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July – September 2016

Editorial

The 20th Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture on the subject 'The Role of Higher Defence Organisation in India's National Security Architecture' was delivered by General NC Vij, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd), former Chief of Army Staff on 28 Sep 2016 with Shri Kanwal Sibal, IFS (Retd), former Foreign Secretary in the Chair. The subject has gained a great salience, especially in view of the kind of threats and challenges that confront India's national security. General Vij covered the subject in a most comprehensive and candid manner, starting with the 'genesis of the problems'; going on to 'India's Present Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) and its Inadequacies, Strategic Challenges Confronting India and Complexities of Future Wars'; and finally ending with his views on 'The Desired HDO in the Indian Context'. Ambassador Kanwal Sibal who was in the Chair added a lot of value through his very perceptive comments. The lecture was well attended and the interactive session was most stimulating.

The year 1991 will remain an important landmark in Independent India's history because in that year, under the leadership of Prime Minister (PM) Narasimha Rao, India made a great turn to break the stasis that had set in during the preceding decades as far as India's economic growth and development were concerned. Dr Sanjaya Baru in his article '1991 – Leadership and Strategy' recaptures the crisis situation prevailing at that point of time and how PM Rao managed to achieve policy reorientation to give a new direction to the Nehruvian politico – economic legacy in the changed geopolitical context. No doubt, there was deft political manoeuvring and Dr Baru through his most perceptive essay gives the reader a ring side view of the historical events of the early 1990s.

The next article 'National Perspective on Disaster Management' is based on a talk delivered by Lieutenant General NC Marwah, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Member National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) at USI on 13 Jul 2016. General Marwah outlined in great detail the kind of disasters that can occur unannounced and all that was being done at various levels at the

Centre and in the States to deal with these and mitigate the damage. One is happy to note that the NDMA has assumed a dynamic profile and has taken great strides to achieve synergy between not only the Centre and the States but also between various ministries / department of the Government.

In the next article 'The Chinese Military's Mind Set' Colonel Iqbal Singh Samyal traces the evolution of Chinese military thought since ancient times, through the early PLA days, the Soviet influence and the contemporary developments. In its historical evolution, the two strands of traditional Chinese military culture, i.e. civilisational attributes and the strategic culture have merged to give way to the modern PLA thinking. The author has also covered the recent organisational transformation that is underway but avers that the changes may take much longer than is being projected.

South China Sea continues to make news because today it is the most contested area in the maritime domain. Commander MH Rajesh in his article 'South China in Retrospect : Post Tribunal Verdict' analyses recent developments post the July 2016 verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague; the dispute having been referred to by the Philippines. Of course, the Chinese response has been along the expected lines but the verdict has implications on the interpretation of UNCLOS itself and its many provisions. While China may remain in a denial mode in the short term, the 'verdict' is there to stay and will form a benchmark not only for South China Sea disputes but on the maritime spaces as a whole. It is also obvious from Chinese diplomatic and military reactions post the 'verdict' that they have taken note of it and are at pains to explain their position to the world as a whole.

Continuing in the same vein, in the next article Ms Amrita Josh looks at China, Japan and the Evolving Risks in the East China Sea, another area of contestation and a flash point between China and Japan. It is also a dispute in which the USA, though not a party directly, also has stakes. It is also proving to be a test bed at which China tries to test the credibility of the USA-Japan military alliance.

The next article 'Nuclear Deterrence and Southern Asia' by Dr Arun Vishwanathan looks at nuclear developments and how these impact the strategic balance in the region. While the countries concerned continue to send signals about their nuclear posturing there is no common understanding or even a dialogue to create a common platform at which the role of nuclear weapons can be discussed. It is also of interest that though the USA is a lead player in the non-proliferation field at world forums, they have done nothing to roll back or even limit the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan which is a known proliferator. It is a paradox of the modern day power play!

The global war on terrorism (GWOT) has been on for over 15 years but the end is nowhere in sight. Infact, trans-national terrorism seems to be becoming the order of the day. In the next article 'Trends in International Terrorism', Major General Nguyen Hong Quan, Ph D, of the Vietnamese Defence Forces looks at the emerging trends in international terrorism and its various facets, especially its fundraising methods and recruitment.

In the next article 'Audacity in Warfare: A Perspective', Brigadier Mandeep Singh analyses various aspects of this virtue which is known to pay disproportionate dividends, if followed in a prudent manner. He has highlighted the importance of 'audacity' through many historical examples and illustrations. The author emphasises that it is important to inculcate this virtue amongst the military commanders so that it becomes a second nature and for that an enabling environment is a *sine quo non.*

The last article 'Army Recruitment in Punjab, 1846-1913 : An Evolutionary Study' by Professor KC Yadav is an off shoot of the ongoing USI Project "India and the Great War 1914-18" which has succeeded in bringing to life 'Indian Voices' about India's contribution to that cataclysmic event which also impacted India in many ways. This well researched article based on many primary sources puts the events of that period in a different perspective. It emerges quite clearly that the British Indian Army which came into being during that period served the Imperial interests well, but not the broad Indian interests and aspirations.

I would also like to add that 'India and the Great War 1914-18' Project continues to gather momentum and generate great interest amongst the Indian people. A number of publications commemorating the role of the Indian soldier in various theatres of war have already been published under the aegis of the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) of the USI and some are waiting to be launched. There was a talk on the Battle of Somme by Lieutenant General Aditya Singh, PVSM, AVSM** (Retd) to commemorate the last cavalry charge of the First Great War held at USI on 14 Jul 2016 which was well attended, including many school children. A few more events are planned over the next two years. An update on the Project activities is being carried in this Issue of the Journal.

India and the Great War Publications

Code	Subjects	Price (Rs)	Year
CAFHR-21	Last Post - Indian War Memorials Around the World Edited by Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd)	2000	2014
CAFHR-24	India and the First World War 1914 – 18 Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd)	2000	2014
CAFHR-25	India in World War I : An Illustrated Story (Comic) Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM and Shri Rishi Kumar	99	2014
CAFHR-28	India and The Great War – Eight Theatres Booklets Edited by Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd)	2000	2015
CAFHR-29	India and The Great War Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd)	2000	2015
CAFHR-30	Les Hindus : The Indian Army on the Western Front 1914-1919 Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd)	2000	2016

20th Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture 2016

The Role of Higher Defence Organisation in India's Security Architecture*

General NC Vij, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd)@

The Context

I stand here after 12 years when on the eve of the Army Day on 15 Dec 2004, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the then Defence Minister and I came here to announce the promulgation of the AV Singh Committee Report. For me, that was like a mission which ensured the dignity of officers by way of certainty of reaching a certain level of rank. 18000 officers were promoted in one day. The joke went that in the Gopinath Bazar they ran out of the epaulets for various ranks on that day!

I thank the USI for inviting me to speak from this very exalted platform which has seen very many distinguished persons before me speak on this particular subject or many other closely related topics.

Firstly, a word about the 'Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Talk' itself. Colonel Pyara Lal is a venerated icon among our generation of professionals. He took over as the Secretary of this Institution (established by Colonel MacGregor in Shimla in 1870) four years after it moved into the Kashmir House in New Delhi, in 1957, and continued to nurture it during its still fledgling years for three decades, till 1987. Perhaps, he would have carried on longer had he not died in harness. It was his sheer dedication and perseverance that pulled the Institution through its most difficult days. Indeed, this talk is an apt homage to the memory of this visionary.

The subject of my talk is, "Role of Higher Defence Organisation in India's Security Architecture". Since the problems about this issue, by now, have been well established and also widely discussed, a lot of what I will say today perhaps would have been said before; may be in different forms. Therefore, in order to save time and not be repetitive on those issues, I would just draw your attention and not elaborate on the same. First, let us identify as to wherein lay the genesis of the deficiencies in our Higher Defence Organisation, or HDO in short.

Part I –Inherited HDO and Genesis of the Problems

Genesis of the Problem – Trust Deficit in the Army

The mistrust of the then Government was one major malice which has afflicted the Army right since our Independence. This has had an impact on our organisation and functioning all along. In 1947, India inherited a highly rated Army along with some components of Navy and Air Force. This force used to be headed by a Commander-in-Chief, who was the number two man in the pre-Independence hierarchy. The British governed India through civil service machinery headed by the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Imperial Police (IP), while for security, they banked upon the disciplined and thoroughly professional British Indian Army. Conditions, however, turned completely different after Independence. Having convinced themselves of having 'won' freedom through peaceful *Satyagraha* alone, most Indian leaders, in their misplaced idealism, subscribed to such notions as 'peace loving India will not be at war ever', and 'there would be no requirement for an army', least of all, what they still considered to be the British Indian Army.

That unfortunate politico-military discomfort solidified into innate mistrust when in the 1950's, one after the other, newly independent countries in the neighbourhood turned into military dictatorships. Bureaucrats, on whom the politicians could not but be dependent for any and all of their aspirations, found an opportunity to grab unquestioned and unaccountable control over a very upright military. As to how fallacious these notions were, is borne out by the fact that India has fought as many as five wars since Independence and has been engaged in near-continuous insurgency-cum-proxy war since 1960's. Indeed, credit for the success of our forces, except for the humbling experience of 1962, goes to the wisdom

of our then senior commanders, duly backed by sound generalship, bravery of our young leaders and soldiers, and their excellent operational execution. Nevertheless, this trust deficit obviously impacted the HDO very adversely.

Along with the element of mistrust, another factor, which has hurt us historically, and that still persists, is the "lack of strategic culture in India".

Lack of Strategic Culture

Strategic culture is generally defined as a *"set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force, often moulded according to historical experience" (Chappell 2009). It "includes national traditions, habits, values, attitudes, ways of behaviour, symbols, approaches and special processes chosen to influence external environment and the ways of solution of problems face to face to threats or to using of force"* (Ken Booth 1991).

It is needless to emphasise that the lack of strategic culture has been a bane of our history. Formal recognition of this debility in the Indian political understanding came in the early 1990's from George Tanham, which has now been further alluded to by the old India hand, Stephen Cohen. Our leadership at the time of Independence and even thereafter has carried no experience of warfare at all, unlike the Americans and the European countries. As it becomes starkly apparent from the developments post-Independence, this inexperience, exacerbated by very poor level of professional-expert consultation, manifests in the absence of strategic culture. What could be more glaring example of this weakness than such unwise beliefs as 'we are a peaceful nation, we do not need an army, police is enough', or words to that effect by our first Prime Minister?

That strategic disorientation was thus manifested by the premature termination of the 1947-49 War in Kashmir, adoption of 'forward policy' prior to 1962 under the influence of wayward intelligence and diplomatic assessments – and to the complete dismissal of the warnings of the military leadership – in the run up to the 1962 debacle. Subsequently, strategic myopia was also demonstrated by the return of Haji Pir Pass after 1965 War and 93000 prisoners of war after 1971 War, both without any reciprocal gains, and finally, the 10 month long meaningless deployment in

Operation Parakram in 2001-02. But what annotates the Indian political leadership's strategic naiveté most is the strange fact that they have unwittingly allowed the nation's HDO to pass under the proxy control of a generalist bureaucracy, while military professionals remain banished from the process of substantial decision making - unless 'invited' to express their opinion. One wonders if this has been a well-considered option adopted by the political leadership!

Is it not pitiable that even though India maintains the world's third largest military, we still neither have a 'National Security Doctrine' nor a 'National Security Strategy' and an institutionalised mechanism to assess the dynamics of our security challenges!

The Inherited HDO

As the British left, at Pandit Nehru's instance, Lord Ismay, the Viceroy's Chief of Staff, devised a mechanism for higher defence management in Independent India. That mechanism or the HDO consisted of three elements of defence policy making. At the political decision making level, there was the 'Defence Committee of the Cabinet' – the fore bearer of the present Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Then came the 'Defence Minister's Committee' with Service Chiefs and Defence Secretary as its members to attend to policy issues at the ministry level. The third element was a purely professional body meant to render military advice and implement or execute the political directions. Thus, there was a Tri-Service 'Chiefs of Staff's Committee' to guide the conduct of inter-services matters while intra-service control was exercised by the three Service Chiefs. Integrated approach to defence management was promoted through the committees for 'Joint Intelligence', 'Joint Planning', 'Joint Training' and 'Common Logistics' etc. Catering to the defence-dedicated public and private sectors, there was the 'Defence Coordination and Implementation Committee' chaired by the Defence Secretary to synergise defence research, development, finance, production and acquisitions. Notable aspects of the arrangement were:-

(a) Firstly, Service Chiefs were formal members of a duly constituted 'Defence Minister's Committee' and other Joint Committees. To that extent, other departments of the Ministry of Defence – viz, Defence Production, Research and Development, Defence Estates, Ex-Servicemen Welfare,

Finance etc. – had to be more responsive to the Service Headquarters' voice over defence matters, as compared to this day. In the present set up, discontinuation of such an institutionalised forum and subsequent bifurcation of the Department of Defence Production from the Department of Defence has diluted that degree of influence.

(b)   Secondly, in strategic matters and higher defence policy making, the military leadership had no formal decision making authority. That authority was kept as a sole preserve of the politico-bureaucracy combine, while only the responsibility for execution of the decisions was assigned to the Defence Forces.

(c)   Thirdly, an important issue to note here is that the HDO was created when India had no inkling of the humongous security challenges which would crop up subsequently in an unending succession, thereby rendering it unsuitable for our present day requirements.

This was the system in operation when Kashmir was rescued from Pakistan's aggression in 1947-48. However, during the 1950's, an era of peace-rhetoric gained ground among the Indian political leadership and the salience of higher defence management got gradually further diluted. While the Service Headquarters were formally assigned the status of 'Attached Offices', thereby virtually disfranchising the military leadership from apex policy-making process, the Committees ceased, more or less, to function. The situation was not helped by a politically obsessed and manipulative Defence Minister.

Functional procedures of the HDO were somewhat corrected after the 1962 debacle but they still remained unsatisfactory. Even then, over the next 25 years, better management of the military resulted in the success gained – in 1965 and 1971 Wars, continuous internal insurgencies, regional interventions in Sri Lanka and Maldives, and above all, nearly three decades of effective deterrence against Pakistan's and China's aggressiveness. However, lessons of the Kargil conflict, when put through the microscopic scrutiny, pointed at grave deficiencies in our HDO, and it is a pity that the corrective measures have been implemented only selectively.

Part II – India's Present HDO and Its Inadequacies

Present HDO

India's present HDO is still emerging as a result of the 'Post-Kargil War' restructuring of the defence establishment. The Kargil Review Committee was followed by a 'Group of Ministers' (GOM) headed by then Deputy Prime Minister, Shri LK Advani. It had four Task Forces, which made far-reaching recommendations through their report titled 'Reforming the National Security System'. A decade later, the Government convened another 'Task Force on National Security Reforms' referred to as the 'Naresh Chandra Committee' to suggest course corrections in respect of some leftover issues of GOM's decisions. Besides some others, these mainly were the appointment of CDS and integration of the Defence Ministry. The CDS, when in whatever form it is instituted, would bring in the most desired internal jointness amongst the Services and also provide 'single point military advice' to the Government. These matters occupy the centre stage of all current strategic issues and discussions, and would be touched upon again in the later part of my talk.

Defence Structure

The CCS is a constitutionally empowered apex decision making authority which has the task of outlining the mandate for the military to organise itself, allocating resources for that purpose and dealing with various security challenges from time to time. The Committee has the counsel of professionals who are competent in nuances of national security, though strangely, the Service Chiefs are 'invited' for the meetings –only on as required basis, and that rests at the discretion of the Government. Thus the CCS does not have any constant institutionalised professional military advice.

Next, to provide the necessary staff support to the polity, there is a formally constituted body referred to as the 'National Security Council (NSC), with a 'National Security Advisor' (NSA) and the consultative bodies in the form of the 'National Security Advisory Board' (NSAB) and the 'Strategy Policy Group' (SPG) (not constituted for the last two years). The NSC also has a secretariat headed by Deputy NSA to support it.

Furthermore, the national level intelligence work is attended to by the 'Intelligence Coordinating Group', which is responsible

for tasking and coordination among various intelligence agencies like the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and further assisted by the Technical Coordination Group (TCG) and the National Information Board (NIB). They all report to the NSA.

Management of Nuclear Force

The nuclear force is organised under the overall control of a 'National Command Authority' (NCA) which has its stand-by or alternate set-ups, and is supported by its dedicated 'Strategy Programme Staff' (SPS). The NCA is made up of a 'Political Council' under the Prime Minister (composed as the CCS) and an 'Executive Council' to operate the intended nuclear posture. The Executive Council is headed by the NSA and has Service Chiefs, Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the heads of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) as its members.

Organisation of the Executive Council is, therefore, reasonably well taken care of – except for the stark misbalance of not having any dedicated institutionalised military representation by way of CDS, who is supposed to assist the NSA. In his absence, the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee, who is not a permanent head and is frequently changing, represents the Services.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD)

At the next level, the MoD is responsible to facilitate the military in finding a right balance of organisational architecture, force-composition, equipment profile and professionally trained and motivated personnel. Similarly, it guides the rest of the defence sector to be truly responsive to the requirements of the military forces. Needless to state, formal and lead participation of military professionals in these functions of the MoD should be mandatory, but that is missing.

Actually, the Raksha Mantri (RM) attends to his responsibilities predominantly through a bureaucracy of generalists and also occasionally through professional military advice. However, under the present dispensation, the military is mostly absent from the policy and decision making process. This absence of formal military participation at the policy-making level further adds to sub-optimal

harnessing of the nation's intelligence assets and processing of strategic information at the MoD level. In other words, matters of national defence at the ministerial level are being attended to in an unstructured manner, in which professional military participation is neither sanctified nor considered mandatory.

Inadequacies of Our HDO

From the foregoing, inadequacies in India's HDO are quite apparent. There is the imbalance in professional interface between the MoD and the military leadership, wherein the Ministry comes to wield far more authority beyond its actual mandate. Civil servants, instead of just assisting the Minister in finalisation and implementation of policy issues, for the Defence Forces to discharge their responsibilities, end up taking decisions which are best left to the military professionals' domain. Even if the Services Headquarters were to be 'integrated' into the MoD as a follow up of the Kargil Committee Report, on ground, the archaic 'Allocation of Business' (AOB) and 'Transaction of Business' (TBR) Rules continue to jar the functioning of the entire defence set up. The best example is that the real authority continues to be at the hands of a bureaucracy which is not competent to wield it. Also, the facts that the 'RM's Monday Morning Meetings' continue to be mundane and the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) remains headless ever since its inception, are some of the major gaps. To cap it all, the Chiefs' traditional access to the Prime Minister has practically become a notional event. These, therefore, are some of the examples of the inadequacies of the present HDO.

The result is that the MoD, at its best, performs merely as a post office to attend to the staff work associated with projections made by the Services on various capital, revenue and personnel management schemes. In so doing, more often than not, the MoD is using the process of scrutiny to deflect or dilute professionally adjudged projections. Furthermore, Services continue to generally remain out of the decision making loop, wherein even the Service Chiefs' decisions and recommendations are put to scrutiny from Desk Officers' level upwards. *There are many versions of who conveyed the decision of the Government of India to the Chiefs to 'throw out' the Chinese across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 1962; with some saying it was a desk officer while others claiming it was a Joint Secretary. Who exactly conveyed the Government's*

order is of lesser consequence, what is more important is that, a decision of such magnitude should have been first discussed and then conveyed to the Chiefs at the very apex level.

The situation is further exacerbated by lack of inter-services jointness on matters of force-structuring, modernisation and acquisitions – all due to our faulty organisational structure. Indeed, non-institution of CDS, true integration of the MoD, absence of a National Security Doctrine and National Security Strategy, growth of 'hollowness' in our military capabilities, and lacklustre approach to the establishment of the National Defence University (NDU) etc., all are manifestations of these inadequacies. As to whether it should be a CDS or a "Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee", that could be in accordance with the wisdom of the Government, but the non-existence of this appointment has become a major drawback. *Most advanced countries in the world which maintain reasonably sized defence forces, have instituted this appointment already (28 in number); India remains an odd exception.*

Finally, for the MoD, being bereft of due operational competency, and yet to be sitting in judgement over professionally articulated proposals behind the garb of so called efforts at 'cost saving', is a most counter-productive practice. The net effect is that the civil-military interface in the MoD is reduced to combative mentality among the both. Truly, when the civil- military relations are being termed as 'strained', these are really the cause as well as manifestation of faulty organisational structures.

Appropriately, therefore, the first step of defence reforms would be to invigorate the current HDO and introduce the corrective measures, which in turn would facilitate inter-services jointness, desired modernisation and astute fiscal planning to address the challenges of national security. Let us now see, in brief, as to what is the magnitude of these challenges that India faces.

Part III –Strategic Challenges Confronting India and Complexities of Future Wars

India's Strategic Challenges

Western Borders. Security challenges faced by India are enormous. Along our Western borders, we have Pakistan, who is a constant source of threat and have now introduced the element

of use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) as weapons of war. They also have a sizable number of strategic assets, which perhaps match or exceed that of India. Pakistan has also taken recourse to brazen terrorism for over a quarter of a century. They are mixing it with *Wahhabi* radicalisation and are executing it under the cover of 'nuclear blackmail'. It never tires of holding out the threat that any response by India, as reaction to its acts of terrorism, will be countered by the use of the TNWs. Our deterrence is thus under question.

Northern, Northeastern and Eastern Borders. Along our northern and eastern peripheries, we have unsettled borders with China and these can always be a source of conflict. Even the Indo-Bangladesh border remaining peaceful or otherwise in future would depend on the Government in power in Bangladesh and its ideological inclinations.

The Indian Ocean. China's presence in the Indian Ocean is becoming more and more prominent by the day. The Chinese already have a 'string of pearls' around India, besides the ready availability of Pakistan ports of Karachi, Ormara and Gwadar. Besides these, they are creating connectivity with strategic connotations through the 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor' (CPEC). Lastly, they are also setting up their infrastructure in Djibouti to further ensure the safety of the movement of their energy resources.

Which country in the world faces so many varied forms of challenges, both along their land and oceanic frontiers, as India does? Definitely, none. These challenges get further accentuated when seen in the light of the rapidly changing nature of war. Are we, with our rather modest levels of fiscal budget and defence preparedness, ready to face those kinds of wars?

Complexities of Future Wars

While future wars would be characterised by intense cyber and space operations, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4I2SR) operations in the domain of net-centricity and information warfare, besides the debilitating use of precision guided munitions; there would also be remarkable changes in the prosecution of conventional wars under a nuclear backdrop.

Herein, firstly, the tactical and operational levels of warfare are getting overlapped and the stages for conduct of war are getting blurred. That calls for decision making authority being delegated down to local commanders. Secondly, integrated war-fighting has become mandatory (a rule rather than an option) which further warrants inter-operability amongst the Services as well as with the forces of friendly countries. Finally, even within the mould of conventional wars, there might be built-in elements of hybrid warfare – a combination of special, sub-conventional and information based operations. Indeed, the field of warfare in the contemporary period has expanded and become more complex to handle.

Needless to say, that a suitable HDO is thus a pre-requisite to face these challenges. The overriding inference is that an archaic HDO like ours would not work in the modern regime that stands further transformed by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Let us then see as to what could be the desired construct for a HOD that could effectively respond to the changing modes of warfare and the challenges that may confront India.

Part IV – Desired HDO

HDO – The Desired End State

In any future conflict, it would be mandatory for the government to lay down the 'Political Objective of War' and define the 'Political End State', from which in turn the military would deduce the desired 'Operational End State'. This is more imperative now as the days of 'total victory' are passé. Point to note here is that defining of the political objectives will be shaped by the nation's political leadership in consultation with various concerned civil professionals and the military leadership. Herein, the bureaucracy would join in to help translate the process into action. But when it comes to the application of military power, the same cannot but be a purely military responsibility which would require a high degree of professionalism and experience. Decision making process at the HDO, therefore, has to have close political and military participation, with the bureaucracy working as a facilitator. Indeed, this is how the HDOs are structured in advanced countries, even if the forms and nomenclatures may vary. To that end, the desired construct and roles of a contemporary HDO should conform to as enumerated subsequently.

Intra-Services

(a) **Jointness**. This is a pre-requisite in today's complex wars. It has to be ensured by all the three Services.

(b) **Selection to the Post of Army Commanders Equivalent**. One very important step to ensure the best quality of leadership at the highest level in the Defence Forces can be ensured by introducing a system of selection for the posts of Army Commander equivalent in all the Services.

Composition of CCS. The Chiefs must be made permanent invitees to the CCS on all issues related to national security.

CDS or Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In the era of joint war-fighting and integration of military power, institution of a CDS – or a Permanent Chairman of the COSC - should be a mandatory component of the HDO. However, this institution must be tailored to the indigenous conditions and not aped from the western models. As regards the responsibility of the CDS / Permanent Chairman of COSC, the operational control of the respective services must continue to be exercised by the Service Chiefs. The CDS may exercise control over all matters warranting jointness like joint planning, joint procurement and joint training etc. The control of the SFC, and Cyber and Space Commands (when instituted), and the military role in the Executive Council of the NCA should be transferred to the CDS. The time, however, is not yet ripe to institute 'Theatre Commands' as we are not yet trained and ready for them. It may well have to wait for another decade.

Status of the CDS vis-à-vis Service Chiefs. It follows, therefore, that to start with, the CDS must be termed as the first among the equals (for want of better words) to the extent of rendering single-point military advice to the Government, and optimisation of the force-structure in tune with operational synergy at the one end, and avoidance of redundancies and expensive duplications at the other. However, this does not make him senior to the other Chiefs, wherein his date of commissioning will be the dictating factor.

Integration of MoD. The MoD should venture into true integration between military professionals and civilian bureaucracy. The

continued practice of Service Headquarters functioning as 'Attached Offices' behind the veil of 'integration' must end. The Ministry must be run by the services-bureaucracy interfaced staff and cross-postings at the decision making levels must become the norm. The MoD's Allocation of Business and Transaction of Business Rules should be formally modified to incorporate a combined service-bureaucracy staff. Finally, for the senior bureaucracy in the MoD, prior experience at lower levels in the MoD must be a mandatory requirement.

Services as Prime Players in Decision Making. The military leadership must be an intrinsic and continuous part of planning and decision making process in the HDO, rather than being confined just to the execution part of it.

