Differences of opinion are likely 'to remain on the pace, and sectors open for liberalisation, as the Chinese example could serve as a test bed for Indian policy makers.

(e) Even as India's trade volumes increase substantially, the advantages offered by markets and businesses in China and Southeast Asia are likely to compete for business stakes in the long run, especially if prickly issues are not resolved.[17] This will present a challenge for the United States in an increasingly competitive market.

(f) India's highest GDP growth in the long-term and the allied benefits of trade and investment are likely to remain a major attraction influencing bilateral relations. These factors present India, along with China as the most attractive economic destination with a long term potential, which can be a major impact on US profitability and sustainability as a world economic leader.

(g) Increasing energy requirements of both oil and combined sources especially by fast developing economies like India and China as well as developed countries like United States will continue to fuel demand and keep the importance of energy sources as the engine of global economy at a very high level. This will impact strategic relations of all the three countries with major oil and gas producing nations - in some cases notwithstanding poor counter-terrorism, human rights and democracy records. It also highlights the importance of clean alternative energy as a critical need for India's fast burgeoning economy.

(h) Relatively poor infrastructure status in India is likely to have negative economic implications for the country. This is specifically relevant to bilateral economic relations with the United States as also in terms of retaining a competitive edge with other major growing economies. Therefore, one of the major fields of cooperation between India and the United States is likely to be nuclear power generation as a clean source of fuel for India, to help the country bridge the gap between growing needs and limited availability of crude oil and the adverse impact of fossil fuels on the environment.

(j) The limited levels of FDI coming from the United States are a reflection of the vast potential which could benefit both

countries. The 2004 levels indicate less than 3 per cent of total American investment in India, despite the fact that India is considered the top retail destination in the latest A T Keamey's 2005 Global Retail Development Index (GRDI)[18]. However, this trend is likely to change with growing interest in India steadily translating into a better percentage of FDI when compared to the approval to investments ratio of 14.87 per cent in 1991 to 24.52 per cent in 2004.[19] (See Table 8)

(k) The advantage in terms of manpower surplus in the working age group and more specifically of an English speaking, technically qualified workforce will not only spearhead India's services sector but also its manufacturing, outsourcing and offshore trade. They also have the potential to fill in these slots in the international market.

(l) India's emergence as a knowledge power is in US interest as it is India, which has the socio-economic capability and geo-strategic congruence to assist the United States to remain ahead of China in its quest io remain the pre-eminent power in the world.

The threat of containment for both India and the United States is emerging as one of the most important concerns. However, it needs to be noted and emphasised that this threat is as much if not more from "economic containment" as it is from "strategic containment". The threat of this form of containment will not be through weapons and conventional armies but from adoption of the rules of globalisation, knowledge, infrastructure development, free trade area treaties and armies of economic warriors.

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ADDRESS UPDATE

ALL MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO INTIMATE CHANGE OF ADDRESS ON OCCURENCE, INCLUDING TELEPHONE NUMBER AND E-MAIL

Impact of War in Iraq and Emerging Security Challenges in the Middle East

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The First Gulf war commenced, in effect, on 02 August 1990 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and ended with its eviction on 28 February 1991. The actual conflict witnessed the war being fought by Iraq against a multinational coalition of 50 countries, which had 38 countries contributing actively to war. This virtually one sided war was fought in several dimensions, political, diplomatic, economic and finally military with the rapid capitulation of the Iraqi forces. The combat phase lasted 42 days including a 100 hours ground war. The operational environment witnessed excellent co-ordination of multinational assets by the coalition. Whereas Iraq had deployed its forces in static defence of Kuwait and prepared for attrition warfare, the coalition employed manoeuvre warfare and destroyed the Iraqis means of waging the war as also their will, with overwhelming firepower and high technology. The war became totally one sided and resulted in the imposition of the UN sanctions - both economic and military, including periodic inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the UN teams.

Before an analysis of the second Gulf War is made, it is necessary to recapitulate its geo-strategic environment. Iraq is strategically located in the Middle East. It borders Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula in the South. It is the gateway for the Central Asian Republics and has the largest oil resources after Saudi Arabia. Iraq had been involved with a war with Iran for eight years before being engaged in the conflict with Kuwait which resulted in the First Gulf War of 1991. Subsequent to that conflict, it had come under the UN sanctions. It was also subject to active surveillance and to selective Anglo-American bombing, thus crippling its economic and military capabilities. At the time of the US led coalition war in March 1993, it had been ruled by Saddam Hussain's Sunni dominated Baath-Party, although it had a heterogeneous population of 55 per cent Shias, 22 per cent Sunnis, 18 per cent Kurds and 5 per cent Turkman and Assyrian Christians.

