there in 1987 he was unable to push Indian troops out of the Soltaro Ridge - the intrusions at Kargil were implemented in 1999. This had eventually led to the Kargil conflict, and, ironically for the Pakistanis, the LoC got sanctified after their Kargil misadventure.

In the post-nuclear test period, Pakistan's moves have been directed towards projecting Jammu and Kashmir as a flashpoint on account of its perception that the present international environment is conducive for such a projection. Towards this end, a three-fold strategy seems to have been adopted; to project that India is not willing to solve the problems through negotiations and that the bilateral mode is not likely to resolve the issue; to intensify the firing along the LoC to project the possibility of its escalation into a (nuclear) war; and lastly continuing support for its proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir to project that the local people are continuing their fight against India. Pakistani firing on the LoC is thus aimed at projecting a volatile situation in South Asia. Given their past policy, it is likely that Pakistan would maintain a considerable level of tension on the LoC particularly at times when the US interlocutors are focused on the sub-continent.

The romance of battle apart, the central issue is, is there a way forward? Efforts to demilitarise the Glacier in 1989 and in 1992 were set-aside after long rounds of Indo-Pak negotiations. A military solution to the Siachen dispute could be found with both sides agreeing to a formal demarcation of their positions, as it exists today - called the AGPL or the Actual Ground Position Line-as was done with the LoC, with joint patrolling by both sides. This could include first a disengagement and not withdrawal, for a period of two years, that would take the Siachen dispute away from the public eye. And eventually to either convert the region into a peace park or to establish a Siachen Science Centre to be operated by scientists



from India and Pakistan so that "the world's most insane, cruel, strategically absurd and highest altitude war" can be put to an end. But that can only happen if the leadership on both sides is ready to back down and provide military men an unambiguous agenda for the next round of talks.

However, it is the politician, more than our military men, who have now made Siachen a matter of national prestige, and, therefore, are unable to make concessions to resolve the dispute. But with the exception of George Fernandez the Defence Minister, no Indian Prime Minister or President has ever visited our troops at the glacier. In western countries this would be unacceptable. And with General Musharraf's credibility rather low currently, for his having reneged on so many promises to India, trust between the two parties is nonexistent. And until that is established, Siachen will remain a conflict without an end.

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# Uneasy Borders Distant Neighbours (Part I)

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)

The international border (IB) with Bangladesh, (erstwhile East Pakistan) is 4095 kilometres (kms) long and covers five states of India. The border with West Bengal is 2217 kms of which 600 kms are riverine, 200 kms low-lying - generally under water, and the remaining 1400 kms, on low land, which is inundated for part of the year, during the monsoon. The international boundary starts at the mouth of the Harbangha, one of a chain of interlocking streams that constitute the ecosystem of the Sunderbans. The IB runs along the midstream of the navigable channels. You have to travel for more than 50 kms upstream, before the first village is sighted. The reason why there is no habitation up to this point is because there is no fresh water. Tube wells yield only brackish water. The last post of the Border Security Force (BSF), Shamsheernagar is located here. Beyond this point till the stream opens up before joining the sea, only stray fishing boats are seen. Almost all the boats are of Bangladesh. Indian boats seldom venture here, because the BSF patrols are rare. When the BSF sends its patrol boats, every thing looks orderly, with the Bangladesh boats keeping to their side of the river. When there is no BSF patrol, the Bangladesh fishermen generally plunder the catch of the Indian fishermen. As you go further upstream, the habitations increase in density on either bank, until you hit the land border at Boundary Pillar (BP) Number (No) 1 near Goalpara BOP. Up stream from Shamsheernagar, the cultivation is poor, because the soil is saline. The population resorts to smuggling to augment their meagre earnings from gathering honey from the mangrove forests, braving the tigers of the Sunderbans. In the interior of the Sunderbans, there are small bazaars on the edge of the mangroves. Here sit the *mahajans*, the financiers of the smuggling syndicates. Rice, sugar, mustard oil, medicines and cough syrups with higher alcohol

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Shri E N Rammohan retired as the Director General, Border Security Force. He had a tenure as Advisor to Governor of Manipur.

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content specially manufactured for consumption in Bangladesh are unloaded at the road heads, and distributed in boats among the couriers. They steer the small boats fitted with outdated engines and putter along the meandering streams till they hit the Harbangha, the Jamuna, or the Raimangal, in the midstream of which the IB runs. Lookouts posted warn of the approach of the BSF patrol boats, and when the coast is clear, the rickety boats cross the main channel and unload their contraband in Bangladesh. At times when there is a purchasable post commander, the patrols are conveniently absent, and the outdated engine boats are not called upon to put on a burst of speed to dash across the main channel.

From BP No 1, the land border is thickly populated all along till we cross West Bengal into Assam, and reach Meghalaya. In West Bengal, there are more than 100 villages, which are located right on the zero line. In many villages there are houses where the front door is in India and the rear door opens into Bangladesh. Hilli in Malda district is also located right on the border. A row of houses in this town have their front doors in India and their rear doors opening on to the railway platform of Hilli in Bangladesh. Over the years continual illegal migration of both Hindus and Muslims from Bangladesh has completely changed the demography of the border in South Bengal. The border belt in South 24 Parghanas, Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda and West Dinajpur, up to varying depths of one to five kms, is predominantly constituted by illegal settlers from Bangladesh. The Hindus and Muslims have invariably settled in homogenous groups.

In 1947, very few Muslims migrated en masse to East Pakistan, from West Bengal and Assam after partition, unlike in the west, where there was mass migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India. Two things happened after partition. There were communal riots in East Pakistan in 1954 and 1964. On both occasions, the Hindu and Buddhist communities were targeted, and they migrated in droves to India. They came as refugees, and were kept in camps before being resettled. From the creation of Pakistan, its eastern wing was neglected. In any case, East Pakistan was already over populated. Insidiously, migration of the Muslim population into India started. It was a flow from an economically weaker zone to an economically less weak zone. In this the State



probably did not have a directing hand. Already there were settlements of East Bengali Muslims in the neighbouring districts of Cachar, Goalpara in Assam and in all the border districts of West Bengal. There was also a corrupt bureaucracy in these states, in the form of revenue, forest, and police officials who for a consideration were always willing to look the other way, and allow illegal settlements of Muslim migrants. The economic conditions in East Pakistan were so bad that the Muslim from across the border was always willing to work for lesser wages than his Indian counterpart. There was thus continual movement of Muslims from across the border into even interior districts of Assam and West Bengal. Many of these people who came to work as daily labour did not settle but kept shifting back and forth. Such was Keramat Bhai whom Sanjoy Hazarika has described in his book *Rites of Passage*. There is an interesting corollary to this silent movement. In West Bengal, the districts of North Bengal, have a predominantly Rajbongshi population on the borders. In these areas, settlements of Bengali Muslims are virtually non-existent. The Rajbongshis also inhabit districts of South Bengal up to Malda. Here again you do not find settlements of immigrant Muslims where there are Rajbongshi villages along the border. The same pattern prevails in Assam and Meghalaya. In Assam, in Dhubri, just across the West Bengal border are several very old Rajbongshi villages like Ramraikuti and Chatrasal. Here there are no immigrant Muslim settlers or illegal migrants. The villagers do not allow crossings or settlements to take place. In Meghalaya, in Garo hills there are two plains areas, where there are old settlements of immigrant Muslims, Phulbari and Mahendraganj. After this the IB is the edge of the hills, all sparsely but exclusively populated by indigenous tribals, Garos, Langaams, Khasis and Jaintias. Though Muslim labour from across regularly comes and works in the betel nut and orange plantations of the tribals, there is not a single settlement of the Muslims from across. Today, despite the fencing, across the border, migration of Muslims takes place, wherever the population is similar. The whole of Jaintia hills border has not yet been fenced, but there is no migration whatsoever across the border here. It is also of interest, that inter-marriage between tribals of Assam and Bengal and Bengali Muslims is extremely rare. There are no Muslim Boro Cacharis, or Mishings, or Rabhas, nor Rajbongshis both of West Bengal or Assam.



Then came the crackdown in East Pakistan by the Pakistan Army in 1971. Hindus and Muslims in lakhs fled across borders and were kept in temporary camp. After birth of Bangladesh, many of the Hindus and some of the Muslims did not go back. A very unfortunate development took place after Indira - Mujib pact was signed. The Government of Bangladesh said that they could not take back any illegal migrants from erstwhile East Pakistan, as Bangladesh was a new country. In the euphoria of having helped in the birth of Bangladesh, Mrs Gandhi agreed. At one stroke, several million illegal migrants from East Pakistan, who had violated the provisions of the Foreigners Act, from 1950 to 1971 became citizens of India. This has been strangely called a great act of statesmanship.

The Bengali Muslim is a very hardy peasant. The British, who came to Assam in the mid 1790s, as the East India Company, recognised this. They did not come to Assam via the Siliguri corridor, but through Sylhet district crossing over the Khasi hills, and from Cachar across the North Cachar, hills. Finding that tea grew very well in the hot humid plains of the Surma and the Brahmaputra valleys, the officials of the East India Company, soon started establishing tea gardens. By now it was well into the nineteenth century, and the British had established their rule over Assam after defeating the Burmese and signing the treaty of Yandaboo. The revenue laws were suitably drafted to allow the tea companies to acquire vast tracts of land for their gardens at very little cost. Assamese people were not willing to work in the tea gardens. The British then began to import tribals from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Madras, to work in the tea gardens called the tea garden labour community. The British planters later found that there was no surplus rice to feed the tea garden labour, as the Assamese steadfastly refused to grow more paddy than they required for themselves. It was then that the British hit upon the plan of settling the hardy East Bengal Muslim peasant in the Brahmaputra valley. The community already suffering from a shortage of land in East Bengal soon established themselves wherever they were transplanted. They cleared hundreds of acres of land in Nowgong, Darrang and Goalpara districts. The first Bengali Muslim migrants were brought to the Brahmaputra valley in the first years of the 20th century. Within thirty years they had made a dent in the



demography of Assam. CS Mullen, the census commissioner of Assam wrote prophetically in his census report of 1931- "Whither there is vacant land thither goes the Mymensinghia. Without fuss, without tumult, without undue trouble a population amounting to about half a million has transplanted itself from Bengal to Assam during the last 25 years. A time will come when Sibsagar district will remain the only district that the Assamese can call their own." The situation in 1947, when India became independent had deteriorated further, as the British did nothing to stem the tide of this migration. It was well after independence, that the country woke up to the continual migration. BN Mallick, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau had warned the Government that continual migration was changing the demography of the region. As a sequel, a scheme was originated by the Government of India called the Pakistan infiltration post (PIP) scheme Assam. Related schemes in West Bengal and Tripura were called Task Force for detection of illegal migrants. The scheme worked fairly well in Assam in the 1960s and a large number of illegal immigrant Muslims and Hindus were detected and deported. By the early 1970s, the politicians had discovered that the immigrant was a very good vote bank. In 1975, the concept of committed bureaucracy became an accepted form of government. All detection of illegal migrants came to a virtual standstill in Assam and West Bengal. In the period 1979 to 1982, during the foreigners agitation, senior officers of Assam used to openly tell their juniors that there were no foreigners in Assam. During this period there was no detection or deportation of immigrant Muslims. The task force set up in West Bengal was told to go slow, and its existence virtually forgotten. The Intelligence Bureau, however, continued to report regularly about the steady increase in the immigrant Muslim population in the border districts of West Bengal, and of the gradual decline in the Hindu population within Bangladesh. The Central Government, however, continued to look the other way as this persistent migration continued. In Assam, meanwhile a serious derogatory step had been taken. The centre legislated a new act called the Illegal Migrants Determination Tribunal Act. This was enacted to teach the Assamese community a lesson for having organised and supported the Foreigners agitation in Assam, for the act was clearly in violation of the constitution. How can you have two acts, the Foreigners Act and the Illegal



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Migrants act for the same offence? One Act is applicable in the whole of India, except Assam, and the other applicable only in Assam. The explanation given was that by the application of the Foreigners act in Assam, innocent immigrant Muslims would be harassed. This is a slur on the judiciary and the police of Assam. From the moment a case is registered in the police station, the original FIR is sent to the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and he is now responsible to see that the police investigate the case fairly. This infamous act has been allowed to remain on the statute books for the last 19 years.

In 1984, Punjab was hit by the Khalistan terrorist groups. Pakistan was readying to start an insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, when suddenly they found a group of Khalistan terrorists wanting to be trained. The Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) seized the opportunity with both hands, and began training and arming the Khalsa terrorists. What a heaven sent opportunity for the ISI to subvert the Sikh community, the ancient foes of the Muslims since the days of the Mughals. Punjab had a 555 kms stretch of the IB with Pakistan. The border was on the plains and cultivated up to the zero line on both sides. Soon the ISI was infiltrating terrorists with AK-47 rifles, grenades, and explosives. Faced with this urgent problem, the Home Ministry decided to fence the border, and light it. The work was got done within a year. Acquisition of land for construction of the fence and the lights was done as a special case, after the work was done. Punjab had the highest quantum of gold smuggled, across the land borders in India before the Khalistan trouble started. Had it been normal times, the smugglers lobby, would never have allowed the fence to be constructed. It was well known that the share of the bribes of the smugglers lobby went up to the highest levels. Punjab was given enough battalions for a 555 kms border, to achieve an inter BOP distance of 2.5 to 3 kms. Each battalion had a jurisdiction of just 25 to 30 kms. With the fencing and lighting completed, the BSF found that its work had become accountable. The first casualty was smuggling. This dropped by 95 per cent. Seeing the success of the fencing in Punjab, the BSF began pressurising the Home Ministry for construction of fencing on the Bangladesh border. After a lot of pressure, particularly from the lobby of the All Assam Students Union, the Home Ministry sanctioned 480 kms of fencing,



in patches for the 1600 kms of land border in West Bengal. The State government was none too keen on this project. Acquisition of land took years. Even today this is held up in litigation in several sections. The Bangladesh government vehemently objected to the fencing. The quality of the fencing was also poorer than what was done in Punjab. The biggest blunder was that the border road in West Bengal was constructed on a bund but the fencing was done on low land. As a result the fencing was under water for varying depths for six to nine months in the year. In any concept of fencing, there should be no habitation beyond the fencing. This was strictly achieved in Punjab. On the contrary in West Bengal, there were more than 100 villages, right on the border. West Bengal did not cooperate in shifting the villages behind the alignment of the fencing, pleading that they did not have funds for the compensation. What is most interesting is that many Hindu villages *suo moto* shifted behind the alignment of the fencing. Not a single Muslim village shifted. In Kishanganj sector, big tea companies were buying out land from petty farmers whose lands were falling beyond the alignment of the fencing. This was encouraged by the BSF on the condition that the tea companies should not allow any habitation beyond the fencing. The whole idea of planting tea beyond the fencing was strongly opposed by the Bangladesh Government and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) even fired in such areas to discourage planting of tea beyond the fencing. The BSF benefited by this strategy, because the gates could be closed at last light, and only their patrols remained beyond the fencing. Infiltration and smuggling dropped to zero in the areas where tea was planted beyond the fencing. The BSF took a firm stand and told their counterparts that it was none of their business, to tell us what to plant or not to plant on our side.

Smuggling is rampant all along the borders, except in the sparsely inhabited areas like in Tripura bordering the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The maximum smuggling is in South Bengal, particularly in the areas inhabited by illegal migrants from Bangladesh, be they Hindu or Muslim. Illegal migration into West Bengal and Assam has been continuing unabated from the 1950s to 1971, and till the present. After the foreigners' agitation started in Assam, migration into Assam abated, for some time, but restarted, the moment a political party came to power, that gave them



patronage. In West Bengal, there was no such break. The border districts in South Bengal, Nadia, Malda, west Dinajpur and Murshidabad, have settlements of illegal migrants from Bangladesh to depths varying from one to five kilometres. The Hindus and Muslim illegal immigrants have invariably settled in separate areas. Since most of them have no land, they constitute the army of couriers, who actually carry the contraband of sugar, mustard oil, medicines and high alcohol content cough syrups. One of the biggest commodities smuggled across, is cattle. And these are brought in trucks from interior states, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. In all the small towns situated in depth from the border, sit the *mahajans*, who finance the smuggling. Several officials of Bangladesh, while deploring the decision to fence the border, have candidly admitted that consumption of beef in Bangladesh was possible only because of the cattle being smuggled across from India. Besides smuggling, which provides a livelihood to thousands of people, a hospital industry has developed along the border. In all the towns parallel to the border, clinics and nursing homes have sprouted, catering to an exclusive Bangladesh clientele. The rates are obviously higher. There is a regular stream of patients coming across to these clinics and nursing homes. The majority of them do not use passports. With all this, it is not surprising that the West Bengal government dragged its feet about constructing the fencing.


During the last three decades illegal migration from Bangladesh has extended to several other states in India. Delhi has today an illegal migrant population of more than 10 lakhs. Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have settlements. Touts lead groups of Bangladeshis across the sub continent, and drop them near BOPs on the western borders, in Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu. Here they tell the hapless group to surrender before the BSF post commander. Pakistan regularly pushes Bangladeshi migrants in Karachi and other towns across the border into India. At one time the order given by the government to the BSF was to push back foreigners found at the borders. As a result the Bangladeshi migrants who surrendered to the BOPs were pushed across into Pakistan. The Rangers would promptly push them back into India. The hapless group very often consisting of women and children would be tossed back and forth like



shuttlecocks. Ultimately, the group would be put on trains to the Bangladesh border and handed over to the BSF posts there and pushed back into Bangladesh. Their travails did not end here, for the BDR on detecting them would push them back into India. Bangladesh is the only country in the world that pushes their own citizens at gunpoint across their borders. In the joint working group meeting, the issue of illegal migration would always be taken up and the Bangladesh delegation would deny that there was any migration. On one such occasion I narrated the instances of groups being taken by touts across to the Pakistan border, and the sordid sequel that followed. Requests to stop such an act out of humanitarian considerations is ignored. Bangladesh never responds to the process of consular access. Bangladeshi migrants convicted under the Foreigners Act languish in the jails. Ultimately they are sent to the BSF posts on the Bangladesh border and pushed across. If they are detected by the BDR they are promptly pushed back into India.

*(to be concluded)*

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**THE FORCE BEHIND PEACE**



# **Evolution of the Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and Defence of Our Island Territories (Part I)**

**Vice Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM**

## **INTRODUCTION**

One of the myths with which we have consistently deluded ourselves for over half a century, is that the Indian armed forces have always been joint in their ethos. In support of this thesis, we proudly cite the existence of the National Defence Academy, the Defence Services Staff College and the National Defence College - all pioneering joint services institutions. Notwithstanding this hype, the hollowness of any claim to jointness is brought home to every officer who does tenure on the staff of the Service Headquarters(HQ) in Delhi and has to deal with a sister service.

It was against this backdrop that the unified Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) was formed in October 2002, as part of a larger plan to enhance inter-service integration and encourage "jointmanship". The ANC, which celebrated its first anniversary, recently is not so much a fighting formation as a crucible for a concept. The process of creation of this command was a radical step for the Indian Armed Forces, and it should, therefore, not surprise anyone that it was preceded by much debate, discussion, controversy, and even a degree of acrimony. While most feel that this is a concept whose time had, at last, come, there are others who still harbour a degree of skepticism about the validity, viability and even the need for such a re-organisation.

In the first part, the genesis of jointness in its country of birth - the USA would be covered. Thereafter, the evolution of our defence structures, and the process of reform triggered by the battle of

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Vice Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM is the Commander-in-Chief Andaman and Nicobar (CINCAN) Command.

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Kargil, which finally spawned the ANC would be covered. Finally a description of the ANC and its environment will be given. The objective of the first part is to provide a wider perspective on the issue, and to show that we failed to learn from history; because all the debate and excitement in the context of jointness that took place in the corridors of South Block in the past few years is almost a replay of what happened in the Pentagon some decades ago.

## **HISTORY OF JOINTNESS**

### **The Advent of Air Power**

World War I (WWI) was the last war in which the Services could maintain their autonomy without sacrificing combat efficiency. Air power changed all that forever. The aeroplane had just made its appearance on the battlefield, and did not play a significant role in the first World War. But, shortly after the armistice in 1918, both the US Navy and the US Army saw the writing on the wall and developed significant air components. However, the doctrinal outlook of the two Services could not have been more divergent.

Naval tacticians saw aviation as just one more component of an integrated approach to maritime warfare, involving ships, submarines, and now aircraft. In contrast, non-naval tacticians, led by the US Army General Billy Mitchell, argued that air power should be used, not as tactical support for ground or maritime forces, but rather as a means for defeating the enemy by destroying his population and centres of production. Such a theory alarmed the US Army and the Navy, because it downplayed the importance of land and sea power and thereby aggravated their feelings of insecurity. General Mitchell's vociferous (and perhaps intemperate) advocacy of air power led to a trial by court martial for insubordination, followed by his resignation, but the controversy remained alive.

### **Polarisation of Doctrines**

As WW II loomed large, each Service propounded with fervour, a specific theory of warfare, which best suited its interests. The US Army viewed successful ground operations as the pre-requisite for victory, the Navy saw control of the seas as critical to global dominance, and the Army Air Corps was convinced that only



massive aerial bombardment could pound the enemy into submission. The divergent operational perspectives also gave rise to a polarisation of attitudes as far as jointmanship or centralisation of control was concerned. And this is quite educative in the Indian context, because it shows that armed forces universally, develop an outlook, which is shaped more by their narrow, parochial interests, rather than larger national security considerations.

The US Army, by virtue of its dependence on ships and aircraft for logistical and tactical support, was pre-disposed towards a central authority co-ordinating the assets of different Services. The Navy, on the other hand, used to operating at long distances from home, and possessing its own air power, as well as infantry in the shape of the marines, preferred autonomy and was averse to central control. The main fear of the Navy related to the possible loss of its aviation wing to the Army Air Corps. Sixty years down the line, it can be seen that a similar mix of fears and insecurities lurks in our environment too.

### **Beginnings of Jointness - National Security Act (NSA) 1947**

The US Administration kept the Services totally apart and independent of each other well into WW II. The British, however, were well ahead in this aspect, and had created a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) some years after WW I. In order to form an interface with the British COSC at the same level, the USA had to create an ad hoc body named Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for the duration of the War. This JCS had neither a Chairman, nor formal approval, nor charter. By the end of WW II, it was obvious to the political establishment that growing dissension amongst the armed forces had led to many instances of confusion and discord in operations, as well as much wasteful expenditure, and urgent reform was called for.

There were three other factors, which precipitated matters by 1947. Firstly, the Army Air Corps broke away to become a separate service: the United States Air Force (USAF). Secondly, it became clear that atomic weapons would be the arbiters of future wars, and that aircraft would be the preferred choice as a vehicle for their delivery for the foreseeable future. And lastly, everyone realised that the lion's share of defence dollars would go to the service wielding the A-bomb.



The US Army proposed unification of the Services, and President Truman initiated a wide-ranging debate amongst senators and congressmen. As per the US custom, service officers were permitted to testify and place their views before the Congress. Active use was also made of the media by the Services, to push their points of view. A great deal of political activity and debate resulted in the NSA of 1947.

This was a seminal piece of legislation, and established the US national security structure as we see it today. The act created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as an apex body called the National Military Establishment (NME) headed by a political appointee to be known as Secretary of Defence (SECDEF). It also accorded formal recognition to the institution of the JCS as a body of equals. However, no sooner had this legislation been passed that fierce debates broke out between the Navy and the USAF about roles and missions, and between the Navy and the Army about the relevance of the Marine Corps.

Basically, all the rhetoric boiled down to getting a larger slice of the budgetary cake, and this is where the flaws of the new system emerged. The powers of the SECDEF had not been clearly defined, and he depended on the JCS for advice, expecting them to provide mutually agreed upon operational and budget priorities. The JCS, unfortunately, was merely a body of equals, in which each Chief preferred to represent the interests of his constituency, rather than prioritising requirements. Therefore, as is to be expected from any committee, no substantive decisions ever emerged from the JCS. If pressed hard, they would produce bottom line decisions on inconsequential issues by consensus. This led the Congress to press for another set of reforms, which represented a dramatic shift towards unification and a setback for the Navy. Discerning readers might detect here, some analogies with the situation in India.

The NME was renamed Department of Defence (DOD) and the SECDEF given tangible authority and control over the Department. A position of chairman JCS was created, and he took precedence over all other officers. It was legislated that the chain of command should run from the President to the SECDEF, and



thence directly to the Commander- in - Chiefs (CINCs). Later this was changed to include the chairman JCS after the SECDEF, but without any command authority.

### **Goldwater-Nichols: the DOD Reorganisation Act of 1986**

Between 1958 and 1980, there was relative stability in the US JCS structure, but it received adverse attention because of frequent problems, failures and fiascos in the US defence policy-making and in military operations. Apart from the Vietnam experience, there were other crisis situations whose inept handling led to strident criticism of the JCS system like the seizure of the USS *Pueblo* by the North Koreans, the failed Iran hostage rescue, the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut and the chaotic Grenada invasion. Over the next four years, an intense public debate culminated in the passage, by the Congress of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganisation Act 1986.

### **Salient features of Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986**

This act, one of the landmark laws in American history, encompassed the following changes in the US National Security structure:-

- (a) It elevated the Chairman JCS to be the principal military adviser to the President, but it permitted a dissenting Service Chief to represent his views to the civilian leadership.
- (b) It maintained the Chairman's status as the highest ranking military officer, but precluded him from exercising command over the JCS or any of the armed forces. He was charged with assisting the SECDEF to prioritise the budget, and preparing strategic plans.
- (c) It required that all military forces be assigned to the CINCs unless required for training. Units assigned to a CINC could not be re-assigned without permission of the SECDEF. The chain of command was delineated as running from President to SECDEF and thence to the CINCs.
- (d) It implemented measures to ensure that high calibre officers were assigned to joint posts, and created a "joint speciality" which required courses of study at specified military institutions.