Constitution of National Preparedness Council (NPC). Defence preparedness being a national responsibility and not just that of the Government, a new security apex body may be constituted, which may be called as the 'National Preparedness Council' (NPC). It should have all permanent members of the CCS and leaders from all major political parties (with over 10 or more members in the Parliament) as its members. In order to sensitise the NPC regarding the concerns of national security and the state of defence preparedness, it would be beneficial to have the Service Chiefs brief the political leadership 'in camera' twice a year. Such an arrangement, if approved, will provide continuity in national security matters irrespective of the party in power in the Centre. Importantly, it would also insulate the state of national defence preparedness from the domain of partisan politics. The entire idea is to ensure that the security preparedness remains non-partisan. A somewhat similar arrangement exists in the US wherein the Service Chiefs testify before the Senate on defence preparedness as also the Secretaries of Defence and State testify before the Senate on departmental issues. This takes the arrangement out of party politics. To overcome the existing weaknesses/loopholes in defence preparedness of our country, if the idea of the Constitution of the National Preparedness Council is not politically acceptable/viable, then, the arrangement as mentioned above in the case of US may be considered. In such a case an exception will have to be made for the Ministers to appear before the Parliamentary Committee of Defence or any other such desired arrangement.

The HDO - A Catalyst in Building Nation's Self-reliance in Defence Production. It should be designated to play promotional part in development of the indigenous Defence Industrial Base (DIB), and should be able to provide for a military interface to the idea of 'Make in India'. Joint ventures with foreign companies to manufacture in India may be more workable than just seeking niche technologies which nobody will part with. Gradually, therefore, our own corporates must be assigned more and more avenues for industrial progress. 'Make in India' will thus be formalised as the golden principle.

Modernisation through Our Own DIB. Military modernisation is one of the weakest links in our defence management. The reasons for its long-standing stagnation are the lack of trust in our own corporates and over-reliance on the DRDO. It is, therefore, most necessary to set up our own DIB over the next 20 years or so. The work on this has already begun.

Defence Budget to be Commensurate with the Security Challenges. Needless to state that there is a gaping mismatch between defence planning and its funding. The latter has fallen to the lowest denominator of allocation of funds, resulting in the widening capability gap between us and our adversaries. Finding a rationalised meeting point between the divergence of defence planning and funding would, therefore, be a key role for the HDO. The present allocation of 1.7 per cent of the GDP is grossly inadequate. Gradually, we have to move towards a Defence Budget of up to 3 per cent of our GDP in order to ensure preparedness to the levels as warranted by our national security challenges.

Institute a System of Pre-Audit. We have instituted an effective Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). However, there is a long cycle of complex procedures which are fraught with the concerns of propriety and manipulative complaints. Thus, while the controlling role of the HDO in the DPP would continue to be in force, it is most desirable to introduce a system of pre-audit wherein the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and even Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) participate in the process - with due provision for pre-audit. Thereafter, no complaint should be entertained once a deal is signed. If there is a requirement of modification of the existing laws

in enabling the CAG and CVC's participation, a non-partisan NPC will certainly be of great help to steer the bill through the Parliament.

Articulation of National Security Doctrine and Strategy. Finally, the Government, as a pre-requisite, should be able to articulate an appropriate 'National Security Doctrine' and 'National Security Strategy'. These will help the military to find clear directions in meeting the challenges in the coming years. The National Security Doctrine should clearly define "Red Lines" which should be known to all so that, our reactions to the breach of the same are virtually automatic unless stopped, as also, these reactions are not misunderstood by the environment.

Conclusion

In order to project a credible narrative commensurate to its potentials and aspirations at national, regional and global arena, the polity must be wise to realise the relevance of its military institutions. It must prevent itself from relapsing into the misinformed rhetoric of 'no war–and managing only through soft power'. And then, because of five years election cycle, there is the problematic psychology of short term narratives. These political disorientations are the by-products of inadequate construct of our HDO, and manifest through the ominous sign of declining defence allocations while other nations are constantly modernising their forces. China is undergoing a massive reorganisation and restructuring programme of their forces, and that should be a lesson for us.

In the context of the State's apparent insensitivity to the soldier's dignity even if it is they who have time and again proved to be its ultimate saviour against all threats and calamities, this malice would over time affect the quality of intake into the Armed Forces, and consequently, their performance in defending Indian sovereignty. Given her security challenges, India can ill afford that.

Finally, the military institution, on its part, has to rise up to the complex challenges facing it through; on one hand, upgrading of its military professionalism by ensuring inter-services jointness, and on the other, display of professional uprightness and following of the traditional courage of conviction. Only then will they remain worthy of the admiration and respect of the Nation.

1991 – Leadership and Strategy

Dr Sanjaya Baru[@]

Much has been written recently about the economic crisis of 1991 and the new turn in Indian economic policy since then. Most of this has been written by economists who regard themselves as the key actors in economic policy making and management. Historian Robert Skidelsky titled the volume dealing with the inter-war crisis years in his three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes, the most influential economist of the 20th century: "The Economist as Saviour". Keynes and his fellow economists, says Skidelsky, viewed themselves as members of an "activist intelligentsia, claiming a right of direction, vacated by the aristocracy and the clergy, by virtue of superior intellectual ability and expert knowledge of society."[1] They saw themselves as "the front line of the army of progress." Ever since, economists have basked in this self-image as social saviours and commanders on the development battlefront.

However, a balanced and objective assessment of the management of the crisis of 1991 would show that the country's political leadership played an equally important role. Both Prime Minister Chandrashekhar and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao as well as Finance Ministers Yashwant Sinha and Manmohan Singh played an important leadership role in leading policy. Prime Minister Rao went a step further and introduced far-reaching reforms that went beyond crisis management and altered India's trade and industrial policy regimes.[2]

It should also be noted that the economic crisis of 1991 occurred in the context of major political and geopolitical changes that impacted India. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the failure of any national political party to secure an absolute majority in Parliament provided the political context. In an 'era of coalitions' a minority government took charge and was given the responsibility to manage an unprecedented economic situation. Never before

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had India come to the point of defaulting on its external borrowing obligations. A sovereign default would have serious consequences for India's economic and, indeed, political sovereignty.

Equally important was the fact that India's key strategic ally and defence partner, the Soviet Union, was on the verge of an implosion with the end of the Cold War in Europe and the victory of the West over the East. It is in this context that PV Narasimha Rao took charge as Prime Minister.

A day after being sworn in as PM, Rao addressed the nation on television and said: "The economy is in a crisis. The balance of payments situation is exceedingly difficult. Inflationary pressures on the price level are considerable. There is no time to lose. The government and the country cannot keep living beyond their means and there are no soft options left. We must tighten our belts and be prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to preserve our economic independence which is an integral part of our vision for a strong nation."[3]

The PM then took an interesting step forward. Not restricting himself to crisis management, fiscal and balance of payments stabilisation, Rao chose to commit his government to wider economic reform. "The Government is committed to removing the cobwebs that come in the way of rapid industrialisation. We will work towards making India internationally competitive, taking full advantage of modern science and technology and opportunities offered by the evolving global economy."

In two simple sentences he declared to the nation his decision to utilise the crisis as an opportunity to shift India's trade and industrial policy from the inward-orientation of the Nehru-Indira years onto a new trajectory of globally integrated development.

The 'evolving global economy' was being reshaped by new geopolitical factors – the implosion of the Soviet Union and the restructuring of the world trading system by an assertive United States. It was the US that had helped create the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in the 1950s. The purpose of GATT was to install a global trading regime that would enable the war-torn economies of Europe and Asia to rebuild themselves while creating new markets for US exports. The US believed GATT had served its purpose, helping Germany, Japan and many 'East Asian

Tigers' emerge as globally competitive economies. Their exports were now threatening the US and the sole super power wanted a restructuring of the global trading system, replacing GATT with a new World Trade Organisation.

While the immediate demands of crisis-management, especially the urgent need to avoid default on external debt repayments, required 'import compression', in months to come Rao lent his weight to trade liberalisation and the re-integration of the Indian economy with the global, especially the dynamic East Asian economies.

The government's immediate task was to avoid default. It was not just the ignominy associated with a default that India wished to avoid. The experience of every single developing country that had defaulted was no different from that of a poor peasant defaulting on a loan taken from a landlord. The creditor nations seek their pound of flesh. The loss of confidence in a country's ability to manage its economy prudently is not easily reversed.

Rao's predecessor, Prime Minister Chandrashekhar, had already decided that India would rather mortgage gold than default on external payments. Rao authorised a second round of gold mortgage. The first tranche, undertaken in May 1991, involved the shipment of 20 tonnes of gold. The second round, undertaken in July 1991, involved movement of around 46.91 tonnes of gold, valued at US $ 405 million, from the RBI vaults in Mumbai to the vaults of the Bank of England in London. Even as Dollars were earned mortgaging gold, Dollars were lost as non-resident Indians withdrew the cash deposited in foreign currency accounts in India. Given that the priority for the government was to avert external default, there was no other option but to further tighten import controls. The import squeeze began to hurt the economy which, on the one hand, slowed down, and, on the other, experienced inflationary pressure on the price level. The economy was in the throes of what economists define as 'stagflation'.

Opinion was divided within the government on whether 'import-compression' ought to be ensured through physical controls, an outright ban, or ensured through price signals, devaluation of the Rupee. Finance Minister Manmohan Singh tilted in favour of using the exchange rate rather than import bans. Over the financial year

1990-91 the Rupee had already depreciated by around 11.0 per cent, but it was now felt that a one-time sharp adjustment would stabilise the Rupee by renewing confidence in it. On 1st July the Rupee was devalued by around 9 per cent and on 3rd July there was a further devaluation by around 11 per cent, with the adjustment working out to a 17.38 per cent devaluation.

Following devaluation, the government began the process of liberalising the trade regime, moving away from India's traditional export-pessimism to a new philosophy that viewed exports as another source of growth as well as a source of foreign exchange. India is a resources-deficient economy in per capita terms, and has been vitally dependent on oil imports. It needed to finance not just essential imports but also export-promoting imports in sectors using new technologies.

Further trade liberalisation had to wait till India's balance of payments were on firmer ground. For now, a steep devaluation of the Rupee would act as a disincentive for imports and an incentive for exports. No sooner had the devaluation exercise been completed, PV authorised the ending of a highly dubious sop given to exporters called the Cash Compensatory System (CCS). The CCS was a subsidy given to exporters to compensate for all the inefficiencies of the Indian system that made exports globally uncompetitive. Devaluation was an incentive for exporters. Hence, the CCS was withdrawn.

Ignoring apprehensions of the commerce ministry, which has long regarded its *dharma* to be the defence of the interests of exporters, the PM signed the file abolishing CCS on the same day that the RBI took the second step on Rupee devaluation. On July 4th, Commerce Minister Chidambaram announced trade policy reforms that were defined by two key considerations: first, to enable India to move closer to the emerging new global trade policy architecture that was to be put in place by the yet to be established World Trade Organisation; second, to link import entitlements to export performance.

Combining devaluation with trade policy liberalisation made sense. The purpose of taking these measures was also to demonstrate to international investors and financial institutions that the new minority government was prepared to take difficult

decisions. Thus the measures were aimed as much at securing access to hard currency as they were at boosting confidence in India.

A week after the devaluation exercise and on the eve of the first session of Parliament, Rao addressed the nation for a second time. In a speech televised on Tuesday 9th July, 1991 he explained to the people in simple terms the logic behind his early policy moves. You cannot import if you do not export. Trade, not aid. "Aid is a crutch. Trade builds pride. India has been trading for thousands of years." He then went on to emphasise that he intends to go beyond crisis management to bring India in line with the rest of the world. "We believe that India has much to learn from what is happening elsewhere in the world. Many countries are bringing in far-reaching changes. We find major economic transformation sweeping large countries like the Soviet Union and China……. There is a change in outlook, a change in mindset everywhere. India too cannot lag behind if she has to survive, as she must, in the new environment."

Within a fortnight of taking charge as PM, and even before the first sitting of Parliament, Rao took momentous decisions that helped restore confidence in the economy. The next major step to take, and the one that the IMF and the rating agencies were eagerly looking forward to, was a sharp reduction in the fiscal deficit. If exchange rate management was RBI's job, fiscal management was the Finance Minister's.

In fact the single most important announcement made in Singh's first budget speech, on 24 July 1991, was the reduction in the budget deficit. It was a commitment that Singh's predecessor, Yashwant Sinha, had first made in December 1990. It was now Manmohan Singh's turn to deliver on that commitment. The fiscal deficit was brought down sharply from a high of 8.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 5.9 per cent in 1991-92. The Seventh Plan average was as high as 8.2 per cent. This was, by any standard, a sharp and decisive cut.

Exchange rate adjustment and fiscal deficit reduction would in themselves have been enough to win the confidence of credit rating agencies and financial markets. However, PV went a step beyond. Intervening in the debate on the motion of thanks to the President for his address to Parliament, on 15th July, the PM

claimed, "All (our) measures were really written about in newspapers, times without number……. So it is not as if the measures which we have taken have just dropped from the heaven overnight ……… People are more knowledgeable than myself on what is happening in the Soviet Union. …… We cannot keep out of this change, this complete global sweeping change that is coming." [4]

It is with this perspective in mind that Rao instructed the Ministry of Industry (of which he was then the Cabinet Minister) to prepare a new industrial policy dismantling the infamous 'licence-permit Raj'. The government's first priority was to prevent default. Hence, management of the balance of payments and policies aimed at earning Dollars and conserving what was earned, was the first priority. Devaluation and trade reforms were, naturally, the first step. The second step was to enhance confidence in India's economic management as well as to improve the competitiveness of Indian industry. Towards this end, industrial policy reforms were undertaken. The third step was to reduce the government's debt and deficit and show an improvement in fiscal management. This was the focus of the Finance Minister's first budget, presented on 24th July.

In the Indian sub-continent the tone for the 1980s was set by two significant developments in India's wider neighbourhood. First, the emergence of Deng Xiaoping as China's new leader. Second, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the joint Pakistan-US led Jihadi campaign against Russia. Under Deng began the inexorable rise of China. Thanks to Soviet action and US response in Afghanistan, Islamic radicalism knocked on India's door.

Deng blew the dust off Zhou En Lai's 'four modernisations' of 1963 and launched, in 1978, his own revolution for the modernisation and transformation of China. The modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology were Deng's four priorities. Deng's assumption of power was preceded by a rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. This altered the Cold War balance of power across Eurasia and the Asia Pacific region. Not only had India's strategic environment been altered, but Indian attitudes towards nation building and modernisation began to change.

While the Charan Singh Government conveyed India's disapproval of Soviet action in Afghanistan, Indira Gandhi initially toned down the criticism on her return to power in 1980. However, by 1981 Indira Gandhi decided to send a different message out. Even as her officials let it be known that if the US director on the IMF board voted against India securing a loan, India would have no option but to move closer to the Soviets and their East European friends for economic assistance, India signaled a new willingness to work with the West. The botched Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced India to rethink its strategic relationship with big powers.

According to the then Foreign Secretary JN Dixit, Indira sent Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao to Moscow to persuade the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called on her, asking her to "understand" what factors led to the "Soviet initiative", as he put it. Mrs Gandhi merely let him know that she had heard what had been said and had "taken note of it". She stopped short of expressing her "understanding".[5] In his diplomatic memoirs former Foreign Secretary MK Rasgotra records a conversation between Indira and Soviet boss Leonid Brezhnev. Asked by Brezhnev for advice on how to get out of Afghanistan, Indira's terse reply was, "The way out is the same as the way in."[6]

Soviet unwillingness to withdraw was no longer a sign of their strength. Rather, their brutal repression of the Afghans who opposed their presence was the sign of a new and growing weakness. External aggression and domestic political appeasement, Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* signaled this weakness.

The Soviet handling of the Afghan situation, Pakistani nervousness on account of its feeling enveloped by India on one side and the Soviets on the other (reviving memories of the liberation of Bangladesh), a renewed US-Pakistan alliance against the Soviets, the anger in West Asia against Soviet invasion, Pakistani support for Khalistani separatism in India and the civil war within Afghanistan, pre-occupied PV during his tenure as Foreign Minister and then Home Minister.

India's own economic aspirations and woes required it to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the West, specially the US. Indira Gandhi reached out tentatively to US President Ronald Reagan during his first term and Rajiv Gandhi took that initiative forward,

taking advantage of a new warmth in US-USSR relationship symbolised by the Reagan-Gorbachev dialogue. But, despite tentative Indian efforts there was no qualitative change in the US-India relationship during the 1980s.[7]

In this decade of flux, the external environment was far from comfortable for India. In many ways, India's unwillingness or inability to think its relationships anew, the rekindling of old suspicions with respect to the West, a new discomfort with an old friend, the Soviet Union, and the changing equations in Asia defined the 1980s. India retreated into an old comfort zone hosting the Non-Aligned Summit in 1983 and building new equations with other developing countries in associations such as the G-77 and G-15.

Her investment in South-South links and developing country partnerships were not particularly helpful when it came to dealing with a balance of payments crisis, triggered by a sharp rise in oil prices when the head of a 'friendly' oil-rich West Asian country, Iraq, invaded another friendly oil-rich West Asian country, Kuwait. Reeling under the impact of a balance of payments crisis Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha turned for help to the world's rich, the Group of Seven nations, but in vain.

His counterpart in Tokyo did not even have time to meet him. Japan was busy doing business with China. As that long decade came to an abrupt end, global geopolitics shifted rapidly. India was caught unawares, dealing simultaneously with political transition and economic crisis.

Speaking to the *Economic Times* in July 1991 on the options available to the government on the economic policy front, a chastened Yashwant Sinha observed: "The budget will mark a major departure from the kind of economic policies that have been followed since Independence. Policy will have to be viewed in the context not only of the dramatic collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe, but also of the decisive victory of the United States in the Gulf War. The impact of these two events should not be underestimated."[8]

The implosion of the Soviet Union had more than geopolitical consequences for India. It also had profound economic implications at a particularly difficult time. In 1990 the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries that had Rupee payment arrangement for trade

with India accounted for 17 per cent of India's total external trade. This share collapsed to 2.0 per cent in 1992. The sharp decline in Rupee trade and the Russian insistence on moving away from the Rupee-Rouble arrangement to hard currency payments, especially for oil, imposed further burden on India's balance of payments.

Political and economic change at home, a shift in the global balance of power and the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges of the day shaped India's ability to deal with a payments crisis, and the global response to it. The dramatic developments of 1991 demonstrated how the world had changed, and India with it. Professional economists have analysed in detail the economic challenges India faced at the time; political scientists and commentators have examined the political response to these challenges; and geopolitical analysts have written extensively about shifts in global power balances. However, it is easy to see that the politics the economics and the geopolitics of 1991 were all inter-related.

"Now the Cold War is over, there is an element of cooperation instead of confrontation." PV told the *Sunday* magazine, in an interview in September 1991, explaining the rationale of his economic policies. "It is a new situation. And we have to respond to that also. So certain policy reorientation will take place to ensure that our national interest does not suffer."

In saying this, the Prime Minister was providing both political rationale and geopolitical context to his domestic economic policy agenda. As Indira's Foreign Minister in the early 1980s, Rao saw at first hand the declining influence of the Communists in the Soviet Union and the sweeping ideological changes in the formally still Communist China. In 1988 Rao accompanied Rajiv Gandhi on his historic visit to China where he met China's Great Reformer Deng Xiaoping. Even though Rajiv kept Rao out of that meeting, this visit and earlier ones, enabled Rao to grasp the extent of change underway in Deng's China.

In December 1991 Chinese Premier Li Peng visited New Delhi. A new phase in India-China relations was quietly inaugurated and resulted in 1993 in the two Asian neighbours who had fought a war along their border in 1962 signing the historic *Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual*

Control in the India-China Border Areas. Whatever the continuing tensions between India and China over the years, this agreement ensured that no more lives were lost along the border in the subsequent quarter century.

By taking charge of policy in the summer of 1991, Prime Minister Rao made history. But, he made sure he took no individual credit for it, claiming that what he did is what Rajiv Gandhi would have wanted to do. He told the Tirupati session of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), in April 1992, "In the past ten months, our Government has initiated far-reaching fiscal and financial reforms. This was done in conformity with our Election Manifesto of 1991 which gives the main features of the reforms."[9]

Suggesting that there was no deviation in his policies from Nehru's vision of a 'socialist India', Rao projected his initiatives as ensuring 'continuity with change'. A country of India's size "has to be self-reliant", Rao told the AICC, but self-reliance did not mean the pursuit of import substitution as a dogma. "The very level of development we have reached has made us independent of the world economy in some respects, but more dependent on it in others."

Self-reliance in 1991, Rao redefined to mean as being "indebted only to the extent we have the capacity to pay." Reducing foreign debt, being able to avoid default, promoting exports and liberalising the economy so as to attract foreign investment and earn foreign exchange were all elements that would define the path to self-reliance. In the past, self-reliance had been defined as securing 'independence' from the world economy, now self-reliance was being redefined as creating 'inter-dependencies' that would give others a stake in India's progress.[10]

Next, Rao went on to redefine the role of the public sector, reminding his party that both the profits and the losses of public enterprises were in fact the profits and losses of the people of India. Making the public sector more efficient, so that it would cease to be loss-making, was in the interests of the people. Further elaborating the role of public and private sectors in the economy Rao claimed his policies, "do not represent the withdrawal of the State altogether, but a reconsideration of the areas in which it must be present."

Finally, Rao went on to redefine yet another Nehruvian idea that had been reduced to a shibboleth by Indira Gandhi's diplomats. Non-alignment was not just about remaining outside antagonistic military alliances. It was not about being 'neutral'. Non-alignment is "an urge for independence in judgment and action, in exercise of the sovereign equality of nations." As a non-aligned nation India could be on one side or another in international relations depending on the issue. While India chooses to be outside any alliance, it retained the freedom to work with one or the other alliance depending on its own national interest.

This was a pragmatic, not ideological, view of non-alignment. After all, in 1962 Nehru was willing to seek US military help to deal with China and in 1971 Indira sought Soviet help to deal with the ganging up of the US and China on the issue of the future of East Pakistan. The Polish economist Michel Kalecki described non-alignment as "a clever calf sucking two cows", drawing attention to the policy's pragmatic rather than ideological basis.[11]

Linking his economic policies to his foreign policy, Rao concluded, "This self-reliance must consist in trying to find solutions to our own problems primarily according to our own genius......... We reject nothing useful for its plainness, we take nothing irrelevant for its dazzle."

Rao called it "The Middle Way". Rao's 'Middle Way' is not to be confused with a 'middle path'. [12] It was not a mean or a median, a compromise between extremes. It was a path unto itself. "To interpret Nehru's middle way as being valid only in a bi-polar situation is not to understand our ancient philosophy of the Middle Way." The PM told the AICC.

Writing a few years later, in 1998 to be precise, British sociologist Anthony Giddens called it the 'third way' in his politically influential book, *The Third Way: Renewal of Social Democracy.* It was said to have inspired the politics of Prime Minister Tony Blair who was himself battling the Right and Left within the Labour Party. Rejecting top-down bureaucratic socialism, and its emphasis on public investment and controls, as well as rejecting *laissez-faire* 'neo-liberalism', Rao's 'middle way' sought to "strike a balance between the individual and the common good", as PV put it.

"The Middle Way was meant to be a constant reminder that no assertion or its opposite can be the full and complete truth. It meant that we looked for Truth in the interstices of dogmas. It means today that we will accept no dogma even if it happens to be the only dogma remaining in the field at a given moment."

It was the best expression of a liberal principle that in a different world a very different man summed up as "seeking truth from facts".[13] It was only natural that these changes at home would require readjustments in Indian foreign policy at a time when the world too was changing. The end of the Cold War, the implosion of the Soviet Union and the triumph of western capitalism forced Indian diplomacy to readjust its vision and priorities. Building bridges with the emerging centres of economic activity in Asia and with industrial powers, that still dominated global economic and political institutions, became necessary. Guiding India through a new and hitherto uncharted terrain, in that fateful year, Rao asserted the role of a political leader in a democracy. He put India on an untrodden path releasing the immense potential of Indian enterprise.

Endnotes

[1] Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937*, Macmillan, London, 1992. Page 406.

[2] For a detailed account of the political management of the crisis of 1991 and the introduction of new economic policies see Sanjaya Baru, *1991: How PV Narasimha Rao Made History*, Aleph Book Company, New Delhi, 2016.

[3] PV Narasimha Rao, Broadcast to Nation, *Selected Speeches, Volume I,* June 1991-92, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1993. Page 4

[4] PV Narasimha Rao, *Selected Speeches, Vol I* , (1993). Pages 8-9.

[5] JN Dixit, *India's Foreign Policy 1947-2003*, Picus Books, New Delhi, 1998. Page139.

[6] MK Rasgotra, *A Life in Diplomacy*, Penguin Viking, 2016.

[7] Dixit (1998), Page 151

[8] Yashwant Sinha, "Budget 1991 – Options", *Economic Times*, New Delhi, 1st July 1991.

[9] The full text of PV's presidential address to the AICC has been appended to this book. See *Appendix.*

[10] This is an idea that has been elaborated at length in Sanjaya Baru, *Strategic Consequences of India's Economic Performance,* Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2006.

[11] Baru (2006), Chapter 2.

[12] Many make the mistake of thinking PV merely sought to strike a balance, pursuing a 'middle path' between the state and market.

[13] Originally a phrase used by Mao Zedong to defend his decision to liberate the Chinese communists from Stalinist orthodoxy in the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, the guidance 'seek truth from facts' was used by Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping to challenge Maoist orthodoxy within the Chinese communist party. Narasimha Rao's interpretation of the Middle Way comes close to this dictum of basing political action on a realistic assessment of social, political and economic realities.

National Perspective on Disaster Management*

Lieutenant General NC Marwah, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)[@]

Introduction

Globally, in the last 20 years there has been a rising trend especially in the Hydro-met disasters, with 92 per cent deaths occurring in under-developed countries. Asian Region remains epicentre of global disasters with 45 per cent of global disasters, 42 per cent of economic losses, 83 per cent of mortalities and 86 per cent of people getting affected. With 80 per cent of global disasters being weather related, impact of climate change is very significant. Fast economic growth, high population growth, rapid urbanisation (largely unplanned) and the fact that over one billion people in Asia survive on less than US $1.25 per day; poverty drives vulnerability to disasters.

