

Ninth Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture

The Role of Armed Forces in India's Foreign Policy* General Shankar Roychowdhury, PVSM (Retd)**

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen! It is indeed an honour to have been invited here to deliver the Ninth Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture at USI. I have also had the privilege of serving with Major General Sinha; of course, he was a Major General and I was a Lieutenant Colonel at that time. I have served with him on two assignments. One, when he was the Commandant of the Indian Military Academy and I was a Battalion Commander there and thereafter during the disturbed, confusing times in Bangladesh. We had an organisation no one knew about, no one was supposed to know about; perhaps no one knows about it. We called it 'Operation Jackpot'. It was kept in the shadows and we were often denied entrance into the confabulations of the Armed Forces when they were in uniform. I think we did a fairly good job and did contribute to our overall endeavours in 1971.

Now the subject that has been chosen for this lecture 'The Role of Armed Forces in India's Foreign Policy', is a subject of great contemporary importance which is increasing as the time moves on. The best definition of foreign policy and its connection with the armed forces that comes to mind is the one given by President Roosevelt of the United States of America, not President Franklin D Roosevelt, but his predecessor several generations ago, General Theodore Roosevelt and I have often quoted this in the Parliament, "Speak softly but carry a big stick". I think that sums up the essence of foreign policy and the intertwining between foreign policy and its legitimate conventional practitioners, the diplomatic corps and those who are in uniform. Foreign policy in a world that is ever changing has to be that of a velvet glove on an iron fist. Diplomacy is the velvet glove. It is meant to speak softly. It engages in interaction, structured dialogue to put across the Nation's foreign policy. Now foreign policy itself has many definitions. One of them which might suit the purpose for which we are here is - the projection, management and maintenance of the country's national interests in the international environment. Foreign policy is essentially the international management of national interests. The normal channel for this purpose is diplomacy of various categories: economic, cultural, social and technological, but an alternate option, generally left unstated or understated is use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy.

A highly idealistic foreign policy of non-alignment between the super-power blocs was articulated immediately after Independence by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, based on a moralistic Jeffersonian worldview of "friendship to all and enmity to none". Naturally, the Indian military as a policy option found no place in Pandit Nehru's perceptions, which was ironical, because with the passage of time India had to resort to use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy on a number of occasions in the subsequent years. As India came face to face with the reality of international relations, this high moralism was gradually replaced by realpolitik, and a belief in the perception of India as a regional presence. India's armed forces were leveraged as instruments of foreign policy. India's domestic and foreign policies became increasingly intertwined, on aspects of internal security as well as defence of the country's territorial and societal integrity against threats from externally sponsored proxy war. However, that notwithstanding, the Indian military were kept totally outside the ambit of national policy formulations even on issues of legitimate concern where they had a major stake. Institutional reforms to establish a higher defence organisation and synergise the military into the overall national security architecture were not undertaken until relatively recently when the National Security Council and its associated mechanisms of the office of the National Security Adviser, the Special Policy Group and the National Security Advisory Board were established in 1998. But that notwithstanding, politico - bureaucratic perceptions and attitude in the government have not changed to any appreciable degree, and the Indian military still finds little significant space at the formative levels of policy formulation in spite of creation of the National Security Council mechanism.

As the nation's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was nevertheless personally dismissive of the Indian Armed Forces and impatient with their senior hierarchy if their professional advice diverged from his own perceptions. India's foreign policy towards China in the Nehru era is the most painful proof of this. Nehru's attitude towards the armed forces was reinforced after the assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and the military coup in that country in 1953. Nehru deputed abrasive political commissars like VK Krishna Menon, to keep a check on the hierarchy of the Defence Forces, while for strategic inputs and advice he ignored the professional military and turned to shadowy eminences, with pseudo-strategic pretensions, like BN Mullick, the Director Intelligence Bureau, who also doubled as de facto National Security Adviser, much before the term gained currency. In the name of civil supremacy, Nehru fostered a system of bureaucracy which progressively excluded the Indian military command structure completely from the process of governmental consultation, a system which persists to the present day. Nothing exemplified this deep seated anti-military prejudice more than his denigration of General Thimayya, a distinguished soldier deeply respected throughout the Indian Army. In the long run, the political diminution of the Armed Forces and their legitimate concerns paved the way for national disaster waiting just around the corner in the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.

The total disassociation of the military from foreign policy decisions were directly responsible for two of the post-independence India's major strategic catastrophes - Kashmir and the Peoples Republic of China. The root cause of the Kashmir issue that bedevils India today can be traced to the original sin of the precipitate referral of the Kashmir issue to the United Nations by the political hierarchy without consultations with the first generation of independent India's military commanders who were even then engaged in the process of clearing Kashmir of tribal lashkars, raiders sent by Pakistan and supported by the Pakistan Army. In respect of the Peoples Republic of China, the shame of 1962 can again be directly attributed to disregard of sound military advice from senior commanders of the Indian Army like Lieutenant General SPP Thorat who had strongly advocated a militarily defensive posture preparations along the Sino-Indian border to guard against a potentially adversarial China which was gathering strength after asserting their control over Tibet in 1950, and laying claims to border areas under Indian control along the newly activated Sino - Indian border along the McMahon Line and in Ladakh.

Kashmir and Pakistan are the next major areas of foreign policy where India's defence forces have played a vital but under-acknowledged role in supporting India's foreign policy. The baggage of history, and the events leading up to the partition of the country with the widespread communal violence it generated within both countries have made management of relations with Pakistan problematic. Independence on 15 August 1947, after the horrendous ethnic cleansing of the Partition, brought the first crisis of foreign policy in its immediate wake – the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan sponsored Pashtun lashkars supported by elements of the Pakistan Army. It was a pattern with which India was to become increasingly familiar in the years to come. Presented with a military fait accompli, there was really no scope for conventional diplomacy for India, and the response obviously had to be in kind – unless India was willing to surrender Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Diplomacy and dialogue failed to stem Major General Akbar Khan's "Raiders in Kashmir" and The First Kashmir War 1947- 48 between India and Pakistan commenced in September-October the same year. Indeed diplomacy was on the backfoot throughout the initial stages of the Kashmir process. Efforts in this direction can be said to have commenced on 1 January 1948, when Pandit Nehru played along by duplicitous British advisers like the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army General Sir Roy Bucher; and without consultations with the rising new breed of competent and patriotic Indian military commanders like generals Cariappa, LP Sen, Thimayya, Kalwant Singh and others, took a major non-military initiative and referred the Kashmir issue to the UN. At the same time, Nehru directed the Indian Army to continue operations to evict the raiders from Kashmir, mutually contradictory directions, neither of which could have had a happy ending. Nehru's misplaced and impetuous idealism was seriously mistimed. It placed India, militarily the superior protagonist, at an operational disadvantage by setting a restricted time frame for achievement of the strategic objectives.

In eagerly approaching the UN, Nehru grossly underestimated Pakistan's skill and capability for diplomatic filibustering in the UN, generating a procedural quagmire which perpetuated a status quo without arriving at any satisfactory resolution, leave alone one favourable to India. With a UN mandated ceasefire operative from 1 January 1949, hostilities ended with India's military objectives only partially achieved, leaving Pakistan in proxy control of large areas of Jammu and Kashmir, dividing the state along a Cease Fire Line (CFL) demarcated by the position of the frontlines at the end of hostilities. Pakistan's attempt to settle the Kashmir issue right at the very outset by a military coup de main under cover of the post-Partition chaos carried the professional stamp of military planning, though it faltered in execution. The First Indo-Pak War in Kashmir 1947-48 also highlighted the contrasting approaches of the governments of the two countries – Pakistan far more aggressive and uninhibited, allowing much more latitude and support to its military, India keeping its commanders under much tighter civilian control and scrutiny. In effect, this set the pattern for future Indo-Pak confrontations as well. There is enough evidence that elements of Pakistani regular soldiers, whether recently demobilised or "sent on leave," played a role in imparting the tactical leadership to the invaders (a pattern which would again be repeated in the 1980's with the Taliban in Afghanistan). Fortune might indeed have favoured the brave - in this case the Indian Army - but in the words of the Duke of Wellington after his victory at Waterloo, the First Kashmir War of 1947-48 was nevertheless a "damned close run thing" for India.

Kashmir 1947 was also indicative of future trends in Indo-Pakistan relations, and provided a preview of Pakistan's preferred military doctrine based on pre-emptive offensives and proxy wars featuring Pakistani irregular and regular forces operating in tandem, motivated with the ideology of permanent Jihad against India, a consistent pattern encountered in 1965, 1971, Kargil 1999; and the permanent proxy-wars since 1989. India's responses, even in rapidly developing crises, would be set in a more deliberate, often pedantic and pontificating pattern which would delay any involvement of the military, and generally surrendered the initiative to the adversary.

Indeed, Pakistan's aims to covertly intervene in India's internal affairs at any opportunity had manifested itself earlier as well, in Junagadh and Hyderabad. In 1947-48, the princely rulers of Junagadh in Saurashtra and Hyderabad in the Deccan, wished to accede to Pakistan, even though their decisions were contrary to the popular will of the people. There was a substantial Pakistan connection in respect of both these states, including support to the activities of Sydney Cotton, an Australian mercenary pilot ferrying arms to Hyderabad through a fairly rudimentary Indian aerial blockade. Matters again proved impervious to solution by dialogue and all attempts at political or diplomatic interaction failed. Ultimately, the incorporation of Hyderabad had to be secured by an armoured division of the Indian Army under Major General (later General and Chief of Army Staff) JN Chaudhuri, while Junagadh required a smaller subsidiary operation with a show of military force.

Pakistan's entry into the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955 introduced the dynamics of the Cold War into the subcontinent and intensified the tensions on Kashmir. CENTO and SEATO were collective security pacts sponsored by the USA against the Soviet Union, and baited with free handouts of military hardware and training for its members, which constituted the prime motive for Pakistan's participation – even though its primary fixation was never the Soviet Union but India. As a result, Pakistan could build-up and modernise its armed forces with substantial inputs of military equipment received from the USA which qualitatively transformed their combat capabilities. In April 1965, elements of these refurbished, upgraded Pakistani armed forces were launched against India for the first time, initially as a kind of reconnaissance-in-force in the Rann of Kutch to test and assess the capabilities of the Indian Army, whose military reputation had been substantially downsized in the aftermath of 1962. The Indian Army absorbed the Pakistani onslaught but chose not to respond in kind under the adverse conditions of terrain and logistics in the Rann, but awaited a more favourable opportunity. The Pakistan Army misconstrued this lack of reaction as signs of military demoralisation and demotivation. This time, launching an offensive by infiltration with an armoured brigade in Jammu and Kashmir, in an effort to force the pace of formal diplomacy by presenting a military fait accompli on the Kashmir issue. Once again, India's foreign policy responses hinged mainly on military options, and the country did so in kind, taking an unexpected initiative with a counteroffensive across the international border in Punjab to bring the war home to Pakistan.

The Indo-Pak War of 1965 ended with honours generally even, with Pakistan's advances in the Chhamb Sector of Southern Kashmir compensated by India's seizure of the strategic Haji Pir bulge and some dominating heights in Kargil. Active hostilities ended in September 1965, and were formally ratified by the Treaty of Tashkent brokered by the Soviet Union in 1963. Territories captured during hostilities were mutually exchanged, but the relative strategic benefits from such a transaction were never professionally analysed or advice taken. India's rather plaintive protests to

the USA and its surrogate the UK regarding the employment by Pakistan of CENTO and SEATO equipment in this conflict produced more amusement than any serious consideration or redress, pushing India in turn to take the next initiative in exploiting Cold War dynamics for its own benefit by approaching Soviet Russia for weapons to counterbalance the Pakistani stockpile.

In Western perceptions, these military arrangements put India firmly in the Soviet camp, and further accentuated the pro-Pakistan tilt in American foreign policy. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister who had succeeded Nehru in 1964 and held office during the Indo-Pak War of 1965, died of a sudden heart attack on 11 Jan 1966, the day after signing the protocols of the Tashkent Treaty. He was succeeded on 24 Jan 1966 by India's own Iron Lady, Mrs Indira Gandhi.

Mrs Gandhi understood the use of power and all its instrumentalities, including military force. Her world view on the place and stature India must aspire to attain in the international community was clear, and she directed Indian foreign policy towards these ends. The Indian "Doctrine of Regional Security", which gained popular currency as the Indira Doctrine is ascribed to her, though never formally acknowledged or articulated. It was a muscular perception of India's interests in South Asia and its "near abroad" extending into the Indian Ocean, though its panorama was essentially subcontinental and did not extend beyond the Himalayas, where China was now in total control of its own outer marches in Tibet and Xingiang.

The Indira Doctrine (to use its unofficial name) considered South Asia to be India's natural sphere of influence, and also tried to connect up in some way to the earlier doctrine of Panchsheel of Jawaharlal Nehru's time, but was of course vastly different in range and scope. Its salient points were that, though India had no intention of intervening in the internal conflicts of any South Asian country, but it would not tolerate any other foreign intervention in these countries either, especially if there was any implication hostile to India. In the event, if any South Asian country asked for external military help but excluded India from it, it would also be considered as an anti-Indian move. More importantly, the Government started taking measures to develop the Indian military into a strong and effective instrument in support of foreign policy - a credible iron fist under the velvet glove, and a strong 'big stick' for the soft speaker.

Relations with the Soviet Union were traditionally excellent, and, after the earlier rebuff by the West about reigning in Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc became the chief sources of weapons as well as training at deferred rates of payment, to build-up the Indian defence forces and restore the balance of power in the subcontinent. Soon, the Indian Armed Forces were almost exclusively equipped with Soviet origin equipment. But, though by now Soviet equipped and selectively trained, the military doctrines and organisations of the Indian Armed Forces still remained western-oriented. It was a paradox, but it worked well.

Indo-Pak relations retained their habitual hostility, the essential manifestation of which remained centred around Kashmir. In March 1971, the predominantly West Pakistani power elite of the country, including the crafty Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to countenance a duly elected Awami League Government to take office in the Centre, with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister. This triggered off violent large scale civil disturbances in East Pakistan which led to a military crackdown on Bengalis by the largely West Pakistani Army, and a large scale exodus of refugees, especially Hindus, for sanctuary in India. Without going into detailed exposition of the situation, it was a strategic opportunity to downsize Pakistan, and Indira Gandhi seized it with an exquisite sense of timing. The events to follow were an almost cold blooded demonstration of a well coordinated "preparation of the battlefield" to achieve the overall strategic objective, synergising diplomacy, politics and military force, each in its respective sphere of influence with almost text book precision. Concentrated and imaginative diplomacy abroad focused on the UN and elsewhere to explain India's hapless position as sanctuary for over ten million homeless refugees fleeing military atrocities, thus creating a positive world opinion favourable to India. An Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in August 1971 was separately crafted with a supportive Soviet Union with its veto power in the Security Council, to call upon should need arise, while public support within the country was intensively mobilised for a war against Pakistan, which looked increasingly inevitable.

Finally, the Armed Forces were allotted the primary executive role in the entire scheme of things, and unlike on previous (and subsequent occasions), were allotted sufficient time to deliberately plan, concentrate, equip, train and prepare for war. The decision to create and support an Awami League Bangladesh Government in exile, was another stroke of politico - military genius which paid rich dividends in the form of active support of the Mukti Bahini to the Indian forces when the war broke out. The Mukti Bahini supplemented the Indian offensive with covert insurgency and terrorist operations on its own against the Pakistan armed forces as also civil establishments in East Pakistan. Needless to say, the war in East Pakistan, when it did come, and in spite of some initial and quite unnecessary hiccoughs at some places, generally functioned as planned, and ended in a classic victory. But merely winning the war is not enough - winning the peace that follows is equally important, sometimes even more so, as the USA is discovering in Iraq. After the dismemberment of East Pakistan in a well publicised surrender ceremony of Pakistani forces in Dhaka on 16 December 1971, and the establishment of the new republic of Bangladesh, the Indian forces did not overstay their welcome.

In March 1972, after a ceremonial farewell parade on the 14th, the Indian forces pulled out of Bangladesh, their task fully accomplished. Accomplished too was the overall national strategic task - the downsizing of Pakistan once and for all through synergised operation of foreign policy; the velvet glove removed to expose the iron fist, and covered up again when the task was done. It would be entirely correct to say that the victory in Bangladesh, military as well as diplomatic, made India, Independent since 1947, ultimately a nation in the fullest sense of the word.

However, it must be mentioned that India nevertheless failed to draw out the fullest benefits of the tremendous victory in Bangladesh, even with a leader as astute and capable as Mrs Indira Gandhi - then at the height of her glory. The 93000 Pakistani prisoners of war (PW's) in Indian captivity were the most powerful of trump cards in the peace negotiations at Shimla between the Prime Minister of India, and Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the new Prime minister of Pakistan, to extract and impose whatever terms were necessary on a defeated Pakistan. In this case, it should have

been the formalisation of the Line of Control (LC) in Jammu and Kashmir into an international boundary. But here, the astute Bhutto gave the slip to even such an astute and ruthless practitioner of realpolitik as Mrs Gandhi herself, and managed to evade the entire issue. There is enough anecdotal evidence on record by now to show that it was indeed verbally discussed between the two leaders and agreed upon, but once sidestepped, it was never to be, and it continues to this day as such. Truly speaking, Shimla Agreement was a major diplomatic setback for India, which lost on the negotiating table what had been won on the military battlefield.

In respect of the Peoples Republic of China, an autonomous Tibet had always been a buffer zone to the north and northeast between the British Indian Empire and earlier incarnations of the Celestial Kingdom. The Younghusband Expedition had been sent in 1904 with “bayonets to Lhasa” to establish Tibet as an autonomous principality within the British sphere of influence. This was followed by the Treaty of Lhasa in 1914 under which the Indo-Tibetan border in the eastern region was aligned along the McMahon Line. However, in the immediate post-Independence stresses of Partition and its aftermath, including the First Kashmir War and the simultaneous “police action” in Hyderabad, not too much attention could have been spared towards examining the implications of the civil war in China raging between the Communists and the Kuomintang (KMT) which reached its climactic intensity precisely during this period. On 21st October 1949, just two years after India’s Independence, the Peoples Republic of China was established after the final victory of the Chinese Communist armies over the KMT forces, forcing the latter to abandon the mainland and take refuge on the offshore island of Taiwan.

On assumption of power, amongst the earliest declarations of the new Chinese Communist government was its firm intention to reassert central authority over all the traditional territories of China, including Tibet. This took place in 1950, when the Chinese 18th Army under Commissars Wang Qi Mei and Zhang Guo marched into the Chamdo region of the country. Tibet was eliminated as a buffer state between India and China, and the two countries came into physical contiguity for the first time in the recorded history. This created apprehensions and uncertainty in the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, all opening across the Himalayas into the Indian heartland, their security having a direct bearing on that of the Indian state.

The Chinese advance into Tibet was really a no-contest between the experienced Chinese forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the one hand and the archaic Tibetan troops on the other. Appeals to India and other members of the world community by the Tibetan Parliament for assistance and intercession went unanswered. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who presumed on his standing as an international statesman, attempted to intercede with China on behalf of Tibet but his peacemaking efforts were cavalierly dismissed by the Chinese. Pandit Nehru, though privately indignant did not venture to make an issue of it. In the meanwhile, the Indian government, though now conscious of its intrinsic military weakness vis-à-vis Communist China, and somewhat chastened by its failed diplomacy in respect of Tibet, nevertheless tried to edge its relationships with China forward. Accordingly, on April 29, 1954, after interaction and dialogue, India and China signed the “Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India”. This was the best India could do to maintain some sort of a token satisfaction over Tibet. India expressed much pride in the formulation and enunciation of this treaty, but though papered over in the acceptable language of diplomacy, it was clear to the discerning observer that India was very much the junior partner in these negotiations. The prominent feature of the Agreement was the official declaration of Sino - Indian doctrine of Panchsheel or the Five Principles as evolved by Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai : respect for mutual sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

This was the high noon of “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai,” a tidal wave of euphoria which was to turn exceedingly sour within a decade. Amidst all the display of enthusiasm, a small whisper emanating from Indian intelligence and military sources that the Chinese were making a road in the desolate Aksaichin region of Tibet-Ladakh-Xingiang, which was claimed by India, was lost in the general optimism of the period. The first major step of the downslide in relations between India and China started in March 1959, when the Dalai Lama, apprehensive of the intentions of the Chinese Army, fled from Lhasa and crossed over into India, where he was accorded asylum by Jawaharlal Nehru. Simultaneously with the departure of the Dalai Lama, a major revolt of the local population against the Chinese broke out in many parts of Tibet, including the Kham and Amdo regions in the East, which was put down with extreme ruthlessness with heavy casualties amongst the Tibetan people, but the remnants of the revolt dragged on almost till 1970. The grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama by India annoyed the Chinese considerably and resulted in heightened tensions along the Indo-Tibet border.

Discordant relations beginning with Tibet were slowly but inexorably exacerbated on issue of the Indo-Tibetan border alignment, where China, confident of its military strength and capabilities, denounced the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh as the result of an unequal treaty, as well as in respect of the Aksaichin Plateau in the Ladakh-Tibet region, and Barahoti in UP/Tibet border region. China also offered diplomatic meetings with India at the highest levels to discuss these issues, but India turned it down because it historically considered all these as its own territories and disputed the Chinese claims strongly. There were a series of summit-level visits and meetings between Nehru and Zhou, but to no effect. The Indian leadership failed to understand the psyche of the Chinese leadership, who were conditioned by conflict and fully prepared to go to war on issues of territory. The Indian political culture was more for diplomacy, dialogue and compromise, and the leadership was not psychologically attuned towards conflict even though it too was not prepared to compromise on what it considered to be national pride. The two were mutually incompatible, and given the actualities of relative strengths between the militaries of the two countries, Jawaharlal Nehru would perhaps have done better to swallow his personal pride and agree to discussions as proposed by China. In the event, the only Indian political direction in the intensifying conflict was manifested in a “forward policy” based on a child-like game of Chinese checkers (no pun intended!) played under the control of the Director Intelligence Bureau BN Mullick, revelling in his role of National Security Adviser, by siting, moving and resiting small border posts off small scale maps, to try and face down similar Chinese border detachments (Operation “Onkar”).

Given India’s basic military weakness, this only resulted in exacerbating the situation. As a result of orders emanating from sources far removed from reality, there were a series of incidents between border forces of both sides at Longju, the Kongka La and the Galwan Valley in 1959 in which Indians suffered casualties. Carried away by the

volatile rhetoric of Krishna Menon, and the misinformed miscalculations of BN Mullick in this game of one-upmanship by remote control, the political leadership in India, directed the unprepared and ill equipped Indian Army to move forward and secure a chain of penny-packet posts in highly inaccessible terrain and defend them. Attempts by competent and experienced Indian commanders like Lieutenant General SPP Thorat to tender professional advice were summarily disparaged and dismissed by an ill informed political leadership as not being adequately aggressive. The so-called "Thorat Plan" recommending forward military build-up towards the borders in sound and sustainable defences located only as far forward as the existing system of roads could handle, and thereafter patrol forward with the necessary support from these bases right up to the Indian line of alignment found unresponsive audience with political charlatans like the Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon. This period of growing Sino-Indian tensions lasted for over a decade, but unfortunately, even at this critical stage of a failing foreign policy, there were little or no efforts to develop India's military capabilities with assistance from the western countries who were willing to assist, of course on their own terms and at their own price.

The Indian political leadership did not take steps to build-up the requisite military strength for the confrontation which was becoming increasingly inevitable in the foreseeable future. This was a grave lapse of judgement, and a display of extreme politico-military amateurism by the National leadership for which, as always, the Indian military would pay the price. When the military element was introduced to boost up diplomatic dialogue, it was under the classic contingency of "too little, too late" and launched unprepared into the tragedy of the brief but intense Sino-Indian border war in 1962, whose trauma still haunts the country and has generated an instinctive diffidence in the national psyche in dealing with China which persists even to this day. Pakistan seized the opportunity for a geostrategic follow up by entering into a Sino-Pak Treaty of Friendship with China in 1963, creating a common strategic front which posed a "two-front" threat against India from both western and eastern flanks. Subsequently, in what may well be a supreme act of either total and utter foolhardiness or incredible farsightedness China had decided around 1984 or so, that its national interests against India would be best served by upgrading Pakistan into a regional 'missile and nuclear weapon' power by illegally gifting it with working diagrams of nuclear warheads, even though China was a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India has undoubtedly paid a heavy strategic price for totally ignoring any military input into its foreign policy formulations.