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The political aim of the Second Gulf War in 2003 by the American led coalition-forces was to wage a 'Pre-emptive War' to oust the Saddam Hussein regime who allegedly supported terrorism, and possessed WMD, and to establish a democratic set up in Iraq. The military intervention in Iraq by the US Allies was, however, without the sanction of the UN Security Council. There were widespread protests by the international community and public criticism by France and Germany against this overt unilateralism of the US. The war was, in every respect, illegitimate as neither was there any evidence of WMD nor of Al Qaeda linkages. As for the so called right of 'pre-emptive strike' it can be resorted to only in Self Defence, for which also no justification existed.

The military aims of the war were to ensure an early collapse of the regime by securing the key towns of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul with speed and the economic assets of oil wells, ports and air-heads.

The military strategy was to conduct joint military operations with relentless offensive action for the capture of Baghdad, once the battle field was sufficiently degraded. It consisted of the following components:-

(a) Crippling the fighting potential of the Iraqis by denial of wherewithal through sanctions and by massive military build-up on air, sea and land to break their will to fight. The isolation of Iraq was achieved by an eight months long concentration of forces.

(b) Destruction of Iraqi Military capabilities, command and communication centres and leadership by application of the strategy of "Shock and Awe" through air attacks, Precision Guided Missiles (PGMs) and technology degradation. The US led coalition launched 1200 air-sorties per day. They destroyed over 2500 tanks and other equipment by PGMs and smart bombs from 30 warships and air bases.

(c) Conducting Psychological operations by information warfare, intelligence operations and exploiting ethnic diversities of the population. The Kurdish population in the North was openly supportive, the Shias in the South displayed a mixed response with the Sunnis definitely hostile to the invasion.

Analysis of the Second Gulf War

The US military operations achieved spectacular success,

over running the entire country within three weeks. Momentum of the operations were maintained by developing strategies in depth, by exploiting speed and mechanised forces, Special Forces operations and air power. Independent logistics capabilities were provided by self containment, aerial resupply and securing air heads. Such situations are not normal and assymetrical war would exist only as exceptions, between adversaries.

Collateral damage was minimized for the civil assets by avoiding fighting in the urban centres by engineering surrenders and defection. But the damage to the country's infrastructure was considerable, particularly to power, oil and water supply, since it became difficult to distinguish military targets from the civil targets in the capital city of Baghdad and other major towns.

Air-Power and Air-Space Management. It is not only the control of various platforms in the air, but also the tremendous clutter of communication transmission that would call for strict control and management. In the case of ground forces, the launch base was 200 Kms south in Kuwait and air bases extending over considerable distances from Europe to the Indian Ocean. In the first weeks of war, a dozen opportunities to strike time-critical and high-value targets were missed due to the wide sensor-shooter gap. This was markedly reduced to just 12 minutes as the operation progressed, displaying substantive strides in improved joint operations, inter-operability and seamless data linking.

Civil Affairs. This is described as facilitating military operations and consolidating operational activities by assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing or exploiting relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral manner in a hostile area of operation. Language and culture training of target countries is essential. Cross-cultural proclivities and sophistication can be developed by study of a target country and living there for some time. Unless this is done, civil affairs will not succeed. This is a Special Forces mission and selected Units would have to train for it. The American forces did not adequately plan this aspect well in Iraq. They firstly antagonised the local population unlike the British forces who were friendlier and polite. Secondly, rather than be the liberators of the oppressed people, the Americans behaved like an "Occupation Force". Thirdly, after

disbanding the Government machinery i.e. the Army, the Police and other agencies it should have been ensured that such steps do not hurt the national pride of the Iraqi people.

Use of high technology. All weather continuous surveillance by 'Global Hawk' Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and aerial platforms, satellite digital communication, PGM strikes, use of tank busters (40 bomblets) and use of smart bombs, both from air and warships achieved total degradation of Iraqi war machine. Iraqi equipment was mostly of pre-1991 vintage Soviet origin, which could not be up graded or even maintained due to lack of spares and the imposition of UN sanctions. It had few "Scud" missiles and AD guns which were no match for the Allied air might.

Use of Special Forces. Special Forces were used effectively before, during, and after the campaign both for the traditional roles and for unconventional warfare. In addition to the unconventional warfare, they were used for rapid transfer and management of human and signals intelligence, and for directing air-strikes

Post conquest Issues. Western media had created an impression that a military conquest of Iraq would not be difficult and that when the Americans went in, the Iraqi people would greet them as liberators. The obsession with the conquest was so paramount, that the coalition forces did not take the necessary steps for preventing the administrative collapse of Iraq or closing the porous borders with Jordan, Syria and Iran to prevent escape of Saddam loyalists across the borders. Similarly the damage to infrastructure was so total that even the basic amenities like water and electricity supply became a major problem.