With 10 per cent of global disasters occurring in India, it is one of the five worst affected countries in the world in terms of number of deaths and people affected. India's vulnerability to various types of disasters remains high, with 58.6 per cent landmass prone to earthquakes, 12 per cent landmass (40 million hectares) prone to floods, 75 per cent of coastline getting affected by cyclones and tsunami, 68 per cent of cultivable area prone to drought and 15 per cent of land area at risk from landslides. Thus it emerges that, 85 per cent of India's land mass or 22 out of 29 States get affected by one or more types of disasters. Estimated average annual loss of approximately 2 per cent of GDP, forecast of increase in urban population from 377 million to 600 million by 2030 (40 per cent of population) and effects of climate change pose many challenges impinging on development.

Since India has a progressive and forward looking development agenda of inclusive growth which is getting impacted by disasters, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) has emerged as a high priority focus area in our national policy framework.

National Disaster Management Institutional Mechanism

The overall coordination of Disaster Management (DM) vests with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) are the key committees involved in the top-level decision making with regard to DM. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is the lead agency responsible for the preparation of DM plans and execution of DM functions at the national level. The National Disaster Management Institutional Mechanism is shown in a diagrammatic form at **Figure 1**.


Figure 1

Role of NDMA

NDMA functions under the Prime Minister, who is the Chairperson and currently four members have been nominated. Vital role of NDMA encompasses :-

(a) Lay down policies, plans and guidelines for DM.

(b) Coordinate their enforcement and implementation.

(c) Approve the National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) and the DM Plans of all ministries and departments of the Government of India.

(d) Lay down guidelines for DM to be followed by all the central ministries, departments and the State governments.

The general superintendence, direction and control of the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) is vested in and exercised by the NDMA. The National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) works within the framework of broad policies and guidelines laid down by the NDMA. The NDMA has the mandate to deal with all types of disasters – natural or human-induced. However, other emergencies such as acts of terrorism, law and order, hijacking, air accidents, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attacks, mine disasters, port and harbour emergencies, forest fires, oilfield fires and oil spills are handled by NCMC. Nodal ministries notified for specific disasters are tabulated at **Figure 2.**

State-level DM Mechanism

As per the DM Act 2005, each State is mandated to constitute State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister. SDMA charter of responsibility is akin to that of NDMA. Likewise, as per the DM Act, the State Government is responsible to establish District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) under District Collector / Deputy Commissioner / District Magistrate with the elected representative of the local authority as Co-chairperson.

NDMA and its Vision

In the backdrop of earthquake in Bhuj in 2001 and tsunami in 2004, the Government of India took a path-breaking decision by

NODAL MINISTRIES

Disaster	Nodal Ministry/ Dept./ Agency	
Biological Disasters	Min. of Health and Family Welfare	(MoHFW)
Chemical Disasters and Industrial Accidents	Min. of Environment, Forests and Climate Change	(MoEFCC)
Civil Aviation Accidents	Min. of Civil Aviation	(MoCA)
Cyclone, Tornado, and Tsunami	Min. of Home Affairs	(MHA)
Disasters in Mines	Min. of Coal; Min. of Mines	(MoC, MoM)
Drought, Hailstorm, Cold Wave and Frost, Pest Attack	Min. of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare	(MoAFW)
Earthquake	Min. of Home Affairs	(MHA)
Flood	Min. of Home Affairs	(MHA)
Forest Fire	Min. of Environment, Forests and Climate Change	(MoEFCC)
Landslides and Avalanche	Min. of Home Affairs	(MHA)
Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies	Dept. of Atomic Energy, Min. of Home Affairs	(DAE,MHA)
Oil Spills	Min. of Defence/Indian Coast Guard	(MoD/ICG)
Rail Accidents	Min. of Railways	(MoR)
Road Accidents	Min. of Road Transport and Highways	(MoRTH)
Urban Floods	Min. of Urban Development	(MoUD)

Figure 2

enacting the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and constituted the NDMA to fulfil the long felt need for an institutional mechanism at the national level and to bring about the paradigm shift from a response and relief centric approach to a pro-active prevention, mitigation and preparedness driven approach, for preserving development gains and minimising loss of life, livelihood and property.

The vision enshrined in the National Policy on Disaster Management is to build a safer and disaster resilient India by a holistic, pro-active, technology driven and sustainable development strategy that involves all stakeholders and fosters a culture of prevention, preparedness and mitigation.

Milestones Achieved

In the last decade, the NDMA has worked towards laying a strong foundation and strengthening the DM mechanism framework at the national and state levels. Some of the significant milestones include :–

(a) Preparation of over 20 guidelines for various types of disasters.

(b) Undertaking several Studies and preparation of reports on certain vital disaster related issues.

(c) Supporting preparation of DM plans by states and departments.

(d) Raising, training and equipping of NDRF / SDRF.

(e) Preparation of National Disaster Management Policy (2009).

(f) Risk reduction and mitigation projects – cyclone and school safety.

(g) Awareness programmes and conduct of mock exercises.

National Disaster Management Plan

The first NDMP prepared by NDMA was released by the Prime Minister on 01 June 2016. The Plan hinges on a systematic process of mainstreaming DRR in all developmental agenda and is aligned with adoption of three UN sponsored international agreements as listed below :-

(a) Sendai Framework on DRR (Mar 2015).

(b) Sustainable Development Goals (Sep 2015).

(c) COP-21, Paris Agreement on Climate Change (Dec 2015).

The main highlights of the NDMP are as follows :-

(a) Provides a framework and direction to the government agencies for all phases of disaster management.

(b) Concise and action oriented approach, clearly specifying responsibilities for Centre / State for different stages of all

types of disasters. Lays down measures to be adopted in short, medium and long term.

(c) For each hazard, the NDMP incorporates the priorities enunciated in the Sendai Framework under the five thematic areas for action, viz. :-

   (i)   Understanding Risk.

   (ii)   Inter-Agency Coordination.

   (iii) Investing in DRR – Structural Measures.

   (iv)   Investing in DRR – Non-Structural Measures.

   (v)   Capacity Development.

(d) The response part of the plan has identified eighteen broad activities which have been arranged into a matrix to be served as a ready reckoner.

(e) The NDMP is a dynamic document in the sense that it will be periodically improved in keeping with the emerging global best practices and knowledge bases in disaster management.

Disaster Risk Reduction and Mitigation

Considering the fact that disasters and development are two sides of the same coin, the approach has to be in unison. Sustainable development cannot be achieved unless disaster risk is reduced. As per Global Assessment Report on DRR 2015 released by UNISDR, in recent years, there has been a rapid increase in loss of economic assets and jobs from disasters, particularly in developing and low / middle-income countries.

It is also estimated that economic loss from disasters is growing faster than GDP per capita implying that risk of losing wealth in disasters far exceeds the rate at which wealth is being created. Yet, it is ironical that despite the magnitude of potential costs and loss of income, reducing disaster risks is often perceived as a lesser priority than fiscal stability, tackling inflation and unemployment. For a country like India which is at a threshold of numerous initiatives for economic growth, with focus on development of infrastructure, it is imperative that new investments incorporate DRR and mitigation measures.

As India aspires to be disaster resilient, considering its vulnerability due to recurring hydro-meteorological hazards and

droughts, lot of efforts have been made to build capacity for mitigation and effective response. An example of success story is DRR and mitigation effort in the field of cyclone. The State of Odisha suffered loss of over 10,000 lives because of Super Cyclone in 1999, however, when Cyclone Phailin (2013) and Hud Hud (2014) struck coastal belt of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, due to accurate forecasting and timely evacuation of over 1 million people, this region had very few casualties; 44 and 124 respectively. To meet future challenges of achieving sustainable development, various initiatives are underway to improve India's resilience to disasters.

Understanding Risk

The following measures are being taken for understanding risks :-

(a) Preparation of Hazard Risk & Vulnerability Assessment (HRVA) Maps and Atlas.

(b) Updating of India Disaster Resource Network (IDRN).

(c) Preparation of India DRR Report.

(d) DRR Mainstreaming :-

(i) Undertake HRVA and Cost Benefit Analysis of Investment in DRR which becomes a useful input to formulate development / investment plans.

(ii) Focus on land use, urban and spatial planning, particularly for proposed Smart Cities.

Improving Disaster Risk Governance

Following actions are being undertaken to improve the disaster risk governance :-

(a) Strengthening SDMAs and DDMAs.

(b) Aligning SDMPs with the NDMP and preparation of DM plans at district/ block/village and city/town/municipal/ward level. Appointment /nomination of Nodal Officers for DM.

(c) Sensitising elected officials, local self governments and panchayats.

(d) Legislate mandatory safety audit especially for the lifeline and critical buildings and infrastructure (power/communications installations, hospitals, schools, government offices).

(e)   Strengthen mechanism for compliance of building codes in risk prone areas.

Investing in Risk Reduction

Actions undertaken in risk reduction are :-

(a)   On the lines of National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project (NCRMP), Earthquake, Landslide and Flood Risk Mitigation Projects to be launched.

(b)   As a pilot project, an Earthquake Resilience Model District Programme is being undertaken in Tripura.

(c)   Programme for Sustainable Reduction in Disaster Risk in 10 multi-hazard prone districts of the country has been launched.

(d)   Some of the States have rolled out 'School Safety Programmes', while the National School Safety Programme Phase–2 too has been launched.

(e)   Effort is on to develop five regional centres of excellence on DM in selected apex academic/technical institutions for research and development.

Enhancing Disaster Preparedness

Disaster Preparedness is one of the important tenets of DRR and mitigation initiatives of the Government, involving all stakeholders. Some of the institutional measures are :-

(a)   12 NDRF battalions (including two recently raised) are deployed in hazard prone States, strengthening of SDRF, imparting DM training at State Administrative Training Institutes (ATI) and training centres of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).

(b)   DM training of Civil Defence, Home Guards, NCC, Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan (NYKS) by NDRF battalions and at State/ CAPF ATIs.

(c)   Involvement of Urban Local Bodies (ULB)/wards, block/ village level officials in various awareness programmes.

(d)   CBRN disaster preparedness in all vital institutes/ establishments.

Initiatives by States

States have taken up various initiatives such as launch of innovative awareness programmes, Geographic Information System (GIS) enabled tools for speedy dissemination of warning, harnessing technological advancements for DRR and mitigation, addressing school safety and medical emergency issues through capacity building of community through NGOs.

DM Education and Capacity Building of Professionals.

Some of the initiatives which are in hand are :-

    (a) Inclusion of DM in curriculum of schools through CBSE and State Boards.

    (b) Establishment of DM department in selected universities/ technical institutions.

    (c) Syllabus revision in engineering and architectural institutes to include seismic engineering and effects of landslides and floods.

    (d) Capacity building of DM professionals.

    (e) Masons and other artisans' certification programmes.

Role of Community/NGOs/Volunteers

Awareness programmes such as training of volunteers, as per Community Based DM (CBDM) initiatives by NGOs are vital. Large scale use of social media for information, education and communication (IEC), collection of data and inputs during response stage is invaluable.

Role of Corporates

Besides assisting during relief and rehabilitation stage of a calamity, as part of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), corporates can play an important role towards DRR and mitigation, CBDM initiatives such as awareness programmes and training through NGOs. Corporates can also contribute towards initiatives such as Internet of Things (IOT) for effective DM, innovate tools and research and development projects on forecasting and last mile connectivity.

Leveraging Science and Technology

Early Warning and Forecasting. India has made significant progress in exploiting advanced technology in formulating a robust

early warning and forecasting mechanism, particularly in the field of meteorological forecasting of rains, floods, cyclones and avalanches. Initiatives of Indian Meteorological Department (IMD), Central Water Commission (CWC), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS) and Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE) have enabled extended prediction, customised (Agromet, Aviation, DM etc.) and specific efforts have been put in place for Amarnath, Mansarovar, Char Dham pilgrim routes through varied dissemination modes. There is a need to further enhance the efforts to factor in other parameters so as to accurately predict and forecast landslides and droughts, besides continuing to participate in global initiatives to develop 'Forecasting and Early Warning System' for earthquake.

Space Technology and GIS Applications. Satellites for earth observation, communication, meteorological and navigation applications provide useful inputs for hazard and risk assessments, response, relief and disaster impact assessment. Disaster Management Support (DMS**)** of ISRO and National Database for Emergency Management (NDEM) located at National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) are providing real time inputs to the States and other stakeholders. Bhuvan Portal of ISRO is the largest satellite based web GIS portal.

Reliable Communication including Last Mile Connectivity. For immediate dissemination of early warning it is imperative to achieve last mile connectivity to affected populace. At times of natural disasters, the first casualty is communication which severely impacts rescue and relief effort. Therefore, development of a dedicated and robust Disaster Communication Network with inbuilt redundancy is being given a high priority. NDMA has recently launched V-sat based Phase 1 of National Disaster Management Services (NDMS) Project for 120 locations (all States, Union Territories and 80 most hazard prone districts).

Regional/International Initiatives

NDMA had coordinated rescue, relief and reconstruction work activities in the aftermath of the Nepal earthquake on 25th April 2015. A total of 16 NDRF teams were deployed for rescue while NDMA coordinated despatch of over 1400 metric tonne of relief material, besides extending technical support through deployment

of experts from India. NDMA, in May 2016 also coordinated despatch of relief material to Sri Lanka for flood victims and in June 2016 despatched humanitarian aid for the earthquake affected people to Ecuador.

Since disasters do not recognise geographical boundaries, major disasters may often simultaneously affect several countries. Hence, in spirit of commitment to Sendai Framework, it is endeavoured to develop close cooperation and coordination at the international level in all spheres of DM. In the aftermath of Nepal earthquake, India organised the first South Asian Annual DM Exercise (SAADMEx) and SAARC regional workshop in Nov 2015. India has embarked to take forward this initiative to develop capability and capacity for a joint response.

Other Recent International Initiatives

Initiatives undertaken recently in the field of DM at international level are :-

(a) MoU with Indonesia (Oct 2013)

(b) MoU with ASEAN (Nov 2014)

(c) Ufa Declaration by BRICS (Jul 2015)

(d) Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (Aug 2015)

(e) Agreement with Russia (Mar 2016)

(f) India hosted the 2nd BRICS Ministries meeting at Udaipur on 22-23 Aug 2016 wherein a joint action plan has been formulated.

(g) India is hosting the 7th Asian Ministers Conference for DRR (AMCDRR) at New Delhi from 2nd to 5th Nov 2016 with an aim to formulate and adopt an Asian Regional Plan for implementation of Sendai Framework.

Role of Armed Forces

The Armed Forces are mandated to respond to rescue and relief operations in a situation of any major calamity. In such an eventuality, whether in India or abroad, decision to commit the Armed Forces is taken at NCMC chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. Deployment of Armed Forces for any major calamity including

launch of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations abroad is coordinated by HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) as per decision taken at the Defence Crisis Management Group (DCMG), headed by Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC).

So as to harmonise effort of the armed forces, they are being involved in conduct of major mock exercises (including Table Top Exercises), being conducted by the NDMA at the state level, with full involvement of the State Government and participation of all stakeholders viz. NDRF, SDRF, Civil Defence, Fire Services, Red Cross, CAPFs / Coast Guard (where available). So as to streamline various Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of joint response and to contribute towards awareness of people in the disaster prone areas. HQ IDS too has steered conduct of such exercises this year. The first such exercise was conducted by the Army as lead agency for floods scenario at Guwahati in June 2016. Navy conducted HADR exercise in a cyclone scenario at Vizag in August 2016 while the Air Force has conducted earthquake scenario exercise at Bhuj in September, 2016.

Conclusion

India has indeed come a long way in terms of enhancing our capacity to respond to various types of disasters which we face almost every year. Considering the size of our country and our vulnerability to almost all types of natural disasters, the focus of India's efforts on DRR and mitigation remains a big challenge. Since India has embarked on various initiatives entailing huge investment on development of infrastructure, it is important that disaster resilience should be cornerstone of India's strategy of achieving sustainable development. Harnessing technological advancements too is likely to play a vital role in preventing and reducing impact of a disaster. In this regard, NDMA has built strong partnership with a number of technological institutes and expert bodies to address various challenges. In the spirit of India's commitment at various International forums and in line with tenets of the NDMP, number of initiatives have been taken up by NDMA and the States to involve local administration, NGOs, corporates and most importantly the communities to enhance their level of awareness so as to prevent human-induced disasters and build capacity to withstand impact of disasters.

The Chinese Military's Mindset

Colonel Iqbal Singh Samyal[@]

Introduction

The Chinese military figures preeminently in President Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" *(zhong guo meng)* as the "Strong Army Dream" *(qiang jun meng)*. China's rise and the PLA's growing capability are redefining global and regional power equations. Understanding the Chinese military's mindset has become even more important in this milieu. Rather than dwelling on an academic interpretation of strategic culture which continues to be theorised[1], this article aims to look at the Chinese mindset in the framework of traditional strategic culture, which is focused outwards, and organisational culture, which is focused inwards. The primary aspects analysed are the traditional Chinese military strategic culture, the formative influences on the PLA and the contemporary developments to provide the practitioner with a framework to better discern the Chinese military's mindset.

The Traditional Chinese Military Strategic Culture

Traditional Chinese military culture has two strands viz. the civilisational attributes and the strategic culture. History and exclusiveness of the Chinese culture have led to certain deep rooted civilisational attributes. China saw early consolidation of political power under the imperial court of the Qin and Han dynasties after a violent and tumultuous ancient period. Imperial contiguity under subsequent dynasties, the strength of the Chinese culture and a strong 'Han' identity manifested into the 'Middle Kingdom' syndrome and the *Tianxia* concept. Overtime grew a self-perception as a superior, self-contained, pacifist and defensive civilisation. There is also a strong belief in the strong correlation between internal stability and external threat. The constant threat from the northern nomads engendered a continental outlook towards strategy and led to the concept of frontier defence and peripheral buffers to

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protect the Han motherland.[2] The peripheral buffers to the Han motherland namely; Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and subsequently Tibet have been controlled or lost depending on the strength of the ruling dynasty and this has been a cyclic process through most of Chinese imperial history.

The traditional strategic culture is evident from the ancient texts. The Chinese were the first to formally collate their ancient military texts including *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*.[3] Five of the Seven Classics including *The Art of War* were written during the 'Spring and Autumn' (722 - 481 BC) and the 'Warring States' period (approx 403 to 221 BC).[4] This era is termed as a period of basic establishment of Chinese strategic theory.[5] During the Warring States period seven major states on the North China plains[6] struggled in a long drawn political and military contest to become the hegemon (*ba*), with emphasis on statecraft, detailed assessment of relative state power, strategic alliances, deception, long term planning and preparation for war which permeated the subsequent Chinese strategic culture. The salience of the Seven Military Classics is that from the Song Dynasty (960-1126 AD) onwards, these were used as official texts for martial related examinations having a lasting impact on generations of military and political leaders.[7]

The PLA's *Science of Strategy (2005)* divides the content of ancient Chinese strategy into "Theory of Victory in Advance" (war preparation to include knowledge and war build up), "Theory of Complete Victory" (victory by safe and varied means including attacking the enemy's strategy and alliances, using psychological, coalition and economic warfare) and "Theory of Victory through Fighting" (actual war). The latter theory includes the use of dialectical terminologies to highlight the dynamic nature of war as characterised in *The Art of War.* These three theories were considered as an organic whole supporting each other to form a "strategic theoretical system" to conquer the enemy.[8] Much academic research has been carried out on the ancient and imperial Chinese military texts by both the Chinese and western scholars. Differing perceptions exist with one school of thought including the Chinese propounding that Chinese culture is essentially pacifist in nature preferring the use of nonviolent means to subdue or deal with adversaries and that this culture is rooted in Confucianism - Mencius principles.[9] Johnston (1995) claims that Chinese strategic

culture is based on hard realpolitik considerations with emphasis on offensive action and on flexibility or *quanbian* (assessment of relative strengths and the situation). He bases this claim on an academic analysis of the contents of "The Seven Military Classics" and the military texts of the Ming Dynasty in dealing with the Mongols.[10]

The traditional Chinese military culture influenced many Chinese leaders including Mao Zedong, Zhu De who purportedly memorised "The Art of War" and Marshal Liu Baocheng who taught "The Art of War" at the PLA Academies.[11] Conservative "hawks" in the establishment, including the PLA, invoke this era and there are books written on the similarities between the Warring States period and the current multipolar world.[12] Thus the framework of the traditional Chinese military culture is important for understanding the military strategic culture.

The Formative Influences on the PLA

All organisations are shaped by their initial leadership and experiences. The PLA is no exception to this rule. Arbitrarily taking the period from 1927[13] to the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 as the initial formative years of the PLA, the main formative influences can be summarised as the Marxist Strategic Theory, the towering leadership of Mao Zedong, the initial operational experiences and the Soviet influence. The importance of these formative influences is primarily in the organisational culture of the PLA.

Marxist Strategic Theory. The ideological fountainhead of communist ideology has been Marxism - Leninism. In addition to the ideological aspects, the PLA traces concepts related to People's War, Active Defence, advancement of science and technology and proletarian way of operations to Marxist Strategic theory.[14] Further, even today the PLA strives to align the contemporary situation to the ideological framework.

Mao Zedong's Military Strategy. Mao shaped the PLA and also produced a vast body of military writings which became a kind of scripture for the PLA. The most important aspects of Mao's strategy as per the PLA are his interpretations of Marxist-Leninist ideology as applicable to Chinese conditions, the primacy of politics in military strategy and the strategic guidance of People's War and Active Defence.[15] The PLA continues to abide by these principles

showing Mao's enduring legacy in its discourse and Active Defence suitably modified is the strategic guidance even today.[16]

The Operational Experience. During the formative years the PLA was constantly in conflict starting with the Revolutionary War (1920s to late 1940s; including the War against Japan (1937-45) and the Civil War (1946-49)) and continued after the establishment of the PRC with the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Attacks (1954-55 and 58). Further during this period the PLA evolved across the entire spectrum of conflict from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare. The PLA graduated to large scale manoeuvre and conventional warfare during the Civil War (1946-49) of which three important campaigns namely, the Liao Shen campaign, the Beijing Tianjin campaign and the Huai Hai campaign had major lessons for the PLA and are studied in the PLA Academies even now.[17] These initial operational experiences in conventional warfare shaped the operational and tactical level philosophy of the PLA.

The Soviet Influence. The Soviet influence, which had existed from the inception of the Communist Party of China (CPC), increased after the Korean War when it was decided to build a professional army modelled on the Soviet Red Army. Consequently the period between 1954-58 saw large scale 'Russianisation' covering all aspects including organisational changes, professional military education and doctrine, translation and dissemination of Red Army manuals (regulations, curricula, handbooks and research reports), weapons and equipment procurement and Soviet military advisers at practically every level.[18] Although the subsequent Sino-Soviet split impacted the relations, the PLA organisation was modelled on the Soviet Army and the PLA which for much of its existence due to necessity had been largely decentralised became centralised, hierarchical and rigid along horizontal and vertical organisational lines.

At the end of the formative period, the Chinese military had a nationalistic, ideological and operationally experienced mindset. Most Chinese military leaders had less or no formal military education and learned through practical experience. The CPC also saw enemies, both within and outside the country, posing an existential threat to it and reinforced the military's ultra-nationalistic outlook and sensitivity to territorial matters. On a broader note, the Chinese military mindset could be considered to be ultra-

nationalistic with sensitivity to territorial integrity, realist by nature with reliance on assessment of relative military power (national power) and long term planning, laying emphasis on deception, offensive pre-emptive action and surprise at the operational level, dependent on Mao's military philosophy and drawing lessons from China's rich traditional strategic military culture. Some of these aspects are hard coded in the PLA mindset. However, contemporary changes in modern warfare have influenced the Chinese operational thought and the recent reorganisation will impact the organisational culture.

The Chinese military became highly politicised in the following years and became mired in the internal politics of the CPC. Deng Xiaoping's take over after Mao's death heralded a new era and the PLA's journey from becoming a combined arms force to the transformation for prosecuting integrated joint operations began in earnest.

Contemporary Developments

China has changed faster than any other country has in a short span of five decades. The Party has moved on from 'ideological purity' to 'economic development' as *raison d'être* and under the present leadership is drumming the nationalistic beat. Economic changes have created interests beyond the mainland. China has emerged from a regional power status to consider itself part of a triangle of big powers to include the USA, Russia and China.[19] In addition to these factors, the PLA has also been impacted with the changing nature of warfare and the expanding arc of PLA roles. Fortuitously the economic resources, leadership guidance and improving indigenous technological capabilities have been enablers for the PLA in its quest for the "Strong Army Dream". Given the opaqueness of China's real strategic goals, inferences have to be drawn from the important manifestations which are evident in the professionalism, modernisation and the changing priorities of the PLA.

Professionalism. The PLA's influence within the CPC has reduced in comparison to the past although it still stands as a powerful institution within the Chinese political structure. Heath (2015) contends that the PLA is evolving into a functional equivalent of a modern, national army while being organised along Leninist principles implying that the PLA is moving from a political first to

becoming a professional political army.[20] It also implies that, like other State institutions in China today which have become more professional, the military is in tune with the strategic and ideological framework provided by the CPC and focused on the security domain. Consequently, it mostly retains major influence in the security and defence related issues including strategic arms, territorial disputes and policies with regard to countries like India, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the USA.[21]

Modernisation. The comprehensive modernisation process, aimed at being capable of winning wars under conditions of informationisation by mid-21st century, is largely on track with interim objectives being achieved. In consonance with the demands of integrated joint operations, the PLA has carried out reorganisation of higher and operational level defence organisations. A major driving force of the PLA modernisation is the large military research community including the PLA Academy of Military Science and other military education institutions. Comprehensive study on foreign armies, conflicts and concepts is carried out by this community and an important outcome has been the hybridisation of Chinese military thought with western war fighting concepts. It is common to see military texts using terminology like asymmetric, non-linearity, tempo of operations alongside phraseology straight from Mao Zedong's thought *(Mao Zedong Sixiang)*. Chinese war fighting concepts are aligning more with the West, though the change is more in nature of Michael Porter's definition of 'operational efficiency' rather than strategy.[22] The PLA graduated from combined arms operations *(hetong zuozhan)* in the 1980s to joint operations *(lianhe zuozhan)* in the 1990s to its current aspirational doctrine of integrated joint operations *(yitihua zuozhan)* with system of systems *(zuozhan tixi)* capability, akin to the western network centric warfare, under an overall vision of time bound "mechanisation *(jixiehua)* and informationisation *(xinxihua)*". The PLA has systematically carried out its modernisation to become a more capable and effective modern fighting force and a modicum of confidence is already evident in the unfolding events in the South and East China Seas.

