

**Role and Limitations of Social Media in Image Building and Perception Management\***  
**Colonel Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, AVSM (Retd)@**

I consider it a great privilege and an honour to be speaking to this distinguished audience. At the very outset I would like to thank USI for giving me this opportunity to deliver the memorial lecture which has been instituted to commemorate the great service rendered by Colonel Pyara Lal to this institution.

All of us are leaders and as leaders communication becomes a very important tool. All of us, while in service or otherwise, have communicated through words, actions, body language and at times by setting an example. Every bit of it was communication to the soldiers that we commanded. But, to amplify that communication, we have to look at other modes of communication also. In today's fast changing world, we have realised that apart from television and radio, social media is also changing fast because of the way the world communicates now with each other. At one point of time social media was considered an icing on the cake, but now it is the cake itself. It has its pluses and minuses. Today every leader, and at times the organisations themselves are leaders; so a leader or an organisation needs to keep pace with fast changing world of communication and adapt to the latest communication techniques.

Then there is globalisation as well as localisation. The Government of India (GoI) has rules and regulations regarding starting up of various channels, their licenses and permissions. We also keep a track of the kind of programmes and news that are shown on these channels. We have established programme codes and guidelines to which all the channels are signatories and, therefore, answerable to that programme code. But yet there is internet through which the foreign channels can come in without these programme codes and guidelines, and without being signatories to any of these terms and conditions of the GoI.

Most of the people in urban cities these days are reading news, less in the newspapers and more online. We are catching up on the news on the go on our mobile phones. As a result of this, the growth of newspapers in the world is in the negative, while online and other applications is on the rise. In India, however, the newspapers are still in the positive growth and one of the reasons for the same is that people in rural India have started reading newspapers now. But it won't be very long before the 4G technology or the other ways in which internet is delivered will penetrate the rural hinterlands and newspapers will again go on the decline there as well. On the other hand, there has also been a boom in the regional news channels. The local cable television operators have set up their own news networks in the cities. There is a sort of a competition between the consumption of global news and local news and, this provides both opportunities and challenges to various news channels. So far there was only one way communication, whether it was reading newspapers, listening to radio or watching television; but social media has changed all that. Social media gave each one of us the ability to communicate hence; people's interest in the social media grew manifold. Each one of us on social media is like a channel itself. No individual or community is marginalised and are able to communicate their thoughts and processes, their ideas and opinions and views on any policy or issues freely on the social media. Thus, it became an extremely attractive component of communication process and that is why it has caught the imagination of the whole world.

Apart from giving each one of us the ability to communicate, and therefore become a two-way communication, it also provides us real time information and communication. We have the ability to communicate at any given moment and get response at that very time. This adds to the fascination of social media. Amongst the first ones to know of any incident that occurs in any part of the world, is the person present there with a mobile phone who tweets about that incident. The news channels have now started feeding off the social media. Social media has become the content provider, and the news channels have become drivers to amplify that event further. So saleability is with the news channels and content is with social media and they continue to feed off each other. A visit to the Twitter account of the anchors of various news channels would reveal who all they are following. There would be the politicians who make policy decisions, sports personalities, celebrities and anybody who has developed the ability to communicate and spread news and views. This is how they are taking news from social media. There is a great interlink between the social media and news channels.

Social media has developed the ability to influence public policies. Now the Government is seeking views of the public. Ten years back it was perhaps difficult to understand what the people wanted; but today it has become that much easier. GoI's official website, [www.MyGov.in](http://www.MyGov.in), is very user friendly like Facebook. Once you register on it, there are various discussion forums that one can join. All these discussion forums are being tracked by the Government to pick up the bright ideas that people may have on issues. On many occasions we have had logos and advertisements designed by the people. In terms of policies also, drafts of various policies and blogs are uploaded on the internet and people are free to respond to them through the social media. This is done to get a sense of what people think about the various policies of the Government.

The Information and Broadcasting Ministry is coming up with a new Cinematograph Act for films. The last Cinematograph Act was formulated in 1952 and hence the need to amend and modernise it. We prepared a draft and put it on the internet and let people respond to it. We received thousands of responses; some interesting and some wild, but we also received some that could even be incorporated. So these are the ways that government has started communicating with the people. In the bargain, the individual has developed the ability to influence policy decisions and that ability gives him a sense of confidence and rightly so.

The social media follows a process of news, views, emotions and mobilisation. On social media people develop and join various groups. If a person wants he can start his own channel on YouTube. For example, if you have experience of war or counter-insurgency; you could record a video and post it on YouTube or you could record an interview of a jawan and put it on YouTube, and gradually you will find people of similar interest following your channel on YouTube. Also, when an individual who has a following on social networking sites tweets something it reaches out to

the entire group; and if a person who has his own following, re-tweets it he is getting the groups interconnected. And that is how the process of news to views, to emotions and then to mobilisation comes about. The 16 Dec 2012 rape case, when thousands of people gathered on the Delhi streets, is an example of mobilisation through social media. And even before that, Arab Spring came about as a result of mobilisation through social media.

A few other advantages of social media are that the government is able to reach out to a large audience with lesser investment; especially during the time of crises and natural calamities the information about missing people, the location and phone numbers of the help centres can be easily made available to people in distress and requiring help. It is open knowledge that Prime Minister of Nepal got to know about the Nepal earthquake last year through Prime Minister Modi's Tweet. The district administration is better organised now because of social media networks.

In spite of all this, there has always been a slight hesitation by some organisations to get on to various social media platforms. There is a feeling that these are newer technologies and at times one doesn't understand them. But it is now imperative that all our organisations must invest into the social media. No leader or organisation, that needs to move forward, especially when connected with public issues, can stay away from communication on social media. There are a number of examples of international organisations taking to social media. CIA came on Twitter. ISRO's #MarsOrbiter and NASA's #MarsCuriosity were on Twitter and they had an interesting exchange of first tweets. Similarly, for 26 Jan 2015 Republic Day Parade, the invitation was tweeted by Prime Minister Modi to the US President Barrack Obama and it was accepted through Twitter. These are some of the interesting ways to attract people to social media and make themselves count. President Obama and Prime Minister Modi have the largest following in the world on Twitter and Facebook. Both are great communicators and therefore, it goes without saying that both are very active on social media.

These are some of the pluses of social media but there are also the negatives. As I mentioned earlier, the news channels take information from Twitter feeds and other platforms but because of high competition between the channels to be the first to report, they themselves have confessed on many occasions that they don't vet the information before broadcasting it. So, as soon as news breaks on one channel, its competitor will immediately break that news and check its veracity only later; and then withdraw it, if it is not found correct. But in this process the person/organisation on which the news is broken has already gone through character assassination. This is the biggest negative of today's fast communicative world.

Another aspect is that rumours can very easily be spread on the social media. For example, when in August 2012 people of northeast India started moving out of Bangalore in huge numbers because of unfounded rumours floating on the social networking sites about violence against them. There are umpteen examples of pictures or videos taken, perhaps in some other countries, and then referred to as something that happened in Muzaffarnagar or Gujarat or any other part of India to ignite emotions of a particular community. It is very difficult to police it. So, because of such like reasons social media could be extremely dangerous at times. But the only way of countering this situation is for a mature individual to send a positive message, one can look at the original handle of the organisation to ascertain if it is a rumour or otherwise. If the organisation is tweeting positive message then there are enough number of good people retweeting that information so that the right message reaches maximum number of people. There was a time when we would think that keeping quiet on a certain issue would make the news die down but in today's times that is not true.

Coming to the issue of national security. The social media as an entire medium of communication was meant to be absolutely free of any kind of government or regulatory authority. The entire essence of internet when, it was created in 1967, was to break down the authority of every authoritarian department and government. Social media was born from the same spirit. Any government that has tried to control or put restrictions on social media has had to face public ire. This phenomenon is not limited to India; the same is the case with other countries in the world as well. The Indian Government does not fear free communication; in fact it favours and encourages it. But the ability of the people to create ideological groups on social media sites with questionable intentions and then go on to views, to emotions and then, God forbid, go onto mobilisation is something the Government is obviously worried about.

We are proud of our Armed Forces and also of the fact that no one can come through our defences. Our defences are very well covered, from air, land and sea, but not from the internet. And today the enemy or elements inimical to India's interests, without any restrictions, through news or through views on social media can enter our country. There are no boundaries between districts, states and countries as far as internet is concerned and this certainly is a threat. The only defence against such mischief is that we have larger number of people present on the social media so that we understand when there is an 'ideological seed' being planted and then we are able to counter it. When the person who is trying to foment trouble is identified, then that particular handle or Facebook profile is taken care of. But it is such a large platform that it becomes very difficult to identify such people if we are not present on social media ourselves. We all have to become soldiers on the internet. If we all play our part as soldiers then we will be able to police it to some extent.

Also very important is the person who is handling the social media in a department or an organisation. As individuals we could tweet or retweet frivolous issues, but as organisations there is a certain amount of grace and dignity involved. Therefore, the person who handles the social media on behalf of an organisation has to be very mature in understanding of the issues. Today, ministries and various government departments are on social media and it becomes imperative that nothing goes out that does not depict India in the grace that it ought to be as these are international messages that go across the borders and can have implications.

What are the GoI and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting doing in terms of social media? We realise that it is a very important tool of communication, so we have created our own social media cell. It is a communication hub and we are tracking the social media continuously twenty four hours. We have software that trawls up to 40 million websites in an hour and it picks up all the keywords we are looking for. So it provides to the Government the trends and analysis of anything that is happening. Even on One Rank One Pension (OROP) issue Government had used this feedback. In fact on every issue on a daily basis such feedback is communicated to the Government. This process started two years ago and till date we have generated about 1500 reports. On a daily basis the reports are sent to

concerned ministers and they can gauge the effect of their policies on the general public. So without going on ground if one wants to understand what people are thinking then social media is the place where one can see the trends and analyses.

The Government has its own YouTube channel. We decided to have the 26 Jan 2015 Republic Day Parade broadcast live on YouTube inspite of some apprehensions from certain quarters that it was a holiday and people would rather watch it on television. In the event, we had 11 lakh hits live on YouTube channel. These were the people who may have been on the move and did not have access to television but wanted to see the parade. So to think that people will not make use of such platforms is a fallacy and the moment you give an option to people they would use it and put their views and opinions on it.

We also realised that some of the communication that the Government wants to do with the people should be done in a format that we want. For example, the Budget Day speech is very important and every news channel wants to talk to Finance Minister that day, but with nearly 800 channels existing it is impossible. So we devised a way. His speech inside the Parliament was telecast live on Lok Sabha TV and DD National and in the evening we conducted a Talkathon. We invited questions from general public. A day before we had started advertising 'ask your query to Finance Minister' through #AskYourGovernment and by evening it was trending Number One on social media. We had about three crore hits on #AskYourGovernment. So we keep having such Talkathons with the ministers and we publicise it through the social media. We are also coming up with mobile applications now so that people can have access to the direct information from the Government and it becomes a two-way traffic between the people and the Government. We realise it is extremely important to be a part and parcel of the social media and to be able to understand, communicate and deliver in a way that our voters want and expect.

Thank you and Jai Hind!

### Interactive Session

During the interactive session a number of issues and questions were raised to which the Hon'ble minister answered very freely and frankly. A few of the important points that emerged are enumerated in the succeeding paras.

Responding to a question the Minister informed that his Ministry was by far quite liberal in giving benefit of doubt to those people who voice their criticism against the government policies and actions, and if at all an issue of anti-national activity is brought up, it is handled by Inter-Ministerial Committee of Secretaries. He also said that they were reluctant to issue notices to news channels for breaking programme code, but after the live coverage of events during 2008 Mumbai attack, the channels were advised to follow 'self-regulation'. During Gurdaspur attack recently, there were some minor violations on part of a few news anchors and the Ministry sent 'advisory' to those channels. However, some news channels crossed the "Lakshman Rekha" in the Yakub Memon hanging case and they were issued a Show Cause notice.

Informing the audience about his Ministry's upcoming tasks and activities he said that the Government had decided to spend INR 600 crores to restore, archive and digitise very old films, and that he had requested the Chief of Army Staff to provide such movies to his Ministry so they could be preserved for posterity. The Government has also started a new channel, DD Kisan that provides all the information regarding agriculture to our farmers, and a new channel DD India was being thought of that would be on the lines of BBC. Responding to the concern of Armed Forces officers present in the audience, he informed that his ministry was also in the process of creating movies on all the Param Vir Chakra awardees.

He said that during the Frequency Modulated (FM) Phase II policy, sports channels were not allowed to be aired on private radio channels but with the FM Phase III policy being implemented, the private radio channels have been allowed to air sports related news. Every town with a population of one lakh and above would be covered by FM radio in the near future.

The Minister also highlighted some very interesting facts about Doordarshan and All India Radio (AIR). He informed that there was no other channel that employed upto 33,000 people, as Doordarshan did. It broadcasts programmes in 23 different languages. He said that his Ministry had the mandate to keep the Indian culture alive and for that AIR was in the process of recording nine lakh songs (some not even of the level of folk songs) that are sung in various big and small communities throughout the length and breadth of our Country. He said that right then 45 per cent of India was covered by FM radio and in 2-3 years the percentage would rise to 60, and by 2016 all the television signals would be digitised.

\*Text of the talk delivered by Colonel Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, AVSM (Retd), Hon'ble Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting at USI on 09 Sep 2015 with Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd), Director USI in the Chair.

**@Colonel Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, AVSM (Retd)** was commissioned into 64 Cavalry with the coveted 'Sword of Honour' on 15 Dec 1990. A second generation 'Grinder', he was transferred to 9 GRENADIERS on 28 Feb 1992. He took part in CI operations in J&K (1995-96) and was awarded the COAS Commendation Card. In 2004, he won the Silver Medal in Athens's Olympics and was honoured with the Arjuna and Rajiv Gandhi Khel Ratna awards followed by AVSM and Padma Shri. After premature retirement in 2013, he became a Member of Parliament in 2014 and is presently the Minister of State, Information and Broadcasting.

# **Social Media and Social Mobilisation - A Catalyst for Change**

**Major Akshat Upadhyay@**

## **Introduction**

With the bursting of the dot com bubble in early 2000s, a new avatar of the Internet, unofficially called Web 2.0 has come into being. Instead of a few companies or individuals hosting content on servers, to be lapped up by the passive consumer, Web 2.0 has seen a dizzying proliferation of user-created, generated and hosted interactive content. Ordinary people, citizens can now revel in this new found power of interaction, expression of views (conservative or radical), real time simultaneity of coordinated expression, among so many other features. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn et al have changed the way events around the world are perceived and brought hitherto unknown incidents into limelight. They have introduced speed and interactivity into a realm which has traditionally been dominated by state sponsored media and privately owned media empires, whose stated neutralities are questionable. Comment threads on every page of every conceivable subject matter lead to a coalescence of varying viewpoints. This may, sometimes, lead to a Hegelian synthesis or alternately, a Hobbesian state of nature: chaotic and unruly. The point to emphasise is that whatever may be the end result, everyone gets a chance to air his/her sentiments or point of view. This real time horizontal and vertical linking as well as physical adaptability across multiple devices has increased the lure of the improved web.

This article seeks to explore the potential of Social Media in Social Mobilisation and see what direction it might take in the future. This has been done with the help of three case studies, of successful and not so successful mass movements in the last five years, and then draw suitable conclusions for the future of social media, both as a communication medium as well as catalyst for social change.

## **Mass Mobilisation as a Phenomenon**

Mass mobilisation behind any cause requires (to borrow from Gabriel Almond)<sup>1</sup> near simultaneous interest articulation and interest generation by collectives (parties or individuals) followed by interest aggregation which can subsequently be moulded into political/social mobilisation. For the first step i.e. interest generation to be effective, an umbrella cause is required, generic enough to elicit interest from major chunks of the population and specific enough to be time bound and addressable by the relevant authorities. Traditional methods such as distribution of pamphlets and literature, television interviews, advertisements, street plays, peer groups, lobbying etc. can then be the most effective forms of interest articulation on any issue. Interest aggregation is the final step of creating a critical mass of opinion, as well as a physical presence which may manifest itself in letters of protest, peace marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, riots or near anarchy. All these three stages i.e. interest generation, articulation and aggregation require large and disciplined organisations, structured hierarchy and a motivated and relatively indoctrinated work force. Organisations such as political parties, NGOs, INGOs are well versed and adept at utilising the media for shaping the perceptions of public.

## **Arab Spring or Jasmine Revolution**

The spark that ignited the Arab Spring was the self-immolation by Mohd Bouazizi, a vegetable vendor in Tunisia. After being humiliated and repressed by the police, he took the extreme step, protesting against his helplessness and desperation. His act was filmed and clicked by many on their personal mobile phones, and not before long the videos and photographs went viral.<sup>2</sup> Protests first started in the interior of the country. When the protestors were brutally beaten up by the state authorities, footage of these was used as ammunition by experienced online activists, to spread revolution into the affluent parts of the country. A chain reaction, these people then used cellphones and internet to coordinate their meetings and actions. President Ben Ali, who had created a virtual police state since 1987, could not cope with the outpouring of grief and anger amongst the young Tunisians, whose throttled up feelings could now be let loose. Slogans like 'BEN ALI DEGAGE' and 'RCD DEGAGE' became the chant of the common man.<sup>3</sup> Various blogger sites such as nawaat.org<sup>4</sup> and increasing Facebook updates confirmed the discrepancies and distortions in the statements of the leading politicians, and after Ben Ali fled, the same social media was used by the citizens to quell any kind of a misinformation campaign by dubious groups, as well as organise themselves against the security forces, regime supporters and looters.

The most successful and memorable use of the social media, however, was made by the Egyptians. If the final aim of good governance was achieved or the unemployment rates showed a downfall, are questions which remain unanswered. But the attitude and poise showed by the Egyptian youth during the Arab Spring has few parallels in history. The Egyptian Arab Spring, similar to Tunisia, started due to the brutal killing of Khaled Saeed, a 28 year old man who was beaten to death by two police officers. Photos of his disfigured corpse went viral and a Facebook page called 'WE ARE ALL KHALED SAEED'<sup>5</sup> was created which received massive hits. More calls to action such as 'I'M GOING TO TAHRIR, ARE YOU?'<sup>6</sup> and 'DOWN WITH MUBARAK, LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION'<sup>7</sup> and its variants galvanised the youth into action. It was now time for the long pending woes of inflated prices, high unemployment rates, abhorrently expensive housing and institutionalised corruption to end. The government machinery got into action and tried to shut down the social networks. Ironically this led to more and more number of people coming on the streets. A week prior to President Hosni Mubarak's resignation, the number of tweets about change in the political situation in the country went from 2300 a day to 230,000 a day. The top 23 videos on this subject received 5.5 million views. A total of two million people gathered in Tahrir Square, a significant majority of whom were present due to the extensive social media coverage.<sup>8</sup>

## **Occupy Wall Street**

In order to protest against the growing income gap between the top one per cent and the rest of the American population and inspired by anti-austerity protests in Spain, protestors occupied Zuccotti Park in downtown Manhattan

on 17 Sep 2011. The main demands of the movement were the reduction of influence of financial corporations on politics, more balanced distribution of income, more and better jobs, student loan forgiveness and most importantly, alleviation of the foreclosure crisis. The campaign was initiated by a Canadian pro-environment and anti-consumerism group called Adbusters. Before the main protests of Sep 17, a large number of unrelated but similar incidents had already occurred, most taking the support of social media to advance their cause. Some of them were:

- (a) Jun 12 – Thousands of people marched on Wall Street, egged on by labour unions.
- (b) Jun 14 – Online activist group Anonymous tried an occupation of Wall Street.
- (c) Aug 1 – Group of artists arrested after performing nude in front of Wall Street.

