

## **India and the Great War Centenary Commemoration Project - An Update**

### **Mr Adil Chhina@**

The Joint MEA-USI Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research's (CAFHR) 'India and the Great War Centenary Commemoration Project' has lately been focussed on producing a number of publications that are in the pipeline and will be published in the coming two months. These include a boxed set of eight booklets on the theme 'India and the Great War', edited by Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd). The subjects/authors of the individual booklets are:


- (a) An Overview by Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd)
- (b) France and Flanders by Tom Donovan
- (c) Gallipoli by Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd)
- (d) Mesopotamia by Harry Fecitt
- (e) Egypt and Palestine by Harry Fecitt
- (f) East Africa by Harry Fecitt
- (g) Indian State Forces by Tony McClenaghan
- (h) Indian VCs 1914-18 by Adil Chhina

In addition the following Coffee Table Books are being produced:


- (a) India and the Great War
- (b) Indian Army on the Western Front

The USI CAFHR team has also contributed articles on India and World War One for a special commemorative issue of the magazine produced by the Indian embassy in France. It is not often realised that India's first ambassador to France Hardit Singh Malik, was also the first Indian to be commissioned as an officer in a combat arm. He flew as a fighter pilot in the Royal Flying Corps and ended the war with a German bullet in his leg which he carried till the end of his days. Work is also progressing on the academic volumes focussing on various aspects of India's involvement with the War, including the theatre histories.

### **Commemoration Ceremony for the Centenary of World War I in Paris**



**Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina, Secretary CAFHR addressing the UNESCO delegates**



**The Panelists**

Other than the planned publications, a commemorative event was organised by the permanent delegation of India to UNESCO in Paris to mark the centenary of the Great War and the role played by India in it. The Secretary CAFHR addressed the assembled UNESCO delegates as well as members of the diplomatic corps and French college students and school children who were present for this event, and highlighted the sterling performance of the Indian armed forces in preserving world peace a century ago. The talk was very well received. Another talk was also given on the subject at the 'India and the Great War' seminar organised by the Alliance Francaise in Pondicherry on 7th February 2015, as part of Pondy Partages 2015 Festival. The French Embassy in New Delhi has dedicated a page on its official website, recognising the valour and sacrifice of India's soldiers in WWI, on the eve of centenary of Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The page may be accessed at the following location :

**<http://www.ambafrance-in.org/Centenary-of-World-War-I-1914-1918>**

There are a number of events and talks taking place during Mar-Apr 2015. Squadron Leader Chhina presented a paper titled From the jewel in the crown of empire: the Indian army on Gallipoli on 19th March 2015 at Llewellyn Hall Australian National University (ANU) at an International Conference - 'Gallipoli 1915: A Century On', which was jointly organised by the Australian War Memorial and the ANU, Canberra between 18th and 20th March 2015.

Another event commemorating the centenary of the start of the Gallipoli Campaign was organised on 24-25 Mar 2015 by the Turkish Consulate in Hyderabad in collaboration with INTACH-Hyderabad, where talks were delivered by Professor Kahraman Sakul, a Turkish historian and Squadron Leader Rana Chhina (Retd).

A seminar on the 'Use of Chemical Weapons' is being jointly organised by the USI and the Embassy of Belgium, New Delhi on 24 April 2015 at USI to mark the centenary of the second battle of Ypres (now Ieper), where poison gas was first used by the Germans and Indian troops were amongst the victims. In addition to this a joint USI - Belgian Embassy reception is likely to be held at the Belgian Ambassador's residence in New Delhi on the evening of the same day. This reception will showcase an exhibition depicting the role of Indian and Belgian soldiers during the Great War curated by the USI-CAFHR team.

On 25th April a joint USI - Australian High Commission exhibition 'Gallipoli One Hundred' will be displayed at a reception likely to be held at the Australian High Commissioner's residence in New Delhi to commemorate the centenary of the landings at Gallipoli, in which the Indians and ANZACs fought side by side as comrades in arms. The exhibition will have a central element - 'Camera on Gallipoli' accompanied by a supplementary exhibition - 'Indians and ANZACs'. The New Zealand High Commission is an active participant in these ANZAC Day commemorative activities being planned in April, 2015.

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**Jointness : Call of the Future\***  
**Colonel UM Visal@**

**Introduction**

Jointness in the Armed Forces has been a well professed aphorism albeit in theory but least practised or understood by the members of its fraternity or even at the highest political level. It stems from common thinking in doctrinal terms, integrated planning of operations, conjoint training, seamless execution of operations and coordinated logistics for all combat forces. In order to achieve the above, it should be duly supported by empowered organisational structures, systems and smooth interactive processes.

Post-Independence India has fought wars with China and Pakistan, in which higher defence organisation (HDO) has not handled the national security matters with due diligence and astuteness. The civil-military relations continue to be marred with deep mistrust and suspicion. Devoid of institutionalised mechanism, turf wars continue to be exploited by the bureaucracy. Kargil Review Committee has brought out several deficiencies in the defence establishment. Several of its recommendations have been implemented, however, creation of the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been ignored till now. The appointment of CDS is the starting block to set the Armed Forces moving in a concerted manner towards jointness.

The world view on jointness brings out that the USA, as the lead country, adopted it through enactment of various acts of law. Several military failures forced the US polity to affect changes in their military organisations and associated structures. This not only reflects the awareness of the political leadership in the US on matters concerning national security but also brings to fore the limitations of the Armed Forces to affect changes on their own. The political and military leadership in India have to study the issue of jointness holistically so as to understand its nuances and finer aspects.

**Aim**

The aim of this paper is to ascertain the status and challenges to jointness in the Indian Armed Forces within the context of national security apparatus and to suggest a road map for the future.

**Scope**

The scope of the paper is as follows:-

- (a) Understanding jointness.
- (b) The US Armed Forces and jointness.
- (c) Existing jointness and recommendations.
- (d) Restructuring and road map.

**Understanding Jointness**

It is the way of preparing and fighting wherein all elements of a nation state contribute in a concerted manner to achieve the stated aim both, during peace and war. Jointness is an imperative in today's interdependent world. The forces of globalisation, riding the wave of Information Technology revolution, are increasingly interacting and optimising domain specialisations which no single unit can attain independently.

**Levels of Jointness.** The interdependency or jointness has to be the cornerstone and all-pervading aspect of political and military machinery. There has to be jointness at apex level between political and military leadership, within its institutions, with common goals and objectives. At Ministerial level, it should encompass all departments concerned with national security; and at the Armed Forces level, between the three Services and Headquarters (HQ) Integrated Defence Staff (IDS).

**Extent of Jointness.** Each level would encompass an organisational structure guided by philosophy of employment through doctrine and enunciated policies. The systems and processes which are routine command and staff functions should ensure smooth functioning of the system. The operational planning, force structuring and associated logistics need to be deliberated at all levels. It also permeates in the realm of training, budgeting and defence support in the form of production, research and development (R&D), procurements etc.

**Challenges.** At the apex level the bogey of civilian control has flawed the thinking of bureaucrats and politicians alike; and within the Armed Forces, the Indian Navy (IN) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) are weary of losing their identity to the Indian Army (IA).<sup>1</sup> The basis of motivation in the Indian Armed Forces is the unit bonding or regimentation. It is so compulsive that the officer cadre, even after reaching higher ranks, fails to rise above unit/service affiliations to understand the macro perspective. Overall civil-military set-up have not yet grasped the need for jointness, its manifestation from top to bottom and limitations of the Armed Forces to evolve by themselves.

**Driving Factors.** Basic ingredients of jointness are :-

- (a) **Adopting Right Attitude.** Jointness is all about attitude and grooming.
- (b) **Human Resource Development.** Through proper military education.

- (c) **Systems Approach.** Adopting holistic approach to jointness.
- (d) **Top Driven Impetus.** Need for ruthless implementation of policy decisions.

### US Experimentation on Jointness.

The major statutory acts passed by the USA for promoting jointness are:-


- (a) **The US National Security Act 1947 and its Amendment.** Secretary of Defence was created to exercise general authority and control over three separate service departments; and Central Intelligence Agency was also created. The 1949 Amendment merged service departments into Department of Defence (DoD) and created Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).<sup>2</sup>
- (b) **DoD Reorganisation Act 1958.** Created Geographic Unified Command, Strategic Air Command and brought in clarity on command and control structure.
- (c) **Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) 1986.** Vietnam war and other failures forced the US to pass this Act.<sup>3</sup>  
The details are:-
  - (i) Military advice was centralised in the CJCS as opposed to the Service Chiefs. The Chairman was designated as the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council (NSC) and the Secretary of Defence.
  - (ii) Restructuring afforded a combination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement and a reduction or elimination in inter-service rivalry.
  - (iii) Officer management made it mandatory for an officer to serve in a joint appointment before being considered for General Cadre promotion.

**Analysis of the US Jointness.** The victories in Gulf War I and II have been accredited to the GNA-86 Act. However, major observations on jointness are:-

- (a) Doctrinal differences persisted within the Services and degree of jointness was directly proportional to degree of dependence.<sup>4</sup>
- (b) Services capable of semi-autonomous action were inclined to go their own way.
- (c) Jointness has not matured sufficiently to accommodate the cultural differences among the Services.
- (d) Unquantifiable value that service ethos plays in war fighting should be exploited and not suppressed.

### Existing Jointness and Recommendations

**Broad Observations on Indian War Experience in Jointness. This is illustrated in Figure 1.**



**Figure 1**

**Performance Audit.** Foreign, Defence and Home policies were bereft of any joint culture which marred the Indian experience on security matters with more pitfalls than achievements. Lack of strategic thought and joint understanding of operations have resulted in lack of joint effort and non-involvement or late involvement of either service.

## **Existing Jointness and Recommendations**

### **Depth of Jointness**

- (a) **Doctrinal and Policy Aspects.** At the apex level Union War Book gives out broad guidelines and a few policies.<sup>11</sup> It needs to be updated to cater for infrastructure development, changing nature of warfare, technology advances and consequent war philosophies. At Ministry of Defence (MoD) level National Security Doctrine needs to be enunciated; and Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces should translate into tangible structures, forms and practices by the Services.
- (b) **Organisational Structures.** Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS), NSC, MoD, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and three Services are the premier structures existing for resolving matters on national security. It is observed that CCS and NSC have overlapping members performing same charter of duties and responsibilities. Central Police Forces (CPOs) are under MHA. However, during war they are placed under command of the Armed Forces; and in peace time, they are either independent or under operational control of the Armed Forces. This anomaly needs to be corrected. Services and CPO HQ are virtually subordinate/attached offices of the MoD and MHA respectively. The establishment of HQ IDS, without a CDS, is the first step towards jointness. There is an urgent need to restructure the security set-up at all levels so as to bring all agencies dealing with security under one umbrella organisation with all resources and forces to further jointness. Higher defence management at the apex level needs a major overhaul.
- (c) **Systems and Processes.** NSC and other organisations are functional; however, systems and processes are still not honed to handle challenges and crisis situations like Mumbai attacks. Within the MoD there is requirement to re-engineer the systems and processes as they are mired in red tape as well as bureaucratic delays and cost escalations. A proposal initiated by a Service is perused thrice by different agencies before it is even seen by the Defence Minister. HQ IDS still remains an organisation which is maturing its systems and processes. Currently, there are no institutionalised systems for interaction between the three Services at operational or tactical levels except for few courses and exercises. A few measures like cross postings on staff and as instructors (for common subjects), observers on exercises and more vacancies on selected courses would enhance jointness. These are elaborated in the subsequent paras.

**Training.** National Defence Academy is the first military institution where cadets of all Services are trained together during their three years stay. Thereafter, the first professional interaction between the selected officers happens at approximately 10-12 years of service at Defence Services Staff College; at 16-20 years during Higher Command or equivalent course and next at 24-25 years during National Defence College. It is recommended that all these military institutions be brought under the proposed Indian National Defence University which in turn could come under newly formed Joint Training Command (JTC) under IDS/Armed Forces Staff (AFS).

It is recommended that JTC be formed by merging part or whole of existing Training Commands of the three Services. There is also a need to holistically review the jointness through courses wherein a new course may be introduced between 6-8 years of service and the content of existing courses be reviewed for better understanding on jointness. As a pilot project JTC can have content which is common to all three Services like training of engineers, logistics, administration, law, clerks, drivers, police etc. Later, aspect of centralised joint warfare training through dedicated courses and joint exercises can be considered.

### **Operational Aspects.**

#### **(a) Force Structures**

- (i) **Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC).** Integrated organisation for combat is an important aspect for success of operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Active Commands of three Services and Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC) like Andaman and Nicobar Command and Strategic Forces Command (SFC) are the main stake holders for jointness. There are a total of 17 Commands (14 active);<sup>12</sup> seven of IA, seven of IAF and three of IN, including Training (two) and Maintenance Command (one) all with different geographical areas, duplication of assets and varied command and control structures.<sup>13</sup> There is a requirement to merge these into ITC for furthering jointness. No service Chief or even the CDS would be able to achieve the same unless it is pushed ruthlessly at the apex level by constituting a statutory body for executing the formation of Theatre Commands.
- (ii) **Joint Force Multiplier Commands (JFMC).** Aerospace, Air Defence, Expeditionary, Communication, Cyber, Information Warfare and Special Forces are the new vistas for formation of new Joint Commands which need to be expedited.

**(b) Evolution and Evaluation of Plans.** As per historical precedence, all the Services have evolved individual service plans and these were coordinated through Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and joint meetings with MoD. Personalities played a vital role and no institutionalised systems existed. HQ IDS's first year review of performance states, 'Management of warfighting is left to active Commands and is not within the purview of HQ IDS'.<sup>14</sup> Hence, it is recommended that a four star Chief of Armed Forces Wing (AFW) be introduced who should be made responsible for joint evolution of plans. For evaluation of plans, it is imperative to establish a National Wargaming Centre (NWC) with state of the art wargaming engine to customise need specific wargames.


Jointness at operational and tactical levels is adhoc, incidental and not institutionalised.

**(c) Logistics.** Currently, there is no synergy and jointness on logistics aspects; including infrastructure, supply chain, communication, transportation resources etc. There is a requirement to form Joint Logistics Command to coordinate all logistics aspects as part of JFMC.

## Analysis

Jointness is a top driven phenomenon. It is imperative to restructure the Apex level organisations so that all security related organisations could be placed under one umbrella organisation for initiating jointness in the environment. Jointness would then automatically flow into the realms of the Armed Forces as a natural after effect.

**Restructuring Initiatives and Road Map. This is illustrated in Figure 2.**




**Figure 2**

**Apex Level Initiative. Please refer to Figure 2.**

- (a) **National Security and Defence Council (NSDC).** A tectonic shake up is mandatory for the seed of joint culture to germinate into a giant tree. The hierarchical top structure should be wholesome to initiate and support jointness in the Services. The suggested apex agency should be chaired by the PM with two streams of members, i.e. ministerial and non-ministerial for two point advice. Keeping in view the Indian experience in war, representation of non-ministerial members is imperative for domain expert advice in decision making. It is felt that there is a requirement of forming a special ministry for Border Area Development as border areas are underdeveloped.
- (b) **Restructuring Monitoring Bureau (RMB).** This would be statutory/regulatory body headed by NSA for all aspects related to restructuring, jointness and integration. All reviews, studies, projects and issues of national security specifically in creation of ITC, Joint Commands and other joint structures would be monitored by this body. RMB would directly report to the PM and NSDC on timely execution of policy decisions and orders both in peace and war. Deputy Chiefs of all wings of MNSD would form part of this group.
- (c) **National Security Review Bureau (NSRB).** It should be headed by Cabinet Secretary level officer with experience on matters of national security. The main task of this team would be to carry out periodic review of all types of threats to national security. It can have members from varied fields of expertise related to national security.
- (d) **Strategic Wing** [Headed by Strategic Forces Command (SFC)].
  - (i) **SFC.** All nuclear and other strategic assets would be controlled by SFC. It should also have members like Deputy CDS, R&AW, representative from Nuclear Energy Commission and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to assist NSA for continuous situation assessment, review and decision making.
  - (ii) **Strategic Non Military Threat Assessment Bureau (SNMTAB).** Threats to National Security and Defence have proliferated into domains like food, energy, power, water, environment etc. which need to be viewed in holistic manner at the apex level. Deputy NSA should head this bureau with secretaries from important ministries.

