

# U.S.I. JOURNAL

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JULY-SEPTEMBER 2002

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## EDITORIAL

The highlight of events organised by the USI during the quarter July-September 2002 was conduct of a seminar at Chandimandir on 04 Sep 2002 on the subject of "Security Challenges of India in the Regional Context, with special reference to Terrorism-Prognosis and Responses". It was the first Seminar held by the USI outside New Delhi in recent years. The conduct of the Seminar was coordinated by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) former Vice Chief of the Army Staff and member of the USI Council. It was very well attended and a number of important issues were discussed. The proceedings of the Seminar are being published separately.

The USI Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (USI-CUNPK) conducted a National Seminar on **Emerging Trends in Peacekeeping-The Challenges and Response** during July 2002. Many important points pertaining to the approach to UN Peacekeeping were debated during the seminar. During Aug-Sep 2002 a three week training capsule for United Nations Military Contingent Junior Officers (UNMCJOC) was conducted. The training capsule for prospective peacekeepers from 15 friendly foreign countries and 28 Indian officers was aimed at acquainting them with the basic principles and techniques of peacekeeping and their conduct in mission areas.

Ambassador Philippe Welte in the article titled **A Swiss Perspective on International Security and Defence Policy** has traced the history of the Swiss experience. According to the author the founding states of the United Nations Organisation comprising members of the victorious coalition of World War Two were initially reluctant to welcome the World War neutrals into the UN fold. During the subsequent years, Switzerland got accustomed to the concept that neutrality was only possible outside the UNO. However, after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1989, such reasoning did not appear to stand scrutiny. During March 2002, the people of that country accepted by a good majority that Switzerland join the United Nations as a full member in order to fulfill its obligations as a



responsible member of the World Community and pursue the National Foreign Policy objectives as a sovereign state like other member countries.

It was in October 2001, after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington that the US led war against international terrorism in Afghanistan was undertaken. Maj Gen Ashok Joshi's article on **Afghanistan : History, Taliban, Operation "Enduring Freedom" and New Challenges** provides a comprehensive analysis of the situation in Afghanistan commencing with historical background, from mid - 18th Century onwards right up to the present scenario. The author has focused on lessons learnt consequent to the military operations in Afghanistan. There are no victories worth the name since the abrupt dispersal of Taliban, Al Qaeda and other components of Osama Bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jihad against the USA and Isreal. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri his number two, and Mullah Omar, the Amir of the Taliban remain untraced. The challenges facing the new Afghan Administration are considerable. For economic reconstruction, aid of \$ 4.5 billion has been committed by the international community. However, there is an imperative need for monitoring the path as well as the pace of progress. It has been suggested that Afghan National Army of 50,000 to 60,000 strength should be raised, which is likely to act as a galvanising force by ensuring national security and national integrity.



# **A Swiss Perspective on International Security and Defence Policy**

**Ambassador Philippe Welti**

## **Recent Developments in Line with Europe**

In the field of security and defence policy, Switzerland has been doing and still is doing what all her neighbours and traditional partners have been doing since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. We have analysed the strategic changes, have redefined our strategic objectives and the security policy concept and are now reforming the armed forces.

The parallelism with other European states is not pure coincidence, but shows that Switzerland with her record of independent policies cannot avoid being affected by historical events which have affected the whole European Continent.

It is my purpose to explain the background of Switzerland's standing as an independent-minded European state of small size and middle weight and to show the margin that is left for independent policies and the limits to the implementation thereof.

The Swiss Government and the wider public are engaged in a domestic debate about how much of the country's autonomy in security matters should be substituted by participation in international cooperation. To understand this debate it is important to recognise how much collective experiences of some two hundred years have shaped Switzerland's security mentality and the underlying beliefs of official security policies.

## **Switzerland's Place in Europe**

Switzerland is surrounded by five neighbours, four of which are larger than Switzerland. We are a nation of seven million inhabitants, against more than eight million Austrians, more than fifty million Italians, more than sixty million French and more than

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**Ambassador Philippe Welti** is the Deputy Secretary General, Head of Security and Defense Policy, Swiss Department of Defense. Excerpted from the talk delivered at the USI on 2 April 2002.



eighty million Germans. These four neighbours are members of the European Union (EU), three of them are founding members and belong to the big four. The same three are at the same time members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Despite various changes on the political map over the last two hundred years, the geo-political environment has always been roughly the same.

### **The 19th Century: A Republic between Monarchies**

In Europe, the 19th Century was the age of the balance between powers. The then big powers shared the control over the functioning of this strategic concept; and at the same time, this international order allowed smaller European states to live under relatively safe conditions. It was over all, in particular compared to the 20th Century, a peaceful age for Europe. The occasional wars were traditional wars fought by armies without affecting civilian populations as much as was going to be the case during the following century.

That order not only helped to preserve the stability between states, it was also instrumental to keep monarchy rule in place in many countries. In fact, it was a European order of monarchies, and the rising political philosophy of liberalism had not yet reached the governments.

The most significant generalised outburst of liberal ideas after the French Revolution and the revolutionary tide of 1830 was the revolutionary year of 1848. In most of the countries it led to changes of governments or even of dynasties. In Switzerland it resulted in the transformation of an old fashioned, loose confederation of relatively sovereign cantons into a modern federal state. In fact, the creation of modern Switzerland in 1848 was the only immediate success of that liberal revolution in Europe. From then on, Switzerland, a republic, remained suspect in the eyes of the monarchies surrounding us, not least because we became the asylum haven for many liberal revolutionaries who were persecuted throughout Europe. The political and economic philosophy of liberalism merged with old and deep rooted traditions of local



democracy and local government and helped to strengthen the national identity. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 had already formally recognised that Switzerland's neutrality was in the general interest of Europe, that meant in the interest of the delicate balance between the bigger powers.

Neutral status and strong national identity against a potentially hostile, but generally indulgent environment, was to become the solid basis for the nation's belief that relying on one's own strength and avoiding alliances was the safest strategy in an uncertain world. This strategy served us well. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, we credibly abstained from taking sides either for France or for Germany, despite the strong bi-cultural composition of Switzerland. This was, the model situation where the Swiss type neutrality had its full impact as a strategy providing security.

Swiss neutrality has always had a double objective and impact. On the one hand, by refusing to get into an alliance with any of the belligerent neighbours, it gave each neighbour guarantees that Switzerland would not join forces with the opposite neighbour. These assurances to each side obviously were of relevant strategic and operative value, since they spared our nation from getting involved in war. This was the "foreign policy" aspect of neutrality.

On the other hand, neutrality always had a dominant domestic quality. By staying away from a conflict between two neighbours - mostly France and Germany, over the last two hundred years - the national cohesion was safeguarded. Indeed, during many centuries, there were critical moments for national unity.

Whenever the big powers in Europe opposed each other - the Emperor versus the Pope, France against Austria, the Catholics against the Protestants, France against Germany - each time followers of each of the large scale opponents could be found in Switzerland in almost equal proportions. Had they followed their feelings of loyalty to the outside power, Switzerland would have fallen apart. Such critical moments materialised several times during Swiss history. But each time, loyalty with the freely chosen allies within the loose confederation prevailed and thus saved Switzerland. This double mechanism has functioned for decades.



## **The 20th Century: Neutrality Still Works**

In 1914, at the outbreak of World War I it was vital for neutral Switzerland to present a credible will and ability to defend the national territory against any aggressor, without taking sides with one of the belligerents, without opting for the benefit of an alliance. At the same time, neutrality meant in the domestic debate that the strong pro France feelings of the French speaking part of the country and the equally strong pro Germany feelings in the German speaking part of Switzerland had to accept that the Government would not support any of the belligerents. All sides accepted and the national cohesion was saved.

Militarily, the full potential of the citizens' army was mobilised to guard and, if necessary, defend the national borders from the neighbouring states. The label for this concept was, and still is, "armed neutrality". The message which went with this label was, that we would militarily oppose any aggressor and not just rely on good faith and hopes. You know the history: the strategy and the concept worked, we were spared again an involvement in a large-scale European war.

One more example proved that relying on one's own strength was the right policy for Switzerland. In 1939, when World War II broke out, it was clear to neighbouring state that we would not step into an alliance. Domestically, this policy was easier to implement, since the nation was united against the threat from Nazi-Germany.

Whereas during the first phase of the war, this policy seemed to be in the interest of all nations involved, things became more difficult later on. In fact, the war between two belligerent coalitions had turned into a war of the good against the evil, that was Western civilisation against Nazi-fascism. Despite the feelings of solidarity with the Allied Forces throughout the war, the Swiss supported the Government's policy of armed neutrality.

As soon as the Allied Forces had defeated Nazi-Germany and its allies, the Swiss were confronted with criticism from the



Allied because of their not joining the alliance for the good against the evil. We faced difficult times in our foreign relations, but on the basis of the long term merits of our longstanding neutral tradition, we accepted to pay this price. When shortly after 1945 the Cold War started, the community of European states including the USA had new priorities and the Swiss policy of neutrality was, obviously, again in the interest of the international community.

Then followed long decades of the Cold War and we continued to rely on our own strength and not on strategic ties and alliances. Militarily speaking, we had to develop the capacities of a credible deterrence. This meant having relatively large and strong armed forces. The full mobilisation force of our citizen's army meant that Switzerland would have, in a case of war, one of the larger armies in Europe. Against a military aggression we would probably have had, in relative terms, the largest army. The evenly spread density of armed soldiers and anti aircraft canons and anti tank weapons was nowhere so high as on our national territory. Add to this our pride of having the least accessible topography in Europe, once it is defended actively.

This was our strength; and it made sense in the stable inertia of East-West confrontation. The confrontation was solid; the confrontation line in Europe remained unchanged and the 41,000 odd square kilometres of our country communicated the message that they were defensible and would be defended. In a strategic situation of certainties, we added our own contribution of certainty; the military character was sufficient. And all this produced security.

### **The End of the Cold War 1989-1991: Security Policy Report 2000**

After 1989, things changed. Old certainties got lost, new uncertainties appeared. New challenges appeared. And ways to new chances opened up. Everybody on the European Continent seized these chances. So did we. Before even elaborating the official analysis of changed realities and before formulating the new strategies and concepts, the Swiss, loyal to their reputation of pragmatic people, made one small practical step after the other



until 1999, when we published a Government White Paper, the Security Policy Report 2000.

In that report, meant to indicate what the new policies should be, we could, so to say from hindsight, show that all the steps made and all measures taken since 1989 had indeed followed a coherent logic. That is the Swiss way: First the deeds, then the concepts. There is a reason, or an explanation behind it. In a society and a political culture of direct democracy, people do not believe so easily in concepts. But they believe the messages that come out of practical steps - provided they are successful - and support the further development of successful concepts. We gave the Report the title "Security through cooperation".

This was set as a programme for the future, but at the same time it was also an acknowledgment of the last decade's changes. Indeed, we had changed our fundamental strategy from security through deterrence to a multi fold strategy of cooperating with partners in order to contribute together to stability on the European Continent and to producing security for everybody.

The initial steps during that significant decade were - in 1989 the deployment of a medical unit for UNTAG (United Nations transition operation in Namibia), and in 1991 another medical unit for MINURSO (United Nations operation in the Western Sahara). During the same years, we started to train and send military observers in various UN Peace-Keeping operations in different regions.

This was in a way amazing for a UN-non-member country!

Most significant was Government's decision in 1995 to join the NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative, which has become the most important Continent-wide network for supporting stability and peace on the Continent.

These were some of the small steps taken since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, when we started to realise that deterrence was no longer the concept required for safeguarding



the security of our nation, since instability in various regions and sub regions had become the major threat to security.

### **Yugoslav Wars 1992-1999**

Of fundamental importance to the Swiss perception of threats and conception of security policy was to be the gradual demise of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the growing anxiety and increasing involvement by the Swiss public. There were strong repercussions of the war in the Balkans on my country. Most visible for the man in the street were the waves of refugees. At the peak of the crisis, more than four hundred thousand persons from former Yugoslavia were living in Switzerland as permanent residents or refugees - against an overall population of some seven million. About half of them Kosovar Albanians, corresponding to roughly 10 per cent of the total population in Kosovo.

Switzerland was - as for per capita of inhabitants - the most preferred harbour for refugees, not just due to her economic appeal but obviously also because she is not a party to the Dublin asylum agreement, restricted to EU member states. And the citizens of former Yugoslavia constitute a cultural group clearly discernible from other foreigners in Switzerland. In addition, the ramifications of the activities of criminal organisations, that had been fuelled through the political and economic instability of the region, did not stop in front of Swiss borders.

Another impact of the Yugoslav crisis on Switzerland was the cruelty of warfare. Of course, most countries were shocked at the notion of ethnic cleansing, as it occurred for the first time in Europe since 1946. But from the perspective of a country that has always considered itself especially fragile due to its cultural diversity, the resurgence of the aggressive ethnic nationalism may arguably have been considered as particularly outrageous. Violence against one's neighbours purely on the grounds of ethnicity was indeed a slap in the face of the very principles and values Switzerland has been built upon.

Both features of the Yugoslav war, the stream of refugees



into Switzerland and the humanitarian crisis showed that Cold War neutrality did no longer provide any useful protection nor any meaningful yardstick on where to take a stance. Switzerland had in several respects become a virtual neighbouring country or a front line state in the Yugoslav war.

When the international community got involved militarily in the Bosnian civil war, the challenge to security was no longer relevant for neutrality. The Government accepted first to join in the UN economic sanctions, then to let Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar aircraft fly over Swiss territory, because they helped to enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia- Herzegovina, and finally, after the signing of the Dayton Agreement by the parties to the conflict, we let even troops and material transit through Switzerland to allow the multi-national peace support operation Implementation Force in Bosnia - Hergzegavina (IFOR) / Stablising Force in Bosnia - Horzegovina (SFOR) to deploy rapidly in Bosnia. For legal reasons, Switzerland could then not join in the operation, but decided to support the civilian Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Bosnia with a logistics company.

So, regional security in the Balkans, or rather the lack of security there, mattered a lot to Switzerland and produced broad domestic support for contributions aimed at creating conditions that would allow the refugees to return home in dignity and at supporting them in rebuilding their lives and societies, afterwards. The efforts, needed to be internationally coordinated. In a way, the Balkans became the first major area of application of an earlier Foreign Policy White Paper. That report formulated in 1993 five foreign policy goals for Switzerland as under :-

- (a) Maintenance and advancement of security and peace.
- (b) Furtherance of human rights, of democracy and the rule of law.
- (c) The promotion of welfare.
- (d) Reduction of social differences.
- (e) Protection of natural resources.



Switzerland decided to contribute her share to the international efforts for peace and reconstruction in former Yugoslavia. This act did not just reflect sheer national interest but was also in line with a politically approved concept. Switzerland did so from the outset through humanitarian measures, eventually by providing also military means as well. The most significant being the OSCE-headquarters support unit from 1996 to 2000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, since 1999, the logistics and service company within Kosovo Force, KFOR.

For the first time, Switzerland used military in addition to civilian means for crisis management, in order to fight security challenges. Those two military missions were the most prominent manifestations of what became the motto of the Government Security Report 2000: Security through cooperation.

Both military units in support of OSCE and the NATO led KFOR, respectively, were more substantial in size and numbers than anything Switzerland had contributed to a peace keeping mission before. So, arguably, the Yugoslav war had an even more profound impact on Swiss foreign and security policy in concrete terms than the end of the Cold War, in 1989-1991.

### **Partnership for Peace (PfP)**

By joining the Partnership for Peace initiative in 1995, Switzerland adhered to the political objective to create, sustain and promote a continent-wide stability with civilian and military means. As Switzerland had no significant experience in the use of military means for the promotion of peace when joining PfP, we decided to focus particularly on civilian means in order to build on comparative advantages. This is the origin of the creation of international foundations in Geneva providing essential services to the international community in the field of crisis management and peace promotion. The international foundations being :-

(a) Geneva Center for Security Policy, providing advanced education and training for security policy officials of Foreign and Defence Ministries and armed forces officers.

(b) Geneva International Center for Humanitarian De-mining, providing technological and material support to de-mining activities world wide.



(c) Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, developing programmes with interested countries which are engaged in security sector reforms.

These centres have been included in Switzerland's offer to partner countries within PfP, and they have been very well received by the international community. They are still developing their activities; their financial support comes mostly from the Swiss Government, but they are run by international boards.

An additional Swiss offer to the international community is the internet programme ISN - International Relations and Security Network, which is an electronic database, library, network and much more in the field of security policy. Its success is illustrated by the increasing number of users world wide and the saying that in an international crisis the world watches CNN, but reads ISN.

### **Security Policy Report 2000: Security Through Cooperation**

Coming back to the Security Policy Report 2000, which is the basis not only for how we see the new threats to international stability and security, but also for how our policies should be focused. The Report defines as the core of our strategy the comprehensive use of our capabilities for the prevention of force as well as the use of all appropriate civilian and military resources against the threat or the use of force which menaces our country, its population and its resources to a significant extent. This is no revolution; it is the "natural" content of every security strategy. What is new is that we perceive the threat to our national security no longer as a one dimensional military aggression, but as multi-faceted. The appropriate strategic guideline for a country like Switzerland in her current strategic environment is the cooperative endeavour to stabilise the European Continent as a first priority, and to contribute to stability and security in other regions. From these objectives we derive three fundamental strategic missions, which are, according to their probability of occurrence as under :-

- (a) Promoting peace and crisis management.
- (b) Prevention and management of vital threats, particularly in cases of natural and man made disasters and disturbances of the internal order of strategic magnitude.



(c) Defence being understood as the country's capability to protect and safeguard its sovereignty, its territory, its air space and its population against the threat and use of force on a large/strategic scale.

### **Stability in South Eastern Europe**

Since the early 1990s we have identified as one of the most relevant risks for Swiss security the regional instability in the Balkans. The overall aim of Switzerland towards South Eastern Europe has been to help create an environment in which military conflict will become unthinkable and thereby to contribute to expand the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom - alongside all like minded countries.

The key issues for regional security are addressed by the priority fields spelled out in the Balkans Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, originally an initiative by the EU, to which Switzerland could adhere on the basis of her obvious interest and of her equally obvious potential to support the international efforts in this region. The Pact's concrete targets include: overcoming crises and tension, setting up democratic structures, ensuring the protection of national minorities, promoting economic co-operation, strengthening regional cooperation, and combating organised crime. These are the established targets, and relevant achievements are expected within the next 10-15 years. Through this Pact, South Eastern Europe is encouraged to adopt the appropriate reforms in favour of democratisation, the rule of law and the defence of human rights and security, and a market economy. There is a large consensus on these aims and also that the civil society has to play a central role in the process of transition.

### **Army XXI**

The Security Report 2000 has triggered an ambitious reform, that of the Swiss Armed Forces. This reform project, called Army XXI, is still in the making, since we have only just started the parliamentary process. According to the threat analysis and the new strategic missions, the Army has to live up to a three fold mission. It has to develop its capacities for :-



- (a) International peace support and military crisis management.
- (b) Area security and defence.
- (c) Subsidiary operations on behalf of civilian authorities.

In line with a general trend in European countries, the armed forces will be down sized. From a 360,000 strong mobilisation potential, we will cut down the army to 120,000 to 140,000 temporarily active soldiers and an inactive reserve of 80,000 men. We will also adopt a modular structure allowing for assembling formations for specific missions according to the task force principle. We will, therefore, abolish the corps, divisions and regiments and stick to brigades, which will be composed of battalions. And we will increase the ability of the army to cooperate with foreign armed forces.

Fundamentally, neutrality remains a framework element of our security policy without, however, hindering any longer the capacity to cooperate in international training activities and in international peace support operations based on a UN mandate. We keep the constitutional obligation for every male Swiss citizen to serve in the army and we keep the militia principle, which makes the armed forces a citizens' army, or in other words, we do not intend to switch to a professional army, although we plan to increase the number of professionals in the field of training.

### **Recent Popular Decisions and Outlook**

One final word on the most recent decisions by the Swiss people taken through national referenda. In June 2001, the Swiss people voted on an amendment to the Military Act which was to allow for more active participation in international peace support operations. This piece of legislation was very hotly debated, since the Swiss people, in line with their inward looking traditions in military affairs, are not accustomed to international military cooperation. The Government finally won the people's support by a narrow margin. A psychologically important step was taken. Six months later, the people rejected an initiative asking for the



abolishment of the army, thus confirming the traditional support for the army and at the same time indicating a growing support for new concepts in the use of armed forces.

Finally, on 3 March 2002, the people accepted by a good majority that Switzerland join the United Nations as a full member.

This may amaze you; in fact, it was the only national decision world wide taken by a popular vote to adhere to the United Nations. This peculiarity must be explained by the original reluctance of the founding states of the United Nations - you may remember that it was the victorious coalition of World War II that founded the organisation - which initially were not keen to welcome World War neutrals. During the following years, Switzerland got accustomed to the thought that neutrality was only possible outside the organisation. Since the historical changes of 1989, such a reasoning could not be upheld any longer. It was time for Switzerland to take its place in the ranks of the international community.

This brings me to the question what the world can expect from our country after the policy changes I have briefly outlined. We have managed to lay the legal foundations for participation in international peace promotion on an equal footing with comparable nations. We are in the process of laying the necessary military capacity foundations for the same purposes. And we will finally be able to actively and with all instruments and means of a sovereign and fully integrated state pursue the foreign policy objectives already laid down in the Foreign Policy Reports of 1993 and 2000 and in the Security Policy Report 2000.



# **Afghanistan : History, Taliban, Operation Enduring Freedom And New Challenges**

**Major General A Joshi, VSM (Retd)**

## **A History of Violence and Instability**

**T**o analyse the events now unfolding in Afghanistan after the Coalition unleashed a series of military operations to liquidate the Taliban, it is essential to know the background of Afghanistan and thus its psyche.

Afghanistan emerged as a separate kingdom in the mid-18th century under Ahmed Shah Abdali. Despite foreign interventions, tribal conflicts and continuing violence between various segments of power structure, Afghanistan has continued as a geo-political unit till date. This in itself is remarkable considering that Afghanistan is a plural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country in terms of its demography. Pathans or Pushtuns constitute the majority of its people- notwithstanding the separate tribal identities of various sub groups of Pushtuns. The other major ethnic groups that have a significant political and social influence in the Afghan society are the Hazaras, Tadjiks, Uzbeks and a small number of Uigurs and Nuristanis- descendants of Greek soldiers of Alexander the Great. Majority of the people are followers of the Sunni sect of Islam. The remaining- notably the Hazaras - are Shias. The main language is Pushtu and the second important language is Dari a colloquial derivative of Persian. It has been the lot of Afghanistan to be the area of imperial ambitions in medieval and modern history. In the yore, Persian and Mughal empires as also the Ottoman empires competed for influence in Afghanistan. When the Russian influence extended in Central Asia in the 19th century, Afghanistan became an area for the Great Game between the Russians and the British.

After World War II, there was no let up and this continued as

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a diplomatic game between the Western democracies led by the USA and the Soviet Union. A feature of the increased tension in the country in the 20th century was the internal conflict and competition between the forces of modernisation and the forces of orthodox Islam. The ethnic divisions of the population were also caught in the internecine war between Shia and Sunni sects. In the event, King Amanullah (1919-29) failed to introduce modernity into Afghanistan. After his defeat he left for Bombay and later Italy. King Zahir Shah succeeded him in 1933 and ruled in comparative peace till 1973. During this period, Afghanistan experienced stability and prosperity. King Zahir Shah successfully performed the balancing act during the Cold War between Soviet Union and the Western Powers seeking to gain influence in Afghanistan. Broadly speaking, Soviet influence and Soviet aided projects were permitted in the northern parts of the country and its southern limit could be defined by a line joining Namazkar in the West to the Southern end of Wakhan corridor. Central, Southern and South-Eastern Afghanistan came under the influence of the West including economic and technological activities. An important point is the persistent and vocal anti-Pakistan sentiment in the country. Afghanistan has historically claimed areas described as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and portions of Baluchistan on the basis of the jurisdiction which the Afghan kings exercised till mid-19th century. The territorial claim is supported by ethnicity as these areas are inhabited by Pushtuns and Afghanistan never reconciled to the border drawn between British India and Afghanistan called the Durand Line. Incidentally, India's stock has always been high with the Afghans and India has stood by the Afghans throughout its history.

In 1964, post a *Loya Jirga*, a new constitution was adopted which provided for a representative government for the first time. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was replaced in a bloodless coup by Sardar Mohammed Daud, who ushered in an era of reforms including women's education, removal of *pardah* (veil) etc. Daud also heightened tension with Pakistan by reviving territorial claims vis-a-vis the Durand Line and Pustoonistan. Daud's insistence to eradicate medieval practices as King Amanullah before him had attempted, was resented by Pushtoons steeped in religious



orthodoxy and conservatism. Intrigue was the order of the day and print media which developed as a result of Daud's reforms gave rise to *Khalq* (a magazine) and *Parcham* (a newspaper) whose founder-editors Noor Mohammed Taraqi and Babarak Karmal respectively later became President of Afghanistan. While the former represented Pushtoon interests, the latter represented non-Pushtoon concerns ie. Tadjiks, Hazaras etc. In 1978, along with Taraqi, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. Taraqi took a pro-Soviet stance and PDPA launched a series of radical programmes of literacy, women's education and other reforms. The increasing Soviet influence in the region which amounted to a permanent foothold was resented by America, Pakistan and Iran. Taraqi was murdered by Hafizullah Amin in mid-1978, who turned to the USA and Pakistan to neutralise the Soviet presence. On 29 December 1979, with the help of Soviet armed intrusion, Babarak Karmal and PDPA came to power. The Karmal regime lasted from 1980-1988 entirely with Soviet military, political, administrative and economic support. The Afghan government as well as the PDPA were run by the Soviet Union and the Communist party. The failure of the Americans to prevent the Iranian revolution and President Carter's failure to rescue US Embassy staff made it necessary that the US restore its credibility among its Muslim allies in South Asia and the Gulf. Plans were drawn up and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) amongst others got to work. Between 2.5 - 3 million Afghan refugees had sought refuge in Pakistan and were easy prey to the machinations of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the US Intelligence. Zia-ul-Haq and President Reagan joined hands to organise sustained resistance against Babarak Karmal with active support from Islamic nations eg Libya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. The *Mujahideen* force that emerged comprised not only Afghans but had a large number of foreign mercenaries from other Islamic nations numbering over 30,000. These *mujahideens* were trained in *madrassas* mainly in Pakistan and armed with weapons bought from funds supplied by the USA and the '*Talibs*' were born.

Eventually with the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan the stage was set for Taliban to take over the reins. Najibullah was killed and Northern Alliance pushed to remote isolated areas of Afghanistan. With Taliban taking a firm control over Afghanistan,



the nation regressed into the Middle Ages. Afghanistan's woes have been exacerbated by extra-regional players and Pakistan. A spawn of Pakistan, the Taliban ruled over Afghanistan for over three years. In the name of Islam as they perceived it they refused to acknowledge international boundaries between nation states. With terror, drugs and guns they sought to export their concept of Islam.

The miniscule progress that this nation had somehow made over the decades was completely lost and Afghanistan was laid waste. Lumpen elements had taken over and Afghanistan became a haven for international terrorists like Osama bin Laden. The Taliban had megalomaniac fantasies of conquering Central Asian Republics, and Jammu and Kashmir. It is worth noting that Pakistan was one of three nations that gave recognition to the Taliban and the only nation which retained diplomatic relations with the Taliban government till the decimation of Al Qaeda. Had 11 September 2001 not taken place, it is unlikely that the West would have woken up to the terminal danger posed by international terrorism of the Islamic variety. The Afghan conflict and the foisting of Taliban is really the result of conflicting external factors. Nations both far and near Afghanistan, greedily advanced their individual agendas and exploited the Afghan nation.

### **Fall of the Taliban and Aftermath**

Notwithstanding their much vaunted superiority in Information Technology (IT) and reliance on Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), America was caught off guard on 11 September 2001. It was a nightmare similar to Pearl Harbour and invited swift retribution for its perpetrator-Taliban. The US military campaign began with massive air strikes on 7 October 2001, combined with support for anti-Taliban United Front on the ground. Within the space of four days in November, key cities fell to anti-Taliban forces in a cascade. On 9 November 2001, Mazar-e-Sharif fell to groups led by General Dostum. The following day United Front forces launched simultaneous attacks across Northern Afghanistan on Khwajaghar, Eshkamesh, Baghlan, Pul-e-Khumri, Nahrin, Aibak and Bamiyan. All these including Hairatan and Shibarghan fell to General Dostum's forces. Maimana fell on 11 November and Herat on 12 November.



The Taliban fled Kabul on 13 November after looting the main currency market and Da Afghanistan Bank. The Coalition forces while delivering *coup-de-grace* to the Taliban were unable to catch Osama-bin-Laden or Mullah Omar.

On 5 December 2001, a group of Afghan notables meeting in Bonn under the auspices of the UN, endorsed an 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions'. This did not provide for an interim government but for interim administration. The signatories recognised the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population. This was a good beginning considering parochialism prevalent in Afghanistan. Post emergent Loya Jirga meeting, in May 2002, it can be said that Afghanistan has taken small but firm steps to establishing a broad-based gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government. The Transitional Authority headed by Hamid Karzai has a broad-based Transitional Administration under it to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through elections to be held within two years from the date of the convening of the emergency Loya Jirga. As regards judicial functions, the Transitional Administration is to 'establish with the help of UN, a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions'. Provision has also been made for two important Commissions. The Interim Administration is to establish with the help of the UN, an independent civil service commission to provide the Transitional Authority with short list of candidates for key posts in administrative departments as well as those of governors and *uluswals* in order to ensure their competence and integrity. Finally, it has enjoined upon the Interim Administration to establish an Independent Human Rights Monitoring-Commission, whose responsibilities will include human rights monitoring, investigation of the violation of human rights, and development of domestic human rights institutions.

### **Execution of Operational Plans-Some Military Lessons**

The war against terrorism launched by the international coalition



under the US leadership, with mopping up operations still continuing, has little to show for all the efforts put in. There are no victories worth the name since the abrupt dispersal of Taliban, Al Qaeda and other components of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front for *jihad* against the USA and Israel. Apart from the capture of Abu Zubaida (supposed to be No-3 in Al Qaeda set up), along with over 20 other members of Al Qaeda at Faisalabad in Pakistan in March 2002 and Ramzi bin al-Shibh from Karachi in September 2002 there have been no other major successes. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, his No-2, and Mullah Omar, the Amir of Taliban remain untracked. While India's Deputy PM is convinced that Osama is hiding in Pakistan, General Musharraf articulates Bin Laden is dead. Reports on the subject indicate that Osama has probably survived the ordeal in Tora Bora mountains and is likely to have escaped in to a neighbouring country - Pakistan. This is corroborated by a United Press International (UPI) report of 30 August 2002, which states that Osama bin Laden along with his family members is hiding either in Karachi or in Faisalabad. Another report puts him in Swat in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir along with Al Qaeda militants. Surely this must be with the active connivance of the ubiquitous ISI. The strength of Al Qaeda members in Karachi and Faisalabad is stated to be in thousands which is why President Musharraf is keen to turn a blind eye to facts unpalatable. And this from a professed ally of the Coalition in the war against terrorism! Yet another report indicates that they have escaped to Iran and are hiding in the Eastern border towns of Maashad or Zabal. The fact that Osama married an Iranian woman is cited as a reason. Be that as it may, Operations Anaconda, Mountain Lion, and Mountain Sweep etc in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan have revealed infirmities in ground operations specially where operations were to be undertaken conjointly. Sealing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border specially by the Pakistani Army is perhaps a case of locking the door after the horse had bolted!

