Award of the Macgregor Memorial Medal to Colonel Narinder Kumar, PVSM, KC, AVSM (Retd)*

Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd)**

In the Nineteenth century, Great Britain and Tsarist Russia were the two major power blocs that influenced world affairs. In 1885, the Panjdeh Incident or Panjdeh Scare, rekindled British fears of a Russian threat to their Indian Empire through Afghanistan.1 Conflicting Russian and British interests in Central and South Asia for years had been the cause of a virtual cold war, known euphemistically as 'The Great Game'; and the Panjdeh Incident came close to triggering full-scale armed conflict between the two powers. Following the incident, the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was established to delineate the northern frontier of Afghanistan.

One of the aspects that troubled the authorities in India was the lack of reliable information about the vast tracts of uncharted territory that lay along the remote and inaccessible frontiers of their Indian Empire. The person who devoted his energies to filling this gap in his capacity as QMG and originator of the Military Intelligence set-up in India, was Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, KCB, CSI, CIE, who founded the United Service Institution of India in 1870. Therefore, shortly after he passed away in February 1887, the USI Council instituted the MacGregor Memorial Medal (MMM) in May 1887 to commemorate his memory.

The criteria for award of the MMM were laid out at a meeting held on 03 July 1888 at Shimla, presided over by the C-in-C General Sir FS Roberts, with the Earl of Dufferin, the Viceroy, being present as Chief Guest.

Initially, the award was to be given only for significant military reconnaissance or journey of exploration or survey in remote areas of India, or in countries bordering, or under the jurisdiction of India, which produced new information of value for the defence of India. The award was usually of a silver medal, but a gold medal could be awarded in place of a silver medal or in addition to it, for specially valuable work. During the period of the British Raj, the MacGregor Medal became the de facto award of 'the Great Game' and among its recipients were names such as Sir Francis Younghusband (1890) and Major General Orde Wingate (1943). The first Indian soldier to get the award was Havildar (later Subedar, IOM) Ramzan Khan, 3rd Sikh Infantry, PFF (1891).

Subsequently, as opportunities for journeys of reconnaissance or exploration declined, on 22 October 1986 the USI Council expanded the scope to include mountain/desert expeditions, river rafting, world cruises, polar expeditions, running/trekking across the Himalayas and adventure flights amongst the eligibility criteria. First priority, however, was to continue with military reconnaissance. This decision regarding expanded scope was again confirmed by the Council in its meetings held on 22/23 Dec 1994 and 11 December 1997.

Personnel of the Armed Forces, Territorial Army, Reserve Force, Assam Rifles, and Militias are eligible for the awards. Recommendations are received by USI through the Joint Planning Committee. However, for non military reconnaissance these can also be sent directly to USI. The award is decided by the USI Council.

So far 117 medals have been awarded – 7 gold medals to officers, 62 standard size silver medals to officers including 5 JCOS (one officer winning it twice in 1938 and 1946), and 48 reduced size silver medals to soldiers. The last medal to a soldier was awarded in 1944 and to an officer in 1997 (Investiture in 2001). Thirteen Indian Officers and a JCO have won the medal since Independence. These are: Maj ZC Bakshi (1949), Col IC Katoch (1951), Capt MS Jarg (1956), 2 Lt IB Goel (1956), Capt V Badhwar (1957), Capt SL Tugnait (1959), Brig ML Whig (1969), Maj Prem Chand (1970), Col CS Nugyal (1971), Capt Ravindra Misra (1972), Sub Bel Bahadur Pun (1972), Sqn Ldr RK Makkar (1986), Flt Lt Rana TS Chhina (1986) and Lt Col NJ Korgaonkar, SM (1997).

The obverse side of the medal has the effigy of Major Gen Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, the reverse side depicts figures of Army personnel belonging to various races. The ribbon of the medal is composed of the colours of the Macgregor Tartan. The medal may be worn around the neck on uniform on ceremonial parades prescribed by the respective services.

Major Bob Hammond, starts his book on the history of the MMM with a quote from Kipling's poem 'The Winners':

Down to Gehanna (Jahannum) or up to the Throne,

He travels the fastest who travels alone.

The sentiment epitomises the spirit that infused most recipients of this unique award. They usually had a love of the outdoors and exulted in the wide open spaces in the deserts or mountains along India's vast and remote frontiers. None, perhaps better epitomised this spirit of adventure than the present recipient of the award, Colonel Narinder Kumar, PVSM, KC, AVSM (Retd) of the Kumaon Regiment.

Colonel Narinder Kumar was born on 8 December 1933 in Rawalpindi. He was the first Indian apart from Tenzing Norgay to cross 28,300 ft (8500 mtrs); only eight men in the world had then climbed higher. In 1965 he handled the logistics for India's first successful expedition to Everest, which placed nine men on the Summit, then a

record. He led the first successful Indian expedition to Nanda Devi, then the highest mountain in India and Chomalhari, highest in Bhutan.

In 1931, a German attempted Kanchenjunga from Northeast Spur: they reached the height of 25000 ft. The British Alpine Journal described the German attempt as a feat without a parallel in mountaineering history. It was awarded special gold medal at Los Angles Olympics. Colonel Narinder Kumar's team succeeded in reaching the Summit of Kanchenjunga (28,208 ft, 8548 mtrs) from this difficult and dangerous route. This achievement was described by American, Japanese and Swiss Alpine Journals as "One of the greatest achievement in Mountaineering history…". The Himalayan Journal described it as "… more notable than that of Everest".

He was the first one to cross Siachen from snout to the source. He led the summit team to Sia Kangri (24, 350 ft, 7379 mtrs). At the age of 46 his team climbed Saltoro Kangri (25,400 ft), the highest in Eastern Karakorams. He was Principal, National Ski School and led the Ski Trishul Expedition in 1976, which skied down from 23,360 ft. to the Base Camp at 15,500 ft.

He has written six books on Mountaineering, Skiing and Rafting. In 1983 Films Division Government of India selected him, along with Acharya Vinoba Bhave and Nargis Dutt, to make a film on their lives. He has been awarded the Padma Shri, Arjuna Award and Indian Mountaineering Federation's Gold Medal in addition to Army decorations like PVSM, Kirti Chakra, AVSM. At present he is Vice President of the Indian Olympic Association and Managing Director of Mercury Himalayan Explorations, an adventure travel company, was declared by Government of India Tourism Department, as "most innovative adventure company of the year 2004".

The USI Council approved the award of the MMM to Colonel Narinder Kumar for valuable reconnaisances. The achievements of Colonel Narinder Kumar that led to this award are as recorded follows:

(a)	IC 6729 Colonel Narinder Kumar, PVSM, KC, AVSM (Retd) led multiple expeditions in the Siachen Area between 1978 and 1981 and gained highly valuable terrain and enemy information which has been instrumental in safe guarding our borders in the Siachen Glacier.

(b)	The expeditions were carried out in uncharted territory under extremely harsh weather conditions with minimal equipment and administrative support and at grave risk to life and limb. The results achieved in these expeditions were spectacular and formed the bedrock for the subsequent launch of Operation MEGHDOOT.

(c)	For his stellar contribution in carrying out multiple expeditions and operational reconnaissance in remote and uncharted border territory under extremely hazardous terrain and climate conditions, Colonel Narinder Kumar, PVSM, KC, AVSM (Retd) is awarded the MacGregor Memorial Medal.

Eighth Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture

Water Conflict: The Looming Threat*

Shri BG Verghese**

Let me join in paying tribute to Major General Samir Sinha, a former Director of the USI in whose memory this auditorium has been named. I did not know him but I did study in the same school as he did in Ranchi for a few weeks, before being withdrawn on account of illness. To that extent, we shared something in common. We remember him through these Lectures in his name.

Some Basic Facts

Water is life. Mounting stress is evident on account of population growth, seasonal and spatial variation, development, upstream diversion and pollution. Now we must factor in climate change. India was peopled by 330 m in 1947. We are 1200 m today and will be 1700 m by 2050 when our population stabilises. All these Indians need more water per capita.

Only 2 per cent of available water is freshwater, the balance consisting of ocean and polar ice. Of this water stock, only half is utilisable. Water is sourced from atmospheric precipitation as rain or snow, river flows, lakes and groundwater aquifers. Surface and ground water are not independent entities but are hydrologically interconnected. There are many saline aquifers and both surface and ground water can get polluted or mineralised. Ground water must be harvested, not mined; and drainage is most important.

Many major rivers, certainly India's Himalayan rivers, are international watercourses with the Country being an upper, lower and middle riparian in different situations. International water law is still evolving, other than in relation to navigation and, possible pollution, and there is no overall binding statute regarding consumptive uses though the International Lawyers Association (the Helsinki Rules) and, more recently the UN, have sought to frame regulations. The former is not binding; the latter has not been ratified by the number required for enforcement. Yet, domestic law, court rulings, arbitration awards, treaties, conventions and donor conditionalities provide a framework of guiding principles and best practices.

Round the world, pressures to access and control water are mounting. Conflict threatens and water has become a major security concern, domestically and internationally. There are numerous examples.

The Domestic Scene in India

Inter-state, inter-regional and inter-sectoral strife is commonplace. Disputes over the Cauvery, Ravi-Beas and other rivers have raised tensions; as also rural-urban, municipal and pollution issues. Who own the water beneath an individual's property? Current concerns are partly directed towards mediating this issue so as to ensure equity.

The Indian constitution delegates resolution of inter-state water disputes to an Inter-State Water Tribunal (Article 262). But though empowered to do so, Parliament has not legislated to bar the jurisdiction of the courts from such disputes or complaints, with the result that the Supreme Court has in effect reopened the Award of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal. The Ravi-Beas Tribunal's final Award has yet to be pronounced on account of serious differences between Punjab and Haryana, while the Cauvery Tribunal's Award has been by-passed. In all cases politics has intervened.

Stay orders and protests have also delayed or prevented the construction or completion of various water resource projects on a variety of displacement, compensation, human rights, environmental and equity considerations. All these are products of or generate conflict situations. They constitute complex, sensitive and emotional issues, sometimes of an inter-generational character, that call for delicate handling. Yet, delay constitutes denial and denial can unleash a stream of other wrongs to other actors and interests.

India's International Waters

The Indus and Ganges, Brahmaputra and Barak/Meghna (GBM) are international rivers that India variously shares with China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The Manipur and Kaladan rivers are shared with Myanmar.

Nepal

Indo-Nepalese water relations go back to British India when the Raj negotiated the Sharda Barrage in 1927 that entailed a small territorial exchange as well. With Independence and menacing floods in Bihar and UP, Government of India negotiated the Kosi and Gandak projects with Nepal though both were soon modified to accommodate Nepalese concerns. Nevertheless, Nepal felt that the Sharda, Kosi and Gandak agreements were one-sided and gave the Kingdom unequal benefits. This was not really so, as there were several balancing factors; but perceptions are the realties that shape national attitudes and dictate policy. Big neighbour arrogance and mismanagement by UP and Bihar in shared projects also queered the pitch.

This is the backdrop to Nepal's tendency thereafter to drag its feet on cross-border water projects, seeking prior guarantees of benefits even before project parameters were frozen. Internal politics intruded and the sheer magnitude of many Himalayan projects was certainly daunting. Thus were Kosi, Mahakali and many other projects delayed, despite a landmark Mahakali Treaty (1996) that set out an agreed basis for cost-benefit sharing. In seeking to get too much, Nepal got nothing. As against a techno-economically feasible hydro potential of 45,000 MW, Nepal has actually developed less than 1500 MW, though with its Himalayan gradient and abundant water resources, it could match Gulf petro-dollars with aqua-dollars.

Bhutan

Bhutan, a smaller state with a later development start has, with full Indian cooperation, developed 2000 MW and will soon attain 5000 MW installed capacity while planning to generate up to 10,000 MW. From being the poor cousin, Bhutan will soon boast the highest per capita income in the SAARC region, leveraging its hydro potential to develop sustainably.

Bangladesh

The GBM empty into the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh which is a low lying funnel, highly susceptible to floods and storm surges. Partition virtually landlocked India's northeast and disrupted its arterial waterways. Bangladesh in turn found 95 per cent of its headwaters emanated in or through India. It naturally sought a share of GBM waters for consumptive uses and to prevent saline intrusion from the sea. India's decision to build the Farakka Barrage to save Kolkata port became the flashpoint.

The 40,000 cusec diversion of water from Farraka to the Bhagirathi-Hoogly set alarm bells ringing and East Bengal/Bangladesh demanded a fair share of lean season flows. Tortuous negotiations yielded a just outcome in the Ganges Water Treaty, 1995, guaranteeing Bangladesh a minimum of 35,000 cusecs or 50 per cent of available flows during the most critical six weeks of the January to May lean season. Though Bangladesh gets this water, none of it goes into the Gorai distributary that feeds the Khulna region on account of a natural silt blockage or hump at its off take caused by secular geo-morphological changes in the regime of the river which has been shifting eastwards. Uninformed Bangla opinion has raged against Indian mala fides with internal political compulsions precluding any clarification by Dhaka. Fortunately, that situation is now changing. Avoidable controversy over the sharing of Teesta waters and Indian plans to build the Tipaimukh hydro-cum-flood moderation/navigation project on the Barak is also now moving towards resolution. Mistrust is giving way to cooperation.

Indus Waters Treaty

Partition severed an integrated Indus irrigation system across united Punjab and Sind. Initial controversy over canal water flows resulted in negotiations leading to the Indus Waters Treaty brokered by the World Bank. This gave the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi) to India and the three western rivers (Chenab, Jhelum, Indus) to Pakistan. It however permitted India stipulated consumptive uses to irrigate up to 1.34 m acres of land and store 3.60 MAF of water for flood moderation and power generation in that part of J&K controlled by India. An Indus Commission was set up to monitor and manage the Treaty and an elaborate dispute settlement mechanism put in place.

India was required to inform Pakistan of any scheme it proposed on the three Western rivers, leading to Pakistani objections, delays, even modification (Sallal-I), delay (Baglihar) or denial (the Tulbul flood detention barrage) of these projects. The latest clutch of "disputes" relate to the Kishenganga (a Jhelum tributary), Sawalkote (Chenab), Nimoo Bazgo (Indus) and other projects. Pakistani objections have risen to a crescendo of hysteria and rabid jihadi rhetoric alleging water theft, willful Treaty violations and plans to flood and desertify Pakistan in turn, and wage water terrorism that could lead to nuclear war.

Although Pakistan is admittedly facing water stress, there is no warrant for its wild charges against India which

threaten to undermine the Indus Treaty. India is using less than its irrigation entitlement in J&K and has no storage on the three western rivers, relying exclusively on run of river pondages which are permissible under the Indus Treaty. Indeed, part of its unused entitlement is still flowing into Pakistan as a bonus. The problem is that Pakistan has not managed its water resources efficiently and has not built sufficient storages (partly on account of inter-provincial disputes). As a result, 35 MAF of its share of 137 MAF of Indus waters flows to the sea unutilised during the flush season. It would appear the Indus issue is being politicised and linked to a renewed thrust based on the argument that the Indus is Pakistan's "lifeline" and it must therefore control its headwaters that flow through the Indian part of J&K. The reasoning is specious. The Indus Treaty laid that ghost to rest.

The real answer, especially with the onset of climate change, lies in further cooperation under the Indus Waters Treaty as envisaged in Article VII to optimise available benefits though joint investigations and engineering works to build or augment storages on the three western rivers on either side of the LOC.

China/Tibet

Over the past many years there have been persistent reports of grandiose Chinese plans to divert the great Tibetan rivers, including the Tsang-po, northwards to the Gobi and the northern plains beyond Beijing. The fear has been that this will "dry" up the "Brahmaputra". Apart from the fact that the "Brahmaputra" is only formed after the confluence of the Tsang-po, (which becomes the Dihang/Siang in Arunachal), Dibang, Luhit and Noa Dihing near Sadiya in Assam, more than 70 per cent of its discharge is generated south of the Himalaya. Topography, ecology, hydrology, economics and technology do not suggest that such a massive northward diversion of Tibetan rivers is feasible. Proposals have certainly been mooted but have been strongly discounted and ridiculed by Chinese experts.

Smaller diversions are possible and even legitimate if feasible and there can be no objection to reasonable consumptive uses in Tibet. But crying wolf because of reports of small projects in Tibet and problems caused by debris dams in the Himalaya-Karakoram in China is best avoided.

The Mekong and Salween

Reports that China plans to divert the Salween and Mekong or dry them up by massive hydro projects within its own territory are equally misplaced. Hydro projects are non-consumptive as the water returns to the river. Large hydro project have indeed been built on the upper Mekong or Lacang in China. But the river here flows through very rugged terrain and there is little scope for irrigation uses. Therefore, the diversion charge is baseless or greatly exaggerated. A recent meeting of the Mekong Commission disabused those who feared an imminent danger of crippling diversions by China.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is landlocked. It has four river basins – the Kabul, Amu Darya, Helmand and Hari Rud - originating within its territory but flowing into Pakistan, Central Asia and Iran. Being a late developer and racked by conflict, it faces prior appropriation by its neighbours and is handicapped by a poor data base and the lack of water agreements except for a limited one with Iran (1973).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the then Soviet Union greatly over-extended irrigated cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan. This virtually dried up the Amu Darya which soon failed to reach the Aral Sea, causing widespread desertification and an ecological catastrophe. The damage is now being slowly repaired but Afghanistan's largest river may be hostage to the resuscitation of a ravaged Central Asian ecology.

Turkey and the Tigris Euphrates

The Tigris and Euphrates rise in Turkey's Antolian Plateau. They have been harnessed to generate power and irrigate parts of southern Turkey but there is "surplus" water that Turkey proposed to divert southwards to Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and beyond through "Peace Pipelines" that it would control. The Arabs protested and demand their due share of river flows.

Israel-Palestine

Underlying the territorial conflict between Israel and Palestine for control of land, heritage sites and settlements, is a

struggle for water, centring on the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers and a shared aquifer. The land is desert but water transforms it. Here is a conflict waiting to explode unless resolved sooner.

The Nile and Africa

Egypt, it has been said, is a gift of the Nile. The upper riparians are now demanding to share that gift. Sudan first, then several central African states watered by the White Nile, and now Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile. A series of hydro dams built and planned in the Ethiopian highlands – the Gibe I, II, III, and IV cascade for example, will also provide water for irrigation lower down. But there are concerns and a Nile consortium has been put in place to reconcile differences on the further development and sharing of the waters of the Nile basin.

Similar efforts are being made to seek trans-boundary cooperation on the Congo, Niger, and Zambezi and other African rivers.

Climate Change

Enter climate change and we have something of a game-changer. The tropical regions will be particularly affected and the Indian sub-continent acutely, though in descending order from West to East.