**Ministry and Armed Forces Level Initiative.** Please refer to Figure 3. Currently, agencies responsible for security

are distributed under MoD and MHA with complex command and control structures. It is important to place all of them under one umbrella organisation. Apart from security forces all intelligence agencies also need to be centralised under chief of intelligence for optimising of resources and intelligence. All wings have similar equipment and weapon requirements, hence planning, budgeting, production, procurement and R&D can be done centrally, optimally, economically and speedily. The major restructuring initiatives recommended at the Armed Forces level are as follows:-



**Figure -3**

- (a) **JFMC.** JFMC to be established directly under AFS.
- (b) **Initial Restructuring ITC.** The first step for establishment of ITC is to align the geographical boundaries of the three Services including state territories and co-location of all three Headquarters. No change in command and control arrangements is recommended; respective Chiefs to continue leading their service. Every ITC would have a designated Joint Rapid Action Force (JRAF), trained in conjunction with Special Forces for quick actions on any security related incidence.
- (c) **Permanent ITC.** The next step is to train and create senior cadres who should have held a staff appointment in two other Services and attended a dedicated tri-service course (newly planned) for leading ITC. Respective chiefs would then be only responsible for administration of individual services.

#### **Appraisal: Restructuring Initiatives**

- (a) **NSDC.** The current CCS be dissolved as its charter and members are overlapping with NSC and it doesn't have representation of executives. NSAB being too unwieldy, its secretariat should also be dissolved. There is a need for creation of a four star CDS for centralised inputs on the Armed Forces, Border and Internal Security Wings who would act purely in advisory role. Newly formed NSRB on the basis of current Strategic Policy Group would provide the Strategic Policy Guidance to the MNSD.
- (b) **MNSD.** The current MoD be designated as MNSD. Post of Defence Secretary to be removed and five wings as recommended above be placed under MNSD removing the stigma of attached or subordinate offices. The erstwhile staff of MoD can provide the staff for the new ministry. All security and defence related agencies from MHA to be placed centrally under MNSD. Creation of post of Chiefs of Border Security to function in coordination with Ministry of Border Area Development (newly created). The Chiefs of Internal Security, Intelligence, Finance and Support should head their respective forces and departments. Clubbing of all intelligence inputs under Chief of Intelligence would give accessibility to respective Chiefs in review and formulation of their assessments and plans. The empowered MNSD would have all the wherewithal, from intelligence to forces and resources, under one umbrella organisation to deal with any crisis situation. This would drastically improve the reaction capability to any natural disaster or crisis situation.
- (c) **AFW.** It would be headed by a four star officer as overall commander of the Armed Forces. AFS to replace the existing IDS. The formation of JFMC and ITC in phases would be a major effort towards enhancing jointness.

## Road Ahead

- (a) **Restructuring of National Security Apparatus.**
  - (i) **Phase I.** Appoint NSRB to study all aspects holistically (Time Period – 3 years).
  - (ii) **Phase II.** Promulgate restructuring by enactment of a law (Time Period – 1 year).
  - (iii) **Phase III.** Formulate NSDC (including appointment of CDS). Designate RMB as a statutory body to implement restructuring (Time Period – 6 years).
- (b) **Ministry and Armed Forces Level Initiatives.**
  - (i) **Phase I.**
    - (aa) Bring all five wings related to security under MNSD. Designate respective Chiefs. Establishment of JFMC under AFS (Time Period : 3-5 years).
    - (ab) Establishing ITC without a joint commander (Time Period: 3 years).
    - (ac) Review doctrinal and training content (Time Period: 1-2 years).
  - (ii) **Phase II.** Establishment of ITC with joint commanders (Overall period – 10 years).

## Conclusion

The current state of jointness between civil-military, within three Services and even within components of the single Service, is non-existent except for a few organisations, courses and publications. The politico-military establishment has not been able to comprehend the changing nature of warfare, geostrategic dynamics within the neighbourhood, global trends and aspirations of India as a regional power.

There is an urgent need to adopt a top-down driven approach for restructuring the organisational set-up so as to facilitate jointness at all levels. The Armed Forces owing to strong biases and service grooming are incapable of affecting any changes towards joint warfare. There is a requirement of forming Restructuring Board for studying the national security apparatus holistically. Thereafter, a statutory body may be created to affect changes in the Armed Forces. The overarching philosophy should be – Train as a Team, Fight as a Team and Win as a Team!

## Endnotes

- 1 Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, My Years with IAF, (New Delhi, Lancers International Publications, 1986), pp 327.
- 2 Rear Admiral AP Revi, Restructuring Indian Military (New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2012), pp 45.
- 3 Gold Water Nichols Act, <http://en.wikipedia.org> accessed on 24 Aug 2014.
- 4 Jointness, Service Culture and the Gulf War by Bernarde Trainor in Joint Force Quarterly magazine 1993-94. [www.jfqonline.com](http://www.jfqonline.com) accessed on 25 Aug 2014.
- 5 Wing Commander R Venkatraman, India's Higher Defence Organisation and Management (New Delhi, KW Publishers, 2011) pp 87.
- 6 Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, Note 1, pp 165.
- 7 Ibid, pp172.
- 8 Admiral SM Nanda, The Man Who Bombed Karachi (New Delhi, Harper Collins Publishers, 2004) pp184.
- 9 Lt Gen Depinder Singh PVSM, VSM, The IPKF in Sri Lanka (Delhi, Trishul Publications, 1992) pp 164.
- 10 Maj Gen AK Verma, AVSM, Blood on the Snow (New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2002) pp 100.
- 11 Govt Revises Union War Book <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-revises-Union-War-Book-to-meet-current-situation/articleshow/6554663.cms> accessed on 25 Aug 2014.
- 12 Commands at <http://indianarmy.nic.in>, <http://indianavy.nic.in>, <http://indianairforce.nic.in> accessed on 06 Sep 2014.
- 13 Higher Defence Organisation, Report of a USI seminar held on 24-25 Aug 2006 at New Delhi.
- 14 First Year of Existence, Report by HQ IDS <http://ids.nic.in/reportfirst.htm> accessed on 25 Aug 2014.

\*This is an edited text of the essay which won the First Prize in USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2014 in Group A.

@ **Colonel UM Visal** was commissioned into Mechanised Infantry on 11 Jun 1988. Earlier, he won the First Prize in USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2010 – Group A and Second Prize in the 2012 Competition in Group A. Presently, he is the Chief Instructor at the Mechanised Infantry Regimental Centre, Ahmednagar.





**Challenges of Leadership, Morals and Ethics in the Armed Forces and the Way Ahead\***  
**Lieutenant (IN) Ankush Banerjee@**

## Introduction

In the last few years, changes of an overwhelming nature have taken place in the economic and social spheres of our Country. The culture of consumerism is an inevitable by-product of 'India's success story' accompanied by a robust growth rate, booming economy and emergence of a huge middle class with considerable purchasing power. All these factors cast an indelible mark on the collective psyche of the society. With regard to the Armed Forces, on one hand these economic changes have assisted in the modernisation of the forces, but on the other, it has radically shifted the values of the society, which has created complex challenges, as the men in uniform are deeply intertwined with the society.<sup>1</sup>

The first question that arises is, whether there has been any real erosion of value systems within the Armed forces? If one were to go by the media reports about sex scandals, the Adarsh Society scam, Sukhna land case etc., the answer is a disappointing 'yes'. Indeed such acts have brought about criticism towards the military as an Institution. However, this essay attempts to argue otherwise. The main premise of this essay is that, 'no, there hasn't been any deep erosion of military values in view of changes in society'. The incidences which have come to light, albeit unfortunate, ought to be treated as aberrations, rather than the norm. Such an assumption ensures one doesn't judge an honourable institution based on a few dishonourable acts.<sup>2</sup> More importantly, incidences ought to be seen as manifestations of individual moral turpitude rather than as Organisational shortcomings.

The second question the essay raises is: what should today's leaders do to address such aberrations? This essay attempts to analyse the reasons for depletion of military values, highlighting the challenges facing the military leadership, suggested corrective measures, a comparative study of military training in India vis-à-vis some other countries and attempts to define the ingredients of an Honour Code for the officer cadre.

## Factors Impacting Value System in the Armed Forces

Some of the major factors that have impacted the value system in the Armed forces are elaborated in the subsequent paras.

### Internal Factors

- (a) **Changes in Individual Mindset.** Changed priorities of the younger generation and absence of enough role models, coupled with reluctance on the part of senior officers to assume serious mentoring roles have given rise to a generation of younger officers whose value system is at variance from that of the armed forces.
- (b) **Lack of Substantial Training in Ethics.** Training in ethics and leadership-based subjects is weakly prioritised as compared to combat/operations related subjects.
- (c) **Opaque Assessment System.** Closed system of performance evaluation and an absence of fair in-house redressal system have compelled some personnel to go to court which has tarnished the image<sup>3</sup> of the armed force.<sup>4</sup>
- (d) **Zero Error Syndrome.** The armed forces have a steep pyramid therefore, leaders at various levels are intolerant towards ambiguity and expect all the tasks to be performed without any errors. At times, these lead to fudging of reports, rendering inflated inputs, maintaining the 'feel good factor' etc.
- (e) **Sycophancy.** Instances of subordinates 'apple polishing' their way to desired ends, and seniors reciprocating to such behaviour has also affected morale of officers and men in an adverse manner. It has also created a perception that 'professionalism' as a core competence has taken a back seat.

### External Factors

- (a) **Economic Growth and Rising Disparity.** The Nation has grown economically but the disparity in incomes between the military and other professions has widened causing dissatisfaction. The implications of this have been discussed later in the essay.
- (b) **Role of the Media.** The media plays an important role today and it has both, positives and negatives. At times, to remain relevant, the media digs out stories that may have grave security concerns or negatively affect the morale of the forces.
- (c) **Lack of Adequate Institutionalised Sensitisation.** Increased involvement of the armed forces in internal security/ peace-keeping duties without adequate institutionalised sensitisation has also given rise to incidences bringing embarrassment to the Organisation.<sup>5</sup>
- (d) **Changing Nature of Warfare.** Earlier, the function of military was, in general terms, to undertake Defence of the Realm.<sup>6</sup> The moral justification for engaging in such a conflict could be found in the Just War theory.<sup>7</sup> Asymmetric warfare, anti-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance etc. have made the military's job more complex, especially in the ethical realm. This calls for introspection in the way personnel are trained in military ethics.

The above factors have given rise to challenges for military leaders in the realm of morals and ethics. These challenges and suggested corrective measures are discussed in the ensuing paras.

## Emerging Challenges

**Shifting of Values in Society.** As mentioned earlier, many changes have occurred in the economic and social spheres in our society, that have deeply impacted collective value system and has caused shift in the way 'values' are perceived. In an increasingly materialistic world the good old values of kindness, generosity and even patriotism are seen as weaknesses while traits like cleverness, greed, acquisitiveness and aggressiveness are encouraged and even discreetly admired.<sup>8</sup> This transition of values is neither consistent, nor compatible with the core values of the Armed Forces. Hence, one of the major challenges confronting military leaders is mitigating the ill effects of such changes on personnel through setting personal examples and adherence to laid down norms and regulations.

**Ethical Relativism.** Ethical relativism, which propagates the view that all morality is relative to the norms of one's culture, has been taking root among military personnel. This has blurred the boundaries between 'right' and 'wrong'. Military leaders must recognise and be watchful of such seemingly ambiguous, but extremely unethical practices and nip them in the bud as and when the situation comes to light. The collective attitude towards such practices, of justifying them by telling ourselves that 'everyone does it', or to brush it under the carpet could be a very dangerous trend. Thus, there is a strong need to reinforce value systems.

## Where Do the Fault Lines Lie?

Would it be prudent to suppose that the major fault lines lie within the Organisation? Irrespective of the social background from where personnel are presently being recruited, they undergo training in various training institutions where they learn wrong things e.g. the term "Beg, borrow or steal". A cadet who tells lies and escapes punishment is said to be smart and the one who tells truth is called a dope. This trend continues till an officer is half ripe to become a 'leader'. When he joins the Unit he is instructed to be in good books of the Commanding Officer and to do well in professional courses to achieve success. This officer smoothes his way through by using unethical methods to earn a good grading which he knows would be the stepping stone in moving up the pyramidal hierarchy. When he becomes a senior he expects his subordinates to do the same. Over a period of time when this officer goes up in the ladder he starts accepting small indirect favours from his subordinates in the name of perks and privileges and makes it a habit till he goes all the way up. This does not imply that this is the only way to be successful and that such behavior is universal.

The influence of societal trends ought to be gleaned from this phenomenon. The first requirement of military leaders in such an environment is to 'set the right example'. It is only by setting right examples and imbibing the right values in themselves that they can expect their subordinates to emulate them.

**The 'Just a Job' Syndrome.** Modernisation of armed forces has led to increased focus on imbibing technical and military skills at the expense of developing moral and ethical reflection. The 'civilianisation' of functions in the military is gradually creating the outlook that this is 'just a job'. The idea of armed forces being-a 'way of life' has weakened. Moreover, with promotions being the standard determinants of success, rather than service and contribution, the age old concept of 'Nishkama Karma',<sup>9</sup> which means work performed without any expectation of fruits as against work for personal reward, has diminished.

Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), in his article A Matter of Honour says something worth mentioning in regard to ambition. He agrees that ambition is a highly desirable trait in a human being. But he cautions against harbouring overweening ambition. Ambition becomes 'overweening' when one starts putting one's personal advancement above all other considerations. Nothing remains sacred before such an all-consuming passion; friends can be stabbed in the back, the Service can be shown in a poor light etc.<sup>10</sup>

Reinforcing the importance of the Chetwode motto becomes extremely relevant here. It reads, "The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first - always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last - always and every time."

## Corrective Measures

**Creating Ethically Oriented Culture.** There is a need to create an ethical climate. Every leader is charged with building an ethical climate in his or her unit that demands and rewards behaviour consistent with Services values. The health of the ethical climate is based on a soldier's perception of how leadership functions. Permitting vacuum between what leaders practice and preach would obviously cause a dilution in authority. Leaders must exhibit the decision making skills, knowledge and competencies to make ethically sound decisions. As an example, it could imply creating a culture where resorting to unfair means to win a competition/exercise is anathema; resorting to illegal means to create funds is abhorred even if such funds are meant for a good cause. In operations, such a culture could translate into honest reporting, not fudging records to make the unit look better than what it actually is etc. In short, it implies doing the right things and not just doing things right.<sup>11</sup>

**Inculcating Moral Courage in Self and Subordinates.** Moral courage is the ability of a person to stand by what he thinks is right, against any pressure which may manifest itself in a variety of ways ranging from simple advice to threat and coercion. It implies admitting one's mistakes, giving honest professional inputs and saying 'no' when the situation demands. It also means disagreeing without being disagreeable. This precious character trait must be inculcated in all military leaders from their formative years.<sup>12</sup>

**Emphasis on Integrity.** As mentioned earlier, with modernisation, there is far too much emphasis on professional training, as compared to ethical education. The selection process for promotions too seems to give more weightage to the same. This mindset needs introspection. Judging a person's integrity is far more important than evaluating his

professional skills. When primacy is given to this aspect, we can expect higher standards of ethical behaviour from personnel, right from their initial years in service.

**Resisting Groupthink.** Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people, in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome.<sup>13</sup> In an organisational set-up, it has to be understood that contrary to the popular notion, neither age nor rank invests a senior officer with any special Solomon-like wisdom. They give him only experience. To ensure that gaps in his experience are plugged, and the best advice is always available to a commander, a complete staff hierarchy is placed at his disposal. In order to give himself the maximum benefit of their expertise the commander needs to have an open mind, to welcome new ideas, and even to accept occasionally that he may be wrong. The catch here is that leaders make it known deliberately or unconsciously that bad news is unwelcome. This breeds a set of courtiers who always bring good news and never contradict the boss. Even in an undemocratic set-up like the armed forces, seeking a consensus, and taking people along (in policy making) is not a bad thing. It may prevent the senior officer from making a serious error of judgment.

**Establishing Credibility.** There is a need for leaders to get extra-ordinary things done by their subordinates. This can be achieved only when one knows what the followers expect from their leaders.<sup>14</sup> There is thus, a need to establish credibility. The actions of the ethical leader should also be transparent without any partiality or favouritism. There is also a need to make ethical behaviour more conspicuous for subordinates to follow.

**Shared Values.** Shared values encourage ethical behaviour and foster teamwork and esprit de corps. They promote higher levels of loyalty and foster pride in their unit/establishment/formation. Once people are clear about the leader's values, about their own values and about shared values, they know what is expected of them.

