

**Revamping India's National Security Architecture for Optimum Synergy
in the Use of its Instruments of National Power**

Shri Shyam Saran, IFS (Retd)@

General Satish Nambiar, General PK Singh, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am deeply honoured for having been invited to deliver the 18th Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture at the United Service Institution of India (USI). I would like to thank the USI and its Director, General PK Singh for giving me this opportunity to interact with a very distinguished gathering and I specially thank General Nambiar, a much admired soldier and thinker, for having consented to chair this morning's session.

This memorial lecture honours the memory and contributions of a distinguished soldier, Colonel Pyara Lal, whose name is closely associated with the USI. He served for several years as the Director of the Institution and helped to build it into a centre of excellence. The USI Journal of which he was the editor, was transformed into a major forum for intellectual debate and reasoned discourse on the entire spectrum of national security and defence related issues. It is most befitting that we honour his memory today by focusing on a key challenge for our Country, that of ensuring national security in a vastly transformed and still rapidly transforming domestic and international environment. We need to make a correct assessment of the nature of the contemporary security challenges our Country confronts, analyse how these are likely to change and what is the most appropriate institutional architecture to deliver the required results.

National Security of a modern state not only endeavours to safeguard its territorial integrity and national sovereignty but is also indispensable for the pursuit of economic and social development of its citizens by ensuring and sustaining a supportive internal and external environment. National security in the contemporary context goes beyond its narrower conceptions of internal security and defence. It has multiple and inter-related dimensions which demand cross-cutting and integrated responses for which traditionally hierarchical governance structures, working in relatively autonomous silos are no longer effective. In order to ensure policy coherence every country needs to articulate a National Security Strategy which enjoys broad political consensus and provides a stable and predictable template against which various component parts of the State take decisions on a whole range of issues they must deal with on a day to day basis. Without such an overall strategy national security decisions often take on an ad hoc, fragmented, reactive and sometimes contradictory character and the State appears to lurch from one crisis to another. As stated earlier, in the contemporary context, national security involves multiple dimensions, which are closely inter-linked through strong feedback loops. Let us explore this aspect further.

Rapid technological change, in particular the digital revolution, has accelerated the process of globalisation and the traditional concept of a relatively autonomous nation state no longer conforms to reality. The world has become an interconnected and interdependent space blurring the distinction between what is domestic and what may be considered external. In tackling domestic challenges such as food, water and energy security or trans-border crime and cross-border terrorism India finds itself impacted by developments taking place outside its borders. India's economy is vulnerable to global financial and commodity shocks as a result of greater integration into the global financial system and its increasing import dependence for key resources. Its responses to these challenges will require a coordinated mix of domestic and foreign policy actions. The pursuit of foreign policy goals will be influenced by the country's economic and military capabilities, but foreign policy can also contribute significantly to the acquisition of these capabilities.

It is also evident that the sheer size of India's population and economy, and the scale of its strengths and weaknesses, have a significant impact on a range of global and cross-cutting issues; for example, in confronting the threat of global Climate Change, tackling global public health issues such as AIDs and other pandemics and dealing with the issues of food and energy security. The choices India makes in any of these domains will alter their global outlook and this gives India significant leverage. Any National Security Strategy will have to take this complex reality into account. This also implies the creation of institutional structures that permit coordinated responses across domestic and external domains as well as multi-disciplinary capacities among those who run the institutions.

In addition to the blurring of lines between what is domestic and what is external, we are also confronted with the reality of the complex interaction among different resource domains such as water, energy and food. Water is essential to the production of food. It is also integral to many forms of energy production. Energy, on the other hand is required for modern agricultural production. In many instances access to water is dependent upon the availability of power. India is confronted with a serious depletion of fresh water resources and diminished access to affordable energy, which in turn impacts on food security. Food security is already facing a crisis due to shortage of arable land and the decreasing fertility of soil. This may lock India into a cycle of reduced water, energy and food security which in turn would exacerbate the incidence of poverty, hunger and disease. Furthermore, the impact of global Climate Change is already making the situation more fraught. It is apparent that the issues of water, energy and food security cannot be tackled as separate challenges. Being closely interlinked with strong feedback loops they demand cross-domain responses. Policy coherence across sectors is an urgent necessity. This will not be possible unless we break away from current governance structures that operate in compartments without taking cognisance of these feedback loops. Vulnerabilities in one domain may exacerbate those in related domains. Increased capabilities in one domain may reinforce strengths in other domains. In addition to new horizontal, cross-domain institutional mechanisms one must also ensure human resources that are increasingly multi-disciplinary. The country's education system will need to cater to these new requirements.

Another aspect which has acquired critical importance is strategic communications. In a democracy, citizens are at the heart of any concept of national security. The objective of national security is to ensure the well-being and security of citizens but citizens ought to be as active participants in this respect as governments must be. Strategic

communications seeks to align public perceptions with the state's policy objectives through continuous engagement with the citizenry. The channels of communication must be two-way and ensure feedback. This will enable constant policy review and adjustment. An institutional structure is required to disseminate and to receive information in a timely manner and such information must carry credibility. The use of social media must become an important part of this endeavour.

If we look at our current governance structures, we find that even within specific domains, there is significant fragmentation. Take energy, for example, where no coherent strategy is possible since there are different ministries and agencies that pursue policies each from its own narrow perspective. Energy sources, such as coal, oil and gas are mostly fungible and substitutable; therefore inter-se pricing must be based on a comprehensive and overall assessment. Pricing must also be based on what our long term energy strategy is, in particular which fuel source needs to be promoted and which one to be discouraged. Our import dependency on oil is now over 75 per cent and likely to reach 90 per cent in the next two decades. This undermines the Country's energy security and yet there is no credible policy to deal with this challenge. The Ministries of Coal, Power and New and Renewable Sources of Energy have been put under a single minister, and perhaps this is a start. However, the ministries continue to be separate entities and it is difficult to see how they can come up with integrated policy responses. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas will continue to function in its own bubble while Hydro-power will remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Water Resources. There is a crying need for an empowered institutional structure, like an Energy Commission which can make comprehensive assessments of India's energy challenge, draw up appropriate strategies and have the authority to implement them.