Aberrant rainfall, glacial melt, enhanced flooding and sedimentation, debris, dams and sea level rise - all threaten established hydrological patterns. There may not be diminished rainfall but its occurrence could be wayward and episodic. Wind and snow patterns are changing. Glaciers are melting, though the rates of retreat and ablation vary, with some glaciers even advancing. The science is still tentative but there is no doubt about the trend, including polar warming. Initial glacial melt is augmenting summer flows but once these storehouses are diminished or exhausted discharges will fall. One study suggests that the Indus at Skardu may carry 30 per cent less water 30 years from now. How do we cope, nationally and worldwide?

Climate change does not respect boundaries or treaties and activities far away can affect local water regimes.

The Himalayan-Karakoram shield and Tibetan Plateau are among the most important global weather makers. In Tibet, glacial melt has been aggravated by melting permafrost in the vast northern rangelands. This has been reportedly caused by faulty livestock management patterns introduced over the past 30 years by the Chinese to support a growing immigrant population. Initially large herds of sheep, goats, yaks and horses were encouraged, resulting in overgrazing the pastures and destroying biodiversity and altering the heat balance thus affecting humidity, temperatures and precipitation. Subsequently grazing has been sought to be limited by enclosures, resulting in another cycle of unintended effects.

The Way Ahead

These practices and trends call for global scientific studies, and India and China should cooperate with others to develop the knowledge required to devise appropriate coping strategies. Therefore, to cry at China on non-issues is most unwise.

India and Pakistan should move to Indus-II to harness the optimal potential of the Indus system to store water and generate power. Aberrant weather calls for more storages as insurance to trap the water and prevent storm surges, floods and sediment slides. Automated weather platforms in remote regions should be jointly set up and interrogated by satellites to provide real time data about potential debris dams and looming disasters.

India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh should also revisit their postures and plans to forge new cooperative and coping strategies to mutual benefit. Water conservation, demand management, appropriate pricing policies and cropping patterns call for review so as to avoid or mitigate crises and conflict.

The challenge is enormous, but can be met – cooperatively. In so doing we may be able to move on to another and better and more sustainable growth path that caters to everybody's need but discourages greed. Gandhiji said that a hundred years ago.

water management. He is also a member of India's National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development.

China in a Shifting Asian and Global Order

Professor Ramesh Thakur*

The destiny of Asia will be shaped by China, India and Japan whose strategic footprint will cover the world. Cooperation between them will promote peace and prosperity in Asia. Rivalry and conflict will roil the world.

From 1000-1800 AD, Asia, Africa and Latin America accounted for 65-75 per cent of world population and income. Europe rode to global dominance through the industrial revolution, innovations in transport and communications, and the ideology and practice of colonialism, during which the developing countries suffered dramatic relative losses. From 1870 to 1950, Asia's per capita income plummeted from one-half to one-tenth of West European levels.1 Asia has been bouncing back since in economic output, industrialisation and trade.

India's legitimacy is rooted in a political model of liberal democracy that is unique in human history in scale and poverty; China's economic success is without precedent in scale and pace; and Japan's combination of political democracy, wealth creation and per capita income is unique in Asia. China uses political control and the heavy hand of the state to forestall and suppress challenges and uprisings; India uses procrastination and indecisiveness to ride out and exhaust most insurgencies along with an occasional oppressive security presence; and Japan is largely free of such challenges.

India is the only one of the three to have been conquered and colonised by the West. It was also humiliated militarily by China. But China was attacked, invaded and humiliated by Japan as well as Western powers. China and India, nuclear armed billionaires, are the heartland of the world. Non-nuclear Japan was atom bombed. Not quite a spent economic powerhouse, it is the wealthiest of the three. But its economic future seemingly lies in the past; China is the most vibrantly growing today and an economic giant although most Chinese remain, for the present, largely poor; but its ageing population against India's growing working and consumer cohort favour India as tomorrow's economic success story.

The early 19th century saw the displacement of Asia by Britain as the dominant actor of the times; the early 20th century, of Britain by America. Is the early 21st century witnessing the beginning of the end of the USA and Western influence and the re-emergence of China and India?

China-USA

The demonstration of limits to the US and NATO power in Iraq and Afghanistan has left many less fearful of "superior" Western power. Abusive practices in the "war on terror" and the great financial collapse have made them less respectful of Western values. Their own resilience through the financial crisis has enhanced their self-confidence. Their future economic potential has already translated into present political weight. China has overtaken Germany as the world's top exporter of manufactured goods, having previously edged past the US as the world's biggest auto market by unit volume. It will account for the largest growth in foreseeable world trade and be a major player in setting energy, mineral and commodity prices.

The China-US relationship will be the pivot of the post-unipolar world order. Driven by strategic narcissism, the three trillion dollar wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have helped to bankrupt America and, by outsourcing manufacturing to China and services to India, enfeeble its capacity to produce enough goods and services to pay its bills. The US economy, once the biggest, best balanced and most productive and innovative, is saddled with debts, deficits and distortions. A dysfunctional political system neuters most efforts to address structural problems. If by the end of the decade the US is still the world's biggest borrower – ten-year economic forecasts lack credibility – will it still be the world's biggest power?

The US remains the finance and consumption capital of the world but the new production capital is China. Dependent no longer on the US markets, managerial know-how and technology, nor on the US power as a counterweight to a Soviet threat, China has exploited the US entrapment in Iraq and Afghanistan and a collapsing moral and financial reputation to expand its soft power reach and influence. Many countries are searching for an alternative model to the discredited Washington Consensus of the free-market, pro-trade and globalisation policies promoted by the financial holy trinity of the US Treasury, IMF and World Bank. Those looking for faster growth and greater stability are talking of a "Beijing Consensus": a one-party state, government-guided development, strictly controlled capital markets and an authoritarian decision-making process that can think strategically for the long term, make tough choices and long-term investments, and not be distracted by daily public polls.2

The frugal Chinese save furiously, a profligate America spends recklessly. When President Barack Obama visited China in November, the symbolism was of a supplicant nation paying tribute to its chief creditor to the tune of $800 billion. Obama's refusal to grant an audience to the Dalai Lama before the trip reinforced the impression. Their White House meeting in February drew warnings from Beijing that it had seriously undermined bilateral trust and cooperation.

China is needed by the USA to finance its mounting debt, projected to hit $9 trillion over the next decade. But America is just as vital to China's economic health. A collapse of the US economy would mean drastic cutbacks to sales

of 'Made-in China' products in the world's biggest consumer market and also erode the value of the $2.4 trillion currency reserves held by Beijing.

For the first time in two hundred years the world has to cope with a united and powerful China. But so too does China have to come to terms with its new status: the Middle Kingdom has no historical, philosophical or literary tradition of diplomatic intercourse as a great power in a system of great powers. This will become especially relevant as China's footprint becomes increasingly global and its interests, presence and activities mushroom around the world.

Peace cannot be maintained without accommodating China; but will it be durable if based principally on a policy of appeasement? Treating China as an enemy would turn it into one. But should the US underwrite the rise of "a Leninist one-party state, that is America's only plausible geopolitical rival"?[3] The Clinton and Bush administration policies had rested on the assumption that exposure to and experience with free trade in the information age would release and strengthen the forces of liberalisation and political change in China. What if the assumptions are dangerously false?

When Washington announced $6 billion arms sales to Taiwan including missiles, helicopters and mine-hunting ships, Beijing retaliated by suspending bilateral military exchanges and imposing sanctions on companies selling arms to Taiwan. With more than 1300 Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan, bolstering the latter's military preparedness may be a prudent hedge against actually having to defend it from attack.[4] Should Beijing choose to go to war, this simultaneously raises the risks of failure and the costs of success.

There has been a flood of declinist commentary about the US by Chinese analysts since the financial crisis that began in the heartland of global capitalism but proved the resilience of China's economic miracle. "From the Copenhagen climate change conference to Internet freedom to China's border with India, China observers have noticed a tough tone emanating from its government, its representatives and influential analysts from its state-funded think tanks."[5] Yet calculations of relative US decline are more likely to nudge Beijing towards exerting more leverage over the US international policy than confrontation with Washington. In particular, an assertive China will want to recalibrate the multilateral order on its terms that set aside questions of human rights and political values to focus instead on solving common problems. It will be more willing and able to shape the international environment and world order proactively rather than react passively to it.

International affairs are shaped by the interplay of power and ideas; and multilateralism is more than the pursuit of national interests by international means. Is China prepared to shed its anachronistic adage from Deng Xiaoping, "to keep a low profile and not take the lead"? Will it use growing wealth, power and influence for narrow mercantilism or the common good? How long can it question the dollar's status as the global reserve currency without loosening its iron grip on the RMB whose undervaluation "has become a significant drag on global economic recovery"?[6] China's rise has been welcomed by many as a counterweight to the US military muscle and political arrogance and many look to it as the world's engine of growth. But if not careful, China could encounter a grating wall of resistance as countries, multinationals and NGOs begin to push back against heavy-handed assertiveness.

Google's threat to leave rather than become more complicit in internet censorship may be a harbinger of a changing international mood. Its fight with China is motivated more by commercial calculation than sentimental concerns about freedom of information. Many foreign firms have discovered that to move from China's massive potential to massive profits is not easy. Google has a one-third share of China's search engine market, accounting for five per cent of its global annual revenue.[7] Its chief domestic competitor in China is Baidu with close ties to the government. In a true open market that permitted competition on a level playing field, Google could wrest a much larger market share from Baidu. The risk assessment of the strategy of standing up to Beijing may reflect this cost-benefit analysis.

China's implicit social contract is one in which the citizens acquiesce to political control in return for the government overseeing continuing prosperity that delivers the same goods and services to Chinese consumers as to Westerners. With communism totally discredited, the party-as-government lacks an alternative legitimising ideology to rapid economic growth. If this is put under threat by major multinational firms pulling out, the legitimacy loss for the Chinese government could be more momentous than the lost revenues for the firms. A group of American lawmakers has urged the Treasury to designate China as a "currency manipulator" and the US business community can no longer resist political pressure from Washington for a tougher stand against Beijing.[8]

China likes the growing acknowledgment of its major power status and is happy to take the benefits flowing from it but is less keen to stop being a free rider, exercise international public leadership and accept the burdens of being a great power. That mindset helps to explain currency manipulation to protect exports at the expense of other countries, unwillingness to commit to internationally verifiable cuts in emissions and courting of pariah authoritarian regimes to gain access to raw materials and resources. Unwilling to bind itself to agreed global norms, China could find itself in lonesome company with arms-length relationships of convenience rather than true friends as allies – of which America still has aplenty, including Australia, Canada, the EU, Israel and Japan.

South Asia

A clash between overgoverned China and undergoverned India is less unimaginable than between China and the USA.[9] For Pakistan's ruling elite, the arch-rival is India. But India's arch-rival is China: a simple but critical distinction. Analysts need to switch their frame from the India-Pakistan-US subcontinental to the India-China-US strategic triangle. India's national security interests dovetail with major US security challenges, including preventing the domination of Asia by China.

China's muscle flexing has taken a toll on its international image. In a global public opinion survey of 30,000

people in 28 countries released by the BBC on April 18, images of the United States under President Barack Obama had recovered remarkably. Forty-six per cent view its influence positively and 34 per cent negatively. For China the respective figures are 41 per cent and 38 per cent. In the 15 countries in which the survey has been done annually since 2005, positive views of China have fallen from 49 percent to 34 per cent. India's view of China turned from a net six-point positive image last year to an eight-point net negative this year.10

Indian analysts, many still suffering from the "1962 syndrome,"11 are as divided as Westerners on whether China's diplomatic belligerence is rooted in insecurity or swagger. Their 3,500km long border is volatile on both sides, running from India's insurgency-plagued northeast along Nepal and Tibet and on the edges of Xinjiang, home of the Uighurs. China, hyper-sensitive to "splittism" in relation to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, is curiously insensitive to the fact that Pakistan was created by splitting India.

China's unease at India's rising global clout intensified with the India-US nuclear deal and growing military ties with the US and Israel. The US was previously permissive of Chinese complicity in Pakistan's nuclearisation and of Pakistan nurturing terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Does it help Washington even in relations with Beijing to adopt a stance of neutrality on such issues as India's northeastern provinces? To concede Asia as China's sphere of influence? Does it advance nonproliferation to remain quiet on China's supply of designs and material to Pakistan which then found their way to Libya, Iran and North Korea?12

The US Quadrennial Defence Review expresses concerns over lack of transparency in China's military development and decision-making processes. It notes India's rapidly improving military capabilities through increased defence acquisitions that include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction and strategic airlift. It acknowledges India's democratic values, an open political system, and commitment to global stability as demonstrated through peacekeeping, counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. It accordingly welcomes India's rising profile "as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond."

East Asia

Is China like the US in 1890, about to inherit the century to follow, or Japan in 1980, on the cusp of a bursting bubble? 14 In some respects China's position today is weaker than Japan's in 1980: a wealthy, fully literate, homogenous, highly advanced industrial country with a stable political system. China is a middle income, populous, regionalised developing country with infrastructure challenges, a still suspect political system, and an unstable inverted population pyramid as the legacy of a one-child policy for half a century.

Japan lacked geopolitical autonomy whereas China is nobody's errand boy. But China is strategically encircled by South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Vietnam, India, and Russia. Large numbers of American forces are based in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Iraq; Israel is a solid US ally; and several Arab states are de facto US protectorates. This helps to explain the strategic basis of China's relationship with Iran, the only autonomous oil producer in the Middle East. A nuclear but independent Iran is in China's strategic interest compared to a non-nuclear Iran under US domination. Hence China's "delay-and-weaken" strategy with regard to UN sanctions on Iran.15 Even if it manages to raise domestic productivity significantly, China will remain reliant on securing and importing massive overseas resources and will therefore have to develop a significant naval capability to protect its shipping lanes and overseas resources. In the meantime, Beijing has used the West's absence to invest and trade in Iran free of Western competition; to consolidate its strategic leverage against a West that both China and Iran are suspicious of owing to past sanctions and interference in internal affairs.

Should Washington respond to rising China by bypassing Japan or reinvigorating the US-Japan alliance? For Tokyo, a healthy alliance with the US is insurance against a future China threat; good relations with China are a hedge against an unreliable US ally. Three possible scenarios may be postulated:

(a)   Sino-Japanese rivalry, with the USA as the balancer which deters China and restrains Japan;

(b)   Sino-US bipolarity, with China dominating the mainland, the USA controlling the seas and Japan playing second fiddle;

(c)   Sino-US rivalry, with Japan acting as the conciliator.

The most technologically advanced, richest and best educated country in Asia cannot be written out. History offers a caution against writing off Japan too hastily. It has shown superhuman ability to emerge triumphant from grave crises through mass mobilisation of the collective identity, at extraordinary personal and national cost and effort, in astonishingly short bursts of time. Japan will not remain content to be an ATM serving US global policy. If Asia turns to cooperation, Japanese money will be required to underwrite the institutional arrangements and agreed deliverables. If Asia turns to Sino-US confrontation and conflict, Japan will anchor any US forward strategy for East Asia. If Japan is ignored, if Washington attempts to use its relationship with China to shape the environment into which Japan fades quietly into the sunset, Tokyo can play spoiler-cum-saboteur for most regional initiatives and even embrace nuclear weapons.

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Confidence Building between India and China: An Analytical Approach*

Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)**

Introduction

India and China are two ancient civilizations who are at the forefront of major ongoing changes in the World Order. The rapid rise of China in the international hierarchy of power from the cultural revolution of the 50s to its overtaking most industrialised countries in terms of GDP has drawn awe, admiration, envy and fear in varying measures from the international community. China has already become the dominant economic and military power in Asia. China's position in the international order has been cemented further during the ongoing global recession.

India is often mentioned along with China when the shift of power to Asia is discussed; BRICS and Chindia have become common jargon in the international strategic and economic communities. India's economic progress lags China by about two decades, and, in absolute terms, the economic and military power of the two is not comparable. Notwithstanding, India has certain strengths, in some cases beyond those possessed by China, that demand attention of the international community. At the same time, both China and India are yet to attain the status of Western industrialised economies on account of their large size and population. The common features of their developmental trajectory imply that they are often placed identically when dealing with the external environment.

Aim

This paper examines the congruence and divergences in various facets of the China-India relationship with a historical perspective and looks at prospects for the future. It suggests ways to build on the congruence and suppress the divergences through a comprehensive set of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the two nations.

Objectives

Developing CBMs presumes that both China and India are desirous of avoiding conflict in the short term and reducing divergence over time. Hence, the following objectives could result in methodical evolution of the CBMs:-

(a)   Ensure that China-India competition does not escalate into a conflict.

(b)   Ensure harmonious growth of 'both', China and India.

(c)   Ensure development of friendly relationship between Chinese and Indian stakeholders across the social, economic, political and strategic spectrum.

Factors

Culture and History

China and India are both ancient civilizations that together generated over 50 per cent of world's GDP in the 18th century. Yet, these are neither the same civilizations nor arrived at their present locus through the same route. In the strategic domain, as well as in strategic culture, each has its own discernible features. The convergences and divergences are listed in succeeding paragraphs:-

Convergences

(a)   Both civilizations and their heyday precede western industrial civilizations by a long margin, giving them an abiding sense of pride.

(b)   Both were affected by external imperialism – China by Japan and European powers and India by several Western countries.

(c)   Both have great internal diversity and a history of internal political struggle.

Divergences

(a)   The colonial presence in India lasted much longer. In fact, counting the Mughal period, India was under 'external' influence for almost a thousand years. However, India 'assimilated' the external powers, including the Europeans, much more extensively than China. As such, Indian diversity is not only indigenous but almost trans-continental. The impact of this is that diversity - social, cultural, linguistic and religious, is deeply ingrained in the Indian psyche. As opposed to this, China lived through a similar long period of internal strife where many empires attempted the 'integration' of China through an expansion (or imposition) of a Han identity. This means that fissiparous tendencies are much more likely in India but also that India has developed the natural culture to adjust to such challenges in an open manner.

(b)   The colonial subjugation by Japan and the later rise of the Party have meant a very high acceptance of violence as a means of state policy in China. That the writings of Sun Tzu have guided the Chinese leadership in recent times only confirms China's fondness for the realist theory based on balance of power. On the other hand, India's road to Independence only affirmed the idealistic, pacifist cultural tendencies that espoused avoidance of violence in worldly affairs. What this means is that Indian and Chinese leadership could conceivably be placed in situations where their understanding of each other's readiness to use violent or aggressive means could be at wide variance. It is within context to mention that an understanding on similar lines has landed Pakistan more than once in situations where the Indian response was far more vigorous than expected.