The Current Iraq Situation

In military terms, the US started losing the upperhand in Iraq when the Islamic fundamentalists and others opposing them started to fight the coalition forces in Iraq where the coalition forces present over a hundred thousand targets daily. Restricting themselves into "fortresses" results in loss of freedom of manoeuvre, whereas sallying out involves escorting by tanks gunship and helicopter guns ships. Both the options require additional troops and resources, which would imply nearly doubling the present force levels of 150,000 troops. Every US soldier killed raises the morale of the Islamic fundamentalists correspondingly reducing the morale of the US forces.

According to a reliable analyst, (Jeffiry D Sachs) America is paying an astounding US $ 51 billion per year to station 1,40,000 troops in the country. The US could save itself tens of billions of dollars per year by withdrawing troops and instead allocate resources for reconstruction of infrastructure and recovery of oil production. The US seeks greater participation from friendly countries for additional troops as well as funds but opposition from Jehadi Islamists and absence of UN mandate are the restricting factors. The US has already lost 2000 soldiers since last two years, whereas in Vietnam the total US soldiers killed between 1962-63 were only 392. This is making the war in Iraq highly unpopular in the US.

It would be reasobable to assume that the US is unlikely to stabilise the situation without enhancing the force levels. A pull out would result in loss of face and greater chaos. Placing the country under UN Security Council control does not serve the long term US strategic goals or provide control over oil. The US is left with no choice but to continue 'occupation' for another three to five years and shape the new Iraqi Government. The US is also simultaneously undertaking back-channel contacts with the insurgents both amongst the Sunnis and Shias, to break the insurgency.

Instability in Iraq suits the Sunni population, who dominate only 4 out of 18 districts. The Al Qaida supporters in the region, and the Taliban in Afghanistan are growing stronger. Syria and Iran are threatened by the Americans with possible air-strikes. The two US allies - Saudi Arabia and Pakistan also have hardliners at the grassroots who are supporters of fundamentalists, with the autocratic governance at the top forced to coexist with the fundamentalists.

The Emerging Security Challenges in the Middle East

It appears that having temporarily pushed the Islamic fundamentalists from Afghanistan, the Anglo-American intention to use Iraq as a launch pad for further consolidation in the Middle East with Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the outer flanks, has met a setback for the present. American bases in the Central Asian Republics for operations in the region have also become potential trouble spots as both the local governments and

the Russian and the Chinese have come to suspect them of serving American interests.

After winning the war in both Afghanistan and Iraq and bringing down the governments that were in power before the attacks, the resistance of the local population has increased and Fidayeen attacks have taken a heavy toll of both the coalition led forces and civilian populations. One of the biggest problems that the US forces and their allies face is the need for higher allocation of combat elements for safeguarding the assets and bases of the occupying forces. It leaves less effective combat strength for offensive operation whose reach and periodicity is thereby reduced. The public opinion in America and in the home countries of the coalition countries demands reduction and early return of their soldiers, which has no prospect of immediate relief in sight. The morale of the occupation forces would get adversely affected due to prolonged deployment and the stress. This would require shorter tenures and frequent relief and hence higher allocation of troops,

The high tech advantage of the initial onslaught of shock and awe and savage effects has died down. The local elements fighting the Americans have found ways to effectively neutralize the high tech advantage.

Urban Warfare-Future Trends. The Americans did not visualize the need for sufficient ground forces and the power of the boot" in the urban warfare in Iraq and they are not able to ensure effective security in Iraq. William S Lind and others of the US Army, have written on the **Fourth Generation of Warfare** where the battlefield is likely to include the enemy's society and warfare will be widely dispersed and the distinction between war and peace may vanish. The difference between civilian and military may disappear, as there would be no definable battlefields or fronts. Major military and civil facilities will become targets. The characteristics of this type of warfare combined with new technology would possibly be the outline of the fourth generation of warfare. However, urban warfare involves people, and unless deliberate attempts are made to win them over, nothing else will succeed. It implies military dealing with non-state actors rather than the conventional armed forces of a country, (such as the Jehadis) with which they are not comfortable.

SECURITY SCENE IN THE IRAQI NEIGHBOURHOOD

Post Conflict Peace Building

The political process in 'Iraq' has not proceeded as visualized and the interim Government has taken a heavy beating. The Army and the Police have not become fully professional, lacking leadership, motivation and equipment. The new constitution that is being worked out as the federal democratic set up has met with disagreement by the 'Sunnis' who do not want the federal structure, as it would involve domination of Shias and the Kurds in respective majority areas, leading to eventual separation and disintegration.