In order to ensure that jointness received the importance due to it, and that service on joint staffs received due recognition, the act mandated that the promotion rate of officers on joint staff, should match that of other officers. It required flag rank selectees to attend a special "capstone" course, and mandated that for an officer to be eligible for service chief, he must have "considerable joint exposure". It also created the post of a Vice Chairman JCS, who is the second highest-ranking officer in the military, but again without command functions.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act represented the most sweeping changes in the US national security arena since 1947, and is seen to have had a beneficial impact, as perceived by the US forces, from their performance in Panama, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq and lately in Afghanistan.

### **Goldwater-Nichols in the Indian Context**

Virtually everything that took place in the USA has happened or will happen here, including the debates on air power, control of nuclear forces and creation of the chairman JCS. Had we been less insular and complacent in our outlook, we would have studied and learnt from the experience of others, and ensured that the structures for modern warfare were in place before staking claim to nuclear weapon state (NWS) status. There is also a need to clearly understand two other factors.

Firstly, our polity does not have the comprehension of defence matters to involve themselves in complex military issues. The Armed Forces by themselves at present lack the institutional will and vision to bring about any meaningful change on their own. Therefore, regrettably, we have to wait for some external agency or personality to initiate a political intervention in our cause.

Secondly, we should be well aware that jointmanship in our context has yet to take root, and that instinctively the Services will fight each other ruthlessly, if they think that their share of the budgetary cake is under threat, or what they perceive as their "core competence" is likely to be encroached upon.

## **A REVIEW OF DEFENCE MANAGEMENT IN INDIA**

### **Historical Context**

The present day organisation, has its origins in the Presidency



Armies of the East India Company, and evolved according to the colonial imperatives of the British. In very general terms, the Commander in Chief (C-in-C) in India, looked after operational matters and rendered advice to the administration on military matters, in his capacity as a member of the Governor-General's council. The Governor-General had his own military department, headed by a military member of the Council, to convey his directions to the C-in-C. This system, with some variations, served the purpose till the early years of the 20th Century, when the Armed Forces in India began to be seen as an extension of the British war machine. The C-in-C consequently became akin to a theatre commander who would function within the ambit of Whitehall's overall imperial design.

In 1924, a Chiefs of Staff Committee(COSC) without a permanent chairman was constituted in the UK, and about the same time a similar body was also set up in India. The Indian COSC comprised the Chief of General Staff (CGS), the flag officer commanding Royal Indian Navy (RIN) and the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) India. However, in the overall picture, the Indian Armed Forces continued to be seen as a useful instrument of imperial strategy, and their development and higher direction guided by the British rather than the Indian interests.

### **Post-Independence Formulation**

In 1947, India had, at the helm of affairs, two very experienced military leaders, namely Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General, and Lord Ismay as his Chief of Staff. The Government of India(GOI) asked them to apply their minds to the evolution of a system of defence management for the newly independent country. Highly disturbed conditions prevailed in India at that juncture, and the Armed Forces, like the country, were about to be partitioned. Under these circumstances, a radical re-organisation of the Armed Forces was not considered appropriate by them.

Lord Ismay, who had earlier been invited by the USA to advise on national defence, therefore, pragmatically recommended a system which encompassed the COSC as well as a series of committees which would ensure supremacy of the civil over the military, enable co-ordination between the Services, and provide



for quick decision making with minimum red tape. This framework was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management.

### **The Bureaucracy Strikes**

However, for reasons that we will refrain from analysing here, the senior Indian civil servants of that era decided to intervene, and changed the concept of "civil supremacy" to take on the entirely different connotation of "bureaucratic control". This was done by the simple expedient of designating the Service HQs as "attached offices" of the DOD instead of giving them the status of independent department(s) of the GOI that they rightfully deserved to be. The military leadership was at that juncture, either too inexperienced, or too preoccupied to determinedly oppose this *fait accompli* that they were presented with. Over the years, the status of these committees, the powers of the Service Chiefs, and the effectiveness of the Service HQs were all badly eroded. Consequently, it appeared to many at the senior levels that the Services were totally excluded from the decision making process in their own affairs, and entirely at the mercy of the bureaucracy.

### **Post-Kargil Developments**

The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) formed under the chairmanship of former civil servant and defence analyst, Mr K Subrahmanyam, went into the events leading up to, and the conduct of the Kargil campaign. The findings of the Committee were a scathing indictment of the deficiencies in our intelligence services, the higher defence organisation and the management of our borders. The KRC urged a thorough and expeditious overhaul of the national security system, insisting that the exercise should be undertaken by an agency other than the bureaucracy.

The KRC led to the formation of a Group of Ministers (GOM) which in turn commissioned four task forces to undertake a critical examination of different aspects of national security. The task force of interest to us was the one headed by the former Raksha Rajya Mantri (RRM), Shri Arun Singh who, a decade ago, was the head of the "Committee on Reforms in Defence Expenditure".

This body was charged with a critical examination of existing structures for management of defence, against the background of



the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and our new status as a nuclear weapon state (NWS), and tasked to suggest changes for improving the management of defence. It was also tasked inter-alia to look at the interface between the MOD and Service HQs, as well as the need for integration between the Services.

### **Deliberations Pertaining to the Task Force**

During the four months of deliberations, history, indeed, tended to repeat itself. The positions taken and arguments put forth were almost identical to those that have been described in the American context. In the US, it was the Navy and the DOD, which were seen to favour the 'status quo'. In our case, it was the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the bureaucracy who appeared to agree (for different reasons perhaps), that there was no need for any radical changes in the security set up.

As in the US, the IAF repeatedly raised a very basic issue that unless the roles and missions of each service were clearly delineated, it was infructuous to undertake any study related to changes in defence management. There were extended discussions on the need for, and extent of integration between the Services and the MOD, and within the Services. And of course, the most serious item of contention turned out to be that relating to the constitution of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

The main plank of those favouring status quo was that the COSC system had worked quite well for the past 50 years, and, therefore, we needed neither a CDS, nor integration with MOD nor any further inter-service integration.

The creation of the ANC, by itself did not raise as much debate as the more basic issue of whether joint formations and integrated commands had relevance for India. Looking back at the US experience, it could be seen that there were some things which never changed.

### **Task Force Recommendations**

The task force made a large number of recommendations, of which the main ones relating to the higher management of defence were as follows:-

- (a) The Service Headquarters to be re-designated as "associated offices" in the MOD, and substantive delegation



of financial and administrative powers given to them. This recommendation fell short of the demand that the Service Headquarters be made Departments, but was accepted by the Services as a compromise solution.

(b) The existing COSC be enlarged by the addition of a CDS who will be the permanent chairman, and a Vice CDS (VCDS) who will be the member secretary. An alternate recommendation was also offered.

(c) The CDS would be the "principal military adviser" to the GOI. He would not exercise command over any of the Chiefs or forces other than those placed specifically under his command. The Secretary Department of Defence, would be designated Principal Defence Adviser as a counterpoise.

(d) Two joint formations; the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) be established.

(e) The ANC be commanded initially by a three star naval officer, and then in rotation by officers from all three Services. The Commander - in-Chief (CINCAN) to have under command, all Army, Navy, IAF and Coast Guard assets in the islands. He would report directly to the CDS/Chairman COSC.

### **GOM Response and Follow-Up**

The task force recommendations were, by and large, accepted by the GOM, and converted into GOI directives. While the actual issue of constituting a CDS got embroiled in controversies and no directive has to-date emerged from the GOI, the GOM did take pains to pinpoint the reasons for the creation of a CDS as under :-

- (a) To provide single point military advice to the GOI.
- (b) To administer strategic forces.
- (c) To optimise the planning process through inter-service prioritisation.
- (d) To ensure the required "jointness" in the Armed Forces.



An implementation cell was established in the MOD and each broad directive was discussed in detail by the COSC before being converted into a GOI letter. Faced with government directives, the Services had little choice but to comply, but that did not prevent extended discussions and even heated debates on many issues. Some go so far as to say that without a CDS in place, the whole exercise of re-structuring defence management is meaningless, while others contend that without a Strategic Forces Command in place, our nuclear deterrence lacks credibility. The validity of such views can be debated, but it must be accepted that the exercise triggered off by the KRC was not taken to its logical conclusion. Let us now examine the joint Andaman and Nicobar command against the backdrop provided in the preceding text.

*(to be concluded)*

**UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA  
CENTRE FOR ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL RESEARCH (USICAFHR)  
RESEARCH PROJECTS 2003-2004**

A Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research has been established at the United Service Institution of India by the Council of the Institution in consultation with the three Service Headquarters, to study the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, and covering the strategic, tactical, logistic, organisational, socio-economic facets and their implementation. Two Chairs, namely Chhatrapati Shivaji and Maharana Pratap, have been established.

Scholars, both serving as well as retired, desirous of applying for a fellowship to carry out research in the history of the Indian Armed Forces may submit project proposals in quadruplicate either through Service Headquarters or directly to the USI. Copies of the Rules and Regulations and Application Format may be obtained from the Secretary, USI CAFHR.

Each fellowship shall carry a contingency grant of Rs 12,000/- to be paid in four equal quarterly instalments. In addition an honorarium of Rs 72,000/- shall be paid as per the terms and conditions laid down in the Constitution of the CAFHR.



# Operation Khukri : Joint Excellence

Major Anil Raman

## Introduction

Operation (Op) KHUKRI was an unique multinational operation launched in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), involving India, Ghana, Britain and Nigeria. The aim of the operation was to break the two month long siege laid by armed cadres of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) around two companies of 5/8 Gorkha Rifles (GR) Infantry Battalion Group at Kailahun by affecting a fighting break out and redeploying them with the main battalion at Daru. Its successful execution displayed the effectiveness of the United Nations and brought it kudos from every corner of the globe. The professionalism and the dedication of the Indian Armed Forces was yet again reiterated for the world to see.

## Background to the Conflict

Sierra Leone (see Map 1) is located on the west coast of Africa, bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Liberia. It was a home for slaves and ruled by the British till 1961. Thereafter, it was wracked by tribal strife, which culminated in full-scale civil war in 1991. The participants in this bloody and savage conflict were the RUF and ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group. ECOWAS is an abbreviation for Economic Community of West African States). The RUF gained a notorious reputation for brutality and using drugged child soldiers who were particularly savage. This was brought to world attention when on 5 January 1999, the rebels attacked Freetown and held it till 12 January 1999. During their offensive in Freetown, the rebels indulged in indiscriminate slaughter of families, mass rape, burning buildings with people inside, and worst of all, amputated the hands of hundreds of children including infants.

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Major Anil Raman is from 5/8 Gorkha Rifles. He was Adjutant of the Battalion Group in UNAMSIL.







## **The Lome Peace Accord**

After attack on Freetown, the ECOMOG gained control but were unable to defeat the RUF decisively. After negotiations, the Lome Accord was signed whereby all conflicting parties agreed to disarm, supervised by a United Nations (UN) Force. When requested by the UN, India as a responsible member of the UN, agreed to contribute troops, including an infantry battalion group, engineer company and a medical unit to UNAMSIL.

## **Organisation of Battalion Group**

5/8 GR was selected, redesignated as INDBATT-1, and was reorganised to include two Mechanised Companies of 14 Mechanised Infantry including two platoons of 23 Mechanised Infantry alongwith 116 Engineer Regiment, Signals and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers elements. The battalion also shed two rifle companies which formed the core of the Quick Reaction Company (QRC) and the Guard and Administrative Company. The QRC also had complements of wheeled company and tracked mechanised infantry and 9 Special Force (SF).

## **Induction and Initial Activities**

The unit was inducted into UNAMSIL in December 1999 and by mid April 2000 was deployed deep inside the RUF held territory at Daru (battalion minus two companies) and Kailahun (two companies), 400 kilometres from the capital, Freetown. The battalion had been tasked to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in carrying out disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of various rebel groups in its area of responsibility. Accordingly, reconnaissance of interior and far-flung regions was carried out with the assistance of the RUF. Extensive civic action, to include medical care, road and bridge construction, water supply and assistance to schools, also commenced, with the intention of winning over the population. In Kailahun, which had been under rebel control for a decade, the state of the people especially the children was extremely pathetic due to malnutrition and diseases and the Indians were worshipped as saviours. This policy paid rich dividends when one battalion of the RUF disarmed on 10 April 2000 at Segbwema in the largest numbers ever seen. Another disarmament was planned in early May 2000 in Kailahun.



## **Genesis of Crisis**

While some tension always existed between the RUF, and the Kenyans and Nigerians, events suddenly turned for the worse when on 01 May 2000 the RUF at Makeni, in the Kenyan Battalion (Kenbatt) Area of Responsibility (AOR), attacked and overran UN forces. Due to a communication gap, this information could not be passed to INDBATT in real time, as a result of which, on the morning of 02 May 2000 when the Kailahun company commanders went to meet the local RUF commander about the planned disarmament rally, they were taken hostages. Certain Military Observers (MILOBS) present in Kailahun were also captured. While the capture of their commanders and MILOBS from 13 other countries made it difficult for the companies to take offensive actions against rebels, they manned their defences and steadfastly refused the RUF's demand for their surrender. Based on orders, the Battalion Second in Command (2IC) was despatched with a patrol from the Battalion Headquarters (HQs) at Daru, alongwith the RUF Cease Fire Monitoring Committee (CMC) member, to negotiate the release of the hostages at Kailahun. At Kuiva this patrol was stopped and surrounded by about 200 drugged rebels. As the battalion had experienced similar situations many times earlier during reconnaissance and initial deployment, the 2IC tried to calm the rebels down and began negotiations with their commander. The RUF commander requested the patrol not to go ahead since the situation was extremely volatile. He said that the RUF leadership at Makeni had informed all its cadres that the UN had attacked them. The patrol was detained and, while not being ill treated, and even being permitted delivery of food and movement of persons to Daru, was not allowed to leave as a whole. The hostage crisis at Kailahun was resolved 10 days later through intense pressure put on the RUF commanders by friendly civilians and the officers of INDBATT-1.

## **Situation in the Rest of the Country**

By 06 May 2000 general hostilities had broken out all over the western and northern parts of the country and bulk of a Zambian battalion and some troops of a Kenyan battalion (approximately 500 peacekeeping troops in all) were disarmed and taken hostage. As the RUF began moving towards Freetown, the British troops landed to stem the panic and UNAMSIL HQs evacuated most of



its civilian staff. The Battalion's QRC was launched to move to Magburaka where more Kenyans had been surrounded. Led by BMPs (tracked armoured personnel carriers/infantry combat vehicle), the company made a lightning 180 kilometres advance through rebel territory. They linked up with the Kenyans and then extricated them after defeating RUF ambushes and attacks. This action which received wide international acclaim and special praises from the Kenyan media, generally went unnoticed in India. This shattering reverse caused the RUF to recoil and the growing British presence in the country caused them to return to their original positions. The capture of their leader Foday Sankoh and mounting international pressure on Liberia were used to secure the release of the remaining UNAMSIL hostages less the Indians. India also inducted additional forces including an infantry battalion and an attack helicopter flight by the end of May 2000.

### **Factors Affecting the of Use of Force**

The extrication of the patrol at Kuiva was well within the capability of the troops at Daru and the plans had been prepared and the forces rehearsed. However, the same could not be executed in the absence of resources required for the extrication of troops at Kailahun. As the strength of UNAMSIL increased, with the arrival of fresh troops, specially the INDBATT-2, Artillery Battery, Special Force (SF) Company and Attack Helicopters, the feasibility of executing successful military operations increased.

The 2IC's patrol was detained at Kuiva for nearly two months amidst intense negotiations at all levels. The patrol was released on 29 June 2000 through Liberia due to international pressure and efforts by the Indian government. Plans for break out of the Kailahun companies took a concrete shape immediately on release of the 2IC's patrol. While the personnel could have been safely extricated in helicopters, the need to bring warlike stores back and question of regimental pride, dictated a fighting breakout.

### **OVERALL PLAN : OP KHUKRI**

#### **Design of Battle**

The design of battle envisaged the following :-

- (a) Mobilise maximum air effort to concentrate own forces at Kenema and Daru secretly.



- (b) Ground offensive from Daru and Kenema and breakout from Kailahun.
- (c) Simultaneous engagement of key RUF locations by attack helicopters and artillery.
- (d) Selected troops to be helilanded with attack helicopter cover at key locations along the road axis to secure picquets for safe passage of ground column.
- (e) Ensure early link up of both the columns at Pendembu and evacuation by air.
- (f) Return of all vehicle columns from Pendembu for redeployment at Daru on completion of air evacuation.
- (g) Security of Daru to be ensured at all times.

### **Deployment of the RUF**

The military organisation of the RUF consisted of six brigades under a Defence HQ. Each brigade had four battalions and a "strike" battalion. The cadre consisted of battle hardened and motivated veterans. Each battalion had approximately 960 men and women, divided into four companies of 240 persons each. Each company had four platoons of 60 divided into four squads of 12 to 15 persons. They were equipped with AK-47, RPG-7s, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). The 1st Brigade of the RUF, with its HQ in Pendembu, was deployed in own AOR as under :-

- (a) 1st Battalion – Mobai.
- (b) 2nd Battalion – Kuiva.
- (c) 3rd Battalion – Neama.
- (d) 4th Battalion – Koindu.
- (e) Strike Battalion – Segbwema.

### **Own Troops Available**

The troops available for this operation were :-

- (a) INDBATT-1 (5/8GR and two Companies 14 Mechanised Infantry).
- (b) QRC (troops of 5/8GR, 14 Mechanised Infantry, 23 Mechanised (Recce and Support), 9 PARA (SF).
- (c) INDMECH QRC (Company from 11 Mechanised Infantry).



- (d) INDENG Company-2 (Company from 7 Engineer Regiment).
- (e) INDSF Company (Company 2 PARA (SF).
- (f) Indian Aviation Unit (MI-8s, Chetaks and MI-35s).
- (g) Indian Sector HQ.
- (h) Forward Surgical Team.
- (j) INDBATT-2 (18 GRENADIERS).
- (k) Independent Composite Battery (120 mm Mortars) from 310 Light Regiment and Light Field Guns (105 mm) from 255 Field Regiment.
- (l) 2 Companies GHANBATT (Ghana Army).
- (m) 2 Companies NIBATT (Nigerian Army).
- (n) 2 x Chinhook helicopters of the UK Royal Air Force (RAF).
- (o) Elements of D Squadron of the British Special Air Service (SAS).

### General Outline

The operation was to be in five phases (See Map 2) :-

(a) **Phase 1.** Mobilisation and move of combat elements from Freetown/Hastings to Kenema / Daru on 13 and 14 July 2000 by air/road.

(b) **Phase 2.**

(i) Pre-emptive attack helicopters strikes and pre-planned artillery engagements from 0600 hours (h) on 15 July.

(ii) 18 GRENADIERS to secure firm base for 5/8GR (Daru column) earliest and secure and hold Giehun by heliborne assault.

(iii) **5/8 GR less 2 Companies (Daru column).**

(aa) Advance along axis Daru-Kailahun and link up with QRC column at area 3 Bridges earliest but not later than 1400h on 15 July 2000.


(ab) Assist in securing firm base.

(iv) **Kailahun Companies of 5/8 GR.** Establish an air head at Kailahun for air extrication of non essential personnel, MILOBs and stores by British forces and prepare to break out by road for link up with SF team.



# OP KHUKRI

## GUINEA



Map 2



- (v) SF team to secure general area North of Kenewa by heliborne assault.
  - (vi) QRC column to secure area 3 Bridges by heliborne assault.
  - (vii) IND MECH QRC to secure Pendembu.
  - (viii) Two companies of GHANBATT to advance from Kenema at 0630h on 15 July 2000 and secure Bendu Junction earliest.
  - (ix) NIBATT companies to relieve company of 5/8 GR and hold defended locality in Daru and act as force reserve.
  - (x) One platoon INDENG Company-2 to occupy a platoon defended locality in Daru with effect from 1900h on 14 July 2000.
  - (xi) Two CH-47s of the RAF and the SAS to drop Indian SF Company at Kenema and evacuate MILOBS and essentials from Kailahun.
- (c) **Phase 3.**
- (i) 5/8 GR (Daru column) to secure and hold Pendembu and establish air head .
  - (ii) Kailahun column and SF team to link up with Company at Giehun earliest.
- (d) **Phase 4.**
- (i) Link up of 5/8 GR Daru and Kailahun columns at Pendembu.
  - (ii) Air extrication of foot columns from air head established by 5/8 GR.
- (e) **Phase 5.**
- (i) 5/8 GR columns to withdraw tactically to Daru .
  - (ii) Other elements to fall back to Daru after passage of 5/8 GR columns.

## CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

### Mobilisation

The build up at Daru and Kenewa was conducted from 13 to 15 July 2000. 3 x MI-26s, 7 x MI-8s, 2 x Chinook helicopters and



1 x RAF C-130 aircraft were pressed into service for the task. Daru being cut off from the rest of government controlled areas, had to be built up by helicopters. By the last light of D minus one (14 July 2000) the build up of forces was completed.

### **Preparations at Kailahun**

The entire operation depended on the successful breakout of Kailahun companies and extrication of MILOBs. The Kailahun company commanders were given a broad outline of the plan and the force commander and commanding officer (CO) also spoke to them regularly on satellite phone (satphone). As most of the troops were to be helilanded and close support was dependent on attack helicopters, the weather conditions for flying were of paramount importance. The two companies were deployed 500 metres from Kailahun on dominating ground. Two helipads within the defended area, were secured by occupying perimeter defence and deploying protective elements.

### **Air Extrication**

On 15 July 2000, the helipad was secured and entire area sanitised by 0600h. Despite bad weather, two RAF Chinook helicopters landed exactly as per plan at 0620h and extricated 44 personnel including 11 MILOBs and war like stores. Enroute the same helicopters had dropped Company 2 PARA(SF), two kilometres South of Kailahun. The RUF had approximately 300 to 400 of its cadre in Kailahun. Due to the arrival of Chinook helicopters the RUF were activated but were effectively engaged by own fire. As per plan the Chinooks were to be followed by three MI-8 escorted by attack helicopters (AH) of Indian Aviation Unit to extricate more stores, however, these helicopters could not take off due to bad weather.

### **Breakout**

Prior to move, a fire assault was delivered for 10 minutes employing fire power of rocket launchers, armoured personnel carries, automatic grenade launchers, 51 mm mortars and medium machine guns. As per the plan Mechanised Company-1 of 5/8 GR (Mech 1 Company) was tasked to capture Town Square in Kailahun and Motorised Rifle Company-1 of 5/8 GR (Mot 1 Company) to capture RUF checkpost astride road Kailahun - Daru. The advance



was led by the Ghatak (Commando) Platoon supported by three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDMs). The advance drew fire from QG area and RUF checkpost. QG area was neutralised by Ghatak with support of BRDMs. Thereafter on contacting the town square, a fire base was established by Mech 1 Company and Mot 1 Company assaulted the check post with the Town Square as their forming up place (FUP). The advance of Mot 1 Company towards the barrier came under heavy fire from the RUF but the fierce assault closed in and soon secured the check post. Immediately, the B vehicle column moved out and link up was established with Company 2 PARA by Mot 1 Company at the barrier. The fire base at Town Square in Kailahun continued to be in position till all elements had crossed and then disengaged by fire and move. The column quickly advanced towards Giehun with Company 2 PARA and BRDMs covering the tail. At around 0930h the attack helicopters arrived and thereafter it was easy to break contact from the RUF who by now had reorganised and were continuously sniping at the rearguard. Around 1030h the road column arrived at Geihun to link up with the INDBATT-2 Company which had been helilanded earlier. The Force Commander landed at Geihun to meet the troops and ordered the helilift of 60 troops to Daru.

### **Move to Pendembu**

After reorganising, the column moved on and encountered two major road blocks in the form of 8 feet wide and 4 feet deep ditches dug on the road covered by small arms and rocket launcher fire. Continuous sniping by rebels and slushy conditions on the road impeded progress. The area was physically secured and bridging stores carried by the column and those dropped by an MI-8 helicopter facilitated speedy bridging. The column met the linkup force under the CO 5/8 GR Battalion Group about 5 kilometres from Pendembu at 1700h, D Day. Thereafter the entire column moved to Pendembu and was directed to deploy in respective areas of the battalion harbour for the night.

### **Actions of Daru Link Up Force**

The insertion of SF Company and extrication of MILOBs from Kailahun at 0620h signalled the commencement of operations



of forces located at Daru. 18 GRENADIERS advanced and secured a firm base in conjunction with the Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) of 5/8GR Battalion Group and artillery bombardment.

### **5/8 GR Advance to Pendembu and Link Up with QRC**

5/8 GR columns ex Daru commenced advance immediately on securing of the firm base with the ICVs of Mech-2 Company leading. At approximately 0830h the lead elements came under heavy fire from North of the road 500 metres short of Tikonko. ICVs effectively neutralised the fire and the advance continued. The column again drew fire from houses in Bewobu (RUF Company location) but burst through with all guns blazing. At Kuiva, heavy small arms fire was encountered from jungle on either side of the road and the village. It was initially planned to physically secure and search Kuiva, but the progress of Kailahun columns indicated a possibility of link up and air evacuation on the same day. Therefore, CO decided to continue to advance with speed for Pendembu. Supported by battalion mortars, the column crossed the town by fire and move. The rebels had taken up positions inside the village but after offering initial resistance, fled into the jungle in face of accurate fire leaving ammunition scattered behind. The column moved at good speed suppressing small arms fire using its ICVs. In the meantime, the battalion's QRC was lifted from Daru in two waves of 3 x MI-8s each and captured Area 3 Bridges by heliborne assault. Maintaining momentum, the 5/8 GR column advanced at high speed to link up with the QRC. Enroute a rebel vehicle full of arms and ammunition was chased by the ICVs and recovered by Mot-2 company. At 1230h the link up was established with the QRC and thereafter the battalion column started to deploy on the southern edge of Pendembu.

### **Securing of Pendembu**

Pendembu was the HQ of RUF's No 1 Brigade and its stronghold in the east and a pitched fight was expected. The town was about one kilometre in length and had solid single storeyed cement houses. Tall grass along the road and inside made it ideal for ambushes.

