

“The 26/11 attacks on India were planned and organised in one country, where the attackers were trained, the logistics and communications support chain extended over at least seven countries, and the attack was carried out in our country”.

- Mr Shiv Shanker Menon,

India's National Security Adviser

Introduction

Transnational terrorism remains the defining security paradigm of the post modern era. Globally there were 11,000 terrorist attacks in 83 countries with over 58,000 victims and 15,000 fatalities in 2009.² Almost 90 groups were associated with these attacks with Taliban and Al-Shabaab posing the biggest challenge. India too has been impacted by spread of violence on the periphery as well as within over the years. India's response to terrorism has improved considerably from the ignominy of incidents in 2008; which started on New Years Day and ended with the complex terror attack in Mumbai on 26 November, commonly referred to as 26/11. The transnational significance of this strike is evident with many groups now replicating such attacks across the World.

While 2009 was the first terror free year in the Indian hinterland, two attacks in Pune and another in Bangalore [till August 2010], underline that the road ahead continues to be challenging. Moreover, with an extremely unstable political as well as security situation across India's western borders, state philosophy of support to terrorism and transnational terrorist groups from neighbours, there is a need for continued vigilance. The challenges of transnational terrorism have become diverse ranging from surrogate criminal organisations, financial networks and information and cyber war. These manifestations have been denoted by the, 'Karachi Project,' and emergence of the Headley-Rana duo's links with diverse intelligence agencies. Evolution of the Indian Mujahideen and right wing extremism are other trends that denote new transnational challenges that India will have to face in the years ahead. On the other hand, capacity building remains a, 'work in progress,' as the Home Minister, Mr P Chidambaram publicly acknowledges from time to time.³ A review of the transnational terrorism challenges faced by India and possible responses is therefore necessary.

Transnational Terrorism – Challenges

South Asia with India at its centre remains challenged by multiple forms of terrorism. Some writers as David C Rapoport and Paul J Smith refer to these as waves to include anarchism, separatism, left wing and religious extremism. The first identified wave is 'anarchism'. The next wave, associated in the past with anti colonialism or nationalism, has today manifested as 'ethnic separatism'.⁵ The 'New Left Terror,' emerged as the next form; first seen globally in the 1970's with an attack by the Black September Organisation at the Munich Olympics, and as the first wave of Naxalism in India, since 1967 – which has sprung even more viciously today. The fourth wave of terrorism is the contemporary phenomenon of 'religious extremism'. The al-Qaeda remains the singular manifestation of this ideology. The level of violence in this wave is unrestrained, 'morally justified' by religious exclusivism associated with such groups. ⁶ Use of terror as a tool by militant groups in an insurgency can also be seen as another sub form in many areas in India. Terrorism in India is increasingly seeing a hybrid of forms; different waves and ideologies are being used to create disorder, which combine cause and effect, seamlessly.

There are a number of factors which support growth of terrorism in modern societies particularly in the context of ongoing developments in South Asia. Large multi ethnic and developing nation states such as India will face the challenge of rebellion by one or more communities who perceive marginalisation.⁷ Rapid growth of population, youth bulge, unemployment, urbanisation, industrialisation and its ill effects, with social, political and economic assemblages competing for the same resources, lead to a need for redistribution of power in society, achieved by some through the gun.

While development is the core agenda there is a time differential between economic change and socio-political satiation, best explained by the Kondratieff cycles which indicate that it takes approximately ten years or more for the socio - political system to adjust to changes brought about by economic growth, thereby, creating uncertainty and instability in society in the interim.

In the external dimension, separatism is a cause fostered and supported through terrorism by antagonist states. The involvement of the state is invariably through intelligence agencies and has multiple firewalls; therefore, making it difficult to trace them directly, except at times when there is grave human error or intelligence agency attempts to overreach itself.

Why Transnational Terror?

Transnational interactions as per Nye and Keohane involve movement of, “tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organisation.”¹⁰ The malign form entails individuals of nationalities other than the home state influencing 'political' activities across borders.¹¹ When governments fail to achieve foreign policy goals through conventional linear diplomatic and other means they resort to terrorism. Thus, when diplomacy, propaganda and psychological war cannot achieve national objectives or international law and organisations are not able to address key grievances and there is near parity in military and nuclear forces as in the case of India and Pakistan, terror can become a tool for the state.¹² This is also denoted as the stability- instability paradox.¹³ Globalisation and informationalisation has provided terrorist groups greater opportunities for effective engagement with their peers across the globe. Of the many catalysts for transnational terrorism, information and free flow of money can be identified as the main contagions.^{14,15} In short, transnational terrorism can be identified as the downside of globalisation.

State Support to Terrorism and Cooperation in South Asia

Weak state formation and national identity in some parts of South Asia creates conditions for support of terrorism by antagonist powers, as SD Muni states, “There is an unavoidable external dimension to the challenge of terrorism in South Asia, primarily due to the integrated nature of the region – unnatural borders, socio-economic contiguities and the cultural identities across these borders – and also because of globalisation which has played a significant role in the spread of terrorism. No internal conflict is truly internal.”

Institutionalising support to terrorism has also been a defining element of some states e.g. Pakistan. Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence's (ISI) anti India activities are now well documented but the influence has spread well across the region. Imtiaz Gul in his book, “The al-Qaeda Connection”¹⁷ writes how the US intelligence agencies, namely the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the State Department, knew of the role of the ISI in virtually, “colonising” Afghanistan but preferred to turn a blind eye.¹⁸ On the other hand, Gul has also provided an account of how the ISI and Director General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh facilitated the activities of Indian terrorist groups in the North East (such as the ULFA) by providing linkages with others such as the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Ealam (LTTE).

There have also been instances of cooperation between the states in combating transnational terrorism. Sri Lanka is a classic case wherein three regional rivals, India, China and Pakistan tacitly cooperated to assist the Sri Lankan government to put down the LTTE during the civil war from 2006 to May 2009. However, each state acted in its own interest. The second case of cooperation in recent times is that of India and Bangladesh. The Awami League led government on coming to power in 2009, adopted a cooperative approach by turning in leaders of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) – they had been harboured in that country for long. The change is based on a larger recognition that it would be in their best interests to cooperate with India.

States thus tend to collaborate when such cooperation is seen as beneficial and a high level of strategic understanding exists.²⁰ A possible matrix based on current status of India's relations with its four neighbours Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar, based on factors such as political relations, border security, type of support to terrorist groups and their capability, and the 'Likelihood of support to Terrorism' is listed in Table

	Political Relations	Border Security	Type of Support	Capability of Terror	State Response to
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				Groups	Counter Terrorism
Pakistan	Strained or Adversarial	Line of Control contested, Coastal Security Weak	Political, diplomatic operational, financial and training	High with multiple groups operating.	Adversarial supports, groups operating in India
Bangladesh	Varied based on the political party in power Generally good when Awami League is in power, weak with Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	Weak, trans-border infiltration is possible.	Low level of political support, some training and sanctuaries.	Low, indigenous HUII while others are groups operating in North East India	Varied based on political party in power
Myanmar	Satisfactory	Weak, sanctuaries to terrorist groups and trans-border movement is possible	Sanctuaries due to poor presence in areas adjoining Indo Myanmar border	High with large number of groups operating in North East India	Poor, effective surveillance of border areas lacking.
Nepal	Varied	Weak, trans-border movement is possible with ease	Provides access, transit, facilitating support operations	Low	Poor, ineffective control of vectors supporting terror.

Table 1 – Matrix of Likelihood of State Support to Terrorism in South Asia

Transnational Counter Terrorism Strategic Construct

India has so far employed four broad strategies to cope with terrorism – use of force, enforcing law and order, political negotiations and socio economic development.²¹ In the global and the regional dimension, Professor Muni has highlighted many strategies ranging from, “sharing of intelligence, military support, joint operations, border management, question of sanctuaries, shelters, refugees, flow of arms, training camps ____ etc”.²² Thus a joint approach bilateral, regional or multilateral is a key requisite to meet the challenge of transnational terrorism. This is particularly important in South Asia where the flow of ideologies, support structures and people are co-joined. Even where operational coordination is limited, other areas such as legal and regulatory pacts and treaties can be worked out. A multi-faceted agreement or a set of agreements are necessary for effective cooperation in say extradition, financial, intelligence and information sharing, migration, border control, travel and trade. Similarly, a regional financial architecture to target money laundering could be evolved.

Where there is state support to terrorism, the USA has a comprehensive set of counter measures which includes ban on arms exports and sales, controls over export of dual use items that can enhance a country’s military capability, proscribing economic assistance and imposing varied financial restrictions from time to time.²³ India could do well to evolve a coordinated well publicised policy highlighting disincentives that would be applied in the future.

Since terrorism is a socio-political issue, trust building between people is also important. This is particularly relevant for India and Pakistan. A recent survey by Pew Research Centre entitled, “Concern about Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan,” states, “Indeed, they (Pakistani citizens) are more worried about the external threat from India than extremist groups within Pakistan. When asked: Who poses the greatest threat to their country — India, the Taliban or al Qaeda? Slightly more than half of Pakistanis (53 per cent) chose India, compared with 23 per cent for the Taliban and just 3 per cent for al-Qaeda”.²⁴ This support is also fostered through transnational political parties as Jamaat-e-Islami.

In the larger perspective for multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies as in India, Professor Rohan Gunaratne highlights the need to avoid the ethnic and political card for short term electoral gains.²⁵ Within this paradigm, counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies will also have to be considered given propensity of religious radicalism in the post modern era.

Intelligence and counter-intelligence will be defining instruments for controlling and combating terrorism.²⁶ Frequently states may be able to prevail over terrorism but are not able to effectively reduce militancy. It is important to reduce the gap between a successful counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaign to ensure that the basic causes are addressed with alacrity because festering sores due to perceived injustice would create grounds for terrorism or other forms of agitation from time to time.

Countering transnational terrorism will also place a premium on harmonisation between various arms of a state and extending the same regionally and globally. For coordination of intelligence and operations a National Counter Terrorism Centre is being planned by the Ministry of Home Affairs in India. This plan appears sound and includes intelligence coordination and dissemination down to districts, improving first responder capability and building capacity of local and central police. Effective implementation of the plan will ensure high degree of internal security assurance though it may take time, up to a decade or so, and there may be some slippages yet it needs to be pursued vigorously.

When all else fails, a state would have to be prepared to go to war, either full scale inter-state war, of the type which was virtually forced upon India in December 2001 after the attack on the Parliament, it could be a ‘localised limited war’ like Kargil War in 1999, a border or a shooting war, or a prolonged phase of hostilities in the ‘No War, No Peace’ (NWNP) mode. Employment of special forces, armed drones, clandestine and covert operations are other hard options envisaged to coerce a state or a non-state actor to give up the path of terrorism.

There is a justified moral debate over employment of covert options by states, in as much as targeting terrorist groups and violent non state actors are concerned. this will bear the scrutiny of ethical logic, where all precautions to avoid collateral damage have to be taken and should not be confused with fostering militancy in other states which cannot be justified.

Employment of these tools by a state after a terrorist attack would largely depend on fatalities suffered and a state’s capacity to exercise the given option. With a major terrorist attack, as on 9/11, the USA went to war which was facilitated by their capability to do so, far away from the mainland. India on the other hand, chose political and diplomatic tools after 26/11, where the number of fatalities was below 200. A possible matrix of options that a state may use when faced with a transnational terrorist attack based on intensity of strike in terms of fatalities could be evolved as indicated in Table 2. Special Forces and intelligence operations can be employed against non-state actors as well. However, a declared capability and the ‘will’ to act is necessary.

Option	Intensity of Terrorist Strike		
	High	Medium	Low

	(> 500 fatalities)	(>200 fatalities)	(>200 fatalities)
Politico	√	√	√
Diplomatic	√	√	√
Economic	√	√	√
Inter State War	√	-	-
Border War	-	√	√
Shooting War	-	√	√
Localised Limited War	√	√	-
NWNP	-	√	√
Special Forces/Drone Operations	√	√	√
Clandestine	√	√	√
Covert	√	√	√

Table 2 - Possible Options, Post Terror Attack

Conclusion

In conclusion, it could be said that India remains challenged by transnational terrorism in many dimensions. The state response so far has not been very effectual. However, post 26/11 a plan is in place which when fully operational will considerably enhance internal security. As has been brought out this will be an action oriented rather than rhetorical regional endeavour by building a cooperative security structure with commitment to comprehensive approach. India's commitment to adopt a plural and multi ethnic society based on equity and equality has to be supplemented by accountable and participative structures of governance at all levels from the grass roots to national level. Also, there is an urgent need to establish multi-disciplinary mechanisms for countering transnational terror. Such mechanisms must be supported by efforts of the political, diplomatic, social, economic, information and security establishments. Yet when all else fails, the country will have to be prepared to use military force with a well calibrated response, while retaining control of the situation at every stage of the crisis. This will require capacities to be built up and complete synergy in politico-diplomatic-military fields.

* This article is based on the text of a talk delivered on the subject at USI on 25 Aug 2010.

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The article traces the considerations that are shaping India's policy for peaceful nuclear use. The article also delves into the security calculus, and the national interests that drive the country's endeavour to continue to make a bid for universal nuclear disarmament.

Introduction

As a state's material power and wealth increase, so does its interest in shaping its strategic environment. Its increased interests in its near neighbourhood and in its extended strategic realm take the shape of bilateral, multilateral and collective security arrangements. But before such security collectives can be worked out, a nation's stand on certain issues of international concern must be properly delineated. In the present scenario, nuclear proliferation is second only to terrorism as an issue of concern on the global scale.

In fact, the recently concluded 2010 NPT Review Conference has brought the issue of nuclear proliferation back into the foreground. Although India's relationship with the NPT itself is fraught with controversy, India's relationship with nuclear proliferation and the call for universal disarmament go back a long way. The Indian argument has always been that the distinction made by the NPT between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) is insufficient in addressing India's position as a state with known nuclear weapon technology. For the foreseeable future, as a non-signatory of the NPT, India's status as a NWS remains elusive. While the classification of India's strategic programmes might be disputed, India remains one of the most important rising powers with nuclear power capabilities.

Indeed, as the dominant regional power of South Asia and as an increasingly important global player, India is likely to be called upon in the near future to take on an important role in the realm of nuclear politics. In this context, India's views on nuclear proliferation and on nuclear disarmament are increasingly crucial. Given the unique nature of India's nuclear power status, it is important to further refine her stance on these issues. Often, India's stand is cloaked in opaqueness for no particular reason. This paper attempts to demystify the Indian view of nuclear proliferation and disarmament.

Historical Background

In 1953 the first Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) calling for a "standstill agreement" on all nuclear testing. India believed that this would be a precursor to achieving universal nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the polemics of the Cold War prevented the realisation of this resolution.