A group of people calling themselves New Yorkers Against Budget cuts (NYAB) organised a ‘sleep in’ in lower Manhattan, called Bloomsbergville. This led to a large number of activists, online and ground, to collect at one place and ‘Occupy’ movement started taking shape. When the main protests started on 17 Sep, they were supported by Anonymous and A Day of Rage, among many others. 19 Sep saw creation of a Facebook Page with an embedded YouTube video describing all the previous events. By mid-October, the number of Occupy related pages had crossed 125. The number of members of these pages exceeded 450,000.<sup>9</sup>

When the protestors were finally chased off the property on 11 Nov, they had introduced a novel system of functioning and introduced slogans such as ‘WE ARE THE 99 per cent’, procedures such as modified consensus, progressive stack and the dead notion of direct democracy. However, what was clearly visible was the use of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube in keeping the protests alive, meaningful and relevant to the common man. One of the major effects of this huge online campaign was that the Occupy Wall Street spawned a number of similar Occupy movements such as Occupy Sandy, Occupy SEC etc. Though the movement was not able to accomplish much in terms of their demands but its impact has been so significant that the upcoming 2016 elections are going to be all about reducing the income gap.<sup>10</sup>

### **Protests in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2015**

The violent protests and riots that erupted in the ‘Dark Heart’ of Africa were against the time delaying tactics of incumbent President Joseph Kabila Kabange. On the verge of completing his mandated two terms in office, President Kabila introduced a resolution in the Parliament in Kinshasa, by way of which a compulsory census had to be completed successfully before the 2016 elections could take place. In a country larger than the size of Western Europe combined, and crippled by a non-existent communication network as well as endemic corruption, this could have easily taken several years. Already incensed by what they saw was an incompetent and an insensitive regime, the Congolese people in the urban centres took to the streets to protest the provisions of the bill and calling for removal of the controversial census clause. The protests were spearheaded by students of Kinshasa University, who gathered around the Palais de Peuple on 19 Jan 2015. As more and more people joined the protests, the movement turned violent. In order to stop the Congolese people from coordinating their protests across the country and especially in the restive eastern provinces of Nord and Sud Kivu, the government ordered the shutdown of all internet and text message services on 20 Jan 2015.<sup>11</sup>

That is when the expatriate Congolese community took the lead in propagating the revolution. Online campaigning led to support of the protests by countries such as Senegal, whose online activists also took up the cause of #Telema (Stand Up in Lingala) and #JeSuisKinshasa (I’m Kinshasa).<sup>12</sup> However, the effect of the internet blackout was substantial. Protests petered out in Goma, Bukavu and Lubumbashi (respective capitals of Nord Kivu, Sud Kivu and Katanga provinces), after three to four days of violent demonstration. With no access to internet or text messages and mainstream media being carefully monitored, protestors slowly lost the momentum that had been generated from 19 Jan 2015. A total of 42 people had been killed, a figure contested by the government authorities. The impact of these protests was that the President, after witnessing the killings as well as being advised by diplomats of US, UK, EU, UN, France and Belgium, recalled the controversial clause on 25 Jan 2015, and subsequently the protests stopped.<sup>13</sup>

### **An Analysis**

The above three protest movements occurred in three different Continents, in different circumstances, across different time zones and had varying impacts, either on the authorities or the general populace or both. However, some salient points which may be said to be common and perceived to have a bearing on future movements are enumerated in the succeeding para.

**Resonance.** For a movement to be successful, it has to resonate with the general mood of public opinion. Issue(s) of contention could vary from incompetent governance to repressive state authorities to local level administrative issues. Modern social movements, after the advent of the social media have depended on a flashpoint, something extraordinary, to act as a clarion call for mass mobilisation. By providing visuals and opinions on a global forum and providing opportunities for all strata of society to participate, social media acts as the catalyst to ignite reactions and as a platform to coordinate actions and protests on an unprecedented scale.

**Perception.** Perception, in unison with resonance plays an important role in the initiation as well as the continuance of any social or mass mobilisation. It depends on the customs, traditions and priorities of a particular society. The cause and call to action for people in societies is different for different parts of the world. Environmental protection, freedom of press, free speech, creation of jobs, reducing income inequality gap: all are worthwhile causes depending on how people perceive them in their importance. Also important is the population’s perception of the individuals or groups organising the cause. Social media by putting visual media and opinions in the relevant context helps create and shape perceptions.

**Coordination.** The Congo protests in 2015 have showed the failings of an uncoordinated movement. Due to effective shut down of internet and text services by major telecom providers almost immediately, the government, in effect,

crippled the movement from the very start. Also, once the protests started, there was no way to control the mob and in most cases, the youth damaged and destroyed a significant portion of their neighbourhoods. The movement, started for a rightful cause, disintegrated into mob violence as soon as it began due to lack of coordination among different groups taking part, as well as no clear directions. Coordination has an almost folkloric importance for any group activity, and becomes crucial for mass mobilisations. By allowing people to coordinate their activities among different groups and take control of the momentum of a movement by dispelling malevolent rumours and ensuring strict adherence to agreed codes, social media acts as an enabler.

**Leadership.** While most movements are led by individuals or groups fighting for a particular cause, there is emerging a new type of phenomenon, exemplified by the Occupy Wall Street, of leaderless movements rallying behind a cause. This involves time-dynamic leadership, which essentially means that people with a specific set of qualities and qualifications step up and take up the mantle for a particular time frame, or till a portion of the project is complete and then step down, only to be replaced by others in a similar fashion. What better and time effective way to attract members to a cause than online activism.

**Online Activist Groups.** Online activist groups such as change.org, avaaz.org, purpose.com, moveon.org have changed the way activism functions. With member bases around the globe and boasting of memberships of tens of millions, these organisations have used novel ways to elicit public interest in a multitude of topics. They generally use online public petitions, videos and email-your-leader tools to generate interest in the causes, and then stage sit-ins, rallies, phone-ins and media friendly stunts, to elicit action and reaction on part of the relevant authorities.

**Slacktivism.** A relatively new term, slacktivism combines the word 'slacker' and 'activism' and is used to denote an activity that just satisfies the ego of the person performing it. These activities may include clicking on online petitions, changing the avatar on social networking sites, sharing of status messages or updates on Facebook or Twitter. This gives the 'slacktivist' an erroneous self-satisfaction of taking part in a social movement without the accompanying physical or financial effort. In spite of its many criticisms, there is no denying the fact that online activism has done what traditional canvassing or activism has so far failed to do: creating awareness about complex issues in the most effective way and shortest time possible. A great example in this case is the effort by the group Invisible Children to educate people about the atrocities perpetrated on African children by Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The group created a 28 minute film which when uploaded on YouTube became the fastest growing viral video of all time. It was viewed by over a 100 million people in just six days.<sup>14</sup> This effort made a global impact and led to mass awareness about LRA, a feat which number of diplomatic missions, NGOs and aid workers had not been able to accomplish for a long time.

## Conclusion

No revolution or social movement in the history has been successful without mass participation. Mass participation, in turn requires a consciousness, of being exploited, of being wronged. Awakening of the consciousness is brought about by knowledge, of events, of government policies and repression. As brought out earlier, people may also be galvanised into action by a momentous single event, which may resonate with their latent frustrations with the system. Before the advent of social media, mass movements were centralised, leader oriented and more often than not, led by either famous individuals or well-funded and disciplined organisations. An example is the Civil Rights Movement in the US led by Martin Luther King Jr on the one hand and the militant Black Panthers on the other. The main drawback was that these movements, while purporting to be people based, never used democratic methods in drawing up their charters or deciding their course of action. Opinion making was limited to the 'inner circle' or a few elites. The general sequence was word-of-mouth publicity, recruitment, indoctrination and finally action. Another disadvantage was, due to their calling-card and very public and propaganda based actions, these movements were susceptible to sabotage, infiltration or total break up. Also canvassing and lobbying for a particular cause required a huge presence on ground, lots of time and enormous amounts of materiel.

However, by masking everyone under an avatar (or Gravatar), by linking disparate groups on public as well as private chat rooms, by enabling leaderless movements, by eliminating the need of huge logistics, by providing time critical information at never-seen-before speeds, by dispelling incorrect rumours and acting across multiple devices and countries, social media has helped ordinary people avoid coercive state mechanisms as well as strengthened and supplemented mass movements. Internet based social mobilisation and ground based canvassing are two sides of the same coin. They are not mutually exclusive but reinforce each other. With increasing internet penetration, improvement in communication infrastructure and rising awareness all across the world, social media is on its way to becoming the most powerful tool for social change in the future.

## Endnotes

1. <http://udel.edu/~jdeiner/strufunc.html>. Gabriel Almond's theory of structural functionalism is a key concept in comparative politics. His ideas have been modified and adapted to the needs of this article.
2. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisian\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisian_Revolution).
3. <http://genius.com/Michael-hardt-declaration-take-up-the-baton-annotated#>. The author also took the help of various YouTube videos in postulating the view.
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## **Introduction**

Napoleonic dictate, "Without an Army there is neither independence nor civil liberty" finds an echo in 'The Queens Regulations for the Army' which set forth the task of the British Army of maintaining peace and public order. Because the Armed Services truly have a vital part to play in preserving community's existence, the relationship between the Services and Civil authorities is of paramount importance. If correct balance cannot be attained, the outcome may be detrimental and dangerous to the Services, Government and Society at large – as France discovered during the Algerian War (1956-62) and subsequent Organisation Armée Secrète campaign, when generals challenged the elected politicians.<sup>1</sup>

Post World War II period, particularly after the end of Cold War, is marked by greater dissipation of power, with new power centres emerging, spread of globalisation and greater economic interdependence and interaction. Last two decades have seen the emergence and spread of terrorism, making the security scenario complex and diffused. While most nations have learnt by experience and created structures and procedures to meet the new challenges, we have been slow to respond. Since Independence, suspicion of military in power centres persists and they are reluctant to shed power gained beyond Constitutional framework, which remains a hurdle for Civil-Military relations.

Broad aims of national security continue to be to protect the nation against external and internal threats. While our external threats persist, our internal threats have increased. Internal security has got intertwined with external threats and spread of terrorism and subversion threatens the stability of India. State response has been mostly to crisis and violence. Holistic policy is mostly absent and measures if instituted are not sustained. Political handling of security problems is tardy. In such an environment Civil-Military relations as an aspect of security assume even greater importance.<sup>2</sup>

Before proceeding further, I consider it appropriate and useful to briefly recount the experience of other two democracies – the USA and the UK. The UK first, as we have adopted their systems and traditions.

## **The UK Experience**

Developments in Civil-Military relations in the UK can be examined broadly in three parts – during World War II, from World War II and up to 1962, and post 1962. Churchill on becoming the Prime Minister in May 1940 appointed himself as Minister of Defence, the central direction of war became personalised and beyond Cabinet scrutiny. The real check on Churchill came not from Cabinet but from Chiefs of Staff. Where there were differences Churchill's authority was weak, even when he tried to bully them he knew he could not command them.<sup>3</sup> For this paradoxical situation credit goes to both, although for success Churchill claimed credit. Probably only those who had experienced his exceptional power of interference and obstinacy can imagine how difficult he could be. He mostly had a good cause and kept his powers within limits. The role of Cabinet diminished and two Defence Committees of operations and supplies with a common secretariat were more to implement rather than take decisions. The evolution of joint planning and administrative procedures, concerning the Services, influenced to a large extent post War command and control.

In the post War phase, Prime Minister Attlee retained the post of Minister of Defence till 01 Jan 1947, when a separate ministry was established. The Committee of Imperial Defence and a revamped Defence Committee under the Prime Minister were formed, with different sub-committees for different areas of Defence. Prime Minister remained directly responsible. Chiefs of Staff though normally part of the new ministry but submitted strategic papers directly to the Defence Committee and not through Defence Minister, although Minister of Defence was its deputy.

Chairman of the Defence Committee, was not to chair Chiefs of Staff and only to discharge administrative functions of allocation of resources. He was a coordinator and not a controller. Individual Service ministers were excluded from the Cabinet but attended Defence Committee. In 1955, serious flaws became apparent due to lack of coordination between Service departments and Colonial Office, and Minister of Defence complained that since Chiefs of Staff were not under him so joint inter-service long term plans in conformity with political plans could not be formulated. Lord Montgomery as the Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS) suggested placing a senior officer above Chiefs of Staff for single point advice and coordination. But it was due to the escalating defence expenditure really that Eden, on instigation of Lord Mountbatten, first Sea Lord, decided to end the system. He created a Chairman of Chiefs of Staff in addition to Service Chiefs to convey the collective views to the Minister of Defence and sit on international bodies like NATO and Western European Union. Lord Mountbatten was asked to be chairman but he declined due to his junior position and Sir William Dickson, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, assumed the new post. Attlee also asked Lord Mountbatten to become the Defence Minister in 1949 as no Defence Minister had made an impact.

On becoming the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten in 1962 expanded his joint planning staff and wrote a paper on reorganisation of defence and sent to the Minister of Defence. This was based on his experience of unified commands then established in Middle East, Near East and in the Far East in November 1962. He proposed abolition of separate service departments and creation of a single Ministry of Defence to overcome wasteful and ineffective decision making. He recommended that Minister of Defence be upgraded to Secretary of State level and two Ministers of State under him for administration and equipment for all Services. The new organisation came into being on 01 Apr 1964. However, it took twenty one more years for the establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system and integration of Services with the Ministry of Defence on 02 Jan 1985.

The British association of symbols of Sword and Mace respectively of Armed Services and Government at all levels represents the interaction and interdependence which obtains between civil and military. We have similar symbolisations but it still is to be translated into practice.

## **The American Experience**

Unlike the UK who had a long history of wars, colonial governance and traditions; American Civil-Military relations and defence systems matured in a short period since World War II. These were conditioned by their participation in war, nuclearisation, Cold War confrontation and their role as a world power.

During the World War major policy and strategy was influenced and executed by the military. According to Huntington power of military reached unprecedented heights,<sup>4</sup> faced with war both the political authority and the military had little choice but to accept it. The creation of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1942 was a military necessity and gradually its influence and activities increased in areas of diplomacy and politics. By 1945 War Department became totally involved in foreign policy. Huntington further argues that the enormous role of military in war and its experience in conducting a total war made it an indispensable organ for civilian authorities in the conduct of foreign policy.

In the post War period military policy and political policy became more closely related, which resulted in tension in Civil-Military relations. These tensions and disagreements became pronounced during the Cold War period. However it goes to the credit of both the political authorities and the military that while disagreements in formulation of policy were frequent, it was accepted and considered vital for transparent dialogue in Civil-Military relations. To contain and deter communism, development of nuclear weapons was considered essential. American involvement in the Korean War added to military's dominant role. Policy makers gave military strong impetus in not only building and management of nuclear weapons but also shaping nuclear doctrine around nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation, which had an enormous impact on the USAF. The Manhattan Project for production of nuclear weapons was under Army control with General Leslie Groves in charge and scientists working under him. Even though the Atomic Energy Act 1946 established certain civilian control with Lilienthal as Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) but military continued to assert itself in the management of nuclear weapons. In 1946, JCS made the first attempt to wrest control over nuclear stockpile arguing that utility of weapons depended on their familiarity with its use. President Truman in spite of his reservations placed nine capsules under military control at the outbreak of Korean War. During Eisenhower's administration the nuclear stockpile was gradually transferred to the military. Civilian custody of nuclear weapons finally ended in 1967, when President Johnson directed AEC to deliver all completed nuclear weapons to military. AEC remained only the producer and not the controller.

Another notable feature of American functioning and role of the JCS was the National Security Act of 1949, which allows a member of the JCS after informing the Secretary of Defence to present to the Congress on its own initiative any recommendation related to Department of Defence (DoD) he may deem proper. Although JCS works within the DoD but its recommendations are submitted direct to the President and the Congress.

The Iraq war (2003) brought out serious differences between the Bush Administration and the military over the objectives of war and its execution. The military fraternity openly criticised the civilian administration and called Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld incompetent while the media called it, "Revolt of the Generals".<sup>5</sup> They accused politicians to have chosen loyalty to their Party above their duty to the Constitution and the Nation, which was borne out by General Petraeus testimony to the Congress. Obama administration faced similar criticism on Afghanistan (2009-2010) from the military and General Stanley McChrystal, one of the chief architects of America's counter-insurgency strategy. His open criticism in an interview to the "Rolling Stone" Magazine resulted in his removal and replacement by General Petraeus.<sup>6</sup> The above clearly reflect on failure of policies due to civilians treading in military's domain.

Before discussing the Indian Scenario, I wish to briefly dwell upon major environmental imperatives and societal influences.

### **Environmental Imperatives**

First one is globalisation and its interplay with security dynamics. Two inferences of Professor Gregory Foster of the American Defence University are important. One, the phenomenon itself; he has defined globalisation as a process which suffuses virtually every aspect of our lives and is inevitable. It assumes so many forms and occurs at so many levels that it cannot be stopped. Second, the viability of the State will depend on how it meets the expanding needs of the society. He also concluded that performance of the military acting as an arm of the State and as an Institution of the society will be instrumental in determining how viable the State remains.<sup>7</sup>

The author's claim that globalisation is irresistible is an acknowledgement of variety and complexity and a reasoned descriptive judgment of its likelihood, not a normative assessment of its goodness or otherwise. This coupled with advances in information technology and in the present era of instant communications has resulted in telescoping of time and space requiring immediate responses. Effect of action and inaction will be magnified, threshold of crisis for decision making lowered and potential for disaster multiplied. In such an environment compartmentalised functioning and out dated procedures are a recipe for disaster. Need for immediate attention and action mandates close Civil-Military coordination, cooperation and jointness.<sup>8</sup> It also requires strategic competence of both civil and military, a responsive society and resource backing.

### **Societal Influences**

Huntington has allied the Civil-Military relations with national security and gone on to claim that Civil-Military relations entail the formal, structural position of military institutions (in the State) - informal role and influence of military groups in politics and society at large, and ideologies of military and non-military groups. Considering the hierarchical and disciplined nature of the Army, he focusses on the study of officer corps and its relationship with the State. He further broadens professionalism of military beyond expertise, thus making officers as the directive element of military and responsible for military security of the society as the State is the directive entity of the society; hence, responsible for allocating adequate resources for military as well as for the society.<sup>9</sup> Social and economic relations between the military and rest of the society normally reflect relations between the officer corps and the State.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately it is not true of India as military's relationship with the society is very healthy but not so between the military and the State. Face-off between the Services (Chiefs of Staff) and the Govt during the implementation of the 6th Pay Commission recommendations, the events of the years 2011 and 12 and long dragging issue of 'one rank one pension' reflect it

vividly.

The officers' role concerns management of violence and not the act of violence. Similarly, military professionalism is a means by which armies become neutral and not a threat to society. Janowitz's idea of constabulary role of armies is a further refinement. Violence will be deployed and managed for benefit of the society (not for the State).<sup>11</sup> However, this can be challenged as violence is more frequently deployed by the State for its protection and political motives. This was clear during the ill-conceived elections of 1983 in Assam.

The Armed Forces operate at the margin of moral behaviour and they shall obey political authority as long as it appears to be legitimate. Military derives its legitimacy from its Constitutional position and public acceptance of its role, thus its involvement in affairs of the State has to be proper within the accepted norms of democracy.<sup>12</sup> During the emergency in 1975, Mrs Gandhi left the Armed Forces untouched. The Armed Forces on their part also remained aloof and detached from the happenings. In the final analysis, the democratic system reasserted itself and the Indian polity was restored, though a little dented.

### **The Indian Scenario**

The Indian scenario is marked by crisis management, reactive responses, an inadequate system of defence and security management, and Civil-Military relations are a reflection of the same. Improvement is slow and primarily driven by compulsion of events. Like any other institution, the Indian Armed Forces are driven by its functional imperatives to meet the growing threat to the Country. They are also influenced by our democratic system and societal influences; that is why they are different from the Pakistan Army. Unlike Pakistan, the legitimacy of the political authority has a traditional acceptance by the military. It is also a fact that while in western democracies, military over a period of time, has learnt to accept the skills of their political masters, it cannot be said in our case.

The concept of civilian control is accepted and honoured by the Armed Forces but what is worrisome is the misplaced concept of civilian control – who is the controller? Huntington has defined that civilian control exists, “where there is subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy”; while the statesman acknowledges the integrity of the military profession, military in turn remains neutral and accepts political guidance of the State.<sup>13</sup> The controller is the political master and not the bureaucracy, which is only an administrative executive.

Civilian control implies two things. First, civilians make policy and all policies made by subordinate institutions remain subordinate to civilian policy, because political leadership of the Country exercises ultimate say, whether policy is right or wrong. Secondly, with specific regard to the Armed Forces, even if civilians respect the military as an autonomous institution with expertise on issues of strategy, final decision remains the prerogative of civil polity. Civilian control can be objective or subjective. In objective control there is a clear division of civilian and military functions – civilian make policy and military fights war. Subjective control can vary from overlapping of civilian and military functions to excessive influence of civilians in military affairs and vice versa.

The other point of rub is involvement of military in internal strifes and non-conventional operations, where military profession faces different challenges with no clear-cut political or military objectives. This will be discussed in detail later, but this factor has to be recognised in the light of distorted civilian control in India.

The ignorance of our political elite of national security issues has resulted in absence of politico-strategic direction and ineffective mechanism for formulation and execution of national security policy. The fear and suspicion of military of our founding fathers, and lack of understanding of military affairs by our political leadership has been exploited by the bureaucracy, as they (politicians) feel comfortable in dealing with the civilian bureaucracy. The void can only be filled by professional military advice and understanding of it by the political leadership. In 1965 war with Pakistan and to a much greater extent in 1971 war for liberation of Bangladesh the political leadership and the nation benefited due to sound professional advice. The advice of Field Marshal Manekshaw and other Service Chiefs to postpone operations till winter was accepted by Mrs Gandhi in spite of very pressing international and domestic political compulsions. The requirement is for an objective civilian control where power is distributed between the civilian political control and military with maximising of military professionalism.