(c)   Recent history provides the single gravest source of divergence – the 1962 War. Without going into the build-up to the conflict and the details of claims and counter-claims, the overwhelming social memory in India is one of having been shocked in a devious manner. This goes well beyond the pain and lessons learnt from a military defeat.

Political System

The political systems in China and India are so sharply distinct that to look for congruence would appear futile. However, both countries value their own systems immensely and are resentful of external influences on their sovereignty.

Convergences. The shared vision for the 21st Century co-signed by PMs Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao on 14 January 2008 lists a large number of political convergence points.

(a)   China has sharply projected the Panchsheel – The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as the basis of relationship between states. Indian systems are highly appreciative of these principles, provided they are practised.

(b)   The two countries respect the "right of each country to choose its own path of social, economic and political development in which fundamental human rights and rule of law are given their due place". Such an agreement contrasts sharply with the Western, and particularly the US, views that place democracy at an ideological pedestal. Of the major issues between China and the West, this is an issue that carries the most negative connotations. With their special circumstances, support to each other on such a vital issue can have innumerable positive payoffs.

Divergences. The Indian system is based on political decentralisation, federalism, constitutionally well demarcated institutions and a fractious polity. The Chinese system is rigidly structured with limited political decentralisation. This does not lead to any significant divergence in itself. The problem occurs when interactions take place between different sub-systems in either country. The outcome of interaction can be reasonably controlled and predicted in China. However, Indian policy responses could be, and frequently 'appear to be' fickle. This has major implications for the design and execution of CBMs as well as other systemic interactions

International Relations

This factor is one of the most fertile in yielding convergence and divergences. History has placed India and China very far apart in their posture at the regional level in Asia, somewhat closer in their posture with respect to other international players, and very close to each other in a structured multilateral context. However, the issues of distrust closer home have normally overwhelmed the possibilities of building trust at distant locations.

Divergences

(a)   **Pakistan.** Pakistan is the biggest source of distrust between China and India. Chinese complicity in nuclear proliferation to Pakistan and its overt and covert support to their nuclear and missile programmes can never be

discounted in India. That such support happened, and still continues, against declared Chinese policies on non-proliferation and technology controls not only puts China in Pakistan's camp but only affirms Indian apprehensions that China would go to any length to build-up Pakistan in a manner that would restrict Indian strategic choices.

(b) **South Asia.** Some aspects of China's engagement with Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are distinctly divergent from the Indian position in these areas. This gives rise to Indian apprehensions that China is not present in South Asia as a benign regional power, interested in harmonious sub-regional development, but is doing so in pursuit of its perceived geo-political interests at any cost. Similarly, China has provided unstinted political support to many anti-India regimes in Bangladesh. On the whole, Chinese political involvement in South Asia appears to have no positive payoffs but appears motivated only by the will to pull India down.

(c) **Asia.** In Asia, it appears that China takes its perceived position as the regional hegemon very seriously and can barely conceal its irritation at India's, and often other Asian countries, attempts to have India play a greater role in Asian matters. Thus it has been with great reluctance that China has acquiesced in greater Indian involvement with ASEAN, the East Asia Summit and the SCO.

(d) **USA**. The US-China relationship is, by all metrics, much stronger than the US-India relationship, if one were to go by trade and economic figures. However, on the basis of political beliefs, shared values and vision and their current world view, the USA is much closer to India in real terms. Whether US warmth towards India is driven by basic congruence, or US realpolitik, for the Chinese decision-makers who are driven strongly by a balance of power approach, this can only be an attempt to contain China's ascendance. Phrases like 'Concert of Democracies' only serve to accentuate Chinese apprehensions.

(e) **United Nations.** India has very strong aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs, of which a desire to have a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is an important manifestation. The Chinese position on this is seen as not helpful.

(f) **Other Multilateral Fora.** While China and India have cooperated on several international issues, the Chinese opposition to India, for example at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, often comes at short notice and in a convoluted manner. This is hardly conducive to enhancement of trust.

Convergences. China and India have convergence on many international issues particularly as they pertain to trade and climate change. They also agree on the central role of the UN in multilateralism. On multilateral arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of outer space, China and India have very similar positions that can be leveraged to increase trust as also to gain their respective national interest.

Strategic / Military

The strategic domain is the main source of divergences and some convergence. While the boundary question is the main issue of divergence, it appears to Indian stakeholders that the border issue is only a peg for the overall balance of power approach by China to keep India down. However, transnational security issues increasingly affect both and could be the source of convergence.

Divergences. The boundary question has bedevilled China and India ever since the British handed over their legacy to India. While the non-demarcation of the border is a historical fact, the lack of progress on the issue is surprising to all in India, because China has settled its borders with all other neighbours. Since the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Question, many meetings of the special representatives have been held with no progress. China has even been stonewalling the relatively simpler issue of demarcation of the Line of Actual Control. On the contrary, China appears to have deliberately escalated tensions on the issue of Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh and Indian administrative control over these areas.

China's military modernisation, aggressive infrastructure and military facilities development in Tibet and on the India Tibet border, and deployment of strategic and tactical missiles in a manner that covers large parts of India has created military capabilities that are usable only against India. This has forced India to move from a posture of self dissuasion to limited deterrence. Thus, the risks of localised escalation have been growing instead of reducing. Therefore, this is one area that can benefit immensely by institution of tactical and operational level CBMs. In similar vein, Chinese ships and submarines have become increasingly active in the Indian Ocean and misunderstandings/mishaps are much more likely than earlier.

Convergences

(a) **War on Terror.** 9/11 signalled the arrival of global terrorism as a threat no country could ignore. Subsequent events in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Yemen have proved that support to terrorism as an instrument of state policy would be self-defeating. While, India has been suffering from the effects of Islamic terrorism since long, China has become aware of the risks extending to its Western regions from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Incipient cooperation in the SCO could be a model for further engagement.

(b) **Nuclear Proliferation**. Although China has a long history of cooperation with nuclear pariah states, its new position as a global leader will in due course require it to clamp down on nuclear proliferation. With India also becoming a recognised nuclear weapon state, Chinese and Indian interests could well become closely aligned in the

future.

      (c)   **Maritime Security.** The IOR is host to 50 per cent of world trade flows. 40 per cent of world trade and 50 per cent of the world's oil and gas flows pass through the Malacca Straits. China and India both have vital interests in the security of the sea lanes of communication in the IOR. China and India have both launched several military missions to the Somali coast to tackle piracy. However, these efforts are typically stand-alone with little mutual support and long term gains. Cooperation can serve the mutual interests of both with reduced costs.

Natural Resources. Availability and utilisation of natural resources - energy, water, minerals etc not only have implications for the economy but in cases of extreme scarcity or heavy external dependence, can become key issues of national security. China and India are large countries on the development path and have a voracious appetite for resources. It has been widely analysed that scaling up Indian and Chinese consumption levels to Western industrial per capita levels will strain the international availability of all resources to breaking point. The divergences and convergences flow from this basic postulate.

Divergences

      (a)   **Energy.** Indian and Chinese dependence on external oil and gas supplies is extremely high. Naturally, both are attempting to secure overseas assets. While competition in international markets is market driven, China does tend to secure these vital assets through questionable means, undercutting fair competition through a package of political patronage and military support.

      (b)   **Water**. The Tibetan plateau is the richest source of fresh water in Asia. The main rivers of the Indian sub-continent, The Indus, the Satluj and the Brahmaputra all originate in Tibet and flow to India. China itself is suffering from a potential crisis in the availability of fresh water; the situation in India is not much different. China has been extremely reluctant to discuss its plans to tame these rivers for energy and water. The South-North Water Transfer Project and similar schemes are being developed by China with lack of transparency. This potential threat is the source of much apprehension in all segments in India.

Convergences. The convergences flow from the attempts of the West to constrain Chinese and Indian growth by consideration of gross consumption of resources (including free goods like air and weather) versus Chinese and Indian per capita claims. Specific issues of convergence are the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) wherein both China and India are committed to the 2007 Bali Roadmap envisaging 'common but differentiated responsibilities', participation in global efforts to diversify the global energy mix by enhancing the share of clean and renewable energy, and participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).

Economy. Over the last two decades, the economy has become one of the major pillars of international relations leading to economic security being viewed as a key component of national security. China and India are natural competitors but there also exists great potential for mutual benefit through cooperation.

Confidence Building Measures - The Way Ahead

The potential targets for CBMs have been clearly identified in the previous section. Specific CBMs would require much greater interaction with concerned stakeholders. These are listed in the succeeding paras alongwith their potential for success.

Social and Cultural.   As seen, India and China are well established civilizations and nation states which are culturally very distant from each other, often depending on received wisdom to understand each other. Therefore, the top CBM category has to be one which brings the civilizations closer through the following means:-

      (a)   **Language.** Learning of Chinese in India and Indian languages in China in specific domain contexts - for example, technical education, the arts, development studies etc. English could be used as a bridge language. Greater accessibility to translated works, both classical and contemporary needs to be provided.

      (b)   **People to People Contacts.** To be drastically enhanced through tourism, small entrepreneurs, border trade, education etc. Frequent organisation of festivals in each others countries would enhance cultural understanding.

Economic. Economic CBMs are the easiest to implement since mutual benefit is easy to model and demonstrate. Mutual economic engagement of the highest order has already been demonstrated between the USA and China, China and Japan and China and Korea, despite severe bilateral reservations. Globalization and mutual economic engagement is thus the most potent CBM. CBMs would include addressing the trade imbalance in favour of China by giving market access to Indian goods and services in the field of IT, pharmaceuticals and engineering.[1]

Political. The Strategic Vision for the 21st Century signed between the two Prime Ministers on January 14, 2008 already provides an example of political CBMs at the highest level.2 Other CBMs would relate to the activation of mechanisms that would demonstrate mutual adherence to the principle enshrined therein.

Natural Resources. Possible CBMs include:-

      (a)   Sharing of data on precipitation, snow, glaciers, hydrological flows and utilisation for all rivers originating from the Himalayan system; this should be done to include Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan. More transparency is required on damming of rivers that affect the middle and lower riparian countries based on international covenants and agreements.

      (b)   Sharing of climate change and weather data from across the continent and Cooperative modelling of weather.

Strategic. Strategic CBMs have been adequately addressed in the ongoing interaction between the two countries and the Annual Defence Dialogue. There is a need to take it beyond reciprocal visits of military officials and think tanks to greater understanding of each other's motivations, capabilities and limitations. Additional CBMs should address the following issues:-

      (a)   Joint demarcation of the Line of Actual Control

      (b)   Exchange of military scientists; this could commence with exchange programmes between educational institutions focussing on military research.

      (c)   The flag meetings presently held at the tactical level should be upgraded to the operational level and be held in the border regions but away from the tactical deployment areas.

      (d)   Advance warning of training activities at tactical and operational depths; this is required in order to reduce the feeling of vulnerability to surprise from the opposite side.

      (e)   Nuclear CBMs is another area which needs to be addressed even though officially, China does not consider India as a nuclear weapon state.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted a novel approach to determine the manner in which CBMs may be evolved. The convergence and divergence between China and India have been examined in some detail with an emphasis on motivation and perceptions. This has led to listing of a broad set of potential CBMs. The CBMs can be refined through the workshop route using experts from both sides. This activity was noticeable among the think tanks of the National Capital during 2009, with USI also holding an international seminar on China's Rise in November 2009.3

*Text of paper presented in May 2010 at Guanxi University at Nanning.

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Changing Face of Modern Conflicts: Shaping the Indian Response

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Introduction

One of the few constants in the world has been the prevalence of change in virtually all facets of human existence. Conflicts and wars through the ages have evolved in keeping not only with a state's or a leader's political, territorial or economic ambitions but societal norms, behavioural patterns, value systems and importantly the growth of human thought. If changes in warfare in early millennia were more evolutionary, the 20th century was witness to revolutionary changes driven by the advent of rapid technological advancements. The last two decades of the 20th century saw unprecedented marvels in Information Technology Revolution, impacting deeply the nuances of conflicts and wars globally. Though, many principles of war have remain unchanged since years; amazingly today, some states through a new phenomenon of non-state actors are taking recourse to older covert forms of warfare with formidable destructive power, namely; terrorism, insurgencies and various forms of sub-conventional war or what is popularly referred to as asymmetrical warfare.

Evolution of Modern Warfare: The Generational Model

In the study of the evolution of modern warfare, some military scholars have conceptualised four generations in modern war, with the fifth currently on the threshold.1 The First Generation followed the tactics of 'line and column' which developed in the age of the smooth-bore musket and culminated in the massed manpower armies of the Napoleonic era. The Second Generation adopted the tactics of 'linear fire and movement'. With the dawn of industrial age, this era made firepower, including indirect fire a dominant form of war in the First World War phase. The Third Generation evolved in the 30's of the 20th century and was in full flow right through the Second World War. In this the lethal fire power, with the 'advent of mechanisation and airpower', was supplemented by the 'blitzkrieg' tactics of mobility and manoeuvre, which involved outflanking, infiltration and deep strikes aimed at enemy objectives in depth, instead of frontal assaults across fortified enemy defences.

The Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) covers the post Cold War period, when failing weak states and non-state actors or both in tandem took on the might of stronger states by employing the tactics of terror, insurgency, intimidation in pursuit of their goals. This generation of warfare is normally characterised by the violence of covert non-state actors taking on the might of nation states e.g. the successful fight of Mujahideen against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, current Hezbollah confrontation with Israel or till recently, the Tamil Tigers fight against their own government in Sri Lanka. The 4GW is decidedly set for a long term duration. It is highly decentralised and dispersed in its operations, and may also comprise disaggregated forces such as terrorists, guerillas and rioters lacking a centre of gravity, thus multiplying the counter terror operational problems of the forces of the state they are in confrontation with. Computer hacking, cyber crimes, illegal money laundering, drug smuggling are tactics of this generation of warfare. The 4GW makes use of the revolution in the current information/electronic age to maximise the power of terrorism, insurgency and other acts of violence against a legitimate government.

Most experts feel that the Fifth Generation, in the evolution of modern warfare has not really commenced. Noted military scholar Dr TX Hammes has opined that it would unfold, "super-empowered small groups that fight for a cause rather than a nation using off the shelf technology to attack nation states or even the entire international system. The 2001 anthrax attack in Washington DC may have been the first example of this attack." He further amplifies that "it will truly be a 'nets and jets' war. The network will bring the key information, a field to recruit volunteers and the jets will provide for worldwide inexpensive, effective dissemination."2 Presently, militarisation of Space is in a stage of infancy, but Space warfare would be added to the Fifth Generation. Although chemical and biological weapons like mustard gas were used as early as the First World War, the threat of biological weapons in the hands of technology driven terrorists is a real threat to mankind.

Spectrum and Characteristics of Future Conflicts

Unquestionably, there has been a paradigm shift in the spectrum and nature of warfare. Clear-cut distinctions between conventional and unconventional wars are getting blurred and there is not much to separate the periods of peace and war. Conflicts in the foreseeable future are likely to be both varied and complex; however, a few aspects stand out. Firstly, the existence of nuclear weapons now with a growing number of states has successfully deterred powerful nations from engaging in outright warfare. Even the enormous destructive power of conventional weapons, and consequently the unacceptable collateral damage in an all out war is a prohibiting factor. Thus a 'Total War', even if it is purely conventional in nature, would give way to limited war or restricted war and an array of low intensity conflicts. Recent events like the 2006 Lebanon conflict, the 2008 Russian campaign in Georgia in 2008 and the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009 are examples of such conflicts. Even the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the US intervention in Iraq are restricted conflicts in many ways. All out wars are inexorably giving way to "wars by other means" – sub-conventional and asymmetrical across a wide range in the spectrum of conflict. Weaker states, sub-state and non-state actors are moving to unconventional and other irregular means of warfare to achieve their political

objectives. Some non-state groupings are acquiring conventional capabilities which earlier existed only with nations, e.g. the Hamas today has conventional weaponry which even most smaller countries do not possess. The erstwhile Tamil Tigers boasted of an arsenal which took on the might of the regular Sri Lankan Armed Forces. Not surprisingly the Chinese People's Liberation Army speaks of Unrestricted Warfare in which every sphere of the state is attacked and the aim is to restrain the enemy's development without physically going to war! 3 In addition, even most established governments seek to settle differences diplomatically and with economic sanctions rather than using military force. International acceptance, prior to launch of military operations, has since assumed great importance. Though conventional conflict, owing to major differences between states, cannot and must not be ruled out, trends portend a shift from it. Nevertheless, the possibility of Hybrid War (a combination of the conventional and proxy war where non-state actors join up with the state to confront the common enemy) always exists.

Secondly, transnational and non-traditional security challenges like energy security, maritime privacy now growing by the day, climate change, water disputes, pandemics, natural disasters are the more pronounced imperatives of international security. Thirdly, there appears a discernible trend towards the militarisation of Space by some countries. The Chinese exhibited their Space capabilities in January 2007 by shooting down one of their old satellites which prompted the USA to carry out their own test in February 2008 even though it was a signatory of the Anti-Ballistic Treaty in 2001. Concerned at these developments even India has set up an Integrated Space Cell. Japan, concerned at the Chinese foray into Space, has now changed the interpretation of peaceful uses of outer Space from 'non-military' to 'non-aggressive.' Space could thus become the new frontier of conflict in future.

Another technological endeavour that looms on the horizon is the quest for ballistic missile defences. Though the USA has taken a lead in this highly technological yet operationally questionable pursuit, both China and Japan and now India too have shown interest in deploying missile defences. The impact of missile defence on nuclear deterrence will need to be analysed. In addition, the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) attributable to advances in information technologies will enable new war-fighting synergies through enhanced command and control, precision weaponry, foolproof surveillance, artificial intelligence and robotics. In the next 10-15 years or so, some nations, would deploy weapons, designed to destroy or disable information and communication networks and systems including anti-satellite, radio frequency and laser weapons, to disable an adversary's critical economic, energy, military and other information infrastructures. According to the eminent futurologist Alvin Toffler, "The full implications of what we termed 'Third Wave Knowledge Warfare' have not yet been digested. The wars of the future will increasingly be prevented, won or lost based on information superiority and dominance."4

Finally, one of the most serious danger that haunts everyone, is the looming threat of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It can lead to catastrophic consequences for any country. In addition, technology has now empowered even an individual terrorist or a very small group to create havoc through bio/chemical/cyber attacks, using inexpensive off-the-shelf technologies e.g. a nuclear device or Anthrax spores attack can be easily set off from a small suitcase.