It was only in 1996, long after the end of the Cold War, that a draft of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally voted on in the UNGA and received overwhelming support. However, domestic compulsions and other considerations of some nations prevented the CTBT from gaining universal approval.¹

India's Relationship with Nuclear Proliferation

The changing global order has affected the non-proliferation regime in many ways. The NPT has been the most affected part of that regime. Indeed, the fruition of the Indo-US nuclear deal was symptomatic of the winds of change that now beset the non-proliferation agenda. In many ways, the deal was a harbinger of forward-looking changes to the regime itself. When the deal was first announced, it met with intense debate and unrestrained criticism. Arms control organizations decried the deal, despairing at American double standards and Indian opportunism. The non-proliferation community tried every argument to play out the failings and the dangers of the deal. However, the deal went full steam ahead and intense political campaigning brought it to culmination.²

But the deal has opened up a Pandora's Box of questions. The non-proliferation regime has come under close scrutiny and many of its faults will remain open to public debate long after the days of the deal. Will the regime be jettisoned for a more efficient framework? Will it remain the basic structure of counter-proliferation and be supplemented by additional arrangements for non-members? Whichever path is chosen, the non-proliferation regime has had to undergo severe revision. The effects of this were visible in the scepticism faced by the 2010 Review Conference. India has been at the heart of it all, having plunged the US into an unprecedented course of action that has changed the non-proliferation landscape forever.

At the same time, domestic debate about the deal and about India's nuclear ambitions soared. A healthy and robust public discussion about the political, scientific, energy-related and economic consequences of the deal is still under way. As a watershed in India's non-proliferation history, the Indo-US nuclear deal is unparalleled. Not only were India's credentials in the matter open to widespread scrutiny outside of India, but also within India there were many factions opposed to the deal (some of them still do not toe the line) and it became quite clear how democratic the process was going to be. In fact, the parliament was itself deeply divided on the issue and for the first time in long years, the balance of power within the country shifted on account of a foreign policy issue.

But proponents of the deal within and outside the country argued that India was a "responsible power" which only needed this deal to facilitate its projects on nuclear energy for peaceful use. In an energy-deficient country like India with an exponentially growing energy demand, this is a valid argument. It is also an argument that finally tilted the balance in favour of the deal. India insists that its proliferation record boasted of vertical proliferation for peaceful purposes and of no horizontal proliferation activities. As a "clean" country, it has no parallel in the region which also hosts China and Pakistan. India asserts that even as a non-signatory of the NPT, it has always adhered to two out of the three main pillars of the treaty – a curb on proliferation and the movement towards disarmament. It is now demanding the third pillar – the right to the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In the past, India's civilian nuclear energy programmes that generate power for peaceful purposes have been severely limited by the non-availability of nuclear technology. However, the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver entitles India to trade in nuclear fuel and technology for peaceful uses. This waiver is viewed as an immensely important development that recognizes the rights that India has despite being a NPT outsider. Although allegations and counter-allegations followed on the issue of India's proliferation record, it is on the whole clear that India is a responsible nuclear power with aspirations to energy sufficiency.

Additionally, the claim to non-proliferation was further assuaged by the Indian acceptance of IAEA safeguards on its facilities. Under the terms of the Indo-US nuclear deal, all the facilities being supplied with nuclear fuel and/or technology from the US were to be placed under IAEA safeguards that would verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thus, it was established by repeated claims and actions that although India was against the NPT, it actively supported and encouraged non-proliferation. While others

saw this as an inherent contradiction, India has always maintained that the NPT and non-proliferation can be mutually exclusive. India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007, "If India has not signed the NPT, it is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider NPT as a flawed treaty and it does not recognise the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment." Nevertheless, some argued that the US-India nuclear deal, in combination with US attempts to deny Iran civilian nuclear fuel-making technology, may destroy the NPT regime, while others contended that such a move would likely bring India, a NPT non-signatory, under closer international scrutiny.

India is not a member of the NPT and technically has no role to play in the treaty. Rather, the NPT is so rigidly structured that there is no scope to accommodate India in the treaty. In fact, with the NSG waiver, India is now in a category of its own, different even from the other three non-signatories, whose strategic programmes do not have the same acceptability. But transparency has never been an issue associated with the Indian nuclear programmes. Since the second round of nuclear testing at Pokhran in 1998, there has been a lull in the momentum towards further testing and a decided shift towards trade in nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. In this scenario, it was ever more important to emphasize India's long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Weapon-Free World: Utopia or Reality?

Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires NPT parties to pursue negotiations on an end to the arms race, nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, in the post post-Cold War situation, this objective has not been achieved and many states still possess a large arsenal of arms while other states are developing their own. Despite being a non-signatory to the NPT, India took the initiative towards nuclear disarmament and proposed the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988, named after late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.³

The Action Plan was introduced by the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the Third Special Session on Nuclear Disarmament of the UN General Assembly in 1988. Marking the tenth anniversary of the plan, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that the Action Plan was a comprehensive exposition of India's approach towards global disarmament. Ten years before the nuclear explosions of Pokhran II shook the world, it is interesting to note how the Nehruvian concepts of 'atoms for peace' and 'global disarmament' simultaneously constituted India's nuclear policy. In fact, Rajiv Gandhi had referred to nuclear deterrence as the "ultimate expression of the philosophy of terrorism". It remains to be seen if the Action Plan can still inspire constructive multilateral initiatives for global nuclear disarmament.

The post-Cold War also brought about a paradigm shift from competitive to cooperative security. As decades of hostilities were replaced with dialogue, the unlikely fallout was the weakening of the movement for global disarmament. No longer threatened by the shadow of a bomb, the momentum for universal disarmament suffered a serious setback. In this scenario, India proposed the Action Plan that on the one hand played with the possibility of a global zero, but equally importantly raised the issue of the "third nuclear wave" and the dangers of the new nuclear environment where the prospects of nuclear violence by non-state actors become more real with each passing day.

The probability of a nuclear weapon-free world and the non-violent world order that will be required to sustain it have always been an issue of deep intrigue in India. Vice President Hamid Ansari has often suggested that the answers lie in investigating the logic of realism, as the current disarmament process is rendered impotent by a political context it cannot change.⁴ As nations live in a system of sovereign states, is it feasible to pursue a goal that is essentially human in nature and does not fit into the Westphalian nation-state-centric framework – "would a higher priority be accorded to the survival of the state if the survival of humanity were at stake?"

In India, we believe that even before the philosophical nuances of nuclear abolition can be further debated, the idea flounders on two basic issues – the desirability of achieving such a state and the feasibility of doing so. The diplomacy of nuclear disarmament requires verification, confidence building and regional restraint. Assuming that the scope for progress in the short term is relatively modest, pragmatic logic places emphasis on the possible, not the desirable. In the post post-Cold War scenario, the contemporary security calculus gives hope for neither. In fact, the workings of the global nuclear industry place so much emphasis on non-proliferation controls and ownership patterns that the call for disarmament does not find its natural place. As a process, disarmament is by nature incremental; is it then so difficult to achieve that it is eventually less desirable? Is that the reason why disarmament seems less and less probable in the near future?

However, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan is in the end consistent with as much as six decades of work inside and outside of the UN to advance the internationally agreed goal of general and complete disarmament. To prevent it from languishing in the corridors of power, the revival of the plan lies in raising other fundamental questions pertinent to the contemporary politico-nuclear scenario. Has the argument for disarmament ceased to be relevant for the survival of the human species? Condoleezza Rice is often quoted as saying that for the first time since the treaty of Westphalia, the prospect of violent conflict between great powers is ever more unthinkable. But as nations learn to compete in peace, will transnational, borderless entities increase problems of insecurity? These are issues to be pondered over. Thus, while momentum for disarmament is building in the west, led by countries such as the US, the UK and Norway, the emergence of Asia's role and of coalitions across the world such as the Group of Eight, the Six-Nation Initiative and the Mayors for Peace initiative also have interesting potential.

Looking to the Future

Finally, attention should be drawn to what seem to be three immensely critical issues – evolving state behaviour, the role of the armed forces in a reformed security calculus, and India's commitment to no-first-use (NFU).

In the Third Wave, terrorism benefiting from horizontal proliferation encouraged by irresponsible state behaviour is an ever more real risk. In fact, the divide between the so-called responsible nuclear powers and the supposedly irresponsible nuclear agents, actual or potential, is completely artificial. The focus on the enormous threat and danger posed by nuclear terrorism specifically and by non-state terrorism more generally is a risky discourse that seeks to shift focus away from what is the primary problem – that of state terrorism in both its nuclear and non-nuclear forms. Where irresponsible states are implicitly involved in sponsoring, aiding or camouflaging terrorist activity of any kind, nuclear terrorism is at its riskiest. It is thus crucial that the differences between state and non-state actors need not be made irreversible, and where a state is seen as complicit in terrorist activity of any kind, and with a special emphasis on nuclear terrorism, that state be brought to task.

This also impinges on the role of the armed forces of a state in its security and the protection of its territory, property and people. Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal in his book 'The Vision of the Armed Forces of India circa 2020' has suggested that the most efficient combination of manpower and technology would have to be implemented carefully and judiciously. He emphasizes that the nature of threats to India's security are such that Army 2020 would have to be designed to function in an amorphous security environment, with capabilities to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict from low-intensity conflict to nuclear warfare.⁵ This is a real issue that we are dealing with – the urgency of further equipping India's armed forces and upgrading their warfare capabilities in the event of real war or proxy war, which is much more of a reality in India. Indeed, India's rise to regional power

status and beyond also depends on threat perception, force structures and the war preparedness of India's armed forces.

In the same vein, global stability will be hugely aided by the finalisation of a universal NFU commitment. While security assurances of the NNWS will significantly reduce the attraction of nuclear weapons, a universal acceptance of NFU by nuclear weapon possessors will remove the possibility of a nuclear exchange between NWS too. The acceptance of NFU will enable de-alerting, de-mating and de-targeting, all three steps that are critical for reducing the existential dangers that accompany nuclear weapons. India's draft resolution 'Reducing Nuclear Dangers', which has been tabled in the UN General Assembly every year since 1998, highlights the fact that the hair-trigger posture of nuclear forces carries an unacceptable risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of a universal NFU treaty will not only reduce the dangers of an accidental launch, but also heighten the chances of no-use of nuclear weapons. Once the centrality of nuclear weapons in security calculations has receded, the gradual delegitimizing of nuclear weapons per se will be a far more achievable objective. Fallout from the discrepancies of the non-proliferation regime will also be neutralised in this way.

Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership

At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC on 13 April 2010, the Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singh announced the establishment of a "Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership" in India. It will be a state-of-the-art facility based on international participation from the IAEA and other like-minded nations. The Centre will comprise four schools dealing with Advanced Nuclear Energy System Studies : Nuclear Security, Radiation Security, Radiation Safety, and the application of Radio isotopes and Radiation Technology in areas of healthcare, agriculture and food. The Centre will conduct research and development of design systems that are intrinsically safe, secure, proliferation resistant and sustainable.⁶

Conclusion

In conclusion it is emphasised that the rise of India's standing in the regional or global order need not be exclusive of India's involvement in the furtherance of a collective and cooperative regional mandate. In the post-cold war world, alliances have given way to strategic partnerships, a concept most befitting India's posture. Such partnerships will foster goodwill, with a direct effect on trade and commerce. As such, the vision of a powerful India stems from an all-inclusive trajectory of progress that does not preclude the interests of other regional powers. In this era of political globalisation, India's rise to a regional and global power can only be founded on the principle of first among equals. We understand and recognise that, and view our continued and deepening commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament as a priority.

Note by the Author

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*This paper was presented by Lieutenant General ML Naidu, PVSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd), as a representative of USI at the Joint Conference organised by Hanns-Siedel-Stiftung, Munich and the Potomac foundation from 6-8 June 2010. Text of the talk delivered by him alongwith the Conference Report is available in USI Library.

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Swarming : Is it the Panache of Future Wars?

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“Time and again, where a radical change in equipment, doctrine or force structure is concerned, one finds a gestation period of between 30 to 50 years or more between the technique becoming feasible, or the need for change apparent, and full-scale adoption of the innovation.”

-Richard Simpkin

Introduction

26/11 was an attack by two to three “pods” of a “cluster” of ten men lightly armed, moving rapidly, near simultaneously “pulsing” five targets over a wide area of West Mumbai. These men were not only well oriented to their area of operation but were intricately networked. This is probably an apt example of ‘swarming’ albeit by a terrorist organisation. On the flip side, in response to the attack, the police forces used ‘melee’ and ‘mass’ to counter-attack. The results are well known.

For long, swarming has been one of the four forms of warfighting in which the enemy is engaged simultaneously from all directions with fire and/or force. The other three forms of engaging the enemy are the ‘melee’, ‘mass’ and ‘manoeuvre’. One distinct difference between each of these forms of fighting has been the differing range of information required for their successful execution. The information requirement is least for melee, manoeuvre needs more than massing and swarming depends completely on robust and rapid communications.¹

Today, information technology has not only been a major cause of RMA but has become instrumental in changing the very way ‘war making’ is being viewed. New generations of insurgents, terrorists and criminals are exploiting innovations of the information revolution. Information revolution has enabled them to be loosely organised, in small groups and sometime even singly, into networks that permits close coordination and cooperation. When the time is right they strike from all directions, simultaneously at multiple targets. This swarming technique causes paralysis of the security system that gets overwhelmed and fails to respond effectively.

History is replete with examples of swarming being used to good effect and even some states have tailored their forces and doctrines based on the concept of swarming. The concept of swarming, probably, needs closer scrutiny and there may well be a case to adopt this concept selectively or wholly. One fact that stands out is that adopting swarming as a concept would call for radical changes in our organisational structures, command and control systems. The question is, do we need to change, or is swarming old wine in a new bottle?

History of Swarming

Even before man was possibly using the technique of swarming to wage wars on his enemies, animals were using it most effectively. Examples of swarming amongst the animals are seen in ants, bees and wolf packs. In amongst men the most ancient recorded history of swarming is seen amongst the tribes of the central Eurasian steppe like the Scythians, Parthians, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Magyars, Turks, Cossacks, and Mongols. For close to two thousand years these tribes invaded settlements in China, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe² with armies of lightly armed archers on horseback that used swarming tactics. Later, swarming was used by the British who pioneered a kind of swarming in their naval doctrine when fighting against the Spanish Armada in 1588. The British Navy used swarms of fire to relentlessly harass the enemy ultimately leading to his defeat. In the 18th century, the British got a taste of their own medicine when swarming fire of American rebels resulted in the British Army suffering heavy losses. In the Zulu war of 1879, yet again swarming was used this time by the Zulu Army. During World War II, the British used their Air Force in defensive swarms to win the Battle of Britain and the Germans used it in operations of the U-boat wolf-packs in the Battle of the Atlantic.

More recently, the ethno-nationalists of Somalia and Kosovo organised in small, dispersed units, wreaked havoc and stunned the US and allied forces. Similarly, the Russian military faced the battle-minded clans of Chechnya who used swarming techniques most effectively during the battle of Grozny. In the conventional format the US Marine Corps is known to have structured forces called ‘multi squad-sized fire teams’ that are designed to operate on the concept of swarm.³ The Iranian forces have also supposedly adopted swarm technique for its special forces and structured and equipped them accordingly. At home and in the neighbourhood, in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, we have seen the insurgents/terrorists, LTTE, and the Taliban using swarming to shocking effects. The serial bomb blasts in Mumbai, Bangalore and Delhi are classic examples of stand off swarm attacks with fire.