An attack helicopter directed to strafe Pendembu made five



passes at 1300h and carried out pin point engagement of the known RUF locations in town. In the meantime, the Battalion mortars deployed north of Bridge 3. The CO reviewed the plans and chose Mot 2 Company, to secure the complete built up area of nearly 300 houses and an air head in the south west (SW) portion of Pendembu. First to secure the northern flank, Mech-2 company moved through with all guns blazing and occupied the north edge of the town. Thereafter, the Mot-2 company began its operations by first silencing heavy fire from the SW of the town using ICVs and then using its rifle platoons to clear the houses systematically. A massive RUF cache of arms and ammunition was found. Some rebels were killed in the SW portions by 4 Platoon of Mot 2 Company and more were killed while clearing the armoury by 6 Platoon. Later a suitable airhead was selected along the Pendembu - Daru road. The QRC Company linked up to the SW of Pendembu. Soon thereafter, companies were reorganised, areas allotted and preparation of temporary defences for the night commenced.

### **Link up with Kailahun Column**

At about 1630h the CO led a column to the link up site. The advance through dense jungle was done by boldly employing ICVs and link up was established with the Kailahun party at about 1730h. This column was escorted to Pendembu by about 1900h.

### **Pendembu Night 15/16 July 2000**

Officer Commanding (OC) QRC coordinated the defences at Pendembu and on arrival, the Kailahun columns were guided to their respective areas of responsibility. Throughout the night, the RUF who tried to probe the defences were, much to their discomfiture, accurately engaged by own fire. The 105mm Light Field Gun (LFG) and the battalion mortars were used to engage likely routes of RUF reinforcements throughout the night.

### **Helilift Operations**

By 0700h Mot 2 Company prepared a helipad and troops earmarked for helilift started to upstick as per their deinduction schedule and the defences were readjusted. The MI-8s started arriving at the helipad at 0815h in a continuous stream. A total of 12 sorties were flown. Mech 1 Company, Mot 1 Company,



SF Company, D Company 18 GRENADIERS and QRC Company (two Platoons) were deinducted. The last helicopter took off at 1030h.

At about 0930h own troops, deployed to the north of the town reported 50 to 60 armed RUF cadres moving towards the platoon post along the road. They were effectively engaged by an armed helicopter directed by the Adjutant acting as an Air Control Team (ACT). Later, selected RUF bunkers in basement of buildings and their ammunition storage centre were demolished with help of the battalion engineers.

### **Move Back to Daru**

After the last helicopter took off for Daru, the road column comprising of Daru companies, QRC company less two platoons and vehicles of Kailahun Companies started to reel in as per their order of march with Mot 2 Company leading. The Mech 2 Company was told to hold on to the north edge of the town till the last and bring up the rear of the column after conducting a tactical disengagement. Continuous overwatch and intimate fire support was given by one MI-35 helicopter at all times till the column reached Daru. While crossing area 3 Bridge, the CO's party came under fire. The command BRDM was effectively used to silence the fire. The column reached Kuiva without incident. Speculative fire was brought down at all suspected locations by the leading ICVs. The troops deployed for the firm base also started reeling in as 5/8 GR moved back.

### **Kuiva Ambush**

The column had been cautioned to expect a road block cum ambush near Kuiva based on information from radio intercepts and intelligence. At about 1400h scout helicopters also reported that the road had been dug up between Bewabu and Kuiva. At Kuiva, which had been secured by a company of 18 GRENADIERS, the CO ordered a halt as the column had extended over a long distance. Suddenly, the column was engaged by rocket launcher (RPG) fire from very short range and a rifle platoon supported by ICVs had to be used to drive the rebels away.



### **Bewabu Ambush**

The column then moved ahead with caution towards Bewabu and at about 1430h, the leading ICVs, short of Bewabu came across a ditch covered by heavy small arms fire from high ground on both sides of the road. The Mot 2 Company Commander, moving just behind the second ICV of the column realised at once that the column was in the killing ground of the ambush. Immediately Number 4 rifle platoon following just behind was ordered to counter ambush on the high ground supported by ICV fire. The firefight continued for next 15 minutes. Attack helicopters were also tasked to strafe both sides of the road to deter the rebels from further interference. Number 6 platoon and the battalion's engineer platoon immediately set about bridging the gap.

### **Mobai Ambush**

While the head of the 5/8 GR column was engaged in tackling the Bewabu road block, the 18 GRENADIERS column was following up about six kilometres behind with 2x BMPs of Mech-2 and 2x BRDMs of Mech-1, at the end of the convoy. This convoy, came under heavy fire short of Kuiva. After 10 minutes of exchange of fire, the troops again mounted the vehicles and advanced. After about 500 metres of move, a vehicle carrying artillery ammunition had a direct RPG hit. A Chetak helicopter flew in to pick up the casualty from Kuiva.

The entire convoy thereafter moved at high speed without encountering any resistance and carrying out speculative fire where necessary. With the MI-35 helicopters also providing intimate fire support the convoy made good speed and reached Daru at 1730h.

### **Reasons for Success**

**Synergisation of all Available Assets.** Op KHUKRI was a classical example of synergy of effort. The optimum utilisation of all resources, joint planning (Indian Army, IAF, UNAMSIL forces and the British Forces) and execution resulted in a synergy that multiplied the effectiveness of the assets deployed.

**Simultaneity of Operations.** Commencing operations simultaneously from Kenema, Daru and Kallahun, and helilanding troops at three places enroute caused utter confusion in the RUF.



**Real Time use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).** During the planning of rescue mission from Kuiva, Pendembu and Kailahun, non availability of air/satellite imagery was a big handicap. The Intelligence Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) of 5/8 GR made nine trips with the ration convoys to covertly note RUF strength, deployments and obtain Global Positioning System (GPS) fixes of RUF targets. This intelligence was later used by the artillery and attack helicopters to engage targets. The Battalion radio monitoring cell did an outstanding job in monitoring RUF communications throughout the three months to build up a clear picture of the RUF activities. Real time monitoring of RUF communications during operations gave a picture of RUF actions regarding move of reinforcements and preparation of ambush/road block sites. These were passed on to the columns and to attack helicopters for verification and engagement.

**Good Intelligence of RUF Activities and Intentions.** The painstaking study of RUF tactics, organisation, personalities of leaders and updating of activities helped to anticipate reactions correctly.

**Deception and Security During Build Up.** RUF was successfully kept in the dark about the build up. The RUF was made to believe that the battalion was being replaced hence additional troops were coming as relief. No operational messages were passed on radio and only satphones were used. The unit had made own codes and nick names for places and personalities. All conversation was in Hindi and Gurkhali and for further secrecy, plans were passed over satphone to Kailahun in colloquial Malayalam.

**Flexibility in Conduct.** The plan had an inherent capacity to be changed as per the progress and situation. The presence of the Force Commander at Daru helped further, as decisions were taken on the spot.

**Maintenance of Momentum.** Relentless advance by Daru columns and brushing aside ambushes without dismounting added to the speed of advance. Not changing the leading companies at Kuiva and Mobai as planned ensured momentum.



**Resolute and Competent Junior Leadership.** Op KHUKRI was a series of subunit actions fought independently. The exemplary leadership displayed by junior leaders was infectious and added to the potency of the force.

**Use of ICVs to Lead Advance and Break Ambushes.** Notwithstanding the dense jungle, ICVs were used to lead the advance. Their mobility and high volume of fire enabled the columns to proceed without dismounting at most of the ambush sites.

**Attack Helicopter Support.** The attack helicopter was one of the most potent assets and proved very effective in breaking ambushes as well as denying free movement of rebels on the road by day. Combat Air Patrol (CAP) provided to the returning road column on 16 July 2000 was instrumental in its safe return.

### **Conclusion**

The success of Op KHUKRI was felt not merely in its tactical terms. It gave the RUF its worst defeat in recent history and at the same time gave a tremendous boost to the UNAMSIL forces in particular and to the UN as a whole. The detractors of the UN were silenced and the potential of this noble institution was once again displayed. The greatest reward for the Indian Peacekeepers was the rapturous reception given to them by the people of Daru as they came triumphantly back from battle. It was the welcome of a long suffering and desperate people who understood that there were people in this world who would shed their blood for them. Perhaps, that is why they helped build the KHUKRI Memorial in Daru barracks overlooking the Moa River.

### **ARTICLES FOR THE USI JOURNAL**

1. Members are welcome to forward original articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. Articles should preferably be around 2,500 words. These should be forwarded in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a floppy disk (1.44 MB diskette), IBM Compatible, on MS Word for Windows 97. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternately, articles may be sent through e-mail on [dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in](mailto:dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in). The Editor reserves the right to make alterations. Articles should not have been offered for publication to other journals or media.
2. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers should enclose no-objection certificate signed by their immediate superior for publication of their articles.
3. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.



# **The UK and International Security**

**His Excellency Sir Rob Young, KCMG**

## **Introduction**

**O**ur national security and prosperity depend on promoting international stability, freedom and economic development. Our economic interests and history gives us many international responsibilities. Our society is formed of many different cultures, drawn from all across the globe, including, of course, many from India. Through these ties, and through our membership of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the G8 and the Commonwealth, Britain's interests are inextricably linked to those of the international community. And in these are arenas, Britain plays a full role in developing the international community's response to security challenges we all face today.

## **Changing Threats**

If I may borrow a few words from Nehru: "A moment comes which comes but rarely in history when we step from the old to the new." Few events could have proved him right more dramatically than the events of 11 September 2001. These atrocities marked a gear change in world affairs.

The British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has said: "We now know that states can no longer define their security purely in relation to each other. The greatest challenges at the beginning of the twenty-first century come from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and states where the rule of law has broken down. Tackling these threats will require an unprecedented level of co-operation between states".

We have to recognise that national prosperity and security are more dependent than ever before on a stable international environment. The UK and India have a shared interest in eliminating

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His Excellency Sir Rob Young, KCMG is the High Commissioner of the UK in India.

Excerpted from the talk delivered at the USI on 27 November 2002.

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the conditions that contribute to global insecurity and state failure. We need to work together to defend the things that our two nations believe in: freedom, democracy, justice, tolerance and respect towards others. We must strive to create a world in which all states play a responsible part in the global community, and where all nations respect the rule of international law.

The UK Government recognises that this is an ambitious agenda. It will require us to address difficult issues. But no nation can shy away from its global responsibilities just because the road ahead is tough. These responsibilities apply both to how a nation conducts its own defence, and how a country responds to the challenges facing the global community. On a domestic level, all nations must take responsibility for their own actions, and for the consequences. Nowhere is this more clear than in the field of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are a uniquely destructive force, whose effects can transcend national boundaries. With the possession of such weapons comes a unique responsibility.

On an international level, nations must act together to confront the three key challenges that Jack Straw identified. These are the challenges of WMD, Terrorism and Failing States.

### **Weapons of Mass Destruction**

No challenge in terms of WMD is greater than that posed by Iraq. The Iraqi government has consistently frustrated all attempts to enforce the rule of international law. Since 1991, the UN has called upon Iraq to comply with UN weapons inspections and decommission WMD. Four years ago, Saddam Hussein effectively rejected diplomacy when he forced the inspectors to leave with their task incomplete.

Iraq's unwillingness to co-operate with the international community is also shown through aggression to its neighbours. Iraq had invaded two of its neighbours, occupying one – Kuwait. Iraq has launched missile attacks against five of the countries in the region. It is the only country to have been condemned by the UN for breaching the Geneva Convention on chemical weapons, having used them not only in international conflict against Iran, but



also against its own people. These weapons were developed outside international regimes, and in clear contravention of international laws. We must also guard against the terrifying prospect of Saddam Hussein passing WMDs to terrorists such as Al Qaeda.

The international community cannot allow Iraq to continue to defy the authority of the UN. We cannot continue to allow Iraq to pursue its weapons programmes and thereby threaten the security both of the Middle East and the world.

The UK is clear, however, that there should be the widest possible support for the uncompromising line we are taking against Saddam. That is why the British Government has worked from the beginning to ensure that the UN has been in the lead on tackling this issue. The unanimous decision of the UN Security Council on 8 November 2002 to adopt a new powerful resolution on Iraq (SCR 1441) demonstrated the high degree of international solidarity in the face of the challenge from Saddam. If Saddam thought that, by exploiting differences in approach between the members of the Security Council, he could evade his responsibility to dismantle his WMD programme, he was mistaken. It is encouraging that Saddam has allowed weapons inspectors back into Iraq. They must be allowed to do their work without hindrance. Saddam can be in no doubt about the serious consequences he will face if the inspectors are not allowed free access.

Progress to date on Iraq is a rewarding example of how, in certain circumstances, diplomacy may need to be backed by a credible threat of use of force if it is to be successful.

### **Terrorism**

The second challenge we have to face up to is that of terrorism. Firstly, may I say that the UK condemns the atrocities committed against temples in Jammu on 24 November 2002 in the strongest terms. Only recently in Bali, we saw yet another example of the devastating and arbitrary effects of terrorism. Both India and the United Kingdom have suffered the terrible effects of terrorism first hand for decades. We were all horrified by the attack on your



Parliament in December 2001. This was not just an attack on India - it was an attack on democracy. The terrorism, wherever it occurs, must be condemned unreservedly. As Tony Blair told the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in Bangalore in January 2002, "Terrorism is terrorism wherever it occurs, whoever are its victims."

This is why co-operation is vital in the fight against terrorism. We all know that to combat terrorist violence we need to tackle the networks which transcend national boundaries and threaten us all. As Yashwant Sinha said in a recent speech at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur: "States with a strong democratic and pluralistic culture become natural allies in the war against global terrorism because they perceive the threat, directly and intuitively, and together they make a strong coalition." This is why the UK and India are natural partners in the fight against terrorism.

During his visit to India in January 2001, Tony Blair and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed the New Delhi Declaration. The declaration pledged that our two countries would work together to identify and develop new areas of partnership between the two countries - to the benefit of our peoples, and to help create a better and safer world. Action against terrorism is a cornerstone of this partnership. Our Prime Ministers made a commitment to enhance significantly our bilateral co-operation in counter-terrorism, including training, building on the work of the UK and India Joint Working Group on Terrorism.

This is a commitment we take very seriously. In March 2001, India hosted a course on Aviation Security, led by experienced UK trainers, and attended by representatives of Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives. Only last week, the Bomb Squad from the Metropolitan Police held a course on Bomb Scene Management for police trainers from across India.

We have established a link between the excellent Bomb Data Centre in Delhi and in the UK. This allows our scientists to share expertise and experience to broaden each other's knowledge base, and to improve each country's ability to identify, track down, and hopefully stop those responsible for the horrific bomb attacks which can cause devastation.



The UK and India Joint Working Group on Terrorism goes from strength to strength, and we intend to continue to work together to identify areas for further co-operation. This is the kind of co-operation that we would like to see among all countries in the world.

A word about Kashmir. One of the interesting developments of the last 12 months has been the change in the terms of the international debate about Kashmir. India has succeeded in exploiting the changed environment post 11 September 2001 to convince the world that terrorism is the core issue in Kashmir. Hardly anyone talked about terrorism in relation to Kashmir a year ago. They might have talked about militancy. But that was as far as it went. Now, everyone's vocabulary contains the phrase "crossborder terrorism". It has to be stopped. The UK and the US in particular, have been working hard this year to achieve that. We have commitments from President Musharraf that all support for cross-border terrorism will cease. Those commitments have to be carried through. Progress had been made. More needs to be done. We always add that the lasting solution to the problems between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir, can only come through negotiation. There can be no military solution. That is why we welcomed the Indian decision to redeploy troops from the international border. This will undoubtedly lower tension. We hope that it will contribute to the creation of an environment in which dialogues between Islamabad and Delhi can resume, and progress be made towards a lasting settlement which takes account of the wishes of the Kashmiris.

### **Failing States**

Terrorists are strongest when states are weakest. We must, therefore, face up to the challenge of failed or failing states. Just over a year ago, we saw in Afghanistan the terrible consequences of a failed state. As part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and through the UN, the UK has been working to help the people of Afghanistan, and we have seen the remarkable progress that can be made. By addressing issues from poverty to human rights, we can help to restore democracy to a country where the rule of law has collapsed. If we address these issues



early, we can help to save states from failing. But if we are to tackle the problem of failing states effectively, we have to develop a more coherent and holistic international response, using all the tools at our disposal to help foster the development of stronger nations.

The case for international action to tackle state failure was strong even before the events of 11 September 2001. In the 1990s, almost all of the world's conflicts took place within states rather than between them. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2001 only one of 24 conflicts world-wide was between states. Over the past decade, it is estimated that wars in and amongst failed states have killed about eight million people, most of them civilians, and displaced another four million. Hundreds of millions have been deprived of sustenance, education, healthcare and security.

Of course, it takes centuries to make, or recreate a state. So rather than waiting for a state to fail, we should aim to take action, and if necessary intervene, before the situation reaches collapse. The irony is that it can often be difficult to secure international support to intervene unless we are faced with an acute crisis. But we must continue to make a strong case for early engagement.

The question then is what can we do? A state fails when it is unable to control its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens, when it is unable to maintain the rule of law, which includes promoting human rights and providing effective governance, and when it is unable to deliver public goods to its population. Ensuring a strong state, therefore, requires us to address security, governance and economic issues.

To address these areas, we must use all the means available to us. I am proud to represent one important strand of this effort: diplomacy. Both by applying diplomatic pressure, and by helping to create an international consensus to tackle these issues, diplomacy has an important part to play in shaping international events. But of course, diplomacy has to go hand in hand with action on the ground.



This brings me to another vitally important area where the international community can help address the problems faced by failing states: developmental assistance. Sustainable Development has become a "buzz word", so frequently used that we sometimes forget its true meaning. But by helping to foster development in a way that delivers continuous progress in harmony with the environment, we help to create a more equal world of increasing prosperity. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in August 2002, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to reducing poverty among the world's most disadvantaged people. The Summit in Johannesburg represented the culmination of a series of international meetings that have set an agenda for action to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development. The overarching goal was the halving of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015, together with other goals, including achieving universal primary education and reducing child mortality by 2015.

The UK is committed to making this aim a reality. The Department of International Development (DFID) in the UK in 2001 spent over £ 2.9 billion on development programmes across the world. That's about Rs 22,000 crores. The Chancellor recently announced that this will increase by £ 1.5 billion to reach 0.4 per cent of national income by 2005-06. This is the biggest ever rise in UK aid, and will represent a 93 per cent real terms increase since 1997. This includes grants to India worth more than £ 180 million (or Rs 1,350 crore) per year, and this is planned to rise substantially over the next few years. This is the largest DFID investment in any country.

But alleviating poverty has to go hand in hand with the promotion and preservation of human rights. In cases where states ignore the human rights of their citizens, experience has shown that criminals and terrorists thrive. And there are several tragic cases, from the "ethnic cleansing" in former Yugoslavia to the genocide in Rwanda, and the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, where human right abuses should have alerted the international community to the threats these regimes posed to its security.



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Finally, recent experience has sadly shown that, in addition to diplomatic and developmental means, it is sometimes necessary to take more coercive measures, such as sanctions or military intervention, to tackle problems of state failure.

This sort of activity is not without controversy, impinging, as it does, on issues of national sovereignty. Clearly, the authority of the UN should underpin any action of this sort. But, as we have seen in Bosnia, Sierra Leone and most recently in Afghanistan, some instances of state failure have no real hope of remedy without intervention of this sort.

### **What the UK Brings to International Affairs**

While we cannot reverse dreadful events such as 11 September 2001, it is essential that we learn from our past if we are not to repeat its errors. In this, the United Kingdom is well placed to call on a long experience of dealing with international affairs to help address some of these pressing needs. By combining commercial strength and skilled armed forces with membership of many of the world's key decision-making institutions, the United Kingdom has a unique contribution to make in promoting international security.

The United Kingdom's commercial interests are truly global. The UK is the world's third largest trading power. Trade represents about 30 per cent of our GDP. Most years, UK overseas investment is on a par with that of the US. A good part of the work of my team at the High Commission is dedicated to increasing trade and investment opportunities for both the UK and India. Last July, the CII and Confederation of British Industry (CBI) proposed a new target of doubling total India-UK trade in goods and services to £ 10 billion over the next five years. As global trade and investment grow, the commercial interests, and the influence of the UK, spread ever further beyond our shores. The UK's interests are inextricably linked with those of the global community. A strong economy is vital for any country wanting to play a part in making the world safer and more prosperous. Over the last nine years, Britain has had the longest period of sustained economic growth since World War II. The UK now has the fourth largest economy in the world.



The British armed forces remain a key of the UK's foreign policy. These forces are flexible, mobile and capable of deploying anywhere in the world. But the value of Britain's armed forces also lies in their ability to evolve and respond to a changing world. Until relatively recently the core task for our armed forces was to defend our nation and our allies against the horrendous possibility of a major conflict in Europe. Our forces were prepared and trained for this possibility. But in the post-cold war strategic environment, the United Kingdom undertook a "Strategic Defence Review", providing a reassessment of Britain's security interests. While the defence of our nation is obviously still crucial, the strategic defence review also defines a new concept of defence diplomacy: setting a new mission to "dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution."

After the appalling events of 11 September 2001, the Government commissioned a new chapter to the Strategic Defence Review - to look at asymmetric threats, and threats from non-state actors prepared to use suicidal methods to achieve their devastating aims.

Peacekeeping is an essential part of this Defence Diplomacy. This is an area in which both the UK and India work closely with the UN. I have already paid tribute to India's contribution. India has played a crucial role in UN missions in Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique to name but a few. General Nambiar himself was the Force Commander of the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia in 1992-1993. Here at the USI you run the Centre for UN Peacekeeping, which organises workshops, seminars and training for peacekeepers from India and across the world. The UK strongly supports this initiative, and indeed, some of our experienced peacekeepers are currently learning and sharing their experiences on USI courses.

The UK and India continue to look for ways in which our two countries can work together on military issues, to improve our ability to respond to the challenges which face us. The Defence Consultative Group provides a bilateral forum in which to discuss



issues ranging from training to science and technology and joint exercises. Its work on peacekeeping is particularly important.

Our military efforts and defence diplomacy run hand in hand with our conventional diplomacy and our highly effective intelligence services, which are an essential asset for any country aspiring to a global role. My High Commission is part of a network of over 220 British posts around the world. And our Ministers, both at home and abroad, continue to engage with governments across the world, both bilaterally and through multilateral organisations like the UN.

### **International Organisations**

Multilateral organisations must be the key focus of our effort to create a stable and secure world. The United Kingdom is proud to be part of several international bodies, all with their part to play.

The UN was established to respond to the challenges of the Second World War. Over more than 50 years, the UN has worked for peace and security, establishing international law, defending and defining human rights and encouraging economic and social development. It certainly has an impressive list of achievements to its name. But we also recognise that the world continues to change, and the institution of the UN must change with it. The UK has taken a leading role in trying to prepare the institutions of the UN for the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This includes the Security Council. The challenge is to expand the membership so that Council can ensure its credibility as a representative body of the UN membership as a whole; while retaining the efficient procedures for decision-making that have made it such an effective forum for handling international crises.

The UK Government supports India's candidature for a permanent seat on the Security Council—and Tony Blair pledged in January 2002 that the UK would work with India to achieve that.

The Security Council is key to our efforts to ensure international security. We witnessed a particularly striking example of this in the wake of 11 September 2001, when the members of the Security Council united to pass resolution 1373. This resolution urges all states to put in place legislation and to take effective



action to tackle international terrorism. Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1373 represents a real milestone— it is the first mandatory action against terrorism taken by the whole international community. SCR 1373 also recognised the importance not just of making resolutions, but also of making an on-going commitment to tackling terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Committee, chaired by the UK, was established to monitor and assist in the effective implementation of this important resolution.

Of course SCR 1373 is only one of a growing corpus of international agreements on terrorism. India has been at the forefront of attempts to bring these together in the framework of a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism. These efforts long predated the events of 11 September 2001. The UK has been a consistent supporter of the Comprehensive Convention; indeed in the New Delhi Declaration, Prime Ministers Blair and Vajpayee called for early agreement on and entry into force of the draft Convention drawn up by India. Unfortunately it has so far been difficult to reach consensus on this at the UN. But I am sure that the Convention's time will come.

### Europe

I should now like to run to the increasingly important European dimension to the UK's security structures. Earlier this year, Jack Straw gave a speech in which he set out the three pillars on which European Security should be based in the 21st century: an expanded and modernised NATO; a credible European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and expanded EU. Let me just say a few words about each of these pillars.

**NATO.** NATO remains the cornerstone of British defence and security policy. NATO continues to guarantee security for its members, upholding the founding principles of the Washington Treaty – democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. But NATO, like the UN, has undergone many changes. The post-cold war environment has witnessed the emergence of new states and the creation of alliances that seemed so impossible 20 years ago. Many Central and Eastern European states are now full members of NATO – seven more joined last week. 26 countries, mainly from



the former Soviet Union, are associated with NATO-through the partnership of peace. The establishment of the new NATO-Russian Council in May 2002 formalised the new special relationship between these former adversaries. We are certainly in a new era of defence and security co-operation. Enlargement forms an essential part of ensuring that NATO remains relevant to the new realities with which we are faced in the 21st century. But for NATO to continue to be effective, enlargement must be accompanied by modernisation and reform, to streamline decision making processes, and to continue to develop the partnerships which have become increasingly integral to our work.

**ESDP.** The second pillar aims to develop a capability to manage crises on those occasions when NATO as a whole decides not to engage. The ESDP will of course be based on a close relationship with NATO, and we hope that this will include giving the EU access to NATO's planning and assets. As part of the ESDP, we are also working to improve military capabilities of European states. Member States are tackling their weaknesses in targeted small groups.