Air power was used to pulverize an enemy that could not retaliate. Powerful lobbies in the US have been instrumental in guiding the military planners and the US Defense Department's Joint Vision 2010 lays great stress on the electronic age advances. Apart from near total 'information superiority' the Joint Vision 2010



states that 'new technologies will allow increased capabilities at lower echelons to control more lethal forces thus leveraging the skills and initiative of individuals'. The operations in Afghanistan however do not bear this out. The US forces tried its hand in ground operations gingerly and that too during the later stages of the war. The main reason was the High Command's immense faith in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept, which failed them many a times when the Americans bombed friendly Afghan forces and civil marriage parties. As for example, on 1st July 2002, USAF B-52 and AC-130 bombers blasted Kakarak, Shatoghail, Syansang, and Miandao killing 63 civilians. The juvenile explanation offered by Pentagon was 'casualties could have been as a result of anti-aircraft artillery (later found entirely fictitious) which the bombers were attacking'. The American lie has been nailed by the media including *Der Spiegel* (July 3, 2002). Another major reason was that the Americans were not keen on sending body-bags of American soldiers to the USA. Notwithstanding such a kid glove approach, already there are disturbing signs that fatigue is setting in amongst the troops deployed on ground. This is marked by edgy over-reactions - the bursting of fire crackers is mistaken for a hail of bullets and disinformation fed by mercenary warlords is accepted uncritically. Over reliance on technical intelligence (TECHINT) and insufficient human intelligence (HUMINT) has cost the US forces dearly. Cover up has been attempted in every case of negligence with attendant adverse affect on the morale of troops. It has been reported that three members of US Special Forces upon returning from Afghanistan killed their wives at Fort Bragg and two later committed suicide. These incidents point to a low state of motivation and morale.

The great captains of war won their major victories by an adroit combination of manoeuvre and fire power. Nobody relied on fire power alone as USA has done in Afghanistan. In the Gulf War which proponents of air power cite as the re-birth of their doctrine, the decision to halt the ground offensive after only four days and without advancing on Baghdad left Saddam Hussein firmly in control. A decade of 'no-fly zones' and air strikes has not prevented the Iraqi strongman from undermining the Coalition by diplomacy while developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It would however, appear that the US is none the wiser from its Afghan adventure.



President Bush has noted that the combination of "real time intelligence, local allied forces, special forces and precision air power shattered the Taliban regime". The fact is America could attack Afghanistan with impunity and the military victory over the Taliban rabble was easy because it was no contest in any case.

There is talk of further downsizing the US Armed Forces, particularly the conventional ground forces. The US Army has already been cut from 18 divisions at the time of Gulf War to 10 divisions today. The proponents of RMA would like this number reduced to eight or even six divisions and money saved reallocated to fund long range Precision Guided Munition (PGM). The present opinion as also articulated by President Bush seems to be that only Special Forces are needed to serve as target spotters for air power and as liaison to the local ground forces. As the US operations in Korea, Vietnam and Kuwait have shown, reliance cannot be placed on local troops even when supported by American air power. Should President Bush declare war against the nominated member states of the Axis of Evil, America would do well to rethink their overall strategy.

In the Afghanistan military operations, reliance on local forces and allies had its disappointments. Many Taliban leaders and Al Qaeda members were allowed to escape through battlefield deals. Peaceful surrender of territory or some other pecuniary advantage for the safe passage of defeated forces is a way of life for the tribal groups- a fact evident from Afghan history. This exercise is rendered all the more easier since Pakistan, which created the Taliban in the first place, is more than willing to help the Al Qaeda members to escape. Had the US thought of deploying airborne/ air mobile formations to interdict escape routes rather than rely on Pakistani soldiers to seal the border, they would have had far bigger success.

### **Challenges vis-a-vis the Ground Realities**

Today, the challenges faced by Afghanistan are staggering. It is a measure of international maturity that the developed and some developing nations have come forward to aid the Afghans. Many



like India have helped with material, funds and personnel for training and expertise. A committed cumulative aid of \$4.5 billions apart from men and material from across the globe is quite substantial. Yet, there is a need for the international community particularly the USA, Japan and European Union (EU) - the largest donors- to monitor the path as well as the pace of progress. There are many skeptics of grandiose nation- building schemes. In Somalia, in 1998-99, the need for security and services for UN and other international persons provided by foreign countries was so great that only a small fraction of aid exceeding \$ one billion was spent on humanitarian missions such as hospitals and schools.

Afghanistan is beset with myriad re-construction priorities. These include security, police, gun control and mine clearing. While the carpet industry has picked up, there is a need to revitalise agriculture, seed plantation, irrigation and re-construction including telecommunication, power and roads. Rehabilitation of refugees, education, healthcare, private sector development and empowerment of women also need urgent attention. A large international presence in Afghanistan is crucial to stabilisation of the country. Since regional economic development is a key to stabilisation, the USA, which has access to military facilities at Khanabad in Uzbekistan, should persuade Uzbek President Islam Karimov to cooperate closely as it would be mutually beneficial for the two neighbours.

In a nation where blood letting is a common occurrence - two ministers of Hamid Karzai government have already been assassinated - the obstacles to ensure a peaceful return to a democratic process and an egalitarian society are formidable. There are no institutions left intact in Afghanistan, past practices cannot be got rid of so easily, the big powers have stakes in the region and an ambitious Pakistan would like to continue its meddling as it has its own agenda for the region.

It is possible that the USA, may in the near future withdraw the bulk of its forces. However, the US will continue to ensure a visible presence in Afghanistan, its main task being the protection of Hamid Karzai - widely perceived in the Pashtun belt as USA's



Babarak Karmal - and keeping the warlords opposed to Karzai under control. Further, Afghanistan remains an important spring board for Central Asian Republics, Russia, China and Middle East. It is unfortunate that the USA promoted leaders like the late Abdul Haq, Hamid Karzai, Haji Abdul Qadir (recently assassinated) and various warlords and narcotic barons for its anti- Al Qaeda hunt. This motley group was brought into the Pashtun belt by the CIA who not only mobilised them but armed and funded them as well. The fact is that while pretending to help the USA many of them have used the money and arms to re-establish their old fiefdom and heroin refineries. As on date the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan is sliding back into chaos and insecurity for the ordinary citizens marked by extortions by the warlords and a flourishing trade in narcotics. Pushtuns in the North have been raided in Balkh where VIII Corps-mainly Uzbeks - is located. This will not be tolerated for long by the Pushtuns. Presently, the Afghanistan of the US design is a country without leaders who command the respect of Pashtuns. Many of the members of the present Karzai Administration barring those from Northern Alliance had lost touch with the country for a decade. Having lived in the comforts of Gulf and the West with the money given by the Western Intelligence (pre-1994) and the Taliban (post-1994, for leaving the country), they were brought back by the CIA and placed in positions of power. It is not surprising that they have failed in rallying the people and /or restoring law and order. Surprisingly, the only Pashtun leader having a sizeable following is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of *Hizbe Islami*. Earlier a blue eyed *mujahideen* of CIA and ISI of Pakistan till 1994, he joined the Northern Alliance against Taliban. In 1996, he took shelter in Iran, from where, he periodically issued anti-US and pro-Bin Laden statements. Hekmatyar has since returned to Afghanistan. ISI has grabbed the opportunity of resurrecting him with weapons and funds and helped infiltrate him in the Pashtun belt where he has successfully gathered his followers and remnants of Taliban . It is widely believed that this force was instrumental in the recent incidents of violence in the country including the assassination of Haji Abdul Qadir. In early May 2002, CIA sent an unmanned plane to liquidate Hekmatyar. The attempt failed but the incident serves to highlight the thorny problems Karzai faces. In fact, Karzai has not made any progress in one of his professed priorities, the



campaign against warlords. The writ of the warlords runs over their respective areas unfettered by any central ruling and bulk of the country remains as lawless as ever. Militias of Tajik General Ustad Ata and General Dostum clashed near Mazar-i-Sharif forcing the UN to intervene. Karzai's main problem is that unlike Hekmatyar, Dostum, Ismael Khan ( Herat Governor), Gul Agha (Kandhar Governor), Zadran (Khost warlord), Vice President and Defence Minister General Mohammad Fahim and others he is not a warlord and as such does not have a militia. After his selection as the President while Karzai traveled the world seeking aid and making friends, Fahim strengthened his grip on Afghanistan and is in fact a major headache since he has inherited the late Ahmed Shah Masood's Panjsheri Tajik force. The level of mutual trust can be gauged from the fact that while Karzai is given security cover by the US , which has not prevented an attempt on him by Al Qaeda in Kandhar on 5 September 2002 , Hazara leader Karim Khalili has British commandos and security to Uzbek leader Dostum is provided by Uzbek commandos.

The Interim Administration in Afghanistan is under severe pressure and to cap it, the selected leaders have an unclear vision how to pull the country out of the morass they are sinking in. Mere donor aid is not the answer which is slow in coming as per the Afghans - only one-third of the promised \$1.8 billion for the year has been received by them. In this regard EU has been active and from September 2001 it has given Euro 352 million. On 26 February 2002, the European Commission has allocated Euro 57.5 million for issues like-rural economy (13 million ), support to public administration (20 million), mine clearance (10 million) and basic urban infrastructure and coordination (10 million). Putting the aid to effective use as per inter-se priority is, however, far more important. Quite clearly, such is not the case.

From the history traced earlier it is apparent that the level of trust amongst key players and ethnic groups remains low. The single most action that will address this problem and many other ailments is a national security force. As evident from their history, the Afghans are a proud race and take to weapons like a duck to water. It would, therefore, be foolish to attempt to disarm the tribal groups - an act suggested by some. Promoting such a development-



of structuring a neutral security force, an Afghan National Army (ANA)- is one of the responsibilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The constellation of regional warlords who tend to lose a great deal in the transition to a new government, though outwardly supporting military integration, have not made any effort to disarm their personal troops numbering thousands. The ISAF has recruited and trained an ethnically balanced unit of 600 soldiers drawn from the 33 provinces. By the end of 2002, when ISAF is withdrawn it would have trained 4000 soldiers. Considering the volatile warlords and the fact that Al Qaeda is not a spent force-specially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and NWFP of Pakistan and in Southern Afghanistan, this is not sufficient. In March 2002, Bush administration had proposed a \$ 50 million plan to train and equip 18,000 Afghan soldiers over 18 months. US Army Special Force Group together with French servicemen are carrying out training from squad to battalion level. One battalion has been raised and two are under raising. Afghan officers are expected to take charge by end 2002. Even if the training is thorough the number is inadequate for the security needs of Afghanistan as the threats to Afghanistan are internal as well as transnational. Past history shows threats are politico-military and civil-military hybrids. The task of ANA will essentially be to act as a counter-balance to ambitious warlords, Al Qaeda remnants and subversive elements incited by propaganda from across the border with Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan. There is an urgent need for the UN, US and EU to guide Hamid Karzai and his team to make this as their *numero uno* priority. The point to be addressed is whether greater security is a pre-requisite for reconstruction programme or will reconstruction despite obvious risks advance security. Since a tacit truce exists at present the points at issue are- what type of national military is needed, finances for the same, a detailed plan on a graduated scale for creation of the force at the initial stages and for its final shape and a commitment from the international community to remain engaged in Afghanistan to help create the right ambience. Command structure, size of the force and role of the military must be specified. All this should be deliberated upon at length, where the UN should mediate as a continuation of the Bonn Agreements. US is, however, passing the buck on to Afghan leaders that reforms are critical and the



Transitional Authority must create representative, multi-ethnic and apolitical Ministry of Defence. As such Karzai is working to develop a National Defence Council encompassing all key ministries to provide security leadership. At present, the ANA, under formation, is US/ EU trained distinct from the existing force of post - October 2001 warlord armies. The Geneva Conference in April 2002, pledged \$235 million for this cause but the funds are yet to fructify fully. The international pledges should be centralised in a fund administered by a joint military commission composed of Afghans and donor nations to ensure that the funds are used for the purpose they are allotted in the first place. The Interim defence minister, General Muhammad Fahim has proposed a national army, 2000,000 strong that combines all the warlords' militia and other standing armed forces. At this juncture perhaps this is over ambitious. The present planning for ANA is 60,000 strong with an Air Force element and border patrol units. A force of about ten brigades, of which three could be mechanised and supported by artillery, engineers and logistic troops should meet the current requirement. The overall strength of ANA could be around 50,000. It may possibly be advantageous not to disarm or demobilise the private armies of the warlords. After a careful screening it may be possible to recruit a majority of these soldiers since there has been a poor response for the ANA. Once enlisted it should be possible to order movement of soldiers for training / manoeuvre. The regiments should be mixed from all ethnic groups and creation of pure Pashtun / Uzbeks / Hazara units avoided. The ethnically integrated formations should be based near the major nerve centres - Charikar, Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz and Mazar-I-Sharif to help the government establish their authority without stepping on the toes of rural leaders. To win over the populace and generate greater confidence, command structure must not favour any ethnic group and must be broad-based. Unfortunately, General Fahim, Defence Minister, has erred in this regard and out of the 100 generals named , 90 are Tajiks ! Mistakes of this nature must be rectified quickly albeit discreetly and more command appointments given to Pushtuns vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Surplus Tajik Generals can be side-stepped in police, bureaucratic and other administrative duties. The ANA can act as a role model, a social institution that binds the Afghan nation by setting examples of loyalty, sound



business practices and integrity. The ANA can with advantage be tasked for mine clearance operations, reclaiming arable land, as a vehicle for education and for providing communication and medical comforts in remote regions. Equally, there is an urgent need to provide for a police force as it may yet pay the best dividends. Although a National Police Academy has become functional in Kabul since August 2002, police should be raised from all ethnic groups. Internationally trained and supported, it should be tasked with border security, anti-smuggling operations and internal police functions including intelligence. An effective police force would help control anti-corruption operations as well.

Finally, Jane's *Foreign Report* credits India with establishing a military base in Farkhor, Tajikistan and thus joining the New Great Game in Central Asia for influence over the region's oil and gas reserves or as a foothold against Pakistan. Be that as it may, India should first concentrate on its immediate vicinity, take major proactive steps and become a partner in developing the economy, industry, education, communications and security concerns of Afghanistan. In view of its geopolitical importance, nurturing our relations with Afghanistan will pay us far better dividends.

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### **USI RESEARCH PROJECTS FOR THE YEAR 2002-2003**

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|------------------------------------|---|
| (a) Fd Mshl KM Cariappa Chair      | Modernisation and Streamlining of Defence Procurement Procedures and Production Systems<br>Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd). |
| (b) Adm R D Katari Chair           | Integrated Management of Maritime Affairs in India<br>Cdr Manoj Gupta.  |
| (c) Air Mshl S Mukherjee Chair     | China's Power Projection Capabilities<br>Air Cmde RV Phadke (Retd).   |
| (d) Prof D S Kothari<br>DRDO Chair | Training in the Army under the New Technological Environment<br>Col BS Pama.  |
| (e) M E A Chair                    | Role of the Coast Guard in the Maritime Security of India<br>Shri P Paleri, IG Coast Guard.   |
| (f) Special Chair                  | Defence Budgeting System for Better Planning and Control of Expenditure<br>Shri AK Ghosh, IDAS (Retd).                                |



# Dealing with the New Global Uncertainties

Major General Vinod Saigal, VSM (Retd)

**1** 1 September 2001 changed the perspective for most people and many nations around the world. Because when one talks of people it refers to several billion human beings who were unlikely to have been affected by the events of that fateful day or the response that followed.

It should be possible to mention a few things that did not change with 11 September tragedy. These include the following :-

- (a) The miserable conditions in which a large majority of human beings live. If anything their misery has been accentuated.
- (b) The economic decline that had set in the countries of Latin America worsened.
- (c) Environmental degradation leading to increased planetary stresses continued as before.
- (d) The turmoil in the global markets brought on well before September 11 that had resulted from the bursting of the dot.com bubble after a period of irrational exuberance, has continued in most cases. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economist Paul Krugman characterised the Enron scandal (the world's biggest bankruptcy) as a "disaster" even greater than September 11.<sup>1</sup>
- (e) The urge of the Western alliance to expand eastward has in no way diminished.
- (f) The North-South divide did not get papered over.

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Excerpted from the talk delivered at the USI of India on 02 August 2002.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXXII, No. 549, July-September 2002.



(g) The USA went ahead with the abrogation of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and commenced National Missile Defence (NMD) deployment.

(h) The new US administration opted out of the Kyoto protocol on global warming and continued to undermine the newly created International Criminal Court (ICC).

For the larger portion of humanity, for whom the front wall of the stomach tends to almost touch the rear membranes, the outcome of 11 September is unlikely to make any difference to their lives. Therefore, when talking of global uncertainties or considering ways for dealing with them, it relates to nations whose power projections affect the world. Belt tightening for the developed communities means a lowering of the thermostat; belt tightening for the have-nots is more starvation deaths.<sup>2</sup> The themes taken up for discussion include the following :-

(a) Externalities that impinge on the South Asian security environment.

(b) Regional Instability in South Asia.

(c) Extra-Regional Uncertainties: Political and Economic.

(d) The USA and the Imperial Moment.

(e) Nuclear Aspects.

(f) Existential Incertitude.

### **Externalities that Impinge on the South Asian Security Environment**

Had the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)-Al Qaeda network not targeted the USA and had decided instead to restrict activities to Europe, Russia and the Indian subcontinent it was well on the cards that they would have done considerable damage with the USA simply looking on. Currently, looked at purely from the point of regional stability, the US military presence would appear to be crucial to peace in the region till the time that an effective government is in place in Afghanistan and democracy is irreversibly



restored in Pakistan. Should the USA limit its aims in the post-intervention phase to eliminating all vestiges of the ISI-Taliban-Al Qaeda network and refrain from actions that could be viewed with concern by the other major regional powers like Russia and China, peace could return to the region. Any advancement of US geo-strategic aims through its present military deployment could lead to tensions in the years ahead.

Countries of the region would be wondering about the duration of the US presence in the region? Will the presence remain at the same level? Or will it be reduced? Or will it be augmented? In case of extended presence what would be the readjustments that the regional powers will have to carry out in the near future, as well as in the medium and long terms - in their individual capacity, bilaterally and multilaterally.

Since the Western alliance into which Japan has been co-opted is likely to remain in place in the ensuing decades the only potential challenge to a super dominant role of the US in Asia and Asia-Pacific, remains China. Regardless of the fitful attempts at forming an integrated China-Russia-India triangle none of these countries is seriously interested in setting up even a remotely confrontationalist structure against the USA. Should the triangular relationship be ever formed, it would limit itself to providing some sort of counterbalance in the form of an identity of views against a US unilateralist approach; more specifically, those elements of unilateralism that are generally opposed by the world at large, including the European nations. An example of such flying-in-the-face-of-the-world opinion would be the US reneging on the Kyoto protocol. Even in the case of Iraq, while there would hardly be any backers for the Iraqi strongman the world would definitely frown upon a direct military intervention in Iraq by Anglo-American forces without a mandate from the UN Security Council; which may not be forthcoming.

### **South Asia**

Had the US not been attacked on 11 September 2001, international terrorism fueled by the ISI backed Al Qaeda militants might have continued to grow. It would be difficult, by hindsight, to assign any definite limits to this growth. Suffice to say that it can



be reasonably surmised that, if left unchecked for just a few more years, it could have developed any or all of the following capabilities :-

- (a) Expand the war in Chechnya to other Russian Republics.
- (b) Expand activities in Kashmir to the level where the Government of India might have had to take recourse to war with Pakistan.
- (c) Establish a far more violent Islamists' salient in Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia.
- (d) Capture the whole of Afghanistan.
- (e) Effective domination over parts of Central Asia.
- (f) On the way to overturning the existing Saudi Arabian regime.
- (g) Established effective capabilities to undertake September 11 type attacks in many parts of the USA, Europe, Australia and elsewhere.
- (h) Development of nuclear capability.
- (j) Development of chemical and biological warfare capability.
- (k) Ability to damage the US interests worldwide at much higher levels.
- (l) Fortress Afghanistan developed as a full-fledged training base for Arab-Pakistani legions - as opposed to a few thousand jihadi fighters - for overthrowing several regimes in the Middle East.
- (m) Talibanisation of Pakistan; or sufficient integration with elements in the Pakistan military and the ISI.
- (n) Possible attempt to control Middle East and Central Asian oil production and flows.
- (o) Establishment of a Narcotics International.
- (p) Terrorising the Islamic diaspora in the USA, the West and elsewhere in the world to contribute a portion of their income to the Islamists' coffers.



- (q) Takeover of selected companies worldwide through several dummy corporations for influencing world capital flows.
- (r) Jihadisation of Bangladesh.
- (s) Attempt subversion of the Indian Muslim psyche.

The scope of expansion that was being attempted through the Taliban regime was no 'fringe element' at the 'margins of Islam'. Its success could have resulted in the virtual capture of power by the Islamists in Central Asia. The consolidation of power in the hands of militant Islamists' regimes would have assured dominance over Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves in the same manner as achieved by the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil cartel or the military dominance over the Gulf by the USA. Except that in Central Asia both aspects would have been combined in the hands of Islamic jihad.

The enormous inflow of funds through narco-trafficking network as well as through the monopoly marketing of the hydrocarbon wealth, would have made them a force to be reckoned with, not amenable to being pushed around by the USA. In the process of consolidating they would have acquired nuclear weapons and longer-range delivery systems. Militant Islam would have been well on the way to developing a global reach, far out of proportion to its actual strength, by the simple expedient of enforcement of anti-modern religious orthodoxy over larger swathes of the Muslim world. The next stage would have been the extension of their power into Europe and the USA through Muslim communities through violence and terror, as had been happening in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Radical Islam was well on its way to becoming a global power player prior to 11 September 2001.

The grand design failed. One of the contenders vying for a dominant role in Central Asia, i.e., the Islamists, have been knocked off the Central Asian chessboard. The USA is unlikely to yield place to anyone else till the hydrocarbon reserves last. The uncertainty that now remains as regards the Islamists is their future course of action. They have been severely mauled in Afghanistan. They have not been destroyed. Their base in Pakistan is largely intact. In many ways it would appear to have been strengthened. Pakistan was the epicentre of global terror in the form of jihad



prior to the Afghanistan debacle. It remains so after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Islamists are being denied space by the USA and coalition forces to move northward into Central Asia. Their principle thrust having been blocked from that direction their strongest outlets now remain an eastward expansion into the subcontinent (India, Bangladesh and then further east) and exploration of fresh avenues for ingress into the USA and Europe (including Russia).

Pakistan, which will remain the epicentre of terror for a long time to come, unless the Pakistani swamp is effectively drained through concerted global action, the following aspects will need urgent attention :-

- (a) Pakistan is fast becoming economically, politically and culturally irrelevant to the world beyond being the epicentre of global terrorism, or a frontline state against itself.
- (b) Pakistan's so-called low cost option - i.e., the jihad option through proxy wars and terrorism - is low-cost only for the Pakistan army. The costs are transferred by the Generals in power to others - the others in Pakistan being the exchequer, the political class and the civilians. And now even the jihadis. Meanwhile the Pakistan Army gathers all the plums.
- (c) The Pakistan Army is adept at buck passing. After having made the Taliban carry out its bidding in capturing Afghanistan and pushing towards Central Asia, the Pakistan Army abandoned them when the chips were down, as it had done earlier with the political class after the Kargil debacle. Currently it is busy hounding the democratic forces and supposedly hunting the Taliban.

Counter terrorism investigator Mazhar Hussain has estimated that more than 50 radical groups currently operating in Pakistan have links to Al Qaeda. "Osama is not alone. He has a big organisation, in every city, in every district here." According to a columnist of a US publication, "Pakistan has long been to terrorism what Las Vegas was to the Mafia-a free zone, where any hood from any "family" can pass through with impunity".<sup>3</sup>

The year 2002 is turning out to be a repeat of 1980 in the sense that the US policies in Pakistan are leading to the



strengthening of the military and the mullahs; exactly as had happened at the time of Zia-ul-Haq. At that time as well the military and the burgeoning forces of militant Islam were being strengthened at the cost of Pakistan's civil society. Democracy was being trampled underfoot. The Western world was simply looking on. Presently, democracy is again being trampled underfoot by another military usurper. This time far more comprehensively. The West is again looking on. The difference is that the burgeoning Islamists are now a force to be reckoned with. They have demonstrated their ability to take on the Pakistan military as well as the West.

In Afghanistan the problems for the Americans could result more from the latent potential of the Taliban, or their mutated successors, to re-emerge in Pakistan or elsewhere on the subcontinent, even attempting to regain a foothold in Afghanistan. As part of the US strategy many local commanders who supported the Taliban were induced to change sides or to distance themselves from the Taliban. The strategy that may have worked in the short run could create problems at a later date. Tribal leaders who are buyable could just as easily be re-purchased by others, should the price be right. Hence, to base post-intervention governance strategy for Afghanistan on the shifting sands of purchased loyalty might not turn out to be a sound proposition. The US has no choice but to go all the way to remove the influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as their spawning grounds in Pakistan. The Pushtuns being the largest ethnic grouping in Pakistan will no doubt wish to have a major representation in any future Afghanistan government. Before that they will have to be permanently separated from the Taliban.

### **Extra-Regional Uncertainties - Political and Economic**

Geo-economics has assumed as great an importance as was the case with geopolitics. In the present context, the military dimension will continue to preponderate for the foreseeable future over the socio-economic, environmental and other dimensions in the national and regional security perspectives in South Asia; till the time that terrorism stands sufficiently degraded for normalcy to return.



When dealing with the extra-regional uncertainties, both political and economic, it has to be noted at the outset that outside the Western world the factors relating to national security become variables in relation to:

- (a) Space (geographical location).
- (b) Time (whether there is stability in the region during that period).
- (c) The attitude of the super power (USA) towards the countries concerned.
- (d) The hostility of the neighbours (or otherwise).
- (e) The internal security situation.
- (f) Economic vulnerability.
- (g) Social equilibrium.
- (h) Quality of governance.
- (j) Other factors.

In its initial response, the USA was willing to come close to the global fraternity to make common cause against what it considered to be a faceless enemy. The US manifested the symptoms of a responsible member of the global community. No sooner had it become clear that the Taliban and Al Qaeda could be defeated, it began to re-display the arrogance of a superpower and a global bully. A few days after the fall of Kandahar, President Bush announced his intention to walk out of the ABM Treaty with Russia.

It is presumed that the essential strategic purpose of the American-led response to Islamic jihad would be destruction and not conquest. The response would be sufficiently long-term to make the undertaking successful. At the start of the global coalition against terror, put together by the US, the platform of common interests was more compelling than the differences that could, at a later stage, plague them.

### **Economic Uncertainties**

The present economic decline in various regions of the world has been a major contributory factor in the overall global uncertainty.



Anticipatory action by affluent nations, including in the oil producing Muslim world could have prevented many of the conflicts that have surfaced in recent years. Citing Afghanistan, where timely action in the past could have averted the disaster that overtook the world, Finland's Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja said: "In Afghanistan we had had civil war for 20 years, with continued human rights violations, stepped up when the Taliban took over. But it became an international concern only after it became evident that it had become the basis for global terrorism. We would have been spared much if we had been able to act much earlier. But instead we had neighbouring countries, actually aiding and arming groups (having links with terrorism) for their own political reasons."

Elaborating on globalisation, he said that it was unavoidable and, on the whole, a positive phenomenon as it would help create more wealth everywhere in the world. He saw two challenges - one, of ensuring that the increased wealth was distributed equitably among and within countries and, two, the need for a more efficient, democratic framework to manage globalisation<sup>4</sup> is nowhere in sight. With the developed world failing to take the steps necessary to reduce the debt burden of developing societies or put into effect policies that do not (potentially) cripple the agricultural economy of third world countries, bigger turmoil with unforeseen consequences could result. The World Bank, the IMF and Western governments criticise lack of transparency in the economic functioning of developing countries. Ironically, in May 1998, *Fortune* magazine warned its leaders of the perils of investing in South-east Asia: "You can't trust the companies, you can't trust the governments, you can't trust the analysts, you can't even trust the mutual fund managers." After the revelation of a \$ 1.70 billion (approximate) accounting scam at US telecom giant WorldCom, which comes in the wake of the collapse of Enron and a number of scandals involving the leading Wall Street investment banks, the same words might just as accurately be applied to the American business scene.<sup>5</sup>

### **The USA**

The USA has been bombarding the world with talk of American values. There was always a high moralistic note that preceded almost every US intervention overseas, which their government



and media would have the world believe, to uphold cherished American values. A random survey reveals the following :-

- (a) The scandals relating to the US business practices that have descended on the public with monotonous regularity - Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom or any of the other US giants whose reputations are tumbling like ninepins is the tip of the iceberg.
- (b) WorldCom, a company that once epitomised the telecom bubble, revealed that it had overstated profits by \$3.8 billion over the past five quarters, after what the Securities and Exchange Commission called "accounting improprieties of unprecedented magnitude".<sup>6</sup>
- (c) American corporate malfeasance was revealed in a survey of top executives. Although 99 per cent of them pronounced themselves to be honest in business, some 82 per cent admitted to cheating at golf, even though huge pay packets and enormous bonuses were not at stake.<sup>7</sup>
- (d) September 11 has given the US government a powerful new incentive for global activism. Afghanistan was just the beginning. Although the Afghan people had almost nothing to do with Al Qaeda's actions against the USA, that country continues to be bombed savagely.
- (e) Opinion polls indicate considerable public backing for George W. Bush's activism abroad. Whether the scale of the backing for the US president's actions has been artfully contrived or simply a case of oversell by the pro-establishment US media would be difficult to say.
- (f) According to media reports the past business practices of the US President and his closest associates may not be able to withstand scrutiny.
- (g) Sexual scandals surfacing in the Church hierarchy across America have surprised many by their pervasiveness and persistence.

Thoughtful persons have started cautioning their government against future excesses. Gore Vidal has suggested that the US should stop meddling in the affairs of other nations as also the



private affairs of its own citizens. In a collection of essays published in the wake of September 11 titled 'Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got To Be So Hated', Vidal shows that

"The USA indulged in 200 'military adventures' since the end of World War II. The number of military strikes we made unprovoked against other countries since 1947-48 is more than 250. These are major strikes everywhere from Panama to Iran. And it is not even a complete list. It does not include places like Chile, as that was a CIA operation. I was only listing military attacks."<sup>8</sup>

The doctrine of 'hot pre-emption' is being slowly but surely legitimised by the US administration. Very soon the Western allies will endorse it officially. It would not come as a matter of surprise if at some point in time the UN Security Council too were to pass a resolution on the lines of resolution 1373, sanctifying hot pre-emption after a particularly gruesome outrage of the 11 September variety, especially if it is perpetrated in the Western world. Therefore, since hot pre-emption fits in incrementally - and naturally - in the pursuit of an agenda for world domination already decided upon by the USA even prior to 11 September 2001, its implications have to be studied dispassionately by the rest of the world, and more so the American citizens themselves, before it becomes the accepted norm. The earlier attempts to expand NATO's role for 'out of area operations' were given a new lease of life by the events of 11 September. As far as the global community is concerned the questions that need to be urgently addressed are summarised below:

(a) Hot preemption against whom?

(b) What forms can hot pre-emption take?

(c) Up to what limit will hot pre-emption be pursued? Who will decide when 'enough is enough'? For example, Iraq continues to be bombed by the Anglo-American combine even after 10 years since the end of the Gulf War.

The global implications of hot pre-emption need to be gone into carefully by all concerned, irrespective of whether in the face of prolonged terrorism such action would be justifiable or not.



Justification for hot preemption brings into play several complex issues. Included therein is the nature of the organisation carrying out the terrorist outrages and the bases from which they operate, has the support - covert or overt - of the state from which it operates, or whether the state from which it operates has been so enfeebled that it finds itself helpless to stop the terrorist activities launched from its soil. The answer to this question becomes important because in case a state is seen to be sponsoring or even turning a blind eye to terrorist activities carried out trans-nationally from its soil, then the ambit of hot pre-emption could include action against that state as well as its ruling establishment. In cases where the ruling establishment is a military dictatorship, hot pre-emption can be undertaken in a no holds barred manner. Alternatively, should the state concerned be a democracy, but finds itself helpless to deal with the terrorist organisations operating from its soil, hot pre-emption could aim at destruction of the terrorist potential in situ as well as the bolstering of the democratic process as a sort of package deal. In the latter case the enfeebled state can be construed to be an ally, in some sense, of the power or powers carrying out hot pre-emption.

A thought has to be given to the regional imbalance that could result from a successful or failed hot pre-emption exercise undertaken against a country. In the same context the aspect of dilution of national sovereignty needs to be deliberated upon at the UN and other global fora, especially when hot pre-emption is undertaken by the USA and its allies or one of the P-5 nations. Hot pre-emption undertaken by any other state against another state would fall into a different category.

