U.S.I.

JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)

PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

Demographic Imbalance and Implications on National Security – A Management Challenge for India - *Shri Ved Marwah, IPS (Retd)*

India's Security : The New Great Game - *Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM (Retd)*

The Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006 - *Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)*

Image of the Armed Forces – Arresting Negative Trends - *Lieutenant Colonel Yogesh B Athawale*

Military Justice System in India - *Wing Commander U C Jha (Retd)*

Pakistan's Strategic Perspective in Evolving World Order - *Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)*

Indo-US Relations – A Strategic Partnership? - *Shri Natarajan Krishnan, IFS (Retd)*

APRIL-JUNE 2006

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © Rs. 75.00 PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

USI PUBLICATIONS

		Price (Rs.)	Year
SEMINARS			
S-24	Joint USI-CIISS (China) Seminar – Asian Security and Role of Outside Powers in the Region.	75	2001
S-25	Joint USI-NCMES (Egypt) Seminar Regional Security, International Intervention, NMD System and its Implications, and Bilateral Relations Between India and Egypt.	100	2002
S-27	Joint USI-ECFS (Germany) Seminar Security Environment in Southern Asia.	100	2003
S-28	USI Seminar held at Chandigarh Security Challenges of India in the Regional Context with Special Reference to Terrorism – Prognosis and Response.	100	2004
S-30	Joint USI-CACDA (China Arms Control and Disarmament Association) Seminar The New US Strategy and Impact of Iraq War on Arms Control and the United Nations.	100	2004
S-31	Joint USI-Executive Committee (Peace in Asia), Japan Seminar Regional Security Perspective, NMD, TMD Systems and Future of International System.	100	2004
S-32	Joint USI-Centre for Military and Strategic Research (CMSR) of Russian Armed Forces Seminar Regional Security Perspective, Military Cooperation, International Security Mechanism and Future of the United Nations.	100	2004
S-33	Joint USI-China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), Beijing Seminar Regional Security Perspective; Nuclear Control Regimes and Missile Defence; Dimensions of International Terrorism and Countermeasures; and Increased Cooperation within the Framework of Evolving Sino-Indian Relations.	100	2004
S-36	The India-Pakistan Peace Process : Developments and Prospects	75	2005
S-37	Joint USI-HQIDS Seminar on Terrorism	250	2006
S-39	Second Trilateral Dialogue : United Service Institution of India-Institute for Taiwan Defence and Strategic Studies (ITDSS) – Okazaki Institute (Japan) on Regional Security		2005
		495	2003

USI NATIONAL SECURITY SERIES - 2002
(Available from Knowledge World, New Delhi)

NS Lecture (L-22)	(a)	India's Look East Policy: A Review and Way Ahead. by Shri I K Gujral.	
NS Seminar (S-29)	(b)	Vulnerabilities of Our Economy in the Backdrop of Globalisation: An Analysis of India's Long Term Economic Security.	
NS Paper (P-20)	(c)	Safeguarding of India's Energy Security. by Shri Chudamani Ratnam.	
		550	2004

USI NATIONAL SECURITY SERIES - 2003
(Available from Knowledge World, New Delhi)

NS Seminar (S-34)	(a)	The Emergence of the People's Republic of China as a Power to Reckon with in the International Arena and the Implications for India and the Region.	
NS Paper (P-21)	(b)	The Future of Manned Combat Aircraft by Air Mshl Vinod Patney, SYSM, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd).	
		620	2005

USI NATIONAL SECURITY SERIES - 2004
(Available from Knowledge World, New Delhi)

NS Lecture (L-23)	(a)	The Maritime Dimension of India's Security - The Future by Admiral JG Nadkarni, PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM (Retd)
NS Seminar (S-35)	(b)	India and its South Asian Neighbours Other than Pakistan
NS Paper (P-22)	(c)	Future Wars and the Indian Military by Lt Gen VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

(Continued at last page and inner back flap)

ISSN 0041-77OX

The

Journal

of the

United Service Institution

of

India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave)
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057
Telephone No. 26146755, 26146490 Fax : 26149773
e-mail :

director@usiofindia.org
dde@usiofindia.org
ci@usiofindia.org
ddadm@usiofindia.org
adpra@usiofindia.org
library@usiofindia.org
cafhr@usiofindia.org
cunpk@usiofindia.org
cs3@usiofindia.org

Website : www.usiofindia.org

Vol CXXXVI **April-June 2006** **No 564**

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 250.00. Postage extra.
(Rs 80 for four issues) Subscription should be sent through Bank Draft/Local Cheque/Postal Order in favour of Director USI of India. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution. Articles, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be addressed to the Deputy Director (Adm).

For overseas subscriptions, trade enquiries and advertisements write to : Spantech & Lancer, Spantech House, Lagham Road, South Godstone, Surrey RH9 8HB, UK.
Overseas annual subscription (By Air Mail) - £ 40 or $ 65
Tel : +44 1342 893239 Fax : +44 1342 892584

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

for

the furtherance of interest and knowledge in the art, science and literature of National Security in general and of the Defence Services in particular

VICE-PATRONS

Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM, *ADC*
Chairman COSC and Chief of the Naval Staff

General J J Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC
Chief of the Army Staff

Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC
Chief of the Air Staff

COUNCIL

President

Lt Gen Hardev Singh Lidder, UYSM, YSM, VSM
Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman COSC

Vice Presidents

Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, VCOAS
Vice Adm Venkat Bharathan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, VCNS
Air Mshl Ajit Bhavnani, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, VCAS

Ex-Officio Members

Shri Shekhar Dutt, SM, IAS, *Defence Secretary*
Lt Gen R N Kapur, PVSM, AVSM & Bar, *DCIDS (DOT)*
★ Maj Gen V K Ahluwalia, YSM, VSM, *Offg DGMT*
★ Cmde Nalin K Dewan, *Principal DNT*
★ Air Vice Mshl V K Yajurvedi, AVSM, VM, ACAS (Trg)

Elected Members

★ Lt Gen K Balaram, PVSM (Retd)
★ Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)
★ Vice Adm P S Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd)
★ Shri CR Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)
★ Air Vice Mshl Kapil Kak, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
★ Lt Gen V K Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)
★ Vice Adm I J S Khurana, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
★ Shri Vijay K Nambiar, IFS (Retd)
Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
★ Air Mshl Vinod Patney, SYSM, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)
★ Lt Gen V R Raghavan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd)
★ Lt Gen Vinay Shankar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
★ Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen R K Jasbir Singh, PVSM (Retd)

Member Secretary

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)
Director

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Chairman

Lt Gen R N Kapur, PVSM, AVSM & Bar, *DCIDS (DOT)*

Members

Those indicated by ★

Member Secretary

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)
Director

CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AND SIMULATION
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

Vice Adm P S Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd) *Chairman*	Chairman
Maj Gen R K Malhotra, VSM *ACIDS (PP & FS)*	Member
Maj Gen A S Sekhon, AVSM, YSM *ADG (PP)*	"
Rear Adm S P S Cheema, AVSM, NM *ACNS (IW & Ops)*	"
Air Vice Mshl V K Yajurvedi, AVSM, VM *ACAS (Trg)*	"
Brig Anil Kumar Sharma *DACIDS (NA)*	"
Lt Gen Vijay Kumar Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)	"
Shri Vijay K Nambiar, IFS (Retd)	"
Air Mshl Vinod Patney, SYSM, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)	"
Dr V Siddhartha	"
Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)	"
Shri N N Vohra, IAS (Retd)	"
Dr Charan D Wadhva	"
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) *Director USI*	"
Brig Arun Sahgal (Retd) *Dy Director (Research)*	Member Secretary

CENTRE FOR ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL RESEARCH
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

Lt Gen V K Singh, PVSM (Retd)	Chairman
Lt Gen R N Kapur, PVSM, AVSM & Bar *DCIDS (DOT)*	Member
Air Vice Mshl T S Randhawa, VM *ACIDS (TRADOC)*	"
Maj Gen Mukesh Sabharwal, AVSM, VSM *ADGMO (A)*	"
Rear Adm S P S Cheema, AVSM, NM *ACNS (IW & Ops)*	"
Air Vice Mshl D C Kumaria, VM, VSM *ACAS (Op C & D)*	"
Maj Gen V K Ahluwalia, YSM, VSM *Offg DGMT*	"
Cmde Nalin K Dewan *Principal DNT*	"
Air Vice Mshl V K Yajurvedi, AVSM, VM *ACAS (Trg)*	"
Vice Adm R B Suri, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)	"
Air Mshl S G Inamdar, PVSM, VSM (Retd)	"
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) *Director USI*	"
Professor D N Tripathi *Chairman, Indian Council of Historical Research*	Co-opted Member
Shrimati R Dhanedhar *Officiating Director, History Division, MOD*	"
Sqn Ldr R T S Chhina (Retd) *Secretary and Editor*	Secretary

CENTRE FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM *VCOAS*	Chairman
Lt Gen Sushil Gupta, AVSM, YSM *DCOAS (IS & T)*	Member
Maj Gen R P S Malhan, YSM, SM *Addl D G Staff Duties*	"
Rear Adm S P S Cheema, AVSM, NM *ACNS (IW & Ops)*	"
Air Vice Mshl D C Kumaria, VM, VSM *ACAS (Op C & D)*	"
Maj Gen V K Ahluwalia, YSM, VSM *Offg DGMT*	"
Cmde Nalin K Dewan *Principal DNT*	"
Air Vice Mshl V K Yajurvedi, AVSM, VM *ACAS (Trg)*	"
Air Cmde Ravi Krishan *DACIDS (Doctrine)*	"
Shri Sanjiv Arora, IFS, *JS (UNP), MEA*	"
Shri Sanjay Bhattacharyya, IFS *Director (Finance), MEA*	"
Shri B S Julka, IAS, JS (G), MOD	"
Representative ARTRAC	
Lt Gen B M Kapur, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	"
Vice Adm R B Suri, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)	"
Air Vice Mshl Kapil Kak, AVSM, VSM (Retd)	"
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) *Director USI*	"
Col R K Rajput *Secretary cum Coordinator*	Secretary

USI STAFF APPOINTMENTS

Director

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

Dy Director & Editor Maj Gen Y K Gera (Retd)	*Chief Instructor* Brig M S Chowdhury VSM (Retd)	*Dy Director (Adm)* Col V K Singh VSM (Retd)	*Dy Director (Research)* Brig Arun Sahgal (Retd)
		Sr. Accountant Shri R C Mittal	*Research Coordinator* Dr Sudha Raman
Librarian Dr S S Murthy	*Supdt Courses Section* Shri B David	*Supdt Adm Section* Sub Maj and Hony Capt Dalbir Singh (Retd)	*Secretary and Editor CAFHR* Sqn Ldr R T S Chhina (Retd)
		Estate Manager Shri H M Robertson	*Secretary cum Coordinator, CUNPK* Col R K Rajput

CONTENTS

April-June 2006

Editorial 167

Demographic Imbalance and Implications on National Security – A Management Challenge for India
Shri Ved Marwah, IPS (Retd) 169

Indian Security : The New Great Game
Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM (Retd) 183

The Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006
Shri EN Rammohan 203

Image of the Armed Forces – Arresting Negative Trends
Lieutenant Colonel Yogesh B Athawale 208

Military Justice System in India
Wing Commander U C Jha (Retd) 220

Pakistan's Strategic Perspective in Evolving World Order
Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd) 233

Indo-US Relations – A Strategic Partnership?
Shri Natarajan Krishnan, IFS (Retd) 253

Report on Visit of USI Delegation to Russia
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd) 263

Impact of Nanotechnology on Nuclear Weapons
Commodore S Kulshrestha 284

The Jallianwala Bagh Revisited-I
Lieutenant Colonel Nigel A Collett (Retd) 296

Letters to the Editor 308

Review Articles 311

Short Reviews of Recent Books 319

Additions to the USI Library 330

NOTE

The views expressed in the Journal are not official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

Secretary

letd)

Dy Director (Research)
Brig Arun Sahgal
(Retd)

Research Coordinator
Dr Sudha Raman

Secretary and Editor
CAFHR
Sqn Ldr R T S Chhina
(Retd)

Secretary cum
Coordinator, CUNPK
Col R K Rajput

USI CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

1. The USI conducts correspondence courses for DSSC – Army, Navy, Air Force, TSOC (Army) Entrance Examinations and Promotion Examinations Parts B and D.

2. Membership of the USI is mandatory to join any correspondence course.

3. **Schedule of Correspondence Courses 2005-2006.**

Courses	Commencement of Course	Date of Exam	Tuition Fees: All Subjects (Rs.)	Tuition Fees: Each Subject (Rs.)
(a) DSSC (Army)	Nov 2005	Sep 2006	1850/-	400/- MH & Tac B. 300/- for remaining subject.
(b) DSSC (Navy)	Dec 2005	Aug 2006	–	375/-
(c) DSSC (Air Force)	Jan 2006	Jul 2006	650/-	350/-
(d) TSOC	Nov 2005	Sep 2006	1500/-	400/- for MH 300/- for remaining subject.
(e) Part D	Apr 2006	Oct 2006	1200/-	350/- for MH 250/- for remaining subject.
(f) Part B	Dec 2005	Jul 2006	1050/-	300/- for MH 200/- for remaining subject.

4. **Contact Programmes.** Two contact programmes will be conducted at USI. The dates for contact programmes are 24-29 July and 7-12 Aug 2006.

5. Correspondence courses for Special to Corps subjects are not conducted.

6. **Mode of Payment.** Local cheque or bank draft payable at New Delhi or postal orders payable at Vasant Vihar PO New Delhi in favour of *Director USI of India* or cash.

7. Contact address : Rao Tula Ram Marg (Opposite Signals Enclave)
Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057

8. Email/Website : **ci@usiofindia.org / www.usiofindia.org**

9. Visiting hours : 1000 AM to 1230 PM, 1400 PM to 1630 PM } Monday to Friday

10. Telephones : Course Section - 26148682, CI - 26146390

11. Prospectus : Available from Course Section and on Website

MEMBERSHIP FEES

	Defence Personnel (Rs)	Entitled Civilians (Rs)
1. **Life Membership**		
(a) Entrance	1000/-	1000/-
(b) One Time Fee	4000/-	6000/-
Total	**5000/-**	**7000/-**
2. **Ordinary Membership** (For 3 years at a time commencing 01 Apr)		
(a) Entrance	300/-	300/-
(b) Subscription/Renewal Fee	900/-	1350/-
Total	**1200/-**	**1650/-**

3. Membership form available at the USI.

EDITORIAL

On 26 April 2006 Shri Ved Marwah, delivered the Fourth Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture at the USI on the subject of "Demographic Imbalance and Implications on National Security – A Management Challenge for India". Excerpted text of the talk has been published as the lead article. High population growth in India and neighbouring countries is a major impediment to rapid economic progress and to raising the standard of living of the people. It also imposes a severe strain on fragile ecology. Demographic shift is another important factor that adversely affects socio-economic stability and progress. Demographic shifts and refugee movements are a global phenomenon, with movement taking place across and within national borders. According to the author, India's problem is heightened by the fact that it is surrounded by countries with lower level of economic prosperity and standards of living. A stable social order and a cohesive society is a pre-requisite for a smooth and speedy growth and development, as no worthwhile progress is possible in a fractured society plagued by conflict, lawlessness and administrative mismanagement. The author has stressed that we live in a troubled neighbourhood. Two of India's most populous neighbours are rapidly being dominated by *Jehadi* forces. Concentration of the madrassas and mosques set up with foreign funding in the border areas where demographic composition has undergone a radical change cannot be ignored. The Task Force on Internal Security had noted with concern the spread of the ISI networks in the Siliguri Corridor and other areas of the country. Political parties must appreciate the seriousness of the situation and stop playing partisan politics with it. Migrations cannot be totally stopped, but they can be drastically reduced, if all political parties broadly agree to take a united stand against illegal migrations.

While nations try to assimilate the ever changing, sometimes incomprehensive twists and turns to international politics, policy makers strive to formulate strategies for their nation's well being, based on cogent criteria. Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle gave a talk at the USI on 31 May 2006 on the subject of "Indian Security : The New Great Game". Excerpted text of the talk has been published as an article. Brigadier Bhonsle reflects on the manner in which India was poised in the 19th Century – the period of the

Great Game when the battle was for control of the Indian wealth. The new Great Game on the other hand is a conflict over resources, energy, strategic minerals, trade, information technology and knowledge. These are all goals to be sought by the players. Today, India is one of the players. According to the author, by building economic and military capabilities concomitantly India should be able to play its destined role both regionally and as a global player. The author has stressed that the Armed Forces would have a definite role in the New Great Game. Major accretions in air and naval assets for power projection as well as control of the seas are called for. A blue water navy and a strategic lift capability would be required. These combined with the Army's special forces would add to the overall capabilities of the Armed Forces and Comprehensive National Power. These should be factored in while evolving national policy and formulating strategies.

Illegal migration from Bangladesh territory into Assam, West Bengal and Tripura, has been taking place ever since Independence in 1947. By the year 1961, some of the border districts in these States got converted to majority Bengali Muslim populations. Shri EN Rammohan in his article titled, "The Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006" has traced the history of illegal migration into the area, the part played by politicians and bureaucrats and the prevailing scenario. The author has expressed the opinion that severe communal riots may break out in Assam, West Bengal and Tripura, along the faultlines between the immigrant Muslims and the local people. The sequel to communal rioting may be the eruption of a Bengali Muslim insurrection spearheaded by the Bengali Muslim insurgent groups embedded in Assam. According to the author, the likely aim of the insurgency would be to attain a homeland for the immigrant Bengali Muslims in Assam.

Demographic Imbalance and Implications on National Security – A Management Challenge for India

Shri Ved Marwah, IPS (Retd)

It is indeed a privilege for me to be invited to deliver a lecture at the United Service Institution of India, an Institution that has been in the forefront of work on studies relating to national security. The USI has been doing great service to the country in building a strategic culture that simply did not exist till recently. Preoccupied with electoral politics and short term agendas, those in charge of policy-making have neither time nor interest to think about the national security issues in long term. I was initially reluctant to accept the invitation, as I do not consider myself qualified to speak on this important subject. My only qualification to speak on the subject is that I was a victim of the mass migration in 1947 and a witness to the disastrous consequences of internal displacements and cross-border migrations for many years in the Northeast. To be giving the Major General Samir Sinha Memorial lecture adds honour to the occasion. Major General Sinha was not only associated with the USI since 1947, but was its Director for nine long years, from 1987 to 1996. It is appropriate that lectures on subjects of importance for national security are held in his memory. My personal association with Major General Sinha started when I became a member of the USI during his tenure as the Director.

The problem of demographic changes and the growing imbalance have serious implications for national security. If the complex issues being thrown up by this imbalance are not addressed adequately, they could threaten the very survival of the Indian Union as a sovereign republic. Successive governments are guilty of inadequate response to this very serious problem.

Military is only one aspect of the complex problem of national security. The military can do little except contain the problem for a brief period, until other aspects of the problem – political, social and economic – are adequately addressed. Demographic imbalance

---

Shri Ved Marwah is a former Governor of Manipur, Mizoram and Jharkhand.

Excerpted text of the talk given on the occasion of the fourth Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture, at the USI, on 26 April 2006.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

has, both, short term and long-term implications for national security. India is poised to emerge as a world political and economic power, but that hope would remain a dream unless we are serious in tackling this problem instead of treating it as a hostage to electoral politics. The 2001 census is an important source of information to learn about the serious imbalance in social and economic conditions that is developing in different parts of the country. I quote only a few facts to underline the point. The Indian population on 1 March 2001 was 1027 million. In ten years, the population increased by 181 million – an increase of 21.3 per cent though a slight decline in the increase as compared to 23.9 per cent in the previous decade. But more worrying is that Bihar, the third most populous state in the country, recorded the highest growth, which increased to 28.4 per cent as compared 23.4 per cent in the previous decade. Andhra Pradesh recorded the sharpest decline – 13.9 per cent from 24.2 per cent in the previous decade. UP, Maharashtra and Bihar in that order are the most populated states in India. West Bengal has the highest density of population followed by Bihar. The literacy rate was the highest in Kerala (90.9 per cent) and lowest in Bihar (47.5 per cent).

The 2001 census data fully confirms the common perception that BIMARU states (Bihar, MP, Rajasthan and UP) are the core of the population problems in India. Paradoxically, however, from the point of literacy level, Andhra Pradesh may be classified as a BIMARU state in South India. Other telling statistics are that nine states have a population of over 50 million, 10 states (including a Union Territory) over 10 million, and 16 states (including six Union Territories) less than 10 million. Sikkim has a population of only 0.54 million and Mizoram only 0.89 million. Union Territory of Delhi has the highest density of population and Arunachal Pradesh the lowest. Among the states, Bihar registered the highest increase, followed by UP and West Bengal. Assam and Nagaland are in the middle, and Manipur and Sikkim are among the lowest. All the southern states are demographically progressive and the 2001 census data confirms the analysis in terms of North-South demographic divide.

The demographic imbalance among various states creates problems, more so in a democracy. Democracy is a number game, where the winner takes all. It is the numbers that decide who

controls the levers of power. The problem gets more complicated when the distortions in the relative strength of various ethnic groups are due to internal displacements in the country or external migrations from neighbouring countries.

The history of movement of people from one place to another is as old as the history of mankind. But earlier there were rarely any protests against the immigrants. The problem of refugees, migrants, stateless and displaced persons, which one hears so often today, was unheard till not too long ago. The problem of the integration of migrants into the host societies started only when ethnic diversities became sharp, and the modern development processes made their social assimilation more difficult. In developing countries like India, there is intense competition between various ethnic and religious groups for the fruit of development. It is in this context that one has to understand the conflict of interest between the local inhabitants and the so-called 'aliens'. The aliens become easy scapegoats for the economic hardship of the local people. During the last half-century, the South Asian countries have witnessed the largest movement of people in recorded human history, both within the national boundaries as well as across them. Within India while the process of development caused large scale migrations from rural to urban areas, the regional disparities have resulted in movement of people from the impoverished to prosperous regions. Migrations from labour surplus regions, particularly during the plantation and harvesting seasons, are quite common. Large-scale migration of labour has been taking place from states like Bihar and Jharkhand to Punjab and even West Bengal in recent years. Another factor contributing to migrations is violence and terrorism against the minority community. The migration of large number of Hindus from Punjab in the eighties and the Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley in Jammu and Kashmir in the early nineties are examples of recent migrations.

In respect of cross-border migrations, the dimensions of the problem have been even larger. Ever since the partition of the country, according to some estimates, about 35 million people have been involved in cross-border movement in search of security of life, honour and property, and sometimes to escape from religious prosecution and other forms of discrimination. War and civil strife are other factors that have resulted in large-scale migrations. Economic hardships, a desire for ethnic, racial, ideological and

religious homogeneity have also driven people to leave their homes and migrate to the neighbouring countries.

The unleashing of 'jihadi' forces and international terrorism, to which are connected the drugs and arms and ammunition trafficking, have further complicated the issue. Together, the resultant movements of people have serious security implications. The security threat from these migrations has seriously undermined the bilateral relations and inter-state cooperation among countries in South Asia. It is not possible to understand the dynamics of the relationship between these countries without understanding the nature of movements. They impact very strongly both on internal politics and foreign policy. Military threats are no doubt important and cannot be ignored, but equally important are non-military threats. The epicentres of threats could be in environmental, demographic, ecological, and economic domains. They get more serious and complicated when linked to internal displacements and external migrations. However, it is not possible to appreciate the seriousness of the situation without understanding the political dimension.

Political Dimension

Security is a complex construct. Threat to national security can be interpreted in many ways. It is an action of sequence of events that could threaten the quality of life for its citizens, or it could significantly narrow the range of policy choices available to the government. Illegal migration causes politicisation of the issues leading to ethnic and religious conflicts in the host country with their natural fall-out on the bilateral relations. Drugs, guns and international terrorism coupled with growing corruption and criminalisation of politics convert this already volatile mix into a dangerous brew, which seriously impacts on India's national security. Many of the security problems that are viewed as political problems have demographic roots. Converse is also true. Policy interventions that are proposed and implemented with the intention of dealing with the demographic problem often result in distinctly political consequences. The centrality of India, both in terms of geography and political development, in South Asia, further underlines the importance of demographic factor for India's national security. The paradox, however, is that while political rhetoric concerning immigrants and refugees has increased, political will to take practical measures to check infiltration of illegal immigrants

has in fact decreased. While all political parties in the fray in the current assembly elections in Assam are aware of the seriousness of the problem, few are making it an election issue. In fact, it is the other way around. The Congress Party by amending the Foreigner's Act through an ordinance just before the assembly elections wanted to send a message to the illegal migrants, many of whom now play a crucial role in the outcome of the elections, that they have nothing to fear even if the IMDT Act has been held *ultra wires* by the Supreme Court. The Union Government has brought back the Act through the back door by amending the Foreigner's Act only for Assam for gaining political advantage in the electoral battle. The politics for power at any cost has destroyed the ideological base of most political parties. Blatant opportunism is increasingly robbing the politics in the country of legitimacy.

There is continuing dynamic and intricate relationship between the issues pertaining to population on the one hand, and to those pertaining to society and politics on the other. The demographics have not generally paid much attention to these interactions. It has been confirmed, both theoretically and empirically, that the demographic characteristics of a society invariably influence the politics of that society. Therefore, not surprisingly, politicisation of the demographic issues occurs not only in India but also all over the world. Demographic variations as a factor influencing internal politics, however, could be of various types. They range from internal migrations, increased birth rate, or reduced mortality rate, cross-border migrations, or the dismemberment of a country.

The close connection between population growths and migrations is well established. As early as in 1798, Malthus in his celebrated 'Essay on Population' dwelt extensively on the growth of population in England. But even demographers are not unanimous in their approach to managing the various issues. The economic demographers and political demographers have opposite points of view about the causes of migrations. The economists argue that in the sending country as compared to the receiving country the wages are low, employment opportunities fewer, and agricultural land use poor. Therefore, the so-called push factor is in operation resulting in out-migration from the sending country. In contrast, however, the political scientists emphasise the disequilibria within the sending country itself and not between the sending and the receiving country. Since there are regional and other sorts of

disparities within the sending countries, the disadvantaged people migrate to other countries to escape from their miseries, and eventually contribute to the disequilibria in the receiving country as well. While the migrants leave their country in search of better wages, prospective employers in the receiving country welcome them for the cheaper services they provide as compared to the native workers. The opposition to the Bangladeshi migrant is on account of political factors. While some political parties turn a blind eye to their presence, the others oppose their presence also in terms of electoral politics when they are projected as racial, communal or ethnic threat.

There is another interesting feature of these migrations. Empirical evidence from our neighbouring countries suggest where migrations are politically determined, they often diminish the ethnic heterogeneity of the country of origin, whereas economic hardship driven migrations have made the countries of destination more heterogeneous. The phenomenon of cross-border movements together with the inter-state conflicts they generate are increasingly becoming a major concern all over the world. Since the phenomenon is closely linked to the principles of self-determination, national integration and the politics of nation building, its nature and dimensions often become extremely complicated. The complexity of the issues involved is evident from the dissimilar stand taken by states with regard to such questions as ethnic loyalties, secessionist movements and so on, both within and outside their respective national boundaries,

Population pressures can lead to conflicts in a number of ways: first, because of population pressure on resources, that may be already scarce, leading to expansionist tendencies; second, when the clandestine population movement affects the demographic balance of the host region to the detriment of the interest of the local political elite, the latter are forced to enter into a relationship with the country of origin of the migrants. Of all kinds of factors impinging upon politics, however, the most complex are the ones having religious and ethno-nationalistic roots. The inter-state conflicts rooted in ethnic and religious discords are the most intractable and most violence-prone of all the issues relating to international conflicts, because they draw their sustenance from human emotions, which can often be irrational. Most of the migrations from the neighbouring countries have ethno-nationalistic and religious roots.

In the neighbouring Bhutan the majority Drukpas has forced a large number of ethnic Nepalese Lhotsampas to leave the country and seek refuge in India and Nepal. This influx into India was largely responsible for the launch of the anti-foreigner movement in the receiving areas in Assam. In Myanmar, that was part of British India till not long ago, about 900,000 Indians had to leave after it gained independence in 1948. Making Burmese the official language was the first strong signal that Indians were no longer welcome in Myanmar. A number of inter-ethnic conflicts owe their origin to demographic factors. Sinhalese-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka is one the many examples where demographic-factors had serious consequences for national security of the country. Here, like in Myanmar, the first signal was the declaration of Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka, thus, hurting the interests of a large number of Tamils. The Tamils who came to Sri Lanka centuries ago were made to feel alien in their own country. But unlike in Myanmar, they could not be pushed out of the country, as they decided to assert their autonomy in areas where they were in majority.

Assam and the Northeast

The problem has assumed serious proportions in Assam and other states in the Northeast. Population in Assam has increased from 10.837 millions to 26.656 millions in 2001. The decadal growth of Muslims increased from 34.5 per cent in the previous decade to 36 per cent in 2001. Migration-security interface has close connection with population growth. The demographic changes in Assam as a result of external and internal migrations have brought with them religious, ethnic and linguistic conflicts. Some of these migrations date back to the nineteenth century, when the then colonial government decided to bring in labour from Nepal and tribals from Bihar to meet the demand for labour in the tea-plantations in Bengal and Assam. So great was the pressure of the Nepalese in the region that Assam Rifles came to be manned mostly by the Gurkhas. Santhals came as indentured labourers. They are treated as aliens, especially in the Bodo dominated areas, even after about two hundred years. Marginalised and getting increasingly disenfranchised, their living conditions are pathetic. They are frequent victims of mass violence for ethnic cleansing. Assam is a classic case of political and economic destabilisation due to demographic factors. Because of its geographical location and its rich natural resources, Assam has been attracting migrants for

centuries. But the problems have become more acute since the partition of the country in 1947. Instead of finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problem, successive Bangladesh governments deny even the presence of the illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India. Internal politics in Assam have not helped the situation. Senior politicians, increasingly depending on the minority vote bank to secure power, have been giving protection to illegal immigrants. To what extent some political leaders have gone to cultivate the immigrant vote bank can be seen from their statements like that of Hitesh Saikia, the former Chief Minister of Assam, who emphatically claimed in 1991, that if anybody could identify a single foreigner in Assam, he was willing to quit politics forever. The insincere rhetoric was aimed at attracting the Muslim vote bank. It ignited communal passions in Assam. The Illegal Migrant Determination Tribunals (IMDT) Act was passed in 1985 to assure the minority vote bank and to neutralise the Foreigner's Act, which puts the onus of proving that he or she is an Indian citizen on the person concerned, whereas under the IMDT Act the onus is on the authorities to prove that the person is not an Indian citizen. Politics continue to play a role, and the fact the UPA government amended the Foreigner's Act through an Ordinance for Assam only to put the onus on the authorities to prove the illegal status of a person days before the forthcoming assembly elections in Assam, only shows that political interests continue to be given preference over national security interests. In order to strengthen their political base, different political parties have been manipulating differently the question of infiltration of the Bangladeshi nationals into India.

The result is the continuing inflow of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh into Assam that is creating all sorts of political and security problems in the state.

Assam is not the only state in the Northeast faced with this serious problem. Arunachal Pradesh has still to sort out the problem of the Chakmas. In Mizoram too, the presence of Chakmas from Bangladesh has become a major political issue. Both the ruling and the opposition parties vie with each other to score political points against each other on the Chakmas issue. Flow of refugees and economic migrants from Bangladesh has made Tripura a Bengali majority state, leaving its indigenous tribes feeling marginalised. The division of Assam to accommodate the demand of some major tribes has led to unending demands for the creation of more states

on ethnic lines. The Bodos who number about two million, that is double the number of Nagas, want a separate state. The Kukis demand a separate state in Manipur. The Nagas want Greater Nagaland to encompass all the Naga dominated areas. The tragedy is that ethnic cleansing through violence has over the years become part of the strategy to press the demand for a separate state. The division of Assam and the creation of new tribal dominated states have not solved the problem. In fact, it has led to the creation of many more serious conflicts in the region. The shortsighted strategy was like opening of the proverbial Pandora's box. The dominant tribes who had earlier agitated against the so-called Assamese domination, now seek to extend similar domination over the smaller tribes. Even in a tiny state like Mizoram, which is frequently quoted as a land of peace, is now confronted with demands for the creation of more states and autonomous districts from smaller tribes like Riangs, Brus, Lakhers, Hmars and the Chakmas, whom the Mizos now regard as outsiders. Some of these tribes like Hmars, Brus and Riangs have taken to arms to press their demands. Tribal and racial groups demanding the creation of homelands for their group have unleashed a campaign of terror to push out all the so-called 'outsiders'. A violent stalemate has been created and the situation is likely to get only worse.

External Security

The security connection has internal as well as external dimensions, both causational and consequential linkages. The external dimensions are even more serious than the internal dimensions. Out of the 28 states that constitute the Indian Union 17 have international borders. In the Northeast, 98 per cent of the border is international border. During the colonial period, the British policy in the peripheral areas was dictated by the requirements of security from external threats. The division of the country, especially the division of Bengal and the creation of East Pakistan is responsible for the many cross-border migrations. It is directly responsible for the huge inflow of migrants from East Pakistan (Bangladesh). The issue of illegal migrants is one of the major issues responsible for the tension in bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh. Many senior Bangladeshi political leaders have openly talked about India's Northeast to provide living space to ease its population pressure. Moreover, India-locked Bangladesh feels threatened by India's size and its military and economic power.

Ever since its creation in 1971, successive governments have continued the Pakistan policy of supporting subversive and secessionist forces in the Northeast. One cannot deny the ground reality that anti-India sentiments today are no less strong in Bangladesh than in Pakistan. The growing Talibanisation of Bangladesh is a matter of great concern. Its collaboration with the ISI for spreading subversion in the Northeast and its support to the *Jehadi* forces, including Al-Qaeda, cannot be ignored. Bangladesh has undergone a big political and social transformation over the past three decades. Islamic nationalism has replaced Bengali nationalism, architect ideology of the creation of Bangladesh. This process that started with Sheikh Mujib has been gathering momentum. Harkat ul Jehad Islami (HUJI) was formed in 1992. An umbrella group called the Bangladesh Islamic Manch was set up in 2002. These developments have caused great sense of insecurity among the Hindus and have resulted in their exodus in large numbers to India. The capture of a ship with huge cache of arms on 2 April 2004 in Chittagong goes to show how Bangladesh has become a centre of *jehadi* terrorism and a market for export of arms and explosives to the insurgent groups in the Northeast. The demand of homeland for the Bengali Muslims in Assam and other parts of the Northeast is getting louder. When the Bangladesh Foreign Minister makes the remarks that if Bangladesh is India-locked, India's Northeast is Bangladesh locked, he is not being frivolous. If fact, he is being quite serious, as he is claiming parity with the bigger neighbour through this leverage. When the neighbouring country harbours a desire to separate the Northeast from India, to fight its sense of insecurity or for expansionist designs, the flow of illegal immigrants and the change in the demographic imbalance are matters of serious concern for India's national security. The Task Force on Internal Security in a report in 2002 noted with concern the spread of the ISI network in the Siliguri Corridor, an area that is so crucial for the security of the Northeast. Large-scale illegal immigration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh over several decades has been altering the demographic complexion of the states in West Bengal and the states in the Northeast. The many ethnic insurgencies flourishing in the Northeast have developed unprincipled networking of the jehadi forces. All these developments should have raised alarm bells in India. But unfortunately, the policy-makers have continued in a state of denial. It would be suicidal to ignore the rapid growth of Islamic

fundamentalism in our neighbourhood; but it also needs to be stated that it would be equally dangerous to twist the facts in such a way to give them a religious colour to play communal politics. Doing so would be doing what the jehadi forces have not succeeded in doing so far, that is, to radicalise the Indian Muslims and build a strong base of the *jehadi* forces in India.

Indo-Nepal relations are also greatly influenced by the presence of the Nepalese as also by people of Nepalese origin in India, and the presence of the people of Indian origin in Nepal, especially in the Tarai area. Indo-Sri Lanka relations are similarly influenced by the Sinhala-Tamil relations, and have given rise to the problem of the LTTE, which has its sympathisers and bases in south India. Migrations and ethnic factors have further complicated the relations between India and its neighbouring countries. The demographic factor plays a crucial role when viewed in this context.

A Management Challenge

In this highly complex situation, there are no easy solutions. Ideally, the most obvious solution lies in regional cooperation approach, where the countries take a broad regional view of the problems and manage the migrations in cooperation with each other. The concerned countries, big or small, should have a sense of participation in a regional security system. Such an approach, unfortunately, is not practicable unless the countries concerned have friendly and reasonable attitude towards each other. In the absence of a desire for mutual good, it is not possible to make any meaningful progress through this approach. But this does not mean that all diplomatic efforts should stop. While every possible diplomatic move should be made to persuade Bangladesh to change its attitude in its own interest, there is no alternative to taking other measures to manage the situation. A comprehensive strategy that simultaneously tackles the problem, both internally and externally, and takes into account the micro and macro-level management problems, has a chance of success.

Internally, steps will have to be taken to stop large-scale internal displacement from one part of the country to another. A well-planned development strategy to reduce regional disparities is a must. The growing gap between the so-called advanced states

and the poor and underdeveloped states needs to be bridged by sensible development policies. Assam and other states in the Northeast deserve special attention. In an extremely heterogeneous and ethnically sensitive society as in the Northeast, where the acceptance of even legitimate demands of one group is seen as an assault on the concerns of another, the demands for further divisions will grow. Peace and development are two sides of the same coin; you cannot have one without the other. The solution is economic development backed by a legal and constitutional framework that is sensitive to local concerns, that gives economic equity and political fairness to all including the small ethnic groups. But there can be neither peace nor development without good governance. There is no reason why the quality of governance in these strategically sensitive areas cannot be improved. Requirements of both national security and development are, in fact, the same. The central government should stop treating the posting of senior administrative and police officers in these states as punishment postings. The postings in these areas should be treated as a challenge and only those who are willing and suitable should be posted. The present All India Services cadre system in the Northeast should be completely overhauled. A new Northeast Administrative Service should be constituted. The officers from this service should not be transferable to the Centre or any other state. The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) should screen volunteers from all the Class One Services, including the Armed Forces, to fill the posts for the initial constitution of the new Service.