Meanwhile with Pakistan, diplomatic efforts for resolution of the Kashmir issue, including extension of the theatre of conflict into the Siachen region in 1988, have continued for over five decades both through the United Nations, as also bilaterally, but except for small incremental shifts, still remains totally snarled up to this day in a labyrinthine dialogue of the deaf. India-Pakistan relations have made very little progress through exercise of diplomatic options, but Pakistan has repeatedly attempted to force the issue by military means, resulting in five Kashmir-centric military conflicts so far between India and Pakistan, in which India has naturally had to fully employ its military resources. Four of these wars were in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 (which also created the independent nation of Bangladesh from what had been Pakistan's eastern wing), and the brief high intensity Kargil border war of 1999.

The fifth Indo-Pak confrontation is in a separate and special category altogether - an ongoing Afghanistan-type covert war of insurgency-cum-terrorism actively sponsored by the covert Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan since 1989 as an Islamic jihad in Kashmir and a Khalistani movement in Punjab. It is a classic "black diplomacy" option planned to bleed and ultimately dismember India by an extended low-intensity "war of a thousand cuts" initially in Kashmir, followed by Punjab (now resolved) as also on subsidiary fronts in India's North East through separatist anti-Indian insurgencies supported by the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh. Successive military governments in Bangladesh of Generals Zia ur Rahman and HM Ershad, and subsequently the right wing Bangladesh National Party (BNP) government under Begum Khaleda Zia extended their tacit but full support to the Pakistani game plan. In addition, the jihad sponsored by Pakistan has now extended outside the earlier areas of direct confrontation such as Kashmir and into non-traditional hinterlands from Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in the North to Tamilnadu and Kerala in the South, and from Maharashtra and Gujarat in the West to West Bengal, Assam and the other adjacent states in the East. Both India and Pakistan are aware of the "deniability" of these operations, as also that it will be a very long haul. Low intensity warfare is a long-term low-cost option, where level and intensity of operations in the various regions fluctuates according to changes in internal and external political dynamics as well as local circumstances. The only pawns are the normal citizens, hopelessly trapped in a long unending night of terrorist violence and counteraction by security forces. In addition the LC in Kashmir witnessed daily exchanges of heavy gunfire and repeated clashes between Indian Army troops and Pakistani infiltrators attempting to cross over into Indian territory. These have now reduced in intensity. India has brought Pakistan's aggressions to the notice of the world community repeatedly but to no avail or reaction. In the meanwhile, with formalised diplomacy failing to achieve the desired results, India has reacted militarily to safeguard national interests and protect the territorial integrity of the country. However, dramatic changes in Indo-Pak relations occurred after the USA proclaimed its War on Terror following simultaneous airborne strikes on American soil by jihadi fideyees on 9 September 2001 (9/11) in what became America's newest Pearl Harbour. The terrorist strikes at New York and Washington, synchronised as nearly as possible, demolished the World Trade Centre Towers and caused extensive damage to the Pentagon.

Chinese support for its strategic surrogate Pakistan did not translate into active operational assistance in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 or 1971. On both occasions, China had issued verbal notifications, but made no active attempt to open any second front against India. For India, the decisive defeat of Pakistan in 1971, including the complete severance of its eastern wing did not bring about any noticeable stabilisation of the strategic environment on the subcontinent either. Rather, the desire for revenge for the loss of East Pakistan made Pakistan more determined to increase the tempo of conflict in terms of covert sponsorship of proxy war warfare in Kashmir and Punjab to inflict maximum damage and losses on the Indian military forces as well as civil infrastructure with the long term objective of detaching Kashmir from India as a symbol of retribution. Cross border terrorism became the new buzz word for this process of covert warfare, which in effect continues to the present time. Of course, it has not succeeded, nor indeed will it ever - the Indian state and its military apparatus is much too strong to be overcome by such methods.

In another but equally important context, one of the major planks of India's foreign policy has been a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. India's claim is based on its increasing international relevance as a

significant participant in world affairs and a rising economic power. “Peacekeeping” and “peacemaking” or peace enforcement are major politico-military activities in the UN, where a substantial military staff has been created in its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) for management of military operations under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Indian Armed Forces have participated in forty three UN peacekeeping operations (out of a total of sixty three such operations) and it is no exaggeration to state that their consistently high professionalism and superb operational performances have enhanced India’s diplomatic leverage in the world body in support of India’s claims.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has traditionally been off centre from the focus of foreign policy until relatively recently. But what is perhaps India’s biggest foreign policy misadventure occurred in this very region in Sri Lanka, where after the failure of Indian and Indian brokered diplomatic efforts, the military option of dispatching an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to the island was exercised, to maintain and if necessary enforce the peace between the warring Sinhala and Tamil communities. This became known as Operation Pawan (1987-1990), and is definitely not one of the more glorious chapters of post-Independence India. But though totally mismanaged politically and militarily - no fault of the troops and formations on the ground - Operation Pawan, coupled with the highly successful Operation Cactus in the Maldives islands in 1988, bringing succour against a coup d’etat by Tamil mercenaries of People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), can perhaps also be visualised positively in a larger strategic sense as a tentative curtain raiser for India’s aspirations in the IOR. India’s interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives have perhaps succeeded in conveying the appropriate signals, which are now being further reinforced by the extremely effective anti-piracy campaign of the Indian Navy against Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean.

The military are the country’s ultimate agency for management and control of internal and external conflict. Military force and diplomacy have historically been synergistic, their equation analogous to the iron fist under many layers of velvet gloves. Diplomacy is the velvet glove, to manage international opinion through structured engagement and dialogue. The defence forces are the iron fist, normally latent, to be unveiled and displayed or actually committed as the option of last resort. The American President Theodore Roosevelt, succinctly summed up the military- diplomacy interface with his celebrated remark “Speak softly, but carry a big stick”. Diplomacy speaks softly, the military is the big stick.

The Twentieth Century ended with Kargil, while the Twenty First began with the Mumbai terrorist strike of 26 Nov 2008. The beginnings of the new era have been inauspicious, and while diplomacy remains the primary conventional channel for foreign policy, it would be wise to always keep options for military backup within easy reach.

*Text of the talk delivered at USI on 25 May 2011 with **Shri MK Rasgotra, IFS (Retd)** in the Chair.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Coercive Air Power and Peace Enforcement
Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur, VM*

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence”

- Sun Tzu

Air Power is a very seductive term – in the modern conflict-ridden world it seems to be the harbinger of relief from the drudgery of long drawn out conflicts. Nowhere is it more apparent than in conflicts where attempts are made by the United Nations (UN) and the international community to bring violence to a close with minimum commitment of boots on the ground. The latest is the use of Air Power, initially by the USA, and then by NATO in the ongoing internal strife in Libya – as we go to the press, would it happen in Syria too?

Have air operations of the UN helped it meet its Charter of ushering in an environment of tranquility and stability, so that civilians caught up in a conflict start leading a normal life? Has Air Power lived up to its aura of being an enabler for peace for the UN? While Air Power has many roles to play in the ambit of operations of the UN (C2, ISR, communication, mobility etc), this paper will study its coercive effect on peace enforcement operations, taking the Bosnian conflict and the Indian experience in UN Missions as baseline parameters.

Historical Perspective

The UN Special Committee on the Balkans (1947-52) was the first mission to get off the ground after the formation of the UN.¹ From there started the saga of international involvement in conflict areas. Between 1947 and 1990, 21 UN operations were started but in the decade after the end of the cold war, i.e. till the turn of the Century, 32 new missions were launched! Between 1987 and 1994, the Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorised and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per year.² The UN has been a busy organisation indeed – and its involvement in conflict prone areas only seems to be increasing, as the winds of democracy blow through hitherto uncharted territory in the Middle East, West Asia and North African countries post the ‘Jasmine revolution’ in Tunisia.

In one of the bigger missions, even by today’s numbers, which saw 19280 peacekeepers in the Congo in 1960, Air Power came into its own when it was employed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The job of elimination of the Katanga Air Force was taken up by the ‘UN Air Force’, which was an assortment of the following aircraft³ :

- (a) Six B-55 Canberra bombers of the Indian Air Force.
- (b) Four F-86 fighters of the Ethiopian Air Force.
- (c) Three J-29B Tunman fighters and two S-29C recce fighters of the Swedish Air Force.
- (d) Sixteen C-119s and a Squadron of Dakota aircraft manned by aircrew of diverse nationalities (commanded by Wg Cdr GB Singh of India).

Thus, began the role of Air Power, when it brought to bear all its facets of reconnaissance, transportation and offensive power in a conflict where an International body had assumed the role of a peace maker and a peace enforcer. Air Power was called in in other major UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) also, but the defining ones were the first Gulf War or Operation Desert Storm, Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and, then in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003 when the Indian Air force was asked to give utility and attack helicopters to United Nation’s Mission in Congo (MONUC). There is, however, a major difference between the DRC operations of the IAF and the others listed here; Operations Desert Storm and Deliberate Force were UN mandated operations while the ongoing actions in the DRC are under a pure UN peace keeping force under MONUC. Though both were authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter i.e., peace enforcement, the mandated operations were sublet to a member country or another organisation; thus, Operation Desert Storm was a coalition led by the US while Operation Deliberate Force was NATO led. In reality, Bosnia was a mixture of the two – the ground force was a Chapter VI raised under the UN flag and formed the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) while the air element was mandated to NATO to carry out a Chapter VII operation (Op Deliberate Force). The implications of this will be discussed later in this paper.

It is a well accepted fact that the peace keeping process consists of four stages, as espoused by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in his 1992 seminal report Agenda for Peace⁴ viz,

- (a) **Peace Diplomacy or Peace Making.** Action to prevent disputes from arising, and, if they have already taken place, then to prevent them from escalating into conflicts; included in the term would be the efforts to prevent the dispute from spreading to other areas.
- (b) **Peace Keeping.** To deploy a ‘UN presence between warring parties after obtaining their consent’ as a confidence building measure while diplomacy tries to arrive at a solution.
- (c) **Peace Enforcement.** To act, including with the use of armed action, with or without the consent of the warring parties under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- (d) **Peace Building.** Wherein the UN assists in building infrastructure and civic institutions so that normal life can be led by the populace; this phase is also called post conflict reconstruction.

Any conflict is the result of incongruent and divergent thought processes or principles between two or more warring parties; when a clash takes place requiring external intervention, it implies that self arbitration has reached a point of no return and failed. A treaty or accord reached thereafter to stop the fighting is a mutually hurting stalemate – the belligerents could not reach a settlement and an outside agency was required to do it. Therefore, there does exist

the 'incentive' to break the accord, normally initiated through the actions of spoilers (marginal groups owing allegiance to clans, tribes, religious sub-sects et al)) who are present in all such situations; this is thereafter used as an excuse by major groups to step-in. The disincentive can only be a threat or actual use of timely proportionate retribution, if peace efforts on ground fail to bring the accord violators to heel. It is important to underscore the words timely and proportionate, as their importance was highlighted in the post mortem after the Bosnian conflict.

So, in what manifestation does air power come into the equation? As an instrument that carries kinetic power into the conflict zone or as an instrument of coercive power to 'persuade' belligerent(s) to the negotiating table? The spectacular showing of Air Power in the US-led UN-mandated Gulf War in 1991 gave a new spurt to peace keeping efforts. Air Power was seen to be a deliverer of peace with minimal casualties to ground troops - in the seven month period of Operation Desert Storm there were only 147 American deaths due to hostile actions.⁵ The Security Council saw a spurt of increased activity; and between March 1991 and October 1993, new innovative approaches were tried in other conflict areas (the death of 18 US soldiers in Somalia seriously undermined the will of the international body thereafter). Thus, within this period, 185 resolutions were passed as against 685 in the preceding forty six years of UN history while fifteen new peacekeeping and observer missions were launched as against seventeen in the previous four and a half decades. Between 1946 and 1986, thirteen operations had been planned, while forty seven were started between 1987 and 2006.⁶ This was predominantly due to the new capability that became available through smart air munitions. However, one aspect or basic fundamental also became clear, that, peacekeeping could not be allowed to 'creep' into peace enforcement. It had to be a calculated and well thought-of decision having the required unity of effort, unity of command and political will of the international community. These aspects were missing from the authorisation for the UN mandated NATO air power and the UN force, UNPROFOR, which went into Bosnia.

UN in Bosnia

In more ways than one, the Bosnian conflict is an engagement which can be taken as an ideal case study on how to use or not use air power in a conflict in which the UN has been called upon to mediate. Without going into the politics of the Bosnian imbroglio and for the sake of simplicity it can be said that after pitting the Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniacs, against the Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina, the events so unfolded that the UN found itself as an unwitting belligerent on the side of the former against the latter. NATO Air Power was available on call for the UN troops on ground 'guarding' the designated safe areas. In the initial stages the Serbs had advanced in a series of steps, pausing to ascertain whether or not NATO would use force against them. The ultimatum to use air power had worked in the short term and in the words of the then UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia Herzegovina, "it was NATO air power that helped deter attacks by Bosnian Serbs against the safe areas".⁷ Despite this assessment that the threatened use of air power had been effective at critical moments around Sarajevo and Gorazde, the Secretary General advised exercising caution based on the following reasons ⁸ :-

- (a) Use of Air Power had to be based on 'verifiable' information, and
- (b) The use of Air Power would expose the UN personnel on ground to retaliation.

The Serbs utilised the difference in opinion and the lack of political will by taking UN troops as hostages at regular intervals, thus blackmailing the troop contributing nations and arm twisting the UN in not using the one instrument of coercion that the international community had, viz, Air Power. As the Secretary General put it, "the Bosnian Serb side quickly realised that it had the capacity to make UNPROFOR pay an unacceptably high price", by taking hostages. He considered that the episodes in which UNPROFOR had used Air Power had, "demonstrated the perils of crossing the line from peace keeping to peace enforcement.....without proper equipment, intelligence and command and control arrangements"⁹.

The Secretary General's report makes for fascinating reading as one 'walks' through the deteriorating situation, with the evidence of massacres and ethnic cleansing being seen by the world and a powerless world body. Srebrenica falls and Zepa is under imminent threat and once the world gets fully aware of the horrendous deaths, NATO takes an important and long overdue decision on 25 Jul 1995 - air strikes, as against close air support, are authorised if the UN or NATO commanders assess that the Serbs pose a serious threat to the safe areas. The Special Representative of the Secretary General objects but is overruled by the Secretary General and the authority to ask for air strikes is delegated down to the Force Commander. This marked a seminal change in the way the Bosnian conflict was thereafter addressed by the international community.

Operation Deliberate Force was, thus, launched by NATO on 30 August 1995 and marked a totally different way the intransigence of the Serbs was dealt-with. The Rapid Reaction Force created for NATO went into action on ground in an offensive mode.¹⁰ The UN HQ took a diametrically opposite view to its earlier stance, reflecting the change of political will in the international community - it made clear that force would be used in self-defence, including defence of the mandate.¹¹ This was, then, a threat as used in a classical war because NATO and the UN had become belligerents against the Serbs. The firm resolve was evident on the ground as 3000 sorties were flown and 60 targets attacked in a matter of 15 days; this had the desired effect and the Serbs came to the negotiating table¹² to find a solution to the conflict.

"Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations", a 2008 study commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs analysed the crisis response capabilities of various Missions and came up with a very succinct analysis of where a non-UN led interventionist force would be required if the intensity of violence has to be halted. Based on their study of various missions, the study group plotted the intensity of violence in missions with respect to the passage of time and superimposed the availability of UN forces and non-UN led mandated forces; the findings are plotted in Figure 1.

The study goes on to say that the grey area (Figure 1), where there is a sharp increase in violence against civilians (as in Bosnia), has to be anticipated and planned-for in the post-mandate planning process; if not done, the study says, it transcends beyond the capability of a traditional UN PKO on site to tackle the crisis. The only option is to

call on external mandated military forces¹³, as what finally happened when the ‘curbs’ were removed on NATO Air Power (in Bosnia). With hindsight, it can be said that in case of ONUC in 1960 (Congo Leopoldville), coercive action was taken by the UN before the inflection in the curve – after a series of operations (Operations Rumpunch, Morthor and UNOKAT), the last resort was the use of coercive measures to end the secession for the sake of unity and international peace.¹⁴ It was here that the “UN Air Force” brought to bear all its might to coerce the Katanga rebels to make peace and usher-in a peaceful political process.

All conflicts have a political *raison d’être* for the discord. The counter strategy, whether military or otherwise, aims to get a solution that is politically acceptable to the parties involved. Air Power, if used judiciously, can act as a catalyst to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. However, there are limits to this, and if used inappropriately, the credibility in subsequent conflicts can be greatly reduced. So, to analyse Air Power as an instrument of coercion in peace keeping it would be necessary to examine the linkage between the two.

Measuring Coercion

A Rand study authored by Daniel L Byman and others defines coercion as the use of threatened force, including the limited employment of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would. Coercion is characterised by two subsets – compellence and deterrence¹⁵.

Coercion is not a one way action taken only by the coercer; it is a dynamic two (or more) party process in which the target of coercion also takes remedial or evolutionary action to negate the coercion – sometimes the coercer gets counter-coerced. It does not have a discrete beginning but is a continuum, with some elements present all the time. The measure of success too is not a simple yes or no, as there are only limited effects that take place during the process – it all depends on a precise definition of the behaviour sought. Even limited effects, in tandem with other coercive measures, may be sufficient to change an opponent’s decision making, leading to change in his behaviour¹⁶. As Thomas Schelling in his landmark work, “Arms and Influence”, put it – the power to hurt, though it can usually accomplish nothing directly, is potentially more versatile than a straight forward capacity for forcible accomplishment¹⁷. Coercers must recognise that perceptions are many times more important than actualities on ground; the adversary must fear its costs, not just suffer them.

It has been brought out earlier in the paper that the capacity to escalate is an important constituent in the projected capability of a coercer. Air Power has this important ingredient as an intrinsic part of its capability – it can very easily and very quickly escalate or threaten to escalate, thereby increasing the stakes for the adversary; equally importantly, it can de-escalate at a very fast pace. Thus, the power to manipulate, space out the events and control the tempo is easily achievable through Air Power. This capability to control the intensity of violence is an invaluable tool in the hands of a commander in a peacekeeping environment who is trying to implement a UN mandate to ensure peace and not gain a military victory in the traditional sense. Schelling has explained the adversary’s desired behaviour in a different way; he brings out that while brute force of two parties can cancel each other in physical terms, pain and grief do not (emphasis added); it is this threatened pain and grief – the likely impending effect – that the coercer tries to impress upon the coerced¹⁸. Thus, one of the reasons for success of air power in Bosnia in 1995 was that, once the curbs on employment of Air Power were removed, the Serb leaders came to realise that air strikes could increase in number and intensity and inflict greater costs (pain and grief) on them.¹⁹

There are, however, domestic compulsions that restrain the freedom with which Air Power can be used. When national interests are not vitally involved, Air Power usage becomes restrictive. The approval ratings for American involvement in Somalia were only 43 per cent, with 46 per cent of those polled disapproving it (11 per cent had no opinion); what is of importance is that this was even before the October 1993 Mogadishu incident in which 18 US servicemen lost their lives.²⁰ In case of coalitions it would be worse, as was seen in Bosnia where the British and French put restrictions in the use of Air Power because they felt that their troops operating under Chapter VI, would be targeted. This ambiguity was used by the Serbs to their advantage. The massacres at Gorazde and Srebrenica were caused by the complicated decision making procedure (result of political compulsions) shown in Figure 2 — both ‘keys’ had to be ‘turned’ for air strikes to be authorised.²¹

Coercion and Non State Actors

Generally, in an intra state conflict, one or more sides of the conflict are belligerent(s) who is (are) non state actors. Thus, as conflicts have evolved in the past three decades, the United Nations has been called-in to mediate in many such crises situations. This is going to be more of a norm, as in the 1990s, 94 per cent of conflicts resulting in more than 1000 deaths were civil wars. In 2004, one source found 25 emergencies of “pressing” concern, 23 of which were civil wars. As Thomas Weiss, a prolific UN observer puts it, the future battlefields will not feature conventional front lines but would consist more of violence born out of resources and economic opportunism for which borders are meaningless. The new wars are characterised by situations where battleground states have minimal capacity and their monopoly on violence is opposed in almost equal measure by internal armed groups.²² It is, thus, necessary to study whether Air Power of the international community, whether mandated or part of a UN peace keeping force, can be instrumental in bringing peace under such circumstances.

Coercion implies threatening something or a value that an adversary holds dear to itself; where there are non state actors, this becomes a nebulous situation and complicates this core assumption. Since their chain of command is diffused and holding of fixed or identifiable assets very limited, if not non-existent, the odds or the probability of non state actors to get coerced becomes remote. Bombs cannot have a significant impact against a determined enemy who chooses to fight an infrequent guerilla war²³. The UN faced this in Rwanda and the DRC and the Russians in Chechnya. After the miniscule Chechen ‘air force’ was destroyed by the Russians, the Chechen leader Dudayev had reportedly signalled the Russian Commander, “I congratulate you and the Russian Air Force on another victory in achieving air superiority over the Chechen Republic – will see you on the ground”.²⁴ Motivation of a group cannot be measured by its physical military holdings, and the one thing that armament cannot destroy is the intangible which constitutes the driving force or impulse of a rebel group; this could be a religious or clan/tribe belief or something very

real and down to earth as sheer banditry for physical survival. The lack of a formalised state structure implies that the non state entity is more resilient than a recognised group, since the 'belief' cannot be destroyed by arms. Thus it was possible for the UNPROFOR and NATO Air Power to subdue or coerce the Bosnian Serb Army (partially through pressure exerted on the Serbs, its external sponsor) but not General Aideed in Somalia. The UN succeeded to a certain extent in Congo Leopoldville in the 1960s, as there was a formalised Katangan military structure as an adversary; however, the same has not happened in the past decade in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) is more a movement of many groups than a state.

Indian Experience

India has always operated in an international peacekeeping environment under the UN umbrella, other than its brief dalliance in Sri Lanka, when an Indian Peacekeeping Force went-in for a short period in what was essentially seen as a destabilising conflict in its backyard. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was, perhaps, one of the pioneers in committing its resources, when it sent Canberra bombers in 1960 (frontline aircraft of those times); the deployment was under Chapter VII and during their two year stay, they were used extensively for destroying the Katangan Air Force's assets and infrastructure²⁵ and helped bringing about the capitulation of the secessionist Katangan rebels. This was followed by Chapter VII deployments in Somalia (1993), Sierra Leone (2000) and DRC (2003) and a Chapter VI mission in Sudan (2005). The IAF took with it its experience of flying helicopters in the most inhospitable of terrains and in conditions that can only be described as challenging. While the utility Mi-8s and Mi-17s flew logistic support sorties, casualty and medical evacuations and inserted and extracted troops, the Attack Helicopters (AHs) became indispensable assets to ensure that the utility helicopters flew safely, the convoys moved unhindered on ground and that rebels and spoilers did not interfere with the mandate.

The Indian missions in Sierra Leone and Somalia were short for a variety of unconnected political reasons and it was in MONUC in DRC that the coercive nature of Air Power was used very successfully, almost on a daily basis, as evidenced by two landmark operations that IAF helicopters undertook. The intimidating effect of Air Power was exemplified in 2006 in an engagement which has become well known in UN peacekeeping circles as the 'Sake incident' when rebels owing allegiance to rebel Commander General NKunda, marched towards Goma pillaging, killing and raping the inhabitants; the UN base at Goma was itself threatened. In a series of coordinated actions in which attack helicopters played a pivotal role, the UN troops repulsed the rebels and re-took Sake.²⁶ In 2008, at a place called Masisi, UN troops were stoned by the locals protesting UN 'inaction' against NKunda rebels. AHs were called in and in a show of coercive action, that included firing of a few rockets, the situation was brought under control.²⁷ It has been a well accepted fact that the mere appearance of offensive air assets, viz, the AHs resulted in the rebels either moving out of the area or not indulging in any violent activity; psychological coercion by attack helicopters is an understated capability of this weapon system.