**EU Enlargement.** The EU also has a wider role to play. Previous expansions in the membership of the EU have helped to root democracy and increase prosperity in many countries, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. The prospect of EU membership has given momentum to the political and economic reforms in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, and increasingly in countries such as Serbia and Croatia, where only five years ago, we witnessed the horrifying consequences of ethnic rivalries and a lack of respect for human rights. Enlargement will fundamentally change the nature of the EU. The UK is at the forefront of efforts to improve the democracy of European decision-making and to bring Europe closer to its citizens. In October 2002, former French President Giscard d'Estaing, who is presiding over a special Convention, published a draft constitution for the EU. This has created a certain amount of controversy in Britain, with some of the more excitable commentators calling it a fundamental erosion of national sovereignty, which paves the way for a federal super-state. In fact, the truth is the opposite. The British government



wants a single, coherent constitution for the EU, to show how the Union should work, where it should work, and where it should be reformed. The Convention should do just that, by attempting to settle the relationship between the Union and its member states for the foreseeable future, to remove the sense of constant treaty change, with more and more powers being transferred to the centre.

### **Commonwealth**

The Commonwealth too has an important role to play. The modern Commonwealth counts nearly one-third of the world's countries among its members, and its 1.7 billion people comprise quarter of the world's population. The 54 countries represent some of the richest and some of the poorest in the world, as well as some of the biggest and the smallest. This diverse group of nations, bound together by history, provides a global network with considerable reach and influence. The UK supports the work of the Commonwealth in promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance and human rights, as well as the Commonwealth's economic and development work, all of which contribute to creating a more stable and more secure global environment.

We are committed to working closely with India within the Commonwealth to achieve our mutual aims. We are particularly grateful for the constructive role that India is playing in the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group.

### **Conclusion**

The UK sees India as a natural partner in our work for international security. As Prime Minister, Mr Vajpayee, said at his Independence Day speech this year, "today, India stands proudly on the world stage-tall, self-reliant, and full of self-confidence". India is indeed a powerful player, and one with whom we hope we can continue to work closely. Our bilateral relations have never been stronger. Our commercial and historical bonds bring us together, and our common aims bring us side-by-side in the fight against terrorism, state failure and poverty.



The United Kingdom is committed to working with India bilaterally, and through the international organisations I mentioned before, to help ensure a stable and secure global environment. But the world has changed dramatically since the creation of many of these organisations, and so has the nature of the threat facing us. The challenge for us all is to ensure that our armies, our governments, and our international organisations remain relevant, by adapting to the new security situation.

We must continue to work together to combat the threat of terrorism, to prevent the disastrous consequences of failing states and to tackle those states which persist in operating outside the rule of international law. We must recognise that ensuring international security requires more than just a military response to crises, and more than sending in peacekeeping troops.

It requires more than just diplomacy - much as I might be loath to admit it! It requires more than just humanitarian and development aid, and more than just work on human rights. Today's global environment means that we must use all of these tools together - and in co-operation with the whole international community - to create truly international security.

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and it co-operates with Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian communities, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The OSCE started with the Helsinki Final Act as a process in 1975 with the participation of 35 countries. Helsinki Final Act encompassed three main sets of recommendations, commonly referred to as 'baskets'. Between 1990-1994, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was transformed into OSCE.

The first set is related to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (the Decalogue) and military confidence-building measures. The second set concerns cooperation in a number of fields including economics, science and technology and the environment. The third set deals with "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields", a formula covering human rights issues under the headings of "human contacts", "information", "cooperation in the field of culture" and "cooperation in the field of education". It also includes a specific set of recommendations related to Mediterranean issues.

Helsinki Principles, which are commonly referred as "Helsinki Decalogue", consist of the following :-

- (a) Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
- (b) Refraining from the threat or use of force.
- (c) Inviolability of frontiers.
- (d) Territorial integrity of States.
- (e) Peaceful settlement of disputes.
- (f) Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- (g) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- (h) Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- (i) Cooperation among States.
- (k) Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.



OSCE's approach to security is based on comprehensive concept of security as initiated in the Final Act of Helsinki. This concept relates to the maintenance of peace to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and co-operation with peaceful inter-state relations. This is equally valid in managing change as it was necessary in mitigating confrontation.

OSCE member states are convinced that security is indivisible which means that the security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all others. This principle of indivisibility of security also obliges the member states of OSCE not to strengthen their security at the expense of others and to pursue their own security and stability in the OSCE area and beyond.

The OSCE member states reaffirming their respect for each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, have agreed to base their mutual security relations upon a cooperative approach. They are also under the obligation to develop complimentary and mutually reinforcing institutions that include European and transatlantic organisations, multilateral and bilateral undertakings and various forms of regional and sub regional cooperation in harmony with OSCE principles.

Cooperative security pre-supposes non-hegemonic behaviour on the part of participating States, it requires a true partnership based on mutual accountability, transparency and confidence at both the domestic and the foreign policy level. This principle of cooperative security is reflected on the fact that all States participating in OSCE activities have equal status and that decisions are made on the basis of consensus.

### **CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMs)**

Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) are provisions for the exchange and verification of information regarding the participating State's armed forces and military activities, as well as certain mechanisms promoting co-operation among participating States with regard to military matters.



The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 describes as the main objective of the then confidence building measures to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of military activities which can give rise to apprehension, particularly where the participating states lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities. A further objective is seen in their role to promote contacts and mutual understanding. The CSBMs are to create a climate of mutual trust by encouraging openness and transparency. These objectives have remained unchanged ever since.

Confidence building presupposes a degree of normality in interstate relations. Hence, in Europe, CSBMs emerged only after the borders had been recognised. One virtue is that they lead to increased openness. Increased openness is necessary in order to enhance predictability which is essential for the development of mutual confidence so very important to curb dynamics of arms build-up and to embark on disarmament. This is in short the logic and "raison d'etre" of CSBMs.

The current provisions of CSBMs evolved in three stages:

- (a) The Helsinki Final Act regime (1975-1986).
- (b) The Stockholm Document regime (1986-1990).
- (c) The Vienna Document regime (1990/92/94/99).

The cornerstone of the CSBM regime was laid in basket I of the Helsinki Act. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, we find for the first time commitments concerning prior notification of major military manoeuvres and exchange of observers. As a next step, the 1986 Stockholm Document established the first CSBMs which included the first exchange of Military information. The Document of Stockholm met the following four criteria :-

- (a) Politically binding.
- (b) Militarily significant.
- (c) Verifiable, when possible.
- (d) Extend from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Stockholm document, adopted on 19 September 1986,



provided for lower thresholds and a longer time-frame for prior notification of certain military activities, invitation of observers, and an exchange of annual calendars of planned military activities. Most importantly, for the first time ever in the history of modern arms control, it provided for compulsory inspections as a means of verification. Due to the improvements and the widened scope, these measures were seen as the "second generation" of CSBMs.

The Vienna Document of 1990 again went one step further; developing the CSBMs by adding the possibility of verification, i.e. on site inspections of the information previously exchanged. Vienna Document also provided for the exchange of current and projected military budgets, established a Conflict Prevention Centre and a forum for annual implementation assessment. A communication network was set up to streamline CSBM information, and increased military contacts. As a "Living Document", the Vienna Document has been amended three times in 10 years, in 1992, 1994 and 1999. The last adaptation of 1999 brought, among others, new implements to the so called mechanisms for risk reduction. However, the success of the revised document lies in the adoption of a new chapter which envisages CSBMs with voluntary measures tailored to regional needs.

Besides the Vienna Document which contains CSBMs for the OSCE area, there are also sub regional and bilateral CSBMs. The Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, widely known as the article II Agreement, sometimes referred to as Vienna Agreement as well, is the best example for sub regional CSBMs. This agreement is signed in accordance with Article II of the Annex I-B of Dayton Peace Accords on Regional Stability between three parties, namely the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two component entities Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose armed forces were divided by strong mutual mistrust. Establishing a minimum degree of confidence is not an easy process. It requires time and patience. Sub regional confidence building is a unique challenge on all these counts and its success or failure will determine further international efforts in dealing with other local crises and conflict situations.



The 1990s have witnessed the search to enhance confidence beyond the Vienna Document provisions on a bilateral footing in the Balkan region. First, Turkey reached agreements with Bulgaria through the so-called Sofia and Edirne Documents of 1 January 1992 and 12 November 1992 respectively. In fact, the Turkish-Bulgarian Agreements encouraged other Balkan countries to agree on similar measures. Later in December 1992 and 1993 Bulgaria signed similar documents with Greece. In 1995 Turkey signed Edirne-like documents with Albania and Macedonia and Bulgaria concluded a bilateral CSBM document with Romania. All the bilateral CSBM Agreements are inspired by the existing CSBMs contained in Vienna Document and foresee a more developed information exchange within a specified zone of application along the border between the countries concerned as well as an extended programme of military contacts.

CSBMs can be categorised as follows :-

- (a) Measures of transparency and information.
- (b) Measures of communication.
- (c) Measures of constraint intending to impose restrictions on military activities.
- (d) Measures for crisis management which provide mechanisms for risk reduction in the military field and aiming at the explanation of unusual military activities.
- (e) Measures for verification.
- (f) Measures for military contacts.

Military to military contacts are important in helping define the nature of mutual relationships. This was formally recognised by the drafters of the Helsinki Final Act which encourages military exchanges. In Helsinki Final Act, under the Section on other confidence building measures, it is stated that in particular the participating States will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understating, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.



Admiral Crewe, the former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, published a book in the early 90's (a sort of personal memoir) which depicts his experiences as a senior American military officer. He gives a great deal of attention to his relationship with the late Marshal Akhromeyev who was one of the last Chiefs of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Marshal Akhromeyev was hosted by Admiral Crewe during a visit to the United States. They got to know each other, as individuals charged with the defence of their respective countries. Akhromeyev was intellectually convinced that America was an aggressor nation. Crewe had also served his country for a long time. He knew and understood the implications of Soviet military doctrine and its offensive orientation. Nonetheless, these two distinguished officers, developed a personal relationship which helped to dispel the fears and suspicions each had about other's intent. For Admiral Crewe, it was a highly personal experience which dramatically altered his views.

Chapter IV of Vienna Document 1999 titled "Contacts" has five sub-headings as under :-

- (a) Visits to airbases.
- (b) Military contacts.
- (c) Military co-operation.
- (d) Demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems.
- (e) Provision of information on contacts.

Paragraphs 19 to 29 of the document 1999 are devoted to visits to air bases. According to these provisions, each participating state is under obligation to arrange a visit for representatives of all other participating states to one of its normal peacetime air base at least once in five year period. As a rule, up to two visitors from each participating state will be invited. The invited state may decide whether to send military and/or civilian visitors. The visit to the air base will last for a minimum of 24 hours. In the course of the visit, the visitors will be given a briefing on the purpose and functions of



the air base and on its current activities. Some concrete examples of military contacts are :-

- (a) Exchanges and visits between members of the armed forces at all levels, especially those between junior officers and commanders.
- (b) Contacts between relevant military institutions, specially between military units.
- (c) Reservation in military academies and schools and on military training courses for members of the armed forces from the participating States.
- (d) Use of the language facilities of military training institutions for the foreign-language instruction of members of the armed forces from the participating States and the organisation of language courses in military training institutions for military foreign- language instructors from the participating States.
- (e) Exchanges and contacts between academics and experts in military studies and related areas.
- (f) Participation and contribution by members of the armed forces of the participating States, as well as civil experts in security matters and defence policy, to academic conferences, seminars and symposia.
- (g) Issuing of joint academic publications on security and defence issues.
- (h) Sporting and cultural events between members of their armed forces.

### **CONFERENCE ON INTERACTION AND COOPERATION IN ASIA (CICA)**

The idea to convene the Conference on Interaction and Cooperation in Asia was first introduced at the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly in October 1992 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev underlined that the aim of the initiative was to renew attempts, unsuccessful previously, to create an effective and universal structure ensuring security on Asian continent, where, unlike other regions of the world, such a mechanism has not yet been created.



At this time member-states of the CICA are: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan; observer states are: Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Ukraine, the USA, Vietnam and Thailand. The international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE, the League of Arab States, and others also took part in the CICA.

At the **first stage** several meetings of the Asian countries were held in the framework of the realisation of the initiative. The first one was held in April 1993 with 12 participants; the second was in August-September 1993 (28 participants), and the third in October 1994 (29 participants). The main achievement of the first stage was an agreement that discords existing in the region cannot be an obstacle to finding common approaches to the problems concerning security and cooperation among the regional states.

At the **second stage** the member-states decided to establish a Special Working Group (SWG), aimed at the preparation of the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the states, interested in convening the CICA. The first SWG meeting took place in March 1995. Participants of SWG were represented at the level of Ambassadors, Charge d' Affaires, Counsellors of the Embassies accredited in Almaty and experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The SWG meetings have been conducted regularly ever since. During the sessions in 1995-99 the projects of the basic CICA documents such as "The Rule of Procedures", "Declaration on the Principles", "The CICA Structure and Institutes" were considered.

At the Conference of the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs conducted by the MFA of Kazakhstan in Almaty on 7 and 8 February 1996, the representatives of 23 Asian countries agreed that the development of the CICA process needed a long term and common effort of all participants. The course of debate showed that the states of the region were willing to work thoroughly in the framework of preparation of the projects of basic documents and definitions of cooperation directions.

On 3 December 1997, the second meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the CICA member-states was held.



Representatives from 27 countries and international organisations took part.

The international colloquium "Asian Security in the Context of Convening the CICA" held in Almaty on 21 and 22 October 1998, was an important moment in the development of the CICA. The heads of leading scientific and research centres and institutions from 16 countries of Asia, Europe and the USA took part in the colloquium. The main goal of that event was to exchange opinions on all aspects of Asian security with an emphasis on pursuing the idea of creating a regional security system.

In January-February 1999, bilateral consultations were held in the capitals of key CICA member-states. During the consultations the agreements were reached on the rapprochement of positions of the participants concerning several disputed provisions of the Declaration of Principles.

The Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CICA member-states, held in Almaty on 14 September 1999, and the signing of the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between CICA Member-States became the biggest achievement for Kazakhstan's diplomacy since President Nazarbayev came up with the initiative to establish a multilateral mechanism of security and cooperation in Asia. Thus, for the first time legal basis for the Asian security system providing for concrete activities, measures and mechanisms of ensuring stability in the region was created.

The foreign ministers of the 15 CICA member-states, representatives of the observer-countries such as the USA, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Ukraine and of the international organisations (UN, OSCE) participated in the ministerial meeting. The participants adopted the Resolution of the ministerial meeting, where they confirmed their support for the development of the CICA process as the regional forum. They also decided to work out a document within the CICA framework to be signed by the Heads of States and the Governments.

At the **third stage** the regular session of the SWG within the CICA framework took place on 12-14 of April 2000. The participants noted that after signing the Declaration of Principles by the foreign ministers the process reached a new stage, where the concrete



measures should be taken to implement the provisions of Declaration. On this session the participants adopted the structure of the document to be signed by the Head of the States and Governments and agreed that the main provisions of the document will be in line with the methods of implementation of the principles of the Declaration, as well as the elaboration of a common approach to the new threats and challenges to the security in Asia such as terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, international crime and ecological problems.

The international seminar on "The ways and methods of implementation of declaration of principles, guiding regulation relation between the CICA member-states" was held from 15 to 17 of June 2000. The main objective of the seminar was to elaborate and exchange opinions with the content of the document to be signed by Heads of States and Governments.

In the period from 26 to 31 March 2001 the regular session of SWG was held in Almaty to continue work on elaboration of the summit document. During the session experts agreed on majority of the provisions of the document and decided to continue elaboration of the document. The following working groups on preparation of the summit were created :-

- (a) The working group dealing with organisational issues of the summit.
- (b) The working group dealing with security issues of the summit.
- (c) The working group dealing with issues of providing information support to the summit.

Executive Secretariat of the CICA summit was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

From 4 to 9 June 2001 the last SWG meeting was held in order to finalise the draft of the CICA Summit Document. The attendants were informed of the positive reaction of the heads of CICA member-states to the proposal to hold the summit during the



proposed period of 8 to 10 November 2001. In view of the tragic events of the 11 September 2001, it was not possible to hold the summit on those dates. Finally, on 3-4 June 2002, heads of states and governments of CICA came together in Almaty and signed the Almaty Act. A declaration on eliminating terrorism and promoting dialogue among Civilisations was also adopted at the summit which came into agenda only after 11 September 2001.

Almaty Act consists of four sections and 35 provisions. There is also a short preamble. The first section relates to security and cooperation which lays down certain principles and norms of behaviour. The second section is called challenges to security. In this section new risks and challenges like terrorism, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, racism are also addressed. Third section is on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Here only some basic principles are laid down. It is also agreed upon to elaborate a catalogue of CBMs which will be implemented gradually. The last section is about the structure and institutions of CICA and speaks about regular meetings, specialised meetings and secretariat.

Declaration on terrorism is a two page document. In this declaration the heads of state and government condemned all forms and manifestations of terrorism committed no matter when, where or by whom and expressed their belief that no consideration whatsoever can be invoked to justify terrorism. They also emphasised that eliminating terrorism was the common goal of all cultures and civilisations and that all religions of the world rejected violence and terrorism.

### **RESEARCH PROJECTS**

Members interested in undertaking research projects under the aegis of the Centre for Research, may submit research proposals. In case of serving personnel, the proposals should be routed through the concerned Service Headquarters; retired personnel may route their proposals through one of the Service Headquarters, or send these directly to the Director, for consideration by 31 December each year. At present, five chairs have been instituted for one year projects, namely Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair, Admiral RD Katari Chair, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair, Prof DS Kothari DRDO Chair and Ministry of External Affairs Chair. Final approval of projects will be the prerogative of the Board of Management. Copies of the Rules for Award of Fellowship Grants and Conduct of Research may be obtained from the USI.



# Nepal's Maoist Movement and Implications for India

Shri Nishchal Nath Pandey

An extreme left ideology in the leftist movement in Nepal has existed for a long time. In fact, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was established in India in 1949. Mr Ayodhya Singh of the Communist Party of India was a member of the first politburo of the CPN, something quite unusual for a political party, which went on to vehemently denounce "Indian hegemonism" in the years and decades to follow. The seed of discord was planted in 1950 as India mediated the end of the Rana oligarchy. The last Rana Prime Minister concluded a treaty popularly known as the Treaty of 1950 with India and he continued to remain as Prime Minister even under the new set-up in Kathmandu. The treaty has remained an issue of irritation between India and Nepal with all governments in Kathmandu in the last 50 years pledging to amend it.

With the banning of the CPN in 1952, the party advanced its aura and appeal as it happens with banned movements all over the world. A special focus on establishing camaraderie with other communist parties ensured its permanence and long-term sustainability. The party sent its member of Gandaki zone committee Gauri Bhakta Pradhan for a guerrilla training to China.

So long as Britain was a dominant power in Tibet, India's northern border was secure, as it remained a buffer zone. But with China's suzerainty over Tibet, it ceased to be a buffer. Nepal's position vis-a-vis India's strategic concerns came into the fore as a frontier state and whatever little meaning the Himalayan defence walls had in the past was further reduced. The rise of communism in Nepal became possible, as over a hundred years of Rana misrule with its limited social base had kept the soil fertile enough for its

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Shri Nishchal Nath Pandey is Deputy Executive Director of the Kathmandu based Institute of Foreign Affairs and a well known Nepali writer on security and international affairs.

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rise. To the dismay of everyone, in the first pamphlet published by the party, it declared, "the Chinese people became victorious under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the revolution has come right at our doorstep in Nepal. We must also follow the same course. During the second national congress of the party held in June 1957, the resolution of starting the struggle for a constituent assembly and a republic was approved. The magnetic appeal of the CPN was widely sensed when despite its banned status, it figured well in the first local level elections in 1953. Mr Janak Man BA, a candidate of the party became the first Mayor of Kathmandu. He later also became a Judge of the Kathmandu district court and decided on the famous legal tangle involving Succha Singh, the assassin of Pratap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister of Punjab. It was the one and only extradition case between Nepal and India.

The royal takeover of 1960 at the time of the visit of General Thimayya to Nepal altered the entire course of Nepal's history and halted the fast rise of the communist movement itself. General Secretary of the CPN Dr Keshar Jung Rayamajhi, who was at that time in Moscow issued a statement supporting the King's move by calling it a "progressive step forward." This created a furore inside the party and during the central plenum held in Darbhanga in India three chief factions emerged: *first*, in support of the King led by Rayamajhi group; *second*, in favour of reconvening the dissolved parliament led by Pushpalal; and the *third*, proposing an election of a constituent assembly led by Mohan Bikram Singh. The third faction held its "unity conference" and declared a communist block of its own in 1978. It is in this party that the current Maoist leaders Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda have their roots.

It is believed that the CPN (Maoists) had set forth the idea of launching the people's war in Nepal prior to handing over the well known 40 point demand list to the then government in February 1996. In an interview to the 'Revolutionary Worker', Comrade Prachanda had said, "Making the plan for the commencement of the struggle, there was a great debate over how to go to the armed struggle. Then we said that the only process must be a big push, a big leap. Not gradual change."



The causes behind its expansion from mere five districts to nearly all of the 75 districts of the kingdom can be attributed to a host of factors. Change of 1990 with the end of the Panchayat following the deliberate lapse of trade and transit treaty by the Rajiv Gandhi government in India stirred over expectations among the general population of Nepal. Naturally, like in other emerging democracies, managing a democratic change was an onerous task especially as Nepal is anguished with abject poverty, unemployment, lack of resources and trained manpower, illiteracy and a difficult terrain. It is estimated that nearly three hundred thousand labourers enter the labour market every year. 38 per cent of the Nepalese are currently living under the poverty line. 80 per cent of the children are suffering from malnutrition. Due to the declining agriculture and industrial activities, the economic growth of the country is as low as 0.8 per cent and especially the mid-west region of the country has been neglected by successive regimes.

As politicians of mushrooming political parties entered the rural districts to request for votes in 1991, Nepalese rural folk had a dream: a dream that was so emotive yet so powerful. Unfortunately, the democratically elected governments failed to live up to the expectations. Nothing was more frustrating than to see the same leaders that had lived in prison cells for as long as 10 years during the course of the struggle for democracy, resorting to lucrative commission dealings, constructing private villas and forgetting the pledge that they had made to the people that brought them to power. Nepal can boast today of being the most vibrant democracy in South Asia with 10 Prime Ministers in 12 years. But despite this revolving door charade of corrupt ministers and officials coming in and going out, serious concerns over Nepal's style of functioning and its lack of seriousness for ensuring good governance has time and again provoked severe criticism from donors. As the corrupt, dishonest and the despised were continuously rewarded, the Maoists emerged as the liberators. The main point was that the Nepalese began to dream again.

What had started with a few .303 rifles and khukris has today become a "virtual alternate to the state". Secretly the Maoists established themselves in the country side where due to isolation



and difficult terrain, Kathmandu's unpopular administration was the weakest. They initially organised cells and later established extensive wings of their organisation. Around the cells there were political and propaganda groups to win popular support and teams of guerrillas to terrorise where propaganda failed. They took over isolated villages where they formed their guerrilla bases, operated parallel administration and set up recruiting and training camps. A demoralised, highly politicised police force was given the mandate to bring the situation under control. It further complicated matters. General people were more alienated with the state; the insurgents emerged hardened, solidified and equipped with the captured police weapons and communication equipment.

With preoccupation in a never-ending game of dirty political one-upmanship, the political leadership failed to bring about a national consensus on the issue. They instead blamed the palace for not allowing the use of the army to curtail the situation. A clear-cut stand of the late King was that a state of emergency be imposed for the army to be mobilised. He perhaps feared that without a clear operational strategy and civil and political support coupled with unpopular political masters that have absolutely no clue to the concepts of national security management, the hands of the soldiers would be tied and the Royal Nepal Army with its glorious tradition would also be meeting the same fate as that of the Nepal Police and the National Intelligence Bureau. The Maoists too were clever enough not to disparage the popular King and open too many fronts at the same time.

Subsequent to the royal massacre and with the Maoists attacking the army barracks in Dang district in the inner Terai on 22 November 2001 and looting modern automatic weapons and ammunition, the Royal Nepal Army was directly brought into the confrontation. A state of emergency was imposed in the kingdom. On 17 February 2002, they overran another barrack in Achham district and killed 57 soldiers. Although, sporadic incidents had been taking place, only after a gap of nearly seven months they struck hard in September 2002 at the headquarters of Arghakhachi district killing 60 security personnel.

The strength of the Royal Nepal Army is about sixty thousand



and it has an outstanding record of excellence at home and abroad. The Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), a four star General is responsible for looking after the regular affairs of the army with two Lieutenant Generals -the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) looking after operations, intelligence and training and the Chief of Staff (COS) responsible for operations other than war. It is organised as combat brigades, combat support brigades and combat service support brigades. A combat brigade is commanded by a Brigadier General and comprises of infantry battalions and independent infantry companies. Depending upon the geographical region of the kingdom, each combat brigade may have two or three infantry battalions and upto six or more independent infantry companies. The signals, engineer field company, light artillery battery, air defence battery, field ambulance company, transport elements and ordnance elements augment each combat brigade.

Even with changing times, the army is still one of the most prestigious professions in Nepal with the best and the brightest youngsters each year vying to get recruited. It has been a tradition that one son of almost every affluent family from the *Thakuri* clan gets into the army. But, it is not that other castes and social groups do not excel in the army. There have been many such stories of success. Today more Generals in the Royal Nepal Army are non-Ranas or non-Shahs.

Although it may seem that the army actions have not been successful so far, one must judge several crucial factors to assess the situation on the ground in Nepal today. The factors are :-

(a) It is an insurgency with nearly 7000 armed cadres and more than one hundred thousand sympathisers. A difficult terrain, lack of resources, frustration among the rural class and massive unemployment creates problems for the army. Any army, anywhere in the world, is not the cause of the mass uprising, but to resolve the problem; it needs the full backing of the political actors, the civil administration, media and the general public. Without these, the counter-insurgency operations become long and dreary.

(b) The rebels adopt the policy of surprise hit, run and hide in the forest and hit again, always a challenge to the security



forces. A powerful country like India has not been able to arrest dacoit Veerappan who is hiding in the jungles. The United States has not been able to kill fugitive Osama Bin Laden who is probably hiding in the caves. This is a full-fledged insurgency in a poor and resource-less country like Nepal and perhaps is going to take some time before a decisive knock can be delivered. Therefore, patience, determination tempered with discretion and steady pressure may wear the insurgents down rather than big hasty operations.