**Fostering Humility.** It is imperative that a culture of humility be fostered wherein leaders at all levels do not take the privileges extended to them for granted. Such behaviour transcends to unethical domain as the underlying thought-process behind them is 'but it is my due'.<sup>15</sup> Offences such as filing inflated claims, abusing government resources for personal use etc. can be countered by fostering such a mindset from an early stage.

**Motivation.** One must realise that primary reasons one joins armed forces are patriotism and motivation. Leaders must keep this spirit of motivation, 'josh' and patriotism intact.<sup>16</sup> This can be accomplished by harbouring faith, sense of duty, respect for each other, esprit de corps, adhering to giving lawful orders and following right procedures.<sup>17</sup>

## Teaching Military Ethics

Lawrence Kohlberg developed a famous (though disputed) model of moral development<sup>18</sup> which includes three levels: the pre-conventional level, in which individuals act correctly primarily in order to avoid punishment; a conventional level, where they respond to peer pressure, and are driven by a concern for reputation; and a post-conventional level, during which individuals use their own reasoning to determine "universal ethical principles" of right and wrong, and then abide by them because they have seen the validity of principles and become committed to them. The objective should be to train soldiers who act ethically, not because they've been told to, or because they think it will make them look good, but because they themselves have determined that it is the right thing to do. Otherwise, they may acquiesce to unethical orders or peer pressure.<sup>19</sup>

The approach adopted in Indian Armed Forces is that of teaching personnel "virtue ethics". Essentially, virtue ethics seeks to ensure moral behaviour by instilling certain virtues (loyalty, honesty, and courage) to create good character and thereby bringing a holistic, deeper change in the individual.<sup>20</sup>

A few methods in which ethics education can be strengthened and made more effective across the ranks of military leaders are given below :-

- (a) **At Training Academies.** The cadets must be given lessons in inculcating moral judgment. The training institutions presently focus on social conduct rather than moral virtues because it is assumed that ethical values are already ingrained in them.
- (b) **During Courses.** An officer has to undergo a large number of courses through various stages of his career. It should be necessary to put them through a capsule of ethical training in each of these courses right from ab-initio courses to National Defence College. Emphasis should be on teaching ethical leadership in practical military context and situations rather than on theory.<sup>21</sup>
- (c) **Countering Bathsheba Syndrome.** The Bathsheba Syndrome postulates that more often than not, ethical failures are not a result of an individual's low morals, but are a by-product of success. It brings to light certain disturbing issues such as the fact that success often allows leaders to become complacent and to lose focus, diverting attention to things other than their primary roles. Moreover, since success leads to privileged access to information and organisational resources, it makes successful individuals more prone to ethical transgressions. In the recent past, many ethical failures have occurred in the higher ranks. There is thus, a need to sensitise military leaders about such psychological vulnerabilities that they are exposed towards in view of their rank and stature.
- (d) **Workshops and Seminars.** Workshop and seminars should be conducted on ethical conduct at various levels from unit level to Command Headquarters for officers and troops from time to time.
- (e) **Negative Reinforcement.** It is necessary that the organisation should not be seen to be weak in taking action against those who compromise their ethical values. Rather than sweeping the cases of moral turpitude under the carpet of secrecy, the punishments given should be highlighted so as to strengthen the image of the Organisation as one where moral failings are not only unpardonable but invite strong negative

reinforcements as well.

Having discussed some of the ways through which education in ethics can be strengthened, a brief discussion regarding the ethics training at The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) ensues. The objective of the discussion is to describe how ethics training is carried out in other militaries, and considering the same for introduction in our own institutions, if found feasible.

The RMAS is regarded as one of the world's leading military academies. The current mission statement of the Academy is, "Through military training and education, to develop the qualities of leadership, character and intellect demanded of an Army Officer on first appointment."<sup>22</sup> The syllabus is exhaustive. Civilian academic staff and service personnel impart classroom-based education on issues such as institutional ethics, treatment of prisoners of war, laws of armed conflict, avoiding civilian casualties etc. These sessions include numerous practical case studies where students place themselves in situations which they might face on leaving the Academy.<sup>23</sup> This classroom based education is followed by a two weeks field-exercise where students face complex situations. They have to deal with refugees, prisoners of war, terrorists, pirates and rioters. Besides being exercised as soldiers, students find themselves role-playing as hostages, negotiators and NGO staff. Here, they have to show maturity, knowledge and appreciation of rules and regulations.<sup>24</sup> Similar exercises are carried out to teach institutional ethics, gender sensitisation, financial probity etc. The chief take-away is that trainee officers are pushed into thinking maturely from the formative years. They are given exposure to sensitive situations concerning ethical conduct like gender sensitisation, laws of armed conflict etc. in a context-centric, practical fashion. Unlike learning by rote, the emphasis is on inculcating values through imaginative and practical training in ethics.

### **Towards an Honour Code**

It is opined that the constituents of an honour code can already be found in the Chetwode motto. However, it is also opined that having an honour code with concrete thought-to-action amalgamation would go a long way in giving a necessary sense of direction to the officer cadre. Such a code could involve the following :-

- (a) Setting an example with highest moral character, professional excellence and competence.
- (b) Undertaking moral responsibility for one's actions.
- (c) Conducting oneself in an ethical manner towards subordinates, superiors and peers.
- (d) Encouraging new ideas and reporting bad news promptly.
- (e) Making decisions in the best interests of the Service.
- (f) Handling organisational assets with utmost care and efficiency.
- (g) Treating mission as sacred.
- (h) Inculcating a deep sense of duty, resolve and fighting spirit.
- (j) Placing the interests of the Service before that of the Unit and that of the Unit before the Self.

### **Conclusion**

In an age witnessing a rapid transition, especially in the domain of value systems, the onerous responsibility of preserving and inculcating military values befalls on the military leaders. The approach undoubtedly has to be 'top-down'. This ought to be achieved through setting of personal examples, reforming institutional methods which impede honest conduct and through proper training.

The most important responsibility however is to counter the perception that military values have eroded over the times; as it is not the values, but people's perception of these (values) that has changed. Hence, courage is still courage, commitment is still commitment but distorted perceptions make one see courage manifesting in flouting rules or commitment to Self being stronger than commitment to Service. Ironing these distortions forms the most important objective of military leadership. No matter, how many submarines, aircraft and tanks that we may have, the primary factor that wins - is the man behind the machine. And more importantly, how they are commanded! In the words of Field Marshal Manekshaw, "The real test of leadership is not if your men will follow you in success, but if they will stick by you in defeat. They won't do that unless they believe you to be honest and to have care for them."<sup>25</sup>

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\*This is an edited version of the essay which won the First Prize in USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2014, Group B - open to all officers upto 10 years of service.

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# **Leadership Challenges in the Information Age**

## **Major General Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd)@**

### **Introduction**

Warfare is mutating. While conventional state-on-state conflict is not passé, future conflict will see increasing interventions by non-state actors, acting independently or supported by a state to achieve specific objectives. As we move into the information age, the future will bring forth fresh challenges in confronting a variety of military threats in an increasingly asymmetric world, with all its attending complexities. Leadership, as always will play a critical role in determining force effectiveness, but leaders will increasingly be confronted by challenges based on a changing environment. They would need to be trained and prepared accordingly.

### **The Environment**

In their monumental work, 'War and Anti War', Alvin and Heidi Toffler posit a linkage with the stages of development of a society and the manner in which such societies conduct wars.<sup>1</sup> As we move into the information age, greater emphasis will keep being placed on information as a weapon system and its impact on the environment of operations will have increasing relevance. Allied with this is the rapid pace at which technological advancements are taking place, enabling lethal engagement of targets at long ranges with precision, giving rise to the concept of network centric warfare (NCW). Applications of NCW in some form are visible in the conflicts presently taking place in Afghanistan and in the Levant. However, networks simply alter the character of warfare; they do not change its fundamental nature.<sup>2</sup> Direct and indirect engagements will continue to exist but the network will enable collaborative engagements in which the sensor is not always identical to the shooter. Networks thus will remain additive and will not substitute for the fundamentals of warfare.

The additive advantage of networks however, is significant as combatants in conflict, both now and in the future, besides having greater battlefield awareness, will also possess the means to deliver precision guided munitions at designated targets. Survival of the agile will thus be a key feature of future conflict and will largely depend both on the quality of decision making as well as the speed at which decisions are taken. In his book, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty first Century*,<sup>3</sup> Thomas PM Barnett observes that the future is not so much about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment but in dealing with the environment of threats. In this process, societies which are knowledge driven will have the edge as power shifts to knowledge based real time actors.

As we move towards self-synchronisation of forces, we may well be looking at a future in which decision making and action will take place at a far quicker pace than hitherto thought possible. Greater information availability comes with its own set of dilemmas in the form 'information overload'. Analysis capability too is not endless and will increasingly be put under severe strain. The desire to have maximum inputs for decision making is a tempting proposition but will have to be tempered with the necessity of giving a decision in time. As time pressures become more acute we may well end up with 'information decoherence'. We would also have to contend with the problem of 'attention fragmentation'.<sup>4</sup> Military leaders, like leaders in all walks of life need uninterrupted time to synthesise information from many different sources, reflect on its implications, apply judgment, and arrive at good decisions. The capacity and capability of commanders to take appropriate decisions in a timely manner will hence be a key attribute for the leaders of tomorrow.

### **The Leadership Challenge**

Technology, while continuing to have great significance, cannot by itself provide solutions to all strategic and operational challenges. Success will, more often than not, be a result of the interaction between humans and technology. Leadership at the higher level would need an understanding and development of a broader worldview on the changes taking place in the domestic and international environment. While using the tools of technology, the approach to war fighting would need to be constantly refined, expanded and improved. This evolution is a function of strategic leadership. Failure to evolve could well lead to our forces being well prepared for the previous war, but hopelessly incapable of fighting future conflict.

In the Armed Forces, while the tactical level leadership remains outstanding, the same cannot be said of the leadership at the operational and strategic levels, which remains tactical in its orientation and approach. The leadership challenge lies in creating an environment in which leaders with a strategic bent of mind will emerge. Skill sets required for strategic leadership would include facets like challenging the status quo, anticipating the challenges of a changing environment, interpreting multiple information flows, decisiveness and a focus on continuous learning.<sup>5</sup> The information age demands leaders who can tolerate ambiguity, adapt to changing conditions and make decisions rapidly under stress. They should also have skills that are interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical.

Culture, too, impacts on the evolution of leaders. By definition, culture is a 'repertoire of socially transmitted and intra-generationally generated ideas about how to live and make judgements, both in general terms and in regard to specific domains of life'.<sup>6</sup> Social and political theorists have postulated that culture exerts a decisive influence on a people's economic and political development. As an example, socialist economies produce a cultural milieu in which anti-market, anti-profit schooling and insider privilege have planted and frozen anti-entrepreneurial attitudes. People thus fear the uncertainties of the market and yearn for the safe tedium of state employment. Or they yearn for equality in poverty, a common feature of peasant cultures around the world.<sup>7</sup> For the Indian Armed Forces, the cultural milieu of the country will impact on the leadership traits of its officers. Here, let us examine the role of the family and of society.

The central role of family in Indian society establishes clear hierarchical relationships within the family and within society with close family ties often leading to nepotism. As the military is drawn from society, people joining the forces come with ingrained attitudes; many people thus do not view nepotism as a serious ethical aberration. Tendencies towards nepotism are transferred over time to the strong institutional bonding in the Army based on arm

and service affiliations, regimental loyalties, school ties et al. While many frown at such behaviour, the numbers who would desist from taking advantage of such bonding to further their self-interest dwindle to a mere handful. This leads to some seeking postings under a 'known' superior with the possibility of earning reports based on factors other than merit and to favourable considerations in selections for promotions. The cycle is self-perpetuating and leads over time to increasing number of mediocre officers occupying senior positions in the military hierarchy.

Culture affects in other ways too. Unlike the West where children are encouraged to think and act independently, the Indian family structure promotes deference to the head of the family for even mundane decisions. This translates into deference to superior authority whether in the family or at school and later in life as adult wherein even life choices are dictated by the desires and preferences of the elders. The custom of touching the feet of relatives and those in positions of authority is a direct outcome of such cultural constructs. Our schools also promote such a culture. Erroneous equation of such deference with respect and honour, results in a loss of individuality and leads to sycophancy, servility and obsequiousness.

The hierarchical decision making structure of the Armed Forces also tends towards attitudes of unilateralism and could preclude consultative mechanisms. In progressive cultures, authority tends towards dispersion and horizontality whereas in static cultures authority is concentrated in vertical silos.<sup>8</sup> This limits the narrative to individual views being the dominant input in the decision making process. Ingrained cultural attributes militate against effective decision-making and dilute leadership traits. The phenomenon of every decision being vetted at higher and higher levels of command is fallout of such cultural attributes. This leads at times to ridiculous situations where decisions, which should rightly be taken at the level of colonel, find their way to three star generals for approval. Play safe attitudes kill the leadership spirit, lead towards indecisiveness, promote mediocrity and sycophancy and hence need to be countered with an alternate narrative. There is thus a need to promote a counter culture within the military, if desired leadership attributes are to be developed.

The rise of Generation C will increasingly impact the environment and pose challenges to contemporary and future leadership. This is the generation which is connected, communicating, content-centric, computerised, community oriented, always clicking – hence the name. In India, this generation, born after 1990, for the most part comes from an urban or suburban background. It is from this base that the future leadership of India's Armed Forces will be drawn. This generation has grown up with the internet and mobile communications and is very familiar with technology. They will thus have an enormous impact on the way the Armed Forces function, as within a decade, they will form the core of its junior and middle level leadership.<sup>9</sup>

As we move towards greater digitisation in the forces, the increasing numbers of Generation C in leadership roles will start playing a more dominant role in military affairs. This will impact on the way information is transmitted and consumed. The linear set ups which are an essential ingredient of hierarchical systems will get more and more diffused as non linear information flows increase. Security issues arising from the same would need to be addressed. More importantly, we will increasingly witness a generation gap in the way this set of Generation C leaders function in relation to the rest. While the upper age limit of the digitally literate older generation will rise, they will remain far behind the junior and middle rung leadership dominated by Generation C in their digital behaviour and in terms of their ability to absorb, assimilate and employ technological tools.<sup>10</sup>

## **Strategy for Change**

The start point for promoting an alternate culture to nurture leaders of substance must begin at the roots. Here, we need to look firstly at the selection system where the Services Selection Boards (SSB) will be the lead players and then at our training academies – the National Defence Academy, the Indian Military Academy and the Officers Training Academy. These are the nurseries which will produce our future officers and so the greatest care and circumspection must be exercised here.

The SSB procedures perhaps need a re-look. To claim that our selection system has stood the test of time and hence needs no change is denying the emergence of a changing aspirational India. Such review cannot be left to the Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR), but must be led by the Services themselves with inputs from leaders in the field encompassing multiple disciplines. The next step will be to nurture the selected lot in the training academies. Here we come up with inherent contradictions. The prayer at the National Defence Academy which all cadets recite at the morning muster parade cannot remain a mere recitation of words but must be converted into an actionable plan. The words are stirring, emphasising duty and honour to the country and to the Services. Ethical conduct is emphasised through the words..."awaken our admiration for honest dealing and clean thinking and guide us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong" and also... "endow us with the courage which is born of the love of what is noble and which knows no compromise or retreat when truth and right are in peril", but this cannot remain simply a morning prayer. There must be an actionable plan to convert the words into a way of life which becomes second nature to the cadets. The aim must be to turn them into men of character and substance who will not flinch when upholding a principle. Undoubtedly, the task is difficult for the cadets also have to be taught to obey orders without hesitation. How then are they to be taught to resist orders which are illegal and immoral? Who is to determine the same? These are the challenges to overcome; they would require a culture where openness is encouraged and space exists to oppose authority.

There is then a need for a live conversation in our training establishments of ethics and values, where people hold each other responsible and accountable about whether they are really living the values – and this has to be internalised to become a part of Academy life. Creating this culture is the primary challenge. It means that cadets must have knowledge of alternatives, but still choose to stay within the bounds of ethical behaviour because it is important and inspires them. Making a strong commitment to bring such a culture to life is an essential part of ethical leadership. The 'authority trap' has to be avoided; this would require established and explicit ways for subordinates to 'push back' if a person thinks that something is ethically wrong and the values of the organisation are being eroded. The process of developing these mechanisms must be created in our training establishments. In due course of time, these will get transmitted to our units and establishments creating a unique army culture which could be emulated by the nation.<sup>11</sup>



Another criticality lies in the selection of directing staff to these establishments. They must be men of exceptional honour and commitment, and the selection process to select them the most rigorous. Each person so selected must be able to walk the talk, whether he is the Commandant or the divisional officer.