Let me turn to the military dimension of security in some greater detail since this would be of greater interest to this audience. Traditionally, wars have been fought over the land, sea and air and these platforms are increasingly integrated with one another in modern warfare. Post the Second World War we have added the nuclear domain. However, we now have a much more complex reality with the appearance of the Space and Cyber domains, which are both platforms in themselves but also pervade all other domains. No modern war fighting is possible without heavy reliance on cyber capabilities; neither is it possible without the navigation and surveillance capabilities provided by space based assets. The threat spectrum has also undergone a change. It now extends from the sub-conventional all the way to nuclear exchange and a country needs capabilities and strategies which enable it to meet threats at any level of the escalation ladder. This also implies the ability to integrate capabilities in each domain. It must also be appreciated that in modern warfare it may be difficult to separate military targets from civilian targets. Cyber attack on critical civilian infrastructure may have consequences far more significant than damage to military installations. In any case military activities are heavily reliant on civilian infrastructure such as the transport network.

Currently, India does not have an integrated command structure even for the three armed services, let alone the integration of the nuclear, cyber and space domains. Each armed service has its own cyber cell and space cell with little inter-service engagement and synergy. A Group of Ministers Report as far back as 2001 had recommended a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who would provide a single point military advice to the Minister of Defence, ensure jointness in the Armed Forces, ensure long term planning and inter-service prioritisation and administer the Strategic (Nuclear) Forces. It would now be necessary for the new domains of Cyber and Space, as they pertain to defence, to also be placed under the CDS management. The CDS could also bring a degree of coherence into the area of defence research and development, aligning it more closely with the perspective plans for the Services.

There are strong arguments in favour of setting up an empowered CDS with authority to override Service Chiefs. He would have a key role in the Nuclear Command Authority. Currently the Strategic Forces Commander functions under the Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, who is the senior most service chief serving in rotation. He cannot devote the attention to Strategic Forces that is indispensable even while being in operational command of his own particular service. There is also little continuity since the Chairman sometimes serves only a few months before retirement. There is also a strong preference for the setting up of separate Space and Cyber Commands for the Armed Forces, which would also be placed under the CDS. The National Security Council headed by the Prime Minister would continue to be the apex decision making authority and the National Security Adviser, who is the Secretary of the Council would in turn work closely with the CDS.

Taking into account the fact that the military and civilian domains are closely interlinked, there should be constant engagement and interaction between the two. For example, the proposed Cyber Command should work in close coordination with the National Information Board which brings together the cyber capabilities that exist in the civilian domain.

Maritime Security is a key aspect of national security. It is in the ocean expanse which surrounds the Indian peninsula where there are opportunities for power projection using naval assets. While India has a significant naval force capability, it is not a maritime power. Maritime power is related to the scale of a country's international trade, its possession of a merchant fleet to carry its seaborne trade, extensive ship building capabilities, modern ports with efficient port handling facilities and, of course, a strong navy to protect its sea lanes, its ships and sea-based assets. Only 11 per cent of India's external trade is carried in Indian ships. Indian shipbuilding has actually declined in recent years. There continues to be a serious lack of modern ports, which compels trans-shipment of a very large proportion of India related cargoes through Colombo, Singapore and Dubai. Therefore, in addition to expanding our naval forces, it is necessary to recognise that maritime security in any real sense would require urgent measures to remedy the current inadequacies on the maritime front. A Maritime Commission would enable the formulation of a national maritime strategy including naval forces, shipbuilding in military and commercial sectors, port development and port handling facilities for both civilian and military use and the development of a significant merchant fleet. This will synergise efforts in both civilian and military sectors.

As would be apparent, national security can no longer be compartmentalised into purely civilian and military domains. They need to work through collaborative engagement. It should be self evident that a country's foreign and security policy needs to be closely aligned with its military capabilities. An external posture not anchored in corresponding military capabilities will undermine credibility and expose the country to serious threats. This is the

reason why I strongly believe that our foreign policy establishment needs to work in close consultation with our Armed Forces and look upon the latter as an important instrument of diplomacy.

The Indian Constitution prescribes civilian authority over the military and this principle remains unchallenged. However, current security challenges can only be addressed effectively through combined efforts among the Services and between civil and military establishments. This will only be possible if the current strains in civil-military relations are addressed with sensitivity. The deputation of civil servants in Forces headquarters and in the CDS secretariat to work together with their uniformed counterparts as well as the deputation of military officers in the Ministry of Defence and other security related ministries and agencies should be encouraged. This would enhance mutual familiarity with the nature of work and requirements confronted by civilian and military establishments and promote better understanding and inter-personal relations.

I have been able to touch upon only a few key elements of a National Security Strategy for India and the characteristics of the governance structure needed to deliver on that strategy. The subject is vast and complex and it has not been possible to explore all its different aspects in detail. However, I trust that my brief talk today has given you a general sense of the nature of national security challenges our Country confronts and the institutional transformation required to deal with them successfully. I would like to summarise the main conclusions as under :-

- (a) National Security of a modern state goes beyond domestic and external domains. It has to be approached in a comprehensive frame involving multiple domains, which are interlinked and impact upon each other.
- (b) There is need for a National Security Strategy which can provide a template on which a whole of government approach becomes possible. In a democracy like India, such a strategy must enjoy broad political consensus. There is need for a strategic communications strategy to enable such consensus.
- (c) Governance structures must be transformed to enable cross-domain interventions and this requires human resources with multidisciplinary skills.

I thank you for your attention.

*Text of the talk delivered by Shri Shyam Saran, IFS (Retd) at USI on 22 Sep 2014 with Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), a Padma Bhushan awardee, former Director USI, in the Chair.