Maritime Focus. The Chinese Defence White Paper 2015 titled "Military Strategy" clearly states that China has to build itself into a maritime power. [23] The PLA Navy (PLAN) has moved beyond Admiral Liu Huaqing's "Near Seas Active Defence Strategy" to "Far Seas Operations". While Chinese articulations are indicative

of a defensive outlook towards Chinese economic maritime interests there are indications of the influence of Mahan on Chinese Strategists.[24] Contemporary Chinese maritime strategy is still being analysed based on the growing PLAN capability, Chinese publications and PLA texts with some scholars positing that China is making a layered developmental strategy with a combination of "Near Seas Defence, Far Seas Operations", as it projects power in an incremental manner outwards.[25]

Geopolitics. The PLA has always established a 'main strategic direction' for any given period. As mentioned in the *Science of Strategy,* its orientation in the 1950s was the South East Coast and in the 1960s post the Sino-Soviet split, became the Northern Areas[26]. The current reorganisation into five Theatre Commands clearly indicates its new orientation towards the maritime domain in the Asia-Pacific region. The geopolitical significance of Taiwan has grown because of the Chinese contest for geostrategic space with the US in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, though not clearly articulated, there is a clear perception of the East China Sea and the South China Sea being considered as the new maritime buffers akin to the peripheral buffers in the historical continental strategy. The developments in the South China Sea and East China Sea signal that the Chinese will use both coercive and non-coercive policies in this quest for regional dominance which can be considered a litmus test for China becoming a 'Big Power' in its own right. [27]

Conclusion

China's metamorphic and rapid change has created both prosperity and contradictions. Wealth has also created inequality; capitalism flourishes in the cloak of modified communist ideology, and growing societal aspirations co-exist with and challenge authoritarianism. Metaphorically, the PLA also reflects this reality and despite the projection of rapid development, the PLA will absorb the changes desired in a much longer time frame than is being projected, especially in the organisational culture. In order to comprehend the Chinese military's mindset, all the frames of reference including the traditional and formative influences as also the contemporary developments need to be appreciated.

The Chinese military has a realist and nationalistic outlook with both hard-line and moderate factions within its ranks. The

maritime outlook of the military is coming to the forefront and the Chinese are aiming to contest the maritime space in the Asia-Pacific from the US. The important question in the future will be – if the Chinese, and by corollary the military, be successful in applying an essentially continental strategy in the maritime domain where the connotations are different and zero sum outlook cannot be applied. Further, will China continue to view the world through the insular lens of the 'Middle Kingdom' and the outlook of 'Warring States' period in a bid for world pre-eminence or adopt a more mellow outlook to limit the military buildup and work out a regional security architecture which is based on mutual trust and accommodation?

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South China Sea in Retrospect : Post Tribunal Verdict

Commander MH Rajesh[@]

Introduction

In July 2016 a tribunal in Hague delivered its award over several features and an ambiguous line over water in the South China Sea (SCS) – an issue that has been brewing for several years between China and her maritime neighbours. The appellant to the arbitral tribunal – a redressal forum of the United Nations Conventions on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) – was the Philippines. The award went against China and in favour of the Philippines. However, the heat and dust over SCS is unlikely to settle anytime soon, considering the hard, *historical* (emphasis added) line adopted by China. This article tries to place some relevant aspects of that case in retrospect and gauges some of its impacts.

The South China Sea

The SCS is a marginal sea in the Pacific Ocean, littoral to the South East Asian Nations and China (**Figure 1**). It has several reefs and shoals, which make it rich in fish and other resources. Nations that abut that sea – China and the ASEAN nations – are also significant engines of global growth. They are also deeply into trade, 90 per cent of which happens via the oceans. This is especially true of China, which is the most trading nation in the world.[1] The SCS is also an important maritime conduit that connects the Indian and Pacific Ocean Economic Systems which has markets at one end and resources at the other. Any disturbance to this Indo-Pacific system can upset global economy.

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China   Malaysia   Vietnam   Brunei   Philippines   Taiwan

(source http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/07/31/challenging-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/)

Figure 1 : The Map of SCS

The Disputes over SCS

The SCS has over two hundred land features in separate groups, many of which are presently contested. Of all the disputes, the Spratlys involve the most number of claimants including China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Over and above these contests, there is a unique claim over these small features by China known as the 'nine dash line'. This is a Chinese cartographic expression which dates back to a 1947 map produced during the Nationalist rule. This makes matters complex with hardening positions taken by Communist China and Nationalist Taiwan.[2] The modern version of this nine dash line surfaced in 2009. That year, China in its *note verbale* to the UN in response to the continental shelf claim by Vietnam and Philippines, placed the present version of the nine dash line.[3] Over the years the dashes have varied both in numbers and positions.[4] Two dashes in Tonkin bay vanished, as China settled that portion of the claim, whereas an additional dash got added near Taiwan. China since

2012 also issues passports with a map showing this nine dash line. UNCLOS does not recognise such a line over water. Hence, the SCS disputes have two main arguments – national ownership of land features as well as legality and meaning of the infamous nine dash line.

The Laws of the Sea

UNCLOS is the modern law of the ocean, first articulated as *mare liberum,* meaning open seas. The concept got refined over a period, resulting in the three mile *cannon shot* law. Rising marine activities demanded adapting the UNCLOS, a process that commenced in 1958, which finally came into force in 1994. China and all parties involved in SCS disputes are signatories to the UNCLOS. The most notable non-party is the USA, which has reservations with its Seabed Convention. Some relevant UNCLOS tenets of the dispute are as follows (Refer **Figure 2**) :-

(a)   A country's entitlements over sea stem from its ownership of adjacent land. This is the doctrine of *"la terre domine la mer"* or land dominates the sea.

(b)   The extent and rights of entitlement from 12 nm territorial rights to 350 nm economic rights for a continental shelf claim.

(c)   Waters landwards of 'baseline' are *internal waters,* where sovereign rights can be exercised.

(d)   Land features such as drying heights, rocks, and islands may confer some entitlements as under :-

(i)   Small features that are visible only during low water (Low Tide Elevations (LTE)) do not provide entitlement over sea, nor can they be appropriated by occupation, but they become part of baseline points.

(ii)   Rocks accrue only a 12nm territorial sea (TS) around them.

(iii)   To qualify as Islands, features in their natural condition, must be able to sustain habitation and have capacity for non-extractive economic activity. Islands fetch territorial sea and 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

(e) UNCLOS accounted for *historic claims* during its formulation. Pre-existing rights to resources were considered, but not adopted by the convention. Such rights were extinguished with provisions of EEZ /Continental Shelf (CS) in UNCLOS.

(f) The UNCLOS defines an archipelago regime exclusively for states that exist as a group of islands which entitles an archipelagic baseline and internal waters inside them (refer Figure 2).

(g) The degree of freedom of passage varies, depending on nature of waters – i.e. straits, internal, territorial and high seas.

Figure 2 : Maritime and Air Space Zones

Along with UNCLOS came a dispute resolution mechanism. States could choose one or more designated organisations for settling disputes including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), International Court of Justice or Arbitral tribunals.

A Brief History of Disputes

There are several reasons behind onset of SCS disputes. National maritime capacities and awareness expanded simultaneously with UNCLOS negotiations. One trigger point was discovery of oil in Spratlys in 1970s. The presence of reefs and shoals also made the area abundant in fish, a significant source of protein. The East

Asian economies and China grew phenomenally, relying on trade as well as energy flows through the SCS. As significance of SCS grew, disputes too became bitter. China and Vietnam fought naval battles over the Paracel group in 1974 and a Spratlys reef in 1988. The coming in to force of UNCLOS in 1994, accentuated the disputes. By 2002, diplomacy yielded a declaration of conduct between parties in SCS which provided some mitigating mechanisms. Nations had also commenced building and reclamation on the features in their possession. Some of it was with a military perspective to improve habitability and status as per UNCLOS. This altered natural state of the features reclaiming approximately 3300 acres, majority being Chinese efforts.

The Arbitration

The territorial disputes kept simmering till early 2013 when the Philippines chose the arbitration route, through the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague as per UNCLOS provisions. Instead of raising sovereignty, the Philippines, pivoted the case on interpretation of UNCLOS.[5] This was an astute strategy, primarily since the tribunal has no mandate to award on sovereignty or delineation but can interpret legalities based on UNCLOS. Two core questions from the Philippines comprised the legality as per UNCLOS of *'Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line' and 'Status of Features'* in Spratlys. From these two core questions emerged *lawfulness of Chinese actions.* It also raised *aggravation of dispute and harm to environment* also in its submission.

China abstained from the arbitration, but pronounced its views and non-acceptance of arbitration through position papers. Yet, the hearing proceeded since *'absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings'* according to UNCLOS. The tribunal initially decided on admissibility and jurisdiction and awarded the final verdict in Jul 2016 against China.

The Award

The salient ponts of the award along with comments are given in the succeeding paras :-[6]

Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line'

    (a)   **Nine-Dash Line.** Award stated that scope of entitlement

is defined by UNCLOS. Claims in excess by China are invalid regarding Nine Dash Line.

Comments. An entitlement over sea originates from ownership of land. The waters in contest are more than 350 miles away from Chinese mainland, beyond maximum zone of entitlement (i.e. extended Continental Shelf). Therefore, Chinese entitlement around Spratlys if any, would emerge from the ownership of features within it and not the 'Nine Dash Line' over water. It is here, that historical aspect of the claim becomes relevant.

(b) **History and UNCLOS**. It stated that UNCLOS during the formulation had considered historic rights but were not adopted and deemed subsumed and extinguished in EEZ rules. The award stated that though Chinese mariners historically made use of the islands, there was no evidence that it historically exercised exclusive control over water or their resources. Tribunal, therefore, concluded that there is no legal basis for China to claim historic rights, to resources within sea areas of the Nine Dash Line.

Comments. UNCLOS considers historic claims in two instances. They are articulated as historic *bays* and historic *titles.* Both pertain to sovereignty over a sea area close to land, with certain quantifiable as well as subjective criteria, treating them as 'internal waters'. In these cases claimant has to prove propriety, continuous effective control, besides acquiescence of foreign states in exercise of that authority.[7] In distinguishing between historic water, title and rights, there is an interpretation that historic 'water' or historic 'title' are about sovereignty whereas historic 'rights' are lesser set of rights.[8]

Status of Features. The tribunal considered the features. As described earlier, an island, rock or an LTE accrued different entitlements over water. Tribunal concluded from the present and historical evidence that none of the Spratlys features was an island.

Implications and Comments. This meant that none of it generated an EEZ or a CS irrespective of ownership by any nation freeing up a very large area for global commons. To illustrate, merely a spot on island would generate 125600 sq nm of EEZ, whereas 'rocks' reduced entitlement to 452 sq nm of territorial sea.[8] The verdict implied that certain seas

were part of the Philippines EEZ since they were not in any 'possible' entitlement of China. Additionally, EEZ entitlement also has a navigational implication considering China's views on freedom of navigation in EEZ.

Other Awards. The other awards, of relevance are:-

(a)   China violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its EEZ and created a serious risk of collision with Philippine vessels.

(b)   China caused severe harm to environment and violated its obligation to preserve ecosystems.

(c)   China had aggravated the dispute, by land reclamations and construction during dispute resolution.

Responses

International responses were along expected lines, mostly measured and diplomatic. Even domestic responses within affected nations were muted and controlled. A few of these are highlighted below:-

(a)   The Chinese response to the Tribunal award was that it was *'a political farce under the pretext of law',* and declaring the award *null and void* with no *binding force.* It reiterated China had neither accepted nor recognised the same. It had crafted a response, one alluding to existence of internal waters in SCS taking the archipelagic/historic route for legitimising what was within the nine dashes.[10] A White Paper was also released with copious historic details reinforcing its historic claim. The response fails to challenge the logic of the verdict apart from hardening the historical route to the claim. In an attempt to gain support, China has also incorrectly interpreted the joint Russia-India-China statement as a measure of Indian and Russian support.[11]   Pakistan and Taiwan were notable supporters of China.

(b)   Indian statement mentioned the following :-[12]

(i)   Expressed support to freedom of navigation, overflight and unimpeded commerce.

(ii)   Ushered respect to International law and UNCLOS.

(iii)   Sought resolution of disputes using peaceful means without use of force and threats.

(iv)   Sought self-restraint in not complicating disputes.

(c)   The dynamics in the Philippines have also undergone a change. New President Duterte is busy with extra-legal crackdowns and has even risked falling out with its ally, the USA. It seems to be mending fences with China with ex-President Fidel Ramos as the chief interlocutor. The official reactions have also been with restraint.[13] Hanoi, too has clamped down anti-China protests.[14]

A Geopolitical Perspective

China's late maritime resurgence, geography and its historical actions in the continent partly answer why it is undertaking contrarian positions after signing UNCLOS in 1996. It appears, just as it had created a continental buffer around a coastal Han core by annexing Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia in initial days of PRC, it is in the process of creating a maritime buffer zone in the SCS. It is called a *core,*[15] albeit in unofficial parlance, due to following reasons :-

(a)   SCS is vital to its maritime commerce and energy needs especially with the *'new normal'* of slow economic growth. Even a minor disturbance to trade flows can cause severe imbalance, with a political price to pay. This is also closely linked to their Malacca Dilemma.[16]

(b)   SCS holds reasonable reserves of oil and gas.

(c)   As the largest consumers of fish in the world with the depleting fish stock in Chinese EEZ, SCS is a source of food and livelihood for China.

(d)   SCS is the vital area leading to Malacca Straits critical to a two ocean strategy. Kaplan argues that SCS is key to China's two ocean strategy just as Caribbean Sea was key to the US's two Ocean presence with the making of Panama Canal.[17]

(e)   The US Pivot to East Asia accentuates that insecurity.

Steps to Control that Buffer

China's aim appears converting SCS into zones where it has higher control. According to UNCLOS the legal nature of waters, whether internal, territorial, EEZ or high seas, decides degree of

freedom of navigation through those waters.[18] Since land dominates the sea, a line over water has no *locus standi* and only a feature in the sea can give a nation control over water. That must explain the scramble for features and island building. Among maritime zones of control within the ambit of UNCLOS 'internal *waters',* offer highest navigational control.[19] They are usually landwards of 'baseline' or within boundaries of an archipelago.[20] The geography of contested waters in SCS legally cannot become internal waters to China because :-

(a) It is not landwards of any Chinese baseline.

(b) Creation of archipelagic base line is an exclusive privilege of an *archipelagic* state which China isn't with a continental mainland.[21]

(c) The tribunal has also ruled that Spratlys do not fulfil the archipelago criterion as per UNCLOS on its own, even if features were deemed as a single entity.

Yet, the three post tribunal Chinese responses on *sovereignty* and *arbitration,* by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Government and the White paper mention *internal* waters in the SCS![22,23,24]

Whilst, creation or claim over features provides measurable methods of control, there is another route – of history which in very rare, well defined cases provides internal waters and rights. In a peculiar position of Marxist Leninist state over history, Chinese statements hinge on the *historic* claim[25] in an effort to give a fillip to its 'rights' over these waters. In fact, the Chinese post tribunal response invokes history over twenty times, whereas UNCLOS mentions history just twice, that too in a text ten times as voluminous. This desire to turn the clock back into a historic era with incipient law will do China and the world more harm. The SCS issue is back to where it started with such a stand, albeit with greater public clarity over UNCLOS.

Implications of the Award

The most significant implication of the award is that it clarified several UNCLOS aspects hitherto not available from a legal perspective to a wider audience; such as :-

(a) This offers a legal respite to affected parties.

(b)   By awarding that the subject features are not islands but rocks and low tide elevations, it has freed large water space for use by global commons.

(c)   It has awarded that historic rights were considered and deemed extinguished when EEZ's were decided.

This award serves as a precedence and reference to further resolutions of disputes in the region. However, it did not judge on sovereignty, leaving that question open for resolution. Here, China's insistence of a bilateral approach to resolution is a ploy considering the power differential between China and individual nations.

The verdict has affected China's claim to adherence to rule of law and peaceful development. Even though it abstained and rejected the verdict as a ''farce'', it reacted throughout the proceedings through position papers, public hearings across nations and newspaper advertisements.

As a cue for the road ahead, it is good to recall that power in global politics will remain diffused in the future.[26] This is also one reason why adherence to law becomes all the more important with lesser powers for the hegemon. Concepts like buffer zones have proven to be part of the problem than solutions, and could become redundant when rule based, equitable cooperative constructs emerge in a new order. It would be ideal and augur well for China as a responsible global power to scale down the actions and take lead in a cooperative, oceanic regime based on rule of law with all stake holders. That should assuage some of its own insecurities.

The award will positively affect rule of law for oceans. So far members of the Security Council including the USA have shown little respect to previous arbitrations.[27] Whereas middle powers have amicably settled issues by arbitration irrespective of sizes of countries involved like India-Bangladesh Settlement.[28] China has portrayed the Philippine action as a proxy initiative by the USA; whereas the USA, a non-party to the convention was not allowed to be a part of the Tribunal hearings. The USA becoming a party to UNCLOS will strengthen the regime in a world which is becoming increasingly multipolar. Bill Hayton highlights the irony that China has ratified UNCLOS but doesn't adhere to it, whereas the US has not ratified but adheres to most of its provisions!

Chinese internal situation is presently marked by a powerful President, an anti-corruption campaign which has shaken its polity, triggered an economic slowdown and a transition of its economic model. Such a transition makes any nationalist spark, a sensitive issue. Despite etching the 'nine dash line' on public consciousness, China has so far clamped down on public response.[29] It can ill afford any popular uprisings as previous experiences indicate that such events quickly spin out of control and attain a different tone and tenor.

The SCS has so far not been elevated to a core status, unlike Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.[30] Yet, it's response evoking *internal* waters and historical rights are signs that the issue is far from over. The 'verdict' is one window, to tone down the rhetoric as a first step to an eventual settlement. It remains to be seen how far China would push the envelope in the matter, as 'nine dash line' has been tattooed. However, it can alter interpretations to suit the verdict for non-exclusive rights such as those over Scarborough Shoals or the joint development route that it seeks as per UNCLOS. Whatever be its choice, it appears that the issue is far from over considering the stakes involved. India and the world must encourage parties to resolve disputes through peaceful means without use of force and exercise self-restraint based on the principles of UNCLOS. Law must remain above politics.

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China, Japan and the Evolving Risks in the East China Sea: Implications and Policies to Avert Risks

Ms Amrita Jash[@]

Introduction

With much of the attention being paid to the South China Sea dispute, it becomes imperative to note that the constant militarisation of the East China Sea signals greater risks of an accidental military confrontation between the two Asian powers, China and Japan. At the outset, although the potential costs involved discourage any such intended move either by China or Japan but the increasing trends of escalation and constant militarisation of the East China Sea has seemingly increased the likelihood of an unintended confrontation between China and Japan, if not deterred. In this view, the alarming trends call for immediate de-escalation policies to be adopted by both China and Japan in order to quell the dangers of an imminent confrontation. Thus, the latent emergency needs to be acted upon by precautions to avert an unwarranted calamity imposed with heavy costs. Given this perspective, the paper examines the building tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The paper argues that the increasing trends of military escalation between China and Japan reflect unwarranted risks. In this view, the paper examines the potential risks involved and therefore, recommends some policies in order to avert any form of miscalculated tragedy.

Background

On July 12, 2012, The Hague based Arbitral Tribunal's verdict on the South China Sea arbitration rejected China's historic claims to the South China Sea and declared the "Nine-Dash Lines" as illegal, causing serious legitimacy crisis for China to its disputed sovereignty claims.[1] At the same time, one of the most contested

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sovereignty stakes is rested in the East China Sea, where China faces a challenge from Japan over the territoriality of Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands and the surrounding maritime waters. In its act of rejection of the South China Sea verdict, Beijing executed a strong showdown of force in the East China Sea. As on August 1, 2016, China carried out live-fire navy drills in the East China Sea, sending strong signals of its sovereignty claims and reflecting an uncompromising attitude.[2]

China's naval activism in East China Sea has heightened in the recent times. On June 9, 2016, China flexed its military muscles in the East China Sea by deploying a Chinese Navy frigate, identified as PLA-N Type 054 *A Jiankai-class* frigate,[3] into the 24-nautical mile contiguous zone around the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. This act of intrusion was further compounded by China's June 15, dispatch of a Chinese navy reconnaissance vessel - a PLA-N Type 815 Dongdiao-class spy ship[4] into Japanese territorial waters of Kuchinoerabushima Island south of Kyushu. What makes this Chinese act important is that until now only China's coast guard ships patrolled the disputed waters but the frigate's deployment marked the first military ship that transited into the contiguous waters. This signifies *upping the ante* in China's militarisation of the East China Sea. Making matters worse, on June 17, two Japanese Air Self Defence Force (JASDF) *Mitsubishi F-15J Eagles* intercepted two Chinese *Sukhoi Su-30* fighters over the East China Sea in the Beijing declared Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) near the Japanese-controlled Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands.[5] Besides, in 2015 Chinese incursions into Japan's airspace prompted a record-high 571 fighter scrambles,[6] elevating Japanese concerns. In this regard, with China's growing naval activism through increased incursions by coast guard vessels and jet fighters in surrounding waters and airspace, Japan too has upped its defensive posture.

In counter response, Japan has recently switched on a radar station in the East China Sea,[7] giving it a permanent intelligence gathering post close to Taiwan and the disputed islands, and has also, increased its fleet presence by deploying 12 coast guard vessels.[8] Tokyo also plans to develop and deploy by 2023 a new land-to-sea missile, which reportedly will have a range of 300 km, on islands such as the Miyako in Okinawa prefecture. The range will cover the disputed island chain.[9]

This continuous spiralling of tensions has caused the new low in China-Japan relations, making East China Sea take the centrestage in their security concerns. These actions imply little more than just causing diplomatic 'cold' in the relations. Even the recent diplomatic talks between China and Japan have failed to de-escalate the tensions. Following a temporary thaw in China-Japan relations after the 2015 Security Talks, maritime territorial tensions have ramped up again in the East China Sea. In the recent talks between Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe summit meeting (ASEM) in Mongolia, Abe raised concerns over China's expanding military activity in the East China Sea.[9]

Given the above perspective, whatever the significance, the chain of events has raised the fundamental question on the likelihood of a potential conflict between China and Japan. With the heightened pressure of an inflated risk, an unwarranted military casualty is of central concern. With the envelope being pushed to extremes and no quick fix solution to avert an uncalled tragedy, both China and Japan need to rethink their military postures in order to practically reason whether the costs of a confrontation are in their best national interest. Therefore, pragmatism lies in acting proactive rather than reactive in this dilemma of accidental risks.

China and Japan's East China Sea Dispute: Contested Interests

The dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea is multifaceted. The contestations mainly revolve around legal claims and material interests. These are discussed in the succeeding paras.

Clash of Legal Claims

On legal grounds the dispute is two-fold, which concerns: (a) the sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and (b) the way the maritime border between China and Japan in the East China Sea should be drawn.

First, it concerns the contested sovereignty over the territoriality of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands which comprises five uninhabited islands and three rocks. The islands are currently administered by Japan but claimed by China based on historical

records. Here, the clash of interest lies in the competing claims made by China and Japan over the territoriality based on differing international laws. Japan claims that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were *terra nullius* (or land without owner) at the time they were formally incorporated into Japanese territory in 1895. Thus, the fundamental Japanese claim is that the disputed islands were acquired by virtue of "discovery occupation," one of the established modes of territorial acquisition under international law, whereby valid title under a piece of territory can be acquired through occupation if it was recognised as *terra nullius.*[10] Hence, for Japan there exists no dispute on the sovereignty of the islands as they belong to Japan.

On the other hand, China makes its claims based on historical records, arguing that the islands have been Chinese territory as they were "first discovered, named and used by the Chinese as early as the 14th century".[11] Based on this, China negates Japan's claims based on the principle of "discovery occupation" as the islands were not *terra nullius.* In this view, China's 2012 White Paper on "Diaoyu Dao" strongly claims:

> *"Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's inherent territory in all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao."*[12]

With this view, China firmly opposes Japan's sovereignty over the islands as Beijing argues that Japan's occupation of the islands as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 is "illegal and invalid"[13] and thereby, asserts that the islands should have been returned to China under the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) Declarations, which stated that Japan must return all territories stolen from China.[14] Unlike Japan, Beijing acknowledges the presence of a sovereignty dispute in the islands and thus, wants to establish its own jurisdiction in the East China Sea by challenging Japan's administrative control over the islands and the surrounding waters.[15]

Secondly, the dispute revolves around the demarcation of the sea boundary and different interpretations by of the UNCLOS in the East China Sea, which stipulates the 200-nautical-mile maritime border claim over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

Here the conflict lies in the overlapping of the EEZs between China and Japan. China in using the UNCLOS principle of the natural extension of its continental shelf delimits at the Okinawa trough just west of the Ryukyu Island chain, while Japan draws it halfway between the Ryukyu and the Chinese mainland.[16] This has created overlapping claims of nearly 81,000 square miles.[17]

Clash over Material Interests

The dispute also involves both China and Japan's competing national interests in the East China Sea. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are not only strategically located but also their adjacent waters are rich in economic value given the abundance of hydrocarbon resources and rich fisheries stock, both vitally important for China and Japan, given their heavy dependence on oil and gas, and their rich appetite for fish. The untapped oil reserves are estimated at 100 to 160 billion barrels, according to the US Energy Information Administration.[18]

According to the relevant prospecting data, it is estimated that the oil and natural gas reserves in the East China Sea will be enough to meet China's needs for at least 80 years. While the abundance of manganese in the waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands will meet Japan's needs for 320 years, enough cobalt for 1,300 years, enough nickel for 100 years, and enough natural gas for 100 years, not to mention other mineral resources and plentiful fish.[19]

Hence, based on the contested claims and interests, the main maritime security concerns relating to China and Japan in the East China Sea are: (*a*) disputes over islands (*b*) disputes over maritime rights and interests (*c*) the Chinese Navy passing through international waters, through the Japanese archipelago into the Western Pacific and (*d*) overlapping ADIZs.[20]

Escalating Risks and Policies for Crisis Management

Since the normalisation of relation in 1972, the East China Sea issue was just a minor irritant in China-Japan ties until becoming one of the potential flashpoints. The latest escalation of tensions in the East China Sea has renewed the attention to foresee the possibility of there being a military clash between China and Japan in the contested maritime region. The accelerated trend with which the East China Sea is getting increasingly militarised by China and

Japan, has pushed the maritime security index to dangerous levels. This has heightened the possibility of a latent clash between China and Japan and has therefore, become a matter of concern as the chances of accidents remain high.