It must be recognised that there is no way the Indian government can forcibly send away the large number of illegal immigrants who are already here, if the Bangladesh government refuses to recognise them as their citizens and accept them into Bangladesh. In this situation, the only practical solution is to follow a strategy of strong physical and legal measures to ensure complete stoppage of any future inflow of illegal migrants, and to extend the government control over those who are already here. The suggestion of giving work permits based on length of their stay and suitability to those already here deserves serious consideration. The internal controls include raising legal barriers to their employment and making their stay in the host state more difficult. Anyone giving shelter or employment to the unregistered illegal immigrant should lose his or her work permit in addition to other legal punishments.

The question of migration is closely linked to national borders. Effective border security control is one of the key elements in meeting this management challenge. Borders throughout history have been a controversial subject and evoke strong emotions particularly from people and groups living near them. In a nation-state the concept of borders is considered sacrosanct. Borders are markers of a state system. The problem arises when territory, national identity and political community do not any more correspond with one another. National borders are political constructs, projection of territorial power. Border regions have their own social and economic dynamics. Revolutionaries hide there, local inhabitants cross them, whenever services and commodities are cheaper or of better quality on the other side. And the traders are quick to take advantage of price and tax differentials. The border security depends on a number of factors like cohesiveness of the state, the strategic and economic importance of the border, and more importantly the actual presence of the state in the borderland. Vested interests develop not only among some people living in the area, but also among the customs officers and the security officials serving in the area, who get involved in smuggling of humans and contraband articles. They facilitate smuggling which becomes more profitable than checking it. But before we think of soft borders as a solution, we must have an effective system of identity cards in place. None of India's international borders can be termed as friendly borders, not even the Indo-Nepal border. Crossing that does not require an Indian passport or visa. The recent political developments in Nepal and the growing clout of the Maoists in that country have serious repercussions for India's national security. India-Pakistan border is a hostile border and the rest come somewhere between these two extremes. For obvious reasons, the management of demographic imbalance and border management has to be approached differently on different borders. There is no common solution for all of them. The oft-repeated phrase, sealing of the borders, has little meaning when applied to most of the country's international borders. Either the terrain is such that the sealing of borders through physical measures is simply not possible, or the ground situation does not allow these measures to succeed for political reasons. Ultimately, the success of border management will depend on how easy or difficult it is for the illegal immigrant to cross into the country and find shelter and employment, and for the government to detect their

presence. It is not an easy task. Linkages of ethnic kinship have made the borders porous and difficult to secure. Moreover, ethnic, religious or linguistic affinities of communities have encouraged constant cross-border movements.

Measures like border fencing need to be implemented in sensitive areas that are used as common routes for illegal infiltration. Improved surveillance and effective river patrolling is essential. An efficient network of police and revenue intelligence needs to be built up. Officer in charge of the local police posts should be made responsible for the detection of illegal migrants. His annual assessment report should contain a separate column about his performance in this regard. The Police Station should have a separate register for recording information about illegal migrants, the routes through which they infiltrate the places of shelter and employment.

We live in a troubled neighbourhood. The region is economically backward, politically unstable and, more importantly, two of India's most populous neighbours are rapidly being dominated by the *jehadi* forces. The concentration of madrassas and mosques, set up with foreign funding, in the border areas where demographic composition has undergone a radical change cannot be ignored. The Task Force on Internal Security had noted with concern the spread of the ISI networks in the Siliguri Corridor. Political parties must appreciate the seriousness of the situation and stop playing partisan politics with it. No internal or external strategy can succeed in the absence of a broad political consensus among the political parties. India's not very friendly neighbours are aware of this weakness and ruthlessly exploit it to pursue their own national agenda of breaking-up India and subverting its political and security system. Poor governance by politicians pursuing populist policies and non-performing civil services have created an explosive situation. Migrations cannot be totally stopped, but they can be drastically reduced if both the pull and push factors are managed in an imaginative way, and all political parties broadly agree to take a united stand against illegal migrations.

Indian Security : The New Great Game

Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM (Retd)

"Now I shall go far and far _____ into the North Playing the Great Game"

Rudyard Kipling
Kim, 1901

Introduction

India is poised for an historical opportunity of emerging as a dominant player in the world economy and polity. The vast untapped potential of the country in its multiple dimensions has been universally realised, recognised and acknowledged. The Indian diaspora is becoming increasingly assertive and is seen as an engine of growth and prosperity even in the West and in Europe. India's strengths are ironically its vast population, educated youth, appetite for energy and consumer goods and the growing military power. The long and hard battle that the country has waged to emerge as a resilient democracy, overcoming many ideological and militant revolutions, has also paid rich dividends. India today is a stellar example of "establishing democratic rule in the Third World". This evokes memories of India poised as it was in the 19th Century, a jewel in the British Crown, sought by colonial powers, Britain, France and Russia. This was the period of the Great Game, immortalised by writers as Rudyard Kipling. Today it is a player in the emerging great game of resources, trade and economy. The dimensions of this New Great Game are, thus, multi-spectral, yet there is a security dimension to it which is considerably significant and needs greater exploration.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to define security dimensions of India's economic and political growth from the perspective of the "Great Game".

Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle, SM retired as Commander Lucknow Sub Area.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

The Great Game

The Great Game was the 19th Century battle for the control of Indian wealth. The Russian empire surreptitiously supported by the French increasingly forayed across Central Asia and the Indo-Afghan frontier in an attempt to reach the gates of the Indian sub continent. The British, no mean empire builders, employed great subtlety, subterfuge and intrigue to combat this threat. Local leaders and intelligence guides, adventurists and powerful war lords were mustered through typical British skills at organisation to beat the Russians in a battle of wits and stratagem over an extended period. A number of Indian military commanders and intelligence agents had a prominent role to play in this Great Game. These were Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Zorawar Singh, Mohan Lal besides renowned British figures, Younghusband, Pottinger and Arthur Connolly.

The Great Game was marked by an aggressive forward policy by the British as against the advice of the "masterly inactivity school", which did not want to stir a hornet's nest.[1] It was adventurist nationalism at its best. There was limited use of conventional armed forces but reliance on local forces, sabotage and subterfuge, Information warfare, deception and deceit were effectively used to gain positional advantage. It had a primarily geographic dimension, located on vast wasteland of Central Asia.

The new Great Game on the other hand is a conflict over resources, energy including oil, nuclear and hydro power. Strategic minerals, trade, information technology and knowledge are all goals to be sought by the players. The size of a country's market and demand will also be significant in attracting investment and growth. Defence will be an important constituent of the Great Game because India's military capability is envied and its arms build up vied by multinational corporations. The geographical landscape of these manoeuvres will be spread over Central, West, South and South East Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The aggressive competitors will be the United States of America, China, Russia and India. The benign competitors are envisaged as the European Union, Japan, Australia and other large states. Non state actors both commercial and disruptive terrorist organisations will have an important role to play in this Great Game.

India's Strategic Strengths

India's strategic strengths, which enable it to participate in this New Great Game are now well established. The peace and prosperity of a multiethnic, multireligious democracy, which has succeeded in overcoming the vestiges imposed by partition is the country's greatest strength. India has lately made rapid progress in the quality of governance. Fall in the failed states list from 79 to 93 in just one year is one indication.[2] The jump in competitiveness index of states from 39 to 28 is another. These are all indications of long term success benchmarked against global states. India's demographic strength is indicated by the Malthusian dividend rather than the bomb of 500 million working age population by 2025. This is the most productive populace which is enterprising, risk taking and outgoing. The intellectual capital in the big league information and knowledge age signified by the Business Processing Outsourcing segment graduating towards the value added knowledge sector is fast denoting the country's strength. This is also indicated by the 2.5 million graduates every year who pass out from Indian colleges with approximately 250,000 engineers. This signifies 28 per cent of the available global work force as opposed to 11 per cent of China.[3]

India is likely to be the third largest economy by 2030. It has $ 160.677 billion foreign exchange reserves-one of the largest amongst developing countries. The low cost of compensation of production workers in the manufacturing sector which is below $ one per hour as opposed to developed nations as the USA, which is above $ 20 and the European Union, above $ 25, provide it manifold advantages. Then there are 10 to 30 million people of Indian origin living across the globe, equivalent to the population of Australia or Canada, which form a powerful source of influence. Indian industrial strength is signified by Mittal Steel, which has seen the French giant Arcelor running for Russian cover. The automobile and auto ancillary sector is another key strength of the country. India is one of the largest diamond traders with an industry value of Rs 70,000 crore per year. Thus, we see in India a resource hungry and demand heavy state, with over one billion population. The energy, consumer and infra structure appetites spell great opportunities for Indian and global corporations.

India's Vulnerabilities – The Security Dimension

India's vulnerabilities in the New Great Game, denoting crisis created by opportunities are that growth and disruption will be concomitant. There are a large number of failed states in the Great Game area as well as on the periphery of Indian territory. Resources are best acquired from the near vicinity and all land and sea routes pass through or are astride our neighbouring states. India is also surrounded by states that are either openly or ideologically antagonist as well as powers skeptical of the country's growth. These are likely to create hurdles towards smooth attainment of our objectives. The perils of the New Great Game were evident with the kidnapping and killing of two Indians in Afghanistan. Working on green field projects of infra structure development in the war ravaged state of vital significance to India, Kutty and Suryanarayana were brutally killed by the Taliban, allegedly at the behest of the Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, which demanded that all Indians in Afghanistan leave the country. The outrage in the country was understandable, but this is the price we will have to pay to participate in the Great Game. The cost, however, can be reduced through better awareness of the threats and being better prepared for it.

The internal security dimension of the country is no less challenging as it affects economy and growth. India's rural landscape is a vast market of 128 million households with limited spending power. The urban market is roughly 45 million households with large paying capacity. However, the problem lies in over 200 districts of the country in the grip of severe law and order strife bordering on militancy. Some say the country is in a state of stable anarchy. Others give India's internal security, two points on a 10 point scale.[4] The increasingly para military nature of militancy in the Maoist dominated so called Compact Revolutionary Zone is a cause of serious concern as it is showing signs of a, "state within a state", with its own system of justice, taxation and governance. The organisation of Kashmiri militancy is at a lower level, a form of networked terrorism, but has a higher degree of political sensitivity and lethality. On the other hand, sporadic violence mars the landscape in the North East with splintered terrorist groups operating at will in many parts of the hilly areas. Ironically, all these areas are rich in natural resources and are also attractive tourist destinations.

The above factors denote that expansion of national power in the economic sphere has to be accompanied by growth of security power. The East India Company flourished solely because it was supported by the British state. The dimensions of security power in modern times will be kaleidoscopic where military will be the primary but not the only means. While soft power is likely to dominate, the varied dimensions of military capabilities need to be understood. There are environmental and economic proportions to this threat which need consideration. Societal security is also of increased importance with approximately 30 per cent of the Indian population living below the poverty line, 50 per cent of population in Indian cities living in slums and water and electricity, a perennial problem both in urban and rural areas, the imbalance needs to be specifically controlled.

We live in a Hobbesian World, "poor, nasty, brutish and short".

But there can be no retreat from this reality. As the weekly *Economist* has said with reference to terrorism, "It is a dangerous illusion to suppose that another retreat by the civilized world would satisfy the appetite of the terrorists and get them to leave us alone – such a retreat would convince the terrorists that free nations will change ... policies, forsake ... friends, and abandon ... interests whenever ... confronted with murder and blackmail".

THE ENERGY GAME

Energy Security

Energy security will be a key factor in the New Great Game. Energy security entails long term measures to adequately maintain the required supply of energy resources both domestic and imported in the country at all times and at minimum cost. This includes not just security of the sources of supply but other issues such as extraction and refining, economical purchase through buyer's power, distribution, environmental effects and avoiding manufacturing fraud. The US spends $ 50 billion a year on oil security deployments in the Gulf Region. India's energy requirements are gigantic. The requirement of power by 2031-32 is estimated to be 7,70,000 MW. With oil price threatening to breach the $ 100 per barrel mark and depleting resources of coal, the energy mix of hydro, oil, gas, coal, nuclear and unconventional

sources has to be carefully strategised to enable stable long term energy security. Alternate energy sources will provide 8300 MW by 2009 while nuclear energy is targeted at an ambitious 40,000 MW by 2030. Notwithstanding the above, gas and oil will be the prime constituents of the energy mix with gas forming 25 per cent of this overall combination.

70 per cent of India's crude is imported and all of it comes by sea. India is expected to be the largest importer of oil by 2050 and our oil consumption is expected to rise to 150 million tons by 2020. India's gas requirements by 2024 are said to be 125 billion cubic metres (BCM) of this 52 BCM are likely to be available locally while the balance of about 75 BCM will have to be obtained from abroad. 70 per cent of the gas reserves in the World are said to be in North and Central Asia and the Gulf countries. The same is true of oil reserves. Russia is another important player in the oil and gas energy space. World polity is increasingly focused on the energy resources in the Caucasus with the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) Pipeline commissioned on 28 May 2006 and the United States politically undercutting Russian influence amongst CIS nations with the formation of the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development in Ukraine. Thus, we see the opening stages of the new Great Game unfolding.

Building strategic relations with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus along with West Asian states to include Iran, Iraq when it gets going fully, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is of critical importance. Myanmar too will be a key energy ally of the country. While our focus has also been in obtaining oil rights in countries as Syria where a 50:50 partnership between Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) and China National Petroleum Corporation marked a new beginning as also in Sudan, Sakhalin and the Nam Con Son Basin in Vietnam, these will only enlarge our strategic capability and are too far out to provide continuity in supplies. For this we have to depend on the immediate neighbourhood. Thus, the SAARC region including Afghanistan is of considerable significance to the country for oil security. Transportation of oil and gas will be multi modal. If it comes by sea, the security of the sea lines of communications assumes importance. In case it comes through oil pipe lines, and this appears to be the way ahead, these pass through antagonist states as Pakistan to the West and Bangladesh in the East; more over

Balochistan, a province of Pakistan is seeing rising insurgency which is beyond the control of the Government in Pakistan. Under such a situation energy security assumes critical importance. The experience in Assam where oil pipelines have become a target for anti national elements also rings an alarm. The vulnerability of pipe lines in other countries some of which are antagonists is also a cause of concern. While diplomatic measures may provide a modicum of security, some of it would involve physical guarding of assets which may have to be carried out through proxy forces as the Americans have done in BCT. The key pipelines, which are in the offing in the Indian context are as follows:-

(a) **TAPI.** The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan gas pipe line project. The length is 1921 kms to Multan. This has the backing of the Asian Development Bank. The cost is $ 3.5 billion and the extension to India is likely to cost $ 600 million. It will deliver 55 MCM. 1200 kms of the route is sensitive.

(b) **IPI.** This is the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipe line which is 2720 kms long with a cost of $ four billion and delivering 90 MCM per day. 760 Kms will pass through sensitive areas.

(c) **MBI.** The Myanmar–Bangladesh–India pipeline, with a total length of 897 kms, the cost is $ one billion. It has a capacity of 33.5 MCM per day. 289 kms passes through sensitive areas.[5]

Another option for laying pipe lines is by outflanking antagonist states. The Myanmar pipeline is proposed to bye pass Bangladesh and the Zaranj–Delaram route via Iran is under construction to provide an alternative approach to Southern Afghanistan, given Pakistani sensitivities to Indian forays into its back yard. All these issues highlight the need for security.

India is also emerging as a refining hub with lucrative margins of $ two per barrel the highest in the World. Pipeline manufacture is also an important area in which India is leading. The coast of Gujarat is emerging as a key area. Its proximity to Pakistan and the internal turbulence in the state is a cause of concern. Thus, the security of the port areas and the sea lanes also needs some consideration. Vulnerability of India's off shore installations, which are said to be worth Rs 175,000 crore, is also important as 68 per cent of India's oil production comes from offshore resources.[6]

In terms of security from the vagaries of world oil price and cartels as OPEC, the efforts initiated by the former petroleum minister, Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar to form an Asian or a Sino Indian cartel free of the New York Mercantile or the London Brent Crude Index needs to be pursued with vigour. In India, Mumbai appears to be the ideal location for such an Asian oil trading hub, given the strength of the financial capital in equity and commodity trading and the dynamic investing and trading community of the country.

Nuclear Energy

Nuclear energy is also assuming considerable significance given the need for environmentally superior mode of production. With a target of 40,000 MW, the Indian nuclear energy potential is attracting a large number of state and non state energy suppliers lining up for their share of the pie. France is a key nuclear energy producer, so are private players as GE, Areva and Westinghouse. The US interest in the Indo–US Nuclear agreement needs to be seen from the perspective of opening of the Indian nuclear energy market as of great commercial interest for America. To that extent it can be reasonably assumed that the outcome of the US Congressional approval to the Agreement will be positive. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project (ITER) is a programme conceived by the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Korea and the European Union to build a reactor with hot fusion. India has been granted admission in this exclusive club. The large hardon collider project is being built by the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Organisation Européene pour la Recherche Nucléaire commonly known as CERN). ITER is to provide unlimited, clean and cheap energy wherein one kg of fusion fuel would be able to produce the same amount of energy as 10 million kg of fossil fuels. The reactor is expected to be built by 2016.[7] India thus needs to approach the nuclear issue with growing strength and not diffidence. The countries in question have an increasing stake in India's energy market and will veer towards granting it entry into the NSG shortly.

Hydro Power

With the turbulence in Nepal showing some signs of receding there is a scope for improvement in relations with it, which is significant from the energy point of view as it can be a major source of hydro power for India to the tune of 43,000 MW which

include the following projects under consideration[8] :-

(a) West Seti Hydro Project.

(b) Upper Karnali.

(c) Pancheshwar.

(d) Sapta Kosi.

(e) Sun Kosi.

(f) Burhi Gandak.

(g) Kamla Multi purpose.

(h) Bagmati.

ECONOMIC DIVIDEND

The next significant facet of the Great Game is of economic security. India's potential is vast though it is still a small player in the global economic sphere. The potential lies in prospects rather than the present output. Market players consistently predict India's rise to the first three economies of the global order any time from 2030 to 2050 based on individual predilections. Suffice to say the potential is largely unrealised so far. Some hard facts may be more relevant. Indian exports were $ 120 billion in 2005-06, doubled in two years from 2003-04. India's foreign exchange reserves are $ 162 billion up over 10 times in as many years from the doom faced by us in early 1990's. Indian market size is also huge and a back of the envelope calculation will denote that if the one billion population spends $ one a day average, it would imply $ one billion a day or $ 300 to 400 billion dollars a year. Thus the country is seen as a major point for investment by global, national as well as multinational entities.

The security of trade through the sea is of considerable significance for India's economic growth. 90 per cent of India's trade by volume and 77 per cent of trade by value worth $137 billion is seaborne. Indian shipping has registered 584 merchant ships making it amongst the 20 largest maritime nations of the world and there are as many as 200 major and minor ports on India's coast line. In terms of international shipping, 60,000 ships transit through the Indian Ocean every year carrying goods

estimated to be over $1800 billion. Of $ 200 billion worth of oil coming through the Strait of Hormuz annually, $ 60 billion worth passes through the Strait of Malacca, with approximately 11 million barrels of oil moving through Malacca every day.[9] India's geographical location and peninsular structure enables it to dominate this area and ensure its security. The coast line off Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, Bangladesh and Indonesia has emerged as piracy infected areas of the World in the past one year or so. With resurgence of Pakistan in the maritime sphere aided by China and increased threat from piracy and crime on the high seas, security of trade routes for economic growth is of considerable significance for the country. An improved perception of security in this region will boost our trade with Pakistan, Iran, West Asia and South East Asia amongst other countries.

In the internal security sphere, economic growth is linked to development of infra structure. The National Highway project is making slow progress over the years and an additional 1113 kilometres has been approved by the Cabinet recently. This is in some of the strife prone areas. It needs an umbrella of security. In the air fields segment, out of 454 airports in the country, 170 are non operational. If these are developed it will generate growth of these areas so far removed from development. So would the additional ports which are being developed on the East as well as West coasts with Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh taking the lead. This will provide considerable boost to internal growth provided we are able to ensure security.

Another key issue in economic security is that resource rich states of the country, Chattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern States are under varied influence of militancy. Most of these are rich in coal, iron ore, minerals, oil and forest produce. The Bailadila mines in Chattisgarh which produced 15.75 Million tons of Iron ore earned a massive Rs 2100 crore profits in 2005-06. Assam has produced five million tons of oil out of the 30 Million tons domestic production. 1.3 billion tons oil and 1.56 billion cubic metres of gas reserves are said to be in this critical North Eastern state, while there are 55 oil exploration blocks on offer. Internal security, thus, needs to be focused not merely on political issues but also economic facets of stabilising growth.

In the international sphere, trade wars are imminent, with denial regimes, trade barriers and sanctions followed by preferential funding used as a route to foster interests by developed countries including China of late. The flooding of goods from China is a stark reality which the manufacturing lobby in India seems to have accepted. Perhaps as it has only affected the small players, the toy and the lock manufacturers it has been considered as a closed chapter. But the 1000 suicides in the Indian small scale sector is a cause for concern. Measures as free trade regimes and economic alliances need to be created to overcome these economic challenges. Indian companies such as United Breweries are facing impediments in acquisition of foreign entities as Taittinger while the NRI, Mittal is facing resistance to acquire Arcelor and emerge as the largest steel maker of the World. There is a need to provide some institutional props to our entrepreneurs stymied by foreign protection interests.

Evolution of the Asian Monetary Union is a long way off. India will have to devise a strategy to overcome these encumbrances and derive major concessions based on the size of its strategic as well as retail market. For instance the Indian and Air India deal for aircraft from Boeing and Airbus is worth $ 9.3 billion, a number of other air lines are also contracting aircraft. The large size of the demand needs to be leveraged to advantage to gain concessions.

Smooth functioning of finance, stock markets, trade and currency with a level playing field is another area of grave concern. The dimensions of money laundering are said to be worth $ 800 billion to $ two trillion per year globally. Loss of developing nations such as India is said to be $ 50 billion per year. The underground economy is sustaining terrorist organisations in Jammu and Kashmir as well as other parts of the country. Counterfeit currency is another move in the great game of undermining economic security of the country. Pakistan is the usual suspect with multiple routing through Bangladesh and Nepal. The volatility of the stock market is another cause of concern. It is said that 85 per cent of the investment in the stock market is speculative. Foreign Institutional Investors operating from Mauritius are a key factor, some of whom are acting as fronts for influential Indian players. The nexus of bankers-stock brokers and finance companies continues to be exposed from time to time. Corruption is another major issue of

concern for economic security. Mr N Vittal the former Chairman of the Central Vigilance Commission termed it as financial terrorism. In the Mumbai blasts of 1993, RDX was smuggled into Mumbai by a bribe of Rs 20 lakh leaving 200 plus dead, while in a recent incident, in Russia, explosives were smuggled on aircraft by paying a bribe of $ 16 or Rs 650/- leaving over 300 dead. In Jammu and Kashmir the cost of a grenade being thrown on a vehicle is sometimes ludicrously low as Rs 150/-. This in turn causes major social disruption in the country as seen post the Mumbai blasts. Thus we see that while India has great economic potential, its canalising towards effective contribution to stability can be achieved by measures to secure its vulnerable outposts.

SPACE DIVIDEND

Space is another area where the country has considerable leverages in the New Great Game. The budget of the ISRO is $ 700 million a year, with most of it in capital intensive development activities. The space field is an internationally integrated one. Thus international participation is seen in projects as the Chandrayan moon mission in 2007 – 08. There were 30 international responses when the project was floated for international participation. While an outer space treaty exists which denies national sovereignty over outer space, there are threats which arise in space on issues of geosynchronous orbiting. Tonga has already declared rights over its geosynchronous space in which these orbits operate, as also other equatorial countries are planning to do so shortly. Exploitation of the moon may lead to conflicts over mineral and other resources. The preparedness of the country to face such challenges in the realm of space is unknown. The much vaunted Aero Space Command could perhaps provide some focus of appreciating the threats which may arise from space exploration, presence and utilisation.

DEFENCE DIVIDEND

Indian arms build up has a security and economic dimension. While it would enhance our deterrence it would also provide a boost to economic growth in the manufacturing sector. India's defence budget appears to be creeping towards the magical Rs 100,000 crore or $22 billion. The distribution is likely to be 50:50, revenue and capital. This will imply an arms accretion of $11 billion per year. The principle beneficiaries will be the Indian

Navy and the Indian Air Force, which is aiming to be a precision strike force by 2015. The Indian Artillery is slated to acquire 1600, 155 mm guns in the next 15 years. The list of major Indian arms acquisition is impressive as given below[10] :-

(a) 8 Maritime surveillance aircraft.

(b) 6 Mid air refuelling aircraft.

(c) 80 Medium lift helicopters of the MI 17 class.

(d) 66 Hawk advanced jet trainers.

(e) 3 Airborne warning and control systems.

(f) 126 fighters for the Air Force.

(g) 60 advanced light helicopters.

(h) Light combat aircraft.

(i) Intermediate jet trainers.

(j) Medium transport aircraft in the 15 to 20 ton class.

(k) 66 hawk jet trainer – Rs 12,000 crores.

(l) Aircraft Carrier Gorshkov – Rs 12,000 crores.

(m) Phalcon AEW from Israel – Rs 10,000 crores.

(n) 24 diesel powered submarines.

(o) The helicopter acquisition list is also very impressive. The Army Aviation is seeking 60 helicopters off the shelf and 137 from HAL at a cost of $ 500 million. The total bill is of $ 1.5 billion and has also projected a requirement of 500 attack, high altitude reconnaissance and medium lift aircraft.

(p) The Indian Coast Guard is bidding for 60 helicopters by 2017.

(q) The IAF is bidding for 80 MI 17 class, while the Navy is negotiating for 16 helicopters for anti submarine warfare to replace the older Sea Kings.

The economic dividend lies in government policy of 30 per cent offsets, which is relatively modest as there is more leverage

for bargain in strategic deals. The offsets would imply that foreign companies need to outsource approximately 30 per cent components to Indian industry, implying massive potential for growth in the country's manufacturing sector. Are we exploiting this strength enough to gain maximum advantage from our vast defence import market? This is a question which needs to be pondered over. Aggressive price negotiations employing sophisticated tools and expert advice are called for. Any savings accrued would provide additional resources for development in other areas. We do not seem to be doing enough in this sphere. Indian companies are also increasingly building up their defence production capacities. BEL, BHEL, BEML and other public sector companies are leading equipment producers. Larsen and Toubro and TATA group are manufacturing 40 Pinaka MBRL each while Tata group has shown interest in other areas of defence manufacturing. India has also embarked on an ambitious missile production programme. The BrahMos Cruise missile can be produced at the rate of 400 missiles per year and the scale is over and above the indigenous requirement. The IBSA route adopted of cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) in three different continents may provide us an entry into the lucrative South American and African defence market.

IT AND TECHNOLOGY DIVIDEND

The trend in the IT industry denotes a movement from stand alone computers to the internet to mobile, "internet". Mobile phones are increasingly used for political as well as commercial activities including social disruption, economic transactions, entertainment, general information and finally communications. Blog power exclusive to the internet is also extending to mobile phones. India by sheer force of numbers today can colonise the global IT software and services industry. Though its overall share is still very low. IT exports of the country are Rs 100,000 Crore or $ 22 billion. Software exports are slated to increase to $ 60 billion by 2010. China has exports of $ 180 billion while the US exports are $ 149 billion. We have a lot to catch up.

However, there is increased focus on high end work and we are no more seen as software coolies. There are increased signs of reverse off shoring with the Taiwan Institute of Information Industry setting up off shore development in Chennai's Olympia Park and INFOSYS hiring 300 Staff from the US Universities.

The key area of concern once again is security which has multiple dimensions today to include technology disruption, economic anguish as well as social mayhem. Mobile networks are increasingly vulnerable as 200 viruses have been discovered in this space. The vulnerability of the internet is well known. There are 17 million users of the internet in the country today and soon it will be the number one internet using nation in the World that is if the mobile revolution does not overtake the internet one. The large number of B2B AND B2C transactions on the internet and on mobile phones enhance vulnerability of these media. We have to expand beyond the present policies, organisations and implementation to ensure fool proof security of our information sphere.

India is doing well in the field of space, nuclear, energy, telecommunications, web services, bio technology, robotics, nano processes and information. In the information technology field alone we are having major advantages in RFID, remote infra structure management, knowledge process outsourcing and intellectual property creation.

Media Power Supplementing the Great Game

A quote from His Highness the Dalai Lama on media power appropriately brings out the impact of modern media "The power of the media whether direct or indirect is a real power which acts on us, which modifies our behaviour, our tastes and probably our thoughts." Media will have an increasing role to play in supplementing the Great Game. Information power can be used for national growth, control social disruption and ensure balance. However, this is an emerging field and any effort for attaining balance are being seen as control, by the media, inviting adversarial reactions. On the other hand the, "bollywoodisation" of news and hidden camera journalism has replaced respected personalities as Prannoy Roy with sensational crime reporters of all hues. Thus the space for creating informed opinion amongst the masses has considerably shrunk. Public opinion is being manipulated by commercial and vested interests to force the government of the day to act against national interest. Kandahar being one example. Such a situation will not enable us to play our cards correctly in the New Great Game. The media will thus have to be taken on board while a separate Electronic Media Council may exercise some control over this, which seems to be going berserk at times.

SERVICES DIVIDEND

India's services sector is one of its key areas for growth. It includes such value added services as media, entertainment, knowledge, health services, tourism and travel, security and clinical research services. Health services are regarded as the key business opportunity. The US is slated to spend 20 per cent of its GDP on health care. Collaboration between the US and India involving hospitals and laboratories would reduce healthcare costs for the United States with great savings for its economy while for India it will virtually replicate the benefits that accrued from the IT revolution. The potential of travel and tourism should not be lost sight of. However, unless we ensure a better security atmosphere in the country, we will not be able to reap benefits from these sectors. Security services are important and need some consideration. So far it has been restricted to the government sector with Indian participation in the UN contingents in various countries. There is increased scope for private sector agencies operating in the lucrative global security services market exploiting the expertise of domestic agencies in this sphere.

SUMMARISING THE SECURITY FOCUS

The New Great Game will be characterised by jockeying by World powers for economic advantage. It will be a multi dimensional game of energy, trade, information, technology, space and defence. There will be limited use of violence but extensive intimidation. This highlights the importance of soft power and use of non state proxies. The geographical dimensions of the New Great Game will include the areas of West and Central Asia, South and South East Asia and the Indian Ocean. The capability paradigm of the New Great Game would entail multi dimensional structuring of security forces. Covert intelligence and Special Forces capabilities will be key instruments of policy. We need to have state sponsored, commercial as well as non state proxies operating in our areas of interest and influence, Central Asia, South East Asia, Afghanistan, Balochistan, Myanmar and so on. Support of the Indian diaspora is also essential. Increased emphasis on dynamic means of conducting manoeuvres of influence to gain political and economic advantage such as information and trade warfare need to be considered. Non military dimensions of security will also assume significance. We are in for what have been called as pin striped soldiers watching giant computer screens, identifying threats to

multiple systems that denote human enterprise of the morrow. There is a need to visualise the threats more proactively and not fall prey to an energy or economic Pearl Harbour. Thus we should not fall into the trap which Roger Trinquier has called as, "...persisting(ing) in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again".

Growth of Soft Power

Soft power is assuming increased importance to include not only information and culture but also diplomacy and cooperative security. Building economic and political alliance will be the key to exercising soft power. In some cases, economic union may precede political coalition while in other cases it may be just the opposite. Thus, we find that in SAARC, economic cooperation is preceding political as these issues are too complex to be resolved in the present state of dissonance while in the ASEAN sphere, the political is seen to be preceding the economic. In the security sphere there are a number of alliances looking for partners including the NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation which controls the Central Asian Security Space. Clubbing with these may provide us major advantages if the political resistance to such ideas is ironed out. Major initiatives in Africa and South America will also provide us the advantage of the vast natural resources offered by these Continents, where China is already in the lead. A domestic consensus on foreign policy may be a precursor to achieve these objectives.

Effective use of diplomatic pressure points needs to be made which is lacking at present. There is no annual report on terrorism or annual certification of countries not cooperating with the country in anti terrorism which are means that the United States has been employing effectively so far. Two track back channel means need to continue to include Bangladesh and Myanmar as well, to achieve a breakthrough in people to people contacts. The British Foreign Secretary recently landed in Somalia amidst a civil war, demonstrating a stellar resolve at the highest level to exploit opportunities for growth of power. Such examples need to be emulated to establish presence in areas of critical economic importance. A visit by any of our leaders to Indonesia would have sent a correct signal to foster our interest in that country. Organisational think tanks as the United Service Institution of India

are also important players in the field of information and knowledge management at the higher military and civil bureaucracy level. These should be leveraged to greater effect in the World of tomorrow.

India has very effectively used aid and relief to build closer alliances with people in the neighbourhood as also well afar. Tsunami, the Jammu and Kashmir earthquake and Hurricane Katrina wherein $ five million and 25 tons worth relief were provided are all salient examples of our aid and relief diplomacy. The speedy relief to Indonesia recently is another move in this direction. This trend needs to be continued in the interest of humanitarian assistance to the needy. Traditional soft power means films, entertainment and cricket also can be continually exploited. It would thus be seen that the dimensions of soft power are vast and its potential provides major leverages to the country which need to be fully optimised.

Security against Violent Threats

The importance of the military will never diminish but will take many diverse forms. By building our economic and military capabilities concomitantly we should be able to move from military deterrence to dissuasion in the conventional and the nuclear spheres. Deterrence against terrorism also needs to be an area of focus, for which a more aggressive external policy will have to be evolved as the present soft policy is not paying dividends. Deterrence against terror has many dimensions. The first stage of deterrence is against states supporting terrorism which has been achieved during Operation Parakram, while the next stage of deterrence against covert support of terrorism by states needs greater emphasis. The strategy of deniable level of terrorism followed by some states in the neighbourhood also needs an effective counter. This alone will build the confidence of Indian power in the neigbourhood. In the domestic space too, there is a need to ensure that those groups who are playing into the hands of terrorists by acting on their minions need to be marginalised. Ironically these personalities are well known. The state now needs to act more decisively to ensure that their duality and duplicity is exposed. These elements have a greater impact on Indian security than the terrorists whose role is limited to the physical.

Nuclear deterrence is a harsh reality in the great game. It will guarantee us the umbrealla for growth. How many bombs do we need to ensure deterrence? Presently estimates are that we have 75 bombs to counter China's possible 300 plus. What ever be the numbers, the need to build up our nuclear arsenal post haste has been highlighted by the recent introduction of the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Vienna.[11] Building a missile shield over our critical assets to guarantee a second strike capability will also enhance nuclear deterrence. Monitoring of the emerging threat from WMD terror also needs consideration before we are hit by a, "tsunami" of terror.

Conclusion - Role of the Armed Forces in the Great Game

India's Armed Forces have increasingly played an important role in nation building. During the fight for Independence, retention of the Armed Forces as an instrument of the state led to its successful integration into the state structure. The decades of the 1950's to 1970's saw the Armed Forces successfully overcoming the threat of external aggression, while the decades from 1970's to 2000's led to establishment of deterrence. From 1950 to this day the Army is engaged in controlling internal dissension. These roles have to be expanded to fill in the diverse facets indicated by the requirements of the New Great Game. Increased force projection capability, emphasis on covert and overt role of special forces, rapid deployment potential, hostage rescue and relief, training and military diplomacy are essentials which need consideration. Intelligence operations would also have to be effective over a diverse area than being restricted to the sphere of internal and external border security management as at present. A para military structure could be considered and a force on the lines of the National Security Guard could cater for such contingencies. It will have the advantage of military rigour combined with an outward police veneer, which may be more acceptable diplomatically as well as domestically.

Major accretions in air and naval assets for power projection as well as control of the seas are called for. We may have to overcome the continental mindset of our Armed Forces and provide a larger role for the Navy and the Air Force. A blue water and strategic lift capability will be in order. This combined with the Army's rapid deployment and special forces – small team ability

would provide us significant advantages in the emerging land scape of protecting our vast economic interests. We also need not shirk from deploying our forces abroad in national interest based on economic, resource and entrepreneurial accretions. What ever be the form of security, there is a definite role for the Armed Forces in the New Great Game and the earlier it is analysed and rationalised, the greater would be the national dividend. In the end we need to abandon the age old Hindu mind set and cross the oceans for that will denote the greatest virtue in the 21st Century.

End Notes

1. Peter Hopkirk. *The Great Game,* John Murray, London, 1990. p 3.
2. *Failed States Index 2006.* A survey by Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. Foreign Policy.com.
3. The Economist Report. *The Economist,* 17 December 2005. p 54.
4. KPS Gill. "Containing ideological violence." *The Pioneer,* 24 December 2005, p. 6.
5. Vinish Kathuria. Promise of Transborder Pipelines. *The Hindu,* 8 May 2006, p. 16.
6. Ashok K Mehta. "Navy : Full Steam on Course". *The Pioneer,* 30 November 2005, p. 6.
7. Reuters Report. *Sunday Hindustan Times,* 4 December 2005, p. 17.
8. Supriyo Gupta. "Alienating the King___". *The Pioneer,* 25 November 2005, p. 7.
9. Ashok K Mehta. "Navy : Full Steam on Course", *The Pioneer,* 30 November 2005, p. 6.
10. Data culled from defenceindustrydaily.com
11. Report in *The Hindu,* "US for Banning Fissile Material," *The Hindu,* 19 May 2006, p. 15.

The Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)

On Friday, 10 February 2006, the Ministry of Home Affairs published two notifications amending the Foreigners Tribunal Order of the Foreigners Act 1946, thereby, proving the argument stated by Dr D N Bezbaruah, the then editor of the *Sentinel* that to the Congress party, remaining in power was more important than the security and integrity of the country.[1] Why did the Government issue this order? And what are its implications?

The roots of this order lie in the liberation of Bangladesh, in which India had the lead role. After the liberation, in the historic meeting between Mrs Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of Bangladesh, the latter told Mrs Gandhi that he would take back the refugees who had fled from the erstwhile East Pakistan after 25 March 1971. He, however, stated that he would not take back any one who had migrated to India before 25 March 1971; the date of creation of the Government of Bangladesh in exile in India. This meant that lakhs of Bengali Hindus and Muslims who had illegally migrated from East Pakistan into India from 1950, when India had become a Republic, till 25 March 1971 could not be detected and deported. Mrs Gandhi agreed, thereby, regularising at one stroke lakhs of illegal immigrants from East Pakistan.

The illegal migration from Bangladesh continued into Assam. The illegal migration had been so persistent that the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, B N Mallick had pointed out the dangers of this illegal migration of Bengali Muslims into Assam, West Bengal and Tripura, rendering some of the border districts into majority Bengali Muslim populations by 1961 itself. The Government of India had then instituted a Pakistan Infiltration Post scheme in the border states with East Pakistan. This had been functioning in Assam since the early 1960s. The cut-off year for detection of illegal migrants

---

Shri EN Rammohan is a former Director General of the Border Security Force. He had a tenure as Advisor to the Governor of Manipur. He is a member of the National Security Advisory Board.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

from East Pakistan was 1951 as per the provisions of the Citizenship Act of India. The National Register of Citizens was prepared on the basis of 1951 being the cut off year. And it was on the basis of this Register that detection and investigation of cases under the Foreigners Act was carried out.

After the liberation of Bangladesh, and the agreement between Mrs Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, about not taking back the people of East Pakistan who had illegally migrated into India between 1951 and 25 March 1971, there was the question of the cut off year. What was the legal basis for 25 March 1971? The Citizenship Act of India had 1951 after the creation of India into a Republic as the cut off year.

It was at this juncture that the sitting Member of Parliament (MP) from Mangaldoi constituency in Assam died. When the issue of a bi-election came up, the people of Mangaldoi and Assam represented to the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) that the electoral rolls of Mangaldoi constituency should be revised as there were a number of foreigners in the constituency. After inquiries conducted, the CEC announced that the bi-election would be held only after the electoral rolls were revised, as there were a number of foreigners in the electorate. At this juncture the politicians took over. The Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, had to step down as some of his coalition partners decided to defect. Charan Singh became Prime Minister with Congress support. The Muslim lobby promptly pressurised the Congress to prevail on the CEC to conduct the polls in the Mangaldoi without revising the electoral rolls. The CEC under pressure from the Congress leadership wilted and announced tamely that he would conduct the elections in Mangaldoi on the basis of the 1976 electoral rolls. In Assam, the result of this turnaround was electric. The different groups who were agitating against foreigners in Assam, the All Assam Students Union (AASU), the Ahom Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chatra Parishad (AJYCP), the Ahom Sahitya Sabha combined to form the Gana Sangram Parishad and started the Foreigners Movement. This was a unique movement and resembled the disobedience of the Quit India Movement of 1942.

Meanwhile, from the time of the meeting between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the issue of the cut off year was creating a lot of simmering debates. The foreigners agitation started

in 1979. During the agitation, the leaders of the AASU were continually pressurised to accept 1971 as the cut off year, but they refused to accept it. After four years of agitation, in which lakhs of people courted arrest and shook the whole state, the Central Government decided to force an election on Assam. This election of February 1983 was a farce. For the people of Assam it was a blood bath. More than four thousand people were killed in firings by the police and paramilitary forces on crowds agitating against the election. In Assam, from 2 February to 21 February 1983, the state was at war. In an atavistic frenzy, the Assamese caste Hindus and the Bengali Muslims and Hindus fought pitched battles in the dry paddy fields with spears, bows and arrows. When it ended on 21 February 1983 the youth of Assam had decided that they would have no option but to take to the gun. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was born as a result of the blood bath of an election. They contacted the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in Dimapur, and soon the first cadres were on their way to the NSCN camp in the Sagaing Division of Burma for training.

The Central Government had one more jolt for the Assamese people. Smarting from the spirit shown by the Assamese people, the Central Government legislated an act called the Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunal) Act (IMDT) in 1983, ostensibly to facilitate the detection of foreigners in Assam. This was a cruel joke on the Assamese people. The IMDT Act actually made it virtually impossible to detect a foreigner. Firstly, the Centre directed that the Foreigners Act would not apply in Assam. Under the IMDT Act, it was for the Police to prove that the suspect was a foreigner, not for the accused to show that he was an Indian. In all such Acts across the world, it is the suspect foreigner who has to prove that he is a national.

For 12 years there was no legal basis for making 1971 as the cut off year. Two years after the election and continual attrition on the leaders of the agitation in Assam, they finally decided to sign an accord with the Central Government. The Assam Accord was signed in 1985. Regrettably the leaders of the agitation who had stood off the blandishments of the Centre for years, succumbed to the lure of power and agreed to accept 1971 as the cut off year. The Citizenship Act of India was promptly amended and the cut off year was now shown as 1971 and not 1951, courtesy the Assam

Accord, 1985! The Government of India had finally found a way out of the impasse after keeping the issue hanging fire for 14 years!

Meanwhile, the IMDT Act had been challenged in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the, Supreme Court. The court finally decided the case in 2005, after 22 long years, that the IMDT Act was unconstitutional and illegal and repealed it.

This was a serious blow to the Congress party, grievously affecting its vote bank in Assam and elsewhere. It was not long before the Congress party placed two amendments to the Foreigners Tribunals Order 1964 under the Foreigners Act on the table of Parliament. The first order amended the original order making it applicable to all states in India except Assam. The second amendment issued a new version of the Order applicable only to Assam. Herein it stated that the Central Government or any authority specified shall by order refer the question as to whether a person is or is not a foreigner to a Tribunal.

In the original order it was stated that the Central Government may by order refer the question as to whether a person is or is not a foreigner to the Tribunal.

The government of the day has brought back the very provisions of the IMDT Act that had been struck down by the Supreme Court. Regrettably, this step has been taken disregarding the security considerations of the country.

Today, there are several Islamic fundamentalist insurgent groups in Assam, all created with the help of the Directorate General Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh and the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The main groups are the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and the Islamic Liberation Army of Assam. These insurgent groups are in the vanguard for lebensraum for Bangladesh. In August 1999, the Assam Police arrested four insurgents who had come from Pakistan by air to Dacca and crossed over illegally through the Karimganj border with a plan to sabotage installations in India. On interrogation, they confessed that the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI), Bangladesh had recruited and sent a number of young Bengali Muslim immigrants from Assam to Pakistan for training in ISI sponsored camps of mujahideen. Based on this information, the Assam Police was able to arrest a

number of immigrant Bengali Muslims who had been trained in Pakistan. They also arrested one Muhammad Muslimideen, the Chief Organiser of the HUJI Bangladesh in India. They found that the *Naib Amir* of the HUJI in Assam Muhammad Fakhruddin from Goalpara in Assam was now based in Pakistan.[2]

What is interesting about these Islamic fundamentalist insurgent groups is that they have not done any operations till now. Interrogation and intelligence reports have revealed that they are in a phase of preparation. They are to recruit cadres, train them in Pakistan, stockpile arms and explosives and motivate the people for the coming insurgency. The target date is reported to be in 2015.

It is certain that severe communal rioting will break out in Assam, West Bengal and Tripura along the faultlines between the immigrant Muslims and the local people. The infamous election of 1983 was a forerunner for this prognosis. The sequel to this communal rioting will be the eruption of a Bengali Muslim insurrection spearheaded by the Bengali Muslim insurgent groups now embedded in Assam. And this will be an insurgency to attain a homeland for the immigrant Bengali Muslims in Assam.

References

1 D N Bezbaruah, "Our Land, Their Living Space" in *Bangladesh, Treading the Taliban Trail,* New Delhi, Vision Books, 2006.

2 *ISI Activities in Assam.* Statement laid on the table of the Assam Legislative Assembly, Item-12 dated 6 April 2000, by the Chief Minister of Assam.

RATE CARD - ADVERTISEMENT IN JOURNAL

	Black and White	Coloured
Full Page	Rs. 2,500/-	10,000
Four Consecutive Full Pages	Rs. 8,000/-	36,000
Half Page	Rs. 1,500/-	10,000
Four Consecutive Half Pages	Rs. 5,000/-	36,000

Image of the Armed Forces – Arresting Negative Trends

Lieutenant Colonel Yogesh B Athawale

"The nation which forgets its defenders will be itself forgotten."

– Calvin Coolidge, (1872-1933)

Since the genesis of civilisation, the profession of arms has received adulation within civil societies, both, during war and peace. As the *raison d'etre* of a soldier's existence is itself the security of the state; it is only natural that his work, which often involves uncommon sacrifices, is held in high esteem by his countrymen. The military profession counts among very few other professions that have been traditionally regarded as 'honourable' by the society at large. This universal image is bolstered time and again when the society witnesses the relevance of soldiering in the face of external aggression, internal instability or natural calamities. Thus, the Armed Forces are looked upon as 'protectors' and 'saviours' – impressions that are laden with awe and admiration. This paternal image confers high responsibility upon the military and consequently the expectations from them in terms of conduct are proportionally exponential. An offshoot is that it is this very image of the Armed Forces, which attracts volunteers who wish to join the ranks in order to fulfil their aspirations based on the needs of self-actualisation. Thus, the 'larger than life' image of the military is intrinsic to its effective existence and functioning.

As much as the society desires its military to be incorrupt and disciplined, it is in the interest of the military to preserve its 'morally elitist' image. In a democracy like ours the military has to play an indispensable role in securing the country against threats and sustaining democracy itself. In a world that is in the throes of rapid transformation by information technology revolution and rising consciousness about rights and liberty, preserving their traditional ethos and insularity is emerging as a big challenge for the Armed Forces. Like never before, the Armed Forces face an unhappy

---

Lieutenant Colonel Yogesh B .Athawale is posted at INS Akshay. He was awarded the gold medal for this essay in the Group B category of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2005.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

prospect of witnessing their credibility being dented due to a variety of factors like growing media activism and public sensitivity to lapses.

The Classical Image

The classical image of the Armed Forces in the society is intertwined with their reputation of upholding discipline. A military man is assumed to be disciplined apart from being patriotic, chivalrous etc. It is perhaps this image, which accords the 'morally elitist' image to the Services. Since early times when armies, navies and, later, air forces fought to defend and protect their societies, the man in uniform has been regarded as a hero and treated as such. In modem times, the trend has continued with the uniformed personnel having to deal with numerous armed conflicts, peacekeeping duties, and disaster management operations. In India this fact was particularly evident when the nation rallied behind the Armed Forces during Operation Vijay (Kargil War) of 1999 and profusely acclaimed the heroes who brought victory home. More recently, the Services earned the respect of the entire nation with their concerted humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of the devastating Tsunami of 25 December 2004 and flood relief in the inundated parts of Maharashtra during the monsoon of 2005.

Complementary to the positive public image are the ethos and culture of the Armed Forces that are distinct and, in a sense, conservative too. The secret of the efficiency of the Armed Forces as an organisation lies in their professionalism, discipline, hierarchical command structure, fairness and even ritualism. These attributes provide the military that decisive edge, which makes a difference during testing times when they have to venture by themselves in harm's way. The Armed Forces have, thus, earned the appellation as 'the last bastion of democracy' – a sentiment which is even reflected in the statutes where the involvement of the Armed Forces is provisioned as a final law enforcement measure to restore civic order and protect democracy. The aforesaid factors result in creating a halo around the Services, raising expectations in terms of conduct, efficiency, loyalty, probity and transparency.

Causes of Change

The fears expressed about degeneration of the positive image of the Services are founded on growing public sensitivity to various

exposés and lapses *apropos* the military, which come to fore in the public domain. Let us try to analyse the factors, which contribute to the erosion of good reputation that military organisations have traditionally cherished with pride.

(a) **The Information Revolution.** "The pen is mightier than the sword", goes an old adage. The 20th Century was described by some as the Century of Information Technology. The digital revolution resulted in creation, sharing and transfer of information on an unprecedented scale. India in particular witnessed a deluge of technologies in the nineties, which revolutionised the way Indians accessed and assimilated information. The ushering of globalisation and liberalisation brought along many state of the art technologies from the West. Dozens of news channels mushroomed over the satellite waves and crept into Indian homes besides the Internet, which was already opening new vistas to global information. Images started getting beamed 'live' into the bedrooms even as the news rolled along. The definition of journalism gathered a new meaning as a large army of enterprising reporters and correspondents joined the race for providing the 'news that matters'. Investigative journalism became a new catchphrase. Driven by the ideals of free speech and socially responsive reportage, journalists started probing sources that traditionally remained averse to uninvited media scrutiny. The Armed Forces, wherein insularity and confidentiality is seen as a prerequisite to many functions, perfectly fitted into the media's prospect for sensation. Thenceforth, the Armed Forces have found it difficult to manage the scale of damaging stories, which the media routinely puts up in various forums, be it print, TV, radio or the Internet. In addition to bad publicity, the presence of preponderant media representatives in a conflict zone (as during the Kargil War) taught some lessons to the Armed Forces, especially the Army, in media management. While the 'Fourth Estate' is an essential pillar of a free society, it is also a manifestation of the freedom of expression and perhaps the only component of the democratic setup, which has the least amount of regulation. In today's age where commercial interests also play a vital role in gathering and disseminating information, the reality of overbearing media attention is here to stay with the Armed Forces.

(b) **Publicised Impropriety.** The public perception of professional organisations is a direct result of the positive or negative stories, which appear in the public domain or through contact with the members of the public in one way or the other. The hallowed image of the Armed Forces has often taken a beating due to a number of cases of indiscipline, which continue to crop up time and again. As discussed earlier, the sensationalism that is associated with news pertaining to military affairs can promptly attract public attention and become hot news all over. Cases of corruption involving well placed officials, capital offences including rape, treason, and incidents of public disorder are some examples of offences that have served to severely damage the reputation of the Armed Forces in the past. In addition, the increasing trend of publicised litigation by serving and retired personnel for addressing their resentment about career matters has created a contrived impression about the Armed Forces in the public mind. This impression strikes a highly incoherent note with the norms of fairness and discipline, which are closely identified with the Services. The Armed Forces have streamlined procedures for dispensation of justice and redressing grievances. They also have a very effective system of rewards. The Services are known to treat rather unkindly those individuals who bring disrepute to the organisation by their actions. Yet, aberrations do occur, earning notoriety for the accused as well as the organisation. Another cause of bad publicity is the accusations of human rights violations committed by Service personnel deployed for counter insurgency operations and law enforcement in Disturbed Areas.

"Guard with jealous attention to the public liberty. Suspect everyone who approaches that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright force".

- Patrick Henry

(c) **Involvement in Internal Security Duties.** The constitutionally defined principal role of the Armed Forces is to protect the country from external aggression and protect its territorial integrity. However, provision exists to employ the Armed Forces in Internal Security duties as and when deemed necessary by the Government. It goes without saying that the

latter is not the primary duty of the Armed Forces and their services are sought in rare cases where other security agencies prove inadequate to address the problem. However, the reality on ground today points towards a near permanent involvement of the Army in Internal Security duties. Elements within the Navy and the Air Force also form a part of this arrangement. Operations in Internal Security scenario may involve Counter Insurgency (CI) Operations or law enforcement in areas covered under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, Disturbed Areas Act, National Security Act and Defence of India Act and Rules[1]. The demands which are placed upon a soldier during such duties are varied and circumstantial. In a sense this kind of employment is in contrast to the soldier's classical role and also his training. The Army is trained to fight the 'enemy across', whereas its involvement in Internal Security duties is diffused. Operations in such open-ended scenarios run an innate risk of civilian attrition losses or perceived highhandedness by the military, which can lead to erosion of goodwill amongst the local populace. This phenomenon has occurred in a number of 'disturbed' locations in our country such as in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and, more recently, Manipur. This is the type of bad publicity, which the Army does not necessarily invite upon itself but is purely circumstantial with its nature of duties. Search and Cordon, road checks, frisking, interrogation etc are some of the measures, which almost become inseparable from the overall operational policy in the affected areas. These invariably bear great potential of antagonising the civilian community for whom it may become routine annoyance. Thus, the military is caught in a *Catch 22* situation wherein the efficient performance of its duties is fraught with the risk of damaging its reputation. On many occasions in the past, agencies such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, reactionary media groups and other freelancers have put the Army and the government on the back footing by raising a hue and cry about actual and alleged human rights violations, by security forces in affected areas. While the Army has its own internal checks and balances to minimise such incidents, odd aberrations subject to human frailties become fodder for the 'human rights bandwagon' to make an issue and project its humanitarian image with renewed zeal.

(d) **Propaganda Warfare.** Not all negative publicity originates as a result of cause and effect on ground. In fact, in the realm of international affairs, much of the damaging publicity can be attributed to purposeful information warfare by vested interests. Accusation of 'rights violations' and 'oppression' by security forces forms the central theme of the propaganda spread by myriad groups operating at the behest of the adversary. In regard to the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, a well orchestrated and sponsored misinformation campaign against the Indian Army is already in place using forums like the conventional media, internet, congressional lobbies and diplomatic links. Exaggerated accounts of civilian deaths, false stories about offences against women, gory and graphic images of the dead and injured – all serve to raise passions and create a prejudiced image about the activities of the Army. Such propaganda effectively exploits public sensitivity to factors such as religion, ethnicity and history. As an offshoot of such widespread campaign, many individuals and reactionary groups within the country too tend to be critical of the Armed Forces. In India, by and far the media have been appreciative of the role of the Armed Forces in critical situations. As seen earlier, the aggressive and inquisitive journalism we witness today is a clear shift from the past when the military was treated rather as a 'holy cow', to be left alone in its detached domain. With their technology driven influence, the pressmen and reporters are more objective and brazen than ever before. The adversary's propaganda machinery is, thus, indirectly benefited from the criticism within.

(e) **Low Self-Appraisal.** The image of an organisation also depends upon the confidence and satisfaction radiated by its members. Away from the spit and polish, pageantry and orderliness, what matters is the contentment of those who voluntarily preferred the service in uniform. A variety of factors leave many disillusioned about their job. Their opinions and impressions based on personal experiences, when expressed by word of mouth, may not exactly enhance the military's 'good image'. Serving members apart, the most effective ambassadors of the Armed Forces are the 23 lakh strong ex-servicemen who are spread across the panoramic mosaic of India.[2] With about 55,000 personnel being added to this pool

every year, the ex-servicemen have immense potential for shaping public opinion through their post retirement pursuits such as writing, interaction with students, training activities etc. Regrettably, the ex-servicemen themselves are not organised very cohesively, with the retirees in lower ranks almost left to restart earning a living. The long-standing demand of 'one rank one pension' remains unfulfilled till date. Many pledges and promises made by politicians regarding their resettlement are lost in the ravages of time. Ex-servicemen with little or no gratitude towards their 'uniformed past' could not be expected to further the positive image of the Armed Forces.

The Way Ahead

Having seen the reasons for the erosion of the good reputation, which the Armed Forces have traditionally enjoyed, it could be of interest to probe for possible solutions, which could check the negative drift. Essentially, it is a feature of the working culture of the Armed Forces to undertake systemic in-house reviews and apply course corrections when the need is evident. In this case, however, the military is only one amongst the many parties that are involved and hence the methods of correction may not be simple. The following steps could lead to solutions:

(a) **Improving the Military-Media Relationship.** We have briefly dwelt earlier upon the complexities of the relationship between the military and the media. The ethos of the two institutions are diametrically opposite. The military likes to conduct most of its business huddled up in its own world whereas the media agencies reach out to the public and gain strength thereof. Exclusiveness comes natural to the military but the media look forward to bringing the former under public scrutiny. The peculiar relationship between the two entities is universal. In fact, in the West the media has increasingly gained prominence in military affairs including conduct of warfare. The entire world witnessed the Gulf War of 2003 through the images and commentaries provided real time by the 'embedded' reporters, who rubbed shoulders with the invading US led Coalition troops. It is still widely believed in the US military establishment that the Vietnam War was lost

due to the overweening attitude of the American media, who shaped the anti-war public opinion.[3] Through the history of conflict, the presence of media in the military's area of influence has only increased. Our own Operation Vijay was the first televised conflict that was beamed live into Indian homes albeit in bits and pieces. In India the military-media relationship has been generally positive. By and large, the media do give the Armed Forces their rightful space in reportage, especially with regard to the contribution made by the latter in Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) and humanitarian operations. At the same time, the criticism, when regarded as due, is unequivocal. The media have a valid argument when they claim that as the Armed Forces are an organ of the Government, the citizenry has a bona fide right to know about its affairs through dispassionate observers. Easier said than done, the way towards working out an amicable methodology is difficult indeed. Let us see how.

I have made arrangements for the correspondents to take to the field...and I have suggested that they should wear a white uniform to indicate the purity of their character.

Union General Irvin McDowell [4]

(i) **Acknowledging the Media.** Like with the American and other Western militaries, the reality and magnitude of media influence took its time to sink into the military psyche in our country too. The Kargil War was an eye opener, especially for the Army, which found it difficult initially to manage the steady trickle of news hungry reporters, correspondents and cameramen into the battle zone that soon turned into a force to reckon with! Soon however, the situation was brought under control by dedicated efforts at highest levels albeit after learning some valuable lessons. Thence, the indispensable role of the media in military operations has been acknowledged by the Armed Forces. Post Kargil, the Army has carried out many reforms in this direction. These include creation of the post of Additional Director General of Public Information apart from the existing setup comprising the Army Liaison Cell, media centres and mobile press release units.

(ii) **Creating Awareness About the Media.** The next logical step towards building a healthy military-media relationship is increasing the awareness about the media within the rank and file. In fact, the Services have already taken concrete initiatives in this regard. Seminars have been conducted across the country by various Services formations to promote media interaction. Institutions of repute like the Indian Institute of Mass Communication now conduct regular courses for the officers of the Armed Forces. The process can be taken a step forward by dovetailing this subject in the *ab initio* professional training as well as in various promotion linked/mid-career courses of officers and JCOs.

(iii) **Media Sensitisation.** No interaction can be one way and, therefore, it is obligatory that the media have a correct and unprejudiced impression about the Armed Forces, their work culture, traditions and command structure. In a reciprocal measure, these aspects about the Armed Forces need to be communicated to the media personnel right at the training stage itself. Secondly, at the Government level a panel with representatives from the media houses, Armed Forces and the Government could be formed to enunciate a military-media policy or plan for the future. The underlying theme for such an endeavour should necessarily address the core question of how the Indian public can be kept informed about the facts regarding military operations while ensuring the safety of own forces and confidentiality of the military mission. The media can also be of immense help to the Armed Forces in countering the malicious propaganda by the adversary's terror infrastructure.

(b) **Increasing Transparency.** In the days of increasing public sensitivity to issues like human rights, corruption, fiscal accountability and social responsibility pertaining to the Armed Forces, reforms may be a necessity. Not to be remiss, the Armed Forces have initiated certain remedial measures to bring in more transparency in their affairs. After episodes like the Tehelka expose, the gallantry awards fiasco, growing accusations of human rights violations and other charges of

misuse of power, the Army has shown the way by demonstrating the swiftness and fairness of the military system of reform and refinement. The following steps could go a long way in perpetuating the responsible and humanitarian image of the Armed Forces to the society at large.

(i) **Human Rights.** The issue of alleged human rights violations by the Services personnel has featured on top of the list of concerns which harbour potential to undo the good work done. The Army, which bears the majority of brunt, has a formidable record in managing this problem to a fair degree of satisfaction. Establishment of 'Human Rights Cell' at different formation headquarters, issue of the Ten Commandments, systematic sensitisation of personnel etc are some of the measures that have been in place for sometime now. In addition, speedy trials leading to exemplary punishment to the guilty is a feature, which is unique to the Armed Forces. Recently, in an unprecedented gesture, the Army and the Air Force allowed the media to attend the trial by court martial of two of their officers facing serious charges of indiscipline. This approach towards demonstrating transparency has to be adopted *in extenso*. The Services should accord wide publicity to their fair and just policies and low tolerance to indiscipline in matters of human rights violations. Moreover, the training of all personnel should include the subject of human rights in a formal manner with adequate exposure to case studies and awareness of legal implications.

(ii) **Tackling Corruption.** The Services have traditionally been intolerant to corruption. As Defence procurements involve large sums of public money, the inquisitiveness about Defence deals and other contracts is high and hence these should be open to scrutiny. In a recent development, the Ministry of Defence have standardised a Defence Procurement Procedure to streamline the process of procurement. Going further with the same philosophy of standardisation, the fiscal management of public and non-public funds, stores and inventory should be reformed and streamlined across the Services. While

it goes without saying that penal retribution for offenders should be severe, the sincere and scrupulous should be motivated and rewarded.

(c) **Social Responsibility.** Another feature of reform pertains to the process of positive contact with the society through programmes that have mass appeal and wider reach. For many years Service organisations and formations have been proactive in organising health camps, environmental protection drives, charity, rehabilitation and literacy programmes in their areas. Such initiatives bring out the human face of the soldier. The success of Operation Sadbhavana in the Kashmir Valley serves as an example of the positive influence that the Armed Forces can exert in containing social strife and lending the much wanted healing touch to the people. Lessons drawn from these experiences could prompt more such initiatives in conflict prone areas where the social fabric needs mending to sustain nationalism and harmony.

(d) **Empowering the Ex-Servicemen.** The role of ex-servicemen in radiating the image of the Armed Forces has been touched upon earlier. The ex-servicemen often find themselves caught between the inconsistent responses by the State and Central governments. A number of committees have submitted recommendations towards improving their lot but many of these recommendations remain dishonoured. The Government needs to view the ex-servicemen as a trained pool of skilled manpower, which is available for a second innings in the service of the nation. This large human resource can be tapped for nation building activities. Apart from technical jobs, ex-servicemen can contribute to a variety of fields like vigilance, health, education, sports, physical training, adventure activities, police and paramilitary training. The recommendations of the KP Singh Deo Committee, the Sharad Pawar Committee and more recently the Khurana Committee have to be seriously considered for implementation. The financial objections to the implementation of 'one rank - one pension' also need to be removed at the earliest. It is in the interest of the Services and also the Government that the ex-servicemen, particularly the Personnel Below Officer Rank (PBOR), look back upon their yesteryears with pride and a sense of gratitude.

Conclusion

The dynamics of social and economic change are bound to have their impact on the Armed Forces and their image. The causes for erosion in image of the Armed Forces are multifarious and complex. The Armed Forces have to adapt to the changing circumstances. Notwithstanding the unjust criticism and propaganda by vested interests, the Armed Forces, have enjoyed a privileged social status in our nation. While the society has to be appreciative of the intricacies of the soldier's job, the soldier also needs to be alive to the sensitivities of the society. As the nation moves from strength to strength, the Armed Forces should demonstrate their dexterity and flexibility in evolving with the changing times. Internal reforms, mutually beneficial partnerships with external agencies and unflinching support from the Government are the basic pre-requisites for preserving the venerated image of the Armed Forces, which thrives on the essentials of public confidence and adherence to the values of democracy.

References

1. Dr S Subramanian, *Human Rights Training* (New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2000), pp.526-527

2. Lok Sabha Debates (Part I - Proceedings with Questions and Answers) The Lok Sabha 04 August 2005 http://164.100.24.230/Webdata. Accessed on 07 Aug 05

3. Major Barry E Venable, The Army and the Media, www.leavenworth.army.mil.

4. Ibid.

ADDRESS UPDATE

ALL MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO INTIMATE CHANGE OF ADDRESS ON OCCURENCE, INCLUDING TELEPHONE NUMBER AND E-MAIL

Military Justice System in India

Wing Commander U C Jha (Retd)

INTRODUCTION

The Union Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister has given approval for the setting up of an Armed Forces tribunal. As reported, the tribunal would be formed on the lines of the Central Administrative Tribunal and its composition would be incorporated in the Armed Forces Tribunal Bill 2005, which is likely to be passed by the Parliament. It was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 20 December 2005. It has been referred to the Standing Committee on 27 December 2005. The proposed tribunal would deal with appeals from court martial verdicts and grievances related to conditions of service, including promotions, confirmations and appointments. It is likely to be independent of the Service Headquarters and headed by a retired judge of the Supreme Court. The judgments of the tribunal may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court. This is a long-awaited change in the justice system in India. However, the creation of an appellate forum may not solve all the problems that the military justice system is riddled with.

NEED FOR A SEPARATE SYSTEM

To appreciate the need for a change in the military justice system, it is necessary to understand why a separate system of justice is needed. Military functioning in modem war demands quick decisions that cannot be achieved by a debating society. In many military situations, a commander's decisions are enforced through his subordinates. This is the reason why the Armed Forces have a system of rank and command, clearly designed to place one person in charge when group action must be decided upon. Military justice provides a stimulus for cultivating a habit of unquestioning obedience by posing the threat that disobedience will be penalised.

The military has developed laws and traditions of its own. The primary function of the Armed Forces is to fight or be ready to fight should the occasion arise. The Armed Forces are not a deliberative body. They have an executive function. The officer's

---

Wing Commander U C Jha is a Consultant (Legal) for the National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

right to command and the soldier's duty to obey cannot be questioned. Besides, the military constitutes a specialised community governed by its own laws that recognise unique military offences, such as desertion, absence without leave, disobedience of orders and dereliction of duty. These offences exist to ensure discipline, which is essential for accomplishing military objectives. If a commander cannot rely on his subordinates to obey and if the members cannot rely on each other to follow orders, the effectiveness of a fighting force is undermined and the security of the nation may be endangered. No civilian parallel may be drawn to explain the need for enforcing discipline. Further, the military justice system is designed to adjudicate cases efficiently. This is important in a contingency, when a commander must deal with misconduct expeditiously to prevent degradation of the unit's effectiveness and cohesion.

THE INDIAN MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

The British military justice system, conceived to 'discipline' a mercenary force after the 1857 mutiny, is the progenitor of the Indian Army Act 1950, the Navy Act 1957 and the Air Force Act 1950. (There are minor differences in these three Acts. However, for discussion, the general term "Army Act" (AA) will be used). Only a few minor changes were made before the British laws were adopted by independent India.

Deficiencies in the Justice System

The Army Act reflects the old system with all its inherent defects. Some of the defects are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Right to Bail. There is no provision of bail for a military person arrested on a charge. It is a matter of discretion of the commanding officer, or the superior military authority. While the Supreme Court has laid down categorically the principles on which bail ought to be granted, these provisions have not been made applicable to military personnel held in military custody. Such discretion in granting bail, is arbitrary, liable to misuse and makes the constitutional guarantee under Article 21 meaningless.

Trial in Summary Court Martial (SCM). Trial by SCM does not come up to the recognised standard of justice because there is no

prosecutor and the court itself performs some of the functions of the prosecutor. The accused is not entitled to defend himself with the help of a counsel, or defending officer. This is not in keeping with the safeguards provided in Article 22 of the Constitution. It also violates Article 21, as the procedure prescribed for SCM does not pass the test of just and fair reasonableness. The Supreme Court and high courts have criticised the decisions of a number of SCMs as being biased, awarding excessive punishment and being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Legal aid to Accused. The most significant is the absence of the services of an experienced legal officer as counsel for the accused. Military rules permit an accused to engage a civilian lawyer at his own expense or to be defended by a military officer known as the defending officer. In reality, very few of the accused can engage a civilian lawyer at their own expense and service officers normally detailed for the duty are inexperienced and unwilling to undertake this commitment. The infrastructure required to meet this obligation of legal aid has not been developed in the Armed Forces. The organisation does not provide any incentive to the defending officers. The problem is further compounded by the fact that defending officers have little or no interest in the task. Consequently, cases before the court martial are not adequately defended, which is in violation of the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution.

Members of Court Martial. A court martial constituted under military law determines both findings and sentence. The members are neither legally qualified nor trained in the administration of justice. In fact, experience shows that the most unwanted officers in a military station are detailed for court martial duties. They are exposed to varying degrees of "command influence" and cannot be completely independent in exercising their judgment in a trial. Invariably, the members are detailed from the command whose commander-in-chief orders the court martial. He appoints the principal functionaries of the court martial and controls their service career. Even if he does not wish to influence the functionaries directly, they function under the "command influence".

Functioning of Judge Advocate General (JAG) Department. The Judge Advocate (JA) performs no functions, either as an advocate or as a judge. Thus the JA cannot be compared to the

judge in a trial by jury except in the sense that he has to maintain an entirely impartial position and his address cannot be in the nature of a direction. The department of JAG is placed under the administrative and functional control of the same executive who orders a trial by court martial and reviews the proceedings. The quality of advice given by the JA plays a very crucial role in swaying the minds of the members of the court martial. The officers of the JAG department are, however, not independent and cannot be expected to give a fair and just opinion.

Double Jeopardy. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy enshrined in Article 20(2), whilst available before a court martial is not available to prevent a second trial on the same offence before a civil court. A person subject to the Air Force Act, who has once been tried and convicted or acquitted before a court martial can be tried again on the same charge by a civil court.

Denial of Right to Appeal. There is no provision of appeal against the finding and sentence of a court martial. Chapter XII of the AA, which contains sections 153 to 165, provides for the confirmation and revision of the order of the court martial. Section 153 states that "No finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general, court martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by this Act." Section 160 provides for the revision of a finding or sentence of a court martial by an order of the confirming authority. Section 164 deals with confirmation and remedy available to those against whom a finding or sentence has been confirmed. In the case of a final finding or sentence awarded by a GCM, DCM and SGCM, the remedy available to the accused is given in section 164 (2), as "Any person...who considers himself aggrieved by a finding or sentence of a court martial...may present a petition to the central government, the Chief of the Army Staff or any prescribed officer superior in command to the one who confirmed such finding or sentence, and the central government, the Chief of the Army Staff or other officer, as the case may be, may pass such order thereon as it or he thinks fit." This remedy can be invoked only after the finding of the sentence has been confirmed. The privilege of seeking the remedy is, thus, not available to the accused before the confirmation of the sentence. Besides, this remedy is an exercise on paper and takes place in closed rooms where the accused has no right of personal

representation. Thus, in reality, there is no right to appeal against the order of the court martial. Article 136(2) of the Constitution stipulates that the Supreme Court (Article 227 (4) in the case of high courts) cannot give special leave to appeal against any judgement, determination or sentence of a military court or tribunal.

The Supreme Court, in the case of *Union of India v. Himmat Singh Chahar* (1999), has considered the extent to which a high court, under Article 226, of the Constitution can exercise the power of judicial review over the court martial. The Court held: "The judicial review would be for a limited purpose to

(a) find out whether there has been infraction of any mandatory provisions of the Act which has caused gross miscarriage of justice; or

(b) find out whether there has been violation of principles of natural justice which vitiate the proceedings; or

(c) find out whether the authority exercising the power was having jurisdiction under the Act." Thus, the remedy of judicial review provided to a military person under Articles 32 and 226 is limited.

The existing system of military justice is regulated by the power of military command rather than the rule of law. The military commander exercises almost unrestrained and unlimited discretion in determining:-

(a) Who shall be tried.

(b) The prima facie sufficiency of proof.

(c) The sufficiency of charges.

(d) The composition of the court.

(e) All questions of law arising during the progress of the trial.

(f) Correctness of the proceedings and their sufficiency in law and in fact. Moreover, there is no right to appeal against his decision.

MILITARY JUSTICE IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES

The world has moved forward in the last twenty five years, and there have been major changes in the military justice systems of other democracies. In fact, a number of democracies have abolished military tribunals during peacetime (Austria, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland). Reforms in the military justice system of some democracies are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

The United Kingdom

The English court martial system can be traced back to the military court attached to the army in Scotland in 1296. Over the centuries, the English system developed from its feudal beginnings to a recognisable court. When the Royal Air Force was formed on 1 April 1918, the Army system was adapted for its use. This system survived until 1946, when the Lewis Committee report was published. The Air Force Act, 1955, the Army Act, 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act, 1957–collectively known as the Service Discipline Acts (SDA), introduced the present system. These legislations remain in force today albeit with certain amendments.

Prior to 1 April 1997, it was not possible to appeal against a sentence alone. The change brought about by the Armed Forces Act, 1996, brought the court martial system closer to the civilian system for appeal. Following an appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court, a further appeal is possible to the House of Lords. In cases where a court martial decision has been reversed and there has been a miscarriage of justice, the Secretary of State is required to pay compensation to the person who has suffered.

Under the recent reforms in the British military justice system, the duties of the commander have been distributed among three separate bodies. An independent prosecuting authority decides whether to take a case to court martial, an administration officer selects the court martial panel members, and a reviewing officer justifies the decision. The UK's Armed Forces Discipline Act 2000 has also established a summary appeal court for the purpose of hearing appeals against the findings and punishments awarded by commanding officers while dealing summarily with charges. The order of trial in a Summary Appeal Court follows very closely that of the Crown Court.

The government has introduced a Tri-Service Armed Forces Bill in the Parliament on 30 November 2005. The Bill reflects the government's commitment to modernising the military justice system. The main proposals in the Bill include:

(a) A common Service Discipline Act for the three services.

(b) Harmonization of offences and disciplinary powers of commanding officers.

(c) A joint court administrative authority.

(d) A single prosecuting authority.

(e) A standing unified tri-service court martial.

(f) Abolition of the rights of reviewing authority to review court martial.

(g) Right of accused to elect his trial by court martial.

Canada

The Canadian system of court martial was based on the British system. In 1950, a comprehensive National Defence Act was created, which included all legislations relating to the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force, established a uniform process for administering justice and provided the right to appeal from the findings and sentence of courts martial to the Court Martial Appeal Board. The next step pertaining to appeal process came in 1959, when Parliament replaced the Board with the Court Martial Appeal Court. The adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, has resulted in more constitutional issues being raised before the court.