Concept of Swarming and its Imperatives

Arquilla and Rondfeldt in their seminal work ‘Swarming and the Future of Conflict’ have described swarming as follows:-

“Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions. It will work best-perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units (what we call ‘pods’ organised in ‘clusters’)”.⁴

Today, information technologies have made it possible to connect and coordinate entities even when widely distributed. Therefore, the key forms of organisations that are emerging are all-channel networks. The connectivity also enables creation of a large number of highly mobile small units, networked in such a fashion that, although they might be widely disbursed, they can regroup at will to attack the enemy from unexpected directions. Though such a networked force would enjoy substantial advantages, they would be effective only if old principles and practices give way to a new way of war fighting and new doctrines.

As has been defined, the swarm concept is based on networked, small units operating adaptively and autonomously in an environment of directive style of command. An elaborate C4ISR and a compatible architecture for information, fire support and logistics are mandatory for a swarm to be effective. At the tactical level, swarms have to depend on accurate organic fire, information operations and indirect fire to cause attrition on the enemy. The main intent of the swarm would be to force the enemy to be confronted with multiple new threats from constantly changing directions. The swarm would aim at psychological dislocation of the enemy more than his physical destruction.

Successful swarming is based on some important principles. Principles that are vital are elusiveness, superior situational awareness; stand off capability, simultaneity and encirclement.⁵ These basic principles make the swarm unique in the way combat power is applied and distinctly different from other forms of application of force using non-linear, distributed technique of warfighting. The five principles are further elucidated below:-

(a) **Elusiveness.** Elusiveness of the swarm is basically derived from the distributed state of its small size pods, its high mobility and its superior situational awareness.

(b) **Superior Situational Awareness.** This principle is extremely important and is dependent on the robustness of the network connectivity. Squads and even individuals are required to be completely aware of the tactical situation, preferably as well as the senior most commander of the operations.

(c) **Stand Off Capability.** This principle basically denotes the fact that the swarms can inflict more damage on the enemy than it has to endure. This requirement reiterates that networking, combat support of air force and long range weapons are of utmost importance.

(d) **Simultaneity.** This is an important combat behavior of the swarm to use its pods simultaneously to cause the enemy to have to turn to threats from multiple directions and at unexpected time.

(e) **Encirclement.** Swarms have the ability to get behind the enemy lines. This it can do with relative ease owing to its small size, situational awareness and effective logistical architecture. This gives the swarm substantial tactical and psychological advantages.⁶

Relevance of Swarming in Future Conflicts

Future battlefield milieu will be characterised by well dispersed forces due to increasing lethality of weapons, particularly the precision guided munitions (PGMs), which would make it imprudent to mass forces. Vast improvements in C4ISR have enabled effective use of long-range fires. In effect, warfare is fast becoming akin to the game of hide-and-seek where entities remain indefinable in order to survive. In such an environment, the need is to remain dispersed yet integrated and use non-linear tactics. Such tactics are best suited to forces that are applied in small teams, are networked and can operate independently with adequate support and effective stand off capability.

Appropriateness of swarming in future conflicts could be assessed by studying its application in defensive, offensive and counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations. Operations could be against an enemy who is technologically advanced or otherwise. The enemy may also be using similar non linear tactics or could be more conventional in the form of tactics he uses.

Defensive Operations

Many examples are available of swarming in defensive operations. Consequently, there is plenty of scope to analyse these to derive sound planning considerations for such swarming operations. Swarming is also well suited to defensive operations since imperatives for swarming would be more easily satisfied while operating in own territory. The problem of insertion and extraction are also absent in a defensive operation. Another important aspect is that a well laid out logistic architecture can be put in place to support the swarms. Finally, support from other arms, be it the air or long range weapon platforms, can be better coordinated and applied.

In a defensive operation swarms can be applied to deter, delay, cause attrition and halt a much larger enemy force and prevent it from seizing vital objectives. Swarms can rapidly deploy, manoeuvre and bring to bear long range artillery, air, and naval fires, using an operational concept based more on elusive tactics and reliance on stand off fires. Areas requiring heavy deployment of forces can be defended by swarms particularly in some terrains that contribute to their lethality. Swarms can best operate in a closed country like jungles, built up areas and hilly terrain that enable them to use stealth, and restricts the enemy to limited avenues for attack.

The deployment of swarms could also be done in conjunction with defensive forces holding ground. In such a scenario the defensive forces should be deployed in depth to lure the invasion forces to penetrate the defensive area. Carefully planned obstacle system and layout of defenses can channelise the enemy to selected areas where swarms could pulse the enemy from multiple directions of attack, achieve encirclement and sever enemy’s lines of communication. Such encirclement and pressures would adversely affect the enemy’s psychological strength. Swarms must never be used to hold ground or tasked for any other missions that do not exploit their mobility.

Offensive Operations

Unlike the defensive operations there are very few examples of swarming in conventional offensive operations available to aid analytical study. One example that closely resembles swarming is of the US forces in Vietnam War where small teams were launched for short duration operations like the offensive insertion of SOG12 teams into Laos and Cambodia to ambush NVA truck convoys along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These teams also worked as ISR teams planting sensors and providing vital information aboutthe enemy. These teams often used swarming by fire calling for air strikes on enemy base camps, truck parks, and weapon caches.

Common military understanding of tactical feasibility indicates that that swarming could be adapted to offensive operations. One deployment option could to secure an initial area in the peripheries of the area of operations and using this as the launch pad for the swarms. The pods and clusters could use different insertion modes and infiltrate into adjacent areas to gradually disperse outwards in all directions, building additional base camps and supply depots, and so on. Once distributed with adequate supplies and support materials, the swarms could extend outwards spreading across the entire area of operation. Such an operation should have to be undertaken when manoeuvre and mass are not the most optimal methods to use in that particular circumstance. One major consideration in using the swarm in offensive mode would be its survivability. Arms and supply caches would have to be prepositioned and a reliable chain of resupply set up before the operation even begins. Alternatively, a system of rotating the teams would have to be devised.

Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism Operations

Considering the nature of these operations, swarming could be said to be the most appropriate form of structure and the most effective mode of contesting an elusive enemy who more often than not is networked and distributed using pulsing technique to strike at soft targets. The application of swarming is not being discussed extensively as there are any number of examples of CI/CT operations being conducted by small teams and adequate expertise exists in this mode of fighting. However, to make the method being applied to fit to the definition of swarming, appropriate restructuring and equipping of the force to be effectively networked would be desirable. Also, the intent of the operations would need to be clear and not be restricted to a mere bean count of number of insurgents/terrorists eliminated. The situational awareness needs to be of a high order that is possible only with an intelligence network and process of dissemination that is capable of providing real time intelligence. Most importantly, there needs to be in place a fully integrated surveillance and communications system. Possibly, if our present system can be hybridized and incorporated with these attributes we would be able to classify it as swarming.

Conclusion

The ultimate aim of swarming may not be as much the physical destruction of the enemy, although swarms can cause heavy attrition, but more the disruption of the enemy’s cohesion that renders him incapable of manoeuvre or fire effectively. To achieve this, swarm has two basic requirements. First, to be able to attack an enemy from multiple directions, the need is to have large numbers of small units of manoeuvre that can communicate and coordinate with each other effectively. Secondly, swarm force must have offensive capability as also the ability to act as a sensory organisation, with reconnaissance and surveillance capability. This would enable the swarm force to maintain situational awareness. Thus, to have ‘small and many’ as Libicki7 calls it and a command element that ‘knows’ a great deal but intercedes only when necessary, there may be a need to transform our security apparatus with new structures and adaptable C4I systems. One thing is for sure, the wine is old and ready to be savoured, definitely not preserved in a new bottle.8

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The War of Ideas between India and Pakistan

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Introduction

This article argues that India and Pakistan are locked in an ideological impasse, which stems from their respective identities as nation-states. Such a dynamic does not permit the emergence of lasting amicable relations. At best, it can only allow for armed coexistence, much like the relationship between the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Terrorism and Kashmir are side-issues; the real contest is between two different interpretations of how politics in the Indian subcontinent ought to be handled.

The article is divided into two sections. Section-I advances the proposition that the Pakistani state is an ideological contradiction. It points out that the Two Nation theory, usually cited as the basis for Pakistan's creation as well as its claim on Kashmir, is at odds with official support for Pan-Islamism. In section-II, the article examines how Pakistan is exploiting this duality to its advantage, through perception management directed at international audience. It concludes by suggesting that India should concentrate on negating the Two Nation theory by promoting secularism domestically.

An Ideological Contradiction

Pakistan was created on the basis of a presumption that Muslims and Hindus could not coexist within a democratic framework. Its founders, members of the anglicised Indian Muslim elite, maintained that both communities represented distinct 'nations', and needed separate spheres of influence.¹ Their demand for a separate Muslim homeland acquired popular support through religious mobilisation. Any Muslim who did not support the call for a separate state was threatened and branded an infidel.²

Yet, when the Indian subcontinent was eventually partitioned, the Two Nation theory was only partially vindicated. Although a million people were killed in religious riots, more Muslims still chose to remain in 'Hindu' India than join Pakistan.³ Three years after partition, only 7 per cent of Pakistanis spoke Urdu, their national language, as opposed to 38 per cent of Indian Muslims.⁴ Even more worrisome for the Pakistani leadership, all major centres of subcontinental Islamic thought remained within the borders of independent India.

Upon its creation, therefore, 'Pakistan' represented only a landmass. Unlike Israel (created shortly thereafter), it lacked a spiritual connection with the territory it occupied. This detracted from the credibility of the new state as a Muslim homeland. The Muslim-majority kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir (hereafter abbreviated to 'Kashmir') became crucial to Pakistani self-sanctification. Its accession to an Islamic state would have reiterated the principle that religion defined nationality – a principle that the leadership of post-colonial India had already rejected.

As is well-known, Kashmir acceded to India instead. The Pakistan elite chose to refer to the kingdom's subsequent status as reflecting the 'unfinished agenda of partition'. It thus generated an impression, both domestically and internationally, that Kashmir would have acceded to it, but for Indian perfidy. The Two Nation theory was elevated in Pakistani discourse to the status of an absolute truth, instead of remaining a contested abstraction between armchair intellectuals.

In effect, the territorial dispute over Kashmir masked a bigger ideological dispute over whether Pakistan had sufficient grounds to call itself a 'nation', distinct from the rest of India. Once the latter had declared itself secular, it had also implied that the creation of Pakistan was unnecessary, since all religions would be treated equally by post-colonial Indian governments. Perhaps the first analyst to recognise that Kashmir was just a symptom, and not the root cause, of India-Pakistan rivalry was Bhola Nath Mullik.

Writing in 1948, Mullik (then an Assistant Director in the Indian Intelligence Bureau) warned that Pakistani irredentism was not confined to Kashmir. The incomplete nature of partition in the Indian heartland, where Hindus and Muslims still coexisted amicably, was the real source of tension between the two states. As long as Pakistan symbolised the idea that both communities could not share the same political space, it would threaten Indian internal stability and in turn, be threatened by it. Reducing the threat of Pakistani subversion would require discrediting the Two Nation theory.⁵

Almost simultaneously, the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau developed a similar conception of the bilateral relationship. Its top officials believed that the preservation of Pakistan required balkanising the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious Indian state into its constituent parts, with each identity group representing a separate 'nation'. From this vision arose the Qurban Ali Doctrine – a paradigm for continuous but covert Pakistani subversion within Indian territory.⁶

Thus, right from their creation, secular India and Islamic Pakistan were locked in a zero-sum game. India scored an important advantage in 1971, when civil war broke out in Pakistan. Over the course of eight months, the Pakistan army massacred between 300,000 and three million Bengali Muslims. It justified such brutalisation by indoctrinating its personnel to view Bengalis as 'Hindus in disguise'.⁷ Killing them was, therefore, not contrary to the Two Nation theory.

Such terminological gymnastics aside, the fact remained that with the secession of its Bengali province in December 1971, Pakistan lost much of its rationale. Its territory now had even less significance from an ideological perspective. To reconcile with its new borders, the Pakistani state began rewriting its history. The so-called 'Arabist shift' in its domestic narrative created a 'tendency to view the present in terms of an imagined Arab past with the Arab as the only "real/pure" Muslim'.⁸

Basically, after 1971, Pakistan domestically replaced the Two Nation theory with a Pan-Islamic or 'One Nation' theory. Its education system propagated the notion that Pakistani nationhood dated back to 711 AD, when Arab conquerors introduced Islam to the Sind region of India.⁹ This narrative overlooked the fact that Islam had appeared in southern India 82 years earlier.¹⁰ It also strengthened Pakistan's claim to Kashmir domestically, by portraying the region as having once been part of a Pan-Islamic realm. Lastly, the Arabist shift depicted modern-day India as representing 'Hindu' usurpation of Pakistani territory, having once been ruled by Muslims.

The new discourse, however, came with some drawbacks. It portrayed British colonialists, who ruled India between 1757 and 1947, as invaders of 'Pakistan' and enemies of Islam.¹¹ Although such sentiments could be fostered within the confines of Pakistani classrooms, they risked alienating the West if propagated internationally. (By the 'West', this article refers specifically to the Anglo-American world, not all European or developed countries). Furthermore, they implied that Pakistani irredentism was not limited to Kashmir, but potentially extended to the whole of India. Since Islamabad was keen to acquire Western support on the Kashmir issue, it needed to compartmentalise what it told domestic and international audiences. The Two Nation theory was therefore officially retained, even as the One Nation theory was unofficially popularised.

Pakistan became a schizophrenic state. On the one hand, it possessed a distinct identity within the international community of nation-states, with sovereignty over a finite piece of territory. On the other, it perceived itself as a protector of Muslims worldwide, with an obligation to make their struggles its own.¹² Extra-territorial intervention was ingrained in the narrative of Pan-Islamism. The result was a country that formally insisted on others respecting its sovereignty, while informally not recognising theirs. The next section shall describe how Islamabad rationalised this duality to international audiences.

Leveraging Ideological Duality

Writers on civil-military relations often compare Pakistan with 19th century Prussia, arguing that instead of being a state with an army, it is 'an army with a state'.¹³ There is another basis for comparison however: the leadership of both states learnt to use diplomatic double-speak while pursuing expansionist policies.