@Shri Shyam Saran, IFS (Retd) joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1970 and rose to be India's Foreign Secretary, a position that he held from 2004 till his retirement in September 2006. He served as India's Ambassador in Myanmar, Indonesia and Nepal. After retirement, he was Prime Minister's Special Envoy till 2010 and presently, he is Chairperson, National Security Advisory Board.

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35th USI National Security Seminar

**Indian Ocean Region : Emerging Strategic Cooperation, Competition and Conflict Scenarios
Keynote Address***


Admiral RK Dhowan, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC Chief of the Naval Staff

Introduction


It is indeed a distinct honour and a proud privilege for me to be present here today for the inaugural session of the annual seminar organised by the USI and to address this august audience on a subject which is very close to my heart, that of the Indian Ocean, the emerging security challenges and the strategic cooperation in the region.

The seas around us are gaining new found importance as each day goes by because of their linkages with the blue economy; and there is no doubt that the current century is the century of the seas. The subject of the seas and the oceans therefore, enthuses all of us who have donned the white uniform, but I am sure that the subject would be of equal interest to all others as well, because we are all tied and connected to the oceans.

To explain this further, I would like all of you to reflect on a very interesting biological fact. We all have in our veins, exactly the same percentage of salt in our blood, as the percentage of salt in the oceans. This is true not only for the salt in our blood, but also for the salt in our sweat and in our tears. We are all therefore, tied and connected to the oceans. Whenever we go back to the seas, whether it is to sail on it or merely watch it, we get the feeling of going back to where we came from. This truly defines the relationship of humankind with the oceans and perhaps is also the reason why talking about the seas brings out such passion in us.



Inaugural Session



Keynote Address



Session III - Panelists



Valedictory Address

Our planet Earth, the blue planet, has great significance for the maritime domain because of the 70-80-90 per cent principle. More than 70 per cent of the Earth's surface is covered with water, nearly 80 per cent of humanity lives within 200 nautical miles of the coast and nearly 90 per cent of the world's trade transits across the oceans.

Geostrategic Importance

The Indian Ocean Region has been the vortex of intense maritime activity over centuries, starting way back from the Indus Valley Civilisation in the western part of the country, which existed in 3,300 BC. We still have a dry dock in Lothal in Gujarat, which dates back to 2,200 BC. It is from these small ports that Indian seafarers sailed to distant lands in Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt and the east coast of Africa. All the kingdoms that existed in the country had deep linkages with the seas. Whether it was the Cholas, the Pandyas or the Cheras, they all sailed to distant lands from the eastern part of the Country. Therefore, even till today, we have the cultural evidence of India in all Southeast Asian countries.

We then had the medieval period, during the Mughal rule, when we lost the supremacy of the seas, and that paved the way in the form of the seafarers from Europe, starting with the arrival of Vasco da Gama from Portugal in May 1498, when he landed at Calicut. This was followed by the Dutch, the British and the French. As you can see, the Indian Ocean has been a strong unifying factor in history and has led to promotion of religion, trade and cultural ties across the oceans.

The Indian Ocean today has emerged as the world's centre of gravity in the maritime domain. It is the third largest water body in the world, after the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, covering an area of 68.5 million square kilometres. As we can see, the Indian Ocean Region is also home to nearly 2.6 billion people, which is nearly 30 per cent of the world's humanity, and this population lives on the rim, or the shores of the Indian Ocean. It is also rich in oil and mineral products. Actually, India was awarded an area of nearly 1,50,000 square kilometres in the central Indian Ocean in 1987, for deep seabed mining.

Another unique factor of the Indian Ocean, compared to the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, is that it is landlocked on three sides and the access is primarily from the southern parts of the Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope and southeast from Australia. So access to the Ocean is primarily through a few choke points, whether the Gulf of Aden (linking the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean), the Strait of Hormuz which links the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Malacca, which links the Ocean to the Southeast Asian countries and the Sunda and the Lombok Straits.

Nearly 100,000 ships transit through these waters every year; 60,000 of these transit through the Strait of Malacca. The Ocean, therefore, has emerged as the world's global economic highway, because 66 per cent of the world's oil, 50 per cent of the world's container traffic and 33 per cent of the world's cargo traffic transit through this Ocean. The oil arteries flow from this region destined to countries on the eastern side, to Japan, China, Australia etc., and to the West to various countries in Europe and even to the United States. These figures are bound to grow in the

future and the importance of the Indian Ocean is ever-increasing.

Another unique factor which distinguishes the Indian Ocean from the Pacific and the Atlantic, apart from being the world's largest oil producing region with thousand million tons of oil transiting through its waters every year, is the unique fact that nearly 80 per cent of the trade which transits through the Indian Ocean Region is extra-regional in nature. The figures are just about reversed when we look at the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, where 80 per cent of the trade is regional in nature. This means that any disruption in the free flow of the oil arteries or in trade would have a detrimental impact, on not just the economies of the region, but the global economy as well. It is evident therefore, that the Indian Ocean Region influences the well-being and prosperity of all nations and it is very important that safety, security and stability is maintained on the waters of the Indian Ocean.

Threats and Challenges

Maritime challenges of the Indian Ocean are as wide and varied as they come. Who could have imagined that in the 21st Century, we would once again be grappling with pirates, or that the major threat in the maritime domain would be in the form of asymmetric warfare and maritime terrorism? But piracy has emerged as a major threat and, as you are all aware, the world's navies are deployed in the Gulf of Aden patrols and off the coast of Somalia, including the Gulf region, in various task forces. As a result, the number of piracy incidents have progressively come down.

Ever since 2008, the Indian Navy has continuously deployed a ship on patrol in the Gulf of Aden. Currently our 45th ship is on patrol and we have safely escorted nearly 3,000 vessels of various flags and nations on which nearly 22,000 Indian seafarers have been embarked. Not a single vessel under Indian Naval escort has been hijacked so far. We have been successful in countering at least 40 piracy attempts. It is also very important to understand that at its peak, sometime in 2010-11, the farthest line of piracy had moved further East, very close to the Indian Islands off the West Coast. With effective action carried out by the Indian Navy in support with all the other navies deployed, we have managed to push back the farthest line of piracy closer to Somalia. While all efforts are on by various countries of the region, the solution to overcoming piracy actually lies in sorting out the issues on land, i.e. in Somalia and efforts are on by the United Nations Contact Group on Piracy to ensure that. While a lot of effort has been taken by the merchant ships themselves to ensure that they adopt safe practices by embarkation of private security guards, there are issues with regard to regulating these guards and floating armouries that have complicated the security matrix.