Canadian military courts are required to have a greater degree of institutional independence from the command structure of the armed forces. The commander has no authority to appoint judges or panel members. In cases where the accused is a non-commissioned officer, Warrant Officers are authorised to sit as members of the court martial panel. The Director of Military Prosecutions prefers charges and conducts prosecution at court martial. The court members are chosen under a modified random

selection process based on rank, and there is right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on questions of law.

The United States of America

In the United States, the modem military justice system is based on the Constitution, which gives the Congress the authority to "provide for the common defence", "to raise and support armies", and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces", and designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It was established with a foundation resting on four authorities: the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); the Manual for Court Martial (MCM); a Presidential Executive Order that includes the rules for trial by court martial; and the body of case laws developed from the courts that review military justice cases. Military members do not forfeit their constitutional rights. Like all American citizens, service members enjoy the fundamental protections of the Constitution.

The UCMJ represents a masterpiece of legislation that balances the need for good order and discipline with the constitutional rights afforded to all citizens. It provides for a single criminal code applicable to all the services and a criminal justice system containing safeguards for the soldier that go beyond the rights enjoyed by civilians. The military justice system provides checks and balances to ensure that an accused's procedural and substantive rights are protected. The military judges base their rulings on constitutional provisions, common law, Rules for the Court Martial (RCM), and Military Rules of Evidence (MRE). These rules and procedures ensure that an accused's rights are maintained throughout the trial. The military justice system also offers the accused extraordinary access to the appeals process through a series of appellate forums: the Court of Criminal Appeals (one for each service), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the United States Supreme Court. In addition, the President of the US can, in time of emergency or war, order 'military commissions' to be set up to try certain offences. Their 'jurisdiction' can extend to civilians.

The military justice system gives service members virtually all the rights and privileges afforded to citizens who face prosecution in civilian courts. In many areas, such as, the right to counsel,

pre-trial investigations, discovery, sentence, post-trial process, and appeals, the military justice system offers benefits that are more favourable to the accused than those available in the civilian system. In addition, Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits unlawful command influence.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The right to a fair trial is a norm of international human rights law designed to protect individuals from the unlawful and arbitrary curtailment or deprivation of their basic rights and freedoms, the most prominent of which are the right to life and liberty. It is guaranteed under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides that "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law." The fundamental importance of this right is illustrated not only by the extensive body of interpretation it has generated but, most recently, by a proposal to include it in the non-derogable rights in the ICCPR. Other legal provisions on fair trial are to be found in Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Additional rules relating to the right to fair trial are contained in the United Nations documents---Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 1990, Basic Principles of the Role of Lawyers, 1990 and Basic Principles on the Independence of Judiciary, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1985.

Article 14 of the ICCPR, which provides for equality before the courts and for the right to a fair and public hearing, contains a catalogue of "minimum [procedural] guarantees" for an individual undergoing a trial for criminal charges. These rights are:

1. The right to a fair and public hearing.
2. Equal access to, and equality before the courts.
3. The right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
4. The right to a presumption of innocence until proved guilty according to law.

5. The right to prompt notice of the nature and cause of criminal charges.
6. The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence to the defendant and to his counsel.
7. The right to a trial without undue delay.
8. The right to defend oneself in person or through legal counsel of one's own choice and to free legal assistance.
9. The right to an interpreter and the right to examine witnesses.
10. Prohibition of self-incrimination.
11. Prohibition of double jeopardy.
12. The right to appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher tribunal established according to law.
13. The right to compensation for miscarriage of justice.

The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary emphasise that the independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed by the state and enshrined in the constitution or the law of the country. It suggests that "everyone be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other United Nations Documents". It says further that "The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducement, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason." The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers states that the role of lawyers should be seen in the context of rights of due process and access to the legal representation included in the international "Bill of Rights" and other sets of standards adopted by the United Nations. The United Nations' Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors dictates that states shall ensure that prosecutors have appropriate education and training and should be made aware of the ideals and ethical duties of their office, of the constitutional and statuary protections for the rights of the suspect and victims, and of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised by national and international law.

RULE OF LAW

The rule of law is the basis for any liberal political system that recognises individual rights protected by an independent judiciary. It presupposes the existence of a set of rules drawn up in advance to determine the powers of institutions and the government and must apply to all organs of society and every citizen. Fuller (1969) has prescribed eight conditions for the rule of law :-

(a) Law must be general.

(b) Laws have to be promulgated (publicity of law).

(c) Retroactivity must be avoided, except when necessary for the correction of the legal system.

(d) Laws have to be clear and understandable.

(e) The legal system must be free of contradictions.

(f) Laws cannot demand the impossible.

(g) The law must be constant through time.

(h) Congruence must be maintained between official action and declared rules.

The rule of law implies that the functions of the government should be exercised in such a manner as to create conditions in which the dignity of man as an individual is upheld. It means that no man can be punished or be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of law. The rule of law is a part of the 'basic structure', which cannot be abrogated in the exercise of the amending power of Parliament under Article 368 of the Indian Constitution.

The Indian military justice system falls short of the international legal standards in that it is not free from command pressure and there are chances of its being applied with discretion. An individual cannot be governed by regulations that depart from known rules or be tried by a judiciary under the influence of a higher command or have no forum to appeal against the decision of quasi-judicial authorities. The functioning of the justice delivery system for the armed forces and the need for reforms must be viewed in this context. If reforms have to be made, the new system must establish a uniform code for all members, which is updated at regular intervals

based on the prevailing international standards. It must ensure that :-

(a) The tribunal exercising military jurisdiction is a part of the overall legal structure of the country's legal system.

(b) There is no control or interference by the military executive.

(c) The acts of executives, including the award of non-judicial punishment is subject to judicial review.

(d) Appeals lie from trial courts to higher appeal courts.

(e) Compensation is paid for miscarriage of justice.

(f) Accused military members are rehabilitated in civil life.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we may say that the human rights principles recognise the inherent dignity and fundamental freedoms of all members of the human family. They form the foundation of all basic freedoms, justice and peace in the world. Under Article 14 of the ICCPR, the right to a fair trial and equality before the court has been regarded as fundamental rules of law. The recognition of these principles has brought about changes in the military justice systems of the USA, Canada, Australia and the UK. Even countries like China, Indonesia, New Zealand, Russia, and Thailand have procedural safeguards and appellate courts which entertain appeals against the decisions of the court martial. But in India there are glaring deficiencies in the safeguards provided to the accused and in the attitude of those administering the military justice system. The system is considered a part of the executive department and is an instrument in the hands of the executive to enforce discipline. This, despite the fact that the Constitution of India makes a declaration that justice shall be secured for every citizen.

The Indian military justice system, is a hangover from a time when the battlefield was far away and the Armed Force needed to be self-contained. No legal system can or should operate in a vacuum, disregarding the changing norms of society. The military justice system has become outdated and the mere creation of an appellate tribunal will not make it dynamic. It requires the incorporation of fundamental protections based on international legal norms in the light of the experiences of other democracies in

the world. Therefore, instead of making reforms by creating a "tribunal" it would perhaps be more advisable to review the military justice system in totality, in order to evolve a healthy justice delivery system. The system should be common to all the three Services and function as a guide to the people in the process of nation building. If the government succeeds in making military law more humane and dynamic, it will serve to reassure military personnel that they are overseen by a fair, just and impartial justice delivery system under the Indian Constitution.

REFERENCES

1. Roberta Arnold, Military Criminal Procedures and Judicial Guarantees: The Example of Switzerland, *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2005, Vol. 3, No.3, July 2005, pp. 749-777.

2. A V Dicey, *An Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution*, 10th Edition, London: Macmillan, 1967.

3. Lon L Fuller, *The Morality of Law.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

4. M P Jain, *Indian Constitutional Law*, 2 Vols, Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, 2003.

5. *Lt Col PPS Bedi v. Union of India*, (1982) 3 SCC 140.

6. *Motiram v. State of MP*, (1978) 4 SCC 47.

7. Parliament of Australia: *Senate Committee Report on the Effectiveness of Australia's Military Justice System*, 2004. Available at www.aph.gov.au.

8. Brigadier-General Jerry S T Pitzul, A Perspective on Canada's Code of Service Discipline, 52 *Air Force Law Review*, Winter 2002, p.1-16.

9. Judge J W Rant and Jeff Blackett, *Courts Martial, Discipline, and the Criminal Process in the Armed Services : Authoritative Guide to the UK Military Justice System by the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces and the Chief Naval Judge Advocate, 2nd Edn*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

10. David A Schlueter, *Military Criminal Justice: Practice and Procedure*, USA: LexisNexis, 2004.

11. Rear Admiral O P Sharma (Retd), *Military Law in India*, Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., 1990.

12. *Union of India v. Himmat Singh Chahar* 1999 (4) SCC 521.

13. www. parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/defence_committee .cfm

Pakistan's Strategic Perspective in Evolving World Order

Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)

Pakistan's strategic perspective has been shaped by circumstances of its birth, its geography, history, its struggle for forging a Pakistani identity and the role played by its dominant elite in formulating and sustaining its strategic culture. External and internal shocks have continually impacted the strategic discourse in Pakistan which at different points in its history have forced it to veer away from its much cherished strategic goals. Forces of globalisation and ascendancy of economic and human security over military security have caused the Pakistan establishment to rethink its strategic perceptions and make an attempt in moving towards a more cooperative approach in its regional, economic and security issues. Pakistan is said to have embarked upon Musharraf's path of 'enlightened moderation' with mixed success.

Evolving World Order and Pakistan

1990s witnessed Pakistan becoming the most sanctioned country in the world. This decade increasingly drew focus on Pakistan because of terrorism emanating from the region, nuclear weapons proliferation and the nuclear tests of May 1998, not to forget the Kargil misadventure and overthrow of democracy in October 1999. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA were a defining moment in Pakistan's strategic history and had the greatest impact on its strategic policies. The current international relations have been marked by a few notable features:-

(a) The emergence of the US as the sole super power and rise of China as an economic power.

(b) The recognition of terrorism as the biggest threat to world peace and focus on terrorism emanating from Pakistan-Afghanistan region.

Brigadier Vinod Anand is a Senior Research Fellow of the USI-CS3.

* This is a modified and updated version of the paper presented at the USI on 29 March 2006.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

(c) Geo-economics as the most important paradigm and ascendancy of non-traditional aspects of human security.

(d) Military confrontation is not a preferred option even though the US believes in preemption and unilateralism as enunciated in their National Security Strategy documents of 2002 and 2006 and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006.

Pakistan fashioned its responses to the evolving world order by absorbing the changes in its environment and then devising 'appropriate' strategies to maintain its Indo-centric approach as a solution to all its strategic dilemmas. In spite of a continuous flux in the strategic environment, Pakistan's construct of the world order is very simplistic. A Pakistani analyst while commenting on India-fixation of Pakistan's strategic thought has observed that "Despite claiming an extra regional identity (greater cultural and regional affiliation with the Middle–East) Pakistan has never ventured to expand its security vision beyond India. In fact, Islamabad's view of entire world appears simplistic, with the world divided between states that are considered important for their ability to provide any direct or indirect help in strengthening Pakistan against India and those that are of no help in this regard"[1]. Its relationship with other countries has been underscored by this fundamental perception. The US, and China occupy an important place in Pakistan's quest for security.

Pakistan-US-China Equation

In its quest for balancing equation with India, Pakistan has always endeavoured to remain strategically relevant to the US. The US-Pakistan strategic relationship is underscored by different strategic perspectives. Some of these are outlined below:-

(a) Pakistan has traditionally responded to regional dynamics and the US to global imperatives. Their strategic and tactical goals, short term and long term objectives are apparently quite different.

(b) Earlier, the threat from outside (USSR) was the basis of relationship, now threat from inside (i.e. terrorism emanating from Pakistan) is basis of relationship. And the US sees Pakistan as having contributed significantly to this condition with its internal dynamics and external behaviour.

(c) Pakistan perceives the American presence in their country as an inhibiting factor for India to implement perceived aggressive designs against Pakistan. Continued engagement of Pakistan besides addressing the aims of global war on terrorism also allows the US to checkmate the rising Chinese influence in Pakistan.

China has been all weather friend of Pakistan since mid-sixties and over the years Pakistan's strategic interests have largely been satisfied with its relationship with China[2].

(a) China has supported Pakistan militarily and diplomatically and has promoted Pakistan as a balancer to India.

(b) In the 1990s, when the US played down its ties with Pakistan, China continued with its comprehensive relationship with Pakistan. It built up Pakistan's nuclear and missile arsenal which strategically benefited both the countries.

(c) Pakistan views China as a more reliable ally than the US in addressing its security concerns especially regarding India.

(d) While the US wants to promote India as a major power and apparently as a competitor to China in Asia, China is looking for a unipolar Asia with India confined to South Asia.

(e) In Pakistan's understanding of emerging order, the growing Indo-US nexus has enhanced Pakistan's strategic importance to China which needs to be exploited by Pakistan.

However, at another level India's rise as an economic power and its growing cooperation with the US also enhances India's strategic relevance in China's calculus. China has been encouraging Pakistan to solve its differences with India, especially the Jammu and Kashmir issue, bilaterally and was almost neutral during Pakistan's adventure in Kargil.

The Middle East and the Islamic Card

Since Pakistan was created on the basis of Islam, it has strived to be identified as leader and champion of Islam. It stresses its importance as the only nuclear capable Muslim nation of the Ummah. Its solidarity with Islamic causes like Kosovo, Palestine and active participation in Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC)

is generally aimed at addressing its strategic concerns. A former Ambassador of Pakistan argues that "while favouring an enlightened and moderate approach, Pakistan must defend the core interests of the Islamic world, whether in political matters (as in Palestine and Kashmir), or in ideological or economic affairs."[3] Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries has provided it with political, diplomatic, economic and even military support for its competition with India. Its 1.5 million expatriate community in the Middle East countries provides for a significant amount of foreign remittances. Saudi Arabia have promoted Madrassa culture in Pakistan and contributed to spread of Wahabi Sunni religious orthodoxy which has led to rising sectarianism in Pakistan. With Iran, Pakistan's relations have gone through many ups and downs as Pakistan had competing interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistan's perspective is to develop itself as an important trans-Asian hub for Afghanistan, Central Asian Region (CAR) and beyond and provide access to Arabian Sea through its territory. In 1990s Pakistan proliferated nuclear technology to Iran as part of its westward orientation and a vision of acquiring a larger pan Islamic perspective. It has also embarked on the path of improving its relationship with Israel to promote itself as an enlightened and a moderate Muslim state and also to address its concerns on growing Indo-Israeli defence and technological cooperation. It makes good sense to improve its relationship with another anchor of the US Middle East policy and with whom many other Arab nations have diplomatic relations. Pakistan believes that it can play a crucial role in bridging the gap between Arab and Israeli views[4].

Central Asian Region and Russia

The emergence of new Islamic countries in CAR was seen as a strategic opportunity to extend its influence. It also fitted in well with its policy of westward orientation and evolving Pakistan as 'hub of Islam'. It is the founder member of Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) which comprised Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan and six members of CAR. The objective was to build infrastructure links, development of transport and communication corridors, network of gas and pipeline grids and interconnected power grids. However, Pakistan's vision of a new Islamic block with non-Arab component has been stymied by continued instability in the region

to which Pakistan has contributed and is still believed to be contributing in not a small measure[5]. Pakistan has strived to remain strategically relevant by becoming an observer in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) a status held by India[6].

A weakening of Indo-Russian equation is viewed as an opportunity for Pakistan to exploit the emerging strategic space especially for obtaining defence and military supplies from the nascent states like Ukraine. It has also supported Russia's case for membership of OIC[7]. In its strategic perspective, the long term presence of the US in Afghanistan and Central Asia goes contrary to Russian and Chinese interests and a Sino-Russian convergence can be useful to Pakistan's ambitions in the region. After the signing of Indo-US nuclear energy deal, besides looking at China as an alternate source for its nuclear energy needs, Pakistan may also focus on Russia. Pakistan is viewed by Russia as an evolving hub of energy grid between West Asia, Central Asia and vast markets of South Asia. And, therefore, Russia has (during Russian Prime Minister's visit to India in March 2006) expressed willingness to have a stake in the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

Pak perspective is more of a military perspective rather than a holistic national strategic perspective. Pakistan's strategic edifice is supported by three pillars. First is to seek military parity with India, second is to leverage its geo-strategic location and Islamic linkages and seek military oriented[8] (for instance CENTO & SEATO earlier and now Pakistan is most favoured non-NATO ally) and diplomatic alignments that are of help in restraining India and third is to seek asymmetric ways of warfare and strategies for cost effective options. Perceived threat or rather building of threat to its ideology and Islamic nature of state has been used as a powerful ideological and strategic tool by military and civil governments to advance their own agendas. Progressive Islamisation of Pakistan society has created societal dysfunction and the effects of culture of jihad have had world wide reverberations. Policy of jihad in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan were basically to serve India-centric strategic designs of Pakistan establishment. For dominant elite of Pakistan any accommodation with India despite the dictates of realpolitik is an anathema. Strategic culture of Pakistan shaped by its elite prevents it from getting out of the Indo-centric rut and also inhibits it from seeking harmony with India except on the terms defined by this select group.

Strategic Culture: Who shapes it in Pakistan?

Strategic culture to a great extent affects the formulation of strategic policies and adopting a course of action in a given situation. Jack Snyder describes strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditional emotional responses and patterns of behavior that the members of national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other"[9]. It is widely recognised that in order to understand a nation's strategic culture one has to study its history, its outlook and how it has conducted itself. A Pakistani writer, however, cautions that too much should not be read into Pakistan's strategic culture because Pakistan is yet to become a modern nation state and what is being seen is only evolving trends. According to him "developing nations have national psyche and strategic outlooks based on their holistic experience, which might differ from the Western experience. Strategic choices are often determined by narrow parochial interests driven by local factors and in response to a regional based competition. In countries such as India and Pakistan dominant elites build narratives, hypothesise threat perceptions and develop notions of war and peace. They create narratives and myths to help consolidate local interests, domestic politics and organisational interests."[10] The author's observation about Indian dominant elite seems to be ill founded since there are many checks and balances in Indian political system and no single group or elite can dictate a dominant discourse. Also it is not very far back when India was perceived to be having no strategic culture (as highlighted by George Tanaham). In case of Pakistan, the dominant elite have created strategic myths in order to consolidate its bureaucratic and organisational interests and to continue to hold onto reins of power and affluence. Propagating notions of competition and parity with India have had debilitating consequences for the state of Pakistan.

Pakistan perceives itself not as a state but as a religious community. It has as yet to learn to behave like a modern state based on comparative advantages in political and economic terms instead of religious terms. Pakistan's elite insists on running it as a Muslim minority being persecuted by a Hindu majority within the South Asian geopolitical construct. Any onslaught on this process or calculus can only occur due to threat of dire consequences,

e.g. threat by the US of post 11 September 2001 incident reprisals. But then escape routes and ways and means are found to reassert Pakistan elites' old thought processes and tenets of strategic behaviour. All present, past and even likely future actions, in a general sense, can be said to be as a result of such a fixation of the dominant elite[11]. Dominant elite in Pakistan which is instrumental in shaping its strategic culture is said to consist of military and civilian bureaucrats. They are 'slow to respond, slow to change, resist alternative world views' would follow the rut rather than chart out a new path and would be more loyal to the King than King itself. The members have to be loyal to a core of set of principles. This establishment or strategic elite is said to share the idea that India is the main threat to Pakistan and must be countered militarily thereby giving military a paramount role. Accordingly, armed forces are considered as best guarantors of security; and democracy is seen as good only as long as it does not interfere with governance of the elite. Alliances and alignments are necessary to achieve objectives of its Jammu and Kashmir policy. Pakistan establishment also has a longstanding belief that some one or something will always come to Pakistan's rescue because of its (geo-strategic) location[12].

The strategic myths[13] made popular by the elite has been that Islam is a unifying force in Pakistan, antagonism and animosity to India is a rallying point for drawing attention away from domestic issues, and patronage and hegemony of the US and China helps Pakistan militarily and economically and enables to withstand Indian pressures. That Islamic ideology and its unifying effect could not help Pakistan keeping its both parts together in 1971 is conveniently glossed over. Pakistan's troubles like insurgency in Balochistan and unrest in Northern Areas is attributed to India's machinations. Notions of strategic depth in Afghanistan are also post-Taliban creation. Hussain Haqqani argues that even the reference to Jammu and Kashmir as 'core issue' is of recent origins. This concept was invented in 1980s and was entirely absent in 1960s[14]. Although this oligarchy professes desire for peace with India, it is yet to make a paradigm shift. According to Haqqani the top five per cent of Pakistani individuals (which naturally includes the elite) account for 42 per cent of national income and bottom 20 per cent account for only 8 per cent of national income[15]. The vested interest of elite continues to maintain a certain degree of hostility against India to maintain it's pre-eminence.

Main Components of Strategic Perspective

The main components of Pakistan's strategic outlook can be said to include the following elements:-

- Forging of an Islamic identity and appeasement of religious fundamentalism.
- Hostility and confrontation with India and quest for parity with India.
- Salience of its Jammu and Kashmir policy to the exclusion of others.
- Primacy of military security over all other areas of security.
- Seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan.
- Developing and securing its nuclear assets[16].

A major shift in Pak policies is said to have taken place in the wake of 11 September 2001 events when General Musharraf did his famous U-turns on a number of issues connected with both its internal and external dynamics. The four areas of strategic transformation to which Pakistan was expected to devote its energies were: Islamic terrorism and extremism, restoration of democracy and democratic institutions, dialogue with India and change in its Jammu and Kashmir policy and its nuclear proliferation activities.

During his speech of 19 September 2001 Musharraf cited the following reasons for changing his strategic outlook :-

- Pakistan's strategic assets are not neutered.
- Safeguarding of Pakistan's Jammu and Kashmir policy.
- Avoid being labeled as a rogue state helping terrorists.
- Prevent an anti-Pak dispensation taking hold of power in Afghanistan.
- Improve the image of Pakistan as a responsible nation.

Pakistan's Jammu and Kashmir policy came into international focus again following terrorists' attacks on 1 October, 2001 in Kaluchak and 13 December, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament in

New Delhi. This led to India mobilising its forces and launching Operation Parakram in order to force Pakistan to change its policy of cross-border terrorism. Pak president in his famous speeches of 12 January 2002 and June 2002 promised again to prevent use of Pakistan's territory by terrorists for their activities.

In December 2004, General Karamat, Pakistan's ambassador to the US had acknowledged the misdirection of Pakistan's strategic policies and was at pain to emphasise that these have been transformed and Pakistan had to pay a price for this strategic re-orientation. This transformation, according to him included the following:-

(a) From a policy of active interference and destabilisation of Afghanistan, Pakistan is now working with the US for a stable and friendly Afghanistan.

(b) From a policy of hostility and confrontation with India, Pakistan now has a policy of dialogue and conflict resolution.

(c) From a policy of appeasement and political expediency with extremist religious elements, Pakistan has moved to confronting them to end the negative influence within the country.

(d) From a clandestine nuclear programme with proliferation consequences, Pakistan has moved to a regime of command, control, and international cooperation.

(e) From vendetta-oriented political leaderships and dictatorial regimes, Pakistan is moving, slowly but surely, toward sustainable democracy and political stability.

(f) From a military-centric concept of security, Pakistan has transited to realise the importance of a broader concept of security with the emphasis on economic and internal stability[17].

This can be said to be a frank recognition of Pakistan's obtuse policies and it is also an indicator that Pakistan has not been able to achieve anything of substance in its objectives of strategic redirection even though its strategic elite is seized with the necessity since September 2001. However, the elite leaves no opportunity to impress the international audience about the sacrifices Pakistan had to make to alter its strategic direction and, therefore, it needs

the support of international community in its endeavours, especially in terms of military and economic aid and in overlooking of its transgressions of nuclear proliferation activities. Even lack of progress in instituting democratic and social reforms is expected to be glossed over by the international community due to unique security environment of Pakistan and its status of frontline ally in the war against terrorism (FATWAT). Before General Karamat took over as ambassador to the US, Pakistan had been given the status of major non-NATO ally of the US in June 2004, as a reward for its 'contribution' to war against terrorism.

Afghanistan Perspective: Pakistan still looking for Strategic Depth

A review of events in Afghanistan would reveal that there has been resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan with active connivance of Pakistan. In 2005, former US President Bill Clinton observed that 'keeping Afghanistan out of the hands of Taliban and undermining Al Qaeda should be priorities because that is by far the biggest threat to our country'. 9/11 Public Discourse Project Report of November 2005 while reviewing progress made on recommendations of 9/11 Commission Report has emphasised that Pakistan continues to be a sanctuary and training ground for terrorists and advises the US government to put pressure on Pakistan to do more to crush terrorism. Besides the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the Report stresses that Pakistan should act forcefully to close Taliban-linked madrassas, shut down terror camps and prevent Taliban from operating across Pakistan-Afghan border[18].

Pakistan is waiting to claim its self assigned strategic space once the American withdrawal takes place from Afghanistan which according to Pakistan's thought process may take place eventually. Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has stated many times that a strong prosperous and stable Afghanistan would be in everybody's interest. But then a strong and stable Afghanistan may not be favoured by strategic elite of Pakistan. It has not as yet abandoned its visions of gaining illusory strategic depth vis-à-vis India. It was for only six years of Taliban reign from 1996 to 2001 in Afghanistan that Pakistan had some semblance of so called 'strategic depth'. In a paper written by a think tank in 2003, the Pakistani author even talks of inevitability of an eventual federation between Pakistan

and Afghanistan. Historically, a strong and stable Afghanistan has always been a rival of Pakistan and except for Taliban government no other dispensation in Afghanistan has either been under Pakistan's tutelage or favourably disposed to it. A strong government in Kabul has always been a motivator for Pashtun and Balochi nationalism in Pakistan and has raised questions on controversial Durand line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan had also entertained vision of extending the strategic depth to include Islamic nations of Central Asia through Taliban held Afghanistan.

Taliban are major cause of the US and Afghan troops casualties across the border. Musharraf has also refrained from dismantling the terrorist organisations that carry out terror attacks against India. A Washington Post editorial reflecting on Damadola incident of 13 January 2006 opined that 'in keeping with his double game Musharraf's government publicly criticised the latest attack even though his intelligence services reportedly cooperated with the US'. The editorial also castigated Musharraf for not cleaning up the madrassas and for protecting and pardoning AQ Khan, the 'greatest criminal proliferator of nuclear weapon technology in history'. During the visit of the US President George Bush in March 2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai apprised him of the intensification of Taliban activities in Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan. However, at official level, Musharraf's contribution to war against terrorism has always been praised as according to the US thought process, alternatives to him could be worse.

Internal Dynamics: Uncertain Direction

Fundamentalism, extremism, bigotry, intolerance and violence in Pakistan society have grown rather than abated. Pakistan has not progressed towards democratic practices and its military controlled government has been instrumental in destroying or degrading democratic institutions and structures and human right abuses have increased. The current situation is largely due to flip-flops on the very issues which General Musharraf, as a president cum Army Chief, could have handled in a deft and firm manner.

In the pre-11 September 2001 dispensation Musharraf subscribed fully to culture of jihad. Musharraf has attempted to draw distinction between terrorism and Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir

but the reactions from the West were not favourable and ironically even his own Jihadis do not understand this distinction as they continue to carry out sectarian killings inside Pakistan and so called Jihad against India. And these are same Jihadi elements that are helping the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Waziristan. In the period 2003-2004, Shia community was at the receiving end of the worst sectarian violence and it reached peak in 2005.

There is also a conflict of interest between Musharraf's desire to perpetuate his own rule and his path of enlightened moderation. He side lined the mainstream political parties and gave more political space to Islamist parties which enabled politico-religious combine Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) to come to power in Baluchistan and NWFP. MMA is the most vociferous opponent of Army's actions in Waziristan or for that matter MMA is against any step, which is remotely connected with moderation or enlightenment. Yet MMA colluded with Musharraf to approve 17th Amendment to the Constitution so that Musharraf as President and head of National Security Council (NSC) could acquire supra-parliamentary powers. Armed with these powers, President can dissolve the National Assembly thus enabling Musharraf to become both king and kingmaker. The role of Military in dictating terms has been institutionalised in the shape of NSC (established in April 2004) for all times to come. Musharraf's promise of shedding his uniform by end December 2004 did not materialise. Pakistan has been cited as 'not free' country in the areas of political rights and civil liberties by the Freedom House Report for the year 2005 (sixth straight year). Mainstream political parties' leaders have either been exiled or jailed or marginalised and Musharraf has changed Prime Ministers depending on his convenience. It is yet to be seen whether scheduled general elections in 2007 are held and Musharraf sheds his dual charge of President and the Army Chief.

The collusion with MMA has been correctly interpreted by many analysts as contributing to weakening of Musharraf's resolve to fight militancy and it is also being seen as manifestation of military mullah alliance that has existed since days of Zia. However, Musharraf, through his siding with the US war on terrorism, wishes to be seen as a moderate and pro–democracy leader, yet his record so far shows lack of purpose and direction in moving towards this goal of moderation.

Despite his promises to reform madrassa system of education, no concrete steps have been taken to modify this type of education which promotes violence, intolerance, hatred and militancy.

Ahmed Rashid a well known analyst had written in the wake of London bombings of 7 July 2005 that "the enormous Islamic extremist infrastructure that the military maintained before 11 September 2001 to fight its wars in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir have not been broken up, only put to temporary sleep while clandestine training camps still spring up at new locations. Some militant groups have been banned three times, only to re-appear under different names".

Musharraf's war on religious intolerance had also included reforming and amending Hudood Ordinances and Blasphemy Laws promulgated through edicts during Zia's years. Over the years, these draconian measures have been abused and misused against women and minorities. Musharraf is either unwilling or unable to steer the nation towards his oft-stated path of enlightened moderation.

Human Rights Watch in its annual report of the year 2005, published in January 2006, has observed that Musharraf's military backed government has done little to address human right concerns and Musharraf has continued to tighten its grip on power. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has objected to Pakistan Army's and para-military forces' violation of human rights in Balochistan and Northern Areas. It is also critical of lack of political freedom and abuse of women rights and treatment of minorities. Similar reports have been issued by Amnesty International.

Revisiting Military Security and Economy

Pak's strategic elite has been stressing on the changed focus on economy and non-traditional areas of security due to not only forces of globalisation but also the need to address the more important issues of human development. The macro-level indicators point towards an upward trajectory of Pakistan's economic growth. According to World Bank figures, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has been 6.4 per cent in 2004; in 2001 it was two per cent, in 2002 it was three per cent, in 2003 it was five per cent. For fiscal year 2005-2006, it is expected to be around 6.2 per cent, somewhat less than expected because of the impact

of earthquake in October 2005. The foreign exchange reserves have also grown to over $ 12 billion compared to $ one billion not long ago. Pakistan's per capita income of $ 480 in 2000 has grown to $ 600 in 2004[19]. However, these macro-economics conceal a number of variable factors which may affect the sustainability of economic growth in the long term.

A number of reports have cautioned that long term economic outlook of Pakistan is uncertain because Pakistan is highly dependent upon foreign lending and import of basic commodities besides its public debt being 70 per cent of its GDP. Pakistan has been receiving aid from World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international institutions in a more liberal manner after it became ally of the US in war against terror. Even Pakistani diaspora which had become cautious in sending foreign remittances after military take over in October 1999, resumed sending funds after 2001. In 2003, it received $ 4 billion in foreign remittances compared to one billion dollars in 2001. What might compound the problem is consistently substantial fiscal deficit every year.

Pakistan's external debt of $ 33 billion has grown to $ 38 billion in 2005 (one third of the GDP). Defence expenditure and interest on public debt take away 67 per cent of total revenues leaving very little for expenditure in areas of infrastructure, health and education. Economic reforms have been slow and hampered by political instability or lack of political will. In February 2005, President World Bank remarked that even though macro-economic indicators were looking good, 'Pakistan has a long way to go in terms of achieving its human development goals'. World Bank President committed to increase lending to Pakistan by 50 per cent for the period 2006 to 2009 and cautioned that there are many problems that remain to be tackled.

In the current fiscal year, Pakistan's trade deficit in first six months has increased by 132 per cent amounting to $ 5.6 billion compared to $ 2.4 billion for the same period last year. Pakistan's oil import bill has also increased by 62 per cent. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has declined to resume $ two billion special financing arrangement (SFA) for crude oil imports thus creating more problems. Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves of $ 12.5 billion are not adequate to cover $ 13.65 billion worth of six months imports- 'a benchmark that the Pakistan's government used to take pride in recent years'[20].

Further, the defence expenditure as a percentage of overall government expenditure has been consistently high at an average of 18 per cent for the last five years or so. Similarly the percentage of GDP spent on defence budget has been maintained at four per cent plus levels with large annual increments in real terms in spite of the avowed change in emphasis on military security[21]. For 2005, its defence expenditure has gone up to five per cent of its GDP[22]. The US $ three billion aid package for Pakistan apparently lays more emphasis on military component of the aid rather than the civil aid even though the US claims to split its aid evenly between both the components. According to Pentagon, Pakistan received coalition support funding of $ 1.32 billion for period January 2003 to September 2004, an amount roughly equivalent to one-third of total defence expenditure during that period[23].

Even though purchase of F-16 fighter aircraft has been deferred by Pakistan due to earth quake and resulting unpopularity of the military government, Pakistan has been given major equipment through US military grants and sales. Another deal signed a week after the earthquake for $ one billion with Sweden for purchase of six early warning aircraft was quietly allowed to continue in spite of urgent requirement of funds for rehabilitation, reconstruction and provision of relief aid (estimated to cost $10 to 12 billion) for the earth quake hit areas[24]. The inventory of military equipment being provided by the US includes six C-130 military transport aircraft ($ 75 million grant), 12 radars and 40 Bell helicopters ($ 300 million sale), eight P-3C aircraft, six Phalanx guns and 200 TOW missiles (proposed sales worth up to $ 1.2 billion) and sale of 300 Sidewinder air to air missiles and 60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (worth $ 226 million) besides six Aerostat surveillance radars ($155 million) and other miscellaneous military equipment[25]. It is obvious that all this equipment is not meant for counter terrorism missions and is ultimately likely to be used against India thus highlighting the misplaced perceptions of the US also in preserving the so called balance in South Asia. This also indicates that Pak military's notions of security have very low priority for human security and their fixation with military security have not undergone a change.

Jammu and Kashmir Policy and Quest for Parity- Has There Been Any Change?

After the military stand off on Indo-Pak border in 2002, there

has been cease fire along the LOC and in Siachen since November 2003. The peace process which was initiated in January 2004 has progressed to third round of dialogue which was held in January 2006. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has stated that peace process is irreversible and short of secession and redrawing of boundaries, India can live with anything. The composite dialogue comprising eight elements has two broad areas; confidence building measures (CBM) and dispute resolution. While there has been noticeable improvement in people to people CBMs there has been no progress on disputed issues. At one point there was possibility of reaching an accord on demilitarisation of Siachen but it was stymied by Pakistan's intransigence on exchanging marked maps showing each other's troops' positions before withdrawal from actual ground position line. This situation continues even after the tenth round of talks held between Defence Secretaries on 26-27 May 2006. For Pakistan's military government the core issue continues to be Jammu and Kashmir and for India core issue continues to be Pak sponsored cross-border terrorism. Indian priority is to pursue people to people contacts and improve trade and economic relations before Jammu and Kashmir issue can be addressed in a substantive manner. For Pakistan priority remains Jammu and Kashmir and every thing else comes thereafter.

The Pak military has made heavy investment militarily, psychologically, ideologically and doctrinally in Jammu and Kashmir and in spite of repeated failures has not been able to alter its perceptions. For Musharraf and his military there is an inescapable need to show some returns on this investment and to save its propagated image of saviour of Pakistan. In his zeal to force the pace of peace process Musharraf has been suggesting proposals like demilitarisation and self governance which though look very attractive on the face of it but lack the substantive, political, diplomatic and historical perspective that is needed to solve the 56 years old problem. Musharraf needs to show something to the people before he goes in for general elections in 2007, perhaps with an eye on becoming an elected President.

There appears to be no perceptible change in Pakistan's defence policy and military strategy, which revolves around being on tactical offensive in Jammu and Kashmir and retaining the capability to upscale low intensity conflict in Jammu and Kashmir

as well as in other parts of India combined with continuous improvements in its conventional and nuclear deterrence. A review of Pakistan's strategic behavior on nuclear and missile related issues would reveal that it has not given up substantively its ambitions of seeking parity with India. Pak has remonstrated before the US that it should be given same benefits and concessions which may be conferred on India due to Indo-US nuclear deal. This is in spite of the adverse record of Pakistan on non-proliferation issues and activities of AQ Khan Network. It has also been reported that even though AQ Khan has been sequestered, certain sections of this network are still active[26].

Implications

Whether Pakistan moves towards stability, democracy, moderation, prosperity and good governance and avoids being a source of insecurity to its neighbours in particular and international community in general would largely be shaped by its internal dynamics and external behaviour. This in turn would depend upon the ability and willingness of its strategic elite to respond positively to the forces of globalisation and aspirations of its people and moving away from its anti-India fixation.

India has to fashion its response options keeping in view the likely scenarios that may emerge in medium and long term. Some have even suggested that it is better to deal with Musharraf now than his replacement later. Even if Musharraf goes, the new dispensation in Pakistan is unlikely to be worse or better than him. It is also a fallacy that Musharraf's military government is a barrier against fundamentalists taking over the reins of power since it has been propagating this myth to prolong its hold on power. However, on balance, if democratic government comes to power it would definitely be more representative but may still be constrained by strategic culture of its elite to not seek accommodation with India except on its own terms. Islamist parties would continue to influence the strategic discourse. For instance, for 2007 general elections both MMA and Alliance for Restoration of Democracy are forming a joint front to contest elections. If Pakistan moves more towards radicalisation and fundamentalism it would become unattractive for the US and the West and its strategic leverages would diminish, therefore, it may continue to follow a policy of calibrated support to extremists in order to remain

strategically relevant and at the same time pursue its unaltered strategic interests.