Balance of Power in the Region

Although, in general terms the war in Iraq has not altered the security scene in the Middle-east dramatically, it has changed the balance of power as under:-

(a) The new Regime in Iraq will no longer be a pro-Arab Sunni regime as the majority Shias, the Kurds in the North of Iraq, and to a certain extent the Turkmans will sit in a mixed government. A Shia Regime in Iraq is also likely to develop closer relations with Iran, thus posing a potential threat to the Saudis, the third major power in the region.

(b) The US is now a power in the region with its troops stationed in Iraq. This will make the radical forces in Syria and Iran uncomfortable.

(c) The war has inflamed Arab anger and encouraged radical elements as also anti-West resentment, thereby creating a space for the Islamic radicals who subscribe to fighting a Jehad against Western powers. Frequent suicide attacks within Iraq and outside in the neighbouring region of Israel and Jordan clearly demonstrate this trend.

(d) The traditional US-Turkey cordial relations were also somewhat strained due to the denial of bases to the US as also due to the rising aspirations of the Kurds for autonomy. However, Turkey remains a strategically located North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally both to the US and the European Union (EU).

US-Iran Relationship

Re-establishing security in Iraq would become the prime concern of the international community to prevent its spill-over effect. As far as Iran is concerned, it does not pose any credible threat to the US notwithstanding the US branding it as part of the 'evil empire', although in a decade or so it may pose some threat to US interests in the region. It is unlikely to harbour any expansionist ambition. However, Iran would need to be integrated into the world community in return for its abjuring its nuclear ambition, by lifting all restrictions and providing access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The US-Arab Equation

Despite the rhetoric, the Syrian response to the Israeli air strikes on Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was symbolic. Most countries in the region are beholden to the US in one way or the other. Egypt, the traditional leader in the Middle East has been living on an annual American grant of US $ 2 billion since the Camp David agreement. However, wide-spread suspicion remains among Muslims that Iraq is only part of a wider American plan to subvert their faith. Jordan, though one of the progressive states has hardcore elements with Jehadi leanings who undertake terrorist activities in Iraq with some of the underground groups.

Relationship with CAR countries

The US intrusion into the traditional Russian turf of Central Asian Republics (CAR) worries Moscow more and more. What began as temporary American Military presence in Central Asia endorsed by Russia to facilitate the anti terror war in Afghanistan, far from winding up, is expanding. In addition to air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the US is helping Kazakhstan to set up a naval base on the Caspian Sea close to the Russian border, besides seeking to lease three military bases in Tajakistan. Russian President Putin has reportedly stated in an interview to *Al-Jazeera* TV that "we are against the policy of pre-emptive strikes without the UN approval. But if this practice continues to be asserted in international relations, Russia retains the right to act in the same way".

Conclusion

Two of the basic justification of the Second Gulf War i.e. that Iraq had WMDs and that the Iraqi people (other than the Kurds) were eager to be liberated have not been proved right. The situation on the ground today for the common people is no better than during the Saddam era, infected with a hurt national pride, and an ineffective administration with a civil warlike situation.

The war has been won militarily but nearly lost politically. The war on terrorism has got enlarged with more Bin Ladens in the making. The Middle East appears to be heading for greater instability. American stature has been reduced and the coalition forces have got involved in a 'quagmire' from where there is no easy way out. American led forces need wider allied support and a UN mediated authority to handle the civil-war like situation in Iraq, whereas the US does not wish to hand over the mandate to the UN as it wishes to be able to influence the new government in Iraq for strategic interests. An early pull out would result in loss of face which is not in the US interest. The Americans are also attempting to split the insurgency by establishing interest groups, not only with the Kurds, the Shias but even the Sunnis. The new Iraqi Army, the Police and the Administrative authorities are also being indoctrinated with the US strategies. However, there are others who feel that the war in Iraq will never be won as there are no clear military targets and the political issues are complex. People are getting disillusioned and a civil war like situation is emerging.

In the final analysis, it is ironic that the strategy of pre-emption adopted by the US has legitimised terrorism as a heroic fight for justice. The war on terrorism has not only extended the reach of terrorists but has even glamorised them. Hence what is needed is not the American concept of pre-emption but genuine attempts to pre-empt the causes of poverty, ignorance and negative religious indoctrination that provides a continuous stream of recruits to Jehadi outfits.