The other threats and challenges in the maritime domain include drug running, arms and human trafficking and indeed poaching and fishing in the deep sea areas, which is a major threat and challenge in the waters around us. To counter any of these threats is a challenging task because non-state actors which operate these illegal activities have anonymity of identity and intent. They have transnational links and patronage, and at times the money trails go across the oceans and across various countries. Therefore, to counter any of these challenges our policy options are indeed limited.

Another factor that poses a great challenge in the Indian Ocean Region is the fact that 70 per cent of the natural disasters, which emanate in the world, occur in the Indian Ocean Region. You are all aware of the Tsunami of 2004 that had a devastating impact on many countries of the region. It also displayed the alacrity and the speed with which the navies and coastguards of the region reacted, indicating the unique brotherhood of the seas and the ability of the navies to catalyse and facilitate cooperation and collaboration towards humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The oceans are also considered an ideal maritime medium because of the accessibility they provide for disaster relief and for deploying various platforms through the seas to aid and assist in relief efforts. India has accorded a national priority to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Therefore, the environment in our region out at sea is extremely dense because of the increased maritime activity and the dense Sea Lines of Communication that transit the waters around us. At any given time there are at least 4,000-5,000 merchant ships displaying their automatic identification systems, i.e. ships of 300 tons and above, and when you add to this the coastal traffic and fishing boats the environment is very cluttered indeed.

The instability and turbulence in some regions in the India Ocean Region have a potential to spill into the maritime domain and the situation can best be described as fragile. Consequently, about 115 warships from about 20 extra-regional navies are present in the Indian Ocean Region at any given time to protect their own maritime interests.

Regional Cooperation

With regard to the imperatives for regional cooperation, it is evident that the seas are no longer a benign medium, which were earlier used for free flow of trade and commerce. In the wake of globalisation and the challenges in the maritime domain, the global commons and the oceans have become extremely vulnerable and no single navy is robust enough to monitor the global commons on its own. This lends the navies and coastguards naturally towards cooperation out on the high seas. The medium that we operate in, the sea is distinctly different from that encountered by the army or the air force because there are no boundaries on the high seas and you cannot fence your maritime borders. These borders are porous and are to be left open for freedom of navigation and fishing and other commercial activities. Let me just illustrate this with an example. If the army were to find on a particular day, people from another army peering down their pickets, on the borders, it would be cause for grave alarm, because somebody has violated the borders and entered their territory. If an air force aircraft found a fighter aircraft from another air force close to its wing tip, it would be cause for grave alarm because the airspace would have been violated. But out at sea, when the Officer of Watch reports to the Captain that we have a warship from another nation on the starboard bow, he tells him, "Son! Wish him Good Morning, because he is in international waters and so are you". That is the unique nature of the maritime domain and that is the reason why this medium lends itself for maritime cooperation.

Maritime cooperation has to be collective in nature and ensure shared responsibility, only then can we ensure stability in the maritime domain. There needs to be synergy among the various forces, whether it is the navies or the coastguards, which are operating, so that they can combat non-state actors and the asymmetric threats, which have

emerged in the maritime domain. For this, it is very important that we carry out capacity building and capability enhancement of the smaller littoral navies in the region so that they can participate in the maritime cooperation initiatives.

For any element of maritime cooperation to be effective, information exchange is of extreme importance to ensure transparency in the waters around us. This has to be on a 24x7 basis. Information exchange between various stakeholders who operate in the maritime domain is essential for strengthening maritime security. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), therefore, is a key enabler for effective constabulary operations and is crucial for maritime security. Amongst the various stages in achieving an effective MDA, the first is to have actionable intelligence. This provides the advance information, so that one can launch a fool-proof and an effective surveillance in the waters to locate and identify the threat and then initiate an effective response mechanism to deal with that threat.

The essential components of an effective MDA requirement include the development of a common picture. This picture is obtained from space-based Automatic Identification System (AIS), shore-based coastal radars, shore-based AIS, other data from ships and aircraft which are carrying out surveillance. The whole picture is compiled with the exchange of white-shipping information. We also need to have an effective cooperation construct so that we can carry out information sharing and streaming of AIS data across neighbours, across navies and across the friendly countries in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, information sharing is an important step towards enhancing the MDA in the region.

At any given time we have in our waters 4000-5000 large merchant ships of above 300 tons that are mandated to have transponders for the AIS. When we add to this at least a thousand coastal vessels which are operating and the 240,000 fishing and coastal craft that we have in our waters, you can well imagine that the picture gets extremely dense. This poses a huge challenge. After the 26/11 attack on Mumbai, a lot of action has been taken, including setting up of the coastal radar and the AIS stations. The Indian Navy has been designated as the lead agency and various initiatives have come up by different agencies in the maritime domain, which are being coordinated by leveraging technology to get a better MDA picture.

We have 46 coastal radar stations, 10 of them in the islands and 74 AIS; the picture or the inputs of these is then fused to our National Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Network. This has also been established by the Navy. With the Information Management and Analysis Centre located at Gurgaon, 51 nodes of the Navy and the Coast Guard have been integrated, with the Joint Operation Centres at Mumbai, Kochi, Vizag and Port Blair and various state maritime centres which have come up along the coast. What needs to be done in addition is that we need to integrate the inputs from various agencies that operate in the maritime domain. With the Navy being in the lead as the coordinating agency, we also have the Coast Guard, the CISF, Director General Shipping, various ports and harbours under the Port Trust, economic agencies, Director General Hydrocarbons, intelligence agencies, Director General Lighthouses and Lightships, Fisheries, Customs and Immigration, BSF, marine police forces etc. There are both centre and state agencies involved and it makes coordination among them very difficult. But it is very important that the inputs from all these agencies are coordinated together to have an effective national MDA picture and transparency in the waters around us.