Given the inflated dimension of the maritime tension, the potential risks that call for precautionary actions are mainly three-fold:[21] Firstly, the risk of accidental and unintended military confrontation between China and Japan given the heightened emotions and the operational activities at close proximity. To cite an example, the June 17 incident when two Japanese fighter planes intercepted two Chinese fighters over the China's ADIZ, in the East China Sea could have resulted in a serious incident.

Secondly, the risk involves political miscalculation in an effort to demonstrate sovereign control which can lead to an armed conflict. This can be caused by misperceptions of the other's motives and actions. The patrolling activities carried by China and Japan as well as their strong military postures in terms of deployment of frigates (China) or installing radar stations (Japan) does pose concerns of a military clash based on perception gaps. Additionally, in this miscalculation the US factor looms large given Washington's commitment to safeguard Japan against any aggression. There are high chances of Beijing's miscalculation of US intentions in the dispute.

Thirdly, the risk involves a deliberate action to forcibly establish control over the islands, which largely remains unlikely for either China or Japan to enact, but the possibilities cannot be overlooked. The activities, such as the Japanese Government's purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 2012 and similarly, China's unilateral establishment of ADIZ in 2013 does imply the potential risks. Given these prominent conceivable risks, although both China and Japan do not seem to make use of force to guarantee their positions, but there is still some catalysts which can foster the two actors to do so. One of the critical factors is the increasing nationalist sentiments in both countries that largely narrow down the room for any form of settlement of the dispute. Additionally, both China and Japan are equally strong actors who can counter-weigh each other at any level of an armed escalation. In this scenario, the best policy for both countries lies in adopting proactive measures to manage an unwarranted military tragedy.

With the heightened risks of an armed conflict between China and Japan in the East China Sea, prevention remains the central question. With a failure in establishing a crisis management mechanism to meet the risks, it is important to note that any framework of management at the foremost will require a mutual understanding and trust of both the countries. To do so, first it requires to build diplomatic efforts to exchange information and negotiate in order to quell the risk of misperceptions. Second, both countries need to tone down their military postures to de-escalate the brimming tensions. Third, both China and Japan should build a crisis management mechanism as well as successfully implement it to thwart any form of emergency in the East China Sea.

In order to successfully establish and implement a crisis management mechanism in the East China Sea, both China and Japan need to do the following :-

(a) Make the 'security-talks' a regular phenomenon in the bilateral relations. This could help in building the trust and thereby, bridging the gap between misperceptions of intentions and actions.

(b) Both China and Japan can have joint naval exercises between PLAN and JMSDF and also exchange communications between each other to maintain the status-quo in the East China Sea.

(c) Both China and Japan can initiate third party intervention such as the United States to act as the mediator in times of emergency and hence, maintain the stability in the relationship.

Conclusion

The brimming tensions in the East China Sea call for serious attention. With the spiralling tensions between China and Japan as reflected in the increased militarisation, the risks of an unintended confrontation looms large. Any form of military confrontation will impose severe costs on both, China and Japan. Thus, to avert an uncalled tragedy both China and Japan should undertake passivity in controlling the military tensions. In doing so, the best policy lies in adopting a crisis management mechanism that acts as a strong impediment in neutralising any form of potential risks. Both China and Japan need to act proactively in scaling down the tensions in

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Nuclear Deterrence and Southern Asia

Dr Arun Vishwanathan[@]

Situating Southern Asia

At the outset let me state that I am more comfortable with the term Southern Asia instead of South Asia.[1] This is primarily due to the fact that the issue of nuclear stability in the Indian sub-continent is not confined to only two players; namely, India and Pakistan but, four players: China, India, Pakistan and the USA. It is important to include the US in this dynamic because first, US actions influence the thinking in the other three countries about nuclear weapons and their decisions to acquire certain capabilities; secondly, the US has historically played an important role in crisis stability in the region between India and Pakistan. Given the existence of a triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan with the US having an important influence on the several bilateral relationships and more so the trilateral relationship being an important element that is captured only if we use the term 'Southern Asia' to describe the region.

In the history of nuclear weapons and deterrence, Southern Asia is different because in the past we have not had three nuclear armed countries sharing borders which continue to be disputed. The geographical contiguity in essence results in shorter flight times which translate into less time available to the countries' command and control systems to plan a response and more importantly the certainty of radioactive fallout spreading across borders.

Another important factor that sets the region apart is the fact that the three countries have gone to war in the past over the contested borders. In particular, India, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent in recent times, China also continues to think and prepare for an armed conflict as a possible solution to settle the differences.[2]

The three countries continue to expand and incrementally modernise their nuclear stockpile and delivery systems. The region

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has been witness to introduction of long-range missiles like India's *Agni*-V, Pakistani *Shaheen*-II and *Shaheen*-III and Chinese DF-31; a general move away from liquid-fuelled missiles towards solid missiles, introduction of battlefield 'nuclear' missiles like *Nasr (Hatf IX)* and canisterisation of missiles by China and more recently by India.[3] Thus, the region is witnessing an important phase in terms of expansion of nuclear and delivery capabilities, acquisition of advanced weapon systems and thinking about nuclear strategy.

Vulnerabilities and Thinking about National Strategies

The rise of China and emergence of India have altered the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific Region. China's efforts to counter US dominance, India's efforts to counter China, and Pakistan's efforts to counter India are logical actions arising from the current situation. A China-Pakistan nexus that targets India is also a part of the current interplay between these parties. China, India, and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states with growing nuclear arsenals. Each of these states is pursuing a national strategy that includes a major role for nuclear and other advanced weaponry. These national strategies are based on an assessment of each nation state's vulnerabilities vis-à-vis their perceived adversaries.

The vulnerabilities of countries are shaped by a number of factors. These include their colonial and post-colonial historical experiences, internal political and governance structures, aspirations, and geographical location. These form a set of interconnected factors that determine a country's perception of vulnerabilities. Though major vulnerabilities arise from shared borders and shared history with neighboring countries, relationships with other major powers of the world, especially the US, also shape the country's perceptions of its vulnerabilities.

The aspirations of the countries, border problems, and the maritime claims of countries in the Asia-Pacific region remain the principal sources of friction and conflict. Issues related to these problems drive the political and military strategies of these countries. Though the US is not a part of this geographical area it remains the principal actor in this part of the world. Its power and influence evoke responses from an emerging China. This in turn results in responses from the other countries in the region in a kind of chain reaction. Alliances within the set of countries and their role in balancing power and bringing about some kind of stable order is

also an issue. The US-China-India-Pakistan relationships are crucial components of the security architecture of this region. Understanding the key drivers of these relationships and their implications for stability is, therefore, important.

China, India and Pakistan have sought to address their vulnerabilities in various ways which include both military and non-military approaches. A military component of such a strategy may require the deployment of nuclear weapons. The use of space-based assets for waging war has also seen major shifts in technologies and capabilities. Space may become a contested domain in case of conflicts between major powers and this brings in additional dimensions to be factored in looking at the changing role of nuclear and other kinds of advanced weapons in deterring war and conflict between countries.[4]

With the developments in technology and improvements in the capabilities of delivery vehicles like missiles, the clear separation between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and their strategies of deployment seem to have moved away from the extremes of nuclear war and nuclear deterrence towards a more complex strategy of deterring war and conflict.

Chinese and Pakistani Thinking about Nuclear Weapons

To understand the trilateral nuclear dynamic between China, India and Pakistan, it is important to take into account the larger US-China dynamic which is the overall driver for many of these developments. India's geopolitical situation is quite unique. In China and Pakistan it shares borders and a troubled history with two nuclear armed neighbours. With continued modernisation of its missile and submarine-based delivery platforms, China is arguably the world's fastest growing nuclear force. Pakistan, on the other hand, is home to the fastest growing nuclear stockpile in the world today.

China

Given the fact that Chinese short and medium range missiles (like the DF-21) can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads, Beijing is seeking to create ambiguity in the nuclear or non-nuclear use of such weapons. China is attempting to raise the US threshold for fighting a conventional war and thus hopes to deter the US from intervening in a Taiwan conflict.[5] One of the major Chinese

objectives in the long term is to prevent any US intervention in a future Taiwan Straits crisis. To achieve this objective, China has been strengthening its conventional forces as a part of its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategy. The development and operationalisation of its Anti-ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) system that will deter active US intervention in a conflict over Taiwan is a key element of Beijing's strategy. Chinese space assets, its strong missile design capabilities along with ground based sensing and, command and control capabilities, have been integrated in a new architecture that will raise the risks for American involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan.[6]

China, India and Pakistan seem to be responding in different ways to these developments which have largely emanated from the US. These responses seem to have taken different forms ranging from the development of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems, Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capabilities and advanced weapons such as the ASBM.[7]

Pakistan

Pakistan's nuclear weapons and strategy are India-centric. In the nuclear weapon and missile domains, it is trying to change the terms of its engagement with India from a strategic nuclear weapons game into a more conventional war-deterrence game. In recent years, Pakistan has focussed on the plutonium route to stockpile its fissile material. This has resulted in Islamabad building additional heavy water-based plutonium production reactors at Khushab. The construction of Khushab reactors which began in 1990s has expanded by leaps and bounds to four plutonium producing reactors between 2000 and 2015.[8] In addition, Islamabad has been developing cruise missiles like *Babur* and *Ra'ad*[9] and the *Nasr* battlefield missile that it claims can carry a nuclear warhead.[10]

Pakistani signals of possible use of the *Nasr* in a war with India are clear indications of a shift away from a simple nuclear deterrence strategy towards a more complex conflict / war deterring strategy. Such a strategy uses the threat of nuclear escalation to deter India. Importantly, such a strategy provides Pakistan the space for continuing its support to jihadi terrorist groups with a low probability of punitive response from India.

Similar, Yet Different: Chinese and Pakistani Thinking about Nuclear Weapons

Since the first nuclear test 'Trinity' in July 16, 1945, the world has witnessed 2056 nuclear tests. The US has led with 1032 tests followed by former Soviet Union/Russia with 715, France with 210 tests, the UK and China with 45 tests.[11] The numerous nuclear tests served several purposes. It allowed for analysing the physical results of the tests, testing and validating newer designs and most importantly served as a signal to the country's adversary of its growing capabilities. This was largely true also of the various missile flight tests carried out by these countries.

Despite their similarities, the Chinese and the Pakistani thinking and strategy about nuclear weapons are fundamentally different because of the credibility with which their adversaries view their claims. In the Chinese case, Beijing has tested various kinds of nuclear weapons ranging from normal fission weapons of yield ranging from 15-40 kilo tons to a few megatons (Mt). In addition, the Chinese have also tested weapons of miniaturised design as well as enhanced radiation (ER) weapons. Similarly, in the case of the ASBM, the Chinese have tested and demonstrated the credibility of every element of the architecture beginning with the DF-21D missile, the ELINT, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Earth Observation (EO) Satellites, the Over the Horizon (OTH) Radars and the command and control architecture.[12]

Now to the Pakistani claim that the *Nasr/Hatf-IX* battlefield missile can carry a nuclear warhead. As brought out in this technical analysis and sizing of the *Nasr* missile, given the limited space available to house a nuclear warhead in the *Nasr* missile, it is likely that the warhead on the missile will be a Plutonium-based linear implosion warhead. Pakistan in its 1998 nuclear tests did not test a Plutonium weapon. In the absence of such a successfully demonstrated test, there are doubts about Pakistan's claims that the *Nasr* missile can carry a nuclear warhead.[13]

However, the Chinese thinking with regard to the ASBM and its strategy of addressing its vulnerabilities vis-à-vis American involvement in a future Taiwan crisis and the Pakistani thinking behind the *Nasr* directed towards an Indian land-based response following a future terrorist strike, are similar. Both the responses

are 'rational' especially when pursued by the weaker player in an asymmetric relationship. The strategies adopted by both the countries seek to ship the onus onto the more powerful actor and throws at the latter the very difficult challenge as to whether they would like to risk escalating the conflict to the nuclear threshold.

Conclusion

In the Southern Asia context, there are two very important aspects which shape the deterrence relationship between India, China and Pakistan. Thinking and Perceptions are important keywords. First is the countries' thinking about these capabilities and employing ambiguity to deter not only nuclear war but also conventional war/ conflict. Second is the credibility of the countries' claims and capabilities and how they are perceived by their adversary.

Though inferences can be made about the countries' strategies from the posture and signals being sent out by them, there has so far been no attempt by the parties concerned to reach a common understanding on the role of nuclear weapons in deterring conflict between them. In addition to this lack of common understanding the situation on the ground is fraught with a large number of uncertainties. These include uncertainties related to weapon performance, organisational and institutional capabilities, intentions, strategies and doctrines. As a consequence the postures adopted by them and the signals that are being exchanged between them are confusing and liable to misinterpretation.

It is therefore important to attempt to have a better and more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the vulnerabilities of the respective countries and their strategies. With such an understanding, it might be possible to explore the specific pathways of achieving some kind of stability in the complex relationships that governs the strategies of these powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Trends in International Terrorism*

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Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent "war on terror," international terrorism has been on the increase in terms of frequency, scale and severity, posing serious threats to national security. The United Nations estimated that there have been over 5,770 terrorist attacks of various scales, causing the deaths of more than 48,170 people, injuring nearly 86,000, resulting in political and social unrest, seriously hurting societies' morality, and causing great loss of property in a number of countries since 2001.

Trends in International Terrorism

Organisational downsizing. As the "war on terror" drags on, the terrorist groups also adjust their strategies. Terrorist groups tend to downsize by dividing themselves into smaller subgroups. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "lone wolf" terror attacks have been on the rise. International terrorism has established a global terror network, connecting scattered groups around the world. These groups operate independently while maintaining close coordination. Each network is formed by a series of subgroups and individuals. The subgroups usually cover wide areas and operate flexibly.

New Fundraising Methods. Today, terrorist groups do not apply traditional fundraising methods but call for support of many individuals, small organisations, and nations. The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is an example. This group generates its revenue through illegal activities targeting property and capital of individuals and organisations doing business within areas under their control. These activities, among others, range from bank robbery, control of oil rigs and refineries, appropriation of property, tax collection,

kidnapping and calling for financial support from individuals and organisations, including various nongovernmental organisations and foreign terrorists.[1] They even raise funds by taking advantage of social media. IS is controlling huge areas for growing wheat which account for 40 per cent of Iraq's wheat output. They earn money from export of wheat.

Through such methods, IS has become the richest terrorist group in the world, causing lots of difficulties in tracing terrorists' sources of income. These groups hardly spend money on arms production or procurement; most of the money is spent on recruiting, travelling, training courses and so on. IS's diversified financial model ensures its high level of independence from foreign donors. This model facilitates flexibility of administration and building adequate combat capabilities of armed groups, as well as generation of social welfare schemes. IS, therefore, always seeks to control new territories in order to get more resources to cover their expenditure.

Changing Sites of Attacks. Terrorists usually target famous cities in the world, which are symbolic representations, or economic and political centres with high population density such as Paris, Brussels, London, or tourism destinations (Nice, France), and hospitals like the one in Pakistan in August 2016 that killed at least 90 people and wounded nearly 100.

Increasingly Rapid Planning of Terrorist Attacks and Increasingly Shorter Cycles of Operation. Today, terrorists do not need to devote much time to planning and training as before. As for newcomers, it takes IS about half a year to brainwash and train recruits (as those being identified in Belgium or France in 2015-16) before assigning them to launch terrorist attacks. By the time the security forces are able to identify enough evidence of their terrorist activities, the attacks would already happen.

Recruiting Pattern. There has been a change in recruiting new terrorists. In the past, the majority of terrorists came from Arab countries and several European countries, which made it easy for security forces to identify the terrorists. Today, terrorists can be local people, immigrants, or descendants of immigrants, causing a lot of difficulty in identification. As for the IS, this group mainly relies on the Iraqi Sunni population, who were marginalised from Iraq's political and economic life under the Government of Prime

Minister Nouri al Malaki. The group's elites mainly consist of Iraq's former military officers from the era of Saddam Hussein, who are in an increasingly weak position after the Allied invasion of Iraq. In addition, there are other elements from Syrian and Arab society, who regard the IS as their indispensable "temporary companions" to attain their ultimate goals. Finally, thousands of mercenaries from all over the world continue to flood Syria and Iraq to become part of a global Muslim "project."

Localisation of International Terrorism. Today, international terrorism has established a close association with crime groups, extremist religious groups, nationalist groups, black gangs, etc., while taking advantage of local forces to carry out terrorist attacks like in the case of Egypt. A number of terrorist groups are being "localised" and become principal "players" in the international "terrorist arena." This is one of the most fundamental changes of international terrorism in recent years.

Terrorist Attack and Target Diversity. Terrorists choose from a wide variety of weapons such as guns, grenades, machetes, axes, and lorries. The attack in India and Belgium in 2008 and 2016 respectively and elsewhere even witnessed exchanges of gunfire between police and terrorists. The attacks are coordinated so as to strike different targets simultaneously as it happened in Mumbai in 2008 and 2016 attacks in Paris.

Recent terrorist attacks in the world reveal that terrorist groups have shifted their targets from populous areas to luxury hotels,[2] crowded theaters,[3] non-Muslim areas,[4] taking hostages including citizens of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Canada, etc. creating fear, panic, and anxiety among other foreigners nearby. Targets of terrorist attacks are not only diplomatic missions, government offices, or military installations, but also less secure civilian facilities.

Different Aims of Attack. After the event of September 11, terror attacks have been conducted not only to achieve political aims, but create social instability, public anxiety, and public distrust of government and undermine peace efforts. Terrorists, therefore, tend to target local people or foreigners. After 9/11, mass killings have become terrorists' preference. Terrorism is being increasingly isolated. Facing strong counter-terror efforts, terrorists have gradually given up their conception of combining actions with aims

and simply focused on killings and revenge. This shift has been reflected in the Nice lorry attack on July 14, 2016, in which 84 people were killed.

Widening Areas of Terror. In the past, the US and Europe used to be the primary theatres of terrorist activities and counter-terrorism. After 9/11, terror attacks have occured not only in those two concentrated areas, but also in developing countries such as Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Thailand, and so on. As a result of uneven socio-economic development and religious, ethnic and social contradictions, terrorists find it easy to exploit people in developing countries. Also, counter-terrorism mechanisms in these countries have not been improved, and equipment of security forces are still old and outdated.

Growing Threat to Nuclear Facilities. IS's propaganda apparatus has tried to convince people that IS would soon possess nuclear weapons. However, up to now, they have not been able to launch a nuclear attack. Chechen militants placed a dirty bomb containing Cesium-137 in a park in Moscow in 1996. Another Chechen rebel group made a dirty bomb containing an unidentified radioactive material near Grozny in 1998. According to British intelligence agencies, there was evidence that al-Qaeda was making a dirty bomb in Afghanistan in 2003. Fortunately, that "imaginary" bomb was not found.

According to the April 5, 2016 edition of the New York Times, there are "credible" threats of a terrorist attack on nuclear power plants. The authors warned governments that such an attack "would not result in the death of thousands of people but produce considerable radioactive fallout, causing chaos and long-term displacement."

Southeast Asia: The Threat from Terrorism and Cooperation on Counter-terrorism

Due to its failure in Syria and Iraq, the IS is boosting its global presence and searching for new areas to gain ground in Southeast Asia. Some countries, including Indonesia and Singapore, have warned their citizens about potential Jihadist terror attacks, which are only a matter of time. In his National Interest article, Watts said "Indonesia is not only the most populous Muslim nation in the world, but also the most tolerant and harmonious Muslim-majority

in the world. Indonesian people often oppose radical ideas. Therefore, recent attacks aim to radicalise and split Sunni community." However, it is necessary to pay attention to the coincidence in a series of terror attacks in the region. The "Grey Wolves", an ultra-nationalist Turkish terrorist group, were believed to have been involved in a bombing in Thailand in August 2015, killing many tourists, most notably Chinese. This attack was part of a broader terror campaign launched by the "Grey Wolves." It might have been targeted to create tension between Thailand and China, which are enjoying growing economic and military relations.

In the "war on terror" initiated by President George W Bush administration after the event of September 11, 2001, Southeast Asian nations were considered as the second front. The reasons for this may lie in the fact that there are numerous indigenous radical Islamist groups sponsored by al-Qaeda in the region. These groups seek to not only overthrow governments, but target the United States and its allies. Furthermore, Southeast Asia is vulnerable to terrorism because there are Muslim separatist movements among the large Muslim population (accounting for one fourth of the world's Muslim population). The porous borders and ineffective counter-terrorist measures also worsen the situation.

While compelled to maintain a balanced relationship with major powers, Southeast Asian nations need to be cautious because of anti-American rhetoric in the Muslim community. Some people believe that the US efforts to combat terrorism aim to weaken Islam. Modes of cooperation with the US are based on the cost-benefit analysis of actions of regional countries. However, any Southeast Asian nation facing the threat of terrorism is willing to cooperate with the US. Apart from the US support in the fight against terrorism, regional countries have other geopolitical and geoeconomics dynamics that are to promote economic relations and take advantage of the US to maintain the balance of power in the region.

The US gives priority to cooperation with Indonesia, which concentrates on strengthening counter-terrorism institutions. After the Bali bombing in 2003, the US supported the establishment of Special Detachment 88. It also gives Indonesia USD 40 million to combat terror every year. As for the Philippines, the US assistance to the Philippines' fight against Abu Sayyaf reached USD 100 million annually. The US and Thailand set up a joint Counter-

terrorism Intelligence Centre and promoted cooperation on military technology as early as 2001. Although the US suspended military aid to Thailand after the 2014 military coup, Thailand still continues to participate in the US-led counter-terrorism programmes. Meanwhile, Malaysia is being accused of double standards in the US-led "war on terror." On the one hand, it opposes the US to use force in the Middle East and Afghanistan, but on the other hand, it boosts military ties with the US. Malaysia-US cooperation on counter-terrorism has increased considerably in recent years, which include legal support and training. Singapore promotes close cooperation with the US in the field of intelligence exchange. It also makes use of the fight against terrorism to enhance military cooperation with the US and strengthen its national security. Bilateral relations in the fight against terrorism allow the US to promote its military and diplomatic influence in the region. The above mentioned countries in Southeast Asia are given financial assistance and have opportunities to broaden economic and trade relations and build defence capabilities, as well as ability to act.[5]

Although there have not been any major attacks after the Bali terrorist attacks in 2009, the threat of terrorism is growing with IS's influence. Several regional countries share common views with the US on the threats posed by the IS. However, the US no longer considers Southeast Asia as the second front in its "war on terror" and adjusts cooperation in the direction of supporting moderate Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia, and helping nations to monitor operations of radical groups. Most of the Southeast Asian nations, however, are not willing and have no desire to participate in the US-led alliance against terrorism in any form.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) initiated interagency coordination, including counter-terrorism in 2010. Special forces from 15 ADMM-Plus countries and 3 observers (Japan, Malaysia and Cambodia) carried out force integration training to combat terrorism at Sarimbun Scout Camp, Singapore in May, 2016.

Vietnam's Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorism

Prevention and combating terrorism is an enduring and complex struggle, which requires close, comprehensive and prudent leadership, guidance and implementation both in preparation and handling of specific events. In this direction, the responsibility to

prevent and combat terrorism, must rest under the direct and absolute leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the unified management and direction of the State. It is vital to bring into full play the strength of all people, in which the police, in association with the military, forms the core. Prevention is primary; deterrence and addressing the root cause of terrorism are important. Some principal measures are enumerated in the succeeding paras.

Firstly, it is necessary to make organisations, security forces, and common people in the locality aware of the causes, risks, and consequences for national security and social order, posed by terrorism. Besides, it is also necessary to improve leadership, management and effectiveness of the steering committees working on prevention and combating of terrorism at all levels. It is also important to develop and improve plans as well as coordination mechanism between forces involved in prevention and combating of terrorism and take prompt action to improve organisational models and provide equipment for all forces thus ensuring timely and effective response to potential threats.

Secondly, there is a need to conduct training exercises to improve professional skills and combat capabilities of forces engaged in counter-terrorism like the Special Force, Military Engineering, Navy, Air Force etc. to operate in complex environments, terrain and weather. The forces should be able to manoeuvre and respond rapidly to foil terror plots. There should be strict control of entry and exit of persons through land, sea and air borders. Police and military units should coordinate more closely in order to proactively advise party committees and authorities to lead and direct the whole political system and people to prevent, deter, and respond effectively to terrorism right at the grassroots level.

Third, it is vital to actively and proactively boost international cooperation on prevention and combating of terrorism to ensure national interests. Vietnam attaches great importance to cooperation with some international counter-terrorism entities, including INTERPOL, EUROPOL, ASEANPOL, etc., neighbouring countries and other countries which have rich experience and capabilities in combating terrorism in order to facilitate information sharing, training and provision of modern counter-terrorism equipment.

In July 2015, Lao Cai Border Force and Honghe Border Police of Yunnan Province held a joint counter-terrorism exercise, codenamed Red River No.1 2015, on the border. The participating forces were deployed to deal with simulated situations and scenarios effectively.

Vietnam also participated in the international ASEAN-Japan Cyber Exercise the theme of which was "Prevention of extortion attacks to critical information systems of the ASEAN countries and Japan" in May, 2016. More than a 100 leaders dealing with network security and information security of critical organisations of Vietnam participated in this exercise with nine other ASEAN countries and Japan. This exercise was considered as an event of significant importance. In the same year, Vietnam People's Army sent a counter-terrorism unit from its Military Special Force to participate in the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter-terrorism Exercise 2016 held in Brunei and Singapore under the ADMM-Plus framework. Vietnam's delegation successfully completed all phases of this exercise. The participation proves Vietnam's resolve in finding solutions to global security issues, while improving its prestige in the international arena.