What we have in India is a type of subjective control. This is the main cause of friction in Civil-Military relations. List 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution lays down the subjects to be dealt with by the Government of India (GoI). In this GoI is assigned the responsibility for the defence of India and part thereof. While the President is the Supreme Commander but responsibility for national defence is with the Cabinet. Raksha Mantri is the head of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is his secretariat. GoI (Transaction of Business Rules) 1961 lay down that all business allotted to the department shall be disposed off under general or special direction of the Minister in Charge i.e., Raksha Mantri. Rule II provides that in each department the Secretary (or Relevant Level Officer) shall be the administrative head and shall be responsible for observance of these rules (Rule II). Accordingly, the functioning of the MoD rests with the Raksha Mantri, with MoD providing secretarial and administrative support. Bureaucracy has manipulated its interpretation to say MoD is responsible for all matters related to defence of India and thus intruded into policy formulation and matters related to the Services. Moreover Army, Navy, and Air Force are autonomous professions and institutions and not departments of MoD. The rot started during Krishna Menon's time due to his overbearing style and interfering in military matters, which continues to be perpetrated, in spite of recommendations of civilian strategic thinkers like Late Dr K Subrahmanyam and Shri Arun Singh. As we shall see later, the recommendations of Kargil Review, Arun Singh and Naresh Chandra Committees have been ignored in this regard and system remains inadequate and distorted, with MoD occupying the middle space in the defence structure between the political leadership and the Services. This ultimately is detrimental to national interest as security management lacks strategic and professional interaction between the political decision maker and the military which remains a major area of concern due to its absence.

### **Compulsive Changes in Civil-Military Relations due to Nuclearisation**

Nuclearisation of the sub-continent followed the familiar competitive action and reaction between India and Pakistan. When India established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and created the Department of Atomic Energy in 1954, Pakistan followed by establishing Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1955. In 1971 after the defeat in East Pakistan and birth of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Bhutto took a conscious decision to go the nuclear weapons route. Without going into detailed historic narrative it is important to record that Pakistan's nuclear programme differed from India both in substance and nature. It was guided by their military, totally weapons oriented and supported by their political leadership. On the contrary Indian programme was developed under civilian scientific and highest political control without any security or strategic dimension. Sitting along with General Sundarji in Rajasthan desert less than 100 kms from the Pokhran site we heard about the blast on the radio in 1974. This was the first time that I heard General Sundarji talk about the need for nuclear weapons.

By 1980s, General Sundarji was quite clear of the need for India to go nuclear and while as Commandant of College of Combat he articulated his views through two essays "Effect of Nuclear Symmetry on Conventional Deterrence" and "Nuclear Weapons in the Third World Context". Later, as Western Army Commander in 1983 he made a full presentation to General Vaidya the then COAS on India's Nuclear options, where I was present. After he took over as COAS, a start was made to acquire equipments with nuclear, chemical and biological defence capabilities. He also started trying his ideas to make the Army conscious of the nuclear environment and new organisations like reorganised army plains infantry divisions (RAPIDs) came up to enhance mobility for quick concentration and dispersal. I was a close witness to this and authored exercise "Brass Tacks" under General Sundarji's guidance set in such an environment. This is also the time that missile based delivery systems were initiated and the Integrated Guided Missile System programme was launched under Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in mid 1980s in conjunction with the military.

Pakistan's clandestine operations came to notice by 1990, when Pakistan offered nuclear technology and weapons programmes secretly to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. In early 1992, Pakistan's Foreign Minister in an interview to Washington Post announced that Pakistan had obtained capability to produce nuclear weapons.

At a seminar organised by the USI in 1990, serving and retired officers from the Services, diplomats, academicians and strategists all were of the opinion that to offset Pakistan's nuclear capability nuclear weapons were essential. Late Dr K Subrahmanyam, India's foremost strategist thinker and doyen, supported by late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh and others strongly propagated in favour of nuclearisation. This is also the time that Mr VP Singh asked Arun Singh to do a review after UN special commission inspectors had discovered documentary evidence of Dr Khan's contacts with Saddam Hussein. Arun Singh in his findings commented, "It is clear that we have to end the wink and nudge approach. When it is crunch time you just cannot ring up the COAS and say press the button. The Army will not take scientist's word that it would work. They want to know if they have a credible deterrent, otherwise they are likely to say buzz off."<sup>14</sup> It is a significant disadvantage if you don't have a command and control structure". In a major decision Prime Minister Shri Narasimha Rao put Army's Prithvi Ballistic missiles (150 kms/1000 kg) at Army's disposal.

Indian nuclear tests in 1998 were followed by Pakistan's tests and 1999 Kargil war was fought under a nuclear shadow. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) Report made categorical recommendations supporting Indian Military's role in formulating nuclear policy, saying Indian Military has to be made as well informed as its Pakistani counterparts and military has a professional role in formulation of nuclear strategy. The KRC also strongly recommended a reorganisation of higher defence organisation. Indian nuclear doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence and 'no first use' raised the question of minimum deterrence which could only be decided by professional military, and testing their effectiveness before absorption. Nuclear weapons presence in the subcontinent has made achievement of political and military stability difficult. While the presence of nuclear weapons has reduced the chances of war, stability is undermined by sub-conventional and proxy war. The biggest challenge to Civil-Military relations has been that we thought of going nuclear first and thought of doctrine, strategy and structures for command and control afterwards. However, it has forced civilian authority to accept that selection of weapon systems, target selection and delivery means and doctrine formulation can only be decided by the military. It also mandates the military to formulate new ground, air and naval doctrines. Greater shift to offensive doctrines will require political leadership to be proactive in national security. It should also hopefully result in greater convergence of Civil-Military functions. It is not only desirable but an urgent necessity.

### **Civil-Military Relations in Counter Insurgency (CI) and Proxy war Environment**

Most scholars with Western orientation including Indians are of the view that involvement in these operations distracts the Armed Forces particularly the Army from their main role of conventional operations of war and affects their capability to execute such operations. This is true to a large extent but over a period of time the Indian Army has learnt to draw a balance as was proved by the Kargil war in 1999. However, this needs constant attention and our field formations must ensure that they train for their conventional role as intensively as possible.

It must also be recognised that we have extensive experience in CI and unconventional operations in diverse environment, both in physical terrain and population variety. We must keep in mind what I have mentioned earlier of Bush and Obama administration's criticism in Iraq and Afghanistan as it will be useful to compare with Indian experience. Space does not permit covering in detail our varied experience in different areas. I shall mainly give out inferences with key elements of the background.

I commanded a division in Manipur and Nagaland in early 1980s, of thirty five battalions (15 Infantry, six Border Security Forces, five Central Reserve Police Force and nine Assam Rifles) deployed in five brigades and six other sectors. Meitei insurgency in Manipur was at its peak with Naga insurgency rejuvenating and spreading to new areas which had been peaceful for over a decade. There was President's rule in Manipur and one of our most experienced and respected IAS officer Mr LP Singh was the Governor of all the seven North East states for over five and half years. After a quick familiarisation, I met him and gave him my assessment of the situation. Situation in Imphal valley was such that some police stations had been deserted and Manipur Rifles, Para Military Forces (PMF) and even some Army troops were protecting anything and everything. I explained to him that all troops under me after a bit of

orientation will go on the offensive; and civil administration, with adequate armed police should take over the protective duties and manage the towns. I had seen Manipur Police and Manipur Rifles and was confident that with support they could manage the situation.

Army and PMF were to operate to hunt and destroy insurgents and their bases. We trained to operate in urban areas in pairs, and in Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) on cycles, motor cycles and civil vehicles. The Governor did not agree and things came to a head when he called Giani Zail Singh the Home Minister and Rao Saheb Krishna Swamy, the Cabinet Secretary. I refused to meet them as I was not answerable to them, till I got orders from the Army Chief General Krishna Rao. I explained to Giani Zail Singh in Punjabi and later to Rao Saheb in English. I ended up saying I am a professional and will not compromise my judgment for good relations. I put my strategy in action and results came in ones and twos, till after two months in a well-planned operation we captured Bisheswar Singh, Chairman of Peoples Liberation Army and some of his Lasha trained ojahs. This was a big break. Mr LP Singh flew from Shillong to congratulate me and after that he was my biggest supporter. He was most magnanimous and later I got a message of congratulations from the Prime Minister. This was followed by continuous success in Manipur and Nagaland. There was equal resistance to me from within the Services. These incidents are recorded in the official history of the division in the chapter "Quick and Aggressive Response".<sup>15</sup>

During one of the discussions, General Krishna Rao said, "Government has not given us a directive, we should ask for one. He said better to draft and send one covering all aspects of political, economic, ethnic and, law and order." I drafted one and when I sent it to the Army Chief, I recommended we should not ask for it as while we continue doing what we have to, the civil agencies would never do their part, my main worry was, who would do it? I issued one as Governor, ten years later, laying down what was to be done in a year's time. It was termed as the year of peace and development.

### **Lessons**

- (a) Professional judgment and military expertise cannot be dictated; Government can lay down objectives which was not done.
- (b) In the absence of policy, military must decide strategy keeping all factors in view - political, social, population and terrain which is the key. This also raises the question, as to what extent should military interfere in formulation of policies in areas affected by insurgency?

### **Jammu and Kashmir**

The Jammu and Kashmir situation is an outcome of lack of politico-strategic vision of our leaders, foundations of which were laid by the partition of the Country and the manner of accession of the State to India. Inner turmoils and convulsions during the period 1953-1989 marked by political ineptness, rigged elections and corruption adversely affected the situation thus, turning disenchantment into alienation. The rigged elections of 1987 perpetuated the syndrome of power sharing, which further added to alienation in spite of economic well-being. On military front, dismemberment of JKLF provided ground for Pakistan design to foment it as a proxy war with radical design and with a religious orientation. The current situation has further increased the Indo-Pak dimension of the problem. We failed again politically and strategically to resolve the issue in 1972 during the Shimla Agreement by trusting a neighbour who had failed to deliver on the promises made. The current situation is a proxy war within our own area where reactive policy as practised so far will not improve the situation. Need is for a strategic design to counter it. Recent floods have demonstrated that fringe elements need to be tackled from within by the J&K Government for which GoI ought to lay down ground rules and support the State Government.

### **Lessons**

- (a) In the absence of politico-strategic vision, military strategy will remain confined to the Line of Control (LC) and anti-militancy with variations in intensity and complexion. Pakistan is a negative factor but we need to look inside.
- (b) Alienation cannot be overcome by political and economic dispensations alone. It requires trust, which can only be built by honest, credible and legitimate means over a sustained period. You cannot play politics over it as it leads to appeasement and mistrust.

### **IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka**

Sri Lanka from professional point of view is important as a case of power projection in our neighbourhood, where we had been intimately connected with one or other aspects of problems over a period of time. We are all aware of GoI stance varying from helping LTTE with humanitarian help to providing bases and arms, and a sudden change to that of an adversary. It is a clear case of our failure to discern politico-strategic objectives. In the absence of any documented evidence, India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) can probably be treated as the joint intentions and objectives of India and Sri Lanka. The main points of the Accord were to preserve the unity of Sri Lanka and its multi ethnic society and integrity of Tamil speaking areas. Both the governments had agreed that to achieve the above, the establishment of North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) and elections to it were essential. GoI had also agreed to extend military assistance to Sri Lanka if asked to implement the Accord. The GoI was deemed to be the guarantor of the Accord. Annexure to Para 6 of the Accord gave IPKF, on invitation of the Sri Lankan President, added responsibility to underwrite the resolution and provide full-fledged military support beyond peace keeping. A critical analysis of the above would reveal that requirements were not only conflicting but fulfillment of some clauses would negate others. Confusion and dichotomy was bound to happen. Such a mandate required clear-cut political directions not only to fulfil the requirements of the Accord but also to safeguard Indian and Tamil interests. All this straight away raised doubts in Sri Lankan Tamil mind, whether IPKF was for them or against them. Elections to the provincial council were only a part of the process and not an end in itself, especially when they were not fully representative.

What made things worse was the so called Core Group in Delhi who failed to carve out a clear CI strategy and started directing and controlling tactical operations which resulted in differences between General Sundarji and the Army Commander. IPKF HQ acted as the henchman of the Core Group and, command and control became a victim of differences amongst senior commanders. There was lack of synergy at politico-diplomatic-military level and General Sundarji totally failed to discern the military fall-out of the changes in political stand. In retrospect, the Services should feel satisfied in performing the task well, considering the political ambiguity, lack of strategic direction and clear cut military directions.

## Lessons

- (a) ISLA was a flawed Accord and in the absence of clear politico-military directions its implementation became even more difficult.
- (b) In the absence of well-crafted political management, our efforts beyond the military field did not respond to situations on ground and stance of the contending parties. This resulted in Core Group's unwanted involvement in tactical operations, with disastrous consequences.

## Overall Observations

In the field of CI and unconventional operations in India, there has been no politico-strategic direction to military. Military has been evolving and carrying out its own military strategy based on its experience and expertise. This is the reason for a situation often not being consolidated after it has been brought under control. It is a cause for frustration and disillusionment for the military.

There is no institutionalised political handling of these problems, which remain confined to political party in power's sphere and interest. The establishment of National Security Council has not helped as they are only duplicating work done by other agencies and ministries. Under these circumstances, while the Army should remain apolitical but it must understand the political dynamics of the areas of their interest and oppose bad politics which precipitate military situations. It is the Army's Constitutional and national duty.

In the absence of institutional structure for strategy, formulation of military strategy by and large shall continue to be carved and operationalised by the military.

Military has never questioned political civil control but the bureaucracy in the MoD can never fulfil this role. Interaction between political leadership and military needs to be institutionalised. In its absence, strategic issues will remain out of focus; knee jerk reactions and tactical responses will be the end result. Similarly, with political leadership's lack of strategic orientation, there can be no division of labour between civil and military, and clout will dictate balance.

The above state has also resulted in raising and augmentation of agencies and forces without effectively contributing to efficiency. Forces need to be employed for the task for which they are raised. Adhoc contingency-based deployments have failed to deliver. New agencies and forces raised without proper thought result in deactivation of existing ones.

At field level unity of command is essential; in its absence operations will suffer and forces will be misused. Unified Headquarters is a ploy to satisfy ego of different paramilitary forces and militates against operational efficiency.

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**Aspirations and Career Management of Non-empanelled Officers\***  
**Colonel Sanjay Malik@**

**Introduction**

An Army career in India like all militaries has a steep pyramidal structure. Of a total cadre strength of 45000 officers, only 85 are Lieutenant Generals implying that only 0.02 per cent can aspire to reach the highest rank. Even the first selection grade rank of Colonel is available to only 35 per cent officers resulting in stiff competition and the related stress at a younger service bracket starting at 8 -10 years of service wherein sifting starts by selection on career courses.

Every officer who has cleared his Service Selection Board (SSB) interview and joined the Services has the potential and equal opportunity to rise in ranks. Then why do some officers continue to perform well consistently and others falter along the way? Their level of motivation and to some extent the organisational climate available to the officer varies with the length of service. In addition, there is no formal counselling or a feedback system in the Army which prepares a young man to face the feeling of failure on non-empanelment (NE) in the first selection board (SB). Though this is not an ideal philosophy in any organisation but being a 'Command Oriented Army', we have to live with this phenomenon.

Many psychologists have tried to analyse the aspiration quotient of human beings. The modern day managers even try to link it heavily to financial gratification, but sadly it is far from the truth in the case of a soldier. After a few years of service, the salary package is less important than his psychological and social needs, with the most important aspect being your standing, importance, job satisfaction and social recognition within the organisation. Hence, it is felt that this aspect needs to be managed first while dealing with the subject of 'Aspirations and Career Management of NE Officers'.

**Aim**

To analyse the aspect of aspirations and career management of NE officers and recommend options to improve the present status of such officers.

**Scope**

It is assumed that the present system of career management of officers would continue in the future also and any options considered or recommended for improvement in the system remain within the ambit of the present cadre structure. It is also assumed that there is no dilution of ranks in the future.

**Preview**

The paper has been covered in three parts :-

- (a) **Part 1.** Issues affecting aspirations and career management of NE officers.
- (b) **Part 2.** Comparison with other organisations/armies.
- (c) **Part 3.** Options to improve the present management of NE officers.

**Part 1 : Issues Affecting Aspirations and Career Management of NE Officers**

**Genesis of the Problem**

Prior to implementation of Ajay Vikram Singh Committee (AVSC) Report in December 2004, we had upto 2000 NE officers and the Army had nearly 3800 appointments in the system to accommodate them. Secondly, the NE percentages and rank structure was different. We had No 4 Selection Board (SB) which made approximately 40 per cent officers NE at 15-16 years of service and No 3 SB at 19-20 years which made another 40 per cent lieutenant colonels NE. In this system also only 35-40 per cent officers reach the colonel's rank.

Though one of the aims of AVSC was to improve the aspirations of the officer cadre for promotion, we ended up creating a set of new problems:-

- (a) Having nearly 6200 NE officers in the system against lesser number of appointments available for them to be posted to.
- (b) These figures would rise to nearly 11000 NE officers when we are able to cut down on officers' shortage (nearly 11000) in junior ranks.
- (c) An officer becomes NE at 15-16 years of service where as he is required to be managed in the system for another 17-18 years, till he retires at 54 years of age.

Though the Army is trying to implement a system where the ratio of intake of support cadre is higher than regular officers to overcome this phenomenon, it would take nearly 20 years for the system to stabilise. Again, this is based on the presumption that such a system will succeed. Depending on such a system to succeed in the long run is a gamble. In the Indian male psyche job assurance plays a major role in selecting careers. For a young man to join the

Indian Army would be a risky career option, knowing fully well, that nearly 80 per cent of them would be retired (or forced out of a job) compulsorily at the age of 32-34 years. Hence, we need to be pragmatic and consider this increase in support cadre model as one of the options and not the only option for cutting down NE officers in the system. We need to take the present figures of approximately 6200 NE officers as a benchmark for future also and plan ahead for their career management.

### **Aspirations of NE Officers (Felt Need)**

Why is it that the efficiency and motivation levels of NE officers are questioned when they have gone through the same basic military training and have grown up in the same environment? It is felt that the system is more at fault than the officer himself and the treatment meted out to NE officers is itself questionable. In an intense competitive environment most of the officers who miss the cut are borderline cases, then why are they written off totally after the first SB itself?

One has to empathise with the pressures which a NE officer goes through. The most important is the loss of self-esteem due to the sense of failure which he feels at such an early stage in service. Peer and family pressures add to his woes. Many of them lose interest in their jobs but, due to financial insecurities, continue serving as their job and pension are secure. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to keep such a man motivated for long.

Another problem of the NE officer is that he is not prepared for such an outcome. We neither have a system of mid-course career counselling for an officer nor are we able to make him aware of his standing within his batch. Hence, irrespective of the performance of the officer, he feels he stands an equal chance of promotion till the first SB. The narrow bracketing of ACR grading further compounds the confusion in his mind. Thus we need to address the problem of maintaining the self-esteem and motivation of the officer till the end of his service. It is reiterated that financial compensation by way of regular increases in salary is only a minor comfort and not the ultimate solution.

### **Career Management of NE Officers**

Presently, the appointments tenable by the NE officers are considered as less important and it is difficult for them to get a sense of achievement or actually make a difference to the organisation. Most of these appointments are of routine nature; and even though some of them require specialisation, no effort is made by the organisation to provide specialised training for them. We devote tremendous amount of effort at IMA or OTA for training of officers prior to commissioning but fail to recognise the need to retrain them after they have fallen off the main stream. We need to have a similar effort in training our NE officers as they still have another 15-17 years to serve post NE in the Army and prior to retirement.

So the real challenge is not only to motivate the NE officers but also to train them for residual service and provide them:-

- (a) A job content that gives them a sense of achievement.
- (b) Enhance their self-esteem.
- (c) Maintain their dignity within and outside the organisation.

We may possibly have to look at redesigning our appointments at Station Headquarters (HQ), higher formation HQ, NCC HQ, Intelligence and employment in organisations like Border Roads Organisation, Military Engineering Service, Married Accommodation Project and Army Welfare Housing Organisation. The most suitable situation would be if we can mix up these appointments with both NE and high profile officers to maintain the importance (or popularity) of such appointments.

## **Part 2 : Comparison with Other Organisations / Armies**

### **Government Organisations within India**

Post-Independence there has been a trend to compare the status of the Armed Forces with Civil Services. Earlier the comparison was based on rank structure but post 1970s we went in for rank equivalence based on comparative salaries. The Civil Services over a time went in for Assured Career Progression (ACP) model and also quietly introduced the Non Functional Upgrade (NFU) component in their salaries. This created a disparity in the rank equivalence. The Civil Services also went in for dilution of their rank structure over a period of time. With this they were able to provide promotion to an officer to the equivalent rank of Brigadier and Major General with 14 and 18 years of service respectively and with higher percentages of promotion. In addition, by deftly employing the deputation vacancies available to them they could manage their cadre perfectly. Such options are not available to the Army. The main factors are :-

- (a) There was a limit to dilution of ranks acceptable within the Army. Even though we went in for colonels as commanding officers in 1980s, it was a small step compared to civilians.
- (b) Further dilution to match the civilians implied upgrading command and staff appointments. This would force upgrading the commanding officer to a brigadier and brigade commander to a major general. In addition, the erstwhile staff appointment equivalent to Brigade Major could be a brigadier/colonel. Such a model is not acceptable as it does not exist in any Army of the world. In fact, even a Colonel as a commanding officer is somewhat unique to the Indian Army.
- (c) The deputation appointments are held by IAS and IPS in large numbers. They refuse to increase the share of the Army in this. The IAS and IPS hold 45 per cent and 22 per cent of all deputation appointments respectively against only one per cent being held by the Army.