The proliferation and increasing sophistication of communication, interaction and collaborative technologies and tools could perhaps lead to redefining the way the armed forces operate. The capability of Generation C to use technology must be exploited to change many of the antiquated ways in which the Armed Forces currently function. If the senior leadership has the wisdom to exploit this talent, it could well lead to a revolution in the way the Armed Forces are currently administered. The entire logistic management could be overhauled leading to greater efficiency, real time availability of material, decrease in manpower requirements, reduced costs and more importantly a reduced logistic footprint in all types of conflict situations.

Systems would have to be reworked, especially financial rules and regulations as increase in transparency levels could potentially lead to massive cost reductions in items purchased for the force. Current procedures in which financial advisers from the Indian Revenue Service are dominant players but remain unaccountable for the decisions they endorse will have to give way to alternate models where decisions can be taken in compressed time frames with total transparency. On the operational front, Generation C is already wired for taking on the requirements of NCW and needs only a guiding hand to propel it in the right direction. We are indeed living in exciting times. The future holds great promise for the Indian Armed Forces – the current Generation C. But a great deal of maturity and understanding would be required to let Generation C fulfill the role which their upbringing and circumstance have fortuitously given.

## Conclusion

Institutionally, we need to acknowledge that strategic information is now an essential element of combat analysis and combat power. Our training establishments need to rebalance from a competency based training approach towards an educative approach that involves cognitive learning.<sup>12</sup> Within the Armed Forces, we need to develop and embrace an organisational culture of “lifelong learning” for leaders. Let us also keep in mind that leadership is all about decision-making. Sometimes, the choice is between ethical behaviour at the cost of personal advancement. What the leader chooses will be a product of his upbringing and conscience but the options lie in the ‘black and white’ domain. However, most choices will not be that simple. Difficulties arise when the options are between two courses, both having tremendous positive possibilities; or in having to choose one among a range of options, each having negative consequences.

Sam Manekshaw, in his address to officers at the Staff College, Wellington spoke of five fundamental attributes of leadership – professional competence, justice, courage, loyalty and decisiveness. It is the last named quality however, which finally defines a leader. The ability to take a decision and accept full responsibility for one’s action will, in the ultimate analysis, define a person and what he stands for. Our ability to nurture such leaders, and place them in senior levels of command, remains the defining challenge of the day.

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## **Backdrop**

The cornerstone of India's international relations since independence has been the policy of non-alignment. While in most cases, the foreign policy of a country is dictated by its national interests, both Gandhi and Nehru wanted India to be an oasis of peace and tranquillity whose example others would follow. Pandit Nehru, the first Prime Minister of the country, envisioned an ideal world where peace and harmony would prevail and mankind would prosper and progress to eradicate hunger, disease, poverty and illiteracy through mutually cooperative efforts of all nations. At one stage, he even felt that India did not need any military since it planned to live in peace and promote friendship among all nations of the world. Steeped in the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence and an idealistic world view, he felt that a newly independent India would assume a leadership role in international affairs by charting the path of non-alignment.

The Second World War having just culminated in 1945, there was a general revulsion against violence, death and destruction. Nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki confronted mankind with the possibility of extinction if the mayhem continued. The craving for peace and survival resulted in the birth of United Nations. Simultaneously, decolonisation of a host of countries across the globe including India gave a fillip to the UN movement with the newly independent countries joining the bandwagon.

Nehru, along with President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Joseph Broz Tito of Yugoslavia formed the non-aligned group which acquired huge popularity among the smaller developing countries of the globe, especially in the Afro Asian region. As the cold war between the US and the USSR started intensifying, a number of these countries which did not wish to take sides joined the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). Thus, while NATO and East Bloc groupings took shape, NAM also expanded exponentially. To be sure, compared to the other two, it was a loose grouping of nations with more of an ideological convergence on staying away from cold war than any economic or military association. But it had a tremendous appeal which surprised many.

## **Appeal of Non-alignment**

From an Indian perspective, besides conforming to Nehru's world view, non-alignment suited us for a number of other reasons. Firstly, it gave us autonomy in decision making in international affairs. Secondly, British occupation for almost two centuries had ensured total exploitation of the country and its resources, leaving India in an underdeveloped, poorly governed state with rampant poverty, unemployment and illiteracy. We needed time and effort to rebuild and grow in a peaceful environment which non-alignment seemed to offer. Thirdly, being co-founder of NAM, India acquired a prominence in international affairs which was way beyond its economic and military might at that point in time.

However, the harsh reality of power politics hit us squarely when China overran our defences in a short and swift offensive in 1962. Mr Nehru was so disillusioned and shattered that one of the reasons ascribed for his early demise was this reverse which highlighted the chinks in his world view and foreign policy.

The global appeal of non-alignment seemed to diminish due to a series of other factors as well, as we approached the end of the last century. The passing away of founding leaders Nehru, Tito and Nasser left the movement in a state of disarray from which it never fully recovered. Secondly, India's rout in 1962 operations against China exposed the chinks in the non-aligned policy as the perception that non-aligned nations are on their own in the event of a crisis situation. Thirdly, in the intensity of cold war, increasingly large numbers of non-aligned nations were constrained to choose one side or the other purely to get aid and assistance for their growth and development. Lastly, the prognostication by the US and the West during the cold war that 'if you are not with them you are against them' nudged a number of fence sitters towards either of the cold war adversaries, particularly the US.

Even as the cold war came to an end with the break-up of the Soviet Union, India continued to pursue the policy of non-alignment in international affairs. While unipolarity of a world led by the US started giving way to a multipolar world with the emergence of tiger economies of Southeast Asia and rise of India and China by the end of last century, non-alignment provided India with autonomous decision making capability. It enabled us to adopt a merit based approach to international issues while at the same time protecting our national interest. Adherence to this policy may not have resulted in our making too many close friends but by the same token it ensured that we did not acquire too many enemies either. At another level, a healthy respect has been maintained for the Indian world view. More importantly, it has enabled India to grow in a difficult environment and create a place for itself.

## **A Review**

The moot question that arises is whether we should continue with our present stance or should we tamper it to suit our national interest. There is, therefore, a requirement of a review and if need be, to reorient our foreign policy to suit the nation's interest in the long run.

Domestically, the Indian economy is well on its way to recovery. Easing of inflation, lowered oil prices, increased productivity and better governance have started making the difference and the decline in growth rate has been stemmed. Projections of approximately 7 per cent growth for the current fiscal portend a still brighter future with the measures taken so far by the present dispensation. Thus, as we compare our progress with the rest of the world, we find that we are among the faster growing economies of the universe and hope to continue with this trend.

## **Security Concerns**

On the security side, however, there is cause for concern. Prodded by a dominant military, Pakistan has continued to maintain a confrontational stance. Despite being shaken by fundamentalism and terrorism for which it has conveniently laid the blame on India's door, there is no let-up in its efforts to destabilise India both internally and externally. Its

proxy war in J&K has shown no signs of slowing down and its attempts to foment sectarian trouble in the country are ongoing. State sponsored acts of terrorism and efforts to derail India's economic progress continue unabated.

Our boundary issue with China is not settled despite protracted efforts and interlocutor level talks over a prolonged period. Illegal occupation of Aksai Chin and claims over Arunachal Pradesh caste doubts over Chinese intentions. Development of massive infrastructure in Tibet accompanied by frequent intrusions all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) leaves India with a degree of unease. On the other hand, India's expenditure on defence as a percentage of its GDP has been declining over the last five years and its development of infrastructure all along the LAC with China is stuck in environmental clearances and bureaucratic delays. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO), the prime infrastructure construction agency in border areas has neither the wherewithal nor the organisational structure to meet the challenge. With China spending more than three times India on its military modernisation over the last decade, we would be at a major disadvantage in case hostilities between the two take place.

There has also been an attitudinal change on the military side as the Chinese economy has developed and grown over the last two decades. China initially moved away from Deng Hsiao Ping's maxim of 'hiding capabilities and biding time' to increased assertiveness all along its borders with its neighbours. Now, this assertiveness has been replaced with further hardening of its stance, and aggressiveness is being resorted to. In fact, it is a determined attempt at one would say 'peripheral domination'. Unilateral declaration of its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), aggressive actions against its neighbours in the South China Sea and increased intrusions all along the Sino Indian border are clear indications of this shift in its stance.

This has caused reverberations in the entire region. Countries which are closely aligned with the US and depend on it for their security, like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Australia are increasingly concerned about the growing Chinese power leading to apprehensions whether the US will come to their assistance if a crisis develops. Precisely, to assuage these apprehensions and in view of growing importance of the region, the US is repositioning its strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific. A second set of countries are those which are non-aligned but have boundary disputes with China and are concerned about the use of force by it to settle issues. Vietnam, India, Bhutan and Indonesia would fall in this category. Finally, in the third category are those countries bordering China who do not have any boundary issues with China but are nevertheless concerned about being swamped by Chinese Diaspora and expanding Chinese markets and influence. Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia belong to this category. The common thread through all categories is the apprehension about a rising and aggressive China.

### **India's Options**

From an Indian perspective, what is of greater concern is the possibility of collusion between our two hostile neighbours. In the event of a conflict with China, the likelihood of Pakistan trying to take advantage and activating our western border is strong. In such an eventuality, India would be exposed to a debilitating two front war with resultant heavy losses.

To safeguard our interests, we need to develop relationships on which we can fall back in case of a crisis. While continuance of non-alignment is beneficial and should be persisted with, it must be tampered to suit our long term national interest. On issues of global commons, terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy and freedom of high seas, universally acceptable principles need to be followed and like-minded countries of the region must act in concert to ensure their adherence. Economics and security are the other two major areas of concern for all countries of the region.

Economic cooperation between nations of the region to ensure collectively beneficial growth needs to be encouraged and India must actively participate in it. In fact it would be totally in consonance with India's 'Look East' policy. China should be equally welcome to be a part of it. Massive economic potential of the Asia-Pacific region needs to be exploited collectively to achieve optimum results. Besides, growth of economic ties may diminish apprehensions of use of force and develop progressively harmonious relationships in the long run. Beneficial economic progress may also act as a deterrent to any planned attempts to change the status quo by use of force, thus resulting in turmoil and instability in the region.

Recent overtures by the US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam and other countries in the region for closer ties have been appropriately responded to. This policy enhances India's options while pursuing a path of peaceful coexistence. Like-minded nations acting in concert on issues of mutual concern is an internationally accepted practice and India must resort to it in its long term national interest. Within the ambit of non-alignment, it must have options to act in conjunction with other nations, including rendering and receiving assistance in case of a crisis. Collective action against a powerful potential adversary is a better response for weaker nations than individual action. While acting as a deterrent and imposing caution on the adversary, it also ensures better chances of survival for all of them, if and when a crisis occurs.

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# India and New Zealand : Reeling Strategic Relationship Across 13000 Kilometres

## Major Malay Mishra@

### Introduction

Few would know that in Gallipoli<sup>1</sup>, it was also the blood of Indian sons that marked the historic event for eternity. More than 1300 Indian soldiers laid down their lives and about 4500 got injured while fighting on the same side as that of New Zealand (NZ) and Australia. Even fewer would know that the Royal NZ Naval vessel Achilles which had fought in the battle of River Plate was refitted as INS Delhi and served thence for decades. It would be of interest to know that NZ teaches and discusses Kautilya's Arthashastra with great seriousness in its strategic circles. India and NZ are bonded by history.<sup>2</sup>

### India and New Zealand Relations: A Glance

The relations between NZ and India have been warm, cordial and long-standing. We share Commonwealth heritage, Westminster governance, English as common language, democratic traditions and hugely popular cricket links. Gandhi is admired equally well in New Zealand as Sir Edmund Hillary is in India. Bilateral relations have enjoyed the warmth not only recently but also during the times of prime-ministership of Walter Nash, Norman Clark and, of course, that of David Lange, whose period is regarded as the peak in mutual ties. However, beyond cricket, commonwealth and curry, there lies in plenty for readers of contemporary history.

*"I am delighted to introduce the New Zealand Inc India Strategy....This strategy is the first. India is emerging as an Asian Superpower and New Zealand needs to make the most of the opportunities it provides for the future." 3 - Rt Hon John Key, Prime Minister NZ in 2011*

'Opening Doors to India - New Zealand Inc India Strategy'<sup>4</sup>, released in Oct 2011 by the Prime Minister John Key is going to be the cornerstone of the developing mutual relations. It outlines its vision for India to become its core trade, economic and political partner by 2015. Importance attached can be gauged by the fact that it is the first of the series of all-of-government strategies. The strategy has six broad goals viz : trade, export, mutual investment, retaining skill migrants, ties on regional and global security issues and raising NZ profile. Each merits a deeper evaluation.

### Reeling Relations: Sector Wise Analysis

Trade and Economic relations are the main driver of all international relations in this rapidly changing 21st century. Both nations sit poised to compliment perfectly by this arrangement. India is a land of limitless opportunities and NZ can be a great provider and participant. India is a rising, resilient and the predicted-to-be third largest economy by 2025, largely insulated against the global financial crisis due to domestic driven factors and provides huge consumer market.<sup>5</sup> According to the McKinsey report,<sup>6</sup> by 2030, there will be 590 million people in Indian cities, nearly twice the population of the US today and an increase of 270 million in the number of working age people. Further, 68 cities will have a population of one million plus, up from 42 today. Europe has 42 today. This demands \$1.2 trillion to meet projected demand in Indian cities. Thus three quarters of India's consumer market in 2025 does not exist today and is up for grabs. About 700 to 900 square kilometres of commercial and residential space needs to be built, a new Chicago, every year. In the bargain, New Zealand's immense expertise in this field, in addition to traditional fields of wood and wool, are going to be invaluable to India, like agro-technology, food processing, supply chain, clean energy and sports technology. Mutual trade presently stands at \$1.1 billion<sup>7</sup> with \$725 million and \$398 million as NZ export and import respectively, which is low vis-à-vis its global profile. Free Trade Agreement between two countries, whose negotiations are underway, promises to take mutual exchanges to new heights.

No trade can survive without healthy people-to-people connect. A plenty is on the table for both to realise this dream. Educational exchanges are growing strength to strength, courtesy a joint initiative called India-New Zealand Education Council (INZEC). India is a quality source of students and NZ is a responsible provider of quality education with assured safety. India sends about 12000 students annually, second largest contributor.<sup>8</sup> Tapping skilled migrants from India, as targeted in the vision 2015, is also a win-win supposition. Complimentarily, what is in surplus in India, can address the shortages in New Zealand. India has surplus of ICT-enabled professionals, willing to venture out abroad which NZ software companies would happily embrace.<sup>9</sup> 0.1 million strong Indian community in NZ forms the base for furthering all such initiatives. Tourism is another chapter of successful story. The number is rising sharply, 30000 in 2011,<sup>10</sup> and thus contributing to the most important economic activity of New Zealand. The jump from 19th position to now 10th largest tourist arrivals from India is a welcome sign. Bollywood, Indian film Industry, has popularised NZ as one of the most favourite tourist-cum-honeymoon destination for middle class Indians, whose number is rising significantly. Amusingly, sweltering Indian summers of 'April-June', which throws out tourists humming for cooler climes fits well for NZ. Bollywood serves more than one purpose. It is world's largest producer of the films, about 1300 in a year, more than double the number of Hollywood's 485 and shoots many of the beautiful dance/ romance sequences in NZ thus raising its country profile.<sup>11</sup>

### Strategic Domain

At strategic level, turn of the century has opened newer realms of cooperation. We are committed to collective security and global peace and multilateral response to these challenges. There exist numerous fields of convergence of interests as described in the succeeding paras.

Asia-Pacific region is one point of convergence where we attach similar importance as this region holds nearly 60 per cent of the global GDP, is home to nearly four billion people out of the world's six billion, and where almost 50 per cent of the world's sea trade passes through the choke points of its archipelagic waters. Its vital economic significance lends itself to the newer forms of rivalry and non-traditional security threats like terrorism, piracy etc. Existing territorial disputes and rise of assertive China has infused new dynamics to the region. We, as common members in various regional fora, work together towards the regional peace such as in ASEAN+6, ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF) and more recently East Asia Summit and Asia Pacific Community. India strategically sits to dominate the sea lanes where more than 80 per cent of the oil imports of the energy hungry China passes through. "Pivot policy"<sup>12</sup> by the US and perceived role therein for India as 'lynchpin' has brought India as an important player in the region, thus giving greater latitude for New Zealand to accelerate mutual relations. India and New Zealand have taken lead in ARF to initiate dialogue and cooperation on security aspects and their quest for ASEAN based suitable security architecture has led to the formation of ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight Forum. We together, with impeccable track record, would certainly bring wings of peace in the turbulent waters of Asia-Pacific.