Initiatives by the Indian Navy

As part of the initiatives that the Navy has taken with regard to maritime diplomacy, the Indian Navy launched the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008 as a construct to enhance maritime cooperation among 35 member navies in the Indian Ocean Region. The aim was to promote shared understanding of maritime issues facing the littoral nations and formulate strategies to enhance the regional maritime security. Currently, the chairmanship is with Australia, after having been passed on from India to the UAE to South Africa. We also have a construct called 'MILAN'. It is a biennial event to enhance regional cooperation and conducted at Port Blair. The last event was conducted in February this year, where 17 regional navies participated. The forum serves as an avenue for formal and informal dialogues for cooperative maritime engagement between various navies of the region. The Indian Navy has also formulated a 10-year cooperation roadmap for maritime engagement with a clear aim and a sense of purpose. One of the aims is capacity building and capability enhancement among various Indian Ocean littorals and friendly nations. The purpose is to strengthen bridges of friendship and promote avenues of cooperation in the maritime domain. The Indian Navy regularly conducts exercises, at least 10 bilateral and multilateral exercises with various navies; including Exercise Malabar with the United States Navy, Exercise Konkan with the Royal Navy (UK), Varuna with the French and INDRA with the Russian Navy. In addition, we also carry out passage exercises each time our ships visit any foreign country or indeed other ships from foreign navies visit ports of India.

With regard to capacity building, we make sure as part of our annual programmes that we provide hardware and platforms and provide assistance in infrastructure creation to friendly foreign countries in the Indian Ocean Region. As far as capability enhancement is concerned, the various avenues include training, joint exercises, joint patrols, exclusive economic zone surveillance, hydrographic cooperation, technical assistance as well as information sharing with all friendly countries in the Indian Ocean Region. Some of the recent activities carried out by the Indian Navy include the joint patrols carried off Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius; our ships of the Western fleet are on the way back and our survey ships have carried out hydrographic survey off Kenya and Tanzania. Off the east coast in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, we carry out coordinated patrols with Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. The aim of all this cooperation with our littoral neighbours is to promote peace and stability in the region, and to see that India emerges as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

Perspective of the Indian Navy

India is a maritime nation with a natural outflow towards the seas. Peninsular India juts deep into the Indian Ocean as the country sits astride busy shipping lanes that transit through the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy, from its humble past of having acquired 33 very old ships from the erstwhile Royal Indian Navy, has emerged as a multidimensional force with 140 ships and submarines, which range from aircraft carriers to destroyers, stealth frigates, landing ships,

anti-submarine warfare corvettes and the landing ships. Also our submarines are both nuclear as well as conventional.

We have nearly 240 aircraft, which include fighter aircraft that operate from aircraft carriers, long range maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft and integral helicopters operating both from ships as well as from shore. We have multidimensional capabilities and with the launching of the naval satellite Rukmani last year, our forces operating across the Indian Ocean region are within its footprint and can carry out effective network-centric operations.

The roles and missions of the Navy are traditional, and are military, diplomatic, constabulary and benign. As part of the military role is the task of sea denial, where we have sea-based deterrence with submarines, both conventional as well as nuclear. As far as sea control is concerned, this is executed by the Carrier Task Force. We also have other roles to safeguard our offshore assets and for coastal defence, as well as to safeguard our mercantile marine and trade, since 90 per cent of our trade transits through the Sea Lines of Communication.

With regard to the diplomatic role, some of which I mentioned earlier, we need to strengthen maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region, portray a credible defensive posture and capability, enhance defence relations with our friendly neighbours and also provide security in the Indian Ocean Region.

On our constabulary role, I had mentioned some aspects related to coastal security. We also have to look after the security of our offshore energy assets, as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep Islands.

In the benign role, the Navy looks after aspects such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue and salvage operations. You are aware that in the recent J&K floods, our marine commandos and divers participated in relief operations. More recently, after the super-cyclone hit the coast of Andhra Pradesh, the Navy was actively deployed, looking after all the people in the state, as well as setting our own house in order.

The Indian Navy seeks to be a stabilising force in the Indian Ocean Region to ensure that the global commons are safe and secure at all times. The Navy has been maintaining a very high operational tempo and carrying out multidimensional operations across the spectrum. Our operational footprint at this point in time extends from South China Sea and Western Pacific in the East to the Persian Gulf and east African countries on the West and the southwest Indian Ocean islands in the South. The ships of the Western fleet are just about returning from their deployment to Seychelles, Mauritius, Réunion, Madagascar, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa. They also participated in the trilateral exercise 'IBSAMAR' between the Indian, Brazilian and South African navies. The ships of the Eastern Fleet proceeded on an overseas deployment from Vishakhapatnam to Vladivostok, where they carried out an exercise with the Russian Navy. They then proceeded off Sasebo in Japan and carried out Exercise Malabar with the United States Navy and with ships of the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) participating. They also visited Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Our indigenously constructed stealth frigate INS Sahyadri proceeded to Hawaii to participate in Exercise RIMPAC, with 22 other navies of the world and she also visited Australia and the Phillipines. These deployments along with the deployment of the Southern Naval Command ships to the Persian Gulf, where they visited Oman, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have helped to establish the operational footprint of the Indian Navy across the Indian Ocean Region and also enhanced our avenues of cooperation with the friendly navies as well as with the countries of the Indian Ocean Region.

Capability Development

As part of capability development, we induct platforms in accordance with our Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. As you are all aware, we have integrated the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya, which has the MiG 29K aircraft embarked and these aircraft have a ski-jump assisted short take-off, and as far as their landing is concerned, they carry out arrested recovery on the carrier. Our own pilots have now been trained and they are operating these aircraft from the aircraft carrier.