Hence, trying to compete with the Civil Services on this aspect is not possible. Most of our NE officers are lieutenant colonels or colonel time scale (TS). We need to give them a stature based on service bracket rather than the rank structure as presently NFU is not applicable to Army officers. In case, if we are able to achieve NFU for the Indian Armed Forces it would provide some relief on this issue.

### **Comparison with Other Armies**

Though we tend to compare our structure with other armies of South Asia, our standing is more akin to armies of the Western world or developed countries. For armies of South Asia like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka the problem is less as they have better stature than their Civil Service counterparts having a say in shaping their nation's policies. Thus they are able to control their salaries, perks and lateral absorption or deputation into other services. Even East Asia militaries like Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, etc have control over national policy formulation and do not face such a problem.

If we were to compare our situation with militaries of developed countries like the UK, the USA, Germany, etc. then we need to consider their system of promotion and job opportunities available to Ex-service personnel. Most of these countries have an 'Up or Out' model post pensionable service. For example, in the French Army you get to face a promotion board for lieutenant colonel (commanding officer in their case) at 13,15 and 18 years of service. Should an officer still be NE, he is given time to prepare for a second career and forcibly retired after 20 years of service. Hence, the number of NE officers in the system are restricted by way of:-

- (a) Keeping aspiration for promotion alive till nearly 18 years of service. Officers are not considered NE till last SB.
- (b) Thereafter within two years the officer is asked to quit with pension thereby; ensuring that the number of NE officers in the system are minimal.

Though such a system exists in the Indian Army for soldiers, it is not applicable for officers. Such a model would also not be acceptable within our country where it would be seen as social injustice to one service. Another reason for this model being not suitable is that assured second career to an officer (at 42 years of age) is not available in India unlike developed countries where the conditions and respect for Ex-service personnel is better with reservations in private industry, para military and police force.

Hence, we need to recognise the realities of our present service terms and conditions for officers. We need to accept that NE will occur, the numbers will remain somewhat similar as of today and we have to design a unique system of management for NE officers in the framework of present service terms for Indian Services.

### **Part 3 : Options to Improve the Present Management of NE Officers**

Having listed out major issues pertaining to the existing system, there is a need to consider options available to improve the situation. Some of the options considered are:-

- (a) Increase in deputation appointments and lateral absorption into other uniformed services.
- (b) Granting of NFU on priority to Service officers.
- (c) Reduce service for TS promotions and possibly extend the TS rank to Brigadier level.
- (d) Retirement at a particular service with Severance Pay (Golden Handshake).
- (e) Training of NE officers afresh to hold suitable administrative jobs within the Services.
- (f) Creation of a Corps of Logistics Officers for employment of NE officers.

**Increase in Deputation Appointments.** This is an ongoing battle at Military Secretary Branch and Army HQ. Though we have been able to achieve some additional vacancies in DRDO, DGQA, NHAI, etc, we still have scope for additional vacancies in Public Sector Undertakings and lateral move to para military forces. Even if approximately 2000 vacancies can be increased (which is a meagre increase of 4-5 per cent of deputation appointments) it would go a long way in ameliorating the present situation.

**Grant of NFU to Service Officers.** On this issue it is felt that the Service HQs have been making good headway and it is a matter of time before we win our case. Introduction of this for Service officers will have a major impact on meeting aspirations of NE officers in times to come. The financial security as well as protection of perks and privileges would definitely take the sting out of the embarrassment of NE.

**Reduction in Service for TS Promotions.** This issue is a delicate one and needs deliberate analysis. On one hand it may improve the aspiration level of NE officers, but it has the danger of raising challenges to career management as well as adversely affecting the motivation of achievers in the system. Suitable differential must be maintained between the selection grade and TS promotions.

We may even consider raising the bar and extending TS promotions to brigadier rank also. A suggested model is as follows:-

- (a) Colonel TS to be granted at 22 years of service.
- (b) Brigadier TS to be granted at 30 years of service.

The issues of brigadier TS needs more deliberation at the Military Secretary's Branch level with reference to

their numbers arising in the system and providing suitable appointments to be filled by them. However, the issue is not insurmountable and adequate brigadier level appointments do exist within National Cadet Corps. We could also consider upgrading Administration Commandants at Station HQ and certain appointments in other Non-Fighting Force HQ to brigadier rank.

**Retirement with Severance Pay.** This issue has been brought out in Bagga Committee Report and subsequently in AVSC report also. The option of giving full salary for residual service subject to maximum 60 months' salary has been recommended. Such an option is likely to encourage NE officers to quit the service and attempt a second career in the private industry. However, the IAS lobby has been opposing this option on the plea that such an option will have to be given to all Civil Services uniformly. It needs to be appreciated that the Services merit different dispensation because of their pyramidal structure and early retirement ages.

**Training of NE Officers for Further Employment.** As brought out earlier, the residual service length of NE officers has increased to over 15 years which has to be utilised fruitfully by the organisation. For this, we first need to identify the appointments wherein we need specialisation. Secondly we need to provide an option to the NE officer for selection to this specialisation based on what is most suited for their aptitude. Some of these specialisations could be in :-

- (a) Financial planning.
- (b) Logistics and supply chain management.
- (c) Cyber warfare.
- (d) Project management.
- (e) Human rights.
- (f) Legal services.
- (g) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical protection.
- (h) Foreign languages.
- (j) Defence production.

With the establishment of Indian National Defence University we could start planning and designing one year specialisation courses on the subjects listed above. Till that is achieved, we could outsource the training. This training has to be paid out of the defence budget. There are adequate appointments in staff at various formation HQs which could utilise the skill of these officers. The Army could also consider opening of Consultancy Services with posting of these NE officers and could also provide services to the Private Sector and State Governments.

**Creation of Corps of Logistics Officers.** This model is being suggested on the lines of Administration and Logistics Branch of the Indian Air Force. For this option, once an officer is NE, he is given training as suggested in the above option and thereafter his Arm/Service is changed to 'Logistics' with change in service conditions as follows:-

- (a) Separate cadre management and promotion prospects up to the rank of major general.
- (b) A different rank structure with separate nomenclature of Logistic Officer Grade I, Grade II and so on. Rank equivalence could be based on service length at a differential of approximately four years from selection grade officers.
- (c) A separate uniform, if required.
- (d) Employment only on staff appointments at various HQs.

The above could be examined further with reference to retirement ages and subsequently we could also look at trimming down the cadre strength in senior ranks of services like Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Judge Advocate General, Army Education Corps, etc. The trimming could be only non-specified appointments that are held by these service officers. This model would give a new identity and resultant fresh aspirations to NE officers. In addition, it would reduce the embarrassment of supersession as he would now belong to a separate stream altogether within the Services, drawing similar pay and allowances.

### Conclusion

The large number of NE officers available within the system must be seen as an asset to be exploited by the organisation rather than a liability to be managed till they superannuate. Any person who has joined the Services after evaluation of his capabilities by the SSB and completed basic military training has the potential which must be nurtured and utilised within the organisation.

Though granting NFU to Service officers, providing higher TS promotion and introduction of severance pay may meet the needs of a few NE officers; but in reality, most of them seek job satisfaction at their age to keep them motivated within the system. Hence, as an organisation our emphasis should be more on the option recommended for further training and fruitfully employing them subsequently.

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## **Infrastructure Development in Border Areas**

**General Deepak Kapoor, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd)@**

### **Introduction**

In the 1950s, the road, rail and air infrastructure in Tibet was as primitive on the Chinese side as on the Indian side of the line of actual control (LAC). It was estimated till the end of eighties by India that infrastructure in Tibet being what it was, the Chinese would require one season to prepare and concentrate their forces and the second season to fight operations for any meaningful gains against India. This would, therefore, give India sufficient time to concentrate their forces to ward off any threat.

However, the Chinese put in massive efforts to develop the Western, Central and Eastern Highways, Beijing Lhasa railway line, Gormo Lhasa fuel pipeline and 7-8 international airfields capable of day-night operations. They have gone ahead and further extended the road and rail networks right up to the LAC in most areas. This now gives them the ability to launch large scale operations within 3-4 weeks, a truly amazing feat, making India's defensive task that much more difficult.

For a soldier to fight at his optimum level, he needs to be provided, besides good leadership, the necessary wherewithal in terms of clothing, equipment, ammunition and logistic support to produce decisive results. Availability of good infrastructure enables him to be supplied with these basic requisites through multiple options, thereby enhancing his mobility, survivability and flexibility. Poor infrastructure, on the other hand, becomes a handicap and limits his options, thus denying him the capability to give off his best.

### **Historical Perspective**

The British policy of developing those areas of India which provided them with economic profitability resulted in a lopsided and haphazard development of infrastructure in India. Thus, the quadrilateral connecting Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai and Mumbai became the focus of infrastructure development, to the detriment of the rest of the country. No wonder, at the time of Independence, areas like the north eastern states had just one tenuous metre gauge line, predominantly running through Assam, connecting them to the rest of India. The gap between the two has been so great that even 68 years after Independence, it has not been fully bridged.

However, areas closer to the borders have perhaps been bigger sufferers as far as infrastructure development is concerned. As the focus has been on developing those which have large populations, remote areas with smaller populations got ignored. The Inner Line Permits policy of the Government also literally shuts them off to tourism and consequent growth and development.

The Army too has to share the blame for lack of infrastructure in these areas. Post the Chinese aggression in 1962, a deliberate policy of non-development of infrastructure in border areas was followed till the end of eighties. The rationale was that any future attacks by the Chinese would get delayed due to lack of infrastructure in these forward areas, in the process giving us vital time to prepare and move troops to counter the threat. Such a theory presupposed loss of national territory from the word 'go' and aimed at checking deeper inroads by utilising time thus available. It was totally defensive in nature, attempting more to minimise loss of territory than to win the war.

### **Damage Due to Lack of Infrastructure**

In hindsight, the consequences of these policies have been disastrous from all angles. Firstly, while the rest of the Country has progressed, matching development has not taken place in the border areas. Illiteracy, poverty and unemployment are much higher here as compared to the other more developed parts of the country.

Secondly, lack of infrastructure in border areas has inhibited exploitation of their rich natural resources, to the detriment of national economic growth. China is fully exploiting the vast mineral resources of Tibet, thanks to the infrastructure it has created there. Additionally, lack of infrastructure is a constraint to the growth of tourism.

Thirdly, the assimilation of these areas with the rest of the Country has been much slower. Sections of population here do not feel fully aligned with India. There is a feeling of neglect when compared with other parts of the Country. The degree of alienation and resentment felt by the inhabitants often finds expression in insurgencies taking roots, creating major internal security problems for the nation. No wonder, most north eastern states have experienced some insurgency or the other at different points in time. ULFA, Naga, Mizo and Manipuri insurgencies are clear examples of this phenomenon.

Fourthly, external support forthcoming for such insurgencies impinges on territorial integrity of the Country and keeps the nation busy with trying to eliminate them. On one hand, inimical powers exploit local alienation to create instability and divisiveness at minimal cost to themselves, and on the other, own precious and scarce resources get diverted to tackle these insurgencies, thereby hitting the country's growth and development.

Fifthly and most importantly, lack of infrastructure in these areas has severely limited the ability of our troops to defend our territory successfully. The Indian Army soldier is known the world over for his bravery and fighting capabilities. However, he needs the necessary wherewithal to acquit himself creditably.

### **Current State of Our Border Areas**

On our side of the LAC, we are still dependent on one single, tenuous road axis in most areas facing the Chinese. In the Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh, an area claimed by the Chinese, only one axis from Tezpur, Bomdila, Sela to Tawang and Bumla is existing till date, as was the state in 1962. Likewise, in Sikkim, areas like North Sikkim are dependent on one narrow road for sustenance during operations, leaving troops at a major disadvantage. In the

northern sector in East Ladakh, we still have not achieved road connectivity up to crucial outposts like Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). In the central sector in Barahoti area, our roads terminate 20-30 kms short of the LAC, leaving us in a vulnerable position.

The above state is a cumulative effect of neglect, poor appreciation of national priorities, resource constraint, vote bank politics and indifference to local aspirations. However, it has a direct bearing on the territorial integrity and national security of the Country. We need to examine reasons for it in depth and take corrective action before we are exposed to a 1962 like situation once again.

## **Funding**

Lack of funds has always been a major constraint in development of infrastructure in border areas. In our Country, the concept of a welfare state has invariably received greater priority even at the expense of national security. Higher populated underdeveloped areas have been the beneficiaries of larger funding than border areas most of the time, even where territorial integrity of the nation was at stake. With defence getting merely 1.8 per cent of GDP on an average for the last six years, it has negligible ability to allocate funds for development of infrastructure. Ministries of surface transport and railways find it non remunerative to spend funds for these projects. There is thus, within the Government, a confusion and reluctance to earmark funds for border area infrastructure development. No wonder in Assam, upgradation of railway line from Rangiya to Murkokselen has taken decades to fructify and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh has no rail infrastructure till date! Project for rail connectivity from Sundernagar to Ladakh in J&K is still on the drawing board. Only 17 of the 73 strategically important roads identified by the China Study Group (CSG) have been completed after a period of almost 15 years. A number of airstrips, constructed during Second World War in these areas are non functional purely because no funds were allocated to maintain them for decades.

There is a need for a central coordinating ministry purely for border area development. Adequate funding needs to be specifically allocated for construction of road, rail and air infrastructure which would cater for defence requirements as well.

## **Environmental Clearances**

A number of important projects are held up for want of environmental clearances. To cite an example, a large number of areas close to the LAC have been declared as sanctuaries or reserves by the Sikkim government e.g. Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary, Kanchanjunga National Park, Tso Llomo Cold Desert Reserve etc. without approval of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) which is mandatory for all areas located within 50 kilometres of the LAC. No infrastructure development can be carried out in these sanctuaries and reserves without taking environmental clearances from the state and central governments as well as the Supreme Court. In some cases, obtaining clearances has taken as long as 7 to 8 years.

The rationale for environmental clearances was introduced to ensure that degradation of the environment is not carried out by unscrupulous profit seekers by indiscriminate felling of trees without any compensatory forestation. Logically, it should not have been applicable to military forces who wish to construct infrastructure for security of the country. In any case, the military has an enviable record of not only protecting and maintaining infrastructure but enhancing it.

Thus the vital issue of national security becomes hostage to our own rules and regulations, impinging severely on defence preparedness. A case to do away with environment clearances requirement where national security is concerned is already in the Supreme Court. This needs to be pursued expeditiously for speedy implementation.

## **Land Acquisition**

The state governments have been sluggish in acquiring land vitally needed for infrastructure development in the border regions. Sometimes, local politics and interests have predominated, resulting in avoidable delays. An alternate axis to Tawang has not fructified after 15 years of efforts so far primarily because of land acquisition issues. And this is an area which the Chinese strongly claim as an extension of Tibet, which should be handed over to them!

Once again, where security of the nation is involved, land acquisition should be immediate irrespective of any constraining factors. If required, appropriate laws should be framed to ensure speedy acquisition in such cases.

## **Top-Down Approach**

This is one area where, for a variety of reasons, only a top-down approach would work. First and foremost, on the political side, very few understand and appreciate the importance of national security. Both within the Government and the Parliament, there are hardly any members of the political class who have had a formal exposure to issues of national security and defence. Thus, there is a natural reluctance to delve in to these issues and instead depend on the bureaucracy, whose own knowledge is limited.

Secondly, since national security has nothing to do with their political constituency and its problems, their interest in it is perfunctory. They prefer to deal in issues which concern their constituents, thus depicting them in good light and ensuring their future re-election.

Thirdly, experience for the past 68 years has shown that a bottom up approach has not worked and we have been slow in establishing better infrastructure in our border areas. It is time we took the other route and hope it works!

Lastly, issues like funding, land acquisition, enabling legislation, higher awareness of security issues by the political class, appropriate organisation etc. would be better handled if a top-down approach is followed.

## **Revamping the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)**

Low profitability, huge costs, security restrictions and lack of appropriate expertise and equipment have discouraged private enterprises from undertaking road construction projects in these remote areas. Inhospitable terrain and non availability of labour for carrying out hazardous tasks like road and rail construction are additional constraining factors. It is, therefore, imperative in view of national security implications, for the state and central agencies to step in.

Unfortunately, Border Roads Organisation (BRO) under the MoD, whose prime charter it is to undertake such projects, has not been able to deliver. It suffers from the following drawbacks:-

- (a) Its resources stand frittered on non essential tasks which can well be undertaken by other central and state agencies.
- (b) It lacks the organisation and manpower to take on all the tasks envisaged for it.
- (c) It does not possess state of the art equipment to undertake road construction in these inhospitable areas in a time bound manner.
- (d) Poor compensation and difficult service conditions have made BRO an unattractive organisation for recruitment.
- (e) Most importantly, BRO lacks adequate funding.

## **Conclusion**

On our western border against Pakistan, we have fairly well developed infrastructure. This is one of the reasons for the conventional edge that we enjoy over it. However, the same cannot be said about our northern and eastern borders, where China enjoys a definitive edge. Once again, its massive infrastructure in Tibet has placed it at a major strategic advantage. These examples highlight the importance of good infrastructure.

It is also a fact that infrastructure development is a time consuming process. On an average, a project starting today may take 10 years or above to be completed. Remoteness of border areas and difficult mountainous terrain increases cost of construction exponentially. To spread out the cost factor would again imply longer construction period. Keeping this in mind, the earlier we start, the better it would be for our national security, earlier exploitation of natural resources and quicker assimilation of border areas within the Indian Union.

Some suggestions to get on with infrastructure development in border areas expeditiously have been mooted above. A lot more can be done if there is the political will and a clearer understanding of the implications of national security at the highest levels. Let us hope we are not too late even now to tread this difficult and arduous path.

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# Mountainous Regions: Spiral of Threats and Human Security Challenges

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## Introduction

Mountainous region with high peaks, deep valleys and difficult terrain is extremely significant as it forms one of the most essential bio-geographical assets of the nation state. About 80 per cent of the planet's fresh surface water comes from the mountain watersheds.<sup>1</sup> In fact, most countries depend on mountain regions for a wide range of goods and services viz., water, food, hydro-electricity, timber, and mineral resources, besides providing opportunity for tourism and maintaining ecological balance. However, mountainous regions are characterised by unstable landscape, fragile ecosystem and geomorphological attributes. Weather in mountain areas is often severe which coupled with diverse anthropogenic dynamics operating in the ecosystem makes them highly vulnerable to natural hazards and disasters affecting human security in a big way. This paper attempts to analyse ecological threats and human security challenges emanating from mountains and suggest measures to combat them and evolve sustainable development approaches for mountainous regions.

## Ecological Threats and Environmental Insecurities

**Fragile Geology and Unstable Formations.** The mountainous regions are weak, unsteady and geo-dynamically very active and are prone to landslides, rock fall etc. Caving in of land masses results in slippages of soil and rocks due to naturally occurring vibrations, water seepage, increase in soil load, weathering or human activities. Landslide results in blockade of roads/cutting off communication links, loss of productivity of agricultural/forest lands, flooding, destruction of property, injury to persons or even loss of life causing great human, economic and environmental disasters. In snow bound areas avalanches pose the greatest challenge for the locals and troops deployed in such areas.

**Extreme Weather Conditions.** Due to high altitude terrain, funnelling effect causing wind chill factor, heavy rains and snowfall in certain areas; cold climate perpetually prevails in the mountain regions. This has adverse effect on vegetation and geomorphologic features of mountains, leading to physiological stresses and deterioration of the region. Cloudburst and flash floods are other natural vulnerabilities that can cause landslides, debris flow etc. Their intensity and sudden occurrence in restricted time and space can create large scale devastation and havoc downstream.

**Earthquakes.** Mountains in India fall in the zone of high seismic activity and are therefore vulnerable to earthquakes which pose one of the greatest threats in the mountainous regions. Earthquakes can trigger landslides and flash floods, water contamination, debris accumulation, run down ecosystem and threaten livelihood. Earthquakes are one of the most destructive natural hazards which can dismantle buildings / infrastructure in seconds, causing sustainable injury or death of the inhabitants.

**Human Induced Insecurities.** Human activities such as deforestation, unorganised tourism, unsustainable agriculture, unplanned infrastructure development, excessive mining, species hunting, overfishing etc are some of the reasons for depletion of ecosystem. Similarly, construction of dams, unregulated population rise and climatic degradation due to human actions also contribute towards mountains' vulnerability and catastrophic hazards.

## Peculiarities and Challenges of Mountainous Region

Mountain people are among the worlds poorest and most underprivileged. They suffer political, social and economic backwardness and lack access to basic services such as health and education. Mountain regions are easily subject to cascade of changes, due to high fragility of their environment with numerous natural thresholds. Some of the peculiarities and challenges of mountain regions have been analysed in the succeeding paragraphs.