Conflicts: Other Global Trends

Some other global trends in the shaping of emerging conflicts are easily discernible. Irregular Warfare capabilities are set to rise exponentially. The spread of light weaponry including portable, precision tactical weapon systems coupled with communication technologies would substantially increase the threat posed by irregular forces. Satellite and cellular phones with global coverage are enhancing the capabilities of irregulars as witnessed in the operations of Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region and Pakistan trained 'jehadi' terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir. The prominence of non-military aspects of warfare such as cyber, economic, resource, psychological and information based forms of conflict would gain more importance in the coming decades. In future, states and non state adversaries may engage in media warfare to manipulate public sympathies to gain popular support for their cause e.g. the Naxals/ Maoists in the Indian hinterland are employing this stratagem and have managed to elicit sympathies of certain so called human rights activists; notwithstanding, the fact that the Naxals and Maoists are indulging in brutal killings and criminal activities even against poor villagers and petty government functionaries.

Conflicts in future are likely to expand beyond the traditional battlefield with the advancements in range, clean destructive power and total precision in weapon capabilities. Apart from Space Warfare, Cyber space is the next arena for intensive conflict both during periods of peace and war. Cyber warfare is a potent constituent of Unrestricted Warfare. It is pertinent to note that till now there were no international conventions or laws to prevent Cyber warfare even during peace and this warfare is not restricted to national boundaries either. The ability of a nation or a group of technology savvy hackers to electronically paralyse the information networks, military grids, banking and transportation systems and above all the command and control systems of a nation, can easily wreck havoc even to a militarily strong country. The growth and spread of Information Technology will increase the vulnerabilities of all users of these technologies. Perception Management is also an important constituent of Information Operations now. It is designed to influence logic, emotions and decision making process and perceptions on both sides. This would grow in sophistication in the coming years.

Geopolitical Trends Impacting Future Conflicts

Globally strategic trends are shaping with alacrity and world power equations in the coming decades are likely to be distinctly different than even a few years earlier. Firstly, the epoch of American dominance, which lasted for over 60 years since the end of World War II, is drawing to a close. A unipolar world is slowly but surely giving way to multipolarity. The rise of China, Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Iran and the European Union among many other growing economies in the world will increase economic inter-dependence and enhance political linkages among nations. However, China, more than any other nation, is using its vast and rapidly growing wealth to build a formidable

military machine to become the dominant military power not only in Asia but also for global power projection. Economic forecasters predict that keeping GDP as a benchmark, China would overtake the USA as the leading economy by 2020 or so. The gradual eroding of the US pre-eminence has strategic ramifications for all democracies.

Secondly, the proliferation of WMDs would remain a source of perpetual concern to the world community. Thirdly, the cancerous growth and lethality of international terrorism across the globe remains a major concern for the civilized world and it is imperative that both the global war against terror and monitoring of WMDs is conducted with sincere cooperation by the international community. Fourthly, it is a sad fact of today's world that many Islamic nations are falling prey to radicalisation and extremism. International linkages among extremists and fundamentalists, is a harsh reality and it would continue to be inimical to the international order. Fifthly, it is also an adverse commentary on today's times that the UN is losing its grip in resolving conflicts across the world. The UN can regain its relevance in tomorrow's world only if it is realistically re-structured, to include in the Security Council, those nations too who matter in the world affairs today.

India: Meeting Future Challenges

India today faces myriad and complex security challenges. Notwithstanding the fact that its national security objectives, derived from its core values of democracy, secularism and peaceful co-existence, have neither impelled it to export its ideologies nor to have any extra-territorial ambitions. Nevertheless, it faces formidable challenge to its security, economic resurgence, and opportunities it has now to play a larger role on the world stage, from China and its nuclear armed proxy Pakistan. Threats to its internal security, in the last two decades, have seriously manifested from Pakistani sponsored terrorism; and now, since the last few years, from ultra - left Naxals/ Maoists who have managed to infect nearly 220 districts out of 619 in the Indian hinterland. This calls for re-vitalising the Para Military Forces (PMF) and the State Police set-ups and strengthening Intelligence, especially at the grassroots levels. In addition, though Internal Security is not the Army's main role yet, it must be prepared to pro-actively assist the Government in stabilising the situation when called upon to do so. This would necessitate raising of additional Rashtriya Rifles units, specially equipped and trained for counter- insurgency operations.

It must be factored in our security calculus that, overall, India has multi-front obligations and, not being a member of any military alliance/grouping, has to ensure its own security. This requires building up of additional military capabilities for creating a credible deterrence and force projection. The latter would also contribute to imposing caution on belligerent nations.

Though a nuclear exchange between India and any of her nuclear armed adversaries is highly improbable but it is not entirely impossible. Thus our nuclear doctrine of "No-first use" and never to use nukes against non-nuclear states is a mature and rational policy. Our nuclear weapons policy will only be able to deter a nuclear war in case any potential adversary fully understands our national resolve and more importantly the robust capabilities of the triad of Indian Strategic Forces. We thus need a credible and fool-proof 'second-strike' retaliatory capability to deter any nuclear misadventures.

For the Armed Forces to gear up for multi-front, multi-spectrum and multi-operational capabilities, it is imperative that adequate budgetary support is accorded to it. The current abysmally low figure of 1.98 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, from nearly 3.4 percent in 1997-98, is woefully inadequate. Modernisation of the Armed Forces has suffered and our desired combat profiles vis-à-vis our potential adversaries have slipped to unacceptable levels.

In keeping with our growing role, both in the immediate region and globally, it would be in India's interest to further intensify Defence cooperation with friendly foreign countries. Apart from cooperation and assistance in training and disaster management, India must foster intelligence cooperation among such nations to combat the common threat of terrorism in the region. In addition, Defence diplomacy is another area in which the Armed Forces must engage both bilaterally and multi-laterally to further the nation's interests both globally and in the region.

A peninsular India with approximately 7600 km coastline, an EEZ of over 2 million sq km and nearly 15000 km long land borders with seven countries; which include a 7000 km land border with two countries with whom serious differences still exist, may call for operations involving all the three Services apart from tri-service operations in other contingencies. Thus synergising the war-potential and interoperability of the three Services is sine-qua-non. The Indian Armed Forces must take radical steps to synthesize effectively their concepts, doctrines and capabilities for victory in battle.

As the Armed Forces strive towards harnessing state of the art technology, it is important for determined steps to be taken for indigenisation in the manufacture of military equipment for the three Services and other security organs of the State. The Government must provide all encouragement for tapping the vast reservoir of talent existing in the Country, especially in the private sector and various world class educational institutions that exist in India. Cooperation with industry from abroad to set up joint manufacturing hubs in India must be further explored and Foreign Direct Investment in Defence manufacturing should be encouraged.

Conclusion

The varied future security challenges for India can be met effectively only by having a clear and steadfast national vision, alongwith, a synergetic political and diplomatic approach and by also incorporating the professionalism of the Indian Armed Forces in national security decision-making. India is on the threshold of becoming a reckonable power on the world stage. For continued resurgence of our economic growth, the desired secure environment can be guaranteed

only by maintaining robust Armed Forces – capable of operating multi-dimensionally and in the entire spectrum of conflict to preserve India's core national values to safeguard our national interests.

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Smart Power*

Lieutenant General HS Lidder, PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM (Retd)**

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great privilege to be speaking at RUSI, in front of such an erudite group of professionals who are committed to understand and define the use of power.

Force has always been applied in the affairs of mankind. It also has been the arbitrator between nation states. Employment of force has been well documented and the world has witnessed great power struggle between states and also between communities within states. Geographical boundaries too have been continuously drawn and redrawn through the ages as a consequence of power struggles.

The last century itself has witnessed two world wars, maturing of revolutionary war and the validation of the principles of revolutionary war. The humbling of two super powers through this route connotes a victory of a combination of hard and soft power which is, military means plus ideology over pure hard power.

The world witnessed huge remorse at the end of each war and made attempts to redeem the wrongs perpetuated on humanity by the creation of the League of Nations after the First World War then the UNO after the Second World War. Additionally, Geneva Conventions were also drawn up in order to insulate the unarmed civilians from the tussle between the armed forces of warring nations. Nuremburg Trials indicated the desire of the global powers to recognise the blind application of hard power as a crime against humanity.

Establishing political control and subjugating the will of the adversary have always been the end state sought in the application of force. The two world wars and the march of technology has made wars very costly in terms of men and materials. Application of hard power for settling disputes between nations/communities is increasingly becoming prohibitively costly. This has relegated Hard Power to being an instrument of last resort.

The emergence of Soft Power as the means of influencing inter and intra state issues is a natural outcome of the prohibitive cost of the application of hard power. Soft Power has grown, to include other instruments of influence i.e. diplomatic, economic, political, legal and cultural aspects. Application of force had by and large remained a sequential one in which the escalation took place from Soft Power to Hard power. This gave birth to concepts of dissuasion and deterrence, where escalation and de-escalation were clearly discernible and necessary space for negotiations was created for reaching an understanding well before the decision to apply Hard Power was taken.

There are countries of various sizes with diverse geographical, cultural and industrial attributes. Their interests and aspirations differ widely and they are all carrying out their affairs in a paradigm of Action and Reaction. Historical evidence and its analyses indicates that primacy of Hard Power or Soft Power by itself has failed to produce a sustainable impact. India learnt this lesson the hard way. In 1962, India's soft power was shown to be ineffective during the Indo-Sino Border Conflict. Therefore in my opinion, the nation requires "Balanced Power" i.e. a combination of both Hard and Soft Power. The Soft Power connoting its indirect appeal and the Hard Power lurking in the background to send a subtle message: "to let the playing field of contention remain within the jurisdiction of soft power unless one wants to mess with hard power of the nation". Simply put as our American friends often state that there can be no McDonald without a MacDougall.

Each nation has a unique signature of its hard and soft power. This signature is reflective of its core values, its vision, historical and cultural construct, so to say - the way of life. While the manifestation of hard power is well understood the soft power of the nation manifests itself in various activities which may take any form. These are difficult to be legislated and regulated by a nation state. As regards India, I would like to quote a very practical example. In Afghanistan where some of the most popular television shows are being telecast, I would like to make a particular mention of an Indian Daily Soap "Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi". I am given to understand that during the telecast of, this serial, life in Afghanistan comes to a virtual standstill. Now, the government of India would have never even imagined using this telecast in this manner. This supports my argument that the elements of Soft Power may or may not be regulated by a nation state. Other forms of Indian soft power which have evolved are - the Bollywood, Indian Cuisine, Yoga, Transcendental Meditation, Satyagraha, spirit of accommodation, democracy and other activities which appeal directly to the well being of the population where Soft Power is being applied.

So much for the Indian context. Now, looking at most effective yet most innocuous way of how soft power is employed for achieving exponential results is the export of English language to the colonies of erstwhile British Empire. Adoption of English as official language over German in the USA, eventually shaped the alliances and linkages, which have so dramatically impacted the global events in the last century. Another example of Soft power projection is the use of English as part of the operating system of the computers. It has forced many a nation to refocus on English.

The world today is technologically advanced. Most of the technologies are widespread and its ownership is diffused. The world is a global village in the true sense and its economic inter- dependence causes even small ripples to have large cascading effects. The world has also shrunk in size and is intimately linked with a flood of information. Therefore, shifting of information from need to know basis to information overload; where strategic, operational, tactical transparency is a fact and accurate analyses and deductions are the sole arbitrators of knowledge. In such a world the military field which spanned the NBC, conventional and low intensity conflicts is more intertwined and responses multifaceted. This has given birth to "unrestricted warfare" which has brought other facets of national existence into the ambit of war fighting in order to achieve asymmetric advantage. Aspects which now feature in war fighting include cyber space, communications, space, electricity grids, water supply schemes, food chains, climate, economic sanctions, etc to quote a few. Increasingly, more and more organisations both formal and informal, have adopted the nuances of "Revolutionary Warfare", the success formula of the century. This form of warfare has active components of both Hard power and Soft power and is being used to challenge the supremacy of Hard power. To

compound the problem further, the lines between combatants and non combatants, so diligently drawn after the Second World War, have been deliberately blurred. Armed attacks are now being made on uniformed personnel from the civil population mass, laying put to the rules of engagement drawn up in order to protect the civil population after the war. In short the spectrum of conflict has been broadened beyond recognition. Newer facets are being added to warfare and every facet of national existence is fair game for application of force. The issue has been compounded by drawing in of the criminal networks and non government organisation seeking extra constitutional power, money and influence.

It is in such a world that we seek to apply power as nation states. The choices are no longer simple ones i.e. Hard or Soft power, governed by a clearly discernable escalatory ladder. Multifaceted challenges desire a plethora of responses, with a large number of agencies falling beyond the ambit of "Ministries of Defence". There is now an urgent need to coordinate these inter agency responses. This demands creation of joint networks, supportive data bases to act as impartial monitors and also nominate the coordinating head whose arbitration is final in that sphere. This would tantamount to using power intelligently or smartly, as everyone calls it these days. A good example of intraoperability of Hard and Soft Power is the use of Hard Power instruments for Soft Power purposes in our response to Tsunami.

Let me now discuss how this would apply to the profession of arms. Firstly, the military responses would continue to span the entire spectrum of conflict. To this would be added the nuanced diplomacy, economic sanctions, enforcing blockades, protecting essential services, ensuring continued use of cyber space and accessibility of the spectrum for communication as well as non-interference in space. Freedom to use air, land and space would still be the desired end state for ensuring successful outcome in a conflict. It is for this "Expanded Spectrum", that the militaries all over the world need to prepare for and co-opt it in their organisational and doctrinal percepts.

In the sphere of NBC, till the world achieves total disarmament, there is a need to ensure survivability of networks, essential services and the cohesion of force to carry out second strike and battle thereafter. On the conventional front there would be a need to engage and prevail over the enemy at all costs. In the Low Intensity conflict spectrum there is a need to treat the conflict as a "Fight for the Allegiance of the People" and not any military prize. Military force when applied in this spectrum has the sole purpose of bringing home to the antagonists, the futility of following the armed route and driving them to seek a political solution. This is the smart application of power in conflict resolution in the Low Intensity Conflict Spectrum. Civil administration, Para Military Forces and Police forces have integrated fully in any response that is generated in this spectrum. Low intensity conflicts epitomise the synergy between Hard and Soft power. Joint command structures and a close coordination between governmental structures and military force is the principle means adopted to influence the contested area. In my opinion, "Winning Without Fighting Is The Epitome Of Application Of Smart Power'

Let me now conclude by making some recommendations about employment of Smart Power. These recommendations are descriptive in nature than being prescriptive; also their application would require adaptations merited by the operational environment.

(a)   Firstly, for the application of smart power the local populace and the armed forces fraternity must be treated as a singular whole – one entity. This would ensure synergised responses.

(b) Secondly, the application of smart power has to be accompanied by perception management. This would ensure occupation and retention of moral high ground, which is a prerequisite for any power projection.

(c)   Thirdly, there is a need to energise the smart power application through a synergistic application of multifaceted and multi tiered power output.

(d)   Fourthly, there is a need to create organisations to orchestrate, in real time the myriad facets of power. The organisation must enable the flow of elements of power in the desired levels. Vertical lines of command and control need to be demolished and replaced by horizontal linkages reflecting necessity and not the control paths.

(e)   Fifthly, there is a need to impart broad band education to the rank and file of all participating so that they understand the power and usage of each component. This will increase intraoperability at the macro level. Also there is a need to empower the executing Commanders both legally and financially. This would ensure that they do not get tied up in procedural knots while executing smart power.

(f)   Sixthly, there is a need to redefine the rules of engagement, drawn up after accounting for the "Expanded Spectrum Of Conflict". The responses to the smart power component of the adversary should make an important component of the response spectrum.

I would like to conclude by saying that application of smart power has opened up new vistas of challenges, opportunities and deliberations. I am glad to be part of this pioneering effort which is examining the application of Smart Power. From my experience, I would like to state that any application of Smart Power needs to tie the population to your efforts with an invisible bond of hope which should be free of any political overtones and must project secularity of credentials. Those applying smart power need to be seen as honest brokers with a just cause. As such, each participant should be an ambassador and their officers be statesman.

We will have to prepare for this new era. I will close my brief presentation here and attempt to cover the gaps during the interactive session.

on 16 December 1967. He retired as Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) on 30 September 2008.

Understanding Civil-Military Integration in the Higher Defence Organisation

Lieutenant Colonel Sushil Pradhan*

When war starts, the soldier can only act according to the political and military situation as it exists then.

Heinz Guderian (Panzer Leader, 1953)

Introduction

The military is a powerful institution in contemporary society of states. Irrespective of the form of government, the military is expected to be subservient to the executive and assist it when called upon. On its part, the executive is expected to cater to the genuine requirements of the armed forces and give them their due.1 In other words, the civilian executive and the military are expected to perform their respective duties and not encroach upon one another's space and, thus, not impede the smooth functioning of the other.

Civil-Military Relations

The term civil-military relations in a broad sense is used to refer to the attitudes and behaviour, which the general public and the members of the armed forces or society exhibit towards each other. In a narrower and, specifically, a political sense, it refers to the relationship of superordination and subordination existing between the armed forces and the lawfully constituted public authorities of the state.

The nature and content of the discussion on civil-military relations varies from one political system to the other. In other words, civil-military relations vary from one country to the other and the issues of concern differ at different points of time. In India, since Independence, the Military has assiduously maintained the tradition of remaining apolitical. The military has, therefore, been a neglected arm of the state. It has also been more or less excluded from the decision making process in matters concerning security and foreign policies. This created a negative effect culminating in the Country suffering humiliation at the hands of China in the 1962 war. Matters have changed since then, but the military is not accorded any significant role in the affairs of the state2. Further, interaction between civilians and the military constitutes a critical as well as controversial relationship in any country. Ideally, civil and the military form two distinct domains, each with a specific set of functions. While the decision to go to war is made by the political establishment, the military is responsible for the actual conduct of war on the battlefield3. Yet, this relationship is not as simple as it appears at first glance. There often emerge situations in which the traditional division of responsibility between civil governance and the military becomes blurred; whereas, close interaction is important to achieve national goals.

In India, this relationship between the civilian leadership and the military has not always been smooth. There have been occasions when the military had entered into a dissonance with its political masters. So far India's politicians have countered this by inter-positioning the bureaucracy against the military4. The bureaucracy in turn uses inter-service cleavages effectively with the defence secretary being a virtual Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).The sacking of Admiral Bhagwat is, by far, the most controversial episode in the gamut of civil-military relations in India. The actual dismissal and the days preceding the dismissal witnessed an acrimonious slanging match between the military and civilian arms of the Government. It had prompted a debate on the subject in the Country and provided an occasion to seriously probe the limits to civilian control, either of the political leaders or of the bureaucracy, over matters concerning the day-to-day functioning of the Armed Forces. It was argued at that time that the civilian arm should define policy and strategic objectives and it was for the military to implement them5. Interference in the day-to-day functioning of the Armed Forces would imperil discipline and gnaw at its professionalism.