(c) Unfortunately, a militarist approach to security which has been proven wrong on many occasions is being tried in Nepal. Politicians are sending the army to save themselves but are not rectifying their past mistakes. Democracy for them has meant a free ride to fulfill petty selfish purposes without any checks and any safeguards. Until the leaders make corrections and sincerely commit themselves to the socio-economic development of their country, no lasting results can be achieved. The army may be able to curb the insurgents but not the insurgency. For instance, what do the insurgents do once they leave the rebellion? The state has not been able to create additional employment opportunities.

With these factors as a background, the implications for India of a long drawn out conflict in Nepal can be listed out as under :-

(a) The Maoist hit areas in the mid-west of Nepal are the closest by distance to New Delhi than any other existing insurgency in the whole of India. Already, with long-standing conflicts on ethnic, religious and sectarian lines, the last thing India would want is a critical situation to develop right at the top of its head. A sustained conflict in this area may gravely expose the entire Indo-Gangetic plain.

(b) Unfortunately, India has placed itself in a rather difficult predicament in Nepal. For the Maoist leaders, India is going all out to help the Government of Nepal while for the elite of Kathmandu, India is not doing enough to help in bringing back the normalcy. Speaker of the House, moreover, has explicitly said that India is actually harbouring the Maoist leaders and



because of the non-cooperation of India, Nepal has had to face so much of hardship. It is this dilemma that is the real challenge. But, this is not the first time that India is positioned in a situation of "do and you are damned -don't do and you are damned". Ever since 1950, almost every major change inside Nepal has been the result of deterioration of Indo- Nepal relations but remarkably every set-up that emerges in Kathmandu has had difficulty in accommodating Delhi's concerns and interests.

(c) The first five in the 40-point demand list submitted by Dr Baburam Bhattarai to the government in 1996 are directly linked with India.

(d) Implications for Indo-Nepal border relations are evident. India has already stationed paramilitary forces along 1800 kilometres of the porous border. With the complaints that the Maoists are misusing the border for their motives including clandestine movement of explosives plus increasing number of reports of Inter Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan (ISI) crossing over to India from Nepal, this unique characteristic of Indo-Nepal traditional relations is already the prime target.

(e) Impact on the Gorkha connection between the two countries is another area where the conflict could have a direct bearing. Gorkha units of the Indian Army have traditionally recruited soldiers from Nepal. As of now there are 60,000 Nepalese serving in the Indian Army including in some sensitive areas. As the Maoist rebels and the soldiers in the Gorkha Regiments are from the same clan, the possibility of family members or even wives of the soldiers getting involved in the rebellion cannot be ruled out. The Indian Army recruitment camps set up at six different places had to be shifted this year. Pension privileges of two retired veterans of the 2/11 Gorkha Rifles have been scrapped for allegedly assisting the rebels.

(f) The People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) were once the source of inspiration



for the Maoists. Now it is the other way around. These like-minded groups of South Asia have formed what is called the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). Cross border relations of these groups could be a major headache in the foreseeable future.

(g) The concept of a greater Nepal although unrealistic has always been a touchy issue. A persistent battle in Nepal could well have spillovers in the area with nearly 10 million Nepalese diaspora.

(h) Nexus between the Bhutanese refugees and the Maoists has not yet been established. But they are one hundred thousand in number, idle and are situated in the seven camps in eastern Nepal's politically volatile Jhapa district. This bordering district is near the sensitive chicken neck area where a small piece of Indian territory separates the two countries and harbours one of the region's longest standing conflicts. A handshake between the Maoists and the Bhutanese refugees will clearly mean the entire area literally going up in flames.

(j) A steady growth of "conflict entrepreneurs" on both sides (Maoists and the government) will create a situation in which there will be vested interest groups that will want to sustain the conflict rather than resolve it. If this happens, it will be an un-winnable war with ramifications all around.

(k) A chaotic, messy and politically confused Nepal can never be in the interest of India. Rather a prosperous, stable and friendly Nepal can be an asset for a growing power like India. The turmoil can well be used by those elements that are inimical towards India and want to use the situation for anti-Indian activities.

For Nepal's future to be stable, truly democratic with prospects of mutually cooperative endeavors with India, certainly Delhi could help Nepal to help itself.

In the final analysis, therefore, peace is the main agenda of today's Nepal. Without peace there can not be democracy, no economic development and no future for the Nepalese.



# The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Implications for India

Major General Ashok K Mehta, AVSM (Retd)

## Introduction

It is a classic case of too little too late. Despite the writing on the wall, Nepal failed to mobilise and prepare the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) for containing the Maoist threat. Instead, the police was employed to combat what was misinterpreted as a law and order problem. Successive governments could not create a national consensus on dealing with the Maoists and also obtain from the King, the Royal assent to employ the RNA. This failure to mobilise the sword arm led the Maoists develop the capability and clout that has spread throughout the country in a plan that was brilliantly conceived but less effectively executed.

Other than Bhutan, the RNA is the only army in the world not under civilian control. It was mobilised only when the Maoists attacked the RNA garrison in November 2001 at Dang. Since then nearly 1500 Maoists, nearly 900 security forces and upto 2200 civilians have been killed. The official figures are much lower.

After the last big attack against the RNA on 27 May 2002 at Khara there was a three month lull in the fighting. Parliament was dissolved and an election had been ordered for 13 November 2002. The Maoists had dramatically announced their intention to blast the elections. With the Emergency having lapsed on 28 August 2002, and the government unable to hold the elections on time, the King was obliged to dismiss the caretaker government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. This has put the 1990 constitution in a limbo and placed all the power in the hands of the King. There is now a new interim government under the Royalist Prime Minister Lok Bahadur Chand which is tasked to hold elections and restore normalcy. Nepal faces an uphill task bringing the Maoists around to the negotiating table just when they feel power is in sight.

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Major General Ashok Mehta, AVSM is from the Gorkha Rifles and is now a journalist. Excerpted from a paper presented at the USI during a panel discussion on 16 September 2002.

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## Background

The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was formed in 1949 after the success of the Communist Revolution in China. CPN was also inspired by the Naxalite movement especially in Jhapa, East Nepal, which became the hotbed of the Communist movement. Nepal was regarded "suitable for revolution due to centralised reactionary rule for close to 200 years in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial small mountainous country favourable for guerilla warfare" by Prachanda. He was convinced that both the subjective and objective conditions for revolution existed in Nepal. Underdevelopment, poverty and neglect by Kathmandu made West Nepal historically, geographically and culturally the basin of revolt and the epicentre of the People's War. It is also the case that parts of West Nepal were never under effective central control and always enjoyed some autonomy. The revolution, however, was not confined to the West as the Maoists realised that it would be contained by centralising effort. So it was a broad-spread movement. The rank and file Maoists are mainly of Mongolian ethnicity - jan jatis like Magars, Gurungs, Rais, Limbus, Tamangs and so on. Brahmins and Chhetris who dominate the political and military leadership along with Tharus, Dalits and women are also among the fighters. In many ways this is a caste and class war of the oppressed against the elite with similarities in People's War Group (PWG) and Maoist Coordination Centre (MCC) in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.

The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (MLM) ideology was adopted by CPN (Maoist) in 1986. In 1991, the Samyukt Jana Morcha or United People's Front (UPF) had won nine seats in Parliament. But it boycotted the 1994 elections saying it had demonstrated it could win elections but was abandoning the democratic path as it knew it would yield nothing. UPF split between the Baida group led by Lilamani Pokhrail and Maoists under Bhattarai. After the "two-line struggle" CPN (Maoist) was formalised abandoning MLM ideology.

The brains behind the revolution are two firebrand Marxist ideologues - Pushpakamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai (Jit Bahadur). While the Prachanda Path outlines the operational strategy of the People's War, Bhattarai has provided



the "politico-economic" rationale of the movement. A great deal of homework was done by the two. It seems the preliminaries started in the early 1990s with a full range of political discussions and interactions with Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), PWG and MCC in India and several like-minded people in South Asia. Bhattarai, like the legendary Orde Wingate, is known to quote from the Bible. The spark of the revolution was lit on 13 February 1996 with the launch of three raids on banks and police posts simultaneously across the country stretching from Gam in the West to Gorkha in the centre and Sindhulgarhi in the East. It later spread to all the 75 districts of Nepal. The decision to put a broad spread on the revolt was made so that the government would not be able to centralise its efforts to contain and localise the movement. However, cadres were told that cities were not for armed clashes but to fight a propaganda war.

The Maoist revolution is a thoroughbred homegrown insurgency and unlike other movements, not geographically limited to one region. Previously it was the East of Nepal that was considered the stronghold of Leftists and Dharan was called the Red Fort. It is reported that the only time King Birendra was shown black flags was by the Communists in Dharan. But this time around, the stronghold of the People's War was the midwest, centered around Rolpa. The current movement has external ideological linkages though material support is wholly indigenous. In 1995, Bhattarai and Dahal made the plan called "Taking the revolution to the people". It was conceived in four parts (for details see Prachanda's interview in *Revolutionary Worker*, February 2000) as under :-

- (a) Ideological preparation.
- (b) Transition from peaceful to armed struggle.
- (c) Military action.
- (d) Developing strategic base areas by encircling cities from villages and converting unarmed masses into armed fighters.

The Maoists also called '*Maobadis*' are compared with the Shining Path in Peru due to multiethnic, topographical similarities such as high mountains (Himalayas and Andes), middle hills



(Mahabharat or Sierras) and low lands (Terai and the Amazon basin). Both movements started due to lack of governance, rampant corruption and poverty. The police failed in its fight against the insurgents in Peru as in Nepal and the Army had to be mobilised. In the case of Nepal, Maoists drew a reluctant RNA into a fight by attacking them. The widespread killing of school teachers, destruction of Sanskrit schools and desecration of temples gave it an anti-Hindu touch. As it is, in the West, there are few temples compared to the rest of Nepal.

The heart or base of the revolution was in Rolpa, Rukum, Gorkha, Sindhuli and Kabhre districts of Nepal, with the first two being the citadel. Gorkha is the home of deputy leader, Bhattarai. It gradually spread throughout the country from the west to the middle (which is economically better off) and eastern region. As an insurgency, it is unique compared to others on the Indian subcontinent which are geographically localised.

Prachanda believes the revolution has to embrace the seven million Nepalese who live in India and are active in the Akhil Bharatiya Nepal Ekta Samaj (ABNES) which was recently banned by India on the request of Nepal. In addition he has sought help from Nepal Trade Labour Organisation, students and women. At some stage, the Maoists expect to fight the Indian Army.

They started the revolution with 43 demands. Some of these were met and incorporated in the reforms of the Deuba government in 2001. They are at present focussing on three demands as under :-

- (a) Formation of interim government.
- (b) A constituent assembly.
- (c) Placing the army under civilian control.

They have shed their Robin Hood image and are now seriously looking for political power. They know they cannot win the People's War with guns alone, especially after 9/11.



In an interview with the *Far Eastern Economic Review* on 20 October 2002, Prachanda has said that no elections can be held till there is a political resolution of the civil war. He has also made three demands for holding peace talks: a round table conference of all political organisations, elections for a constituent assembly and the formation of a new interim government.

### **Peace Talks**

His Majesty's Government made two attempts to negotiate with the Maoists, first in 2000 under Prime Minister GP Koirala and more seriously in 2001 with the Sher Bahadur Deuba government. Nepali Congress (NC) leader Chakra Bastola, and NC facilitator, Daman Dhungana claim the government was never serious about the talks. It seems that Deuba was conducting parallel negotiations with Bhattarai and Dahal. While the Maoists apparently dropped their demand for a republic they got nothing in return. Their expectation was a constituent assembly. While the conventional reasoning made for the breakdown of the talks is the rift between the hawks and doves among the Maoists, there is also the usual conspiracy theory that the Maoists were assisted by the police in cleaning up the armoury at Dang. The RNA, instead of chasing the Maoists into Rolpa, reacted after three days when emergency was declared. The RNA says that many Maoist commanders were released and the four months of peace was used by the Maoists to rebuild military capability. Nobody knows the real reason for the failure of talks that pushed the People's War into a full-scale civil war. The competing politics of peace talks is apparent: press for dialogue when not in power. Even now, the only practical way out of the impasse is unconditional peace talks.

### **State Response**

The Nepalese state had never envisioned a situation when internal security and stability would be so seriously threatened that it would require external assistance to cope with it. Neither of the two security treaties, one with British India in 1923 nor its successor treaty of peace and friendship with India in 1950 contained such a contingency. These treaties merely dealt with external or foreign aggression. As such, no contingency plan existed for quelling



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internal disorder of such grave magnitude. Some of the other reasons for an imperfect response were :-

- (a) Lack of political consensus on how to deal with the Maoist revolt.
- (b) Reluctance of the King to permit use of RNA.
- (c) Preference of political leadership to employ the police and raise an interim force, the armed police.
- (d) Differences between the ruling establishment over proclamation of Emergency and employment of RNA.
- (e) An unclear chain of command. In fact, RNA is de facto not under civilian control. That it should be is one of the key demands of the Maoists.
- (f) The RNA was employed only after it had been attacked by the Maoists and state of emergency declared in the country on 26 November 2001.
- (g) Peace talks were not taken seriously by either side. There were parallel talks going on besides those at the official level. Both the Prime Minister and the Palace had separate channels operating with top Maoist leaders.

### **Role of Royal Nepal Army**

According to a booklet issued by the RNA in the first week of June 2002, "the primary and conventional role of RNA is to defend its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of its motherland. Besides its commitment to the primary role, its secondary role is to assist government in the internal security of the country. RNA is actively involved in the various development activities throughout the country."

It has never been clear whether the RNA seriously factored an external threat, either from North or South. Their deployment in the 1970s mainly in the Terai, suggested the primary threat was envisaged from the south - India - though logistics was also mentioned as a prime consideration for RNA "looking South". Then,



as now, it was a defensive army ostensibly maintaining neutrality in foreign policy. The concept was to fight delaying battles in the plains and mountains with independent companies, battalions and brigades which is the mainstay of the current organisation.

As a result of the Maoist threat, RNA has proposed an elaborate expansion plan which is far beyond its means and needs. The RNA was last involved in combat operations against the British in 1814-16 and against Tibet in 1892. More recently in 1974 one battalion was involved chasing Khampa rebels under their commander Wangdi in the Mugu region, now the hotbed of the Maoists.

### **Military Ethos**

The RNA motto decrees that the safety, honour and welfare of King and Country come first, equating the King with country. Therefore, RNA is directly associated with the defence of the Palace and security of the King and Monarchy. The Royal title was given to the RNA by King Mahendra after it helped in quashing democracy in 1960 and perpetuating Panchayat Raj for 30 years. Even after emergency rule, the RNA is governed by traditional Kathmandu culture: a panoply of ceremonial activities, no let up in UN Peacekeeping missions, heavy concentration of troops in Kathmandu including two battalions deployed in the Palace together with a light battery and anti aircraft guns. Another two battalions are employed in protecting wildlife parks. There is a trained pool of British and Indian Army ex-servicemen, experts in counter insurgency operations, which has not been mobilised.

### **Location of Power**

The Maoist demand has shrunk to placing the Army under civilian control. Despite the Constitution and Electoral Laws clearly stipulating that the RNA will be guided by the National Defence Council (NDC) headed by the Prime Minister, it is the King who exercises de facto if not de jure control over it. His is the last word on the RNA. While Article 119 confers on the King, the appointment of the Supreme Commander of the RNA, Article 118 (2) says "His Majesty shall perform the operation and deployment of the RNA on the recommendation of the NDC". The word "shall" not "may" has



been used. Until two years ago, the NDC consisted of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Army Chief. Since the Prime Minister was also his Defence Minister, there was normally a tie between the civil executive and the Army Chief. In order to overcome this, a separate Defence Minister was appointed to increase the quorum of the NDC from two to three and thereby avoid any impasse. Because of the perceived ambiguity in the chain of command the Palace continues to control important promotions and postings.

### **The Current Situation**

Following the Maoist debacle against the combined RNA and police post at Khara on 27 May 2002, an operational stalemate existed due to two reasons: the onset of the monsoons and the hazy political picture. The Emergency lapsed on 28 August 2002. The Maoists have brought their war to Kathmandu by attacking soft targets including political assassinations in the run up to elections which they have vowed to block. The string of deadly attacks in September, October and November 2002 against security forces reflect this determination not to be marginalised militarily.

Security forces control the capital Kathmandu, major towns like Surkhet, Baglung, Pokhara, Dharan, most of the Terai and the 75 district headquarters. In terms of territory, the Maoist diktat runs over a relatively larger area than that of the government. A broad categorisation of control and influence in the five erstwhile development regions of Nepal could be described as under :-

- (a) **East.** The government is effective and functioning upto district headquarters. Maoist influence is palpable but no major attacks or clashes have taken place. The Maoists say "balance has been achieved."
- (b) **Central and Western.** Security forces dominate with Maoists having pockets of influence. Maoists call this "situation confused and our movement sabotaged".
- (c) **Mid-West and Far West.** Maoists are dominating. They have categorised the situation as 'gains' for the movement. Overall, with the recent attacks in Sindhulgarhi, Arghakhanchi,



Rumjatar, Jumla and Gorkha, the Maoists have demonstrated they still hold the initiative. For the government the recent attacks are a setback. With time and resources the RNA can regain the initiative within 12 to 18 months.

### **Deployment of RNA**

Against an authorised strength of 53,000, RNA is posted with 50,000 combatants. The US specialist team which visited Nepal earlier in the year 2002 has suggested an augmentation of 150,000 to take the overall strength to 200,000 which is probably what the RNA desires - an Army of three Corps, six Mountain Divisions and four Plains Divisions. The police are 30,000 which is to increase by 10,000. The armed police sanctioned for 25,000 have only 7000 but are still not fully operational. Both police forces are under operational command of RNA. The relations between the RNA and police were soured in the pre-emergency period when RNA refused to bail out of the police even at Holleri which marks the lowest point in civil-military and RNA-police relations. Prime Minister GP Koirala had to resign after this incident.

There are 16 brigades in RNA. Of these, seven are specialist brigades. Of the remaining eight operational infantry brigades, (ninth is the counterinsurgency brigade still under raising) two, including the Palace Brigade, are deployed in Kathmandu. Just six brigades are out in the field. In addition there are 45 independent Himal companies. Nearly 80 per cent of this force is committed to holding ground: static duties like protection of key installations, headquarters and so on. For example, the only division in Nepal deployed in the west at Nepalgunj has just two brigades - one each at Surkhet and Dipayal. It has roughly the equivalent of 30 rifle companies to manage an area of responsibility almost as big as Jammu and Kashmir. This tiny force is looking for a needle in a haystack. Similarly in the East, there is one brigade at Hille with its battalions located in the Terai. The two brigades at Dhading and Pokhara are the ones best poised to blunt the Maoist threats in areas west of Kathmandu stretching to Pokhara and Baglung, contiguous to the western region. The Hitauda brigade covers Kathmandu's southern flank and central Terai. Nepal has approved the raising of a new corps consisting of three divisions. Already fresh raisings of Army



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and Police have taken place and the overall strength of security forces increased by 20,000.

### **Human Rights**

One of the arguments that was used for not deploying the RNA initially was: Maoists are our own people. It is against these very 'own' people and civilian 'own' people that RNA has been highhanded. Untrained in internal security and counterinsurgency, RNA is facing serious allegations of excesses in human rights both against Maoists and civilians. In the absence of Parliament and a fully representative government and local administration, the security forces are operating in a political vacuum without adequate political and administrative guidance. Better training, motivation and consciousness of humanitarian law is necessary.

### **The Maoist Organisation**

**Organisation Structures.** There is a standing committee or central advisory committee with a politburo on the political side. The military affairs committees consist of the military high command which is the central military commission, interfaced with the standing committee and percolating down to the regional, district and area military commissions.

**Force Structure.** Maoists strength of trained fighters is estimated around 5000 to 8000 with a People's Militia of 25,000. The main force is augmented by a semi-trained army of 5000 support force. Their main fighting and support forces consist of Magars, Tharus, Janjatis (Gurungs, Rais, Limbu, Tamangs, Dalits, Brahmins and Chhetries, the last two also providing the political and military leadership). Nearly 20 per cent are females. At least three dozen Indian and British ex-servicemen are actively involved in planning, training and conduct of operations. There are some reports that serving soldiers from the Indian Army on leave either pay a donation or run a three to four day training capsule for Maoist recruits.

The bulk of Maoist fighters - about 60 per cent - are deployed in the mid West and West in their strongholds. Another 10 per cent are in the far West with around 10 per cent in Gorkha. The remainder



20 per cent are located in Kathmandu valley and East of it. In other words, Puthan and West - 2500 to 3000; Baglung to Gorkha - 1000; Kathmandu - 500 to 1000 and East of Kathmandu - 1000 to 1500. The Maoists had steered clear of the Terai because of easy detection, people being relatively better off and because security forces enjoy greater intelligence and mobility. But recent activities reflect their growing presence in the Terai and linkages with the Terai dissident groups. Similarly they have avoided Pokhara-Dharan where a large population of ex-servicemen reside and prosper. They have no shortage of funds. Extortion, donation and looting have kept their coffers full. They pay their soldiers Rs 2000 per month. According to one estimate they have amassed around Rs 2 billion in cash and jewellery. The Maoists are, therefore, extremely motivated. They have promised all tribes and communities part of their movement, in securing separate enclaves, and autonomy for them once they are in power.

### **Pattern of Attack**

Planning, coordination and placement of fighters is followed by stage management and deception to achieve surprise. The attack is mounted in four overlapping stages. The first is led by the People's Militia, Jan Sena, a motely collection of fighters, hangers on and persons simply forced to join the so called human shield or human wave. They are plied with drugs, drinks, food and in some cases, money. This force is roughly 1000. It carries mashaals, beats drums, uses loudspeakers, makes catcalls, fires crackers, guns, explosives. It storms the enemy posts in waves and, therefore, suffers maximum casualties, the idea being to unnerve the defender and make him expend his ammunition. Therefore, this is more than just a jitter party. The second echelon is the support force (500) which fires the main weapons on specific targets to neutralise the defender's fire power. It also covers the movement of the first echelon of attacks. The main force (Lal Sena) actually enters the post using a few AK 47s, grenades, bombs of all sorts including bucket, tiffin carrier and pressure cooker and socket bombs. The socket bomb is considered the most effective. The main force is around 300 to 500. The last column is the salvage group (doko party) which hacks the heads of victims with khukuris and puts them into the doko (basket). They also empty the armoury



and valuables and set fire to the post. Stealth, storm tactics and speed are essence of these operations. The attackers rapidly melt into the countryside with their booty and casualties, seldom burying the Maoist torso but often leaving telltale signs. It is for this reason that physical fitness is regarded the prime quality of a fighter.

### **Who Else is Helping the Maoists**

There is no dearth of help for Maoists from within Nepal and outside, mainly India. In Nepal the main support in the East is from Limbuván and Khumbuván, Limbus and Rai tribes of 11 Gorkha Rifles (GR) fame. The former is active around Jhapa and Morang, while the latter also called the Khumbuván Rashtriya Morcha (KRM or Kharamo) is totally integrated with the Maoists. The KRM led by Gopal Khumbu helped the Nepali Congress to oust the Ranas in 1950. It is demanding and has been promised regional autonomy. There is also near east Jhapa bordering Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and India borders, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) the dissident Koch-Ranbanshi tribe from Cooch behar demanding autonomy in West Bengal. The ISI of Pakistan has a finger in all these pies. The Madheshi Mukti Morcha (MMM) also called the Madheshi Tiger Force is active in the 22 districts of Terai. They too are demanding autonomy, bigger representation in Parliament based on population and in the RNA. The Indian militant organisations networked with Maoists are the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Khalistan Liberation Organisation (KLO), Gurkha National Federation and Gurkha Liberation Organisation. The Maoists have also established links with the PWG and MCC in Bihar, UP, and Andhra Pradesh. Foreign groups like the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been involved in training and sale of explosives. The names of Taliban and Kashmiri groups also figure on the help list. The RIM based in Peru and the Revolutionary Communist Party supply the ideological fervour. In addition the Leftist India-based Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), a Maoist ideology supporting organisation which was established in July 2001 and has links in South Asia is a new ally, but not much is known about it.

### **Economy**

The economy has been most severely damaged by the People's War. The rate of growth of the GDP has been declining



from eight per cent in 1990 to five per cent in 1995 (when the Maoist problem started) and now down to less than one per cent. The per capita income is also down from \$ 240 to \$ 224. There is shortfall in almost every area of economic activity - in exports, tourist arrivals and government revenue. Tourism is down by 60 per cent, 90 per cent of development expenditure is likely to get diverted to defence. Funds for development aid cannot be used due to internal disorder. Further, the election if held will cost Rs 2 billion. Expenditure on defence has gone up six fold, and is growing further.

### **Implications for India**

The Maoist movement in Nepal which was simmering since 1995 was misread by successive governments in Kathmandu as a law and order problem localised to the districts of Rukum, Rolpa and Dang. It rapidly turned from an insurgency into a people's uprising sweeping the entire country. The decline of monarchy, denigration of democracy, failure of peace talks and the direct attacks by Maoists on RNA have altered the character of the revolution. The positive aftermath of the revolution is that the Nepalese elite now comprehends the meaning of security concerns which India has been traditionally drawing their attention to. These new security challenges to Nepal pose a spillover threat to India.

The open borders and eight million Nepalese residents in India increase prospects of greater weaponisation of UP and Bihar and cooperation with terrorist groups in India and pose long term threat of subverting Gorkhas in the Indian Army. It is time the process of reconciliation between the political class which is the legitimate custodian of military power and the RNA is started and the anomalies in the constitution on location of power are rectified in word as well as in spirit. The economy is in free fall. The Nepali rupee is pegged to the Indian rupee at 1.6:1. The adverse effects of a further downturn in the economy can only be averted by a bailout by India. Constitutional monarchy has to adapt to cohabit with multiparty democracy or else directly confront the Maoists. It is ironic that the Maoists have grabbed the agenda and space meant for political parties whose failure to implement their electoral promises has led to civil war.