The future role of the UN has to be seen in the context of hot pre-emption undertaken without a UN mandate. Should the USA adopt the hot pre-emption doctrine any place outside the Pakistan-Afghanistan region from where Islamic jihad was able to debouch to carry out the 11 September attacks, then the US action could result in the fatal undermining of the UN charter, which for all practical purposes could be torn up thereafter.

### **Nuclear Aspects**

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condition is volatile. Its nuclear programme is under direct and exclusive military control. It keeps threatening at every opportunity to use nuclear weapons. It has often tried to indulge in nuclear blackmail on a global scale - 'do this or else the weapons could fall into the wrong hands' - prior to 11 September. Now it has changed tack, insisting that the weapons are in safe hands. The rest of the world, however, does not discount the possibility of nuclear weapons or material falling into the hands of the radical Islamists under certain conditions that can no longer be considered very remote.

A US journalist writing in *Fortune* opined that Richard Pearl's death and the mid-March bombing of a Protestant church in Islamabad were only the visible signs of a dysfunctional nation which he said could be called Problemistan - being a country that professed to be an ally of the US in its war on terrorism but probably harboured more terrorists than any place on earth. He added that it was "the most unstable nuclear power in the world, a land where even the best intentions are undermined by some of the world's worst economic conditions".<sup>9</sup>

The world must now bring itself to carefully consider the "extra-dimensionality" of the Chinese nuclear and missile technology transfers to Pakistan. To date the concern has been on account of the nuclear arms race that could develop on the subcontinent and the violation of the non-proliferation regimes in vogue. Note has to be taken of the fact that the possibility of nuclear materials and delivery systems falling into the hands of Islamic militants at some future date 'cannot be excluded'. In the case of Pakistan it is not inconceivable - at some future date - that elements in the Pakistan military and the ISI, who back the Islamic militants, stage a coup and capture power. Staging coups in Pakistan has never been a difficult proposition. Under such an eventuality the government of Pakistan itself would become the direct sponsor for Islamic jihad worldwide and provide the wherewithal for nuclear blackmail and terrorism; as was happening in Afghanistan through the erstwhile Taliban-Al Qaeda setup. Anti-Americans in Pakistan would be fairly large. The chant of 'death to America', 'death to the kafirs' that rebound through the seminaries of Pakistan prior to 9/11 has in no way subsided. It may have become muted simply as a tactical necessity. If anything, the sentiment has become



stronger. Therefore, hypothetically at least, one in fifty or one in hundred Pakistanis, given a chance, would not be 'psychologically' averse to blowing himself up in the midst of the targeted communities with a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD); for maximum damage should the opportunity arise. The point that is highlighted is that China, which has had the closest of relationships with Pakistan for several decades, would be fully alive to the sentiment coursing through the veins of a large number of Pakistani Muslims who swear by Islamic jihad. While it may have wanted to enhance its influence in South Asia through transfer of these lethal technologies to Pakistan, it was fully alive to the possibility of these technologies [nuclear materials] being used to cause unimaginable destruction in the USA, Western Europe and Russia besides India by the Islamic jihadis being trained in the seminaries of Pakistan for that very purpose, with the full backing of the Pakistan military regime and the ISI. Therefore, China cannot avoid guilt by association. At the very least, it should be obliged by the global community to ensure that no further transfers of this nature take place, under any circumstances. Going a step further, the potential for enormous mischief that inheres with the ISI backed jihadis in Pakistan who avowedly would be prepared to destroy themselves to cause unacceptable damage to America would, ipso facto, make any further transfer by China a 'hostile act directed against the USA'.

### **Existential Incertitude**

The most pressing concerns of the opening decade of the 21st century represent existential incertitude of a nature that does not brook delay in resolution. These include *inter alia* the following :-

- (a) Increasing planetary stresses.
- (b) Increasing the US waywardness.
- (c) Third world indebtedness.
- (d) Weakening of the UN.

**Increasing Planetary Stresses.** Increasing use of lethal technologies are destroying life support systems around the planet, making larger and larger tracts azoic. The Tora Bora complex encompassing a few hundred square kilometres was subjected to



some of the most concentrated bombing in recent times, in an attempt to capture or destroy the leader of a militant Islamists faction and a few followers. The number of his followers actually killed after the massive onslaught was not large. In the process life forms that had inhabited the complex since time immemorial would have been comprehensively obliterated. Ecological mega-tragedies of this kind, far greater than anything that happened on 11 September, are being enacted around the world and not many people at the helm of affairs seem to be overly concerned.

**Increasing US Waywardness.** The new found US penchant to single-handedly oppose global protocols arrived at after long years of painful negotiations could end up as an unmitigated global disaster unless the US is stopped in its tracks right away before irreversible damage is done to the planet and the fragile global equipoise that obtains after the end of the Cold War. The US public must realise that the global threshold of tolerance of the US waywardness has already been crossed. Any further move in this direction could force the US allies to abandon it. In an increasingly interdependent world the US cannot go it alone. No nation can.

**Third World Indebtedness.** Economists around the world have rallied against the inequity of the new global order. The G-8 group of nations routinely makes platitudinous noises that something needs to be done as the situation worsens and Third World debt increases. The groans emanating from countries of Latin America can be heard continents away. International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, as was the case during the South East Asian meltdown, will mainly recompense the lead bankers in the USA and the West. To an extent these disbursements could postpone the inevitable collapse. The venality and profligacy of Latin American politicians notwithstanding, the resources of Latin America have been exploited to the hilt by the USA and lately Western and Japanese consortia. No light can be seen at the end of the tunnel. Till the time that there was an opposing superpower the US imperialism could not extend to cover the globe. It has a free run now - militarily as well as economically. One of the Latin American countries is again threatening to declare a moratorium on its debts. The exercise will fail unless all Latin American countries join hands to renegotiate their debts. They should swim or sink together.



**Weakening the UN.** Nations that benefited the most from the UN Organisation set up after World War II are taking the lead to undermine it. The USA used the UN to push its interests most successfully, even during the Cold War. Today it is hell-bent upon weakening the UN Organisation. In the process it might end up by destroying it. Should that happen the worst sufferer could be the USA, followed closely by the other permanent members. The remaining permanent members must join hands to restore the vigour of the UN before chaos descends in the form of increased US unilateralism. India and China must join hands to reinvigorate the UN. Russia, Japan and Western Europe must make it a point to pull away from the USA to chart out an independent course for strengthening the UN. The global menace for which UN resolution 1373 was passed cannot be tackled except through policies, or mandates, harmoniously blended in the crucible of the UN.

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## **Pakistan, Musharraf and De-Talibanisation**

**Lieutenant General R Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)**

**E**ver since Musharraf turned 'approver', in Taliban's 'crimes against humanity' the General became a vital ally of the West in their war on terrorism. By supporting the West in operations against the Taliban, Musharraf has redeemed his status from a condemned military dictator to an admired statesman. For Musharraf it was an apocalyptic option - a choice between economic demise or civil war. But as events unfolded in the 'fast forward', Musharraf had turned the biggest challenge in his rule to his greatest opportunity; scoring a diplomatic coup, reviving Pakistan's strategic value and reaping rich harvest by way of economic succour for Pakistan. There were rumblings within the country against Musharraf's un-stinted support to the US, yet he remains unscathed and firmly in control at the helm; thus far. Internationally he has enhanced his image as a leader with the verve to take bold decisions, accepted as a reliable, indispensable ally of the US.

The Americans are deeply beholden to President Musharraf for services rendered in defeating the Taliban and bin Laden's Al Qaeda; for assistance in establishing a new regime in Afghanistan acceptable in the new World Order. But the American agenda in South Asia remains unfinished. There are major concerns about Pakistan itself. The primary apprehension of the US is of Pak's nuclear arsenal falling into fundamentalist hands. And Musharraf remains a vital cog in the US strategy in obtaining control of Pak's nuclear weaponry. With Musharraf's political and personal security firmly in American hands, the West is more assured of guarantees against nuclear belligerence by Pakistan. The nuclear issue is a long-term concern, but is linked with the immediate endeavour of the West to root out fundamentalism from within Pakistan - the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan.

The major question is, how far can Musharraf go in de-Talibanisation of Pakistan. Musharraf has turned approver for the

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West, but has the Pak nation too turned approver against its kinsmen, branded criminals by the West ?

In this article I propose to analyse this aspect, under the following heads :-

- (a) The dimensions of Pakistan's Talibanisation.
- (b) De-Talibanisation of Pakistan under Musharraf.

### **THE DIMENSIONS OF PAKISTAN'S TALIBANISATION**

Talibanisation of Pakistan is a metaphoric explanation and elucidation of the phenomena of rise of fundamentalist Islam in the country. 'Taliban' means a religious student. The term Talibanisation is specifically applied to Afghanistan's earlier Taliban regime (1996-2000), who imposed a medieval form of Islam in the state, rejecting modernisation of the society and economy as something perverse. In the governance of the state they imposed on the Afghan people, their rural values and a distorted form of radical Islam as their true heritage, interpreted by the clerics and their leader Mohammad Omar, proclaiming himself as Mohammed's descendent.

Talibanisation of Pakistan has other connotations and wider dimensions beyond religion. Pakistan veered towards Islamic fundamentalism in early 70s ironically under secular and feudal Bhutto, who was compelled to turn to radical Islam as a nation-binding factor after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. General Zia used Islam to legitimise his military rule. He promoted the concept of Jihad to fight the Russians in Afghanistan, which gave rise to Islamic militancy within Pakistan. In the post-Zia democratic rules of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, the fundamentalists grew, as the governments were too weak to oppose them. The Taliban are a creation of this era-early 90s -trained and nurtured by the state to foist a Pak controlled regime in Afghanistan.

The spill-over of the Afghan imbroglio impacted on Pakistan's polity, with clandestine flow of arms and drugs in the country. This gave renewed prominence to Muslim right wing groups. Ever since then, the 'Ulema' have enjoyed extra-constitutional powers in the country. Clerics, especially Amir Qazi Hussein and Fazlur Rehman of Jammat-e-Islam, Jamiat-e-Ulema, along with other sectarian



groups wielded an out-of-proportion influence in Pak polity. The Talibanisation of Pakistan had begun.

Talibanisation of Pakistan has external and internal dimensions. Its external dimension legitimises Jehadi intervention outside Pakistan, to rid the Muslims from oppression in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The internal dimensions of Pak's Talibanisation are indirectly related to the external content. The cause and effect of exporting Islamic Militancy in domestic affairs. This manifested itself in Pak's socio-political spheres, feudalism in the state and society; existence of ethnic, sectarian violence; the use of force in governance of the state.

The de-Talibanisation of Pakistan will not be complete, unless the problem is addressed in entirety, in all its dimensions enumerated below.

- (a) The ills of 'feudalism' and foisting of Punjabi hegemony in a federal state.
- (b) The rise of Islamic militancy, and the concept of Jihad in foreign and domestic policies.
- (c) The perpetuation of an authoritarian style of governance, and 'rule of force' by civil or military governments.

Musharraf, well aware of the phenomena of 'Talibansation', addressed the problem selectively - differently, at different times, in different situations - to suit his requirements. Aspects that threatened his rule were eliminated; aspects that facilitated his rule were retained; some aspects he was forced to address under American pressure.

## **MUSHARRAF AND DE-TALIBANISATION**

### **Feudalism and Punjabi Hegemony**

If Afghanistan was run by the Pakistan warlords, Pakistan has been run by the Punjabi feudal lords. Pakistan inherited the feudal system prevalent in the West Punjab region of undivided India, and the system grew with close links to Pakistan's polity. No government paid attention to 'land ceiling' reforms necessary to dismantle the serfdoms. President Ayub tried and failed. The land reforms were laid to rest ever since, and the rich landlords



continued to possess thousands of acres of land. The rich 'hundred' families - with accretion of retired generals awarded privileges and lands - grew primarily in the Punjab province, and wielded great influence on the Pak political system, with their money power and 'Zamindari' constituencies. The Pak Muslim League (PML) which ruled Pakistan for the first decade was primarily a Punjab-based party, and enjoyed the patronage of the Punjabi landed gentry. During this period Punjabi dominance prevailed, and left this legacy for all times, with large induction of Punjabis in the bureaucracy and the armed forces.

The Punjabi hegemony grew, and so did resentment to it in other provinces. The ethnic problem aggravated by misrule of successive governments, erupted into violence in the early 70s, the breakup of East Pakistan, the revolt in Baluchistan and the beginning of the 'Mohajir Quami Movement' (MQM) in Sind.

The ethnic divide already under strain, worsened with the US intervention in Afghanistan. The people from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan had felt the tremors of US fire-power in their vicinity, and were witness to large scale killings of the Pashtun kinsmen by the Americans abetted by Musharraf's government. The US military operations now under way to ferret out Al Qaeda cells from Pakistan's western region, have directly impacted on the people in this area. Sind has become another safe haven with Al Qaeda melting into Karachi's urban areas, drawing the region into the clandestine Central Intelligence Agency, USA - Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan (CIA-ISI) operations. Sindhis already simmering with the MQM agitation against the Pak government, are annoyed further with the new developments. The situation in the affected provinces is volatile, and has the potential of exploding into civil war, with anger swelling against Musharraf and Punjab. The minority provinces associate the military rule with Punjabi hegemony.

Musharraf himself a Mohajir is deeply conscious of the severity of ethnic violence that can bedevil the nation, threatening his rule. He must be seen to end Punjabi hegemony. The general's strategy is to break up the two main parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the PML. Both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif have been convicted for corruption, denigrating the parties, weakening their



appeal leading to possible split within. Musharraf's attempt is to promote new regional groups to become enablers for local governance encouraging decentralisation and seeming erosion of Punjabi rule.

Musharraf has made deliberate moves to induct non-Punjabis into important key positions, to appease the minorities. The head of the ISI is a Baluch officer. In the blueprint for the proposed constitution, Musharraf has promised equal representation from all provinces in the National Assembly and the National Security Council. If in the national elections in October 2000, the general abides by his promises of equal opportunity to all ethnic groups, he may yet stem the tide threatening another breakup of Pakistan.

In all this the feudal lords have been left untouched; certainly the feudal aristocracy. The feudal Zamindar's are side lined with the stipulation of minimum educational qualification for elections. There is no mention of land reforms, nor has the National Accountability Bureau drawn any rich and corrupt into its dragnet. Perhaps he does not wish to incur the wrath of the powerful landed gentry. Or is it that Musharraf is a part of the feudal system too? Yet if the feudal lords stay, so shall Punjabi hegemony. Nor will it help to curb Islamic militancy, which is indeed nurtured by the feudal system, a conduit for drug trade.

### **Islamic Militancy and Jihad**

Musharraf on taking over Pakistan found Afghanistan firmly under Taliban's control, with the Northern Alliance squeezed in a small pocket in the north. The new development suited Pakistan, as a friendly Afghanistan met Pakistan's requirements for strategic depth, also providing bases for training of the Kashmiri militants. There was a negative side to the new Afghanistan. Musharraf was uncomfortable with the Taliban regime practising a repressive and radical form of Islam in Pak's neighbourhood. With close links developing between the Pashtun Taliban and their brethren tribesmen in NWFP and Baluchistan, there was always the danger of de-stabilisation of Pak's volatile region on the western borders. The growing bond between the Pak cleric Fazlur Rehman, Taliban leader Maulana Omar and bin Laden was disconcerting. The troika had visions of establishing the new 'Caliphate of the Umma' in



greater Afghanistan which encompassed vast areas of Central Asia, Pakistan and Kashmir. Musharraf was under no such delusions, he disassociated himself from such wild notions. He visioned Pakistan emerging as a modern Islamic state, preventing the country's drift into isolation of fundamentalism. Thus while maintaining cordial relations with the new regime in Afghanistan, he tried to break the religious bonds between his western provinces. He attempted to close down the 'Madrassas' in Peshawar but when strongly opposed by the Pak Ulema, he backed off, as he was yet to consolidate his power. It is only now that a Pak decree has made it binding on the religious seminaries to enlist with the Pak Educational Board, reorienting the Madrassas for imparting education rather than religious indoctrination.

As for Islamic militancy within Pakistan, Musharraf followed a two-track policy. He targeted the Sunni-Shia militant groups to curb the growing sectarian violence in the state. However, the export of terrorism in Kashmir remained the corner stone of his foreign policy. Under him main militant groups - Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen thrived with state patronage. Militancy in Kashmir reached a new high with the creation of new Jehadi groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammad of Maulana Azhar under ISI's tutelage. Musharraf raised the intensity of the proxy war in Kashmir, assigning the ISI a formal role of coordinating militant operations for better effect.

The world changed on 11 September 2001 with terrorism striking US soil. Musharraf under desperate compulsion joined the war against terrorism. He had to change tack in his foreign policies. The Taliban regime was abandoned, and Pakistan had to contend with the renewed rule of Northern Alliance in Kabul. The fact that Afghanistan's new President Hamid Karzai is a Pak sponsored Pashtun was some consolation. Yet clearly the days of Pak hegemony in Afghanistan were over.

The de-Talibanisation of Afghanistan caused some tremors in Pakistan, but the people benumbed with the demonstration of massive US fire-power accepted the dismantling of Taliban regime as inevitable. The de-Talibanisation of Pakistan, the next agenda, will be, however, strongly opposed by the clerics who could foment violence and political chaos in the state. The common man in



Pakistan, however, is not a fundamentalist. His aspirations are for modernism and good governance. Jihad is more a socio-economic problem and driven less by ideology.

Thus Musharraf at some risk, continues to support US military operations against Al Qaeda cells in Pakistan, without trouble thus far. But any action for dismantling Jihad in Kashmir will be a bitter pill. To give up intervention in Kashmir goes against Musharraf's own conscience; abandoning the Kashmir policy will be a great national humiliation. Musharraf is in a 'siege' with severe opposition from within, and under extreme US pressure to end cross-border terrorism. Pinned in a corner, it is to be seen how Musharraf manoeuvres himself for survival, without loss of face and US goodwill.

### **Absolute Power and Rule by Force**

Rule by force is the obvious method of governance by a military dictator. Yet use of excessive force by an authoritarian ruler in Pakistan has been his downfall. Yahya Khan put down the revolt in Bengal by force and lost his job, and Eastern Pakistan. Bhutto's charisma and power got eclipsed by the use of military force to put down the Baluch revolt. Musharraf is a shrewd man and has learnt from history. His military coup was blood-less, and he consciously avoided the use of military power to put down opposition. Yet he knows that a military dictator can survive only with the rule of force. He amasses power by arming himself with constitutional decrees. Musharraf has already invoked the 'Eighth Amendment'. The use of direct force is injudicious, wisdom lies in use of covert force through the ISI.

The ISI, a tri-service monolithic organisation, with its vast experience in the Afghan war has emerged as a powerful instrument of governance by successive rulers. Staffed primarily by military personnel, it should have been an adjunct of the armed forces. Paradoxically it grew independent of the parent body, and emerged as the 'Fifth Estate' challenging the power of the army itself. Nawaz Sharif exploited the anomaly, firmly taking the ISI under his direct control to assume absolute power. He, however, miscalculated the army's reach and strength when he appointed Lieutenant General Ziauddin, the then Director General ISI, as the new Pak Army Chief,



sacking Musharraf. In the aftermath of the counter coup, Musharraf's axe would fall inevitably on the ISI, to cleanse it, to induct loyalists, and to take it firmly under army's control.

The second purge of the ISI is under-way at the behest of the US to break the ISI-terrorist nexus. The ISI had become suspect in American eyes, for misleading the CIA in US army's military operations against the Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The ISI restructured and more subservient, has become a major instrument for Musharraf's governance. He, indeed, manipulated his referendum for Presidentship, through the ISI.

The so called Constitutional Reform Package proposed by Musharraf is replicating Zia's wily methods of consolidating power. He has proposed a form of 'controlled democracy' in emulation of Ayub's model. But the administration remains firmly in army hands, and not left to bureaucracy alone as during Ayub's rule. The 'Constitutional Review' has been universally rejected by the intelligentsia and the political parties. However, if Musharraf stays on course to bring about a stable government, it will be more with American support. It is only the long reach of the American money power that can keep the armed forces and Pak polity in check, and keep Musharraf afloat.

### CONCLUSION

Pakistan has always been a blind spot of the US, especially of the Republicans. In the 1980s, it was a great omission by the Americans turning a Nelsonian eye to the nuclearisation of Pakistan. The next US folly was to leave Afghanistan at the perils of Pak manipulations, after the Soviet pull out. The US now deeply hurt by Islamic militancy are more perceptive, determined and watchful to root out terrorism. Pak's centrality in the 'axis of evil' has been realised by them. Yet if the US have chosen not to declare Pakistan a terrorist state, nor denounce Musharraf for stifling democracy in Pakistan, it is out of calculation and not out of conviction. But the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan is considered an imperative by the US, to stop export of terrorism from the region and even make Pak nuclear safe.

Musharraf is committed to the process of ridding Pakistan of militancy after his January 2002 speech. He stands further



committed to change in Pak's policies of Jihad, being a signatory to Conference Interaction and "Confidence Building Measures in Asia" (CICA) at Almaty, accepting cooperation in the war against terrorism in this region.

Musharraf's popularity at home is waning, and his abandoning the Kashmir policy will be unacceptable to the nation. Thus, if he does indeed curb cross-border terrorism, it will be a temporary ceasefire, in the hope that the US will pressurise India to negotiate with Pakistan over Kashmir. He can always return to proxy war, once outside American scrutiny and when effects of India's 'coercive diplomacy' wear off. His second option is to precipitate another Kargil-like situation in J and K. The Kargil venture failed as it was clearly seen by the world as a one sided aggression by Pakistan. Today the Line of Control (LOC) scenario has changed, with both armies in eye-ball contact and already engaged in a 'war of attrition' with regular artillery duels. In this environment, Pak's foray can always be justified by them as retaliation to India's aggression across the LOC, creating a compelling international incident for third party intervention. In such contingency planning, the Jehadi groups in Pakistan have special relevance. The battle-hardened Pak militants including remnants of Al Qaeda, today damned as terrorists could be valuable military resource as an enlisted commando force. They could always be employed in support of regular troops in any future contingency.

Pakistan, Musharraf and de-Talibisation is a highly complex equation. There is great ambivalence in Musharraf's approach to the phenomena. There are too many contradictions in the man. He promises democracy to the nation, but imposes absolute military rule in Pakistan. He condemns terrorism, yet asserts Pakistan's right to handle terrorist infrastructure within, as deemed fit. Musharraf's ability, intent and scope of de-Talibisation of Pakistan will be governed by US concerns and US support, rather than his own convictions. Serving the death sentence on Sheikh Omar in the Daniel Pearl case is more to placate the Americans. Yet there are no major initiatives to eliminate militancy from within, which will only perpetuate with terrorist institutions intact on Pak soil. This is the new reality, which Musharraf must come to terms with. Or he too would go the Zia way.



# **WMD in Hands of Non-State Actors : An Emerging Threat Assessment of the Possibility and its Impact on National Security**

**Professor Matin Zuberi**

**I**ronically, nuclear weapons-by far the most destructive weapons-remain legitimate, while biological and chemical weapons, with more limited and problematic effectiveness, have been outlawed. Non-state actors, of course, are not bothered by these legal restraints. The three types of weapons differ greatly in their ease of production, potential lethality and destructive power, and effectiveness of protection and defence against them. Nuclear weapons certainly deserve the appellation "weapons of mass destruction"(WMD). Lumping them together into the new inclusive category of WMD, however, elevates the status of biological agents that are difficult to disperse and control, and chemical weapons whose much lower lethality has been demonstrated in military combat.

It is assumed that because the essential ingredients for biological and chemical weapons are easily available, any group of terrorists having access to modern biochemical technology and some scientific expertise could produce them. There are, however, major technical hurdles like gaining access to specialised chemical ingredients or virulent microbial strains and acquiring equipment and technique for their production and dispersal. Chemical weapons are not easy to keep safely in stable conditions, and their dispersal depends on climatic factors. It is difficult to use them on a large scale unless it is done in a confined space. The quantity of the agent employed and the means of dissemination would determine their impact. According to Mathew Messelson of Harvard University, "it would take a ton of nerve gas or five tons of mustard gas to

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produce heavy casualties among unprotected people in an open area of one kilometer."

Historical record suggests that the inclusion of chemical weapons as a weapon of mass destruction is highly dubious. A German chemist, Fritz Haber, is infamous for having introduced poison gas in the First World War. He threw himself into the task and worked himself to exhaustion organising the manufacture of hundreds of tons of chlorine gas and thousands of gas cylinders; trained special troops to test them and oversaw their installation in the trenches at the front, regardless of danger to his own person. Only two to three percent of the victims on the western front died while wounds caused by conventional weapons were 10 to 12 times more fatal. On average it took over one ton of gas to cause a single death. The official British history of the First World War devoted a single footnote to chemical weapons; it dismisses them with the observation that chlorine gas "made war uncomfortable...to no purpose." Chemical weapons were not used in the Second World War. The only major use of them was by Iraq in its war against Iran; according to Iranian reports, however, out of 27,000 Iranians injured only 262 died.

There are very few other lethal agents as accessible and as stable in the environment as anthrax spores. Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army attacked villages in Manchuria with crude anthrax bombs during the Second World War. In a "most secret" memorandum of February 25, 1944, Lord Cherwell, Britain's chief science adviser informed Prime Minister Winston Churchill that anthrax could be used to kill people in great numbers and to render places uninhabitable, making it an ideal weapon for use against the Germans. The weapon, he emphasised, had "appalling potentiality." It might even be "more formidable, because infinitely easier to make than ---." Cherwell discretely left a blank in his memorandum for the atomic bomb. He added: "We should have full information since the use of such material might be valuable after the war for keeping order in the world." Britain's military planners were even putting together a bombing plan for the use of anthrax against six German cities, including Berlin, Hamburg, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt. It was expected to kill at least half the population by "inhalation," and many more



would die later through skin absorption, and the cities "would be contaminated for years," the planners promised. Fortunately, there were production delays, and Churchill-then pushing strongly gas warfare and intolerant of moral constraints on Britain's conduct of the war-did not have the option of using anthrax. British research continued and the experiments included unleashing anthrax on the small island of Gruinard, off the Scottish coast; that island is still contaminated and uninhabitable.

Biological agents are especially useful for covert delivery because of the time lag needed before their effects are noticed. Deranged groups, especially if they have the backing of a state, can conceal their involvement and avoid reprisals. These agents, however, are not as easily weaponised as often imagined, nor are their effects predictable. The capability to disperse microbes over a wide area as an inhalable aerosol for inflicting mass casualties requires a sophisticated delivery system. Moreover, effective dispersal is easily disrupted by environmental and meteorological conditions. As former Soviet expert on biological weapons Ken Alibek wrote in his memoir *Biohazard*, "The most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop them than individual agents." A scenario published in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) *Yearbook* 2000 assumes the dispersal of anthrax over a busy shopping centre. In realistic conditions, between 20 to 30 thousand people could be exposed to the cloud of spores, but only 300 people, concentrated in a relatively narrow area, would be infected but not necessarily killed. This contrasts with dire predictions of mass casualties over large areas.

Let us look at the data available on the 263 global terrorist incidents between 1900 and May 1999 involving chemical or biological agents. Out of these incidents, 26 percent were hoaxes, eight percent involved an unsuccessful conspiracy, attempts were made to obtain dangerous materials in four percent cases, and in 21 percent cases a threatened attack never occurred. There were only 71 incidents of the actual use of a chemical or biological agent,



59 of these occurred outside the United States. In 1998, 15 incidents were reported, one-third of them in the United States. Chemical and biological agents used in the 71 attacks included cyanide, rat poison, VX nerve agent, sarin nerve agent, butyric acid, mercury, insecticide, anthrax, botulinum toxin, salmonella bacteria, and the HIV virus.

Religiously motivated groups were responsible for 24, nationalist-separatist groups for 15, and single-issue groups and unknown actors for 12 attacks. These 71 terrorist attacks resulted in only 123 deaths and 3,774 injuries. This includes the death of a single American caused by the use of a cyanide-tipped bullet by the Symbionese Liberation Army in 1973. As for injuries, 1,038 were caused by Aum Shinrikyo's release of sarin nerve agent in Japanese subways in 1995. Out of a total of 784 injuries in the United States, 751 resulted from the Rajneesh cult's food poisoning case. This record shows that chemical and biological agents have so far been only weapons of mass disruption rather than of mass destruction.

Revelations of the Iraqi production of some 8.5 tons of concentrated anthrax before 1991 alerted world community to new dangers. Another event signaled the beginning of a new era of technically sophisticated use of chemical or biological agents. Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious cult, became the first terrorist group to resort to a major chemical attack. Between 1990 and 1994, it attempted six unsuccessful attacks with biological agents. Then, at the height of the morning rush hour on March 20, 1995, cult members placed 11 sarin-filled bags wrapped in newspapers on five Japanese subway trains causing 1,038 injuries but only 12 deaths. The triggering event, however, was trivial; the attack was designed to distract the police from raiding Aum facilities!

In 1984 members of the Rajneesh cult contaminated salad served in a restaurant in Oregon with *Salmonella typhimurium* bacteria; 751 people came down with salmonella poisoning under conditions devoid of terror. At first, the illnesses, none of which was fatal, were attributed to poor sanitary conditions. A year passed before it was established that the outbreak was not natural when



Rajneesh himself called for a government investigation. The perpetrators, however, were not interested in inducing terror; they simply wanted to keep the victims at home so as to get the outcome of a municipal election in the cult's favour! This incident, however, is cited as a bioterrorist attack!

Bioterrorism, however, was not a subject of serious concern within the US government until 1995. The Pentagon then began to lump biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons into an inclusive category of WMD reportedly being developed by a new category of states in the international systems, the so-called 'rogue' states. It was also suggested that nuclear weapons might have to be used to deter any chemical or biological attack by a 'rogue' state. Nuclear weapons, in such contingencies, ceased to be weapons of mass destruction! A spokesman of the Defence Intelligence Agency, however, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 22, 1996 that the agency knew of no terrorist organisations that were actually "developing chemical, biological or radiological weapons."

The first anthrax threat in the United States was made on April 24, 1997 in Washington, D.C. The area was cordoned off and residents quarantined. Although it was found to be a hoax, the next month the threat of WMD in the hands of terrorist groups was officially elevated to "one of the gravest threats to the United States." The New York Times reported that President Clinton was alarmed by the depiction of a bioterrorist attack in the novel *The Cobra Event*. Secretary of Defence William Cohen appeared on television holding a bag of sugar, warning that an equal amount of anthrax, dispersed properly, could wipe out half the population of Washington D.C. The catch was in the phrase "dispersed properly" because it is extremely difficult to do so. Cohen, talking about attacks with WMD, declared: "The question is no longer if this will happen, but when." In 1998, Congress gave the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency \$2 billion to sponsor "wild and crazy" science projects whose funding requests ordinarily would not have even been entertained. Stories about the threat of bioterrorism, often mentioning anthrax, began to appear with greater frequency and, through a process of 'incestuous inter-quote', amplified the scare. Responding to the peoples' craving to be horrified, imaginative novelists, television



networks, and sensationalist journalists cashed in on the spreading fear. The New York Times published 27 stories in its "Biological and Chemical Warfare" category in 1994; but by 1998 the number had increased to 278.

Then began a flood of anthrax threats/hoaxes in the United States. Between October 30 and December 23, 1998, came seven major threats, some of them warning that anthrax had been placed in ventilation systems at health clinics and other buildings in Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and California. About 1,800 potential victims were told to take protective measures. There was, however, no evidence of anthrax contamination. When a department store in California received a telephonic threat on Christmas Eve, two hundred people were made to strip and take a shower in a makeshift outdoor facility. A similar threat was made to a nightclub a few days later that resulted in the evacuation and quarantining of 800 people for four hours. Five more threats were delivered on February 9, 1999. Letters claiming to contain anthrax reached the Washington Post and a federal building in Washington, a post office in Columbus, and an NBC office in Atlanta. And between February 18 and 22, 35 more threats led to the setting up of outdoor showers for potential victims. By March 1999, an FBI investigator complained: "Not a day goes by without us hearing from somewhere in the United States about an anthrax threat." Such threats averaged more than one a day and disrupted the lives of more than 10,000 potential victims. Some of the perpetrators were just having fun at others' expense. A man from Los Angeles telephoned an anthrax threat simply to avoid appearing in a bankruptcy court! Science policy analyst Daniel S. Greenberg criticised "a whiff of hysteria-fanning and budget opportunism in the scary scenarios of the saviors who have stepped forward against the menace of bioterrorism." Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig warned that panic itself was becoming the new terrorist tool. There was a flurry of anthrax hoaxes after the September 11 attacks. In the words of a commentator, it was an "open season for the loonies of the world."