The Arun Singh committee6 had recognised the need for closer cooperation between civil and military bureaucracies. In his proposal, the defence secretary would function as the "principal defence adviser" to the defence minister, while the chief of defence staff would function as the "principal military adviser", and both would enjoy an equivalent status in terms of their working relationship. Further, the Kargil Commitee Report7 had clearly brought out that "Structural reforms could bring about a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue, taking account of the revolution in military affairs and threats of proxy war and terrorism and the imperative of modernising the Armed Forces. An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage, except in 1962. The country can no longer afford such ad hoc functioning. The Committee therefore recommends that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganised."

Based on growing awareness in the country on matters related to strategic and defence planning, the reports of

various government committees, and the media influence on the rapidity of reforms, the Higher Defence Organisation has been revamped and reorganised in recent times8. A brief study of the civil-military integration achieved in this organisation will reveal that while some progress has certainly been achieved, there is much more that needs to be done. To improve the efficiency of the existing Higher Defence Organisation further, the need to integrate the Service Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence was accepted in 1991. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommended the integration of the Services Headquarters with the MoD and the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Subsequently the Group of Ministers (GoM) approved the setting up of four task forces. These included Intelligence Systems and Apparatus, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of Defence. The Higher Defence Organisation was restructured to cater for future wars, maintain parliamentary control over military, strengthen advisory apparatus to the Government on professional military matters and strengthen budgetary process. However, it was ensured that the changes in the working system were to be minimal.

Higher Defence Organisation at the Apex Level

Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). This is the highest body at the apex level and is the final decision maker on all aspects of security. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes the Cabinet Ministers of Defence, Home, External Affairs and Finance. Other cabinet ministers attend as special invitees whenever required. In addition, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) / CDS and the Service Chiefs are in attendance on required basis. Similarly, the Cabinet Secretary or any other Secretary to the Govt of India will attend whenever required. The CCS is helped in decision making with inputs from various agencies. Some of the important agencies are: -

(a)   **National Security Council (NSC).** The NSC deals with all issues that threaten or have the potential to threaten India's internal or external security. NSC is in effect an advisory body; NSC does not have any executive authority. The authority of execution lies firmly within the ministries. The Council and its associated structures are expected to focus primarily on a multi-disciplinary approach to security issues, long and medium range assessment of threats, challenges and opportunities. The NSC comprises five structures – the Council, the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS).

(b)   **Council.** The six member Council is a Cabinet level body chaired by the Prime Minister. It consists the Ministers of Home Affairs, Defence, External Affairs and Finance. The NSA functions as the pointsman to service the Council.

(c)   **Strategic Policy Group (SPG).** The 16 member SPG, comprising the chiefs of the three services, heads of important security related ministries, and heads of the major Intelligence agencies. It is the principal mechanism for inter-ministerial coordination and integration of relevant inputs in the formulation of national security policies. The Cabinet Secretary chairs it.

(d)   **National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).** The NSAB comprises a nominated convenor and other people of eminence outside the government with expertise in various fields. NSAB advises the NSC on issues of national security.

(e)   **National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS).** The NSCS is a specialised unit under the direct charge of the NSA in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). All ministries/departments consult the NSCS on matters having a bearing on national security. It is headed by Deputy to the NSA, and acts as the Member Secretary to the SPG.

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS will provide the single point military advice to the CCS/RM when appointed. He will ensure the efficiency and the effectiveness of the planning process through inter service prioritisation and also exercise control over the strategic forces. He would rank 'primus inter pares' in the COSC and function as the Principal Military Adviser to the Raksha Mantri. Till appointment of the CDS, the Chairman COSC will perform the tasks of CDS. The CDS/Chairman COSC is assisted in functioning by the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) under the command of the Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman COSC (CISC).

Enhancing Understanding of Civil-Military Relations

Effective control of military is what is desired in the democratic world. The military is an asset of the Nation; the elected civilian Government is constitutionally empowered to control and use it to achieve the national goals and is also accountable to the Parliament. Therefore, the civilians who attain the position of controlling the military must have enough knowledge of the military's working system9. They should be able to exercise control over the military in the following way:-

(a)   **Up-to-date Security and National Security Strategy**: It should be publicly debated and approved by the Parliament.

(b)   **Credible resource based plan:** Controlled by the Parliament on what is done and how resources are used.

(c)   **Appropriate legislative underpinning:** To support national plans and international objectives.

(d) **Accountability:** To National Parliament and the public in the narrow, financial sense and more generally for policies and operations.

(e) **Adequate security arrangements and access to intelligence:** To facilitate exchange of classified information within government and internationally.

(f) **Effective arrangements for public information**: To ensure transparency in respect of national policies and security forces activities and to respond to points of public and media concern.

(g) **Appropriate military structure:** Organised, trained and equipped to meet national and international obligations and objectives.

(h) **Trained manpower**: Both, the military and civilians should be trained to work in tandem.

It must be debated as to what military strategy is adequate to meet the threats and national security strategy? What are the appropriate military roles, missions and tasks and how they could be prioritised? Does the entire defence organisation fit into these missions? What defence reorganisations are needed and how urgently should they be pursued? What defence planning approach should be used to manage the Armed Forces? The civilian leadership should be able to find the answers to all these questions.10 To produce the best result, it is obvious that the civilian-military relationship has to be healthy. Also, these relations should be institutionalised.

Civilian control of the military has been suggested as a necessary condition for democratisation. In a democracy, the military serves the country by accepting the authority, the legitimacy, and the leadership of elected officials. The military in India has remained apolitical in the state's affairs due to the mechanism developed to control the military. "Subjective civilian control" is interested in maximising the civilian control of the military through governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional avenues. "Objective civilian control" can be achieved by capitalising on military professionalism in order to cultivate the professional attitudes and behaviour among the members of the officer corps.

The Way Ahead

India's military has historically been apolitical. Unlike militaries in other developing countries early in the post colonial period, we have never had an instance of the Indian military transgressing its bounds. This has consistently been among the indicators of India's democratic good health. However, this has resulted in the military's marginalisation even in core security decision making structures and processes.11 This refrain in security studies commentary testifies to the continuing distance between the apex military leadership from political decision makers on policy issues.

Continuing security challenges at the sub-conventional plane and the nuclear overhang over conventional conflict necessitate an integrated approach to national security with appropriate structural and process changes. What is required is a fundamental review of the civil-military relationship12 based on certain premises. It must be recognised that the area of activity encompassing defence planning, defence preparedness, defence administration and defence management – in short, the discourse on national security – is distinct from the specialised aspects of military operations and military training. The bureaucracy has no role to play in the latter, yet the higher military commanders, to function as credible military advisers, must have some level of statutory role in the former.

Undoubtedly, there have been instances where the administrative actions of the bureaucracy have adversely affected the operational readiness of the Services. A strong political leadership, besides a definite charter of duties, is needed to prevent civil-military conflict. The Arun Singh Committee recommendations would require to be taken to their logical conclusion13 and the power of a generalist bureaucracy requires to be curbed through the merger of the service headquarters with the ministry. To bring about parliamentary control over this powerful Indian avatar of the Pentagon, greater attention and involvement of the politicians through bipartisan parliamentary committees would be necessary. Procedures bringing in greater scrutiny into defence processes need to be in place.

Conclusion

Rather than banking on the good fortune of possessing sagacious political and military leaders, the emphasis, as rightly highlighted in the Constitution, has to be on establishing institutionalised systems and processes for operational and administrative control of the Armed Forces by civil leadership. It is high time the Indian state displayed the political will to undertake structural reform of its higher defence set-up. This, besides fulfilling the dreams of our Constitution makers, will also provide the military leadership and bureaucracy their rightful place in formulating an integrated and coordinated national security strategy. India has a developing strategic culture in a variegated strategic community; organisational experience in the National Security Council (NSC); and competing power centres in the security field, such as the 'strategic enclave', to lend balance. It is poised at a generational change in political leadership. Its democracy and federal structure are healthy enough to co-opt the military. What is important is that the foundations of civil- military relations should be based on sincerity of purpose, mutual trust, tact, perseverance and above all, professionalism.

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Crafting a Counter- Naxalite Strategy

Ms Vinita Priyedarshi*

Introduction

Tracing its origin to the 1967 Naxalbari movement of West   Bengal, forty years down the line Naxalism has come to acquire new dimensions. This led Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to call it the single largest threat to India's internal security. Today, around 235 districts are affected by Naxalism in varying degrees which has led to innumerable loss of life and resources of the country. The stated aim of the Naxalites, to capture power in Delhi, is no longer a secret looking at their strategy of penetration into the urban areas. The Government has to date treated this as a law and order problem and has tried to address it through a three pronged strategy comprising the use of force, dialogue and addressing the socio-economic causes which were responsible for the movement taking roots among the tribals.

Going by the success witnessed by Andhra Pradesh in containing the threat of Naxalism with a similar strategy, nothing seems amiss in the strategy itself. Then why is it that the same strategy does not seem to yield similar results in other Naxal affected states? This is because each prong has a number of imperatives attached. These form an intrinsic part of the overall strategy which the Government has failed to knit into a comprehensive whole. Until each of these imperatives are addressed and interlinked to formulate a comprehensive and coordinated counter-Naxalite strategy, success will continue to elude the security forces. The counter-Naxal experience of the states shows that whenever these strategic imperatives have been considered, the strategy has paid dividends. There is, therefore, an urgency to make the agencies dealing with Naxalism aware of these strategic imperatives and incorporate these at the tactical and operational levels.

Strategic Imperatives Associated with the Strategy of Use of Force

To examine the first prong of the strategy, which emphasises 'use of force', there are a number of interlinked imperatives. These are: firstly, the amount and type of force which should be used in such actions. Secondly, the type of training which such forces should be imparted. Thirdly, the weapons which they should possess and fourthly, their method of operations. So far the Counter-Insurgency (CI) strategy has focussed on the use of Central Police Forces (CPOs) or the raising of Special Task Forces like the Greyhounds or the Cobras without analysing the lacunae associated with the use of CPOs in CI operations. It is suggested that the use of CPOs should be considered only after duly analysing these strategic imperatives as otherwise, their effectiveness could be doubtful.

Imperative One: Involvement of State Police Forces

Security analysts and experts have said that in CI operations, State Police Forces should be at the forefront of fighting. In my interview, Mr Mahendra Kumawat[1] and Mr DM Mitra[2] emphasised the significance of using trained 'State Police Force' for dealing with insurgency, since they belong to that particular area and also form part of the local population. They are familiar with the culture, ethos and language of the people; have bonds with the people and are better conditioned mentally to handle them. They would also be more circumspect than the CPOs, when under attack. Their actions would be influenced by the fact that their misguided kith and kin may be on the other side. Moreover, they would have a better chance of fighting the insurgents efficiently because of their inherent motivation for doing so. The defeat of Naxalism in Andhra Pradesh and terrorism in Punjab reveals that leadership of the local State Police Forces played a significant role in these campaigns. Even in Gadchiroli, reports suggest that CRPF always moved in tandem with the Maharashtra police. The forces involved in operations had at least 30 per cent participation from the State Police Forces and increased intelligence-sharing between them.[3]

The use of Armed Forces is, therefore not recommended in anti-Naxalite operations. The Government has also hesitated in using the Army for internal conflicts. This is because the Army is trained to fight in a wider arena where they enjoy complete operational freedom and only have to follow the restrictions imposed by the Geneva Conventions. The rules in CI operations are totally different. Firstly, the Armed Forces have to fight against their own citizens and secondly, this is done in full glare of human/civil rights activists and media.

Another factor which merits consideration in CI operations is that the objectives are not clearly defined and the insurgents are always elusive. Whereas, in conventional armed warfare, aim, objectives and plans are executed with clinical precision in well defined areas of conflict. No such defined theatre of war exists for CI operations. The insurgents attack from within the local population and merge with them easily. Therefore, counter attack by the CI forces carries with it the danger of collateral damage. It is an established fact that large scale collateral damage and targetting of own population strengthens their resolve to fight back. In CI operations use of excessive force can suddenly turn the tide against the forces, which is not the case in military operations against the enemy.

It is a fact that the State Police Forces are specifically trained to maintain law and order within the society. They do not possess the skills and wherewithal for combating insurgents and well armed terrorists. Thus it is essential to

reorganise, reequip and train the State Police Forces in jungle warfare also. The Central Government must also implement its decision of modernising all the Police Forces in tandem with the State Governments expeditiously.

Imperative Two : Avoid Centre-State Jurisdictional Conflicts

While CI forces are governed by jurisdictional constraints between Centre and the States, for maintaining law and order; no such restrictions apply to the Naxalites. Any move on the part of the Central Government to enter into areas under the jurisdiction of a State is viewed with suspicion. Besides, each State is governed by the dynamics of its internal politics, which might be at variance with the rules governing the politics at the national level. It is precisely due to these reasons that States like Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa, which are ruled by non-UPA governments, have not responded positively to the Central Government's call for joint and coordinated operations. However, under the Maoists onslaught, these States are now forced to look upto the Centre for additional forces. The result is a half-baked counter-Naxal strategy which lacks cohesion between Central and State Forces. Since actions of the State Police Forces cannot be disowned by the state governments, they have the freedom and flexibility to innovate and experiment with new tactics. Under the present scenario, the state governments must understand the benefits of raising special anti-Naxalite forces with help from the Central Government. Such a strategy would meet the approval of the states, since these additional Special Forces would function under their direct supervision. It would also give them the additional advantage of creating a permanent pool of trained Special Forces which could either be used in CI/CT operations or to deal with other Internal Security (IS) problems, as well.

Imperative Three: Intelligence Collaboration

Intelligence forms the back-bone of all CI campaigns. This, therefore, becomes an unfamiliar task for the Army or CRPF which being not well versed with the lingua franca of the region, are seen as alien forces by the local populace. Further, deployment of CRPF or Army is coupled with the problem of coordination between the Centre and the state. CPOs deployed in combat zones located in various states cannot operate on their own. They must liase with the local police, especially for intelligence. Their role, as the CRPF's commander of anti-Naxal operations, Vijay Raman, says, is of ''a force multiplier, not contractors to have been given the job of exclusively rooting out Naxals''.4 It is interesting to note that in Andhra Pradesh, which is being projected as a success model (even at the peak of CI phase in 2005-2009), merely six battalions of CPOs were ever deployed for anti-Naxalite operations.5 The experience of Punjab terrorism reveals that CT operations started yielding results only when the Punjab Police Force assumed leadership and started paying attention to training of the Punjab Police personnel.

Imperative Four: Strong and Independent Leadership

Effective leadership, especially at the apex of the State Police apparatus, is vital in CI operations. A study conducted by Navlakha in the heartland of the Naxalite movement brought out the case of an upright police officer,6 who was shifted due to political pressures. This is not the only instance of political interference. Good leadership is indispensable in CI operations, not merely for boosting the morale of the Police Forces, but also for building confidence among the people. Yet going by the analysis of Ajai Sahni7, there is huge deficit in the ratio of DSP to SSP (deficits in Andhra Pradesh stands at 19 per cent, Bihar 35 per cent, Chattisgarh 28 per cent, Jharkhand 51 per cent, Orissa 34 per cent and West Bengal 25 per cent as also in the ratio of ASP to Inspector (Andhra Pradesh 15 per cent, Bihar 39 per cent, Chattisgarh 41 per cent, Jharkhand 18 per cent, Orissa 34 per cent and West Bengal 30 per cent. The 13th Finance Commission has allotted adequate funds for modernisation of Police Forces. However, it would still take some time before a pool of trained Police Forces, with strong and independent leadership, become fully operational.

Imperative Five: Modernisation of State Police Forces

The type of training and amount of forces which should be deployed in CI operations also need serious consideration. Training of Police Forces should also include the basics of jungle warfare. Except Greyhounds no other Special Operation Force seem to follow the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of jungle warfare. Non-state actors/insurgents, lacking the expertise needed to wage conventional warfare, adopt new techniques of warfare. Their aim is neither to defeat the enemy nor to attack it from the front but they attack surreptitiously, to achieve surprise. In such scenarios, large forces would not be suitable as they would be easily detected by the insurgents. They would also find it difficult to move at night, with all their equipment. Special Police Forces on a mission need to carry night vision goggles, bullet-proof vests, sleeping bags and dry rations. Mr Mitra from his own CI experience and research states that "size of the force in any CI operation should depend on the thickness of the jungle, its average visibility area and circumference. A smaller force in a thinner jungle could be counter productive and vice-versa".8

There are, other factors too; such as strategy of the adversary, his preparedness, the resources available to the security forces, the intelligence available to them, and the terrain in which the operations have to be conducted. All

these put together will determine, both the strategy as well as the operational tactics of the CI forces. The one man Rammohan inquiry, appointed to probe the killing of 76 security personnel, including 75 belonging to the CRPF, in Dantewada, Chattisgarh, in its report is believed to have indicated leadership failure during and after the operation as one of the causes for the debacle.9 Further information on the command structure, hierarchy and decisions concerning the operation, quality of training imparted to the CRPF and whether they followed the SOPs would be revealed in due course when the report is made public by the Home Ministry. In all likelihood, lacunae in these aspects are certain to have been responsible in some measure for the brutal ambush of the CRPF company.

Dialogue

As far as the second prong of the Government's strategy i.e., dialogue with the Naxalites is concerned, one needs to be reminded that the aim of dialogue should be to win the support of the masses. This needs to be done by exposing their lack of agenda and preparedness in offering an alternative to the Parliamentary democracy. Till now the Government has not paid adequate attention to the details of the dialogue. Although the Government's CI policy does talk of the creation of a Perception Management Cell, which would frame the overall policy for articulation of its views and policies to the masses, it has not yet been implemented. Offer of dialogue has been made without chalking out a strategy as to how it should react to the Naxalites rejection of dialogue or how it should utilise the ceasefire period once negotiations commence. It is, therefore, recommended that the following considerations should guide any offer of dialogue with the insurgents:-

(a) **Using Dialogue as a Period of Strengthening the Forces.** The first ever dialogue with the Naxalites that started in Andhra Pradesh at the behest of the 'Committee of Concerned Citizens' reveals that it was used by the Naxalites for reinvigorating their movement. The peace initiative was fully utilised by the People's War Group cadres for eulogising their aims and objectives and creating a sympathetic image for themselves in the media. However, there was also another side to this story. During the ceasefire between the Andhra Pradesh Government and the Naxalites in 2004, Security Forces sent informers into the fold of the Naxalites which helped them strengthen their intelligence machinery. Security Forces also collected information on Naxalites during political negotiations with the State Government. In these negotiations, Security Forces came to know of the hitherto unknown faces of the Naxalites which helped them nab these leaders in later days. Taking lessons from the Andhra case the Government should try to hold talks with the Naxalites but not at the cost of postponing its intelligence and operational preparedness in the process.