Under Otto von Bismarck, Prussia followed three principles to convince established powers not to intervene while it militarily redrew the map of Europe. First, it insisted that its wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870-71) were each motivated by limited aims. Second, it cited common values among European states to create an impression that it shared the same objectives as established powers, and only had a different way of achieving them. Lastly, it set 'rhetorical traps' for opposing governments (i.e. all those suspicious of its long-term motives) by pointing to their past statements and arguing that their current policies contradicted these.¹⁴

Pakistan has adopted an identical approach to concealing tensions between the Two Nation theory and Pan-Islamism, regarding matters of state sovereignty. Firstly, it has portrayed itself to international audiences as a weak power with no geopolitical agenda beyond self-preservation. The key to this image is a discourse linking the status of Kashmir to ongoing instability in Afghanistan. Pakistani support for Afghan Islamists is depicted as a quest for 'strategic depth' against India. Even Pakistani writers admit, however, that this usage differs from traditional concepts of strategic depth, which involve creating a buffer zone between two opposing armies, not to the rear of one.¹⁵

Secondly, Islamabad has emphasised the Two Nation theory in its discourse on Kashmir to foreign audiences, thereby appealing to shared norms of nation-building. Since religiously-defined statehood is a European construct, Pakistani irredentism finds sympathy amongst some Western governments. The present-day state system is itself derived from the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, which established a credo of 'whose region, his religion'.¹⁶ It aimed to contain sectarian rivalry between Catholics and Protestants, by allocating sovereignty to each within well-defined territories. The nation-state concept has, therefore, come to signify the homogeneity of a people and mutual respect for political boundaries.¹⁷

India faces an uphill task in explaining to neutral governments why it rejected the Two Nation theory - a subcontinental version of the exclusivist Westphalian ideal. Its claim to being secular is considered suspect, given the violence that accompanied partition in 1947, and occasional riots between Hindus and Muslims. Like Pakistani nationalism, Indian secularism is an unproven idea - an 'essentially contested concept'.¹⁸ Its applicability to the real world is open to interpretation, and its respectability varies with circumstances as well as the biases of those doing the interpreting.

Internationally, the Indian case has also been muddled by the fact that New Delhi's claim to Kashmir is based on a legal argument. Although this argument itself is almost flawless, it takes some understanding from those unfamiliar with its intricacies. Pakistan in contrast, has adopted a reductionist approach whose simplicity is appealing: Kashmir was meant to join it on religious grounds, but India engaged in a land-grab. The logic of partition favours this interpretation over the complicated Indian one.

By fashioning an irredentist narrative bereft of nuances, Pakistan has conveyed its case to the broadest possible audience. This propaganda technique was used to good effect in May-June 1999, when Islamabad insisted that its military intrusion into Kargil was not an intrusion at all. Rather, it portrayed the Indian army as attacking local insurgents fighting for self-determination. Pakistani officials calculated that foreign commentators would not know the demography of Kargil - a Shia-dominated locality that did not support the Sunni-led Kashmiri insurgency.

Post 1999, New Delhi has attempted to gain moral superiority by highlighting Pakistani sponsorship of jihadist terrorism, while abstaining from overt or covert retaliation to specific terrorist attacks. This tactic stalled on two counts: first, the international community did not regard violence in Kashmir as 'terrorism'. Instead, it perceived Kashmir as a disputed region whose status was open to negotiation. Second, following 9/11 Pakistan grew increasingly important to Western counterterrorist efforts, due to the sheer number of international jihadist plots originating from its territory.

Pakistan also managed to project terrorist 'spectaculars' within India as the work of non-state actors outside the control of its intelligence establishment. Most Western analysts have been prepared to buy into this argument, after making allowances for the possible involvement of 'rogue' state officials. Basically, these analysts do not subscribe to Indian assessments that events such as Mumbai 2008 amount to covert warfare, conducted as part of Pakistani state policy.¹⁹

Thirdly, Islamabad has been helped in the battle for international opinion by the tendency of Indian political leaders to fall into rhetorical traps. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated in September 2006 that India and Pakistan were both victims of terrorism. While this observation was statistically true, it did not reflect the whole truth. As a Pakistani columnist has pointed out, there was no basis for comparison since Indian terrorists never rampaged through Pakistani streets.²⁰ To suggest that the two countries are equal victims of terrorism was misleading and amounted to an own goal by the Indian government. Pakistani official spokesmen have capitalised on this mistake.

By constructing a narrative that depicts itself as restrained and acting in conformity with international norms, Pakistan has legitimised its intervention in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It has blunted the Indian diplomatic response by projecting New Delhi as being inconsistent. Most importantly, however, it has managed to engineer a mutually reinforcing dynamic between the Two Nation theory and Pan-Islamism. Pakistani spokesmen argue that if international jihadism is to be curbed and Afghanistan stabilised, the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved. Few Western analysts doubt that by 'resolution', what Islamabad really wants is an international ruling in its favour.²¹ However, they do not question the internal logic of this narrative: how can settlement of a territorial conflict reduce the potency of a borderless concept? Focusing on this issue would require acknowledging the extent to which Pakistani society has been radicalised – an unpleasant thought for any policy adviser.

Religious Tolerance is Itself a Weapon

This article argues that Pakistan has struck an intelligent balance between preaching the Two Nation theory and practicing Pan-Islamism. Western governments depending on Pakistani counterterrorist cooperation have gone along with the dichotomy. These governments are not ill-disposed towards India, but their perceptual filters are more compatible with the Pakistani discourse than the Indian one. New Delhi can do little to change this, and perhaps should not waste time attempting to.

Instead of lobbying the West to dissuade Pakistan from supporting terrorists, India should strengthen its own secular credentials and thereby undermine the long-term basis for Pakistani statehood. Centrifugal forces are already tearing away at Pakistani society, in the form of ethnonationalism and sectarian violence. These forces would be strengthened over the next decade if India builds itself into a prosperous and inclusive state. In the interim, it needs to resist Anglo-American pressure to make concessions on Kashmir.

The difficulty of enforcing secularism cannot be underestimated. As the 2006 Sachar Committee report noted, widespread bias against Muslims pervades Indian society.²² Muslims are wrongly believed to be complicit in atrocities carried out by Pakistani terrorists, and are victims of retaliation by Hindu vigilantes. Such trends, if not aggressively countered through policing and inter-faith dialogue, risk strengthening the argument for Pakistan and for religious segregation. Their elimination is necessary if India is to win the war of ideas with its troublesome western neighbour.

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Dutch Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Explaining Domestic Constraints of Foreign Policy

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Introduction

When Dutch forces deployed in Afghanistan as a part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commenced their withdrawal on 1 August 2010, it was termed as the beginning of a new phase by some people. The decision to recall the troops from Afghanistan was taken by the Dutch government in February this year and the Netherlands became the first North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) country to pull combat troops out of Afghanistan. By the end of this year, from a contingent of nearly 2000, Netherlands will have only 60 non-combatant military personnel in Afghanistan, placed at Kabul and Kandahar. Dutch, who had both combat and non-combat missions in the Uruzgan province of Southern Afghanistan, will be replaced by Australian forces. The withdrawal comes at a time when President Obama had sanctioned the American surge in Afghanistan and also requested the NATO countries to respond positively to his plan. Despite the US surge, President Obama too has on several occasions expressed the desire of early pull out of forces from Afghanistan. In this regard it is also important to highlight the statement of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on foreign forces during the 2010 Kabul Conference. President Karzai in his address said, "I remain determined that our Afghan National Security Forces will be responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout the country by 2014".¹

Situation in Afghanistan

Will, the situation in Afghanistan take a new turn in the next couple of years with the government at Kabul getting the control of security and subsequently ISAF ceasing its operations? Interestingly, it's not an unplanned move and there are larger dimensions to it. This can better be understood in light of the fact that the nation's foreign policy is influenced by domestic politics and other actors. International relations scholar Robert D Putnam, in his article Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games, explains this complex linkage of domestic politics and international relations. According to Putnam, "Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled.....it is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determines international relations or the reverse. The answer to the questions is clearly, Both sometimes".²

A closer analysis of American and ISAF operations in Afghanistan from 2001 shows the apparent link between domestic and international politics. It is evident and can distinctly be divided into two phases. The first phase begins after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and continued till 2006. The second phase is more recent, starting from 2007 and coincides with the emergence of Mr Barack Obama in the American politics. Terrorist attacks on the sole superpower simultaneously shook the American public and the government and there was nationwide unanimity that the epicentre of terrorism (Afghanistan) should be attacked to dismantle al-Qaida and its terror networks and to capture the main conspirator of 9/11, Osama bin Laden—dead or alive. American President George W Bush, asked his coalition partners to help the USA in what was termed as 'War against Terrorism'. In a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac in first week of November 2001, Bush categorically mentioned that, "A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy, a coalition partner must perform. Some nations don't want to contribute troops and

we understand that. Other nations can contribute intelligence-sharing, but all nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something".³

The USA - ISAF Operations

During the first phase America got unqualified support from its European allies who contributed to NATO forces. In retaliation prominent European cities were attacked by al-Qaida and its associate organisations. Major lethal attacks on civilians in Europe include, 1995 Paris Metro bombing, the 2004 bombing of commuter train in Madrid, and the July 2005 London bombings. The mindless violence inflicted by terrorists generated sizeable public support both in Europe and in the USA for the military operations in Afghanistan and to an extent in Iraq. When the propaganda of Saddam Hussain possessing the Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) was floated by George Bush and Tony Blair in 2002-03, it was considered with seriousness by the people gripped with a fear of insecurity. Contrary to these claims, during the course of the Iraq war, revelations of fabricated logic and fraudulent proofs for military operations against Baghdad badly harmed the image of President Bush. This was also the time when casualties of the American and ISAF soldiers had risen in Afghanistan. According to the website: icasualties.org (which keeps the records of fatalities in war) till 2007, coalition forces in Afghanistan had lost 752 of its personnel – of which 475 were Americans, i.e. almost 64 per cent of the total (for more details see table 1).

Table 1 : Coalition Military Fatalities by Years in Afghanistan (2001-09)

Year	USA	UK	Other	Total
2001	12	0	0	12
2002	49	3	17	69
2003	48	0	9	57
2004	52	1	7	60
2005	99	1	31	131
2006	98	39	54	191
2007	117	42	73	232
2008	155	51	89	295
2009	317	108	96	521

Source : icasualties.org [Online: web] Accessed on 13 August 2010, URL : <http://icasualties.org/oef/>

It is also a notable fact that with the passage of time the number of fatalities of Americans and ISAF forces have gone up further. In the year 2004, the number of deaths for the American forces was 52, which crossed double digits in 2007 and went upto 117. The steady flow of coffins both from the war-wrecked Afghanistan and Iraq was the biggest blow for the Bush Doctrine.

Consequences of Dutch Withdrawal

The second phase (2007 onwards), began with a crash in the ratings of President George Bush. Amongst many of the issues which attributed to Mr Obama's popularity, was his opposition of Bush Doctrine. Dialogue, reconciliation and resolution were the new mantra for the White House, and the neo - conservative vocabulary was rendered obsolete. This was even reflected in the official statement of the Norwegian Nobel Committee while declaring the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for Mr Obama. As per the press release, "The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 is to be awarded to President Barack Obama for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and

cooperation between people.”⁴ In brief, a change in domestic politics led to the change in the USA’s foreign policy approach, the same applies to Netherlands. The Dutch withdrawal from Afghanistan was finalised in February 2010, after Labour Party rejected the appeal of Prime Minister Balkende for honouring NATO’s request for extension of withdrawal dates. Dutch Prime Minister Balkende failed to persuade his largest coalition partner, the Labour Party which resigned from government, forcing the PM to accept its position. If the Dutch departure proliferates, it can start a chain reaction because Canada’s commitment to ISAF will end this year, Poland’s in 2012, and for the United Kingdom it is 2014-15.

The American Initiatives

Popular demand for exiting Afghanistan cannot be overlooked for long by the NATO countries. America is also well aware of the situation and White House is busy in chalking out a plan for resolving the Afghan problem without compromising its national interest. The much propagated Af-Pak policy is a step in the direction of resolving the Afghan problem. In a quest for a permanent solution, America is even willing to open secret channels of dialogue with factions of insurgents in Afghanistan. The projection of ‘Good Taliban’ and ‘Bad Taliban’ by the Pakistani Army and ISI is precisely to facilitate negotiations between the Americans and certain terrorist groups with Pakistan being given the central role. It is an open truth that Afghan President had a discussion with Sirajudin Haqqani, leader of a militant group affiliated with al-Qaida. The talks were arranged by the ISI and it goes without saying that this clandestine parley had American consent.

Future Scenario in Afghanistan

The American administration is keen for a settlement in Afghanistan both in the short and long term. In the interim period, power sharing arrangement between the different warring groups is the main aim. However, in the long run America will surely try to ensure political and economic stability in Afghanistan by supporting development policies. In this it is worth noting that the US Secretary of State, Ms Hillary Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan before the Kabul Conference in July this year, pressurised Islamabad to sign Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)⁵. Under APTTA, goods laden trucks can travel from Afghanistan upto Wagah border from where they can easily come to the Indian market. Although assessing the APTTA’s impact on the future of India-Afghanistan relations is a different topic, it shows the US concern for improving Afghan economy to facilitate its early withdrawal from the Af-Pak embroglio. To this end it is applying multiple measures to get Afghanistan on its own feet. That is why strengthening Afghanistan is a part of the US counter-insurgency operations. What the USA requires before starting withdrawal from Afghanistan, is a guarantee from major players in Kabul that anti-American activities will be restricted so as to avoid another 9/11 type catastrophe. There are speculations about the American withdrawal however it will be naïve to think that America will completely pull out from Afghanistan. After construction of fortified bases in Afghanistan, considerable number of its army personnel would remain in and around Kabul to influence the functioning of Afghan government. May be, installing a puppet regime in Kabul and a tacit understating with Pakistan is what the America is aiming in determining the future of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is true that Dutch departure is just the beginning of a new phase in Afghanistan. It can be understood in the theoretical framework of linkages between domestic and international politics, as suggested by international relations scholar Robert D Putnam. The logical corollary of the argument is that before the next Presidential elections in the USA, due in November 2012, President Obama would try his best to finalise a practical, acceptable and workable solution for Afghanistan.

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West Asian Spaghetti (Lebanon)

Major Bhaskar Tomar*

The Confusion State

The concept of state as espoused popularly in the modern world or the evolution of the concept in modern nations has perhaps engendered late in the peoples of Arabia. The concept is a complete paradox for the Arab people and it seems that the rest of the world is out to enforce this notion on them. There has been an acceleration for the acceptance of the concept by the creation of the new state of Israel. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt were part of the Great Ottoman Empire and never existed as today, they were administered as cities.

Lebanon is a multicultural and multi religious state, where they have attempted to run the country based on confessionalism. Confessionalism has not really worked as the country declined into civil war many times and the system is prone to hegemonic influences. The country is well endowed with natural beauty and has enormous potential for creating wealth. Its citizens are proud people with great respect for their history.

Israel and Palestine are a state confused, for their identity remains clouded under historical dispute and interpretation. Yet Israel is far ahead in its endeavour for statehood as it can boast of a prideful position in the world as an economic, R & D, and military powerhouse. They are in complete control of the geographical area that they control and have a say in world affairs. Palestine on the other hand generally squanders away its wealth on attacking Israeli civilians, and is pitiful as a state. They are living on donations from rest of the world!!