Therefore, irrespective of whether civil or military government comes to power it is unlikely to change substantially Pakistan's strategic thought process especially in relation to India. The effects of strategic myths made popular by the elite may be attenuated in the long term and beyond when there is a generation change in members of the strategic elite or their perceptions get altered due to some strategic shock. India's political leadership is unlikely to give any concessions unless fundamental perceptions of Pak elite undergo a change especially in relation to cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus India needs to continue to stress on people to people contacts, nuclear and conventional CBMs, trade and transit and enhancement of commercial and economic relations as a priority before moving towards seeking solution to Jammu and Kashmir issue.

Pakistan continues to be a source of instability not only for the region but also for the international community. Its policies have the potential to threaten interests of its neighbours and the US and China. Pak military's ambivalent record on issues of terrorism and its attempts to export terror through Bangladesh and Nepal needs to be continually highlighted at international fora. Meanwhile our internal machinery needs to be geared up to meet the ever expanding menace of Pak sponsored terrorism and other destabilising activities in India.

References/End Notes

1. Dr Ayesha Siddiqua Agha, "Pakistan's Security: Problems of Linearity", *South Asian Journal,* available at http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/journal/pakistan_security.htm

2. For instance see "Future of US-Pakistan Relations", *Dawn,* February 2006.

3. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, "Relations with China & US", *Dawn,* 5 March 2006.

4. See Farzana Shah, "Pak-Israel Rapprochement", *Pak Tribune,* 9 October 2005. Also see Cathryn Crawford, "Pakistan and Israel-Recognition at Last?" *The American Daily*, 7 April 2003.

5. For instance see Senator Bill McCollum's briefing to the House of Representatives titled, "Pakistan's Assertive Regional Strategy", 12 September 1994 available at http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1994/9409912.htm.

6. Maj Jefferson E Turner, USAF, "What is driving India's and Pakistan's Interest in Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization", *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 8 (August 2005).

7. Editorial in *Daily Times*, "Pakistan-Russia relations need a major overhaul" 29 January 2006. Also see "Pakistan Foreign Policy" on official website of Pak Government at http://.pakistan.gov.pak/foreignaffairs-ministry/policies/pak-fpolicy.jsp .

8. For instance, in fifties Pakistan was a member of CENTO , SEATO and it was aligned with the US against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Now it is most favoured Non-NATO Ally of the US

9. For an incisive critique of Pakistan's strategic culture see Peter R Lavoy, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture: A Theoretical Excursion" in *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 10 (October, 2005), a journal of Centre for Contemporary Conflict, California. Jack Snyder's definition of strategic culture is extracted from this critique.

10. Feroze Hassan Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan", *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 10 (October 2005)

11. In discussion with Professor Satish Kumar.

12. Refer to Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington, Brookings 2004, p. 270.

13. For definition of strategic myth, myth makers and myth making see Peter R Lavoy, n. 9.

14. Hussain Haqani, "India-Pakistan Relations: Where do we go from here?" a discussion held at IPCS, New Delhi, on December 21, 2005, also available at http://www.ipcs.org

15. Ibid.

16. For a different interpretation of components of strategic culture, see Peter R Lavoy, n. 9.

17. General Jehangir Karamat's briefing at the Brookings Institution on December 15, 2004 titled "Pakistan-US Relations: The Next Steps The Idea of Pakistan" available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20041215.htm

18. 9/11 Public Discourse Project Report available at http://www.9/11pdp.org

19. For macro-economic indicators of Pakistan from 1999 to 2004 see World Bank data at http://devdata.worldbank.org

20. Khaleeq Kiani, "Saudi decline to resume oil financing facility", *Dawn,* 9 February 2006.

21. For a detailed critique of Pakistan's defence spending and comparative analysis with India see Rodney W Jones, "Conventional Military Balance and Strategic Stability in South Asia" available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sassu/publications/Conventional_imbalance_RJones.pdfd

22. SM Hali, "Gun vs Butter", *The Nation,* 15 June 2005.

23. CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Pakistan-US Relations, updated 10 February 2006 available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61524.pdf

24. S Akbar Zaidi, "Pakistan: State Failure Once Again", *Economic and Political Weekly,* editorial 19 November 2005.

25. n. 23.

26. Wilson John, "AQ Khan Network: Alive and Still Working", 25 January 2006, available at http://www.ipcs.org /Pakistan.jsp

USI TIE

AVAILABLE FOR MEMBERS IN BLUE AND MAROON COLOURS
For Rs 280 (By Post Rs 300)

Indo-US Relations – A Strategic Partnership?

Shri Natarajan Krishnan, IFS (Retd)

As an emerging free nation in 1947, reaching out to the world, India's expectations from America were high. For the Americans, India was only a small player, even if there was no lack of goodwill. As events played out, Indian disappointment and frustration grew, matched by American annoyance and neglect. Emotionalism ruled the day. Personality compatibility or otherwise at the leadership level also played its part. The two countries drifted apart.

Today, more than fifty years later, we seem to be going through a repeat performance. The coming together of the two countries is being invested with much emotion and drama. The American pronouncements would suggest that America has rediscovered India. The Indian reaction is highly emotional – one of joy at being at last recognised and the other of suspicion and apprehension born out of past experience.

The term describing the unfolding relations, Strategic Partnership, is itself seductive. It is a partnership (signifying that we are both on the same side, but not in an alliance against any third party). And it is strategic because it holds out a long-term perspective, involving resources and capabilities on both sides in a whole range of areas, including key areas of cutting edge high technology in defence, civilian nuclear cooperation and space, etc. It also suggests a partnership in dealing with global and not just bilateral issues.

At the time of independence, Indo-US relationship had everything going for it. Roosevelt was well disposed towards Indian independence and there was enormous goodwill when free India unfurled its national flag. India was one of the few countries outside the Western group with a written Constitution guaranteeing human rights, modelled very much on the American Bill of Rights and Constitution, and a functioning multicultural democracy. But soon

---

Shri Natarajan Krishnan, was India's Permanent Representative at the UN.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

things started turning sour and during the years that followed, the relationship has been shaky, mostly downward, except in the last few years. Perceptions and policies on both sides had a lot to do with it. On the US side, our refusal to align with the US during the cold war was the biggest crime in the US's eyes. Our non-alignment was seen as deviant behaviour and only an excuse for our pro-Soviet postures and policies. "Anyone not with me is against me" was the American rule applied to others. Our mixed economy and socialist pattern of society, projected by Jawaharlal Nehru, was anathema to them and came in the way of any significant economic interaction. Nuclear non-proliferation became an American obsession following the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the policy of encirclement of the Soviet Union with Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Pakistan became the focus of an American strategic alliance. Pakistan could do no wrong in American eyes and in all policies and actions in relation to South Asia, India and Pakistan were hyphenated. India's failure to condemn Soviet action in Hungary shocked the Americans, and years later in 1979, our refusal to condemn their invasion of Afghanistan was cited as proof of India being firmly in the Soviet camp.

On the Indian side, non-alignment was its policy, but India was partial to the Soviets. The US support to Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir, the supply of weapons to Pakistan against India's earnest appeal, in the belief that they would be used to fight communism, the infamous tilt in favour of Pakistan in 1971 and the sailing of the *USS Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal, convinced India that the US could see India only through the prism of Pakistan. The goodwill generated by Food Aid and the support extended after the Chinese invasion in 1962 was easily dissipated, leaving a firm undercurrent of suspicion and misturst. Post-Pokhran 1974, sanctions were accepted by India as the price it had to pay; but the denial of fuel for Tarapur, following the US domestic legislation, in violation of a bilateral agreement, was seen as an act of perfidy.

The end of the cold war in 1989 and after has brought a sea-change in world politics, and Indo-US relations are no exception. It would be fair to say that the change in attitude is more apparent on the US side than the Indian side. Paradoxically, Pokhran 1998, while upsetting the nonproliferation regime, and sending shockwaves around the world, especially in the US, also sparked off a rethinking

towards India and its position in Asia and the emerging world order. This shift became evident in the Clinton era, but has assumed a big thrust under President George W Bush. The neo-conservative think tanks have been busy throwing up the contours of a new vision of the world, in which India has a prominent role. As a result, Indo-American relations have received a major boost.

Recognition of India as a prospective major player in Asia with an emerging global role is central to the new way of looking at India, even if India is not being billed specifically as a counterweight to China. Our record as a democracy and in promoting human rights and freedom is finally acknowledged. But what is new is the liberalisation of our economy, opening up of our market, combined with the burgeoning growth rate of our economy. Vistas of cooperation in the knowledge and Information Technology (IT) sector particularly are opening up, attracting American entrepreneurs, industry and trade. The vast reservoir of professionals that India can harness is one of the main attractions.

A talk given by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns to the Asia Society in New York in October 2005 and an article by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice set out the American perspective. The former emphasises how, to many policy makers meeting at the Asia Society in the past, Asia meant China, Japan etc. Now South Asia is on the radar screen, and especially India will receive particular attention. He observes "successive Administrations in Washington and Delhi approached each other alternately with episodic engagement on the one hand, but with wariness and even downright opposition on the other". Noting that the estrangement of the past with India is turning into engagement, given the initiative of President Clinton and now pursued under the Bush Administration, he goes over the many aspects it has assumed. He quotes President Bush's succinct summing up of Indo-US relations.

"This century will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the world. The trend lines of the past two decades suggest clearly that India will steadily acquire the economic, political, and strategic capabilities that set it along the path to becoming one of the major centres of global power. As such, it is in our national interest to develop a strong, forward looking relationship with India as the political and economic focus of the global system shifts inevitably eastward to Asia".

From the Indian perspective, opening up of relations with the US across the board is obviously very welcome. It would certainly be to India's advantage to develop cooperative relations with the US, even if it were not the uni-polar, hyper-power that it is today. In fact, it would be foolhardy not to take advantage of all emerging opportunities to this end. Whether America needs India more than India needs America is a moot question which need not distract us now. We can benefit substantially from greater bilateral cooperation and by working together in areas of mutual interest. Rationally viewed, there should be no disagreement on this point.

A whole series of agreements have been signed in the last two years, especially after the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative was launched in January 2004 – to open a dialogue and build mutual trust in a number of sensitive areas as defence, space and nuclear energy, high technology, aeronautics, economic exchange at corporate level and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) dialogue and people to people interaction. More and more Indian students are studying in the US now than in any other country and Indians in the US number nearly two million, many of them professionals of high calibre.

Unfortunately, however, Indians seem to be surrendering to emotionalism. The ideologues have raised anti-US slogans and this has driven the other side into overdrive, seeing more virtue in American declarations and actions than is warranted. The civil nuclear cooperation deal, especially, has sparked off a heated debate.

Doubts about the deal were voiced soon after it had been signed. Official reticence to clarify the issues raised, while lauding the accord in a self-congratulatory mode, deepened these doubts. When details of the separation plan started leaking out, the doubts became real. The scientific community as well as the strategic fraternity is clearly divided in their views. Everyone seems to agree on the principle that the autonomy of strategic decision-making should not be impaired in any way. But, there is a difference of opinion whether there would be such an impact or not. The media is also having a field day; but its partisanship has exceeded normal limits, some of the comments speaking disparagingly of the scientists.

Even admitting that the agreement is a landmark one, which could help boost our nuclear energy production and defreezing of the constraints in technology cooperation, the question of what price India would be asked to pay still remains vague.

It needed the outspoken remarks of an anguished head of the Atomic Energy Department, about the Americans changing the goal-posts, to jolt everyone. Now, it appears that the argument over the Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) is over, and it will be kept out. But not entirely, it would seem. It is speculated that it would be brought into the civilian list after 10 to 15 years.

Critics on the American side have argued strongly against bending the rules only to accommodate India, as it would risk jeopardising the entire non proliferation regime. Against this, the Administration strongly contends that it would bring India securely into the non proliferation framework. Even for the Democrat leader, John Kerry, the main attraction is that the deal would strengthen the global non proliferation regime by bringing India into it. It is obvious that the Americans are using the strategy of nuclear energy cooperation to bring us on board. These statements and the whole discussion on what should or should not be included in the civil list would provide the final answer to anyone harbouring the illusion that the deal implies recognition of sorts of India as a nuclear weapon state. The Americans sought to cap, roll back and eventually eliminate India's nuclear weapon and missile programme. This was during the mid-1980s. After 1998, this was no longer tenable. But they are still seeking to contain the nuclear weapon capability of India. The present deal, in conjunction with the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) as and when it is negotiated, would effectively do this. The obligations undertaken by the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) in respect of safeguards and inspections are entirely voluntary but the obligations India is being asked to assume under the deal are not; they will not only have to get the approval of the US Congress now; but even in the future, they could be subject to scrutiny and regulation by others.

That India has been a responsible nuclear power and has scrupulously refrained from proliferation activity, even though it is not party to the NPT, is acknowledged. We have often alluded, in contrast, to the sins of omission and commission committed by several NPT signatory countries. Our rejection of the NPT still holds.

While we have taken several steps to align ourselves with others by putting in place controls up to the level of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act, there should have been no need for any further demonstration of our commitment to non proliferation. The separation of civilian facilities from the military ones should have been left entirely to India's volition and not have been allowed to become the subject of negotiation as was witnessed during negotiation on the deal.

Similar emphasis was observed in another address in November 2005 by the Prime Minister at the 40th anniversary function of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

> "The breakdown of effective international mechanisms also affects the security of individual countries. As long as terrorism was seen as a phenomenon that was 'elsewhere', the international community was unwilling to adopt an effective coordinated strategy to deal with this menace which constitutes a grave threat to the civilised world. Similarly, the international regime against proliferation is also under stress. It is clear that the existing system of unequal and discriminatory rules, based on the nuclear NPT is deeply flawed. It has permitted unchecked proliferation by some, while preventing countries such as ours from acting in its economic and security interests. An effective non proliferation framework that addresses our security interests while simultaneously encouraging peaceful uses of nuclear energy is in our vital national interests".

The reference to an effective non proliferation framework (distinct from the discredited NPT) is significant. India's signing up on the American initiatives such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Container Security Initiative (CSI) are steps in this direction.

The clandestine activity in our neighbourhood has been deplored in the context of the suspect nuclear programme of Iran. Indians were taken by surprise consequent to voting at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna against Iran. The warnings and threats repeated by influential Americans strengthened the impression that India voted under pressure. But the Government has denied this. The statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament stressed that it was entirely India's decision, not

dictated by the Americans. But the grounds on which India determined its enlightened national interest merit analysis. Iran's nuclear programme may be suspect; but while Indians talk insistently of finding a solution through calm reasoned diplomacy, is it reasonable to expect Iran to come back to the negotiating table, under the threat of referral to the Security Council and with an American gun pointed at its head? Presumably, friends of Iran like India are trying to persuade Iran to be reasonable, but isn't there an obligation on the others not to up the ante with attacks and accusations in unrestrained language? Is there any evidence that Indians are similarly persuading their American friends to be more restrained and not to demonise Iran and issue warlike ultimatums? The Prime Minister is on record that India does not want another nuclear weapon power in its neighbourhood. But whoever wanted a nuclear weapon power in the neighbourhood, anytime, anywhere else? Did any of India's neighbours in South Asia want India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapon powers?

How do we prevent another new nuclear weapon power emerging? By riding on the backs of the Americans who are going to bomb the Iranians into submission? Or letting the Israelis do their job? We are reminding Iran that it should honour its international commitments.

Much has been said also about the Walmart type nuclear weapon retailer from Pakistan viz AQ Khan. But despite all the exposures no effort is being made to bring the offender and the powers in control at the time in Pakistan to book, because, for one thing, no American Administration is willing to go down that path.

For thirty years, India suffered under a technology denial regime. As a result of that, we indigenised and managed to develop our own weapons and civilian nuclear capability. Now there is reason to celebrate the prospect of the end to that denial era and the beginning of a cooperation era. But in our enthusiasm, are we not in danger of embracing conditionalities which might constrain or straitjacket us in new ways?

It has been forcefully and correctly argued that we should no longer be guided by the thought processes of the cold war period, that we should move with the times and adapt our thinking and policies to the realities and compulsions of the contemporary world and that we should be ready to seize the opportunities opening up

in this new environment. But it makes no sense to jump at everything that is offered, without subjecting it to a rigorous calculus of pros and cons. Our response should also be tempered by the lessons drawn from our past experience in dealing with the US. It is childish to reject these as manifestations of an old mindset and to categorise anyone who voices such doubts and warnings as living in a time warp.

A dispassionate examination of the American statements and phraseology used would well justify greater caution and pragmatism. The repeated use of "great power" in respect of India is not without tactical motivations. Condoleezza Rice asserts for a balance of power that favours freedom, structured on six powers – the US, Japan and Russia, EU, China and India, which would together build a more durable form of global stability. How far does this fit in with the Indian world view? Does India subscribe to this theory of balance of power of six states? Africa and Latin America find no mention. The "freedom deficit" in the Middle East is highlighted, but the entire Islamic world, as a force in world politics to be reckoned with, is not noted. The dynamics within the weak and failed states are perceived as the greatest threats to international security – freedom and democracy are the prescriptions but there is no mention of poverty alleviation through collective commitment and endeavour. To be sure, freedom and democracy are essential. But, American priorities and methods may not always coincide with ours. From the Indian perspective, the preservation of bio-diversity of humans around the world is important. For the Americans, this would seem to be not too important, in the context of their overall concept of world security and stability. For a country and people whose pride and strength derives from its plurality, America does not seem to give too much thought to preserving the plurality of peoples and cultures, or values, around the world.

At the same time, a better understanding of how the American mind works, their institutions function and the entire system operates is necessary. In this context, I found fascinating a recent book published by the Princeton University edited by Michael Ignatieff on American Exceptionalism and Human Rights. Although its focus is on human rights, the analysis holds equally for other domains. I would like to share a few excerpts with you from his introduction.

Ignatieff argues thus :

"Thanks to Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt, the United States took a leading role in the creation of the United Nations and the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Throughout the Cold War and afterward, few nations placed more emphasis in their foreign policy on the promotion of human rights, market freedom, and political democracy...

The same US government, however, has also supported rights-abusing regimes from Pinochet's Chile to Suharto's Indonesia; sought to scuttle the International Criminal Court, the capstone of an enforceable global human rights regime; maintained practices — like capital punishment -- at variance with the human rights standards of other democracies; engaged in unilateral pre-emptive military actions that other states believe violate the UN Charter; failed to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; and ignored UN bodies when they criticised US domestic rights practices. What is exceptional here is not that the United States is inconsistent, hypocritical, or arrogant. Many other nations, including leading democracies, could be accused of the same things. What is exceptional, and worth explaining, is why America has both been guilty of these failings and also been a driving force behind the promotion and enforcement of global human rights.

While the focus of this book will be on human rights, exceptionalism is also a feature of the US attitudes toward environmental treaties like the Kyoto Protocol as well as the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. Since the attack of 11 September 2001 it has been accused of violating the Conventions as well as the Torture Convention in its handling of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and other detention facilities.

This pattern of behaviour raises a fundamental question about the very place of the world's most powerful nation inside the network of international laws and conventions that regulate a globalising world. To what extent does the United States accept constraints on its sovereignty through the international human rights regime, international humanitarian law, and the UN Charter rules on the use of force? To what degree does America play by the rules it itself has helped to create?"

Ignatieff distinguishes three separate strands of Exceptionalism: Exemptionalism; Double Standards and Legal Isolationism.

The use of the epithet "strategic partnership" is also very deceptive, though flattering. As of now, given the asymmetry in power between the two, I am not sure if one can have a meaningful partnership in strategic matters. But it could well signify the relationship that we aspire to attain in the near future and let me concede that the Americans wish to build Indian strengths in such a manner that such a strategic partnership can be put in place. But what about the asymmetry in goals and objectives?

Can we say with confidence that we share a common world vision and that we have a common strategy to achieve it? Or is it that India would be expected to go along with American objectives and subserve American interests?

"The US and India are poised for a partnership that will be crucial in shaping the international order in the 21st century," remarked Ambassador Mulford. It is an exciting prospect; provided, our ideas on the shape of the new order are based on a common understanding of each other's interests.

India must identify its interests and strategies, objectives and methods and go into serous dialogue with the Americans. It has been well said that India still does not have long term strategy but only short term goals. In such a situation, India should be all the more careful not to rush into strategic frameworks that the American establishment of the day formulates.

Report on Visit of USI Delegation to Russia

Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd)

A four member delegation from the United Service Institution of India (USI) visited Russia from 27 November to 1 December 2005 at the invitation of the Centre for Military Studies and Research (CMSR), the General Staff Department of the Armed Forces of Russian Federation (Moscow). The delegation comprised Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Director USI, Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd); Vice Admiral I J S Khurana, PVSM, AVSM (Retd); Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd), Deputy Director (Research). The visit was in response to an earlier visit by the CMSR delegation to the USI from 16 to 21 May 2004.

The USI delegation and members of the CMSR held extensive bilateral dialogues on 28 and 29 November 2005. This was followed by a visit, on 30 November, to the Military Chief's Club – an ex-servicemen's enterprise aimed at strengthening and developing the Russian state using ex-servicemen's expertise and experience. For bilateral talks the USI delegation was led by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, and the Russian side by Lieutenant General Ostankov Ivanovich. The agenda of the bilateral dialogue focused on contemporary issues including situation in Iraq and the Middle East, Indo-Russian bilateral relations, the future of the UN, and the future challenges to peace and security in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The Indian Ambassador's Address

The bilateral dialogue was initiated with the opening remarks of the Indian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Mr Kanwal Sibal. He welcomed the dialogue between the two institutions and declared it to be an important track II process to promote common understanding on issues of common security concerns. He hailed the discussions as yet another instance of the broadening of Indo-Russian Defence dialogue.

Brigadier Arun Sahgal is Deputy Director (Research) of the USI-CS3.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

In keeping with the agenda for the dialogue, the Ambassador raised critical issues pertaining to four broad themes of the dialogue. He asserted that the deteriorating security scenario in Iraq and the Middle East, was a matter of deep concern for India and Russia. The Ambassador raised issues dealing with the overall security and stability in the Middle Eastern region in general and Iraq in particular. Concerns that the war in Iraq instead of containing the problem of international terrorism was likely to worsen it were highlighted. In addition, there was the added danger of increasing Shia-Sunni divide. He set forth the question as to whether a Shia dominated Iraq backed by Shia Iran would alter the balance of power in the Arab world? He also stressed upon the need to consider the stage at which India and Russia should get involved in the reconstruction of Iraq and the level of support to be provided to the present Iraqi government.

The Ambassador further reiterated the importance of Central Asia and Afghanistan for both India and Russia. Raising concerns about growing religious extremism, drug trafficking and international terrorism, he argued that both countries had vested interests in the stability of the region. He voiced concerns on the rise of Taliban and what it portends for the future. Other issues that were raised included :-

(a) How far the US policies in Afghanistan were facilitating the reassertion of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

(b) The possibility of Pakistan and Afghanistan becoming bases for the US to pursue long-term goals to gain a foothold in Central Asia.

(c) The degree to which the US regional policies are being conditioned by efforts to contain China.

(d) The nature of American, Chinese and Russian competing interests to control Central Asian gas and oil resources.

(e) The security role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

(f) The role other economic and security organisations, promoted by Russia would play in stabilising the Region.

(g) Why Russia wants Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to cooperate with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Speaking on the United Nations (UN) Reforms, the Ambassador attributed the crisis in the international collective security mechanisms as well as the UN to the unilateralist thrust of the current US administration. He raised the issue of how to reform the UN Security Council? He pondered on whether India and Russia could work together especially when Russia's definition of consensus was closer to the Chinese position? On the role of regional security organisations, he questioned the extent to which the UN would be undermined in case of enlargement of the role of the organisations like the NATO, which are seeking a much larger geo-political role through "out-of-area" operations.

On Indo-Russian relations, the Ambassador mentioned a convergence of the long-term geo-political interests of the two countries, of which Defence remains the key pillar. The Ambassador allayed concerns over the impact of India's growing bilateral relations with countries like the US and Israel by pointing out that Indo-Russian relations in the defence field were time-tested and will not be diluted. He stressed on assurances given in this regard by the Defence Minister during his recent visit to Russia. In terms of growing defence cooperation between the two countries, he mentioned agreement in principle on joint development of multi-role transport aircraft and discussions on the fifth generation aircraft together with acquisitions of almost US $10 billion from Russia.

He, however, brought out the serious concerns that persist on product and after sales support for Russian equipment in the Indian Armed Forces inventory, which need to be addressed. The move away from buyer-seller relationship, towards joint research and development, production and marketing should be the model for the future. He concluded by mentioning that both sides were holding joint exercises, which was a welcome development.

Director CMSR thanked the Indian Ambassador, both, for his enlightening remarks and defining the direction of the bilateral dialogue for mutual benefit. He assured that the joint deliberations will endeavour to find solutions and commonalities of interests.

The Sessions

There were a total of four sessions spread over two days. The first session pertained to *Impact of War in Iraq: Emerging Security Challenges in the Middle East.* Papers in this session

were presented by Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar and Captain Kravanchko Vadim.

Session two pertained to *Indo-Russian Bilateral Equations Including Military.* The speakers were Vice Admiral I J S Khurana and Lieutenant General K Anatoly Filippovic (Retd).

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar and Captain Kucerib presented their papers on *The Current Crisis in the International Collective Security Mechanisms and the Future of the United Nations,* in the third session.

Challenges to Peace and Stability in Central Asia – Afghanistan Region in the Coming Decade was the subject of assessment by Brigadier Arun Sahgal and Lieutenant General Grigoriev, in the concluding session.

Session I : Impact of War in Iraq: Emerging Security Challenges in the Middle East

This session was devoted to understanding major lessons emerging out of the Iraq conflict and their impact on Middle East regional dynamics. Essential aspects highlighted in this session included the overall American strategy adopted in this one sided war fought in multiple dimensions i.e. political, diplomatic, economic and military leading to the rapid capitulation of the Iraqi forces. The combat phase lasted 42 days including a 100 hours ground war. The operational environment witnessed excellent co-ordination of multinational assets by the coalition. Some of the important lessons highlighted included :-

(a) **Air Space Management.** The campaign was hallmarked by extraordinary coordination of all air and ground assets spread over long distances from continental US, Europe and the Middle East. It was mentioned that it was not only the control of various platforms in the air, but also the tremendous clutter of communication transmission that would call for strict control and management. In spite of effective management in the first weeks of war, a dozen opportunities to strike time-critical and high-value targets were missed due to the wide sensor-shooter gap. This was markedly reduced to just 12 minutes as the operation progressed, displaying substantive strides in improved joint operations, inter-operability and seamless data linking.

(b) **Civil Affairs.** This is described as facilitating military operations and consolidating operational activities by assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing or exploiting relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operation. Language and culture training of target countries is essential. Cross-cultural proclivities and sophistication can be developed by study of a target country and by living there for some time and unless this is done, civil affairs will not succeed. This is a Special Forces mission and selected Units have to train for it. The American forces did not plan this aspect well in Iraq. They firstly antagonised the local population unlike the British forces who were friendlier and polite. Secondly, rather than be the liberator of the oppressed people, the behaviour of the American forces at times was oppressive and brutal. Thirdly, coalition forces in the first flush of victory disbanded all the law enforcement agencies including the Army and the Police, thereby removing a vital interface between local population and the troops. Strong arm methods used by the security forces have antagonised the local population, which persists to date. A selective screening process to weed out hardcore and regime loyalists while retaining the core infrastructure could have been a useful approach. The impact of this has been that the Iraqi society has been divided on sectarian and ethnic lines.

(c) **Use of high technology.** All weather continuous surveillance by 'Global Hawk' Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and aerial platforms, satellite digital communication, Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) strikes, use of tank busters (40 bomblets), and use of smart bombs, both from air and warships achieved total degradatin of Iraqi war machine. Iraqi equipment was mostly of pre 1991 vintage Soviet origin, which could not be upgraded or even maintained due to lack of spares as a consequence of the imposition of the UN sanctions. It had few "Scud" missiles and Air Defence (AD) guns, which were no match for the allied Air might. The Gulf War provided a testing ground for new space based technologies. There was a constellation of over 50 US satellites providing space support to the US Armed Forces. There were great strides exhibited in all the areas of C^4ISR capabilities.

(d) **Post Conflict Issues:** Western media had created an impression of the American forces being seen as the liberators by the Iraqi people. The obsession with the conquest was so paramount that the coalition forces did not take the necessary steps for preventing the administrative collapse of Iraq or closing the porous borders with Jordan, Syria and Iran to prevent escape of Saddam loyalists. Similarly, the damage to infrastructure was so total that even the basic amenities like water and electricity supply became a major problem. This alienated local population. The American political leadership believed that new technologies had transformed the US forces and a smaller component of the ground forces was adequate for victory. Consequently, it did not cater for the continuing insurgency conditions, which are manpower-intensive. Some of the important aspects highlighted included :-

(i) Re-establishing security in Iraq would become the prime concern of the international community. According to the Russian presenter, the US is caught up in a terrible situation in Iraq. Withdrawal poses serious problems and, if it were to quit Iraq, the space will be occupied by the *Jihadis* and fundamentalists leading to further instability.

(ii) Another interesting point made was that large scale insurgency operations were not possible due to lack of favourable terrain and population. Current wave of terrorism is a consequence of sectarian divide and mishandling by the US forces by use of heavy weapons, air strikes etc., which appear to have infuriated even the majority Shia population.

(iii) Five tactics adopted by resistance fighters were highlighted. These included capture of hostages, killing of political leaders, security forces, and civil officials, destruction of infrastructure making governance difficult. It was indicated that joint operations by local and trans-national organisations were being undertaken who, after hit and run raids, escape through porous borders.

(iv) Given the enormity of task involved in controlling the post-conflict scenario, it was brought out that in Iraq, dispersed deployment has resulted in small band of

terrorists or insurgents provoking local garrisons into using extraordinary force, increasing collateral damage, thereby further alienating local populace. Lack of adequate interpreters was another problem highlighted.

(v) Difficulties faced by the US forces in stabilising the situation were attributed to lack of planning, inexperience in fighting urban warfare, over dependence on shock and awe tactics, and inability to handle two local conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan) simultaneously.

(e) **Future Trends in Urban Warfare.** "The need for sufficient ground forces and the power of the boot" in urban warfare in Iraq was not appreciated by the American forces. According to analysts, future battlefield is likely to include the whole of enemy's society and warfare will be widely dispersed where the distinction between war and peace may vanish. The difference between civilian and military may disappear, as there would be no definable battlefields or fronts. Major military and civil facilities will become targets. The characteristics of this type of warfare combined with new technology would possibly be the outline of the fourth generation of warfare. However, urban warfare involves people, and unless deliberate attempts are made to win them over, nothing else will succeed.

(f) **Security Scenario in the Iraqi Neighbourhood.**

(i) Although Iran was not an immediate threat to the US in Iraq, it was acknowledged that, in the long term, Iran may pose a threat to US interests in the region primarily on account of sectarian Shia-Sunni divide and continued instability and its impact on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

(ii) The US intrusion into the traditional Russian turf of Central Asian Republics (CAR) worries Moscow. What began as temporary American military presence in Central Asia to facilitate the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, far from winding up, is expanding. In addition to Air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the US is helping Kazakhstan to set up a naval base on the Caspian Sea close to the Russian border, besides seeking to lease three military bases in Tajikistan.

(iii) Lastly, unstable conditions in Iraq impact India in many ways. Firstly, such conditions in the strategic neighbourhood of India could become a rallying point for *jihadis* and fundamentalists which could adversely affect India's security environment. Secondly, India's energy security is also impacted upon by the continued instability in Iraq and the Middle East. Thirdly, Middle East has a large migrant Indian population and any spillover of instability in Iraq would affect Indian interests

Session II: Indo-Russian Bilateral Equations Including Military

This session examined the current and prospective dimensions of bilateral defence and security relationship. An interesting facet of the session was the contrasting perspective underscoring different national concerns and perceptions. Tracing the history of Indo–Russian bilateral cooperation Vice Admiral Khurana highlighted the following :-

(a) For a brief period, after the Cold War, India did not find a place in Russia's strategic perception. The visit to Russia by the then Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao, in June 1994, culminated in the Moscow Declaration on "Protection of Interests of Pluralist States". It became the cornerstone of Indo-Russian relations. The strategic partnership was also spurred by the mutually shared interest in Central Asian Region (CAR).

(b) Russia's unequivocal support on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and its critical support during crisis periods underlined the long standing friendship between the two countries. In the changed geo-strategic environment both countries share common perceptions on most international security issues including total commitment to fighting religious extremism and terrorism.

(c) The area of Defence cooperation also reflected the growing relationship. This relationship, in fact, has moved beyond buyer-seller relationship to that of wider concept of transfer of technology. The term used by the Russians in this context is – Equipment and Defence Technology (EDT). Military technical cooperation was gaining ground. *Brahmos* was a shining example of this joint venture in Defence technology. Another example was of Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).

These included continuing struggle against terrorism; revival of Afghanistan's economy; and the exploitation of hydrocarbon sources in the Caspian and Central Asian basins.

On the issue of strategic partnership, Russians provided an interesting perspective. The term "strategic partnership" signifies a form of mutual activity of countries that is considered to be long-ranged, based on the legal recognition of their mutual interests, equal rights, advantages as well as commitment and mutual responsibility directed to achieve certain strategic goals. Strategic partnership in the military sphere relates to the high level of cooperation. This partnership unlike the military-coalition vision does not bear any military threat to other countries. Its main task is to find an alternative to force oriented solutions. The main method of solving problems is finding concerned partners and mutually working out appropriate measures in a wide range of political, diplomatic and economic assets, short of military action. The main aspect of the practical policy of strategic partnership is to analyse upcoming situations and act pre-emptively against destabilising factors. Within the above construct the main spheres of strategic partnership include:-

(a) Pre-emptive approach to solving security problems, which can influence a situation before the negative consequences appear.

(b) Priority of political and other peaceful measures in solving emergent problems and conflict situations.

(c) Coordination of security policy, not causing damage to one another and other partners.

(d) Refusal to enter into a military coalition without approval of all partners and refusal to take part in any actions against an ally that can impair its interests.

(e) Transparency of activities in the military sphere.

He gave an example of step-by-step preparation for multilateral cooperation within the framework of the SCO to highlight the above principles. In this regard, the following aspects were highlighted :-

(a) Russians laid stress on the multilateral cooperation frame work of the SCO and advocated India's case for full

(e) Another aspect highlighted was multinational joint collaborative efforts, which incorporated latest technological achievements of other countries such as France and Israel. Some of these technologies have already been dovetailed and integrated into Russian systems. SU–30MK1 is an example of such cooperation between Sukhoi Design Office and French SNECM.

(f) It was reiterated that the problems of maintenance of equipment and inadequate supply of spare parts with suitable clauses being incorporated into the new contracts, would be addressed. The creation of Rosoboron Services (India) Ltd, consequent to a decree by the Russian President, was a welcome step. The creation of a bonded warehouse to stock Russian equipment and the nucleus of Russian and Indian specialists to provide technical back up are some of the other confidence enhancing steps.

In his presentation, Lieutenant General Khlimenko A F (Retd) indicated the strong bilateral relations enshrined in mutuality of interests signified by the Treaty on "Friendship and Cooperation between India and Russian Federation", signed in 1994, "Declaration on Strategic Partnership" signed in 2000, and strong Indo–Russian defence relationship in terms of "Long-term programme of military and technical cooperation upto the year 2000". As a consequence, by the end 2000, export of Russian arms and equipment to India totalled nearly US $ 3.7 billion (about 30 per cent of all export supplies from Russia).

Lieutenant General Khlimenko also highlighted some problems in Indo – Russian relations such as maintenance of the arms and equipment delivered by Russia to India and the delivery of spare parts. Furthermore, Russia is unable to cover some Indian needs and does not have certain technologies that meet the world standards. In the case of delivery of arms, delay was attributed to the absence of the treaty on the protection of intellectual property. He acknowledged that the time schedule of delivery of arms and equipment from Russia to India was slower in relation to world standards.

Given these limitations, concern was expressed over growing Indo-US military cooperation. To buttress Indo-Russian cooperation in the new environment, three perspective spheres were mentioned.

membership of the SCO. They suggested that India join the Regional Counter Terrorism Structure (RCTS) of the SCO.

(b) Russia, India and China could move towards a multipolar world.

(c) SCO mechanism could be used to solve the Indo-Pakistan problem, which *inter alia* would reduce terrorist threats all around including from Pakistan's territories.

(d) It advocated India and China working together with Russia, Kazhakstan and Iran to ensure energy security. The Ministerial Round Table organised by India on 25 November 2005, on cooperation between North and Central Asian producers and principal Asian consumers for stability, security and sustained availability in Asian hydrocarbon economy, was welcomed. This meeting was attended by CAR, China, Japan, South Korea and Turkey.

(e) An interesting suggestion related to consolidation of Chinese military technologies and productive capacities, which had a great potential for exchange on trilateral basis.

Observations on Session II

This was an interesting session which highlighted the Russian military perceptions of the direction in which Indo-Russian security and defence ties were shaping, their particular concern related to the military dimension of the Indo-US relations, in particular US emerging as the main armament supplier to India. It was clarified that India will take an independent decision on arms procurement in relation to its technological and strategic requirements. Other issues included the following :-

(a) SCO appears to be the vehicle through which Russia wants to keep an economically strong China engaged. Russia has a huge border with China but does not have the capacity and capability to defend it.

(b) Russia's own economic might rests only on three pillars namely energy reserves, natural and raw materials and military hardware itself. It does not have any industry and infrastructure to boast of. Its transition from Soviet days to market economy and globalisation has ensured that most of its consumer goods

requirements have to be met through imports. China did not shed its communistic hold while opening its markets and got into a massive manufacturing potential and creation of infrastructure in industrial belts along the eastern seaboard. Russia is yet to gain direction and be in a position to boast of any fresh infrastructure or manufacturing capacity.