(b) **Using Dialogue to Expose Naxalite's Weaknesses**. In end January 2010, Kishanji (leader of the Maoists) had in a letter to the Chief Minister of West Bengal said that the Communist Party of India (Maoists) would never consent to dialogue after laying down arms at the behest of the Centre or any state government or any political party. The Maoists did not trust the current Parliamentary system and laying down arms was not on their agenda. Further, within the Maoist leadership there is a division of opinion, whether there should be talks with the Government. Gopinathji alias Durga Hembram, wanted talks at the earliest while Kishenji the military commander had opposed it in a Central Committee meeting of 30 out of the 36 members, including those from Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa in the Kanai-shol hill forest. Such developments need to be disseminated to the grass roots level to expose the Naxalites preference for violence and their complete abhorrence to principles of Parliamentary democracy.

(c) **Use Media to Highlight the Futility of Naxalite Violence.** The role of media has not been properly appreciated for highlighting the futility of violence resorted to by the Naxalites. Media seems to vacillate between the 'just cause' propounded by the Naxalites and the 'violence' perpetrated by them. There is not enough debate on television channels concerning the loss caused to the Indian economy due to Naxal violence or the damage caused to developmental activities of the Government through actions of the Naxalites. The current spate of attacks on trains leading to the death of innocent people should be used to highlight the hollowness of the ideology propounded by the Naxalites. The Government, thus, needs to use the media innovatively.

Developmental Measures

There is no denying the fact that Naxalism owes its origin to lack of Governmental authority in the tribal hinterland and its failure in looking after the basic needs of the tribals. However, this is not only peculiar to the Naxal-infected states as other States also suffer from lack of development and deprivation. However, the forested and hilly terrain of the tribal hinterland has allowed the Naxalites to manipulate the grievances of the tribals to suit their own vested interests. Any developmental measure undertaken by the Government needs to take this fact into consideration while formulating its policies.

(a) **Building Infrastructure.** There is an urgent need of connecting the interiors with the mainland through proper roads. One of the reasons why Naxalites have not been able to make inroads into urban areas is because the interiors of the cities are well connected and Forces could easily be stationed at various places. Blaming the Naxalites for stopping construction works will not serve the purpose since the Security Forces, moving in the difficult terrain while commuting, are likely to fall prey to ambushes. Construction of roads needs to be supplemented by building of public utilities like hospitals, rural dispensaries and schools. Protection of these public places should not be left to Security Forces alone but it would be wiser to involve group of villagers who could take turns in guarding them. Involvement of villagers might dissuade the Naxalites from attacking these places. Israel follows the practice of placing voluntary citizen guards (established under the National Police) to guard school premises as well neighbourhoods at night10. Prior to the establishment of voluntary guards, Israel was following the policy of placing two parents on the

gates of the school as guards. India might learn such practices from Israel to involve the citizens to defend public places which are meant for their benefit.

(b)   **Winning Hearts and Minds of the People**. Gaining support of the masses is critical in any CI operations; however, the Government has not shown innovativeness in winning over the masses. Effective implementation of existing policies is the key to development. Corruption in all walks of life has led to siphoning of the funds meant for development of the tribals as well as denial of their basic rights. The Government needs to overhaul the administration, particularly those involved in the implementation of the policies related to the tribals. Proper implementation of land tenancy rights as well as conclusion of Memorandum of Understanding with the mining corporates is long overdue. The laws do exist, but what is needed is the political will to implement them, keeping aside the compulsions of power politics.

Conclusion

Naxalism is an ideology which is difficult to defeat since it tends to hold its sway over adherents long after the enemy is defeated physically. Naxalism can be defeated only if the Government implements the various strategic imperatives discussed above. It is true that there can be no alternative to Parliamentary democracy. Naxalism, while providing some relief to the tribals, cannot be a substitute to liberal democratic set up. The Government's three-pronged strategy (use of force, dialogue and development) of dealing with Naxalism is workable, provided the machinery engaged in its implementation follows the various imperatives associated with these strategies and link them into a comprehensive and coordinated counter-Naxal strategy.

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Indian Ocean : Emerging Chinese Aspirations, Importance of A & N Islands and the Way Ahead for India

Colonel Deepak Saini*

Introduction

Phrases such as 'Clash of Civilizations', the 'Commies vs the West', etc provide a spatial view of critical trends in world politics1. A study of the world map is essential to understand the impact technological advances have made on mankind over the ages. Encouraged and facilitated by globalisation, it also provides an insight into the breaking of ideological barriers today. However, some countries continue to remain unaffected by the current economic trends. These are countries where the 'time for change has arrived' but the political leadership has not measured upto the challenges. Geography dictates that such countries get harnessed to meet the 'needs of tomorrow'. The advent of the internet and globalisation has ensured that politics may not be kept distanced from geographical realities for long.

Under these circumstances, where can we see the beginning of the future? In America, Africa, Europe or Asia? Or, would it be one of the oceans? The ongoing 'Clash of Civilizations', currently termed as the Global War on Terror (GWOT), is making the contours of the future around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The IOR encompasses the entire arc of Islam from the Sahara to the Indonesian archipelago2. Millions of muslims; inhabit this region. This issue is also related to the ability of one of the warring factions to move the war onto the territory of the other, in order to keep the home fires burning. History has many examples of this, e.g. Alexander's conquests and Napoleon's march into Russia. Similarly, currently the Western world is engaged in shifting the war away from the European mainland into Asia.

The rapid economic growth of India and China has been taken note of routinely. However, ramifications of China's equally notable military growth does not seem to be getting the attention it deserves. China's aspiration to be a great world power, as well as quest for energy security, has compelled her 'to redirect her gaze from land to the seas'. The fact that China is focussing on fast track development of sea power indicates, how much more self-confident she feels on land. This is how the map of the Indian Ocean exposes the contours of power politics in the initial years of the 21st century. This would be the gateway to the world in future.

Energy, India and Indian Ocean

As per historian Felipe Fernandez Armesto sea routes, generally, matter more than land routes; for they carry more goods, more economically. Today, 90 per cent of global commerce and about 65 per cent of all oil travels by sea. The Indian Ocean accounts for half of the world's container traffic. Moreover, 70 per cent of petroleum products pass along the Indian Ocean through the world's principal oil shipping lanes, including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, Babel Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.3 Forty per cent of the world trade passes through the Straits of Malacca; which alone accounts for a similar percentage of all traded crude in the world today.

China's demand for crude oil doubled between 1995 and 2005 and would double again in the coming 10 years or so. Today, on an average more than 80 per cent of oil and oil products bound for China cross the Indian Ocean and pass through the Straits of Malacca.

India on the other hand is soon going to become the world's fourth-largest energy consumer, after USA, China, and Japan. Today, India is dependent on oil for roughly 33 per cent of her energy needs, 65 per cent of which is imported. Apart from coal from Africa, Indonesia and Australia, India bound ships in future will also be carrying increasingly large quantities of liquefied natural gas (LNG) across the seas from Southern Africa as also from Qatar, Malaysia and Indonesia.4 The Indian Ocean, thus becomes a vast web of energy trade, stretching from the Straits of Hormuz to Malacca Straits, across to the Gulf of Thailand – this expanse should ideally span India's 'Zone of Influence'.

Chinese Aspirations in the IOR

Recently, the Chinese President Hu Jintao has voiced China's "Malacca dilemma." Geographically and historically, China is a land power. However, over the past two decades, she has found herself to be increasingly dependent on resources and markets accessible only via maritime routes.5 The Chinese hope to eventually partly bypass the Straits of Malacca by transporting oil and other energy products via roads, pipelines and from ports in the Indian Ocean into the heart of China. With this aim, China has made inroads into five of her neighbouring countries in the North West.

One reason why Beijing wants to integrate Taiwan into her dominion is to redirect her naval energies away from the Straits of Taiwan into the Indian Ocean. Towards this end, China wants to build a naval base in Aden, in addition to the ones in Gwadar and Pasni in Pakistan; a fuelling station at Hambantota, in Sri Lanka; a container facility with extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong, Bangladesh; apart from developing Sittwe in Myanamar. Beijing also operates a surveillance facility on Coco Islands, deep in the Bay of Bengal.6 The Chinese also envisage a canal

across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, to link the Indian Ocean with China's Pacific coast; a project on the scale of the Panama Canal and one that will transfer Asia's balance of power in China's favour. This explains her current expanding torrents to the West.

Zhao Nanqi, former DG of General Logistics Department of the People's Liberation Army 1993 had said "We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the Indians". China has been steadily working towards this goal. Sometime in the next decade, China's Navy (PLAN) may have more warships than the USA. She would have more aircraft carriers, JF 17 fighter jets, a proven Main Battle Tank, a potent Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) capability and an amphibious and expeditionary force – all organised into 'Theatre Commands' rather than the present Military Regions.

There is nothing unlawful about the rise of China's military power. As the country's economic interests expand, so will her military, and particularly the Navy, to guard these interests. The British did this in the 19th Century and so did the USA, subsequently. Similar is the case with China. The first proclamation of Zhao Nanqi in 1993 was reiterated in 2005, during a commemoration of Zheng He, a Ming dynasty explorer and admiral who plied the seas from China to Africa, in the early 15th Century. This celebration signals China's belief that these seas have always been part of her 'Zone of Influence'. Her next change of guard is scheduled for 2015 when her aircraft carriers(s) get commissioned. So where do we go from here?

Indian Islands and Indian Ocean

We should logically go back to our 'Zone of Interest' in the Indian Ocean, for this is the area of the 'Confluence of Interests.' An area where major Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) congregate, there is immense marine and natural wealth apart from the wholesome island territories of Lakhsadweep, Andaman and Nicobar. The islands of Lakshdweep are about 200 nm (310 kms) to the West of the Indian sea board, where as the 572 islands of Andaman and Nicobar, are located 700 nm (1200 kms) to the East. These islands push the India's reach far into the East. In this regard they stand to be India's national strategic assets. On the other hand their proximity to Southeast Asia yields immense dividends. This proximity facilitates engagement of the extended neighbourhood through politico-military-diplomatic means which enable confidence building and fostering inter-operability for joint operations. This singular issue helps India in safe keeping of domains, through moderation with subregional and extra regional powers, with a direct bearing on her 'zone of interest'. This issue is also linked to India's Look East Policy.

The archipelago of Andaman and Nicobar are an extension of the Arakan Yoma submarine mountain range. The northern most part i.e. Landfall Island is only 30 nm from Myanmar's Coco Islands and the Southern tip (Indira Point) is separated by the Six Degree Channel of about 86 nm from Aceh in Indonesia.

The lie of the ground of these islands extends North to South for about 470 nm. Thus, the island chain acts as a frontier securing vital SLOCs since it creates a series of choke points: The Preparis Channel in the North, the Ten Degree channel between the Andaman and Nicobar Island groups, and the Six degree Channel to the South. The former two waterways are used infrequently by commercial shipping. However, the entire global shipping passing through the Malacca Straits must cross the Six Degree Channel. The Southern part of the island chain is, therefore, geographically well placed to play a larger role.

This island chain is the centrality in the Bay of Bengal as its vast longitudinal spread helps India in ensuring greater domain assertiveness as also for countering rapid proliferation of non traditional maritime threats in the area, and is the bedrock for maintaining good order at sea.

Glimpse of the future IOR and It's Linkages to Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Before moving further it is necessary to first limit the scope of this analysis. It is unlikely that warfare would break out among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).7 China in a stand-alone mode, with her current and near term naval assets coupled with global interdependency of the day, is unlikely to have complete hegemony in IOR. Accordingly, our focus areas should be built upon cooperation, to counter extra regional and transnational threats, rather than to prevent inter-state conflict. 'Cooperation' thus is the key for security and simultaneous development for India, China and the ASEAN. Now, if this is the crux, then the islands of Andaman and Nicobar gain added strategic importance for the Indian subcontinent. They have the potential of catapulting India, as a well placed emerging geopolitical leader in the region.

Contemporary global environment is driven by economic and export led development. China has become more dependent on SLOCs as her trade has increased and she needs to import her energy requirements.8 For India too, the SLOCs are of vital importance. India already is one of the big energy consumers in the world. With a rapidly growing economy, her demand for fossil fuel will only grow. India needs to step up efforts to diversify her energy sources for long-term energy security. In addition to the current supplies from the West, some quantity of oil and gas will also have to be sourced from the East. In other words, given India's rising trade and energy stakes, the importance of Eastern SLOCs and southeast Asian straits would grow significantly. Therein lies another paradigm of the strategic importance of the geographical location of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The Way Ahead for India

While India is still debating the strategic and economic potential of these islands, and how they help in extending the Indian reach into the ASEAN countries, China has already set the cat amongst the pigeons. She has started engaging the ASEAN countries by way of methods evolved over "Regional Confidence Building" and "Defence Forums". Taking advantage of the ongoing diversion related to the GWOT and the ongoing global financial crisis, her recent overture of "soft power campaign" in the ASEAN countries seems to have outshined all the players in the strategic, diplomatic and commercial march. China has very recently infused a package of US $ 10 billion as an "investment fund" in addition to a promise of US $ 15 billion as "line of credit" over the next three to five years for the 'needy' ASEAN countries. In addition to this aid in the southeast, she has also announced a US $ 10 billion support package for the financially distressed former Soviet republics as well as equal investments in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan indicating her desire to shape events across Eurasia.

China's 'First Chain of Islands' strategy which looks at dominating the Philippines and Borneo, is a reality. Her second Chain starts in the North at Bonin Islands, moves southwards through the Marianas, Guam and Carolina Islands. Towards this end, her submarine, ship upgradation and aircraft carrier programmes are well under way. China is seeking to achieve a power projection capability in support of her 'Second Island Chain' strategy by 2020. The next stage is from 2020 to 2050 during which the Chinese power projection is likely to expand into the IOR or towards the 'Third Island Chain'.

The Third Chain is of course, an extrapolation of the Chinese trend, for the present. China is unlikely to go to war with her littorals or with India. There is too much at stake in today's globalised world for everyone, and, therefore, there is a need to build a comprehensive security environment which is nurtured by faith and mutual cooperation. In this context, the concern is not simply cooperation but 'Operationalised Security Cooperation'. Cooperation, in its broad sense, occurs when states, in order to realise their own goals, modify policies to meet preferences of other states. 'Operationlised Security Cooperation' is a specific type and degree of cooperation in which policies addressing common threats are carried out by officials without immediate or direct supervision from strategic level authorities. Consultation between ministries of various states is an example of 'cooperation'; assessment and intelligence briefing by combined teams of analysts is an example in the realms of 'operationalised cooperation'. In maritime environment, international staff consultations exemplify cooperation. Taking this further, it can be said that a 'Search and Rescue Mission' can be considered as an example of a loose 'operationlised cooperation'. However, a scheduled combined and formal 'Law Enforcement Patrol' between two or more states in a given region would be an ideal example of 'Operationalised Security Cooperation'. Presently, India does have such an understanding with a number of her Indian Ocean Littorals, but much more is required to be done.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding all of the above, maritime security cooperation is by no means preordained. A host of wild cards could impel the players in the region towards a more forceful security doctrine.9 But that is another story. For the present the IOR and the seas around are witnessing an intriguing historical anomaly; simultaneous rise of two self made powers against the backdrop of the US domination over the global commons. China is already way ahead on her path with great advances in her rank and file in league with her national aims and ambitions. India probably, needs a new push to realise that it requires to have a 'strategic re-think' of shifting gears from almost neutral to high; as also from land to the seas. And in the seas, on to the islands of Andaman and Nicobar. Even at the cost of repetition, I would like to emphasise that the development of full maritime potential of these islands will undoubtedly give a boost to India's 'Look East Policy'.

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A Re-Look at the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill*

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Nuclear Liability Bill1 is a major step contemplated to operationalise the Indo-US civil nuclear deal. Its underlying aim is to limit the monetary compensation which the operator of a nuclear power plant would be required to pay in case of a nuclear disaster. It goes without saying that a pre-requisite for the entry of private operators in nuclear power generation is framing of a clear policy concerning payment of compensation to the victims of a nuclear mishap. Hence, an unambiguous and legally robust system is the call of the hour.

The text of the Bill shows its drafting being undertaken in haste, without due scrutiny. Its contents appear to have been drawn up without requisite home work or consultation with various stake holders. These are replete with numerous errors.

Need and contents of the Bill may be examined on the touchstone of practical, political, legal and humanitarian considerations. To begin with, the timing and propriety of the legislation is a matter of special relevance. At the outset, the relevance of the Bill has been assailed by political parties on the ground that the proposed enactment should have been attempted only after first amending the Atomic Energy Act, 19622. The latter does not offer any scope for entrusting nuclear power generation to any non-governmental entity. Under the existing law, the Government alone is allowed to run a nuclear power generation plant3. State owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) is the sole operator as of now. No other party can enter this field. Hence, it would be logical to assume that requisite changes to the above Act would first be needed to facilitate entry of private companies before the contemplated Bill can be taken up to limit the liability of a non governmental operator to pay compensation.

Text of the Statute has left a number of loopholes which can be exploited skillfully to dodge or delay payment of compensation to the victims or thwart their efforts to obtain monetary relief by dragging them into legal minefields. These require to be addressed. To illustrate, the Bill enjoins an operator to cover his liability to pay compensation by taking out an insurance policy. Suitable care should have been taken to insure that such a liability to pay compensation under Clause 4 should not be contingent upon receipt by the operator of insurance proceeds under Clause 8.

The definition of nuclear damage includes costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment caused by a nuclear incident4. Such a risk is manifest in the event of a nuclear radiation leak. However, the Bill offers no clue as to the mechanism to claim damages in the event of such a catastrophe that would witness a wide spread damage. It is also silent about the locus of the person or body authorised to seek claim in situation of this type. Such lack of clarity runs counter to the 'Polluter Pays' Principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India5. The Supreme Court had observed – "Once the activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by his activity irrespective of the fact whether he took reasonable care on his activity. The rule is premised upon the very nature of the activity carried on." Therefore, it is only the polluter (read operator) who is to make good the entire payment and is not to be sheltered by the Government with the tax payers money.

The meaning of 'operator' in Clause 2(l) refers to a person. It is not known whether such a definition would afford its application to a company or corporate entity. It would have been prudent to clarify this aspect in the definition itself as it is a major aspect relating to liability. Moreover, the opposition has questioned the manner in which the law does not fix liability on the supplier, limiting it to the operator. The word 'nuclear incident' may also pose problems in case of say three separate events separated by geographical location, time or nature of damage. Would these be treated as three district incidents or as only one?