India's extended 'Look East Policy'<sup>13</sup> underscores major shift in its perspective of the region and also shoulders common commitments in the Pacific. India became a dialogue partner in 'Pacific Islands forum' (PIF) in 2003 where its 'Regional Assistance Initiative' with NZ focuses on multilateral assistance to islands such as capacity building, economy, energy and technological aid. PIF is a right forum for both countries to realise vision for sustainable development in the region.

Afghanistan after 2014 is also a shared concern.<sup>14</sup> While New Zealand has contributed immensely to its reconstruction as part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), by positioning Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyán and with other logistic support, India too has heavily invested in various capacities. Both hope to see a stable and secure Afghanistan. We also utilise other multilateral platforms, like the UN, Commonwealth, WTO and IMF to voice common concerns on key international issues like terrorism, maritime security, trade and environment.

Defence cooperation has been an unexplored territory. World's third largest military of India, approximately 1.3 million strong, has much to learn from a modern, high-tech, well equipped, trained and network-enabled military of NZ. India can offer practical hands-on experience from its rich history of multispectral combat including, four full-fledged conventional wars in all kinds of terrain and full-time sub-conventional wars including counterterrorism operations. Current interaction is restricted to respective navies through port calls, naval symposium or visits through Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) that provides new leverage for shared commitment in the Indian Ocean. Strong common commitment to peace support missions brings us together. India, with about 8000 personnel deployed, has been one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping with constant signature for last six decades. Multiple deployment of over 260 personnel world over by New Zealand Defence Force as compared to its relatively small size is really significant. This rich experience in peacekeeping on both sides presents itself as a good beginner.

However strategy-domain and research can be one bonding factor. This factor came as a pleasant surprise during the strategic studies domain while the author was attending the Command and Staff College Course in New Zealand, wherein an unanticipated inclusion of "Kautilya's Arthashastra" was an eye-opener. It was inconceivable that Kautilya as master strategist and his postulates would be discussed in strategic circles with such seriousness 13000 km away from its homeland India where this resource is touched perhaps only scantily. A simple research on Kautilya's postulates, it can be said with certainty that we have a great deal to learn from his work which is not only comparable but also superior in many regards than the works of Machiavelli and Sun Tzu. His concepts of Shadgunya based foreign policy, Saptanga-theory on state and axioms on war are as applicable today in the contemporary world as they were two millennia ago. This opens a new field of developing strategic relations between the two nations. Kautilya's teachings in his masterpiece across fifteen books covers aspects like strategy, grand-strategy, war, preparing for war, proxy wars, silent wars, insurgency, strategic intelligence, national-power and so on. They must surely be attended to at every level of statecraft in a befitting manner.

## Conclusion

The strength of India-NZ relations is deep rooted and takes strength from deep mutual understanding. Having a partner in NZ, provides India, an effective way to further its expanding strategic interests which very much coincide with Wellington's desire for growing presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It should serve as a common thread for Indo-NZ relations in the future, although there will be challenges such as occasional differences in perception of global issues. Given India's burgeoning geopolitical and economic interests eastwards on one hand, and NZ's adage of 'isolation, not insulation' and commitment to collective security, on the other, there exists potential for boundless scripts to be written together.

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## **Introduction**

The world has got completely hooked to the information technology revolution. Computers, smart phones and internet have invaded into our lives to such an extent that our day to day functioning is now completely dependent on them. As we become more reliant on these technologies, we also expose ourselves to the dangers lurking around in the cyberspace. Cybercrime is one such danger. Millions of dollars are lost to cybercriminals every year. Yet cybercriminals are not the ones who pose the gravest of threats. It is the threat of presence of non-state actors in cyber domain that is worrying nations today. The very nature of cyberspace makes them a potent force that will play a pivotal role in any future cyberwar.

## **Non-State Actors and Cyberwarfare**

While warfighting is all about opposing armies battling it out and dominating each other in the air, sea and on land, non-state actors too have always played some role in all conflicts. The best example in the Indian subcontinent is the “Mukti Bahini” the Bengali resistance that fought against the Pakistan Army by the side of Indian Army during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Tasks from espionage to surveillance to physical combat all have been undertaken in the past by such armed non-state actors. But in the cyberspace this may not be the case. While in an armed conflict, it is the armed forces that play the most vital role, in a conflict through the cyberspace, non-state actors may play a larger role than the armed forces would do in waging a war through this domain. This would be more so when the two nations are not in a state of armed conflict but hostilities do occur between them; e.g. India and Pakistan. We are not in a state of war, yet the relations between the two countries are not cordial. In such circumstances, non-state actors based in Pakistan and supported by Pakistan army/ government will play a crucial role in attacking our critical info-infrastructure through the cyber domain with the Pakistan army/government completely denying any involvement.

So who is a non-state actor in the cyberspace? They could be anyone from an ordinary citizen to a patriotic hacker to a cybercriminal to a cyber terrorist or even cyber militia. Past experiences of cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 clearly show that the Russians, alleged of originating these attacks, completely denied any of its state machinery being involved in the attacks. Anonymity is a characteristic of cyber domain. The state machinery can, therefore, easily hide behind non state actors with little or no risk of attribution and deny any involvement in perpetrating devastating cyberattacks. In fact, the ease with which a cyber militia can operate and carryout cyberattacks, make them a better choice than establishing a full-fledged cyber wing as part of the armed forces.

## **What is Cyber Militia?**

A cyber militia can be defined as a group of volunteers who are willing and able to use cyberattacks or other forms of disruptive cyber actions in order to achieve a political goal.<sup>1</sup> They are men, not in uniform but motivated enough to be employed in covert government-orchestrated campaigns with the purpose to further the strategic political or military objective of the instigating state. It is said that China has established PLA Unit 61398 based at Shanghai staffed by thousands of computer professionals as “Cyber Troops” acting on direct orders of PLA.<sup>2</sup> Unit 61398 is supposed to be responsible for all major cyberattacks and cases of cyber espionage against the USA and other countries including India. China on the other hand completely denies even existence of any such unit, leave alone its involvement or connection of any other state machinery. But if reports in the western media are to be believed and also if Snowden revelations are correct, then China does have a potent group of non-state actors organised in the form of Unit 61398, acting completely under the control of PLA.

Employing cyber militia in place of regulars has tremendous advantages. Some of these are:-

- (a) **Counterstrike.** Although employing non-state actors to carry out cyberattacks might raise suspicion in the international community, the lack of any hard evidence will protect the attacker of any political ramifications. Thus, the threat of a counterstrike is negligible. In 2007 while all evidence showed that the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on Estonia originated from Russia, Estonia or the NATO could not retaliate due to lack of attribution. While Russia completely denied any involvement, the execution may have been carried out by patriotic cyber militia on behest of the Russian government.
- (b) **Cost Factor.** To raise a well organised cyber wing as part of the government or the defence forces would cost a lot of money as such a force will have to be funded and manned by uniformed personnel. By recruiting suitably motivated and technically competent non-state actors, the same task can be achieved at little or no cost. Small nation states today by sponsoring such cyber militia at negligible costs can threaten the critical infrastructure of much bigger and stronger nations.
- (c) **Sponsor Cyberwar.** Non-state actors with the backing of state machinery can form unholy alliances, where state provides advanced capabilities in the form of money or actual intrusion tools to non-state actors who can then pass them on to another state or its non-state actors which wants to build cyberwar capability. As on date there are no international laws or treaties banning such actions. Hence, sponsoring a cyberwar through transfer of such technologies via non-state actors is perfectly legal, or atleast beyond reproach.
- (d) **Freedom to Attack from Anywhere.** Non-state actors need not be based in the same country which is sponsoring them. Cyberspace knows no boundaries. Hence, the attack can be carried out with the same precision and impact with the attacker based in a third country. This makes the task of the attacking another nation even easier as attribution becomes even more difficult in such cases.
- (e) **Laws of War do not Apply.** Even if an indisputable link is established between a non-state proxy and a nation-state, no laws of war apply to these cyber militias. This is because status of such non-state actors



cannot legally be considered to be that of combatants. Also, in some cyberattacks, no physical damage may be caused by these cyberattacks; hence laws of armed conflict do not apply to them. Therefore, such non-state actors in the cyberspace may get away from being tried for war crimes despite the attacks having the same devastating impact as physical attacks.

Raising and employment of such cyber militia forces may have a flip side too. Just like there are no good or bad terrorists, similarly, there are no good or bad hackers. Armed with adequate knowledge and skills, the same attacker may turn against the state and threaten own infrastructure. They may even blackmail the government in order not to disclose sensitive details. Contracted cyber espionage agents might defect to the opposing nation if offered political asylum and cause damage like it happened in the case of Edward Snowden. However, the advantages of using such non-state actor outweigh the drawbacks. This is the reason that a number of nations are preferring employment of such forces instead of employing regular troops to attack the opponents through the cyber domain.

### **What Threat Does India Face from Cyber Non-State Actors?**

Anyone who deals with the cyberspace would know about Stuxnet and the crisis the computer worm created for Iranian nuclear programme in 2010. But many of us would not be aware that Stuxnet was detected in Indian hardware too. Based on a study of the spread of Stuxnet conducted by 'Symantec' an American computer security company, the most affected countries in the early days of the infection were Iran, Indonesia and India. As per a report released by Symantec in September 2010, 8.31 per cent computers in India were found infected with Stuxnet.<sup>3</sup> Stuxnet was designed to attack systems using certain specific software namely Windows Operating System, Siemens PCS 7, WinCC and STEP7 industrial software applications and one or more Siemens S7 PLCs. Only when presence of all software was detected by the worm, would Stuxnet be activated. If complete criteria were not met, the worm was programmed to destroy itself. This clearly indicates that Stuxnet was designed to target computers specifically associated with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as such software is found in SCADA/industrial control systems.

So how did the worm manage to reach well protected hardware in Iran and India and what damage was caused by it in India? Obviously no nation state was directly involved in perpetrating Stuxnet attack. The sophistication with which the worm's code was written and the lethality with which it carried out its task indicates that it was not a handiwork of some novice hacker. As no money or information was stolen by the exploits of the worm, it is unlikely that some motivated cyber criminals created and planted it to steal either money or information. That leaves only one option. The precision with which Stuxnet attacked SCADA systems indicate that it took a lot of planning and effort in implementation of the attack. Such a task could have been done either by cyber terrorists or non-state actors acting on behalf of some state. The same people who perpetrated the worm attack in Iran, also perhaps infected Indian systems also. While the damage caused by Stuxnet in Iran is well documented, unfortunately no survey is available in the public domain which could establish the nature of damage that may have been caused in India by it. Though some reports in the media indicate that INSAT- 4B a communication satellite launched by India in 2007 and which effectively went 'dud' in 2010 due to failure of its transponders affecting 70 per cent of Direct to Home services in India was a handiwork of Stuxnet.<sup>4</sup> The same has though not been confirmed by either ISRO or by Siemens whose software the satellite was using. Whether the satellite went 'dud' because of Stuxnet or not, the mere fact that such a deadly computer worm was able to penetrate unnoticed into control systems of our satellite network (if the Forbes report is to be believed), is an indication of the penetration capabilities of offensive cyber tools available today with rogue elements.

**Sabotaging the Critical Info-Infrastructure.** The above two incidences clearly indicate that networks and infrastructure in our country are vulnerable to cyberattacks, specifically by non-state actors acting on behalf of states like Pakistan or China. Sabotage is an integral part of Cyber Warfare. Malicious software and cyberattacks are ideal instruments of sabotage. This is especially applicable for sectors which provide direct services to consumers such as Telecom, Banking and Power sector. The above three sectors rely heavily on information and communication technology (ICT) and networking. As all of these three sectors provide consumer services, use of internet is also essential for all three sectors. While it is difficult to attack a standalone network or service, any infrastructure which is connected to the internet becomes more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Therefore these three sectors are specifically vulnerable to well-coordinated cyberattacks resulting in breakdown of their services. State sponsored non-state actors can not only target such critical info-infrastructure but other spheres of life which rely on ICT. As systems become more complex, the knowledge required to attack them also becomes more complex and arcane. Unless the attacker is backed up with full financial and knowledge support, sabotaging industrial control system will be a difficult task. Non-state actors are the only group of cyber adversaries who can achieve such a task with ease as they have all the necessary backing.

**Subversion.** Another activity which a non-state actor can undertake effectively through the cyberspace against our country is subversion. As per Thomas Rid, a British scholar and writer, information technology has enabled proliferation of subversive causes and ideas. Because of the cyberspace, subversion has become more cause driven, it is seeing higher levels of membership mobility and is now characterised by lower levels of organisational controls<sup>5</sup>. One common tool of all subversion activity is media, may it be print or visual media. The exponential rise and infinite reach of social media today has made it a perfect tool for subversive activities. The kind of influence social media has on the society has got our government thinking about the impact it can have on internal security of the Country. Today politicians, senior government officials and scholars can often be heard voicing their concern about the negative and subversive impact of social media. A very recent example of this was the exodus of the northeast students from Bangalore and other southern cities in August 2012. Despite appeals and assurances of safety by the Karnataka government, people from the northeastern parts of India working in cities of Karnataka continued to flee the state in hordes. Whatever were the actual reasons for the event, social media was blamed for the massive exodus.

Social media in particular and internet in general are mediums which a non-state actor can exploit for creating an adverse public opinion against the government of the day. Examples of this can be found in the way Arab Spring of 2011 was triggered. Social network, especially Facebook, offered a platform for planning and after action deliberations. The moderators of various Facebook groups that helped spark the unrest remained anonymous during most of the Arab Spring. Even the shutdown of the internet could not prevent the spread of political movement. The

recent arrest of an ISIS Tweeter handler in Bengaluru shows the innovative ways a Jihadi organisation can make use of cyberspace. The IS militant group has made extensive use of social media for propaganda and recruitment, as well as for disseminating gory execution videos. If a banned jihadist rebel group based in Iraq and Syria can so well put to use the cyberspace, imagine how well a state sponsored organisation will be able to use it.

Listed above are just some of the ways a nation can employ non-state actors in the cyberspace. While sabotage, subversion and espionage would be the main motives behind employing cyber militia, there could be many other ways to use them in spreading terror in India using the cyberspace. Our armed forces and other governmental organisations have mastered the ways to counter state sponsored terrorism in J&K and the northeast; we will have to learn innovative methods for fighting actions perpetuated through the cyber domain. Time has come to recognise the potential of non-state actors in the cyberspace and take countermeasures against their likely method of operations.

## Conclusion

Non-state actors wield more influence and pose greater national security risks in the cyber domain than they do on land, sea and air. With low barriers to entry and the ease with which technology today is available, a state can achieve its nefarious goals in the cyber domain by proxy non-state actors who can be as effective as a nation state in undertaking precision cyberattacks. It is time that the government took a serious view of this and addressed the issue of cyber conflict with non-state adversaries. It is a must to establish a secure and resilient cyberspace in the Country.

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# **Rise of Media in Bhutan and Its Impact on Democracy**

## **Ms Madhuri Sukhija@**

### **Introduction**

The world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the picture that is drawn for them by the various editors, publishers of papers and other media actors. That in fact, is the power of the media. A liberal democracy works on certain ideals and for Bhutan, to realise them all in so short a time, sounds rather idealistic. Bhutan is currently trying to consolidate its nascent democracy, which indeed is a challenging task. What has been media's role in advancing democratic governance in Bhutan?

### **Evolution**

Centuries back, official and community messengers, prayer flags, carved messages on stone and wood, were the face of the traditional media which kept the people informed on various aspects. With modernisation making inroads in 1962, media got a boost from the monarchy and emerged as an independent force. The first ever national newspaper began its journey in 1986 and since then there has been no looking back. From a weekly, it gradually evolved into a bi-weekly and then into a daily newspaper, only recently in 2009. Likewise the BBS i.e. the Bhutan Broadcasting Service, the first ever national broadcaster to start in 1973, was initially known as the NYAB (National Youth Association of Bhutan).<sup>1</sup> In keeping with the decentralisation process, both the Kuensel (National newspaper of Bhutan) and the BBS were delinked from the Government in 1992, through a Royal Edict, allowing them to function autonomously. In 1998, the Kuensel stopped receiving Government subsidy and in 2006, the paper sold 49 per cent of its shares to the public. Television and Internet entered as late as 1999.<sup>2</sup> Granting legitimacy to the media was an important move by the monarchy and this was done through the Constitution which was drafted in 2008. Since the Constitution of Bhutan is based on the philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNH), the media also shares the responsibility of working towards this goal.