Fourthly, there is a need to address urgent issues within the Vietnamese community, strive for eradication of poverty, improve education and healthcare, build infrastructure and create jobs for the youth with a view to bringing about opportunities and better life for the Vietnamese people. Sustainable development is the best way to prevent and combat terrorism.

Finally, special attention should be paid to the establishment of procedures and mechanisms for close coordination among forces, with an aim to respond effectively in case of a terror attack. Accordingly, if a terror attack took place in a locality, the Party committee and authorities in that area should be responsible for assessing accurately the situation and forecast the forthcoming attacks. This would lay the foundation for working out measures to direct field forces to combat terrorism according to approved standard operating procedures (SOPs). Local departments, industries and unions need to evolve relevant plans and so as to protect their offices, people; and economic, political, cultural, and social infrastructure while coordinating with forces to carry out political, economic, legal, propaganda work, etc., in order to foil terror plots and activities in their area. As far as areas close to

terror scenes are concerned, it is necessary to localise and isolate the terror scene from surrounding areas, provide medical assistance to terror-stricken people, prepare to assist adjacent localities, pursue fleeing terrorists to ensure security and social order; thus, reducing negative impact of terror attacks on other localities.

The Special Forces, Militia and Self-Defence Force must be determined to fight to safeguard vulnerable assets, pursue and destroy terrorists according to operation plans. They should act as vanguards of protecting and evacuating people during a terror attack and closely coordinate with forces on the spot to capture or destroy leaders and deadly terrorist groups, rescue hostages, restore damaged assets and even wipe out the den of terror, if necessary.

Conclusion

Over the past 15 years, terrorism has become extremely vicious and has become a challenge to security of every nation, region and the world as a whole. Vietnam is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. Therefore, it should have stricter measures to control its society and websites; promote international exchange and cooperation; enhance community building measures; create more jobs; improve people's living standards, education and healthcare; seriously implement the State religion and ethnic policy; and prevent hostile forces from exploiting people to raise money, recruit, or contribute to training for terrorist groups. Units dedicated to prevention and combating of terrorism need to actively practice plans, improve their reaction capability and be determined to fight to safeguard people and vulnerable assets according to well laid out SOPs.

Endnotes

[1] Some countries such as Malaysia, the US etc., have captured those taking part in fundraising activities for the IS.

[2] Bomb attacks at Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in Indonesian capital on July 17, 2009.

[3] Terrorist assault at the Bataclan Theater in Paris on November 13, 2015.

[4] Terrorist attack in Bangladesh on July 2, 2016.

[5] In the period of 2002-13, US gave 262 and 441 million US dollars for security-related assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines respectively.

Audacity in Warfare: A Perspective

Brigadier Mandeep Singh[@]

Introduction

Military operations to be successful cannot be divorced from risk; in fact, the quantum of success is exponentially proportional to the level of risk. The level of risk is abstract in nature and depends upon myriad factors. It has been repeatedly postulated that risks should be 'calculated' and they should not go into the domain of fool-hardiness or recklessness. It is also a perceived notion that 'Audacious' operations yield better results. Patton was one the greatest exponents of Audacity as is exemplified by his words *"L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace!* "Remember that, gentlemen, from here on out, until we win or die in the attempt, we will always be audacious."[1] What then is Audacity? And how does it factor into military operations? In this paper an attempt has been made to examine the dynamics of audacity in military operations at all levels of warfare.

Risk Matrix

Calculated Risk. Common military knowledge suggests that all operations should be undertaken with 'calculated risk'. A mission may be said to be undertaken with calculated risk when as per the perpetrator's perception and current doctrines there is an element of risk, that is, there is a chance of failure of the operation. However, the failure, if it occurs, should not result in major imbalance in terms of dispositions and casualties. In spite of the setback the commander should be able to accomplish his mission, though it may be in a larger time frame and possibly with additional resources. However, the risk taken should provide for disproportionate success compared to that with conventional themes and chances of success should be greater than failure. Obviously, this is a matter of fine judgement and at best a challenging decision. Most military commanders should normally be operating in the realm of

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calculated risk. However, a step higher in the ambit of risk ladder is 'audacity' which is what would lead to far greater success.

Audacity. Audacity could be defined as a form of daring and boldness which does not correspond with the prevalent norms in warfare. Audacity is thus the next higher level of risk after calculated risk. However, audacity should be divorced from recklessness and foolhardiness which may lead to disaster. Audacity thus overlaps with calculated risk on one side and recklessness on the other with higher chances of success in operations. It will normally imbibe aggressiveness, unconventional themes and imagination as the prime ingredients. The figure below illustrates the correlation between risk and success and the various terms argued above. Audacity may be practised in various domains : doctrines, strategy, operational art, tactics, technology or even bluff. The relationship between risk and audacity is shown in a graph at Figure 1.


Figure 1 : Relation between Risk and Success

Appreciation of Adversary's Risk Threshold

An analyst of a military situation tends to assume that the enemy will try to reduce risks in decision-making, and generally rules out an audacious approach by the adversary. However, this assumption may be erroneous, since the quantum of risk is a matter of personal preference. As such, the adversary may not consider reduction in risk to be a preferable strategy;[2] moreover, enemy's willingness to take risks relates to specific situations. Thus even a good understanding of the enemy's conceptual framework does not ensure a correct estimation of his behaviour in any given situation. Moreover, the adversary may not see his venture as a very risky one. The misjudgement of the risk taking profile of the adversary is, therefore, one factor, which may be calamitous. The invasion of South Korea and Cuban Missile crisis are examples of such ventures wherein strong reaction from the adversaries was unexpected.

Adversary's Capability. If it is estimated that adversary's capability is insufficient for undertaking an audacious action, the victim may rule out such a possibility. An audacious venture in such a situation is likely to fetch results. Thus Israeli intelligence assumed that the Arabs in 1973 would not risk an attack that they thought would be suicidal and similarly, Macarthur estimated that with America's supremacy in the air, and given American nuclear potential, the Chinese would not hazard the commitment of large forces on the Korean Peninsula.[3]

Risky and Audacious Ventures in Desperation. If the perpetrator overestimates his chances for success or that the stakes are so high and no other options are available that he must take a chance despite probable failure, deterrence from the defender's perspective may fail. Thus, in 1941 the Japanese leaders believed that they had no choice but to attack the United States since the war was inevitable, and they had better chance to win at that time than in the future. This was emphasised by the Japanese Naval Minister in November 1941 before the attack on Pearl Harbour. "…. if we decide to continue diplomatic negotiations and later fail to bring them to a successful conclusion, we will be forced to open hostilities at a great operational disadvantage caused by the delay. Consequently, although there is a great risk in beginning the war now, we must realise that there is also great risk in depending

upon negotiations unless we can be certain of the final outcome".[4] At times the inability to fully appreciate the impediments to victory may lead to audacious operational plans. Audacity can thus also manifest in planning due to inadequate intelligence. During the German offensive in Russia in 1941, Germans grossly underestimated the USSR's actual potential. Hitler later said that had he known how large the Soviet Union forces were, he would never have invaded Russia.[5]

Risk Taking Ability in Groups. Groups tend to be more willing than individuals to accept risk. Wallach and Kogan defined this assumption, "If members of a group engage in a discussion and reach a consensus regarding the degree of risk to accept in the decisions which they make, their conclusion is to pursue a course of action riskier than that represented by the average of the prior decisions of each individual considered separately".[6] This is possibly because in a group the responsibility for the decision is shared by all group members. From this it can be inferred that risky and audacious decisions are more likely to emerge from a group than a single decision maker.

The Interacting Forces

Primarily there are three interacting factors which influence the risk outcomes of an operation. These are the personal attributes of the commander, the organisational environment and the situation. The way these factors interplay is explained graphically in Figure 2. It is evident that audacity is product of personal, organisation and situation attributes. The audacity cuboid can thus increase or decrease by variation in any of these factors as illustrated at **Figure 2**.

Amongst the personal attributes, courage (moral and physical) is the primary attribute of an audacious commander. Rommel, who may be regarded as one of the great advocates of audacity at tactical and operational levels, possessed a high degree of physical courage. He led from the front where he could best appreciate the constantly fluctuating battle, unlike Ritchie (Rommel's British opponent) at Gambut and his chief even further away in Cairo.[7] Also related to courage, particularly moral courage, is boldness. As aptly worded by Wood, "boldness governed by superior intellect is the mark of a genius".[8] Way back in 1944, referring to boldness at the higher levels, Wavell remarked, "the soft modern maxim of

Figure 2 (Audacity Cuboid)

safety first, which so often marks the decline of business, of governments, of armies, of nations, found no place in Allenby's creed'.[9] A bold plan always appears to be attractive and has an appeal with a higher probability for success.

Boldness and Age. In an interesting study of senior commanders, boldness was shown to be an important component in determining success. A statistical analysis conducted on the basis of 326 land battles substantiated the above fact.[10] It was also concluded that older generals tend to be more cautious or conservative than their younger opponents. This finding is consistent with another finding that risk taking is inversely related to age.[11] The finding corroborates earlier research which identified initiative and aggressiveness as personality traits of leaders.[12] Many generals known to be indecisive and vacillating were known for boldness

and initiative as junior officers. Thus in spite of experience, boldness inevitably dilutes with age. However, the greater the extent to which it is retained the greater is the range of genius. Figure 3 below is indicative of the above arguments. A platoon commander is capable of undertaking operations with a higher degree of risk than the formation commanders. Possibly, the increased sense of responsibility breeds caution.

PLATOON COMMANDERS	SUB UNIT COMMANDERS	UNIT COMMANDERS	FORMATION COMMANDERS	
			SUICIDAL	
			FOOL HARDY/RECKLESS	
RISK	Average Risk Operating Zone		AUDACIOUS	
			CALCULATED RISK	
			CAUTIOUS	
20	30	40	50	0
AGE				

**Figure 3 : Risk Taking Profile vs
Age of Military Commanders**

Professional honesty or ethics in decision making is also an important facet of an audacious commander. An audacious decision should be based on military prudence and not for any other considerations such as personal fame etc. Flexibility and creativity is another requirement of an audacious commander since audacity invariably involves deviation from laid down norms and doctrines. However, an audacious decision without intelligent analysis is likely to lead to disaster.

Ability to Influence or Convince. An audacious commander should be able to influence his subordinates and superiors about the viability of his venture. An apt example being, the decision to carry out landings at Inchon by MacArthur during the Korean War much against the 'wisdom' of others in the system. Germany's opening run of victories in the Second World War was only possible

due to the panzer forces that Guderian had created, trained and by his audacious leadership, in disregard to Hitler's fears and caution.[13] Each idea had to be argued vehemently with its rivals; however, Germany was lucky to have forward looking organisation which ensured that the idea flourished. These arguments underscore the importance of personality to get others to fall in line with offbeat and audacious plans.

Organisational Attributes

A hierarchical environment often leads to dilution in application of audacity. Hierarchy and discipline conflict with intellectual independence, objectivity and audacity except in evolved organisations. An outfit functioning on directive style of command is more conducive to audacious operations than a centralised one. Audacity cannot be exercised in environments where the tolerance to errors is limited. A liberal establishment offering space to its subordinates is more likely to breed audacious operations.

Rigidity in Doctrines. Rigid adherence to the prevalent military doctrines, especially if they are conservative, does not lead to audacious operations. The military doctrines of the British during the World War 1 did not encourage audacious planning at the strategic levels, though there was no dearth of courage and bravery at lower levels. The very foundation of the Israeli Army, on the other hand is based on boldness and audacity.

Situational Attributes

A favourable military situation including morale of troops is conducive for audacious operations. Japanese could launch audacious attacks in the jungles of Burma; amongst other reasons this was possible due very high levels of motivation. At the national and strategic levels, the mood of the people is another major factor. The high risk German venture into Russia during the World War II could not have been undertaken without the positive national mood, which was that of euphoria due to spectacular preceding successes. Availability of adequate resources also encourages such operations. Montgomery could afford to launch audacious airborne operations against Arnhem because he had no dearth of resources, and even the massive failure, which occurred, did not turn the tables against him. When a commander is aware of certain weakness of the enemy he can exploit the situation by being

audacious. Slim was able to move the 4 Corps (crossing of Irrawaddy during World War II) boldly in a different direction and dislocate the Japanese primarily, because he was aware of the weakness of the Japanese Air Force, and thereby their limited capability of surveillance.

The interaction individually between the personal, organisational and situational parameters is evident from the following figures (4, 5 and 6). The audacity outcome is the green rectangle and the benefit to enemy (due to lack of audacity) is depicted by the red rectangle. In the first case (Figure 4), a liberal organisation and a bold commander is likely to yield maximum audacity. In the second case (Figure 5), a positive situation and bold commander yields more audacity. In the third illustration (Figure 6) a liberal organisation and positive situation yields maximum audacity.

ORGANISATION

A Restrictive organisation will inhibit Audacious operations. Personal attributes can offset organisational restrictiveness; the reverse is also true

The benefit to the Adversary must be reduced to the minimum

Figure 4 : Interaction of Personal and Organisational Attributes

SITUATION

POSITIVE   CHALLENGING

TIMID		AUDACITY
BOLD	ADVERSARY BENEFIT	IMPONDERABLE FACTOR

PERSONAL

A situation may not be conducive to Audacity but personal attributes may offset it and vice versa

The benefit to the Adversary must be reduced to the minimum

Figure 5 : Personal and Situational Attributes

SITUATION

POSITIVE ───────────────────►

CHALLENGING

An inhibitive organisation may be detrimental to audacity, but the situation may encourage audacity and vice versa

The benefit to the adversary must be reduced to the minimum

Figure 6 : Interaction between Organisational and Situational Attributes

Conclusion

In this paper an attempt has been made to analyse various nuances of audacity and various interconnected factors which affect its manifestation. Undoubtedly, Audacity is an essential ingredient of military operations. Conservative and cautious operations are unlikely to yield requisite results. The quantum of success increases exponentially with the risk quotient. However, the judgement between Audacity and recklessness/foolhardiness is where the acumen of a military commander comes into play. *Boldness or Audacity governed by intellect is the mark of a genius*. The personal attributes, organisational climate and the situation are the primary factors which have a bearing on the successful outcome of an operation. It will be seldom that the scale of all these factors will

be in abundance; however, one can offset the deficit in any of these by careful analysis and, audacity in planning and execution.

Military operations laced with undue caution will inevitably lead to prolonged, slow and grinding operations. Moreover, they would also require overwhelming superiority of men and material. Audacity in operations at all levels is likely to yield overwhelming success and should be incorporated into our doctrines so that it becomes second nature. Above all, it is important to create a working environment in which military commanders can imbibe and practise the essentials of operational art, especially the virtue of 'audacity'.

Endnotes

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[11] Vroom, Victor H. (1971). "Relationship between age and risk taking among managers". Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 55(5), Oct 1971. pp 399-405.

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Army Recruitment in Punjab, 1846-1913 : An Evolutionary Study

Professor KC Yadav@

Introduction

The present paper is in effect concerned with, as its title evinces, the evolution of Army recruitment in the colonial Punjab, popularly called the 'shield', the 'spear-head' and the 'sword-hand' of India.[1] There are, no doubt, several scholarly studies, contemporary and later, discussing different aspects of the subject.[2] But still our understanding of the phenomenon in question is faint and foggy, because of which we are hard put to satisfy 'the fresh concerns' of the present generation and answer its new questions to a satiable extent. Hence the present exercise – a revisit to the old Punjab, going, in the first place, across its social and economic landscape, albeit in quick pace, to perspectivise the narrative; secondly, to understand the dynamics and complexities of the recruiting system itself by tracing its evolution and operationalisation, stage by stage and blow by blow, from 1846 to 1913.

But before proceeding further, a word on the sources seems imperative. Unfortunately, we have no indigenous sources for the earlier period (19th century), and the ones from the other (British) side are in most of the cases, if not all, problematic. They betray the colonialists' universal policy of showing, in Jean-Paul Sartre's profound words, the naked truth 'with clothes on'.[3] They hide[4] many a thing in the interest of the state or the concerned state actors, and orchestrate many a myth, a number of which, unfortunately, still rule the roost as authentic stuff of history and distort and disorient to an extent even our present discourse.[5] The situation somewhat improves when we come to the following century (20th). The colonialists' cloth-wrap becomes a little less opaque, in the light of some Indian sources, which

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begin to be available in this period. But, unfortunately, it is not so in our case. As a result, most of the experiences of the 'other' side, the side as seen from the receiving end of the stick, remain inaccessible. Yet there is hope to get somewhere near the truth, for, it has, as they say, many strange ways of revealing itself, provided we seek it.

The Perspective

For a better comprehension of the factors, forces and issues involved here, a brief word on perspectival aspect of the study seems imperative. Like several other provinces (now called states), Punjab also witnessed geo-administrative alterations and changes during the period under study. In 1846, whence from our narrative commences, the British held under their absolute sway only its Jullundur Doab (about 7,000 sq. miles). But in less than three years, they were the masters of the entire Punjab, comprising broadly, the present states of Punjab and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan, and the states of Punjab, the upper parts of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh of the Indian Union. In 1858, it got the lower parts of Haryana, and in 1901 lost the NWFP. In its new avatar, its spread was about 135,770 sq. miles[6] and its population, according to the 1911 Census, was 24,187,752 persons,[7] 51.1 per cent of whom were Muslims, 35.8 per cent Hindus, and 12.1 per cent Sikhs.[8] All the communities were divided, practically speaking, into castes/tribes.

The province was then, as it is now, a land of villages. Agriculture was the main calling of the people, which was, except in small tracts and canal colonies, where irrigational facilities were available, in very many ways unrewarding. The peasants were, therefore, by and large poor. The colonial masters further locustised them by converting their land into 'private property' and demanding payment of 'revenue in cash,' which was hardly available with them. Worse, to ensure payment of their demand, they created a class of money-lenders (usurers) from whom the poor, cash-crunched peasants were forced to borrow money to pay the revenue on exorbitant interest rates, thus rendering them, as HG Trevaskis has rightly said, with the active interference of the Court, *'the serf of the money lender'* (emphasis added).[9] This was in a way tantamount to putting a noose around their neck. The more the poor people tried to loosen it, the more grasping it became.

They were left with no escape route 'to forestall an impending disaster for themselves and their families' except one – Army service, which they perforce availed in large numbers.[10] That is how their land became, in due course of time, a recruiting ground, and got the above-mentioned epithets like the 'shield', the 'spear-head', etc.[11]

The Evolution

The First Phase

Having portrayed the perspective in broad, brief strokes, let us come to the issue proper, i.e. the system of recruitment during the period under study and its directional policy, organisational structure and operational strategies. The system came into operation, as indicated above, in 1846, when, after the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-1846), the British became the *de jure* masters of the entire territory, hill and plain, between the river Sutlej and the Beas, i.e. the Jullundur Doab (area : 7,000 sq miles), and the *de facto* rulers of the rest of the Kingdom of Ranjit Singh (area : 74,000 sq miles).[12] They introduced their direct rule in the former[13] and indirect in the latter.[14] But, as it usually happens in such cases, it also brought some serious problems in its train. The bellicose Sikhs were no doubt down after the War, but they were not downright out;[15] over a score of war-like tribes living on the 800-mile long North-Western border, from Hazara in the Himalayas near the upper Indus to Sind in the South, were a perpetual source of trouble;[16] and beyond the border there was a traditionally hostile Afghanistan;[17] and a little further, there was the 'loom of the bear', Russia, the Imperial rival.[18] In view of these unsettling problems, the large Army of Occupation (54,000 men) deployed in Punjab, the loyal and trusted Lahore Durbar troops (27,000) and large contingents of Police of several types, mostly made of ex-soldiers of the Sikh Army who had betrayed their 'king and country' (hereafter BKC), seemed inadequate to them. Consequently, more troops, comprising two Sikh Irregular *Paltans,* called Ferozepur and Ludhiana Sikhs,[19] and a Punjab Frontier Brigade, consisting of four Irregular local Sikh Infantry Regiments,[20] and a Battery of Artillery, were raised by the authority of the Governor-General under the guidance and supervision of Sir Henry Lawrence, the Governor-General's Agent at Lahore. The former two *Paltans* were meant for 'service with the Bengal Army' and the latter Brigade for 'police and general purpose'.[21]

The nucleus of each of the newly raised six Regiments was made of British officers, Indian junior commissioned officers (VCOs), non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and some sepoys (about 100), mostly Rajputs and Brahamans from Avadh, belonging to the Regular Regiments of the Bengal Army. The Regimental commandants made further recruitments to fulfill the prescribed strength of their regiments by sending recruiting parties to the well marked areas. The local officials, *tehsildars, patwaris,* village headmen, etc., helped them find able-bodied men they required from the following collectives and regions: the Sikhs, Muslims and others from among the ex-soldiers of the Sikh Army (BKC) from the Cis-Sutlej region for the Ferozepur Sikhs, and the same collectives from the Trans-Sutlej region for the Ludhiana Sikhs. In the case of the four Irregular local Sikh Infantry Regiments, the Sikhs and Muslims (both BKC) and others were recruited from the Cis-Sutlej area for the Ist Regiment; Hillmen (Dogras) were enlisted, through the agency of the rich, loyal family lads from the region (Kangra), who were commissioned as *jemadars,* and some Gurkhas (100) and some Pathans for the 2nd; the Hindustanis, Rajputs, Brahamans, etc. from Avadh, and some loyal Sikhs and Muslims (both BKC) for the 3rd; and a mix of loyal elements – Sikhs, Muslims (Punjabi), Pathans and others (all BKC) – for the 4th.[22]

Almost simultaneously, Sir Henry also raised, on the authority of the Governor-General, an Irregular Corps called the Guides (1846). Later some more corps, called Irregular Levies, were raised by Sir Henry's 'political officers', popularly called his 'young men'. Surprisingly, the Army greybeards and their rules and regulations had hardly any say in any matter in recruitment there.

> We do not want antique generals and brigadiers, Sir Henry said, with antiquated notions, in such quarters, but energetic, active-minded men with considerable discretionary power, civil and military. It is all nonsense sticking to rules and formalities….[23]

Henry's those 'active-minded men', Herbert Edwardes, James Abbot, George Lawrence, Harry Lumsden, and John Nicholson, mostly in their early twenties, enjoyed unlimited powers, and did their work the way they liked. In fact, not they alone, the Punjab of those days (mid-1840s and 1850s) was a typically strange place and whoever had anything to do with it, right from the

Governor-General to the local assistants, and small revenue subalterns to the junior lieutenants, changed, after taking a simple sip of the Sutlej water, into powerful despots, treating, more often, their wishes as laws and their whims and vagaries as rules and regulations. The way Sir Henry's favourite Assistant Herbert Edwardes, raised and operationalised 'his' Levies of North-Western Frontier Pathans proves the point to the hilt. Let us hear him :

> 1st. The (Irregular) army was raised by personal influence; such as it becomes every political officer to have in the country under his charge – such as I am proud to think every other Assistant to the Resident at Lahore had acquired in his own district. ... I encouraged the enlistment of brotherhoods; fifty or a hundred clansmen, with their own chiefs at their head. There was subdivision, and a company at once. Then I asked a dozen brotherhoods which of my chief officers they would follow? They picked their own according to their border feuds and friendships; and thus I got together bodies of five hundred, one thousand, and two thousand, each with its responsible leader, who took his orders straight from me and saw them carried out. ...

> 2nd. The army I thus raised was fed and paid out of the revenues (read *loot*) of the country which it conquered. I commenced the war (against Mool Raj at Multan) with a few thousand rupees in hand, and maintained it for nine months at an expenditure, civil, military, of two lakhs of rupees a month, without receiving more than one lakh from the Sikh (Lahore Durbar), and another one from the British Government. ...

> 3rd. As to discipline. There was no time to attempt what regular soldiers call discipline. The men had to fight the day after they were enlisted; and they could only fight their own way. All I did was to make the best of their way; to draw tight such discipline(?) as they had.[24]

Edwardes is elaborate and frank, but he has not cared to explain how those bold and freedom-loving Pathan borderers, who had long memory and revengeful disposition, forgot their decade-long ruthless persecution,[25] constant blockade of their villages,[26] and curfew-like situation imposed upon them[27] by the British, and came forward to serve them. The explanation is, however, not

difficult to find. Hunger and dragoonisation can break everything—memory, will, even soul. This happened to Pathans; and this drove many of them to criminal activities to remain alive. Edwardes and his associates, who raised Levies and other corps (for instance, the Guides), preferred among them *'the most cunning trackers, the most notorious cattle-lifters, the most daring free booters',* in short, all sorts of *'bold villains ready to risk their own throats and to cut those of any one else'* (emphasis added),[28] – Dostoevesky's characters, criminals, 'men of no character at all'.[29] They made better soldiers, they believed. The belief, strange as it might appear, always remained with them to some extent or the other, as seen below, for a long time.

To resume the narrative. Though the above recruiting endeavour (raising of the Punjab Irregular Regiments, Levies and Guides) was on a modest scale, yet it is rated in the Army annals as the most important milestone in the history of the evolution of Indian Army: General George MacMunn has gone even to the extent of declaring that with this raising actually 'commenced the Indian Army of today'.[30] The defining question, then, is : What was so special about this raising that it went to get such an enviable status. Examining clinically, we find nothing in the raising as such, it was in the following special principles which were devised in raising them for the reason that these became by and large the *mantras* for raising the colonial Indian Army of future.