A trigger mechanism to set in motion the process of liability for nuclear damage is the issue of a notification by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)6. The notification is required to be issued by the AERB 'within' 15 days from the date of occurrence of a nuclear incident. The use of 'within' creates a doubt about the validity of a notification made after expiry of 15 days. Further, what happens if the full compliment of AERB is not functional due to any reason say sickness, leave or retirement at the time of a nuclear incident? Could the decision by way of notification be liable to be opposed on the ground of "lack of quorum", where one or more members are absent? Moreover, authority to withhold such a notification is vested in the Board if in its opinion the threat and risk involved is 'insignificant'. In a case of insignificant nuclear damage, it may be logical to infer that there may not be any notification or order issued. Can the 'non-decision' or, in other words, absence of a decision be challenged on the ground of erroneous application or non application of mind. The right to claim compensation shall stand forfeited if the claim is not made within ten years from the date of a nuclear incident7. Such a clause which extincts the right to claim calls for a review because the consequences or ill effects may quite often come to be visible many years or even generations later. The other objectionable clauses are 16(5) and 32(10) where no appeal or review is provided for even when the decision of the Board is erroneous or flawed.

Clause 5 provides a shelter to an operator from payment of compensation, if a nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident directly due to certain acts, which include amongst others, an act of terrorism. This stipulation is also open to mischief. What happens, if an operator contests or evades his liability citing the incident to have been caused by a terrorist act? It is noteworthy that 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy Agency do not have terror as ground for exemption. Further, the likelihood of an operator indulging in foul play to get away from paying compensation cannot be ruled out, given the insertion of clause 16(3), 32(8) or offences under Chapter VI of the Bill.

By keeping the entitlement to compensation without claim for interest for delayed payment, the victims would

be totally at the mercy of an operator. 8 It may also induce the operators to take a complacent attitude.

The bill contains a number of clauses that are apparently ambiguous. For example, it pegs the maximum penalty liability for an operator at Rs 500 crore. On the other hand, the Government is authorised to either increase or decrease the amount of liability of any operator. What then is the rationale to peg a limit at Rs 500 crore? Such a position is legally undesirable also because the operator and regulator are both on the same side as opposed to a victim, who would invariably be at the receiving end.

The rationale for pegging the monetary limit at Rs 500 crore has itself led to major criticism having regard to a like amount having been decided as total compensation to the victims of Bhopal gas tragedy of 1986. The critics point out that the extent of damage in a nuclear incident would be considerably higher and thus warranting bigger amount. In any case, the cost of inflation over past two decades has rendered the value of Rs 500 crore as 'peanuts'. It is noteworthy that the Vienna Convention does not cap nuclear liability but only puts in a minimum floor. Putting a limit of Rs 500 crore upon the liability of an operator would run contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in MC Mehta and another Vs Union of India9. The case had firmly established the notion of absolute liability. It was held, "we are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part."

The primary purpose of the bill is to provide for civil liability for nuclear damage caused in the nuclear plants owned by the Government and operated by private operators. However, it also gives an indication about nuclear installations other than those owned by the Government10. This ambiguity needs to be explained.

It is significant that the power of the Central Government to increase the liability of an operator beyond Rs 500 crore is based on the "risk involved" in a nuclear installation11. Perhaps it would have been more appropriate to make it dependent upon the 'damage' involved.

By treating a claim decided by a commissioner or a commission as final (under Clause 16(5) or 33(10) respectively) the scope for moving an appeal has not been allowed to exist. Such a position does not appear to be desirable where the basic or initial order is opposed as legally flawed. Take the case where a claims commissioner does not hold a law degree or prior experience in legal adjudication. Can the adjudication by a claims commissioner in such a situation without even application of a legal mind on a serious right affecting the life, limbs or property of individuals or their future generations be allowed to attain finality by denying a chance for putting up an appeal?

The Bill shows lack of clarity with regard to the definition of a beneficiary entitled to receive the compensation. On one hand, clause 14 lists four categories of persons who may submit an application for compensation. On the other, clause 31(2) expects the person who has suffered the damage to himself come up with an application. This confusion needs to be cleared. Further, the damage in the case of a nuclear catastrophe may be quite devastating. What if the complete immediate family has been wiped out or rendered incapable by the evil consequences of a nuclear incident? Who would be allowed to stake a claim in such an event?

Clause 17 deals with legal binding of the culpable groups in case of a nuclear accident. Only the operator (government owned NPCIL) will be able to sue the manufacturer/supplier. Victims will not be able to confront the real defaulter. The option to claim damages from foreign supplier lies with the Government. Decision on such an option is liable to be influenced by diplomatic considerations which could neutralise the rights of victims.

The proposal legislation covers the civil liability for nuclear damage in the sphere of nuclear power generation. However, it does not deal with the victims of nuclear damage caused by naval ships or submarine armed with and propelled by nuclear power. A mobile reactor fitted in a submarine would not fall within the definition of a nuclear installation12. It may be noted that extensive damage may be caused to civilian property in coastal areas or to the neighbouring ships by any mishap on a nuclear submarine. It would be discriminatory for the victims of nuclear submarine mishap not to give them any relief by way of compensation when the law of the land stands changed to provide monetary amends in other cases of major mishap. Therefore, such a contingency should not be left uncovered.

A section of the opposition has called for setting up a committee of scientists to study the pros and cons of the Bill. One of the suggestions calls for introduction of a grading liability according to installed power capacity of a power plant. The Government is indicated to have assured due scrutiny of the Bill by the Parliamentary Standing Committee after the legislation is introduced in the House. However, such an assurance has failed to convince the opposition because the recommendations of the Standing Committee have been often disregarded by the cabinet in the past. A review of the Bill therefore, appears inescapable. Yet another option may be for the President to refer the Bill to the Supreme Court for its opinion and legal scrutiny!

The Mischievous Anonymous Author

Brigadier Abhay Krishna, SM, VSM

Introduction

The changing socio-economic environment has ushered in high levels of awareness, rise in individual aspirations, expanded needs, hope and to a large extent greed as well, resulting in growth of envy and jealousy in the society. Personnel of the Indian Armed Forces are drawn from the society at large and hence cannot remain immune to the degenerating value system and host of other ills of modern societies.

One of the immediate negative fallouts of the societal changes on the Indian armed forces has been the rise in insidious practice of anonymous reporting. An anonymous communication is one wherein the author does not disclose his/ her identity deliberately and hence the recipient cannot easily identify the originator with any degree of certainty. A letter initiated under a fake identity is categorised as 'pseudo anonymous'. The practice of anonymous reporting is also known to be rampant in the government departments, corporate houses, police and paramilitary forces as also reportedly within political organisations. During the past decade or so, the Indian Armed Forces have experienced an increasing trend of this malaise. While, this is a matter of grave concern for commanders, it is yet to be recognised as a professional hazard. There is, therefore, an imperative need to focus on the increasing trend of anonymous complaints in the Indian Armed Forces, its deleterious effect on the organisation, the dilemmas for commanders at all levels and evolve ways to tackle this growing menace.

Modus Operandi

Anonymous letters usually contain allegations of misuse of power or financial impropriety in official capacity or even aimed at character assassination. Generally meant to be an expose, anonymous letters could also take the form of threats, obscene messages, slurs etc. Anonymous letters initiated within the Indian Armed Forces are written generally for the following identifiable reasons:-

(a)   **Whistle Blower.** The aim is to surreptitiously allege wrong doings of a superior officer or bring to fore perceived malpractices existing in the organisation. Experience indicates that anonymous complaints that are initiated with intent to blow the whistle are usually bereft of verifiable information or reliable documentary evidence supporting the allegations. Enquiry in such cases whether open or discreet are generally inconclusive.

(b)   **Intent to Slander.** Here the intention is to target the reputation of professionally successful individuals. To this end an anonymous complaint is generated by a jealous colleague to assault the reputation or merely to create a doubt in the mind of superiors about the credibility of the targeted individual. Such a salvo is fired just before a report is due to be initiated or a promotion board is to be held where the individual is being considered or in some cases when the targeted individual has just assumed a new appointment. In essence, it is a devious onslaught by an ambitious but incompetent individual on an unsuspecting competent victim to undermine the latter's capability and position.

(c)   **Malicious Gossip.** It is carried out by disgruntled individuals to spread malicious gossip with the intent of mischief or merely to put a superior or colleague off balance. At times, it is also done as a pastime essentially to keep the heads of the organisation disoriented and detracted from their real focus. For instance, if an officer is honest and upright but very strict, demanding and harsh in his conduct towards his subordinates, there is a possibility that some amongst the subordinates may be triggered to react with an anonymous complaint to discredit the leadership of such a superior and keep him under pressure with an antagonistic propaganda campaign. When there is no evidence of corruption, the individual may resort to 'character assassination'. There is lot of gossip and entertainment value for even bystanders, who might by and large be neutral.

(d)   **Intent to Shatter Family Life.** This is done mostly due to animosity or vengeance where one perceives having been wronged with no hope or possibility of redress.

The anonymous communication may be handwritten or typed on a typewriter or on a computer and a printout sent via post. Thereafter, the letter may be deleted or the computer may even be formatted to avoid detection.   The letter could also be e-mailed from a fictitious ID under a false name. Of late, such communication is being directed to a wide range of addressees ranging from the immediate superior to the Supreme Commander, as well as to the political hierarchy.

Whatever be the modus operandi, an anonymous complaint can be a tormenting experience for the targeted individual, both on the professional and domestic front, adversely affecting motivation levels. Fortunately, in a high profile case involving a senior officer, the Delhi High Court ruled that anonymous allegations could not be the basis for prosecution1. Strange as it may sound, there have also been cases, though rare, of superiors initiating anonymous letters against their own subordinates selectively with the aim to harass, embarrass or blackmail.

Dilemma and Challenges

Dealing with anonymous complaints is usually a difficult proposition and sometimes very tricky. As per the existing policy on the disposal of anonymous letters, investigation, open or closed door, may be ordered depending on whether the contents and allegations made by the author are verifiable. While the irregularities brought out should be investigated; the problem arises when anonymous complaints are sent merely as an act of vengeance or with the intent of mischief to tarnish the image of an individual. All it takes for a person is to use his imagination and write an anonymous complaint containing nothing but falsehood. Ready acceptance of anonymous complaints, therefore, can also open the floodgates for slanderous and libellous writing, a tide that may be difficult to stem.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, one view is that follow-up of anonymous letters also acts as a barometer to judge prevailing levels of morale and motivation in an organisation like the Armed Forces which are so pyramidically structured and the organisation is characterised by layers of hierarchy. For some it is an effective tool to draw the attention of higher commanders to the alleged misdemeanour of seniors without prejudice to their own self. Not all authors of anonymous letters use indecent language and not all are hostile to the system either.2 They could be individuals overwhelmed by a feeling of isolation from the mainstream and are thus dissatisfied with the administration and decision making styles. It is, therefore, important that truth must prevail.

It is all right to say that a whistle blower must have the courage to get recognised but it is equally important to accept that not all can. The line dividing courage and bravado is thin and not everyone would risk his position to become a messiah of change. However, if the said tool is used for mischief or with malice in order to demolish ones reputation, defame or mount an assault on ones honour, integrity and character, it has the potential to create havoc in the social fabric of the organisation. If a senior officer is seeking an opportunity to harass the subordinate targeted by the anonymous author, he would order an enquiry into the allegations. An enquiry is a convenient tool to harass and embarrass. Unfortunately, a lie told repeatedly becomes the truth. The more one tries to defend his/her position, especially against the 'character assassination', the dirtier it gets. Who can understand better the agony and ordeal the targeted individual and his family suffer than the victim himself, especially so when all the allegations levelled eventually turn out to be false. The goodwill earned by the victim in his entire career is dissipated and even after being cleared by the investigation, the damage done is irreparable. After all the society is influenced by "no smoke without fire" syndrome.

Unfortunately, the policy makers in the Armed Forces have overlooked this fact which has become a part of uniformed existence wherein personal and professional differences are often seen to surface through anonymous letters. If we act on them with gossipy glee - what example are we setting for others to follow? That, it is right to put in an anonymous complaint? Are we looking for honest men with integrity and loyalty, who do not have the courage to pen down their names with the complaint? If convictions are acute, the wrong so harsh, the offence so grave, the love for protecting the values and ethos of the organisation you venerate is so powerful, then 100 times out of 100, the complaints are not anonymous. When the issues are personally motivated, frivolous, done out of sheer spite and are non issues in nature, then 100 times out of 100 the complaints are anonymous. Now by acting on anonymous complaints, what do we as the organisation demonstrate? Apart from setting precedence, it is also a message of mistrust and lack of faith. Moreover, at times an anonymous letter is accompanied with a threat of making the complaint public by going to the media. With the present trend of sting operations on the rise the media would be happier do to an expose on the armed forces for all the wrong reasons.

Response Methodology

How then do we curb this menace? Many instructions have been written on the subject that is fair and open. It will be fair to assume that today a senior formation commander receives at an average of sixty to seventy anonymous communications during his tenure. At the Service headquarters the number could be higher. Is it, therefore, possible to order an enquiry, open or discreet in every case? Is it correct to seek comments of all the targeted individuals as a matter of routine? Is it ethical or practical to instruct the intelligence units or the neighbouring formation commander/ commanding officer to check the veracity of the contents every time an anonymous letter is received? It goes without saying that the answer is a big 'NO'. Many well intentioned senior commanders are wary of anonymous letters which do not contain verifiable information or reliable documentary evidence to support the allegations levelled. They consign such letters to the waste paper basket. Even the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) has issued a circular stating that all anonymous letters should just be filed with 'No Action' endorsement.3

The age old practice of complaints box is an effective back channel communication for the commanders at all levels. These, however, remain largely empty today having been replaced by mischievous anonymous letters whose number is increasing with each passing day. Moral courage is a fundamental quality, amongst others, that all the Armed Forces personnel must embrace. If the menace is allowed to persist then it would undermine the foundation of the Armed Forces. Appropriate checks and balances in an organisation may help track the defaulter.

Notwithstanding the existing instructions and standing operating procedures on the subject, the approach to the problem needs to be redefined. More often than not, the problem lies in the approach to the issue .The anonymous writer who enjoys a free reign with the content and breaks through all norms of propriety with the intent of mischief must be checked. He has no fear as he is assured of his anonymity and thus he goes on a rampage. This malaise, therefore, needs to be confronted head on by adopting the policy of 'catching the bull by horns'. Where no enquiry is warranted, commanders must take measures to disseminate the contents of such letters periodically to the environment at an appropriate level and time. A quarterly 'No Action Taken' news bulletin by respective Service headquarters indicating total number of anonymous complaints received during the period may be published. This would not only tire out and deny undue attention to the mischievous anonymous writers which they desperately seek but will also help stunt the spread of rumours and gossip that generally follow the receipt of an anonymous letter. Apart from the aforesaid, necessary effort must also be directed towards identifying the authors of those anonymous letters which do not contain any verifiable information or reliable evidence supporting the allegations. This proactive approach will instil

fear in the minds of mischievous anonymous writers and in turn would contribute towards reducing the frequency at which these are received today. What is needed is a scientific process to address the problem.

Proactive Approach. Every individual has a motive and literary fingerprint that seeps into his/her expression or style of writing.4 Analysis of the contents reveal the motive behind writing the anonymous complaint. This helps the investigators to identify the potential writer or a group of suspects who could be from within the same organisation or outside, directly or indirectly connected with the targeted individual. There are telltale signs that lead to the author such as repetitive errors of spelling and grammar. Some words are only used in certain areas and some physical ascents are easily noticeable in the text. The grammar and sentence structure may also suggest the general age, education and demeanour of the author. In this era of scientific advancement wherein highly effective and collaborative methods of investigation are available with Forensic Science Laboratories, it is time that this expertise and knowledge be used to deal with the malaise.

Involving the Experts. Once the search has been narrowed down, then experts must examine the document for information that may lead to close in on the identity of the writer. Such examinations involve unusual aspects of paper or envelope, watermarks, detection of indented impressions and comparison with previous anonymous submissions. Based on the contents of the letter, psychological profile of the writer is then prepared by a psychiatrist or a psychologist. Joe Jalbert and Associates – an International Document Examiner Associates says that good writing samples are essential for proper investigation.5 The investigations even examine the glue used; pick up finger prints, carryout sniffer test to check presence of cologne or perfume besides studying the handwriting samples of the suspects. Having narrowed down on the possible suspects one can generally home on to the author by a process of elimination. The process will entail looking into the following:-

(a) **Handwritten Letters.** In so far as the hand written notes are concerned, the experts examine the document in question for sequential and pictorial similarities with available hand writing samples of the suspects. However the same may require furnishing of adequate hand writing samples.

(b) **Typewritten or Computer Printed Communication.** Every typewriter / printer has a distinct signature that it invariably leaves on all the documents it produces. Typically, different printers imprint ink in distinct bands that can be spotted by image processing software. Such software is highly advanced and is commercially available. The pattern recognition techniques are used to identify the printers. There is thus, a requirement to prepare a data bank of all computers and peripherals available in the target offices.

(c) **Data Recovery.** Those who think that after deleting the file or formatted the hard disk, they can no longer be traced and accused of anything, may be in for a shock. Data recovery is easier than ever before. Today freely available data recovery software on the internet enables an intermediate computer user to recover lost or deleted files even from a formatted hard drive.

(d) **E-mails.** Only a novice would want to send an anonymous letter through an email for it is possible to quickly and accurately track the origins of the mail through the unique number called the Internet Protocol (IP) address. This method is widely used to track cyber criminals.

Recommendation

Creation of a Task Force. A different approach is required to tackle the problem of anonymous letters which are written as an act of personal vendetta maliciously or with the intent of mischief containing complete falsehood. It erodes the very foundation of military ethos and discipline. There is a case for creation of an establishment to deal with this challenge head on. Many may not agree with this recommendation at this stage, however, in the present era of specialisation it may become a necessity soon. Once biometric cards cover all personnel of the Armed Forces including families and those retired as well, it would become much easier for experts to reach the anonymous writer through the help of all available data and technology.

Conclusion

Functions of command in the Indian Armed Forces have had a curious pattern of proliferation in the 21st Century. When adverse media reports became intolerable, "Media Management" became a command function. The latest addition to the list of command functions now perhaps could be "Management of Anonymous Complaints." Though more often than not, anonymous letters that appear motivated are outrightly rejected but this trend cannot be eradicated with any degree of assurance, unless the approach to the problem is redefined. Commanders at all levels need to be sensitive to the problem of anonymous complaints. There is a need to evolve a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) on anonymous letters beyond the existing advisory in the Army Order, to crumple the letter and throw it into the waste paper basket or pass it through a shredder. A more aggressive approach is needed to expose the mischievous and shady anonymous figure through modern forensic techniques. When there is no concrete or a prima facie evidence to support the allegations contained in the anonymous letter, all resources available with the organisation must be employed to establish the identity of the originator of such communication. The anonymous writers who seek to establish a reign of

fear among the leadership to stifle innovation and forward movement must be defeated. Creation of a Specialised Task Force with experts from within the organisation or the responsibility outsourced to an external agency to deal with this menace may be the next step in this direction.