A paper prepared by the Centre on International Cooperation of New York University for discussion during an international workshop on Rotary Wing Assets held on 27-28 Apr 11 at New York, noted that military helicopters were required to air maintain close to 25 Operating Bases (OBs) in a week in MONUC of which 10 were in medium and high risk areas. Air operations to these 'risky' OBs were permitted only with Attack Helicopters (AHs) giving air borne protection. Due to the withdrawal of four IAF Attack Helicopters in 2010, operations had been affected significantly. In MONUSCO Ituri Brigade, operations to medium and high risk areas had ceased, said the paper; it further stated that if the remaining four AHs were withdrawn in July 2011 (as asked by the Government of India), the situation would become 'grave'. This showed the deterrence and almost indispensable worth that the IAF AHs had in the mission area. The enemy was not structured, but the mere presence of the AHs in the vicinity made the rebels 'put their head down'. The compellence or coercive nature of Air Power was thus clearly demonstrated in the past six years of AH ops in MONUC/MONUSCO. The CIC paper stated that Armed Groups (AG) made forays into villages at night and made a getaway in the morning - "however the arrival of night capable Mi-35s became a deterrent to these nightly raids...."²⁸ and underscored the coercive capability of Air Power against non-state actors.

Analysis

Air Power, as an instrument of compellance, retains its potency only if the coercer can ensure sustained application of force, with the ability to escalate when required. In conflicts where there is an identifiable adversary having physical holdings of tangible assets then coercive pressure can be brought to bear by, as Schelling put it, the threat of inflicting of 'pain and grief'. In such cases the following imperatives arise:-

- (a) There should be a clear and unambiguous mandate available for the air component.
- (b) Sufficient air assets should be available to deliver the required 'weight of attack' on the adversary - this is not limited to application of kinetic power but includes intelligence (by confronting the opponent with proof of his misdemeanors), surveillance and reconnaissance.
- (c) The application of coercive assets should be intelligently graduated, with its punch being delivered before the point of inflection (see Figure 1) beyond which extra ordinarily high quantum of force would be necessary.
- (d) The coercive capability of Air Power must not be overestimated, as boots on ground would always be required in a peace keeping environment. There would be times though, when compellence of supporting groups or factions could help squeeze the main adversary into doing one's own bidding - in the final analysis, Bosnia is a classic example of this.

In case of the adversary being a non-state actor, a combination of 'soft' application of kinetic Air Power with adequate and timely psychological operations is enough to help the field commander achieve his mandate; the Indian experience in DRC is proof of this deduction.

Conclusion

Human history is witness to the fact that war, inter and intra state, is and will continue to be, an incontrovertible part of our existence. The past is also witness to the process of rapprochement (both externally driven and self concluded) that has invariably taken place between the warring parties, no matter how delayed the start of the process. Modern human history, especially after the birth of the United Nations, shows that the international community is seized of the need to push belligerents to find a solution. It is true that during the period of the Cold War, the two Super Power blocs had their own agendas to play out, thus ensuring a modicum of stability in areas where their vital interests were not threatened. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world saw a rise in conflicts where mediation of the international community was required; the UN rose to the challenge and this increased engagement coincided with the revolution in military affairs and the availability of smart munitions, the lethal combination of which was seen in the first Gulf war.

Air Power came into its own in Operation Desert Storm and was brought to bear by NATO in Bosnia thereafter under a UN mandate. From a faltering adjunct to UNPROFOR, the UN force on ground, Air Power became a catalyst in 'bombing the Serbians to the negotiating table'. Though this process of coercing the Serbs was greatly aided by additional factors on the ground, the major cause for the revitalisation of its potency was the removal of ambiguity from the tasking process and strengthening of the political will of the international community. The potency against nonstate actors is altogether on a different plane; since there is no asset or real estate to be lost the use of Air Power to coerce becomes restricted. Since the aim of the coercion is to threaten 'pain and grief', the employment of Air Power has to be very judicious - while the results are not as 'impressive' as when there is a structured enemy, they have a big psychological impact on the non state actors. The AHs of the Indian Air Force were great force multipliers for the UN in DRC, as their mere presence was itself coercive enough for the rebels on ground; in incidents when the rebels tested the UN's resolve, they got a fitting and proportionate response from the air.

Sun Tzu had said that know your enemy as yourself - study the adversary minutely so as to know everything about him. This is most applicable in the use of coercive Air Power as an enabler for peace enforcement; the Security Council needs to deduce what would cause the maximum 'pain and grief' to the adversary and accordingly mandate and equip the Mission with forces to achieve this - this would ensure fulfillment of the mandate given to the UN Mission.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Current Situation in Egypt and the Middle East*
HE Dr Nabil El-Araby, Foreign Minister of Egypt**

It gives me great pleasure to address this distinguished gathering at this Institution on the current situation in Egypt and the Middle East. First of all, I intend to make a few remarks on recent developments in Egypt and the Middle East, to be followed by some comments on the special relationship between India and Egypt; and finally some other comments, and 'opening up' some areas with respect to the question of Palestine.

It is for me a nostalgic trip to India because I stayed here for two and a half years from 1981-83. Though, it was not long but I and my family enjoyed every moment of it. I have developed friendship, high respect and admiration not only for the Indian people as such and with their norms; but also for the administrative system that India follows, and also the Indian think tanks. Today, India is one of the great powers. The whole world should benefit from its experience and continue to emulate it in many fields.

Earlier, when I was here, the relations between the two countries were quite strong. I do not recall that I have been to any gathering with Indians, without someone telling me a story about President Nasser and Pandit Nehru, and about our relationship; how we, Egypt-India-Indonesia-Yugoslavia and Ghana, managed to establish a group of non-aligned countries that were acting sincerely and genuinely as the conscience of the mankind in International relations. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) played an important role in international relations. I think we should try again, with India as a big brother, to work together to revive these old relations between us. Wherever I went, I felt the warmth and genuine friendship of the Government and the people of India. I was reminded of the past era i.e. to say we should work together to revive the golden era. In Egypt, we continue to share our special relations with India. With the growing trade volume that now stands at some US \$ 30 billion, we should revive economic cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

My trip to India, as Ambassador Gharekhan said, is my first bi-lateral visit at the International level. It is an indication, how much the Government of Egypt is interested to build-up on our relations with India. I see amongst you, even here today, many friends whom I have met before and I am happy to be with you today.

My first point really today is: What happened on January 25th this year? Egypt witnessed a major transformation and revival. The Egyptian people took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations, in now famous 'Tahrir Square'. I believe that if the Pyramids could speak, they would say that they are envious; because everyone who comes to Egypt now, wants to go to 'Tahrir Square' and get photographed there and not go and see the Pyramids!

The people on the streets came from the middle class, intellectuals, young men and women, who were calling for liberty, democracy, social justice and a change that was long overdue. They were not slum dwellers, as many had expected, including myself as well as some of my Egyptian friends and colleagues here. We had expected that may be some slum dwellers would go to the streets, at any time, calling for a change in their economic standards; but they were well off people, at least most of them. They had never been interested in politics before. All of a sudden, all of them felt a genuine urge that they needed a change. The general theme was 'We want change' - we want to be able to speak freely and want to get better jobs. Yes, they also wanted democracy and rule of law, and to end corruption in the Government. All of a sudden, so many people went there - you cannot imagine how it was! I went, of course; my wife, my daughter and two sons were there, I have a grandson of 18 and a grand daughter of 14 who also went there. They had never discussed politics before. They all went there, stayed on the streets and were happy to be participating in something that was taking shape.

It is true, like what had been described by Harold MacMillan 50 years ago, "A wind of change has blown". That time a wind of change had happened in Africa and African countries were de-colonised. This time the wind of change has started in Tunisia, came to Egypt, went elsewhere and we all feel that 'change would come'. We are very lucky in Egypt that this change came with a minimum of bloodshed. No doubt there were some casualties. There was violence at one time but that soon ended and we are lucky again that the military, particularly the Army did not participate actively in quelling these demonstrations; they could have acted to finish them. But they took a courageous and a correct decision that whatever orders they might get, they would stick with the people instead. I hope, without offending anyone, that other countries in the region would have also done so. But that doesn't seem to be the case. We have managed to change the regime in Egypt in eighteen days in a peaceful manner.

At present, Egypt is in transition. Transition to democracy is always difficult, full of pitfalls and will take some time. You cannot change, from an autocratic regime to full democracy, in a day. It is not like that. We should look only at Eastern Europe which can give us some examples, and also Spain before that. Though it takes time, I believe we are on the right track. The road map, at least for now, includes parliamentary elections this coming September; to be followed by electing the Constituent Assembly, a new Constitution for civil and democratic Egypt - followed also by Presidential elections. So, one can say with a degree of certainty that in less than a year, we hope that full democratic rule will prevail in Egypt. But, in addition to the general aspects of transition, we also believe that the economy has been affected. It is important now to see how we can generate revenue from tourism, overcome slow down in production and some other factors.

Something happened in Egypt, which I certainly have not seen in any other country. Once this revolution started, somehow, the Police force, just vanished. In such a situation, you find that a lot of petty crimes do take place. That affected tourism right away. But luckily most of this has disappeared now and the situation has really improved, as of late. A referendum was held to amend a number of Articles that relate directly to the coming Parliamentary and Presidential elections. New rules have been promulgated to govern the establishment of new political parties. The election process, as well as a new rule of unified worship, that provides equality for all religions and practices of their religion, is taking shape now.

With respect to political parties, democracy means that every person or a group of people have the right to form a political party. In the past, we had the political parties; but these parties, in order to be able to work, had to go to a

certain committee and this committee was composed of members selected by the ruling party. If they found that a particular party could have some credibility with the people, they would never allow it to be established. So, it was a vicious circle, without trying to renew the blood and to make sure that not even some minor manifestation of democracy could take root.

Egypt now is in a new era. Once the Cabinet, of which I have the honour to be part of, was established in March, we decided after some meetings that we want to review our policies – domestic policies and international relations. We decided to open a new page, review the mistakes of the past and make sure that we do not repeat them; and to look for our roots in Africa, Asia and definitely also in the Arab world. Egypt is committed now, to respect and adopt measures and policies that would bring about justice, accountability, political rights, non-discrimination and political freedom; as also liberalise by undertaking further studies through an International committee, and undertake ratification of several key International treaties / conventions on human rights. We want Egypt to be a State ruled by law. These conventions include the 'Convention of Forced Disappearances' and the optional protocol to 'Convention Against Torture'. Another Committee has met already and decided that Egypt should ratify the 'Statute of the International Criminal Court', which will happen as soon as we get the new Parliament.

Yet, many challenges remain in the area of Human Rights. To bring domestic freedom, amidst continuous guerrilla activity, security and economic difficulties – social dialogue, conciliation and consensus remain key guarantees for overcoming differences and tensions, whenever they arise. The promotion and enhancement of each democratic Human Right credential is 'work in progress'. We are confident that with the spirit of high morality of our youth and the support of our friends in the International community we will be able to build bridges that will help us to pass and go through the transitional period. In effect, many other things that are taking place in Egypt now, inspire the whole world with the values of 'peaceful change' that would bring about full respect for Human Rights and political freedom.

Now, I turn to International relations. In the first Foreign Policy area, what has happened in Egypt is, what in International Law is called – 'Succession of States'. That is to say, when a State becomes a new member of the International community, it is entitled under the law to start with a clean slate. Namely, that the State would say; today for example, South Sudan has accepted in a referendum to secede from the North and establish a new State – on the 9th of July, there will be a New state of Sudan. A country like that is entitled to say, "These conventions and treaties I accept and these I will not accept". This is established International Law.

But, our case is different – in our case it is a change of command. We are not entitled to do that. From the very beginning, even as soon as President Mubarak stepped down; even before the Government I belong to was sworn in, the Supreme Military Council made it clear that Egypt is bound by every treaty, convention and agreement it has entered into. That is correct in terms of the International Rules and this applies to Egypt also.

You will recall the time, when two war ships belonging to Iran wanted to cross the Suez Canal – the previous Government would have stopped them. The new Government, I mean the Military Council itself, allowed it to pass because of our obligations emanating from the 1888 Constantinople Convention which regulates and governs the passage of ships through the Suez Canal. We have no right to stop the countries, which are not in a 'state of war' with Egypt. So we are applying, from the very day President Mubarak stepped down, the International Law in our international relations. But, the Government has also decided to review its International relations and open a new page with everyone. At present, we believe that with new Egypt, we are entitled to tell every country in the world, "We are here, this is the new policy; we will like to cooperate with you faithfully and with full speed". The Government has decided to review and strengthen its Afro-Asian roots and work closely with traditional and historical friends, such as the host India.

Here, I should also say that as part of the 'opening up', we decided to review certain policies which were not popular with the people in this region and do not really fit with the new Government that says, "We are a new Government with new thinking and we would like to co-operate with everyone". One such case was, of course, Iran; because, the previous Government did not want to have anything to do with Iran. Iran is not an enemy, in any case with Egypt; and we made that very clear to them. Another one, which really touched every Egyptian, was the question of the 'Siege of Gaza'. The new Government reviewed all our commitments – if there were any commitments. We found that the only legal commitment that binds us is the Fourth Geneva Convention, with respect to occupied territories, which makes it very clear that "It is illegal and it could be considered a war crime, when you participate in laying siege to a civilian population". So, that was one of the first things which received our attention. I am very happy to announce today i.e. on 28th of May, 2011, the 'Gaza Siege' has been lifted.

It is also important to refer to: How we envisage, where we stand today? It is clear to us that we have traditional friends – good friends who stood by us. We never forget the position of India and Pandit Nehru, who was Prime Minister in 1956 – when we were attacked by three countries. India was one of the few countries who stood by Egypt. Notwithstanding only what you may have read in the papers, public statements, about the support extended to Egypt, I must also tell you that, I met a person by the name of Dr B Sen, who told me that, during that period, he went more than once to Egypt, sent by the Prime Minister of India to President Nasser to advise him on certain matters, relating to handling the situation emanating from the attack on Egypt in 1956.

Today, our challenge on being here in India is: How to engage with India in fostering better, closer and wider relations; how to engage in joint ventures and magnify our bi-lateral commercial trade that should really be the objective of both our countries. We should strive to attain a situation where we can work together, for the benefit of the two countries. Let us intensify our political consultations, exchange visits and delegations with a view to constructing an edifice of confidence and strategic partnership. I propose really to seek to usher a 'new golden era' of Indian-Egyptian cooperation.

Now I turn to 'The Middle East Situation'. Here, I would focus only on the question of Palestine. As I said earlier, the Middle-East is really witnessing major changes. The winds of change have blown in full force in the Arab world. The so called 'Arab Spring', I am sure, will have a significant impact that will eventually change the destiny of the area. The

revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have brought hope in an era of freedom that would unleash the potential of the people in the region. The people's movement in certain countries (I am not naming any one country) should lead to the achievement of legitimate aspirations of the people. Hopefully, it will happen with no bloodshed. We hope that in Egypt, any change that I have referred to, would come from within; and will not be imposed from abroad – an Egypt where political freedom and rights are respected and protected. That is, in my view and in the view of my Government, very important because we in Egypt, as in India, have always stood-up against foreign intervention. We also stood-up against foreign exploitation. We would like to see the change coming from within the Country and with the help of the people within the Country.

At the same time, while the whole world is mobilised to support the rise of the people in our region, all efforts should be made to end the occupation of the Palestine occupied territories by Israel. The Palestinians deserve to live in peace and dignity in their own independent sovereign State, with East Jerusalem as its capital – and side by side in peace with Israel.

I recall reading a few days ago a very important article in the International Herald Tribune by President Jimmy Carter, himself playing an important role in ushering peace in the area. But, he failed regrettably. He regrets very much now that he could not continue till the end. He had one term (as the US President) and at a certain moment he could not proceed to attain this goal. But, he has been following what is going on in the area for a long time. He has written three books, which are very important; and I would recommend them to all those who are interested in knowing about Egypt. President Carter refers to what President Obama has said a few days ago, about the need to establish a state of Palestine. The state of Palestine would live side by side with Israel, within, and it has to be within the 1967 borders – with agreed adjudication or switch of land (whatever you want to call it). But the main point is that the parameters would be '1967'. This was attacked fiercely by Israel's Prime Minister, Mr Netanyahu.

Let us look at what President Carter said and then I would touch upon what Mr Netanyahu said. President Carter said, "There is nothing new here" – which is true. Partition of Palestine into two States – one Jewish and one Arab, was the integral part of the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 adopted on 29 November, 1947 which Israel used as the legal foundation for the establishment of the State of Israel. If you go back to what Ben Gurion announced on 14 May 1948 – to quote word by word, "On the basis of the strength of the General Assembly Resolution", i.e. exactly the two State solution.

Then later on, after 20 or 30 years, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242, while India was a Member of the Security Council. Perhaps, Ambassador Gharekhan can say more about it – how this Resolution was 'cooked', more than I can. I was there anyway, but Egypt was not a member of the Security Council at that particular time. The Resolution made it clear that to have peace and stability, one had to have two main methods amongst others. These were, "withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied on June 5, 1967; the other was to end belligerency", which applies to both sides – we had to end belligerency. Israel accepted that.

Then at Camp David Israel accepted, with us in September 1978 that Resolution 242 would apply to every other country that was willing to enter into peace with them. Now, Palestinians are willing to enter into peace with them. The Israel Government has accepted Resolution 242 basing their existence on Resolution 181, which divided Palestine into two states – one Jewish and one Arab. At the same time, corresponding obligations emanating from Resolution 242, will apply to any other country or any other people who would like to live in peace with Israel. So they accepted all that 30 to 40 years ago; and now, Mr Netanyahu believes that it is not possible because the borders are indefensible. I was reminded today by one of my ambassadorial colleagues here that the matter is very clear to everyone. Even his daughter asked him: What does that mean? If Israel had successfully defended its borders in 1967, why do they say – these are now indefensible? It makes no sense really.

So what is needed now is for the International community really to garner all its efforts to end the conflict. What has been going on in the efforts to seek peace ends up being called peace process, which has been going on for 18 years. What is this peace process? It has never graduated outside the 'process' stage. So, what is needed now is to leave aside the policy that conceptually one can call 'Managing a Conflict', and enter into another stage which should be called, 'How to End the Conflict'. What is needed now after 60 years of bloodshed, of suffering by the Palestinians, is to end the conflict. To end the conflict, we in Egypt along with Palestinian colleagues and others have been surveying the history of the conflict. The history of the conflict is 'in the proof' that proves, "In every decade or so, when a concrete step was made it was done in what might be called an International conference". In 1949, after the first Arab-Israeli war the neighbours in the area, four Arab countries and Israel signed an Armistice Agreement, wherein the International Conference was called by the UN Security Council in the Greek island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean.

Later on in 1978, Egypt entered into peace treaties at Camp David; first, the framework and then the Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979. Earlier after the 1973 war, Egypt entered into two disengagements with Israel; and Syria entered into one disengagement with Israel. Later on, President Clinton reached the same conclusion, as before him President Carter had, and called for a Conference – which did not succeed. It is very clear that if you want to have peace, to end the conflict, you have to go for an International Conference, to meet under whatever auspices. Actually, a Resolution came out after 1973 war – Resolution 338 which gave a very imaginative formula, a Conference under 'appropriate' auspices. We can have it under UN auspices, under European Union auspices, or under anyone who is acceptable to the two sides. This conference should try to work fully and faithfully to conclude peace.

If we look back, we will also find that it is not possible to conclude peace between two parties, when you have a party which is very powerful and another party which is much weaker. We also believe that to help the Palestinians, the International community can do something based on the onus of morality, with law and the political situation around; that is to say, recognise Palestine as a State. When you enter into an agreement with one State which is weak, with another that is much stronger, there is a possibility of finding a solution, if the framework has been agreed upon by the International community, as also in part by the countries themselves. So, we are trying that again now. We are meeting and discussing; of course, India is one of the most important members there. We discussed that NAM should work to get enough support to show that International Community has recognised the State of Palestine.

Finally, let me end with a brief note on the willingness of the new Egyptian Government to establish good relations and strengthen our ties with India. This is a very important and major decision that we would like to implement, as soon as possible. We in Egypt believe that ‘The golden era of exemplary co-operation be attained as soon as possible’. We are working together within the NAM, the origin of which goes back over 50 years with the legendary leaders of that era. We do hope that our leaders these days will stand up and try to emulate their predecessors and that we will grow together, both India and Egypt, for the good of the entire International community.’

Thank you very much.

*Text of the talk delivered by **HE Dr Nabil El-Araby** at USI on 28 May 2011 with **Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)** in the Chair. This was the first talk delivered by him anywhere in the world after taking over as the Foreign Minister of Egypt.

****HE Dr Nabil El-Araby** took over as the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt in March 2011. On 15 May 2011, he was also elected as the Secretary General of the Arab League. Earlier, he was Egypt’s Ambassador in New Delhi from 1981-83.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

The Politics of Oil and the Arab Spring

Shri RS Kalha, IFS (Retd)*

The recent popular uprisings in some countries in the Arab world that have been euphemistically characterised as the 'Arab Spring', have once again brought to the fore the cold cynical calculations that prevail under the surface when dealing with such historic upheavals. While most liberals in the world rejoiced that the battle for democracy in the Arab Street was at last truly joined and that the end of odious dictators was in sight, yet the undercurrent within various Foreign Chancelleries was very different. While paying lip service to the need for 'democracy', most countries have tempered their response based on their own defined 'national interest'. This dichotomy is most glaring when we see the reactions of Western governments to the case of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya.

The uprisings in both Libya and Syria have a common denominator in that a large number of people of both countries took to the streets to show their disgust at the existing state of affairs and sought to overthrow their respective dictators. These demonstrations took place in the face of harsh repressive measures in the full knowledge that the lives of most would be at risk. The demonstrators fervently hoped to usher in an era of democracy, whereby they would be able to choose their own leaders and live in peace and harmony. Most people were fed up with the long serving coterie that ruled their countries based on brutal suppression, often with the sole purpose of self aggrandisement and perpetuation of their rule.

The question that therefore comes in the open ever so vividly is, should the reaction of the International Community not be the same in the case of both the countries? Should the yearnings for democracy in both the countries not be supported by the International Community with the same zeal and intensity? Should the UN Security Council not take up the case of Syria as it has in the case of Libya? For most people the answers to such vital questions must be in the affirmative, but that is not so as we have discovered. The reason is conveyed in the short answer —Oil!

Syria has practically no oil or very little of it. But it is strategically located, for the Iraqi pipeline bringing Kurdish oil goes through Syria to the Mediterranean Sea and terminates at the Syrian port of Baniyas. Syria also has powerful friends such as Russia and Iran, and a strong motivated army that is capable of creating disturbances along the border against another important Western ally- Israel. It is also capable of infiltrating trouble makers into another Western soft-spot, the yet to be fully pacified Iraq. The Syrian government of President Assad demonstrated its trouble making capabilities when at the height of the anti-Assad demonstrations, it sent Palestinian refugees not only to the Israeli border along the sensitive Golan Heights, but also along the Gaza-Israeli border. The intentions were clear and so was the message. Western governments well understood the message. Thus when the crackdown took place and several hundreds of peaceful demonstrators were brutally beaten and some even murdered by the Syrian regime, protests by Western governments were, to say the obvious, rather muted. The Syrian army had no hesitation in opening fire on its own people. No UN Security Council meeting has yet taken place and only very limited bilateral sanctions are in place. Even the G-8 Communiqué issued recently has no reference to any 'desire' of the G-8 countries to take the Syrian issue to the UN Security Council. It only vaguely talks of 'further measures' if the Syrian government crackdown on its own people does not stop. Although the Western governments blamed Russian insistence for watering down any references to Syrian repression, these shenanigans are hardly likely to have any impact on the Syrian regime.

Everyone knows that Saudi Arabia is flushed with oil. Everyone also knows that the Saudi regime is one of the most repressive Arab regimes and that there is little to choose when it comes to repression as compared to what occurs in some other Arab countries. The Saudis are a key US ally and maintaining the stability of the Saudi government is a core US foreign policy objective. When the Saudis decided to intervene in Bahrain, Western reaction was muted, practically non-existent. There are reports that Saudi army snipers enforcing order against civilian demonstrators in Bahrain were trained for the task by the British forces.¹ The fact that Bahrain is the home-base to the US 5th Fleet and is also a major oil producer, was perhaps instrumental in President Obama completely glossing over, in a speech billed as the defining moment for the US policy in the Middle-East, any reference to the Saudi action to put down with brute force demonstrations for democracy in Bahrain or to make any reference to Saudi internal repression. Similarly, demonstrations in Yemen are usually downplayed as its long time ruler is considered to be pro-West.