Three specific rights pertaining to the media are incorporated in the constitution:

- (a) Freedom of speech and expression.
- (b) Right to Information.
- (c) Freedom of Media i.e. Freedom of Press for Radio, TV etc.

### **The Private Media Makes Its Debut**

The credit for the advent of the private media goes to the fifth king, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk. The private media raised the bar and did away with the monopoly of the State owned media in various fields. 2006 saw Bhutan Times and Bhutan Observer start off as weekly newspapers. The first Daily newspaper to be launched was Bhutan Today in 2008. In 2010, two more weekly newspapers, Business Bhutan and The Journalist, began publication. In addition to these, private Dzongkha (local) papers and a few entertainment magazines were also launched.<sup>3</sup> Private Radio stations are not far behind. Kuzoo FM (launched in 2006), describes itself as the "voice of the youth", Radio Valley (launched in April 2007) is Bhutan's first commercial radio station, which is kind of daring, young and fun. There are others too like Centennial Radio (launched in 2008) and Radio Waves (launched in 2010).<sup>4</sup>

### **The Growing Reach of the Social Media**

Just like rest of the world, the power of the social media in Bhutan is undeniable. Internet has broken down barriers as well as the hierarchical society. The Constitution too was launched on the internet. May 2013 statistics point out that there are 84000 Facebook users and 5000 twitter users for a population under 7 lakhs.<sup>5</sup> It is no longer the conventional media, but the social media too like, blogging, wikis, video sharing sites like, YouTube and social networking sites like, Facebook and hi5, which are making a difference. Social media allows the people to instantly connect and interact which is so necessary in Bhutan where people in remote and far flung areas are not able to communicate. A commendable act by the media followed the endorsement of the Tobacco Control Act of Bhutan, 2010. A journalist by the name of Kinley Tshering started a Facebook movement called "Amend the Tobacco Act", which went viral enabling people to voice their grievances as well as openly question the Government. This bold initiative by the media and the people finally put pressure on the Government to amend the Act in 2012. <sup>6</sup>

### **Role of the Media is Multifaceted**

It has educated the public in politics, public affairs, economy, science and technology, music, arts, sports and much more. The media has helped the politically inert to form opinions on several issues and further it has given their opinion a definite shape, a task so important during the phase of Bhutan's gradual evolution to a democracy. In Bhutan, the media's reach is not only urban-centric but it has also regulated people's involvement in the political process in the far flung areas. The illiterate voters bank on the media for information. Television and radio are dominant mediums, made use of by party strategists, for they reach many uncommitted voters, who watch television or listen to radio for other reasons. TV (48 per cent), followed by radio (35 per cent) had the maximum influence on people's choice of representatives, while newspapers had an influence of 11 per cent on the respondents.<sup>7</sup> Social media like Facebook and twitter also played a vital role during the latest 2013 elections. The good thing about social media is that there are no costs involved and each party has a fan page on Facebook. Thus media is a very important element of political party strategy. The Bhutanese democracy may be just seven years old, however, the Bhutanese media has served as a forum for public debate and analysis as well as criticism and comment by disseminating information and interpreting political events and personalities. Digital forums like Kuenselonline.com are very much in use. The media has come a long way by helping people to engage in meaningful dialogue, national and otherwise by giving rise to democratic discourse, exposing corruption and making institutions accountable.

Bhutan has continually improved in the press freedom index, where, in 2007 it was ranked 116 out of 169 countries. In 2011, it rose dramatically to 64th position, highlighting that Government control over media is disintegrating allowing greater freedom and diversity to prevail.<sup>8</sup> A conscious media can work towards shaping the right agenda which in turn can help to produce democratic outcomes. The Bhutanese media takes its role seriously as an agenda setter, by calling attention to multidimensional needs and crisis that arise. The media have affected the decision making schedules of policy makers. For example, by giving prominent coverage to particular events or issues, the media have forced governments and politicians to address issues they may have preferred to avoid. In the political arena, the governments have used it for propaganda; political parties use it to gather votes as well as to convey their ideologies and differently, the corporations have used it to sell their products.

One of the biggest contributions of the media in Bhutan as an agent of democratisation has been to keep the Government in check by playing the role of a watchdog and by exposing the Government's misdoings. In June 2010, Business Bhutan broke the story of the Bhutan Lottery scam in India. In the same year, the paper revealed how the Bhutanese cabinet had trespassed the sphere of the Parliament by approving several new taxes on its own. In 2011, another landmark case to be exposed by the media was the Gyalpoizhing land scam in which several bureaucrats as well as the Home Minister and the National Assembly Speaker were found to be guilty. Despite their being a royal decree, that the local administrator cannot give the land away, many influential people including the Prime Minister, got land through unfair means in this town.<sup>9</sup> The media coverage of important Government decisions have pressurised the Government to think otherwise and halt their policies midway. The last few years are replete with such examples.

The Pay Commission's proposals to hike the pay of senior officials and politicians in 2009 could not come through, thanks to the media coverage and the hype created by it. The Government had to cut a sorry figure in rejecting the report of the Commission. To prevent the common man from bearing the brunt of the Government's high handed policies, the media's timely leak of the proposal by Bhutan's monopoly and state owned companies to double electricity charges, prevented the Government from carrying out their decision. On the contrary the Government went about levying more realistic power charges. Bhutan is a nation which provides free medical care to all its citizens, for which the ministry of health gets money from the Government. A major part of this money is spent by the ministry in procuring drugs and medical equipment every year. This is where corruption has made serious inroads between the international companies along with their middlemen and the corrupt senior bureaucrats in the ministry. The media's tireless efforts in exposing corruption and bringing the guilty to book have earned it the respect of the society at large.

### **Challenges Facing the Media**

Media sustainability and not media growth seems to be the big question in Bhutan. Barring the state owned media houses (BBS) and Kuensel which are state funded, the source of revenue for other media houses depends on government advertisements, which constitute more than 80 per cent advertisements in the market. Therefore, calls for Government subsidies means trading off the media's independence. A unique policy has been adopted by the Government, wherein a daily paper publishing six days a week would receive the same amount of advertisement as a weekly, publishing once a week. Distributing advertisement, while not taking care of quality, content or the reach of newspapers does not augur well for the media industry. Further, the Bhutanese Government has been over expansive in issuing media licenses to all and sundry; too many private newspapers and too small a market. Democracy, no doubt has helped the media grow in terms of the number of agencies but has it also helped professionalism to grow? In fact media agencies have turned far more commercial and market driven with a high dose of entertainment.

**Findings of the Bhutan Information and Media Impact Study (BIMIS) 2013.**<sup>10</sup> Financial constraints have caused the media to compromise editorial independence and content. Sometimes the media was even politicised and carried partisan views. Besides, balanced coverage is still some distance away. No doubt coverage of rural issues was increasing post 2008, but by and large media coverage is urban centric. There is also the issue of growing plagiarism among Bhutanese journalists which has impacted the quality of service and professionalism in the media industry. The proliferation of media has resulted in duplication and confusion for advertisers in the ethical and fair use of public funds.

A free and independent media adds to the strength of any democratic set-up, but sometimes the Bhutanese Government has faltered. For instance in 2009, when the Chief Editor and Managing Director of Kuensel was appointed Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Communication in the Government, it aroused a fair deal of curiosity, on account of the same person holding a government post as well as managing the most powerful media house in the country. The Ministry of Information and Communications frames policies and regulations; and the Bhutan Information, Communications and Media Authority (BICMA) enforces the regulations. The relationship between the Bhutanese media and the media regulatory body (BICMA) has many times run into rough weather, which impacts the functioning of democracy. In March 2007, the BICMA came out with a code of ethics but this was far from welcome as the media houses put forth that such ethical codes for journalists should be best left to individual media houses. BICMA went to the extent of stopping a newspaper from printing pictures of alcohol beverages as well as pictures of cigarettes, at the height of the Tobacco Act controversy as this would encourage people to smoke.<sup>11</sup>

A positive development has been the revival of The Journalist Association of Bhutan (JAB). The previous one fizzled out because of the lack of funds. Accessing public information, remuneration and sustainability do pose a challenge in Bhutan. The JAB is now a legally recognised and certified Mutual Benefit Organisation (MBO) under the CSO Act of Bhutan.<sup>12</sup> The Journalists will now be in a better position to explore funds (which was otherwise difficult without legal status) as well as groom reporters and protect them from harassment and litigation from interest groups. The charter of the JAB, which if pursued seriously, will be good for the functioning of democracy.

In this day and age of globalisation, when there are close to two hundred global channels, there is always the risk of the Bhutanese culture being homogenised under the impact of globalisation and this is where the Bhutanese media has to step in i.e. to assimilate the best practices from other cultures and incorporate it in Bhutan's culture thereby making it more diverse, without overwhelming it. Freedom of expression is a reality in Bhutan but because of bureaucratic barriers, sometimes the Bhutanese citizens choose to remain anonymous when interacting with the media

or exposing their views on national issues. Bhutan's democracy has been fortunate because all along the media in Bhutan has had the backing of the monarchy.

### **Efforts Made by the Monarchy**

As mentioned earlier, the monarchy has been very supportive of the media, since the time Bhutan began to modernise itself. On

21 Feb 2010, His Majesty the fourth King used His Royal prerogative of Kidu to launch a Bhutan Media Foundation and provided an initial grant of Nu 15 million to support media development. 13 More recently, on 17 Dec 2011, the 5th King (current King) of Bhutan granted the National Order of Merit (Gold) to each and every media house in the Country to encourage them and laud their efforts, despite their financial constraints. 14

### **A Word on the Right to Information (RTI)**

The media landscape would be incomplete without reference to the RTI Bill. In the case of RTI the initial push came from the media in Bhutan. In India, it was a grassroots feature. The media picked it up strongly as it would open the floodgates of information for the common man. As mentioned earlier, the previous DPT Government did not get the RTI passed, whereas the current PDP Government had it passed in the lower House (National Assembly) and it is now waiting for approval in the Upper House (National Council) because of differences over the bill.

### **Conclusion**

A healthy media is the greatest democratic opportunity for any nation and so it is with Bhutan. A few factors need to be capitalised on: economic sustainability; improved technology; legal enabling environment; better purchasing power; credible content-information is galore and it is important to select intelligently along with political prudence and the desire to serve public interest. A good newspaper is like a nation talking to itself. Raising literacy levels is rather important and Bhutan is gradually developing and the citizens have to be provided with such tools so that they can use the media as autonomous and rational citizens. Online media is more the forte of the literate sections living in urban areas. The Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy (BCMD) has done some creditable work in this direction like teaching multi-media skills, and covering people in the rural areas. The BCMD has opened media laboratories in Thimphu, where the youth can make use of digital media tools.

Bhutan is a young democracy and the media has to prevent itself from falling into the trap of cynicism, where criticism is prized far more than praise, the sensational over the mundane and methodical and personality over process. The relationship between Bhutan's nascent democracy and the media is one, in which both sides are seeking definition and recognition, and yet each is dependent on the strength of the other. Good beginnings are generally hard, but then well begun is half done. If these two sayings from the yore are any yardstick, then the Bhutanese media may well be on the right track.

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## **Introduction**

Cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) began to intensify in the early 1990s and has been controversial ever since. As the 1999 air-strikes in Yugoslavia have shown, there are obvious pitfalls in the coexistence and collaboration between the major agent for peacekeeping (UN) and the most significant provider of military power (NATO). This article focuses on future prospects that could result from NATO - UN cooperation and the resulting obstacles that have to be overcome. How can the central advantages of NATO - UN cooperation be defined?

The UN and the NATO both emerged within the context of the post-World War II international order. The UN was set up to focus on collective security mechanisms, whereas NATO arose as a collective defence alliance in response to the emerging threat emanating from the Soviet Union. NATO and UN subsist in an ambivalent coexistence - according to the UN Charter, the Security Council (SC) is the sole authority with the ability to legitimise the use of force in international relations. However, the "inherent right" to self-defence remains unaffected 'if an armed attack occurs' and until the Security Council takes the 'necessary measures to maintain international peace and security' (Article 51 of the UN Charter). Referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, NATO Treaty Article 5 constitutes the legal basis for military action of the collective defence alliance.

NATO was created for defensive purposes. Its collective enemy - the Soviet bloc - has vanished and therefore NATO's "life expectancy" has, by many, been expected to be limited as well. However, the Atlantic partnership has proven to be more adaptable to the changing international environment than anticipated. Its anachronistic appeal put NATO on the spot in justifying its continual existence. NATO experienced a transition towards a global security agency with worldwide reach and influence.<sup>1</sup>

The NATO Treaty makes no specific reference to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and explicitly does not qualify NATO as a Chapter VIII regional organisation, but is solely to be seen in reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Subjecting NATO's enforcement measures to the veto in the Security Council would have rendered its existence as a military alliance - opposing the Soviet bloc - absurd. Hence, mandating or sub-contracting NATO within the framework of UN peace operations - as recently the case in the Balkans and currently in Afghanistan - clearly shows NATO's evolution beyond its original alliance character towards a "security manager" in Europe and beyond. NATO's global reach and its global definition of threats to its member states' security, on the other hand disqualifies it as a regional organisation in the traditional sense, leaving it at a hybrid stage.<sup>2</sup>

## **Cold War Period**

UN peacekeeping has evolved since its beginnings in 1945. Initially, peacekeeping was limited to observer missions. The first four operations, occurring between 1947 and 1949, involved tasks similar to those undertaken by the League of Nations. In two of the missions, the UN Secretariat directly controlled employment of military personnel provided to it by contributing nations. In the other two missions national authorities retained control of their personnel while operating under a UN mandate.<sup>3</sup>

The Charter of the UN gives regional organisations a role within the arrangements for maintaining international peace and security.<sup>4</sup> The primacy of the UN is made clear in the Charter by Article 53 which lays down that no enforcement action - no use of military forces without the consent of the states concerned - shall be taken by a regional organisation without the authorisation of the Security Council. On the other hand, Article 52 states that members of the UN "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council". There is therefore a clear distinction between actions taken with the consent of the states concerned (where the Charter encourages regional bodies to try to solve problems in their regions) and those where action, including military action, is imposed upon states without their consent i.e. where the Security Council has the sole right to authorise action.

Although the Charter is not explicit, regional bodies have traditionally been seen as having a role in solving problems among their own members.<sup>5</sup> They were seen as providing a measure of regional collective security. In the Cold War period in Europe another kind of regional organisation developed explicitly for collective self-defence against an outside attack. Western European Union and NATO were organisations of this sort. They based themselves not on Article 52 or Article 53 of the Charter (Chapter VIII) but on Article 51 which makes clear that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

In both, the 1948 Brussels Treaty that created Western European Union and the 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO, the key articles which provide the security guarantees on which these military alliances are based make explicit reference to this provision of the UN Charter and accept the obligation to report any action taken in collective self-defence to the Security Council and terminate it as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>6</sup>

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter refers to regional organisations, such as NATO, in the context of appropriate regional action in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is in this area that a relationship exists between the two organisations, with ultimate authority centred in the UN. Excepting the area of international peace and security, however, the relationship between the UN and NATO is not hierarchical.

When the NATO Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of Washington,<sup>7</sup> it made no mention of any relationship to the Security Council as a "regional arrangement," nor did it contain any provision providing for action

only upon the authorisation of the Security Council, or for reporting activities ‘in contemplation.’ Instead, the Treaty of Washington expressed the obligation of NATO’s member states to be that of ‘collective self-defence’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter and, correspondingly, embodied only the obligation to report ‘measures taken’ to the Security Council.<sup>8</sup> This formulation was adopted by the United States and its NATO allies because subordination of NATO actions as a regional arrangement to Security Council review in advance during the Cold War would have subjected all actions to Soviet veto. By characterising NATO’s military actions as “collective self-defence” under Article 51, would not constitute a ‘regional arrangement’ under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; hence, no prior Security Council review would be required.