**Marginalisation.** Mountain regions due to their remoteness and poor population density are mostly marginalised in comparison to plain areas. The people generally have little or no voice in national affairs, even on issues that affect their own resources or community directly. The development of infrastructure and services, especially in education, health and agricultural extension are slow and far from satisfactory due to inaccessibility of mountain areas. Lack of understanding of mountain regions results in poor policy formulation on the line of lowland systems which further aggravate the issues rather than creating a positive growth model.

**Unplanned Development and Tourism.** Unprecedented economic, environmental and cultural changes have been brought about by different agricultural, commercial and developmental activities. In their haste to catch up with their compatriots in the plains, mountain people are unhesitatingly embracing all-round changes, sometimes even jeopardising their unique environment and cultural heritage, creating new problems of pollution and degradation of natural resources. Besides the ills of unplanned development activities, the beautiful hill stations attract millions of visitors as tourists which results in further deterioration of the distinctive character of the mountains.

**Degradation of Land and Natural Resources.** With integration of economy and commercialisation of mountain culture, there has been an unabated exploitation of natural resources. The exposure of intricate ecosystem of mountains to heavy population influx, unplanned growth and resource mismanagement has adversely deteriorated the health of mountain ecology. Similarly, detrimental land use practices, poor irrigation and overgrazing have led to rapid degradation of valuable land of mountain regions. Mining in the mountain regions is largely unorganised and unscientific and is known to cause land degradation.

**Deforestation and Loss in Biodiversity.** Industrialisation, agricultural expansion and over dependence on forest products for meeting the energy needs have resulted in large-scale deforestation in most of the mountainous regions. In an effort to increase agricultural production farmers have encroached upon forests and other environmentally fragile areas. Deforestation has also resulted in the loss in biodiversity due to trade in forest products, uncontrolled tourism and over exploitation of mountain regions for short term economic gains.

## Mountains and Human Security Contributions

Mountains play a very important role for socio-economic future and well-being of mankind and for maintenance of ecological balance. Mountain areas are important source of cultural diversity, keepers of traditions, languages and customs that could represent key factors for sustainable economic development. Some of the security contributions of mountain regions have been analysed in the succeeding paragraphs.

**Water Security.** Mountain ecosystems play a significant role in regulating water quantity and quality. Almost all of the world's major rivers, originate in mountainous regions, and support the entire globe.<sup>2</sup> The high-altitude cryosphere that stores huge amounts of water as snow and ice are unique reservoirs of fresh water and flow as perennial rivers, serving as a lifeline for billions of people downstream.<sup>3</sup> For this reason mountains are often referred to as the 'water towers of the world'.<sup>4</sup> Mountain hydrological services are also essential for groundwater recharge and related functions that maintain hydrological balance in downstream areas.

**Energy Security.** Hydropower and other forms of clean energy, such as wind and solar are becoming increasingly important all over the world to meet ever growing energy needs. Clean energy is needed to maintain economic growth in a sustainable way and to improve the living standards of the vast number of people who still depend on fossil fuels. Swift flowing mountain rivers are cost-effective sources of hydropower and need to be fully exploited. The Himalayan region, for example, has the potential to generate over 300,000 MW of hydropower and only nine per cent of this potential has been developed.<sup>5</sup>

**Climate Security.** Mountain ecosystems contribute in regulating global climate through biogeochemical and biophysical processes that mediate the carbon, energy, and water balance on the land surface.<sup>6</sup> Because of the great depth, area and altitude of large glacier masses, mountains also assist in modifying the air circulation and regulating temperature of the region. The Himalayas influence the climate of the Indian subcontinent by sheltering it from the cold air mass of Central Asia and also exert a major influence on monsoon and rainfall patterns. They serve as a barrier for the moisture laden monsoon winds, preventing them from travelling northwards, thus facilitating timely and heavy precipitation in the southern part of the region.<sup>7</sup> Mountain ecosystems also have a significant role in carbon storage and carbon sequestration.<sup>8</sup>

**Environmental Security.** Mountains are a repository of biodiversity, water, and other ecosystem services and their influence extends far beyond their geographical limits including the surrounding lowlands. Mountains support about 25 per cent of the planet's ecology, 50 per cent world's biodiversity hotspots and 32 per cent of global protected areas.<sup>9</sup> Mountain forests cover account for 28 per cent of the world's closed forest areas encompassing significant assemblage of unique flora including some precious variety having usage in rare pharmaceutical products in the world market.<sup>10</sup> Remote mountain regions serve as the last sanctuaries of many exceptional species of wild life and play an important role in safeguarding the endangered species. Thus, a mountain region plays a vital role towards development of green economy and human survival.

**Cultural Security.** Mountains provide a setting for cultural, religious and traditional living in the nature's ambiance harbouring a high degree of ethnic and linguistic diversity. For instance, more than 500 languages are spoken in the Himalayas, over 400 of which are spoken by less than 100,000 people, and most are in danger of extinction.<sup>11</sup> Mountain populations also conserve vast indigenous knowledge about such subjects as agriculture, botany, medicine, and ecology. Mountain people are caretakers of natural resources, driven by the beliefs and behaviours of human communities, strengthened by their intimate connections to the natural environment that sustains them. They consider the mountains as sacred and the spiritual values of mountain cultures contribute towards continuing stewardship of watersheds and other mountain ecosystems.

**Economic Security.** Mountain ecosystem services make both direct and indirect contribution to mountain and downstream livelihoods and the economy. In terms of direct contribution, mountains provide a large share of the world's resources for mining, forestry, water for drinking and irrigation, and energy in terms of hydropower and wind. Mountain products and services form the basis for many economic sectors viz.; food, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, forestry, hydropower generation, tourism and other range of products and services. Mountain range land and forests provide economic benefits to local people and global communities through medicinal plants, timber, firewood, and minerals. Indirect contributions to national, regional, and global economies include the support and regulation of ecological functions and processes, such as carbon control, soil conservation, flood control, climate moderation, and wind and monsoon regulation.

**Food Security.** By 2050, the global population is expected to increase to nine billion and the challenge of feeding a growing population is daunting.<sup>12</sup> While all economic sectors depend to some degree on ecosystem services, agriculture has the most intimate relationship with nature. The unique diversity to include water sources, ground water recharge capabilities, climate regulation, wetland ecosystems etc., preserved in mountain ecosystems, helps to ensure the world's future food security. Thus, a sustained flow of mountain ecosystem services is critical for feeding the growing world population.

## The Way Ahead

Due to increased deterioration of ecosystems and isolation of mountain regions; the native population has become poorer and has progressively lost control over their subsistence base of resources. Therefore, mountains merit special consideration for building sustainability and equity across affected sectors. Sustainable mountain development requires a long-term vision and holistic approach that integrates political, economic and environmental aspects, multi-stakeholder cooperation and forward-looking institutions. Some of the measures deliberated upon during United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD or Rio+20) and other forums have been analysed in the succeeding paragraphs.

**Poverty Reduction.** For long lasting and effective resolution, it needs to be ensured that mountain populations receive

full compensation for the ecosystem goods and services they provide to enhance their livelihoods and reduce poverty in mountain areas and to prevent migration. This will also ensure sustained flow of these goods and services for the benefit of all. Policies need to be formulated to factor in the role of mountain people in decision-making processes for the development of mountainous areas.

**Balancing Conservation and Development.** Mountain ecosystems are often fragile. Protecting their integrity is key to securing the provision of critical goods and services. However, the development of most of the mountain areas frequently lags behind that of other regions. Mountain areas are often the site of unsustainable investments and damaging extractive industries. There is a need to maintain balance between conservation policy and development programme. This can be achieved by combining the use of high end environmental friendly technologies and products, local material/practice and targeted investments.

**Integrated Resource Management Strategies.** Given mountains' key role in providing water for domestic and commercial use, ensuring food security and supporting green energy, national and regional bodies must develop integrated water resource management strategies. These strategies should be based on a multidisciplinary approach that embeds mountain centric policies and action within the overall goal of sustainable development.

**Environmental Governance to Institutionalise Green Economy.** A green economy in the region has to rely on a strong natural resource base to include water, biodiversity, forests and clean energy sources. These resources need to be managed as public goods, in line with the principles of good governance and social equity and involving local communities in accounting for the full value of ecosystem goods and services. This includes reorganising marginal mountain communities' role in environmental stewardship. The private sector can play an important role in the development of mountainous region. Incentives should be provided for green initiatives and other innovative financing ventures that follow principles of corporate social responsibility.

**Climate Change Adaptation.** Climate change is already affecting mountain ecosystems, production systems and related livelihoods. The need for coordinated efforts to support measures of adaptation to the expected impacts at the local, national and regional scales is widely recognised. Hence implementation of national adaptation programmes with appropriate strategies of land-uses addressing the social and environmental effects of climate change in mountains and other areas need to be effective. These measures needs to include new technologies, encourage the exchange of mountain-specific traditional and innovative information and systems for sound decision-making, and establish appropriate information baselines and monitoring systems.

**Disaster Management.** Mountains are particularly vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, such as avalanches, mudflows, floods, landslides and earthquakes, with consequences that often extend far beyond mountain regions. Individual countries need to prepare mountain-specific disaster risk management plans that integrate risk assessment, prevention, response and recovery. These plans could contain elements of a green economy, such as sustainable forestry and hazard-resistant road construction. Further, the plans need to suitably factor in employment of Army or establish institutions capable of successfully dealing with hazards and risk management.

**Capacity Building.** Lack of mountain-specific knowledge and processes leads to poor decision-making at all levels. Technologies and institutions that work well in lowland areas are often ill suited to mountain realities. There is a need to promote mountain-focussed regional centres of excellence with advance research and green technology development, enhance capacity building and institutional growth and generate policy advice tailor made for mountain areas.

**Regional Cooperation.** Regional cooperation is the key to developing a green economy and good environmental governance, and also to enhance access to the markets, finance and technology transfer. In order to make full use of this potential in a sustainable way, individual countries need to tap existing national and international finance mechanisms, explore partnerships and design green investment plans for mountain regions.

## Conclusion

The mountain regions are unique natural expanse of great beauty and ecological value, and home of the head waters of major rivers. Efforts towards sustainable mountain development should not concentrate exclusively on mountains; they should be designed to benefit the entire river basin. The focus must be on actions that ensure the continued supply of mountain ecosystem goods and services that are critical to promoting a green economy in the all-inclusive area. Natural resource scarcity and inequitable distribution of benefits are emerging as major drivers of social conflicts. Adopting a mountain perspective in addressing national and regional issues thus becomes an issue of paramount importance and countries needs to pursue green development pathways for futuristic solutions.

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# **Internal Security : Countering Terror (In India) - A Brief Overview**

**Major General KA Muthanna@**

## **Introduction**

India has been combating terrorism in many forms since its Independence in 1947. The types of terror attacks range from thinly disguised attacks to anonymous bomb attacks to armed attacks by gunmen. The culmination was the Mumbai Attacks in 2008 on 26/11. Such terror attacks in the hinterland of the nation, far away from the borders/line of control, were dealt with by the national internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau and the state police.

Counter-terror involves the preventive phase wherein intelligence is built up to pre-empt and stop any terror attack from developing. Then there is the protective phase which would run concurrently with the preventive phase. The protective phase involves the measures taken to ensure the safety of the site or installation or geographical areas such as perimeter fencing, CCTV surveillance, access control, initial response and so on. Finally, there is the reactive phase. This is the phase where the responders react to contain and resolve the terror attack. Then there is the investigative aspect of the reactive phase, so essential to pinpoint and track the perpetrators and the brains behind the attack, eventually leading to prosecution and conviction in the court of law and enabling prevention of future attacks.

## **Internal Security - Under India's Federal System**

Under the Indian Constitutional Federalism, law and order which covers Internal Security and thereby counter-terror actions comes under the purview of the states. Thus we see a collection of myriad approaches in dealing with terrorism. Each state has developed its own approach and the Union Government is hard pressed to develop some commonality amongst the various federated states.

In cases where the Internal Security situation grew to proportions beyond the capability of the state police, the Army was called in, with the accompanying declaration of the affected area as 'disturbed' with the troops functioning under the legal protection of the much maligned Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). From the legal point of view, the Armed Forces cannot operate or undertake counter-terror actions as they are not empowered as the police are, under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

But, as Mumbai 26/11 showed, the Army cannot be deployed everywhere. Further, the Army is not specifically equipped to operate in an environment where collateral damage and civilian casualties are bound to occur. Finally, National Security Guard (NSG), the Federal Counter Terror organisation, was requisitioned to deal with the situation in Mumbai. However, they were requisitioned tardily and then needed time to familiarise themselves with the target areas and plan the search and clearance operations, thus it took nearly 60 hours before the terrorists could be liquidated. The entire incident highlighted the complete unpreparedness of the state police to respond to terror situations. It was very unfortunate considering that a copy book precedent was available in the Akshardham case where two terrorists attacked the Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar (Ahmedabad) at around 4 pm on 24 September 2002. The state's swift response and timely requisition of NSG resulted in containment of the incident and speedy resolution of the incident in a little over 12 hours.

The Centre/Union and many States have created disaster response mechanisms such as National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and their equivalents in the states. However, these mechanisms would be hard pressed to deal with terror related disturbances as terror strikes bring in the aspect of heightened vulnerability of victims and responders as compared to a non-terror disaster where the responders can attend to the victims and the situation without having to worry about secondary or continuing terror attacks.

## **Internal Security - the Centre's Response**

Coping with the federated system of states' responsibility for law and order, the Central Government through Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has set in place a number of initiatives to deal with counter-terrorism. These are discussed below :-

- (a) Appointing a Military Adviser, of the rank of Brigadier, in MHA.
- (b) Appointing Mr Vijay Kumar, retired DG of CRPF, as Special Security Adviser in the MHA.<sup>1</sup>
- (c) Enunciating a Crisis Management Plan (CMP) and periodically updating/revising it.<sup>2</sup>
- (d) Enhancing funds for the Modernisation of State Police Forces (MPF) Programme. Under this Non-Plan scheme, assistance is being provided, inter-alia, for procurement of modern equipment for surveillance, communications, forensic science laboratories, weaponry, vehicles, computerisation, training infrastructure and for construction of Police infrastructure viz., Housing/Police stations/out posts/barracks etc. All the north eastern States are eligible to receive 100 per cent central assistance of their approved annual plan for modernisation of Police force. In the 2015 Budget central assistance for National Scheme for Modernisation of Police and Other Forces will cease. In the spirit of "Cooperative Federalism" Government has accepted the recommendations of Fourteenth Finance Commission to devolve 42 per cent of Union Taxes to States. To achieve the compositional shift in fiscal transfer as envisaged by Fourteenth Finance Commission, Central Assistance to State Plan has been restructured and Union/Central support will be delinked for some programmes having been made a part of devolution or States may or may not continue with these programmes.<sup>3</sup>
- (e) Setting up of Counter-Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist Schools (CIATs): During the 11th Plan period a scheme was planned to set up 20 CIAT Schools, four each in the States of Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand

and Orissa to train police personnel in combating terrorism/naxalism. The MHA would provide an amount of Rs 1.5 Crores to each school for development of temporary infrastructure. The Ministry would also bear recurring expenditure towards honorarium to be paid to the trainers. The land for these schools would be provided by the concerned State Governments which would also provide administrative support for running the CIAT Schools and necessary training equipment like weapons, ammunition, supporting manpower etc.<sup>4</sup>

(f) Upgrading capabilities of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) in terms of equipment, training infrastructure and training. In Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), it has created special Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA)<sup>5</sup> and ensuring that all new battalions are counter-terror capable instead of the traditional law and order and riot control roles. Large numbers of military veterans have been contracted as trainers and, bomb detection and disposal (BDD) experts. CRPF has set up a CoBRA School of Jungle Warfare and Tactics (CSJWT) at Belgaum (Karnataka), Intelligence Institute in Gurgaon (Haryana), the Institute of IED management in Pune (Maharashtra), and two CIATs.

(g) Employing NSG's training capacity to further enhance states' counter-terror capabilities in BDD and intervention.<sup>6</sup>

(h) Counter-Terror Exercises.

(j) Arranging foreign training, in the USA and other countries and in-country, for central and state police personnel.<sup>7</sup>

(k) Setting up of National Investigative Agency (NIA) and the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the latter still a work in progress.

### Internal Security - the States' Counter-Terror Responses

Counter-terror response would encompass terror incident management which would include various aspects as discussed in the subsequent paras.

(a) **State Level Security Committee.** This would be on the lines of the Union Government's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and would comprise important cabinet ministers. Only some states have formally created such a committee.

(b) **State Crisis Management Group (SCMG).** SCMG would be constituted from the Administrators - Secretaries of various departments and senior intelligence and police hierarchy. Many states have set up this committee, more from a disaster point of view.

(c) **State Internal Security Organisation(s).** These are meant to cover aspects of counter-terror intelligence and response. In some states a counter-terror intelligence subsidiary has been created within the traditional intelligence agency leading to synergy in intelligence activity. In some other states the Internal Security Division (ISD) has the responsibility for counter-terror intelligence with the complications of overlapping jurisdiction between the traditional intelligence agency and jurisdictional (district and city) police units. The important aspect of post-incident investigation and prosecution has received mixed attention. Where jurisdictional police have the responsibility there is immediate action but not very focussed long term attention. In cases where it is the responsibility of the state nodal internal security element the long term investigation and pan-national linkages receive due attention. In Karnataka, ISD has been made a state-wide special police station with powers of investigation and prosecution/filing of FIR in specific terror related provisions of the IPC and other legal provisions.<sup>8</sup>

(d) **State Counter-Terror Response (Special) Units - Naxal and Urban.** Many states have created and maintained special response units to deal with high levels of militancy/insurgency such as the famous and reputed Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh, Anti-Naxal Force (ANF) of Karnataka, C-60 (Commando 60) of Maharashtra, Jharkhand Jaguars, Tamil Nadu Special Police, Kerala's Thunderbolts<sup>9</sup>; and so on. Till 2007, Urban Counter Terror operations were the expertise domain of the federal counter-terror unit NSG. Mumbai 26/11 highlighted the need for states to develop their own urban counter-terror capability. Thereafter, many states have developed and some are in the process of developing urban counter-terror special response units. Some states have taken assistance from the Armed Forces veterans while Karnataka has opted to avail of the services of a serving Army Officer to create a counter-terror capability in terms of training and operational units.

(e) **State Counter-Terror Response Mechanism.** Some states, such as Karnataka, have evolved a formal counter-terror response mechanism which lays down responsibilities of various stakeholders in the event of a terror situation. Further, robust protocols have been developed such as Incident Command Post for each incident with appropriate support structure. Periodic Counter-Terror Mock Drills (CTMD) ensure counter-terror preparedness of all concerned stakeholders and responders.

Some of states that took the lead in developing this capability are Maharashtra, the then united Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Their approaches are quite different. These are enumerated

below :-

(a) **Maharashtra** set up the state police's counter-terror response force 'Force One' after 26/11 (2008). The Force is based in Mumbai with Counter-Terror teams deployed across nodal towns across the state. Intelligence gathering was left to the traditional agencies.<sup>10</sup>

(b) **Andhra Pradesh** set up the Organisation for Counter-Terror Operations 'OCTOPUS' on 1st October 2007. The organisation was mandated with both counter-terror intelligence and response but subsequently responsibility

for intelligence was hived off to the traditional intelligence agencies.<sup>11</sup>

(c) **Karnataka** set up the ISD as early as 12 Dec 2008, barely a fortnight after Mumbai 26/11. ISD's mandate was focussed on counter-terror intelligence and it later developed a response capability. However, jurisdictional issues continue to cloud intelligence operations. After setting up the state counter-terror training centre 'Centre for Counter Terrorism (CCT) and the state response force 'Garuda Force'; it is now focussing on creating counter-terror response capabilities in each police unit in the districts, city commisionerates and state (armed) reserve police battalions.<sup>12</sup>

(d) **Other States** such as Rajasthan, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Delhi have developed some reasonable counter-terror response mechanisms with creation and deployment of counter-terror response forces in the state capitals and in nodal cities across the state.

Most State Police units are grappling with issue of quality leadership for counter-terror special units. Counter-terror requires a modification of police style leadership with more on the lines of military leadership wherein senior and middle level leaders are engaged in hands-on leadership roles. In the Indian police environment the various levels of hierarchy are quite distinct with Indian Police Service (Regular/Direct) being on the top, followed by the state promotees to IPS and the lower levels. Inspectors are the cutting edge of day-to-day police functions with the higher levels engaged in administrative, supervisory and guidance roles. Two states that have IPS (Regular/Direct) officers directly involved with the Special Counter-Terror units are Maharashtra and erstwhile united Andhra Pradesh. The dividends in terms of manning, equipping and operational preparedness are evident to any analyst. Karnataka has benefitted by obtaining the services of a senior serving officer of the rank of Brigadier, who as Director of ISD's Centre for Counter Terrorism (CCT), is responsible for counter-terror training and operational preparedness of the state's special counter-terror unit, Garuda Force.

## Conclusion

In the current heightened Internal Security situation and likely threat scenario it is imperative that all central and state police forces develop enhanced counter-terror capability. Special counter-terror response units must be created to ensure that terror incidents are combated with modern and effective counter-terror methods ranging from sourcing of motivated manpower, modern weapons and equipment, supported by sound tactics and response mechanisms. Terrorists must know that their actions will attract swift and professional response thereby, shrinking the windows for their success.