Why then is Libya singled out? Why is a regime change being insisted upon, even though this aspect was never part of any UN mandate? The short answer again is – Oil. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) Libya a member of OPEC has the largest oil reserves in Africa, with an annual production of some 1.69 million barrels/day of oil (crude and natural gas liquids). Of these volumes, nearly 1.49 mb/d are exported. Europe receives over 85 per cent of Libya's crude exports and southern European countries are particularly dependent on Libyan oil. One very noticeable fact is that those Western powers that are most active in opposing the Gaddafi regime, namely the US, the UK and France import only about 0.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent of Libyan oil as compared to their total imports. The inescapable conclusion would be that even if the turmoil in Libya continued for any length of time, economic turbulence in these countries would be minimal. The action initiated by them for regime change is for long term strategic advantages and not for any short term gain. In any case, Saudi Arabia has promised to make up the shortfall, if any, by increasing its own production so as to keep oil prices stable.

Although by any standards Libya is not in the league of major oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE or for that matter Russia, yet its reserves of crude oil are about 3 per cent of the world's total. Libyan gas reserves are even more important with large areas of the country still to be surveyed. Nevertheless, Libyan crude is much in demand. Firstly, it is of very high quality with low sulphur content. Secondly, situated far away from the Gulf region, Libyan oil exports are not subject to the vicissitudes of Gulf region politics. With the threat of a confrontation looming between the West/Israel and Iran over the latter's nuclear ambitions; the control of Libyan oil assets becomes a strategic necessity. The Persian Gulf produces about 27 per cent of the world's oil, while holding about 57 per cent of the total world's crude oil reserves. It also holds about 45 per cent of the total world gas reserves. Any confrontation with Iran will of necessity involve a possible disruption of oil exports through the Straits of Hormuz. It is through this area that the bulk of the West's oil imports pass.

The importance of oil in any economy cannot but be stressed. Oil is the engine for economic growth. Oil provides nearly all the energy for transportation, heating for buildings and is the essential feedstock for the plastics, paints, fertiliser and pharmaceutical industries. Oil has a 40 per cent share in the US National Energy budget. Modern warfare depends on oil. Virtually all modern weapon systems rely on oil based fuel, be it tanks, trucks and transportation systems, fighter aircraft or naval vessels. No nation can project power abroad, if it cannot be assured of uninterrupted fuel supplies. It is for this reason that governments go to considerable lengths to secure oil supplies. Conversely, it becomes a viable strategic option if potential adversaries are either denied access to oil production centres or their supply routes be interdicted, if necessary. China, a major importer of Libyan oil, thus has a cause for worry. On the other hand, continued unrest in Libya suits the Russians, for it pushes up the price of oil and its earnings from oil exports would consequently go up.

The Chinese role in the evolving situation in the Arab world has, to say the least, been perplexing. Whilst on the one hand it has gone along with the Western countries in the UN Security Council (China abstained) thereby giving them a free hand in interfering in the internal affairs of Libya, yet it must be rather worried at the turn of events. About 13 per cent of Libya's oil exports head east of Suez mainly to China, accounting for some 3 per cent of the total Chinese crude imports. In addition, as China's thirst for energy increases with an ever growing economy, the bulk of her oil imports are likely to continue to be from the Middle-East. Thus nearly 80 per cent of China's energy imports cross the Malacca Strait on their way to China. It is for this reason that China has started building bridges with the oil rich Central Asian countries so that it can develop overland oil pipelines that are not hostage to the politics of the Middle-East. It would be interesting to watch Chinese reactions to the developments and its attitude to the Arab Spring and whether it will go along with the West or chart an independent course. The choice for China is not an easy one, for it cannot be seen as an ardent supporter of democracy abroad, whilst denying the same to its own people at home. On the other hand, not supporting the 'Arab Spring' is also going against the tide in the Arab world.

Thus as the battle for change and democracy evolves, the calculations of major powers are also likely to undergo subtle change. Much of the Arab world is ruled by hereditary monarchies, long serving military regimes and autocrats. A recent trend has been that even autocracies have become hereditary, as in the case of Syria. There is hardly any functioning democracy anywhere. This is particularly so in oil rich Arab countries. Even where democratic elections are held, the inconvenient winners were soon overthrown or not allowed to assume power due to significant external intervention, as in the case of Hamas or with the connivance of multi-national oil companies, as in the case of Algeria. In most Arab countries there is no tradition of democracy. In the case of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya there has never been any such tradition, for they are still largely tribal societies. The battle for votes in a democracy can easily fracture into warring factions based on tribal affiliations. Even if democracy were to be introduced, voting patterns will largely be along tribal groupings. To succeed, the 'Arab Spring' will need substantial outside help to foster democracy. In this respect the role of the multi - national oil companies will be crucial.

In the past the role of multi-national oil companies has not been very helpful. Looking at the situation from their own perspectives, they have tended to favour an autocratic form of government. The 'big five' major oil companies in the world earned a healthy US \$35 billion in profits in the first quarter this year and are very influential when it comes to determining policies of home governments. Democracies can sometimes be very stubborn and inconvenient. For the 'big five' it is much easier to deal with an autocratic ruler, where laws can be enacted, amended or changed at will and without much debate, public knowledge or rancour. A neat 'profit-sharing' arrangement is often negotiated and this has in most cases suited both, the ruler and the multi-national oil companies. Major oil consuming nations, with large economies, too do not wish to see any disruption in the smooth flow of oil. Most countries would prefer a system that ensures price stability. Any convulsions whether for political or other reasons are not contemplated with any relish.

Thus while enthusiasm for ushering in democracy under the auspices of the 'Arab Spring' might remain high, there is little expectation that it will ever succeed in the Arab world. We should never make the mistake of underestimating Western resolve when it comes to their core strategic interests, all else will be set aside. The core western strategic interests in this region are two-fold. Firstly, to ensure that oil producing centres are in 'safe-hands' and that the transportation of oil to western markets continues without any let or hindrance, and secondly to make certain the safety and well-being of Israel. While it may be hazardous to predict the future course of events, the prognosis is that while lip service will continue to be paid to democracy, a new set of autocratic rulers suitably attired as democrats are likely to emerge. Their long term survival in office will, as in the past, depend on how they interact with multi-national oil companies!

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Operation Geronimo - An Analysis Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd)*

Introduction

Operation Geronimo conducted deep inside Pakistan on 02 May 2011 by US Navy Seals will go down as a remarkable operation in annals of the US Special Forces (USSF) history notwithstanding speculations of a US-Pak understanding to sacrifice bin Laden, facilitating the US withdrawal from Af-Pak and boosting President Obama's ratings for re-election. A viewpoint circulating the web even posits Osama having died six months back, his body preserved in Tarbela and Seals taking 40 minutes at Osama's safe-house because a Pakistani helicopter had to fly in Osama's body from Tarbela. The whole truth may never come out considering close US Special Forces (USSF)-SSG ties, long standing CIA-ISI relations albeit with mutual suspicion, the recent Raymond Davis affair, divergent Pakistan and US claims post Geronimo and even façade of resignation by Shuja Pasha (DG ISI) knowing fully well it would not be accepted by Prime Minister Gilani, survivability of Pak politicians being courtesy blessings of ISI-Military. Remember feeble effort of President Zardari to bring the ISI under the Ministry of Interior, words he was made to swallow within 24 hours? David Ignatius wrote in Time magazine dated 23 May 2011, "When I asked top CIA and military officials what the intelligence showed about ISI activities, they would become visibly angry. They would say ... see the double dealing ... how US intelligence is passed on to Haqqani network". In all probability, the USA could not trust ISI on this one despite the fact that the US-Pakistan mutual dependency in terms of strategic and security values will remain critical at least till the US presence in Afghanistan, unless a major event like 9/11 recurs. It is for this reason that despite giving \$20 billion to Pakistan for counter terrorism since 9/11, the US has hardly received sincere and appropriate response for something which is seriously being questioned by the US citizenry.

Osama bin Laden

Post 9/11, when USA declared war on Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden was priority one target. CIA operatives and USSF launched a global hunt for this most wanted terrorist. Information and intelligence were both elusive with Pakistan having been forced into the GWOT rather than submit to the alternative of being "bombed into stone age". In 1998, the US launched a cruise missile attack against an Al Qaeda camp, having tracked bin Laden through his satellite phone. It could be providence or a tip off that Osama switched off his phone in the nick of time, moved away and was saved by the skin of his teeth, the corollary being that two of the unexploded cruise missiles were spirited away to China courtesy ISI and the Chinese having mastered reverse engineering, produced their own cruise missile in no time. Over the years, there were a couple of sightings of bin Laden but he managed to evade capture / death. In February 2011, Al Qaeda declared they had thwarted an assassination attempt on Osama a month ago by US forces using a device that could send signals to satellites to locate and guide air strikes. "The Al-Qaida leadership is proud of its technical wing which used its expertise to discover a 5 mm chip fixed in a Universal Serial Bus (USB) that was meant to reach our leader for an interview", the statement said. According to them, a man who called himself David Noshkay, posing as a US journalist wanted to interview bin Laden and having been refused had sent a USB with his questions, requesting the interview to be recorded on camera and saved on the USB.

Abbottabad Compound

When Benazir Bhutto said in 2007 that Osama was in Musharraf's backyard, she was not lying. Post Geronimo, an ISI spokesman told BBC's Owen Bennett-Jones in Islamabad that the said compound in Abbottabad was raided in 2003 and the compound was not on ISI radar thereafter. Significantly, satellite imagery / aerial photographs with CIA, US DoD and GeoEye show this area empty with no construction in 2003. So, what was the ISI raiding in 2003? Only the boundary wall came up in 2004 and construction of the mansion began in 2005 perhaps under the watchful eye of the ISI / Musharraf himself (see photographs below).¹ Houses in close proximity of the boundary wall (missing in the 2004 photograph below) may well have been constructed to house Al Qaeda / Taliban cadres.

The fact that a mansion on a plot measuring 2508 square metres came up within 700 metres of Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), Kakul, adjacent to a cantonment housing three regimental centres including the Frontier Force Regiment and housed bin Laden for perhaps six long years without knowledge of the ISI and Pakistan Military is hardly acceptable. Though without internet and telephone connections, USBs containing e-mails for Osama were regularly brought to the house and replies taken back in similar fashion. Osama was either getting medical treatment **at** PMA Kakul or had doctors visiting him. The likes of Hamid Gul and ISI contacts too would have been visitors. The design of the mansion itself is typical of a 'safe house' designed by ISI to provide maximum security, considering the various security walls denying outsider observation, privacy wall on the third floor living of Osama, limited opaque windows and large killing zones on the western and eastern ends to trap intruders.

Intelligence

An operation like Geronimo cannot be undertaken purely on TECHINT even though Leon Panetta, Director CIA claimed the US was not sure whether Osama was present. If the US was not 200 per cent sure about Osama's presence, the raid would never have gone in especially after the failed hostage rescue of 1980 in Iran and the 1993 disastrous operation in Somalia. Amidst stories of Osama having been betrayed by Ayman al Zawahiri (Al Qaeda Number 2) and Amal (Osama's Yemeni wife), the US must have ensured synergising of 'all sources' overlapping and overwhelming intelligence - human, signal, open sources, imagery, technical, geospatial and technical. CIA already had some 3000 strong Counter Terrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPTs) deployed in Af-Pak region crucial for HUMINT and vital to guide 'Predator' strikes on Al Qaeda and Taliban. The US must have deployed intelligence operatives and Special Forces deep inside Pakistan without taking ISI into confidence. Raymond Davis himself was a CIA operative. The main lead came up over a year ago when a 'trusted courier' of Osama was tracked down in Peshawar. While bits of intelligence from thousands of interrogations from prisoners and captives collected, eavesdropping on telephone calls and e-mails of the 'trusted courier' with contacts 'inside Pakistan' coupled with constant satellite surveillance of the Abbottabad mansion provided hard intelligence for conceiving Operation Geronimo, vital piece of intelligence being when the 'trusted courier' was

spotted driving himself into Osama's Abbotabad compound. One cannot say the mansion was not kept under surveillance from ground. If indeed there was a mole inside the house, then there had to be an outside contact who himself visited the mansion or communicated through a delivery boy though such arrangements are fraught with danger. In such a covert operation little can be left to chance. Excellent coverage of the target area provided a 3D model of the mansion, enabling building of a life sized replica of the target area.

Planning, Rehearsal and Execution

Any operational plan has a number of options and sensitive operation like Geronimo requires that these be weighed very carefully. The options in this case were three; a joint raid in conjunction with ISI / SSG with actual target given to Pakistan last minute, an overwhelming air strike by B-2 bombers and a heliborne raid by the USSF. The first option was more theoretical considering doubts of ISI sincerity. A bombing run by B-2 bombers could obliterate even the post operation proof of Osama's death, especially since the assessed requirement for effective bombing was 32 x 2000 pound bombs. Therefore, the third option of a heliborne raid by USSF was considered the best and adopted.

US Navy Seal Team Six chosen for the operation had the advantage of training extensively on life sized model of the target in a training facility back home in the US. As in all Special Forces operations, the Seal Team was quarantined and not told during the rehearsals what the actual target was and whether they were training for a live operation and when such an operation would go in, if at all. This is standard procedure and the actual target must have been told to them either after arriving at the transit base at Jalalbad in Afghanistan or even after having taken off from Jalalabad for Osama's mansion.

The raiding party consisted of 79 Seals in four helicopters, catering for possible firefight and 100 per cent back up. The route taken was hugging the hills and over the Tarbela river, approaching the target from the north. The night was moonless and the raiders arrived at the target just past midnight on 02 May 2011, in pitch black darkness.

24 Seals descended on the compound. Five occupants of the mansion were killed with no casualties to the raiders. One of them was Osama Bin Laden who was found in his living room on the third floor. He reportedly resisted and was shot in the head. 40 minutes taken for the raid included time required to search the sprawling mansion, collecting the intelligence treasures of electronic equipment, laptops, hard drives, tapes, USBs, uploading pictures of Osama for confirmation of identity and destroying electronic and sensitive parts of the MH-60M Black Hawk that had stalled. Though Osama's body was identified by one of his wives, his photograph was uploaded to analysts back in the US. The CIA confirmed Osama had been killed by feeding the photograph to a facial recognition programme and by matching DNA with Osama's sister who had died two years earlier. President Obama and his national security team watched the entire operation live via satellite - an example of battlefield transparency flashed by news channels around the world.

Analysis

Geronimo was undoubtedly a flawless operation, meeting all the requirements of a successful Special Forces mission - intelligence, planning, rehearsals, stealth, surprise, speed of execution, optimising technology, no collateral damage and no casualty to own side. It was a fine example of employment of Special Forces effort at low and precisely calculated levels to achieve strategic effects, major fallouts being:

- (a) Focussing world attention on Pakistan being home to terrorist leaders especially of Al Qaeda and Taliban.
- (b) Messaging Pakistan that there was a limit beyond which the US would not tolerate ISI's duplicity in GWOT despite dependence on land route via Pakistan to sustain US/ ISAF forces in Afghanistan.
- (c) Heightening internal debate in Pakistan on capability of ISI in protecting the country and complicity in sheltering terrorist leaders - help generate public opinion to strengthen democracy.
- (d) Delivering another blow to a weakened Al Qaeda.

Aftermath - Pakistan

Post Geronimo, musings within Pakistan are on following lines - If we did not know Osama was in Pakistan, then we are a 'failed state' and if we knew Osama was in Pakistan then we are a 'rogue state'. Shahid Saeed tweeted, "I am, for not a single moment, arguing we should have shot down the Americans. I for one believe they did the right thing. For all we know, it was the nightmare we have, that some sympathetic group in our very forces protected the most wanted man on Earth". In immediate aftermath of the raid, an ISI spokesman told BBC that ISI had shared all information of the compound with the CIA since 2009. Whether true or not, it surely evoked repercussion from Al Qaeda-Taliban resulting in the 22-23 May attack on PNS Mehran in Karachi causing much damage including the destruction of two PC3 Orions. Security experts now question the safety of missiles and nukes of Pakistan. This notwithstanding, for Pakistan to change its jihadi strategy is not going to be easy with the ISI-Military combine having infiltrated into every sector of Pakistani governance.

Post Geronimo, Pasha warned India that any Abbottabad-like attack would invite befitting response from Pakistan, targets inside India having been identified, reconnoitered and rehearsed. Pasha was obviously referring to ground work done by terrorists like David Headley and Tahawwur Rana. MK Dhar, former Joint Director IB, writes in his book 'Open Secrets', "Way back in 1992-93.....the process of 'transplanting armed modules' in the heartland of India had started taking cognisable shape. Some of these cells were identified in Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Kota/Ajmer region of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala. The Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had already started deputing 'volunteers' to Pakistan for training along with the mujahideen, Taliban and Al Qaeda cadres". So where is the problem in identifying, reconnoitering and rehearsing targets in India?

Aftermath - India

Lack of reaction to the Geronimo raid by military garrisons located close by, is being construed by a cross section of our security experts as proof of ISI-Pakistan Military having been given advance information of the raid. This need not be the case. The sound of low flying helicopters on a pitch dark night is so misleading that it creates the mirage of an omni-directional attack. Earmarking a reaction team from a close by garrison implied more and more people knowing someone important was in the compound. Can you imagine the ISI risking this with troops turn over and requirement of rehearsals? One thing is certain that having eluded the US for a decade, complacency must have set in with the US hunting along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border while Osama enjoyed the comfort of his luxurious mansion in urban surroundings. This is perhaps the reason that the developers and occupants of the mansion never thought of developing escape tunnel (s) that could have helped evade capture and death, utilising them the moment helicopter noises were heard. Talking of reaction, how deep inside India was the Purulia drop? Did we scramble any aircraft? How many hours after the terrorist strike during 26/11 did we react and how do we rate the eventual clean up - taking 60 hours to clear a couple of terrorists?

As it happened after the attack on Parliament and 26/11, the Indian media went in a tizzy on whether our Special Forces could undertake a similar raid like the US Navy Seals. The answer is yes provided our boys could be landed in the same compound but could they have been landed there? Answer to the second question is 'no', in the absence of national will and our inability to revive the concept of HUMINT that was throttled during Prime Minister Gujral's time. Notwithstanding this, covert actions to take out the wanted terrorist are possible provided we have the will. There are many ways that covert and incognito operations can be conducted and it is all the easier when the targets move freely in Pakistan. Our Special Forces come into focus periodically when operations like Geronimo occur. There are calls for revisiting our Special Forces but the end result is only unwarranted expansion in complete disregard to global norms. The annual expansion rate in Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is 3.5 per cent albeit for 2012, a special sanction is being sought to hike it to 4.12 per cent due to increased commitments. This growth rate is despite USSF deployment in over 85 countries. In sharp contrast, our Army Special Forces expanded by 110 per cent during the period 2000 to 2003. This year, we have raised the eighth Special Forces unit, causing a manpower shortage of 80-90 personnel in all Special Forces units. Already, India's Special Forces are at par in numbers with SOCOM, considering 2/3rd strength of SOCOM is 'in support' role comprising civilians and military which are not Special Forces. We need to define a National Strategy for Employment of Special Forces and integrate and consolidate our Special Forces. Unless we want to continue suffering from Pakistan's '1000 cut policy', we must develop a deterrent to the irregular war thrust upon us. We need to build overt publicised capabilities and deniable covert capabilities with Special Forces in the lead. We should also have the will to selectively demonstrate this deterrence in order to establish its credibility. We should heed Chanakya who said, "Do not be very upright in your dealings for you would see by going to the forest that straight trees are cut down while crooked ones are left standing". Advantages of joint training / joint operations of our Special Forces with counterparts like the USSF require little elaboration and should be exploited.

There was considerable inquisitiveness about the 'stealth' helicopter used by the Seals. Indications suggest the MH-60M Black Hawk has greater radar and acoustic stealth. Delivering his posture statement on 03 March 2011, Admiral Olsen, Commander SOCOM had stated, "We are fielding the first of 72 planned MH-60M as part of our capitalization of MH-60 K/L platforms". Additionally, the flight route was obviously chosen intelligently through gaps in radar coverage hugging the hills, which would obviously be known to the US.

Conclusion

India should not be lulled by elimination of Osama Bin Laden. Having sponsored terrorism in India for over two decades, Pakistan is becoming more and more jingoistic, increasing her nuclear toys, tacit Chinese support to her jihadi policies and impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Her obsession of installing a Pakistan favoured regime in Afghanistan and kicking Indians out is unlikely to recede. The thousand cut policy of Pakistan is going to multiply much more with institutionalised radicalisation in Pakistan, especially in urban areas, which according to an opinion published in Daily Times of Karachi dated 11 May 2009 is " ...a monstrous experiment in brainwashing and on a par with, if not worse than, Nazi Germany's eugenics". Dr Marc Faber, author of Gloom, Boom and Doom writes, "India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities ... throughout history, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives". India needs to gear up for much harsher times.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Af-Pak Region: Post Osama bin Laden Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)*

Introduction

When a main player exits the centre stage of history to ascend to Valhalla it invariably results in a variety of theories, views, analyses, speculations and predictions, and so it was post bin Laden's demise. Will the event give a fillip to terrorists or demoralise them, even if temporarily? Will it hasten peace and stability in the Af-Pak Region? Has a major battle been won in the "War of Civilizations"? Or in Churchillian phraseology is it the 'end of the beginning' or perhaps even 'the beginning of the end'? These are the aspects that will be pondered over in the days ahead.

In this article it is intended to review the back-drop, look at Laden and other personalities involved and essay answers to the many issues raised in the wake of his death. Basically we need to consider whether his death has dealt a major blow to the organisation or will it provide motivation to the cellular network across the globe by creating a legend.

Background

It would be useful to revisit the events leading upto the current morass. In order to be able to carry out a predictive assessment it is necessary to build-up the scenario brick by brick. To this extent the background would need to be covered in some detail.

Al Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden about 1989. This movement functions a network comprising a multinational stateless army and a radical Sunni Muslim movement calling for global Jihad. Some members have taken a pledge of loyalty to Laden. There are also groups linked to Al Qaeda who have not done so. Training camps are mainly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Sudan. The ideologues of the movement dream of creating a new Islamic caliphate. They also instigate sectarian violence between Muslims – targeting Shias, Sufis, liberal Muslims and non Sunni Muslims – whom they regard as heretics.¹

Laden was the Emir (commander) and Senior Operations Chief. He was advised by a Shura (Council). His deputy was Zawahiri. The organisation functioned through various committees. It is assessed that roughly 300 Al Qaeda commanders are located in 40 countries and can command insurgent forces as required. These commanders are autonomous and many of them chalk out their own agenda.

Post Soviet withdrawal there was anarchy in Afghanistan. The void there provided a good breeding ground for the growth of the Taliban which mainly consisted of uprooted or orphaned youth educated in the Af-Pak madrassas. By 1996 it was able to form the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (which was recognised only by Pakistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia). At this time Al Qaeda flourished under the Taliban rule. After 'Operation Enduring Freedom', survivors of Al Qaeda and Taliban fled to the countryside and Pakistan. By 2009 it is believed that the two groups had severed ties completely and not many Al Qaeda survivors remained in Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda has been propagating International Jihad on a global scale to drive out non Muslims from Muslim lands. They also called for solidarity with Muslim causes round the world; more notably, Bosnia, Kashmir, Iraq and Palestine. They were, in addition, active in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Laden believed that there was a Crusader-Hindu-Zionist conspiracy against Islam. As a counter he began training militants for Jihad in Kashmir. By 2001 a Kashmiri militant group, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) became part of the Al Qaeda Coalition. There are also ties between Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Al Qaeda continues to operate from bases in PoK with the support of Pakistan. Kashmiri militants are trained in the same camps as the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In an open letter to the American people, bin Laden had written that he was fighting America because of its support to India on the Kashmir issue.

Al Qaeda has created a global network of affiliates making it a decentralised regional structure. It has its constituent nationalities and ethnic groups, each with its own charter and geographic responsibilities. It is believed to have autonomous underground cells in some 100 countries and is linked to a large number of Muslim terrorist organisations across the world.

Operation Geronimo - Many Unanswered Questions

The death of bin Laden has given rise to much speculation and many questions to which clear answers are not available. There are many links about which there is no clarity or information. Without a clear picture/answers, making an assessment of the future acquires added complexity. In due course of time we may get some of the answers. Till then prediction of the future would be hamstrung to that extent. The issues which beg answers are: Did the US act unilaterally; did the Pakistani Army double cross the elected government; did ISI mislead the government and even the Army; was Laden betrayed by his deputy or perhaps his wife; was he ratted on by his trusted courier; was he sacrificed in a deal between the US and the co-founder of the Taliban, Ghani; is Mullah Omar alive; was there a secret Bush-Musharraf deal; was there a mole among his confidants; did Pakistan betray him; was he killed prior to the actual raid; or was he taken alive; was he shot or did he blow himself up? Besides, several other queries require authentic responses. There is much sceptism about the raid.