(a) *Divide et Impera (divide and rule)[31]* : The old Roman dictum was initiated by Henry Lawrence, Governor-General's Agent at Lahore, in Punjab regiments and levies in order to counterpoise different collectives in them in 1846, and was perfected and fine-tuned later by his younger brother, John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner, Punjab, by decreeing that, unlike in other places in India, recruits should be 'drawn from the greatest possible varieties of races, differing from each other in religion, birth place, habits and dialect.'[32]

(b) *'Take a country dog to catch a country hare'[33]* : More clearly, 'select from a newly subjected country men willing and capable of military service, who would readily help in keeping down their own people'[34]. The Punjab authorities took up the principle and put it into practice in all seriousness from 1846 onwards.[35]

(c) *All is fair in Imperial interest :* This principle was also seriously followed in Punjab in recruiting where good *chaal-chalan* (character) was normally a pre-requisite for enlistees.[36]

(d) *Ignorant, naïve and uneducated should be preferred.* Men of no education, no culture and no class, having empty bellies, who were least likely to question the order of their officers, like Tennyson's 'six hundred', had been the choicest stuff for the Army for a long time.[37]

The Punjab troops raised and kept going in line with the above principles served, for the most part, their masters well in the Second Sikh War (1848-1849) when several Bengal Army's regular regiments not only wavered but showed sympathy to the Sikh cause. Small wonder then, the Governor-General-in-Council ordered the Punjab authorities to raise ten more Irregular Regiments, five of Infantry and five of Cavalry, comprising 800 and 500 men each respectively, a Sind Camel Corps and three batteries of Artillery and some more Irregular Levies.[38] The nuclei of all the Irregular Regiments were made, as before, of the officers, both British and Indian, from the Regular Regiments of the Bengal Army. The Regimental commandants filled the rest of the vacancies (of sepoys) in their respective regiments through their recruiters with the help of the local civil officials in the following manner :

> For the 1st, the 3rd and the 4th Regiments, of the five irregular Infantry Regiments, they recruited the Pathan tribes from the North-Western border, the Hindustanis, mostly Rajputs from Avadh and Punjabi Musalmans (BKC). For the 2nd and the 3rd Regiments they enrolled Hindustanis, Brahamans, Rajputs, Muslims, again from Avadh. For the five cavalry Irregular Regiments they enlisted North-Western Pathan tribes, for the 1st; Hindustanis, Brahamans, Rajputs and Muslims from Avadh for the 2nd; Hindustanis of the castes mentioned above (half), and Pathans (half) for the 3rd; and the Punjabi Muslims (BKC) from different regions for the 4th and the 5th. For Artillery batteries they went again to the old 'Sikh Artillery men', mostly Muslims (BKC) and to Sindi tribes for the Sind Camel Corp. The strength of the Guides and Irregular Levies was raised manifold.[39]

In raising those corps, the recruiters played an important part, but they alone could not have done much without the help of the local officials and petty loyal *jagirdars.* Both were a great help.

In the year 1850, the doors of the Bengal Army were also thrown open for Punjabis, though partially, by allowing its 74 Infantry Regiments to have 200 of them – 100 being Sikhs – in each.[40] But as no eligible Sikh, i.e. the one who had not fought against the British or was not above 20 years of age – was available, the strength of the Sikhs remained terribly inadequate (about 750) in the Army.[41] Yet, perhaps to show to the world in general and the Sikhs in particular that how broad of mind and kind at heart the British were to have forgiven and trusted their 'staunchest foes' so soon and so easily, Dalhousie declared that he had raised a large 'Sikh Contingent'.[42] It is difficult to know whether the declaration impressed the world and had some cooling effect on the Sikhs or not, but it certainly elicited sharp rebuke from Dalhousie's detractors in India and England. Caught at the wrong foot, the unnerved Governor-General let out the suppressed truth before his trusted friend, philosopher and guide, Sir George Couper, in a private letter thus :

> I have done no such thing. By the acts of the local officers I was *pledged* to employ the troops who stood by us of the Khalsa in last war. Besides these, we had 20,000 levies, to some of whom service was positively promised. I could not employ these in our regular army, for it was full. I could only make local corps of them. There are five regiments of Infantry, five of Cavalry, but so far are they from being Sikh that I have no one Sikh in the Cavalry at all, and only 80 men in a regiment, or 400 in all, in the Infantry. The rest are all to be from the levies, not Sikhs, who served us and fought for us for twelve months.[43]

In fact, Dalhousie never trusted Sikhs – rather he feared and abhorred them. He told General Napier, his Commander-in-Chief, that if any trouble would come to them, it would come from Sikhs of Manjha.[44] They believed that Sikhs were like Greeks, the very sight of steel made them fight. They took many measures to incapacitate them like taking their 'King' away from them, and putting the queen-mother, the fiery widow of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Maharani Jindan Kaur, and every 'real' Sikh leader worth the name

behind the bars; They were starkly disarmed; left with only 'finger-nails' with which, Dalhousie believed, and rightly so, 'men can't make war'.[45]

In this circumstance, the local architecture and grammar of recruitment put to use in 1846 served their craftsmen well. Some strain was, however, felt in 1857 when 'the greatest calamity' (Benjamin Disraeli) befell upon the British Empire and everything seemed to be slipping like butter off a hot plate from their hands. The Bengal Army, the chief component of the East India Company's Indian Army, which had played a major role in conquering the whole of India and much more for them, rose up in full fury to destroy them root and branch. The civil populace took hardly any time to join them. As a result, what started as a mutiny of the troops became a People's Revolt/War. There was, as they say, darkness at noon. The massive Imperial citadel built by Clives, Hastings and Dalhousies seemed to be falling apart.[46] But Punjab, they say, came to their rescue. Thanks to 'the paternalistic' and 'just rule', 1846-1857, of John Lawrence and his chosen band of officers, the grateful Punjabis, Sikhs and Muslims, says MacMunn, who were after their blood some eight years ago, 'flocked from every village . . ., filled the ranks of (our) countless new corps', and saved the situation.[47] Hardly anyone disagrees with him – even eminent historians toe his line. But historically speaking, it is not only not true, the statement is, as they say, a lie, including 'and' and 'the'.

The fact is that British rule over Punjab, 1846-1857, was neither 'paternalistic' nor 'just', as they claim, it was an exploitative, hard-hearted, autocratic rule.[48] The Punjabis had no reason to be grateful and loyal to such an unlawful and rapacious foreign rule. In fact, no Punjabi, particularly Sikh, of any worth or integrity offered his services during the Revolt.[49] Yet, John Lawrence made a case to justify the annexation of Punjab by his mentor, Lord Dalhousie, and to silence his critics, who called it (annexation) a Himalayan blunder. But for annexation, he said, a pretty large number of Sikhs who came on his appeal and fought on their side to capture Delhi, wouldn't have been available. General Macleod Innes who had studied the subject from close quarters very meticulously called Lawrence's bluff: *'One often reads',* he said, *'loosely worded allusion to John Lawrence, having sent down large bodies of newly*

raised Sikhs to Delhi. In point of fact, he sent none' (emphasis added)'.[50] Many more supported him. John Lawrence's repeated pleas and requests to Sikhs to join his Army fell on deaf ears. Shocked and baffled, he made desperate calls to the Sikh chiefs (of Punjab) to furnish men. Yet, says General Innes, *'no bodies of real Sikhs under their own leaders ever seem to have joined at all'* (emphasis added).[51] Almost the same was the case, as seen above, with the Muslims, especially Pathans of 'the class.' They also kept away.

In this circumstance, the Chief Commissioner and his men had no alternative but to go to their old tried and tested constituencies and collectives, the hungry and harassed Pathans, Sikhs, Dogras, Punjabi Muslims (all BKC) and even some Hindustanis, Rajputs, etc. (who were still loyal to them). They expanded their force in two ways : first, they added four additional companies to each of their existing Infantry Regiments,[52] taking officers and men from the earlier raised Punjab Irregular Regiments. Secondly, they 'partially raised 15 Infantry Regiments, some Cavalry Regiments and new Levies, horse and foot', from the loyal stuff mentioned above, the same old way. The strength of the Guides was increased manifold and new Irregular Cavalry Corps like them, namely the Hodson's Horse, Wale's Horse, Lind's Horse, Cureton's Multanis, etc. were also created[53] by the young officers, enjoying full discretionary powers. The total strength of the Punjab corps thus raised (during the crisis) was 23,524 strong – Infantry : 8,461, Cavalry : 7,242; and Levies : 7,821—which was 'trained', held together and made to function, fight and loot like the Levies raised by Herbert Edwardes and his colleagues about a decade ago.[54]

By mid-August, the situation became very grave. Contrary to their expectations, Delhi did not fall and on account of heavy causalities and some desertions, the ranks of the Field Force at the Ridge (Delhi) got thinner. They needed more troops – desperately. But the wind seemed to be blowing, for them, in the wrong direction. The recruiting parties sent for the purpose 'found it difficult to get recruits. Where a hundred recruits came first, now one or two fit for service are presented'.[55] The Sikhs, as General Macleod Innes has said above, stood aloof. The Muslims were hesitant to go to fight their own King (*Badshah*). Earlier, about, 1,200 poor, Mazbhi Sikhs from the labour pool of the Baree Doab

Canal had come to them, but now even they stopped coming.[56] A large number of the loyal Sikhs, Dogras and Muslims (BKC), had already got into the Punjab Regiments, Levies and Police; as such even they were not available in a sizeable number.

Thus forced, the Punjab authorities again looked towards the hills – the North-West Frontier, to be precise. There the poor, wretched Pathans were lured with juicy carrots.[57] 'Delhi and *loot!',* says Cave-Browne, *'was now the cry they heard, and the city of the Mogul with its fabulous wealth and splendour, like an Eldorado of the 16th century, or a California of the present, drew off by hundreds the daring or the needy'* (emphasis added).[58] This resulted in the Levies being over-crowded with, again in the words of Cave-Browne, *'the outlaws, desperadoes, escaped convicts, idle vagabonds'* (emphasis added).[59] Some idea as to how 'over-crowded' were these Levies with such elements can be had from the Punjab Government's official Report on 'Mutiny' : *'One troop alone that is fighting at Lucknow (1857),' it says, 'contains no less that 60 outlaws'* (emphasis added).[60] The loyalists brought in their men. Thus the Province was able to give, whatever their make or character, a formidable force, numbering 58,815 strong – 24,815 belonging to the old Sikh troops and Military Police, and 34,000 new recruits to win back Delhi and upper India. In terms of their social composition, 24,072 of them were Muslims, 13,344 Sikhs, 5,338 Hindus other than 2,203 Dogras and Gurkhas, 2,430 Hindustanis and 16 Christians.[61]

In sum, this novel Punjab experiment, perhaps the first of its kind ever made on such a scale in any Army laboratory from 1846-1857, was in a way successful in serving the Imperial interest and need, but not in the making of a modern professional army. That happened in the ensuing period – the second phase.

The Second Phase

After the burning embers of the Revolt somewhat cooled off, serious steps were taken to overhaul and 'make the Army in India such a force that would be always available and prepared for any emergency (and) would ensure to Great Britain the permanent command and possession of Indian Empire' A high-powered 8-member Commission, headed by Major-General Jonathan Peel, Secretary of State for War, London, was constituted[62] for

suggesting the ways and means to do it. On its recommendations, the Army was re-organised – rather rebuilt. The Punjab Irregular Regiments and Levies were mostly merged with the small remnants of the Bengal Army. In recognition of their loyal and meritorious services during the Sikh Wars and the great Revolt, they were given pride of place in the new Army. Placed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, they stood, in their new avatar, as follows:

> The old Ferozepur and Ludhiana Sikh Irregular Regiments became the 14th and 15th Bengal Infantry Regiments; the 14 Punjab Irregular Infantry Regiments raised during the Revolt, became the 19th to 32nd Bengal Infantry Regiments; the 8 local Infantry Corps raised during the Revolt as Levies became the 33rd to 40th Bengal Infantry Regiments; and the 8 Sikh Irregular Cavalry Regiments and the Horses (like the Hodson's, Wale's, Murray's, etc.), which were also raised during the Revolt, became 9th to 15th Bengal Cavalry Regiments.[63]

In place of North-Western Provinces, now Punjab became the centre of recruitment. The old 'Punjab Force' rules and practices for enlistment were done away with. In the new scheme of things, the civil authority had no business to enroll sepoys directly, as was done earlier. It was now Army's job which it did following the old two-pronged strategy – 'Direct Regimental Recruiting' and 'Class Recruiting'. In the former case, the Regiments, whenever they needed recruits, formed recruiting parties consisting mostly of some junior commissioned officers (VCOs) and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The parties visited their recruiting areas and picked up men of the required classes. The relatives of men serving in various regiments could also go directly to the regiments and get, if otherwise fit, enrolled. In the case of 'Class Recruiting', enlistment was made by Army recruiting officers whose offices were located at various cantonments. They enrolled recruits from particular classes/castes for 'Class Regiments' or 'Class Company Regiments'.[64] In peace time the recruiting strategy worked well, but not in the war days. But that is another story.

Besides changes in the recruiting strategies, some changes were also effected in the social fabric. The old policy of not to enlist Sikhs and others who had ever taken arms or worked against them in the past was relaxed, if not completely given up. Some

new peasant-castes, as seen below, were added to the recruiting list. In short, men from the Land of the Five Rivers occupied major space in the re-organised Army.

Around 1880s, the position improved still further when certain activities in Central Asia and thereabouts convinced the British that Russians, after befriending/over-running Afghanistan and nearby territories, were coming. Several Commanders-in-Chief of the Indian Army, especially Lord Roberts (1885-1893) thought that because of its human resource and geo-physical and strategic location, only Punjab could supply men who could fight Russians. But there was a problem there too. Punjab had 4,013,920 male population of recruitable age at that time. They had to be, therefore, selective in choosing the required number. But the task (taking in some classes/castes and leaving some others) was not easy. Nonetheless, after taking social, economic, political and psychological factors into account, they selected the following peasant classes/castes: 'The Rajput Dogra of the lower Himalayas, the Punjabi Mohammadan of the north-west, the Sikh of the central districts and the Jat of the south-east,' for enlistment,[65] and put a tag of 'martial races' around their necks.[66]

The tag was neither biologically tried-and-true nor militarily or politically prudent. Even for its creators – as it was proved during the war-days – it was a disaster. But for Indians it was, both in short and long run, a misfortune. In the first place, it deprived a huge multitude of them living in different provinces, the right of bearing arms in defence of their country, their life, their honour and their property.[67] Secondly, it harmed them socio-politically by adding one more division to their already divided society, which the British exploited to the hilt. They patronised its elite heartily, made them their subordinate collaborators and bestowed *izzat* (honour) and *iqbal* (prosperity) upon them. The grateful class served them loyally and faithfully.[68] Its non-class folk became the choicest material for their Army.[69]

As time rolled on, the process of 'Punjabisation' gathered more steam and strength. About 1913, says O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab then, 'one-half of the Indian Army was drawn from the Punjab, over one-sixth from the Frontier and the trans-border Pathans and…Ghurkhas (non Indians), and less than one-third from all the remaining Indian races'.[70] Numerically,

the Punjabis amounted to about 100,000 – 87,000 combatants and 13,000 non-combatants.[71] There was no change in the recruiting system; the old one remained intact in term of its architecture, grammar and functioning.

The Indian Army was now, as people sarcastically, but not quite baselessly, said, 'the Punjab Army': It was, in other words, an ethnically and territorially 'imbalanced Army,'[72] which served the Imperial purpose well, but not the broad Indian interests and aspirations. The Indian Army is now a truly National Army but it has taken a few decades after Independence to correct the compositional contortions.

Endnotes

[1] Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew it*, London, 1925, p. 213; HG Trevaskis, *The Punjab of to-day,* Lahore, 1931, pp. 36-37.

[2] Most of these studies have been mentioned, and sometimes critically appraised, in the references and notes at the relevant places.

[3] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Eng. tr. C. Farrington, New York, 1963, p. 7.

[4] The official documents and reports are more often selective and misleading. For instance, the eminent historian, Sir John W Kay, found the '*State Papers*' as 'one-sided compilations of garbled documents': cited in Ad. to the Second Edition of J.D. Cunningham's *History of Sikhs*, by his brother Peter Cunningham, Kensington, 1853, p. XVIII. '*The Blue Books*' presented to the British Parliament were no less untrustworthy (see *The Punjab Papers*, ed. Bikrama Jit Hasrat, Hoshiarpur, 1970, pp. 233-34); Dolores Domin, *India in 1857-1859,* Berlin, 1977, p. 253. Even '*Parliamentary Debates*' are not always truthful. *Calcutta Review*, vol. 29, July-December 1857, p. 424. And so on. Yet, truth comes out, as they say, in her own strange ways, provided we seek it.

[5] The myth of the Punjab loyalty in 1857 is an apt case to illustrate the point. See, for details, KC Yadav, *1857* : The *Role of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh,* Delhi, 2008, pp. 13-117.

[6] See *The Census of India*, *1911,* Calcutta, 1913, vol. 1, pp. 2-3.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-41.

[9] Trevaskis, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

[10] Mustapha Kamal Pasha, *Colonial Political Economy : Recruitment and underdevelopment in the Punjab,* Karachi, 1998.

[11] Op. Cit 1.

[12] NM Khilnani, *The Punjab Under the Lawrences,* Shimla, 1951, pp. 13-46.

[13] John Lawrence, holding the rank of a Commissioner, 'ruled over' the Jullundur Doab from 1846 to 1849 with an iron hand. For details, see R.R. Sethi, *John Lawrence as Commissioner of the Punjab, Jullundur Doab, 1846-1849,* Lahore, 1930.

[14] Sir Henry Lawrence, was appointed Resident at the Lahore Durbar (1846). For his 'reign', see S.S. Thorburn, *Punjab in Peace and War,* London, 1883, pp. 73-9; Khilnani, *op.cit.,* pp. 47-101.

[15] 'The Sikhs had been defeated and humiliated, their country garrisoned and their military formation broken up; and their Maharani was banished and they were betrayed by their leaders. In spite of all this, their spirit had remained undaunted. They held their heads high' (Khilnani*, op.cit.*, p. 62), proudly declaring that … 'Gobind would clothe his disciples with irresistible might and guide them with unequalled skill' (JDCunningham). *Ibid.*

[16] For their fighting skills, see Charles Napier, *Defects, Civil and Military of Indian Government,* London, 1853, pp. 113-14.

[17] Come rain come shine, the British always used to have very suspecting and uneasy relations with Afghanistan, which led to three wars, 1848, 1878, 1919.

[18] For fear of Russia in the British mind, see JH Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, Cambridge, 1950.

[19] For details relative to their composition, etc. see PG Bamford, *The Sikh Regiment, the King George's own Ferozepur Sikhs,* Aldershot, 1948, pp. 1-2; E.G. Talbot, *The 14th King George's own Sikhs, 1846-1933,* London, 1937, pp. 1-2; *History of the First Sikh Infantry 1846-1886, vol. 1, Calcutta, 1903; The Sikh Regiment : Brief History, 1846-1968*, (cyclostyled copy) issued by the Sikh Regimental Centre, 1970.

[20] They were designated as the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Sikh Local Infantry. See *The Sikh Regiment: Brief History, op. cit.*, pp. 1-2; *History of the First Sikh Infantry, op.cit., pp. 1-7;* Talbot, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2; W.E.H. Condon, comp., *The Frontier Force Regiment,* Aldershot, 1962, pp. XXI-II, 1-5; *The Punjab Administration Report (*hereafter *PAR*), 1849-50, 1850-51, p. 42.

[21] *Vide* the Government of India, GO, no. 2457, dated 14 December 1846.

[22] For details see Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2; Talbot, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2; *The Sikh Regiment,* official, pp. 1-2.

A question usually arises here: Why were the above regiments made of such heterogeneous elements called 'Sikh regiments'? The designation might have given the impression to the general public that the Regiments

were either 'wholly Sikh' or Sikhs 'preponderated' in them when none of the two things, as seen above, was there. The reason was simple: they were called 'Sikh' because bulk of the sepoys in them came from the old Sikh Army. As for the Sikhs, actually, a very small number of them (only BKC) were there. See Condon, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[23] Henry Lawrence to Lord Stanley (private), 31 March 1853, in Herbert Edwardes, H Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence,* London*, 1872, p. 219.*

The Army seemed to have somewhat lost its authority in those days. From 1792 to 1853, 14 Commanders-in-Chief served in India. Out of them, 10 resigned for not being allowed full say even in the matters of purely military nature. Of the remaining four, two were themselves Governors-General; only 'two held their command to the last, suffering all things' Napier, *op.cit.,* 1853, p. 220.

[24] Edwardes, *Punjab Frontier,* vol. 2, pp. 721-25.

[25] Soon after their occupation of Punjab, the British sent several expeditions to subdue the freedom-loving, 'warlike' Pathan tribes living on the North-Western border. Each expedition attacked their villages, burnt them, and bolted away, to do the same again till the Pathans were down and out. The policy was called, 'Butcher and bolt policy'. See Khilnani, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

[26] There was hardly a tribe', says a contemporary writer, 'that was not in what is technically called a state of blocade—scarcely less potent than the interdict of medieval Rome'. J.Cave-Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857,* London, 1861, vol. 1, p. 139.

[27] The Pathans who were found roaming outside their villages between sunset and sunrise were punished. See *PAR,* 1849-50-1850-51, p. 52.

[28] Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, New York, 1883, vol. 2, p. 263; for 'villians', See J.C. Marshman, *The History of India*, London, 1867, vol. 3, p. 315.

[29] Smith, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 263.

[30] George MacMunn, *Armies of India* (hereafter *Armies*), Delhi, reprint, 2007, p. 67.

[31] The principle was, no doubt, in vogue elsewhere also, but it was not taken so seriously and used so meticulously as in Punjab. Sir John Lawrence's biographer, Bosworth Smith, (see his work, *op.cit.,* vol. 2, p. 98), confirms the fact, though in his own biased manner, thus: 'Seldom has the somewhat sinister maxim, *divide et impera,* been acted upon by a ruler with less selfish motive' (to be objective, read 'more selfish motive).

[32] *Punjab Mutiny Records, Reports, Lahore, 1911,* vol. 8, pt. 2, p. 340.

[33] Herbert Edwardes, an important actor in the affairs of Punjab in those days, was very fond of using this folk wisdom in the North-Western region

(see his *Punjab Frontier*, p. 732). MacMunn has given another version of it, 'to set a thief to catch a thief'. *Armies*, p. 132.

[34] Dolores Domin, *India in 1857-59,* Berlin, 1977, p. 105. The soldiers who formed the bulk of the Punjab Irregular Regiments were, as seen above, from among those ex-soldiers of the Sikh Army who had betrayed 'king and country' (BKC) during the late Sikh Wars.

[35] In 1862, Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, wanted the principle to be used universally: '*We should have*', he counseled, *'a different and rival spirit in different regiments, so that Sikh might fire into Hindoo, Goorkha into either, without any scruple in case of need'*. Quoted in Steven. I. Wikinson, *Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence,* Delhi, 2015, pp. 37-38.

[36] The principle was seriously adhered to from 1846 to 1857 and to some extent in the later times – even during WWI.

[37] Nirad C Chaudhury, 'The Martial Races of India', *The Modern Review*, vol. 48, no. 1, January 1930, p. 43.

[38] *PAR*, *1849-50-1850-51*, pp. 35-38.

[39] *PAR*, 1849-50-1850-51, pp. 35-38. The strength of the Guides went, for instance, three times up, and that of the Levies a little more. Taken together, they numbered about 20,000 strong.

[40] Domin, *op.cit.,* pp. 114-17.

[41] The strength of the Punjabis should have been 14,800, but it was far less. The position of Sikhs was still worse. They numbered less than 750 (1857) in all the 74 Regiments. See, for details, K.C. Yadav, 'British Policy towards Sikhs, 1849-57', in Harbansh Singh, N.G. Barrier, eds., *Punjab Past and Present : Essays Presented in Honour of Ganda Singh*, Patial, 1976, p. 191.

[42] JGA, Baird (ed.), *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, London, 1910, pp. 84-85.

[43] *Ibid*.

[44] NAI, Foreign, Secret Consultations, nos. 114-17, 26 April 1850. Napier agreed with Dalhousie, at least on this count, and told him that he had placed troops all round the Manjha; at Nurpur, Kangra, Hajipur, Mokerian, Badapind, Hoshiarpur, Kartarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepore, Lahore, Govindgarh and Sialkot. 'Thus the Manjha is in centre of a girdle of troops which can in a few hours, and the most distant in two marches, be poured in rapidly from Jullundur and Lahore under two of our ablest general officers, Sir W. Gilbert and Brigadier Wheeler'. Napier, *op.cit.,* p. 406.

[45] Dalhousie shared this truth, privately, with the President of the Board of Control, Hobhouse, on 17.4.1849 thus : 'Men can't make war with their

finger-nails; and if you only let me, I will take care that even those should be pared close', *Punjab Papers*, p. 230.

[46] For Punjab's role in role in the Revolt, see K.C. Yadav, *1857 : The Role of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh* (thereafter *1857),* Delhi, 2008.

[47] MacMunn, *Martial Races*, p. 216.

[48] See, for details, Yadav, *1857,* pp. 13-117.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Macleod Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt* : *A Critical Narrative,* London, 1877, pp. 118-19.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Punjab Mutiny Records, Reports,* Lahore, 1911, vol. 8, part 2, p. 340; Domin, *op.cit*, p. 145. The relatives of those who left their companies were brought in to take their places.

[53] MacMunn, *Armies*, p. 65.

[54] *Punjab Mutiny Records, Correspondence*, Lahore, 1911, vol. 7, part 2, p. 19; for 'class' composition, see Condon, *op.cit.*, p.4.

[55] NAI, Foreign, Secret Consultation, no. 47, 30 October 1857.

[56] Domin, *op.cit*, pp. 160-61.

[57] Cave-Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[58] For poverty as a policy to facilitate recruitments, see Pasha, *op.cit.,* pp. 107-11.

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] *The Punjab Government Records : Mutiny Reports,* vol. 8, pt. 2, p. 183. A troop ordinarily consisted of 65-70 sepoys there.

[61] *PAR*, 1858-59, pp. 398-400, quoted in Domin, *op.cit.,* p. 210.

[62] For a brief but highly useful account of the proceedings of the Commission, see *Calcutta Review,* vol. 33, July-December 1859, pp. 186-259.

[63] MacMunn, *Armies*, p. 66. They formed, says the General, 'the nucleus and model' for the new Army.

[64] *Recruiting in India* : *Before and during the War*, 1914-1918, official, Calcutta, 1920, pp. 11-15.

[65] *Ibid.,* p. 213.

[66] For detailed discussion on the issue, see Nirad C. Chaudhary, 'The Martial Races of India,' *The Modern Review,* vol. 48. 1 and 3, 1930, and vol. 49, no. 1 and 2, 1931.

[67] Chaudhury, *op. cit.,* vol. 48 no. 1, July 1930, p. 41.

[68] Yong, *op.cit.,* pp. 240-280; Raghuvender Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party,* Delhi, 1999; Rajit Mazumder, *The Indian Army and the making of the Punjab,* Ranikhet, 2011.