The banning of ABNES and deportation of Maoists by India are positive steps to assuage the misgivings in the minds of Nepalese about India's perceived help to Maoists.

Nepal is at a crossroads. It is not just a matter of salvaging democracy but ensuring change with continuity. The institutions of state - the constitution, monarchy and democracy - need restructuring. The onus is on a discredited monarchy to learn to cohabit with and nurture the fledgling democracy. The critical questions are whether an election can be held at all, leave alone a free and fair one and how to bring the Maoists and the government to the negotiating table soon. The stakes for India in the internal disorder and political instability in the Himalayan kingdom are as high as for Nepal as anarchy there would spill over into India.

The King is trying to deal directly with the Maoists. The stumbling block to negotiations is the Maoists demand to hold elections for a constituent assembly, and a new constitution, which would challenge the centrality of monarchy in Nepal. Unless the Maoists can shelve their objective of a democratic republic, uncertainty and chaos will rule the Himalayan kingdom.

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# Taiwan and People's Republic of China (PRC) : A Perspective

Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri (Retd)

## History's Ghost

In 1954 at the height of the Sino-Indian détente and Panchsheel, People's Republic of China (PRC) published China Pictorial or Lei-Hua, (the official history), a map that depicted its dream of the fabled 'Middle Kingdom'. It showed twelve neighbouring countries and regions as its part. Listed out in it were the then Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan, the Pamir-Sinkiang (Xinjiang) region, Nepal, Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan and whole of former NEFA (India), Burma, Taiwan and Outer Mongolia. This claim not only showed the Chinese clamour for a 'neo-colonialism', but also its avariciousness. Besides, it showed how out of tune the then PRC was with the time.

PRC had already grabbed Tibet since 1950. India, which could have prevented it, ignored it. While the invasion of Tibet was termed as the 'peaceful liberation', the Republic of China (ROC), or Kuomintang (KMT) has remained an independent island state since 1949. All these years the KMT has, however, swayed between the extremes of 'independence' and 'Taiwan a remote relative of China and close neighbour'. Beijing, has intimidated Taiwan many a time such as the 1996 missile blockade when relations deteriorated owing to the Taiwanese prosperity, advancement in technology and the US support, or simple obduracy to retain *status quo*.

## The Crunch Issues

The KMT party ruled Taiwan for 50 years until replaced by the present Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under President Chen Shui-bian in May 2001. In his election manifesto, Chen Shui-bian hoped to rid Taiwan of corruption and improve 'cross the strait relations'. Of the latter, he vowed that he would not declare independence nor hold a referendum for independence beside

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Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri is a military historian and security analyst. He is author of *Rediscovered History of Gorkhas of Nepal*, *Field Marshal K M Cariappa: His Life & Times*, *Soldiers & Politicians*, and *Generals & Strategists*.

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excluding slogans of a 'state to state' policy in the new constitution, which the former KMT governments had hastily tried to introduce. Chen also offered to enlarge *rapprochement* by his Government's offer of 'three mini links' to Beijing. These involve opening of direct links for tourism, trade and communications between Kinmen and Matsu Islands. Beijing always found something irksome about Taiwan. Taiwan had even offered a suggestion for 'Taiwan-China Confederation' for improved mutual relations especially in trade which remarkably goes over \$100 billion.

The fundamental problem - and Beijing emphasises it - is of Taiwan's refusal to accept the 'One China policy' or even expanding it to 'One China-two systems' policy. Softening up of attitude since 2000 has, however, been in evidence. In September 2001, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen made a new offer of the "freedom the Island would enjoy in the proposed reunification under the formula of one country two systems". In the event of acceptance, "Taiwan would keep its own currency, military, customs, status and government structure without Beijing levying either taxes or enforcing appointments of the mainland." He also assured least interference in the Taiwanese way of life or culture. He summed up Beijing's offer by saying, "As long as Taiwan accepts one China arrangement we have patience to wait." Characteristic typical to the PRC, Qichen, however, kept the Democles sword hanging by reiterating Beijing's ever-readiness to use force to enforce reunification. The basic policy of PRC, involving the proverbial, 'carrot and stick', had, obviously not changed.

The PRC has concurrently continued to build its campaign for 'internationalising' the Taiwan issue against the US support for Taiwan's independent or autonomous status. President Jiang Zemin during June 2001, meeting of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation emphasised the need for a concerted effort against terrorism, separatism and extremism. The support came from Russia too. The 20 Year Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between Russia and China signed on 16 July 2001 makes a significant and bold stand:

The Russian side acknowledges that there is only one China i.e., PRC and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China... ..Russia opposes any form of Taiwan's independence.



Similar views are repeated in official and semi-official Chinese documents. The opinion building exercise nevertheless continues even within Taiwan. What was once a stonewall to the very thought of reunification seems to be gradually giving in to creating political consensus in favour, albeit in small but assured measure - of reunification and reconciliation. An opinion poll of mid 2000 showed 20 percent voters seek reunification ; 12 percent remain on the fence ; while the rest still favour present status. The Chinese are gradually growing conscious to the politics of the Island and its effect on world opinion. In 1996, for example, while the military response of Taiwan was restrained to the 'Missile Blockade', politically the bogie of 'Independence' gained momentum. Along with it went the request to the US for loaning over the Theatre Missile Grid system to the Island in tandem with South Korea's.

Decidedly, two more factors weigh in favour of the present status. First, the American commitment to come to the aid of the Island in case of conflict with the mainland. Second, the confidence people show in ROC's defence mechanism to thwart the Communist attempts at a *coup de main*.

### **Taiwan : An American - Protege**

Readers of history would recall a mighty successful US effort at proselytising over 20,000 Communist Prisoners of War (POWs) of the Korean War and repatriating them to Taiwan in February 1954. No amount of protestations from Beijing helped. Some of these former communist prisoners are pioneers in industry and management and are said to form the hardcore of the anti-PRC wave in Taiwan.

ROC, undoubtedly has survived because of the US support. It began with the USA signing 'A Measurement of Agreement' when in July 1958 a battalion of Nike Hercules ground-to-air guided missiles were handed over to the KMT. It was further strengthened by the 1979 US-Taiwan Relations Act. This commitment stands despite the 1972 Shanghai Joint Communiqué and the 1979 and 1982 Communiqués on the US-China Diplomatic Relations and Restraint on Arming Taiwan. Nonetheless, USA has assiduously exerted itself to make a place for Taiwan among the UN members



and acquire Taiwan's membership to other international institutions. It has thus far failed to see Taiwan enter the UN though Taiwan has managed to become a new member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), almost at the heel of PRC. It is evident that the US accepts the 'one China policy' but rejects reunification.

Although, after 11 September 2001, China had proved a valuable ally in counter-terrorism, the Chinese have put no blinkers to their vision on US-Taiwan policy as the one which "will not substantially change" no matter how the international strategic environment and global situations constantly change and the Taiwan issue will remain key to US-China relations.<sup>1</sup>

This seems to be further confirmed by a Pentagon Study which enumerated that China was rapidly modernising its military with the goal of countering American power in the Pacific and pressurising Taiwan to accept reunification. Towards this it sees China employing broader range of tactics and weapons including computer viruses as part of cyber warfare, naval blockades, increasingly accurate tipped missiles and quieter diesel submarines. It attributes enhanced capabilities in PLA to adopt a 'strategy of coercion as against of annihilation'<sup>2</sup> against Taiwan in its national goal of reunification.

In all their strategic responses, the Chinese have studiously dismissed America's the 'Chinese Threat Theory' as 'groundless'. The *China Daily* of June 28, 2002, for example, equated it with the Aespean logic of 'wolf at the door' by statistically disproving the Chinese military capability to venture an offensive across the Strait assumes that the American support will be fully available to Taiwan. And in vindication, it compares the American military might vis-à-vis PRC's. Where is the chance, it argues, when US 'GDP is more than one-fourth of the world's total, and its military expenditure larger than the aggregate of the eight major military powers'. It then puts its own capabilities as 1/9<sup>th</sup> of USA's GDP and a 'negligible military strength combined - which would take another three to four decades to develop a matching capability with or against the USA'. It, however, does not hesitate to term the US's Taiwan policy as 'interference in PRC's internal affairs'.



The Chinese biggest *battle royale* in so far as reunification of Taiwan is concerned has, therefore, been to win over the 'American conscience', as the Chinese intellectuals say. Beginning from President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 to declaration of President Clinton's 'one China policy', the USA has, in fact, followed 'two China policy', supporting Taiwan as an ally for strategic partnership in Asia and developing all round trade and cultural ties with the mainland. In a later development, the official Chinese newspaper conveyed its Government's views in its issue of 25 August 2002 : "USA is the largest developed nation and China, the largest developing nation. Why not have strategic relations?" In response the US State Department has even offered one to one military exchanges with the PRC.

### **Military Possibilities**

Over the years ROC has developed adequate military capability by itself. And it continues to upgrade its C<sup>4</sup>ISR - the ever increasing, command and control capabilities of coordination, computerisation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. So are the PLA, including its Navy and Air Force, acquiring modern arms, weapons and equipment.

It must be said at the outset that comparison of Taiwan with mainland China is to draw an uneven comparison of, say, the moon with the sun, or a mythical David with Goliath. But it must be seen from the military angle, namely, the force that the PLA would be able to apply against Taiwan at the beginning of an operation for a sudden attack.

The Taiwan Strait is a 130 kilometres to 160 kilometres wide, shallow continental shelf with mud flats on the western side. The tide varies up to five metres in 24 hours. The two very unusual monsoons of August-September and November-April generate high winds of over 40 to 50 knots with 7 to 10 metre high waves. Then there is 'funnel effect' of stormy winds. Combined with high annual rainfall of approximately 180 centimetres there is constant bad weather and poor visibility for landing ships and landing crafts. Geography seems to favour a natural defence of Taiwan. That perhaps is the reason why China tried to experiment a 'Missile Blockade' rather than an invasion in 1996 when the USA



not only sold F-16 fighter aircraft to the Island but threatened to install Theatre Missiles Grid in Taiwan.

Table below compares relative capabilities and strengths.

| Forces   | China (PRC)  | Taiwan (ROC)   |
|--|--|--|
| 1. Total armed forces (active)                                     | 2,480,000  | 376,000  |
| 2. Nuclear forces and ballistic missiles (ground and sea launched) | 20-30, ICBMs, 180, IRBMs, 12, SLBM, 300, SRBMs.  | Nil  |
| 3. Total ground forces   | 1,830,000  | 240,000  |
| 4. Armoured Vehicles   | Over 10,000 of which 8,500 are Main Battle Tanks (MBT).<br>2,000 Light tanks.  | 1700 armoured vehicles including approximately 100 MBTs.   |
| 5. Artillery - all kinds   | 15,000 pieces  | 1400 pieces  |
| 6. Total Air Force personnel                                       | 420,000  | 68,000   |
| 7. Total combat aircraft   | 3600   | 680, Mirages and F-16s   |
| Total Bombers  | 360 including 38 SU-30   |  |
| Total Fighters   | 3,000 QS J6  |  |
| 8. Total Naval Personnel   | 230,000 including 5,000 marines.   | 68,000.  |
| Destroyers/Frigates  | 60 destroyers including 4 GM destroyers.   | 40 ships including 4 Kidd class with Aegis system (being introduced), 60 missile boats, 20 amphibians, 30,000 marines.   |
| 9. New and Growing Inventories                                     | China has signed a \$ 4 bn defence deal of four to five years with Russia to obtain: two more Sovremenny - class destroyers, PMU anti-aircraft missiles, 40, SU-30 MKK fighter bombers, besides eight Kilo-class submarines (with 225 km anti ship Klub class missiles.) | In April 2002, US supplied to Taiwan eight, diesel submarines, 30, AH-64 D long range Apache attack helicopters, 12, P-36 submarine hunting aircraft, four Kidd class destroyers, radars and Patriot-3 missiles. |

(Source : *Military Balance*, IISS, 2002 and *Janes Intelligence*.)



Doctrinally PLA has adopted its earlier version of 'fighting in local conditions' to 'fighting against an enemy in modern high technological battlefield conditions'. It has an obvious reference to the Chinese version of a future conflict over Taiwan. Indigenously, China is replacing its DF-5 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with some 60, longer range versions which can strike the Western hemisphere easily. Similarly its Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) now over 300 are located in Fujian Island bordering the Taiwan Strait.<sup>3</sup>

Operationally, two capabilities can be attributed to the PRC against the ROC: ability to lay several concentric circles to effect naval blockade of the Island; and, to make initial dent into its defensive perimeter. Strategically deterrence needs to be seen in its phlegmatic dimension.

### **Deterrence**

Deterrence continues to be built by Taiwan as it determinedly improves its early warning capability, electronic warfare and target acquisition capability. Its effort at acquiring P-3 Orion maritime reconnaissance plane, Arleigh Burke class destroyers even after getting Kidd Class types, would enhance its C<sup>4</sup>ISR capability with a view to deter Chinese direct attack. Nonetheless, Chinese 'missile blockade' in differing variations could hardly be overruled.

The Chinese future course shall probably, be dictated by a combination of overall strategic factors including the fallout of a military action upon the ongoing economic development of China, its own image of a China which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and above all, the response of the coalition forces that could probably marshal under the banner of the USA, as, happened in the case of invasion of South Korea in June 1950, or the Gulf war of 1991. While the Chinese immediate objective remains - deterrence - with a view to prevent Taiwan declare independence and create a fait accompli, that of the Taiwanese is of survival.

### **What do the Developments Portend?**

Like a big brother, China has never stopped cajoling Taiwan from joining the mainland. In August 2001, it urged it to accept 'one China principle' and honour its commitment of relaxing its rules for cross-strait trade. Concurrently, it laid a red carpet welcome to



delegation of parliamentarians of the KMT now in opposition. Fortuitously, both China and Taiwan were made members of the WTO by end of 2001. However, in August 2002 China obdurately saw the UN Committee reject, for the tenth time, the entry of Taiwan into the world body.

Following terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Taiwanese Government apprehended a surprise attack on the Island by China. Initially, the Chinese are said to have indirectly pressed their demand to the US for creating suitable conditions for Taiwan's amalgamation with the mainland as *quid pro quo* for its support for *Operation Enduring Freedom*. As situation developed, China fell in line with the rest of the world in showing its solidarity with the US to fight international terrorism.

In dealing with Taiwan, PRC would seem to follow the classic example of Kautilyan strategem of *Sam, Dam, Dand, Bhed* - namely conciliation, reward, retribution and dissension, in that order - to achieve reunification. Its policy makers are expected to treat Taiwan in accord with strategic realities and constraints of international behaviour.

In Taiwan itself, the general elections of 1 December 2001 saw the DPP retain lead over the KMT. KMT slid from its earlier 114 seats to 68 whereas DPP rose to 87 from 66. The remaining 70 seats were shared by other smaller parties who showed inclination to join the DPP. Two clear implications of the elections are : one, KMT, and with it the Communists, seem to be an ineffective force in the Taiwanese political life ; and, two, President Chen's position has been strengthened vis-à-vis China on the question of sovereignty of the Island. He, as *The Economist* (December 8, 2001) puts it, sees the reunification, if ever, as 'unification of two sovereign states'.

A word of caution however, would serve Taiwan, well. It comes from the Dalai Lama, who says, "China never says what it has made up its mind about." It is reasonable, however, to assume that even if China had in mind the use of force to achieve reunification of Taiwan, it would do nothing before the conclusion of the 2008 World Olympics, for which it has worked most assiduously for over a decade. The events of 11 September nonetheless, if taken



with wit and vision, would suggest to Taiwan that it should keep its powder dry. For, it remains a flash point.

And what of the bottom line on whether reunification is possible? Reunification, no doubt, is possible, but only a decade or two later, say by 2020. For, it is then that the Koreans would have been reunified; a credible counter-poise to the USA would most probably have emerged in the collective security paradigms of Russia-China; and perhaps, Taiwanese opinion itself may suggest so.

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### ERRATA : USI Journal July-September 2002, Vol CXXXII, No. 549.

1. Refer the article "Pakistan, Musharraf and De-Talibanisation" by Lt Gen R Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd). Page 349, the Sentence, 'if the national elections in October 2000..... should read if the national elections in October **2002**.....'.
2. Refer the article 'The Unforgotten Who Deserve Better : The Need for a Truly National War Memorial'. Page 433, the sentence 'This came to her vigilant eye when, on the 50th anniversary of Victory in Japan Day in 1955..... Should read This came to her vigilant eye when, on the 50th anniversary of Victory in Japan Day in **1995**.....

The errors are regretted

### ERRATA : Index of Articles Published in USI Journal Vol. 130/2000

#### SUBJECT WISE

Serial 33 for Lt Cdr Sudhakar Jee read **Lt Col** Sudhakar Jee

#### TITLE WISE

Serial 4 for Lt Cdr Sudhakar Jee read **Lt Col** Sudhakar Jee

The errors are regretted



# **Tactical Land Attack Missiles As An Instrument of State Policy**

**Captain Sunil E David, VSM, IN**

## **Preamble**

**O**n 19 January 1991 a stunned world watched unforgettable television images of Tomahawk missiles searching out and hitting their targets in Baghdad with astonishing accuracy. The customised destruction that these Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) inflicted upon command structures, communication facilities and early warning sensors of a hapless Iraq clearly demonstrated their strategic and tactical significance. The fact that F-117 stealth fighters and other aircraft followed in their wake with virtual impunity stands testimony to the effectiveness of the Tomahawks.

Subsequently, there have been other crises in other countries too such as Sudan, Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and also in Iraq (1996 and 1998) that have underlined not only the military role of TLAMs but also their political importance. Closer home this has been illustrated by the attack on the hideouts of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998, and then again in the recent US-led attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. The flexibility in the deployment of TLAMs provides increased options not only to force commanders but also political decisions makers. Therefore, TLAMs are not just another weapon system, but one that can be used as an effective instrument of state policy in what may be defined as the most efficient form of gunboat diplomacy.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the political and strategic implications of having and using TLAMs from the Indian Naval ships and submarines. Ballistic missiles as land attack missiles do

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**Captain Sunil E. David, VSM, IN** is a specialist in missiles and gunnery.

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not come under the purview of this paper due to the nature of their trajectory they are in a different league.

### **Relevance of TLAMs**

Five decades ago, nations with aspirations to great power status looked towards stockpiling their arsenals with nuclear weapons. These weapons were viewed as talismans of national sovereignty and symbols of national intent and resolve. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence was formulated and came to rest on the paradox that the utility of nuclear weapons lies in their non-use in combat, leading to the inevitable conclusion that a nuclear war was not winnable and must, therefore, never be fought.

While the doctrine of nuclear deterrence may have been successful in averting a large-scale theatre war between the erstwhile Cold War rivals, it was meaningless in so far as smaller wars and skirmishes were concerned. Moreover, with the emergence of asymmetric threats from weaker nations, and also where the adversary may be a non-state organisation or a terrorist group, retaliation by massive force has to be ruled out. In a scenario where the possibility of escalation to beyond the nuclear threshold does not exist, it is meaningless to even suggest such a threat.

It is in this backdrop that the big powers searched for a weapon system that would enable them to project power as required in their out-of-area interests. This led to the development of TLAMs. While nuclear weapons were designed for indiscriminate death, the contemporary requirement from today's most advanced weapons is just the opposite. This is where the true relevance of TLAMs comes in; they are weapons that can actually be used to demonstrate political and military intent and resolve as against weapons that remain in the basement.

TLAMs give ships and submarines a stand off capability, as well as it gives political decision makers the ability to flex muscles in exercising coercive diplomacy. Their surgical precision and ability to cause minimal collateral damage make them weapons of choice. More importantly, TLAMs provide a long-range, highly survivable, unmanned land attack weapon system. This is especially relevant in scenarios when the Navy may be called upon to defend national interests, and where the loss of pilots and combatants or their being taken prisoner is politically unacceptable.



## **The Indian Context**

As discussed above, TLAMs are useful not only to the military commander but also to the politician. In fact, they serve no purpose unless there is a political will to sanction their use in less than war situations. Therefore, the utility of acquiring TLAMs needs to be viewed in the context of India's defence and foreign policies.

In recent years, the defence policy spectrum of the nation appears to have widened. This is possibly consequent to India's perceived regional role, the chain of events post Pokhran II, as also the realisation that military power must seek to defend the nation's strategic and security interests.

TLAMs are of relevance to India when looking at exercising a degree of influence in the immediate neighbourhood, contribution towards regional and international stability, and having an out-of-country contingency capability. A robust foreign policy can be pursued only within the framework of a strong military capability and the willingness to use it. After all, "War is a continuation of political intercourse by other means."<sup>1</sup>

India must be capable and ready to discharge its responsibilities towards maintaining regional and international security. It is within this context, that the potential for using TLAMs by the Indian Navy needs to be examined.

### **TLAMs for the Indian Navy**

Manufacture of TLAMs is presently limited to the US and Russia, with France reportedly on its way to developing this capability by 2008<sup>2</sup>. Realistically, the best avenue available to the Indian Navy for acquiring a TLAM is to look towards Russia, the traditional supplier of missiles. Due to restrictions laid down by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the range of the TLAM would be limited to 300 kilometres (kms) and the warhead to 500 kilograms (kgs). The limited warhead would hardly be a cause for concern as the Tomahawk carries only a 450 kgs warhead. While the Tomahawk is nuke capable, nuclear warheads have been withdrawn from missiles operationally deployed on ships and submarines. This is to signal across the globe that Tomahawk



would be with a conventional warhead and to ensure that a Tomahawk streaking through the air is not mistaken for a nuclear attack, which elicits a proportional response from the intended victim. Perhaps, the Indian Navy would also have to consider such a decision for the same reasons. While so far the US Navy and Royal Navy have fired Tomahawk missiles against a significantly weaker side that was geographically distant from their homelands, use of TLAMs by the Indian Navy is unlikely to fall into the same template. The potential of a mistake in identifying the nature of the weapon in flight leading to crossing of the nuclear rubicon by the targeted party must be minimised to the extent possible. On the other hand if India were to consider TLAMs as part of the nuclear triad, then like other nuclear weapons they would become instruments of deterrence rather than actual use. They would then not be available as leverage for coercive diplomacy.

A range of 300 kms, which an imported TLAM would have due to the MTCR ceiling, would suggest that it would be able to strike targets up to 100 kms inland. This is presuming that the firing unit keeps 200 kms away from the enemy coast.

In such a case, TLAMs would not be able to strike deeper into the enemy hinterland. While these coastal targets may be of naval interest, TLAMs would not be in a position to influence the land battle or, in less than war situations, be able to carry out a surgical strike against targets of interest such as terrorist training camps, hide outs of gangsters wanted in connection with various crimes in India, clandestine chemical and biological weapons infrastructure etc. Looking at TLAMs as instruments of policy, it follows that they should be able to fulfill these roles.

Therefore, a 300 kms TLAM would be of use only against naval targets and little else. However, it should not be too difficult to increase their range to 600 kms or even 1,000 kms once they are acquired. If the Iraqis could enhance the range of the Scuds supplied to them, it would be easier to increase the range of the air breathing TLAM. TLAMs would then be able to contribute to the land battle in limited theatres by suppressing enemy air defences especially if the Indian Air Force (IAF) does not enjoy air superiority, destroying command centres, striking at enemy force and armour



concentrations, providing close air support, disrupting rail movement and communication networks, demolishing power grids, razing fuel farms and ammunition depots etc. However, the real impact of TLAMs would come if their range could be enhanced to 1,500 kms. That would bring the entire area of interest to the immediate West of India within striking distance.

Even for a country like China with immense strategic depth, most of the potential targets can be hit with a 1,500 kms TLAM. For smaller littorals it would cover their entire area. As most of the world's population lives within 100 kms of the sea, even a 300 kms TLAM would be of relevance in regard to many of the smaller nations. Nonetheless, a 1,500 kms TLAM would still remain the weapon of choice as targets closer to the hinterland can be engaged from longer ranges away from the adversary's coast thereby ensuring better survivability of the firing platform especially if it is a surface unit. More importantly, a longer range TLAM would ensure that the first round could be fired that much earlier without waiting for the firing unit to close the target. This would be of great relevance in a less than war situation where an early display of intent and resolve may actually precipitate the opposition into backing down. In the case of impending hostilities, units would not only be in a position to carry out a pre-emptive strike earlier but would also ensure their own survivability by keeping outside the range of shore based aircraft.

Great power navies have today shifted their prime focus from 'controlling the seas' and 'fighting great battles' to dominating the littoral. Using sea power to destroy the enemy's war waging potential on land was always the theme of Soviet Union's Admiral Gorshkov. Three decades later, this is the focus of American sea power. With longer range missiles available, the ability to go beyond the hinterland and strike deep into the enemy's heartland has become more relevant. The days of dominating and controlling the littoral are now upon us. TLAMs would then play a major role as the primary strike weapon especially in areas outside the range of shore-based aircraft.

TLAMs, however, are not an end in themselves, but just another rung in the ladder of graduated escalation. The nation must have



the will and capability to transit through if TLAMs are to be used as an instrument of state policy. The phase before firing TLAMs is showing naval presence as a sign of intent, an action that in itself may cause the other party to back down from its adversarial stance. After firing of TLAMs the nation must be politically and military prepared to send in special forces and ground forces should the situation so arise. It is only with the backing threat of intervention forces that the damage caused by TLAMs can have any real meaning in getting the adversary to capitulate.

### **Cost-to-Capability Analysis of TLAMs**

Every naval planner would like to have the latest electronic wizardry and hi-tech weaponry in his repertoire. But the man in the treasury is quick to transport every dreamer with such hopes back to the stark reality of the budget. The debate of converting ploughshares into swords or *vice versa* is centuries old, and one that perhaps would go on forever. A rather down-to-earth view on this was expressed by former US Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney: "... In the real world, budget drives strategy, strategy does not drive budget"<sup>3</sup>. Whatever capability one may crave for has to be within the confines of the available buck. Investing in a big way in TLAMs is bound to pinch elsewhere. Before discussing the cost aspects it needs to be analysed as to how effective has the Tomahawk really been, as also to estimate the number of TLAMs that the Indian Navy would need.