The world reaction has been predictable. There was elation from one camp and sharp anger from the other. Pakistan, playing the injured party, responded angrily. But it was evident that they were caught between a rock and a very hard place!

After Laden Who?

Given the loose autonomous nature of the organisation the selection of a successor will be a long drawn and complex affair. To find Laden's attributes, notably commitment, courage, personal wealth, charisma and above all acceptability, would be difficult indeed. Perhaps time and events would throw up a successor or perhaps an affiliate which shares Al Qaeda's sharp Sunni Muslim puritical fundamentalist views may provide the leader. This organisation could be Hezbollah, a radical Iran backed Lebanese militia, which has been closely cooperating with Al Qaeda, or it could be the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda which is best known and considered to be the most effective. But it needs to be emphasised again that the issue of succession is bound to be a complex one. The likelihood of Al Qaeda breaking up into autonomous radicalised regional groupings across Middle East, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia without any central leadership is high. Even worse than that would be the sprouting of small virulent area based groupings which follow the concept which BBC calls "one man, one bomb".

The Muslim World

The response to the raid was one of anger not dismay even from Muslim countries purporting to be not supportive of Al Qaeda. Tremors were felt across Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and West Asia and North Africa (WANA) regions. Various groups talked of: "a bloodier Jihadist movement", "the death of the Sheikh will only increase our persistence" and "the ember of Jihad is brighter". In general those fighting against terrorism were warned to be ready to face serious retaliatory consequences. The Mehran attack was the beginning of the "revenge of the martyrdom of Laden" and as per the organisation, "a proof that we are still united and powerful." 2

The Arab world with its plethora of clans, sects, ethnicities, religions and economic interests will be affected in disparate ways. From the recent happenings in the Arab World, it was clear that citizens wanted change, transition from autocratic rule to democracy, accountability, human rights and participative governance. However, it must be noted that the radical element is there in each country and given an opportunity this element could balloon out. A civil war or an extended period of uncertainty would provide the ideal soil for this.³ To underscore this aspect a wide-spread urban-rural survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan concluded that 67 per cent of the people of Pakistan wanted further Islamisation of its society while only 13 per cent did not.

Pakistan

Pakistan obviously has become the eye of the storm. Though hard put to deny complicity, the leadership has not lost its aggressiveness. Their credibility is at stake. The fault lines are now more sharply in focus. The image of its Army stands dented. There are doubts between the people and the Army, Army and the Government, ISI and the Army, the US and Pakistan and between militant organisations and Pakistan. Pakistani Army has warned the US of unspecified reprisals in case of another raid and protested against the drone attacks.

Pakistan will remain a key player for both the US and China. Despite her complicity the US cannot cut aid to Pakistan, as this will cause more unrest and increased recruits for terrorism. It will ultimately handover Gwadar port to China and there will be increased bond between the two countries. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan will increase and the military would further tighten its grip over the country. Threat to its nuclear weapons would increase and the spectre of balkanisation loom larger. There would be increasing speculation about an independent Pashtunistan, an independent Baluchistan and a further shrunk Pakistan (Punjab and Sindh); or worse an unending conflict and civil war. None of this would bode well for India and the world.

Nawaz Sharif has shown great courage in rejecting the internal military probe.⁴ He has also pointed out that India is not Pakistan's enemy No 1. This is a good opportunity to reassert civilian control over the delinquent Army. Terrorism cannot be defeated without rebalancing Pakistan's civil-military relations, deradicalisation and downsizing its military.⁵ There is also a small chance of a split within the Pakistani Army between the radicalised element and the moderate group. Happy as this thought is, it would lead to a chaotic situation. Both Geronimo and Mehran suggest that the establishment has been compromised. In an interview Mr Shaharyar Khan, the former Foreign Minister of Pakistan said, "In the early death of Jinnah his secular ideals were forgotten. It led to long periods of military and feudal mafia rule. Now the terrorists have overwhelmed us. But realisation has begun to dawn on people and a correction will develop".⁶ Let the world pray that it does so. This is a golden chance for Pakistan to abnegate its path of violence.

Now that the military faces a double whammy (failure on Laden and the raid) perhaps, the time has come to rein in the military; and given the rumblings against the military, re-establish civil authority. Four attacks against the military in Karachi seem to have brought in "no lessons learnt".

When the drone attacks killed some civilians Pakistani press went overboard. But the killing of civilians by the terrorists was not an issue with them. It is the responsibility of the international community to see that the lunatic fringe does not become the mainstream as it happened in Germany. The world must now brace itself to see the road Pakistan takes from the tri-junction it finds itself at: Taliban take over, an implosion or return to military dictatorship. None of these is a happy augury for India. Finally, despite a bad marriage the US and Pakistan cannot do without each other. The US has addressed Pakistan's complaints with alacrity. To name some : The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009, Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capability Fund and finally, the establishment of a Strategic Dialogue. Perhaps the time is ripe to increase civil aid to Pakistan at the cost of military largesse and to route it through the elected government rather than direct doles to the military. In any case the US cannot end this Faustian relationship.

The USA

With no small contribution from America the USSR was successfully dismantled but it gave a fillip to Wahabi fundamentalism. It also led to the emergence of six new Muslim Central Asian Republics. Terrorism increased along with narco arms production and smuggling. 9/11 happened which shook American self confidence almost to the same level as Pearl Harbour. But Pearl Harbour was far away while 9/11 was Homeland. It was a wake up call and helped to obfuscate the real strategic and economic aims that America has for its continued domination. Interestingly 9/11 was perpetrated by its own protégé turned nemesis. It would appear that the 'War of Civilisations' has begun to reach its

crescendo.

Distrust between the US and Pakistan and the US and China will increase, but bring India closer to the US. Attacks on American interests will escalate which may not only delay US pull out from Afghanistan but raise the probability of intervention in Iran or Syria or both. Another 9/11 event would result in curtailment of civil liberties, tightening of Homeland Security and increased policing. All this along with economic decline would cause widespread unrest.

It is not to America's credit that it has allowed Pakistan to treat it as a friend and adversary simultaneously. It is now possible that the American game in the region is over. It remains to be seen as to how the declining and over stretched superpower will handle its exit. The people are tired of this war. The Administration needs to be more proactive to contain the impending upheaval. As starters it needs to bring Taliban on board, cut Predator attacks and conclude – which side is Pakistan on? In any case, they need to desist from supplying long range maritime reconnaissance aircraft and other similar wherewithal to a duplicitous ally to fight militants. A little wonder that Pakistan is referred to as America's indispensable and dishonest partner.

There is resentment in the Muslim world against Muslims killing other Muslims apart from other issues. The US needs to build on this but show good intent and get Israel to settle the Palestine issue. However, what the US must not do is, threaten to violate the sovereignty of another country. This would merely play into the hands of radicalism. Notwithstanding this, it is America's primary responsibility to locate and hit Laden's support system which enabled him to enjoy uninterrupted Pakistani hospitality over an extended period of time.

The USA must also change its rules of engagement in the region, educate its wayward ally that it is not normal for the military/ISI to determine critical foreign policy issues and educate Pakistan on the fact that a stable and friendly Afghanistan that does not fear Pakistani hegemony is the best possible strategic depth for Pakistan.

China

China has played its cards well and it will remain a key player. Post Geronimo, Pasha's dash to Beijing as opposed to Washington, highlights this. Besides, China is an effected party as the proposed caliphate involves China as well, as it is to include Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China's Xinjiang Uigur autonomous region.

China is aware that the US is repeating its destabilising strategy against China. It also knows that the US will be forced to vacate strategic space in Afghanistan and that space will be filled in by China. This equally applies to the rest of the embattled world. It is believed that Pakistan is to hand over Gwadar Port to China and that a Chinese naval base would be constructed there.⁷ This would be a coup of no small dimensions. Already a large presence of PLA is reported in the POK ostensibly to upgrade infrastructure projects. This would be in accordance with the larger strategic aim of Pakistan to involve China in its dispute with India regarding J&K.

Pasha's dash to Beijing followed by Gilani and then the Chinese statement, "Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan must be respected – made great efforts to fight terrorism – an attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China USA must work to improve relations with Pakistan,"⁸ must make scholars of international relations sit-up and take note. Pakistan already a protégé of China could well end up as its demi-colony, if the international community does not play its cards well.

Afghanistan

It is here that the origins of the problem lie – and possibly the solution. Afghanistan is the strategic hub in Central Asia. It is a land bridge which links the Caspian Sea Basin to the Arabian Sea. That is why the hapless people of the country have borne the brunt of the 'Great Game' over centuries.

What will happen next? In the near term the level of strife and violence will increase. At the same time greater efforts would be made at negotiating. Talks are underway between the US and the Afghanistan Taliban.⁹ Here the presence of other factions would confound the issue like the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan tribal areas, though a Taliban affiliated group may prefer to act on its own. As a best case the US forces would withdraw as per schedule, retain a limited presence as a Karzai-Taliban Coalition begins to function. This coalition may or may not last. In the later case the Taliban would take over. If there is a decline in Pakistan, Pashtun areas would accrue to Afghanistan.

As a worst case, a prolonged period of unrest and civil war could follow with several nations pitching in. China would enter the fray both with soft and hard power and the possibility of a greater Pashtunistan would increase appreciably. Clearly China will be the regional hegemon. It was quick to come out in support of Pakistan, hailing its anti-terror strategies. Both China and Pakistan were lavish in their praises for each other. Pakistani leaders advocated to Karzai to embrace China as America had proved to be an unreliable ally. Karzai on his visit to China was given a stupendous reception in Beijing. Perhaps, it would have got him thinking.

Thanks to corruption and ineptness, the once hated Taliban are gaining despite the surge and the Predators. They are on the ascend in SWAT and FATA areas and moving outwards. Taliban has to be brought on board. It is a stark reality that Karzai – though himself a Pashtun cannot rule with the majority Pashtuns pushed out of power. In time, civil war in the country would intensify with rabid elements of the Taliban gaining over the conservative groups, and with China watching in glee. Many moderate voices in Pakistan are advising engagement with the majority Pashtuns. Mr Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, a former ambassador of Pakistan has pointed out, "If Pakistan tries to impose compliance on Afghanistan, it will be India rather than Pakistan that obtains the so called "strategic depth."

India

India will now need to act with finesse. This is not the time for bombast but sympathy for the people of Pakistan and

soft diplomacy to encourage higher degree of civilian control over an arrogant Army. Our diplomacy must be calibrated accordingly. India must refrain from chest thumping. This can only benefit the Pakistani Army to reinforce its threat perception from India. India today is disadvantaged in Afghanistan, despite a generous aid of \$ 1.5 billion and another \$ 500 million apart from other soft power projections. We are too firmly in Karzai camp and too heavily dependent on the US to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. However, it is only natural that the US would look after its own interests first.

We need to prepare for turbulent times which will follow. More support will be forthcoming for the militants, there will be more incidents within the country and as a diversion, infiltration into India will be stepped up. We need to be on a high alert, revamp our entire intelligence gathering and processing system and above all finally appoint a CDS and create a US type Homeland Security Department with overriding powers.

A nation that cannot even get its “most wanted” list right needs to tread with considerable caution. It needs also to act in unison and with dispatch. We must seem to be reaching out to the whole of the Afghan people and provide what Karzai called, “emotional strategic depth” to the Afghan people.¹¹ It is fortunate that our development projects have also come up in Pashtun areas and we have improved our standing with the Pashtuns. India has supported the reconciliation process in Afghanistan and its actions by no means indicate a strategic overreach.

Dr Manmohan Singh’s visit to Afghanistan shortly after Operation Geronimo was an unqualified success. It was a clear indication of a heightened strategic partnership. At the same time India must vigorously engage with Taliban while increasing its footprint in Afghanistan. Defence Minister’s cautionary at the Unified Commanders Conference, “ripples of Laden’s elimination will have wide ranging impact on India’s strategic neighbourhood”¹² needs to be noted carefully.

India-Pakistan vendetta should no longer be sacred. Al Qaeda wants to provoke a war between India and Pakistan; to decrease pressure in the West, to destabilise the region and possibly lay their hands on a nuclear device or even a dirty bomb. That is why India should not feed the paranoia in Pakistan.

Nuclear Aspects

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have always been a source of concern. With heightened tensions post Laden, the unease has only deepened. The attack on Mehran just 24 kilometers from a nuclear weapons base has justified the anxiety. Pakistan militants have already struck thrice at its nuclear facilities.¹³ Many Pakistani nuclear weapons facilities are inside or in proximity of Pakistani Taliban dominated areas. Given the exacerbated tensions and the fact that the protector (Pakistani Army) is itself suspect, justifies any anxiety on this score. Perhaps, the biggest danger will come from incensed extremist officials supported by insider information. To be emphasised is the fact that Pakistan was on its highest alert status at the time of the raid and Mehran was a well guarded military installation.

An actual nuclear device would be difficult to handle and could only be used for blackmail. A far greater danger would be that of fissile material (which Pakistan is producing in large quantities) falling into the militant hands. This would be used to make a dirty bomb. What would be required is some spent nuclear fuel, X-ray machine, gamma ray camera (available in the health and industrial sector) and a small piece of fuel. All this can be stocked in a small box. Add dynamite to it and the dirty bomb is ready. Once set off there would be a small explosion followed by release of radioactivity which could affect a whole city. The impact in a densely populated city would be dramatic, leading to mass hysteria, breakdown in law and order, services being unable to cope and medical failures.¹⁴ And what would be the most suitable location for its use? India!

Yet another danger has arisen in the shape of Pakistan’s ability to make low yield short range plutonium weapons. These are intended to be used against India’s, so called ‘cold start doctrine’ (however, it seems that such a doctrine does not exist). And to be of value these weapons would need to be decentralised making their security that much more difficult.

Despite the assurances given by the officers of Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe, unease looms large in the changed circumstances. After all there have been attacks on Pakistan’s nuclear installations in the past. Though as far as the Taliban are concerned they have no intention of attacking Pakistan’s nuclear assets. They intend to take over the country along with its nuclear assets. This has been emphasised by Ehsanullah Ehsan, the Taliban spokesman.¹⁵

The world draws comfort in the belief that should there be a threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, America would move in, à la Geronimo. This requires greater analysis. There are a large number of war heads (at one count 100 and growing) dispersed over a wide area, many of which are dominated by the Taliban. Militant infiltration into the military establishment is not on a small scale. No guarantees can be given even for the personnel of the SPD. Finally, as the situation deteriorates for America, the issue of the country’s will and the China factor would come in.

Conclusion

The situation today is similar to the one prevailing in 1936 when the world leaders watched helplessly as mankind hurtled towards a chasm. Additionally, now there are added complexities, not the least of which is the nuclear overhang and the non state players. In the prevailing turmoil it is impossible to say which country will be thrown off its axis.

Response to Laden’s death has seen increased violence - mainly in the host country. Whether this violence will sustain or subside will depend on the handling by the international community. The world must unite against any form of extremism. The angry retort, “many more Osamas will rise”, cannot be allowed to become a reality. That is why the ongoing US-Taliban dialogue must be strengthened and maximum other factions brought on board. Seen in its entirety, it is unlikely that Laden’s death will incite waves of Jihadis or lead to closer bonding of these groups.

Having won his pyrrhic victory which has made the prospect of re-election more likely, Obama has an ideal opportunity to display statesmanship of a high order. To start with, bring in Russia, China, India, Afghanistan and

Pakistan into the talks. The theme to play on, needs to be that Al Qaeda and its affiliates would not be allowed to continue their deadly gory game of destabilisation. The world must now genuinely fight a joint and coordinated battle against extremism and terrorism.

Finally, it is in the Af-Pak Region that the solution must be found. Turmoil in this area would affect the whole world – so it falls on the international community to work towards a resolution. It is clear that Pakistan is fragmented and tethering, and very much a victim (though of its own making). While maintaining its strategic posture in the East, Pak Army is engaged in counterinsurgency operations along its western border, FATA and even internally.

The key to all this is Pakistan's Praetorian Army in cahoots with a variety of militants. Its many failures and omissions have given an opportunity to break its hold on the country and the national institutions. Now the politicians must re-assert. The need for stability dictates that this country not be pushed to the brink. At this stage it would be prudent for India to try and avoid any tension building upon its western borders as that will give an excuse to Pakistan to go slow in its war on terror. The situation is rather fluid in Pakistan and India must gear up to handle whatever dispensation may be thrown up.

In order to ensure stability in the Af-Pak region the US needs to ensure that the Al Qaeda and other organisations do not take root there. This especially applies to J&K linked organisations looking for safe havens to subsequently operate against India. In this regard the US and Indian interests converge and they ought to work jointly.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

India and Central Asia*
Mr Dilip Hiro**

By extraordinary turns of events, relations between the Indian sub-continent and Central Asia, stretching back to ancient times, have acquired renewed importance – albeit for totally different reasons. During the early period of recorded history, it was the migration of pastoral communities – sometimes peaceful, other times not – which moulded history. Today, it is the drive for improving the living standards of tens of millions of settled people that has become the prime narrative of the political and economic chronicle.

It was from the steppes to the North and East of the Caspian Sea that the nomadic, pastoral Aryan tribes, facing lack of pastures, began migrating southwards, and arrived in the Indo-Gangetic plains around 1500 BC. Later, around 1000 AD, Sultan Mahmud, the Turkic ruler of present day Afghanistan and parts of Uzbekistan, extended his realm into the Indian subcontinent, setting in motion a process that led to the Delhi Sultanates (1206-1526). The founder of the subsequent Mughal Empire, Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur (1483-1530), was born in Andijan, the fourth largest city in contemporary Uzbekistan. In his journal, the Babur Nama, he refers repeatedly to Transoxania, meaning beyond the Oxus River, which is today's Central Asia – also known as Eurasia.

By happenstance, the Republic of India became the first country to establish its embassy in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent in 1992. It did so by upgrading its already existing consulate after the erstwhile Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic declared itself independent in December 1991 and became the Republic of Uzbekistan. The consulate was established during the Soviet era to serve the large number of Indian students at the V.I. Lenin Tashkent State University (renamed National University of Uzbekistan), most of them pursuing a degree in petroleum engineering.

At one billion (1,000 million) barrels of oil, Uzbekistan's petroleum reserves are modest. But its natural gas reserves of 66.2 trillion (1,000 billion) cubic feet of natural gas are enough to enable it to export the gas to the neighbouring Tajikistan. However, Uzbekistan's greater importance lies in its strategic location and the size of its population. It has common borders with the remaining Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. At 28 million, its population is almost equal to the combined populations of the rest of the Eurasian republics.

While sharing their Soviet heritage they have developed differently since their independence two decades ago. Each of the five republics now has a distinct geopolitical identity. Uzbekistan has adopted Emir Timur Beg (also known as Tamerlane) as the progenitor of the Uzbek nation, with his statue erected where Lenin's used to stand. The fact that Timur Beg was not an ethnic Uzbek has been conveniently overlooked.

In Turkmenistan, President, Saparmurat Niyazov (r. 1991-2006) tried to forge the Turkmen identity by publishing *Ruhnama* (Journal of the Soul) – a hotch potch of revisionist history, petty philosophising, and unsubstantiated claims – as a cultural and moral guidebook for Turkmen. In Kyrgyzstan, the nation has grounded its identity in the *Manas*, an epic poem of 500,000 lines of verse about the eponymous Kyrgyz superhero. Twice the length of the *Mahabharata*, the *Manas* is as stirring as the *Iliad* and as episodic as *Don Quixote*. The Tajik government has pegged the history of the nation to Emir Ismail Samani (r. 892-907) who ruled both Transoxiana and Khorasan (Eastern Iran). Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev chose Khwaja Ahmad Yasawi (1106-66) as the epitome of Kazakh identity; a popular Sufi poet who composed poems in Turkish, rather than Persian, the language of literature, he brought Islam to Turkistan, the present-day Southern Kazakhstan.

In area, Kazakhstan dwarfs all other 'istans' (countries) in Eurasia. At 2,717,300 sq km (1,049,155 sq miles), it is four-fifths the size of India. Yet its population of 16.5 million is less than that of Metropolitan Delhi with its 19 million residents.

Kazakhstan is vast not only in its area but also in the size of its oil reserves. At nearly 40 billion barrels they are the second highest in the former Soviet Union, after Russia. Therein lies the attraction of Kazakhstan to the energy-hungry mega nations of India and China. In 2005, their oil companies competed for Kazakhstan's petroleum. On one side was China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the country's largest oil and gas producer, and on the other ONGC Mittal Energy (OME), a combination of India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and the steelmaking Mittal group. At stake was the future of the Canadian-registered Petro Kazakhstan Incorporated, the third largest producer of oil in Kazakhstan. CNPC outbid OME – but only after, in the words of then Indian petroleum minister Mani Shankar Aiyar, "the goalposts were changed after the game began."

The other Central Asian country that is of particular interest to India is Turkmenistan – and again for its energy needs. This sparsely populated country of 5 million has natural gas reserves of 286 trillion cubic feet. The only economic way to transport gas is by pumping it through a pipeline. The idea of erecting a pipeline to carry gas from Turkmenistan to the Indian sub-continent through Afghanistan came up in 1995. However, due to the political and military convulsions that Afghanistan suffered for the better part of the next decade, nothing substantial happened. It was not until 2005 that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) undertook a feasibility study for the proposed pipeline after the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan had signed a fresh agreement. However, the construction of the Turkmen section of the pipeline that was supposed to start in 2006, failed to materialise.

It was only in April 2008, when Pakistan, India and Afghanistan inked a framework agreement to buy natural gas from Turkmenistan that the 1,735-kilometer (1,080 mile) gas pipeline project acquired credibility. The next step was for the four neighboring countries to hammer out a contract that was acceptable to all. That happened in December 2010. Four months later ADB officials felt confident enough to predict that gas deliveries would start in 2016-17. Nonetheless, doubts about the security of the pipeline persist. Originating in Turkmenistan's Dawlatabad gas field, it will cross into Afghanistan at Herat, and then follow the highway to Kandahar on its way to Quetta in Pakistan. This region of Afghanistan is a bastion of the resurgent Taliban. President Hamid Karzai has promised to deploy 5,000 to 7,000 security personnel to safeguard the pipeline. Yet, the danger is that the Taliban will extract protection money in return for not blowing up the pipeline, and thus bolster its finances.

After the signing of the four-country agreement on the gas pipeline in the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat, the Indian petroleum minister Murli Deora hailed the pipeline as a modern version of the Silk Road. Others have called it the Peace Pipeline, hoping that it will persuade Pakistan and India with a history of animosity and tension to cooperate actively to keep the vitally needed gas flowing.

The pipeline might even prove an antidote to the anxiety that Delhi had aroused in Islamabad by stationing its warplanes at the Farkhor air base in Tajikistan. This happened in stages. It was after the 1992-96 Afghan civil war between the Northern Alliance (dominated by ethnic Tajiks) and the predominantly Pushtun Taliban – a creature of Pakistan – that the authorities in Tajikistan first came into contact with India’s military. The Indian Army’s technicians were flown in to repair the Soviet-made tanks and artillery that the defeated Northern Alliance had brought with it after its retreat from Kabul in September 1996. Unsurprisingly, soon after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in December 2001, the Tajik government invited India to construct a hospital at its Farkhor air base, located 40 miles north of its Afghan border. The next year it signed an agreement with Delhi for renovating the air base and stationing Indian Air Force planes there.

India also has ongoing programmes of training Tajik cadets at its military academies and awarding scholarships to Tajik students to study at its universities. Islamabad views these links of India with Tajikistan as part of its strategy to increase its influence in Afghanistan with the ultimate goal of breaking up Pakistan in a pincer move in a hot war. Thus, by now, the geopolitics of Central Asia has become interlinked with the Indian subcontinent for economic, military and political reasons.

* This is an abridged version of the talk delivered by Mr Dilip Hiro at USI on 09 Mar 2011.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Cyber Warfare-Dangerous Trends
Lieutenant General Harbhajan Singh, PVSM (Retd)*

Introduction

International and political turbulences have at times led to hacking/defacing of websites across the world. Israeli and Palestinian hackers have launched attacks on websites of each other and India and Pakistan hackers have done the same. There are media reports that in Nov-Dec 2010, intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan (Technical Intelligence Agency and ISI, respectively) fought a proxy cyber war affecting a few hundred government websites on both sides.¹ The Chinese have been suspect for a number of cyber attacks in the USA, India and some other countries. These attacks, however, have been rather limited in scope and for short periods i.e. interruptive.