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Disclaimer: Certified that views expressed and suggestions made in the article are made by the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement.

# **Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Expansion : Strategic Ramifications**

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## **Background**

Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at its recently concluded 15th Summit in Ufa, Russia on 9-10 Jul 2015 has far reaching ramifications. With larger representation and broadened base, SCO is bound to evolve into a significant player in the global politics, well beyond its current regional reach. Consequently, in the times ahead, it will pose a challenge to the US domination and lend impetus to shaping of a polycentric world order.

It was on 26 Apr 1996 that 'Shanghai Five' grouping was created with the signing of the "Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions" in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The SCO was founded in Shanghai in 2001 with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. As a political, economic and military organisation, the six nation group accounted for 60 per cent of Eurasian land mass and a quarter of the world population. Since its inception, it has emerged as a regional force, acquiring significant importance in the Asian security dynamics, with two of its founding members Russia and China being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.<sup>1</sup>

The activities of this Forum have gradually expanded over the last decade to include defence cooperation, intelligence sharing and counter terrorism. Energy security has gained pre-eminence since last few years. There exists vast potential and excellent opportunity for the SCO nations to cooperate in linking the energy surplus Central Asia with energy deficient South Asia. The Organisation faces multifarious challenges due to the divergent interests of the member states and long standing territorial disputes. Situation in Afghanistan is also of serious concern for the SCO, post the US withdrawal.

Geographic separation notwithstanding, Central Asia is of immense strategic significance to India. With China and Pakistan controlling all the land access to the region, India's engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) remained constrained. While China's trade with these countries is almost US \$ 50 billion, India's is below 1 billion.<sup>2</sup> For better access to this region, since long, India has been on the lookout to set up an alternate route through Iranian Port of Chabahar and North-South Corridor connectivity that would connect Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with Afghanistan. Due to the UN sanctions on Tehran, the progress on the above projects has been rather tardy. By gaining the membership of SCO coupled with the signing of Iran nuclear deal and consequent easing of sanctions, window has opened for India to play an important role in the region.

With India and Pakistan being granted full membership (the process is underway) the SCO will then stand enlarged to eight. It implies adding 1.5 billion people, as also South Asia and Indian Ocean Region. Expansion of the SCO well serves the strategic interests of its dominating members, China and Russia; yields tangible benefits for the other members as well. Projected to be more of a partnership, in the coming times it could act as a counter balance to the western alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This paper seeks to examine the strategic ramifications of the expansion of SCO, particularly with respect to its key players.

## **SCO Expansion-Strategic Ramifications**

According to Brzezinski's theory, "control of the Eurasian landmass is key to the global domination and control of Central Asia is the key to control of the Eurasian landmass".<sup>3</sup> Both Russian and Chinese leaders have paid close attention to this theory since the formation of SCO in 2001. As per the western diplomats, SCO together with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) is a way for China and Russia to cooperate with each other in creating stability in Central Asia as also challenge the western domination. However, lack of resources is seen as a major shortcoming.

The expanded membership implies greater legitimacy to SCO; adds to its credentials as a global institution with diverse architecture. Besides boost to its influence and appeal, there are numerous pay-offs that accrue to the SCO members, including integrated development of infrastructure, expanded cooperation in the economic arena and strengthening of cultural bonding. With four observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia) and six dialogue Partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey), the SCO is all set to make deep inroads into the Persian Gulf, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, which is bound to disturb the current balance of power equations in the region. As per Alexander Gabuev, head of Asia-Pacific Region programme of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, the SCO is changing quantitatively but not qualitatively and continues its search for a mission. He further argues that Russia supported India's membership primarily to counter balance growing Chinese influence.<sup>4</sup>

## **China**

Originally, SCO was seen as a manifestation of China's ambition for regional leadership and forum for coordination of security mechanism. For China, the gains from the expanded SCO serve its strategic, security and economic objectives. It helps Beijing in realising its aspiration to emerge as an undisputed leader in the whole of Asia and not just Asia-Pacific. President Xi Jinping has stated that SCO members have created a new model of international relations-partnership instead of alliance.<sup>5</sup>

SCO is central to China's efforts to fight terrorism. During the SCO Foreign Ministers meeting held in Moscow last June, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi had called for SCO to play a larger role in guaranteeing regional security and stability. He also called for greater economic integration through Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia with Silk Road Economic Belt.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan's inclusion in the SCO will prove valuable for China in allaying its concerns from the extremism emanating from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan itself. Cooperation from the SCO partners will help China in its efforts to effectively combat the threat posed by the members of Uighur terrorist groups in 'Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region' (XUAR), who are known to have

links with East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

From the economic perspective, enlarged SCO will enable China to expand the multilateral trade and investment opportunities as part of its 'One Belt One Road' initiative. These include Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor. Besides the security concerns, Afghanistan is of immense importance for China, given its vast economic potential and Beijing's 'look West' policy.

## **Russia**

Russia has been advocating the enlargement of the SCO since long. Hence its expansion comes as a victory for Moscow. It also eases Russian concern about Chinese dominance in the region. It gains significantly in terms of political stature and recognition as a global player through the SCO expansion.<sup>7</sup> In the wake of current rift with the West, post Crimea annexation alongside involvement in Ukraine and expulsion from the G8, SCO is the ideal forum for Moscow to scout for new partnerships beyond Europe.<sup>8</sup> Its pivot to East is a long term strategic move. SCO will have a significant role in facilitating Russia to be an important stake holder in the Asian Century.

Even Russia aspires to connect East European Union (EEU) with China's Silk Road Economic Belt as part of the economic vision for the region.<sup>9</sup> It has adopted a policy of accelerated economic integration. Moscow-Beijing US \$ 400 billion gas deal is in the realm of its planned initiative. Russian economy ranks second among the SCO members and is the eighth largest in the world. Enlarged SCO opens fresh avenues for Russia in exploring new markets.

## **India**

For India, assuming the full membership of the SCO has definite pay-offs.<sup>10</sup> As per Prime Minister Modi, "India's inclusion as full member of SCO mirrors the region's place in India's future". India's key interests in Central Asia are security, energy, trade and mutual cooperation in multiple arenas. Delhi can also address its security concerns more effectively in Afghanistan and Central Asia with increased stakes in the region, by scaling up the level of defence cooperation. Joint production of defence equipment, training and related fields offer vast scope. Cooperation in the area of Uranium extraction is in the offing with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It provides India a platform to effectively thwart any design which may be inimical to its national interests.<sup>11</sup>

Energy security is of utmost importance for India. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are endowed with large hydrocarbon reserves. India will get access to the vast energy resources of Central Asia and implementation of long pending Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project will also get impetus.

There is vast scope in enhancement of bilateral cooperation in the field of education, health, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, textiles, petrochemicals, mining, tourism and service sector. It provides India an opportunity to leverage potential and project itself as an important player, well beyond the confines of South Asia. It also helps Delhi to pursue multi aligned policy, negating the pro-USA bias.

In certain quarters, there is an apprehension that the SCO membership does not confer India much advantage. China may not permit India to gain significant benefits from the SCO membership. On the other hand, increased economic engagement between Delhi and Beijing could create more conducive environment and help narrow the prevailing trust deficit between the two neighbours.<sup>12</sup>

## **Pakistan**

Since long, Pakistan had been making efforts to become a SCO member state. Islamabad perceives that as a member, it will be able play a more effective role in the stability of the region.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, Pakistan has a lot to gain as full SCO member with the enhancement of its stature in the region. It can exploit geo-strategic location to seek support from the SCO members to combat extremism and terrorism.

Beijing-Islamabad all weather relationship lends added advantage to Pakistan for diplomatic posturing in the expanded SCO. With the development of Gwadar Port, Pakistan can emerge as an energy and trade corridor for the SCO nations. It also offers Islamabad an avenue to seek SCO facilitation in finding solution towards settlement of the vexed Kashmir dispute.<sup>14</sup> Pakistan could make a strong case for China's entry into SAARC on Beijing's behest.

## **CARs**

The CARs are located at the intersection of the Chinese and Russian interests. The largest and wealthiest Central Asian State, Kazakhstan has large mineral deposits. Closest to Russia, its participation in the SCO is in consonance with its multi vector policy, allowing it to pursue the national interests. It is India's largest trading partner in Central Asia with strong ties in the field of space and nuclear research.

As per Farkhod Tolipov, Director of "Knowledge Caravan" Centre, Tashkent, for Uzbekistan, the primary focus of the SCO's geopolitical agenda still remains Central Asia centric.<sup>15</sup> Because of the concerns about Taliban and Afghanistan, it wants stronger ties between the SCO nations and desires to be less dependent on China and Russia. It perceives that inclusion of South Asian agenda could overburden the organisation and complicate the issues. President Islam Karimov while speaking at Ufa drew attention to the fact that the SCO is about to be joined by two nuclear powers in a state of permanent conflict.<sup>16</sup> In the expanded SCO, Tashkent would be in the thick of multilateral agendas, something it has sought to avoid

Tajikistan which borders Afghanistan and Pakistan was embroiled in civil war from 1992 to 1997 and still remains unstable. Dushanbe seeks to pursue balanced policy in its dealing with Delhi and Islamabad; has worked closely with India over the years. It envisions that expanded SCO could facilitate in resolving the Afghanistan issue

Kyrgyzstan is the smallest yet most democratic among the Central Asian States. Sandwiched between Chinese and Russian interests, it continues to experience serious economic difficulties in raising capital for various developmental projects. It has active military cooperation with India. Turkmenistan has the world's fourth largest gas reserves. Since the death of strongman Saparmurat Niyazov in 2002, the country is slowly opening up.<sup>17</sup> When the TAPI pipeline comes up, India will have its first land connectivity to Central Asia.

### **In Retrospect**

The SCO expansion is occurring at a time of rising tensions between US-EU and Russia. It is seen as a counter balance to NATO. An expanded membership will confer greater legitimacy to the SCO which will yield multiple benefits to its members, especially in the security and economic arena. Cumulative geopolitical clout of SCO is already impressive. Its geographic reach stretches across Asia-Pacific, to Caspian Sea, Arctic Region, Eastern Europe, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. As part of the future growth process, SCO's influence and appeal is bound to grow in the international arena. Inclusion of India and Pakistan implies broader integration of Central and South Asia. India as the largest democracy and third largest economy (in PPP terms) lends international recognition to the SCO. On the other hand, Delhi can make deeper inroads into Central Asia by optimising the potential of the SCO. As a hub of terrorism, Pakistan could emerge as a key player in combating the menace, both in regional and global terms.

Currently, the SCO is facing both economic and systemic challenges. As per Joseph Dobbs, Research Fellow at European Leadership Network (ELN), since its establishment, the SCO has suffered from existential malaise.<sup>18</sup> Originally designed to maintain stability in Central Asia and counter US influence in the region, China has been constantly seeking to strengthen its hold in the SCO. Russia has been an impediment in checkmating Beijing's expansionist agenda.

While enlarged SCO offers numerous advantages to its members, there could be negative fallouts as well. It could dilute the current clout of the founding members in the organisation. With Moscow's genuine concern about the likelihood of its influence diminishing in the CAR, there are chances of tensions brewing up between Russia and China for the leadership role in the enlarged set up. India-Pak traditional rivalry could create a negative impact on the functioning and effectiveness of the SCO.

At the 2014 Conference on 'Interaction and Confidence Building' in Asia, President Xi Jinping has spoken about the new Asian Security Concept (Asia for Asians).<sup>19</sup> China aspires to be a leader in whole of Asia and not just Asia-Pacific. A factionalised or fractured SCO would be harmful to the Chinese strategic interests. In fact, there is scepticism in certain quarters that SCO may turn out to be another forum, high on symbolism and low on substance.

With the ongoing process of expansion, the SCO is set to transform from a purely regional grouping to a global entity. Although security dimension remains the core issue, enlarged ambit and charter of SCO encompassing numerous economic and social initiatives have long term strategic implications. In the emerging new world order, the SCO is destined to play a pivotal role in defining the course of the ensuing shift in 'centre of gravity' from West to East, in the times ahead.

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# Understanding 'Make In India' in the Defence Sector

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## Introduction

In the end of Nov 2014 the Prime Minister of India gave a clarion call 'Make in India', to the Nation and indeed ignited the imagination of millions of intellectuals in this Country, who instantly grasped the fundamental progressive and nation building nature of this concept. So much so that in Feb 2015 during the Aero India show the author was amazed to see foreign business honchos vying with each other to be seen saying the correct things in the changed environment. The events between end 2014 and now have led to a bewildering array of interpretations of the make in India concept and after all the initial euphoria has settled down there is a strong need to understand the make in India concept, if it is to be customised for application to various business sectors.

At the stratospheric visionary level of the Prime Minister he has done his job by providing a patriotic long term practical vision which has to be adopted in letter and in spirit by all Indians at their respective levels of influence and capability to contribute to making this visionary idea a practical reality. At a political, social and national level the simplest way of defining the objectives of this mantra is increase of national economic activity, enhancement of job opportunities, skill development, self-reliance and an opportunity to enhance the quality and standard of life of all Indians. The extent of success can now be measured only by how well decisions and activities are taken in particular sectors to realise the national objectives mentioned above.

## Practical Implications

The make in India concept is visualised for implementation in a variety of business sectors such as automobiles, automobile components, aviation, biotechnology, chemicals, construction, defence, electrical machinery, electronics, food processing, information technology and business process management, leather, media and entertainment, mining, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, ports and shipping, railways, textiles and garments, thermal power, tourism and hospitality and the wellness industries.<sup>1</sup> It is naïve to think that there is one common template that can be applied to all the industries. It is the collective duty of policy makers, business leaders (both private and public sectors) to evolve a coherent, non-antagonistic, enlightened, sector specific road map for each sector so that maximum national benefit is extracted out of this concept.

What role do foreign nations / business entities have to play in the make in India concept? As a general axiom the role of foreign institutions and businesses could be limited and indeed be in conflict with the concept of make in India. In principle, it would not be wrong to say that while any foreign contribution to the growth of make in India concept must be welcomed and accepted, inherently there is a likelihood of a clash of interests between a foreign nation / entity and the broader Indian national objective aimed to be achieved under this mantra. If this principle is accepted by all Indian stakeholders as a reality, then it automatically follows that a certain degree of caution has to be exercised whilst interacting with foreign parties so as to always be able to ensure that all decisions are in line with the national objective. Any laxity in this approach would be self-defeating and counterproductive. This is indeed a very tough call to make.

The success of the make in India mantra can only be evaluated after about three decades of dedicated hard work, which means that only two generations from now will be able to reap the benefits of the dedication and hard work of their forefathers or the results of their inadequate pursuit of the policy. Why this is a tough call is because the current stakeholders will not really be the beneficiaries of any short term immediate benefits. Politically the ruling parties will have to sacrifice the idea of deriving political mileage to help them win the next few elections. Business houses may have to give up short term profits for becoming long term winners. Indeed this movement has all the colours of a new freedom struggle - a national economic one, where we may have to compromise on our today for the benefit of our future generations. In the economic history of a Country that has dominated the world economic order for most part of the last millennium this is but a small price to pay if we have to reverse the aberration of India falling out of the list of top economies of the world in the last 200 years.

It has already been mentioned above that interpretation of make in India has to be sector specific. This paper seeks to analyse, what should be the nature of interpretation of this mantra in the Defence Sector?

## Application to Defence Sector

Defending India has been a very important part of Indian history which has evolved very much due to influx of people into the plains of India from our northern borders. Before Independence from British rule, the concept of India as we know it now did not exist geographically as a Country but was very much the same as a cultural and social entity. Though the warring kings of Indian history did spend a lot of time battling one another there was always an undercurrent of the 'foreign threat' across the borders in the North well recorded from the times of Prithvi Raj Chouhan.

The task of defending our hard fought Independence has been carried out for the last seven decades with a curious mix of legacy. We began with British hardware when they departed from the shores of India, to decades of dependence on the erstwhile Soviet Union; who, to give credit where it is due, have been very dependable partners in the most extreme times of need. Over the last two decade, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, India has found new defence partners in Israel, the USA, France and Germany whilst continuing with former Soviet Union entities like Russia and Ukraine. Besides these foreign sources of defence hardware, our own DRDO and defence PSUs have been leading a 'me too' existence since Independence with insufficient achievements to speak over decades. There has been almost no significant contribution from the private sector which has at best played a role of ancillary to a PSU with small scale industries being an exception, making a commendable contribution. Large private industry probably did not find it to be a lucrative market at all and were literally forced to surrender the available domestic market to foreign

players.

The dependence on foreign technology has spawned a culture of licensed production over the decades with the limited objective of having in-Country maintenance facilities for the hardware of our Armed Forces. So much so that our Defence PSUs like HAL with unit names such as Rotary Wing Research and Design Centre, Aircraft Research and Design Centre, Aero-Engine Research and Design Centre have evolved to be primarily sourcing agencies for components, technology and designs from abroad. They have taken on the role of integrators of these technologies which culminate in much to be desired local production facilities resulting in an eternal tussle between them and the user Services primarily on production quality and product delivery issues. Here the silver lining in this otherwise dark cloud is the policy followed by the Indian Navy who probably due to their in-house design capability (the Directorate of Naval Design) have slowly but surely been inching towards developing a much higher degree of indigenisation starting from humble beginnings of producing the Leander class frigates locally, the Navy has an admirable but not completely adequate, record of true indigenous design.

With the brief historical background provided above on the nature of defence hardware procurement in the Indian Armed Forces, the question naturally arises how should make in India be dovetailed in this sector? A one line response to this question is that make in India should be actually design in India. This is a loaded statement pregnant with many concepts and objectives and the same is being discussed in the succeeding paras.

### **National Objectives**

Let us first list the various objectives and characteristics of operating in the Defence Industry. The key national objectives in this area are:-

- (a) Self-reliance.
- (b) Conserving foreign exchange.
- (c) Develop export potential.
- (d) Technology and skill development.
- (e) Transforming India into a true global super power.
- (f) Using defence manufacturing as an engine of national economic growth.

The primary stakeholders in achieving these objectives are Government through policy facilitation; the Armed Forces through development of future strategy, defining of qualitative requirements of future weapons in keeping with our political objectives and the DRDO-PSU combine, to develop the requisite technologies (with their head start in the business as compared to private industry). Last but not least, the private industries, who though are current toddlers in the business, must set themselves the American defence industry as role models.

### **The Role of Private Sector**

The next question that needs to be addressed is to understand the objectives and role of the Private Sector. The long term objectives of this stakeholder are:-

- (a) Should be based on a long term financially viable proposition.
- (b) Supported by a government policy which will help the industry achieve long term goals.
- (c) There are no big (compared to global scale) private industry players in India at the moment. As greenfield projects, they will require special attention to enter into the R&D area as the gestation periods are long.
- (d) A true internalisation and understanding by the leaders of private industry that make in India should not be licensed production.
- (e) The private industry should adopt a policy of buying talent and not technology to bridge technology gaps and reduce design time.

### **Role of the Government**

For the private large industries to make the above points their committed ideal, they require the support of the Central and the State Governments (irrespective of the Party who rules the Country over the next 30 years at least). The Government again consists of two elements, the civil bureaucracy and the Armed Forces who unfortunately do not seem to be working as one unit at times; the area of conflict is primarily one of supremacy of policy over what is perceived to be the best available hardware. The Government should make a clear policy decision on being partial to indigenous production even at the cost of dilution of some QRs. Defence procurement has been a very tricky business, it has either been hijacked by the corrupt or ignored by the 'clean'. Either way the Country has suffered and we will soon reach a stage when there will not be enough money to make all the necessary hardware purchases from abroad and at the same time the security of the Country will be compromised due to the very nature of import dependence. We have in our own Country the example of great self-reliance in the Indian Space and Research Organisation (ISRO) story brought about by the state of denial of technology by developed countries. This has led to the Country being today self-sufficient in cryogenic engines for space launchers but is unable to produce a jet engine to power our fighters. The real work that needs to be done by the Government is as follows:-

- (a) Adopt a clear policy of preference for indigenous procurement and solemnly stick to it.

(b) The responsibility of the Services is to agree to a minimum QR list and not demand a complete wish list which cannot be supported at the current level of technology in the Country. Discussion on specific cases is beyond the scope of this paper, but examples could be the purchase of only Indian made field guns, purchase of only the armed light helicopter (ALH) etc.

(c) Such an indigenous policy should not result in raising the bogey of compromising national security. This issue can and should be tackled with the correct interpretation of threat perception to the Country and larger numbers, wherever possible.

(d) The Government needs to adopt a policy like that of China which has a 20 year head start in their indigenous arms programme over India, thanks to sanctions on all critical technologies to them by developed nations. A few years ago Chinese military hardware was scoffed at but today they are treated with respect and even awe. A simple case in point is the way China is confidently continuing with its programme of building two aircraft carriers when they have no experience of even operating one. The Government therefore needs to follow an enlightened policy of self-imposed sanctions.