During the Gulf War and thereafter, cameras titling towards a dramatic flare showed Tomahawk missiles singling out their targets and attacking them with utmost precision. What the cameras did not show were the missiles that missed their targets and landed harmlessly elsewhere. The cameras were also conveniently not available when the missiles failed to lift off or ditched soon after firing. Dramatic footage of Tomahawks taking out a target suited the manufacturers, who like others around the world routinely overstate the capability of their products. Also it suited the governments and troops of the allies taking on Saddam Hussein. Therefore, no one was going to give the lie to CNN's spectacular coverage.



The truth, as it slowly emerged afterwards, is that the Tomahawk was less than perfect during the Gulf War and later in the 1993 air strike launched by President Clinton against Iraqi intelligence headquarters. Of the 307 Tomahawk launches attempted, only 288 missiles actually took off. Of these, six suffered boost failures and did not transition to cruise. Finally, only 242 hit the target<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, only about 80 per cent of the intended 307 Tomahawks found their mark. Even the veracity of this claim needs to be viewed judiciously as these are the figures reported to the US Congress by the Department of Defence. It is likely that inbuilt into these figures is a look-good-feel-good factor, which is the case in most weapon firings where the claims greatly exaggerate the actual damage done. After all, Saddam Hussein is still alive. In Bosnia, 256 armoured vehicles were counted as moving after two weeks of surgical strikes by the US using a vast array of weapons including TLAMs, laser guided bombs and precision guided ammunition. Also an accurate and realistic assessment of the collateral damage caused by TLAMs is not openly available, and for obvious reasons.

When a TLAM hits the target, it has the destructive power of a 1,000 pounds (lbs) bomb. While a 1,000 lbs warhead crashing into a ship can have devastating results, the effect of the same being delivered ashore is usually not as dramatic. Due to the large number of targets ashore and their greater resilience to ordnance, it is not possible to estimate the number of TLAMs that would be required in war. A 1,500 kms missile could take on all targets that would otherwise have been allotted to the IAF. Therefore, theoretically the Indian Navy would need as many TLAMs as the IAF has bombs. Of course available funds would not allow such a number. Therefore, the number of TLAMs to be acquired has to be based on a different paradigm.

On one end of the spectrum the US Navy is looking at building up an inventory of 3,440 Tomahawks by 2006 with a total of 6,266 launchers on 72 SSNs (696 launchers) and 70 surface ships (5,570 launchers)<sup>5</sup>. Such a large arsenal would be justifiable for the US Navy, especially if *Pax Americana* is to be maintained. The requirements of other nations would be far more modest. The UK



is seeking to maintain an inventory of only 65 Tomahawks<sup>6</sup>. Such a number does not suggest they having a significant military impact in times of war. After all it is only about 20 per cent of the missiles fired during Desert Storm. Therefore, these missiles are almost certainly meant to be instruments of state policy in less than war situations, as was demonstrated by Royal Navy SSNs firing Tomahawks in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The number of TLAMs in the Russian arsenal is not known, but considering their present political and economic situation it is unlikely to be an impressive number.

Finally, it is the cost that will dictate the number of TLAMs that the Indian Navy would hold in stock. In April 1999, UK negotiated with the US for 30 conventionally armed Tomahawk Block IIIC missiles along with containers, engineering technical assistance, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. These were to be replacement of those fired by them earlier, and the estimated cost of the package was \$100 million<sup>7</sup>, which works out to be Rs 480 crores or roughly Rs 16 crores per missile. It must be kept in mind that while armament supplies from the former Soviet Union were relatively cheaper, the same is no longer assured as the Russians are increasingly looking at the bottom line. 'Friendship prices' are a thing of the past.

Assuming Rs 16 crore as unit cost, 100 TLAMs along with associated infrastructure would cost Rs 1,600 crores. If spread over a period of eight years, it would amount to an annual expenditure of Rs 200 crores. It is unlikely that the Indian Navy would be in a position to set aside greater funds, as there are other demands on the Revenue Budget. There would also be the added cost of fire control systems and pre-launch check equipment on board ships and submarines. Additional expenditure would accrue on account of getting high quality digital maps of our areas of interest for downloading into a TLAM mission when required. These will have to be imported till such time as we can get high-resolution data from our own satellites. While Global Positioning System (GPS) may appear a cheap option for guiding TLAMs to their targets, Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM)/Digital Scene-Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) cannot be dispensed with as they allow the missile ingress routes keeping clear of obstructions in the vicinity of the target as well as precision in terminal manoeuvres.



## Conclusion

TLAMs are powerful instruments of state policy, of immense utility to both the military planner as well as the political decision maker. Acquiring TLAMs by the Indian Navy has become almost inescapable if the nation is to exercise greater influence in the Indian Ocean Region.

While TLAMs have come to epitomise the 21st Century's gunboat diplomacy, their cost effectiveness as weapons in a conflict involving nations with reasonably comparable military capability is, at best, questionable. Only the US with their large arsenal of Tomahawks could possibly use them to secure significant military gains. For nations with more modest stocks of up to, say a 100 TLAMs, the military advantage would not be commensurate with the costs of having and deploying these weapons. However, this does not detract from their effectiveness in being wielded as instruments of state policy in less than war situations, which for now seems have become the rule; full fledged wars are becoming the exception for the moment.

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## **'SECRETARY'S NOTES' ON PAGES 106 AND 107 OF THE USI JOURNAL, JANUARY-APRIL, 1949 EDITION**

It will be noticed that the old title of this Institution has been restored. This decision has been taken by the Council in deference to the sentiments of the Government of Pakistan.

When the title was changed to "The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan" in 1948, there were Pakistan members on the Council and the Committee. Subsequently, however, the Government of Pakistan, while appreciating the work of the U.S.I. and wishing it well, decided that it could not with propriety be officially associated with an Institution outside that Dominion. Also, Pakistan officers could not be office-bearers of the Institution, although they could continue in simple membership. The Council has therefore agreed to drop the names of Pakistan members from the governing body and to revert to the old title of the Institution which will henceforward be again known as "The United Service Institution of India."

In a sense, perhaps, the old familiar title with its associations stretching back to 1870 will serve the purpose just as well, without any change in name, of fostering a spirit of service and comradeship between members in India and Pakistan and the wider Commonwealth. Some of our members, retired or released in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, have written with warm appreciation of the role of the U.S.I. in helping to maintain the bonds that time has, forged in the past. These bonds tested by comradeship in arms in two World Wars are a heritage which would be treasured in the minds of fighting men in India and Pakistan and the Commonwealth.

The Institution will continue its endeavour, as in the past, to be of service to its members wherever they are. It can do this best through the Journal which is a medium for the exchange of military thought all over the world irrespective of country or service. It is hoped that Pakistan officers will continue to enrol as members, and send articles and other contributions to the Journal.



## **Annual Council Meeting**

At the Annual Council Meeting held in New Delhi in November 1948, the President reviewed the activities of the Institution for the year 1947.

The continued reduction in strength of the Armed Forces, the closing down of number of messes, and the departure of many British officers, have deprived the Institution of a number of former subscribers. This was, however, more than offset by the number of new members enrolled, the net increase in membership at the close of the year being 135.

The Auditors' Report and Statement of Accounts showed that income during the year amounted to Rs. 48,044, compared with Rs. 43,238 during 1946. Expenditure had increased from Rs. 45,458 to Rs 52,280, owing mainly to the increased cost of printing the Journal.

The free-hold of the plot in which the U.S.I. building stands was purchased from the United Service Club for Rs. 16,000.

## **Special Council Meeting**

A Special Council Meeting was held in New Delhi in March 1949, when letters received from the Pakistan External Affairs Ministry came up for consideration. It was agreed in consequence to discontinue using the title of "The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan" (introduced in 1948) and to revert to the old title of the Institution, viz., "The United Service Institution of India".

In bringing the Rules and Bye-laws up-to-date, it was decided to enlarge the Council to twenty members of whom eight would be ex-officio and twelve elected. It was further decided that elections would be on an all-India basis.

The Council considered the recommendations of the Judges and made the final award of the prizes for the Gold Medal Essay Competition for 1948.

## **Gold Medal Essay Competition 1948**

Ten entries were received for the competition for 1948, the



subject of which was "Are Officers' Messes Suitable for Indian Conditions ? " The judges have stated that the essays submitted were of a high standard. The first and second prizes have been awarded as follows :-

|           |                            |           |
|-----------|----------------------------|-----------|
| 1st prize | Lieut.-Colonel D.K. Palit  | Rs. 250/- |
| 2nd prize | Sq/Ldr, B.K. Roy, R.I.A.F. | Rs.150/-  |

No medal was awarded on this occasion.

The Institution is indebted to Major-General G.S. Dhillon, Air Commodore D.A.R. Nanda, RIAF, and Instructor Captain W.I. Saxton, RN, for acting, as the three judges of this competition.

### **New Members**

From 1st November 1948 to 31st January 1949, the following new members joined the Institution :

ANAND, Lieut.-Colonel P.C., R.I.A.S.C.

BALBIR SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.

\*BANERJI, Captain B.N., I Cooch Behar Infantry.

BANERJI, Captain R.N., The Sikh Regiment.

BHATIA, Captain M.L., The Rajputana Rifles.

BHATTACHARYA, Lieut. P., R.I.A.

BIR SINGH, Major, R.I.A.S.C.

BOSE, Major R.N., R.I.A.

CHADHA, Captain K.D., R.I.A.

CHIMA, Captain G.S., R.I.A.S.C.

\*Life Member.



## The Impregnable Conquered\*

Lieutenant General Y P Khurana, PVSM, (Retd)\*\*

Reading any of the books so far published, the reader had experienced a sense of incompleteness in understanding the nature and causes of the conflict, the totality of effort used to evict the intruders and the subsequent developments. We now have a book by a war veteran that is different in its perception and motivation for its being. It provides a holistic picture of the events, its context and the aftermath. It examines the conflict in the overall context of Kashmir problem with all its nuances, Indo-Pak relations over the years; and the concerns of international community over the Kashmir problem, especially since the 1998 nuclear tests by the two countries. Its approach to the subject is all encompassing. It is comprehensive in details and simple in narration. The battle accounts are well illustrated with maps, sketches and photographs.

Released on 30 October 2002 by Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, MC, the book opens with a historical perspective and background to the Kashmir problem. It focuses our attention to the region of operations, its ruggedness, its people and their aspirations. It provides the readers with an insight into the pattern of troop deployment by both sides since the 1971 War. It gives a day to day account of how intrusion in different sectors came to the notice of the unit commanders. It points to the inability of higher headquarters in co-relating these intrusions and the failure of senior echelons in analysing Pakistan's "Surprise and Deception" options.

The acts of bravery and sacrifices by the officers and men have been faithfully narrated. The author covers the events in each sector, unit and feature wise, in their chronological order. The role played by various supporting arms, logistics units and the Air Force find their due place in the description of various actions. The role played by Border Roads in keeping the National Highway 1

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\*Kargil 1999 : The Impregnable Conquered. By Lieutenant General Y M Bammi (Retd) (Noida : Gorkha Publishers, 2002), pp. 558, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-7525-352-2

\*\*Lieutenant General Y P Khurana, is former Engineer-in-Chief of the Indian Army.  
*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXXII, No. 550, October-December 2002.



Alpha open throughout the operations against heavy odds and the strategy adopted by the Indian Navy to take care of any surprises from Pakistan Navy; have been brought out to complete the picture of overall synergistic operational effort.

The book has a chapter on Indian diplomacy as practiced during the Kargil conflict to counter Pakistani attempts to get international commitment on Kashmir problem and to label Pakistan as the violator of the Line of Control. The role played by the US in bringing hostilities to an early end and to compel Pakistan to withdraw unconditionally has been analysed and explained.

The chapter on post Kargil events covers the political happenings and other events in India and Pakistan upto August 2002 in great detail. The author makes some telling observations on the Kargil Review Committee Report. He brings out lessons for the higher Defence Management. He observes that the Indian Air Force is not well equipped to support the ground forces during operations in mountainous areas. He also highlights the lessons for the various echelons of Army leadership.

The author is appreciative of the role played by media in galvanising the nation during the Kargil conflict. He examines it in sufficient depth and brings out lessons for the media (electronic) and ground forces.

The book has a very high credibility on a number of counts. While in service, Lieutenant General Bammi had his due share of Jammu and Kashmir postings, including command of a battalion in Poonch sector and a tenure in Ladakh region. Despite this background, he considered it necessary to visit the entire area of the Kargil conflict twice and studied all its elements thoroughly. He interviewed all the participating battalion commanders. He held detailed discussions with the brigade and divisional commanders who conducted the operations. Thus, he acquired first-hand knowledge of the operations and collected a wealth of data and details of actual happenings from the "actors" themselves. He held long briefing sessions with the then COAS, General V P Malik to understand the compulsions of Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence in planning and conduct of Operation Vijay.



The author does not hesitate to dissect sensitive issues like the adequacy or otherwise of the security set up across Zoji La in the summer of 1999. He questions the effectiveness of the responses of our field formations, particularly the senior leadership to the intrusions. Similarly he examines the sensitive issues of the other side as well. He questions the assumptions and compulsions of the Pakistan Army while making plans for intrusions into Kargil sector. He examines the quality of Pakistan Army's reactions to India's Operation Vijay. All along the author's efforts have been to raise the examination of the issues to the higher plane of understanding.

Thus the book has a very wide canvas. Its contents are well researched, organised and the presentation of the matter is properly structured. The narration of events is free from prejudice and bias. The book would be of interest to Service officers, schools of instructions of the defence forces, and Government officials dealing with the Kashmir problem in India and Pakistan. It has wealth of information, organised data and copies of official documents for the discerning readership of G-8 nations and in particular for the United States of America. The book contains copies of important resolutions and documents relating to the Kashmir problem which form a rich source of reference material.

The author deserves our appreciation for bringing out such a book, which could eventually be a reference source for all those concerned with early solution of the Kashmir problem.

### **ADDRESS UPDATE**

**ALL MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO INTIMATE  
CHANGE OF ADDRESS ON OCCURENCE**

### **USI TIE**

**AVAILABLE FOR MEMBERS IN  
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FOR Rs 280**



## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**Behind Psychology: Searching for the Roots.** By Vijay Singal (New Delhi : Manas Publications, 2002), pp 133, Rs. 295.00, ISBN 81-7049-145-2.

The author is a mechanical engineer turned bureaucrat and has given vent to his philosophical musings in this book. He makes an attempt to give a scientific explanation to support his theory of 'consciousness' being the subtle basic energy force that exists as the superfine entity that permeates the thoughts and deeds at the physical level of the body-mind complex. While accepting the Freudian description of the conscious and subconscious mind, he suggests that human mind is the continuity of never ending waves while the body is a 'process' of growth and decay that repeats itself. He finds the origin of 'ego' as being the end result of awareness of one's environment, legacies of experiences and will power. He finds 'awareness' to be the panacea for most ills that afflict a person. These are the 'roots behind psychology'.

Frequent repetition of the same idea differently, at frequent-intervals, makes the book seem like a book of sermons; and makes the author a preacher! The last chapter is in the form of questions and answers. One may go by his answers if one chooses to. All in all, the book can be read to look at some raw ideas on the complex subjects of evolution of life and human psychology.

*Major General Dinesh Chandra (Retd)*

**Bringing The Biosphere Home :Learning to Perceive Global Environmental Change.** By Mitchell Thomashow (Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press, 2002), pp.244, \$ 27.95, ISBN 0-262-20137-2.

Written typically in a professorial style by the author who is a professor of environmental studies, the book draws copiously from the writings of several writers on related subjects to emphasise his points. The author quotes Niles Eldredge that "New species evolve and eco systems are re-assembled after the cause of disruption and extinction is removed and stabilised." Taxonomists have catalogued between 1.5 and 1.8 million living species out of the estimated 30 million species living in the biosphere. Out of the 1.8 million species recorded so far, about 750,000 are insects, 41,000 vertebrates, and 250,000 are plants. Mammals and birds constitute only .025 and .066 per cent of the total number of species recorded thus far. The author has aptly suggested that to understand the biosphere the first step is to be aware of its existence. He



quotes Scott Sanders in that "Creation puts on a non-stop show". This is just what our Sankhya philosophy talks of when referring to 'Prakriti' putting up a non-stop performance to please the 'Purush', the almighty God. The challenge to humanity is to discover ways of sustaining and making ourselves comfortable without using up the world. The author has suggested analysis, imagination and compassion as the three main pillars of biospheric observation. He advocates that we 'think globally and act locally' if we genuinely wish to postpone the catastrophe of extinction. The author has dealt with the subject in a scientific manner, with a right mix of passionate zeal to 'bring the biosphere home' to its readers. This has prompted him to be often repetitive for the sake of emphasis. However, the book guarantees good reading for all those who are concerned with the well being of the biosphere.

*Major General Dinesh Chandra (Retd)*

**Human Rights in the New Millennium.** By Professor N Sanajaoba (New Delhi : Manas Publications, 2000), pp. 343, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7049-115-0.

Decolonisation and self-determination appear to be opposite ends of the same pole in today's world, to people whose political rights remain unsatiated within the constitutional authority of a nation state. To what extent can nation or its constitution be deconstructed to represent every section of society is a vital question particularly in a multi ethnic and diverse state as India.

These series of essays on human rights from a minority and non power elite perspective are in three parts. In part I, the validity of the Indian Constitution, the referendum type annexation and judicial activism are discussed. In part II, the concept and implementation of human rights is explored, to identify emerging paradigms of human rights in the coming century. Economic emancipation rather than mere political freedom is identified as the new rights theme. Issues such as HIV/AIDS, rights of indigenous people (creation of geography rather than history), children in armed conflict and the impact of Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the North East on human rights are also discussed.

In Part III, the author highlights forthcoming trends in law and legal studies such as the emerging law - science disconnect and critical legal studies. A fervent appeal for evolution of a post modern state that would guarantee equality, partnership and a common future, for the haves and have nots, sums up the author's main theme. The book contains wide ranging discourse on topics and events from Kautilya's *Arthashastra* to Gorbachev's period of governance. This is a work of very high scholastic content, where the author examines a wide variety of sources and issues



in his quest to evolve a paradigm of a just and equitable state in the new millennium. A notable work on emerging paradigms of human rights.

*Colonel R K Bhonsle, SM*

**People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action.** By Diana Francis (London : Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 264, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-7453-1835-S.

This is an attempt to demythologise violence and to rediscover people's answer to give peace a chance. Cold war was based on two major conflicting ideologies, capitalism and communism. The cold war is over but conflicts based on ethnicity, religion and nationality continue. These conflicts require a different method to resolve. Might of weapons can at best suppress disputes, temporarily, only to erupt later. It is heartening to see that western think tanks are now discovering Gandhi.

The focus of this book is the role of non-military, non-governmental actors who want to act as peace constituencies in situations of war and open political conflict. Nonviolent actions have won peace in the past. The author gives examples of Gandhi's campaign for India's independence from Britain, Philippinose action to overthrow the tyranny of President Marcos, Nelson Mandela's fight against Apartheid and the very disintegration of the communist system in Europe when unarmed people took to the streets insisting that things have to change. The weapons of war accumulated for a nuclear option, were of no use when it came to a need to change the world. The book calls upon people for direct action bypassing rulers and governments. Winning wars may be exhilarating, but winning without wars is better.

A research work of immense value for people in general and to those engaged in promoting peace and conflict resolution.

*Subedar Major N Kunju (Retd)*

**The South Asian Challenge.** By K Haq (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 333, Rs. 555.00, ISBN 019 5796470.

This book has dealt with many facets of the challenges of development facing South Asia as a region. It is the result of efforts of South Asia Commission - an initiative of late Dr Mahbub ul Haq. Nine renowned economists have contributed to this book dedicated to Dr Mahbub ul Haq - a visionary whose unfinished agenda is carried forward by several intellectuals and students he inspired.

Lord Meghnad Desai defines a new vision of a South Asian community, which though a 'distant' dream is a possibility simply because



'we are yet the same people' The book convincingly deals with common problems in search of collective solutions. In keeping with their specialisation in economics, the contributors dwell on globalisation, poverty, agriculture and development. The chapter on conflict is understandably the weaker one, though its conclusion on the interaction between economic, political and cultural factors as causative factors is unexceptionable. Professor Rehman Sobhan's severity on military regimes as panacea for crisis of governance is instructive, particularly with regard to his exposition on the concept of good governance. What the book misses is a concluding chapter by the editor integrating these several themes of equal import.

The fundamental point is that to meet the challenge a multidisciplinary approach should be adopted.

*Major Ali Ahmed*

**Geographical Dictionary of India.** By BLC Johnson (New Delhi : Vision Books, 2002), Rs 750.00, ISBN 81-7094-428-4.

This outstanding book, written by an ex Indian Army officer and head of the Department of Geography of the Australian National University in Canberra, is a unique publication. The introduction is itself a mine of information. Map 3 on languages, map 4 on geology, map 6 depicting physiographic regions, map 17 on fuel minerals, all are illuminating. The book would be useful to the military, whether it is for campaign planning, disaster management, or assistance to civil authorities. The fact that the text and connected maps have been updated by the inclusion of three new states of Chattisgarh, Uttaranchal and Jharkand: and use of new names for Calcutta, Madras and Bombay add to the value of the book.

The dictionary could possibly be improved by omitting references to minerals – Bauxite, Gypsum: tiger project etc, which do not fall within the realm of Geography. Names familiar to the military, such as Tamu, Panagarh and Sir Creek could be included. This book should find a place in all military libraries.

*Major General Partap Narain (Retd)*

**The Gold Bird: Pakistan and Its Air Force - Observations of a Pilot.** By Mansoor Shah (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.318, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 0 19 579772 8.

The author was commissioned into the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) in late 1944, joining the newly raised No.12 RIAF Squadron operating Spitfires at Risalpur. He records the events leading up to partition of India



and the formation of the Pakistan Air Force, and its subsequent growth and development, from the point of view of a Pakistani military aviator. He retired as an Air Commodore in 1972. The style of the book is anecdotal rather than a dry recounting of historical facts and figures. However, rather than detract from its value, it makes for extremely interesting reading. IAF officers familiar with the works of 'Mally Douglas' (AVM SS Malhotra, AVSM, VM [Retd]) will be struck by the similarity of style. While the book will be of interest to the general reader, as well as students of sub-continental air power and military history, it holds a particular appeal for anyone familiar with life as a military aviator. The author manages to present an informal account of life in the PAF while at the same time avoiding much of the bombastic rhetoric that often accompanies much official and unofficial writing on the subject emanating from Pakistan. Some of the myths perhaps inevitably do find repetition, such as the PAF's rather unbelievable version of the air battle over Halwara on 06 September 1965 in which the gallant OC 5 Squadron PAF, Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Rafiqui, was killed, along with his No.2, Flight Lieutenant Yunus Hussain (According to the PAF account 3 PAF F-86 Sabres were pitted against 20 IAF Hunters, making it sound more like a mounted cavalry skirmish than modern air combat). The book suffers from the lack of an index.

However, on the whole the author presents an incisive look at the ethos and psyche of the PAF and the larger events that shaped it. Strongly recommended for anyone with an interest in the history of air power in South Asia in general, and the Pakistan Air Force in particular.

*Squadron Leader R T S Chhina (Retd)*

**Incomplete Partition -The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-48.**  
By Alastair Lamb (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 373, PKR 495.00, ISBN 0-19-57976-1.

The Kashmir dispute has bedeviled Indo -Pakistan relations for over half a century. Both countries have fought three major wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 as also a short duration localised war in Kargil in 1999. Kashmir is a legacy of partitioning of India by the British based on the principle of Muslim majority areas going to Pakistan. Though Pakistan was to be the exclusive homeland for Muslims, a very large number of Muslims have remained in India. Based on the two-nation theory, Pakistan has been laying claims on the Muslim majority Kashmir being contiguous to it. This dispute has vitiated the security environment in South Asia, which has undergone a drastic change ever since both countries went nuclear. The question of Kashmir is far from simple and remains unresolved.



The book, a product of some hard research, traces in detail the history of the transfer of power by the British to India and Pakistan and the genesis of the Kashmir problem. The author has laid down all the facets in a chronological sequence with all the ramifications of partitioning of the country. It outlines all issues involved including the Radcliff Award, the role played by the British, the accession of J and K to India, attack by Pak regular and irregular troops, the UN Resolutions and so on. Alternatives available for finding a solution for solving the problem have also been suggested. All aspects mentioned in the book should be minutely and thoroughly studied by planners. Only when they have grasped the essential details, will they be able to lay down a policy and framework for solving the Kashmir problem for the betterment of Indo-Pakistan relations.

*Major General Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)*

**Remembering Partition : Violence, Nationalism and History in India.**  
Gyanendra Pandey (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001),  
pp. xii, 218, Rs. 895.00, ISBN 0-521-00250-8.

Partition cannot be erased from memory so long as the generation that witnessed the massacre of Hindus and Muslims is part of the living community. For them it is not the remembering of partition but forgetting the partition that will actually help.

Contemporary South Asia has been publishing books on the politics, societies and culture of South Asia since 1947. In the accessible and comprehensive studies brought out so far, the authors who are already engaged in researching specific aspects of South Asian society explore a wide variety of broad-ranging and topical themes. The series will be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the study of South Asia and with the legacy of its colonial past. *Remembering Partition* is the seventh title in the series and a very sincere effort has been made by Professor Gyanendra Pandey to analyse the partition by talking to those who lived through it. Some of the chapters have actually been drawn from his earlier lectures and articles published in various journals that read well. The author has tried to analyse the history of partition, questions of violence and nationhood—both official and otherwise.

Though the learned author has provided a sustained critique of the procedures of history-writing and nationalist myth-making on the question of violence, and examines how societies are constituted, and reconstituted, by the experience and representation of violent events, history has never been viewed in the same light by researchers and historians in different periods. Accounts and analysis like this shall at that time become the real



evidence of personal interviews the author had with those who suffered the trauma of partition.