Some Important Cyber Attacks

The cyber attacks on Estonia in May 2007, targeting Estonian Government and private web sites were much larger in scale and lasted nearly a month. They were launched to protest against the dismantling of a Soviet era monument to Red Army in Estonia. But the role of Kremlin has not been overtly confirmed, even though greatly suspected. Quite a few of these attacks were 'Distributed Denial of Service attack'. The attackers used a giant network of 'bots' - perhaps as many as one million computers, located in a number of countries including the United States and pelted Estonian websites/computer systems with hundreds of thousand messages. The attackers even rented some servers to magnify the effect.

It needs to be highlighted that the Estonian authorities were expecting a cyber attack and had erected firewalls around government websites, set up extra computer servers and put staff on call for any eventualities. One of the counter measures taken to block hostile data, was to close off large parts of its network to users outside the country. But still the cyber invaders succeeded.

There was also an incident in 2008 in Iraq. A self-propagating malicious worm was injected into the computer system of the US military, through simple infected items like diskettes and pen drives, which took 14 months to eradicate.

Stuxnet Worm Attack on Iranian Nuclear Plants/Establishments

In September 2010, Stuxnet worm attack on Iranian nuclear plants/establishments hit the international news headlines. This worm also intruded in to industries in some other countries. Stuxnet is a dangerous computer worm which targets Windows Personal Computers (PCs) that oversee industrial-control systems; SCADA. It appears that one of the ways to initially inject could be through use of infected diskettes and pen drives. It then spreads the infection to other computers inside networks that are not directly connected to the Internet i.e. are isolated and thus considered safe. Stuxnet hit some Iranian nuclear facilities, targeting banks of uranium enriching centrifuges and associated controllers made by Siemens. It varied the speed of rotation of the centrifuges to the extent which is reported to have damaged them, retarding the progress on enrichment of uranium for the Iranian Nuclear bomb. ³ The Iranians called it a "nation state Cyber attack" blaming the USA and Israel.

Doctoring the Chips and Kill Switches

'Kill Switches' and 'Backdoors' secretly installed in chips can disable, betray and even blow up the equipment in which such chips are used. 'Backdoors' provide access to the equipment for malicious actions. Chips, microprocessors and printed circuit boards (PCBs) on which these are embedded contain millions of components and circuits. There is, therefore, ample scope to slip in secret codes.

It is possible to make chips which after specified usage become ineffective or on external/programmed command carry out malicious actions. Devices in equipment can be remotely switched on and off whether connected or not to internet. Even a soldier on a PCB can act as an antenna, making possible intrusions from mobile phones/drones/satellites and aircraft. As an example, during Desert Storm in 1991 the Iraqi Forces were using color photocopiers at various headquarters/command posts. The circuitry of some of them contained concealed transmitter which revealed their exact position to American Electronic Warfare planes. This helped in precise attacks on such installations. While most computer security efforts have until now been focused on software, tampering with hardware circuitry may ultimately be an equally dangerous threat. ⁴

Some years ago Americans discovered Trojan Backdoors in many of the electronics that the US Department of Defence was purchasing from Asian manufacturers, put in at the behest of the Chinese. Strange thing is that the Americans themselves have been using such tricks in equipments supplied by them to their allies and enemies, including by third countries like Canada.

Most Indian civil communications and other networks/applications including critical ones like power sector are importing electronic equipment and components for indigenous manufacture even from countries which are considered to be potential adversaries e.g. China. The possibilities of such equipment/ chips/PCBs having "Kill Switches" and "Backdoors" as also other malware are immense indeed. The Government needs to shed economic and diplomatic considerations where national security is likely to be threatened and ban imports from such sources for critical communication and other infrastructure, as also defence networks / computer systems. Even items like diskettes and flash drives though looking innocuous have been a major source of cyber threat. Cyber security threats are also rising sharply due to proliferation of Internet-enabled mobile devices like smart phones and tablets. These provide new opportunities for cyber criminals to intrude.

Weaponised Cyber Attacks

Considering the above, the world is now looking at a new era of 'weaponised cyber attacks'. This is likely to multiply the power of cyber attacks to much higher and dangerous levels. The head of the US Cyber Command, has recently stated that it is only a matter of time before America is attacked (read other countries), by something like the Stuxnet worm.⁶ Cyber attacks will not only be able to shut down power grids, air traffic control, banking systems, nuclear facilities and other critical infrastructure but cause damage to electronics and other hardware and corrupt the software controlling them. Such attacks will therefore become more lethal and destructive and corruptive of data and programmes. The scale will vary depending on the resources with the attacker. Most of the preparatory work is being done by such countries on 24x7 basis.

Chinese are supposed to have the largest reservoir of 'cyber warriors'. China's White Paper for 2010 states that the PLA has made great progress in its modernisation and informationisation objectives. As in previous years, the building of new combat capacity to win local wars in conditions of informationisation is emphasised.

Cyber Deterrent

As there is a nuclear deterrent, similarly there could be a cyber/electronic deterrent too, because electronics are all pervasive and nothing works without electronics. No doubt nuclear attacks mean tremendous physical casualties and damage but electronic attacks will immobilise functioning of a country i.e. cause paralysis of the nation and seriously damage its electronic infrastructure. Any deterrent has to be plausible and demonstrated. Spurts of cyber attacks between nations having inimical relations are efforts towards this end and also to test their techniques and responses from other side. Efforts are being initiated to reach international consensus and may be agreements on some rules on use of cyber weapons. The biggest problem is that it is very difficult to locate the source of cyber attacks.

Response to Cyber Threat is based on Past Experience

Generally speaking, in India and other countries measures being taken for defence against cyber attacks are based on the past experience, though new cyber threats are looming. Even for this, resources being allocated in India seem most insufficient. In addition, too many agencies like Ministries of Communications and IT, CBI, NIC and NTRO are involved. There is a dire need for single nodal agency to deal with this critical threat. Our policies, organisations and resources allocated should take into account the futuristic cyber threats and the magnitude of damage and disruption that these could cause. A bureaucratic and incremental approach will invite disaster. Instead, a bold initiative is necessary with the military, central and state governments, industry, academia and more so every citizen participating.

Some Important Measures to face Cyber Threats

Cyber threats have entered the era of nation state cyber and destructive attacks. Also our potential adversaries, China in particular, have made Cyber warfare a key area for waging war. It is, therefore, essential that the criticality of emerging cyber threats is realised at the highest levels of the Government and the Defence Services. This makes it clear that Cyber warfare has to be planned and controlled at strategic level. What is most essential is that a central authority under the PMO, which cuts across bureaucratic boundaries and different ministries and organisations be established, like the Space and Atomic Agencies.

Some of the other measures that are required are as under:-

- (a) The government and industrial as also military infrastructure should be made ready to absorb new destructive attacks and recover quickly.
- (b) There is a need to practise 'Active Defence' as compared to 'Passive Defence'. Active Defence entails "before event efforts rather than after event postmortems".
- (c) Locate bugs/malware that may have already penetrated systems and could be lying doggo. Sources of and how these penetrated the system must be identified and loop holes plugged.
- (d) A national effort to identify infected computers and clean them up needs to be undertaken. All users should be encouraged to report every malicious cyber incident. South Korea and Germany have tackled this problem by setting up national call centres to which Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can refer infected customers to get advice about disinfecting their computers.
- (e) One of the essential remedy lies in manufacturing latest chips for critical equipment in safe foundries. Making chips is a strategic requirement, for which commercial viability should not be a criteria. In addition, even though difficult, maximum possible testing should be undertaken, which requires creation of needed infrastructure.

Need for a Cyber Command. For the Defence Services a Cyber Command is a must, which will coordinate the cyber activities of the three Services. Success in Cyber warfare cannot be assured if we work in penny packets and uncoordinated manner. Unity of command is a pre-requisite. The Cyber Command could be a tri-service command on the lines of the Strategic Forces Command and functioning under the Chiefs of Staff Committee / CDS (as and when created). It will have three Services components suitably structured as well as a Joint Operations Centre which will control both defensive and offensive operations. The Command should have lateral linkages with the National Cyber Authority and the National Security Adviser, and ought to function in close coordination with them during peace and war.

Security of Defence Networks

As for Defence Networks, critical ones must be isolated and a "secure zone" created. Isolation requires totally separate media ensuring end to end quarantine and also isolated access devices like laptops/tablets and PCs. Quite a few of the Defence Networks in the rear areas are engineered on civil media/networks. These can become highly vulnerable to penetration and attacks and act as Backdoors to so called isolated Defence Networks. Also, electronic and physical

security measures, particularly at nodes assume critical importance.

The threat posed by malware concealed in chips/PCBs and equipment from foreign/unprotected local sources has assumed very dangerous proportions. This needs to be plugged on emergency basis. The Defence Services have to lay down security rules and regulations in this regard for equipment and networks they are going to use, whether own or hired, and ensure that indigenously manufactured, fully tested components are used and no diplomatic/economic/political considerations are allowed to dilute or bypass these.

Declaring a Cyber Attack an Act of War

The USA is seriously thinking of declaring cyber attack as an act of war, depending on its severity, as it can cause destruction/disruption comparable to a hostile conventional attack and would take retaliatory actions - weaponised or others. This is a very significant development and shows how seriously the US takes cyber warfare.

Concluding Remarks

Cyber warfare cannot win wars on its own, but its indirect approach could succeed where direct action cannot. Cyber warfare operations must be synchronised with those of other war fighting domains and can act as force multiplier. Cyber threats have assumed dangerous proportions and cyber attacks have become destructive and not just interruptive. Our potential adversaries; China in particular, are laying great emphasis on Cyber warfare and developed considerable expertise and infrastructure. India needs to realise the dangers posed and make this a key area.

There is a need for a centralised organisation under the PMO to coordinate the efforts of different agencies involved. The Defence Forces should have a Cyber Command coordinating the efforts of the three Services. Fragmented efforts in penny packets will not suffice. Individuals who are mission oriented should be put in charge as Cyber warfare is 24X7 happening even during peace time!! Young computer experts should be offered lucrative remuneration to attract them to specialise in Cyber warfare as against having a career in normal software work.

Imported electronic components and equipment including chips and even innocuous CDs and Pen Drives are doorways for deadly infections and damage to the systems they are used in. Even so called friendly countries cannot be trusted. India needs to be self sufficient in manufacturing such hardware and in particularly latest chips/microprocessors, to prevent cyber attacks.

Last but not the least, no nation can come out victorious in any warfare including Cyber warfare, unless it takes offensive action. India should develop credible offensive capabilities in Cyber warfare and let it be known to the world, so that other nations are deterred from messing with India's electronic systems. India has the brains and software competence which are at par, if not better than any other country. What is needed is political will and setting up proper organisations bereft of bureaucratic interference and inter-agency rivalries/turf wars.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Terrain as a Force Multiplier in Operational Planning - Role of the Engineers

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Introduction

Since time immemorial, terrain has played the most significant part for planning of any military operation. In executing operations on land, the study and analysis of ground is the key, as terrain configuration plays a major role in influencing the operations of ground forces. It is a must for all military commanders to understand the terrain they operate on as it deals with all physical and geographical features of a given area. The study of terrain or terrain analysis is the process of interpreting a geographical area to determine the effect of natural and man-made features, including the influence of weather and climate on military operations. In the contemporary era, as part of information dominance, the knowledge of terrain allows commanders to obtain superiority in shaping the battle space. It is thus imperative for all military commanders to visualise the terrain and its effects on the battle's outcome so that own courses of action can be structured accordingly.

Relevance of Terrain for Planning Military Operations

Terrain is a permanent and important aspect of all military operations. For ground operations, terrain information provides an important context. Key terrain is any location whose control is likely to give distinct military advantage to the force that holds it. It also identifies areas where intelligence collection efforts should be focused. In operations conducted by mechanised forces, it will be the attacker's aim to get to the sensitive objectives in the depth area the fastest; while the defender on the other hand will try his utmost to prevent the attacker from doing so. In the achievement of their respective aims, both the attacker and the defender will have to traverse and make use of the same terrain. The side which can read and analyse the terrain better and draw the right conclusions from such an analysis may well carry the day. A correct analysis of the key terrain area(s) becomes critical, because more often than not such areas may not be occupied ab-initio, by either side. Success will go to the side that identifies these areas and seizes them before the adversary can do so. Thus, the layout of terrain is a determining factor in arraying of forces, both friendly and enemy, and to orient one's own likely design of battle.

Key terrain features that allow observation of the opposing forces line of advance, is likely to give a big military advantage to the force that occupies it. Combining information about terrain features with knowledge about enemy assets can lead to inferences about possible avenues of approach, areas that provide cover and concealment, locations that are vulnerable to enemy observations, or the choke points. In addition, if force movements are observed, terrain features give additional information with respect to the intent of the enemy forces that have been observed on the move, thus confirming or negating hypotheses about enemy's likely aim¹.

In the context of internal security, the study of terrain assumes importance for planning operations against insurgents / militants. The terrain aids the insurgent by providing concealment and negating many of the manpower and technology advantages of the counter-insurgency force. To achieve success, the commander needs to first overcome the terrain constraints; making terrain study and analysis imperative for planning operations in counter-insurgency scenario.

In the modern-day warfare, with the backdrop of nuclear vulnerability, terrain study becomes more relevant as troops' safety will necessitate greater accuracy of terrain intelligence concerning the areas to be occupied by own troops. Troops can be protected from thermal radiation by prominent terrain features, and other ill effects of nuclear radiation can be considerably reduced by using the folds in ground configurations. Hence, detailed terrain study is significant and inescapable.

Engineer Officers as Terrain Experts

The Engineers' responsibilities primarily pertain to enhancing tactical and strategic mobility of own forces, denying mobility to the enemy and ensuring survivability of own troops on the battlefield. Execution of these tasks requires knowledge of terrain. Thus, terrain expertise is a key element in executing engineer tasks; since, virtually all of them do involve use of ground. In fact, terrain appreciation and terrain evaluation are skills that should be second nature to an Engineer officer. Although, terrain analysis is essentially carried out by all arms and services, as also by the staff at various headquarters, Engineers are best suited for integrating data received from higher echelons with information collected from field reports and tactical sensors, to produce an integrated view of the terrain. Engineers, because of their intrinsic involvement with the layout of ground, are better poised to resolve the differences between various reports to render a single common representation of terrain configuration.

The study of terrain or topography, thus becomes an enduring combat responsibility of the Engineers. Conventionally too military engineers have been pioneers in the field of terrain mapping². For a military commander terrain evaluation is a critical component of battlefield visualisation. Engineer officers are trained to assist their commanders in accurate terrain analysis by identifying and evaluating the potential of various terrain features on the battlefield, both during the planning and executive stages of military operations.

Having analysed the responsibility of the Engineers in providing terrain evaluation, it is pertinent to mention that the Engineers need to be equipped suitably to accomplish their assigned tasks efficiently. One of the solutions could be to include 'Topographical Engineering' in the curriculum of the Engineers training, as skills and tools associated with topographic engineering begin with an understanding of terrain data and its uses. Terrain data may range from scanned digital map displays, elevation statistics, imagery and records of ground features³. However, for a broader perspective and an all inclusive analysis, the study of 'Geospatial Engineering' would be more relevant in the present day warfare.

Geospatial engineering combines the engineering capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear understanding of the physical environment by providing information of terrain in three dimensions with detailed

analysis to the commanders and staff. The Engineers officer can be correctly oriented to connect the geospatial engineering with tactical operations in order to take advantage of the battlefield space environment. Structured training on geospatial engineering is essential to accomplish geospatial tasks in detail and to be able to generate, obtain and / or use geospatial products to the fullest. In fact, geospatial engineering needs to form a key component of the Engineer Force Modernisation Strategy⁴. The proposed expansion of geospatial-support capabilities needs to be managed and controlled by the Engineers rather than the staff.

Understanding Geospatial Engineering

The importance of terrain analysis has been recognised for hundreds of years in military science. Currently, such analysis is called the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). IPB is a process that starts in advance of operations and continues during operational planning and execution. It provides guidelines for gathering, analysing and collating intelligence. The purpose of this intelligence is to provide relevant inputs to the commander in his decision making process during the various stages of an operation. Engineers play a major role in the IPB process by anticipating and providing terrain analysis products to the commanders. It is then integrated with tactical inputs to ensure success of the mission. Today's integrated battlefield environment presents new challenges to the Engineers with increased emphasis on terrain data and terrain based analysis. An Engineers officer with the knowledge of field engineering and skills of topographic assessment fits into the bigger picture. He should therefore be made responsible for geospatial engineering architecture to maximise its effect for achieving meaningful results.

Geospatial engineering is in fact just a functional name change from topographic engineering and is not a new engineer concept. Engineers were hitherto still carrying out the analysis and synthesis of various military attributes and their likely effects on military operations viz. the terrain going, roads/tracks, rivers/canals/other obstacles, covered approaches, dominating features, villages/built-up areas, local resources etc to facilitate better battlefield visualisation. However, as the Army expands its capabilities through automation, the role of the terrain analysis has expanded significantly. Aerial and satellite remote sensing imagery, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), availability of UAVs and computerised Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are increasingly becoming the driving force for operational planning. Accurate information about the enemy and own dispositions, terrain features and weather pictures promise better digital command and control of military operations. The commanders need an accurate depiction of the terrain/battlefield to conduct military operations successfully, therefore, they do bank heavily on geospatial information. Digital geospatial information is the basis for a superior view of the battlespace and provides the framework upon which all other relevant strategic, operational and tactical information can be layered.

Geospatial engineering is generating, managing, analysing and disseminating positionally accurate terrain information that is pertaining to some portion of the earth's surface. These actions provide mission-tailored data, tactical decision aids, and visualisation products that define the character of the battle zone for the operational commander. Key aspects of the geospatial engineering missions are databases, analysis, digital products, visualisation and printed maps. Geospatial information that is timely, accurate and relevant is a critical enabler for the operations process. Geospatial engineering provides commanders with comprehensive terrain visualisation, which improves situational awareness and enhances decision making. Thus, geospatial engineering is indelibly linked to information dominance and is one of the key elements in the success of any operation in a sophisticated and highly digitised battlefield environment today and in the future⁵.

Geospatial solutions involve systems in accessing, displaying, analysing and presenting spatial data across the spectrum. They are capable of providing two and three dimensional analyses; thus, providing support to commanders in assessing offensive and defensive solutions for timely planning and effective decision making. The system capabilities⁶ would include the following:-

- (a) Display of Map with Military Grid.** Ability to seamlessly use geodata available from military mapping agencies and display map with military grid.
- (b) Preparations of Overlays.** Overlay capabilities that include insertion/deletion of specific topographical features, terrain attributes, tactical overlays, military symbol library etc to reduce clutter and for a better assimilation of cartographic features required by the user.
- (c) Analyse the Terrain.** Use terrain analysis tools to determine optimum sites for bridging, crossing of obstacles system, landing sites etc.
- (d) Dissemination.** Inbuilt export functions for sending the overlays instantly to other formations/units over low bandwidth WAN/LAN communication.
- (e) Three Dimensional Visualisation of Battlefield.** Three dimensional view, fly-throughs, visibility analysis, terrain profiles, going maps etc.

Geospatial Intelligence is a new intelligence discipline emerging out of the convergence of geospatial engineering and imagery information. The convergence is due to tremendous technological advances in digital data processing, precision geopositioning systems, remote sensors and imageries. These advances allow data to be moved and manipulated interchangeably between imagery products, maps and charts. With the advent of GIS software tools, digital databases rather than vulnerable paper maps and charts, have become the key medium for visualising geospatially referenced information. Therefore, geospatial intelligence can formally be defined as the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. It is the merger of geospatial data with imageries so as to arrive at layers of information that depict the physical and cultural features of the area of interest in three dimensions and allow users to visualise inaccessible terrain. Through accurate three dimensional visualisation, geospatial intelligence allows rapid understanding of the physical environment and rapid evaluation of adversary's courses of action. Geospatial reference data, such as digital terrain elevation and terrain feature data provide the environmental context, while latest

satellite or aerial imageries of the area of interest gives the dynamic perspective.

In the context of military operations, the growing demand for battlefield transparency has been the most important factor behind the emergence of new geospatial intelligence discipline. The evolving rapid pace of operational targeting cycle and the massive volume of targets and rapid targeting needs have placed immense stress on the intelligence production process. The timeliness required for rapid, precision oriented engagement of targets demands closer integration of the tools and processes of the imagery specialists, who detect and characterise targets, and the geospatial specialists who characterise and measure the battle space. Decisions at the highest level, including when and where to launch combat operations are getting more and more dependent on geospatial intelligence. To create the basic picture of the environment in which the forces are going to be deployed is crucial; both, for military operations across the border and in the internal security context. Geospatial intelligence embraces the concept of IPB covering the layout of the terrain and environment, the infrastructure, roads, bridges, railway system and many more features that are relevant to operational planning.

Two types of products can be thought of towards generation of geospatial intelligence. One can be called the global reference data sets on any given area of interest and the other product type can consist of mission-specific data sets. The target should be to provide automated, realistic, three-dimensional, fly-through, drive-through and walk-through representations of areas of interest.⁷ Highly accurate terrain-visualisation tools will be of great value to decision makers, strategists, special forces etc, particularly for mission planning and rehearsals. There is also a need to develop a wide knowledge base so that an image analyst or a military planner in future could access the database through a secured web portal and look for what one needs with the help of user-friendly tools.

Conclusion

Terrain is a permanent and unconditional component of all military operations. Military commanders have long realised the interdependence of the earth's land features and success on the battlefield. Military strategists and commanders of yesterday and today recognise that the side which gains mental and physical dominance of the terrain has a decisive advantage. Yet, terrain is often far more complex than meets the eye or is portrayed by a map. Dominating it requires additional study and analysis in geospatial engineering; and the Corps of Engineers is best suited to take on the responsibility in this field for the Army. Engineers are the commanders' immediate guides; they provide the knowledge and tools of all three engineering battlefield functions so that the commander can wield the ground as a weapon against the enemy and as a combat force multiplier for the friendly forces. Therefore, just as the Engineers officers must be combat engineers and operational works specialists, they must also be the commanders' terrain experts.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

The Quintessential Ones: Lessons of Warfare

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General

Man has been fighting wars since time immemorial, ever since there was a failure to resolve amicably, any difference of opinion between two or more persons. Wars have been fought for myriad reasons – land, power, ego, money, women, oil – even football! At the end of each war, certain lessons have emerged for the discerning soldier. From the aftermath of any battle, these lessons are the ones which should be grasped, to preclude any future defeat. Therefore, the lessons of any war are also to be won, not the war alone.

Even though these lessons of warfare have emerged, a posteriori, over aeons of warfare, no detailed treatises on them have been authored by students or practitioners of warfare. As a result, these lessons have been forgotten time and again between the halcyon years of peace between wars, only to be relearnt again in the next war, often by paying in blood. For war planning, these lessons of warfare are undoubtedly more important than principles of war.

Military History - The Fountainhead for Lessons of Warfare

On studying military history, a cautious student of warfare can definitely codify certain lessons which have remained as relevant since the earliest times of Epaminondas and Alexander (4th Century BC) or Hannibal (3rd Century BC); through the ages and the intervening eras of Mongols, Napoleon, Prussia, World Wars, as they are today. On an in-depth analysis of various military campaigns, certain immutable lessons of warfare emerge, based on the distillation of historical military wisdom. It is de rigueur that these lessons of warfare be studied, absorbed and judiciously applied during making of operational plans.

In this article, some of the critically important quintessential lessons of warfare, are enunciated, which epitomise the wisdom of warfare gained over millennia of warfare.

The Lessons of Warfare - At National Level

At the National level, important lessons to be kept in mind for any war are enunciated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Political Aim Commensurate with Military Resources. Assuming that the tenet of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of policy by other means to be true even today, the political aim of a nation must, therefore, be commensurate with its military resources. A nation should not pursue a policy based on a goal, which, if unattainable through politics and diplomacy, is beyond its military means too. Should this be so, future war portends only disaster. If the military resources cannot achieve what the politics want, then war should not be waged. Either time should be taken to build-up the military resources in the pursuance of the political aim, or, political aim should be judiciously reviewed, or, other means – like diplomacy – should be used to achieve that political aim. For example, to achieve Hitler's policy of Lebensraum, the Germans aimed for the collapse of Russia in the Second World War (WW II).¹ Consequently, they declared the military aim (in the war plans for Operation Barbarossa in 1941 in Directive No 21) was conquest of areas up to the line Archangel to Astrakhan – a straight line running east of Moscow from north to south.² This was beyond Wehrmacht's military capability. Had Hitler secured peace through diplomacy after the fall of France in June 1940, then history indeed would have been different. In the case, however, oblivion of the Third Reich was the outcome.