(e) The growth of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) itself is a lamentable story which is dealt with separately.

(f) Several indigenous systems are ready for export and can find foreign markets. The current production policy is so inward looking that meeting the needs of the Indian Armed Forces itself seems to be out of the reach of current installed capacity. Here the Government can demonstrate its commitment by offering these to private industry for production and marketing abroad.

### **The Defence Procurement Procedure and its Associated Problems**

The bureaucrats in the Government in all sincerity have tried very hard to produce a DPP over more than a decade with several revisions trying to correct perceived problems at regular intervals. Without trying to be over critical of their efforts, for the sake of simplicity, the greatest shortcoming has been that though the DPP is a great financially audit worthy procedure, it has completely failed from the technological perspective. The review of the DPP itself is a complete study which requires serious consideration. Major inadequacies are discussed in the succeeding paras.

**Offset Policy.** The concept of offsets was brought in with great fanfare in the initial years of the DPP and in many ways was supposed to fulfil the requirements of make in India in terms of bringing foreign technology and helping Indian industries get acclimatised to the world of defence hardware manufacture and spawning jobs, cheaper production in the Country and ultimately help grow indigenous private industry in the defence sector. On the face of it this was a good idea, but a decade later unfortunately nothing significant in this direction has happened. The lacunae in the argument is the assumption that given the volumes that India imports with its dubious distinction as the world's largest arms importer, foreign companies would fall head over heels to meet the aspirations of the Indian DPP. This never occurred! The foreign companies did rush in to get the contracts but have done precious little by way of technology transfer. It is but unreasonable to expect them to part with intellectual property for the sake of one large purchase order. This is the reason why earlier in the paper the caution has been sounded that the role of foreign participation in make in India is only a matter of cautious optimism.

**Transfer of Technology for Life Cycle Support.** In line with the DPP several procurements have been made insisting on a Transfer of Technology (ToT) for life cycle support presumably to cater for in-Country support for the hardware purchased and presumably at a lesser cost. Even here detailed study of specific areas reveals that the stated objectives have not been achieved. In several cases, sending the equipment to the country of manufacture for major overhaul/repairs is far cheaper than indigenous maintenance support.

### **The Way Forward**

Main recommendations are :-

(a) Make in India in defence sector must be seen as Design in India.

(b) The national policy should be mostly well defined indigenous procurement alone, with a concept of self-imposed sanctions.

(c) Private industry needs the assurance of indigenous procurement to be financially viable.

(d) Private industry must be allowed to build capacity to kick start exports, based on already government funded R&D and products developed.

(e) Private industry must buy talent and not technology.

(f) Continuation of this policy by all governments in the future for the next 30 years. For this political concessions would be required.

(g) Design a procurement procedure which is not only looking after financial correctness but also caters to technology needs. One way of doing this could be to make offset requirements meet nation building activities. In this way foreign companies may feel less threatened and promote more indigenous funding to R&D.

(h) Evolve a clear national threat perception and develop cost effective defence tactics and strategy, so that the QRs defined for future acquisitions are adequate and practical, and not necessarily 'the best' which is out of reach of present indigenous capability. To do this the Government must make use of the services of the large pool of ex-servicemen in an advisory role as a matter of policy.

(j) The private industry must give up their fixation for licensed production. They should look at it as being only an extension of agency business which actually finally results in much greater costs to the government in many cases.

#### **Endnote**

1. [www.makeinIndia.com/sectors](http://www.makeinIndia.com/sectors).

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# **1965 Indo-Pak War - A Critical Appraisal**

**Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)@**

## **Introduction**

The events of 1965 seem to have almost faded from the memory of the Nation; except perhaps the battle honour days which are commemorated by various units of the Indian Army. There is no national war memorial to pay homage to the martyrs of not only the 1965 war but all the wars fought by the Indian soldier (sailors and airmen included) since Independence; nor for that matter to those who sacrificed their lives during the Second World War. This paper seeks to revisit 1965 Indo-Pak War and present a critical appraisal with a view to deriving any lessons that may still be relevant for the future. It is also a tribute to the martyrs of 1965 War.

## **Genesis of the 1965 Indo-Pak War**

The genesis of the 1965 War lay in the events of 1947-48 when Pakistan tried to annex the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by force in the garb of tribal raiders and lashkars. It needs to be said to the credit of Pakistan that inspite of the birth pangs of a new nation state and the trauma of partition they were able to conceive and execute a cross border invasion of J&K to try and achieve their strategic aim. That they could not achieve their aim in entirety is due to the brilliant response by the Indian military which was able to thwart their carefully laid out plans in the nick of time. Another fortunate event for Pakistan was that India decided to go to the United Nations (UN) even while its forces were well poised to evict Pakistani forces from the whole of J&K. In the Northern Areas of the State, the treachery of two British officers, Major WA Brown and Captain Matheson of the Gilgit Scouts whose services had been retained by the State, was greatly responsible for the control of Gilgit to pass into the hands of Pakistan by 03 Nov 1947.<sup>1</sup>

The net result was that when the UN sponsored ceasefire came into effect on 01 Jan 1949, Pakistan was in de-facto control of approximately one third of the entire territory of J&K, a situation that continues to prevail till date.

## **Developments from 1949-1965**

India and Pakistan, the two nation states that emerged from the partition of the Sub-continent moved along entirely different trajectories. India believed that the post-World War II world was a benign one and the fatigue of the Great War would ensure a generally peaceful future. India also laid great trust in the efficacy of the UN for resolution of disputes amongst nations. Hence, India began its journey by concentrating on development and building of state institutions for a democratic and secular polity. In its foreign policy orientation, it chose non-alignment as state policy as the Cold War between the two power blocks was just setting in.

Pakistan on the other hand had a different world view. It joined South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in Sep 1954 and Baghdad Pact in early 1955 which later in 1959 was transformed into the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Although the USA was still not a member of the organisation, it did sign bilateral military aid treaties with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey; thus ensuring that it would continue to be active in supporting the CENTO members.<sup>2</sup>

Soon after joining the above pacts, Pakistan started receiving military aid from the USA and by early 1965 four infantry and one and a half armoured divisions had been modernised with the American equipment.<sup>3</sup> This emboldened Pakistan to test its strength against India once again and to try and wrest the rest of the State of J&K.

Consequent to the military debacle of 1962, India concentrated all its energies to build a strong military posture against China. What an irony - prior to 1962, all the military preparedness was against Pakistan; post 1962, now that all the attention was focussed against China, the Pakistan threat suddenly began to loom large in Kashmir and on the western border.

## **Operations in the Rann of Kutch**

In Feb 1965 Pakistan had seized the area of Kanjarkot (Rann of Kutch) by a company of Indus Rangers. Surprised and reacting to the above situation, India assigned the responsibility for removing the above encroachment to 31 Infantry Brigade Group under the command of Maharashtra and Gujarat Area. Pakistan retaliated by moving in their 8 Infantry Division under Major General Tikka Khan and also inducted armour (24 Cavalry) into the area. There were series of land battles between the two forces during Mar-Apr 1965 with Pakistan capturing Biar Bet on 27 Apr 1965.

However, due to the intervention of Mr Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the UK, a ceasefire came into effect on 01 Jul 1965 and both sides agreed to restore status quo as on 01 Jan 1965. Thus, the Kutch affair ended visibly on a peaceful note but in reality it was only a prelude to another effort by Pakistan to annex J&K, which was to unfold later. The dispute was subsequently referred to an International Tribunal which announced its award on 19 Feb 1968. The award was accepted by both sides.<sup>4</sup>

## **Operation Ablaze (India)**

Operation Ablaze is an important interlude between the operations in the Rann of Kutch and Operation Gibraltar by Pakistan, leading to a full scale war. This Operation included the measures taken by the Indian Army along the western border in May-Jun 1965, following Pakistani attack in the Rann of Kutch. All the formations in Punjab, mainly under 11 Corps, were ordered to move and deploy in their battle locations. It appeared that India was ready for offensive operations across the International Border in Punjab, if the situation in the Rann of Kutch escalated further.<sup>5</sup> Following the ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch and an agreement that the Kutch dispute was to be referred for arbitration, Operation Ablaze was called off and troops were ordered to return to their peace locations.

## **Operation Gibraltar (Pakistan)**

Even before the ceasefire took effect in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan had been planning much bigger things in J&K commencing in May 1965. The plan was to infiltrate a large force comprising some 30,000 men to incite a general uprising in the Valley which could in turn be used to justify Pakistani military intervention. While addressing the Force Commanders on 01 Aug 1965, Field Marshal Ayub Khan impressed upon them the importance of the mission and emphasised that it was their (Pakistan's) last chance to liberate Kashmir.

Pakistan commenced infiltration of the Gibraltar Force in small groups across the cease fire line (CFL) in J&K between 01 and 05 Aug 1965. The areas covered were – right from Kargil in the North to Chhamb in the South. Once inside the Valley, they were to mingle unnoticed among the crowds celebrating the festival of Pir Dastgir Sahib on 08 Aug 1965 and were to engineer an armed uprising, and in the process capture the radio station, Srinagar airfield and some vital installations. Following this, a 'Revolutionary Council' was to proclaim itself as the lawful government and broadcast an appeal for recognition and assistance from all countries, especially Pakistan. This was to be the signal for the Pakistan Army to move in for the kill.<sup>6</sup>

However, Operation Gibraltar came to naught, mainly for two reasons. First, the internal conditions in the Valley were not ripe for an insurrection of the kind that Pakistan had hoped to incite. Secondly, a quick and firm response by India took Pakistan by surprise and thwarted their well laid out plans. India reacted almost immediately by recapturing Kargil heights which had been returned in Jul 1965, a limited offensive in the Tithwal Sector and most importantly, the capture of Haji Pir Pass in a daring operation by 1 PARA of 68 Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) ZC Bakshi by 28 Aug 1965. Thus, by the end of Aug 1965, Pakistan's plans for quick annexation of the Valley had been squarely defeated.

### **The War : Chhamb - Jaurian Sector**

In desperation, Pakistan faced with the failure of Operation Gibraltar, played its final hand by launching Operation 'Grand Slam' on 01 Sep 1965. It was launched across the southernmost portion of the CFL and was aimed at Akhnoor; thus isolating Indian positions in Naushera, Rajauri and Punch. Thereafter, an armoured thrust could be developed towards Jammu, the capture of which would have severed all land communications to J&K. This would place Pakistan in a position to dictate terms to India. The offensive had achieved surprise and made good progress initially but had lost its momentum by 03 Sep 1965. The Indian Air Force played a major role in blunting the Pak offensive. The situation in this sector was stabilised by about 10 Sep and Pakistan remained in control of the areas upto and including Jaurian. Pakistan's grand aim to capture Akhnoor had been thwarted.

### **Indian Counter Offensives**

Indian reaction to Pakistan's Grand Slam came by way of counter offensives across the international border in J&K, Punjab and Rajasthan, commencing on 06 Sep 1965. The 'go-ahead' for an all-out military response had been given by the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on 03 Sep. The Indian grand strategy was to threaten Lahore and Sialkot, thus relieving pressure in Chhamb-Jaurian Sector and while doing so, degrade Pakistani armed potential and capture some territory which could be used for bargaining in the post-war negotiations.

### **Indian 11 Corps Offensive - Operation Riddle**

The main aim of the offensive was to secure the line of Ichhogil Canal and a few bridgeheads, thus posing a threat to Lahore; and in turn remove any threat to the sensitive areas of Punjab; like Amritsar, Beas etc. The formations were required to go on the offensive straight from their peacetime locations without first moving to concentration areas. It was a kind of 'Cold Start'. The offensives commenced at 0500 hours on 06 Sep 1965 as under :-

- (a) 15 Infantry Division along Amritsar - Lahore Axis.
- (b) 7 Infantry Division along Khalra - Barki Axis.
- (c) 4 Mountain Division on Khemkaran - Kasur Axis. However, a major portion of 4 Mountain Division was also required to occupy defences in area Khemkaran to counter an offensive by Pak armoured division which was expected in this area.

The Indian offensives achieved complete surprise and made good progress initially. Along the GT Road Axis, one of the battalions of 15 Infantry Division crossed the Ichhogil Canal at Dograi and reached Batapore on the outskirts of Lahore. However, initial success was not exploited and by about the end of Day One, the Indian offensives had lost their momentum and there were a number of setbacks. Though Ichhogil canal was reached at a few points, no crossings could be secured and held. There was also lack of coordination between armour and infantry. It appears that air support had also not been planned for the offensives.

The situation became particularly grave in the 4 Mountain Division Sector where enemy launched its counter offensive by 1 Armoured Division on 08 Sep towards Jandiala Guru, Beas Bridge and Harike. 4 Mountain Division had to occupy a hastily prepared Division Defended Sector in Area Asal Uttar in the face of this powerful offensive. The Defended sector had approximately three and a half battalions of Infantry (18 raj rif, 1/9 gr less two companies, 4 GRENADIERS and 9 JAK RIF) along with units of 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (3 Cavalry, 8 CAVALRY less a squadron and 9 HORSE) and artillery guns deployed in Area Chittikhui-Valtoha.<sup>7</sup> A few minefields were also laid and some areas were flooded. Fierce battles raged on 08-09 Sep in which Indian forces repelled repeated attacks by Pak armour and infantry. More importantly, personal intervention by the Army Commander, Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, VrC, ensured that there were no withdrawals; Indian troops held firm and the situation was stabilised by 10 Sep with heavy losses to Pak armour. Indian estimate of Pak tank casualties in the battle of Asal Uttar is 97, including 72 Pattons.<sup>8</sup> Hereafter, there were no major battles fought in this Sector. By the time of ceasefire, Indian forces were on the home-bank (eastern) of Ichhogil Canal, while Pakistan remained in control of a small enclave in the Khemkaran

Sector. After the launch of Indian 1 Corps in the Sialkot Sector, Pak was forced to pull out and divert an armoured brigade from this sector to Sialkot Sector to stabilise the situation there.

### **Indian 1 Corps Offensive in Sialkot Sector (Operation Nepal)**

As part of the overall strategy, India decided to launch its main counter offensive by the newly raised 1 Corps in the Sialkot Sector in order to relieve pressure in the Chhamb Sector as also to degrade Pakistan's fighting potential. The offensive was launched on the Night of 07 / 08 Sep 1965 on a frontage from Suchetgarh in the West to Degh Nadi in the East. The Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General PO Dunn and had the following major formations :-

- (a) 1 Armoured Division
- (b) 6 Mountain Division
- (c) 14 Infantry Division
- (d) 26 Infantry Division

A few words about the state of operational readiness of the Corps. The Corps HQ had been raised in May 1965 and was still facing teething troubles which are common with new raisings. 6 Mountain Division had only two mountain brigades (69 and 99). The Division had been deployed on the Himalayan border and was neither equipped, nor trained for warfare in the plains. 14 Infantry Division was still in the process of being raised and comprised only two infantry brigades (35 and 58) which had been deployed on the UP-Tibet border till Aug 1965. Its third brigade (116) joined the Division at Babina in Aug 1965. 26 Infantry Division, which was in area Jammu also had only two infantry brigades (162 and 168). The Corps had never trained as a cohesive formation for its operational role and most of its units met each other for the first time in the concentration area.<sup>9</sup>

**Indian 1 Corps Mission.** The Corps was tasked to secure areas Bhagowal - Phillaurah - Chawinda - Cross Roads (Badiana) with a view to advancing towards the Marala Ravi Link (MRL) Canal and eventually to the line of Dhalliwali - Wuhilam - Daska - Mandhali.<sup>10</sup>

The Corps was opposed by Pakistan 1 Corps comprising 6 Armoured Division and 15 Infantry Division. Initially, the area into which Indian 1 Corps was launched was the area of responsibility of Pak 15 Infantry Division with its HQ in Sialkot. However, as the operations progressed, the responsibility to counter the Indian offensive was given to Pak 6 Armoured Division with 24 Infantry Brigade of 15 Infantry Division which had been deployed in this area placed under its command. So, it was a contest between the Indian 1 Corps which was on the offensive and the Pak 6 Armoured Division with attached troops who were defending. The battles were fought in general area Bhagowal - Badiana - Pasrur - Zafarwal. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to look at the state of Pak 6 Armoured Division.

Pak 6 Armoured Division was raised from 100 Independent Armoured Brigade Group in Apr 1964. It comprised three armoured regiments and two armoured infantry battalions. There are two points that need to be noted. First, each tank regiment consisted of two squadrons of M-48 Patton tanks and a squadron of M36B2 Tank Destroyers of World War II vintage. Secondly, there was no combat command HQ under HQ 6 Armoured Division. Hence, the Division HQ had to control all the units directly on any combat mission. The concept of combat commands had been imbibed by Pak Army from the US Army. The Division was commanded by Major General Abrar Husain who was from the first batch of emergency commissioned officers passing out from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun in Jul 1940.<sup>11</sup>

As mentioned earlier, after the failure of Operation Gibraltar in J&K, Pak launched an offensive in the Chhamb Sector on 01 Sep 1965. For this offensive, the GHQ took away from 6 Armoured Division, the HQ and units of 4 Corps Artillery, 25 Infantry Brigade and two out of three integral tank regiments i.e. 13 Lancers, 11 Cavalry with one company of 9 Frontier Force. As a replacement they received 22 Cavalry (all three squadrons equipped with M-48 Patton tanks) just before the war started. After some to and fro moves from 05 - 07 Sep, the Division HQ was finally deployed in Area Bhallowali (about 10 km South of Sialkot) by first light 08 Sep 1965. By now, 11 Cavalry had rejoined the Division from Chhamb Sector and the Division had its three tank regiments (Guides Cavalry (FF), 11 Cavalry and 22 Cavalry) and two armoured infantry battalions (9 and 14 FF) on its order of battle (ORBAT).

Initially, the responsibility for defence of the complete area from the Chenab to the Ravi River, a distance of about 220 km along the border was that of Pak 15 Infantry Division. However, after the main direction of the Indian 1 Corps offensive became clear the task for defence of this area excluding Sialkot was assigned to Pak 6 Armoured Division with effect from 0001 hours on 10 Sep 1965.<sup>12</sup>

Please see Sketch 1 for Indian 1 Corps plan of operations. The stage was now set for a trial of strength between Indian 1 Corps and Pak 6 Armoured Division. The next ten days or so were to see a series of tank battles in general area Badiana- Phillaurah-Chawinda-Zafarwal on a scale not seen since the Second World War. It is not within the scope of this paper to follow the detailed course of these battles. A few important aspects are mentioned in the succeeding paras.


Indian 1 Corps offensive had achieved complete surprise but after initial success, operations came to a near standstill and there was no major operational activity on 09 and 10 Sep. This gave adequate time to Pak 6 Armoured Division to organise their defences. They adopted the concept of mobile defence. This aspect needs some elaboration.

Major General Sahabzada Mohammad Yakub Khan, who had earlier commanded 1 Armoured Division was now attached to HQ 1 Corps as the Deputy Corps Commander. He developed a concept of operations for 6 Armoured Division which was presented to the GOC at a conference held at HQ Pak 1 Corps at 1100 hours on 10 Sep 1965. Please see Sketch 2.13 The above plan gave strong pivots at Pasrur and Zafarwal that enabled armour to operate against the

flanks of the Indian offensive.

The Indian 1 Armoured Division commenced its attack on Phillaurah at first light on 10 Sep from an unexpected direction. It was a well coordinated attack between armour, lorried infantry and artillery. The high points of the battle were the manoeuvres by 4 HORSE and 17 HORSE who were operating on both flanks of Phillaurah. They manoeuvred beautifully in a text book manner, thus drawing away the enemy armour (11 Cavalry) deployed at Phillaurah. In the tank versus tank battles that ensued that morning, as per Indian estimates, Pakistan lost 28 tanks in this battle. Pakistan accounts accept a loss of 22 tanks on this day, i.e. 16 tanks of 11 Cavalry and six of Guides Cavalry. As a result of this battle, Pak 6 Armoured Division had to temporarily break up 11 Cavalry and its remaining M-48s were formed into a squadron and transferred to the Guides Cavalry. Two units of the enemy (11 Cavalry and 9 Frontier Force) were now out of action with their remnants located at Pasrur and awaiting reinforcements and new equipment.14 6 Armoured Division was now left with the Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry, the latter being part of 24 Infantry Brigade Group.