We recently inducted the P8I long-range maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, which has very potent capabilities as regards anti-submarine warfare. We also inducted INS Kolkata, the first ship of Project 15A built at Mazagon Dock Ltd.; the first ship of Project 28, the anti-submarine corvette INS Kamorta and the offshore patrol vessels Sumedha and Sumitra, which were designed and constructed by Goa Shipyard Limited. With regards to our strategic capability, INS Arihant is carrying out its trials in harbour and getting ready to proceed for sea trials shortly.

Future Plans

With regard to our future plans, these are based on a 15-year Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, which is capability-based and mission-dominated. The blueprint of the future Indian Navy is based on self-reliance and indigenisation. Currently, we have 41 ships and submarines under construction in various private and public shipyards in the country. It is our endeavour to increase the indigenous content in these warships, so that future warships will be 100 per cent made in India.

Just a mention of the man behind the machine who remains our greatest asset and strength. It is our endeavour to continuously hone his operational skills and impart the highest quality of training, while providing him a clean, healthy, harmonious and safe living and working environment so that we can run a taut, efficient and a happy Indian Navy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say that the interests of the nation states of the world are linked to unfettered flow of maritime trade because it is in the maritime domain that the interests of the world converge. The Indian Ocean Region, therefore, lends itself to close maritime cooperation. Networking among the navies of the region is crucial for cooperation and security of the global commons and global maritime partnerships are emerging as the new order of the

21st Century. The Indian Navy is a credible, multidimensional, networked force, which is ready to take on any challenge in the maritime domain in the Indian Ocean Region. It is an instrument for regional cooperation and collaboration. As a maritime nation, India has vast maritime interests and the responsibility of protecting these interests falls squarely on the shoulders of the men in white uniform because it is the responsibility of the Navy and the Coast Guard to ensure that India's maritime interests, which have a vital relationship with the nation's economic growth, are allowed to develop unhindered, both in peace and war.

Jai Hind and Thank You!

*Text of the **Keynote Address** delivered by **Admiral RK Dhowan, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff** at the inaugural session of the 35th USI National Security Seminar 2014 held at USI on 13-14 Nov 2014.

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A Comprehensive Response Strategy to a Collusive and Collaborative Threat from China and Pakistan*

General VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)@

An Overview: India's Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China

Since Independence, India's relations with Pakistan have fluctuated but always remained below the friendly level. Pakistan has never shed the animosity and employed various means to pursue its feud through direct military aggression, supporting insurgencies, stoking communal tensions, infiltration and use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. It has used foreign collusion against India, whenever and wherever it could get strategic advantage over India. Pakistan Army, which drives Pakistan's security and strategic policies, has always endeavoured 'strategic parity' with India.

China occupies Aksai Chin (38,000 sq km), which de jure is part of India's Jammu and Kashmir (J & K). It keeps asserting claim on Arunachal Pradesh (92,000 sq km). The Line of Actual Control (LAC), which came into existence after India-China war in 1962, remains disputed and un-delineated. Since 1962, there have been two incidents of military fire fight on the LAC; in 1967 (Nathu La) and 1986 (Wangdung). China has now improved military infrastructure and capability in Tibet substantially. In spite of several high level agreements to maintain peace and tranquility on the LAC, and many rounds of negotiations to work out a framework to resolve the border dispute by the Special Representatives, border confrontations, where even a slight miscalculation can spark off a limited border war, keep occurring frequently.

China, which received Shaksgam Valley by Pakistan from the Gilgit - Baltistan region of J&K in 1963, treats India's J&K and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) on different footings; apparently challenging Indian sovereignty over J&K. China has also positioned itself in the rest of South Asia. It has been increasing its economic and military footprints in India's immediate neighbourhood - Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives and, its maritime interests and assets in the Indian Ocean.

Despite the strategic challenges mentioned above, India and China have been able to maintain political, diplomatic, economic and military dialogues. There have been regular high level state visits and rapid improvement in the trade (expected to touch \$100 bn by 2015) despite an ever increasing trade deficit for India.

An important factor in China- Pakistan- India security relationship is that all three nations are nuclear weapons equipped nations. This has an impact on the possible nature of conflict. There are reports that Pakistan is developing/has developed tactical nuclear weapons. As per current Indian nuclear doctrine, our response to all types of nuclear, chemical, or biological strike would be a massive counter strike.

Definitions: Collusive and Collaborative Threats

'Collusive threat' from China and Pakistan to India implies both countries acting in secret to achieve a 'fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful goal' or being engaged in secret or hidden avowed goals vis-à-vis India. 'Collaborative threat' implies a joint threat by working together. Basically, that would cover overt as well as covert threats to India from the China - Pakistan nexus.

History of China-Pakistan Collusion and Collaboration

Pakistan was the first non-communist, Islamic country that broke relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) to recognise Peoples Republic of China and establish diplomatic relations with it. The China-Pakistan collusion started soon after India - China 1962 war. In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a Boundary Agreement to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Xinjiang and the contiguous Northern Areas of POK. With this delimitation, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley to China. Both countries extended their common boundary up to Karakoram Pass. China was careful. Article 6 of the Agreement states that after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the 'sovereign authority' will reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the Agreement.

Cooperation in Nuclear, Missiles and Arms Industry

China has played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure.¹ In 1990s, China designed and supplied heavy water Khushab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate high-speed rotation of the centrifuges. When China joined the Nuclear Suppliers' Group in 2004, it 'grandfathered' its right to supply Chashma 1 and 2 reactors.²

Despite growing threats of Pakistani terrorists acquiring material to make nuclear devices, in March 2012 China reaffirmed that it would continue to support Pakistan's civilian nuclear programme. Currently, Chinese state-run companies are in talks to build three 1000 megawatt nuclear power plants in Pakistan - two at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant and the third one at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex.