There are signs now that the US is changing its foreign policy orientation because of difficulties it is facing in establishing democracy. It is advocating greater Middle East and South Asian initiatives to encourage these countries to adopt democratic institutions, economic reforms and ensure human rights. A closer

political and economic cooperation along with engagement and security arrangement is being propagated. This would involve applying pressure on Saudi Arabia to introduce democratic reforms and curb funding of Jehadi terrorism. It would warrant to pressure Syria and Iran to deny sanctuaries to the insurgents and on Pakistan to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and finally provide incentives to the CAR countries for pursuing secular and democratic governance.

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The 'New' NATO

Ms Alyson J K Bailes

I am the Director of a peace research institute, and when the Swedish Government set up my institute exactly 40 years ago they did so largely out of concern for the *threat* to peace that was created by the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact as competing military blocs in Europe. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI's) main political imperative at the time, which most people would say it handled reasonably well, was to ensure that its analysis and criticism of the dangers involved was properly balanced between the two sides in East and West. SIPRI's peace research agenda has changed since the great strategic revolution of 1989-90 in Europe, and so (of course) has the Atlantic Alliance itself. This enables reflection on NATO's role in a more open-minded fashion. In that context, this article would concentrate on three quite distinct phases of the Alliance's historical development, posing questions that are either new or can be looked at now in an interestingly different way. Specifically, I will focus on the following:-

(a) My understanding of the origins and role of the 'old' NATO in the four decades from 1949-1989.

(b) The first decade of NATO's post cold-war adaptation and, in particular, the complications that developed in this period between NATO's and the European Union's roles in the broader trans-Atlantic relationship.

(c) The features, driving issues and implications of today's NATO which presents itself as a truly global military actor, and which-in the process-might be leading at least some people to associate the word 'threat' with it all over again.

'Old' NATO in a historical US/European Perspective

What we now think of as 'old' NATO was actually a great novelty when it was created. Over the previous 150 years of interaction between an independent United States and Europe,

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distance and tension between the two sides of the Atlantic were actually more frequent and typical than periods of unity or even of harmony. I can think of at least one other historical period when, very much like today, one side accused the other of being much too powerful for a proper international balance, of using military force as its preferred instrument especially to overthrow governments in other regions, of preaching democracy without practising it, and of continuing to employ torture. These were all among the accusations that the founding fathers of the United States threw against the evil empire of old-world Europe when they took up arms to try to free themselves from it and to set up a more pure, peaceful and just political system at the end of the eighteenth century. It should not surprise us that relations between the new US and the main European powers remained distanct for a long time after, and also that attitudes towards America were often a divisive matter within Europe itself!

The creation of a trans-Atlantic alliance based on permanent defence guarantees in 1949 was thus in historical terms a revolutionary experiment. It was driven by an equally unique security challenge at the end of Second World War, the need for a strong Western bloc backed by the nuclear weapons of a superpower to hold back the Soviet Union from further expanding its Communist empire in Europe. NATO's role in the Cold War was shaped by the realization that the Soviet/Communist threat in Europe was the single largest challenge, even for the US as a global power - the US's own strategic frontier lay, in a very real sense, in the middle of Germany. The Alliance responded to this prime imperative in two effective ways (at least from the late 1960s): by maintaining a strong defence backed by nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence, but also by 'detente', meaning engagement with the other side to reduce the levels of confrontation and risks of war and to allow some practical cooperation to happen in pursuit of shared interests. It is worth noting, however, that NATO's central and omnipotent role in Western defence was strictly limited to the European theatre-it did not determine most of the things that the US did with its own forces on its own territory and in other regions, and while all kinds of direct and indirect military clashes happened in those decades between the 'West' and 'East' in other parts of the world, they were handled on national initiative or by what would now be called ad-hoc coalitions. Several European members of

NATO, of course, were also preoccupied at the time with the build-down of their own overseas empires and with the purely national responsibility to defend such territories as remained. To complete the picture within Europe, we may note that the European Union (EU) in this period operated more or less on a separate planet from NATO, focussing exclusively on non-military business, but nevertheless playing an important functional part in the Atlantic balance through its ability to talk as an equal with the US on trade policy matters.

As someone who worked personally at NATO during the 1970s, however, I would like to draw attention to some aspects of its role that tend to be forgotten now. You may well have heard the famous remark by the British statesman Lord Ismay that NATO was created 'to keep America in, keep Russia out and keep Germany down'-an extremely *realpolitik* formulation that reminds us there was not much sentimental mystique about NATO at the outset! The reference to Germany is what I would like to point to here, reminding us that NATO's designers also saw it as very much pertinent to recreating democracy and a functioning economy after the damage done by National Socialism within Western Europe itself. NATO served this goal of what might be called internal 'regime change on two counts. These include :-

(a) By preventing its European members from falling back into a nationalistic and competitive culture of defence.