Recommended to all those who are keen to have a glimpse of partition of India in 1947 and the investigation of violence that took place amongst the people living for generations together.

*I R Kumar*

**Pakistan: From Jinnah to Jihad.** By SK Datta and Rajeev Sharma (New Delhi : UBS Publishers, 2002), pp.xii, 348, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 817476339-2.

The authors have successfully redefined the word 'Jihad' especially in the context of Pakistan as a two nation theory. Jinnah himself never used the word during his lifetime though his followers did, inspite of the fact that he vehemently propogated such policies that can well be classified as Jihad in the real sense. This is what makes the book a historical testament. The authors on the strength of their own understanding of Pakistan have predicted the fall of General Musharraf after discussing in depth about the creation of Bangladesh, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, General Zia ul-Haq and about proxy war. This intensively researched book is primarily based on the literature published in Pakistan. It also turns the spotlight on China and reveals that the Chinese leadership, during its 1962 aggression, had suggested to Pakistan to open another military front and resolve the Kashmir issue once for all, but Ayub Khan had hesitated.

The book has, no doubt, a shelf life of historical value and shall be read for a long time to come by all those who are interested in the history of Pakistan's creation by Jinnah and his associates.

*I R Kumar*

**Pakistan: The Political Economy of Lawlessness.** By Azar Hassan (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 375, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 0-19-57621-7

The author examines the impact of lawlessness on the economy, the population, and the food and shelter conditions of Pakistan. On the positive side, he has pointed out the improvements, whatever is there, in the realm of health and education. He emphatically states the importance of education, information and involvement required from various segments of society and their organisations to improve the conditions. He makes an interesting remark when he says that lawlessness in Pakistan is characterised by the political pattern and crime as it exists there. The successive military governments have made no efforts to take action



against the unsocial elements and the rich-poor divide until the arrival of General Musharraf, who has helped in the remarkable improvements that are occurring in Pakistan's economy.

Good reading for Pakistan's political section.

*Commodore R P Khanna, AVSM (Retd)*

**Beyond the Security Dilemma: Ending America's Cold War.** By Jason G Ralph (UK: Ashgar Publishing Limited, 2002), pp.213, Price not indicated, ISBN 0 7546 1249 X.

The traditional security dilemma is a structural feature of anarchy. The states are forced to become power maximising rational egoists who defend security in zero-sum terms. The author here covers both the military and political dimensions of security. The central feature of security dilemma in the eyes of the author is the inability to enter into the other man's counter-fear. It leads all states to rely on military power to guarantee security, yet this solution is unsatisfactory. The study brings out that this traditional approach is intrinsically conservative and the assumption that the state is power maximising relation and egoistic defender of territory is not always warranted.

While discussing normative and political dimensions of the dilemma the author has rightly pointed out that peaceful change can be brought about between states by mutual understanding and building of confidence. In his opinion, security dilemma can be transcended when democratic values become embedded. Multilateralism is possible by following the principles of self-determination, non-discrimination, dialogue and consensus. Here is an ideal read for those involved in international politics. It should in fact be read and re-read by those genuinely interested in world peace.

*Colonel J L Sharma (Retd)*

**Morals Under the Gun : The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics and American Society.** By James Hugh Toner (Kentucky : The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), pp. 215, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-8131-2159-0.

This book deals with those 'core values' that define a military man. The average soldier sees that the prescribed 'code of conduct' is somewhat outdated. The cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, courage and temperance are being compromised in every walk of life, day in and day out. Hence the dilemma is what would he have to do if he came across such a situation that demands a compromise. After discussing various facets of the issues involved, the author himself answers the question:- the soldier has one place to seek answer—his 'soul' or his 'psyche' or his '



conscience', because the 'core values' and their ever-changing definition cannot take the place of moral reasoning. The book is devoted to establishing the relevance of this well-timed and well-meaning advice.

Every aspect of military life, where a soldier comes across situations demanding a resolution of conflict between what he has been taught to do and what he is expected to do has been dealt thoroughly with relevant examples. Lessons from military history of the Western world and relevant to the theme of the book have been interpolated to highlight those conflict situations that put a soldier's character to test. There are 'case studies' to elaborate the points being made. Since the author teaches at the Air War College and has done his military service, he has the right credentials to discuss such a subject that is causing some concern virtually in all militaries of the world. The book is topical, instructive and thought provoking.

*Brigadier Parmodh Sarin (Retd)*

**German Foreign Policy Since Unification : Theories and Case Studies.**

Edited by Volker Rittberger (Manchester, UK : Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 385, £ 17.99, ISBN 0-7190-6040-0.

Division of Germany was designed after World War II to limit German power. Its reunification came about in 1989-90 and new Germany regained full sovereignty. The reunification aroused fears in Europe that the new state may adopt an aggressive foreign policy to regain its earlier power in Europe. The fear became a subject of academic discussions, both inside and outside Germany. The neorealists felt that post unification Germany will be less cooperative and will strive to gain hegemony in Europe, whereas others felt that it would keep a low profile and will participate in various international institutions rationally and objectively.

This book is a record of results of a research project undertaken in 1997 at the Centre for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies for the University of Tübingen to test the theory of neorealists. The objective was to establish whether continuity or change prevailed in Germany's post unification foreign policy and, if changes were detected, were they attributable to its improved power position.

The research project formulated three theories of foreign policy, viz, that of 'neorealism' as already stated earlier, 'modified neorealism' which implied that if a state was exposed to low security pressures then it may give up part of its autonomy to gain substantial influence in return and 'utilitarian liberalism' as the third one. While the first two theories are moulded by the state's power position in the international system, in



'utilitarian liberalism' there are individual actors dominating the domestic scene. In this case, analysis of concrete policy preferences of actors like politicians, prominent companies and administrative heads can predict the foreign policy behaviour in a given situation. The assumption is that both the state and individual actors are rational utility maximisers with given interests. Four research areas were selected by the research team, viz, Germany's 'Security Policy' within the NATO, its 'European Union (EU) Constitutional Foreign Policy', its 'Foreign Trade Policy' within EU and the GATT and, lastly, its 'Human Rights Policy' within the UN.

The book has a lucid account of the public debate on the subject by academics within and outside Germany. The result of the research belies the expectations of the neorealists that united Germany will have an aggressive foreign policy aimed at securing a position of power in Europe. The study, however, supports the modified neorealists' theory that new Germany's foreign policy would aim to increase its influence within international institutions which is found to be what Germany has endeavoured for in the past decade.

The book is well researched and can be useful in undertaking a similar study by us in India to assess the likely foreign policy of those states who matter to us by using the methodology adopted by the research team in this project. It makes for absorbing reading and should be a very useful addition to any good library.

*Major General Dinesh Chandra (Retd)*

**Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over Human Rights in China.** By Rosemary Foot (UK : Oxford University Press), pp 296, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-19-829775-0

The author shows how the normative concern over human rights has influenced the behaviours of key actors within the global system. These key actors referred to by the author are selected non-governmental organisations (NGO's), some national governments and the United Nations human rights institutions. The author's decision to focus on China stems in large part from the special problems that it has posed to the operation of the international human rights regime. Beijing's involvement is important to the regime's future credibility and vitality because of the country's economic, strategic and demographic weight in global politics. The author says that the normative diffusion in the global system, especially for the many, which are without well-defined enforcement procedures, is not well understood. Norms are either seen as being constitutive and deriving from a set of shared understandings, or defined as regulating behaviour, either in the form of constraints or in allowing certain actions.



The book details enhanced international engagement after its decision to embark on fundamental economic reforms in December 1978. China's encounter with human rights norms in the period 1976 to 1989, and its new explorations of the concept of human rights via membership of the UNCHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights) is well assessed.

The author has also examined China's responses - international and internal- to focus global attention on these issues.

*Colonel P K Vasudeva (Retd)*

**The Politics of Human Rights in East Asia.** By Kenneth Christle and Denny Roy (London : Pluto Press, 2001), pp 307, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-7453-1414-7.

Here is a book that dwells on human rights in countries located in Eastern Asia, well punctuated with data facts and events enabling the authors to forcefully pen down their point of view on human rights violations.

However, as most of the western authors have done in the past, the book fails to accomplish and bring out the reasons and alternatives that possibly could serve as role models to avoid some human right violations that have shown recurring tendencies in the subcontinent. The book also brings out the politics involved in human rights. Ironically, the analysis is from the western point of view as in most of the cases. It is an interesting book but lacks depth. An oriental reader may find it biased and lacking the knowledge of ground realities. Human rights problems affecting regional and world politics raises a storm when the event has happened. There are hardly any solutions for a lasting peace.

*Captain Rajiv Ojha, SM (Retd)*

**The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea : A Fragile Miracle.** By Tat Yan Kong (London : Routledge, 2000), pp. 280, £ 65.00, ISBN 0-415-14503-1.

This interesting book on the economic miracle is expensive but educative. The story of its transformation from a war-ravaged country into a giant industrial nation is well worth a study. But the reader must be ready for some heavy reading.

The change in South Korea started in 1960, when after coup by a military officer, Park Chung-Hee, cultivated popular support on the basis of superior economic competence. His regime worked under the cloak of Democratic Republican Party (DRP), took up the task of national revitalisation and liberating people from poverty. The levels of absolute



poverty declined from 40.9 to 9.8 per cent of households between 1965 and 1980.

The production and supply of war stores to the American forces in Vietnam War (1964-73) helped in the industrialisation of Korea. It brought in one billion dollars worth foreign exchange. The foundation of the development came from an alliance between the state and business as a means of dynamic reform; incentives were concentrated to a small number of proven exporters. By end of 1970s, these groups had developed into cheobols. The term Cheobol denotes a state business relationship and needs to be understood. Korea's cheobols epitomised both success and weakness. They were modeled after Japan's "Zaibastus". As there is no definition of Cheobol available I give names of the four top Korean companies—Hyundai, Samsung, Luckey Star and Daewoo. By end of 1970, Samsung and Luckey were well established. President Park selected Hyundai and Daewoo as champions. A typical relationship mentioned is that of the father of the head of one of the companies was the teacher of President Park. The chairman of Daewoo started with a capital of only \$ 18,000 in 1967 but by 1983 it rose to be one of the first four with a turnover of \$ 4.3 billion. With very little money it grew by taking over companies in trouble. The cheobols dominated economic structure led to spectacular rates of growth. But they had serious repayment difficulties during recession. They also depended on their Japanese counterparts. With the coming of President Kim Young deep inroads were made in efforts to eliminate corruption.

This is a narrative analysis about the economy of a country, which happens to be the world's largest ship builder, the third biggest manufacturer of memory chips and a substantial supplier of automobiles – a remarkable progress in which the establishment of a "Think Tank" – the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) of the Federation of Korean Industries (KRI), played a part.

*Major General Partap Narain (Retd)*

**The International Politics of East Africa.** By Robert Pinkney (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2001), pp 242, £ 14.99, ISBN 0-7190-5616-0.

In the light of post war politics, the augmentation of global forces and the rising reliance of Africa on the developed world, this book examines the correlation between the East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania on the one hand, and between them and the rest of the world; particularly the Western world; on the other. Robert Pinkney argues that international politics in this area is only about the hunt for aid, debt



reprieve and evenhanded business relations. All this assistance comes with a heavy price tag, which is negotiated in terms of foreign influence over internal politics. Yet African governments are not toothless because there exist distinctive power bases and interests that are stoutly defended. However, the contradiction remains, that, although East Africa cannot keep away from being subject to considerable outside sway, it is done discretely as a hidden agenda, as it would not be deemed lawful for foreign authority to manage internal politics directly, no matter how much they try to wrest it away by alternately cajoling and pressurising the states to relocate a range of functions to the private and charitable sectors like the NGOs.

It is indeed a paradox that these three states that had a collective colonial background and managerial organisation and only artificial boundaries did not federate at independence. The reason can be traced to the different persona and beliefs of the socialist President Nyrere in Tanzania, the capitalist Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and in the paranoid fear of President Milton Obote in Uganda of being swallowed up by its larger neighbours. As a result of this, the first East African Community (EAC); which was somewhat of an attempted federation, survived only till 1977. It was only 22 years later that a second EAC was set up in 1999, after the causes of earlier incompatibilities had long gone and idealism was gradually replaced by realism in the case of Tanzania; realism being tempered with prudence in Kenya; and realism mixed with adventure in Uganda had run its full course. The comprehensive composition of the EAC remains a matter for parleys but it appears that the international politics of East Africa will rest more and more on its relations with the West than on conflicts within or in Central Africa. Economic progress, economic stability and inter-dependence have been recognised as the panacea of all internal strife in the region and to that end the EAC has to be made to work like the EEC/EU. In the interest of regional co-operation, the EAC should be given a fair chance.

All those interested in international relations, especially the aspect of transition to democracy, will find this work of Pinkney well worth their effort to read through.

*Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)*

**Breaking the Ice in Antarctica : The First Indian Wintering in Antarctica.**  
By Major General Satya S Sharma (New Delhi : New Age International Publishers, 2001), pp. 323, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-224-1290-4.

Antarctica, the land of ice and calm has vast potential for research with the polar cap providing ideal environs. The region is of great



environmental and economic significance, as it contributes to the strategic preservation of the Earth's eco system, facilitates a study of weather and has great potential in natural and fresh water resources. The author, a distinguished pioneer in the study of adverse natural phenomenon as avalanches, snow and extreme cold conditions, has recounted his personal experiences as head of the first wintering expedition in Antarctica in 1984. It is a fascinating account with succinct details of planning, preparation, launch and execution of a mission, which was not only a great adventure but also an emotional and mental challenge to survive in the loneliness of the bare landscape of the polar ice cap. Well illustrated with maps and colour photographs, the personal odyssey of the author has etched for us the vicissitudes of survival in the arctic.

Establishment of a permanent Indian presence in the form the Dakshin Gangotri was no doubt a major achievement of the Indian scientific community. However, research in more contemporary areas of relevance of the glaciated regions of the Himalayas is sadly lacking. Hopefully this work will provide the impetus for undertaking rigorous scientific study of Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh and the Eastern Himalayas to make survival in these regions more comfortable and also to enable us tap the enormous potential of the region.

*Colonel R K Bhonsle, SM*

**Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green.** By S Fitz-Gibbon (Cambridge : Lutterworth Press, 2001), pp. 208, \$ 15.00, ISBN 0-7183-3016-4.

Fitz-Gibbon has presented us in book form his PhD thesis on what has been described by the CDS, UK as a 'feat of arms and gallantry probably unsurpassed in the glorious history of the British Army.' In the course of his detailed battle study, he proves, in his words, 'that despite the way it was to be reported in the British press and the army's reports, the battle for Darwin and Goose Green was not a spectacular victory'. His intent, however, was not to debunk the battle or the victors but to elaborate that 'the Argentinians lost the battle rather than the Paras winning it'. His book is an elaboration of the belief that this is the way most conflicts are resolved. His thesis is a wider one, merely utilising the nature and outcome of a battle for its explanatory worth. It is on the superiority of mobile over positional warfare, of directive command style over restrictive control style of command, and of a liberal over an authoritarian leadership profile. In demonstrating this position, his is a signal service to military studies. His manner of proving his point is also unique. The lesson, intended for the British Army, is one that our armed forces need to consider keenly. The



change in command philosophy that he advocates is applicable across the hierarchy and involves a monumental course correction encompassing ethos, leadership function, psychological conditioning and recruiting basis.

His defence of Auftragstaktik over Befehlstaktik drives home the obsolescence of the latter. His use of the material, to include interviews with participants, makes the book more than an academic exercise. He explores a subsidiary theme worth mentioning - it being that mythology invariably accompanies a feat of arms. As a service to history, this is commendable. More importantly, he highlights that unless the record is faced squarely, correct lessons are unlikely to emerge. It is therefore a professional imperative to focus dispassionately on the warts in order that men do not die in vain. It is yet another lesson our part of the world can imbibe vicariously. The book is strongly recommended as a text for the College of Combat and the Infantry School. The book is equally strongly prescribed for every infantry man and any professional officer desiring to command infantry.

*Major Ali Ahmed*

**Once a Happy Valley : Memoirs of an ICS Officer in Sindh, 1938-1948.**  
By Roger Pearce (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. xix, 514,  
ISBN 0-19-579395-1.

Published in the form of a book after a long period of gestation, the author has drawn a lot from the complete and voluminous correspondence, between his wife and himself, from 1937 to 1948. He served the Indian Civil Service under the Government of India until India and Pakistan became independent. He served in Sindh in Pakistan for a year and a half before retiring. The book is essentially a narrative of the experiences of a British ICS officer in the Indian subcontinent and provides an invaluable record of British administration in Sindh. The book includes the interesting details of the social activities of British officers and their families living in the subcontinent during the Raj. It is a rare glimpse of the British Raj interacting with the people at the grass root level and depicts the District Collector's world of rural Sindh in the middle of the last century.

The book makes a good reading for all those readers who are interested in memoirs.

*I R Kumar*

**Henry L Stimson.** By David E Schmitz (Wilmington USA : S R Books, 2001), pp. 210, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8420-2631-2.

Viewing history from a biographical perspective is a standard literary



ploy of historians. For it provides flesh to the humdrum of dates, activities and events. A book in the series on US Foreign Policy, it examines the life and times of Henry L Stimson, American Secretary of War during the Second World War. Authored by an eminent historian, it traces the salient benchmarks in American foreign policy during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, which happens to be the most turbulent years in the history of mankind.

A useful book, which highlights the effective role that a political visionary can play in guiding a nation's foreign policy in times of strife.

*Colonel R K Bhosle, SM*

**Oyo : The Hope for Survival in the New Millennium : A Scientific Concept from Indo-Chinese Traditional Therapies.** By Avinash Sharma (Delhi : BR Publishing Corp., 2000), pp. 146, Rs. 100.00, ISBN 81-7646-113-X.

"Oyo" by itself carries no specific or generic meaning. It is beyond the barriers of caste, creed, language, race, community, religion, country or continent. The word "Oyo" does not exist in any dialect in the Indian or foreign languages. However, its essence is felt everywhere in the environment. We find the essence of such vowels in every dialect. "Oyo" can also be visualised on the faces of all living species. According to the author, the first half of the word "Oyo" represents the darker side i.e., the materialistic world which is inherited by us since our birth and produces physical energy. The remaining half represents the brighter side of the spiritual world which produces vital energy. Considerable research on these aspects has been done particularly in India and China. Many experts in the West are also becoming conscious about the role of this vital energy in the human body. Thus 'Oyo' is a linkage between the materialistic and the spiritual worlds. Harmonising between the external and internal forces scientifically, it is essentially the essence of the Orient—the traditional Indian and Chinese therapies. 'Oyo' also indicates that both mental and spiritual energies are imperative in our lives. Conceptually, 'Oyo' explores simplistic approach in harmonisation of ordinary physical rhythmic exercises with breathing and meditation to achieve stress and disease free energetic long life. The author claims that by adopting 'Oyo' therapy we can improve environment pollution as well. Thus, 'Oyo' can change quality of life of soldiers, bureaucrats, authors, students, sportsmen, housewives - infact people from all walks of life can be tremendously benefitted by carrying out simple 'Oyo' exercises for 15-20 minutes in their bedrooms, offices or while traveling. Shri Sharma did random sampling of a group of BSF officers initiated in 'Oyo' exercises 86 per cent of whom stated that they




found these exercises highly effective and felt definite improvement in the quality of their lives. Shri Sharma claims that people suffering from hypertension, depression, chronic hepatitis, pelvic inflammation, indigestion, bronchial asthma, headache, duodenal ulcers, to name a few, can benefit enormously from these simple exercises. However, the author has not placed any clinical/medical evidence to support his hypothesis.

Decidedly the book is unique. The Bureau of Police Research and Development, New Delhi, has recommended 'Oyo' as reference book for physical training in Police training Institutions in the country. Overall, this book is interesting and absorbing.

*Colonel N N Bhatia (Retd)*

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# **Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending October-December 2002**

*(The books reviewed in July-September 2002 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

## **ASEAN**

**Exploring Indo-Asean Economic Partnership in a Globalising World.** By Atul Sarma and Pradeep Kumar Mehta, New Delhi, Bookwell, 2002, pp 648, Rs. 1095.00, ISBN-81-85040-62-1.

## **ARMS PROLIFERATION**

**South Asia - Fractured Frontier: Armed Conflict, Narcotics and Small Arms Proliferations in India's North East.** By Binalakshmi Nepram, New Delhi, Mittal Publication, 2002, pp 310, Rs. 595.00, ISBN-81-7099-863-8.

## **BIOGRAPHY**

**Scientist to President: Dr A P J Abdul Kalam.** By Ramesh Chandra, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2002, pp 327, \$20.00, ISBN-81-212-0807-6.

## **CHINA**

**Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents.** By Timothy Chak, New York, St Martin, 2002, pp 259, £10.99, ISBN-0-312-25626-4.

## **DIPLOMACY**

**Diplomacy for the 21st Century.** By Naunihal Singh, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 2002, pp 210, Rs. 395.00, ISBN- 81-7099-846-8.

## **ECONOMY**

**Indian Economics and Social Traditions.** By Krishna Kumar Somani, Delhi, Kalpaz Publishers, 2002, pp 218, Rs. 490.00, ISBN-81-7835-1005.

**The Next Economy: Will You Know Where Your Customers Are?** By Elliott Ettenberg, New Delhi, Tata Mcgraw Hill Publishers, 2002, pp 220, Rs. 275.00, ISBN-0-07-137965-7.



**ENERGY / ENVIRONMENT**

**Energy and Environment In India.** By K Gupta, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2002, pp 264, Rs. 690.00, ISBN-81-212-0788-6.

**Geo Environmental Hazards In the Himalayas.** By Bindhy Wasini Pandey, New Delhi, Mittal Publication, 2002, pp 430, Rs 995.00, ISBN-1-7099-864-6.

**GLOBALISATION**

**Politics of Globalisation.** By V T Patil and D Gopal, Delhi, Author Press, 2002, pp 341, Rs. 650.00, ISBN-81-7273-093-4.

**INDIA - NORTH EAST**

**The Lois of Manipur: Andro, Khukhul, Phayeng and Sekai.** By Lairenlakpam Bino Devi, New Delhi, Mittal Publication, 2002, pp106, Rs. 195.00, ISBN-81-7099-849-2.

**KARGIL**

**Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered.** By Lt Gen Y M Bammi, Noida, Gorkha Publishers, 2002, pp 558, Rs. 750.00, ISBN-81-7525-352-5.

**MANAGEMENT**

**Public Accounting and Auditing.** By K K Bhardwaj, New Delhi, Mittal Publication, 2002, pp 140, Rs.295.00, ISBN-81-7099-852-2.

**MYANMAR**

**Myanmar and North East India.** By Maj Gen Dipanker Banerjee, New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group, 1997, pp 62, Rs. 100.00, ISBN-NA.

**INTELLIGENCE**

**Mission to Pakistan; An Intelligence Agent in Pakistan.** By M Krishna Dhar, New Delhi, Manas Publication, 2002, pp 720, Rs. 795.00, ISBN-81-7049-148-7.

**PARTITION OF INDIA**

**The Demand for Partition of India and the British History.** By Syed Ali Mujtaba, New Delhi, Mittal Publication, 2002, pp 189, Rs. 395.00, ISBN-81-7099-868-9.



**REGIONAL SECURITY**

**Regional Security in South East Asia and the South Pacific.** By Amba Pande, Delhi, Author Press, 2002, pp 232, Rs. 500.00, ISBN-81-7273-101-9.

**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

**Military Conversion: Impact on Science and Technology.** Edited by Diguwarti Bhaskar Rao, New Delhi, Discovery Publishing House, 2003, pp 188, Rs. 400.00, ISBN-81-7141-643-8.

**TERRORISM**

**The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop it.** By John Miller, Michael Stone et al, New York, Hyperion, 2002, pp 336, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-7868-6900-3.

**Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference, February 20-23, 2002, Herzliya, Israel.** By The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel, 2001, pp 160, £ 14.95, ISBN 965-90365-1-5.

**Global Challenge on Terrorism.** Edited by V D Chopra, New Delhi Gyan Publishing House, 2002, pp 324, Rs. 790.00, ISBN-81212-0805-X.

**International Terrorism : Emerging Challenges and Future Prospects.** Edited by Prem Nath Dhar, New Delhi, Kanishka Publishers, 2000, pp 326, Rs. 650.00, ISBN-81-7391363-3.

**Operation Black Thunder: An Eyewitness Account of Terrorism in Punjab.** By Sarab Jit Singh, New Delhi, Sage Publication, 2002, pp 356, Rs. 295.00, ISBN-0-7619-9596-X.

**Tackling Insurgency and Terrorism.** by Maj Gen Samay Ram, New Delhi, Manas Publication, 2002. pp 224, Rs. 595.00, ISBN-81-7049-136-3.


**Terrorism Worldwide: Indo-US Perspectives.** By Parmanand Parashar, New Delhi, Sarup & Sons, 2002, pp 194, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 81-7625-276-X.

**Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge.** By Alan M Dershowitz, London, Yale University Press, 2002, pp 271, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-300-09766-2.





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
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
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## OUR ACTIVITIES

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The library holds over 40,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material.

### Correspondence Courses

The Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

### USI Journal

The USI Journal is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

### Centre for Research

The Centre for Research was established in 1995 to enable scholars to undertake comprehensive study of selected subjects of topical interest on national security matters.

### USI Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

The Centre was established in 2000. It aims at organising workshops, seminars and training capsules for peace-keepers, observers and staff officers - both Indian and foreign. It also oversees the practical training of Indian contingents at the Rajputana Rifles Training Centre. It functions under a Board of Management headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and works in close coordination with the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence.

### Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR)

The Centre was established in 2001 and encourages study and research into the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets like strategic, tactical, logistics, organisational and socio-economic aspects and their implementation.

### Gold Medal Essay Competitions

Every year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions: one for Officers below 10 years of service and the other for all members. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

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A series of lectures, discussions and seminars on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

### MacGregor Medal

This medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.

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