On the missiles front, it is well known that the Chinese sale of 34 complete M-11 ballistic missiles around 1990 was in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. China also built Pakistan's missile plant at Tarwanah, near Rawalpindi. In the last 20 years, China and Pakistan have been involved in several joint ventures to enhance military and weaponry systems. These include the JF-17, K-8 advanced training aircraft, AWACS, Al

Khalid tank, Babur cruise missile, and so on.

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations

Of all the treaties and agreements signed between China and Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations, ratified by both the sides in 2005-06, is the most significant in China Pakistan collusion and collaboration. It binds the two nations to desist from 'joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side'. It also forbids both countries to conclude a similar treaty with a third country. Then Chinese President Hu Jintao had described it as 'an important legal foundation for the Strategic Partnership'. While Pakistan considered significance of the Treaty in terms of protecting its security and a hedge against India³, the Chinese downplayed the security aspect but laid stress to the importance of the document in preventing Pakistan going back to the US camp⁴.

China and Pakistan have signed several agreements for development of communications along the Karakoram Highway, and railway and oil pipeline from China to Gwadar Port (of Pakistan), which has been constructed by China and is being managed by their company. Optical Fibre Cable is being laid along the Karakoram Highway. Recently, China has committed US \$45.6 bn for 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor' and for various energy and infrastructure projects.

China and Pakistan have also signed several agreements for the military usable infrastructure in Gilgit - Baltistan and POK. A Chinese Company is building/to build 165 km long Jaglot - Skardu road, and the 135 km long Thakot - Sazin road. China Mobile has set up cell towers in the area. There are some intelligence reports of (a) 22 tunnels being constructed, which could be used for stocking missiles, and (b) about 1000 Chinese working on the Neelum - Jhelum hydro-electric project and on Muzaffarabad - Athmuqam road project. These include elements of the PLA to provide security to the Chinese engineers and workers on these projects.

In March 1997, I was invited by the Chinese PLA for a friendly visit. When I called on the Defence Minister General Chi Haotian, our conversation was mostly about the need to improve military to military relations and implementation of the agreements signed by China and India in 1993 and 1996. I suggested that Chinese and Indian divisional commanders on either side of the LAC should meet each other. He agreed promptly and said that the first such meeting could be held in Leh. Several months later, after I had taken over as Chief of the Army Staff, a date was fixed mutually for the meeting of division commanders of both sides in Leh. At the last moment, the PLA sent word that the Chinese division commander will not be able to go to Leh and that the meeting should be held in New Delhi. I felt that such a meeting in New Delhi will not serve the intended purpose. We, therefore, called off the proposed meeting. The reason behind this change was not Chinese accessibility to Leh, but because Pakistan did not like a senior Chinese officer visiting J&K.

In 1999, after Kargil war, when all foreign defence attaches were invited to visit Dras and Kargil, only the Chinese defence attaché did not avail this invitation. Later, when I asked him the reason, he told me informally that they did not want to hurt feelings in Pakistan. In May 30-31, 2011, during Siachen talks between India and Pakistan in New Delhi, Pakistan pushed for China to be represented during negotiations on the ground that Beijing controls the Shaksgam Valley. On 13 Dec 2011, in an Urdu Daily, Tufail Ahmed wrote "Chinese Military Taking over Gilgit Baltistan: Pakistan Considering Proposal to Lease the 'disputed region' to China for 50 years".

The Disputed Border Length

Our Army HQ and MoD claim the length of India - China border to be 4056 km which includes boundary/LAC with J & K and Gilgit - Baltistan, including the Shaksgam Valley. Beijing declares the length of the border with India to be about 2000 km, which obviously excludes J&K and Gilgit - Baltistan. The strategic implications of this move can be as under : -

- (a) China has become a new factor in the India - Pakistan debate over J&K.
- (b) The India -China boundary dispute may get divided into two parts. While the Eastern and Middle Sectors remain a bilateral issue between India and China, the Western Sector becomes a trilateral issue involving India, China and Pakistan.
- (c) Repeated references to the length of the India - China border as 2,000 km may impact future global discourse on J&K relating to subjects like construction and international loans or financing of development projects.
- (d) China can now question India's locus standi to discuss the Western Sector, while its own territorial integrity and authority over Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin remain unquestioned and therefore secure.
- (e) In the security scenario and defence planning for the Western Sector, Indian Armed Forces would now have to seriously factor in the collusive, two-front China - Pakistan threat.

Manifestation and Dimensions of Collusion on the Military Front

The dimensions of a China - Pakistan military collusion could vary from; one, collusive support without direct military intervention; to two, activating a second front militarily. The transition from one to the other could also occur seamlessly.

Collusive Support without Direct Military Intervention

This activity, as noted earlier, is already happening. It is likely to increase manifold in an India - Pakistan conflict scenario. Its probability is higher as it is easier to deny, and will accrue high benefits compared to the efforts put in. Such support could take the forms such as:-

- (a) **Military Material Support.** China has been providing military material support to Pakistan for decades. This is likely to continue. During hostilities, it may enhance Pakistan's weapons and equipment reserves, force regeneration and war duration capability. Support in the nature of high end technological weapons and equipment can become a major advantage for Pakistan.
- (b) **Locating Extra Forces in Tibet.** In an India - Pakistan war situation, mere positioning of extra PLA forces in Tibet (from within or outside the military region) can influence Indian Armed Forces' decision to move any dual tasked formations and other military assets from the India - China front.
- (c) **Cyber Warfare Support.** China has potent cyber warfare capability, which if shared with Pakistan, can cripple India's crucial networks, including strategic forces assets, command and control systems, air defence, and civil support structures like the railways, civil aviation, power grids, banking sector, and so on. It can impact India's deterrence and war fighting capability very adversely.
- (d) **Information Warfare Support.** China can support Pakistan's strategy to shape the world opinion against India, in the UN and other world forums.
- (e) **Internal Destabilisation.** China in the past has shown capability to exploit India's internal fault lines and instigate ethnic strife, particularly in the northeast. It would result in diversion of India's war effort.