Balkanisation and Belgianisation

Both are illegal in idea and legitimate in practice. Legitimate, as the UN (United Nations) endorses various lines, even though the natives of the area share little in common; and others, where they are the same peoples, it divides. A combination of Balkanisation and Belgianisation is how Lebanon has been formed over the course of its fractured history. It's a homogeneous mix of eighteen religious denominations, the majority of whom are Sunni, Shiite, Maronite Christians and the Druze. All these people live in common ways but are intent on representation through their own kind, confusing governance and delaying government decisions (including annual budgets) to the peril of the country.

Historians have argued, with some cogency, that its inhabitants would have had a better chance of living in peace had it been incorporated into a Greater Syria, when the Ottoman empire collapsed at the end of the First World War.¹ Being parts of a larger whole might—but only might—have given the Christians and Druze and perhaps even the Shiite Muslims a good slice of autonomy in the areas where they predominate.

Yet the country is living as one, the people aggressively patriotic and nationalistic. Among all states in the region, Lebanon is the only one who has not assimilated the Palestinian refugees, leveraging their cause for personal aims, and perhaps maintaining their cultural identity.

Israel and Palestine are also Balkanised and Belgianised over the past six decades. Today, Israel has managed to make a country for themselves which is not fractured geographically, whereas the result has been that Palestine is fractured and Balkanised (West Bank and Gaza). As were in the Balkans, there are Arabs in Israeli lands who complicate the issue. Sprinkle over this the religious issues of Shiite, Sunni, Christian, and Jews, and it makes for a heady Ayodhya.

Palestinian Enigma

The question this century, for the Arabs may be: Will they survive as an Arab people? Connected with this is the question: Will Palestine ever become a state? To answer these questions one may have to travel ahead into time to see the impossible!!

The Palestinian people are the modern Jews. They are dispersed throughout the world, away from their land, persecuted in some lands, and living as refugees. They are unwanted and a problem for all, and mostly blamed for petty crimes in their forced homelands. But they are a reality, and their final settlement and solution will help ease their long suffering and create a lasting solution for the Jewish state.

There are twelve Palestinian camps in Lebanon. These refugees are living in enclaves without any citizenry rights. They cannot buy land and neither can they vote!! The Lebanese are unwilling to assimilate them as they might tilt the fragile demographic balance in favour of Sunni. The Palestinian themselves live in hope to return to their homeland. But they have become a part of the Lebanese question.

The Palestinian people will not settle for anything less than what they have lost. If the Jewish people have waited for two thousand years for their promised homeland, it may be suggested that the Palestinian people may also wait for their time to come, to resettle in the homeland of their forefathers. This vicious cycle may have its solutions this century. In confronting environmental and existential issues, prudence may improvise a solution. Till then, the world at large has to wait for such issues to become more important for the world to create solutions for lesser causes.

West Bank and Gaza are not only tiny, but separated geographically. There is no corridor connecting the two and Israel is blocking all routes by closing the gates and fencing the boundary. Their contention that it has reduced rocket attacks only gives credence to their policy. But this has had a catastrophic effect on the economy and perception of the Palestinians living in the two enclaves. Given the present circumstances the Palestinians will take a long time to establish a potent state and also to do something about the Palestinian refugees.

Interests of Insurgents

Ever since the dawn of civilisation, whenever people have risen against authority; without arms, we tend to call it a revolution; when with arms, an insurgency. The underlying factor in both cases is armament. In the former there is little need for conventional weapons for fighting, whereas in the latter, weapons and resources are a must. The access to weapons and resources comes from quarters looking for instability in these areas, hence the term 'Interest Insurgents', rather than 'Religious Insurgents' or 'Corporate Insurgents'. Insurgents in Lebanon are not really insurgents in the true sense. The Arabs have kept weapons at home and pride in them as an extension or depiction of male prowess and masculinity. They are swayed by emotion more than ground realities. Pride and Honour (of their own definition) are more important than truth and reality.

Interest insurgents in Lebanon root from interests in Israel, Iran, Syria, the EU, the USA, France and Egypt. The Palestinians are the main protagonists who play the part of interest insurgents, other than the Shiites, Sunnis, Maronite Christians, and the Druze. This heady mixture of different types of peoples ensures chaos at the macro level, whereas at the micro level there is much tolerance and bonhomie amongst villagers.

The Hezbollah has emerged as a powerful organisation capable of successful and conclusive guerrilla warfare. They have managed to overcome the usual shortcomings of Arabic military behaviour to shine against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in the recently concluded Second Lebanon war. The Lebanese government's endorsement of the resistance group as a legal entity has created many problems for the International community trying to police Lebanon. Yet, it is Hezbollah that has been able to stand against the might of the IDF and not the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The endorsement of the Lebanese government of the legality of Hezbollah weapons will pose problems in the long run. It is yet to be seen that for how long Hezbollah can maintain its reputation as a potent force. The statements by Major General Claudio Graziano, Force Commander, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in New York at HQ UN, of the implementation of UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution)1701, in which he has bitterly criticised Israel for violations, whereas he has praised the Hezbollah for respecting the resolutions.²

Post Second Lebanon War

The prisoner swap on 16 Jul 2008 marked the end of the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. The result of the war, though not conclusive for any long lasting peace or harmony, brought about a strong European contingent within UNIFIL in South Lebanon. This has ensured peace and harmony in the short term and has allowed both parties and residents some respite from violence. It is hard to say whether Hezbollah has benefited by this lull. Pro Israel lobby tends to conclude that this has led Hezbollah rearming and re-energising.³ Suffice to say that it has brought the whole fragmented nation together under the Hezbollah banner and engendered pride and confidence. For the Lebanese, the results of the war were conclusive and they have celebrated thus.

For Israel, UNIFIL has wrought peace on its boundary. There is a clear absence of violence fed by different groups on Israeli targets on the border ever since. Yet criticism from the Zionist state continues unabated about UNIFIL inactions on UNSCR resolution 1701.⁴

Perhaps, the Great Powers have brokered a deal with Israel to keep its Northern boundary in order for Israel to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions. UNIFIL has never been of such interest to the USA and the Europeans. There is no gold, diamonds, or oil to be found in the state of Lebanon.

An Unequal Contest

Lebanese soldiers, military vehicles, and hardware, guarding road blocks all over South Lebanon, omnipresent in Beirut, look and feel like of World War II vintage. It is no secret that whenever Israel marches into Lebanon, the Lebanese armed forces leave their positions and rush back home without defending their positions. UNIFIL has never been forceful enough to contain the IDF behind the Blue Line against IDF aggression. Lebanese Air Force consists of two dozen helicopters and a navy of few patrol boats.

Comparing IDF with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is like comparing Goliath with David. IDF has complete control of Lebanese Airspace, both virtually and physically. ⁵ All airwaves in Lebanon are constantly interfered by Israeli equipment. The IAF is the most capable air force in West Asia. It can safely be assumed that it is one of the most capable air force in the world. The Israeli Navy is a modern fleet with corvettes, missile boats, submarines, patrol boats and support ships. This fleet's capability is beyond protection capability for Israeli 180 km coastline on the Mediterranean Sea and 10 km coastline in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The two neighbours are unequal in all aspects of state. The state of Israel has a common cause, powerful friends, is rich and has a lot of assets. Its people are well educated and modern in thought. In contrast, the Lebanese do not have a common cause, their friends and others are using them, and they do not have any assets to boast about. They are not well educated and are yet steeped in the past.

The Future

On the eve of Israel's 60th anniversary, Time and the Economist, as also other publications dared to foretell how Israel would look like in the future. Most were optimistic, and a few were pessimistic; however, it is important to note that most commentators were westerners. It is likely that hard line Islamic pundits would be optimistic from their point of view, but unfortunately the moderate Islamic view is against Israel. It is important to note that even though the human race would will for peace on earth, what matters is History. The foundations of the state of Israel are questionable. It is for no reason that India had not recognised Israel for 45 years of its creation. Similarly the basis of foundation of Pakistan is questionable, hence, all the violence involved.

Jews from all over the world already view Israel as spiritually impoverished and uninviting.⁶ And when Israelis look at their neighbourhood, they see looming threats: a potential nuclear bomb in Iran; one of the world's most powerful guerrilla armies in Lebanon; growing extremism among the Palestinians; and everywhere the rise of popular

Islamist parties that threaten to topple reluctantly pro-western Arab autocrats. For the first time since 1948, real existential threats to Israel, at least in its Zionist form, are on the horizon.

In contrast, Lebanon has only to look ahead. The infrastructure after years of civil war and Israeli bombardment needs to be rebuilt, and maintained. Its economy needs to be nurtured back to pre civil war era. Syria and Lebanon are demarcating their borders, hastening political solutions. There is much to do. All this optimism is not without its caution. Hezbollah will never be tolerated by the West as a legal entity. It perhaps needs to evolve into an acceptable form of politico-military structure with changes in its manifesto. After the recent clashes in Lebanon, Hezbollah has managed to get one third majority within the government and legalise its arms. All the funds from the poppy fields of Bekaa need to convert into funds from fruit, wine, and food from the fields of Bekaa. The Palestinians need to be integrated into the economy and given a say as per their franchise strength.

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Situation in Nepal and India's Policy Perspective

Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd)*

Background

Situation in Nepal continues to be unstable with all the ingredients of a crisis waiting to happen, any time. Extension of the term of Nepalese Constituent Assembly (CA) by one year and resignation of Madhav Kumar Nepal soon after was expected to facilitate election of a new Prime Minister. Continuing political impasse on electing a PM reflects the fragmented and fractious nature of the Nepalese polity¹. Two key issues, which need to be resolved after the new PM takes over and before some semblance of stability can be expected to return, are the integration of Maoists and adoption of the new Constitution. Integration of the Maoist cadres is seen as a must before the Constitution can be adopted. Political parties remain divided over 'The Model of the Constitution' and the manner in which the Maoists can be integrated. The UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is also not being seen by Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) and others as absolutely neutral on some of the issues connected with Maoist cadres' integration². Although it is for the Nepalese political leadership to find ways and means to form a government of national unity through a consensus, Nepalese political and strategic elite is looking at the international community, India and China to take initiatives to resolve the present impasse and forge a political consensus in Nepal in order to move towards peace and stability. Even after new PM is elected, the dominant discourse would still be integration of Maoists combatants and writing of the Constitution.

Integration of Maoist Combatants

At current stage of political crisis, integration and writing of the Constitution have become umbilically linked. Competing political interests are stonewalling the process. UNMIN is being viewed by SPA and other interests groups as being favourable to the Maoists. Recent acts of vandalism and harassment by the Youth Communist League cadres have exposed their duplicity.

According to the given mandate, 19,602 Maoist combatants were identified to be integrated into security forces, subject to meeting the laid down norms. Their integration into security forces did not automatically imply their entry into the Nepalese Army (NA) also. However, it included all kinds of other security forces, like Armed Police, newly created Nature Conservation Force, Industrial Security Force and Border Security Force. Cadres which could not be integrated were to be rehabilitated and given suitable package and work in the civil society.

To oversee the above process a Special Committee comprising of two members each from major political parties like CPN (UML), CPN (Maoist) and Nepalese Congress (NC) was constituted. Further, a 'Technical Committee for supervision, integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants' was organised as a link between the Maoists combatants in the camps and the Special Committee. Technical Committee was to look at creating conditions for implementing, both, the integration and rehabilitation process and adoption of the Constitution. Broad tasks included: -

- (a) Creation of a link with Maoists combatants
- (b) Deciding on their code of conduct in the cantonments, post UNMIN scenario.
- (c) Defining command and control, which would be different from the present set up; where the Maoist combatants in camps report to their own commanders.
- (d) Most important issue pertains to the disposal of "containerised arms". In short, recommend how to handle the Maoist combatants after the expiry of UN mandate in September 2010.

Based on the above mandate, a 112 days plan was made. Broad parameters were :-

- (a) Identify how many of the 19602 Maoist combatants were to be integrated in the security forces - and how were the balance to be rehabilitated.
- (b) Working out the cadre structure in terms of officers and other ranks. It should be noted here that, post confinement in camps, Maoist combatants organised themselves into seven divisions and 21 brigades with an unheard ratio of 1 : 3.5 between Officers and Other Ranks - the normal ratio being 1:30. Evidently, this was designed to gain unfair advantage and to create impediments in smooth execution of the integration process.
- (c) After arriving at the number of the cadres to be integrated into NA they were to be sent to various training centres for training.
- (d) In so far as weapons were concerned, they were to be taken over by the Special Committee and their disposal was to be decided subsequently.

The most important aspect of the mandate was to initiate the process of integration and to create conditions for promulgation of the Constitution. However, the whole process has floundered in the absence of political consensus. Post Copenhagen summit, the then Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal had made another attempt and drafted a 60 day implementation plan but this too got mired in controversy due to lack of consensus. The Maoists did not attend the meeting called for the same purpose. Some of the basic issues impacting the integration process are:-

- (a) The UNMIN refuses to provide the exact number of Maoist cadres present in the camps. A large number of cadres have left the camps but they are still being paid. Nepalese government is seeking their accountability but the Maoists refuse to discuss this issue.
- (b) Non-acceptable cadres were asked to leave the camps after putting together a rehabilitation package jointly by the

UNMIN and the integration committee. The cadres were to be paid Rs. 20,000 per month. This was not accepted by the Maoists. Some of the Maoist cadres left the camps and others came back to claim the package. However, the money is still being paid to all the Maoist cadres without verification.

(c) On the issue of integration, the salient issues are induction of the Maoists combatants not only in the NA but also into other security forces. The NA is not in favour of dilution of criteria or standards for such induction. An additional requirement is that the officer to other ranks ratio, while integrating them, should be as per existing norms. Another important issue in the integration of the Maoists into the NA is that it should be restricted on the number of serviceable and military class weapons only. Local or obsolescent weapons held and kept in 'containers' in the camps should be ignored. Further, the basis for integrating 19602 Maoist combatants is also being questioned, through some statements attributed to Prachanda.

Options for Integration

As far as the NA is concerned their leadership believes that integration of Maoist combatants is inevitable. However, it has to be based on certain norms. It has to be restricted to the minimum - with the rank and file split into various units of the NA. The integration of Maoist cadres can neither be in bulk nor can they be integrated as composite units. The maximum number that the NA may be willing to accept is around 4000 Maoists combatants which would correlate to the number of serviceable military weapons held by the Maoists. There is still a strong resentment within the NA against the Maoists. For the same reasons the Maoist combatants are also not comfortable with small groups being integrated into NA units.

The option of integration into Nepalese police or armed police is also complicated, with the civil society groups perceiving that the lawless elements of the society who have been harassing the people and society could now become custodians of law and order. Integration in this case would also be in small numbers and groups. There is also a perception that Maoist combatants' induction into Border Security Force or Nature Conservation Force would create more problems than solving any. Similarly, given their past record, the civil society is also concerned about the large number of Maoists cadres being absorbed. Problem is accentuated by brigades of the Youth Communist League (YCL) cadre, some of whom are said to be already running loose with weapons and intimidating people.