Correct Visualisation of The End State. Any nation which accepts war as an instrument for achieving a stated goal, must enunciate the desired end state which will signal the end of hostilities. It is futile to fight a war that has lost its relevance vis-à-vis the aim for which it is being fought. If 'selection and maintenance of aim' is the first tenet of war, then 'correct visualisation of the desired end state' should be the final one, to complete the loop.

Favourable Public Opinion and Peoples' Will. Interlinked with the political aim is the public opinion and the people's will, especially in a democracy. There has to be strong public support to fight a war. In case the public support wanes, then it has a cascading effect on the waning of the political will of the government and consequently the military operations. Public opinion has the power to take a nation to war or to prevent the nation from fighting a war successfully. In the 21st century, media and internet are two most important means to muster and shape the public opinion for/against a war; hence this factor assumes significant proportions. The ongoing revolutions in the Arab world in North Africa and Middle East are the latest examples of this immutable verity.

The Lessons of Warfare - In Military Planning and Execution

For the military planners and soldiers on the battlefield, the important lessons to be kept mind for any war are enunciated in succeeding paragraphs.

Sound Strategy, Doctrine, Operational Art, Tactics, Training and Organisational Framework. Whenever the armed forces of a nation go to war, they must have a sound military strategy of conducting the war. Military strategy – which itself is a derivative of the national strategy and dependent on the military resources – is the fountainhead of the military doctrine. The military doctrine in turn should take into cognisance the resources, training and organisational framework of its armed forces. Thereafter, suitable tactics, techniques and procedures should be evolved, and operational art be developed and practised during training. Material alone does not guarantee victory. For example, French Army had more material (read tanks, 3,000 to Germany's 2,700)³ vis-à-vis the Germans in May 1940, yet they lost to the Germans in WW 2. This was due to following important factors: wrong strategy (reliance on positional warfare and defensive mindset); lack of sound doctrine (Germans practiced auftragstaktik i.e. outflanking tactics); professional acumen in operational art (cultivated over decades of training in the War Academy and symbolised by Germany's Generalstab or General Staff); organisational framework (Germans had Panzer Divisions, which were combined arms divisions based on tanks) and the famous Blitzkrieg tactics (Blitzkrieg, literally means 'lightening

war').⁴ The result – Paris fell to Wehrmacht in about 6 weeks in May-June 1940.

Unified Command and Decentralised Control. It is an operational imperative that there is a unified command, for incisive decision making and optimum utilisation of all available military resources in furtherance of the operations being undertaken. The overall military commander can then nominate subordinate military commanders and allocate military resources to them for specified durations, as per the overall plan. This single overall military commander is then responsible to the political authority for all the military operations being undertaken, while the subordinate commander(s) can practise warfare within the intent of the higher commander(s). For example, in WW II, there existed a dichotomy in the command of the Wehrmacht wherein both the OKH (Ober Kommando de Heer i.e. Army High Command) and OKW (Ober Kommando de Wehrmacht i.e. Armed Forces High Command) reported to Hitler, thereby leading to dichotomies in the war plans and military aims.⁵ This led to eventual defeat of Germany.

Joint Operations. The recent history of warfare makes it crystal clear that joint operations are the capstone of any present day military operation with reasonable chances of success. The 'jointness' has to be in terms of aim, marshalling and utilisation of resources, complementing each other's strengths and nullifying the weaknesses, intelligence sharing, integrated operations, and implying 'combined services' approach. The joint operations have been in existence since millennia – right from the times of Hannibal when he used cavalry and infantry of different nationalities together, till the present day wars wherein land, air and sea components conduct joint operations. These must, therefore, be meshed during operational planning.

Judicious Selection and Training of Higher Commanders. It is an oft overstated cliché - armed forces of a nation must be well trained. But the more critically important truth is this – the armed forces must be well led. The selection and training of commanders who lead troops into battle must be done with utmost care. Incompetent commanders can lead to disastrous consequences, even if they have well trained troops under their command. For example, the pitiable initial Russian response to Wehrmacht in 1941- 42 in WW II was – apart from other factors - due to their inefficient and inept senior commanders, who were not capable of handling forces at their disposal. This was mainly due to the fact that military genie like Tukhachevsky and other military brains of the Red army had been executed in the purges of 1936-38 on Stalin's orders.⁶ With no capable commanders at the top levels, the initial losses were but inevitable, despite the obstinate Russian defence and raw courage.

Balance Courage and Intellect. Physical courage in battles is undoubtedly the haute couture of all qualities in a commander. However, it is the intellect that spells the doom for the enemy. A well made operational plan will preclude the need for over-the-top-bravado on the battlefield, leading to victory. Pyrrhic victories are the stuff good short tales for children are made up of, not the dream of a military planner. Hence, in a trade- off between intellect and physical courage, the former should be the preferred in senior commanders (i.e. at the operational and strategic levels) and the latter in junior leaders (i.e. at the tactical level). As regards moral courage, there is no ambiguity: it is the foundation of any commander's character and is hence indispensable. France 1940 in WW II accentuates the importance of intellect over courage while conceiving operational plans and the physical courage to execute it. This brilliant plan - conceived by Manstein - envisaged breakthrough at Sedan and then westwards towards the English Channel, not southwards towards Paris. This ingenious plan required a bold commander to approve it. Hitler did so. The cascading effect of its astounding success was the brittle nerves of all commanders at all hierarchical levels – especially the senior ones of the old school. The plan required extraordinary battlefield courage to be fully executed, as conceived. It was left to Guderian, to show that Herculean mental and moral courage, and character are essential to execute it.⁷ The result – collapse of France in just six weeks.

Strategy Trumps Tactics. Ideally, both strategy and tactics should form a formidable mesh to trap and destroy the enemy. However, if given a choice, it is better to have correct strategy vis-à-vis tactics. With the correct national and military strategy in place, sooner or later, victory will be at your feet, even if the tactics employed ab initio on the battlefield are unable to deliver decisive victories. But if strategy itself is wrong, then perhaps redemption on the battlefield is but a mere illusion. In the military rivalry between Rome and Carthage in 3rd Century BC, despite the tactical virtuosity of Hannibal in his battles like Cannae in 216 BC, Carthage ultimately lost the war to the Fabian Strategy of Rome - avoiding battle and pursuing slow attrition.⁸

Prefer Indirect over Direct. If only one lesson of warfare were to be passed onto the next generation, it should be this: indirect is better than direct. Indirect application of forces will pay rich dividends in the long term and will result in less bloodshed of own forces. The genre of manoeuvre warfare along with its ingredients of surprise, pre-emption, dislocation (physical, functional and psychological) and finally disruption belongs to the indirect approach. At the operational level, the manoeuvres of envelopment and turning movement, requiring a high level of virtuosity in senior commanders, fall into this category of warfare. At the tactical level, 'indirect' translates into 'flank' i.e. flank attack should be preferred to a frontal attack. Frontal attack must be the last resort, always.

Multiple Objectives. It is always preferable to have multiple objectives leading to a singular aim. This forces the enemy to ride on the horns of a dilemma, delays his decision making and increases his Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. Threatening of two or more enemy objectives simultaneously thus leads to achieving success. An operational plan which threatens multiple objectives will lead to the achievement of the war aim, for even if one or more of its thrusts are parried by the enemy, the other thrust(s) will succeed.

Conduct Warfare Based On Surprise and Intelligence. Surprise is the sine qua non of operational planning. The combination of the duo is the most potent combination during any operation. It is essential to have battlefield intelligence before a nation's military goes to war. Wrong intelligence will lead to erroneous planning and thence, complete annihilation of own forces involved. Therefore, intelligence picture must be absolutely clear before any war is undertaken.

Resolute Preparation. As the adage goes – if you have 24 hours to chop a tree, use 23 in sharpening the axe. Therefore, do not give battle to the enemy if you are unprepared. Take adequate time to prepare all facets of the impending war. Select the time, place and manner, after due preparation, in which to give battle to the enemy - the aim

being to win. It is well known that Field Marshal Manekshaw refused war with Pakistan in April 1971, stating to the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the army was not yet ready and preparation time was required.⁹ Over the next few months, the Indian Army prepared for the impending war and achieved a decisive victory in the eastern sector in just 13 days and a new nation - Bangladesh - was created.

Innovative Plans. Whenever there is a major military hurdle which seems insurmountable, then innovative planning and new techniques will invariably succeed. There are numerous instances of this axiom, the most famous one being the Trojan Horse, in which the apparently insurmountable obstacle - the fortress city of Troy - was overcome by the eponymous idea. Another innovative plan was executed by Epaminondas at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. Epaminondas, even though vastly outnumbered, created his left wing stronger and then attacked the Spartan right wing, thereby concentrating his forces at the point of decision, thus achieving victory by adopting innovative planning and tactics.

Conclusion

These are the quintessential lessons of warfare that have (not?) been learnt over the ages. These are not all the lessons and there are many more which have not been discussed here. However, those listed here are the quintessential ones and bear testimony to the lost battles, and decisive victories encased in blood and guts spread over millennia of wars. Perhaps these quintessential lessons will aid a soldier in unravelling the mystery of the crucible of war. If these are imbibed, better operational plans are likely to emerge and executed at a lesser cost of human lives. If that happens, we can say that we, as true soldiers, have learnt the lessons of warfare well and have done our duty to the nation.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

Conduct of Junior Leaders in Counter Insurgency Operations - A Decisive Factor Brigadier PS Mann, SM, VSM (Retd)*

Junior leaders are the mainstay of the Indian Army (IA) and have time and again turned the tide against heavy odds owing to their superior training, high level of motivation, grit and extreme sacrifice. They have been greatly responsible for achieving victory in many a battle which has changed the course of history. Equally, their performance in Counter Insurgency (CI) Operations has been creditable, though their heroics are often obscured in this protracted, messy war with its peculiar characteristics. Junior leaders play a significant role in the resolution of this conflict as they, with their outfits operate in proximity to the local population and carry out physical destruction of the insurgents and their war material. But they must appreciate that the CI operations are carried out in full public view and under the gaze of the media, human rights organisations and a host of other social watchdogs. Therefore, their acts of commissions and omissions are susceptible to public/media scrutiny and legal investigations. Personal conduct of Junior leaders and that of their command thus ought to be exemplary. In the past there have been instances, where certain individuals, particularly at the lower levels of command, have taken recourse to certain disgraceful acts such as extra judicial killings, fake encounters, illegal confinement, torture, molestation and killing of innocent civilians. These violent acts, if proved, are punishable under the law, tarnish the image of the IA and consequently derail the process of reconciliation.

Our strategic vision and concept of CI operations clearly spell out the rules of engagement with the two well defined constituencies – insurgents and the people which are to be addressed in the combat zone. The former with an iron hand to isolate them from the public, to neutralise their influence ; and the latter with a soft and humane approach to restore their confidence, faith and trust in the Indian Constitution and to realign them to the national mainstream. The fundamentals of this policy are to ruthlessly avoid collateral damage and loss of innocent lives. It is to the credit of IA that, in consonance with the above policy, it has been able to successfully contain insurgency in the North East and J&K. Peace has returned to Mizoram, Tripura and now Nagaland. Overwhelming participation of people in the recently held assembly elections in Assam and “Panchayat” polls in J&K, ignoring the boycott call by the secessionists, are encouraging signs of peace returning to these states. Our doctrinal and strategic approach, in managing this warfare, therefore, is sound and has withstood the test of time.

On the other hand, use of brute force to include aircraft, armed helicopters, drones, guns and tanks by the NATO forces and Pakistan Army in the Af-Pak region has caused excessive collateral damage and loss of innocent lives. This belligerent approach has further alienated the people and strengthened the hands of the Taliban and Tahreek-e-Taliban (Pak) that are now more resilient and aggressive than ever before. The area has become the most volatile part of the world with far reaching regional and global security ramifications. “Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it”, said Napoleon. My Lai massacre, the mass murder of as many as 500 unarmed villagers, in Vietnam, under the command of second lieutenant William Calley, the US Army, on 16 March 1968 and torture and abuse of prisoners/suspects at Abu Ghraib (Iraq) by US soldiers² are heart-rending incidents. Recently, three American soldiers mercilessly killed some Afghan civilians, chopped off their organs to be kept as souvenirs. The perpetrators of all these crimes have been severely punished under the US judicial system. The IA too has had a fair share of such violent acts that need to be condemned in equal measure. The guilty in these cases also have not been spared.

Nathaniel Fick a former US mariner, who served both in Afghanistan (2001-2002) and Iraq (2003) has detailed some illuminating facets of CI operations in his article “Warfare Without Shooting”³ written, taking account of recent events in Afghanistan. During his visit to Afghanistan Counter Insurgency Academy (established by the US Army near Kabul) he asked students to list three targets they would aim for if they were leading forces in Zabul province, a Taliban stronghold. A US officer rattled off the names of three Taliban leaders to be captured and killed while an Afghan officer replied, “first we must target the local council to see how we can best help them; then we must target the local mullahs to find out their needs and let them know that we respect their authority.” In CI operations, Nathaniel stated, “targeting is more about whom you bring in than whom you take out.” He further emphasised that “counter insurgents must excel at finding creative, non-military solutions to military problems.”

Mao-Tse-Tung (Chinese revolution 1926-1949) had viewed people as a reservoir of sympathy and support; a sea in which ‘Red Guerrillas’ could swim.⁵ As early as September 1927, he had issued instructions, popularly known as ‘six points of attention’, for guerrillas to observe while dealing with the locals to avoid any untoward incident and to win over their support. The forces engaged in CI operations must make every effort to deny insurgents the chance to freely swim in this sea of humanity. This can best be achieved through meticulously planned surgical strikes, based on actionable intelligence to destroy insurgents and avoid collateral damage on the one hand and a fair and exemplary conduct recognising and respecting the identity of innocent law abiding local population on the other.

Most of the time we get swayed by ‘body counts’ and number of weapons recovered as a token of operational performance of units/subunits in a CI Grid. While destruction of hostiles is equally important, it should not be at the cost of alienating the local population. Occasionally, exuberant result seeking units/subunits and individuals have resorted to unconstitutional acts like fake encounters, extra judicial killings, torture of suspects and even victimisation against locals with the sole intention of gaining recognition, honours and awards. These actions are not only illegal and unethical but against all norms of CI operations – reminiscent of the barbaric behaviour of an ‘occupational army’. Junior leaders must refrain from such murky affairs despite any provocation or inducement. These actions are counterproductive and neither help the cause nor, bring any glory to the unit/subunit or the individual concerned. Instead, they reflect on the professional impropriety of the concerned officer. Often such actions inspire the local youth to join hands with the insurgents to avenge the brutalities and humiliation inflicted on their people.

CI is a complicated, difficult and messy warfare. Due to its peculiar characteristics and nuances, these operations require years of painstaking effort to build intelligence network, master the art of guerrilla warfare and win back the trust and confidence of the locals. Recent operation ‘Geronimo’ was the result of a meticulous effort of 10 years by the American CIA sleuths to trace Osama bin Laden and pin him down at Abbottabad (Pak) in one of the most daring surgical raids carried out by the US Special Forces-Navy SEAL (Team 6) in the history of modern warfare. It was like ‘searching a needle in a hay stack’. Protracted nature of this war often leads to ambiguity, frustration, insanity and

loss of patience, mainly due to lack of results and the casualties suffered at the hands of wily insurgents. Soldiers, who are not adequately conditioned, both physically and psychologically, often succumb to these pressures and fatigue. Complacency and ennui amongst troops deployed in CI operations have rarely escaped the prying eyes of the crafty insurgents, inviting their deadly strikes resulting in loss of men and material. This apparently hurts the honour and prestige of a soldier. Humiliated and infuriated by the ghastly, gory site-remnants of a terror strike, troops often go berserk leading to punitive attacks against innocent civilians. Such heinous crimes are deplorable and against the basic tenets of CI operations and will certainly and justifiably invite legal retribution.

Another belief that persists in the minds of our young officers is that army is made to fight insurgents with their 'hands tied behind their back' and that army should be given a free hand to manage the conflict. In a democratic system, rules of the game are formulated keeping in mind our constitutional and judicial parameters. At the same time enough powers like 'Armed Forces Special Powers Act' have been vested in the security forces for successful management of this kind of conflict. Adequate safeguards have been provided to a soldier to enable him to perform his duty in an effective manner and to shield him from vilification.

No one has ever perfected the art of warfare. In all humility we must accept it to be a continuous learning process as the price of mistakes committed in combat are rather heavy. It is more so in CI operations where gains of years of painstaking effort can be ruined due to a single immature, disgraceful act committed by a unit/subunit or a combatant. The US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have realised that unless they win over the sympathy and support of the Afghans, winning battles alone is not enough for a lasting solution to the conflict. CI operations have become very complex because of the internal and external influences. Terrorism has added a new dimension to this warfare and has compounded the problems of a soldier. In this intricate situation the ethics and conduct of junior leaders in CI operations has gained added importance. Common factor between the insurgents and the security forces are the people whose support in the final analysis, will decide the outcome of such a conflict. They will do well to never allow their focus to deviate from the old maxim; "Help people, defend people and respect people". "When the strategy is right and the tactics are right the war will be won in no time", a proverb often referred to by the Vietcong during the Vietnam War (1946-1975) holds true in all facets of warfare even today. A dichotomy in this regard will only add to confusion and frustration leading to a costly and wasteful effort.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.

The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Security of the Indian State

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Introduction

The story goes back several thousand years to the days before Islam was born in the desert wastes of Arabia. The Arabs, were born in a harsh land of sand and scrub interspersed with small water holes called oasis. The land was hot with searing winds in summer and it bred a harsh wild people, the Arabs. The principal sources of livelihood were herding, trading and raiding. Besides keeping herds of camels and goats and later horses, the Arabs also became intrepid sailors. Their main vessel for sailing was the dhow, a large boat, with which the adventurous Arabs sailed west along the coast of Africa, and east along the coast of Arabia, and then south along the west coast of India, till they rounded Cape Comorin, from where they set out across the Bay of Bengal and reached the coast of what is now Indonesia, Malaya and further east the Spice Islands and the Philippines. Their religion reflected their tribal nature. Gods and Goddesses served as protectors of individual tribes. Mecca, the leading trade centre came to be situated at the crossroads of the trade of merchandise from the east to be ferried to the west. It possessed a central shrine of the Gods and Goddesses called the Kaaba, a cube shaped building that housed 360 idols of tribal patron deities and was the site of a great annual pilgrimage and fair.¹ The main trade was in spices for which there was great demand from the European countries. Spices purchased from as far away as the west coast of India from what is now Kerala were brought by dhows to Jeddah, a bustling port on the southern tip of Arabia. From here caravans carried the precious spices across Arabia to the Levant and the Mediterranean coast and thence to Italy.

Early Days. Into this world of might and strength was born Muhammad ibn Abdullah into a poor family. He grew up to be a man of reflective nature. He worked as a steward for a fairly rich Arab woman who owned a caravan that used to carry spices and other cargo from Jeddah, the port where these goods were landed from dhows. The caravan from Jeddah would move to Mecca where Muhammad's wife Khadija lived and go beyond to the north from where the precious cargo was transshipped to other caravans. In Mecca, the Umayyad clan of Arabs controlled the Kaaba and the annual pilgrimage, where thousands of Arabs from all over Arabia would gather for a month of rituals and worship at the Kaaba. This annual pilgrimage was a source of wealth for the Umayyad clan that controlled the Kaaba. Muhammad after some years began to become more and more reflective and finally started meditating in isolation at a nearby hill. There were some Arabs who believed that there was only one God. They did not express their opinion for fear of getting the wrath of the Umayyad clan in Mecca. It is believed that the hours spent in meditation by Muhammad led to a revelation from an angel that there was only one God. Muhammad then began to preach about his revelation and collected a small group of followers. Meanwhile this attracted the wrath of the Umayyad clan leaders, for their income from the annual pilgrimage to the Kaaba was great and they attacked Muhammad and his small band of followers. Muhammad had to flee for his life to Medina. From there he continued to preach and slowly began to get a larger following. He took the help of the Jews and Christians who lived there and finally organised an army and challenged and defeated the Umayyad clan and cleansed the Kaaba of all idols. The year Muhammad fled to Medina is considered the date of the foundation of Islam. Muhammad then began to consolidate his new religious following and by the year 632 AD when he died all Arabia was consolidated under the banner of Islam. Muhammad during the short period of his rule was the military, political, administrative and religious head of his land and of the new religion of Islam. This was a very important factor, for this is often quoted by the religious revival movements in Islam like the Wahabi and the Ahle Hadith movement that came about later.

The death of Muhammad brought about the first major change in Islam. Two groups formed after the death of Muhammad. The first said that the successor of Muhammad, later to be called the Caliph, must be selected from the best available leaders. The second disagreed and said that the successor must be from the descendants of the Prophet. The first group came to be called the Sunni and the second the Shii. The first four Caliphs were not from the Prophet's family. The fifth was Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet. His son, Hussain revolted against the fourth Caliph, Uthman in 680 AD. He was killed by the Umayyads at Karbala. Ali and his other son Hassan were also killed and this provided the martyrdom of suffering and protest that has guided Shii Islam. Sunni Islam came to place final religious authority for interpreting Islam in the consensus of the community. In Shii Islam, the Imam was the direct descendent of the Prophet and was both the political and religious leader.

The Sunni Shia split led to the Umayyad and Abbasid empires from 662 to 1258 AD. A vast empire was created during this period with capitals in Medina, Kufa, Damascus and Baghdad. Stunning political successes were complemented by a cultural florescence in theology, law, philosophy, literature, medicine, mathematics and art. It is important to note that the Dhimmis or non Muslims were third in the social order, but were never made slaves in early Islam.² The Umayyad conquered the whole of Persia and the Byzantine Empire and moved the capital to Damascus. Then they captured the Maghreb, Spain and Portugal and marched across Europe until they were stopped in France in the Battle of Tours in 732 AD. It is interesting to note here of an extremist offshoot of the Arabs that originated at the time of the Caliphs, Uthman and Ali-the Kharijites. They were pious believers who interpreted the Quran of the Sunna of the Prophet literally and absolutely. Acts were either good or bad, permitted or forbidden, believers and non-believers, Muslim followers of God and non-Muslim enemies of God. They were the forerunners of the Wahabi sect from Saudi Arabia, the fanatical Taliban and the Al Qaeda. By the Eighth century, the Abbasid Empire had by excessive wealth and corruption led to a life of luxury and easy living. This resulted in the growth of two Islamic movements - the Ulema, religious scholars and the Sufis, religious mystics. By the Eighth century, the Umayyad Empire fell and Abu al Abbas was proclaimed the Caliph. The Abbasids came to power under the banner of Islam and became the patrons of the emerging religious class, the Ulema. The development of Islamic law, the Sharia was their great contribution. By the eighth century, the Ulema had become a professional elite - the jurists and theologians in Muslim society and guardians of Islamic law. The strict and rigid interpretation of Islamic law by the Ulema led to a reaction with an expansion of the Sufi way of life. Conflicts arose between the Ulema and the Sufis that have continued till the present day. The vision of Muslim life as the observance of God's law did not coincide comfortably with the Sufi emphasis on the interior path of contemplation.

Islam and the West. Despite their common monotheistic roots the history of Christianity and Islam has been marked

by confrontation. For the Christian west, Islam is a religion of the sword. Muslim armies overran the Christian states of Spain and the Mediterranean from Sicily to Anatolia. Islam rejected the doctrine of Christ's divinity. The reaction of Christianity was hostile. Muhammad was identified as an Anti Christ. Islam was dismissed as a religion of the sword led by an infidel, driven by a lust for power and women. By the 11th century, Christendom's response took two forms – reconquering Spain (756-1492), Italy and Sicily (1061) and the Holy Wars – Crusades (1095-1453). When the Christian armies captured Jerusalem, they butchered the Muslim civilians – men, women and children, forgetting that when the Arab armies captured Jerusalem in 638 AD, churches and the Christian civilians were left unmolested. The contrast between the behaviour of the Christian and Muslim armies in the first Crusade has been deeply etched in the collective memory of the Muslims. In 1099, when the Crusaders stormed Jerusalem, they did not leave any Muslim survivors. Women and children were massacred. In 1187, Salah-al-Din recaptured Jerusalem. Again it was the Muslim army that was magnanimous. Civilians were spared and Churches and Shrines were left untouched.