Five letters containing a highly lethal preparation of anthrax spores were sent through the U.S postal system shortly after the September 11 attack, killing five persons, injuring 18 others, and forcing tens of thousands of people to take antibiotics. Two of these



letters were sent to Democratic Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and Senator Patrick Leahy. Large sections of the US Senate buildings and newspaper offices were contaminated. Initially, it was assumed that Al Qaeda members had sent the letters; some commentators later portrayed Iraq as the culprit. The purity and high concentration of the anthrax spores and the fact that they aerosolised, however, indicated that they were from a military biological weapons programme.

Prof. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg of the Federation of American Scientists publicly asserted that the perpetrator was an American scientist working in the U.S. biological defence programme. American defence labs have samples of anthrax spores from British, Soviet, and Iraqi efforts. Checks of those samples led to the shocking conclusion that the sender was at the heart of U.S. biodefence programme. The needle of suspicion pointed towards Dr. Steven J. Hatfill. Early in August 2002, FBI agents on the trail for last year's anthrax attacker used bloodhounds with "scent packs" lifted from anthrax-tainted letters to the two senators. When the FBI agents approached his apartment, the bloodhounds "went crazy". For years, Hatfill had loudly complained the United States wasn't doing enough to prepare for a potential bioterrorist attack. Attorney General John Ashcroft has described Hatfill as a "person of interest" in the investigation of anthrax attacks. Other American bioscientists are also being investigated.

According to Professor Rosenberg, some of the scientists engaged in this work have been worried about lack of funds for their research. A number anthrax hoaxes before September 11, she maintains, were in the nature of 'wakeup calls.' A message was being conveyed to the U.S. government; with billions of dollars recently sanctioned by Congress, she thinks the message has been received. The U.S Army has now enlisted the help of some of Hollywood's top action screenwriters and directors to conjure up scenarios for future terrorist attacks; in other words, researching the 'exploitable unknown unknowns.' This could have the paradoxical effect of enlarging the scope of threats and hoaxes.

Fears about nuclear terrorism have a long history, and radioactivity adds a new dimension to terror. The nuclear fuel cycle,



including power stations, research reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants, and spent fuel-cooling ponds, offer a range of potential targets for terrorists. Nuclear power stations, containing enormous inventories of radioactive material, have been threatened in the past. Some groups in the United States have used terror in the service of extortion. The London Economist has reported more than 50 such threats. In July 1975 an American group sent a note that claimed: "We have successfully designed and built an atomic bomb. It is somewhere on Manhattan Island. We refer you to the accompanying drawing in one-eighth scale. We have enough plutonium and explosives for the bomb to function. The device will be used at 6:00 p.m. July 10 unless our demands are met." The drawing seemed to be the work of "someone with more than a passing acquaintance with nuclear physics." FBI agents waited for someone to claim the dummy ransom package at the specific place but nobody came to pick it up. The FBI feared a nuclear threat during the celebrations of the U.S. Bicentennial of 1976 and vans drove around federal buildings in Washington D.C., checking radiation levels. It is reported that there have been 100 nuclear threats in the United States since 1975, including threats reported from Boston, Los Angeles, New York, and five other cities. It is worth noting, however, that, despite many British nuclear sites being within easy range of Northern Ireland (Windscale, one of the world's largest reprocessing complex, is just 100 miles from Belfast) there have been no reports of any nuclear threat.

It is sometimes assumed that terrorists both want and can, with some effort, acquire nuclear weapons. And with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was considered only a matter of time before terrorist groups acquired weapon-grade fissile material or the so-called Russian "loose nukes." There have also been periodic reports of talented university graduates in the United States successfully designing on paper a workable nuclear device based upon technical literature in the public domain. Despite repeated assertions by brilliant weapon designers like Theodore Taylor, however, conversion of such a design into a functioning device is not a trivial exercise.

General Eugene Habinger, then head of the U.S. Strategic Command, who visited Russian military sites, said at a press



briefing in Moscow in June 1998: "I want to put to bed this concern that there are loose nukes in Russia. My observations are that the Russians are indeed very serious about security." Even if it were assumed that a terrorist organisation could obtain a complete nuclear weapon from the Russian stockpile, knowledge about the secretly coded sequence of actions to activate it would still be required.

Another pathway to a nuclear terrorism suggested is that of terrorists converting stolen nuclear material into a bomb. Reports of nuclear smuggling, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, appear to lend added weight to the idea. Between January 1991 and December 2001, there were 643 cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. Until 2000, however, the largest seizure was three kilograms of highly enriched uranium. (Some 20 kilograms are required for a uranium implosion weapon.) According to the IAEA database, the total amount of stolen and seized weapon-usable material is about 10 kilograms. It is almost absurd to assume that terrorist groups can manufacture a nuclear device from smuggled plutonium that has to be machined to highly exacting technical requirements. The job would, however, be only comparatively easier with highly enriched uranium.

Another possibility is a crude radiological device using radioactive sources, generally needed for industrial, medical and other purposes, not involving fission. A large number of such sources (those used only in radiotherapy are about ten thousand) often remain outside of any regulatory control. If conventional explosives shroud these materials, a radiological dispersal device (RDD), popularly called a 'dirty bomb', could be produced. It would, however, not cause a nuclear explosion, but would scatter radioactive material over a populated area causing panic and terror. Some writers have presented exaggerated scenarios of thousands of deaths from a 'dirty bomb.' The perpetrators of the attack themselves would be exposed to significant radiation hazards.

"Terrorists," as Brian Jenkins noted, "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people killed." They have so far generally eschewed nuclear, chemical or biological weapons primarily



because of the difficulties in mastering relevant technologies and in acquiring materials needed for their use. Additional constraints have been the hazards and unpredictability of consequences. Most terrorists have both tangible political objectives and expectations from the response of the intended audience beyond the victims. Neither crazy nor stupid, they want to derive political benefits from their activities. As a professor of Jerusalem University put it, even groups like Hamas, Hizbullah, and Islamic Jihad "also want to survive and prosper politically." It is reported that Al Qaeda planned to attack an American nuclear power plant; it discarded such an undertaking out of the fear that things could 'get out of control.' Chemical or biological agents, in contrast to the 'propaganda of the deed' through conventional explosions, do their job silently and insidiously. Terrorists have generally preferred explosive materials and devices that are easily available, relatively safe to use, and have predictable consequences. We are painfully aware of the enormous death and destruction caused by cross-border terrorists using these conventional means. It is estimated that 300 people have already succumbed to terrorist attacks between the announcement of elections in Jammu and Kashmir and the first stage of polling. This is in stark contrast with only 123 deaths caused by terrorist resort to biological and chemical weapons in 99 years.

In recent years, however, the so-called 'new' terrorists have emerged who despise the entire social order and would like to give a push to history. They tend to be motivated by religious fanaticism, supremacist ideology, or millenarian prophecy. Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension. The American white supremacist Christian Identity Movement, for instance, maintains that Jesus Christ was not a Jew but an Aryan; that the Lost Tribes of Israel are composed not of the Jews but of "blue-eyed Aryans"; that white Anglo-Saxons are the "Chosen People"; and that the United States is the Promised Land. In 1986, the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord sought to overthrow the U.S. government and hasten the return of the Messiah. They obtained 30 gallons of potassium cyanide to poison urban water supplies, believing that God would direct the poison to kill only non-believers, Jews, and blacks.



In 1981 Shoko Asahara, the charismatic leader of Aum Shinrikyo, claimed to have experienced the awakening of his *kundalini* and by 1985 Lord Shiva is supposed to have appeared before him ordaining him 'the god of light who leads the armies of the gods.' Next year he claimed to be the enlightened one. He evolved an apocalyptic orientation and preached salvation through Armageddon. When the cult members returned after the sarin attack in Tokyo, Asahara told them: "Repeat the phrase, 'It was nice to be blessed by the guru, Shiva and those who have attained the Supreme truth,' ten thousand times."

In the era of globalisation, the terrorist network has spread its tentacles far and wide. Spearheading this trend is Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda outfit. This Islamic fanatical terrorist group, motivated by blind anger and rage, trying to avenge real or perceived slights and injustices, has compiled encyclopaedias of jihad. It unsuccessfully sought weapon-usable and other radioactive materials, as well as nuclear weapons and radioactive dispersal devices. A senior Pakistani nuclear scientist Sultan Basiruddin Mahmood, who worked in the Pakistani nuclear programme since its inception in 1972, had been an admirer of Osama bin Laden and supporter of Taliban. He claimed that only his knowledge about Pakistan's nuclear program was a secret not to be revealed; the expertise he had acquired on enriching uranium or producing weapon-grade plutonium, however, he could share with others. He was arrested and repeatedly interrogated by American intelligence operatives. According to an American nuclear expert, even if Al Qaeda had succeeded in somehow fabricating a nuclear device, it would have been a relatively crude and massive explosive that could be delivered only by ships, trucks, or private planes.

The growing technological complexity of modern societies is making it easier to kill people on a massive scale. This is facilitated by advances in all major weapon characteristics-accuracy, lethality, range, and ease of use, ruggedness, portability, and affordability. The computational power of a lap top computer can now be compared with that of the entire U.S. Department of Defence in mid-1960s. Terrorists can now use sophisticated technology for their sinister purposes. Even a most imaginative fiction writer could not



have conceived using a commercial airliner into a weapon of mass destruction that transformed "the foot of Manhattan into the mouth of Hell." It was certainly the most televised terrorist attack.

Although the probability of nuclear terrorism is very low, its horrendous consequences demand continuing vigilance. Nuclear power plants cannot withstand attack by a large jumbo jet full of fuel. The Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned: "The tragic terrorist attacks on the United States were a wake-up call to us all. We cannot be complacent." There is, therefore, urgent need to implement security upgrades at all our nuclear facilities.

We must be vigilant about any possible terrorist use of chemical or biological agents, especially if a sponsoring state believed it could shield its identity through intermediaries in a crisis or during a war. Unfortunately, controls on global germ commerce are still lax. The World Federation for Culture Collections is an association of 472 repositories of living microbial specimens in 61 countries but lacks authority to enforce compliance with its regulations. Moreover, 1,000 germ banks have not joined the Federation, and their culture collections are not adequately protected. An Indian organisation should have the authority to monitor access to dangerous pathogens.

It would be unwise to assume that terrorist groups would not take advantage of rapid advances in biotechnology. Our surveillance system should be alert to such possibilities. Dire forecasts of terrible disasters, inducing a climate of fear and panic and consequent increase in funding, however, may sap our meagre resources and divert attention from more urgent threats. The key issue is to devise balanced policies commensurate with the level of danger and our resources. These policies should be executed quietly and reviewed periodically. The National Institute of Communicable Diseases and the National Institute of Virology should be strengthened. Improving our public health system would be, at least in the short run, the best defence against chemical or biological threats. It would also immensely improve the living conditions of our people.



## **COLONEL PYARA LAL : THE MAN WITH A VISION (1916 - 1987)**

*Colonel Pyara Lal, AVSM, was Secretary and Director United Service Institution of India for more than thirty years. He took over the reins of the USI in 1957 shortly after it had moved from Shimla (1870-1957) to New Delhi. He started correspondence courses for promotion examinations and Defence Services Staff College entrance examinations. Simultaneously the USI Journal, because of his untiring efforts to improve its quality, became well known for its well researched and scholarly articles. In addition, Colonel Pyara Lal organised regular seminars and talks by experts.*

*A well-deserved tribute to Colonel Pyara Lal was paid by Lieutenant General Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC the Review Editor of Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (UK) in the April 1988 issue in describing him as India's Liddell Hart, as he had the capacity for making others think. Very appropriately, the USI Council has named the USI Library after him as a memorial for his devoted and selfless service to the Institution.*

### **USI CENTRE FOR ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL RESEARCH PROJECTS FOR THE YEAR 2002-2003**

- (a) Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair "Operational History of the Indian Air Force"  
Air Cmde AK Tiwary, VSM
- (b) Maharana Pratap Chair "History of Low Intensity Conflict in India"  
Maj Vivek Chadha



## Security Challenges of India

**Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)**

In early September 2002, a seminar was held at Chandimandir on the important and topical subject 'Security Challenges of India in the Regional Context, With Special Reference to Terrorism - Prognosis and Responses'. It was organised under the aegis of the United Service Institution (USI), and it was its first seminar held outside New Delhi. The seminar was very well attended and a large number of important issues were raised, both by the panelists as well as the audience. This piece is intended to encapsulate the important issues, which were highlighted, particularly the recommended responses to the challenges.

The Governor of Punjab, Lieutenant General JFR Jacob (Retd), set the stage for the deliberations of the seminar by focusing on terrorism and insurgency, which he called the major challenges facing the nation. Amongst the many important points he made, two need to be highlighted. Firstly, there is neither a purely political, nor a purely military solution to end insurgency and terrorism. The need is for a well-conceived multi-pronged approach. The second point is that, we will only succeed if we adopt new and versatile organisations, techniques and tactics, and not tackle the challenges in the conventional manner. He also noted that there has been a dangerous revival of religious fundamentalism, which needs to be tackled with determination.

There was general consensus on two fundamental issues. The first was that distinction between national, regional and international security is increasingly getting blurred on account of market economy and globalisation, resulting in a world which is much more interdependent than in the past. The second point of general agreement was that any framework of national security must take into account both military and non-military dimensions of threats. It was also appreciated that external and internal threats are enmeshed to a very large extent. Notwithstanding this, for the

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Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM is former Vice Chief of the Army Staff and Member of the USI Council. He coordinated conduct of seminar on 'Security Challenges of India' on 4 Sep 2002 at Chandimandir.

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sake of convenience and focus, while the first session was devoted to external challenges and suggested responses to them, the second session focused largely on the internal dimensions of the challenges confronting the nation.

The major points made and discussed, while dealing with the external challenges, were the continuing intransigence of Pakistan; the long term threat posed by China; the need to carefully assess the emerging relationship with the United States; the continuing importance of the India-Russia linkages; the all pervasive and very real threat of terrorism; and the need for a pragmatic nuclear policy.

It was emphasised that Musharraf had failed to deliver and 'while the world may have changed after 9/11', Pakistan under Musharraf was continuing with its anti-India policy in all its dimensions. A distinction was no doubt made in the thinking of the Pakistani Army establishment and the majority of the people of Pakistan and it was concluded that a democratic set-up in Pakistan was highly desirable, as it may then be possible to 'do business' with Pakistan.

The important role China continued to play in the security calculus of India and indeed South Asia was also discussed in some detail. It was obvious that China was in no hurry to resolve the border dispute with India. Its continuing assistance to Pakistan, in terms of supplying conventional military equipment including weapons, as well as nuclear technology and missiles and their obvious security implications were also brought out. It was opined that while we must continue the dialogue with China on the border question, trade and other issues, we must ensure that we are militarily strong.

The views about Indo-US relations were divided. While a section of speakers were optimistic and favoured a closer relationship with the United States and endorsed the 'strategic' nature of the relationship, others were wary of the Americans. The latter were of the view that the Americans were only concerned with their own interests and could not be trusted as long-term friends. It was also opined that irrespective of how our relationship develops with the United States, we must continue to maintain the existing close relations with Russia.



The challenges which terrorism had posed were discussed in great detail. The consensus was that this scourge had to be tackled head on and that we must not hesitate in joining with other countries in tackling this menace. It was also brought out fairly emphatically, that India must be prepared to go it alone, if necessary, and must strengthen our forces, structures and policies to do so.

India's nuclear policy came in for some criticism from a section of the speakers. It was mentioned that the adoption of the policy of "no first use" has placed us at a disadvantage, especially vis-à-vis Pakistan. A number of speakers expressed their apprehension about India's nuclear capability, highlighting the lack of transparency, which had resulted in the dilution of the credibility of the nuclear deterrent, vis-à-vis Pakistan, which was always threatening us by brandishing its nuclear card. It was emphasised that we must quickly put in place the various structures needed to make our nuclear deterrent credible. These include transparency, an effective command and control structure and a higher degree of military interface.

The second session, which dealt with internal challenges, was dominated by the situation in J and K. It was brought out emphatically that the policies of the Government had failed in tackling the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan, which was now in its twelfth year. The panelists brought out how there has been systematic upgradation of violence by the Pakistani-sponsored terrorists, with one attack following the other, without any effective response. Blame was apportioned to the lack of co-ordination between the Ministries of Defence and Home, the two Ministries directly concerned; lack of clear cut responsibility and accountability; ineffectual performance of Central Police Organisations (CPOs) who are neither trained nor sufficiently motivated; non-functional Unified Command on account of its flawed structure; permitting ethnic cleansing and doing nothing to get the Kashmiri Pundits back to their homes; ineffectual state government; and not giving the Army a free hand, especially in not allowing them to cross the Line of Control (LoC). It was suggested that there was a need to work out a "low level threat strategy" by the National Security Council, which so far has only produced voluminous papers, which



nobody reads! The dire need to develop a strong political will, giving a freer hand to the Army and retaliation across the LoC were the other points mentioned.

The adverse implications of our porous borders were highlighted, as were the nefarious activities of the madrassas, which have mushroomed, in recent years, especially in our border areas. The adverse impact of the demographic explosion within the country, as well as the illegal demographic movements from neighbouring countries, especially Bangladesh, were highlighted, backed by a large amount of statistical data. It was brought out that India's internal challenges are largely non-military in nature and the need therefore was for institutional stability, social cohesion, good governance and sustained economic development. Other aspects mentioned were the need for decentralisation of powers by the Government, in addition to being more effective and responsive to emerging challenges. Poverty alleviation, control on population, rapid economic growth, spreading literacy, controlling ethno nationalism and social tensions, and the need to come down heavily on corruption, which is eating into the vitals of our society, were other important facets which featured in the discussion.

The military strength of India also came in for a fair amount of discussion. Both the conventional and nuclear dimensions were discussed. There was general agreement that considering the multiplicity of threats, both external and internal, there should be no let up of our military guard. The conventional forces need to be modernised expeditiously. Despite competing entities for resources, we cannot afford to neglect defence, which needed a constant and regular infusion of funds.

A lone plea was made for evolving a credible regional framework, so that regional security is based upon cooperative security, for the development of respective countries, thus tackling common threats like illegal migration, terrorism, narco trade and religious fundamentalism in a cooperative manner.

During the interactive phases of the two sessions, some speakers were critical of the tendency of the political leadership to ignore professional military advice, which ultimately led to



compromising on many important security issues. The decision not to cross the LoC during the Kargil operations in 1999 and the continuing suspicions with which the Army is apparently viewed, despite 55 years of loyal and indeed extraordinary service the Army has given to the nation, both in war and peace, came in for large-scale criticism. More than one speaker highlighted the enduring apolitical ethos of the Army. The erosion of respect and "izzat" in society; the callous approach of the political leadership as well as the bureaucracy to the problems of the ex-servicemen; the overuse of the Army, resulting in the lowering of its combat potential; the lack of sufficient funding for modernisation; and continuing with out-dated and antiquated procedures, structures and methodology for the management of an institution which has never let the country down, were highlighted.

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# Economic Power as a Concomitant of Military Power

Major Rajesh Bhat

*Nothing is more dependent on economic conditions than precisely the Army and the Navy.*

Engels

## Introduction

The two main components of a nation's security policy are economic wherewithal and threat perception. Currently the principal global dynamic change is towards economic wherewithal along with technology. However, the analysis of the two factors viz, economy and threat perception leads to a situation where they start pulling at each other in opposite directions. One argument is that there can be no development without adequate defence, and that all developmental gains would be neutralised in the event of a nation facing a major security threat.

Though evident that economic prosperity does not always and immediately translate into military effectiveness, still all the major power shifts in the military power balances of the world have followed alterations in the productive balances of the nations. If they are economically weak and they also have a substantial external security threat, the authority of these nations are eroded both internally and internationally. Such nations tend to divert more and more of their already meagre resources into the military sector. This results in declining productive investment and leads to slower growth, heavier taxes, increased external debt and finally leading to weakening of the defence forces.

A classic example is the military overstretch of the former Soviet Union, which many believe, precipitated its collapse. In an

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Major Rajesh Bhat is from 54 Engineer Regiment. This essay was awarded the first prize in Group B of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition for the year 2001.

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attempt to overtake the US in an arms race, the Soviet Union turned a blind eye towards its collapsing economy, which finally resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. A developing nation like India faces the difficult task of balancing both defence and developmental requirements neither of which can be ignored in the present circumstances. Hence in the context of India, what we are really looking for is security through economic growth and not a choice between the two, given the kind of threat that exists within and without.

Hence the question really is what can India do to maintain a balance between development of economic power and military power and play its rightful role at the international and national levels, guarding her vital interests, core values and achieving national objectives.

### **India's Strategic Culture Through the Ages**

Civilisationally, the Indian nation is a unity, a whole, diverse, multilingual, with numerous shades and varieties of faith and kaleidoscopic cultural distinction, and varieties of beliefs, languages and dialects. Civilisationally, there has been one India, however, politically there has been greater diversity. Hence we had a number of small kingdoms competing and fighting against each other. Geographically India has never been one unified and monolithic state, not even under the great all conquering emperors such as Ashoka and Chandragupta Maurya. It was only in 1947 that an Indian state came into existence, albeit divided.

India is routinely described as a peace loving nation. Yet it is a troubled state. The Indian state, since independence, has been prone to internal violence. The principle security challenge to India has historically been and remains the imposition and maintenance of internal order. That has been the preoccupation of the rulers of ancient India. This preoccupation prevented the growth of a proper security thought, truncated the concept of power and left little military surplus. This inability to develop a surplus of military power beyond that which was necessary for internal control of existing possessions is noteworthy. Thus India's strategic culture got internalised, remained fixated upon curbing within rather than combating the external.



The Indian state, geographically, was a creation of the British. They imparted national armed forces, uniform philosophy of jurisprudence, a common civil service, a judiciary. They conducted extensive and perhaps the first detailed surveys of India. It is during this period that the Indian Army got an exposure to warfare outside the country. The British recognised the strategic geographical location of India and thus the Indian Ocean and ocean routes came into Indian strategic thinking. During the Second World War, the unstoppable Japanese force was halted, turned back and defeated by Field Marshal Slim's XIVth Army largely comprising of Indian soldiers officered by the British. For the period of the British rule, policy about the defence of India and its external relations had been the preserve, total and exclusive of the British alone. No Indian was involved in conceptualising foreign and defence policies, or even in subsequent strategic planning. Hence, in 1947, the resource pool, therefore, of thought, talent and personnel specialising in these fields was almost non-existent.

This lack of strategic culture was evident in post Independent India as well. The diplomatic and military failure in 1962 can be directly linked to lack of strategic culture. India should have been on the alert after Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950. However, the assessment that the Chinese would not use force on a line of Indian posts since they had not used force against a single post was myopic. The aspect of Sino-Soviet rift of the sixties, withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China, the great famine, disaster of cultural revolution and the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Air Force were never fully appreciated. Nehru's anguished exclamation that the Chinese had stabbed him in the back summarises the lack of understanding of the nation's threat perceptions even at the highest level. This continues to plague us even today.

This brief glimpse into India's history gives us quite a few lessons. To be strong internationally, we need to be strong as a nation.

### **Globalisation of the Economy**

With the decline in socialism and the dramatic failure of the Soviet Union and around it, the pre-eminence of liberal economic



ideology has forced upon the rest of the world a powerful drive towards change to a new international order. Even China, another bulwark of socialism, has switched to the capitalist mode of production and stimulation of market forces in a big way. An open economic structure and market friendly economic policies reassert the dominance of international trade as the classical engine of economic growth. India also has re-examined its policy. Consequently since July 1991, a series of reforms have been carried out and more are to follow to reduce the role of the state in economic activity and refurbish the role of private initiative and enterprise. Developed countries have started transforming their economics to meet new challenges. They have called for severely curbing arms race and reduce defence expenditure particularly in developing countries.

### **No Letup in Economic Reforms**

With the introduction of economic reforms in 1991, the country has progressed considerably from a licence-raj regime to an open market economy. However, minor irritants still deter foreign investors from large-scale investments. This will involve protection of their interests in the country and further reducing red tape. Governments may change at the Centre, but there should be no let up in economic reforms. Sick Public Sector Undertakings must be sold off or privatised to reduce the drain on the exchequer. There should be greater emphasis on basic infrastructural development such as roads, civil aviation, power sector, telecommunications, food grains storage and water supply. The state must reduce its involvement in production and development and concentrate more on policy making and improving social justice. This would require a high level of commitment on the part of the leaders. The common citizen cannot absolve himself of any responsibility. Paying taxes in time, he should focus all his efforts towards making the country economically independent. The scourge of corruption that afflicts India makes it one of the most tainted nations in the world. It will require a national movement to eradicate corruption from every sphere of our lives. If the world has to be convinced that India is emerging as a global power, then it has to act with maturity and improve its image at home before starting



elsewhere. History bears testimony that leaders of ancient India have been tied down more by internal disturbances leading to easy capitulation under external aggression.

### **Improving the Social Fabric**

In these days of religious intolerance, there is a need for our leaders to educate, motivate and convince the general public that the image of the country takes a battering due to the activities of a thoughtless few. This can only be done if our leaders lead by example and not bicker amongst themselves on caste and religion based politics. We need to look beyond our constituencies and consider the development of the nation as a whole. This can only be achieved when each and every citizen of this country is satisfied that the state will look after him when the need arises. The state can only then be rest assured that every citizen of this country will contribute his maximum towards development. This will involve emphasis on primary education, employment, primary health care and eradication of poverty. A nation can never hope to become an economic power when some of its citizens starve. There is a need to radically improve the public distribution system of the food grains to avoid starvation deaths. The sum total of improvement in the social fabric will result in lesser discontentment and reduced internal disturbances. A nation free of internal disturbances will be a strong nation and can concentrate on developing itself into an economic power. This will also require a radical change in approach of various states, as they will have to come together to sort out their differences. It will call for statesmanship from leaders of the states to rise above party affiliations and come forward to resolve outstanding issues.

### **Relations with Neighbouring Countries**

The Gujral Doctrine has shaped India's relationship with neighbouring countries. Demographically, being much larger, the neighbouring countries tend to get overwhelmed by the sheer size of India. India must allay the fears of the smaller neighbouring nations that their interests will never be compromised. However,



this in no way means that we go out of our way to accommodate our neighbour's interests. Since 1991, our policy has been towards economic revival. We can ill afford to divert our resources and get into an expensive arms race with China and Pakistan at this juncture. The proxy war being thrust upon us by Pakistan is indeed a drain on our economy to some extent. It would be fruitful to reopen negotiations with Pakistan for resolution of Kashmir issue without compromising our national interests. Any reduction in the scale of violence would definitely reduce the economic burden of proxy war. However, we must not forget that Kargil was being planned when the Lahore peace process was on. Another issue that needs to be addressed by our planners is that we act in response to any defence initiative taken by Pakistan. Historically, we have managed our defence efforts in relation to Pakistan rather than planning them out. Planning presupposes clear objectives assessment and perception of what our defence goals are in the region in the long and short run. Unless an independent defence policy emerges, any rationalisation of the defence effort will not be meaningful. China's sale of weaponry to Pakistan is also a cause of concern to us. By selling weapons to Pakistan, it ensures that India remains involved in the arms race and forces India to allocate additional resources to maintain parity. The current attempt towards normalising relations with China through Confidence Building Measures is an attempt in the right direction. Both countries are culturally strong and mature and can benefit greatly through greater cooperation. These long standing issues must be seriously addressed and we must move towards resolving them if we hope to become an economic power. This would require sincerity, determination and foresight to resolve such disputes. Our leaders will have to rise above vote bank politics and take decisions which may not be palatable to many.

### **Foreign Policy**

Foreign Policy can be defined as the sum total of Principles, Aims and Objectives that a country evolves in conducting its relations with other countries. Over the years a broad consensus has developed on India's foreign policy within the country and



successive governments have reiterated continuity in India's foreign policy. Foreign Policy must be clubbed with security and defence to arrive at carefully planned strategies. By choosing to prove its nuclear capability, India has chosen the hard road to world status. The world views India with more respect but this is also a great countervailing force. However, the government has to do a lot more to contain the political, diplomatic and economic fallout of the nuclear tests. The world at large understands India's security concerns but much more needs to be done. The nineties has seen economic diplomacy acquiring a high profile. India needs to convince foreign countries its commitment towards patent laws and that the interests of multinationals investing in India will be looked after. India's interaction at various fora such as Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) etc will further improve its credibility. India's large market remains a major attraction for most western countries. Apart from the United States, India should also concentrate on the European Union (EU). EU is India's largest trading partner and accounts for about 30 per cent of India's exports and a third of India's imports. A wider, deeper market will result in cheaper foreign currency loans for Indian corporates in an Euro currency market. With the adoption of Euro, all software for currency transaction would have to be rewritten and Indian companies are in unique position to offer cost-effective solutions for the Euro conversion.

India is strongly lobbying for a permanent seat in the Security Council on the basis of its population, volume of economy, its contribution to the UN, particularly in peacekeeping operations. India can provide a strong additional voice, a perspective and an agenda in a politically and economically unequal and iniquitous world. India has been contributing a lot to the UN peacekeeping operations. It has successfully participated in many UN operations. This has strengthened its claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. It has further enhanced its image in the international community as a nation interested in peace and stability in the world. Though all these have strengthened India's claim for a permanent seat, some western countries have suggested that



any country, which is yet to sign Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should not be considered for a permanent membership of the Security Council. India's adversarial relationship with Pakistan is among the factors hindering its claim for a permanent seat. Our foreign policy managers need to work on these issues by intense lobbying if we are to make it to the Security Council. This will definitely strengthen India's position in the international community.

### **Science and Technology**

Science and technology can play a major transformational role in making India secure, self reliant, and prosperous. Large-scale investments have been made in the defence research, space research and atomic energy with very positive results. The methodologies adopted for technology have to be extended to non-strategic fields of considerable economic significance such as areas of power, transportation and communication. Developed nations are reluctant to pass on the know how on technological development to the developing countries. The price charged for parting with the know how is exorbitant. This calls for greater financial support to indigenous technological development from the government and industry. The government needs to build up a scientific temper and promote Research and Development. It will call for ending bureaucratisation of scientific institutions and enhancing national recognition to highly talented scientists. We must focus on select areas of research and achieve global excellence. The economic fallout of successful technological development is tremendous. Presently the investments on Research and Development is about one per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) compared to 2.5 to 3 per cent in developed nations. Indian science must gear itself to face the challenges of globalisation, develop more patents and commercialise them.

### **India's Strategic Compulsions**

An ideal situation for a peace loving country like India with no ambitions to unilaterally alter its boundary, would be to have minimum defence expenditure and focus all its efforts and resources



towards improving the social fabric of the country and economically make it a force to reckon with. However, strategic compulsions prevent India from totally shunning its defence preparedness. India's defence budget continues to be affected by our neighbour's defence expenditure. With the South Asian region going nuclear, India will have to devote its attention and resources towards developing sophisticated delivery systems. India will be compelled to launch its own satellites for military purposes thereby ensuring that its strategic frontiers lie where its national interests are. It will have to maintain a force level commensurate with that of its neighbours. This will require significant investment in the defence sector and the same can only be achieved by compromising elsewhere. What is required is an optimum balance between resource allocation for defence and for improving the economy of the country.

### **Maintaining the Cutting Edge**

In the decades to come, India shall have to continue to contend with covert operations or clandestine war. This is the reality in the Indian subcontinent. Striking a balance between the ever burgeoning demand for resources and a scarcity of them, the country will have to review the structure of its forces and move towards not simply integrating them but also build much higher levels of sustainability. A national manpower policy will be the genesis of a symbolic relationship between the forces currently charged with the responsibility of India's security.