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The Red Fort - From Imperial Palace to Colonial Military Garrison*

Ms Anisha Shekhar Mukherji**

Introduction

It is a pleasure and an honour to be at the United Service Institution – of which I have known since long largely through my father, Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar and his association with it – and to speak to its members about the Red Fort, the subject of my research and writing since more than 10 years. An instantly recognizable image of the Fort is its Lahori Gate, atop which the tricolour Indian National Flag waves. Each Independence Day, it is this view that we salute, that is telecast throughout the Country and printed on the front pages of our newspapers. An overwhelming focus on this image of the Red Fort, as a national icon, has deflected attention away from its historical background and unique conceptual design. A design which not only inspired at different times, all manner of art and architecture within and beyond the Mughal Empire but also attracted visitors and invaders alike from around the world, and earned the Fort even after its heydays the recognition of being 'the Most Magnificent Palace in the East' from the pioneering British historian, James Fergusson.

For most of us such a term is unexpected, even unwarranted. The Red Fort has transformed so much since it was established that we do not realise that even the familiar view of its ramparts from where the Prime Minister addresses the Nation, is actually the antithesis of the Fort's original design. Originally the entrance to the Lahori Gate, in the reign of the 5th Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan, was straight and open to view, in keeping with Shah Jahan's actual and metaphorical accessibility to his people. If, 350 years ago, the inhabitants of Shahjahanabad stood at the Lahori Bazaar (now known as the Chandni Chowk) and looked towards the Fort, they would have been in a straight axis to their Emperor's throne in the Diwan-e-Am, the Hall of Public Audience, where, if in residence, he sat every morning and evening.

The wall in front of the Lahori Gate which we see today – as well as that in front of the other main entrance into the Fort, the Delhi Gate – was made on the orders of Shah Jahan's son, Aurangzeb, shortly after he defeated his brothers in the battle for the Mughal Throne, and imprisoned his ailing father at the Agra Fort. Shah Jahan is reported to have then written to him, "Dear Son, you have made the Fort a bride and put a veil upon her face". All representations of the Red Fort since then have been defined by this forbidding 'veil' in front of its public Gates, which was made even more opaque by the British during their takeover of the Fort in 1857, about 200 years after the founding of the Fort.

I would like to draw aside this 'veil' today to explain the Fort's original design, as well as the transformation of this design over time, especially during and after the Great War of 1857. This is not an easy task. Only about 10 per cent of the Red Fort exists within its walls today. Visualising its original form and function is, therefore, possible only by piecing together available fragments of different sources that, at best, illustrate only some parts of the vast and complex Fort – official court chronicles, Mughal miniatures, archival paintings, travelogues, photographs, drawings, etc. and most importantly the few original Mughal buildings that still exist in the Fort.

The present internal arrangement of the Fort is the result of a radical transformation effected 150 years ago by the British when they deliberately demolished more than eighty five per cent of its pavilions, colonnades, gardens, gateways and courtyards after their victory over the last Mughal ruler, Bahadur Shah Zafar. Barracks for the British army stationed within the Fort were constructed on the cleared areas. The few Mughal structures that escaped demolition were desecrated and looted of their valuable gilded copper domes, precious stones and carved marble panels, and used as military prisons, canteens, mess lounges, hospitals. Even after being restored in the early 20th century, to present the Fort as a showpiece to visiting British royalty, these were mere shadows of their former selves. They continue to exist today as a strange mélange of a few forlorn pavilions, whose beautiful proportions and craftsmanship are revealed only after careful examination.

What was then, the original profile and form of the Red Fort?

The Fort's original design was determined by its location in the larger area of Delhi as well as the political conditions at the time of its establishment (refer to Map 1).

Map 1: Plan of the Red Fort showing the configuration of built and open spaces before 1857, based on a 1850 Map of Shajahanabad.

It was positioned furthest away from the dip in the almost continuous Aravalli Ridge on the northwest and, therefore, from the traditional direction of invading armies. The large piece of virtually flat land chosen for the Fort and the new capital city of Shahjahanabad lay between the Ridge and the river Yamuna, and had thus, two natural defences. The Fort was planned on the eastern end of Shahjahanabad alongside the Yamuna and adjacent to Salimgarh, a 16th century island Fortress established by Salim Shah, the son of Sher Shah Sur, the Afghan ruler who had defeated Shah Jahan's great-grandfather, Emperor Humayun. Built at a node where it controlled important routes to Delhi and beyond

– the road south to Agra and the Deccan; the Grand Trunk Road northwest to Lahore and Kabul and east to Bengal;the river route towards the fertile and rich Gangetic plains – Salimgarh was of great strategic importance. This importance, recognised and used by both Humayun and Jahangir, Shah Jahan's father, was efficiently incorporated into the new Red Fort by locating it just next to Salimgarh and connecting the two through a guarded gateway, accessed from an earlier bridge constructed on the orders of Jahangir.

These precautions were taken as a matter of course. Shah Jahan's primary reason for building his new imperial city and Fort in the mid-17th century at Delhi, the traditional capital of many earlier influential rulers of North India (as well as briefly that of his own dynasty) was to showcase the riches and skills of his extensive and stable Empire. He, thus, instructed his architects and master-craftsmen to design the Red Fort – which like the Taj Mahal was created at the peak of his unrivalled architectural patronage – as the showpiece of the Mughal Empire.

The Red Fort, far more complex than even the Taj, was therefore much more than just an imperial residence. It was additionally designed to be the cultural and urban focus of Shahjahanabad, an elaborate background to formal court ceremonies, an administrative and political core, a manufacturing centre with karkhanas, a recreational space, and a habitation for trusted attendants and soldiers – a sort of Rashtrapati Bhawan, North and South Block, Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, Cantonment, Mandi House, etc. all in one. To put this into context, we can compare the Fort with the Escorial, one of the largest palaces in Europe, constructed in the mountains above Madrid in 1563. Though its size at 204 metres by 162 metres made it closer than most other renaissance royal buildings to the scale of a small city, the Escorial was five times smaller in area than even part of the Red Fort occupied by just Shah Jahan and his family!

Shah Jahan's palaces and gardens, the actual imperial residential domain of the Fort, were at the eastern end of the Fort. Furthest away from the well-guarded high public Gates within moats, surrounded by impenetrable walls with continuous inner terraces designed for patrolling, and with an intervening area occupied by the resident military, these were made triply secure. The possibility of 'in-house' threats from disloyal family members or servants was taken care of by an elite cadre of guards, and by a complex series of buildings, courtyards and walls, which protected the Emperor. Thus, though the Emperor's Throne in the Diwan-e-Am – where he made his main public appearances – was visible from a great distance away, it was impossible to access it directly. A series of railings around the Throne and Hall prevented those standing in the assembly from coming close to the Emperor in his Throne Chamber, which was a separate elevated room within the Hall that was entered through a guarded private back route. Even the Diwan handed up petitions and gifts or received firmans from the lower level. In fact, on the one occasion that Shah Jahan decided to forgo the safety of his Throne Chamber and descend to the floor of Hall, he narrowly escaped an attempt on his life by a disaffected courtier!

The private quarters of the Emperor beyond the Diwan-e-Am were designed as buildings within two or three walled courtyards or gardens, entered through gateways barred to all except a few. Even the Emperor's family and close advisors entered only at specific times in a day or on specific occasions during the year. His adult sons were deputed to distant parts of the Empire as governors, and granted independent mansions in Shahjahanabad. His daughters, wives, and young grandchildren who were themselves vulnerable, stayed within the Fort in areas separated from the Emperor's quarters, but designed in a similar manner with walled courtyards within courtyards. How effective this maze was is evident from a story related by a Portuguese maid to Francois Bernier, a French resident of the city in Aurangzeb's reign. According to this story, a young man was brought into the pavilions of Princess Roshanara Begum, Aurangzeb's sister, but could not be safely escorted out by her attendants. Left to himself, he wandered about all night without finding his way out. Discovered in the morning by the Aurangzeb's guards, he was arrested and punished—by being thrown down to the bank from the high river-side walls of the Fort.

These banks across the Yamuna were agricultural fields with little habitation, while the entire City's riverside boundary was designed with many gardens. The Emperor's quarters and those of his family thus not only had privacy but also a better micro-climate with cool river breeze. A private gateway on the Fort's river side walls helped to safely and quickly enter or leave the Fort and City on boats; as when, Shah Jahan sailed down from Agra on the occasion of the Red Fort's inauguration. The large river bank was additionally used for spectacles such as elephant fights which the Emperor watched from a balcony in his private quarters. Every morning at sunrise, the residents of Shahjahanabad came for the darshan ceremony to the bank below this balcony, from where they offered respects to Shah Jahan. The bank between the Yamuna and the Fort was thus an important space for such activities, and also necessary because of the river's seasonal flooding each monsoon. At such times, the Yamuna served as an additional defence for the Red Fort.

Thus, despite the fact that the Fort was designed primarily for display, it worked effectively as a place for defence, a stronghold and sanctuary. Though its design made it appear that Shah Jahan was at all times accessible, in actual fact, the organisation of the spaces within the Fort, and the strict codes of entering and using these different spaces meant that there were many barriers that had to be breached if anybody actually wished to harm him.

How did the Red Fort transform over time?

It was Aurangzeb, Shah Jahan's son and successor who, after a bitter and bloody fight, introduced another line of defence in the Red Fort's boundaries soon after he ascended the Throne in 1658. He blocked the straight axis into the main public Gate and made secondary gateways, as well as a triangular moat in front of a Water-gate on the Eastern face of the Fort. Aurangzeb also made some changes in the internal organisation of the Fort. His adult sons, instead of staying in mansions in Shahjahanabad, were given quarters under Aurangzeb's surveillance within the Fort's northwestern parts adjoining Salimgarh.

These additional arrangements were necessary because of Aurangzeb's alienating many inhabitants and nobles

by his actions of imprisoning his ailing father and publicly humiliating and ordering the beheading of his popular eldest brother, Dara Shikoh; as well as his use of the Red Fort and Salimgarh for imprisoning political rivals such as his younger brother Murad Baksh, and his nephew Sulaiman Shikoh, before finally getting them killed. In allowing adult sons to stay within the Fort while limiting their freedom, Aurangzeb set a precedent. Practically all the later Mughal emperors followed his example, and instead of a single, strong authority, territorial divisions were created within the Fort.

Later, Aurangzeb permanently left Delhi to battle against the Rajputs and then moved on to the Deccan. His son and successor, Bahadur Shah I, did not ever inhabit the Red Fort as Emperor. For almost 30 years, the Red Fort was a mere residence for those of the Emperor's family left behind while he was in camp—a sort of 'separated family quarters'. In this intervening period neither were there many soldiers to guard the Fort, nor were the original strict codes followed. When finally the Mughal emperors returned to Delhi to reign from here again, they did not have the authority or the foresight to enforce the rules that made the complex maze of spaces within the Fort safe. Thus, weak emperors such as Jahandar Shah and Farrukhsiyar were imprisoned with impunity within the Fort by their powerful ministers, and even murdered here.

In the reign of a later ruler such as Muhammad Shah, the entire code of spatial use inside the Fort was reversed. Nadir Shah, the King of Persia who invaded Delhi, was allowed into the innermost domains of the Fort, and invited to stay inside the Emperor's own personal quarters. Such public capitulation coupled with the already reduced standards in the recruitment of soldiers and officials, along with the shift in the Yamuna's course away from the Fort, and changes in the methods and implements of fighting, weakened the effectiveness of the Fort's original design. This is why it was possible for the Marathas and Jats in 1759 to damage the imperial quarters and bombard the Fort from the riverside with three European guns.

By the time the British East India Company established its official presence in Delhi, after its help was enlisted by the then Emperor Shah Alam II in 1803 to fight against the Marathas, the area around Shahjahanabad was frequently subject to attacks and the Red Fort was overpopulated but insufficiently protected. Shah Alam's own family comprised above 500 women and nearly 70 children, yet his guards and sons could not prevent the Rohilla rebel, Ghulam Qadir from digging up the floors of the Emperor's quarters in search of treasure, or even blinding the old Emperor on failing to find any treasure.

After their victory over the Marathas in the Battle of Delhi, the British re-titled Shah Alam II 'King of Delhi', and confined his civil and criminal jurisdiction to the boundaries of the Fort while only allowing him revenue from a portion of the territories on the Yamuna's banks. The British, after establishing themselves in important parts of Shahjahanabad, primarily along the coveted river banks and along the Ridge, later also moved into part of the Fort. Their presence here was limited to the Lahori Gate area, where a British Commandant of Guard was stationed. He was allowed in to the King's courts and gardens, though not into the quarters of the King's family. So, while the British who now controlled fiscal and administrative responsibilities, thought it worthwhile to strengthen the walls and gates of Shahjahanabad, they refused to release funds for the repair or maintenance of the Fort. Thus, the organisation, use, codes of access of the spaces and structures within the Fort, were weakened and transformed.

How did the spatial and political transformation of the Red Fort affect the events of 1857 and after?

The Red Fort as the symbol of the erstwhile power of the imperial Mughals and the seat of the then Mughal King, Bahadur Shah Zafar, was the natural focus for the soldiers from Meerut who spearheaded the fighting against the British at Delhi in 1857. These soldiers came right up to the eastern walls of the Fort after crossing the Bridge of Boats over the Yamuna, and first tried to gain entrance from the Fort's private river-gate. Bahadur Shah, however, sent word to Captain Douglas, the British Commandant of Guard stationed inside the Fort. He, from the King's private balcony, commanded the soldiers to leave. They, however entered the City's river gates and made their way in through the Lahori Gate and a gateway of Salimgarh, using the dried up moat and the decreased security around the Fort to their advantage.

After convincing the King of their cause, the soldiers first targeted the British in the Fort as well as in the administrative and judicial institutions, residences, and cantonments around – particularly in Daryaganj, Kashmiri Gate and Chandni Chowk – and barred the entrances to the Fort and Shahjahanabad. However, the onset of the monsoon coupled with the collapse of the bridge across the Yamuna made the passage of their reinforcements into the City, which arrived mainly from the east, difficult. The British reinforcements, on the other hand, came from the land routes northwest across the Ridge, and they mounted an attack from these directions. In the battle for control over Shahjahanabad, its western and northern parts were subjected to maximum damage and the Fort, positioned as it was on the eastern end, was protected to some extent by Salimgarh which commanded a wide circuit for firing on British positions north of the City walls.

Within the Red Fort, it was the Princes – residing as they were in mansions on the river-front as well as within nodal public parts of the Fort – rather than the King, who took key decisions. The King's reduced coffers also made it difficult for him to fund the expense of battle, which led to infighting and made it easy for treacherous members to tamper with the guns on the Salimgarh bastion. The British, on the other hand, with more unified control, many more resources, and steady reinforcements succeeded in advancing into the City, especially after the arrival of more aid early in September 1857.

During the last few days of battle, the King escaped with his sons from his private Gateway on the Yamuna bank through the river route to Humayun's Tomb. When finally, the victorious British blew in an opening in the Lahori Gate of the Fort on 20 September, they found the Fort without the King, and at once appropriated it for their own use. The

very next day, Delhi was declared a dependency of the British Crown, and the headquarters of General Wilson were established within the Fort. Bahadur Shah was captured from Humayun's Tomb and imprisoned in a small house inside the southern part of the Fort, before his trial was conducted at the Diwan-e-Khas in the inner part of the Fort.

Within barely two years, the British transformed its vast and complex interior completely (refer to Map 2). British soldiers, who so far had limited access to most of the Red Fort, now resided within it in tall hastily constructed barracks or in Mughal buildings altered unrecognisably for their use. The general principle of coexistence of the different kinds of people accommodated within the Fort by the Mughal Emperors was altered. Instead of it being the site of a complex range of activities, only one uniform use was made of the Fort – that of a British cantonment, insulated from and barred to the Indians in the rest of Shahjahanabad. The British continued to use the Fort as a Colonial Garrison Fortress in this manner for close to 100 years, though they later moved out of some of Shah Jahan's pavilions. They also partially restored some of these pavilions and the Fort's ceremonial imperial uses, especially when British royalty such as King George V came visiting Delhi in 1911. However, after the construction of imperial New Delhi in the 1930s, the Red Fort and Shahjahanabad were again relegated to the sidelines.

Map 2: Plan of the Red Fort showing the configuration of built and open spaces after 1857, based on present Aerial photographs.

What role does the Red Fort's symbolic value have in its conservation as a historical site in the present context?

The Red Fort today continues to be seen as a symbol of power, stemming from its links with the imperial presence of the Great Mughals in Delhi, as well as its association with 1857, often termed India's First War of Independence. Bound inseparably with the identity of India and its struggle for freedom against British rule – the focus of the 'Dilli Chalo' slogan of Subhash Chandra Bose and the Azad Hind Fauj or Indian National Army (INA), as well as the site of the trial of important nationalists by the British after the Second World War – the Fort was chosen by Pandit Nehru for the first public celebration of Independent India. It was only natural thus, that when the British Army vacated the Fort, the Indian Army moved into it.1 Meanwhile, parts of the Fort have been designated as 'monuments of national and international interest', and the presence of the Army was seen by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) to be in conflict with this designation.

There is, however, no conflict between the Indian Army's presence and the historical use of the Red Fort. The Fort's original designed form, as mentioned earlier, encompassed functions and spaces that made it virtually a miniature city. The presence of the Mughal military resident within the Fort was integral to its conception and functioning as such a complex. Thus, the continued and engaged presence of the Indian Army (who vacated the Fort a few years ago) could not only have kept alive one of the historical uses of the Fort, but in partnership with the ASI could also have contributed to better security and maintenance guided by conservation norms. The insistence on viewing the Fort only as a monument with no real interaction with people is, in a sense, no different from its use by the British as a Colonial Garrison Fortress. Today paradoxically, the Red Fort, despite its symbolic value as a national icon, has no real connection with the citizens of Delhi.

We must also remember that history does not stop at an arbitrary time period or look at it as something remote and unlinked to our lives. The Indian Armed Forces are a vital part of our past and indeed our future. Their presence in historic Fort complexes can be utilised to raise awareness about the immediate history of our Nation. It can also add interest, continuity and relevance to such historical complexes, and make them living sites rather than museum pieces frozen in time. Now, I would like to end as I had begun, by bringing to your minds again the image of the tricolour Indian National Flag atop the Red Fort.