(c) Exploration of oil and natural gas particularly in Western Siberia is very capital intensive and it needs investment which the Chinese are very eager to provide. Going whole hog with China would, however, be foolhardy. It finds that equal investment from India will provide a safeguard against loosing major control to the Chinese.

(d) Russia perceives numerous pressures from China in the not too distant future, be it population influx or Chinese influence in CAR.

(e) On the issue of arms supply and joint design and development, Russia was keen to maintain existing relationships but continued to harp on Intellectual Property Rights (IPP) related constraints.

Session III: The Current Crisis in the International Collective Security Mechanisms and the Future of the United Nations

The session discussed the current crisis in the international security mechanisms of a unipoiar world as well as the role of the United Nations and regional organisations. Important aspects emerging out of this session included:-

(a) The very premise of creating a collective international system, it was argued had been violated, for example principle of sovereign equality, settlement of disputes peacefully, no authority to intervene in domestic affairs of any state etc. Interestingly while the UN was excluded from many conflict situations it can claim justifiable credit for assisting in decolonisation and dismantling of apartheid, promoting some degree of democracy, and efforts at control and reduction of nuclear arms and production of chemical weapons. This has been possible on account of agencies like UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, etc, as also on account of peace keeping operations in many parts of the globe despite the Cold War constraints.

(b) In the post Cold War world, the UN has been reduced to being a tool to serve the interests of major players, often to the detriment of developing or less developed countries. The tendency of unilateral action has considerably undermined the authority and sanctity of the UN. Even the quality and content of UN Peace Keeping (UNPK) operations has changed for the worse.

(c) Following were some of the major reasons for international crisis :-

(i) First, the term security relating to sovereignty of state has gradually been replaced by other self serving terms beyond traditional international law, exemplified by shift of emphasis from protection of ***"collective security"*** to ***"collective interests".***

(ii) Second, the creation of new structures parallel to the UN by a small circle of powerful international players, who are extremely influential in security matters. By working outside the system and pressurising the UN on issues like funding, they were attempting to marginalise the UN and reduce it to a performa role.

(d) Regional multinational and regional operations were welcomed, especially given the growing constraints of the UNPK operations, provided they had the endorsement of the UN Security Council.

(e) American unilateralism in Iraq was severely criticised, especially in the face of devastation within that country. While the tragedy that had befallen Iraq could not be undone, the key issue remains as to how long will the international community allow this tragedy to perpetuate.

(f) For the UN this is a defining moment. Recent events have shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to fore deep differences of opinion on the range and nature of challenges we face and are likely to face in future.

(g) The principles of containment and deterrence are increasingly being replaced with pre-emption. This threatens

to challenge the very fundamental core on which the collective security paradigm rests. It is crucial to go beyond denouncing unilateralism, by recognising these concerns and showing that these can be addressed effectively through collective action.

(h) The fundamental issue is to decide whether we can continue on the basis of our past beliefs and agreed principles or introduce radical changes. It is in this context that we need to examine the composition of the Security Council to make it more representative; strengthen the General Assembly and examine the role of the UN as a whole on economic and social issues, including its relationship with Breton Wood's institutions. It is also important to review and strengthen international regimes on issues like proliferation of NBC weapons and counter terrorism.

(j) Based on the Report of the high level panel and the UN Secretary General's report to the 2005 World Summit, an *Outcome Document* was prepared and adopted, which lays down the overarching framework of structural reform process for the United Nations more attuned to emerging global realities. While some important steps have been taken like creation of a Human Rights Council and a Peace Building Commission, there is little consensus either on implementation of these proposals or on critical issues like definition of terrorism.

(k) Recognising that regional organisations are part of the UN Charter, stress was laid on their constructive role in complementing the UN activities particularly peacemaking, provided they have Security Council's endorsement. Nevertheless, the expanding charter and role of military blocs such as NATO was viewed with concern.

(l) During discussion, the role of regional organisations such as SCO and CSTO for maintenance of regional security was discussed. This was particularly so as in some countries there was reluctance on the part of the UN to get involved on account of larger geopolitical considerations. General consensus was that such roles were acceptable if mandated by the Security Council.

Session IV: "Challenges to Peace and Stability in Central Asia-Afghanistan Region in the Coming Decade

This session was devoted to dealing with regional security issues of common concern. The Russians laid great stress on the SCO as a model for multilateral cooperation particularly from the point of view of maintaining military and political stability in Central Asia. Some of the important perspectives emerging out of this session are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

First and foremost there was a three way power play underway in Central Asia. The American foothold in Central Asia has helped accentuate Western soft power through colour revolutions, friendship for peace programmes etc. Russia, on the other hand has always seen the region as a strategic buffer against outside threats. Consequently, many strategic interests compel Russia to retain Central Asia within its sphere of influence. Further, Russia was attempting to regain its leverages through both bilateral and multilateral instrumentalities such as CSTO and the SCO, apart from a plethora of economic cooperative arrangements. There are four major strategic interests driving Russian interests in CAR. One, transform Central Asia into a politically and economically viable entity that is friendly towards Russia. Second, secure Russian economic interest in the region particularly the regional energy resources including transportation corridors. Third, to counter the threat of religious extremism while encouraging the prevention of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Fourth, secure the rights of the large Russian diaspora living in the region. China believes that the region holds the key to maintaining momentum of its economic growth as also security of its troubled periphery. Development of economic, political and security relations remain an important construct of its "Look West" policy, for which SCO remains its principal instrument.

Second, there was a growing strategic convergence between China and Russia and increasing isolation of the US – made imminent in the withdrawal of troops from bases in CAR. Nonetheless, the consequence of unease was being felt, both, by political elites of CAR as also Russia and China over the inroads and democratisation drive being made by the US and NATO. Interestingly, despite the utility of the US forces being limited in local political conflicts, the US was in no mood to downgrade its engagement. It was in fact impervious to such involvement.

In contrast, the growing Russian engagement promised investment and creation of a collective security force to deal with internal security issues. This was seen in the attempts at resurrection of CSTO and creation of a standing force to deal with regional conflicts.

China is clearly attempting to enhance its strategic influence, through military cooperation, and infrastructural and trade linkages. It is the leading force in pushing the SCO agenda, transcending to full fledged security outfit with military connotations. It was also seeking bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The Russian and Indian Perspectives

From the Russian perspective, CAR was gradually moving towards being a significant geopolitical and yet vulnerable region. It was emerging as much a geopolitical centre as being a part of "instability arc" comprising the Balkans-Caucasus-South Asia-South East Asia.

The geo-strategic and political picture in CAR was likely to be significantly different in 2015 from what is perceived today. The region could face a range of security threats, both conventional and unconventional, including extremism, terrorism, and other transnational and global threats. It was likely to remain mired in big power jockeying for influence and control over hydrocarbon resources.

Russians felt that the objective need was for a systems approach to address regional concerns through collective efforts - aimed at both political integration and economic development for regional stability. There is a need to evolve a consensual approach for inter regional cooperation and multilateral engagement defined by SCO, the CSTO etc. They stressed that owing to its geopolitical location, Russia alone was best suited to provide desired level of security guarantees.

Given the evolving regional political dynamics and developing economies, comprehensive cooperation and resolution of issues through peaceful means provided the best guarantee for peace and stability. And, to ensure peace and stability, it was important to validate existing mechanisms in relation to emerging challenges – growing external influences, intra-regional problems and nontraditional threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking and small

arms-smuggling etc. For future conflict prevention and stability, it was imperative to safeguard territorial integrity and preserve national interests of all states in the region. The Russians suggested that new security architecture could be created only through gradual process of integration brought about by bilateral and multilateral engagement based on regional institutions. The main directions of Russian security policy were defined as:-

(a) Choice for multilateral world order, based on respect for international law.

(b) Equal opportunities for all states without political or military coercion (forced democracy).

(c) Policy of mutual understanding, conflict prevention and resolution, based on collective security that supports decreasing use of force.

(d) Central Asia should not degenerate into an area of big power competition. It is important that all regional states are brought on board to ensure peaceful regional development and to address multifaceted security challenges.

(e) Recommended a multilateral approach, wherein CAR, China, Russia and important countries on the periphery to include India, Pakistan and Iran, worked in tandem. This was the rationale behind Russia pushing for India's inclusion as an observer in SCO and in future for its membership.

India's interests in CAR on the other hand including the SCO observer status was based on its need to diversify energy requirements; create strong economic and political linkages by extending trade networks; prevent hostile combination or strategic repositioning in CAR inimical to Indian interests; and to deal with the challenge of terrorism and their transregional linkages e.g. IMU.

The Likely Scenarios

Three possible scenarios were postulated – the Near Term (2005-2010), Medium Term (2010-2020) and the Long Term (2020 and beyond. In the near term, it is estimated that the Sino-Russian cooperation would go a long way to balance US influence. The US and NATO policy would be one of engagement and containment of CAR, Russia and China. CAR meanwhile would try and balance policies between the two competing interests to maximise advantage

for itself. However, there were certain critical uncertainties in the form of developments in Afghanistan and West Asia, the extent of revival of fundamentalism in Central Asia and the level of competition between China and Russia. Another contentious issue will be dynamics of energy politics.

In the medium term, the rise of China could induce greater Russian-American accommodation. The Russian influence if leveraged properly could grow. There could also be an increase in NATO's influence as part of overall eastern engagement strategy. Two wild cards in this scenario are reaction of China towards growing Russo-Chinese and possible Indian convergence over Central Asia as also possible emergence of a Russia-China-Iran axis, exacerbated by American intervention in Iran. On the other hand, depending upon developments in Afghanistan and fructification of AP pipeline, salience of Pakistan could enhance, aided by growing Sino-Pak relations.

The long term scenario fashions a growth of Chinese economic and military power, Russian economic revival and India's economic growth and power potential. In addition, the scenario could be impacted by the consequences of the success or failure of the US, West and Central Asian policies.

Areas of Future Cooperation

In the concluding session both delegations agreed that deliberations over the last two days were of great interest and helped in greater understanding of issues of common concern. It was also decided to take the dialogue forward. The following areas of joint interaction were suggested by the USI delegation:-

(a) Identify joint projects including simulation exercises that can be taken up by two Institutions on cooperative basis.

(b) Consider multilateral dialogue to include China and Japan.

(c) To give fillip to peace keeping efforts joint seminars under the auspices of USI Centre for United Nations Peace Keeping (CUNPK) should be held.

(d) Special forces joint training and exercises on reciprocal basis was suggested which USI could help taking forward through both Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence.

The Russian side while appreciating the suggestions, promised to take up these suggestions with their Ministry of Defence.

The Military Chief's Club

The Indian delegation paid a visit to Military Chiefs Club founded by the veterans from the Military, Diplomatic and Civil Services as also Intelligence agencies. However the prime motivators remain retired senior military officials. The founder President of this club is the Marshal of Russian Federation and Hero of Russia, ID Sergeev. In the words of VP Ivonov, Assistant to the Russian President Vladimir Putin, "the task of the Military club is to combine intellectual, official, and professional potential of senior military officials in strengthening and developing the Russian society and state". The Club is a nascent organisation established as an independent NGO, which is still in the process of establishing itself. Broad areas of its activities include :-

(a) Promotion of steady development of Russia in political, economic and social fields, international relations, education, culture, science, and so on.

(b) Development of cooperation with international organisations involved in similar tasks.

(c) Mobilisation of country's social potential, for raising national prestige by highlighting courage, resilience and heroism of the Armed Forces.

(d) Improving social protection and guarantees of Armed Forces personnel, by laying down conditions for their social integration.

Meeting with the USI delegation was at best exploratory in nature to find common areas of interest. Mutual dialogue helped in providing understanding of each other's activities and opening up number of areas which could be considered for future cooperation. Marshal Sergeev summed up the interaction by suggesting "there are a lot of possibilities of cooperation with the Indian Institute to resist global challenges".

Concluding Observations

Some interesting facets of our interaction are discussed below:-

(a) There appeared to be an apprehension in the mind of Russians that growing Indo-US bilateral relations could in the

long run impact bilateral arms sale relationship. This correlation is looked upon as the major plank of overall defence relationship. For the Russian military, sustenance of strong buyer and seller relationship appeared important even if these were subsumed within joint production or design and development like the fifth generation transport plane programmes.

(b) Strengthening of bilateral trade and economic relationship was something that was not discussed. They remain Eurocentric in their thinking on trade and related issues. However, in private interaction our Ambassador remained upbeat about the inevitable growth of Indo-Russian trade relations from its present level of close to just over two billion dollars.

(c) On joint exercises and greater military to military interaction, certain amount of reticence was noticed. They appear to be quite impressed by Chinese technological and force modernisation strategies. In private, they acknowledged that while major wars were unlikely, border and regional conflicts are a distinct possibility. Therefore, the current military transformation effort is linked to developing capabilities to fight such wars.

(d) In private conversation they acknowledged the declining edge of their conventional capabilities, which is something they are looking forward to address through structured modernisation programme. Interestingly, great emphasis was placed on nuclear deterrence which was being maintained at relatively advanced levels, inspite of financial constraints.

(e) Prominance was accorded to the SCO as a model of regional cooperation, where the interests of all the three major Asian powers coincide. It appeared that Russia was keen on India coming on board in the regional framework essentially to contain growing Chinese influence.

(f) On the issue of joint Indo-Russian-Chinese interaction, often speculated by media, Russians were categorical that these were unlikely in the near future. However, they were keen to promote such interaction within the framework of the SCO.

Overall, the visit was marked by a great degree of conviviality and forthrightness resulting in free and frank exchange of ideas and understanding of each other's perspectives. The Russian hosts were extremely hospitable and went out of the way to make the delegation comfortable. It is also important to put on record the extremely supportive and caring role played by the Indian Embassy in Moscow and the personal interest shown by the Ambassador in making the visit of the USI Delegation a great success. Our sincere thanks to the Military Wing of the Indian Embassy including the Military attaché who provided complete administrative support. On the whole, it was a useful interaction, which the USI would certainly like to sustain.

LIST OF USI PUBLISHERS

1. **Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd.**
M-32, Market, Greater Kailash Part-1
New Delhi - 110 048
Tele : 26485884 Fax : 26472426

2. **Manas Publications**
4819/XI, Varun House, Mathur Lane
24, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj
New Delhi - 110 002
Tele : 23260783 Fax : 23272766

3. **Ocean Books (P) Ltd.**
4/19 Asaf Ali Road
Delhi - 110 002
Tele : 22289555 Fax : 23253232

4. **Knowledge World**
5A/4A, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj
Delhi - 110 002
Tele : 23257714 Fax : 23272010

5. **Gyan Publishing House**
5, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj
Delhi - 110 002
Tele : 23261060 Fax : 23285914

Impact of Nanotechnology on Nuclear Weapons

Commodore S Kulshrestha

INTRODUCTION

Nanotechnology is a field that does not stem from one established academic discipline.[1] There are a number of ways in which nanotechnology may be defined. The most common version regards nanoscience as *'the ability to do things – measure, see, predict and make – on the scale of atoms and molecules and exploit the novel properties found at that scale'*.[2] Traditionally, this scale is defined as being between 0.1 and 100 nanometres (nm), 1 nm being one-thousandth of a micron (micrometre), which is, in turn, one thousandth of a millimetre (mm). Another way to characterise nanotechnology is by distinguishing between the fabrication processes of top-down and bottom-up. Top-down technology refers to the *'fabrication of nanoscale structures by machining and etching techniques'*.[3] On the other hand, bottom-up technology – often referred to as molecular nanotechnology (MNT) – applies to the creation of organic and inorganic structures, atom by atom, or molecule by molecule.[4] It is this area of nanotechnology that has created the maximum excitement and publicity. In a mature nanotech world, macrostructures would simply be grown from their smallest constituent components: an 'anything box' would take a molecular seed containing instructions for building a product and use tiny nanobots or molecular machines to build it atom by atom.[5] In short, full-fledged bottom-up nanotechnology promises nothing less than complete control over the physical structure of matter. That this underlying research is now moving into economically viable products can be gauged from the emergence of three alliances i.e. the Europe NanoBusiness Association, the Asia-Pacific Nanotechnology Forum, and the US NanoBusiness Alliance. In addition to this, laboratories around the world are working on new approaches and new ways to scale up nanotechnology to industrial levels. For example, the first factories to manufacture carbon nanotubes and fullerenes are under construction in Japan.[6]

Commodore S Kulshrestha is currently Principal Director of Naval Armament Inspection.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

Research and Development

The main reason for government interest in nanotechnology is strategic; to achieve an advantageous position so that when nanotech applications begin to have a significant effect in the world economy, countries are able to exploit new opportunities to the full. Smith[7] speculates that it is entirely possible that much, or even most, US government research in the field is concentrated in the hands of military planners. Levels of public investment in nanotechnology are reminiscent of a growing strategic interest; this is an area that attracts both large and small countries. Global R&D spending is currently around US$4 billion[8], with public investment increasing rapidly (503 per cent between 1997 and 2002, across the 'lead' countries).

Defence

Nanoscale informatics, pharmaceuticals and medicine remain the most high-profile areas of near-term market application. However, Gsponer[9] contends that the most significant near-term applications of nanotechnology will be in the military domain. This is because micromechanical engineering is historically connected to nuclear weapons laboratories. It was within this domain that the field of nanotechnology was born a few decades ago. New technologies, are playing an increasingly important part in modern warfare–as reflected by recent investments in the US Department of Defence (DOD). Leading strategic commentators, such as David Jeremiah[10], proclaim that military applications of nanotechnology have an even greater potential than nuclear weapons, to radically change the balance of global power in the future. Other applications include[11]:-

(a) Information dominance through advanced nanoelectronics.

(b) More sophisticated virtual reality systems.

(c) Increased use of enhanced automation and robotics.

(d) Required improvements in chemical, biological and nuclear sensing.

(e) Design improvements in systems used for nuclear non-proliferation monitoring and management.

(f) Combined nanomechanical and micromechanical devices for control of nuclear defence systems.

The infantry soldier is anticipated to receive a nanotech-based 'makeover'; a new Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology (ISN) has been created at MIT, with a US Army grant of US$50 million over five years. The goal of this research centre is to greatly enhance the protection and survival of the infantry soldier using nanoscience.[12] Centre for Nanoscience Innovation for Defence (CNID) was created in January 2003 to facilitate the rapid transition of research innovation in Nanosciences into applications for the Defence sector.[13] CNID is sponsored by two federal agencies –the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and Defence Micro Electronics Activity (DMEA) – to the tune of US$20 million over three years.

Funding of Military Applications

"Nanotechnology is one of the highest priority science and technology programmes in the Defence Department. Nanotechnology is a 'force multiplier', it will make us faster and stronger on the battlefield." said Clifford Lau, the senior science adviser in the Pentagon's office of basic research. Lau, who also serves as president of the nanotechnology council at the engineering group IEEE, said research is being co-ordinated across the military branches, and plans are in place to transition the technology from basic research to deployment.[14]

Military Research in Nanotechnology in the US. The United States accounts for two thirds of global expenditures for military R&D ($52 billion in 2002, followed by France and the UK with a combined $ seven billion, then Russia and China, combined about $ three billion).[15,16,17] Since the Second World War has been the first to introduce many new military technologies, it comes as no surprise that in the US National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI – the US government funded nanotechnology programme that began in 2000), the military takes a considerable share of the funds – between 26 and 32 per cent in 2004 running at $ 222 million.[18] Spending figures for other countries are difficult to obtain, but judging from the UK effort in the range of $ two to three million per year,[19] the US may outspend the rest of the world for military nanotechnology by as much as a factor of ten. This could narrow if more countries follow the US example and make military NT a high priority.

The Naval Research Laboratory has founded an Institute for Nanoscience.[20] Here and in the traditional divisions, wide ranging research is being done in the areas of nano-assembly, -optics, -chemistry, -electronics, and -mechanics. The Navy, already, uses nanotech coatings on submarines to eliminate barnacle build-up and protect bearings against corrosion on surface ships. The Army Research Laboratory is working on nanotechnology for chemical and biological defence, structural materials, and particulate materials; in nano energetic materials focus is on insensitive (i.e., safe against unintended ignition) high-energy propellants with improved burning rate and mechanical properties.[21] The Air Force Research Laboratory is active in biology, electronics materials, and physics; one focus is energetic nanoparticles for explosives and propulsion.[22] The Air Force is using lightweight, radar-resistant nano-composite materials in the airframes of unmanned aerial vehicles. Advanced development also is underway to use nanotechnology to improve the detection of and defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Stronger, lighter nano-composites will be inserted in advanced body armour.

CHINA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY

China has realised the importance of nanotechnology for future economic development and is responding to global trends. In the middle of 1980s, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) initiated support on the development of scanning probe microscopy (SPM) and other scientific issues at the nanometre scale (1987-1995). The Ministry of Science and Technology of China approved the 'Climbing up' project and supported nanomaterial science for ten successive years from 1990 to 1999. Over 3,000 researchers contribute to the field. In 1999, the Ministry of Science and Technology started a national key basic research project 'Nanomaterial and Nanostructure', to continually support the basic research on nanomaterials such as nanotubes. The National High Technology Plan also establishes a series of projects for nanomaterial applications. The Chinese Physics Society and the Chinese Society of Particuology are societies involved in dissemination of nanotechnology research.

To date, more than 50 universities, 20 institutes of CAS and 300 enterprises are engaged in the research and development of nanoscience and nanotechnology. Several centres for research and development of nanoscience and technology have been established in CAS, Tsinghua University, Peking University, Nanjing University, East China University of Science and Technology, and others.

China had planned to spend US $ 250 to 300 million during five-year plan (2001-2005). The National Centre for NanoScience and Technology of China (NCNST) is being built near the Peking University, and is expected to be completed in two years. The government has allocated US$ 33 million for building this Centre[23].

Considering the potential for military force multiplication offered by advanced nanotechnology, the dangerously unstable nature of a nano arms race and the foreseeable temptation to make a premptive first strike, the emergence of China as a major player in the field should be a cause for concern.

NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Strategic Context

Two important strategic lessons were learnt from wars in Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan, in which full extent of Western military superiority was displayed. Firstly, the amount of conventional explosive that could be delivered by precision-guided munitions like cruise missiles was ridiculous in comparison to their cost; some targets could only be destroyed by expenditure of numerous delivery systems while a single loaded with a more powerful warhead would have been sufficient[24]. Secondly, the use of weapons producing a low level of radioactivity appear to be acceptable, both from a military point of view because such a level does not impair further military action, and from a political standpoint because most political leaders did not object to the battlefield use of depleted uranium.[25]

During and after these wars, it was often suggested that some new earth-penetrating weapon was needed to destroy deeply buried command posts, or facilities related to weapons of mass

destruction.[26] It is not, therefore, surprising to witness the emergence of a well-funded scientific effort to create the technological basis for making powerful new weapons – an effort that is not for maintaining a high level of military superiority, but for extending human enterprise to the next frontier; the inner space of matter to be conquered by the science of nanotechnology.

Nanotechnology, was born a few decades ago – in nuclear weapons laboratories under the names of 'micromechanical engineering' and 'microelectromechanical systems' (MEMS). A primary impetus for creating these systems was the need for extremely rugged and safe arming and triggering mechanisms for nuclear weapons such as atomic artillery shells. In such warheads, the nuclear explosive and its trigger undergo extreme acceleration (10,000 times greater than gravity when the munition is delivered by a heavy gun). A general design technique is then to make the trigger's crucial components as small as possible. For similar reasons the detonators and the various locking mechanisms of nuclear weapons were increasingly designed as more and more sophisticated microelectromechanical systems. Consequently, nuclear weapons laboratories such as the Sandia National Laboratory in the US are leading the world in translating the most advanced concepts of MEMS engineering into practice.[27]

A second impetus for MEMS and nanotechnology, is the ongoing drive towards miniaturisation of nuclear weapons and related quest for very-low yield nuclear explosives for use as a source of nuclear energy in the form of controlled micro explosions. Such explosions (with yields in the range of a few kilograms to a few tons of high-explosive equivalent) would in principle be contained, but they could just as well be used in weapons if suitable compact triggers are developed. It is easier to design a micro-fusion than a micro-fission explosive (which has advantage of producing much less radioactive fallout than a micro-fission device of the same yield). Enormous progress has been made, and the research on micro-fusion bombs has now become the main advanced weapons research activity of the nuclear weapons laboratories, using gigantic tools such as the US National Ignition Facility (NIF) and France's Laser Megajoule. The tiny pellets used in experiments, containing the thermonuclear fuel to be exploded, are certainly the most delicate and sophisticated nano-engineered devices in existence.

A third major impetus for nanotechnology is the growing demand for better materials with extremely well characterised specifications. These can be new materials for improved insulators which will increase the storage capacity of capacitors used in detonators, nano-engineered high-explosives for advanced weaponry, etc. They can also be conventional materials of extreme purity, or nano-engineered components of extreme precision. For instance, to meet NIF specifications, the 2-mm-diameter fuel pallets must not be more than 1 micrometre out of round; that is, the radius to the outer surface can vary by no more than 1 micrometre (out of 1,000) as one moves across the surface. Moreover, the walls of these pellets consist of layers whose thickness is measured in fractions of micrometres, and surface-smoothness in tens of nanometres. Thus, these specifications can be given in units of 1,000 or 100 atoms, so that even minute defects are absent for the pellets to implode symmetrically when illuminated by laser.

The final major impetus for MEMS and nanotechnology, which has the greatest overlap with non-military needs, is their promise of new high-performance sensors, transducers, actuators, and electronic components. The development of this field of applications is expected to replicate the micro-electronic industry, which was originally driven by military needs, and which provides the reference for forecasting a nano-industrial boom and a financial bonanza.

Nanotechnological Improvement of Existing Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapon technology is characterised by two sharply contrasting demands. On one hand, the nuclear package containing the fission and fusion materials is relatively simple, i.e. more sophisticated than complicated. On the other hand, many ancillary components required for arming the weapon, triggering the high-explosives, and initiating the neutron chain-reaction, are more complicated. Moreover, the problems related to maintaining political control over the use of nuclear weapons, i.e. the operation of permissive action links (PALs), necessitated the development of protection systems that are meant to remain active all the way to the target, meaning that all these ancillary components and systems are required to meet very stringent requirements for security, safety, and reliable performance under severe conditions. The general solution to these problems is to favour the use of hybrid combinations of mechanical and electronic systems, which have

the advantage of dramatically reducing the probability of common mode failures and decreasing sensitivity to external factors. It is this search for maximisation of reliability and ruggedness, which is driving the development, and application of nanotechnology and MEMS engineering in nuclear weapons science.

To give an example: modern nuclear weapons use insensitive high-explosives (IHE) which can only be detonated by means of a small charge of sensitive high-explosive that is held out of alignment from the main charge of IHE. Only once the warhead is armed does a MEMS bring the detonator into position with the main charge. Since the insensitive high-explosive in a nuclear weapon is usually broken down into many separate parts that are triggered by individual detonators, the use of MEMS-based detonators incorporating individual locking mechanisms are an important ingredient ensuring the use-control, and one-point safety of such weapons.[28]

Further improvements on existing nuclear weapons are stemming from application of nanotechnology to materials engineering. New capacitors, new radiation-resistant integrated circuits, new composite materials capable of withstanding high temperatures and accelerations, will enable a further level of miniaturisation and a corresponding enhancement of safety and usability of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the military utility and the possibility of forward deployment, as well as the potentiality for new missions, will be increased.

Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons

First and second generation nuclear weapons are atomic and hydrogen bombs developed during the 1940s and 1950s, while third-generation weapons comprise a number of concepts developed between the 1960s and 1980s, eg the neutron bomb, which never found a permanent place in the military arsenal. Fourth-generation nuclear weapons are new types of nuclear explosives that can be developed in full compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) using inertial confinement fusion (ICF) facilities such as the NIF in the US, and other advanced technologies, which are under active development in all the major nuclear-weapon states and in major industrial powers such as Germany and Japan.[29]

In a nutshell, the defining technical characteristic of fourth-generation nuclear weapons is the triggering, by advanced technology such as a superlaser, magnetic compression, antimatter etc of a relatively small thermonuclear explosion in which a deuterium-tritium mixture is burnt in a device whose weight and size are not much larger than a few kilograms and litres. Since the yield of these warheads could go from a fraction of a ton to many tens of tons of high-explosive equivalent, their delivery by precision-guided munitions or other means will dramatically increase the fire-power of those who possess them - without crossing the threshold of using kiloton-to-megaton nuclear weapons and, therefore, without breaking the taboo against the first-use of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, since new weapons will use no (or very little) fissionable materials, they will produce virtually no radioactive fallout. Their proponents will define them as "clean" nuclear weapons and possibly draw a parallel between their battlefield use and the consequences of the expenditure of depleted uranium ammunition.[30]

In practice, since the controlled release of thermonuclear energy in the form of laboratory scale explosions (ie equivalent to a few kilograms of high-explosives) at ICF facilities like NIF is likely to succeed in the next 10 to 15 years, the main arms control question is how to prevent this know-how being used to manufacture fourth-generation nuclear weapons. As we have already seen, nanotechnology and micromechanical engineering are integral parts of ICF pellet construction. But this is also the case with ICF drivers and diagnostic devices, and even more so with all the hardware that will have to be miniaturised and 'ruggedised' to the extreme in order to produce a compact, robust, and cost-effective weapon.

CONCLUSION

A thorough discussion of the potential of nanotechnology and microelectromechanical engineering in relation to the emergence of fourth-generation nuclear weapons, is, therefore, of utmost importance. It is likely that this discussion will be difficult, not just because of secrecy and other restrictions, but mainly because the military usefulness and usability of these weapons is likely to remain very high as long as precision-guided delivery systems dominate

the battlefield. It is, therefore, important to realise that the technological hurdles that have to be overcome for laboratory scale thermonuclear explosions to be turned into weapons may be the only remaining significant barrier against the introduction and proliferation of fourth-generation nuclear weapons.

Notes

1. *The Economist,* (2002). Trouble in Nanoland. *The Economist.com;* 5 December 2002 [online]. http: // www.economics. com / science / displaystory. cfm ? story _ id = 14774 4 5

2. Department of Trade and Industry (2002). *New Dimensions for Manufacturing: UK Strategy for Nanotechnology.* Report of the UK Advisory Group on Nanotechnology Applications; June 2002.

3. O Saxl, *Opportunities for Industry in the Application of Nanotechnology,* London, UK: Office of Science and Technology [A report for The Institute of Nanotechnology, April 2000]. http://www.nano.org.uk/contents.htm

4. ibid

5. D Miller, Five Technologies You Need to Know. *The Industry Standard;* 21 May 2001 [online]. http://wwwthestandard.com/article/0,1902,24308,00.html

6. n. 2

7. R H Smith, Molecular Nanotechnology: Research Funding Sources. *Nanotechnology Magazine;* 2 (6), 1996.

8. ETC Group. No Small Matter! Nanotech Particles Penetrate Living Cells and Accumulate in Animal Organs. ETC Group Communiqué; (76) May/June 2002 [online] http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/Comm_NanoMat_July02.pdf

9. A Gsponer, From the Lab to the Battlefield? Nanotechnology and Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons. *Disarmament Diplomacy;* (67) Oct-Nov 2002 [online]. http//wwwacronym.orguk/dd/dd 67/67op1.htm

10. DE Jeremiah, Nanotechnology and Global Security. *Proceedings of the Fourth Foresight Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology;* 9-11 November 1995, Palo Alto, GA, USA [online]. http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/nan04/jeremiahPaper.html

11. R Doering, "Societal Implications of Scaling to Nanoelectronics", in MG Roco, WS Bainbridge (editors), Societal Implications of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology. Arlington, VA, USA: National Science Foundation, 2001, pp. 68-75. http://wwwwtecorg/loyola/nano/NSETSocietal.Implications/nanosi.pdf

12. New Scientist, US Army .Seeks Nanotech Suits New Scientisicom; News Service, 14 Mar 2002 [online]. .http://www.newscientist.com/news /news.jsp?id=ns99992043 ..

13. Science Slog, New Centre to Transfer Nano Innovations to Defence Industry. Science Slog; 10 December 2002 [online]. http://wwwscienceblogcom/community/article553html

14. www_GovExec_com -Pentagon official says nanotechnology a high priority (4-19-04).htm) 19 April 2004. By Ted Leventhal, National Journal's Technology Daily).

15. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Conversion Survey 2004 – *Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization.* Baden – Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2004, p. 40, 55.

16 Bonn International Centre for *Conversion, Conversion Survey 2003.* Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2002, p. 40 f.

17 Bonn International Centre for Conversion, *Conversion Survey 2002.* Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos, 2002, p. 46 f.

18 MC Roco, *Government Nanotechnology Funding: An International Outlook.* Arlington, VA: NSF, 30 June 2003, http://www.nano.gov/intpersp_roco_june30.htm.

19 *Nanotechnology: Its Impact on Defence and the MoD,* November 2001, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/ nanotech.pdf.

20 http://nanoscience.nrlnavy.mil

21 http://nanoscience.nrl.navy.mil

22 ibid.

23. Centre for Responsible Nanotechnology (CRN). China Global Nanotech Leaders.htm http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/2342096

24. Edward Teller, *American Journal of Physics,* Vol. 59, October 1991, p. 873.

25 Depleted uranium (DU) munitions were primarily designed to stop a massive tank attack by the nuclear-armed Warsaw Pact Organisation. Their first use during the 1991 Gulf War broke a 46-year long taboo against the intentional use or induction of radioactivity in combat.

26 Kathleen C Bailey, 'Proliferation: Implications for US Deterrence', in Kathleen C Bailey, ed, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs Versus Benefits,* Manohar, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 141-142.

27 Pictures of the 50-micrometre gears of Sandia's intricate safety lock for nuclear missiles were published in *Science,* Vol. 282, October 16,1998, pp. 402-405.

28 "A nuclear weapon is one-point safe if, when the high explosive (HE) is initiated and detonated at any single point, the probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding four pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent is less than one in a million" : http://wwwdticmil/ whs/directives/corres/ pdf/3150m_1296/p31502m.pdf.

29. André Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni, *The Physical Principles of Thermonuclear Explosives, Inertial Confinement Fusion, and the Quest for Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons,* INESAP Technical Report No 1, Presented at the 1997 INESAP Conference, Shanghai, China, 8-10 September 1997, Seventh edition, September 2000, ISBN: 3-9333071-02-X, 195pp

30 André Gsponer, Jean-Pierre Hurni, and Bruno Vitale, 'A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons', Report ISRI-02-O7, due to appear in the *Proceedings of the 4th International Conference of the Yugoslav Nuclear Society,* Belgrade, 30 September - 4 October, 2002, 14 pp. Available at http://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0210071.

The Jallianwala Bagh Revisited - I

Lieutenant Colonel Nigel A Collett (Retd)

The O'Dwyer v Nair Libel Case

In 1923, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who had been Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab until 1919, sued Sir Chettur Sankaran Nair, also until that year a Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, for libel. In his book, *Gandhi and Anarchy*, Nair had written: 'Before the reforms it was in the power of the Lieutenant-Governor, a single individual, to commit the atrocities in the Punjab which we know only too well.'[1] The book had been written to attack Mahatma Gandhi's Non-co-operation movement, but Nair, who was a moderate, had not resisted the opportunity to take a swipe at a man whose oppressive policies he, and much of India, regarded as the real cause of the Punjab Disturbances of 1919 and the repression under Martial Law which had followed them.[2]

The case was heard before Mr Justice McCardie in the Court of King's Bench in London over five weeks from 30 April 1924, and, apart from being one of the longest civil hearings in legal history, was notable for being the only court to air in England any of the matters arising from the Punjab Disturbances of 1919. The case was seen, and particularly so by the plaintiff, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, as a method by which to vindicate the actions of officials of the Punjab Government who had taken a hand in suppressing the disturbances, among them most notably Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, the perpetrator of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre at Amritsar. It was accepted at the trial that two of the major points at issues were that:

1. On 13 April 1919, General Dyer committed an atrocity by ordering the shooting at Amritsar, and
2. That the plaintiff caused or was responsible for the commission of that alleged atrocity.[3]

In preparation for the case, both sides gathered evidence from supporting witnesses. For O'Dwyer, this was a relatively easy matter, as many key figures who had been involved in India in 1919 were by now back in, or close to, England and could

---

Lieutenant-Colonel Nigel A. Collett is Managing Director of the Gorkha International Group. He is based in Hong Kong. He is the author of the book *The Bhutcher of Amritsar*.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

appear in person. These included the Viceroy of the time, Lord Chelmsford, by 1924 a Government Minister, First Lord of the Admiralty; his Commander-in-Chief in India, General Sir George Carmichael Munro, by now Governor of Gibraltar; and Major-General Sir William Beynon, General Officer Commanding 16 Division in Lahore, Sir Michael O'Dwyer's military equivalent in the Punjab and Martial Law Administrator during the disturbances, who had by now retired. So strong and impressive were these supporting witnesses, that O'Dwyer felt the need to solicit testimony from only six men in India.

Nair found himself at a very great disadvantage. In England in 1924 there were few who were prepared to support his view that Sir Michael O'Dwyer had been a repressive tyrant, and those who were, had little public standing. One of Nair's key witnesses, for example, Mr Gerard Wathen, in 1919 Principal of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, was by 1924 running his own school in Hampstead. Nair's legal team was forced to fall back on depositions legally sworn by over 120 witnesses in India. Justice McCardie made it plain that he attributed these far less weight than he did the evidence of those who appeared before the jury. In the event the Indian depositions had little effect and have been forgotten since. Sir Michael O'Dwyer won his case, and was able ever thereafter to maintain that he and Dyer had been vindicated in a British court of law. He could do so relying to a good degree upon Mr Justice McCardie's highly partial summing up:

> I express my view that General Dyer, under the grave and exceptional circumstances, acted rightly, and in my opinion, upon his evidence, he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India.[4]

The Depositions

The depositions of the Indian witnesses have lain untouched to this day in the Public Record Office (now the National Archive) at Kew, where they are filed under the reference and title J17/634, *O'Dwyer v. Nair, Supreme Court of Judicature, Depositions – Exhibits Taken off the File, 16 January 1924*. The information they contain is important, and represents in some cases the sole evidence for incidents and matters otherwise unknown. This file of papers remains the only place in the English record where the voices of victims of the suppression of the Punjab Disturbances can be heard in their own words. The depositions support and

supplement the evidence published by the Indian National Congress Inquiry in 1921.[5] The depositions, taken within just over four years of the events they describe, have an enormous wealth of detail elucidating and clarifying the history of the Disturbances.