Information Technology is not merely an office tool, it is now a core element of combat and in every spectrum of conflict. The military is not the only user to require this medium for efficacy in the field, there is just as much need for the political class and civil services to understand this weapon and master its usage. In the conflict environment that currently prevails, the leadership's ability to cope with India's already overstretched forces, decreasing resources will have to be made good by rapid and continuous force multipliers.

Defence planning must have a long-term perspective. A 15-year perspective plan would be able to take into account all future



contingencies. It should be done along with national planning, reducing the possibility of wastage through unnecessary duplication in several areas. The critical issues in the defence sector are defence planning, integrated input, civil-military coordination in defence production, research and development and supplies, manpower management and strategic reassessment.

### Conclusion

The security of a nation will have to be built around economic fundamentals of human development, science and technology competence, a sound industrial infrastructure and by integrating into international economic system. These require long-term economic investments and considerable gestation periods. The management of resources includes focusing on large fiscal deficits, bloated government machinery, and barriers to trade and investment. The Five-Year Plans of the Planning Commission can bring about the perspective on the Indian economy for enhancing national security. There is a need for creation of a national security outlook at the apex economic planning level. A strong economy will give India a better footing in the International Community. As the world looks towards the Indian market India must carry forward economic reforms without compromising on core issues. At the same time it must take realistic steps towards normalising relations with its neighbours. It is only through economic growth that we can hope to become a military power.

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## Information Security-II

Colonel A K Pathak

### Protection Against EMP<sup>12</sup>

The EMP threat can manifest by direct radiation through the weapon or weapon platform. An armoured fighting vehicle, radar, gun, ship or aircraft are all good collectors of EMP interference. Doors, hatches, pipes, cables, antennae and communication cables all provide access to EMP interference. Once inside the weapon platform, EMP affects all sensitive circuits. Ideally all entry points are access routes of the EMP and must be closed. But this will not be realistic since the weapon platform has to draw power from the outside source and communicate with other systems. Hence desired level of protection needs to be provided against the EMP as per the vulnerability of the system and its criticality. The most susceptible equipment include the low power high speed computer, terminating long cables, power system control and communication links, all systems employing semi conductor devices. The less susceptible systems include the vacuum tube equipment which do not include semi conductors, equipment employing low current switches, relays, meters, detonators, squibs, rocket, fuels and so on, long power cable runs employing dielectric insulation, equipment associated with energy storage capacitors and inductors. The least susceptible equipment include the 60 cycle per second equipment-transformer, motors, filaments of lamps, heaters, rotary converters, heavy duty relays, circuit breakers, air insulated power cable runs.

For protection of equipment against the EMP attack, the minimum operational requirement of the weapon platform should be first ascertained. Thereafter appropriate redundancy and design parameters must be incorporated in the new or refurbished equipment. EMP protection technique needs to be selected individually for each equipment. The approach involves reduction of pulse intensity to acceptable level using screening, providing protection against indirect pulse connected by cable, pipes, antennae etc and outlining the equipment operating procedure that are not

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susceptible to disruption from the EMP interference. There are a number of procedural, technical and physical security techniques which need to be adopted keeping in view the vulnerability and susceptibility of the equipment. Extremely critical equipment can be kept in a highly EMP proof Faraday Cage. The cage can also house a group of critical equipment in a command and control node. Also it is easier to incorporate an EMP resistant design in a new equipment at the time of 'design and production' of the equipment rather than refurbishing an old equipment to meet the EMP protection requirement.

### **Van-Eck-Radiations : Importance of TEMPEST<sup>13</sup>**

Van-Eck-Radiations and spurious emissions from electrical and electronic equipment leak out important information. The leakage of these spurious EM radiation is a security hazard not only to the military but also to the corporate information infrastructure. The corporate world is more threatened by this security risk. It is this vulnerability of the information infrastructure which needs to be minimised by designing systems and facilities conforming to the TEMPEST specifications. These specifications deal with suppression of unwanted frequencies - minimising the intensity of harmonics of the desired signals, as also controlling the strength of the desired signal so that its field strength is negligible in the near vicinity where it can be picked up. Both these measures also ensure electro magnetic compatibility by minimising the electromagnetic interference.

Implementation of TEMPEST specifications increases the cost of the equipment and the efficacy of the equipment is reduced. Thus processing speed, channel capacity, useful range and so on of the systems will be adversely affected. However, the safety against electronics eves dropping will be very high. The phenomenon was first noticed in the early sixties. Of late some of the specifications have been relaxed. In India the awareness of TEMPEST specifications in the corporate world is very poor.

### **Smart Card**

The use of smart card system could effectively control the physical access of an intruder into an information infrastructure which is otherwise open and interactive. However, it cannot be claimed that smart cards are 100 per cent secure. However, it is quite a cost effective option for authentication and access control



applications. The smart card system by itself comprises of processor embedded plastic card, card reader, programming station and software development tools, application software and back end integration into the information infrastructure. The micro processor houses programme and data and the micro-electronic technology now enables architecture, memory and processing power for housing a large number of applications simultaneously on a single chip. In fact the trend today is to develop hybrid cards. These cards can undertake a number of applications such as security operations, material, finance, personnel, healthcare, administration and communications. A large number of vendors have introduced smart cards. Obviously the security software (code) being used by them may not be reliable for use in the high security military environment such as arming of weapons, entering a secured network or downloading secret information. Hence development of indigenous smart card is a high priority security concern. To make a hybrid card more versatile, back end application software is necessary. Back-end integration implies the following :-

- (a) Each application has its special to type needs in terms of application programming - interface, database, user base etc.
- (b) Some applications have a need for security overlay in addition to its amenability for use of smart cards.
- (c) A very well tested and working system which has already been computerised and tested is amenable to use of smart card and backend integration.
- (d) An extremely agile and careful database management configuration control process need to be in place before introducing smart card system.

**Security Measures for Information Infrastructure.** These measures include physical security, hardware and software security, security of floppies, printers and hard disk, communication network security and remote terminal security. Physical access to computer systems and communication networks by unauthorised persons should be made difficult if not impossible. A number of technologies and innovations are available for this purpose. This includes electric circuit breakers or makers, interruption of light or LASER beam, use of ultra violet or infra red beam, detection of sound and vibrations, ultra sonic and radar detectors, variations in electric fields, magnetic



detectors, identity card readers on doors and gates and closed circuit television. Besides, a number of procedural precautions need to be taken to control access. These should include access privilege, entry procedure for staff, system control. In an electronic environment protection from magnetic objects is also mandatory. With regard to identification technique of individuals before allowing access, a number of methods are in vogue. These include the photo ID badge, optical coded badge, circuit coded badge, magnetic coded badge, passive electronic coded badge, metallic strip coded badge, active electronic badge as also simple smart cards. Thus it is evident that a number of technological means and procedures are available for security of information infrastructure. A careful formulation of an integrated infrastructure security plan or system should be devised based on the criticality and vulnerability of the site. If the system is housed in a building it may be prudent to design "intelligent building" whereby the complete premises will be wired to connect information systems, environmental control and building security aspects as an integrated whole. Even existing buildings may be retrofitted with these integrated systems to convert them to near equivalent of "intelligent building".

### **Paradigm Shift in National Civil Defence Disaster Control and Recovery**

Considering the vulnerabilities of National Information Infrastructure during peace as well as war time, there is a need to modify our view of the threats, vulnerabilities and remedies for national civil defence. It should infact be renamed as National Electronic Civil Defence (NEDC). The goals of NEDC need to include :-

- (a) Complexity of National Information Infrastructure (NII).
- (b) Assessment of vulnerabilities, take steps to minimise them.
- (c) Identify NII jurisdictions and promote caretakers.
- (d) Promote awareness about severity of threats.
- (e) Create Integrated Electronic Civil Defence Infrastructure (IECDI).

**Complexity of the NII.** The National Information Infrastructure involves a whole range of organisations including the railways, banking, governmental and non governmental information



infrastructure which have different requirements of security as well as transparency. This itself makes the maintenance of this infrastructure a complex job. Besides the regulatory regimes for all these are different.

**Assessment of Vulnerabilities.** The threat and protective measures for all infrastructures are different. These need to be borne in mind while establishing the vulnerabilities of the Information Infrastructures.

**Identify NII Jurisdiction.** The jurisdiction and the responsibility to protect are important issues to be addressed to ensure that accountabilities are clearly defined.

**Create Integrated IECDI.** Though the individual responsibilities are to be fixed to focus at the close protection of each Information Infrastructure a national Integrated Electronics and Computer Defence Institute need to be established to coordinate the overall effort.

**Disaster Control and Recovery.** As our dependence on IT and networks increases so will be our vulnerabilities to information theft, corruption or loss of data, damage due to natural calamities and organised offensive information warfare by our adversary. Compared to the developed countries like the US, the UK, France and so on our share in computer ware is almost negligible. Dependence on network in areas like energy, transport, industry, education, health care, defence, housing, finance, commerce, communication and weather etc is still less. However, our vital sectors like defence, space, energy, communications are acquiring IT systems at a very fast pace. It is in these areas that we need to take action for prevention and control, limiting the damage and recovery to normalcy. The most vulnerable elements to damage and destruction are as under :-

(a) **Data base.** The list of critical data bases is very long. Corruption, theft, and destruction of these can cripple the system. Hence the need to keep up to date data files in safe place for reloading and recommencing the system following a mishap.

(b) **Software.** The problem pertaining to software is more acute. All imported software whether used separately or embedded in weapon system is likely to carry IW mechanism



which can be activated by the source agency. Hence the need for indigenous development of software for critical systems. It needs to be remembered that creation of high quality military software takes 10 to 15 years effort by highly trained experts. Therefore, there is a need for a fool proof, state of art disaster detection, control and recovery mechanism for such installations forming a vital part of our NII.

(c) **Hardware.** The security problems pertaining to hardware are also similar. Firstly the imported hardware - especially the processor and RAM might come with the IW mechanisms such as chipping, trojans or trap-doors. Secondly the theft and damage to hardware can pose serious problems. Physical destruction, degradation by EMP, HEMP or other High Energy Radio Frequency Weapon would be real threats in future battlefield as much as during peace time.


### **Operational Implications<sup>14</sup>**

However, these do remain within the sphere of interest. The strategic approach addresses issues like generating a consensus for preventing deployment of offensive IW weapons, constituting international legal regulating bodies and forming an international lobby for economic sanction, information blockade. Military reprisal come as the last option since these will trigger uncontrolled IW. The operational security measures in IW defence are more focussed. These involve establishing physical barriers to protect personnel, hardware and software from physical, electromagnetic or internal attacks by unauthorised access.

The security aspects pertaining to information infrastructures and systems need to be planned at national, and military levels. While the threat at both these levels are some what similar the security consciousness in the non-military sector is much less. This increases the vulnerability of non-military governmental and non governmental information infrastructures. Also an attack on the military information infrastructure will include the sensors. At the national level the public opinion - which includes the print electronic and informal rumour mongering, national defence, governmental and commercial information infrastructure are the main targets. The military infrastructure will include the command control nodes at various levels, strategic and tactical means of intelligence,



surveillance and reconnaissance, data integration system and commanders thought process itself. In the contact battle the threat will be directed at sensors, combat net radio and tactical communication systems and weapon controlling/ guidance systems. At the lower levels of hierarchy the physical manifestation of threat will be high whereas at higher levels of hierarchy network weapons and other technological means will be more in use. The response to the threat has to be configured accordingly. A schematic layout of threat pattern is given below :-





## Conclusion

The security of information infrastructure is of utmost importance during the endeavour for information dominance. The measures to be undertaken for information security include the full range of technical, procedural and policy dependent measures to provide security, survivability and protection of information as well as information infrastructure. In the overall IW spectrum the aspect of information security forms an important component of the IW defence in general and security in particular. The security spectrum itself includes strategic security, operational security and information security. While the strategic aspects fall more in the realm of diplomacy, international economic, commercial and legal frame work, the operational and information security are placed in the military domain. While formulating overall operational and information security following aspects are of importance.

(a) Identify what you are trying to protect. This entails a mapping of criticality and vulnerability of information infrastructure. For military propose this should include the sensors, C2 nodes and communication linkages besides the networks which integrate these entities.

(b) Determine what you are trying to protect it from. In fact it amounts to knowing the enemy's capabilities of physical destruction, penetration, spoofing, hacking, EMP attacks, HERF weapons and other network weapons.

(c) Determine how likely the threat is. In IW scenario the bilateral relationship, overall security environment, technical capability of the adversaries, trade related competitions would decide the likelihood of threat. Risk to own info infrastructure is a function of likely pay off the adversary will get by compromising or breaching our information infrastructure. We need to remember that threats are both from within and external. To that extent the risk is real, continuous and seamless.

(d) Implement measures that will protect own assets in a cost effective manner. Information has a cost. It relates to cost of recreating the information as also the likely damage the loss



of information can do. The cost of protection should also take into account the inconvenience and delay in availability factor of the information being protected.

(e) Review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weakness is found. The technologies and skills of carrying out covert and overt attacks on information infrastructure are advancing so fast that many proponents of IT feel that we must forget to keep secrets or privacy in the information age. This may be a case of exaggerating the offensive IW capabilities, but given the time and resources most of the codes can be breached if they remain unchanged for a prolonged time. Hence, the information and the accompanying infrastructure must be constantly monitored for tell-tale marks of a successful or unsuccessful attack. The policy as well as technique for security need to be reviewed and if required modified/ changed. Another factor which will enhance security of own info infrastructure is the capability of carrying out selective precision attack on the origin of attack on own sites, sensors and other components. The process needs to be monitor-protect-attack-monitor.

Lastly, it must be prudent to assess and prepare for information security in the prevailing social ethos of information age. The cyber crimes in the information age pose a major challenge to info-security professionals. As our dependence on the net increases and given the reality of our lack of security consciousness and weak regulatory system a new form of war will emerge. This may change our existing concepts of national security which at present is considered the exclusive domain of security forces with highly organised Armed Forces playing the lead roles.

#### **Abbreviations used in the Diagram**

NII - National Information Infrastructure.

GII - Government.

CII - Commercial.

DII - Defence.

C2 - Command and Control



- CDRS - Commanders.
- DIS - Data Integration Systems.
- STRAT ISR - Strategic Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance.
- TACISR - Tactical.
- Comb Comm - Combat Communications.
- TPS IN CONT - Troops in Contact.

## Notes

12. Ibid, 7.
13. Ibid, 3.
14. Important Internet sites browsed for operational implication part of the paper are :-
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# India's Maritime Security

Commander Manoj Gupta

## Introduction

**H**istory bears testimony to the fact that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has in the first instance India's sea borne trade at its mercy and in the second, India's independence itself." Thus spoke Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister and the architect of Modern India onboard the erstwhile cruiser INS Mysore in March 1958.

The Indian sub-continent held an unchallenged monopoly on overseas commerce in the entire Indian Ocean until the advent of Arabs in the Second Century AD. This achievement could not be sustained due to various reasons. The principal reason for the decline was the complete lack of appreciation to use naval power, to aid inland battles fought in areas contiguous to the sea.

The concept of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has now put 36 per cent of the world's oceans under national jurisdictions. For India, with the inclusion of the Continental Shelf and the deep-sea mining area the maritime jurisdiction will be more than the Indian landmass. Days of yore are testimony that no maritime nation has been able to become a great power or maintain its position for long without a strong navy.

The need to undertake a strategic analysis of the maritime security framework for India in the 21st century may lead the readers to expect a direct plunge into salt water, addressing force levels, types etc. The difficulty with that is one cannot simply talk about security without a wider exploration of what constitutes the nations maritime power potential in order to derive the ingredients of its security framework. It is submitted here that 'security' has to be understood not simply in terms of the potential for (or absence of) conflict or interstate tension, but in human, economic and

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common security terms, if solutions to the problems are to be successfully devised and implemented. Indeed, a primary focus on conflict and inter-state tension might make it more difficult to attend to other kinds of securities.

### **The Maritime Character**

**Indian Society.** India is probably the most complex society on earth, with a multiplicity of clamorous sub-cultures, languages and aspirations made sharper by the dynamics of a young democracy of nearly one billion people, of which 250 million live near the coast. It has a strong belief system of individual rights and claims and an equally strong forgetfulness of corresponding responsibility and accountability.

**Maritime Concept.** As a possible player on the world scene, the political, diplomatic, economic, legal, social, scientific and security linkages of India are yet to fully develop in a manner that they are for the existing major players. What is lacking in Indian thought process is a clear concept of national maritime power, for even after 55 years of independence India is yet to frame a National Maritime Policy. Definition of "**Maritime**" could be based on the States dependence of the sea. It is an amalgam of factors such as maritime tradition, navy and merchant fleet size, dependence on sea borne trade, size of the EEZ value of offshore resources and the capabilities of the domestic ship building industry.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, "**Maritime Power**" would imply the ability of a nation to exert some control in its use of the sea.

**Ancient Sea Power.** In historical terms this concept did not exist in the individual kingdoms that contended for power within the loose boundaries of the Indian subcontinent. Ancient Indian sea power consisted almost exclusively of its commerce and cultural relations, and apart from small forces maintained by coastal states no concept existed of naval power to go forth and seek colonies in the manner of European sea power. Because of the self-contained nature of the Indian subcontinent, there was no need to do so.

**Century of the Seas.** The new century is spoken of as the century of the seas. With booming populations and shrinking land availability, the seas with their seemingly inexhaustible resources



have increasingly to meet human needs of food and living. India is singularly fortunate in possessing more than two million square kilometres of sea area as its EEZ. Our fisheries have been barely tapped. Apart from oil, there are rich minerals, which are waiting to be extracted from the seabed. India is a pioneer investor in ocean mining, the first nation in the world to get this status. Our permanent manned station in Antarctica clearly demonstrates that we well understood the need to be in the forefront of matters pertaining to ocean and scientific research.

**Maritime Paradigm.** In an era of rapid economic growth, nations are attaching considerable importance to maritime issues such as jurisdictions, trade routes, fishing rights, offshore resources, transit rights, piracy, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. This is significantly influencing every nation's perception of the regional environment in relation to maritime power. Today, India's maritime power potential lies in its economic capacity, democratic values, rich cultural heritage, desire for just, fair and equitable relations between all nations and most significantly its strategic geographic location in the Indian Ocean.

### **Maritime Framework**

**Impact of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III.** A singular factor responsible for aggravating the feeling of maritime (in) security is the 1982 UNCLOS III. Even one time nations, which did not have a navy, are today considering a naval force. For most navies, peacetime tasks have been the main *raison d'être* for their existence. They are now trying to find a balance between security functions and war fighting capability. The navies in protecting their maritime interests would fundamentally be safeguarding their national interests against sea borne threats. The ideology of a nation is therefore becoming more maritime in character in wanting their navies to: -

- (a) Protect their maritime jurisdictions.
- (b) Act as an instrument of international diplomacy.
- (c) Provide economic, environmental and resource security.



**Navy and Maritime Interdependence.** This broadening of concept has come about as a result of the recognition that non-military threats are as important as military threats. As the economic strength of a nation grows, it is giving rise to increased concerns of economic security. Navies alone can afford nations the means of exerting pressure more vigorous than diplomacy and less dangerous and unpredictable in its results than the Army or Airforce when dealing with non-military threats. This is because the freedom of the seas makes them locally available while leaving them uncommitted. It is perennially true: "Diplomacy without force is like an orchestra without instruments".<sup>2</sup> This requires building up of a set of relationships and interdependence between the multidisciplinary maritime activities of a nation. The necessary elements of India's maritime framework for the 21st century therefore are:-

(a) A stable political system with clear maritime objectives. Our political relations with the littoral and non-littoral states using the Indian Ocean is another.

(b) A sound economy with a liberal international trade regime. Our extensive sea borne trade with the USA, Europe, Russia, the Baltic and Black Sea States, Japan, West Asia, South East Asia and the African continent also influence our maritime defence perceptions. New trade opportunities await us in South America.

(c) An efficient port infrastructure.

(d) A productive coastal shipping and inland waterways system.

(e) A vigorous and internationally competitive shipbuilding industry.

(f) Considerably enhanced activity in the EEZ in oceanographic research, fisheries, exploitation of seabed resources and extraction of oil with corresponding growth in onshore and offshore support, marine repairs, maintenance facilities, environmental controls, technology and trained manpower.

(g) A strong legislative framework for management of the oceans.



(h) A sufficient maritime defence force to protect national endeavours at sea and deter larger threats. In the maritime context our peninsular location at the top of the Indian Ocean and astride major Asia-Pacific trade routes through the Malacca Straits, the Gulf, the Red Sea and around Africa is a key determinant of our strategic perceptions at sea.

### **India and the World in 2025**

**India by 2005.** In the short term India can expect to see accelerated economic growth, movement towards political stability and internal security problems. India should also expect to see in this period the reappraisal of relations by the big leaguers such as the USA, China, Europe and Russia, as a two way process of recognition of new realities.

**India by 2015.** In the medium term, the economic growth and significant Indian world trade will have a direct impact on sea borne trade. The political system should stabilise while the military and security situations could be seen to be heading in that direction. Foreign policy should be at a new high with improved relations with major powers.

**India by 2025.** In the long term or the next twenty to twenty five years, one could visualise greater political stability with almost full literacy and satisfactory living standards with rising social indicators. Spill over problems from the neighbourhood may well continue by reason of illegal immigration in search of economic opportunities, differing perceptions of democracy and also threats of fundamentalism.

### **Security Concerns**

Keeping this analysis in mind, India's ocean security concerns have to look far beyond any immediate threats in the neighbourhood and develop increasingly according to the requirements of a resurgent nation, 97 per cent of whose trade goes over the seas. The world ratio of 2:1 of ocean space to land space is indicative of the area available for exploitation for communications, including underwater fibre optic cables and pipelines, raw materials, food as well as a natural environment for human existence in the future. There is therefore a need to cease obsession with pure military



dangers and concentrate upon measures to deal with very different challenges to national well being. The maritime security issues before India that need to be addressed are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.

**Border Security.** The ratio of 1:1.1 approximately of the Indian landmass to India's maritime zones that extend beyond the visible coastline and are depicted by imaginary lines at sea, requires safeguarding national interests across an ocean space larger than the whole of India. While India enjoys exclusive economic, environmental and resource rights there is conflict of interests in the application of the principle of 'Freedom of the High Seas'. The UK, France and the US continue to use the principle to further military intelligence gathering. The UK and the US have in the recent past conducted research in the EEZ without authorisation by the Indian Government. Simultaneously, India's maritime security is an increasingly important aspect of broader regional security. Large-scale arms build up with nations like China, Japan, Australia and ASEAN nations attempting to increase their force levels has a direct/indirect impact on the security environment in the Indian Ocean Region(IOR). China for one is likely to be operating a carrier task group in the IOR by 2020 and has a direct bearing on India's ability to safeguard its ocean space. Finally, outstanding boundary demarcation issues with Pakistan and Bangladesh impinge on maritime sovereignty of the nation.

**Energy Security.** India's demand for energy is heavy and growing. In the widest sense energy security concerns have three facets. The first involves limiting the vulnerability to oil supply disruptions. This is essentially a short-term issue. The second pertains to the long-term concerns of smooth functioning of the international energy system so as to ensure supplies to meet the rising demand at reasonable prices. Finally, a new dimension that has emerged recently is that production and use of energy must evolve so as to minimise the damage to the environment and to promote sustainable development. India is a net importer of oil. Given that the imports from Gulf of oil and liquefied natural gas(LNG) are only going to increase in the future, India could act proactively to adopt and implement strategies such as building oil stockpiles, diversification of energy supply sources and development of



renewable energy sources. In the Indian context, reliance on emergency stocks would tend to be low as India can ill afford such expensive stocks. This can be inferred from the high costs for financing and maintaining these stocks. In addition, the inherent difficulties in using these stocks makes them less popular compared to other response strategies. As for diversification of energy supply sources it may be stated that in recent years natural gas has emerged as an alternative for oil. However several constraints pertaining to its transportation and limited production presently curtail this option. One of the major problems with international gas pipelines say from Russia to India is that they have to transit through many countries. Smooth and continuous supplies depend on multi-country agreements. Such international agreements may not always be possible. Renewable energy is an option involving production of energy through the use of water, currents and wind. Technological advances in this field are yet to fully develop to provide a viable form of alternate sources of energy. India will therefore continue to be dependent on the Persian Gulf to a significant degree. Hence, India has to invest in naval capabilities for sea lanes of communications (SLOC) protection and a variety of naval, ground and air assets to guard pipelines.

**Food Security.** Security of living resources at sea is a key determinant of India's security paradigm. Recognised as a powerful income and employment generator, about six million people are dependent on fishing and fisheries related activities for their livelihood. India is the sixth largest producer of fish in the world and second in inland fish production. The annual potential yield, in the EEZ has been assessed at 3.9 million tonnes. The share of the marine fish production was 51 percent of marine and inland output of 52.2 lakh tonnes in 1998-99. An estimated 200,000 traditional crafts, 34,000 mechanised boats, and 180 deep sea fishing vessels operate from the coastal states. At present there are 395 freezing units, 102 individual quick freezing plants, and 477 cold storage units. Export of marine products during 1998-99 exceeded one billion dollars.

**Ocean Security.** The Ocean security framework primarily involves dealing with crime at sea arising from issues of piracy, terrorism and insurgency, Drug trafficking, illegal arms trade and even marine



safety. The issues that impinge on the security of the mainland coastline and the island territories may be summarised as :-

- (a) Reporting by ships handling dangerous cargo while transiting through the maritime zones of India.
- (b) Mandatory Ship reporting by all ships upon ratification of the Search and Rescue (SAR) convention.
- (c) Action against unseaworthy/substandard ships transiting through the maritime zones of India and dumping at sea.
- (d) Standardised registration and identification system for Indian fishing vessels.
- (e) Matters arising from maritime fraud including cargo.
- (f) Breach of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary law in the contiguous zone such as illegal immigration and landing of insurgents, arms, and drugs by sea.
- (g) Acts of piracy at sea.

**Resource Security.** There are four clear aspects of resource security that needs collective action :-

- (a) Protection of the marine environment.
- (b) Protection of resource data from unauthorised scientific research.
- (c) Safeguarding areas abundant in natural resources from illegal exploitation.
- (d) Safeguarding maritime infrastructure such as development of ports and offshore infrastructure.

**Environmental Security.** Environmental degradation anticipates actual or possible conflict between and within countries over scarce resources, including water and arable land, and the environmental services they provide. The security paradigm focuses concern on increased social tensions and political instabilities within states as a result of environmental degradation and the inequitable distribution of resources and disproportionate vulnerabilities to environmental change. This fits with a more traditional security paradigm, even if the threats are defined as non-military in nature. Equally important is dealing with natural disasters.



## The Way Ahead

**Threat to National Security.** Security in the 21st century assumes a much broader definition in place of the narrow military concept. A threat to national security could be defined as anything, which challenges people's health (environment), economic well being, energy, trade, commerce, living and non-living resources, social stability (crime at sea) and political peace (maritime sovereignty). This compels politicians, bureaucrats, defence planners, corporate bodies and even the public to redefine their concepts and rethink their policies.

**International Level Option.** The changing balance of power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence of an economically and militarily self confident China, a more self assured Japan, the potential emergence of a Unified Korea, Australian initiative towards a co-operative security mechanism and existing powers in the Indian Ocean all need to be factored in India's security perceptions. Increasingly, India should look towards multilateral naval co-operation in the Indian Ocean/Asia-Pacific region. In 1998, the United Nations World Commission on the Oceans recommended that national navies should be employed in a supranational role to uphold international law.

**National Level Initiative.** The management of maritime affairs requires an integrated holistic approach to decision making if India's maritime security challenges are to be effectively met. The Integrated Management model on enforcement and security puts forward the following:-

- (a) India has interests and obligations in ocean and coastal activities occurring within the maritime zones of jurisdiction.
- (b) India requires a range of potential responses - operational, political, legal and non-governmental - to manage the multiple activities.
- (c) India must maintain or have access to capabilities for surveillance, monitoring and control.

**National Maritime Policy.** India cannot expose itself to the risk inherent in a passive maritime policy. Let us not forget that India became a European colony mainly because of weakness at sea. So long as it used the sea extensively, it was a land of enormous



wealth. India has to, therefore, look again to the sea both for its continued prosperity and defence. For this purpose all round development of all the elements of the maritime framework need to be vigorously pursued and developed amongst them a balanced Navy.

**The Nation and Naval Forces.** The Indian Navy is too small for the security of its huge coastline, EEZ, distant island territories and interests in a peaceful Indian Ocean. The focus is shifting from military to non-military threats just as blue water confrontation has given way to littoral engagements, requiring a certain degree of sea control. In the present day scenario absolute sea control may be a figment of the imagination, but limited sea control and sea denial for a defined period is a reality.<sup>3</sup> It is the only armed force which presents a widely visible and recognised international symbol of national power and industrial capacity and is capable of graded application ranging from goodwill flag showing and presence in international waters to a concentration of force as the situation demands.

**Naval Force Structure.** Effective maritime defence for India requires building and maintaining a modern two coast Navy. For a balanced navy a mix of ships, submarines and air power with adequate reconnaissance, airborne early warning and quick reaction against enemy forces are required to tilt the balance at sea. In a unified strategy even small navies can afford these tenets of naval warfare.<sup>4</sup> The classical theory of naval employability advocated by Alfred Mahan is validated for India and given the roles of the navies of today, it can be stated thus:

*"Emphasis on pockets of sea control by large and medium nations as also sea based maritime options exercised by smaller nations will necessitate India's force structure to provide a credible defence and significant quick response capability for a conflict at sea or war."*<sup>5</sup>

## Conclusion

India is a nation with a decisive maritime character that is yet to be politically and publicly recognised. According to international experts, the challenge for India is getting the government to recognise its maritime power potential in domestic and external



affairs. They identify the first priority, as creating an institutional framework that has the political will, mandate, human and financial resources to formulate and implement any future national policy. So far, India has had an insulated system of enforcement and security that is seen as a tool of management rather than an integral part of the management process. The supranational role of the Navy and the integrated approach to management of maritime affairs will allow policy makers to include maritime enforcement and security requirements and response capabilities at the conceptual stage of any development. Besides this, India must continue to develop all the elements of the maritime framework described to effectively meet the responsibilities and challenges to marine resource management, environmental protection, marine safety, illegal activity and maritime sovereignty.

The future prosperity of India lies at sea and evolving an ocean security framework for the 21st century that recognises India as a key maritime power in world affairs. Alfred T. Mahan has said, "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters."

### **Key Recommendations**

The Key recommendations that emerge are:-

- (a) Develop a national level integrated management organisational structure (Requires taking some hard decisions at the political level).
- (b) Frame a National Maritime Policy. (Requires putting together a cohesive team of professionals and specialists - commitment to nation building).
- (c) Enact national legislation in conformity with the provisions of UNCLOS to meet the obligations in India's Maritime Zones (Requires urgent attention on the part of Ministry of External Affairs).
- (d) Coast Guard as an independent organisation or integrated into the Navy to be fully equipped for dealing with enforcement and security challenges upto 200 nm from the Indian Coastline. (Requires taking hard decisions by Ministry of Defence).



(e) Build an indigenous and modern two coast Navy (Requires national will and commitment over the long term).

(f) Move towards multilateral naval co-operation graduating to an alliance in the Indian Ocean (Requires a shift in foreign policy).

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# Disaster Management in the Indian Ocean

Vice Admiral Mihir K Roy, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

## Introduction

The warm, rich embayed Indian ocean of 28 million square miles comprising 36 littorals and 11 land locked states with 1284 islands (418 are not habitated) containing 1/3 of worlds population, 1/4 of landmass, 3/4 of strategic reserves, as also 70 per cent of worlds disasters.

Sea lanes of the Indian Ocean were the highways for commercial and cultural contacts from time immemorial for initially transporting indentured labour, petty shopkeepers, civil servants, hajj pilgrims and the military to ensure the flow of resources and markets to suit the needs of industrial Europe.