Political Perspective and Drafting of Constitution

All political parties including the Maoists are faction ridden subject to pressures from both within and without, and are pursuing their own narrow sectarian interests. For instance Baburam Bhattarai, although an intellectual ideologue of the Maoists, does not have the mass support base and lacks the charisma of Prachanda. Maoists are powerful as long as they stay united. Bhattarai, the number two in Maoists' hierarchy is being painted by some Maoist supporters as an Indian agent. Within the Nepali Congress, after passing away of GP Koirala, bigger problems loom around as three top leaders are at loggerheads. In this situation, the constitution making may continue to be in limbo until some miracle happens. With GP Koirala gone, a sudden vacuum has been felt even by Maoists, as there is no one to take the lead from the point that he left at the last leg. The absence of a strong and visionary leader stymies the stabilisation process in Nepal. This is reflected in twelve rounds of elections for a PM without any positive results, after the resignation of Madhav Kumar Nepal on 30 June 2010. Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal's (Prachanda) withdrawal, on 17 September 2010, from the prime ministerial election has failed to pave the way for formation of a national consensus government to end the almost three month long deadlock. The 13th round of election would be held on 26 October 2010.³

The issue of integration and rehabilitation is coming to the fore because the SPA will not accept next general election till this issue is resolved. Question that arises is: How can one party contesting election continue to have its own armed cadres? Definitely, it would be to the disadvantage of the other political parties, in utter disregard of multi-party democracy. The SPA would prefer minimum integration of Maoist cadres in the security forces, with the balance being rehabilitated in the civil society. An important prerequisite is disposal of weapons from the UNMIN to the Special Committee. There is a perception that in the last elections large number of seats were obtained by the Maoists through coercion and intimidation. For this, India is being blamed for persisting with the elections without Maoists cadres being disarmed. Repetition of the same is not acceptable to the non-Maoist parties.

The general impression among the Nepalese elite and political classes is that the current political impasse is unlikely to get resolved on its own. It would require a third party intervention. In this milieu, India is still the favoured actor despite negative press and perceptions of its past role. They would like India to be pro-active and an honest broker. There would be some risks involved in this but then rewards would also go to the risk-taker. In the absence of any pro-active stance India's competitors were more likely to benefit by default and not through any design on their part. On the issue of Indian developmental assistance, India was expected to be more transparent and people-friendly in implementation of its projects, besides providing for regular maintenance also. Indifference on most of these issues by India had enabled China's developmental projects to be seen in more positive light.

As far as drafting the Constitution is concerned, according to the Adviser to the President of Nepal, India is not taking too much interest. It is keeping itself at a distance from the Constitution drafting process. On the other hand some of the Western countries are taking a lot of interest. This is despite the fact that Nepalese society, culture, education and even legal systems have closer affinity to India rather than any other country.

Several models are under discussion for drafting the Constitution. Maoists are insisting on a federal model based on ethnicity, while the NC and others support formation of states on geographical basis⁴. While NC and CPN-UM favour a Parliamentary Democracy system Maoists support an Executive Presidency. Many other small parties have their own agendas on the issue. Some are against Federalism. There is some degree of revival of sentiment in favour of a Hindu State and Monarchy also. Towards the end of February, there was a general strike in Kathmandu valley calling for a referendum on this issue. Even Prachanda had remarked that "The declaration of a secular state was made in haste", though this remark had put him at odds with his party ideologues and cadres⁵. Thus fragmented and fractious

polity militates against any early resolution of the crises.

Further, even the political parties are not taking much interest in the drafting process of the Constitution, as most of them do not attend the meetings called for the purpose. There are about 19 to 20 areas of difference on the writing of the Constitution; and this can be resolved now that the term of Constituent Assembly has been extended by another year. But what is lacking is a political consensus. Maoists are not amenable to changing their present stance. They seem to be banking on benefiting from any situation of increased instability. However, there is also some degree of realisation among the Maoists that India remains an important power broker considering that their coming to power was in many ways felicitated by India.

The NC and other parties have suggested four conditions for a Maoist led government: "return of seized property and land to the rightful owners; transformation of the YCL from its existing para-military structure; clear plans for army and arms management before promulgating the Constitution and a convincing commitment to show the Maoists have transformed themselves to a civilised party and renounced violence." The Maoists may not readily agree to all these conditions but eventually a via media has to be found so that some semblance of stability can be restored.

Indian Efforts and Policy Perspectives

Undoubtedly, the Indian policy makers remain concerned with deteriorating situation in Nepal - a country that is strategically very important for India's geo-political interests. There has been a flurry of visits by the political leadership of both the countries to and fro in recent months. Shyam Saran, the Prime Minister's Special Envoy,⁶ Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister SM Krishna and Lok Sabha Speaker Meira Kumar have all visited Nepal and exchanged views with Nepalese leadership. Earlier Sitaram Yechuri of Communist Party of India (Marxist) had visited Nepal and held discussions with Maoist leaders. President Ram Bartan Yadav of Nepal visited India on his first foreign trip in February. Similarly SM Krishna was in Kathmandu in February. Thus, India's policy makers have been in intense parleys with Nepalese political leaders for resolving the pending issues.

Actions which need to be taken to restore peace and stability are outlined below:-

(a) There is a degree of understanding that the 12 Points Agreement or 'Delhi Pact' reached between the SPA and Maoists may have to be revisited. There is a need to initiate an intensive dialogue between the SPA, Maoists as also other political parties to ensure that both integration and rehabilitation and constitution drafting process is not delayed further.

(b) The UCPN (Maoist) needs to be prevailed upon to bring the Maoists combatants under the command of 'Special Committee on monitoring, rehabilitation and integration of the Maoists combatants'.

(c) The NA is at a critical juncture. It is undergoing crisis due to lack of training, shortages of ammunition and low morale. It is still deployed in its counter - insurgency posture in difficult and inhospitable terrain and without, at times, any basic amenities. All this while the Maoists cadres are well looked after in the UNMIN camps with all the facilities and they have been training also. The NA remains an important stabilising factor in the current milieu.

(d) Therefore, there is a need to build the deterrent capability of the NA despite the restraints put in place by the UNMIN. India needs to make efforts to upgrade the training levels of the NA. Nepal's Defence Minister had visited China in end March for seeking military assistance in the field of information and communication for the NA. This should strengthen the communication infrastructure of the army to its units spread all across Nepal and enhance its capabilities. If political situation goes adrift only the NA can control the deteriorating law and order situation.

(e) India's development aid of US \$ 250 million announced during Nepal President's visit may not be adequate. It needs to be supplemented. A pro-active effort to push the development efforts needs to be taken.

(f) The other stakeholders also need to be taken on board. Joint efforts by India, China, the USA and others would go a long way in stabilising Nepal.

(g) India needs to take an active part in forging political consensus and it cannot afford to prefer only the NC or SPA to the exclusion of Maoists. Bringing Maoists on board may become a strategic imperative.

(h) Declaration of Nepal as a Secular State has given impetus to the minority religions and sects to enhance their activities. Mushrooming of madrassas and mosques in Terai and closer to Indo-Nepal border has added to the security challenges for India. Destabilising activities of Pakistan's ISI need to be kept under close watch.

Conclusion

Tenuous political situation in Nepal is a cause for concern for its neighbours in particular and for the region in general. Even in its fourth year after the accord between the SPA and the Maoists, the twin issues of integration and adoption of the Constitution remain in limbo and the process has been postponed again for the tenth time. All the political actors are mostly working for tactical gains without giving due importance to the long term strategic benefits likely to accrue from peace and stability in Nepal. There is a grave possibility of Nepal falling off the precipice into the morass of civil war or anarchy; unless all the stakeholders in Nepal and international community, including India, China and the UNMIN, compel the warring parties to come to a consensus on the future of Nepal.

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Fourteenth Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture

New Face of Terrorism : Analysis of Asymmetric Threat from Land, Sea and Air*

Shri Vikram Sood**

Introduction

The character of terrorism has changed over time and let me begin by first talking of the 'The Ultimate Threat'.

I quote from Graham Allison's 'Nuclear Terrorism - the Risks and Consequences of the Ultimate Disaster' where he writes about Tom Clancy's 1991 bestseller 'The Sum Of All Fears'. The novel is about a stolen nuclear weapon planned to be detonated at the Super Bowl in the USA. Allison says that the comments Clancy received after this novel was published had left Clancy uneasy so he wrote an afterword in which he said and I quote:-

"All of the material in this novel relating to weapons technology and fabrication is readily available in any of the dozens of books I was first bemused, then stunned, as my research revealed just how easy such a project might be today. It is generally known that nuclear secrets are not as secure as we would like - in fact, the situation is worse than even well-informed people appreciate. What required billions of dollars in the 1940's is much less expensive today. A modern personal computer has far more power and reliability than the first Eniac, and the 'hydrocodes' which enable a computer to test and validate a weapon's design are easily duplicated. The exquisite machine tools used to fabricate parts can be had for the asking.... Some highly specialised items designed specifically for bomb manufacture may now be found in stereo speakers. The fact of the matter is that a sufficiently wealthy individual could, over a period of time from five to ten years, produce a multistage thermonuclear device. Science is all in the public domain, and allows few secrets."

I have quoted from the author of a bestseller fiction, but truth is stranger than fiction. Let us remember that Osama bin Laden was/is a billionaire, al-Qaeda's members were in touch with Pakistani nuclear scientists like Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, while their masters were surreptitiously offering or supplying uranium enrichment technology and know-how to Iran, Libya and North Korea. State sponsored nuclear terrorism is the best way to describe this.

The five-ten year period that Clancy spoke of is over and there is no way of confirming that the world has become any safer after September 11, 2001 or November 2008.

The Definition and Mode of Operations

The world has had trouble defining terrorism with the old cliché - one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Although terrorism had gone global in the 1980s and then further embellished in the next decade, it was not until Sep 11, 2001 that the word and the act evoked any response from the USA. Even then, it has been-my terrorist first and then, maybe, yours, as we have seen in our neighbourhood.

It has moved from what one may call gentlemen militants / anarchists / terrorists of the 19th century and early 20th century who targeted only heads of state, monarchs, prime ministers - even up until 1970s. They operated as romantics and quite often bungled their individual acts of heroism causing no great loss to anyone.

In the last three decades, there has been a dramatic shift in terrorist objectives and scale of operations. The range of its effectiveness, its lethality and ability to be catastrophic without the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), its instant nature, use of modern technology and communications which give it the ability to strike across frontiers have multiplied many times over. The tactics too have changed; suicide terror is an increasingly common phenomenon. Armed assaults, where death for the terrorist is almost certain, is another phenomenon. We have also seen the use of vehicles, from the cycle bomb to the aeroplane in terrorist attacks. There are many other ways asymmetric warfare has changed and a considerable amount of this change has been technology driven in the past decade and a half. If the 1980s produced international state sponsored jihad, it also allowed nuclearisation of a rapidly Islamising state.

The revolution of the Internet and the mobile phone has been a quantum jump, the full scope of which has not been realised yet. It is difficult to predict how much, how easy and how cheap this technology will be in the future and what use the terrorists can put this to.

All this is accompanied by an effective use of the media eager for 'instant' stories.

In today's context when we refer to international terrorism, we invariably refer to Islamic/jehadi terrorism. Unfortunately, the response to this, described as the global war on terror, is neither global, nor is it against terror. It seems restricted to handling the problem in only one part of the globe against targets that are unevenly defined. The war either in Afghanistan or in Iraq, is not about defeating terror because both have created more terrorists than it destroyed. An over-militarised response has given it the wrong description of a 'war on terror' whereas one should be thinking in terms of counter-terrorism.

The battle has become globalised— capitalism versus global Islam. On one side are the affluent, powerful, politically empowered, mainly Christian States which are running out of resources; ranged against them is a group which is poor, politically un-empowered and Muslim, and resource rich. Both find nationalistic politics an impediment to their progress because nationalism impedes economic domination and theological control. The former wants unhindered access to finance, markets and resources required to retain its primacy while the other strives for an Islamic take over by establishing the supremacy of an overarching Islamic Caliphate.

The present day terrorist considers civilian targets as fair game and suicide terrorism as the most favoured

method. One could say that this was reflection of how the character of war itself had changed from WW I to WW II and beyond. The indiscriminate targeting of civilians by the combatants during the WWII going on from Hiroshima to Agent Orange in Vietnam were other examples where the state led with attacks on civilians.

The ability to perpetrate violence was a state monopoly. But, with the easy availability of small and lethal weapons, easy money, technology and weak failing states willing to wage asymmetric warfare for various reasons, has seen the emergence of non-State actors in destabilising regions by inflicting terrorist violence of even greater magnitude.

From specified ideological or military targets emanating from ideological beliefs, real or perceived oppression or wrong doing, terrorism has moved to punitive, revenge or catastrophic terrorism.

The present day globalisation of terror, especially jihadist terror, is the outcome of Cold War, when States had combined to give money, arms and manpower to defeat their Cold War rival. A multi-billion dollar religious terrorist force was created in the name of freedom because of fortuitous confluence of mistakes that one superpower did not learn from the mistakes of the other. It was the first time that Muslims from different countries got together to work against the Infidel. The Ummah had arrived and has since then been spreading its message. The present day radical Islamist terror is the result of global Cold War ambitions and compulsions rather than any intrinsic ability and zeal among the radical Muslims to take this route.

This was the beginning of the internationalisation of terror. Yet, throughout the 1990s terrorism and terrorist groups expanded beyond borders of their sanctuaries, threatening the stability of regions. We in India battled our imported demons for decades as the world looked away and concentrated more on violations of human rights by countries tackling the worst kind of terrorism. Terrorism was like a tropical disease that afflicted only the developing world while the rich remained happy together. It was only September 11, 2001, that changed the perception of threat but did very little to change the method of tackling it.

Today, there is a genuine and widespread rage against the USA and its allies in the Muslim World. To many in the Islamic world, Osama bin Laden is not the evil incarnate as it is made out in the West. Osama would deliver his followers from centuries of insults and humiliation by the West. They believe in him and in his tactics. That is why they are willing to die. And there is no way you can kill a man who is willing to die. Right or wrong this is a perception that has to be corrected.

It is not as if the Muslims world is faultless. A cursory review of wars, civil wars and other contemporary conflicts will show that there is a greater incidence of Muslim involvement—either fighting others or among themselves. 90 per cent of the cases seem to have affected Muslim societies/countries. Of the 22 members of the Arab League or 57 of the OIC, almost all have had major political violence in the last 25 years.

Muslims have a difficult time living as minorities in Non - Muslim countries, as we see in parts of Europe - France, Germany or the UK. In the west there is a mutual problem of how to arrive at an amalgam; in India we are increasingly going to face the challenge of preserving the equilibrium which others and some of our own seek to destroy.