(b) By providing the shield under which West Europeans could rebuild their economy while spending far less on armaments than they would have needed to do if left alone. It is true that some Southern European countries spent various periods under dictatorships of military juntas while still being counted as members of NATO, but what was important-and what I witnessed for myself in the 1970s - was how NATO membership helped to discourage and contain any internationally aggressive behaviour by these regimes and also legitimised and reinforced the new democratic governments that eventually took over. I was an eyewitness of NATO's role in containing and calming the very dangerous situation in 1975 when Turkey invaded the northern part of Cyprus. Moreover, since the world's biggest disarmament and arms control processes at the time were the ones going on

between the US and Soviet Union and their respective alliances in Europe, NATO was quite a school of arms control expertise and it was, in fact, while working as a UK diplomat on the former Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations that I myself got my first grounding in 'peace' issues! I am stressing these points not so much to idealise the 'old' NATO, but to remind us to ask whether a similar, 'softer' and more ethical side to the Alliance is still in existence or indeed, is possible today.

Three New Agendas Since 1989

The changes which make that question necessary were triggered first of all by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1989-90. At first many experts thought that NATO also might just fade out of existence when the removal of the great European threat made it redundant, and/or when the lack of such a clear uniting force caused its members to drift apart. Those who expected the Alliance to continue saw it evolving rather fast into a more political than military organisation, with a very wide membership which could even embrace Russia like a more Western-flavoured Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Of course all these precisionist were wrong, and what made them wrong was the continued domination of the US and West European thinking by a new set of severe security problems that moved up to take the place of the Cold War threat. There were actually at least three major and successive shifts in the Euro-Atlantic security agenda rather than just one: the first two of them gave new meat for NATO to chew upon, and helped it repeatedly to renew itself, but all of them pushed the Alliance towards a new European and international niche which I would argue was narrower, not wider, than its original one.

First, the whole decade of the 1990s in Europe was in retrospect dominated by the twin themes of *Crisis Management* and *Enlargement*. The former agenda was shaped by the wars on NATO's doorstep in the Balkans but also by good and bad Western experiences abroad (eg in Somalia), in all cases pushing towards a growing demand for military forces specialised for robust long-range interventions and for new forms of civil-military co-ordination in multi-functional operations. The enlargement agenda included two waves of very significant expansion of NATO's membership

and territory into Central Europe, where it once again became a teacher and a guarantor of democracy and of the cooperative approach to defence, but it also involved the tough conundrum of how to maintain a stable and non-zero-sum relationship with Russia while the latter was not and in practice could not be a candidate. History should, I think, conclude that despite some very difficult passages with both the US and Russia around the mid-1990s, the striking feature was how well NATO adapted to these tasks: managing to maintain its unity and *raison-d' etre* through change in spite of change or by resisting it. At the same time, the division of labour between NATO and EU started gradually to shift during this period and became more complicated.

The EU also engaged in enlargement and building new relations with Russia, and because of the nature of the integration process, joining the EU actually involved deeper transformations and new relationships than in the NATO case. Through NATO enlargement, the US might be creating new members and neighbours in Europe, but the American people did not actually have to live alongside them and open their frontiers and potentially their jobs to them as the Europeans did!

At the end of the period and after the practical and political frustrations felt by Europeans over their performance in the Kosovo crisis, the EU decided to launch its own military crisis management capability that might also be used independently from NATO in the framework of the so-called new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

At the higher strategic level, the fading of shared military threats in Europe started to make Europe less of a defence priority for the US and military and defence affairs generally less of a priority for Europe: thus the *relative* part that NATO played in the thinking of each side was bound gradually to become less dominant.

Finally, we should note that crisis management tasks outside Europe in the 1990s were still met without using NATO, though the EU did get involved in some of the related crises with mediation, aid, sanctions etc.

From 11 September 2001, the Euro-Atlantic focus shifted quite sharply to the *Global New Threats* of terrorism, Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and related issues like financial

distance and tension between the two sides of the Atlantic were actually more frequent and typical than periods of unity or even of harmony. I can think of at least one other historical period when, very much like today, one side accused the other of being much too powerful for a proper international balance, of using military force as its preferred instrument especially to overthrow governments in other regions, of preaching democracy without practising it, and of continuing to employ torture. These were all among the accusations that the founding fathers of the United States threw against the evil empire of old-world Europe when they took up arms to try to free themselves from it and to set up a more pure, peaceful and just political system at the end of the eighteenth century. It should not surprise us that relations between the new US and the main European powers remained distanct for a long time after, and also that attitudes towards America were often a divisive matter within Europe itself!