After the capture of Phillaurah there was a lull in the battle on 12 and 13 Sep, till Indian 1 Corps renewed its offensive for capture of Chawinda on 14 Sep. Two attempts were made (the first one by 1 Armoured Division and the second one by 6 Mountain Division) but both were a failure. There was lack of coordination between armour and infantry, and air support had not been planned. By now, Pak had also moved an armoured brigade from Khemkaran into this Sector and forces, especially armour, were almost evenly matched. The formations came out of these battles badly battered and there followed a stalemate which lasted for the rest of the war.15



**Operations in Barmer Sector (Desert Sector)**

In order to contain the Pak offensive in Chhamb Sector as also to pre-empt any Pakistani offensive in the desert Sector, India launched a limited offensive by 30 Infantry Brigade of 11 Infantry Division on Axis Barmer-Hyderabad (Sind). By the time of the ceasefire, India had captured 390 sq km of Pak territory in this sector, while Pakistan held on to the Indian border Post at Munabao.16

**War in the Air**

On the eve of the war, Pakistan Air Force consisted of about 17 squadrons having a total of 260 aircraft of all types approximately. As against this, the Indian Air Force had an overall strength of 26 squadrons with a total holding of about 460 combat aircraft of all types. A few of these squadrons had also to be deployed in the East. The Indian edge in numbers was more than offset by Pakistan’s qualitative superiority. Thus, the two air forces in the West were almost evenly matched.18

As the war opened with a strong ground offensive by Pakistan in the Chhamb Sector on 01 Sep 1965, Indian Air Force swung into action in support of the Army almost immediately and continued to do so day after day, and thus played a major role in blunting the Pak offensive. As a reaction to Pakistani offensive in the Chhamb Sector, India launched its counter-offensive by 11 Corps in Lahore Sector on 06 Sep 1965. In accordance with their war plans, Pakistan Air Force responded by a pre-emptive strike on Indian air bases at Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara and Amritsar commencing at 1740 hours (time on target).<sup>19</sup>

From 07 Sep onwards the air war intensified and both the air forces were carrying out air operations in support of ground forces, counter air, air interdiction and air defence. Indian Air Force carried out a number of attacks against Pak air bases, railway yards, logistics installations, radar sites and even a train carrying tanks. A number of search and destroy, and tactical reconnaissance missions were also flown by the Indian Air Force. However, neither side could establish a favourable air situation over the battle area. There were some air operations conducted by both sides in the Eastern Sector but these were not of much consequence and did not affect the outcome of the war.

In the overall analysis, neither side could claim air superiority but by the end of the war India's greater numbers were beginning to tell and Pakistan Air Force was shying away from aerial combat. On the Indian side, apart from lack of joint planning, there was also no worthwhile air intelligence forthcoming.<sup>20</sup> However, it can be said beyond doubt that the Indian air crew performed admirably throughout the war and, whenever and wherever a call for help came from the Army to meet a crisis, Indian Air Force responded magnificently.

## **War at Sea**

There were no naval battles fought during 1965. Indian Navy was no doubt larger and stronger but then it had a huge coastline and many island territories to defend. India had only one fleet and at the time of the commencement of hostilities, the fleet was operating off the East Coast in the Bay of Bengal. The fleet was able to reach Bombay only by about 08/09 Sep 1965.

During Night 07/08 Sep, some Pakistani naval ships, disguised as merchant ships, carried out bombing of the minor port of Dwarka but with little damage as most of the shells landed on the beach.<sup>21</sup>

In spite of being the stronger force, Indian Navy was not assigned an offensive role, though Admiral Soman, Chief of the Naval Staff tried his best for the Navy to join the war. The political leadership, perhaps wanted to keep the war limited to land and air, and did not relent. They may have also been influenced by the need to ensure the security of the island territories from other powers in the region who had their sympathies with Pakistan.

## **Casualties and Territory Captured**

The total number of casualties suffered by the Indian Armed Forces during the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and in the subsequent cease-fire violations amounted to 2,862 killed and 8,617 wounded. According to the Defence Minister of Pakistan, 1,033 Pakistanis were killed during the War. The Indian official sources, however, state that about 5,800 Pakistanis were killed.<sup>17</sup>

Please see Sketch 3 for territory captured by either side. India had captured approximately 1,920 sq km, Pakistan on the other hand occupied 540 sq km of Indian territory.

## **Ceasefire and Tashkent Accord**

It was not a comfortable situation for the USA and the UK that Pakistan, an ally of the US and a member of both SEATO and CENTO, decided to join hands with China against India. In the Communist bloc, differences between China and the Soviet Union were also emerging. It did not welcome the growth of China's influence in South Asia, particularly at the cost of non-aligned India, where it had significant economic and political stakes. Hence, persistent efforts were being made by Moscow, Washington, London and UNSC for immediate cessation of hostilities.

On 04 Sep 1965, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Kashmir. When neither India nor Pakistan responded to this, the Security Council requested UN Secretary General to visit both the countries in an effort to bring about ceasefire. U Thant visited Pakistan on 09 Sep 1965 and left for Delhi on 12 Sep without any positive outcome.

Meanwhile, China, showing her solidarity with Pakistan, issued a warning Note on 08 Sep 1965 to India that blamed Indian Government of expansionist action against her and said that India must dismantle all aggressive military structures it had illegally built on China-Sikkim boundary or else bear the responsibility for all consequences. China issued another ultimatum to India on 16 Sep and reiterated the support to Pakistan on Kashmir.

On 19 Sep, China issued another Note to India, reiterating its allegations and putting off the time limit set in its Note of 16 Sep to 'before midnight of 22 Sep 1965'. The Super Powers and other members of the Security Council were keenly watching China. They wanted India and Pakistan to accept a ceasefire proposal before China's second ultimatum expired on 22 Sep. On 20 Sep, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon India

and Pakistan to ceasefire on Wed 22 Sep 1965 at 0700 h GMT (1230 h IST). The ceasefire was accepted by both the countries and it became effective with effect from 0330 hours (IST) on 23 Sep 1965.

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, through his earlier letter of 17 Sep had invited the PM of India and President of Pakistan to hold peace talks in Tashkent to which both sides eventually agreed. Before going to Tashkent, India made it clear that Kashmir could not be made an issue for discussion while Pakistan said that it would not sign a 'no war pact' unless Kashmir problem was resolved. However, the Soviet PM persuaded them to agree to a Joint Declaration. The Agreement was signed at 1630 hours on 10 Jan. Prime Minister Shastri died of a heart attack at about 0130 hours on 11 Jan 1966.<sup>22</sup>



The Tashkent Agreement satisfied the leaders of both the countries to some extent. India's take away from Tashkent was that the conference did not make any reference to Kashmir, and Pakistan was happy that it got back from India the territories that it had lost to India during the war, especially the Haji Pir Pass.

### **An Overview of the War**

Looking back, one can say that 1965 War was a continuation of the 1947-48 War launched by Pakistan for annexation of J&K. It is well known now that it (Oct 1947) was a near run thing and the part of J&K that remained with India was the result of many hard fought battles. However, Pakistan on its part had not given up its dream of annexing the complete State of J&K by any means and was constantly planning for the same.

The next opportunity that came Pakistan's way was the Sino-Indian War of 1962 which was an unmitigated disaster for India. However, Pakistan was restrained from taking advantage of the situation by western powers. In the middle of the crisis, India appealed for western help, especially from the USA and the UK. They (USA and UK) readily agreed to help, provided India and Pakistan could resolve the Kashmir dispute. Six rounds of talks were held between Dec 1962 and May 1963 but these failed to produce any results. It was a win-win situation for Pakistan. From then on, India faced a two front scenario. It also emboldened Pakistan to plan its next move for annexation of J&K which unfolded in the form of Operation Gibraltar commencing on 05 Aug 1965.

There was a change in political leadership in India following the passing away of Pandit Nehru on 27 May 1964. In Pakistan's perception, India had a weak political leadership and Indian Army would be still recovering from the 1962 debacle. On the other hand, Pak had a new friend in China which was India's enemy and its (Pakistan's) Armed Forces had developed a degree of renewed confidence - with newly inducted American arms and equipment, further reinforced by the outcome of the recent confrontation in the Rann of Kutch. Thus, Pakistan considered this to be the appropriate time to decide the issue of J&K by force of arms. This then was the Pak calculation and thinking which set the stage for the 22 days war that followed.

In the Rann of Kutch episode, Pakistan's Army had crossed the international border. The Indian reaction need not have remained confined to Rann of Kutch alone. Military prudence lies in avoiding headlong collision and adopting a strategy of 'indirect approach'. Even a limited reaction in the neighbouring desert sector would have produced the desired results and sent a strong signal to Pakistan - not to take India for granted. Secondly, not using own Air Force in offensive role when the adversary has crossed the International Border does not make strategic sense, especially after a similar experience in 1962 against the Chinese.

Soon after the ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch, based on the assurances by the UN Secretary General of Pakistan's good behaviour, India called off Operation Ablaze, returned the territories captured in J&K and moved its army formations to their peace locations. On the other hand Pakistan was giving finishing touches to launching of Operation Gibraltar. Two aspects stand out. At politico-diplomatic level, India was gullible and not enough intelligence about Pakistan's intentions and capabilities was obtained. For such a state of affairs to have existed so soon after the Sino-Indian War of 1962 is, to say the least, inexplicable and unpardonable!

War erupted in all its fury on 01 Sep 1965. It is ironic that prior to 1962 War, most of the Indian Army was deployed on the Western border with Pakistan. So troops from the plains of Punjab and the deserts of Rajasthan had to be moved straight to high Himalayas to face the Chinese. Now the reverse happened. Mountain divisions from the northern borders with China had to be moved post haste to the plains of Punjab and J&K to face Pak armour; e.g., 4, 6 and 23 Mountain Divisions. Obviously, there was no comprehensive defence plan taking into account a threat from China and Pakistan, both proven adversaries at that time.

Coming to the Western Sector, once Pakistan had played its hand in Chhamb-Jaurian Sector Indian reaction was swift and decisive. Army was given a free hand to launch its offensives across the International Border as they deemed necessary. However, close air support of ground operations had not been planned and coordinated; hence, the same was not forthcoming to the desired extent. This was not due to any inhibition on the part of Indian Air Force but

due to lack of joint planning and coordination. However, when the crisis had developed on 01 Sep in Chhamb Sector, Indian Air Force responded magnificently and was not found wanting, inspite of no prior warning. Basically, our institutions and systems for joint planning were neither in place, nor functioning. No lessons had been learnt from 1962!

The main Indian counter offensives had been launched in Punjab (Lahore Sector) and in J&K (Sialkot Sector). Indian formations in Punjab having to move from their peace locations, straight into attack, without going into concentration areas where 'marrying up' could take place, were at a great disadvantage. As a result, armour and infantry coordination was poor and initial success on the Ichhogil Canal could not be exploited. The 4 Mountain Division offensive ran headlong into a Pak offensive by 1 Armoured Division. As a result, a serious crisis developed on 4 Mountain Division front in the Khemkaran Sector on 08 Sep. Had it not been for the tenacity and cool courage displayed by Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, VrC, Western Army Commander to stay put and fight, the results could have been disastrous.

Let us turn for a while to the main Indian punch delivered by 1 Corps in the Sialkot Sector. Though complete strategic surprise was achieved, the Corps was not able to make much progress after initial successes. Pak defences in the area of operations were quite thin. However, there was complete inactivity by Indian 1 Corps on 09 and 10 Sep for almost 48 hours which gave Pak time to rehash their defensive plans and by 10 Sep, Pak 6 Armoured Division had set itself up for a mobile defence.

In hindsight, one can say that the Indian 1 Corps instead of getting involved in clearing strong points like Phillaurah / Chawinda could have isolated these and projected the Armoured Division in the Area of Badiana - Chawinda - Pasrur, as also contacting the MRL Canal (in accordance with the mission assigned) in an early time frame would have denied freedom of movement to Pak forces. The infantry divisions with their integral armoured regiments could have cleared the axis of maintenance. In the event, as the time passed, Pak was able to build-up its strength by pulling in forces from Chhamb Sector and moving an additional armoured brigade from its 1 Armoured Division in the Khemkaran Sector. Thus by about 12 Sep, there was near parity of forces, especially armour. The initial advantage of the attacker and momentum of attack had been lost. There was no cohesive plan for a Corps battle. Each division was fighting its own battle. Instead of a battle of manoeuvre which should have found the Corps leaning on the MRL Canal, the Corps got involved in a battle of attrition for the capture of Chawinda in which it did not succeed till the very end.

At operational level, the Pakistani attempts to breakthrough Indian defences at Asal Uttar on 08-09 Sep and Indian attacks for the capture of Chawinda on 14 Sep and then again on 18-19 Sep were a mirror image of each other. Both were failures, though for different reasons. In the case of Pakistan, they tried to breakthrough Indian positions at Asal Uttar using their 1 Armoured Division and suffered very heavy tank casualties. In the Indian case, 1 Corps tried to capture Chawinda, a strongly held position using an armoured division and a mountain division but separately without proper coordination, resulting in heavy attrition to the attacking troops. Both sides (in both cases) knew that they were defending the most politically sensitive territory and that the ramifications of a breakthrough by the enemy were serious, and there were no further reserves available to restore an adverse situation. At the end of it, both sides had suffered so much attrition that they were unable to mount any fresh major offensive operations.

In the aftermath of 1962 War, India undertook a large scale expansion of its armed forces but the emphasis now was on the Chinese border. The capabilities required for the western front, Navy and the Air Force were still neglected. The result was that when 1965 War came, our mountain divisions were fighting in the plains and our tank fleet, except four regiments of Centurions and two regiments of AMX-13 light tanks consisted of obsolete Shermans which were no match for Pattons M-47/48s. The Air Force which could have played a major role in the plains and deserts, though superior in numbers, was at a disadvantage qualitatively. Indian Navy, inspite of remonstrations by the Chief of Naval Staff was not given any offensive task, like the Air Force in 1962. In retrospect, one can say that in war, a nation ought to bring to bear all its military strength in a synergised manner, more so, in a short duration war.

By 1965, not much had changed in terms of higher direction of war, joint planning and a synergised prosecution of war in the politico-military-diplomatic domain. There was complete lack of strategic thinking to prepare the Country and its Armed Forces to pre-empt or face security threats. The politico - bureaucratic mindset of not involving the military in strategic decision making had not changed. Strategic and operational intelligence were still uncoordinated. There was generally a policy of drift towards the security of the CFL and the international border in J&K. Hence, security threats were not seen in advance and the armed forces had to react only after a threat had manifested itself. The Rann of Kutch episode and operation Gibraltar are prime examples.

If a country goes to war, it is important that politico-military objectives are well defined and once defined these must be pursued vigorously. In 1965, neither of the above happened. We simply reacted to the situations created by Pakistan. Having gone to war, we accepted a ceasefire without achieving any worthwhile politico-military objectives. If Rann of Kutch had been taken as a warning, a number of measures to upgrade our military capability could have been taken in the ensuing months. We could have raised a few more infantry divisions for the Western Front.

Lastly and most importantly, should India have accepted the ceasefire when it did? It has been argued that Indian stocks of all types of ammunition had run extremely low; hence there was no alternative but to accept the ceasefire. Post conflict enquiries have revealed that in overall terms only about 14-20 per cent of the Indian Army's ammunition stocks had been used up; large dumps of unused ammunition were lying in sectors where fighting had not been intensive. On the other hand, in Pakistan nearly 80 per cent of ammunition stocks had actually been expended.<sup>23</sup> Obviously, it was in Indian interest to continue the war a bit longer. The military leadership (Chiefs of Staff) ought to have strongly and unambiguously advised the political leadership on this vital question. In strategic terms, Pakistan had ventured one more time to wrest J&K by force of arms; it was a good opportunity for India to have changed the status quo in J&K in its favour, provided India had prepared and persevered. In the event, India had neither prepared militarily nor, was it able to create international environment diplomatically to be able to prolong the war much longer.

However, it can be said without hesitation that the Indian soldier (sailors and airmen included) had once

again given off his best in service of the Nation. He was brave, resolute and steadfast in battle, and units sought to achieve their missions relentlessly against heavy odds. The Nation too rallied and stood behind its soldiers in a magnificent manner. In the final analysis, the outcome of the war is a tribute to the Indian soldier.

## Endnotes

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**Dear Members,**

Every end of the year is a time of serious introspection, reflection and contemplation for me. At the beginning of another New Year, I have great satisfaction in assuring you that the USI continues to embody forward thinking, free discussion, in-depth research, and, has increased its footprints both within the Country and abroad. The Institution derives its strength primarily from two sources. First and foremost is the galaxy of committed members who unhesitatingly come forward to support the Institution in its multi-faceted activities. Their continued support and trust is best exemplified by the fact that 688 new Life Members enrolled this year. The second pillar of our strength is the autonomous character of our Institution which we have zealously guarded for 145 years. Any encroachment on this will compromise the basic ethos of our Institution.

The USI has the unique privilege of being one of the oldest think tanks in the world and for almost a century it was the only think tank in this part of the world. However, today the world of think tanks has grown extremely complex and competitive with networking, patronage and financial support affecting not only the contours of the playing field but even the rules of the game. As you are aware, we get no financial grants from the Government or the Services, and, in spite of our limited resources in manpower and finances, we have been able to keep pace with the developments taking place nationally and internationally. The main activities and achievements of the USI have been covered in the Annual Report of the President of the Council for 2015, which is enclosed with this Issue of the Journal and will also be available on our website for your perusal, reflection and critical appraisal.

Although we have published over 80 books and monographs since 2008, the Journal, which has had an uninterrupted publication since 1871, remains our flagship publication. Our effort has always been to carry articles with a strategic flavour, especially relevant to national security. To the Library, which is virtually a storehouse of knowledge, we added 776 books during the year. We have also scanned nearly 700,000 pages of rare books and USI Journals since 1871 and made these available on the internet for use by scholars and researchers the world over. We continue to lay a lot of emphasis on our annual events, i.e. the Memorial Lectures, National Security Lecture and Seminar, essay competitions, as also the periodical USI events which are well attended by our members. The credit for this rests solely with Maj Gen PJS Sandhu, the Deputy Director and Editor.

Our Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation under Maj Gen BK Sharma, AVSM, SM and Bar has broken new ground in the field of Net Assessment and Strategic Gaming. We now regularly conduct Strategic Gaming Exercises at our National Defence College, Service War Colleges and the Foreign Service Institute. The Centre also conducted training programmes at the National Defence College, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman and the Jindal Global University, Sonapat. The USI was invited to participate in 19 international conferences / seminars. The Centre signed Memorandum of Understanding with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden and the Sichuan University, Chengdu, China.

As you would be aware, our Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research under Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina has been involved in a four year USI-MEA Project to commemorate the Centenary of the Great War 1914-18. Apart from all the activities planned and undertaken, including an international conference organised jointly with the Shiv Nadar University, I would like to make a special mention about the publications brought out by the Centre and the activities carried out nationally and internationally. The Centre conducted the "Lt Gen SL Menezes Essay Competition" for the first time in 2015. From the next year, this competition will be open to all across the globe and it will be the first time that we will conduct an international essay competition. The details are being worked out and will be communicated to all in due course.

Our Course Section under the new Chief Instructor, Maj Gen SB Asthana, SM, VSM has not only continued the legacy established over long years of its programmes but has excelled the same in many respects. This year we had 1534 officers participating in our correspondence courses and 252 attending the DSSC contact programme. The results achieved by those who took our DSSC (Army) Correspondence Course were outstanding wherein they secured 309 vacancies out of the total of 356 vacancies available. The Chief Instructor and faculty deserve to be complimented for their dedication in guiding the professional growth of our young officers.

The Institution nurtured the Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) ever since it was established on our premises in the year 2000 as a joint venture between the MEA, Army Headquarters and the USI. It is not well known that we had vacated a part of our premises to accommodate the CUNPK. It moved out in August 2014 after a fire incident in its premises. In mid-2015 the Army Headquarters informed us that it had decided to de-link the CUNPK from the USI. This notwithstanding, we continued our peacekeeping and peace-building activities, the details of which are included in the President's Report. I would like to highlight that the USI alongwith institutions from eight other countries; Brazil, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Norway, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, have formed a network called the "Peace Capacities Network" and will bring out a book on "Rising Powers and Peace Operations". The Institution is also partnering institutes from the USA, South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia and Norway in a joint project looking at the role of "Rising Powers in Peace-building". The USI carried out field studies in Afghanistan with the team members visiting Kabul, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif for this project.

I would be remiss in not mentioning the silent work done by our Administrative Branch. Their quiet, selfless dedication under the new Deputy Director Administration, Maj Gen PK Goswami, VSM needs to be recognised and commended.

The year saw two of our stalwarts leaving us after long years of dedicated, selfless service to the Institution. Col VK Singh, VSM had joined the Institution as DS (Coord) in the Course Section in 1991 and took over as Deputy Director Administration in 1995 and, finally hung his spurs on 31 Aug 2015. Brig MS Chowdhury, VSM joined as the Chief Instructor on 11 Sep 2000. He tirelessly guided the professional growth of thousands of our young officers. He left us on 16 Mar 2015. The seamless and smooth transition in both the Administrative Branch and the Course Section speaks

volumes of their organisational abilities and dedication to the Institution. On behalf of all members of the Institution I wish Brig MS Chowdhury and Col VK Singh and their families good health, happiness and success in the years ahead.

Finally, I would request you to take time off from your busy schedule to go through the President's Report. We would welcome your valuable views, suggestions and comments to improve the functioning of our Institution. The points may please be communicated to me or to the Deputy Director and Editor by e-mail or post at your earliest convenience. With utmost humility, I request each one of you to continue to come forth for the growth of the USI through your active participation in all our activities. We look forward to meeting and interacting with you whenever you come to the USI.

On behalf of all of us serving on the USI staff, I wish you all a

“VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR”

With best wishes,

Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd),  
Director USI