Islamist Rage

There may be Muslim anger at the West, but there has also been considerable state assistance to Islamic terrorism. Saudi Arabia has funnelled billions of dollars into West Asia, Pakistan and the rest of the world for over three decades for the propagation of puritan Islam in madrassas. This has made it easier for young minds to accept the cult of violence and be prepared and ready to kill in the name of religion. The other sponsor of jihadi terrorism has been Pakistan. This in fact has been the main weakness of the so-called global war on terror for it accepts the two main sponsors of Sunni Islamic terrorism as partners in the war on terror. Both the countries remain reluctant partners, or even duplicitous partners, yet continue to receive certificates of good behaviour from the US. There has been a lethal mix of Saudi money and Pakistani manpower supplies to jihad. Saudi funding through various trusts like the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Al Rashid Trust, have helped finance madrassas and mosques. Saudi financial contribution to the making of the Pakistani nuclear bomb and contribution to the Afghan jihad has emboldened Pakistani adventurism as well as obduracy.

Post 9/11 and particularly post-Madrid 2004 have led to a hardening of positions in Europe among the majority population and at the same time there are more second and third generation Muslim youth finding their way to jihad. The stereotype of the jihadi coming from the Arab world is changing. Post-September 11, recruits are just as easily to be found in poly-techniques, high schools and university campuses in Europe. Hundreds of European youth, mainly second generation immigrants, have found their way to Iraq to fight in the Sunni triangle. There were reports of a two-way traffic between West Asia and Europe of illegals coming in to Europe and legals going to perform jihad in far away places. Three of the July bombings in London were young second-generation youth of Pakistani parentage. Youth in the UK have been increasingly under the influence of the Deobandhi mosques where al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), Lashkar e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and Hizbut Tehrir (HT) activists have been active.

In Europe, intelligence and police officials from the UK, Spain, Germany, France and the Netherlands meet in state-of-the-art environments to exchange information and data, reports and wiretaps that would help follow leads in their anti-terror effort. Cooperation on this scale or even at a much lower scale is unthinkable on the Indian sub-continent as this would be counterproductive to policies followed by the Pakistani establishment. Indo-Pak talks on curbing terror are more a dialogue of the deaf than any purposeful discussions.

More dangerous than al-Qaeda in the Indian context are the activities of the International Islamic Front established by Osama in February 1998. Five Pakistani terrorist organisations are signatories to this IIF - HuM, LeT, Harkat-ul-Jehadi-ul-Islami (HUJI), JEM and LeJ - all Sunni, all anti-Christian, anti-Jew and anti-Hindu, and continue to

exhort the destruction of India and prophesies victory over Jews and Christians.

Another centre is Bangladesh where jihadi organisations propagate jihadi terrorism in India and South-east Asia. The location of the continuing jihad against Christians, Jews and Hindus can be anywhere. It will be where the jihadis feel that it would be easier to operate and have the maximum impact. This obviously makes the USA and Europe the most likely targets.

Groups like the al-Qaeda and LeT cannot be controlled by a purely non-military response because they seek the establishment of Caliphates, through violence if necessary, and which is not acceptable in the modern world. It is necessary to militarily weaken these forces, starve them of funds and bases and then to tackle long-term issues, and by providing them better education, employment and so on.

There is a naive assumption that if local grievances or problems are solved, global terrorism will disappear. The belief or the hope that, if tomorrow, Palestine, or Kashmir or Chechnya or wherever else, the issues were settled, terrorism will disappear, is a mistaken belief. There is now enough free floating violence and vested interests that would need this violence to continue. There has been a multifaceted nexus between narcotics, illicit arms smuggling and human trafficking that seeks the continuance of violence and disorder.

Global Jihad and Leaderless Jihad

The last few decades have also seen the largest scale of state sponsored terrorism raging from West Asia to South Asia, where the assistance in all its aspects has been so thinly veiled and the only precaution sponsoring states seem to take is that they do not wish to be caught in the act. It is a misnomer to describe such terrorists as non-state actors. Over time these terrorist organisations either morph on their own or are encouraged by their sponsors to split and re-emerge in their new incarnations.

Marc Sageman in his book 'Leaderless Jihad' which is about terror networks in the 21st century, documents how Islamist terror networks were evolving into more fluid, independent and unpredictable groups than those in the past. He refers to scattered groups and individuals who drift into Internet chat rooms and the various websites of the terrorists that now flood the net and whose protagonists have little or minimal contact with their sponsors, thus making it more difficult for authorities to keep track of such activities till sometimes it is too late.

Until 2004, most of the networks functioned through face to face interactions among friends or controllers (the 1993 World Trade Centre Bombings, the 1993 Mumbai serial bombing, the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa, the 9/11 attacks, the Indian Parliament attack in December 2001, the 2004 Madrid train bombings). Starting around 2004, communications and inspirations shifted from these interactions at local halal ethnic restaurants or barber shops close to radical Islamist mosques to interaction on the internet. The Madrid bombers were inspired by a document posted on the Global Islamic Front website in December 2003. People involved in the Mumbai 2008 case made use of internet protocols to keep in touch and draw inspiration even during the actual incident.

WMD Terrorism

The world has not seen WMD terrorism but fears of this taking place are uppermost in the plans of most counter terror and intelligence/security organisations. The nuclear and thermonuclear arsenals of the USA and Russia are still so vast that they have individual weapons that have greater destructive power than all the non-nuclear bombs dropped by all the air forces of the world in all the wars in human history, including Iraq war.

Theoretically, the various kinds of some 20000 nuclear bombs would be at risk, but in practice the more realistic fear would be use of a small weapon stolen from one of the nuclear states, or a plutonium or heavily enriched uranium basement type bomb or the theft of material to make a dirty bomb. Weapons of the first kind form part of the inventory of the US and Russian forces. It is possible that weapons of this kind would attract the attention of terrorists. Particularly attractive could be the American W-25 SADM, a 25 kg device that can be parachuted into enemy territory to destroy bridges, tunnels and other such installations. There is also the 20 kilo Davy Crocket, jeep mounted warhead originally meant to halt a Soviet blitzkrieg in Europe.

The W-82 is a three foot long atomic artillery shell that weighs about 40 kg, or the two foot long which can be carried in a back pack. The Soviet arsenal also included suitcase devices, backpack weapons like the Army's RA 155 and the Navy's RA-115-01 which is meant for underwater use.

The threat is not just from the terrorists getting hold of a nuclear device in the Islamic world or by jihadis but such small devices could be as attractive as the Stringer missiles were during the campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The issue here is not the large scale disappearance of such weapons but even one will be enough to create a catastrophic terrorist incident. However, experts also believe that it was more likely that terrorists would prefer to acquire fissile material and make their own bomb rather than try to buy one off the shelf, as it were.

Maritime Terrorism

The world has seen terrorism on the ground, in the air but has not seen much of it on the high seas. The attack on the USS Cole was a relatively small terrorist attack when compared to the sea-borne attack in Mumbai in November 2008. Since each terrorist attack should be seen as the possible precursor to something even bigger, the Mumbai attack has exposed India's vulnerabilities all along its 7500 km long sea coast and the scattered islands in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. This remains a major vulnerability of India.

Over 50,000 ships pass through the Malacca Straits each year. A terrorist attack in the narrow critical part of the Straits could block the Straits and cripple world trade. This would provide terrorists a large iconic impact that would not be available through a terrorist attack on a ship on the high seas. International threat perceptions of maritime terrorism are high and will continue to remain high in the foreseeable future.

The possible use of oil for causing massive disruptions in the world economy has been receiving increasing attention from the international jihadi terrorist elements. The need for attacks on oil installations is a frequently occurring theme in the messages of Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants. Till now, the attacks on the oil industry have been in the form of one reported attack on a oil tanker at the Aden port, attacks on the foreign experts working in the oil industry in Saudi Arabia and the blowing-up of oil pipelines in Iraq. The attacks, though spectacular, have not had a sustained effect. The oil industry, like the tourism industry, has shown itself to be resilient despite its vulnerability. Both the tourism and oil industries have so far been able to recover from the sporadic attacks on them fairly quickly. The economic disruption, though considerable, was temporary and did not have a serious effect on the availability and affordability of oil. This should not lead to any feeling of complacency that attacks of a more disastrous nature are unlikely. Counter-terrorism techniques tailor-made for the energy sector need urgent attention.

India's plans for ensuring the supplies of energy to fuel its expanding economy through a network of pipelines from Turkmenistan and Iran via Pakistan and from Myanmar via Bangladesh would remain a pipedream till the already-established international jihadi terrorist networks in the region are not neutralised.

The surviving terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan continues to pose a threat to peace and security and economic prosperity in South, West and Central Asia. The emerging one in Bangladesh has serious implications for South and South-East Asia.

The Economy of Terror

The world has not seen financial terrorism, something that would send the dollar into a spin. Modern terrorism thrives not on just ideology or politics. The main driver is money and the new economy of terror and international crime has been calculated to be worth US \$ 1.5 trillion (and growing), which is big enough to challenge western hegemony. This is higher than the GDP of Britain, ten times the size of General Motors and 17 per cent of the US GDP (1998). Loretta Napoleoni splits this terror and crime GDP into three parts. About one-third constitutes money that has moved illegally from one country to another, another one-third is generated primarily by criminal activities and called the Gross Criminal Product while the remaining is the money produced by terror organisations, from illegal businesses, narcotics and smuggling. Napoleoni refers to this as the New Economy of Terror.

All the underground transactions of arms and narcotics trading, oil and diamonds smuggling, charitable organisations that front for illegal businesses and the black money operations form part of this burgeoning business. Terror has other reasons to thrive. There are vested interests that seek the wages of terrorism and terrorist war. Narcotics smuggling generates its own separate business lines, globally connected with arms smuggling and human trafficking, and all dealt with, in hundred dollar bills. These black dollars have to be laundered, which is yet another distinctive, secretive and complicated transnational occupation closely connected with these illegal activities and is really a crucial infusion of cash into the western economies.

The nineties were a far cry from the early days of dependence on the Cold War sponsors of violence and terrorism. In the seventies, terrorists began to rely on legal economic activities for raising funds. The buzzword today is globalisation, including in the business of terrorism. Armed groups have linked up internationally, financially and otherwise, have been able to operate across borders with Pakistani jihadis doing service in Chechnya and Kosovo, or Uzbek insurgents taking shelter in Pakistan.

In today's world of deregulated finance, terrorists have taken full advantage of systems to penetrate legitimate international financial institutions and establish regular business houses. Islamic banks and other charities have helped movement of funds, sometimes without the knowledge of the managers of these institutions. The source and destination of the funds is not what has been declared. Both Hamas and the PLO have been flush with funds with Arafat's secret treasury estimated to be worth US \$ 700 million to 2 billion.

It is not easy but the civilised world must counter the scourge of terrorism. In a networked world, where communication and action can be in real time, where boundaries need not be crossed and where terrorist action can take place on the Net and through the Net, the task of countering this is increasingly difficult and intricate. Governments are bound by Geneva Conventions in tackling a terrorist organisation, but the terrorist is not bound by such regulations in this asymmetric warfare.

The Changing Face of Terror in Pakistan

South Asia, as we all know, is both the battleground and home for these groups, threatening to destabilise political structures and social fabric of the region by acts of terror directed against specific religious and ethnic communities.

There is a clear distinction between the groups which existed during the Afghan jihad and today. There are marked differences in composition, objectives, modus operandi, networks, finances and reach. The pre-al Qaida groups, like Harkat-ul Ansar (HuA), Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HM), Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Lashkar-e-tayyeba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), were created by state agencies in Pakistan for specific objectives. The objectives were two-fold: help the Americans drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan through guerilla war and launch a protracted proxy war in Kashmir. These groups largely depended on the state munificence and funds generously provided by the USA and other western nations, and west Asian countries like Saudi Arabia, through a network of newly created banking organisations like the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), cowboy methods like currency chests flown into Pakistan, besides guns and ammunition shipped and airlifted in tonnes from different parts of the world.

These groups largely drew the cadre and leadership for jihad from madrasas and extremist religious groups in Pakistan which were amply supported by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistan Army. They relied primarily on the religious "brotherhood" both within Pakistan and outside, and their association with the ISI to create a chain of madrasas and training grounds for recruiting, indoctrinating and training the so-called "freedom fighters"

(mujahideen). Their area of operation was pre-determined and they worked strictly under the control of the ISI (and CIA) in Afghanistan.

Terrorism in the Indian sub-continent underwent dramatic changes after the disintegration of Soviet Union and more so, after September 11, 2001. Funds, resources and support for the jihadi groups dried up rapidly. Many of the groups died a natural death. Others were given a make-over by the ISI with a new identity and new grounds of training and operation. A large number of the cadres, unemployed, drifted to rabidly Sunni groups like Sipah-e-Saheba of Pakistan (SSP) and LeJ, criminal activities like carjacking, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom and smuggling. Others joined newly created groups like JeM and United Jihad Council carved out of old Afghan groups like HuA and HuM.

Unlike Pakistan where religious extremist groups have remained on the fringes of the political spectrum, in Bangladesh such groups have had a decisive role to play. One such group is Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) which owes much of its growth to the Islamisation of the country's political institutions initiated by President Zia-ur Rehman in 1977. The present Awami League government of Sheikh Hasina is far more confident and has taken significant steps to curb terrorism aimed at India and also to reign in right wing elements that may be a threat to Bangladesh. However, in the past, both Awami League, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by former Premier Begum Khaleda Zia, assiduously courted JeI for their own bitter and protracted duel for supremacy. The Awami League, for instance, sought support from the religious parties to campaign against the BNP while the latter has co-opted JeI as a coalition partner. JeI, as a result, is today the third largest political party in Bangladesh.

The rise of radical political and religious parties like JeI promoted the growth of madrasas in the country, mostly funded by west Asian countries. These madrasas played host to various terrorist groups anxious to recruit and train young students. One of the more prominent ones is HuJI, widely regarded as al-Qaeda's operating arm in south Asia. HuJI has been consolidating its position in Bangladesh where it boasts a membership of more than 15,000 activists, of whom at least 2,000 are hardcore.

The decimation of the Taliban and the emergence of al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden gave a new hue and ideological boost to terrorist groups. The list of enemy expanded to include the USA and Israel besides India. New alliances were established. Terrorist groups drew recruits from religious extremist groups like SSP and LeJ. Drawing upon the resources of the ISI, these groups established sleeper cells in different parts of India and in other parts of the world.

With cumulative bans imposed on their activities by the US State Department, the United Nations and various governments, including that of Pakistan, these groups, particularly LeT, established new networks of finances, tapping into Pakistani diaspora in the UK, West Asia, the USA, Australia and Europe. These groups began relying on transnational smuggling and hawala syndicates to transfer funds and arms. There was a decisive shift in targets, both in terms of location and character, and modus operandi. The targets today range from political leaders to mass transit systems to nuclear stations, with the clear objective of instigating communal violence in India and inflicting heavy damage to the economy. The methodology has shifted from isolated attacks to bombings of public transport systems and markets and religious places to spread panic and fear. Kashmir is no longer the operational ground nor, the sole target. The groups today live by a pan-India, and at times a pan-global, agenda of establishing the Caliphate.