With the pulling down of the Berlin wall the removal of Apartheid, the collapse of the rupee trade and the advent of competitive market-oriented economy, the environment in the Indian Ocean changed from geo-strategy to geo-economics, from conflict to commerce as also from a continental to a rimland mindset. The volatile Indian Ocean with its neo geo-politics thus became the last frontier for human sustenance and energy flows to meet the politico-economic aspirations of the people.

The emphasis also shifted from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific which was accelerated by the advent of ocean trading blocs such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indian Ocean Rim which brought in its wake broader strategic and economic participation with an annual traffic of 70,000 ships of which 12,000 vessels entered the 11 major Indian ports last year. In 1998-99, good handled by Indian Ports was 272 million tons which is

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expected to go upto 377 million tons by 2005. A new dimension has been added by the privatisation of ports (Build Own Operate and Transfer or BOOT) and joint ventures for berthing quays. Each ocean has its own geo-management matrix. Hence the need to mitigate disasters at sea requires interaction not only between several departments within a country but also between the numerous littorals using the same ocean space.

### **Cleaner and Safer Seas - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO)**

This dramatic increase in the volume of commerce particularly of energy supply by tankers has sharply raised the implications of disasters in the choke points of Hormuz, Malacca and South China seas on which safe and unrestricted passage Japan, Korea, Taiwan and now China are overtly dependent.

There are more than 150 collisions at sea yearly due to poor visibility, radar unservicability, hull failure, boiler explosions and above all human errors. There were 97 bulk carriers lost during the last four years with 532 casualties. In addition there were 532 incidents of piracy (Malacca Straits, South China Seas and West African coasts having the higher density) as reported by the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre at Kuala Lumpur.

380 oil tankers visit Indian ports annually. Hence energy supplies is both a tool for industrial development as also a weapon to limit the potential of adversaries during conflict. During the Iran-Iraq tanker war (1980-88), 543 tankers were attacked of which 80 vessels were sunk. This man made disaster cost a further 200 billion US dollars in hull insurance which in turn increased the price of oil from 12 to 25 dollars per barrel which in turn slowed down the growth of India's fragile economy.

In respect of dry bulk trade, Australia is the principal supplier of coal to most Asian markets. US, Canada and China supply between 15 per cent and 20 per cent of Asia's coal imports and Indonesia is emerging as the second major coal exporter.



## **Natural Gas**

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has been flagged as the century of natural gas which will play an increasing role in the energy sector for power, fertilisers and petro chemical industries. For the first time India will be importing natural gas transported as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) on board ships. The major exporters are Algeria, Libya, UAE, Australia, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. The importers are US, Europe, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India. Therefore of all the maritime activity, none other is more strategically important than oil and gas. Its denial or disruption can have severe effects on a wide spectrum of activities and hence merits careful attention.

## **Pollution**

India has become one of the world's largest importers of petroleum products. As its economy grows, India's reliance on the Gulf for its energy needs will grow. Pollution is another problem. The major concern is the possibility of a catastrophic oil spill. In the heavily trafficked straits such as the Malacca, there are frequent worries about the danger of a major oil spills seriously disrupting, or even closing the Strait. The forest fires in Indonesia that hazarded visibility in the Malacca Straits is yet another example of environmental pollution.

Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) security is closely linked to development of maritime cooperation and disaster mitigation such as an interlocking regional mechanism from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

Hence maritime stability for safer and cleaner seas is a total response of a nation to its surrounding environment and is therefore subordinate to economics, budgetary and developmental interest and must perforce be in harmony with the socio-economic, geo-political and techno-strategic environment in the Asia Pacific.

## **The Indian Ocean Region**

India's coastline of 7000 Km with 53 coastal districts sustaining 50 per cent of India's population of nearly a billion with a functional illiteracy of 30 per cent survives on a fragile economy of a dollar a day. Hence developing countries are not as well equipped by



international standards to cope with natural hazards, oil pollution, vintage shipping and requisite salvage facilities with the three elements-land, oceans and atmosphere interacting intimately through human activities.

Moreover, the Indian Ocean Region is characterised by its human dimension and is getting continuously degraded in a number of global issues. For example, the depletion of fish or overfishing in the Indian Ocean has led to a political and social upheaval in the state of Kerala which in turn has repercussions in Delhi. Similarly in Bangladesh with its population pressures and demographic drift, the loss of thousands of lives during cyclones triggers off environmental refugees which in turn has been attributed to 'Allah's will'. Populations in underdeveloped countries cannot be moved out to safety as they are rooted to their homes, livestock and hand to mouth earnings. And this human trauma goes on from year to year.

### **Environmental Degradation**

The threats to environment and ecology which have a bearing on disaster in the long term are :-

- (a) Tar deposits on the beaches.
- (b) Rise in sea water level.
- (c) Saline water intrusion in coastal regions.
- (d) Health hazards to coastal population.
- (e) Loss of lives and property.
- (f) Over exploitation of marine resources.
- (g) Contamination of drinking water by hydrocarbons and heavy metal.
- (h) Hazardous chemicals and salt.
- (j) **Loss of coral reefs.** Indian ocean has already lost over 20 percent of her coral reefs due to coral mining, fishing by explosives, and pollution. In Sri Lanka and India entire sections of reefs are removed to produce cement. Coral reefs excepting in Australia's Great Barrier Reef and mid ocean islands in the Indian Ocean are expected to vanish in the next twenty years.



### Threats to the Coastal Area

The threats to the coastal area linked to future disasters are:-

- (a) Sedimentation and top soil wash.
- (b) Over crowding.
- (c) Human predating of large marine ecosystems.
- (d) Degradation of quality of human habitats.
- (e) Industrial and urban pollution.
- (f) Non-regulatory human activities.
- (g) Human manipulation of the hydrological cycle.
- (h) Noxious and toxic algae bloom natural calamities.
- (i) Marine pollution by oil, toxic, hazardous substances, industrial and urban wastes, and nuclear wastes.
- (k) Global warming and sea level rise.
- (l) Inundation.
- (m) Accelerated erosion of beaches and coastal shores.
- (n) Increased frequency of coastal flooding.
- (o) Destruction of non-salt tolerant vegetation.

There is therefore a specific relevance for the developing countries in assessing the impact of natural disasters on coastal assets for which contingency plans and response mechanism needs to be planned in view of the country's vulnerability to natural disasters. But, politicians tend to think of a time frame covering their Parliamentary tenure. Hence the overflowing of the Brahmaputra and Ganges which is an annual event has not attracted any long term plan inspite of the high level of dislocations. And in conclusion one must draw attention to environmental distortion as a weapon of war as highlighted in Vietnam and Iraq where 30 million barrels of oil flowed into the Gulf with the slick expanding to over 600 square miles and devastating 20,000 marine bird life. And similarly one must address the contingency of submarine disasters.



## Environmental Security

It will be hence necessary to orient national security to ensure:-

- (a) Defence exercises respect environmental laws.
- (b) Invest in innovative technologies that improves the cost of environmental restoration and compliance.
- (c) Mitigate threats such as ozone depletion or loss of biodiversity that can lead to international instability and global degradation.

Unsustainable environmental activism, the depletion of non-renewable and even renewable natural resources and stocks, environmental degradation, oil pollution and wastes from noxious and hazardous substances, is beyond the sink capacity of the earth.

The National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan 1996 delineates the responsibilities of various agencies in the event of an oil spill in the marine environment under the central coordinating authority of the 20 year old Indian Coast Guard which will be responsible for the clean up operations. A stockpile of pollution response equipment and 20,000 tonnes of chemical are held in India in the various maritime zones. The port authorities will remain responsible for operations within the port limits and the State Government along the beaches and inland waters under its jurisdiction. An omnibus legislation is being proposed by the Indian Coast Guard. A crisis management group also has been set up in Delhi. A data bank is being built up.

## Regulatory Measures

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has focused problems concerning the coastal environment and resources. There are ongoing international programmes such as UNESCO'S (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) Coastal Marine Systems (COMAR), the Regional Sea Programme of UNEP, the Fisheries Programme of Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the Integrated Global Ocean Station System (IGOSS), activities of Indian Ocean Centre (IOC) and World Metrological Organisation (WMO), the Marine



Meteorological Programme of Marine Metrological Organisation (MMO) and the coastal zone activities of International Union of Conservation of Nature (IUCN).

The United Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm (June 72) expressed concerns over pollution of the marine environment especially in coastal waters. A comprehensive Regional Seas Programme has been launched under the UNEP. A Coastal Monitoring Programme jointly sponsored by the Department of Ocean Development(DOD) and the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) along with the National Institute of Oceanography is being continued by the DOD (Department of Ocean Development) and Coastal Ocean Monitoring and Prediction system (COMTAS).

### **Global Warning and Sea Level Rise**

Global long-term level changes during the next few decades will be of lesser importance compared to effects which takes place locally on short time scales as a consequence of tides, waves, storm surges and seasonal cycles. Higher relative mean sea level may cause more frequent flooding associated with combination of local sea events and their impact can be summarised as follows:-

- (a) Accelerated erosion of beaches and coastal shores.
- (b) Salt water contamination and intrusion.
- (c) Increased frequency of coastal flooding.
- (d) Destruction of non-salt tolerant vegetation.

### **Shipping**

In view of the enlarging shipping activity and the crowding of sea lanes, the ensuring hazards can be identified as follows :-

- (a) Collisions due to poor visibility as also the unservicability of radar and navigational equipment.
- (b) Grounding or broaching of a ship leading to leaks particularly of oil as graphically documented by BBC on the disaster of the super tanker Sea Empress in Mfilford Haven which spilled 60,000 tonnes of oil in spite of the availability of tug power, pollution control, oil recovery tankers and salvage vessels. It was primarily due to poor management.



(c) Hull failure or boiler explosions, fire etc. To date there are eight atomic reactors (six Russian and two US) lying on the sea bed.

(d) Avoiding certification by International Societies such as Lloyds, Nippon, American Bureau and Indian Register of shipping.

(e) Laxity in adhering to certification of safety equipment, load lines, hull, gas and radio which is attributed to human failure. Mr G C Howard, General Manager of the Salvage Association who surveyed 10,000 accidents stated that 60 per cent were due to human error due to:-

(i) Management commitment and responsibilities.

(ii) Personnel competence and involvement.

(iii) Maintenance of ships board equipment.

(iv) Inspection and risk assessment.

Hence safety at sea can be seen at two levels:

(a) Prevention.

(b) Minimising casualties, pollution response as also availability of Search and Rescue (SAR), communications, salvage and firefighting.

This requires the collection and analysis of information and data in conjunction with shipping companies, salvagers, Coast Guard, Navy, and Hull insurers.

### **Recommendations**

(a) Evolve a disaster management scale akin to Richter Scale for earthquakes say from A to J which spells out levels of assistance required for disaster management.

(b) Disaster management is a global issue and cannot be contained by human made boundaries of national interests.

(c) A common regional approach for disaster management functioning under the international regime.

(d) Comprehensive risk assessment system for each disaster is required to reduce loss of life, property and ecosystem.



(e) Coastal areas need to be well defined on an uniform standard.

(f) Identify lead agencies for monitoring action by nation states, international organisations and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Disaster management is neither law enforcement, nor providing relief. It is basically mitigation, prevention and reduction.

### **Search and Rescue Organisation in India**

1500 lives were lost when the Titanic sank in 1912 on her maiden voyage. More recently 571 lives on board the passenger ship were saved although this Greek passenger Oceania ship had lost her engines and was battling winds above 80 miles per hour and 24 feet waves. What was common to both ships was that they were built at reputed yards but what was not common to both was the communication system. While the Titanic depended on her simple wireless radio to relay the Save our Souls (SOS), the Oceania alerted the nearest Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) via satellite. The RCC in turn immediately set in motion the rescue operation. It took the rescuers, one day to reach the Titanic but 16 aircrafts and several vessels arrived within hours to assist Oceania.

### **Satellite Communication System: Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) and India**

SAR has come a long way due to instant maritime communication. The early satellites were not designed for the maritime industry and had limited channels. Today over 70,000 marine vessels ply on high seas because of a new satellite communication system called the GMDSS. Now the GMDSS is provided by a global body called International Navigation Marine Satellite (INMARSAT) with which we are familiar, is under the aegis of International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The system came into effect in February 1992. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. of India is a signatory to INMARSAT and provides a gateway via its earth stations near Pune. India is already a party to the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS 1974) Convention. The Indian Merchant Shipping Act 1958 places an obligation on masters of Indian ships to render assistance to the persons in distress at sea. The



Convention of High Sea 1958 also requires every coastal state to promote the establishment and maintenance of adequate and effective search and rescue services by way of mutual regional arrangements in co-operation with the neighbouring states. These arrangements include establishment, operation and maintenance of such facilities as are deemed practicable to provide adequate means of locating and rescuing personnel.

The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 (SAR 79) came into force on June 22, 1985 and provides for adoption of "global maritime distress and safety system and establishment of Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCCs) with adequate facilities and equipment.

### **Traffic Density**

A study of the density of traffic in the main traffic lanes around the Indian Ocean indicates that annually about 12,000 ships entered Indian Ports in 1994-95. The seasonal cyclones and monsoon create severe weather conditions in both the Arabian sea and the Bay of Bengal. The areas around the Gulf of Kutch and the off-shore islands with limited navigation have also been proved to be accident-prone particularly in view of the dense traffic of fishing and sailing vessels which need to update their safety standards. The majority of the fishermen are below the poverty line and no rescuers are available to them even from the State governments. In addition, a large number of boats along the coastal waters are engaged in clandestine operations and any step to ensure fitment of SAR system would lead to accountability problems and may prove to be counter productive. Involvement of the State Government at this stage for part funding of equipment can be a step in the right direction. The present SAR organisation has never been tested to its limits as one is prone to take poor fishermen as granted as most of them returned back after being caught in bad weather.

### **Maritime SAR Organisation**

A maritime SAR Organisation is generally activated 15 to 20 times every year for ships and about 100 times for distress calls generated by sailing ships. Perhaps the air traffic control system in vogue can provide a pattern for a similar data base network for



ships at sea. To start with, information on all traffics originating from the major ports in India could be made available to Maritime Control Centre (MCC) and at a later date all major ports could be interlinked.

A well-tested SAR Organisation already exists in our country for the waters adjoining the Indian coast line, inclusive of the Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. SAR activities at the Indian coast are coordinated by the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command (Mumbai), who co-ordinates all SAR activities on the west coast while his counterpart deals with east on the East Coast. The two coasts lines have been further subdivided into sectors at Mumbai, Cochin, Chennai and Calcutta.

In addition, we have a long range maritime aircraft for search and rescue operation such as the TU 142 M or IL 38 which can carry rescue boats and rafts in their bomb bay for rescue purposes. We have other naval and coastguard aircraft, naval ships and transport aircraft of the Air Force. One TU 142 or IL 38 aircraft crew is available at four hour notice at all times to meet the SAR requirements. All ships at sea within 300 miles of position of the craft in distress are to proceed to the search area. Duty ships in harbour and within 300 miles on the same coast are to raise steam immediately keeping appropriate naval authority and await further instructions. Indian naval ships are to carry out surface search and rescue operations under the control of Headquarters. They will be assisted by merchant ships, whenever possible.

### **Integrated Maritime Coordination Centre (INMCC)**

The INMCCs are located at Bangalore and Lucknow and they work under the control of ISRO telemetric tracking and command networking which is a part of ISRO. Six satellites, (three each launched by US and Russia) are used in this satellite-aided search and rescue. The first pass of satellites results in two positions of the location of the distress platform, namely, rear end image due to Doppler effect. Both positions are passed by INMCC to one of four Information Centres located in India at the first instance and soon thereafter, during the second pass of the satellite, the ambiguity of positioning is resolved and the actual position obtained and passed to the concerned Information Centre. The Information Centre thereafter passes the position and frequency error and



duration of transmission through messages for which C-in-C, West (Mumbai) is the coordinator.

### **Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs)**

The future SAR Organisations envisages establishment of dedicated RCCs at Bombay, Madras and Port Blair. These centres will be in direct communication with the coast earth station, local user terminal of the Department of Space at Bangalore and Lucknow and coast radio station at Mumbai and Chennai. In addition to RCCs establishment of eight in number, rescue co-ordination subcentres have also been envisaged. These would be co-located with the existing Coast Guard district headquarters. However, the resources constraints and the growth of Coast Guard are the main reasons for recommending the continuance of the Navy as the SAR coordinating agency for the immediate future. When the Coast Guard develops sufficiently to become self-sustaining the chairmanship of the national SAR Board and the responsibility for all SAR activity in the water in and off India will devolve on the Coast Guard.

### **Recommendations**

- (a) Computerised redefining system for the shipping traffic in the Indian waters to link up all major ports and INMCC to provide real time analysis of the received distress measures.
- (b) At a later date, all ports in the Indian Ocean will be inter-linked to provide safe navigable waters in the entire Indian Ocean Rim.
- (c) The awareness campaign in the coastal towns to educate the not-so-privileged and poor fishermen on the need for SAR.
- (d) The State Government's involvement to part funding of the SAR equipment for fitment on boats and similar craft and this would also reduce clandestine activity along the coastline.
- (e) GDMSS campaign to bring in awareness to the political fraternity on safety of men at sea.
- (f) Develop responsibility to the Coast Guard in a given time-frame so as to ensure that various Area Disaster Centres (ADCs) in the future are effective.



## Conclusion

Disaster management and mitigation is interrelated between political, economic and security paradigms which can be described as :-

- (a) Clockwork paradigm largely encompassing international relations with a predictable reaction or response.
- (b) Butterfly syndrome as interrelated of varying issues such as the Siberian cranes failing to wing their way to their winter habitat at Bharatpur which has a triggering effect on the tourist economy of the region.

A holistic view is therefore necessary for disaster management both on land and sea which needs to be integrated into the overall planning and management of disaster management in the Indian Ocean Region.

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# The Evolution of Military Honours and Awards in India

Professor Edward S Haynes

It is important to understand that the system of military honours of the Republic of India has a deep and important history which, like other aspects of India's history, needs to be understood and appreciated on the basis of serious archival work. History is not, by its nature, didactic, it teaches us few lessons, it suggests no policies, and it does not serve either to reinforce held beliefs or to seek to demolish such beliefs. To the extent that my words have any contemporary resonance it is accidental, well mostly accidental.

In any military (or indeed in any other complex system), there are always means of recognising and rewarding achievement, of welding the awardee to those in authority over him or her, of acknowledging through the transaction of giving and receiving awards the basic relationships that underlie the system and the hierarchy that maintains it. Whether it is a medal, or a certificate, or a cash reward, or an academic robe, these honours act out the basic institutional values.

While ancient India, rich in both history and mythology, shows a record of prominent figures, including warriors, being rewarded by their superiors with land, cash awards, titles, privileged positions in the public theatre of state rituals, and even tangible bangles, anklets, or necklaces, the system we see in place today and the historical antecedents of which my words today will speak is, essentially, a product of late Mughal times.

It is important to survey the historical heritage of awarding valour and service as it stood at that time: whether in Delhi or in any of the local sub-administrations (and for these purposes, we may as well view the East India Company as one of these

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subordinate governments), good performance was rewarded most frequently by grants of land (*jagirs*), by titles, by promotions within the ritual hierarchy, or by the presentation of a bewildering range of physical items (*peshkash*, ranging from drums to banners to swords to horses) but with none of these wearable (with the exception of pieces of clothing: the *khillat*, ritually taken from the body of the Emperor himself). There were, for the soldiers of the Mughal Raj, no medals, badges, or decorations as we conceive them today and, indeed, for the common soldier, there was rarely any reward at all, regardless of his valour or achievement - survival and plunder were probably enough.

To this, the East India Company added a European tradition of recognising achievement that rewarded more on the basis of birth and rank than in recognition of specific deeds. While medals, as we conceive them today, were rarely awarded, they were more given as jewelry, as personal gifts from the monarch, and whose literal value in gold or silver seems to have been more important than the symbolic value of the reward. Knighthood, deriving from medieval ideals of chivalry, was limited to those of the proper birth and family and had more to do with closeness to the ruler than with any degree of merit or achievement.

The system of honours which the East India Company developed in the years before its end till the tumultuous events of 1857 was a mixture of Indian, British, and Continental European practices, but with a significant number of novel creations mixed in.

The East India Company began as "no more" than a trading company, though a trading company that puts to shame any of today's multinationals. As it arose as a subordinate of the Mughal Emperor in the administration of Bengal, the Company found itself, as a corporate body, the recipient of titles of honour from the Mughal *badshah* and, on occasion (and rather reluctantly) the bestower, in turn, of titles and other honours on its own subordinates - for these, the Company functioned essentially within the Mughal "vocabulary of honour". Titles, after all, were cheap rewards, they took no wealth from the strongbox, and no land off the tax rolls;



yet, for the Company as for the Emperor, they were not always enough, and financial rewards were and had to be a part of the vocabulary of reward and honour.

For rewards with intrinsic value, the Company returned to English practice and began, as early as 1668, to reward services to the Company, first by Europeans and later by Indians, with the issue of specially struck unique gold medals, awards whose main value was in their weight in precious metals. But, for common soldiers who had performed good services, the awards were still tangible and varied, as was the case in a set of awards from 1680: "to the four Commission Officers each a silk scarf, and a hogshead Arrack to the Garrison, to the Chief Peon 2½ yards Broad Cloth, and 5 Pags [currency] amongst the Peons for a feast."<sup>1</sup>

For the soldiers of the Company, such awards could be supplemented by the awards of titles or *peshkash*, as with the 1809 award for distinguished service to Subedar Major Muhammad Sarwar, 1st Madras Light Cavalry of a drum, palanquin, sword, horse, and the title "Khan Bahadur Nadir Jang". But, beginning at least by 1795, Indian officers were also awarded special gold medals for valorous achievement -the first of these traced is the award in 1795 to Subedar Abdul Cawder, 5th Madras Native Infantry, who was awarded a gold medal and chain inscribed "For Conduct and Courage on All Occasions". It is significant that such awards were far more common in the Madras Army than in the other armies.

But it would be in the army of the Bengal Presidency that the most significant innovations were to be made. In May 1766, a group of European officers stationed at Monghyr mutinied over issues of pay and financial reward and a force of Indian soldiers had to be sent in to restore order and arrest the mutineers (a very different pattern from what would be seen ninety years later). To reward these loyal services, the Indian officers and enlisted men were given special medals in gold (for officers) and silver (for other Indian ranks). These medals were to be worn around their necks from cords and were, by all accounts, proudly worn. Although this medal for the Monghyr Mutiny is frequently ignored, it would set the



pattern for several generations of campaign awards for Indian personnel. This evolution reached its highest form, perhaps, in the medals awarded in gold, silver-gilt, silver, bronzed copper, and tin (depending on rank) for the defeat of Tippu Sultan at Seringapatnam in 1799. All in all, ten distinct sets or campaign awards would be given to Indian officers and enlisted personnel (and, occasionally, to their European officers as well) prior to 1820. It is important to remember, for example, that while Indian troops serving against the French in Egypt in 1801 were given either gold or silver medals, depending on their rank, English soldiers would have to wait forty-six years to receive any wearable reward for this service. What was happening in India was a unique experiment in military policy-making.

In 1826, following the example of the medal awarded to British forces for Waterloo eleven years earlier, the campaign medal created for the first Burma War included a ribbon for wearing, shifting the site for displaying honour from around the neck to the left chest.

As the Indian Army was called upon to perform a wider and wider range of service, often out of India (as in Burma) or under adverse conditions on an unprecedented level, new challenges arose. These combined with sociological and organisational changes in the Indian army, with an increasing gulf between European officers and Indian officers to produce administrative problems of career advancement for Indians. Fewer and fewer high ranks were available for Indian subedars, risaldars and jemadars, even while the need to secure their loyalty (at low cost) loomed as an increasingly pressing problem.

A novel solution was advanced in 1834 by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck to "establish a counterpoise to the paralysing effects of rise by seniority."<sup>2</sup> Bentinck proposed the creation of an "Order of British India", modeled on the British Order of the Bath (which had been expanded to cover military services during the Napoleonic Wars), in two classes, which, combined with generous financial rewards, could be employed to reward long and faithful services by Indian officers and, not accidentally, to



cement their loyalty. This award, one of the three distinctive Indian military awards would continue until 15 August 1947 (and was even briefly contemplated for rebirth as a redesigned "Order of Ashoka" after independence).

The other great innovation by Bentinck in 1834 was not patterned on either British or Indian models, but took its inspiration from the Russian Cross of St. George, an award for gallantry with which British officers must have become familiar during their alliance against Napoleon. Russian soldiers were awarded the Cross of St. George for an outstanding act of bravery. On performing subsequent acts of bravery, a soldier would be promoted from the third to second and ultimately to first class for a third act of bravery. Building on this example, Bentinck suggested the creation of an "Order of Merit" for Indian soldiers (renamed the "Indian Order of Merit" in 1902 after King Edward VII created an award of the same name in the UK). Awarded in the third class for a conspicuous act of gallantry, a soldier could receive the second or even first classes for later acts of valour (and, in a unique case, a bar was created to the first class for an unprecedented four acts of extreme gallantry). The Order of British India and Order of Merit (joined later by the Indian Distinguished Service Medal) became the distinctive Indian awards for loyal and long service and for combat gallantry. It is significant that there would be no reward for meritorious service by enlisted men in the British forces until 1845 and no reward for their gallantry until the creation of the Victoria Cross in 1856.

With awards for service and valour taken care of, the problem of rewarding campaign service remained. And it became more of a problem, perhaps, in the aftermath of the First Afghan War, a notable defeat for the Indian Army, for which no fewer than six separate medals had been created, each rewarding services in separate battles of that disastrous war. While these awards were created not by the Crown but by the East India Company (and that could lead us into another important theme), there was a general and growing sense that this sort of proliferation of awards (and for an embarrassing war) was too much. When the same pattern was replicated for the conquest of Sind and the Gwalior campaign, for which, respectively, three and two separate medals were created,



a new and less costly pattern for rewarding campaign service was indicated.

The first Punjab War of 1845-46 ushered in a pattern of rewarding campaign service which has dominated Indian and British award patterns until almost the present day (but which now seems to have been abandoned in both nations). The institution of a single medal for general war service to which would be added separate clasps for participation in battles. With the Sutlej Medal, awarded for the first Punjab War, this system of rewarding campaign services first came into vogue. It was soon followed by retrospective awards (perhaps learning from the new Indian practice) for service in the Napoleonic Wars (the Naval and Military General Service Medals) and for early campaigns in India, 1803-26, (the Army of India Medal), and in a later Indian medal for the second Punjab War of 1848-49.

In 1854 the most important modification in the Sutlej-Punjab pattern of rewarding campaign services took place with the creation of what would, for forty one years, be the characteristic medal for India and for services in India, the India Medal, 1854. With its distinctive red ribbon with two blue stripes, this medal became for two generations of soldiers, Indian and European alike, the hallmark of campaign services in the subcontinent from 1849 to 1895 and would eventually be bedecked with twenty-three clasps for service in thirty-eight separate actions, ranging from the Arabian Gulf to Southeast Asia (the USI's specimen, with all of the clasps, is truly a sight to behold). This practice set India apart from British customs, for, during the same time period, thirteen separate medals would be created in London for various Victorian Imperial campaigns.

There were, however, exceptions to the pattern, although it took a set of special circumstances to shake the dominance of the India Medal, 1854. A separate medal with bars for four separate battles / campaigns was created for the suppression of the "Mutiny" of 1857. Given the magnitude of the impression this event made on the British imperial psyche, this is no surprise. The "Mutiny" also, briefly, "softened" the earlier attitudes toward gallantry awards. Whereas the Order of Merit had previously (and would later) require an elaborate legalistic enquiry similar to a court martial to establish



eligibility and held firmly to the promotion regime, these standards were relaxed and virtually abandoned during 1857-58, as even "loyalty" to the British cause became grounds for a direct promotion to the second, or even occasionally, the first class, of the Order of Merit. However brave an Indian had to be to support the British during this period, the reward offered was certainly a break with established tradition.

The more surprising deviance centres on the second Afghan War of 1878-80. The original government proposal was that this campaign be rewarded with three bars to the Indian Medal, 1854. When compared to the treatment that would be later accorded the 1885-91 war in Burma, which would also be granted three bars to the same medal, this recognition does not appear disproportionate. Not disproportionate, that is, except for a small matter of personalities. The commander of the forces in Afghanistan was the charismatic, politically astute, and well connected Major General Sir Frederick Roberts (later Lord Roberts, and Commander-in-Chief in India) and he spared no effort in obtaining a separate medal for his troops (with six clasps, only two fewer than the India Medal possessed at that time) – and he knew how to "pitch" his plea, arguing that: "Native soldiers value medals much ...; they hand them down as heirlooms and their descendants consider that the possession of a medal which belonged to their father or grandfather fairly entitles them to be looked upon as faithful servants of the Sirkar".<sup>3</sup> Moreover, he obtained a separate bronze star for the troops involved in his march from Kabul to Kandahar in 1880, an important military action, but also a prominent media event.

During these years, the Victorian ideology of class and race translated itself into the award structures of both England and India. The new Victoria Cross had not been extended to Indians, in part due to the feeling that "they" already had "their" older Order of Merit. As new awards were introduced for British troops in the context of the Crimean War, a careful distinction had been preserved in England between awards for officers and awards for enlisted men; this reflected the conjoined assumptions of class and rank in Victorian British society. While, in India, the dividing line was distinctly racial, and limited to campaign medals. Indian



officers (later, Viceroy Commissioned Officers(VCOs) or JCOs) were eligible for the same gallantry awards as a sepoy. The dividing line in India, from 1888 until almost the First World War was between fighting forces and "followers", as sepoys received silver campaign medals, while support personnel of lower status (both "traditionally" and in organisational terms) received bronze medals. Only by the time of the World Wars would the English rank-based division of awards creep into the Indian Army.

By 1895, another challenge came before the Indian Army. The defence and relief of the frontier fort at Chitral became not only a media event but, in a way scarcely seen since the siege of Lucknow almost forty years before, became an EVENT in the imperial Victorian consciousness. It was originally proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir George White, that a separate medal on the pattern of the second Afghan War's medal be created for Chitral. He argued that the operations were at least at that level of importance, or, failing that, that these services should not be rewarded by just another bar or bars to the India Medal, 1854. To quote at length from his thoughtful memorandum on the topic:

Our soldiers generally, and those of the Native Army in particular, prize their medals most highly as a visible record of their achievements. ...Its existence is well exemplified by the almost invariable custom of the native soldier of wearing his medals strung around his neck when not in uniform. ...Sepoys in particular put a very small value on the addition of a clasp to a medal, which latterly they have already earned the right to wear. They regard the issue of a clasp only as a petty economy, and refer to them habitually as 'four-anna bars,' to denote dissatisfaction at the inadequacy of the decoration when often repeated.<sup>4</sup>

While the Commander-in-Chief's argument did not prevail as he had hoped, the Chitral operations were taken to mark the introduction of a new general service medal for India. This step was in part the product of perceptions regarding the importance of this famous defence and in part reflected what had been a growing dissatisfaction with a venerable medal to which a soldier could have come to possess seven or more clasps. This made both the wearing of the medal unaesthetic and the recognition of service



invisible (especially in undress uniform, when only ribbons were worn).

This "general service medal" ideology became and remained, until World War I, one of the core ideas in the underlying policy regarding the issuance of medals in India. Battles and, to a lesser extent, operations were to be commemorated by clasps to an existing General Service medal. Major operations by a process of definition which sometimes consumed weeks or months of official decision making time would get clasps, while minor operations would get nothing, as they were viewed as just a normal part of the profession of arms.

The clearest exception to the "major operations only" rule for bars to the general service medal was the punitive expedition to Tibet in 1903-4. The first proposal advanced was for a separate medal, with two clasps: "Gyantse" representing the closest event on the expedition to what might have been termed a "battle" and an even more controversial clasp, to be called either "Chumbi" or "Guru," to be awarded merely to soldiers who had served above an altitude of 9,000 feet. Both suggestions were treated with no less than derision within the Military Department, but the second idea, for the high altitude clasp, was dismissed out of hand. Some passing consideration was given to a single "Tibet" clasp to the 1895 General Service medal, but even that was seen as an overglorification of a minor, "policing" operation, similar to the constant anti-gun-running services in the Arabian Gulf or the continuing security operations on the North West Frontier, both of which were seen as distinctly undeserving of medals, which, the policy dictated, should be restricted to rewarding fighting. The basis of the debate was, however, changed when the King-Emperor, Edward VII, expressed his personal opinion that the Tibet expedition warranted a medal. Professional military judgments and standards had to be set aside in the face of such political pressure.