The creation of a trans-Atlantic alliance based on permanent defence guarantees in 1949 was thus in historical terms a revolutionary experiment. It was driven by an equally unique security challenge at the end of Second World War, the need for a strong Western bloc backed by the nuclear weapons of a superpower to hold back the Soviet Union from further expanding its Communist empire in Europe. NATO's role in the Cold War was shaped by the realization that the Soviet/Communist threat in Europe was the single largest challenge, even for the US as a global power - the US's own strategic frontier lay, in a very real sense, in the middle of Germany. The Alliance responded to this prime imperative in two effective ways (at least from the late 1960s): by maintaining a strong defence backed by nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence, but also by 'detente', meaning engagement with the other side to reduce the levels of confrontation and risks of war and to allow some practical cooperation to happen in pursuit of shared interests. It is worth noting, however, that NATO's central and omnipotent role in Western defence was strictly limited to the European theatre-it did not determine most of the things that the US did with its own forces on its own territory and in other regions, and while all kinds of direct and indirect military clashes happened in those decades between the 'West' and 'East' in other parts of the world, they were handled on national initiative or by what would now be called ad-hoc coalitions. Several European members of

NATO, of course, were also preoccupied at the time with the build-down of their own overseas empires and with the purely national responsibility to defend such territories as remained. To complete the picture within Europe, we may note that the European Union (EU) in this period operated more or less on a separate planet from NATO, focussing exclusively on non-military business, but nevertheless playing an important functional part in the Atlantic balance through its ability to talk as an equal with the US on trade policy matters.

As someone who worked personally at NATO during the 1970s, however, I would like to draw attention to some aspects of its role that tend to be forgotten now. You may well have heard the famous remark by the British statesman Lord Ismay that NATO was created 'to keep America in, keep Russia out and keep Germany down'-an extremely *realpolitik* formulation that reminds us there was not much sentimental mystique about NATO at the outset! The reference to Germany is what I would like to point to here, reminding us that NATO's designers also saw it as very much pertinent to recreating democracy and a functioning economy after the damage done by National Socialism within Western Europe itself. NATO served this goal of what might be called internal 'regime change on two counts. These include :-

(a) By preventing its European members from falling back into a nationalistic and competitive culture of defence.

(b) By providing the shield under which West Europeans could rebuild their economy while spending far less on armaments than they would have needed to do if left alone. It is true that some Southern European countries spent various periods under dictatorships of military juntas while still being counted as members of NATO, but what was important-and what I witnessed for myself in the 1970s - was how NATO membership helped to discourage and contain any internationally aggressive behaviour by these regimes and also legitimised and reinforced the new democratic governments that eventually took over. I was an eyewitness of NATO's role in containing and calming the very dangerous situation in 1975 when Turkey invaded the northern part of Cyprus. Moreover, since the world's biggest disarmament and arms control processes at the time were the ones going on

between the US and Soviet Union and their respective alliances in Europe, NATO was quite a school of arms control expertise and it was, in fact, while working as a UK diplomat on the former Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations that I myself got my first grounding in 'peace' issues! I am stressing these points not so much to idealise the 'old' NATO, but to remind us to ask whether a similar, 'softer' and more ethical side to the Alliance is still in existence or indeed, is possible today.

Three New Agendas Since 1989

The changes which make that question necessary were triggered first of all by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1989-90. At first many experts thought that NATO also might just fade out of existence when the removal of the great European threat made it redundant, and/or when the lack of such a clear uniting force caused its members to drift apart. Those who expected the Alliance to continue saw it evolving rather fast into a more political than military organisation, with a very wide membership which could even embrace Russia like a more Western-flavoured Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Of course all these precisionist were wrong, and what made them wrong was the continued domination of the US and West European thinking by a new set of severe security problems that moved up to take the place of the Cold War threat. There were actually at least three major and successive shifts in the Euro-Atlantic security agenda rather than just one: the first two of them gave new meat for NATO to chew upon, and helped it repeatedly to renew itself, but all of them pushed the Alliance towards a new European and international niche which I would argue was narrower, not wider, than its original one.

First, the whole decade of the 1990s in Europe was in retrospect dominated by the twin themes of *Crisis Management* and *Enlargement.* The former agenda was shaped by the wars on NATO's doorstep in the Balkans but also by good and bad Western experiences abroad (eg in Somalia), in all cases pushing towards a growing demand for military forces specialised for robust long-range interventions and for new forms of civil-military co-ordination in multi-functional operations. The enlargement agenda included two waves of very significant expansion of NATO's membership

and territory into Central Europe, where it once again became a teacher and a guarantor of democracy and of the cooperative approach to defence, but it also involved the tough conundrum of how to maintain a stable and non-zero-sum relationship with Russia while the latter was not and in practice could not be a candidate. History should, I think, conclude that despite some very difficult passages with both the US and Russia around the mid-1990s, the striking feature was how well NATO adapted to these tasks: managing to maintain its unity and *raison-d' etre* through change in spite of change or by resisting it. At the same time, the division of labour between NATO and EU started gradually to shift during this period and became more complicated.