The unifying force in the beginning of NATO’s history was the Korean War. Initially, it activated many of the doubts that American behaviour had fed before 25 Jun 1950. Asia and the Pacific had been the traditional focus of the American foreign policy. When the war broke out, NATO had made little progress in raising enough force to resist a Soviet attack – which, for the first time, seemed really possible. To the Truman administration, European Defence Community or at least German participation in NATO forces was a prerequisite for any sort of successful European defence. To encourage the Europeans, it offered to station more troops in Germany and to form a unified European Defence Force under a US commander. The Korean War build-up provided not only these troops but also a larger strategic reserve from which Europe might be reinforced in an emergency. The NATO governments liked the idea. In December 1950, their ministers approved the creation of a Unified Command and asked for a US officer (they recommended General Eisenhower) to be appointed as its chief, SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe).

In another case, the Egyptian Dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a more severe challenge to the Alliance. In a bid for leadership of the Arab world and as well as for the assertion of Egyptian nationalism, Nasser took over the operation of the Canal that had been built and controlled for almost over a century by Britain and France. For the British, the canal was a vital link to what remained of their empire in Asia. The Eisenhower administration had appeared to share the concern of the allies but when it came down to possible military action against Egypt, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was evasive about the American position. He wanted to work within the framework of the UN Charter to undo Nasser’s seizure of the canal.

In 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld created the first UN peacekeeping force in response to the Suez Crisis. The UN dispatched 6000 soldiers but the use of force was limited to self-defence. This type of involvement in a peacekeeping situation characterised the missions up through 1978 and is often referred to as “traditional peacekeeping”. These “traditional peacekeeping” missions had several distinguishing features:<sup>9</sup>

- (a) Consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict;
- (b) International support, as well as support of the UN Security Council;
- (c) UN command and control;
- (d) Multinational composition of operations;
- (e) No use of force, except in self-defence;
- (f) Neutrality of UN military between rival armies;
- (g) Political impartiality of the UN in relationships with rival states.

Though the term ‘peacekeeping’ is not found in the UN Charter, the authorisation is generally considered to lie in (or between) Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Chapter 6 describes the Security Council’s power to investigate and mediate disputes, while Chapter 7 discusses the power to authorise economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions, as well as the use of military force, to resolve disputes. The founders of the UN envisioned that the organisation would act to prevent conflicts between nations and make future wars impossible; however, the outbreak of the Cold War made peacekeeping agreements extremely difficult due to the division of the world into hostile camps.

The failure of the UN during the Cold War caused states to move away from a system of collective security and toward a system of collective defence through alliances such as the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.<sup>10</sup> For a period after the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were undertaken outside of the UN system. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Group in Sinai and the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka are two examples of these types of missions.

The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), begun in 1964, attempted to end the conflict between the ethnic Greeks and Turks on the island and prevent wider conflict between NATO members Turkey and Greece. NATO and the strategic interests of the West were threatened by a potential conflict between Greece and Turkey over the island of Cyprus. Peacekeeping thus acted as a mechanism to prevent this conflict. NATO did not want to interfere because of a treaty that gave Cyprus its independence. Many other UN units have been in position for decades in Congo, South Lebanon, in the Golan Heights – keeping a situation from exploding while desultory negotiations continue.

## **Post-Cold War Period**

Not only has NATO evolved past its original purpose, the UN likewise hardly resembles its 1945 founding structure. While NATO “struggled to redefine its purpose” and moved on to crisis-management activities, the UN focused on a variety of development issues as well as a new generation of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

The UN has legitimised various cases of collective use of military force to stabilise peace in many regions of the world, especially in the peace enforcement realm. However, it lacks adequate resources to do so on a more effective level and in the context of long-term engagements. NATO constitutes the most functional and effective military alliance in the world and can hardly be challenged in the technological and logistics realm of military missions.<sup>11</sup> This



constitutes NATO's major advantage and greatest asset for the UN in the context of a more institutionalised relationship. Additionally, the Alliance has excellent capabilities concerning relief efforts and security sector reforms as well as overall coordination of military missions.

Two forms of collaboration can be identified: a stand-by and a stand-alone model. In the first actual cooperation between the UN and NATO in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, a stand-by model was preferred. In a stand-by situation subcontracted organisations complement UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>12</sup> This can either be in the form of a general or sectorial backing for UN troops.

In Yugoslavia, NATO air-strikes (due to the 'dual key' arrangement, which provided the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) with a veto option) were partially delayed by the SRSG until the mid-1990s. The British and French Governments respectively were likewise reluctant to utilise NATO air-strikes, as favoured by the US administration, as they provided most of the UN peacekeeping troops on the ground and were hesitant to endanger their well-being by collateral damage or in hostage situations.<sup>13</sup> Yost 2007: 48, the legally questionable intervention, which consisted of massive NATO bombings to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in 1999, revealed the difficult balancing act in the collaboration of NATO as a military alliance - endangering its credibility as a military power by uttering idle threats - and the neutrality of the UN within a conflict situation. It also gave rise to ongoing discussions about humanitarian interventions devoid of SC mandates.

In Afghanistan, a stand-alone model was used in NATO - UN Cooperation. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US soil marked a turning point in the security perceptions of various states and altered the parameters of the global world order. For the first time in NATO history, action was taken under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which in reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter states that: "(...) an armed attack against one or more of them [NATO member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (...) if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, (...) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, (...) such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The Security Council also responded in an unusual manner, by declaring a situation under Article 51 (S/RES/1368) as well as Article 39 (S/RES/1373). This was the first time the Council had ever recognised a terrorist attack constituting a matter of self-defence. It can be argued, that by simultaneously declaring the situation as a threat to international peace and security thereby invoking Chapter VII measures, it left the US with an unlimited number of options - a practical *carte blanche* - to react. However, the US initially preferred a loose coalition to NATO engagement, as core security aspects were touched and, immediate and unquestioned action without respect for the Alliance's consensual structures deemed necessary to the US administration.<sup>14</sup>

It was in the Alliance's bureaucratic interest to be involved in the fight against terrorism and it, therefore, does not seem surprising that NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson actively campaigned for the premiere declaration of a situation under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. In August 2003, the Alliance formally took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force, originally tasked with helping to provide security in and around Kabul. ISAF constituted the "first NATO-led peace-support operation, far away from its own territory and far outside the Euro-Atlantic area".<sup>15</sup> Not only is ISAF established alongside the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but also side-by-side with UNAMA, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, a peacekeeping mission focusing on recovery and reconstruction. Still ISAF's stand-alone character is apparent, as it is established under its own mandate with its own command structure. Stand-alone missions are characterised by a higher degree of autonomy and freedom of action, and therefore an increased degree of efficiency. Nevertheless, the presence of multiple missions with different mandates and various international organisations, as well as states, on the ground require an exceptional degree of cooperation and consultation between the various actors. UN and NATO representatives meet on a regular basis, discussing a wide range of topics, including drug trafficking, terrorism, civil-military cooperation, disarmament as well as reintegration.

Outlook: Institutionalised versus Selective Cooperation?

Since NATO - UN cooperation has started to intensify fairly recently, an improvement of inter-organisational dialogue can be anticipated. Successful cooperation on case-by-case basis does not necessarily militate against a more institutionalised framework between NATO and the UN. NATO still serves as the predominant security provider in the western hemisphere, with projection capabilities and a worldwide outreach. Its experience and military structures and especially the close involvement of the United States can serve as a valuable asset to UN peace operations as well as humanitarian relief efforts and security sector reform. NATO and the UN have already worked side-by-side on various occasions. If NATO is operating under UN mandate, it is provided with maximum political legitimacy for military actions especially in 'out-of-area' theatres. The question remains, whether NATO can and will provide its unique capabilities for regions of less obvious interest to the Alliance.

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## **Introduction**

To most geopolitical pundits, the end of the Cold War in early 90s promised the dawn of peace emerging from the perceived conclusion of global super power rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Propelled by disintegration of the Soviet Union by end 1991 and the independence of its republics, based on ethnic affiliations and old historical boundaries, rekindled hope for political stability and economic resurgence in not only the once-constituents of the Soviet empire but the entire Baltics and nations of Eastern Europe as a whole.

The truism that more things change, more they remain the same could not be more apparent when one observes the unfolding of events, of the past few years, in one of the largest and strategically placed republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union, namely Ukraine. This hapless nation stands precariously today at the cusp of disintegration with serious geopolitical consequences reverberating far beyond its borders. Prompted by a rekindled power struggle between Russia and the European Union cum US axis, the Ukrainian crisis has assumed dangerous proportions for the world at large and Europe in particular. Over 5700 Ukrainians,<sup>1</sup> including a large number of innocent civilians have perished since the last one year, and, over a million displaced in their own nation owing to the largely unequal violent struggle between loyalist Ukraine forces and well equipped pro-Russian separatists in its eastern and south-eastern regions, bordering Russia. The Ukraine crisis, as unfolding, and if not determinedly managed by the world community, displays all the ingredients of becoming the worst nightmare, apart from global terrorism, to world order in this era.

## **Historical Background**

Before proceeding further, it will be prudent to study the turbulent and bloody relationships in the past century of Russia and Ukraine, and, it will be apparent that the current situation owes its roots to this troubled legacy. With the collapse of the Tsarist Russian empire in 1917, Ukraine, a part of the empire, declared its independence in 1918 with numerous groups vying for control of its strategically located peninsular region. However, by 1921, with the emergence of the Red Army, two-thirds of Ukraine fell to the Communists and its western part became part of Poland. Communist dictator Joseph Stalin's 'collectivisation campaign' in 1932 resulted in nearly seven million peasants in Ukraine perishing in 'man-made famines.' 1937 in Ukraine was marked by mass executions by Stalinist purges against intellectuals. Ukraine, once again, was subjected to grave human tragedy with the advent of World War Two when five million Ukrainians died fighting the Nazi hordes including 1.5 million Jews who had been singled out by the Nazis.<sup>2</sup>


With the end of World War Two in 1945, Ukraine was conclusively annexed by the Soviet Union. It remained under Kremlin's jurisdiction for the next 45 years. It is pertinent to note that the powerful Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev (himself a Ukrainian), in 1954, had transferred the strategically located Crimean peninsula to Ukraine as a 'gift'. It is worth recalling that, historically, Russia has always sought the Crimean peninsula and, accordingly, Russian Empress Catherine the Great had annexed Crimea in 1783. In identical vein as now, historically, most European powers always distanced themselves from Russian rulers (despite some royals being related with each other by blood) and this mindset had prompted, in the 18th century, Frederick the Great, to annexe territories of other European kingdoms, without taking into account the likely Russian reaction.

## **Ukraine: 1991 Onwards**

The disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 led to 90 per cent Ukrainians voting for independence from the Soviet Union; now represented by the Russian led Commonwealth of Independent States and later the Russian Federation. Peaceful yet uneasy relations were sustained between Russia and Ukraine owing to economic linkages continuing for a few years after Ukraine became independent. In addition, Ukraine, in an act of goodwill and with no future nuclear ambitions, had handed over to Russia all nuclear weapons it was holding as part of the Soviet Union.

All along, Ukraine sincerely endeavoured to pursue neutrality in its foreign affairs by ensuring a balancing act between NATO and Russia. Both NATO and the European Union also left no stone unturned to influence Ukraine to wean it away from Mother Russia and into its economic and security fold, however, without much success. Yet, no alliance came forward to guarantee Ukraine's adherence to neutrality, something on the lines of Finland during the Cold War. Map 1 shows the central position of Ukraine between East Europe and Russia.

## **Ukraine and its Neighbourhood**



**Source [www.nbcnews.com](http://www.nbcnews.com)**

### **Map 1**

In 1997, however, Russia and Ukraine signed a Friendship Treaty and an agreement was also reached on the continued deployment of Russia's powerful Black Sea Fleet in Crimea which was in Ukrainian territory. The Black Sea Fleet, headquartered in Sevastopol, is tasked to look after Russian maritime interests in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean besides providing some depth for Russia's southern borders.

The past few years have seen an escalating struggle, as mentioned above, between competing ideologies in this region. The bulk of Ukrainians aspire to join the European Union whilst Russia has been endeavouring, even by coercive methods, to keep Ukraine in its area of influence. Russia does not welcome the prospects of its neighbours slipping too much towards the West! The inevitable thus fructified with a bloody conflict ensuing in March 2014 between Ukraine and Russia. The West, including the US, have accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of old style Soviet imperialism by triggering violent unrest in Ukraine and unabashedly supporting the rebels militarily against democratically elected Ukrainian governments.

To chastise Russia from its Ukrainian forays, stringent economic sanctions had been imposed by the US and European Union on the former in March 2014 onwards when the Russians had seized Crimea and Sevastopol. Notwithstanding Russia's currently grave economic state, attributable also to sanctions from the West but primarily owing to sharp decline in global oil prices – oil being Russia's major revenue earner – Putin hardly appears to have changed his dogged strategy towards Ukraine.

A recent Wall Street Journal editorial pointed out that “ Putin has never stood down” – not in Chechnya in 1999, when he used the Chechen war to take power; not in Georgia in 2008; not in 2012, when he whipped up anti-Americanism and domestic repression to crush his own anti-government street protests; and so far not in Ukraine.<sup>3</sup>

### **Events Post March 2014**

The current Russian-Ukrainian crisis assumed serious proportions in March 2014 with Russian forces invading Ukrainian territory and seizing Crimea and Sevastopol where the Russian Black Sea Fleet was harboured. Simultaneously with formidable Russian support, separatists in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Ukraine launched offensives to seize the predominantly ethnic Russian region of Ukraine which borders Russia. Currently, pro-Russian rebels, with covert support of the Russian Army, are attempting to seize the vital communication centre of Debaltsevo and also endeavouring to enlarge their footprint in the entire Donetsk-Luhansk regions of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Ukraine government of Petro Poroshenko, who was elected President on a pro-West platform, replacing pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich, also launched counter offensives against these rebels but his Army remains rather short of weaponry and ammunition to adequately tackle these pro-Russian separatists. Importantly, one of the reasons for the Russian actions in Crimea has been that former President Yanukovich had given 25 years extension with effect from 2010 for the Black Sea Fleet to remain in Crimea, whilst, the new government of President Poroshenko had proclaimed that this lease would not be extended beyond 2017.

It is pertinent to mention that earlier in Sep 2014 a cease-fire was negotiated in the Belarus city of Minsk. However, Ukraine has alleged that this cease-fire was grossly unsuccessful owing to mischief perpetrated by the Russians who have kept supplying lethal heavy weaponry to the rebels, and, covertly even units of the Russian Army have been fighting alongside these rebels in the eastern regions of Ukraine.

### **Cease-Fire Brokered by European Powers : 15 Feb 2015**


With near civil war conditions emerging and pro-Russian separatists achieving alarming successes in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, the US and European Union, once again, swung into action. While the US President Barack Obama has been vociferously advocating Russia to stop interference in Ukraine and has sent some trucks, clothing and food aid to the beleaguered Ukrainians, many US Congressmen have been clamouring for dispatch of heavy weapons, if not the US boots on the ground, for the Ukrainian Army. Most US analysts opine that if Ukraine can successfully defend its sovereignty whilst inflicting credible costs on the Russians and their sponsored rebels, Putin may learn that he is not as invincible as he imagines. However, as the London based journal, The Economist, has pithily observed that Russia's “economic woes do not seem to have altered Vladimir Putin's strategy..... his popularity rating remains over 80 per

cent.”<sup>4</sup>

With events in Ukraine threatening to spin out of control, German Chancellor Angela Dortehea Merkel and French President Francois Hollande met in early Feb 2015 at Minsk with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to explore a peaceful and acceptable solution to the Ukrainian conflict. It must be put on record that both the German and French heads of state have been in the forefront to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.

After prolonged negotiations going on for 16 continuous hours, a cease-fire was indeed brokered by Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande with the Ukrainian President and the largely unyielding President Putin, to take effect from 15 Feb 2015 onwards. Concerned with the adverse fall-out of this crisis, the UN Security Council immediately ratified the cease-fire agreement calling upon both Russia and Ukraine to sincerely implement the proposals arrived at with great difficulty. The situation emerging from the second cease-fire Agreement is shown in Map 2. The ground situation is quite fluid and is changing with every passing day.