Until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the customary high standards for both gallantry and service awards were scrupulously guarded in the Indian military. The Indian Order of Merit (as supplemented by the Indian Distinguished Service Medal



in 1907 and by the extension of the Victoria Cross to Indian forces in 1911) remained the touchstone of valour and campaign awards were jealously guarded and clasps to medals remained the preferred pattern of reward, to the exclusion of a proliferation of freestanding awards. This pattern began to change after 1914.

It may well be a statement on the magnitude of the two great wars of the twentieth century, or it may be a comment on changing British end game involvement in India and her defence policies, but from the First World War, Indian honours practices began to be pulled (somewhat unwillingly, I sense) into the orbit of English traditions. A class based system of awards infected the earlier Indian attitudes, as the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) came to be awarded to senior officers, the Military Cross (MC) to junior officers, and from 1944, the Military Medal (MM) to enlisted men. The Indian Order of Merit (IOM) was progressively sidelined, reduced to two classes in 1911, to only a single class in 1944, so that, by the end of World War II it had become what amounted to a DSO for VCOs, awarded as much for consistent combat leadership as for any single notable act of extreme gallantry. Campaign awards also proliferated, and an Indian soldier could wear as many as three medals for service in the First World War, but as many as a theoretical maximum of seven medals for the Second World War.<sup>5</sup> Whereas a career of combat service on the frontier would have given a veteran but one medal with a clasp or two, his son would gain three medals simply for guarding a supply dump in southern Iraq in 1915.

As independence approached, and in the larger context of the attendant challenge to civilian honours that the freedom struggle posed, changes seemed to loom for Indian military awards. Despite much of the Gandhian and Nehruvian rhetoric of the freedom struggle, it is important to remember that the critique did not extend to military awards that, even in the non violent climate of the movement, were accepted as legitimate so long as they did not represent "aid to the civil authority" services. It is perhaps a function of the often-forgotten fact that Mahatma Gandhi had himself been awarded two campaign medals for his military service in South Africa that the constituent assembly specifically excluded military



(and, by implication, police) awards from its otherwise sweeping constitutional ban on titles, awards, and postnominal abbreviations in independent India.

Symbolic issues of authority also appeared, when even as straightforward an award as the Indian Independence Medal became a point of immense contention, as the absence of the King's image threatened to upset even India's membership in the newly imagined and emerging "Commonwealth".

There were, we must remember, immense constitutional problems here. During the dominion, 1947-1950, King George VI remained, in theory, the fountain of all honour for India, as well as the head of state. Yet, as the self governing dominions of India and Pakistan initiated their independence with armed conflict between the siblings, the issue of awards moved toward center stage. With an unexpected degree of insight into the underlying systems by which awards should be granted, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru realised that, if they were to have maximum value, gallantry awards, and even service medals, for the conflict in Kashmir had to be bestowed as close as possible to the time of the action. And, yet, there were no available awards. In theory, there was no reason why most of the pre-1947 awards could not have been continued to reward bravery in Kashmir. But the logical nightmare scenario of granting the same awards, say the Indian Order of Merit, to both an Indian and a Pakistani soldier for bravery in action against each other caused this scheme to be rejected out of hand in both New Delhi and London (and, presumably, in Karachi as well). New awards had to be instituted. And, in this regard, the ideology of the freedom struggle played an important role: independent India's awards, unlike the old British awards, were to have no rank-determined boundaries, no longer would there be one set of awards for officers and another for enlisted personnel (a degree of social advance which the British awards policy achieved only in 1993). India was to be a new kind of state, based upon socialist equality, not on a stratified class system. So whatever awards were to be created could be graded only to reflect degrees of gallantry, and there would be no rank dimension to the decorations. Proposals for gallantry awards and for a new General Service medal for



independent India were prepared and sent to London for the King's approval. For a mixture of both political concerns (should the King sanction awards for a war between two members of the Commonwealth?) and design problems (the King would and could have no symbolic presence on these medals), the draft warrants were never implemented and Indian soldiers had to wait until after the promulgation of the constitution in 1950 to have gallantry and service medals retrospectively awarded to them. Police gallantry awards, however, were continued in their exact pre independence form during the dominion period.

Available sources make the extension of this story beyond about 1950 an extremely tentative and difficult task, but a few broad outlines can be sketched.

During the first decades of India's status as a Republic, military awards were jealously guarded and a row or two of post independence ribbons would have been an unusual sight. For most, the General Service Medal 1947 and the Indian Independence Medal would have constituted their sole post-1947 entitlement (with all pre 1947 awards, including the Victoria Cross, worn later, after the awards of independent India). Yet, perhaps inevitably, new awards would proliferate. While these awards are familiar the chronology of these military awards is as under :-

(a) 1948 - The Indian Independence Medal.

(b) 1950 - The Param Vir Chakra, Mahavir Chakra, Vir Chakra, and General Service Medal, 1947.

(c) 1952 - The Ashoka Chakra, in three classes, for non-combat gallantry for military and civilians alike, and a decoration and medal for long service by officers and enlisted personnel in the Territorial Army.

(d) 1957 - New Meritorious Service and Long Service and Good Conduct for other ranks in the Armed Forces.

(e) 1960 - The Vishisht Seva Medal for distinguished service in three classes, the Sena Medal, Nao Sena Medal, and Vayu



Sena Medal for conjoined gallantry and distinguished service in the branches of the service, the Sainya Seva Medal for service in harsh climatic conditions, and the Videsh Seva Medal for service outside India.

Some of the old values were retained: gallantry awards were awarded without regard to rank, a Havaldar and a Brigadier were just as likely to receive a Mahavir Chakra (or, for that matter, a Vishisht Seva Medal, at least in the two lower classes), and armed operations were represented by bars to an existing medal rather than by free standing medals (the Kashmir war, the 1962 China War, various anti-insurgency operations in the northeast, and even overseas armed actions in places like Korea or the Congo were all granted clasps to the appropriate medals). Yet, over time, most of these values would be eroded.

With the 1965 war against Pakistan, this pattern changed with the introduction of what we might call a WW II style set of medals (a star for combat and a separate war medal for service during the time of the conflict). This pattern was replicated for the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and, for Operation Vijay in Kargil. Yet old patterns died hard and the 1975 institution of the Samanya Seva Medal, 1965, and, even, in a sense, the creation of the Special Service Medal in 1986 showed the longevity of the venerable concept of the multi-purpose medal to which clasps could be added for service – in this context, though, it is important to observe that the older ideas seem to have become a bit of an "endangered species". To cite but two examples: (1) When the Special Service Medal was created in 1986, the first clasp to be announced was that for service in Siachen, but the following year this clasp was cancelled and replaced by a separate Siachen medal; (2) When the Sainya Seva Medal was created in 1960, one of the first clasps was that for service in the high Himalayas, yet in 1986 a new High Altitude Service Medal was instituted to replace this clasp (an act which, to the historian, recalls the debates over the Tibet expedition's ejected clasp for high altitude service). There has also, I must observe, been a recent proliferation of awards for the police and quasi police forces, not only for gallantry and meritorious service but for service in harsh conditions, for anti terrorist services, and so on.



## Notes

- 1 Public Consultations, Fort St. George, 30 December 1680, p. 153, quoted in John HORSELY Mayo, *Medals and Decorations of the British Army and Navy*, 2 vols. (Westminster : Archibald Constable and Co., 1897), 1: 54-55.
- 2 Minute by the Governor-General (Bentinck), 22 September 1834, Military Proceedings of the Government of India (National Archives of India), Ootacamund Proceedings, 22 September 1834, p. 12.
- 3 Roberts to Assistant Military Secretary War Office (A. M. Dillon), 10 May 1880, in Brian Robson ed., *Roberts in India: The Military Papers of Field Marshal Lord Roberts, 1876-1893*. (Stroud: Alan Sutton, for the Army Records Society, 1993), pp. 196-97.
- 4 Note by the Commander-in-Chief, 18 September 1895, Military Proceedings of the Government of India (National Archives of India), Medals A, November 1895, pp. 785- 786.
- 5 Although few could qualify for this theoretical maximum entitlement, six medals for this conflict was not uncommon.



## "The Unforgotten Who Deserve Better" : The Need for a Truly National War Memorial

Major General E D'Souza, PVSM (Retd)

**A** veteran of the Duke of Marlborough's Army wrote the following apt ditty, years ago-

God and soldier we adore,

In time of danger not before :

The danger passed and all things righted,

God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.

It poignantly reflects the Nation's ingratitude to the nearly 18,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen of our Armed Forces that have sacrificed their lives for the Nation since Independence in 1947. What is worse is that this callous disregard continues in spite of the stark fact that we continue to lose the precious lives of our Servicemen almost daily not only in declared wars, but also in the numerous ongoing low intensity conflicts. These range from counterinsurgency operations, international peace keeping operations on behalf of the United Nations such as Korea, the Congo, Somalia, and Sierra Leone; and in holding defences at Siachen, the highest battlefield in the world at 21,600 feet where over 1700 men have lost their lives not only due to enemy fire but due to the extremes of altitude and terrain. And what has the Nation done to remember their sacrifices? It was only after the victorious 1971 war against Pakistan that we thought fit to erect a small National War Memorial in the form of a *samadhi* under the Imperial War Memorial (India Gate) conceived by the grateful British to honour the thousands of Indians of all castes and creeds who lost their lives on battlefields across the globe in World War I and

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Major General E D'Souza is a keen historian. He has authored books on the history of the 1st and 4th Battalion of the Maratha Light Infantry.

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the third Afghan War. What is more, our colonial masters ensured that every single name of our war dead with his Regiment has been etched for posterity on this magnificent sandstone structure on Rajpath. The Amar Jawan Memorial loses its significance under the grandeur of India Gate. Admittedly, the *Samadhi* is surmounted by a reversed rifle topped by a helmet, there is the eternal flame, there is a round the clock honour guard in turn from each Service and the respective flags of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force flutter proudly under the arch of India Gate. But this does not detract from the lamentable fact that the *Samadhi* is lost to public view from the two roads that run around India Gate and is certainly not a fitting National War Memorial.

During a recent visit to London in July 2002, this writer learnt in great detail about the new and imposing memorial to, inter alia, Indian troops that had fought with great distinction and valour during both the world wars, representing the largest volunteer army in the world. During the annual Regimental Association lunch of the Maratha Light Infantry at the Taj Brasserie in London his curiosity was awakened when the Chairperson of the Association, Major General (Retd) Ray Cornock, OBE, addressed the gathering of 50 members and their guests including wives, children, widows and even grand children. General Cornock had served in the 6th Battalion of the Regiment in Burma and Java during World War II, and on India being granted Independence joined the Royal Army Ordnance Corps where he rose to the rank of Major General and for distinguished services was admitted to the Order of the British Empire (OBE). He took the trouble of visiting India for the last Post War Regimental Reunion in Belgaum and addressed the hundreds present in flawless Hindustani. In his address after the lunch, he informed those present about the construction of an imposing war memorial at Hyde Park Corner; as to how the funds were raised and a date in November 2002 when it would be officially inaugurated by Royalty. This information aroused the interest of the writer, who has been campaigning relentlessly in the media for over 20 years for a truly National War Memorial in the Capital, worthy of those who gave their lives for the Nation. One became aware of this memorial located on an important ceremonial route, Constitution Hill, at the busy Hyde Park Corner to honour for posterity the



personnel of the Indian Armed Forces and especially the Army that fought in two major World Wars as well those of now from Pakistan, Nepal, Bangla Desh, Sri Lanka, the Caribbean and Africa.

This project was the brainchild of Baroness Shreela Flather, of Indian origin in the House of Lords. Whereas a suitable memorial 'white' soldiers of the Commonwealth from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, no such edifice existed for those 'coloured' soldiers of the Commonwealth. And there were five million of them. This came to her vigilant eye when, on the 50th anniversary of Victory in Japan Day in 1955, she declared with typical Punjabi bravado "there was little talk in the Newspapers about the Indian contribution to the war effort". Single-handedly she pushed the project through for a suitable Memorial to Indian and other troops mentioned earlier, coercing the British Government and the London County Council to agree to such a Memorial and at a 'high visibility' site. The Royal Parks Authorities suggested that the proposed Memorial be erected on Constitution Hill, a processional route in London. The Westminster Council also approved of it. This most impressive Memorial occupies 300 cubic metres of most valuable real estate and consists of four imposing and majestic Portland Stone Pillars, two on either side of the road leading to Buckingham Palace, each topped with a bronze urn to signify a suitable receptacle for the ashes of those cremated. To one side, on the left as one faces the Pillars, is an attractive domed pavilion, very much like a typical Rajasthani "*Chhatra*". On the ceiling of this Chhatra are inscribed for posterity the names of all those gallant soldiers from these countries, who were awarded Britain's highest award for combat gallantry, the renowned and much coveted Victoria Cross (VC), and the George Cross for gallantry not in the face of the enemy. The Indian equivalent of these are the Param Vir Chakra and the Ashoka Chakra. The names of 23 Indian VCs from World War I and 40 from World War II, are inscribed. Among them, those of World II vintage, include the late Lt Gen P S Bhagat, Bombay Engineers, Lt K S Judge, Punjab Regiment, Naik Yeshwant Ghadge and Sepoy Namdeo Jadhav of the writer's Regiment, Sepoy Kamal Ram, Rifleman Thaman Gurung, Naik Ganju Lama, Nand Singh and Prakash Singh



of the Sikh Regiment, Richpal Ram and Chelu Ram of the Rajputana Rifles, and others. Among the George Cross winners was the late Sapper Subedar Subramaniam. It is a pity that their Corps/Regiments are not indicated. On either side of this *Chhatra* are two long coffin like gravestones in the same Portland stone. On one is indicated the various theatres where these 'coloured' troops fought in World War I: Mesopotamia, Persia, China, Syria, Palestine, South Arabia, East and West Africa, France, Belgium and Gallipoli. The other includes Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, India, Burma, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Dutch East Indies, Siam, Italy, France, Belgium, Greece, and North and East Africa. The foundation stone was laid by the late Queen Mother on 1 August 2001 as she was part of the scene during World War II. It is to be officially inaugurated on 11 November (Poppy or Remembrance Day 2002) by Royalty. The grandeur of this imposing Memorial is most impressive; as its unique location and its accessibility and visibility to tourists, joggers, riders and picnickers. Baroness Flather was able to raise nearly £ three million and is confident of making up the shortfall. Now the point one is trying to make is that here is an old colonial power that has thought fit after over 50 years to erect such a striking memorial to the memory of Indian soldiers in the heart of London. On the other hand, we still do not have a National War Memorial of any significance. The moral of the story is that it is high time that we, the people of India wake up and demand of our Government a truly National War Memorial in the Capital at a high visibility site. South of India Gate is a traffic island once a pedestal for King George V. This could be a possibility. Further south in front of the National Stadium at the southern end of Rajpath, is space for a truly striking war memorial, facing Rashtrapati Bhawan. The design could be through open competition and the theme, the secular credentials of the Armed Forces, representative of individuals from every corner of India. One wall or pillar should have etched for eternity the names of all our Servicemen awarded the Param Vir Chakra and the Ashoka Chakra indicating against each their Corps or Regiment. Carved on them should be facsimiles of these two gallantry awards. The names could be shown theatre wise by Regiments or Corps, with one pillar each showing the casualties sustained in United Peace Keeping Missions, Low Intensity Conflicts, Counter



Insurgency, Siachen and Sri Lanka where we lost 1200 of our Servicemen. Once constructed, it should be mandatory for every President of India, as the Supreme Commander, to pay homage and for every visiting dignitary of note be taken there as is done at every National War Memorial in the world, be it at the Cenotaph in London, Arlington in Washington, the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, in Moscow, and elsewhere. The Honour Guard mounted daily should be an Inter-Service one. One recalls an answer given to three officers one from each service, who raised the need for a National War Memorial when the then Defence Secretary addressed the 7th Course at the National Defence College. Like a true suave bureaucrat, his answer was typical: "Whatever for? They were only doing their duty"!! But at the cost of their lives! When this writer during a meeting with former President Narayanan mentioned that he was the first President of India and Supreme Commander, to pay homage to the Unknown Soldier at Amar Jawan, there were tears in his eyes. Another well trotted out excuse is that all Regiments and Corps have appropriate War Memorials in their Regimental and Corps Centres. Admittedly they do, but these are within the Centre lines, where no civilians are normally allowed and the location is not near a public thoroughfare. How then can the Nation pay homage and express its gratitude, or the youth of this country be suitably motivated? If the British did it in New Delhi, and after over 50 years in London, to recognise for posterity the major contribution of Indian troops in two World Wars, why cannot the Indian Nation do likewise, not in the spirit of imitation but out of gratitude? The ditty quoted at the beginning of this piece perhaps provides the answer.

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## Letters to the Editor

I

### MEDICAL SCHEME FOR THE EX-SERVICEMEN AND DEPENDENTS

Sir,

**A**propos the article "Health Care of Ex-servicemen, Widows and Dependents" in April-June 2002 issue of the USI Journal brings into limelight this laudable cause, which has remained neglected for long. Non-authorisation of "indoor" treatment in military hospitals to ex-servicemen (ESM), without any affordable alternative, has been irksome to some, causing undue agony and anguish. Indeed, it is ironic that whereas Central Government employees enjoy the benefits of comprehensive medicare facilities after retirement, no such institutionalised succour exists for ESM and dependents. Today, even state governments and union territories (some of them cash-strapped) provide decent medicare and reimbursement options to own pensioners and their dependents. As aptly highlighted in the article, medicare to ESM and dependents must be considered an inviolable "obligation" of the government rather than a charitable "concession", as at present.

Such a ham-handed discrimination between ESM and civilian pensioners is grossly unjust and patently unfair to the former. Sadly, this apathy lingers on in spite of the rhetoric of repeated assurances both by political leaders and higher military commanders. These tall promises hurt most particularly those ESM, who live in remote areas (where medical facilities are inadequate) and are in distress due to ill-health, old age and infirmity. Being in penury, even their families are helpless. They are forced to suffer in silence. The condition in urban areas is no better either - due to exorbitant costs, city-culture and lack of any organised social security. The situation is worst wherein some of the ESM have to depend solely on meagre pension with no other source of income. Thus, in the absence of formal medicare, ESM find themselves left, literally, in the lurch. One "serious" casualty in all this is the "image" of the



armed forces, which plummets abysmally - unfortunately, in full public gaze!

Interestingly, a dispassionate analysis of the problem reveals one disconcerting fact that this conundrum is largely of our own making. Just why we were not successful in reforming our system to get an improved medicare package, all these years, from previous governments (each one professing greater benevolence to armed forces than its predecessor); will remain a mystery. Probably, our officers being overly disciplined failed to convince the obdurate bureaucrats for a better deal. Time is ripe now to rake-up this issue afresh.

It must be realised that ESM and dependents do not seek parity with those in uniform. But the least that they expect is assured help in times of need similar to what is available to civilian pensioners. In the meantime, the "Chiefs of Staff Committee Scheme for Medicare - ECHS", as modified by MoD, should be implemented throughout the country with active participation of the armed forces. A vital issue such as this should not remain in limbo, any more. It directly affects members of the armed forces as well as ESM and dependents - a combined population of around 1.5 crore, as per the DGR from MoD, *Sainik Samachar*, 01-15 August 2002, p.9, who constitute a very special, significant and sensitive segment of our society.

*Brigadier Govind Singh Khimta (Retd)*

II

Dear Sir,

Reference the article "Health Care of Ex-servicemen, Widows and Dependents" in the April-June 2002 issue of the USI Journal. The Ministry of Defence is trying to create a cleavage between the servicemen and ex-servicemen. The Army Medical Corps has been providing treatment to the ex-servicemen for over 60 years and all of us are able to interact with them. Their personnel are conversant with our service culture and needs. It would be most prudent, that we first fully use their facilities by funding additional personnel, beds and equipment. This augmentation would be easier than the creation of new medical establishments.



Only at non-military stations should we establish new hospitals, clinics and OPD Departments. Anyway, the overall control of the scheme should remain with the DGAFMS only. Will the Ministry of Defence look into the above ?

*Brigadier A Thyagarajan (Retd)*

III

Sir,

The article "Health Care of Ex-servicemen, Widows and their Dependents", published in the USI Journal (April-June 2002) is timely and thought provoking. Frankly, the quality of health care being provided to ex-servicemen and their dependents is something between poor and pathetic. And why talk only of ex-servicemen ? The state of Medicare of serving personnel is not hunky dory either. Our Military Hospitals are functioning under severe resource crunch, whether it is the availability of doctors, para-medics, drugs or appliances.

In view of budgetary constraints, asking the government for additional financial allocation to augment our existing medical set up would be like asking for the moon. So what is the solution ? Despite being a lay man - an Infantryman actually - and without meaning any offence to our medicine men, who are doing a great job indeed against all odds, I have a suggestion to offer. Let us wind up the Medical Corps and retain just the Field Ambulances / hospitals located in remote areas. We can outsource our requirement of healthcare in peace areas/ soft field areas to private hospitals and nursing homes. Not only will this lead to a huge 'matching saving', which our Ministry of Finance people always insist upon before clearing such proposals, it will also give a stupendous boost to healthcare of both our serving as well as ex-servicemen, and their dependents.

*Lieutenant Colonel Sunil S Parihar*

### **COUNTER INSURGENCY IN MANIPUR**

Dear Editor,

The article "Blue Print for Counter Insurgency in Manipur" by Shri EN Rammohan in the USI Journal (April-June 2002) gave a



very appropriate picture of the state of affairs in that State. Those of us who have had the opportunity to serve in Manipur will realise that the article falls in exact perspective. The otherwise salubrious climate of Manipur with its hard working populace is today unfortunately struggling for progress due to insurgency or rather more appropriately the donation / extortion racket.

Security forces no doubt are performing a tremendous task, selflessly, under some not so friendly environment. One incident explains it all and well. Once a column of Rajput troops in Manipur had stopped by a PCO in a nondescript place. They were delighted to find that the owner was a *marwari* from Rajasthan. A conversation that soon ensued went something like this.

JCO I/C : "Sethji, why are you staying here, so far away from home and in such a remote place ?"

PCO Owner : "Saab, it is very easy to make money here."

JCO I/C : "But what about the daily firing and killing all around you ?"

PCO Owner : "Oh! That's between you and the insurgents. What have we got to do with that ?"

In the article, however, addition of a few maps and illustrations would have helped a reader to correlate actions at various places with not so familiar sounding names.

*Lieutenant Colonel A Sikdar*



## A Review of National Security\*

Lieutenant General A M Vohra, PVSM (Retd)\*\*

**A**n annual assessment of India's national security from a multidimensional perspective is a very worthwhile project. The volume under review covers developments from 01 January to 31 December 2000 in seven parts; Politico Military Environment, Economic Environment, Technology and Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, India's Defence Modernisation and Internal Security; a very comprehensive coverage indeed.

Professor Satish Kumar points out in his contribution to the first part of the book - "Politico Military Environment", that the strategic neighbourhood of a country extends beyond the countries on its immediate border and expresses concern over the Taliban's control in Afghanistan, the disunity within the Northern Alliance and the support the Taliban gets from Pakistan. The concerted action by the USA and the alliance against terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 September 2001 tragedy has brought to a close the Taliban chapter within less than six months of the writing of the Editor's Note (25 June 2001). However, not only will the efforts to control terrorism continue, it must also deal with the causes that produce this malaise.

### China

Lieutenant General Raghavan's analysis of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 is revealing and his plea for a settlement of the boundary by both sides showing accommodation is commendable. He observes that the 1993 "Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Control in the Indo-China Border Areas" has worked to the advantage of both. Nevertheless, the stalemate in defining the alignment can lead to an inadvertent clash. While India has been seeking clarity and decision on the LAC, the Chinese response has been less than enthusiastic. A start has been made by exchange of maps of the Central Sector.

Apropos the 1962 debacle, it needs to be stated that the

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India's National Security. Edited by Satish Kumar (New Delhi:Vikas Publishing House, 2002), pp. 817, Rs.995.00, ISBN 81-259-1177-4

\*\*Lieutenant General A M Vohra, PVSM (Retd) is a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.

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performance of the Indian troops in Ladakh was commendable and it was only in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA where one division of the Indian Army suffered a shameful defeat. The political decision to evict the Chinese from Thag La was a blunder. General Thorat, GOC in C Eastern Command, opposed the 'forward policy'; his earlier recommendation to place NEFA under his territorial command had been turned down. What Lieutenant General Raghavan reveals is the observations of Chinese General Lei Yingfeng in his book *My Days as Military Staff in the Supreme Command* published in 1997. General Lei writes that the Chinese perception of India's assessment was that China was weak and in no position to defend itself ; in Nehru's words, "would bark but not bite." At a Politburo meeting on 18 October 1962, Mao said, "Since Nehru insists on fighting, it is best we accompany him. ... But our counter attack is merely a warning and of punitive quality, only to tell Nehru and the Indian Government that it would not do to use military means to solve the boundary question."

### **Pakistan**

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar has carried out a professional survey of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. This quite naturally starts with a statement of Pakistan military's conviction to play a dominant role in the conduct of the affairs of the State. He feels that together with the extremist elements in Pakistan, military has nurtured a sustained campaign of hostility towards India. However, he is carried away somewhat to state that "The Pakistan military would have no reason for existence if there were peace with India"; armed forces are an essential part of the apparatus of all states and will continue to exist.

He rightly assesses that the conventional armed forces of Pakistan are highly professional, well trained and motivated. Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes and forces are fully integrated into the country's overall strategy and have an effective command and control system. There is also the realisation that mere possession of a strategic nuclear capability is not enough to prevent the threat of a limited conventional weapons war. The fundamental characteristic of a nuclear deterrent is that its possible use should pose an unacceptable risk. Success lies in achieving the objective without resort to its use.



He concludes that there is awareness in the Pakistan hierarchy including the military that it is not in Pakistan's interest to get involved in an armed race on the sub-continent. Pak strategy, in the short term, is to avoid a war. Stress will be on supporting cross border terrorism in J and K and to create unrest in India. Written well before 9/11 September 2001, this analysis could not take into account the pressure on Pakistan to cut down and eliminate terrorist organisations and activity. Nor could it assess the conformity of the Musharraf regime with this objective or its ability to do so.

General Afsir Karim's, contribution 'Jehad, Pakistan's Polity and India's Security' is scholarly. He may be right about the objectives he deduces that "Pakistan aims to create widespread religious and political unrest in India and introduce radical Islam deep into the sub-continental region. Pakistan hopes to eventually radicalise the moderate Muslims of India and Bangladesh and indoctrinate them to take recourse to violence to serve Pakistani political objectives." To radicalise the moderate Muslims of India is a tall order indeed. What are Pakistan's political objectives? Are there no "positive objectives" like integrating Sind and Baluchistan? Be that as it may, no country can survive on negative objectives.

### **Economic Environment**

In the holistic concept of National Security, the economic issues and factors constitute a very important aspect. The book under review covers these issues comprehensively. Sanjaya Baru observes that ours is still a largely domestic market driven economy even if integration with the world economy has considerably increased. Globalisation is both a threat and an opportunity: we must create domestic capabilities and ensure increased competitiveness of local enterprise.

Charan Wadhwa draws attention to 'New Regionalism' which has been in evidence since mid 1980. There is an economic case for regional integration and economic inter-dependence promotes co-operation as well as enhances stability and security. Regional co-operation regarding security can thus be developed.

Sanjiv Misra's chapter on 'Energy Security' highlights India's demand for oil, which is growing by 6.6 per cent annually. By 2010 the import dependence will be 81 per cent. In view of the substantial financial needs of the oil exporters, supplies are unlikely to be



disrupted for non-commercial reasons. However, strategic petroleum resources have to be held for 75 to 90 days. Natural Gas has emerged as a more environment-friendly fuel and Bangladesh is slated to become a major exporter. Iran and Turkmenistan have vast gas reserves also. Whereas in case of Bangladesh vis-a-vis India, there are political obstacles to be got over, pipelines from Iran and Turkmenistan would have to pass through Pakistan.

Finally, in the "Economic Environment" part of the book, Suresh Sinha deals with 'Food Security of India.' He observes that scarcity of food due to lack of adequate production or due to distribution failure, threatens the well being of the people and consequently the nation. Poverty is a major cause of food scarcity as is seen by the reported cases of starvation deaths when the Food Corporation of India holds something like 22 million tons of food grains. Poverty eradication, "work for food" and effectiveness distribution are measures of great importance.

### **Technology and Security**

The impact of 'Science and Technology' on 'Research and Development' and of both on National security as also civilian application of technology which have defence and security application are covered in this part of the book. V. Siddhartha refers to the restricted access to international technology. He focuses on feasible solutions and raises a pertinent question of the cumulative value of military production attributable to technologies developed by the DRDO. He ponders on what parts of the present DRDO would fit in were one to design an organisation to fulfil our future military needs well into the Twenty First Century.

### **Disarmament and Arms Control**

This section delves only into the issue of 'Fissile Material Cut off Treaty' and considers various options. There are a number of other important matters in the nuclear weapons field having a bearing on India's security, such as limited conventional wars between two nuclear weapon states (NWS), the improbability of nuclear weapons ever being used in spite of the concern displayed by the West vis-à-vis South Asia being a 'nuclear flash point', the relevance of the size of arsenals and so on, which should have been covered.

### **Modernisation**

AVM Kapil Kak's observation that defence modernisation has



stood frozen for long is valid; as he observes, no worthwhile new equipment has been procured for the last ten years. He correctly points out that force modernisation has to be a continuous process and that the RMA has to be harnessed to build a distinct technical edge. However, to blame it all on cuts in defence expenditure would be simplistic. In fact he himself points out the lack of attention paid to long term perspective, no major review of defence manpower, lack of long term commitment of resources and hence no perspective planning as also the need for a three year rolling plan within a 15 year resource perspective. He has gone into specific weaknesses such as battlefield surveillance equipment, gun locating radar, UAVs and RPVs, night vision devices based on thermal imaging – all highlighted by the Kargil War. Incidentally, Pakistan thought it could get away with minor LOC re-locating; it wasn't a case of not being deterred. All the same, there is need to develop a capability 'to act directly' as stated cogently by Rear Admiral Raja Menon, without going to a full scale war; to extract compliance by conquest.

### **Internal Security**

This segment of the book deals with 'Terrorism' and 'Militancy in J & K' ; both extremely relevant to security. However, as recent events in Gujarat have shown that communal frenzy poses internal threat of a magnitude that may spell doom for India's future. Dinesh Kotwal refers to Pakistan's balkanisation objective vis-à-vis India. Be that as it may, unless we make an earnest effort to live by our secular constitution, we will achieve balkanisation without any outside diabolical designs and plans.

Kaki Darawala defines terrorism born out of voices of protest and intellectual dissent by the marginalised and discriminated and how in India, it is mixed up with secessionism. His observation that these movements should not be seen just in the political context; the battle is for the hearts and minds of the people living there, is sound indeed.

This book will be of considerable value to the general reader and those involved in making policy. It is suggested that future volumes should give a comprehensive coverage of the nuclear issues and the internal threat; long research papers on specific issues only, leave one rather in the air in as far as the subject as a whole is concerned.



## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**Revolutions in Sovereignty : How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations.** D Philpot (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.339, \$ 19.95, ISBN 0691-05747-8.

Philpot's book is an ambitious endeavour that sifts historical evidence to prove his contention that ideas have had a role in shaping modern international relations. The importance of his thesis on the influence of ideas lies more in what the implications are for the future. If ideas have brought about the state system as exists today, the ideas that are current may well change its contours in the future. In short, ideas bear watching. His theory is well substantiated, though he lays no claim to ideas being the sole historical arbiter. He accords due respect to realist and materialist macro-explanations of historical movements as the formation of the nation state system of today in the Westphalian tradition.