By the 13th century, the Abbasid Empire was a sprawling, fragmented, deteriorating Commonwealth of semi autonomous states. Then Baghdad was conquered by an emerging power, the Mongols. Pouring out of Central Asia, the armies of Genghis Khan subjugated much of Central Asia, China and Russia. In 1258, the Mongol army under Hulagu pillaged Baghdad, slaughtered its Muslim inhabitants and executed the Caliph. But by the 15th century, the Mongols had been absorbed in Islam and Muslim fortunes were reversed. Muslim power again peaked. By the 16th century three major Muslim empires emerged – the Ottoman Turkish Empire in Istanbul, the Persian Safavid Empire ruled from Isfahan and the Mughal Empire in Delhi.³ This was the final peak of the Muslim world. After this it was a continuous slide downhill and this brought about a revolutionary line of thought that give Islam its diabolical twist.

This is again rooted in the past. From the earliest time Islam possessed a tradition of revival and reform. Islam was quick to react to any compromise of faith and practice. The reaction to Sufism, the development of the Ulama and Islamic law are based on the concept of renewal (tajdid) and reform (islah) that is in turn rooted in the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. One of the first reformers, who harked back to the period of the Prophet as the purest form of Islam was Ibn Taimiyya (1328). Then came Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahab (1703-92). They were both appalled by the veneration of the tombs and their Saints. They reacted against Sufi practice. The purpose of ijtihad of Abdul Wahab was a return to a purified Islam.

The Rise of the Islamists and the Concept of *jihad*

The descent of Muslim fortunes started with the West's penetration into the hub of Islam, the area between Morocco and Indonesia. The process started with the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt in 1789. Then came the Russian wars with Turkey and the conquest of Central Asia in the 19th century, followed by the collapse of the Turkish Empire and occupation by Britain and the ensuing redrawing of the Middle East by the Imperialist powers, motivated by their quest for oil. This experience has been a trauma from which the Muslim world has yet to recover. It is this that has led to the primacy of redefining jihad in the Muslim lexicon. In the aftermath of World War I and the Russian Revolution, the Western powers carved up the Muslim world into new State like entities that had nothing to do with the character and aspirations of the indigenous people, but also imposed new and ruling elites – whether Royal families, propped by the Western colonial or Communist elites propped up by the Soviets. In the aftermath of World War II the various Muslim States experimented with the ideologies and legitimisation strategies borrowed from the east and west – all of which led to the establishment of oppressive military dictatorships that abused their countries and oppressed their peoples in the name of the quest for glory, modernisation and military might. The biggest shock was the creation of Israel as a homeland for the Jews, dispossessing thousands of Palestinian Arabs condemning them to refugee camps for decades. The Islamist leaders were fully aware of the disparity in power between their nascent movements and the groups pitted against them, ranging from the Arab military dictatorships to the enemies of the Arabs, such as Israel and the Western States. As a result leading Islamist theorists sought alternative methods for waging jihad.⁴

The first of these theorists was Hassan al Banna (1906-49), who established the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. He rejected Nationalism and European inspired legal codes. He regarded these as un-Islamic and a threat to Islamic identity and called instead for an Islamic State to be governed by the Sharia. He blamed Western Imperialism for the ills of Muslim society and said that it was incumbent for all Muslim societies to repel invaders of Muslim lands. Another theorist who came to similar conclusions was Maulana Maudoodi who founded the Jamaat-e-Islami in Punjab of undivided India in 1941. Maudoodi initially refused to accept the creation of Pakistan, believing in the universality of the Umma. He felt that the decline of the Muslim rule in South Asia and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire were the product of British and French colonialism. When Pakistan became a reality, he moved to Pakistan.

Three schools developed in India that had a parallel thinking. The first was the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), founded at Deoband in Uttar Pradesh at the beginning of the century. When Pakistan was founded, a branch went there as the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), that later spawned the Taliban. The second fundamentalist group was the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) founded in Nizamuddin, Delhi in 1927. The third and the most rigid was the Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith (JAH), also founded in Delhi in 1912. Its branch in Pakistan inspired the most virulent jihadi group in the Islamic world-the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET). It's headquarter located at Muridke near Lahore is called the Markaz-e-Dawa-wal-Irshad. Incidentally this complex was financed by Abdullah Azam and Osama bin Laden, who later formed the Al Qaeda.

Yet another reformer was Syed Qutub who from within the Islamic Brotherhood gave an intolerant twist earning him the title of being the godfather and master of Islamic radicalism. He had modern education, but on a visit to the west was appalled by materialism, sexual promiscuity and racism of the west. He returned and joined the Muslim Brotherhood. He equated the pre-Islamic Arabian society Jahilliyah with modern western society. He felt that jihad was the only way to implement the new Islamic order. In October 1968 Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra of the Cairo Al Azhar University defined the essence of jihad under contemporary conditions. Jihad is not confined to the summons of troops and the establishment of huge forces. From all the territories of Islam there should arise a group of people, reinforced with faith, well equipped with means and methods and set out to attack the usurpers? Jihad will never end. It will last to the day of judgement. The definition of a perpetual jihad against superior forces constitutes a tenet of contemporary Islamic terrorism.⁵ The crisis reached its first boiling point in the mid-seventies when the Muslim world empowered by the new petro dollar wealth was exposed to western civilisation as never before – graduate studies in the west, leisure

travel and television. The shock was immense. Leading intellectuals who had studied in the west concluded that the personal liberties and materialism that they had experienced in the west constituted a mortal threat to traditional Islamic society that is regimented and bound by strict codes of behaviour. The Islam of Ibn Taimiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahab stipulated that the Sharia, the law governing mankind was of divine origin and was to be interpreted only by the learned and the pious, who rule the believers as spiritual leaders and guides. In contrast the essence of western democracy lies in the citizenry who elect a few of their own to legislate for them and govern them in accordance with humanly exacted laws.

The Islamists are convinced that this deviation of western society from the Islamic divine order of authority is the root cause of its social malaise. The Islamists' criticism of the American way of life has been scathing. Majid Anaraki who lived for several years in California described the United States (US) as a collection of casinos, supermarkets and whore houses linked together by endless highways passing through nowhere, all dominated and motivated by the lust for money. The Islamists were determined to ensure that this malaise would not penetrate and destroy the Muslim world. All means including the use of violence and terrorism were justified to prevent such corruption. The Muslims, however, could not separate their world, the hub of Islam from the west. The development of their oil reserves required western technology. Muslims drove cars made in the west, used western telephones and ate western imported food, while watching western television. Meanwhile their leaders protected their dictatorial governments using arms purchased from the west. This stark contradiction first burst into the open as a strategic political development in Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Iran.⁶

Fully aware of the might and accelerating spread of western powers, the Islamists sought an indirect form of confrontation with the west. They defined a form of total war in which the Muslim world's inferiority in technology and military power would not affect the outcome of jihad. Brigadier SK Malik of the Pakistan Army formulated this strategy in his country in 1979 in 'The Quranic Concept of War'. The Quranic way of war, is infinitely supreme, because in Islam war is fought for the cause of Allah and, therefore, all means and forms are justified and righteous. Terrorism is the quintessence of the Islamic concept of war.

Two developments set the framework for the growth and fruition of Islamic fundamentalism - the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini led to the first wave of suicide bombers by the Hizbollah in Lebanon. The invasion of Afghanistan led to the creation of the jihad against the Russian Army by the soldiers of Islam, selected from the hub of Islam, extending from Morocco to the Philippines, directed by the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and by a quirk of chance financed and masterminded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US. The Afghan jihad led to the creation of the Al Qaeda and a series of bombings against western targets mainly of the US that culminated in the suicide bombing of the World Trade Centre's twin towers.

The crux of the crusade of the Islamists is what Ayatollah Khomeini never tired of repeating, that the Prophet Muhammad was the spiritual, political and military head of the Muslims when the religion was established and all Arabia came under his control. It is this idea that is behind the establishment of Islamic Governments in the Muslim countries. For the Islamists, the concept of a secular Muslim state is impossible. The division of the world into two mutually exclusive camps - the city of war, Dar al Harb and the city of faith Dar al-Iman lie at the heart of Islam's traditional view of existence. Places where Islam rules supreme and its laws are strictly obeyed are known as the Dar al-Iman. The rest of the world is signified as the Dar al Harb.⁷

There are five kinds of terrorist movements. The first is national. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the various Kurdish insurgent groups fall into this category. In the second category are a whole group of urban guerilla groups, like the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader Meinhof gang in Germany, who unable to appeal to any important sections of society are drawn into a form of political gang warfare with the Police. The third are groups like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. They are old style guerillas, influenced by Marxism-Leninism, but deeply nationalistic. The fourth type is publicity seeking, aimed at focussing on particular attention on particular grievances or causes. The series of hijackings without causing harm to the hostages by the Peoples Front for the Liberation of Palestine is an example of this. The fifth form, Islamic Terrorism has deep roots. Its object is to create an universal Islamic State. The world as it is today is how the infidels shaped it, wrote the late Ayatollah Baqer al Sadr. We have two choices - accept it, that means letting Islam die or to destroy it so that we can construct the world as Islam requires. Another leading theoretician of fundamentalism, Mustafa Chamran wrote, "To us the East is like the West, both are enemies. Communism is as much an enemy as is liberalism, socialism and democracy. We are fighting within the rules of the world as it exists today. We reject all these rules."⁸

For a while Khomeini's revolution in Iran and the coup in Sudan that led to the establishment of a fundamentalist regime there directed by Hassan al Turabi were triumphs for the Islamists. So was the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan and the later collapse of the Soviet Union and the reestablishment of the six Central Asian States. Then came the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq. The west once again demonstrated its immense technological supremacy. The most humiliating occurrence however was the Saudi Royal family, custodian of Islam's holiest shrine in Mecca inviting forces of the US and other western countries to their desert kingdom to fight a sister Arab nation -Iraq. It was a humiliation that still haunts the Muslim and Arab world. Osama bin Laden, a Saudi citizen had voluntarily gone to Afghanistan when the Soviet troops entered that country to help organise the jihad against the Russian army. He turned against his own country, when his pleas not to allow garrisoning of troops from the US were not heeded by his government. By now the direction of Islamic jihad had become clear. On the one side was the US and the European countries, technologically superior and exploiting the Middle Eastern Arab Muslim countries for their oil. On the other side were countries like India where the Muslims had ruled for several hundred years but were now under non-Muslim rule. The Afghan jihad had seen volunteers from the hub of Islam extending from Morocco to Indonesia and the Philippines sending their holy warriors for training to Afghanistan.

The Pakistan ISI who masterminded the training diverted the Islamic fighters to Kashmir, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. The Government of India played into the hands of Pakistan by years of misrule in Kashmir that led to an insurgency by Kashmiri separatists in 1987-89. The young men of Kashmir who crossed the border into Pakistan

in droves were welcomed by the Pakistan Army, who equipped them with arms and trained them in guerilla warfare and re-infiltrated them into Kashmir. Pakistan soon realised that the Kashmiris who were mainly Sufis did not have the mettle to fight an insurgency. So they sent the battle hardened jihadis of the Hizb-e-Islami, a terrorist group of the Jamiat-e-Islami into the Kashmir valley in 1992. This gave an entirely new face to the insurgency in Kashmir. The Hizb-e-Islami were soon followed by the tanzim of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)-the Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI), who had also fought in Afghanistan. The third group to join the jihad in Kashmir was the tanzim of the Ahle Hadith, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the most extreme of the jihadis, patterned on the line of the Kharijites, who killed Ali, the fifth Caliph. They are totally non-compromising and believe firmly that Islam has no international borders and Islam will rule the world. Their objective is to see that two new Pakistans are established one in North India and the other in South India.

At this point a note must be made about how the Muslims lost their Caliphate in India. After Islam was established in the Middle East, it expanded to the north, west and the east. Islam came to India in the Eighth century with the sword. The invading Muslim armies easily defeated the Hindu kings by dividing them and established their rule all over North India. Initially the rulers were Afghans, followed by the Turks. The Afghan rulers were pushed east by the Turkish kings. It was the Afghan kings who converted the people of Bengal to Islam. The Muslim rulers did not penetrate far into South India or into Assam. The trouble rose for the Islamic rulers when the British came trading into India in the 17th century.

The British came first as the East India Company. They soon set-up an administration in the states that they controlled like Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the Northeast of India. Meanwhile in North India and in the other states where Muslim rulers ruled, like for instance in the Deccan in Hyderabad, the language of administration was in a language called Urdu, a hybrid of Arabic and Hindi. In 1857, the Hindu and Muslim soldiers of the British rulers mutinied. The Sikhs and Gurkha soldiers of the British Army sided with the British and the mutiny was quelled. After the situation was brought under control, the British Government took over the administration from the East India Company and shifted the Capital from Calcutta to Delhi. They also changed the language of administration from Urdu to English. This was a death knell for the Muslim population, who never picked up the new language of administration and who were increasingly replaced by Hindus and some Christians. From this point the condition of the Muslim people steadily declined, while the fortunes of the Hindus rose. This is why the Islamists always talk of the three Caliphates, one in Baghdad – Sunni, one in Isfahan – Shia and the third in Delhi – Sunni. This is why the Muslims of undivided India said that India should not be divided into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan and this is why the Lashkar-e-Taiba speaks of re-establishing the third Caliphate in India.

A wave of fundamentalism swept the world after Khomeini's revolution and the Afghan jihad swept across the Islamic world. South East Asian countries with Muslim populations-Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Bangladesh were affected. Muslim migrants settled in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada were also affected. One country that did a lot of damage in this connection was Saudi Arabia, which had adopted the teachings of Abdul Wahab. Saudi Arabia exported the Wahabi teachings along with financial aid to a number of South East Asian countries.

The Islamist's Threat to India's Security

What does all this mean to India's security? Pakistan's Army and the ISI may be focussed on Kashmir, but the Islamist's view goes much beyond. We have a Muslim population more than the population of Pakistan and our politicians have not handled them correctly. Firstly, many of our political parties have wooed the Indian Muslims for the sake of their votes and acquiesced with many demands of their fundamentalist teachers. This has seriously damaged/undermined the security situation. One of the most serious situations created by the party in power in Delhi in 1972 was to tamper with the cut-off date that had been enshrined in the Indian Citizenship Act, illegally as a result of which more than fifty lakhs of illegal Bangladeshi settlers were given citizenship in the Northeast of India.

Subsequent to this two serious incidents, the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the Gujarat communal riots of 2001 have seriously damaged the confidence of the Muslim population in India. Both incidents could have been prevented by firm action on the part of the Government. One must also not put the blame only on the political leadership. The weak bureaucracy has to take a major share of the blame for both the transactions. The sequel to both these incidents, particularly the pogrom of Gujarat has led to serious repercussions by the Islamists. Hundreds of young Muslim boys from Gujarat have gone to Pakistan via Dubai. They have been trained by fundamentalist groups there and returned to India. Bombs have been set off in different places in India in revengeful actions. Several fundamentalist groups have sprung up like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Popular Front of India, a militant group in Kerala. Today a large section of the Muslims in India are rebellious and resentful because of the two major incidents mentioned above.

The growth of Islamists in India has manifested in the form of numerous 'escape attacks', and not through suicide bombings. This predilection for martyrdom is inbuilt in the psyche of Islam. While operating in Kashmir in 1993-95, during several operations cadres of the Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI) or the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) were cornered in houses during cordon and search operations. On every such occasion, the trapped cadres refused to surrender, when called on the loud hailer to do so. They would shout back that they will die as martyrs. On rare occasions, when HUJI and HUA cadres were either caught, or when they were injured in encounters and escorted by their cadres without arms for treatment to hospitals; during interrogation, they would invariably reply that their mullahs had briefed them that if they died as martyrs, 72 houris (angels) would be awaiting them in jannat (paradise)! In fact in Shii theology it has been mentioned that all people who die have to appear for an inquisition before two angels-Monkir and Nakir to answer for their sins. However, those who die as martyrs in the fight to safeguard Islam are exempted from the inquisition and are taken to paradise directly!

From 1999, the Lashkar-e-Taiba started a series of 'no escape' attacks in Kashmir. Later, in Rajouri and Jammu they inflicted dozens of casualties on the Security Forces. Between 1999 and 2004, there were almost a hundred such attacks. The Jaish-e-Muhammad (JEM) executed a few such 'no escape' attacks outside Kashmir. There were three such attacks; on the Red Fort and Parliament House in Delhi, and the Akshardam Temple in Ahmedabad.

The worst 'no escape' attack of the Lashkar-e-Taiba was the attack on 26/11 in Mumbai, when a ISI trained suicide squad penetrated the coastal defence, entered Mumbai city and killed more than a hundred people brutally and mercilessly before being eliminated. It was sheer luck that one of the group (Kasab) was arrested and he narrated the whole plan, which was later substantiated by other sources also.

With the war in Afghanistan, the situation in Pakistan has deteriorated further. During the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan, more than 3 million refugees in Afghanistan (most of them Pashtuns from South and East Afghanistan) sought shelter in Pakistan. While the adults were kept in refugee camps, the children were admitted to madrassas run by the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). By the time the Russians left Afghanistan, the talibs in the JUI madrassas had grown up to be young men. They had been imbued with the extremist philosophy of the JUI and also trained in guerilla warfare in the madrassas. After the Russians left, Afghanistan was divided among the different war lords and soon lapsed into anarchy. It was then that the talibs from the JUI madrassas were organised as the Taliban by Pashtun leaders ably guided by Pakistan's ISI, under the active guidance of the Pakistan Army. Soon, thereafter, under the leadership of a Pashtun leader called Mullah Omar the Taliban were organised into a mobile army by the ISI and captured different regions of Afghanistan. The advance of the Pashtun Taliban to Kabul was stopped by Masud, a Tadjhik Afghan who along with Burhanuddin Rabbani also a Tadjhik, but from the Jammata-e-Islami. The internecine war continued till the Taliban won over some allies of Masud and his forces had to retreat to the Central Asian States.

The Afghan war also spawned an extremist organisation called the Al Qaeda. It was started by an Yemeni Arab from Saudi Arabia, called Osama bin Laden, who along with Abdullah Azam, an Egyptian from the Muslim Brotherhood, had set up camps for all the volunteers who fought the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda organised a group that planned and executed the diabolical suicide attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 9 November 2001 by two passenger planes that were hijacked by them. In retaliation, the US attacked Afghanistan which was being held by the Taliban and was reportedly sheltering Osama bin Laden. The initial attack by the US was purely from the air. The Taliban were simply bombed out from Afghanistan. At that time each Taliban unit was supported by an element of Pakistan ISI. While many such units crossed over from Afghanistan into Baluchistan through the Bolan pass along with Taliban groups, many others crossed over into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and yet others into the North West Frontier Province. General Musharraf, the Pakistan President, even arranged a special airlift from Kunduz airport in northern Afghanistan, when the US troops were closing in on them. The ISI permitted Mullah Omar and the Taliban to reorganize and rearm in Quetta, Baluchistan. Then they were reinfilitrated into Afghanistan to fight a guerilla war against the US forces. This war has continued till date, with the US forces being joined by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001.

In the process of sheltering the Taliban and reequipping them to fight again in Afghanistan, the Pakistan Army and the ISI have been deeply embroiled. As a byproduct several new Islamist groups have been formed like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, who have been fighting with their own Army, thereby, converting Pakistan into a highly volatile state. The prolonged use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) by the US forces has naturally exacerbated the situation on the ground. Each missile fired by an UAV also inflicts civilian casualties, which the US refers to as collateral damage - implying thereby that the casualties have to be borne by the enemy as an offshoot of the conflict. This has only resulted in hardening the Taliban; and the US is now in an inexplicable situation from which they are not sure how to extricate themselves. The consequences for the World from the battle hardened Taliban and other extremist fundamentalist groups, is unimaginable.

The Islamists in Pakistan have chosen to remain India's enemy forever. The concept of the third Caliphate with its capital at Delhi is imprinted indelibly in their minds. They will therefore continue to try and destabilise India again and again. To combat this, three clear actions are required from the Indian establishment. They are:-

- (a)** All political parties must ensure that they do not treat the Indian Muslims as a vote bank.
- (b)** All Indians must be treated equally.
- (c)** The State should take strong action against all fundamentalist religious elements without discrimination.

This is a tall order, but this has to be carried out with single minded determination.

We also have a serious problem in Bangladesh. It must be remembered that it was in Dacca, in what is now Bangladesh, that the Indian Muslim League was born in 1906. With the spread of fundamentalism in Pakistan, it took root in East Pakistan too. When the Afghan jihad against the Russians commenced, the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh sent its cadres to join the jihad against the Russians. Branches of the Harkat-e-jihad-e-Islami were set-up in Bangladesh. With money coming in from Saudi Arabia, fundamentalist groups like the Jamaatul Mujahideen (JUM), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shadat al Hikma (SH) and the Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh were set-up. There is continual migration of Bengali Muslims from Bangladesh into India, who have tied up with different terrorist groups from Pakistan. They come into India to commit terrorist acts via Bangladesh. Bangladesh is also used as a base for committing terrorist acts in India. We have to be far stricter in sealing the border between India and Bangladesh. At present it is totally porous.

The Awami League the main political party of East Pakistan was not allowed to form the Government in Pakistan after they won a majority in the national elections of 1970, the Pakistan Army organised a crackdown in which the Jamaat-e-Islami party sided with the Pakistan Army. Several thousand Bengali intellectuals were brutally killed by the Pakistan Army aided and abetted by the JEI. Hundreds of Bengali Hindu and Muslim girls were raped, brutally killed and buried in mass graves. When Bangladesh was liberated after the Pakistan Army was defeated and surrendered to the Indian Army and the Awami League formed the Government the JEI leaders fled to Pakistan to escape punishment. Then in 1975, the Bangladesh President Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was killed in a coup by some Army officers. After some instability, General Ziaur Rehman took over as the Martial Law Administrator, and later as the President of Bangladesh. He was a freedom fighter and had crossed over immediately after the Pakistan Army started their crackdown. As

President, however he recalled all the Jamaat leaders who had sided with the Pakistan Army in January 1971. Later the JEI even joined the Government of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

It is only now in 2011 that the Awami League, who won the elections in 2009, have started the trial of all the people of Bangladesh who collaborated with the Pakistan Army. There is a strong group of Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh. They are fanatically against Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, head of the Awami League and the present Prime Minister. We have to wait and watch if Sheikh Hasina succeeds in her mission of keeping Bangladesh as a moderate Islamic country. If she fails, India will again be a target of Islamic fundamentalists from Bangladesh. The Harkat-e-Jihad-ul-Islami (HUJI) Bangladesh has a strength of 15,000 headed by Shaukat Usman and Sheikh Farid. They used to refer themselves as the Bangladesh Taliban. The Islamists in Bangladesh had sponsored the formation of several Islamic groups in Assam.

Conclusion

With the history of Kashmir behind us, India has to forever live with the machinations of Pakistan. We will in any case face hostility from the leaders of the Islamists in Saudi Arabia, Iran and major Muslim countries. With a sizeable Muslim population, we can expect problems from Islamist leaders in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan of course; and maybe Bangladesh if the moderates lose out there. We hope that our Governments will pay heed to the three suggestions suggested above to keep the Muslims moderate and contributing citizens of this country.

As for Pakistan, it is of interest that when General Musharraf had declared an unilateral ceasefire in 2004, infiltration from across the Line of Control had trickled down and completely stopped. It is of interest that after the last elections in Pakistan, the Prime Minister Mr Gilani made a statement that they were very much with the people of Kashmir. Within a week of this statement, the first infiltration in five years took place. Since then infiltration has continued in a trickle. The prognosis for the summer of 2011 is that the trickle will steadily build-up and we can expect quite a bit of trouble in Kashmir. It is going to be a very warm summer for the Security forces.

Our policy on the borders of Bangladesh is very wrong. We must see that all the villages that are located right on the border are resited and the fencing constructed 100 metres behind the zero line as on the western border. This will curb routine smuggling and relieve a lot of tension on the eastern borders. With the border fence a clear 100 metres behind the international border and no habitation between the border fence and the international border and only the BSF patrolling this band of a 100 metres, smuggling will dry up on this porous border. This will also put a stop to infiltration of Bangladeshi people, which is a continuous stream at present. This will also insulate us from the fundamentalist groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami, the HUJI Bangladesh, the Shadat-e-Hikma and the Ahle Hadith Andolan. We should also hope that Sheikh Hasina will be able to complete the trials of all the accomplices of the Pakistan Army's carnage during the freedom struggle in 1971-72. Also, that the Supreme Court will be able to pass a favourable judgement on the issue of whether the Mullahs will retain the power to punish rural women through fatwas and the rural system of Salish.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLI, No. 584, April-June 2011.