The EU also engaged in enlargement and building new relations with Russia, and because of the nature of the integration process, joining the EU actually involved deeper transformations and new relationships than in the NATO case. Through NATO enlargement, the US might be creating new members and neighbours in Europe, but the American people did not actually have to live alongside them and open their frontiers and potentially their jobs to them as the Europeans did!

At the end of the period and after the practical and political frustrations felt by Europeans over their performance in the Kosovo crisis, the EU decided to launch its own military crisis management capability that might also be used independently from NATO in the framework of the so-called new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

At the higher strategic level, the fading of shared military threats in Europe started to make Europe less of a defence priority for the US and military and defence affairs generally less of a priority for Europe: thus the *relative* part that NATO played in the thinking of each side was bound gradually to become less dominant.

Finally, we should note that crisis management tasks outside Europe in the 1990s were still met without using NATO, though the EU did get involved in some of the related crises with mediation, aid, sanctions etc.

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crime, travel safety, controls on technology transfer and trade. The implications for the Alliance were symbolised by the pivotal events when NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on 12 September 2001 to show that the other Allies were ready to help the US just as in a Cold-War attack; but the US declined to take up their offer in any practical way. More starkly than at any time in the 1990s, it became clear that :-

(i) *NATO was no longer central* to US-Europe interactions as a consensus - and policy-forming forum.

(ii) That the *instruments* NATO could offer, while turning out to be highly relevant, for example, pursuing operations in Afghanistan after the US's initial coalition attack, were *essentially military and operational ones* growing out of its long-term defence role and assets.

NATO does not have the resources and legal competencies to handle the wide range of internal ('homeland') security measures and travel security measures required in the new threat environment; or to implement technology transfer and export controls and other solutions for specific proliferation dangers; or to be the channel for the Western community to interact with other world powers and groupings affected by the new agenda. The EU does at least in principle have all these possibilities, and it started to develop them after 2001 both for the purpose of negotiation and cooperation with the US (notably on homeland security and travel and trade controls), and to protect its own security interests. As a result of this, the action now has largely moved outside Europe (to Afghanistan and Iraq), the main flow of US/Europe policy interactions (whether negative or positive) in 2001-5 went either through US-EU channels- in the process highlighting the inadequacy of the latter or through fora with wider participation by world powers such as the UN Security Council and G8. (I would argue that the same was very broadly true of US-Russia interaction).

Of course, this story would not be complete without dwelling on the *major splits* of 2002-03 both among Europeans, and between the US and Europeans in general, over various aspects of the Iraq affair and especially the coalition invasion of March 2003. In retrospect, we can probably judge that these had less overall impact on the EU than NATO mainly because :-

(a) The US's new preference to use 'coalitions of the willing' for the most urgent military tasks was taking potential work away from NATO, not the EU.

(b) The EU had too much other business going on - forcing the Europeans to keep on working together willy-nilly-that was neither dependent on Atlantic relations nor linked to the new-threats agenda. After March 2003, moreover, the EU's leaders went through a very public process of pulling themselves together as they realised that neither the opposers nor the supporters of the Iraq invasion had made any material impact on the way the Americans played things, and that Europe could only expect to have influence in future if it could find its own agenda and push it collectively. The results were the EU's first-ever *Security Strategy Document,* a separate strategy on WMD and the opening of the European negotiations with Iran, several additions to the machinery of the ESDP including a defence industrial agency the European Defence Agency (EDA), and an independent EU peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others. I would argue that although NATO also pulled itself together with some success by end-2003 to focus on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, the new start at NATO HQ was neither so political and comprehensive in character nor, perhaps, so irreversible as what was going on in all the EU organs. At the same time, however, we should note that the *enlargement* agenda including the Russian angles continued to be handled quite smoothly by both institutions, and in particular with little US-European friction. In retrospect, we may theorise that the Big Bang enlargement completed in 2004 was actually made inevitable by the 11 September 2001 crisis - inasmuch as the new threats created an obvious logic for building a single, largest possible integrated community of States in Europe to deal with *all* the continent's security challenges, and also gave Russia a rationale for continuing to work with the West on overarching common interests.

Since 2004 in particular, new or renewed attention has been drawn to a third layer of the security agenda: the *threats to Human Security* that may not be, or are only partly, man-made but have great and widespread destructive power. Epidemics like AIDS, SARS and bird 'flu', natural disasters (tsunami, hurricane,