The reader is introduced to the book with the concept of international constitution - the underlying precepts of the international system, which in the present rests on sovereign states. Philpot reflects on the three faces of sovereignty in international constitutions : what are the legitimate polities; who are entitled to such recognition; and what are their prerogatives. He characterises as 'revolution' when there is any revision in any of these three faces of sovereignty. It is noteworthy that the author characterises two recent phenomenon as revolutions - the integration of Europe and post-cold war propensity towards intervention. These two aspects are reversing the steady march of state sovereignty and are pregnant with possibilities in the future.

The author then dwells on the role of ideas and how they become socially empowered through the input of intellectuals and activists. By gauging cause and effect the author seeks to substantiate his argument that ideas have had a role in shaping the present. His proof is centered in the history surrounding Westphalia in the first revolution he deals with, and in the second revolution (ie. the spread of the first revolution across the globe in the sixties) he reveals the force of ideas on the British and French empires.

*Major Ali Ahmed*



**The Invention of Peace : Reflections on War and International Order.**  
 By Michael Howard (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2001), pp 113, £ 6.99,  
 ISBN 1-86197-326-8.

Not many would know that Michael is a Cold Stream-guardsman, and a soldier blue. This book draws its strengths from two of his books, *War in European History* and *War and the Liberal Conscience*. It is also a total account of the plenary lecture which inaugurated the Anglo-American Conference held at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, UK, in July 2000. All the repetitions found in this book are well borne by the adage that no man can afford to step into the same river twice. Besides peace has got to be given a fair chance.

"War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a recent invention" so spoke Sir Henry Maine between 1822-88. But peace was elusive till the Prussian, Immanuel Kant, took up cudgels on its behalf as a child of enlightenment during the post feudal period. Earlier, the philosophers maintained that men were obviously fine but had been besmirched by institutions; and, once those institutions were restructured, innate asset would reassert itself and mankind would live in peace. On the contrary, Kant believed that men were put together out of 'crooked timber' out of which nothing honest could be made. He was for replacing monarchies with republican states, where the constitution would ensure discussion with people before going to war. This was no assurance as war would still persist. But its growing dreadfulness and outlay would restrain people and drive states towards a 'league of nations' which would provide collective security to the member states. Thus was invented peace. Kant's views were precursors to those of Francis Fukuyama, the demise of end of history theory notwithstanding.

With fascinating prose put across with aplomb and panache, the *Invention of Peace* is riveting all the way to the last page. Every soldier should read it, soldiers blue particularly.

Lieutenant Colonel AK Sharma (Retd)

**Losing Control : Global Security in the Twenty First Century.**  
 By Paul Rogers (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp164, £ 12.99,  
 ISBN 0-7453-1769-4.

According to the author of this book, asymmetric warfare and political violence, together with the security vulnerabilities of the urban industrial states have no place in the widening gap between the rich and poor.



Therefore, the conventional military approach to maintaining elite security will hardly be a fair arrangement. He propounds the concept of reversal of socio-economic polarisation and the enhancement of sustainable development as a viable alternative for the West in the first few decades of the new millennium.

This path-breaking book questions the existing global security paradigm which is considered to be totally West oriented. The discourse begins with the Cold War years. The nuclear arms race is posited against anti-nuclear movements; wasting of resources on arms against their utilisation for poverty eradication. The post Cold War period saw the efforts of the Western countries to keep a lid on their security by resorting to rapid deployment of coalition warfare-type forces. The 1991 Gulf War and the intervention in Kosovo are excellent illustrations of this transition in dogma that emphasise stand-off control with the inherent advantage of minimal casualties to friendly troops but maximum damage to the economy of the victims. Indeed, the world's elite has been able to maintain its security. Though, maintains the author, this may be the case, it is fundamentally wrong, as the core reasons for dissent are left un-addressed. Therefore, the main thrust of his argument is that, in practice, confronting socio-economic separation and acceptance of sustainable development are the central issues for international security paradigm in the near future.

*Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)*

**Nuclear World: Defence and Politics of Major Powers.** By Jyotirmay Banerjee (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2002), pp.252, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-139-8.

An exhaustive compendium of research, this book is an excellent account of the events that fashioned history from the time of the Cold War till the new millennium. Divided into ten crisp chapters it gives a full account of events that brought the major powers to the brink of conflict. Systematic perusal of the book gives the feel that entire spectrum of the international events has been covered with proper linkages. But the author also gives the choice to the reader to start reading the book from any chapter.

Professor Banerjee's long association with academics and experience of teaching foreign affairs for more than three decades combined with prestigious scholarships like Fulbright and Von Humboldt Fellowships have given him an added insight and advantage to narrate the events in a simple and straight forward manner. A must read for those who have interest in contemporary world events and also for serious readers involved



in reading and writing about international events. Any library will be benefited with this book.

*Lieutenant Colonel Sunil Chandra*

**Toxic Terror : Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.** Edited by Jonathan B Tucker ( London: MIT Press, 2000), pp 303, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-202-20128-3.

The Robert and Rene Belfer Centre for Science and International Study of Harvard University commissioned leading lights to prepare papers on terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the product is this remarkable book - a collection of twelve case studies on the use of chemical and biological weapons by the terrorists. *Toxic Terror* reads like a fast-paced cloak and dagger whodunit; with the additive of a summary of each chapter in the concluding paragraphs of those chapters for the reader in a hurry. The cases selected are those often referred to in scholastic writings on terrorism and the ones that hit the headlines in their time, got hold of or used CBW agents between 1946 and 1998. Each of these case studies is based on material from primary sources. While Part I of this book is a rigorous in-depth analyses of various CBW terrorist organisations, Part II relates to lessons learnt from the case studies carried out.

Here is a masterpiece that would undoubtedly be a veritable treasure trove for the research scholar providing him or her the pragmatic basis for the formulation of counter-CBW terrorism strategy, and response. The matrix of comparison in pages 250 to 251 and the tabulation on page 263 regarding motivation, objective, ideology, targets, delivery and outcome gives an excellent thumb-nail profile of the CBW-toting terrorists. Propagation of beliefs is another aspect that has been highlighted. The ease with which it can now be done in this age of the internet revolution can be fathomed from the fact that there are thirty terrorists web sites already up and running on the net! There are many who are prone to this propaganda as the written word, virtual or otherwise, retains its sanctity.

*Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)*

**The Principles of War for the Information Age.** By Robert R Leonhard (Novato: Presidio Press, 2000), pp 287. \$ 19.95, ISBN 0-89141-713-3

Establishing briefly the characteristics of future warfare, the author analyses each principle of war as identified in the US Army and reviews its relevance. The author questions the utility of the principle of manoeuvre.



Offensive, says he, needs to be replaced by opportunity and reaction, and the principle of mass by precision, while destruction of enemy as the objective or aim of war is also felt to be anachronous. Though economy of effort continues to be relevant, security could be replaced by protection. While surprise continues to hold well, simplicity and complexity have to be balanced to gain advantage in post modern warfare, while unity of command has to be relegated to history.

The author enunciates three laws of war: law of humanity; law of economy; law of duality and goes on to pen seven principles: knowledge and ignorance; dislocation and confrontation; distribution and concentration; activity and security; opportunity and reaction; option acceleration and objective; and, command and anarchy. This interesting study solicits vigorous debate and perhaps grudging acceptance, only in parts.

Colonel R K Bhonsle

**Globalisation and Environmental Reform :The Ecological Modernisation of the Global Economy.** By Arthur P J Mol (Cambridge, UK: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 273, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-262-13395-4

There have been many writers who have either glorified globalisation or reproached it, particularly for its destructive environmental effects. The author in this book provides a balanced understanding of the relationship between globalisation and environmental degradation. The author has examined academic debates surrounding environmental questions within the fields of sociology, international relations and economic history, focussing on the transformation and continuity of the modern order. Building on earlier ecological modernisation studies that focused on EU, North America, and East and South East Asia, the author takes more of a global perspective. He also addresses the increasing role of non-state actors, especially international institutions, non-governmental organisations, popular movements, and transnational organisations.

The author has examined in great details the confusion created by the failure to distinguish between globalisation, global capitalism, and neo-liberalism. He has examined and analysed, both, globalisation's destructive environmental consequences and its contribution to global environmental reform. The book is relevant for the various theoretical contributions to globalisation also, such as the World Systems approach. This is one point at which early analysis of relations between the world system and environment can be furthered. Elaborating on environmental reforms the author has focussed on three case studies - one involving the economic



triad of the EU, the NAFTA Region, and Japan, one involving the relationship between the triad and developing countries, and one involving three developing countries, Vietnam, the Netherlands, and Kenya. This is a book of great import for both the economist and the environmentalist.

*Colonel PK Vasudeva (Retd)*

**Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests.** By Ralph E Gomory and William J Baumol (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), pp.176, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-262-07209-2.

The book makes an attempt to explore the symbiotic relationship between trade and development in the case of less developed countries and trade and conflicting national interests that may arise between developed countries. This is what is labelled as the equilibrium of international trade. Part II of the book is for economists wherein the generic theories in Part I have been analysed through a stringent process of statistical modelling employing various factors - linear, non linear and multi variant.

This work delves into the consequences of lifting trade barriers in the future. However, some more detailed analysis, based on empirical data is required for developing a holistic understanding of future global trade.

*Colonel R K Bhonsle*

**Doda - An Insurgency in the Wilderness.** By Colonel Harjeet Singh (New Delhi : Lancer Publications & Distributors, 1999), pp. 302, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 1-897829-59-0

An interesting and absorbing book on a subject which has engulfed some of our states particularly in the East for decades. Having had a first hand experience of low intensity conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, the author's work is to be appreciated for having covered the subject in great detail and in a logical sequence which makes for compulsive reading. The author deserves to be commended for his insight into the problem of militancy; few would quarrel with his approach and analysis for working towards a solution. There are, however, some other points, which cause cogitation. A statement of the kind that a nucleus of 30-50 armed men is sufficient to initiate and sustain an insurgency with a reasonable assurance of success (pp ix) is hard to digest when it is not elaborated upon. In his Appraisal, the author concludes that "India does not face such a situation (insurgency) in J&K" (pp243), yet the book is tantalisingly titled as such. It would have been better then if he had used the term 'militancy' instead.



Possibly, he has the Western audience in mind. He accuses the Indian Army of "imposing its own narrow scale of values on other agencies and society" but without any proof or elaboration. At another place he admits to political primacy and control over military involvement in counter insurgency operations. Amongst his specific causes for the 'current insurgency situation in Kashmir' are J&K's accession to India which he terms 'questionable and disputable' (pp 14-15), and on which he is totally wrong. Whereas the writer admits that the Templar model (Malaysia) or the FOCO model (Bolivia) of insurgency cannot be applied in the case of India, he himself uses the Doda template as if it were to conduct counter insurgency operations in India at all levels. A better quality of printing of photographs would have added immeasurably to the book.

To come back to the positive aspects of the book, which are many, his compilation of statistics is thorough and impressive. The author has rightly identified the chain of errors that created the Kashmir problem and has analysed Operation Topac exceedingly well. The diary of a militant reveals the mindset of the misguided. The differences in topography between the Valley and Doda are fully dwelt upon. The author's personal experience in combating militancy is evident when he elaborates upon command and control, legal problems and the ground realities in tackling militancy. The writer is on target when he mentions the need for a unified command instead of 'operational cooperation'. However, the term 'graduated response' is often misapplied as the example of Doda clearly highlights. The author has covered the role of madrassas and mosques in espousing the cause of militants very ably. The collapse of civil administration, nexus of forest contractors and militants and the lethargic reactions of Central and State governments, which have contributed in no small measure to the growth of insurgency, have been well deliberated upon.

*Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)*

**India's Nuclear Security.** Editors Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta  
(New Delhi: Sage, 2000), pp.323, Rs. 575.00, ISBN 81-7036-980-0.

A debate has been going on for sometime as to whether India should have gone nuclear. The authors have brought home the point that nuclear weapons and missile tests conducted by India and Pakistan in the late 1990s have substantially altered the global and the regional environment. This timely and significant book examines the claim of many Indian strategists that stability in the region is better served under conditions of declared - rather than covertly developed - nuclear weapons.



S P Cohen puts down a set of medium-term factors that had emerged since 1990 and influenced the decision to test. Sumit Ganguly on his part suggests the shifting calculations of the Indian leadership in responding to a mix of ideological, statecraft, and domestic pressures and continued perception of external threats and the absence of nuclear guarantee from friendly nuclear states as the main reasons for the conduct of the tests. Deepa M Ollapally discusses the various strategic doctrines that India might adopt. Raju G C Thomas argues that security concerns have shifted in favour of an Indian independent nuclear deterrent. Mohammed Ayub argues that both the US and India will have to make significant trade-offs to strengthen their long term relationship. Farah Zarah examines Pakistan's nuclear rationale and the costs and consequences of Islamabad's actions to match India, bomb for bomb and missile for missile. Ben Sheppard considers the Indian missile programme so viable and effective that it could make India a major player on the world stage, but given the degree of hostility and the geographical proximity of India and Pakistan, the danger of a compulsive or inadvertent nuclear war between them remains. Dinshaw Mistry contends that the space programme may give India the ability to upgrade its nuclear deterrent and may provide military spin-offs as well as the international prestige that India desires. Prem Shankar Jha specifies the major negative consequences of the nuclear tests on the economy. Clifford E Singer focusses on arms control and argues that by resolving international discord over sanctions and fully integrating a global approach to nuclear export controls, such an outcome should become a "win" result with respect to declared non-nuclear weapon states. S R Valluri reflects on the futility of nuclear weapons in general and for India in particular. He sees no advantage of building costly nuclear weapons, in lieu of general national development. Amit Gupta, on his part, proposes the development of both a regional and an international arms control agenda to help India achieve nuclearisation, to deter its regional rivals, China and Pakistan, and to attain increased status in the international system. This book is a must for the libraries, organisations and individuals, who delve deep in the study of India's national security.

Major General S K Datt (Retd)

**Disaster Response in India.** By Prakash Singh, William W Mendel and Graham H Turbiville, Jr (KS, Fort Leavenworth: The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, 2001), pp.191, Price not indicated.

The authors deserve to be complimented for this timely, well researched and well illustrated book. It makes for an excellent reference



book for those interested in disaster mitigation. The historical perspective of various disasters in India, our inadequacies in planning, infrastructure and the services available are highlighted. The book also explains how national response by governmental, the NGOs, voluntary agencies and benevolent donor countries can be optimised in mitigating large-scale human misery. One point to note is that it would not have been out of place to briefly initiate the readers regarding the vulnerabilities to new forms of 'Cyber disasters'.

All in all, this is an absorbing, interesting and educative research work that could be recommended for all libraries.

Colonel N N Bhatia (Retd)

**The Regiment : Free India's First War Novel.** By Ekalavyan, Translated by N Kunju (New Delhi : Reliance Publishing House, 2001), pp 221, Rs. 195.00, ISBN 81-7510-138-5.

The book, which makes the dubious claim of being free India's first War Novel, tells the story of a tank Regiment, in which the author served. The first portion of the book relates to the events in the Regiment under the command of a weak and inefficient Commanding Officer, who, in the pursuit of his own personal pleasures, neglected his duties to the Regiment and failed to train them for war. Under his weak leadership the Regiment, quite expectedly, fared badly in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. After their disastrous showing in battle, nemesis overtook the Commanding Officer in a tragic manner. Other officers of his ilk also paid forfeit for their errors.

In the resulting changeover, the command of the Regiment passed to the Second-in-Command, who was an outstanding Regimental Officer and very popular with all ranks of the Regiment. Under the new dispensation the Regiment is converted to a well trained, efficient and a happy team. As a result the Regiment does extremely well in the Khem Karan Sector during the 1965 Indo-Pak War, but the CO suffers a grievous personal loss in the battle.

The story is realistically told and the book makes interesting reading. In the narrative the author's animosity against the officer class is reflected in poor light. In narrating the withdrawal during the 1962 War against China he states, "the vehicles coming down were almost filled with officers", implying that while officers withdrew in vehicles their men were left to foot-slog back. There are some minor errors that need to be corrected. For



instance Gurungs are not Gorkha Brahmins and trenches are dug with picks and shovels and not with pick-axes.

*Major General Samir Sinha, PVSM(Retd)*

**Mirrors of Vice and Virtue.** By K L Pasricha (Delhi : Indian Publishers and Distributors, 2001), pp. 163, Rs. 250.00, ISBN 81-7341-195-6.

This monograph records the experiences of KL Pasricha, a retired IAS officer. The author has discussed the issue of modernisation of rice mills which reflects the conflicting values being adhered to regarding modern technology vis-à-vis traditional ones. Regarding partial decontrol of sugar and its impact on sugar industry, the author makes an important contribution in the monograph. The formula defined by the author for distribution of levy sugar and free sugar, termed 'Pasricha formula', is relevant even today. The author details the various pulls and pressures exerted by his colleagues, peers and politicians in Parliament. Regarding boiler biz, it appears that he tried his best by checking the facts regarding Vinay Engineering and BHEL through personal efforts and by constituting expert panel / committees so that the contract for purchase and erection of the boilers in various sugar firms could be assigned to a deserving firm.

This is the second volume of the author's reminiscences. It is left to the reader to judge for whatever it is worth. Undoubtedly, there is an urgent need to focus on accountability and transparency in Government's functioning.

*Dr Raj Kumar*

**Pakistan : The Economy of an Elitist State.** By Ishrat Hussain (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 425, Rs 550.00, ISBN 0-19-579014-6.

Pakistan's economy is an enigma. As if challenging the predictions of a total collapse of the Pakistani economy and consequently the nation itself, Pakistan has managed to survive. The author, a Pakistani economist serving with the World Bank, has attempted to place Pakistani economy in perspective. Domination of political power and state apparatus by a narrowly based elite seeking to advance their private and family interests to the exclusion of the majority of the population, feels the author, is at the root of the problem. This is the central theme of the book.

Commencing with a survey of the Pakistani economic performance for the past 50 years, the author highlights the ills, pitfalls and achievements



of the Pakistani economy. A detailed survey of Pakistani agricultural and industrial sectors, fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy, investment in education, population, health and poverty is provided neatly divided into alternating periods of civilian and military rule. The author has also suggested an agenda for transforming Pakistan's economy from being an elitist one to an egalitarian one.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle

**South East Asia's Economic Crisis.** Edited by H W Arndt and Hal Hill (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 169, \$ 28.00, ISBN 981-3055-89-8.

The collapse of the "miracle" economies of South East Asian countries from a high of eight per cent per annum to minus 15 per cent within two years from 1996-1998 was soothing to the elephantine paced economists of India, who crowed about the stability provided by the 'Hindu' rate of growth. What are the origins, lessons and prognosis of the South East Asian economic crisis? A group of prominent economists from South East Asia and Australia provide the reader with an useful insight into the throes of the South East Asian Economic downturn.

The book surveys the performance of the ASEAN economies affected by the crisis. A detailed analysis of exchange rate regimes and financial sector reforms is also included. Reviewing the book purely from the point of view of lessons to be drawn for the Indian economy, the reasons for the collapse were : fixed or quasi fixed exchange rates in the context of rapidly rising short term debt and shaky financial systems; politicisation of economic institutions; large current account deficits; domestic instability; mishandling by governments as well as international financial institutions; inflated assessment of economic fundamentals and perils of dependence on short term capital. All this is simple economic common sense. The prescriptions too are simple yet perhaps difficult to implement: prudent fiscal management, accountability of governments, openness and democracy supported by sound macroeconomic and financial fundamentals. The ASEAN countries did survive the crisis to emerge stronger with even India hoping to join the powerful economic bloc albeit as an observer.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle

**John Quincy Adams : Policymaker for the Union.** By James E Lewis (Delaware : A Scholarly Resources, 2001), pp 164, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-8420-2623-1.

This book is one of the series of biographies in American foreign policy. The series uses this medium to examine the major episodes and



themes in the history of the United States foreign relations. John Quincy Adams is accepted by the American diplomatic historians as nearly indisputably the greatest Secretary of State, which he was from 1817 to 1825 under President James Monroe. After serving two tenures as Secretary of State, Adams was elected as the President of the United States after President Monroe. Because of his politician father, John Adams, the lawyer Quincy Adams had easy entry into politics and diplomacy. When his father became the President, he was appointed to various diplomatic posts in many European countries. The experience thus gained was to be of great help in his work as the Secretary of State. The book also reflects on the important failures of Adams' foreign policies. As President, Adams was not a great success and failed to win a second term. An interesting fact that comes to light in this book is that from the earliest days the United States made all efforts to maintain its position of primacy. Towards this end their efforts were to ensure that the Union of States that they had achieved was not replicated in the countries of South America, when these colonies won their freedom from Spain.

A thoroughly enjoyable and informative book.

*Major General S C Sinha, PVSM (Retd)*

**Balaji Ventakeshwara : Lord of Tirumala - Tirupati : An Introduction.**

*By Dr Nanditha Krishna (Mumbai : Vakils, Feffer and Simons, 2000), pp 114, Rs. 296.00, ISBN 81-87111-46-1*

The history of Balaji Venkateshwara, Lord of Tirumala - Tirupathi, who is the reigning deity of Tirumala in Andhra Pradesh is well provided for in this book. According to Hindu mythology, he is the manifestation of Lord Vishnu. The author narrates in a simple and lucid manner the historical, legendary events leading to the creation of Balaji; the one who gives every human being to lead a better life, the right to hope and keep faith. Dr Krishna is to be congratulated for her research to present the readers the flavour of Tirumala, a curious combination of myth, and reality, answering man's prayers and with the divine power to perform the most improbable of miracles.

This book would be of interest to people of all religions as the author has stated that in a fast moving world, the values and beliefs change almost daily where people in situations are often not what they appear to be. Balaji represents stability and security. A book worth possessing by all those who are curious about Hindu religion.

*Commodore R P Khanna, AVSM (Retd)*



## **Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending July-September 2002**

*(The books reviewed in April-June 2002 issue have been added  
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

### **AFGHANISTAN**

**The March of Folly in Afghanistan.** By S Jagat Mehta, New Delhi, Manohar, 2002, pp 224, Rs. 450.00, ISBN-81-7304-461-9

### **ANNUAL REPORTS**

**Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Dept of Commerce : Annual Report 2001-2002,** New Delhi, Dept. of Commerce, 2002, pp 175.

**Ministry of Defence: Annual Report 2001-2002,** by Govt of India, New Delhi, Ministry of Defence, 2002, pp. 142.

**Ministry of External Affairs : Annual Report, 2001-2002,** by Govt of India, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, 2002, pp. 181.

**SP'S Military Year Book 2002.** By Jayant Baranwal, New Delhi Guide Publishers, 2002, pp 352, ISBN 0076-8782

### **AUTOBIOGRAPHY/BIOGRAPHY**

**APJ Abdul Kalam: The Visionary of India.** By Kant Katyala Bhushan, New Delhi, APH Publishing, 2002, pp 208, Rs. 395.00, ISBN-81-7648-380-X

**Officially at Peace.** By Shankar Roy Chowdhury, New Delhi, Viking Penguin, 2002, pp 326, Rs. 495.00, ISBN - 0-67-088585-1

### **COMMUNALISM**

**Gujrat Holocaust: Communalism in the Land of Gandhi.** By Ram Nath Sharma, Delhi, Shubhi Publications, 2002, pp 344, Rs. 795.00, ISBN-81-87226-71-4

**The Way to Communal Harmony.** By M K Gandhi, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing, 1994, pp 522, Rs. 100.00, ISBN-81-7229-104-3



**GLOBALISATION**

**Hanging Face of Poverty and Globalization.** By GP Isser, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2002, pp 98, Rs. 590.00, ISBN 81-212-0791-6

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

**National Human Development Report 2001.** By Planning Commission, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 2002, pp 297, Rs. 595.00, ISBN-019566328-4

**INDIAN ARMED FORCES**

**Law Relating to Disability Benefits in the Armed Forces.** By Nilendra Kumar, New Delhi, Universal Law Publishing, 2002, pp 284, Rs 195.00, ISBN-81-7534-2699

**Transition To Triumph: History of The Indian Navy 1965-1975.** By Vice Adm GM Hiranandani, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 2000, pp 415, Rs. 100.00 ISBN-1-897829-72-8

**INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS**

**Operation Badr: Musharraf's Contribution - Pakistan's Thousand Years War Against India.** By Kuldip Singh, Chandigarh, Ludra Publication, 2001, pp 288, Rs. 1500.00

**India and Russia: Towards Strategic Partnership.** Edited by Prasanna Patasani, New Delhi, Samskriti, 2002, pp 220, Rs. 20.00, ISBN-81-87374-16-0

**INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY**

**Information Technology and Total Quality Management.** By V D Dudeja, New Delhi, Common Wealth, 2001, pp 471, Rs. 1000.00, ISBN-81-7169-672-4

**ISLAM AND MUSLIMS**

**Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism From The Arab Conquest to the Attack on America.** By John F Murphy, New York, Prometheus Books, 2002, pp 424, \$26.00, ISBN-1-59102-101-7

**The Muslim of The Indian Sub-Continent After The 11th September Attacks.** Edited by Frederic Grare, New Delhi, India Research Press, 2002, pp 344, Rs. 495.00, ISBN- 81-87943-07-6



### JIHAD

**Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.** By Gilles Kepel, London, I B Tauris, 2002, pp 454, £ 25.00, ISBN-1-866064-685-9

### MAPS

**Myanmar Country Map, Singapore, Periples Edition, £ 4. 99**

**Pakistan City Map, Germany, Nelles Vekleg, £ 5.95, ISBN-3-8618-553-2**

**South Asia & Middle East, Roger Lasceller, £ 6.95, ISBN-1-85879-2770**

**South East Asia, Canada, Travel International Maps, ISBN-0-921463-80-4**

**Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Germany, Nelles Vekleg, £ 5.95, ISBN-3-8618-862-1**

### MIGRATION

**The Marginal Migrants.** By BC Upreti, Delhi, Kalinga Publication, 2002, pp 133, Rs. 295.00, ISBN-81-87644-43-5

### NATIONAL SECURITY

**Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security.** By Bharat Karnad, New Delhi, Macmillan, 2002, pp.724, Rs. 795.00, ISBN-0-333-93822-4

### NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

**Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions.** By Saira Khan, Hauts, Ashgate Publication Ltd, 2002, pp 316, £ 45.00, ISBN-0-7546-1946-X

### PAKISTAN

**Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan – Constitutional and Legal Perspectives.** By Sardar Ali Shaheen & Javaid Rehman, Surry, Curzon, 2001, pp 184, £40.00, ISBN-0-7007-1159-7

**The Political System of Pakistan.** By Khalid B Sayeed, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp 321, Rs. 495.00

**The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan.** By Ahmer Fazell, Karachi: Pakistan Law House, 1997, pp 647, \$75.00, ISBN-969-8372-20-8

**Contemporary Conflict in Pakistan.** Edited by S Chand Mohammad, Rajasthan : Institute of Secular Studies, 2001, pp 133, Rs. 1500.00



## RUSSIA

**Russia Under Yeltsin And Putin.** By Boris Kagarlitsky, London, Pluto Press, 2002, pp 303, £16.99, ISBN-0-7453-1502-X

## SINGAPORE

**Singapore in The New Millennium: Challenges Facing the City-State.** Edited by Derek da Cunha, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, pp 281, \$ 29.90, ISBN- 981-230-130-5

## SOUTH ASIA

**SAARC: SAPTA To SAFTA.** By Anshaman Gupta, Delhi, Shipra Library Service, 2002, pp 135, Rs. 350.00, ISBN-81-7541-107-4

**South Asia at Gun Point: Small Arms & Light Weapons Proliferation.** Edited by Dipankar Banerjee, Sri Lanka, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000, pp 319, Rs. 400.00, ISBN-955-8051-179

## TERRORISM

**The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological Material & Political Linkages.** Edited by KPS Gill & A Sahni, New Delhi, Bulwark, 2002, pp 268, Rs. 600.00, ISBN-81-87553-11-1

## ENVIRONMENT AND WATER RESOURCES

**Conflict Management of Water Resources.** Edited by Manas Chatterji, Hauts: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2002, pp 369, £47.50, ISBN-1-84014-260-8

**Environment Scarcity and Violence.** By Dixon Thomas Homer, Princeton, Princeton Univ Press. 1999, pp 253, ISBN-0-691-02794-3



Code	Subjects	Price (Rs.)	Year
<b>USI OCCASIONAL PAPER</b>			
1/99	Recent Developments in Afghanistan with Specific Reference to the Impact on India by Surya Gangadharan.	75.00	1999
<b>USI DIGEST</b>			
Vol III No. 5	Sep 2000 - Feb 2001.	Extract of Important articles from various Journals	75.00 Mar 2001
Vol III No. 6	Mar 2001 - Aug 2001.		75.00 Sep 2001
Vol IV No. 7	Sep 2001 - Feb 2002.		75.00 Mar 2002
Vol IV No. 8	May 2002 - Aug 2002.		75.00 Sep 2002
<b>MISC</b>			
History of the MacGregor Medals (1889-1989)		100.00	1994 (for Members Rs. 50.00)
How to Be Successful Leader Book by Lt Gen (Dr) ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)		125.00	1986 (for Members (Rs. 50.00))
<b>USI RESEARCH PAPERS</b>			
R-1/97	Shape and Size of the Indian Navy in the Early Twenty First Century by Vice Adm R B Suri, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd).	75.00	1998
R-2/97	Sustainable Defence : Harmonising Long and Short Term Goals by Air Mshl Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd).	200.00	1999
R-5/97	Low Intensity Conflicts in India by Lt Gen V K Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd).	275.00	2001
R-1/98	The Impact of Emerging Technologies on Air Warfare by Air Mshl Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).	200.00	1999
R-4/98	A Nuclear Strategy for India by Rear Adm K Raja Menon (Retd). (Available from Sage Publications, New Delhi)	(SB) 295.00/ (HB) 395.00	2000
R-6/98	A Career in India's Armed Forces – How to Make it More Attractive by Lt Gen RN Mahajan, PVSM, VSM (Retd). (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	200.00	2000
R-7/98	Naval Confidence Building Measures - An Indian Approach Cdr Vijay Sakhuja (Available from Knowledge World, New Delhi)	650.00	2001
R-9/99	Information Technology – The Future Warfare Weapon by Lt Cdr A Anand. (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	150.00	2000
R-11/99	Secure or Perish by Maj Gen Yashwant Deva, AVSM (Retd). (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	400.00	2001
R-13/2000	Security Threats to North East India Lt Gen NS Narahari, PVSM (Retd) (Available from Manas Publications, New Delhi)	595.00	2002
R-15/2000	The Indian Air Force : A Balanced Strategic and Tactical Application Air Vice Mshl Viney Kapila, AVSM, VrC (Retd) (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	200.00	2002
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# USI

(Estd. 1870)

## OUR ACTIVITIES

### Library and Reading Room

The library holds over 40,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material.

### Correspondence Courses

The Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

### USI Journal

The USI Journal is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

### Centre for Research

A Centre for Research has been established to enable scholars to undertake comprehensive study of selected subjects of topical interest on national security matters.

### USI Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

This Centre was established in the year 2000. It aims at organising workshops, seminars and training capsules for peace-keepers, observers and staff officers - both Indian and foreign. It also oversees the practical training of Indian contingents at the Rajputana Rifles Training Centre. It functions under a Board of Management headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and works in close coordination with the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of External Affairs.

### Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR)

The Centre encourages study and research into the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets like strategic, tactical, logistics, organisational and socio-economic aspects and their implementation.

### Gold Medal Essay Competitions

Every year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions: one for Officers below 10 years of service and the other for all members. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

### Lectures and Discussions

A series of lectures and discussions on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

### MacGregor Medal

This medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.

## MEMBERSHIP

1. All classes of membership except temporary membership and membership of Service Officers applying for Correspondence Courses being conducted by the USI, will be subject to approval by the Executive Committee. The following are ordinarily eligible to become members of the Institution, with full voting rights :-

(a) Officers of the Armed Forces.

(b) Class I Gazetted Officers of the Central Services associated with the field of Defence (IAS, IFS, IPS).

(c) Any category mentioned in sub-paras (a) and (b) above will be eligible even though retired or released from the Service.

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