Pakistan's duplicity in dealing with terrorist and extremist elements came to haunt the region when Lahore-based LeT trained jihadis, with the connivance of ISI and Pakistan Army, attacked Mumbai and raised the spectre of another war in the region. Even after suffering several attacks in the past three years, Pakistan Army refuses to give up its support for terrorist groups like LeT or the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan.

Left Wing Extremism

It is increasingly evident that the menace of Left Wing Extremism has been underestimated by the Government all these years. Not only does it impact in areas which are rich in mineral resources (80 per cent of India's high grade iron ore, 85 per cent of total coal deposits) are in the so-called red corridor. The insurgency has spread rapidly in the last few years, but has also occupied larger areas as government and governance have receded. 225 districts are affected up from 160 a few years ago; estimated to have Rs 1500-2000 crores through extortion, narcotics and hijacking government development funds. they have an arsenal of about 10000 assorted weapons from AK series to INSAS, LMGs and SLRs to 303 rifles. Originally concentrated in the rural areas of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal they are now also moving into urban centres of Raipur, Surat, Faridabad, Bastar and other places. Local grievances, exploitation and absence of governance have been the planks for their movement.

Backed by a strong informer system, the terrorists avoid any frontal engagements with the Security Forces (SFs) and there is a greater reliance on IEDs. They rely on rapid movement both in attack and escape. There has been a rising trend in the incidents as statistics reveal. In 2006 there were 1509 incidents which rose to 1591 in 2008 and 2258 in 2009. Left Wing Extremists have begun to move into other states like Haryana, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Assam, Kerala and Delhi. These are early stages but then every movement has an early stage before it gets out of hand unless tackled early and counter insurgency is not politicised. The tendency to rush in with humanitarian aid as an attempt to solve the crises is invariably a misplaced tactic and does nothing to win over the population or the insurgents. Developmental assistance without ensuring a semblance of law and order, will always be counter-productive. The entire counter effort has to be fought on a different grid, needs human intelligence (humint), quick reaction teams and the development of capacities to clear and hold. None of this will be achieved overnight and needs sustained long term efforts. Unless, all this is done the movement will continue to grow and may well join hands with other ethnic and religious groupings in the country or aided from outside.

Technology as a Force Multiplier for Terrorism

We have all spoken and read about the exponential transformation in technology in the past two decades. From the first text message which was sent in Britain in 1992 and ten years later 100 billion SMS messages were being exchanged

every month and today 4.1 billion messages are sent daily — is just an example for a typical day. Not only is this the manner in which technology is changing; today we talk of gigabytes and terabytes. But another improvement is on its way – petabytes. When this happens, then it would be possible to store the entire Library of Congress — the world's largest with 120 million books/journals stored on 850 kilometres of shelves with 10,000 books added daily, and these could be stored in just 0.02 petabytes. In March 2007, the CIA began working on a digital library of national intelligence information and it would have everything from raw data to analytical information and it was expected to be bigger than the Library of Congress.

Two years ago the size of the Web was such that Google could search 60 billion pages in a second or less. But there is a Deep Web, that cannot be accessed and it is estimated to be 50 times larger. There is so much information overload that the 16 US intelligence agencies employ 45000 analysts. Of course in India, we don't have that kind of global threat perceptions or requirements or even the funds but need some scaled down model. There are 1.6 billion people on line today, up from 1 billion two years ago. 60 per cent of the world's population of 6.6 billion today uses cell phones up from 12 per cent in 2000. Islamist groups are known to use mini-cameras to post their propaganda films on YouTube. Steganography is commonly used to embed secret messages on the net.

Terrorism is now truly global and as multinational as Microsoft. The USA and al-Qaeda are the two that have global reach today. But terrorism is unrelentingly lethal and it is cheap (the ingredients for sarin gas which, when used properly with a spray, could kill anywhere between a few hundred and a few thousand, cost only \$ 150). The irony is that the American state spends multi-million dollars in developing state of the art drones, armed with advanced weaponry; these can now be hacked into by insurgents with a US \$ 26 off the shelf Russian software which highlights the disparity between costs to insurgents and counter insurgents.

There are many players in the field today — the fanatics, the criminals, the drug-traffickers, the human traffickers. The masterminds are not the archetypal villains epitomised by Bollywood, but could be the boy or girl next door in the suburbs of Atlanta or Marseilles or an alumnus from Binori mosque in Karachi. For us in India we have learnt to live with it, having been victims of this for the last three decades and more. It is a problem that will not go away easily, soon or completely.

Future wars are unlikely to engage massive armies locked in prolonged battle for real estate. Attacks could now come by stealth, master-minded by some computer whiz kid along with some science graduate, and the targets are our ways of life. The terrorist of the day wishes to use 21st century tools to push us all back to the 7th century. It is a highly unconventional war that the State hopes to fight only with conventional weapons or tactics. Unless the State learns to be flexible and agile, and unless there is full scale cooperation internationally, it will always be an uphill struggle with the peak never really visible.

It is the use of modern technology by the terrorist that has led the counter terrorist to evolve expensive, all pervasive surveillance and counter terrorist techniques in ways that leave the espionage and counter espionage activities of the Cold War years far behind. In the west, especially in the US there has been an upsurge in intelligence activity as the US battles to secure itself in the new global war. Faced with an information overload where every

e mail, every telephone call, every SMS, every fax is subject to surveillance apart from the literature floating on the web, intelligence activity has been outsourced in a major fashion. From just being a military-industrial complex it is now an intelligence-industry complex where major players like Lockheed Martin, Booz Allen and Hamilton, CACI International, SAIC and IBM are now active associates of the CIA, NSA and the Pentagon in intelligence activities at home and abroad. Blackwater and DynCorp as well as others provide the muscle power. Their charter includes covert operations and interrogations of suspects. Privatisation of espionage and authorised privatisation of violence will change societies in ways that will become apparent only later when the power of these groups may exceed those of the state, especially in weaker or smaller states.

Intelligence

It is an unending nightmare for intelligence agencies the world over. Who? What? Where? When? And how? In what language will the terrorists communicate and what medium? What code? Will we get to know before they strike? Not all attacks will be preventable. Only finely co-ordinated, transparent and real time co-operation on a global scale will make the task of the terrorist more difficult, if not impossible. The terrorists have gone global so must the counter-terrorism.

Despite the rapid development of the technological element, the human element will continue to be the most important factor in determining the outcome of the campaign against terrorism. In spite of the superiority of the State in numbers and material, and technological resources, the international jihadi terrorists do not show as yet any signs of withering away. The quality of the human element they have at their disposal would substantially account for this. The quality of the human element available to the security and counter-terrorism agencies should surpass that of the terrorists, if the State has to ultimately prevail.

With only mediocre human element, even the best of technological capability cannot produce adequate results. The best of human element can ultimately prevail even if the technological capability is up to the mark. The human element is very important at every stage of counter-terrorism—intelligence collection and analysis, use of the intelligence for prevention, neutralisation of the capability of the terrorists, investigation of terrorist strikes and successful prosecution. How to develop an unbroken chain of human competence of high quality? That is a question which would continue to need attention in the years to come.

There has to be a revolution in the intelligence culture and tradecraft or operating techniques in order to be able to prevail over the terrorists. The existing tradecraft served adequately the purpose of the penetration of the State adversaries in order to collect humint. It has been found to be inadequate, if not unsuited, for penetrating the set-ups of non-State actors, particularly the terrorists, who operate on the basis of the principle of autonomous cells. The progress

towards the evolution of new tradecraft and new techniques has been unsatisfactory.

A revolution in the intelligence culture also calls for effective networking of national and foreign intelligence agencies and sharing without inhibition of all relevant intelligence. The intelligence and counter-terrorism networking has to be as effective as the networking by the terrorists. Such networking was found difficult even in days when the number of intelligence agencies in each nation was small and manageable. How to ensure this in an era of mushrooming agencies is another question which needs urgent attention.

There has been some progress towards international intelligence co-operation at the bilateral level, but the progress towards multilateral co-operation is still years away. Since the US is and will continue to be a predominant player in all intelligence co-operation networks, suspicions of its real intentions and fears of its using such networks for serving its hegemonistic and strategic interests would continue to dog any progress towards multilateral co-operation.

There is an equally urgent need for a revolution in counter-terrorism training methods with an emphasis on joint training in specialised counter-terrorism schools for the officers and staff handling counter-terrorism in all intelligence and security agencies, and police forces and the improvement of language capability. The training should develop in the officers an ability to think and act unconventionally with the help of suitably devised counter-terrorism games similar to the war games.

Effects on Terrorist Groups in India

The emergence of new terrorist groups and coalitions added a disturbing dimension to the terrorist threat to India. While the birth of a new terrorist coalition, which called itself Indian Mujahideen (IM), raised fears about a resurgence of radical elements within the 150-million strong Indian Muslim community, it was the discovery of Hindu extremist group or groups involved in some of the terrorist attacks, till date attributed to Islamic groups, which challenges the earlier Indian claims and adds weight to the protestations made by the Muslim community about painting the entire community with a tar brush every time a bomb explodes anywhere in India.

India thus witnessed the emergence of two clear strands of terrorism, linked in a regrettable sort of way to the State's inability, and timidity, in tackling terrorist groups and persons firmly, and decisively. The IM presents the first strand. According to investigations carried out so far, some of it since discredited by the discovery of Hindu brand of terrorism, it is a diffused but highly networked group of terrorists, driven by a dangerous cocktail of extremist ideology, and a simmering sense of anguish and revenge. They are mostly young professionals as well as from the blue collar class who are aware of the global jihadi propaganda but are provoked more by actions of the police and rival communities at the domestic level.

The Role of the Army in Counter Terror and Counter Insurgency

The Indian Army has been required for internal security duties almost from the very beginning when it was called in to tackle the communist insurgency in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh from 1949 to 1952. The Indian Army was also pressed into action to deal with a Pakistani guerrilla invasion in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. Then, it was successively involved in the north-east in the 1950s and 60s, till the present day in cases like the Bodo and Assamese movements. The Army was called in for action in the Punjab in the 1980s and has been in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990.

The Army and the security forces (SF) have lost 5,962 personnel to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir from 1990 to July 5, 2010. This year alone 45 SF personnel have died in the State fighting terrorists. Elsewhere, as many as 939 officers and men lost their lives in Manipur; 783 in Assam; 81 in Meghalaya and

22 in Mizoram. In addition, 1,226 SF personnel have died fighting Maoists between 2005 and 2010; this year, till July 5, we have lost 204 men in uniform.

Since 1990, the SF have faced 1,511 cases of human rights abuse. These were investigated by various agencies, including the National Human Rights Commission, and 1,473 were found to be false while 104 men found guilty have been punished.

Ideally, one would not want the Army to be involved in counter-insurgency operations. The Government and the people have faced insurgencies almost from the beginning and we should have evolved suitable instruments for dealing with insurgencies, terrorism and such like internal security situations. The induction of the Army into counter-terror/counter-insurgency mode, usually in case of non-availability of the para-military is accompanied by the introduction of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to provide it legal cover for internal security duties. The Army needs to be protected and empowered but with this empowerment comes accountability. Machil incident in J&K cannot be allowed to be repeated. The problem that arises, apart from the fact that the Army is unfamiliar with the terrain, it is not supported by adequate intelligence. Added to this, are the problems of civil-military co-ordination and the ownership of various forces that are deployed. The police answer to the local government, the para-military forces to the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi and the Army has its own command structure under the Ministry of Defence. There is also the problem of co-ordination among Central and local intelligence agencies.

In Jammu and Kashmir the concept of Unified Headquarters was introduced in 1994 and later tried in Assam in 1997 and Manipur in 2004 but had limited success because the body lacked statutory authority. Political parties did not take to this structure with any great enthusiasm as it required them to commit to a counterinsurgency plan which was probably at variance with their political plans. The concept of a Unified Headquarters has been a partial success and effective civil-military co-ordination remains a big challenge to evolving any cohesive long term plan that goes beyond containing insurgency to eliminating it.

The Future

Some of the trends that are likely to emerge in India are given in the succeeding paras.

The Birth of Terror Coalition: -

(a) This implies a tie up between the Pak-based JeM and LeT working with Bangladesh based groups like the HUJI (B) and then tied in with Indian groups like the SIMI and other smaller groups. The IM is a product of such coalition and they-the IM could become part of global jihad.

(b) The spread of a pan-Islamic character across the breadth of the country, with the left wing extremists already talking of coalescing with other groups - Sikh, Islamic or ethnic - would be a cause for concern for the government. This is aggravated if there is the inevitable foreign hand. Be that as it may, it is feared that the northeast especially Assam and West Bengal would be increasingly under threat from a mixture of Left Wing Extremism and Islamist terrorism. This is perhaps the most dangerous part of this spectre of terrorism.

Pakistan is not expected to give up this weapon of state sponsored terrorism as a force equaliser against the stronger India. This can happen only if the price of terrorism is more than what Pakistan can afford to pay and Pakistan overcomes its fear psychosis about India. In the decade ahead we should not expect any appreciable change in the level of terrorism. In fact we should be prepared for new kinds of terrorism. Despite having become a victim of its own terrorism, Pakistan is unlikely to be able to reverse this without further trauma.

We should be looking at the many ways terrorism could morph and evolve in the years ahead:-

(a) Terrorist groups will be smaller, more lethal and in some cases even have the lone operator.

(b) Terrorists will be networked, mobile, educated, in the younger age group which would give them greater zeal, idealism and greater readiness to take risks.

(c) Similar groups - mercenaries to provide support services - for counterfeiting, fund transfers, arms smuggling etc. will operate.

(d) The nexus between mafia and terrorists will grow.

(e) The nexus between the terror groups - in whatever form they take in the years ahead - and the military in Pakistan, is not going to change.

(f) Cyber terrorists will abound.

Terrorists, in our region — whatever their grievances, — revenge for perceived injustice, to weaken/destroy non-Muslim or anti-Muslim countries, or establishing Caliphates - will target mostly soft, vulnerable and high-profile urban targets, especially mega-metropolis like New Delhi or Mumbai.. This would mean vital infrastructure and communications, hijack of airlines, attacks on embassies, foreign interests, mass transit networks, maritime assets - all that would hurt economic interests.

It has to be accepted that there can be no final victory in any battle against terrorism. Resentments, real or imagined, and exploding expectations, will persist. Since the state no longer has monopoly on instruments of violence, recourse to violence is increasingly a weapon of first resort. Terrorism can be contained and its effects minimised but cannot be eradicated any more than the world can eradicate crime. An over-militaristic response or repeated use of the armed forces is fraught with long-term risks for a nation and for the armed forces. Military action to deter or overcome an immediate threat is often necessary but it cannot ultimately eradicate terrorism. This is as much a political and economic battle, and also a battle to be fought in the long-term by the intelligence and security agencies, and increasingly in cooperation with agencies of other countries.

Ultimately, the battle is between democracy and terrorism. The fear is that in order to defeat the latter, we may end up sacrificing some of our democratic values.

*Text of the talk delivered at USI on 22 Sep 2010. **General Deepak Kapoor, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)** former Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee was in the chair.

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