The depositions were taken in India between November and December 1923 by teams of lawyers representing each side. For O'Dwyer, the plaintiff, acted Khan Bahadur Sheikh Abdul Qadir and Mr Obedulla. The defendant, Sir C Sankaran Nair, was present himself with his advocates Mr B Tek Chand, Mr BR Puri and Mr R C Soni. Both sides were allowed to cross examine witnesses, and voluntary follow-up examinations were also permitted. Statements were recorded in English (translated from the vernacular where necessary), the cross examinations and follow-ups in question and answer form, and all were signed.

A reading of the full set of depositions reveals why Nair lost his case. His witnesses include many middle ranking figures, some of them Government officials, but at no point in their depositions do they come close to proving that Sir Michael O'Dwyer directly abused his power. This is unfortunate, as the depositions clearly describe undoubted abuses, for instance in recruiting for the Army in the Punjab during the First World War. All the abuses, though, are attributed to low ranking officials and at no point do the depositions reveal any abuse ordered or carried out by O'Dwyers himself. They singularly fail to tie any abuse to an order made directly by him. On several occasions the depositions point out that during Martial Law public order was in the hands of the Army (despite O'Dwyer's unsuccessful attempt to retain control even after the grant of the Martial Law he had demanded), and so abuses committed under Martial Law could not be directly attributed to him. This is notably the case regarding the Jallianwala Bagh. Nair's team recognized that it had to prove Sir Michael O'Dwyer's involvement in the massacre if it were to successfully defend the suit, but nowhere in the depositions did they manage to present evidence to prove the involvement of the Lieutenant-Governor prior to the event. There was no smoking gun, and on the evidence presented it is difficult to see how Sir Michael O'Dwyer could have lost his case.

Recruiting Abuses in the Punjab, 1917-18

Sixty-eight of the defence's 125 depositions concern abuses in the recruitment of Punjabi soldiers for the Indian Army during

the last two years of the First World War.[6] Allegations of these abuses were prevalent in the Punjab at the time and have been often cited since, and in the depositions the story emerges very clearly of a gradually worsening situation after the civilian authorities took over responsibility for recruiting from the military in 1917. The body of evidence in these depositions is compelling; of recruiting quotas fixed on rural areas as high as one third of the eligible male population; of rural headmen compelled to furnish recruits or losing their jobs as a result of their failure to conform to the policy or to meet targets; of young men fleeing in increasing numbers to the cities to escape recruitment; of misuse of the judicial process by the offering of recruitment as an alternative to punishment, or worse by the bringing of false charges to secure this result; of growing rural resistance to recruitment, resulting in one case in the murder of a Tehsildar and in another of a riotous assault on the police; of a recognized price paid to enable recruiters to fill their quota by paying gangs kidnapping the poor in urban areas or purchasing men from other villages, a price which started at Rs. 250 a head in 1917 and which reached Rs. 1300 by the end of the War. The evidence is personal and compelling. Rai Zada Bhagat Ram, Barrister-at-Law in Jullundur, and a Member of the Punjab Provincial Legislative Council from 1916, stated that he knew of suspensions of headmen and superior headmen for failure to fill quotas and of false cases brought to put pressure on them. He knew a judge who had acquitted a man who had agreed to enlist. Bhagat Ram also testified on the subject of enforced war loans. As a leading member of the Punjab war loan movement, he had seen men pressured to pay by being handcuffed and made to stand in the sun, and as a result he had resigned his position.[7] Dr Mani Ram, a dental surgeon of Amritsar, had seen headmen handcuffed by Sardar Harbel Singh, the Recruiting Officer for his Tahsil in Multan, for refusing to provide recruits; all had paid to escape arrest.[8]

Interestingly, many of the witnesses deposing for the plaintiff, all conservative supporters of the Punjab Government, also testified to these abuses. Colonel Sir Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, elected member of Council of State, stated that the recruiting quota was fixed at one third of villagers of military age. He recounted how Tahsildar Sayyad Nadir Hussain had been killed at Bahk Lurka in Lakk by villagers who objected to his recruiting methods. He also described an attack by a mob of 1000 villagers on police sent to enforce warrants; the police were forced to open fire, killing

some of the rioters. After a very long cross examination on recruiting, he admitted that a system was in force involving a 'white book' listing headmen who met targets and a 'black book' listing those who failed.[9]

Events in Lahore

The depositions include evidence of events across the province during the Punjab Disturbances in April 1919. As one would expect, many (seventeen in all) concern the provincial capital, Lahore. Depositions by the witnesses for the plaintiff cast some light on meetings held by Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the run up to, and early course of, the Disturbances. Nawab Sir Bahram Khan Mazari, a Member of the Punjab Legislative Council in 1919 and later of the Council of State, Umar Hayat Khan and Khan Bahadur Sayyad Mehdi Shah, President of the Municipal Committee of Gojra and Member of the Punjab Legislative Council in 1919, described a farewell party held by the martial classes for Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Lawrence Gardens on 10 April, the day of the first outbreak of violence in the city. They also described political consultations taken by the Lieutenant-Governor at Government House in the following days. Interestingly, Umar Hayat Khan, despite being a supporter of Martial Law, stated that for seven or eight days it proved to be of little or no use in restoring order due to the cutting of telegraph wires, the burning of *bhusa* and strikes by railway staff.[10]

For the defendant, three of the staff of King Edward Medical College, Lahore: Dr Jiwan Lal, Assistant Professor of Pathology and Assistant Bacteriologist; Dr Yar Mohammad Khan, Assistant to the Professor of Physiology; and Dr Tilok Chand Nanda, Assistant to the Professor of Materia Medica, described how, in the days after the imposition of Martial Law, their students were required to march twice a day from the College two miles to the Punjab Club and back.[11] Pandit Raghubar Dyal, Principal of the Sanatan Dharm College and Fellow of the Punjab University, recounted that his pupils were arrested, marched off with bedding and held in the fort as a reprisal for the removal of Martial Law posters from their school wall. They were kept at the fort without food overnight.[12] Pandit Hem Raj, Officiating Principal of Dyal Singh College, deposed that on 18 April the Martial Law Administrator, Colonel Frank Johnson, made an order requiring the compulsory roll call of his students four times a day near the Government telegraph office. This lasted some twenty days, though the

frequency was later reduced to thrice then twice a day. Some of the students were slapped, and they were paraded in the sun. The school was ordered to find and punish the ring-leaders of 'the movement'. The school attempted to comply, listing and punishing some 225 boys, rusticating some, putting others back a year, fining others Rs 25. They chose for punishment those who had absented themselves from an examination on 10 April, the day of the first firing in the city. All this was because the Martial Law Administrator had found one poster on the wall of the college portico.[13]

Mr Manohar Lal, Barrister-at-Law, late Minto Professor of Economics at Calcutta University and a member of the Council of the National Liberal Federation of India, had been in 1919 a Trustee of the *Tribune* Newspaper Trust. He testified that he had been arrested on 18 April, because, according to the statement made to the Hunter Committee by the Punjab Chief Secretary, Sir Edward Thompson, he was a trustee who took interest in the *Tribune*'s editorials, and because 'I think there was some other idea that he was mixed up in the conspiracy'. He had been held in confinement for six weeks without trial. The Government of India had later stated in its white paper Command 705 that it 'considered the arrest and detention for long periods of so many persons and particularly ... Dr Manohar Lal and six lawyers of Gurdaspur were a series of errors, and while they do not overlook the difficulties of the situation, they are constrained to express their disapproval of the action taken in these cases.'[14] On his arrest, Manohar Lal's house was searched over the course of two days whilst his wife and children were forced to live in outhouses.[15]

Events Across the Punjab

Other witnesses described similar roll calls of students and townspeople at Sangla, the imposition of Martial Law at Lyallpur and the outbreak of violence followed by the Royal Air Force's bombing at Gujranwala.[16] Feroze Din, son of Mian Karam Bux, who had been at school in the Kasur Municipal Board High School in 1919, described identity parades by Europeans unsuccessfully looking for culprits of a Martial Law offence. His school was told eight days later to send twenty of its biggest, strongest boys to the Martial Law Administrator's camp at the railway. Twenty boys were also sent from the Islamia school. The Martial Law Administrator selected three boys from each, in all cases the biggest

and strongest, and had them flogged. Feroze Din was flogged, and later received Rs 2300 from the Government in compensation.[17]

Interesting sidelights illuminate events across the province. Witness for the plaintiff, Khan Bahadur Sayyad Mehdi Shah, President of the Municipal Committee of Gojra, stated that the Deputy-Commissioner of Gujrat had disagreed with the imposition by the Punjab Government of a Martial Law order on his district on the grounds that there had been no violence there, and had unsuccessfully tried to get it cancelled before imposing it.[18] Rai Zada Bhagat Ram, Barrister-at-Law at Jullundur, Member of the Punjab Provincial Legislative Council from 1916 and a witness for the defence, stated that when Mr. Watson, Deputy-Commissioner of Jullundur, went on leave to England on 6 April he left Colonel Burlton as officiating Deputy-Commissioner. Bhagat Ram got on well with Burlton, though he found that officials in Jullundur were very nervous in the run up to the Disturbances. On 10 April, after receiving a telegram from Lahore with news of riots in Amritsar, Colonel Burlton asked for his advice and discussed with him what was wrong in the Punjab. Burlton told Bhagat Ram to go to Simla to lay the situation before the Viceroy. 'His view was that so long as Sir Michael O'Dwyer was in the province no peace was possible.' In the event, this trip did not happen, and O'Dwyer later made it plain to Burlton that he should cease meeting with local Indians like Bhagat Ram. The next Deputy-Commissioner, Hamilton, who arrived during the Disturbances, demanded that the leading local Indians draft a manifesto supporting Martial Law. They all refused.[19]

Random brutal British actions which were a part of the reimposition of order are indicated by the deposition of Shrimati Rajan, widow of Mahna, a sweeper of Chuhar Kana in Sheikhupura. Her husband was shot from an armoured train which passed by as he was relieving himself by the railway line. She received compensation for this from the Government.[20]

Events in Amritsar Prior to the Shooting in the Jallianwala Bagh

Eight of the depositions for the defence touch upon the events in Amritsar in the lead up to the shooting in the Jallianwala Bagh, and include an important statement by Dr Satyapal, the political leader whose arrest sparked the violence which unleashed the Disturbances. Dr Satyapal's testimony described the course of

his education and career as a doctor, part of it spent as a Government Assistant Plague Medical Officer and one year as a volunteer in Aden during the War. His deposition covered the history of his entry to politics and his career as a leader in Amritsar in the campaign against the Rowlatt Acts. It showed that on 29 March 1919, he was informed that he was prohibited from speaking or writing to the press under the Defence of India Act. Dr Kitchlew, Pandit Dina Nath, Swami Annu Bhawanand and Pandit Kotoo Mal were similarly restricted and ordered not to move outside the municipal limits. All obeyed the orders, and none attended subsequent meetings. At 8 a.m. on 10 April, when he was visiting patients, Satyapal received a letter from the Deputy-Commissioner asking him to go to his bungalow at 10 o'clock. He arrived at the bungalow at 9.55, Dr Kitchlew arriving soon afterwards. Miles Irving the Deputy-Commissioner and Rehill, the Superintendent of Police, were there with Assistant Commissioner Beckett and other Europeans. Irving showed them warrants of arrest under rule 3, clauses (b) and (c) of the Defence of India Act, ordering Satyapal to remain within the limits of Lower Dharamsala in Kangra and Kitchlew within those of Upper Dharamsala. Neither was given an opportunity to say anything. Kitchlew asked to go home and get his things, but this was refused, and the drivers of their carriages were detained until after their departure in two cars under an escort of armed European soldiers in both and accompanied by Rehill. They drove at breakneck speed to Nurpur then on to Dharamsala where they were accommodated in the *dak* bungalows for twenty-eight days, after which they were arrested again under section 124A of the Indian penal Code. They were remanded by a court, held in the police station at Pathankot overnight, then driven in handcuffs to Lahore Central Jail. There they remained in solitary confinement and on 3 June were brought before the Martial Law tribunal charged with murder, dacoity, arson, theft, sedition, waging war against the King, being members of an unlawful assembly, and other offences. On 5 July 1919 they were sentenced to transportation for life, a sentence reduced later by the Government to two years in the European ward of Lahore Central Jail. Both were released on 26 December 1919 under the royal amnesty. Satyapal's sixty-five year old father was arrested a week after his own arrest and held for six weeks without charge. As a result of all this, Satyapal joined the non-cooperation movement as 'I lost all faith in British justice'.[21]

New evidence is found in the depositions of the events that unfolded in Amritsar after these arrests. Lala Duni Chand, Vakil of the High Court of Amritsar and Member of Amritsar's Municipal Committee, stated that on 10 April he was in court, which was functioning normally as people were not prepared for the events that were to unfold that day. After violence broke out, he met the Deputy-Commissioner on horseback on the Kutchery Road, and was asked by him to go towards city to persuade people to go back inside it. So he and several others went to the footbridge over the railway, where they found Deputy-Superintendent of Police Plomer, who in turn asked them to go to the railway station to get the people there back to city. They did this, bringing the crowd to Aitchison Park, where the people asked for their dead to be returned so that they could go back to city. Duni Chand had returned to the footbridge to accomplish this when there was a burst of unprovoked firing from the Telegraph Office. The people present blamed him for this, so Duni Chand and those with him told Plomer they would withdraw their help.[22]

A similar story is told by Maneck Ji Bhica Ji Dhaber, Inspecting Agent for Messrs Strauss & Company Ltd, at Amritsar. He had gone as usual to his office in a by lane off the Hall Bazar at 11.30 am on 10 April and heard the firing. He watched dead bodies being carried past his office, so decided to close it and go back home to the Cantonment across the railway. He walked to the footbridge, where he saw Plomer and Magistrate Seymour with some troops. Some of the people were still sitting on the bridge and Seymour told him that he wanted to take possession of it, saying that if the crowd didn't move the troops would fire. Maneck began to persuade people to move to Aitchison Park and troops then took possession of the bridge. At that point firing came from the area of the Telegraph House. No one was hit by these shots, but he went to remonstrate with a nearby military officer, who said to him: 'We want to kill as many damn swine as possible.' At this, the people in Aitchison Park wanted to gather to protest, and asked him to petition the Deputy-Commissioner to allow a meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh, so he went to see the Deputy-Commissioner who was by then on the other side of footbridge. Irving said 'that he had no intention of sending the military into the city and that the people were quite welcome to go and hold a meeting' in the Bagh. The Deputy-Commissioner told him that it might be necessary to send the military only for the purpose of bringing out the European Bank

Officials. He asked Maneck to go to the town and find out what the position at the Bank was. Maneck went into the town and met a crowd who accused him of playing false as firing had taken place since his intervention. He was told that the bank managers were dead.[23]

Dr Kidar Nath Bhandari, a retired Senior Assistant Surgeon, stated that he attended twenty-five to thirty men with gunshot wounds at his home on 10 April. He sent others not seriously wounded to Dr Bashir. He attended these patients in the street as there was no room in his consulting room. He saw Mrs Easdon, doctor in charge of the Municipal Female Hospital, on the roof of the hospital which was across the road in front of his house. She was with Mrs Benjamin, Sub-charge. Mrs Easdon 'ridiculed them [the wounded] and said that they had been well served. I asked her to give me some dressing materials but she refused to do so.' Dr Bhandari heard later that people had gone after her, and that she escaped by back door.[24]

Dr Bal Mokand, Sub-Assistant Surgeon at Amritsar, was a private practitioner who at the time of the Disturbances had been in Government service working in the City Hospital under the Civil Surgeon, Colonel Smith. The latter was annoyed at the series of *hartals* which had led up to 10 April. Smith said that Kitchlew and Satyapal were not good men and called Gandhi a great *badmash*. Bal Mokand saw two bodies being carried back into the city on 10 April, and from his home saw smoke over the National Bank. In the evening, he attended a person wounded in the shooting in the Katra Mit Singh. People were panic stricken after the violence on the 10th, saying that all would suffer for the outrages committed by a few. He went to the Civil Hospital on 11 April. Two wounded had been admitted night before by Dr Dhanpat Rai, the Assistant Surgeon. Colonel Smith arrived and found them, blamed Dr Rai and sent him to work at the railway hospital. Two persons with gunshot wounds came but no one attended them, so their relations took them back. 'Colonel Smith said that General Dyer would come and bombard the city. He drew a plan and said how the bombardment would be carried out. I got frightened and asked Colonel Smith what I should do. He said that if I wanted to save my life I should come into the hospital.' On 11 and 12 April, Indian patients were told by Colonel Smith to 'go to Mahatma Gandhi'. No gun shot cases were admitted after the two treated by Dr Dhanpat Rai on the night of 10 April.[25]

Lala Sarab Dial, Vakil of the High Court at Amritsar, who had seen the Deputy-Commissioner at the Allahabad Bank verandah sitting peacefully watching the Ram Naumi procession on 9 April, not guarded by the police but sitting among large number of Indian gentlemen, testified that he stayed indoors from 10 to 13 April as people were panic-stricken and thought that the Government would adopt severe measures. The courts closed on 10 April and did not reopen till the 22nd. Free kitchens were started and operated in the city up to 13 April.[26] But some movement was taking place; K Rustum Ji an Export Import Agent, testified that on 11 and 12 April 'my boys went into city on permits obtained from Plomer. They were dressed in European clothes.' Rustum had also seen the Ram Naumi procession acting very respectful to the Deputy-Commissioner on 9 April. On the 10th, he had gone to his office in the city at 9.45 a.m. He had stopped at the National Bank and had seen the two European managers working there. He also saw the Manager of the Alliance bank drive into the city that morning in his car. He was the last to see them alive before the crowd gathered, the shops closed at 11.30 and the firing started at 12.30.[27]

To be concluded

References

1. Sir C. Sankaran Nair, *Gandhi and Anarchy* (Indore: Holkar State (Electric) Printing Press, 1922), p. 47.
2. The case is discussed in its context in Nigel A. Collett, *The Butcher of Amritsar* (London: Hambledon & London, 2005), pp. 414-18.
3. For Justice McCardie and the case, see George Pollock, *Mr Justice McCardie: A Biography* (London: John Lane, 1934), pp. 132-6.
4. Pollock, *Mr Justice McCardie*, p. 135.
5. Indian National Congress Subcommittee, *Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee of the Indian National Congress*, 2 vols (Bombay: Karnatak Press, 1920).
6. J17/634, D.W.1-49, 55-60, 64-67, 76-82, 86-87, 114, 118, and six depositions for the plaintiff, in the National Archive, Kew, *O'Dwyer v. Nair, Supreme Court of Judicature, Depositions – Exhibits Taken off the File, 16 January 1924.*
7. J17/634, D.W. 114.
8. J17/634, D.W. 115.

9. J17/634, Depositions for the Plaintiff.

10. J17/634, Depositions for the Plaintiff.

11. J17/634, D.W. 69-72.

12. J17/634, D.W. 78.

13. J17/634, D.W. 89.

14. Command 705: *Parliamentary Papers* (Commons), 1920, vol. 14, *Reports*, vol. 6, 'East India (Disturbances in the Punjab, etc)'. 'Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India on the Report of Lord Hunter's Committee', p.19.

15. J17/634, D.W. 113.

16. J17/634, D.W. 83, 85, 117, 118.

17. J17/634, D.W. 61.

18. J17/634, Depositions for the plaintiff.

19. J17/634, D.W. 114.

20. J17/634, D.W. 50.

21. J17/634, D.W. 119.

22. J17/634, D.W. 116. This is similar to, and adds additional information to, the statement given by Duni Chand to the Indian National Congress Subcommittee, *Report*, vol. 2, statement 93.

23. J17/634, D.W. 107. This is similar to, and adds additional information to, the statement given by Maneck Dhaber to the Indian National Congress Subcommittee, *Report*, vol. 2, statement 18.

24. J17/634, D.W. 110. This is similar to, and adds additional information to, the statement given by Dr Kidar Nath to the Indian National Congress Subcommittee, *Report*, vol. 2, statement 13.

25. J17/634, D.W. 112. This is similar to, and adds additional information to, the statement given by Dr Bal Mokand (Mukund) to the Indian National Congress Subcommittee, *Report*, vol. 2, statement 20.

26. J17/634, D.W. 105. This is similar to, and adds additional information to, the statement given by Lala Sarab Dial (Dayal) to the Indian National Congress Subcommittee, *Report*, vol. 2, statement 91.

27. J17/634, D.W. 111.

Letters to the Editor

I

TRIBUTE TO OUR WAR DEAD

Sir,

In the Jan-Mar 2006 issue, Maj Gen E D'Souza, under the caption 'Thimayya of India', has mentioned the gallaxy of tributes paid at his death to this great soldier. To name a few who paid tributes were the citizens of Turkey and Cypriots, the UN Secretary General, and the UK High Commissioner. The pall bearers were from the Canadian contingent, and the Guard of Honour was provided from the Canadian Guards. It is a pity and shame that, whereas the world recognised this soldier statesman's rare qualities, it was not so in his own country. At his last rites, there were none from Delhi present, not even the Army Chief.

The above is nothing new. At the last Vijay Diwas wreath laying ceremony at the National War Memorial in Pune, in spite of 25 invitations being sent to top officials of the government, except for the lady major, not a single civilian official attended the function. However, it is worse still that, although similar invitations were sent to all the retired Army officer's societies, and individually to 40 General Officers of the three Services, only four attended the ceremony. It will be agreed that, if the Service Officers don't pay homage to their own dead, it is asking too much for the civilian society to do so.

To conclude, a nation that does not remember those who laid down their lives for it, cannot always remain a nation worth dying for.

Yours faithfully

Brig N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)

II

Training of Women Cadets in the Army

It was with a sense of dejà vu that I read the well written article "Training of Women Cadets in the Army-Some Issues and Challenges" by Capt Deepanjali Bakshi (Retd) in the Oct-Dec 2005 Issue of the *USI Journal.* Poignantly highlighting aspects close to every lady officer's heart, I thought it prudent to pen down a few random thoughts.

For a long jump you don't require long legs, what you require is right attitude. Some one must have kept this in mind while inducting women in Defence Forces 14 years ago. Initially it was started on an experimental basis for a shorter duration of five years commission. Later, it was extended to 10 years and presently it stands at 14 years.

This periodic extension in the short service commission for lady officers is indicative of the fact that the experiment of inducting women into the Defence Services has met with success. But, somewhere in the minds of the Indian society, mythology still prevails that women are weaker sex. This is why different standards are set for lady officers during training. Being short service commissioned officers, lady officers are given training at the Officers Training Academy (OTA), Chennai for six months, whereas training for gentleman officers is for 11 months. Besides, the level of toughness of training also differs.

Capt Deepanjali Bakshi (Retd) is absolutely right when she says that there is no rationale behind this difference. When the rank is the same, emoluments are similar, then why not the "toughness" in training.

Women perform biologically tougher functions of life (of being a mother) than men. So who is stronger, man or woman? Right from the Services Selection Board, this disparity is created, when in the obstacle test, certain obstacles are kept optional for lady candidates and the same are mandatory for gentlemen. If this distinction is not made in the initial stages and if training for both genders is kept similar, there is no reason why lady candidates cannot compete with gents in any aspect of training, especially when they compete in academics, sports and other activities.

When a fresh course of lady cadets joins the Academy, the previous course has already passed out. Thus, there is no interaction between two courses, which results in a void of handy experience being given by senior courses to junior courses. This experience could greatly reduce the burden on instructors of lady cadets and also save time in teaching cadets basic military etiquettes.

During training, more emphasis is laid on intracadet (lady cadets vs lady cadets or gentleman cadets vs gentleman cadets) competitions and not on intercadet competitions which result in lower level of confidence in lady officers when they join their units. A lady officer has to work with not only gentleman officers but men also. That confidence level could be inculcated in the lady officers during training. The lady instructors posted there can be a source of motivation, not only for lady cadets, but also for gentleman cadets. But for this they need to set an example in front of all the cadets. For instance, there are a number of lecture cum demonstrations conducted at the Academy for cadets but not even one of them is conducted by a lady officer.

The accommodative treatment to lady cadets in the Academy results in embarrassment and a sense of inferiority in lady officers when they join their units and when they are unable to perform at par with their male colleagues.

Women are excelling in every field. The recent example is the first batch of women commandos who successfully completed training at NSG, Delhi. Then why is it that lady cadets are not given training equivalent to that of gentleman cadets? It is more mental strength and will power than physical strength which matters in overcoming a physical obstacle.

The Indian Constitution envisages equality for men and women, not only in terms of rights and privileges, but also in terms of duties and obligations. How can we demand equality for women when women cannot give equal contribution to the Nation.

If right from the beginning of training, there are similar standards of toughness for both lady cadets and gentleman cadets, and if similar training is provided to them for equal duration, lady cadets will, no doubt, be able to compete with them and will, later on, excel in their career also. To project the latent capabilities of lady cadets in a right way, at least on a trial basis, lady cadets and gentleman cadets should be given training in a similar way and for the same duration. This will ensure equality in the real sense.

Lieutenant Bindu Sharma

Review Article 1

Terrorism – Critical Concepts in Political Science*

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)@

Much has been written on terrorism and low intensity conflicts. However, few authors have made comprehensive historical comparisons; and most which are available contain only an interest in the current events. David C Rapport has made an extensive research ranging from important government documents, academic journals and from the documents produced by various terrorist organisations; the FLN and the Palestine PLO. The editor has produced four volumes and in each volume he has examined one particular wave of terrorism as it originated.

Though terrorism gained recognition as a form of warfare in the Post World War II period, it is a fairly ancient mode of warfare starting with the American War of Independence. Modern terror began in Russia in 1880s and within a decade appeared in Western Europe, Balkans and Asia, although the most destructive day in the history of terrorism is 11 September 2001. It came in four waves. The first wave was due to the failure of democratic reforms in the form of 'anarchy' and adopted assassination campaign against prominent officials. The second wave was basically 'anti colonial' wars of liberation against former colonial powers. 95 per cent of these were fought outside Europe and resulted in creation of few new states such as Ireland, Israel, Cyprus and Algeria, among others. As Empires dissolved, the second wave receded, but was overtaken by the 'New Left Wave' prominent among them being Vietnam war, which brought out the effectiveness of Vietcong's radical nationalism even with the primitive weapons against modern technology. Vietnam also saw the introduction of helicopters, chemical agents to defoliate forests and the air power in combating low intensity wars. When the Vietnam war ended in 1975, the PLO replaced the 'Vietcong' as the heroic model. However, the second and third waves consisted predominantly of terrorism with a 'nationalist' and 'ideological' focus respectively.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been the pioneer (1920s) for innovative use of technology at the tactical level for integrated use of explosive, detonator and time delay unit, now commonly used as IED for

---

*__Terrorism – Critical Concepts in Political Science.__ *David Rapport (ed), Volumes I & IV (London : Routledge, 2006), ISBN 0-415-31651-0/ 31654-5*

@__Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM__ is a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff and is a member of the USI Council.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

targeting symbolic targets with Lorry-bombs across international borders. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka perfected the concept of 'Suicide bombers' first used by the PLO in Lebanon. The fourth wave has 'religion' as the motivating factor, 'Islamic groups' being the most radical and fanatic. Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbullah being few prominent movements.

Among all the waves, use of terror, assassination and kidnappings have been common. The three events that have made the terrorist movement a formidable one are the creation of Israel, the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviets - 1979, the Gulf war of 1991 and 2003 in Iraq. After 11 September 2001, the US switched to the 'Pre-emptive' doctrine, from the 'deterrence' doctrine. As deterrence does not work on the non state actors, who are 'underground' and hence not visible or accountable like the 'State'. The Iranian revolution of 1979, by the Ayatollah added another dimension where he propagated that 'Islam' has no frontiers and hence it became international. Religious terrorism with 'Jehadi' involvement or martyrdom operation has manifested in many parts of the world-Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan and post 2003 Iraq.

In the first wave, there were three crucial international elements beyond the terrorist organisations; those additional elements were foreign states, foreign publics and diasporic populations. So far as the terrorist movements in the first wave were concerned, the Russian *Narodya Volya* (will of the people) and the Irish nationalists were most active. Unlike the Russians, the Irish showed little interest in reaching other groups, and their influence was confined to the British island and the United States. The first wave largely completed its course by World War I. The transformation of professional police forces was a striking consequence of the wave.

Volume IV, which deals with the fourth wave, brings into focus, a conspicuous religious fundamentalism in many Islamic states. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 dramatically demonstrated the importance of religion in the Muslim world. The 'Camp David Accord' in 1979 (the peace treaty between Egypt and Isreal) and the Soviet's Invasion of Afghanistan were another two events that made 'religion' in the Muslim nations as a profound political force. The Soviet invasion produced an international resistance organized under religions auspicious, attaching volunteers from all over the Arab Muslim World and the Muslim countries from Asia and Africa. The most important terrorist organization that came into being were the 'Al-Qaeda' and the 'Taliban'.

The first significant act of terror in the fourth wave was a hostage crisis generated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who seized the

American Embassy in Iran, taking 90 hostages. The military effort to rescue was a dismal failure. After the crisis, the implication of the Aytollah's statement that 'Islam has no frontier' was not adequately understood, until the most destructive events of this wave, i.e. the attacks of 11 September 2001. The creation of 'Al-Qaeda' was a direct consequence of the Afghan War, where Muslim world stood united to defeat a superpower, solely by the cause of 'Islam'.

'Suicide bombing' reminiscent of anarchist bomb throwing tactics, was the most deadly tactical innovation of this wave. This was first employed by the PLO in Lebanon to throw out the Israelis. This tactics was later adopted by the Tamil tigers in Sri Lanka and perfected by the 'Jehadis' in Afghanistan. Today, suicide-bombing as a terror tool is being used by Muslim fundamentalists in many countries such as Chechnya, Israel, India, Indonesia and Iraq.

In Volume IV, David Rapport has compiled a very exhaustive and wide range of issues involving terrorism, including all its linkages. He has put together articles by many scholars for combating terrorism in all its dimensions. Issues such as 'role of the media', 'suicide attacks' or 'martyrdom operations' 'jihadi-terrorism, the nature of intelligence and terrorism, the legal aspects of terrorism, 'Jihad against Jews and Crusaders', the 'Al-Qaeda threat' and the 'international response' to terrorism have been examined in separate chapters.

These volumes on 'Terrorism' are an excellent collection of articles, with stimulating thoughts and ideas. The issues examined are vast and complex. The books examine not only the historical background on terrorism, but the contemporary issues of fighting insurgency and all the macro aspects related to low intensity operations. A must read for all those involved in the study of terrorism.

South Asia at the Crossroads*

Shri K K Mitra, IPS (Retd)**

The author teaches international history at Bath Spa University College. A fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he is associated with Wolfson College, Oxford. His academic qualifications are impressive. Unfortunately, however, this volume is a disappointment. As the blurb says, the author investigates the ideological onslaught on pluralism in South Asia with reference to what he calls "majoritarianism" which includes, in his view, Jihad, Talibanisation, Sunni Statism and Hindutva. The author calls them "radical ultra-right populist movements. According to him, the foot soldiers of these populist movements are all trained in madrassas or temples. A sweeping statement unsubstantiated by facts. One tries in vain to look for the basis of the remarks regarding alleged training activities in the temples in India or abroad.

The author wonders whether it would be correct to decry "the ideological forces" that attract so many recruits amongst others without investigating their historical and politico-economic roots. So, the Taliban, the LET, the JEM, the LTTE, Maoists and the BJP, in the eyes of Malik, are all similar ideological groups and need to be discussed together. Much has been written already about the origin and recruitment base of the Islamist Jihadis which the author cannot be unaware of.

The author develops his flawed thesis regarding the so-called ultra right radical movements in South Asia in six chapters. He devotes forty six pages to the 'dangerous implications of Hindutva' for South Asia but when he comes to Pakistan, he refers to only the issues of governance in Pakistan and problems of nation building in two chapters without investigating or questioning the role of the Pakistan State and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in sponsoring, arming and exporting terror. As regards Bangladesh, the issue of stateless Biharis is discussed in detail but there is no attempt to investigate the rise of radical Islam and mushrooming of Islamist terrorist organisations in recent years in that country which has dangerous portents for the region.

The chapter on "Jihad, political Islam and, the Taliban" provides a reasonable overview of political Islam. The notion of jihad, especially, the practical interpretations of Jihad, its early revisionism, the revivalists, the

---

*__Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban – South Asia at the crossroads.__ *Iftikar H Malik (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2005), 298p; Rs. 495.00, ISBN-0-19-597790-4.*

**__Shri K K Mitra, IPS__ is a former Principal Director, Directorate General of Security.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

neo-classicists, madrasas and the jihadi culture have been narrated competently. But once again, the author's mastery over historical details notwithstanding, he invariably slips up when he attempts to pronounce definitive judgement on the Taliban, which he sees as just one more group in a line of Islamist groups that have been struggling for last three centuries to "revive lost Muslim glory" by taking up arms against more powerful foes. Does Malik really believe that Taliban would revive lost Muslim glory by executing civilians and innocent human beings belonging to other faiths?

It is Chapter 2 "Beyond Ayodhya : Hindutva and Implications for South Asia" where Malik tragically and absolutely fails to conceal his prejudiced view of recent events in India's history. Where did he see the growing menace of Hindutva with regional and extra-regional portents? Or the so-called marginalisation of the "constitutionalists" and the "secularists" in India? The support base of the BJP is limited to only a few states and that too amongst the higher castes of the Hindus (not even 20 per cent) a significant number of whom do not vote for the BJP. The myth of the rising tide of the ultra right allegedly occupying centre stage in Indian polity has been proved wrong. To prove his thesis, the author even invents the renewal of an emotional debate in India on the partition by apportioning blame to the Muslims and Jinnah who "vivissected mother India" and now planned to balkanise it. Actually there is no debate nor any scope for debate. As a student of history, the author ought to have known that the partition was a direct result of Jinnah's flawed two nation theory – a theory which has many believers even today – people who cannot still reconcile themselves to the reality that a Muslim majority and Kashmir can exist as a part of secular and democratic India which has rejected religion as a basis of statehood.

Without doubt, Muslim voices have been raised against the obscurantist hijacking of this great religion. Many Muslim scholars have called for reforms in the Muslim world and depoliticisation of Islam. Mushirul Hasan has argued that it is important to have a powerful internal critique, which will set the Muslim societies on the right course. The enemy, he says, is not Huntington, Rushdie or Naipaul, but those within their own ranks, who destroy Bamiyan statues, impose dress codes, execute innocent people and enforce a version of Islam that goes against the spirit and letter of Islam. As and when that reform takes place, Jihad in the sense in which Bin Laden or the terrorists in Kashmir use it, will lose its appeal and the historical tradition of accommodation and integration between religions can be restored not only in South Asia but many other parts of the world as well.

Review Article 3

Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia*

Ms Namrata Goswami**

The book explores the concept of "minimum credible deterrence" and the theory of limited war. The author contextualises his study by focusing on the case studies of China, India, and Pakistan. Most significantly, these three states have engaged in wars in the past; India-Pakistan, 1947, 1965 and 1971 and the India-China limited conflict in 1962. All these three nuclear weapon states also share territorial borders and, thus, possess the potential to destabilise the other's internal security. With regard to their nuclear weapons, the three states are more or less influenced by a historical baggage of distrust; China and Pakistan against India and, consequently, India's nuclear strategy has to account for potential threats from the two states at the systemic and national levels. The dominating variable of domestic public opinion is also an important factor in all the three states' foreign policies towards the other.

Nuclear deterrence signifies the ability of states in possession of nuclear weapons to dissuade each other from engaging in nuclear warfare. The perception of terrible consequences of a nuclear war is reason enough for states to deviate from such warfare; conventional wars between nuclear weapon states are also deterred as they could escalate to the nuclear threshold and, subsequently, the end result would be total destruction. However, the author asserts that the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 between the US and the USSR, the 1969 Ussuri river clashes between China and the USSR, and the Kargil conflict of 1999 between India and Pakistan contradicts the universal logic that nuclear weapons deter all wars. The author argues that nuclear weapons do not deter states from engaging in limited wars. But the contention of this reviewer is that nuclear weapons might have deterred the limited wars between states from accelerating to a point of higher escalation. Moreover, the chapter on nuclear weapons and the international system, which refers specifically to the above mentioned three cases, remains in the national level of analysis. The author has little to add theoretically on the linkage between nuclear weapons and the international system; the crux of the stability/instability debate with regard to the international system. When he asserts that the China-India-Pakistan nuclear triangle is more of a bilateral matrix with China supporting Pakistan against India, he fails to cite the reasons for China's refusal to support Pakistan during the Kargil conflict.