[69] For details, see the Table in Chaudhary, *op.cit.*, vol. 48, no. 3, September 1930, p. 296.

[70] O'Dwyer, *op.cit.,* p. 214. O'Dwyer's calculation of the non-Indians is not right. The non-Indian elements made about a quarter of the Indian Army. See H.C. Mookerjee, 'Why India helped Britain in the last World War, in *The Modern Review,* vol. 72, no. 3, July 1942, p. 221.

[71] Leigh, *op.cit.,* p. 33.

[72] The European colonial armies were, in most of the cases, 'populated disproportionately by minorities: a largely Punjabi and Pashtun Army in India, northern-dominated armies in colonial Tango, Ghana and Nigeria, a Sunni dominated army in Iraq, an army of Karans, Chins and Kochins…in colonial Burma, and Ambonese and Minhassans in Dutch controlled Indonesia'. See Wilkinson, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

India Remembers

Children of Smile Foundation with war veterans and descendants at the commemorative event organised as a part of the India Remembers project on 26th September at the Delhi War Cemetery.

India and the Great War Project: Activities Update

June 30, 2016: To represent the Indian participation in the Battle of the Somme centenary commemoration, Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd), Secretary Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) read an extract from a poem by Rabindranath Tagore during the midnight vigil organised by the British High Commission at the Delhi War Cemetery.

July 14, 2016: USI- CAFHR in partnership with the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) and the Flags of Honour Foundation launched the 'India Remembers' project to encourage communities from a broad spectrum of society to Remember, Honour and Commemorate the Indian servicemen and women. The launch was covered by the BBC. On the same day, a book titled 'Bravest of the Brave: The Extraordinary Story of the Indian VCs of World War I' written by Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd) was released by Lieutenant General Ajai Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).

15th August, 2016 - As part of the 'India Remembers' project, three community groups in Pune undertook commemorative activities. The Corinthians Resort and Club unveiled a memorial plaque in memory of the Indian servicemen and women who fell in various military conflicts since 1914 till date and a wreath of marigold flowers was placed as a mark of respect. The memorial plaque will be installed in a remembrance garden that is being created by the Club within their premises. Moreover, residents from two housing colonies came together to honour serving and retired defence personnel of their societies in an event where children presented the servicemen with marigold flowers. The management committee of one of the housing colonies also allocated a space for the development of a Remembrance Garden. At all the events, the Last Post was played and two minutes of silence was observed in memory of 'India's War Dead'.

22 August, 2016 - As part of 'India Remembers', children of Saint Stephens Primary School, Lungchok, Sikkim, under the supervision of their teachers planted marigolds in their school premises in the memory of the fallen Gorkha soldiers.

7-9 September, 2016: Squadron Leader Chhina visited Dhaka along with a Gallery Design Consultant for discussions with the Indian High Commission and the Bangladesh authorities regarding the proposed Indian Gallery of the Bangladesh Liberation War Museum.

25 September, 2016 - As part of the 'India and the Great War' Centenary Commemoration project and the India Remembers project, the foundation stone of Ressaidar Badlu Singh's (14th Jat Lancers) Memorial marked was laid at his village Dhakl, District Jhajjar by Mr Om Prakash Dhankar, Minister of Agriculture, Government of Haryana

26 September, 2016 - Smile Foundation, an India Remembers community, organised a commemorative event at the CWGC Delhi War Cemetery as part of the project. The event was organised to mark the three significant events that fell at the end of this month - 23 September: Marking the end of the 1965 Indo-Pak War, 23 September - marked the capture of Haifa by Jodhpur and Mysore Lancers, 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade during WW1 in 1918 and 26 September: The first Indian troops landed on European soil during WW1. The event was also organised to give an opportunity to the children associated with Smile Foundation to interact with war veterans from Bhondsi Village as well as descendants of WW1 soldiers from Delhi.

The panel for the launch of 'India Remembers Projec't- right to left- Virginia Crompton, Colin Kerr, Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Director, USI, Lt Gen Ajai Singh,PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Lt Gen Aditya Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), President, Cavalry Officers Association, Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd)

Short Reviews of Recent Books

India's Military Power : A General Reflects. *By Lt Gen HC Dutta, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), (Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2016), pp..284, Price Rs 795.00, ISBN 9788170495178.*

This biographical narration by one of the most outstanding Generals of the Indian Army is more of a 'text book of military education' than a mere biographic sketch. I must confess that the narrative gripped my imagination and I am confident that it is bound to have a similar effect on any serious student of military literature.

The book comprising 12 chapters has three distinct parts : his motivation to join the profession of arms; personal passion to imbibe it in all its dimensions and lastly to reflect on his knowledge and experience in a capsule form. The last part (last three chapters) reflects the vital importance of military power for security and wellbeing of a Nation and how to orchestrate the same in the form of a strategy. For this reason, I have an unconventional suggestion for higher echelons of command and policy makers who may not have the time or inclination to read the entire book, to read the book in reverse order to understand the importance of framing a sound National Defence Policy. It is all the more necessary because even after 70 years of Independence, in the civil-military relationship milieu it still prevails – 'that ostensibly, the Indian Army has yet to prove its apolitical credentials'.

Let me now come back to the book itself. The story unfolds itself, finally culminating into an essence of military wisdom assimilated through a lifetime of intense hard work, professional commitment, patriotic fervour, academic knowledge honed by extensive combat experience and finally, so articulately spelt out for those who wish to imbibe the same. For all the budding leaders I would strongly recommend Chapters 6 and 7, as they can be taken as a professional guide for learning the 'Art of Military Leadership'. *The unambiguous conclusion that emerges from the book is that military power is the best safeguard for any nation.*

While writing memoirs there is always a danger of *'I man ship"* in such writings. It goes to the credit of Lieutenant General Harish Dutta that in his biographical sketch he has scrupulously avoided that fault. On the contrary, he has erred on the other side by relating all his experiences with so much humility that it only

adds to his already established stature as a soldier and a military leader.

The book has been written in a simple language and is a racy narrative. It is a kind of manual of military education. It is strongly recommended to be read by younger officers, higher commanders and policy makers as well as civilians to get a feel of what the Army is all about and what motivates the soldiers to give their 'all' to ensure safety, security and well-being of the Country and its citizens.

Lieutenant General Ajai Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Lieutenant General Billimoria - His Life and Times. *By Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM, (USI-CAFHR, New Delhi, 2016), pp.. 92, ISBN 978-93-84695-13-2*

The book recounts the story of Lieutenant General FN Billimoria, PVSM and his family, and also describes the role and contribution of the Parsi community to the society and the nation. General Billimoria came from a military background, as his father was a Brigadier in the Army. The author has made excellent efforts to research the journey of the General in the Army, replete with interesting photographs and accounts. The narration starts from early days of schooling at the Doon School, the training at the National Defence Academy, the Indian Military Academy (IMA), commissioning into the 2nd Battalion the 5th Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) (2/5 GR) in June 1953 and culminates in his achieving the coveted position of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command.

The General has had a very distinguished career in the Army and held many prestigious appointments, both in command and staff. He commanded 2/5 GR, the battalion which has had three Victoria Cross winners during the Second World War. He was later posted to the Infantry School, the UK, as the Indian Army Liaison Officer; as the Deputy Commandant at the IMA, and as the Commandant Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He had the unique honour of commanding his unit in the battle, at Pir Ganj and Bogra in the then East Pakistan, during the 1971 War, which has been explained in detail in a separate chapter in the book. He commanded a division in the northeast, the 10 Corps and the Central Army. In 1990-91, he was appointed as the Colonel

of the 5th Gorkha Rifles and the President of the Gorkha Brigade, the ultimate for a Gorkha officer.

The author deserves full credit for producing a fine book, more so when the General had passed away and getting details would not have been an easy task. He painstakingly wrote letters to his associates and friends of the General for details and has included some of these letters as a separate chapter in the book. The author acknowledges the contributions of Karan Billimoria (son), a business magnate, now a peer in the House of Lords, Mrs Rati Billimoria (mother) and Yasmin (wife) for providing a wealth of information and the excellent photographs from the family archives.

The book, an interesting and easy read would be of immense value to the officers of his Regiment and to those who would like to know more about this illustrious soldier. The narrative will inspire future generations of officers and men of the Fifth Gorkha Rifles in particular, to strive for excellence and high ethics.

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

China's One Belt One Road: Initiative, Challenges and Prospects. *A joint project by United Service Institute of India, New Delhi, in collaboration with Sichuan University, Chengdu (Vij Books India Private Limited, Delhi,2016), pp..117, ISBN 9789385563591.*

In Mar 2015, The State Council of China, released the Action Plan of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated by President Xi Jinping as 'Silk Road Economic Belt' and '21st Century Maritime Silk Road' i.e. One Belt One Road (OBOR). It has now occupied the centre stage of Chinese infrastructure development and 'Infrastructure Diplomacy' with a near global perspective. BRI is claimed to promote composite connectivity network of four continents and their adjacent seas for sustainable development in countries along the Belt and Road architecture, creating a win-win situation for all participants. This book analyses OBOR, with emphasis on its applicability in India - China context.

The book is a very comprehensive compilation of views of two researchers each from United Service Institution of India (USI), New Delhi, and Sichuan University, Chengdu, divided into two Sections i.e. Section I giving out China's perspective in two Chapters, each written by one of the two scholars from Sichuan University. The first chapter explains the Chinese overall

perspective of BRI, and the second chapter focusses on divergences and convergences between India and China, as perceived by the Chinese scholar. Section II gives out Indian perspective in two chapters, each written by one of the two scholars from USI, covering continental and maritime perspective respectively.

The advantages of connectivity and economic growth have been well covered in the book. China would like the world to believe that it is a benign project for inclusive growth of all countries connected by it. It is also a Chinese need to reduce their logistics cost of offloading trade surpluses and overcapacities, besides increasing deployment capability of PLA to secure her Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), commercial and strategic interests, because infrastructure is a dual use facility (civil and military), with serious security implications. This remains under explained in the book. In Chapter II, while talking about the divergences, the author avoided commenting on serious sovereignty concerns of India in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), in relation to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), although some mention has been made by the Indian author later.

From India's perspective, as part of "Act East Policy" and growth of North East Region (NER), the connectivity to Myanmar and Bangladesh is essential, but it need not be formally under Bangladesh Myanmar India China (BMIC) corridor. India has already finalised requisite agreements with Bangladesh to connect NER, and trying the same with Myanmar. This aspect needed some more explanation.

The book makes an interesting reading and explains the India-China part of the BRI in a simple lucid style, well backed by enormous references.

Major General SB Asthana, SM, VSM (Retd)

The Origins and Early Developments of Shi'a Islam. *By Syed Husain Mohammad Jafri, (Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 2000), ISBN 978-0-19-579387-1.*

This well-researched exegesis on the origins and theological evolution of Shi'a Islam purportedly seeks to present a dispassionate study on the subject that it justifiably claims was hitherto "over-dependent on the polemical works" of Sunni heresiographers like Ibn Hazm and Al-Shahrastani. However, the

conceptual premise and general tenor of the book belies its ostensible objectivity in that it employs the Shi'a counterargument to correct the broad distortions of earlier accounts, as opposed to presenting a more balanced and objective analyses of history.

From the first chapter itself - titled 'Conceptual Foundations' - Jafri asserts that the origins of Shi'a Islam were not limited to political causes as is traditionally believed (stemming from the dispute over Prophet's succession), but had their religious and spiritual underpinnings from the outset. In spite of making this fascinating claim, the author provides little evidence to substantiate it and leaves it unaddressed. He then goes to great lengths to emphasise the pre-Islamic eminence of the Banu Hashim tribe to which the family of the Prophet and his descendants (Ahl Al-Bayt) belonged, which to any student of history is of little consequence unless the author wants to subtly infer the legitimacy of Ali's claim to being the Prophet's successor on a filial basis. Thus, the book resorts to the very polemical insinuations, it laments in its 'Preface' was the norm among the early historians.

Another drawback is that while the book frequently skips over many important events and issues pertaining to early Shi'a history, it delves into great detail on less significant matters. For instance, the chapters on letters exchanged between Amir Muawiya and Imam Hasan and the social structure of the city of Kufa are purely research-oriented and are quite out of place for this general account on early Shi'a history. Perhaps, the reader would have benefitted if the complete historical account of Shi'a theological evolution would have been detailed in this book and the research-oriented chapters, for example on the city of Kufa, could have become the subject of a separate study.

The book is also quite selective in its exposition of historical events and does not sufficiently explore crucial occurrences like the assassination of Caliph Uthman, the accession of Ali, the Battle of Jamal and the Battle of Siffin. It is a work that principally serves as a Shi'a explanation of disparate scholarly contentions and conflicting versions of certain historical events. However, the saving grace of this book lies in the chapters related to Husain's martyrdom and the concluding exegesis of the concept of Imamate. The flawless writing style and the erudite scholarship, in spite of its partisan outlook, redeem this partially compelling read.

Dr Adil Rasheed

India's Engagement with East Africa : Opportunities and Challenges. *By Dr Nivedita Ray, (Vij Books, New Delhi, First Edition 2015), pp..175, Price Rs 695/, ISBN 9789382652946.*

The author has systematically covered the region of East Africa and then drawn its historical and current linkages with India. She brings out India's engagements at international, regional, sub-regional and bi-lateral levels. She also brings out the role being played by the private sector, public sector and multi-faceted Government-to-Government engagements. The importance of Indian Diaspora as a Heritage Resource is well covered. Final chapter covers the security challenges of East Africa and how Indian cooperation has resulted in stability of the region.

India's linkages with the region date back to 19th century, when traders from the West Coast of India sailed across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. These linkages were strengthened during the British colonial rule, when besides traders, labourers and craftsmen were taken by them to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. They have assimilated well into the local population, are economically strong and enjoy prestige and status. This gives India advantage over others.

India is giving aid and assistance to the East African Countries (EAC) as equal partners, with mutual consultation. This covers development and infrastructural projects, capacity building, agriculture and trade. For ensuring internal security, India has readily provided military aid and assistance, through the UN (Peacekeeping) and also bilaterally. India also provides a number of scholarships in her educational and professional institutions to the youth of EAC. The author brings out that though there are other countries (like China) trading in EAC and providing aid, their activities do not necessarily pose a challenge to India's initiatives.

The book covers events and projects up to 2013 only. The initiatives taken by the NDA Government in 2014 could have been included, as a Post Script. The research could have been enriched by interviewing a few dignitaries of the previous and present Indian Governments. Ideally, a few views of leaders/diplomats /officials of the EAC could have also been taken.

The book provides a rich background of India-East Africa cooperation and is recommended for libraries of institutions associated with studies of international relations.

Lieutenant General YM Bammi, PhD (Retd)

War-Conflict-Security and the Military. *By Maj P Tuhinikar Choudhary (Retd), (Institute for Democratic and Economic Affairs, Hyderabad, 2015), pp..279, ISBN 978-81-926688-1-9.*

The nature of war is constantly evolving from the Clauzewitzian model that has prevailed for over three centuries to the Non-Trinatrian in the 21st. Soldiers today are called upon less to fight kinetic battles but more insurgencies, terrorism, law and order and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. This has impacted the dynamics of strategy, operational art and tactics as well as military organisations. An understanding of nuances of today's warfare and application of the same in the context of security challenges that are faced by India assumes importance. This is particularly so due to weak knowledge domain in this sphere restricted to a small elite, mostly military. Available literature on the subject is either too esoteric or non contemporary. Choudhary's compact book overcomes this deficiency to some extent with lucid yet simple style and a unique format for each chapter– highlights, quotations, key concepts, description of the issue and recommendations. The book thus provides a bird's eye view of matters related to national security and strategy.

Set about in 15 chapters the book covers a vast panorama of subjects commencing with nature of war in the 21st Century to organisation for war, equipping, budgeting, insurgency and terrorism and so on, ending with the most recent form of confrontation – stone pelting. To substantiate his conclusions the author has quoted from a number of sources of well established military authors thereby providing a veritable trove of knowledge on a wide range of subjects covered. Choudhary has also given recommendations on each aspect which can provoke debate such as dealing with China, Pakistan and the collusive emerging axis. While one may not agree with all the recommendations by the author, yet that he has ventured to do so in this compact volume is commendable.

Given the vast number of subjects tackled most of which are complex; reducing these for understanding by the layman is indeed very challenging. Thus some of the conclusions of the author such as a solution to the Kashmir issue through review of Indus Water Treaty alone or for media to downplay the impact of terrorist incidents as the per capita fatalities are low as compared to say diseases and accidents are a bit jarring. Nonetheless, an extremely readable and erudite work on war, strategy and security in the Indian context.

Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retd)

Bonded Labour in Pakistan. *Edited by Ayaz Qureshi and Ali Khan, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2016), pp 214, Rs 695.00, ISBN 978-0-19-940389-9*

Pakistan ranks third in the world with respect to bonded labour numbers/modern forms of slavery, after China and India. This includes debt-bondage, human trafficking and forced domestic and child labour. According to the Global Slavery Index, approximately 2.1 million individuals in Pakistan are enslaved in one or the other form of slavery. The book puts across case studies of bonded labour across different sectors and regions in modern day Pakistan.

It includes legal study of bonded labour in Pakistan and lists out details of the legislations, plans and policies. The book has also provided a list and outcome of court cases which are interesting and useful inputs for a person interested in the subject. The chapter on 'Debt Bondage at the Brick Kilns in Pakistan' contains assessment methods and observations which provide a good insight on bonded labour dynamics. The variations in bonded labour in various sectors such as mining, brick kilns and domestic work have been enumerated in the book. The ethnic, religious and caste dimensions have been well analysed.

The case studies contained in the book establish the link between the debt and bondage. The analysis of the *'peshgi'* system (advance payment) has been carried out in fair detail particularly in the brick kiln sector. Tactics adopted by the employer to strengthen the grip over the bonded labourers have been clearly spelt out.

The book rightly brings out that the changes in regional economy have not been matched by the political structure and the livelihood strategies of labourers. The book has brought out that the governments in Pakistan have tried to resolve the problem through legislative and executive means but the intent has failed to translate into action. The workforce in Pakistan is no different than the workforce in many other developing countries and are well aware of the disadvantages they have in an informal sector.

The charts and data referred to in the book appear to be authentic as it is well supported by cross references and notes. The summary of findings as listed out in Chapter 10 are based on a scientific research design and would be of immense use to a student of Sociology and Social Anthropology.

Lieutenant General Chander Prakash, SM, VSM (Retd)

China's Approach towards Territorial Disputes: Lessons and Prospects. *By Sana Hashmi, (New Delhi, KW Publishers, 2016), pp..260, Price Rs 1280, ISBN 9789383649891.*

A slim volume of about 200 pages, the book deals with China's territorial boundary settlements with 13 states [China claims 14 states, but POK is not a state] that share land frontiers with her. Only two boundary settlements remain—India and Bhutan. The reasons for this are complex and the author's views need further refining, although she has made some pertinent points.

The author has done well in articulating and succinctly presenting China's disputes with 11[12 according to the Chinese] of her other neighbours and with whom she has settled the remaining boundary disputes. In case a quick reference is required into the origins and the course of settlement of these disputes, then this narrative is very suitable. The author has to be commended for diligently producing most of the details with maps, in a clear and concise manner that makes reading very pleasing on the eye.

However, the narrative is a little short when it comes to describing China's own attitude towards settlement of territorial disputes and the philosophy that China has adopted. If the author had accessed Chinese sources, which in recent times the Chinese have de-classified, then the narrative would have become that much more sophisticated and authentic. Relying mostly on western sources to decipher Chinese policies may not have been the best possible option available. Recently 'China Quarterly' [Vol1, No.2, July 2015] a publication of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies published an article by Kong Lingjie, an Associate Professor of the China Institute of Boundary and Oceanic Studies, on the issue of China's foreign policy towards territorial and boundary disputes. This work is an excellent compilation of Chinese policies on boundary issues and recent changes introduced as a result of the One Belt One Road (OBOR). Now that Chinese sources are becoming readily available, scholars must tap into this new source material.

There are some obvious errors which could have been eliminated by better editing. Nevertheless, the book is worth reading and the author must be complimented for her sincere effort.

Shri RS Kalha, IFS (Retd)

Even If It Ain't Broke Yet Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change. *By Vivek Chadha (New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016), pp 192, Price Rs 795, ISBN 978-81-8274-919-1.*

This is a rare book on military change and its management with the Indian Army as its subject. The author starts with a wide survey of published material on change, largely international, to highlight different factors and principles enunciated by different authors. Military change is complex phenomenon and factors governing it vary vastly from country to country and regions.

In the Indian context, the study relates to the post-Independence experience, both in the conventional warfare and the counter insurgency domains. In each domain, changes are examined in the organisational, strategic and tactical fields based on case studies. In this regard, developments post-1962 War and the General Krishna Rao Report 1975 form two major case studies amongst others. In India, there is limited interest and specialisation on military issues amongst the political elite and the bureaucracy. The governing structure has failed to incorporate military leadership at the highest levels of decision making. Consequently, military advice reaching decision making levels is filtered and multilayered.

Absence of a national security strategy is another impediment. Consequently, military change has often taken place long after its need and with a lack of inter-service joint approach leading to wastage and inefficiencies. It has been led by a few visionary military leaders and during crisis situations when the political leaders were amenable to military advice. Change has occurred, both Top Down and Bottom up. While changes in the conventional domain have mostly been 'Top Down' marked by tardy implementation, in the counter insurgency domain it has mostly been 'Bottom up' based on ground experience. The principle of minimum force and the avoidance of use of heavy weapons was an early post-Independence military change in countering insurgencies.

An important aspect covered by the author is the level of Professional Military Education (PME). A survey of serving as well as retired officers reveals that our environment is not conducive to the growth of military leaders, especially those holding senior positions. PME challenges relate to our failure to imbibe creativity and open thinking as also lack of strategic foresight and inability to understand issues of national security. The focus of PME is

deeply embedded in tactical issues and fails to create a foundation for strategic thinking among our junior and middle level officers. This deficiency affects timely military change.

Our excessive adherence to secrecy and tendency to brush most problems under the carpet inhibited the author. However, he has shown perseverance and great analytical abilities to produce this vastly original study which will go a long way to enhance the PME of serving middle and senior level officers, and guide future change. Written in a flowing style and avoiding any jargon, the book is strongly recommended for all levels of decision makers in the Defence Services and those connected with national security. Excellent references are given at the end of each chapter and ample tables have been included.

Brigadier N Bahri, VSM (Retd)

The Burning Chaffees. *By Brig BS Mehta, (KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2015), pp..371, ISBN 978-93-83649-85-3.*

The Burning Chaffees is the battle account of 'C' squadron 45 Cavalry in the war for the liberation of Bangladesh. It is not merely the battle account of an armoured squadron, written for the regimental history of 45 Cavalry, it is much more than that. It is first-hand account of 'C' squadron that completely destroyed Pakistan's 3 (Independent) Armoured Squadron in a tank vs. tank battle at Garibpur on 21 November 1971. The battle account by the author, who took over command of the squadron on the death of Major DS Narag, MVC in the midst of the raging tank battle, is unique. The author brings to life the horrors and the fleeting sense of life and death in a tank battle that raged for more than 48 hours in the 'Khaji' (dates) strewn landscape of Garibpur. The account is not about ground manoeuvres and wide outflanking moves; it is about the grit of tank crews, their excellent gunnery and expertise in combat akin to close quarter battle of an infantry sub unit. The account of this tank battle should become an essential reading for every young armour officer as also for infantry platoon/company commanders.

The book is distinguished by another unique facet of the regiment which merits some recounting. 45 Cavalry was originally raised in 1916 during World War I, but was disbanded when the war ended. It was re-raised during Second World War but was

demobilised in 1946 after the war. It was re-raised in May 1965 with a class composition of Jats, Rajputs and Sikhs but was re-assigned the role of an armoured delivery regiment during 1965 Indo-Pak War. However, due to shortage of trained manpower in the original class composition, it was changed to two third South Indian Classes (SIC) and one third Dogras. Finally, the Regiment was re-raised once again as a light armoured regiment equipped with light PT-76 tanks (an amphibious tank) in Jan 1966. In 1967, its class composition was changed once again, with the Dogra squadron being replaced by a squadron of Other Indian Classes (OIC); implying that all castes, tribes and other communities could enroll in this squadron/regiment. And, sure enough the regiment proved its mettle during the 1971 war.

45 Cavalry was equipped with PT-76 tanks for deployment in the riverine terrain of Eastern Theatre. Due to major differences in its gun calibre and the type of ammunitions used, the officers of the older regiments found it difficult to accept PT-76 tank and had mentally written off the tank as a sitting duck in a tank vs. tank battle. Those commissioned directly into 45 Cavalry, including the author, became the core foundation of the regiment. Young officers and sowars dedicated themselves to learning everything about the task and formed the regiment into a battle winning instrument by the time the war started in 1971. The author has candidly described the reluctance to change amongst the older generation of officers.

It is a fascinating book. There are not many books of this genre.

Brigadier SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)

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During this period a total of 76 new books have been added. Details of the new book are available on USI Website.

Research Projects

Members interested in undertaking research projects may submit research proposals to USI (CS3 / CAFHR). At present, six chairs have been instituted in CS3; namely, Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair, Admiral RD Katari Chair, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair, Prof DS Kothari DRDO Chair, Ministry of External Affairs Chair, Flying Officer Amandeep Singh Gill Chair and two Chairs in CAFHR namely; Maharana Pratap Chair and Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair. Copies of the Rules for Award of Fellowship Grants and Conduct of Research are available on the USI Website.

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**Email:** chhabragensets@gmail.com **Website:** chhabragensets.com

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FOR 01 JAN 2017 – 31 DEC 2019

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2	Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)
3	Air Mshl VK Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, VrC** (Retd)
4	Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)
5	Vice Adm Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
6	Air Mshl SG Inamdar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
7	Lt Gen GS Katoch, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
8	Lt Gen Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
9	Shri Asoke Mukerji, IFS (Retd)
10	Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM,AVSM,VSM (Retd)
11	Air Mshl PK Roy, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd)
12	Lt Gen AK Sahni, PVSM, UYSM, SM, VSM (Retd)
13	Vice Adm Shekhar Sinha, PVSM, AVSM, NM** (Retd)
14	Maj (Prof) RN Swarup (Retd)