### **The Battle Lines in Ukraine (Minsk II)**



Source : Ukraine National Security & Defence Council  
**Map 2**

The above-mentioned agreement, dubbed Minsk II, calls for a immediate and full cease-fire; importantly, withdrawal from the conflict zone of all heavy weapons especially missile systems and rockets like the Tornado, Urgan, Smerch and Tochka etc., release of all hostages and pardon to all those who participated in the current conflict. In addition, this agreement also calls for an early dialogue for the holding of local elections. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been tasked to effectively monitor the implementation of the aforesaid ceasefire. However, most analysts do feel that like the earlier cease-fire in Sep 2014, largely attributable to Russian grand designs for Ukraine and the highly ambitious mindsets of their sponsored separatists, Minsk II is also doomed to failure! If that happens, it indeed would be a gross setback for regional peace. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Poroshenko has since withdrawn his troops from embattled Debaltseve to prevent further casualties to his ill equipped forces. In addition, he has suggested a UN mandated peace-keeping force or a EU police mission to monitor the fragile cease-fire between his nation and Russian supported rebels. The

Minsk II Agreement also characterises Europe’s fear of not only Ukraine’s adverse political, military and economic condition but of the US and Russian rivalry, once again, being revived at its doorstep and thus has brought the German and French leaders to diffuse this crisis.

### **The USA and the Ukrainian Crisis**

The Ukrainian crisis has brought back on the global stage the unchanging geopolitical mindset of the Cold War between the two earlier conflicting powers; namely, the US and Russia in the new avatar of the erstwhile Soviet Union. As Russia determinedly endeavours to keep Ukraine away from the EU and NATO not wishing the latter creeping close to its boundaries, the US desires Russia’s regional dominance to be kept limited leaving American allies of the European Union to assume both political and economic ascendancy in this part of the world. The latent mistrust of Russia in the US has evoked many strong reactions after the Ukrainian impasse. Some US think-tanks opine that this crisis is a manifestation of Putin’s “Novorossia” (New Russia) doctrine which has clear cut old Soviet Union hang-ups!

In a speech delivered to the US Senate, Senator Robert Portman had pompously proclaimed that “..... events in Ukraine are a direct challenge to the entire US led international order.”<sup>5</sup> Very recently, the US Vice President Joe Biden had warned the Russians that “the costs to Russia will rise”<sup>6</sup> if it continues to violate the ceasefire.

The US President is currently under strong pressure from many in his administration to supply heavy weapons to the Ukrainian Army to bolster its capabilities to effectively take on the Russian armed separatists who are currently using tanks, infantry combat vehicles, heavy rockets and missile systems supplied by Russia. Overall, relations between Russia and the US have dipped owing to their completely divergent national interests in the Ukrainian crisis. Some US geopolitical analysts also feel that close relations developing between Russia and China currently and Russia’s Ukraine forays could be seen as Russia’s answer to the US “pivot towards Asia.” Noted Russian analyst Lilia Shetsova has observed that “Today’s Russia is an advance combat unit of the new global authoritarianism, with China.... waiting

in the wings to seize its opportunities.” 7

Many Western analysts are of the opinion that Putin is assiduously working to bring the collapse and division of Ukraine and thus altering the existing post-Cold War world order. Meanwhile, the London based ‘Economist’ in its 14 Feb 2015 issue reports, that President Putin has alleged that America “wants to freeze the order established after the Soviet collapse and remain an absolute leader.” Many observers thus opine that Russia is not only fighting the Ukrainians but also the US in Ukraine! Nevertheless, hapless Ukraine must not become the new battleground for a reborn global rivalry between the West and Russia. That the latter, despite its current economic woes, is determinedly endeavouring to re-establish itself as a leading global player is more than apparent. It is well on the cards that President Putin may just use the Ukrainian template in the other erstwhile republics of the former Soviet Union in case he succeeds in his current Ukrainian foray. Thus a political equilibrium in Europe is the most important need of the hour.

## India and Ukraine

Immediately at the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, India had recognised Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation and by mid-1992 established diplomatic relations with them. Indo-Ukrainian relations have been gradually warming-up especially after the highly successful state visit of former Ukrainian President Yanukovich’s to India in 2012. Apart from the deepening of economic, educational, cultural ties both nations have signed many agreements on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Air Services, Defence Cooperation and Exchange of Technology, Nuclear and Radiation Protection – an area Ukraine is adept at and India can profitably utilise Ukrainian expertise for the Russian origin nuclear reactors it operates. The current trade between the two nations is around \$3.2 billion with Indian exports (mostly pharmaceuticals) around \$520 million and imports from Ukraine around \$2.6 billion. In addition, there are over 4000 Indian students studying at a few Ukrainian medical and technical universities.<sup>8</sup>

The current Ukrainian crisis has put India’s foreign policy choices towards Russia, Ukraine and the West under some strain for India has good relations with all these competing interests in this region. As the US, the EU and Ukraine will prefer India to be openly critical of Russian interventions in Ukraine, India has to be careful of not antagonising its old strategic partner, Russia, with which it continues to maintain deep links especially in defence, trade and nuclear matters. Though the present Modi government, after assuming power in India last year, has refrained from expressing its stance on the current Ukrainian crisis, one way or the other, the previous National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon had voiced the official Indian opinion last year.<sup>9</sup> Menon had called Russian interests in Ukraine as “legitimate” – a remark which had not gone down well with the US and the EU. Even President Obama had indirectly alluded to the same while addressing a press conference in New Delhi at the end of his Jan 2015 visit to India. How successful India will be in its balancing act on Ukraine will be clear in the coming months! India can play a more proactive role and mediate between Russia and Ukraine – after all, nations aspiring to be of global reckoning must learn to make hard choices and act on principles of fair-play embellished with moral force. India could thus also impress upon the UN and other like-minded nations to strive much more zealously, than hitherto, for peace, democracy and stability in Ukraine.

## Conclusion

As the contours of old Cold War rivalry loom threateningly on Europe’s geopolitical horizon and the West faces its most serious challenge from Russia, German Chancellor Merkel has very aptly summarised the feelings of most Europeans stating, “we want to shape this European order together with Russia and not against Russia.” Nevertheless, Ukraine, fighting to preserve its integrity as a nation, today stands at an immensely critical juncture in its destiny. Its successful existence, as a young nation-state, symbolises the sustainment of a world order based on the lofty principles enshrined in the charter of the United Nations. Whole-hearted support, both moral and material, of the global community is not only sine-qua-non for the survival of Ukraine but as a beacon for all small nations in preserving their hard-won independence and sovereignty in this unequal world.

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## **Introduction**

The 21st century is witnessing unprecedented changes in work and family relations in India. As the work environment is changing globally, newer trends of work and career mobility are emerging. India is witnessing a major shift in the workplace, as more and more women are joining the workforce at different levels and in different capacities. Over the years, in India, as in most countries, the number of educated women has increased, resulting in their increased participation in organised and industrial sectors. According to Indiatat.com, the employment of women in the organised sector went up from 52.59 lakh in 2010 to 59.54 lakh in 2011, registering an increase of 6.63 per cent. The share of women in organised sector vis-à-vis men is reported to be 20.5 per cent in 2011 as compared to 19.4 per cent in 2010.<sup>1</sup> India has the largest population of employed women and the largest number of certified women professionals in information technology, finance, and healthcare services just after the USA.<sup>2</sup>

These changes are not only influencing the economies, industries and organisations at a macro level but their effects are also visible on families and individuals at the micro level. The increasing career-orientation in women is leading to growing number of educated women in technical, professional and managerial positions and is resulting in an increase in the dual career families in India.<sup>3</sup> Balancing between two equally demanding domains namely the family and the professional becomes a Herculean task for dual career couples, especially for the women. The challenges get further exacerbated for aspirational couples, when the male spouse opts for a demanding profession like the Army.

## **Military Life and Spouse Employment**

The military of today is increasingly a military of families. On the average one in seven of those entering the eighth year of service are married and many have children. Military families, like civilian families, may rely on a second income. At the same time, military spouses may encounter unique obstacles to pursuing work, including the rigid and unpredictable demands on the military member's time as well as frequent relocations and changes of residence.

Challenges in military life are different from those faced by civilians, both in terms of emotional security, psychological equilibrium and physical well-being. One distinguishing characteristic of employment in the Indian military is frequent relocation of serving personnel and their families. Many large corporations transfer executives and their families to different cities, particularly early in their careers. However, corporations tend not to ask their rank-and-file workers to move. The military is unique in the Indian labour force in the extent to which it expects its rank-and-file personnel and their families to relocate, and the long distances that it moves them. It is not unusual for the armed forces to move their personnel every two to three years.

## **Employment Status and Kinds of Employment**

The lives of military wives are as a result riddled with change, unpredictability, and uncertainty. These come as a result of being unsure of when their husbands will return from a deployment or training, uncertainty regarding when he will unexpectedly be called to duty, and not knowing where the next permanent change of station (PCS) will take them. Amidst all of this upheaval and ambiguity, many military wives wish to work outside the home, and many military wives do. However, the options available to them are not as promising as those available to civilian wives. Due to the few or undesirable job opportunities for military wives, many choose to remain unemployed. For those who don't choose to remain unemployed, a few military wives may be able to transfer within their company to a local location, but the majority will not. The limited number of job opportunities for military wives may be a result of the wives being unfamiliar with the area and the options available, which may greatly limit their possibilities from the very beginning. However, it may also be due to the reluctance a number of employers exhibit while hiring these transient workers. Some organisations may be averse to hiring military wives due to the finite amount of time that they will be in the local area. Others believe that military wives only desire to work part-time. These beliefs can create a bias against hiring them, even though many military wives have the knowledge, skill and drive to become highly productive employees.

For those organisations that do hire military wives, many do not wish to train them. Employers know that they will only be in the area for a few years, and many are unwilling to put forth the time, effort, and money to train them to perform the duties they were hired to do, much less offer training for positions higher up in the organisation. This affects not only the performance and ability in the current position, but also doesn't allow the wife to expand on her abilities and take new skills to the next duty station.

Unlike their civilian counterparts who may move to optimise labour force opportunities, military wives are virtually always tied movers and are not necessarily moving advantageously. Military bases may be in localities with low wages and limited employment opportunities for military wives. The pattern of relatively frequent PCS moves may cause military wives to engage in less job search, resulting in a lower return to their human capital. The returns to search will also be lower if military installations are in low wage areas with few high wage jobs for highly educated military wives.

Consequently, military wives may be induced to accept lower-wage jobs than if they were in major labour market areas. Military wives may also be self-selected, placing a high priority on the military lifestyle, with its unique opportunities and limitations. All in all, the relocations of military families have negative impact on the training and employment possibilities of military wives.

## **Comparison of Earnings**

A prominent area of research regarding the effects of relocation on military wives is the comparison of the current wages and earnings over time of a military wife to a civilian wife. Research abroad has found that military wives earned 19 per cent less than civilian wives.<sup>4</sup> Much of this can most likely be attributed to the lack of seniority one is able to



attain and the lack of training that employers are willing to provide to such short term employees. Another reason for the earnings gap could be the type of employment that the military wives are able to obtain. The types of employment that allow for the flexibility or part-time employment that some military wives need or desire tend to be in the teaching, services and retail sectors, which are typically characterised by low wages. Furthermore, studies have shown that the average time that it takes for a military wife to gain employment after a permanent change of station is approximately ten months, which further decreases the amount of time she spends in employment and the amount of money she is able to earn.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the relocations of military families have negative effect on the earnings of military wives, except for those who have government jobs.

In terms of geographic mobility, research has found that those spouses who move less frequently are more likely to be in the labour force and to find a job (especially one in which the spouse is able to work full time and/or use the skills that they have on that job).<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the amount of time a spouse is at a given geographic location is positively related to labour force participation, employment (vs. unemployment), full-time work (vs. part-time work), and whether the spouse is able to utilise her skills in her current job. It was also found that those spouses who live closer to a population centre are more likely to be in the labour force and employed and that those who are stationed overseas are particularly disadvantaged. Having children, especially young children, is associated with lower labour force participation, employment, and full-time work. Education appears to have a particularly strong, positive effect on the likelihood of a wife being in the labour force, being employed full-time, and using her skills in her current job.<sup>7</sup>

### **Many Spouses Opt Out of the Workforce because of Conditions which are Unique to the Military Lifestyle**

A sizable number of spouses are neither working nor seeking work because of military service related barriers, including day care problems, local labour market conditions, or demands of the military lifestyle, that hinder their employment.<sup>8</sup> Although day care and local labour market conditions are issues that large numbers of civilian spouses also face, many military spouses viewed these conditions as the result of their military lifestyle, either because they were removed from extended family that could help with the parenting responsibilities, because they would not have self-selected the location to which the military sent them, or because military demands such as deployments and long hours precluded their service member from assisting them.<sup>9</sup>

### **A Majority Believe that Military Life Negatively Affected their Employment and Education**

The clearest indicator of the challenges of military spouse employment is the fact that most spouses feel that being a military spouse has a negative impact on their work opportunities. The most frequently cited cause was frequent and disruptive moves.<sup>10</sup> Other causes cited were service member absence and the related heavy parenting responsibilities as well as child care difficulties. These spouses also referred to the inflexibility of the military workplace to accommodate the needs of military parents.<sup>11</sup> Finally, some spouses cited an employer bias against or stigmatisation of military spouses, often driven by the employer's concern that the spouse will be forced to leave abruptly. As with frequent moves and service member absence, this perceived cause is uniquely military.<sup>12</sup>

### **Retention and the Armed Forces**

The country's unemployment rate is estimated to be at 4.7 per cent as per the latest Annual Employment and Unemployment Survey Report for 2012-13. The irony is that leading newspapers report that the armed forces are still facing a shortage of over 13,000 officers. The 1.3 million strong Indian military today faces a shortage of 24-26 per cent of officers.<sup>13</sup>

The recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel is a perennial concern for the army and policy makers alike. Many factors have contributed to this downward trend. The demands on the military leadership have since increased considerably with new threats and challenges to national security. Many studies have estimated the effect on retention of military compensation, bonuses, and environmental factors such as the civilian unemployment rate. No study in India has examined the effect of spouse employment on retention behaviour. It therefore seems important to understand how military life affects family earnings, particularly spouse earnings, and—in future research—to understand how family earnings affect the member's decision to stay in or leave the military.

### **Retention and Spouse Employment**

Spouse employment is thought to be an important factor in the soldier's commitment to military life, job performance, military readiness, and the retention of enlisted personnel and officers. The previously discussed issues faced by military wives when attempting to have a career of their own not only affect them and their families, but also the military as a whole. Recent research has indicated that wives dissatisfied with the career options available to them may encourage their military husbands to leave the service at the first available opportunity.<sup>14</sup> Studies have found that "spouse influence on military retirement or resignation decisions has increased with the rate of military spouses working outside the home.<sup>15</sup> This indicates that as long as the tendency of military wives to work outside of the home increases, but the job opportunities available to them do not, a decrease in the number of military members can be expected. This does not bode well for the size and quality of our military in the future

### **Steps to Improve Employment and Educational Opportunities and thus Enhance Quality of Life of Military Spouses**

Systematic researches conducted on army spouses in countries across the world have resulted in various policies, programmes and partnerships internationally to assist the military spouse in the employment process. The lack of research on the effect of spouse earnings on retention in India is due to a lack of data. Regularly maintained databases on military members do not include information on either a spouse's current and future earnings or on whether the member should stay in, or leave, the military. Based on a literature review of studies abroad the following preliminary suggestions are offered to mitigate the problems associated with military spouse employment :-

- (a) Create a separate Indian Army Family Research Institute with a specific time bound Army Family Action Plan to enable research that investigates the determinants of military quality of life and provides solutions to enhance it.<sup>16</sup>
- (b) Conduct periodic Defence Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel and their Spouses in order to assess the ground truth, or actual reality constraints military spouse face in employment.<sup>17</sup>
- (c) Design employment programmes or policies that recognise that different groups of spouses work for different reasons.
- (e) Pursue relationships with local employers and large, nationally prevalent employers working to aid military spouses in finding and identifying portable jobs at great businesses, as well as reduce the wage gap between military and civilian spouses.<sup>18</sup>
- (f) Create Military Spouse Employment Partnership (MSEP), which connects military spouses with corporations who are ready to help spouses explore career options for their mobile lifestyles.<sup>19</sup>
- (g) Consider incentives or requirements for military contractors to prioritise hiring military spouses.
- (h) Establish Military Spouse Career Centres, consisting of a call centre and a website for military spouses to obtain counselling and information.<sup>20</sup>

## Conclusion

Military spouses are a unique and traceable population. Many are trailing spouses over multiple decades. In order to better understand the outcomes of geographic mobility, which include the overall economic impact and career progression of the civilian spouse more robust research efforts are needed. These research findings may answer the question regarding the military spouse's disability to secure employment and determine if her employment status is a factor in the military spouse's decision to support the active-duty service member to remain in the military.

## End notes

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