---

*__Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia : China, India and Pakistan.__ *Arpit Rajain (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2005), 495p, Rs. 480.00, 0-7619-3284-4.*

**__Ms Namrata Goswami__ is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 564, April-June 2006.

In his chapters on China, India and Pakistan, the author traces the strategic culture of the three nations. He quotes Jack Synder, who defines strategic culture as the sum total of "ideas, conditional emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of national strategic community share with each other". While defining China's grand strategy as inclusive of hard power, soft power, coordinated power and environmental power, the author rightly indicates the Chinese belief that economic power is the most essential component of comprehensive national power. China's nuclear strategy, according to the author, is geared to preclude nuclear blackmail; that nuclear capability would deter the enemy because of fear of massive retaliation. However, despite its rising power potential, China does not possess a publicly stated nuclear doctrine. Coming to India, the author explains India's strategic culture as hazy, its military strategy largely reactive. Quoting George Tanham, the author states that military matters in India have been marked routinely by a passive, or at best a reactive approach, that is further located in the hierarchical nature of society...Moreover, the early Indian nuclear path was influenced by the Nehruvian school of thought. Nehru was opposed to nuclear weapons, but was not against the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In those early years after independence, India championed hard for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The author laments that this kind of posture reflected a crippling pacifism and was informed by India's past history of passivity and tolerance. The choices India made at the world forum were determined by a moralistic brand of politics during the Nehru years. One should refrain from offering such a simplistic analysis of Nehru's choice of non-alignment. India's fledgling status as a nation-state augmented such positioning to ward off great power balancing at that time, driven by the rationale of forming blocs by the US and USSR to balance each other. It was realistic to non-align, given the constraints at the systemic level.

Coming to India's nuclear posture, the author refers to the Exercise Brass Tacks crisis, 1986-87, when a large military exercise by India in Northern Rajasthan was perceived by Pakistan as a launch posture and led to it deploying troops on the international border. The nuclear dimension of the crisis emerged when Dr A Q Khan "father" of Pakistan's nuclear bomb informed Indian journalist Kuldeep Nayyar that Pakistan had enriched uranium. It was a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons, but the "nuclear signalling" did not deter India from carrying on military exercises. Herein, comes the question of credibility of a threat in a nuclear scenario. He also refers to the 1990 crisis between India and Pakistan with regard to cross border terrorism. India released its draft nuclear doctrine in 1999 in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests. The author argues that India, in order to establish its status as a responsible nuclear weapons

state, declared in its draft doctrine a unilateral moratorium on testing, no-first use, minimum credible deterrent, and securing the survivability of tactical nuclear weapons. The establishment of a Command and Control structure institutionalised India's nuclear weapons. However, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in justifying the Pokhran explosions in a letter to the US President Bill Clinton cited the Chinese threat as the rationale. This did considerable damage to India-China relations. Moreover, India's status as a "responsible nuclear weapons state" is outside the ambit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, thus, the author's arguments do not carry legal weightage, given the context. It is too speculative and futuristic. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal has the potential to accept India's unique status within the global nuclear order but it remains to be seen how the US Congress and the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) react to it.

Towards the end, the author asserts that in the triangular matrix of China, Pakistan and India, it is not possible to establish nuclear stability given the different motivations and nuclear ambitions of the three actors. Though he does write that nuclear weapons have "limited the military extent, geographical scope and strategic aim of war among states, that possess such capabilities", the author indicates that deterrence is a myth and would not stop nuclear states from engaging in limited wars over borders and other emotive issues. In that context, he quotes Thomas Schelling who warned that "limited war can get out of hand by degrees" and that the risk is enormous in nuclear states fighting each other. Yet, the contention of the reviewer is that nuclear deterrence is a rational strategy and a practical policy in an anarchical world order infested with suspicious and hostile states. Why? The unique nature of nuclear weapons and its ability to assure mutual destruction limit the choice of policy makers of nuclear weapons states to use the deadly weapons they possess. Ultimately, nuclear deterrence has worked for so many decades because it is a bloodless strategy and rational state actors would not use them in wars for fear of Mutuall Assured Destruction (MAD).

The book is well sourced and instructive on the nuclear deterrence debate. The author succeeds in capturing the essence of certain core issues. However, the author could have avoided repetition of similar arguments in certain sections.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

International History of the Twentieth Century. *By Antony Best, Jussi M Hanhimiki, Joseph A Maiolo, Kirsten E Schulze (London : Routledge, 2004), 531p, ISBN 0-415-20740-1.*

The years between 1900 and 2000 witnessed some of the most dramatic developments in the history of international relations. The two World Wars; eclipse of Europe and rise of United States; proliferation of new states in Asia and Africa; the Cold War and finally détente defined the contours of this century. The authors have attempted to provide a detailed treatise of this history in their book. Covering events in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas, the book offers an authoritative account of relations between states as well as the ideological, economic and other factors that have shaped the key developments of that century. Intended to "offer students a one-volume, clear and wide-ranging account of the twentieth century and to explain why world politics followed this complex and violent course", the book partially succeeds in this task.

The authors, all prominent professors of international history at the London School of Economics at the time of writing this book, have used their expertise to produce a thoroughly researched, clear and comprehensive chronicle of tumultuous events. The book treats the century as a whole rather than as disjointed by the two World Wars and the Cold War. All chapters follow in chronological order and are related to each other making it reader friendly and accessible. A detailed glossary, illustrations, maps as well as suggested readings at the end of each chapter make the book more endearing for students of international history.

A drawback of the book, however, is that it uses a narrow lens to review events and does not reflect the concerns of colonial, post colonial, subaltern or feminist schools, which are now increasingly trying to understand the manner in which culture and gender influenced international history. It is necessary to engage these disciplines to produce a work that adds to the academic discourse.

On the whole, the book offers undergraduate students the necessary tools to comprehend international history of the 20th century and is a valuable addition.

Ms Anisha Kinra

Leadership : Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw. *By Major General Shubhi Sood (Retd) (Noida : SDS Publishers, 2006), 282p, £ 19.00, ISBN 81-902828-4-0.*

In a market saturated with books on leadership, this heartwarming addition on a multi-faceted personality must surely create a niche of its own.

The Field Marshal is an epitome of an officer and a gentleman. A man marked for ascendancy, he exhibited traits of a great leader very early in his career. Perhaps no Commanding Officer could have erred more grievously than the one who wrote in FM's first annual report, "... this man may one day become an officer".

In an anecdotal account the varied and colourful traits of this icon have been delightfully encapsulated by the author with the advantage of proximity and the skill of expressive language. The attribute of 'being lucky' – so necessary for a leader – has been highlighted. The Field Marshal survived 'sudden death' both in the field and in his career several times. The other attributes which stand out are his Churchillian gift of repartee, his ready wit and his ability to interact with natural ease and charm at any level from a jawan to the Prime Minister. Bucking the prevailing trend the FM was genuinely averse to flatterers and flattery. Possibly the most remarkable aspect of this kaleidoscopic personality is his concern for and loyalty to his subordinates. In an era in which the two way flow of loyalty is more preached than practiced, he gave more loyalty than he expected.

On the professional front the author has explained how the Field Marshal gave impetus to modernisation, procured the latest equipment, his role in the IGMDP and the circumstances under which the somewhat sluggish Vijayant Tank was purchased.

Certain contentious issues needed greater coverage. Though the author has quoted from Lieutenant General J F R Jacob's book, he has not retorted to some sensitive points raised therein. On the much debated issue of Dacca not being specifically nominated as an objective, the reasons given by the author are not wholly convincing.

Good photographs have added value, though some needed to be of a larger size and some, like 'Pioneer Course' (page 9) would improve with annotation. Maps definitely needed to be of larger scale to aid comprehension. Some printer devils have crept in, such as 'Riana' (instead of Raina) or rights (instead of rites).

Quite understandably a slight degree of hero worship is discernible. Were there really no chinks in the armour? They were there in case of all great captains through ages, from Hannibal to Napoleon to Rommel to MacArthur.

Given the quality of production, the book is reasonably priced for institutions and libraries. However for individual possession a less expensive edition is recommended.

Brigadier M S Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)

The Young Warriors : A History of the Rashtriya Indian Military College, Dehra Dun. *By Arun Prakash (Dehra Dun : Rashtriya Indian Military College, 2004), xxix, 555p, Rs. 999.00, ISBN 81-7525-513-7.*

You may admire them, or you may dislike them; but you most certainly cannot ignore them! Anyone who has served in the Indian Armed Forces will agree that the ubiquitous Rimcollians, as alumini of the Rashtriya Indian Military College (RIMC) are commonly known, permeate every fibre of the military fabric of the subcontinent.

Commander Arun Prakash Bhattacharya, himself an alumnus of the RIMC and now an honorary faculty member, has written history of one of India's premier military schools. It is rare to come across a work of this nature that is as thoroughly researched as this volume.

The RIMC traces its roots back to the early attempts by Lord Curzon to commence 'Indianisation' of the officer corps in India, starting with the foundation of the ill-starred Imperial Cadet Corps (ICC) in 1901-02. The ICC was formed primarily from the sons of ruling princes and chiefs, from various parts of the country, who were considered fit to be commissioned into the Army. While commissioning itself was the desired and stated object of the ICC, the British authorities had not clearly worked out as to what was to be done with the young Indians who were commissioned.

The book is divided into three sections. The first deals with the initial ICC period from 1902 to 1921. While the RIMC was not directly connected with it, the ICC was housed at the Rajwara Camp in Dehra Dun, which location was later passed on to the RIMC. The RIMC itself came into being as the Prince of Wales' Royal Indian Military College in 1921. The second section of the book is devoted to the period, 1922 to 1947 during which the college sent a number of its alumni into pioneering positions as officers in the Indian Armed Forces. During the first ten years after its inception, the RIMC sent as many as 57 cadets to Sandhurst, three to Woolich, and one to the RAF College, Cranwell. After the formation of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in 1932, till a year after independence, 159 RIMC cadets joined the IMA, 29 joined the Indian Air Force and 82 joined Officer's Training Schools. When India attained independence, approximately three-fourths of the officers of the rank of Brigadier and above in the Indian Army were ex-cadets of RIMC. During the Second World War many ex-cadets of the College had distinguished themselves, winning the coveted Victoria Cross (Prem Bhagat, the first Indian Officer to be so honoured), four Distinguished Service Orders, two Destinguished Flying Cross and thirteen Military Cross, one among them getting a bar a few days later. The third section deals with the period from 1948 till date. Following independence, the College retained its 'Royal' title during the Dominion

period, but gave it up, as did all army units, when India became a Republic in 1950, becoming the Rashtriya Indian Military College, thereby managing to retain its original 'RIMC' link. The author has taken great pains to include accounts and details of ex-cadets who migrated to Pakistan on partition of the country in 1947.

There are a number of detailed and useful appendices. The book suffers from lack of an index and would have benefitted from a professional editor. However, it is a comprehensive 'labour of love', and an important addition to the available literature on the history of military education in the sub-continent. Strongly recommended for all Service libraries and for anyone with an interest in Indian military and social history.

Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd)

Strategy for Chaos : Revolutions in Military Affairs and Evidence of History. *By Colin S Gray (London : Frank Cass 2003), 310p, price not indicated, ISBN 0-7146-5186-9.*

This book explains the hypothesis on revolution in military affairs (RMA) theoretically and historically. Prof Colin S Gray gives important insights into the RMA which emerged from the demise of the Soviet Union and emergence of the United States as the sole super power in the early 1990s. He goes on to examine the idea that RMAs have been occurring throughout history and that we are on the brink of another period of revolutionary change in the means with which men and women wage war.

In this book Professor Gray provides analysts and policy-makers an understanding of history, strategy and even the process of policy making. He creates a larger framework for thinking about RMAs and in so doing he has brought historical record to bear on both the specifics of the processes that have contributed to RMAs in the past as well as creation of a theoretical framework on how we need to think about future RMAs. He has linked strategy in the picture of understanding how to think about RMAs. Without a strategic framework that actually relates to the problems the success in creating an RMA would become meaningless.

I would strongly recommend to the serving military brass of Indian Armed Forces to study carefully chapter 3 pertaining to RMA Dynamics, to develop the joint architecture of Network Centric Warfare. This will greatly facilitate the understanding of the theory of developing an RMA in order to avoid pitfalls in the process of development.

Finally, we must complement the author on producing a book which will be of immense value not only for the historical and political science communities but also for the strategic and military policy makers.

Lieutenant General V K Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

Understanding Security : A New Perspective. *By TK Oomen (New Delhi : Macmillan India Ltd. 2006), 174p, Rs. 320.00, ISBN 1403-929424*

'Security' encompasses diverse threats to the nation, ie external, internal, economic and socio-political. However, many states organise their security against external aggression, ignoring issues such as was evidenced in the disintegration of the former Yugoslav republic. Professor TK Oomen an eminent social scientist has examined the non-traditional security threats by introducing the sociological dimension to the security perspective.

The author recommends a re-examination of the conventional concept, that the state should be fully secure and is the sole provider of security needs. Prof Oomen argues that several of the responsibilities earlier shouldered by the state are being taken over now by the civil society and the corporate institutions. Therefore a tri-sector approach, wherein conjoint responsibility of the state, civil society and the market institutions in today's context, is a more relevant theme. Chapter two of the book makes a historical sweep through the colonial era, the Cold War and the current global age so as to understand how the institution of state was implicated in security. In chapter three, the author while mapping the security scenario concludes the wars in the Third World were necessitated because of the artificial divisions created by the colonial powers by promoting ethnicity and separate religious identities. These were further supported by selling cheap arms to the developing world largely in Asia and Africa and sustained by endorsement of the emerging nation states. In chapter four, these issues have been examined with special reference to South-Asia, which has differing socio-cultural complexity, unresolved border issues and differing political systems. Many of the South-Asian states have diverse cultural societies and in most cases the political and cultural boundaries do not coincide. To a major extent the present security problems of the developing world are the creation of their colonial masters, as the concept of nation states and loyalty to separate religious and linguistic identities were made competing, and irreconcilable.

The author highlights the importance of good governance in providing security in chapter five, and further recommends a shift from the prevailing "governmentalisation" of security to governance of security. In chapter six the very important aspects of environment and the role of technology have been discussed. The degradation of the environment by unplaned development, the unprecedented increase in population, migration to the urban centres and economic disparities has brought in its wake social conflicts. Finally in chapter seven, Prof Oomen has provided a new blueprint for security analysis, conceptualising a secure society free of genocide, "culturoscide" and "ecocide". A very interesting and stimulating book on

these security issues from an entirely new and innovative perspective wherein the focus has been on non-traditional security aspects – internal socio-political economic and environmental fields.

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles : Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective. *Edited by Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Timothy M Shaw, (UK : Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005), 151p, £ 49.95, ISBN 0-7546-1671-1.*

This book has eight chapters, each written by a different author. The writers have used empirical analysis and case studies to explain the dynamics and complexities associated with application of military force in local conflicts and international politics with focus on Africa and the Balkans. It questions the use of military force in humanitarian interventions and peacebuilding and recommends out of the box thinking to evolve alternative solutions to the problems being faced by the international community.

The book, however, does not make fluent reading as too much jargon has been used in a complicated and complex manner for easy understanding of issues by layman.

Lieutenant General M R Kochhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Terrorism : Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume II. *Edited by David C Rapoport (Oxfordshire : Routledge, 2006), 362p, Price not indicated, ISBN: 0-415-31652-9.*

Book comprises three parts. Part 1 is General and International Context containing essays on terrorism as it affected different parts of the world. The first essay, by J Bowyer Bell is on British approach to Indian struggle for freedom, the Irish revolt for Home Rule and the Marxist matrix. John Dugard in his essay studies the just war in order to demonstrate its influence upon litico-legal thought in the Third World, and its contribution to the justification of wars of national liberation and acts of terror committed in the furtherance of these wars. Robert Kumamoto examines American response to the Jewish rebels in Palestine and to the FLN in Algeria. Maurice AJ Tugwell describes how guilt transfer justifies the original act, turning it from a psychological liability into an asset, while simultaneously stripping the opponent's actions of moral righteousness and practical utility. Martha Cranshaw Hutchinson, examines revolutionary terrorism as a part of insurgent strategy. Of particular interest to Indian readers is Bhikhu Parekh's essay on Gandhi's Theory of Non-violence: His Reply to the Terrorists. Although the Indian example given in the British Imperial stage

pre-empts this essay to a degree, the author retains his originality by describing Mahatma's changing views on terrorism. Gandhi considered Indian anarchists' zeal as totally misplaced, since violence had no place in his brilliant strategy of dealing with the British. Much later he said, "God would not excuse me if, on the Judgment Day, I were told to plead before him that I could not prevent these terrible things from happening because I was held back by my creed of nonviolence." In Terrorists Tales, Gerald Cromer tackles Lehi's anti British movement in Palestine.

Part 2 is on Movements and Participants' Statements describing terrorism in Ireland, Israel, Algeria and Cyprus. Part 3 is devoted to counter-terrorism describing actions of regimes in Algeria, Ireland and Malaysia.

Although Rapoport has been very judicious in his selection of essayists, this book on political science is of little interest to military readers. He has been orthographically perfect.

Major General Yatindra Pratap (Retd)

Sea Power : A Guide for the Twenty First Century. *By Geoffrey Till (London : Frank Cass, 2004), 430p, £ 18.99, ISBN 0-7146-8436-8.*

The author analyses the traditional Mahanian and Corbettian concept of sea power as it existed till the pre-Second World War era and expounds radical changes and concludes that adaptations are necessary in the priorities of world navies.

The author has put forward a very exhaustive agenda to form the basis for full discussion on matters maritime, in the evolving strategic configuration. He correctly asserts that the bench marks of sea power that had been the domain and preserve of the West will require a sea change in the emerging scenario, post Cold War.

He sees 'maritime power' and 'Sea Power' as interchangeable as both entail interaction with civilian maritime field and/or air and ground forces to influence results. Sea power, the author says, is a "tight and inseperable system in which naval power protects the maritime assets that are sources of its effectiveness". He advocates that maritime power, liberalisation, trade and prosperity have to be fully interwoven to have continuing advantage in the context of information revolution.

Geoffrey Till brings out how ancient naval powers like China and Japan suffered by insulating regimes, from prevailing maritime powers and fell behind global developments. He analyses Corbett's thesis on "limited maritime wars, which were more political than most... allowed country's

rulers carefully weigh the costs of war in order to compare them with the benefits." Naval strategy, the author says, has to be related to land strategy.

The book puts together the maritime and sea power debate that confronted the land focused countries like France, Germany, Russia and China in the background of the Mahanian and Corbettian concepts, which did not suit their geopolitical configurations.

The author dwells extensively on what are the 'Constituents of Sea Power'. These could be candid words of wisdom for our policy makers, a chapter worth reading. He categorises the Indian Navy as a medium naval power after the US Navy, Soviet Navy of 1990, French and British Navies and brackets us with the Chinese and Japanese Navies. The difference is lack of strategic deterrence and compellence.

All in all, a must read contemporary book, which should find place in all libraries of academies and colleges of higher military and strategic learning, naval or otherwise.

Vice Admiral IJS Khurana, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Air Navigation Systems. *By P S Dhunta and K Ramalingam (Mumbai : Nirvan Publications, 2005), 376p, Rs. 1750.00.*

Air Navigation Systems is a book by professionals for avionics engineers and aircrew. The coverage is comprehensive, the text is lucid and diagrams clear. The mathematical treatment is exhaustive and demanding. A simpler treatment would have been more accessible to the average aircrew and engineer, but clearly at the cost of thoroughness.

A point that is of some importance is the purpose of air navigation as enunciated in Chapter 2: "The final purpose of navigating the aircraft is to know its position, altitude and speed at all times during its movement." Actually, the object of air navigation is to ensure that the aircraft follows a planned flight-path within a desired timeframe – implying the progress of the aircraft in a four-dimensional complex. Determining the position is obviously an important means to that end, but it is not in itself the end.

One feature that detracts from the value of this excellent volume is the absence of an index. This would be most useful for a serious student.

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd)

The Future of Europe : Integration and Enlargement. *Edited by Fraser Cameron (London : Routledge, 2004), 170p, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-415-32483-1.*

This book is an insightful overview of the European Union's (EU)

expansion process from 15 to 25 Member States in 2004. The authors indicate the significant implications of the historic agreement in April 2003 at Athens when 25 Heads of States and Governments signed on the Treaty of Accession, which brought an end to division of Europe. These divisions were deepened by the tragic history of the two World Wars, which affected Europe in the 20th Century. The authors assert that the prime motivation for European integration and enlargement of the EU is peace. The concept of European peace is like a recurrent leitmotif. As a result, the political and economic destinies have been woven tightly together, creating an inextricable dependency. The intergovernmental conference (IGC) deals with the process of EU enlargement.

The growing complexity in both the systemic and national levels of functioning, the fallout from the devastating Balkan Wars, the collapse of communism, terrorism, transnational crime and the rising crescendo of immigration pressures have added impetus to an enlarged role for the EU. The EU established a Convention dealing with Europe's future in 2003. The first chapter by David Allen provides an assessment of the background leading to the establishment of the Convention. The negotiations for EU's difficult process of enlargement have been analysed by Graham Avery. The author focuses on the issues of governance, legitimacy, identity and democratic accountability, which dominated this process. He states that the EU institutions, however, suffer from "overstretch", created as they were to deal with six member-states at the time of inception of the EU in 1958. These institutions now deal with 25 member-states. Andrew Scott in his chapter examines the "political economy" of the enlarged EU. Simon Serfaty reflects on the US attitudes and policies towards further European integration. Given the compulsions of the Cold War politics, the US favoured an integrated Europe as it helped contain the erstwhile USSR. With the break up of the USSR, the coming down of Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 and the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, the US and Europe seem to be on separate paths. The author argues that the US is apprehensive that a united Europe could play the role of a counterweight to US global power. Such a posture could seriously damage the transatlantic connection and the EU's progress.

The book ends with a radical conclusion that the European view of an all powerful European superstate is but a figment of imagination.

This book is an excellent study on the challenges to EU enlargement, and provides insightful propositions on the issues of Euroscepticism, the impact of ICG treaty changes on the functioning of the EU, and the implications of reforms within the Lisbon agenda on the EU.

Ms Namrata Goswami

Trust in Public Institutions in South Africa. *Edited by Steinar Askvik and Nelleke Bak (UK : Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 268p, £ 50.00, ISBN 0-754643530.*

This book deals with people's trust in public institutions in South Africa in the spheres of local and federal government, land, housing, water issues, health services, tax collection and education. It goes on to examine the performance of these institutions in the ten years of their existence.

Notwithstanding that South Africa is inherently a low trust society due to history of racial oppression, people had high expectations from the government and the public institutions. In the initial years, these institutions were given the benefit of doubt but as time wore on and people learnt more about their functioning, faith and hope gradually gave way to frustration and distrust. The book has dissected several case studies to unravel the reasons for erosion of trust which the people had reposed in these institutions. Their trust in government and satisfaction with political performance has declined sharply since.

The findings of the book are pertinent not only for South Africa but for many other developing countries also. They appear to be very familiar as they bear great resemblance to the happenings in our country too. The book has great relevance for the people of India who, it seems, are not alone in their agony in so far as the functioning of government and public institutions is concerned. I strongly recommend this for enlightened reading.

Lieutenant General M R Kochhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Bangladesh : The Next Afghanistan. *Hiranmay Karlekar (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2005), 311p, Rs. 320.00, ISBN 0-7619-3401-4.*

This is the first comprehensive book on the developments in Bangladesh after the elections of 2001, that brought the Government of Mrs Khaleda Zia into power in alliance with two Islamic Fundamentalist parties, the Jamiat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Islamic Oikhya Jote (IOJ), that led to a wave of attacks on the minorities, the Hindus, Christians and the Buddhists in that country. These attacks were mainly targeted against the supporters of the Awami League and since the minorities were their supporters, they were singled out for vicious retribution.

The book is thorough and the author has done excellent research following the history and the growth of Wahabi Islam in East Bengal and later Bangladesh. The historical prelude is particularly interesting, explaining the roots of the anti minority feelings that gradually developed, because of British rule, the avaricious Hindu business community and the Hindu

Bhadralok who oppressed the Muslim peasantry. There is a short sketch of the creation of Pakistan and the alienation between the West Pakistan leadership and the Bangladesh people. The interlude of the short secular period after Bangladesh was born then leads to the return of Islamic fundamentalists to Bangladesh under the leadership of General Ziaur Rehman and the rehabilitation of the killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, and the leadership of the Awami League who were killed in the Dacca jail on 3 November 1975 by a group of army officers. This was followed by the return of the JEI leaders who had sided with Pakistan in the liberation of Bangladesh.

The next chapters have been excellently researched by detailing all the press reportage by neutral publications of Bangladesh. The sending of cadres from the Madrassas of Bangladesh to Pakistan and Afghanistan for the jihad against the Russians, the consequent import of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI) the rise of the vicious Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) make vivid reading. The author has also brought out the subversion of the bureaucracy, civil, police and judiciary of Bangladesh by the ruling party in the crusades conducted by the communal oraganisations by well-researched quotes from the neutral press of Bangladesh.

The book is a valuable addition to the literature on Islamic fundamentalism in our neighbourhood and must be read by all officials dealing with national security, civil, police or military.

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending June 2006

(The books reviewed in January-March 2006 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

ANNUAL REPORT – MINISTRY OF FINANCE – 2005-2006

Economic Survey 2005-2006. *New Delhi, Ministry of Finance Economic Division. 2006. 292p., Rs. 225.00, ISBN NA.*

CENTRAL ASIA – CONFLICT PREVENTION

Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention. *Edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006. 209p., Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-309-0077-7.*

CHINA – POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

The Anatomy of Political Power in China. *By Guoguang Wu. Singapore, Marshall Cavendish International, 2005. 365p., $ 30, ISBN 981-210-366-X.*

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Heaven's Light Our Guide: The Genesis of Indian Police. *By Kuldip Sharma. Delhi, Macmillan, 2006. 384p., Rs. 645.00, ISBN 1-403-92857-6.*

CONSTITUTION REFORMS - INDIA

Perspectives on the Construction. *Edited by Subhash C Kashyap. Delhi, Shipra Publications, 2003. 302p., Rs. 650.00, ISBN 81-7541-276-3.*

DIRECTORY - DIPLOMATIC - 2006

Directory of Diplomatic Missions in India & Abroad 2006. *New Delhi, Delhi Information Bureau, 2006. 368p. Rs. 300.00, ISBN 81-88274-02-X.*

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY - CHINA

The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. *By Elizabeth C Economy. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004. 337p., $ 17.95 ISBN 0-8014-8978-4.*

INDIA - ECONOMIC RELATIONS - ASEAN

India-ASEAN Economic Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization. *Edited by Nagesh Kumar , Rahul Sen and Mukesh Asher.*

New Delhi, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2006. 313p., Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7122-095-9.

INDIA - NORTH EAST

History, Religion and Culture of North East India. *By T Raatan. Delhi, Isha Books, 2006. 319p., Rs. 900.00, ISBN 81-8205-178-9.*

INDIA - REFERENCE YEARBOOK - 2006

The Penguin India Reference Yearbook 2006. *Edited by Derek O'Brien. New Delhi, Penguin Books, 2006. 975p., Rs. 130.00, ISBN 0-14-400064-4.*

INDIA - PAKISTAN RELATIONS

India – Pakistan Relations: The Story of a Fractured Fraternity. *By M P Ajithkumar. Delhi, Kalpaz, 2006. 308p., Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-7835-493-4.*

INDIA – TRADE RELATIONS – CHINA

China and India: Towards Global Economic Supremacy? *By Rita Dulci Rahman and Jose Miguel Andreu. New Delhi, Academic Foundations, 2006. 249p., Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7188-424-5.*

INDIAN ARMY - BIOGRAPHY

Leadership : Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw. *By Shubhi Sood. Noida, SDS Publishers, 2005. 290p., $ 34, ISBN 81-902828-4-0.*

INDO - PAK WAR 1965

Missed Opportunities Indo-Pak War 1965. *By Lachhman Singh Lehl. Dehradun, Natraj, 2005. 402p., Rs. 450.00, ISBN 81-8158-005-2.*

INFORMATION WARFARE

Security, Strategy and the Quest for Bloodless War. *By Robert Mandel. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006. 209p., Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-309-0079-3*

IRAQ WAR

The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq. *By Martin Shaw. Cambridge, Polity, 2005. 183p., £ 13.99, ISBN 0-7456-3411-7.*

In the Name of Democracy: American War Crimes in Iraq and Beyond. *Edited by Jeremy Brecher, Jill Culter and Brendan Smith. New York, Metropolitan Books, 2005. 332p., $ 13.50, ISBN 0-8050-7969-6.*

ISLAMIC COUNTRIES – RELATIONS – UNITED STATES

Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. *By Robert Dreyfuss. New York Metropolitan Books. 2005. 388p., $ 21.50, ISBN 0-8050-7652-2.*

JAMMU AND KASHMIR - PROBLEMS

The Great Disclosures: Secret Unmasked. *By Hilal Ahmad War . New Delhi, Manas, 2006. Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7049-247-5.*

MANOEUVRE WARFARE

The Maneuver Warfare Handbook. *By William S Lind. Dehra Dun, Natraj Publishers, 2005. 226p., Rs. 295.00, ISBN 81-8158-041-9.*

MEMOIRS

A Spy's Journey: A CIA Memoir. *By Floyd L Paseman. New Delhi, Manas, 2006. 315p., Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-7049-281-5.*

Kashmir 1947: A Survivor's Story. *By Krishna Mehta. New Delhi, Penguin Books, 2005. 168p., Rs. 200.00, ISBN 0-14-400017-2.*

An Angel in the Cockpit: The True Story of a Death Defying Flight Across Miles of Land and Sea. *By Vijaypat Singhania. New Delhi, Roli Books, 2005. 288p., Rs. 395.00, ISBN 81-7436-427-7.*

V K Krishna Menon Remembered. *New Delhi, Indian Society of International Law, 2005. 212p., Rs. 600 .00, ISBN 81-7827-133-8.*

MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES – FOREIGN POLICY - SECURITY AND STABILITY

International Interests in the Gulf Region. *Abu Dhabi, Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004. 204p., £.24.50, ISBN 9948-00-658-5.*

The Gulf: Challenges of the Future. *Abu Dhabi, Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005. 516p., £ 24.50, ISBN 9948-00-704-2.*

MILITARY - MEDIA RELATIONS

Military and Media. *By Anil Kumar Singh. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006. 261p., Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7062-230-1.*

INDIA – SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives. *Edited by N S Sisodia and C Uday Bhaskar. New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2005. 376p., Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-86019-51-0.*

India and the World: Selected Articles. *From IDSA Journals v.1 Strategic Thought the Formative Years 1965 -1985 Edited by N S Sisodia and C Uday Bhaskar. New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2005. 575p., Rs. 1175.00, ISBN 81-86019-50-2.*

India A Rising Power. *By Naunihal Singh. New Delhi Authorspress, 2006. 264p., Rs. 650.00, ISBN 81-7273-277-5.*

Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security. *By Rajesh M Basrur. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006. 245p., $ 24.95, ISBN 0-8047-5256-7.*

India's Nuclear Policy, Disarmament and International Security. *Edited by S K Mishra. New Delhi, Radha Publications, 2006. 284p., Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7487-430-5.*

Security Management. *By O P Sabharwal. Delhi, Alpha Publications, 2006. 257p., Rs. 350.00, ISBN 81-7948-029-1.*

NUCLEAR RISKS – SOUTH ASIA

Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia : Problems and Prospects. *By Upendra Choudhury. New Delhi, Manohar, 2006. 122p., Rs. 250.00, ISBN 81-7304-661-1*

PEACE BUILDING

Building Sustainable Peace. *Edited by Tom Keating & W Andy Knight. New Delhi, Academic Foundation, 2006. 439p., Rs. 895.00, ISBN 81-7188-500-4*

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. *By Dennis J Blasko. London , Routledge. 228p., £ 20.99, ISBN 0-415-77003-3.*

SOCIAL CONDITIONS – INDIA

Postconflict Development: Meeting new Challenges. *Edited by Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006. 371p., Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-309-0128-5.*

SOUTH ASIA ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

SAARC at Crossroads: the Fate of Regional Cooperation in South Asia. *By Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury. New Delhi, Samskriti, 2006. 412p., Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-87374-46-2.*

SOUTH ASIA – REGIONAL SECURITY

Comprehensive Security in South Asia. *Edited by Nishchal Nath Pandey. New Delhi, Manohar, 2006. 261p., Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-7304-663-8.*

SOUTH ASIA - SUB CONTINENTAL – POLITICS

Triumph of Will : Sonia Gandhi. *By Yusuf Ansari. New Delhi, Tara India Research Press, 2006. 327p., Rs. 695.00, ISBN 81-87943-93-9.*

SRI LANKA – POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Sri Lanka: A Dangerous Interlude. *By Apratim Mukarji. New Delhi, New Dawn Press, 2005. 294p., Rs. 800.00, ISBN 1-84557-530-X.*

TERRORISM

Global Terrorism : A Beginner's Guide. *By Leonard Weinberg. Oxford, Oneworld, 2006. 182p., Rs. 250.00, ISBN 1-85168-358-5.*

Bioterrorism. *By Ranjana Arya. New Delhi, Deep & Deep, 2006. 371p., Rs. 1150.00, ISBN 817629-794-1.*

TERRORISM – GOVERNMENT POLICY – UNITED STATES

Defeating the Jihadists : A Blueprint for Action. *By Richard A Clarke. New York, Century Foundation, 2004. 172p., £ 8.99, ISBN 0-87087-491-9.*

TERRORISM – PREVENTION

Prevention of Terrorism Act: Myth and Reality. *By V P Srivastav. Delhi, Indian Publishers' Distributors, 2005. 417p., Rs. 995.00, ISBN 81-7341-387-8.*

TERRORISTS – NETWORKS - OPERATIONS

Fulcrum of Evil: ISI, CIA, Al Qaeda Nexus. *By Maloy Krishna Dhar. New Delhi, Manas, 2006. 402p., Rs. 795.00, ISBN 81-7049-278-5.*

UNITED NATIONS – PEACEKEEPING FORCES - OPERATIONS

Peacemonger. *By Marrack Coulding. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 393p., $ 29.95, ISBN 0-8018-7858-6.*

Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping : A Gendered Analysis. *By Sandra Whitworth New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006. 225p., Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-309-0081-5.*

Role of Armed Forces in Maintenance of Peace: Special Reference to United Nations Charter. *By Rajiv Vikram Singh Gautam. Delhi, Adhyayan Publishers, 2006. 355p., Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-89161-70-9.*

Peace Operations and Global Order. *By Alex J Bellamy and Williams. London, Routledge, 2005. 234p., $ 65, ISBN 0-714-65595-3.*

UNITED NATIONS - HISTORY

The UN Security Council : From the Cold War to the 21st Century. *Edited by David M Malone. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006. 745p., Rs. 1295.00, ISBN 81-309-0086-6.*

UNITED STATES - FOREIGN POLICY

US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups. *By Janice J Terry. London, Pluto Press, 2006. 160p., £ 14.99, ISBN 0-7453-2258-1.*

Future Iraq: US Policy in Reshaping the Middle East. *By Geoff Simons. New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006. 400p., Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-309-0015-7.*

WARFARE

Ocean Warfare: The Technology Waves. *By A Sivathanu Pillai and R K Tewari. New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2006. 456p., Rs. 895.00, ISBN 81-7049-239-4.*

WATER SUPPLY – POLITICAL ASPECTS

Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building. *By Ken Conca. London, MIT Press, 2006. 466p., ISBN 0-262-03339-9.*

WORLD POLITICS

Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy. *By Stephen M Walt. New York, W W Norton & Company, 2005. 320p., $ 27.95, ISBN 0-393-05203-6*

Europe and Asia: Perspectives on the Emerging International Order. *Edited by V P Malik and Erhard Crome. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006. 210p., Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7062-247-6.*

Code	Subjects	Price (Rs.)	Year
USI RESEARCH PROJECTS			
R-1/98	The Impact of Emerging Technologies on Air Warfare by Air Mshl Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).	200	1999
R-4/98	A Nuclear Strategy for India by Rear Adm K Raja Menon (Retd). (Available from Sage Publications, New Delhi)	(SB) 295 (HB) 395	2000
R-6/98	A Career in India's Armed Forces – How to Make it More Attractive by Lt Gen RN Mahajan, PVSM, VSM (Retd). (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	200	2000
R-7/98	Naval Confidence Building Measures - An Indian Approach. by Cdr Vijay Sakhuja. (Available from Knowledge World, New Delhi)	650	2001
R-8/99	Chinese Military Modernisation by Lt Gen C K Kapur, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) (Available from Manas Publications, New Delhi)	595	2003
R-9/99	Information Technology – The Future Warfare Weapon by Lt Cdr A Anand. (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	150	2000
R-10/99	Aerospace Industry by Air Mshl SR Deshpande, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd). (Available from Manas Publications, New Delhi)	500	2004
R-11/99	Secure or Perish by Maj Gen Yashwant Deva, AVSM (Retd). (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	400	2001
R-13/2000	Security Threats to North East India by Lt Gen NS Narahari, PVSM (Retd) (Available from Manas Publications, New Delhi)	595	2002
R-15/2000	The Indian Air Force : A Balanced Strategic and Tactical Application by Air Vice Mshl Viney Kapila, AVSM, VrC (Retd) (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	200	2002
R-16/2000	Transforming to the Information Warfare Paradigm by Col RK Bhonsle, SM (Available from Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi)	150	2001
R-18/2001	Human Resource Management in the Army by Maj Gen SBL Kapoor, VSM (Retd) (Available from Knowledge World, New Delhi)	495	2002
R-19/2001	Defence, Development and National Security in the Indian Context. by Capt S Samaddar, IN (Available from Gyan Publishing House)	690	2005
R-20/2001	Command and Control of Indian Nuclear Forces. by Lt Gen P K Pahwa, PVSM (Retd) (Available from Knowledge World)	395	2002
R-21/2001	Space Warfare and Military Strategy. by Brig A K Lal (Available from Ocean Books)	300	2003
R-22/2001	India's Land Forces : Structural Imperatives by Brig Jaspal Singh (Retd) (Available from Manas Publications)	595	2003
R-23/2002	Emerging Modes of Conflict and Asymmetrical Challenges to India's National Security by Brig RK Bhonsle, SM (Available from Knowledge World)	650	2004
R-24/2002	Fourth Estate: A Force Multiplier for the Indian Army – with Specific Backdrop of Kargil Battle by Col SC Tyagi (Available from Gyan Publishers)	540	2004