Collusive Support with Direct Military Intervention

An interventionist military collusion could come about in different scenarios as under:

- (a) Pakistan led or China led.
- (b) Either state may take advantage of an adverse situation for India brought on by the other.
- (c) It could be part of a grand design between China and Pakistan to bring India down to its knees.

Historically, full scale activation of a second front has never occurred despite the collusion being in place since the 1960s. However, in view of the updated military infrastructure development in Tibet, and by China in Gilgit - Baltistan and POK, the possibility of a two front war cannot be ruled out. Let us examine each one of these scenarios.

Pakistan Led Scenario. In this manifestation, China is likely to participate only if it sees some gains for itself. Otherwise, it would not be in its best interest. But then Pakistan could beg for the Chinese support even if China does not wish to be drawn in physically. In such a situation, a major offensive by China is unlikely. That would hurt its global image and scare many friendly neighbours. However, China may use the rail and road communications being developed in Gilgit - Baltistan to provide logistic support to Pakistan. It could also make moves to tie down our forces in the North and East by moving extra forces in Tibet; aggressive patrolling by the Chinese leading to provocation and minor clashes; major/minor fire assaults, and intrusion of Indian airspace. India's dual tasked formations would then not be available for deployment against Pakistan. Our offensive capability on the Western front would be affected adversely.

China Led Scenario. In a China-led manifestation, there may be an attempt to seize Tawang or other territory along the LAC, and/or to teach India a lesson. China may then initiate a limited or even a higher level conventional war, depending upon its objective(s). The latter would have to take into consideration its likely escalation into the nuclear, aerospace and maritime domain. In any such conflict, it is unlikely to bank on the Pakistani collusion or participation. But Pakistan could try to exploit such a situation on the Line of Control (LC) or international border. It could make diversionary moves in Kargil or Siachen, which will result in our formations based in Ladakh having to 'look' both ways. Pakistan could also upgrade proxy war conditions in J&K.

Grand Design between China and Pakistan. The possibility of a concerted twin strike in a 'grand design' by China and Pakistan has very serious implications for India: nuclear, aerospace and maritime dimensions. It may also involve Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh. Such a venture would hurt China's global image severely. India would have diplomatic support of almost the entire world. This, to my mind, is the least likely manifestation. However, if it does occur, India could initially hold China in the North, and turn its attention and weight towards Pakistan. This probability will serve as a deterrent to the Pakistani participation. As India would be the main sufferer, it could legitimately 'hurt' maritime interests of China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean and even rescind its No First Use (NFU) of the nuclear doctrine to send warning signals to both countries.

In all these manifestations, China-Pakistan military collusion in the Karakoram Pass region can be considered as the most likely scenario.

Comprehensive Strategy to Counter Collusion and Collaboration

What should be our comprehensive response strategy to the collusive and collaborative threat from China and Pakistan? I would like to emphasise that India's national aim is to achieve economic development without compromising its security and strategic autonomy. Thus, it would wish to avoid a war.

The objective of this strategy, therefore, would be to - firstly, prevent and weaken collusion to minimise its adverse impact on our security and secondly, deal with warlike or a war situation, if it occurs despite our efforts to prevent it. This will have to be a multifaceted, multilayered strategy, with synergised political, diplomatic, economic and military measures. These measures will have to be bilateral as well as multilateral.

When deciding on war prevention measures, and their prioritisation, we need to look at the history of our relationship as well as the likely future trajectory. While China and India are expected to grow on the world stage, and increase their influencing power, Pakistan's growth appears stunted. We must also take note of our comprehensive

national power (CNP). India factors 5 to 6 times ahead of Pakistan, and about 3 to 4 times behind China. Most analysts also believe that this gap is widening on either side of India. China, therefore, requires greater focus in the collusion and war prevention measures.⁵

At the same time, an assertive militarily backed-diplomacy is imperative to safeguard our core interests. There is no need to underplay or de-emphasise the 'China Threat', as we have been doing in the past decade. In order to outflank China-Pakistan axis, and/or to create 'distance' between Pakistan and China, we should exploit the widespread regional and global apprehensions about Pakistani terrorism, and Chinese hegemony in Asia. India should not sever or compromise its connections and stakes in Tibet. The spark of China's 'forcible military occupation of Tibet' could be kept alive.

A war with China (over disputed territories) cannot be prevented unless we maintain active political, diplomatic and economic interactions with China.⁶ Such a Sino-Indian relationship can, and should, transcend bilateral scope. Where possible, it should develop regional, global and strategic significance.⁷

Political and Economic Cooperation Strategy

The desired level of cooperation, without compromising security and strategic autonomy, is already reflected in the 'India - China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity Agreement'. Some of the thrust areas mentioned therein are :-

- (a) Deeper bilateral and regional economic engagement.⁸ Improve trade arrangements, establish industrial zones for enterprises of both countries and explore prospects of regional economic partnership such as the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor etc.
- (b) Maintain peace, tranquility and improve bilateral relations on the India - China border like the BCDA signed in 2013 to strengthen measures to maintain stability on the border.
- (c) Exploration of a framework for the settlement of India - China boundary question by the Special Representatives of both countries. We need to push this with greater vigour.
- (d) Defence exchanges and military exercises to build greater trust and confidence. This should continue.
- (e) Strengthening cooperation on trans-border rivers, exchange of flood season hydrological data and emergency management.
- (f) Facilitation of greater people to people contacts and exchanges, supported by sister-city relationships.
- (g) Coordination and cooperation in multilateral forums (including Russia-India-China, BRICS and G-20) on tackling global issues such as climate change, international terrorism, food and energy security, and in the establishment of a fair and equitable economic system.

India should also endeavour to forge and sustain strategic relations with its immediate neighbours in South Asia, the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region including South China Sea, and major powers surrounding China including Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iran. It needs to strengthen its military diplomacy in the immediate neighbourhood; even reduce these nations' dependency on the China made weapons by offering subsidised military equipment.

To cover China's rise in immediate neighbourhood and other global issues which are likely to be affected adversely by China - Pakistan collusion, India needs to develop a measure of strategic coordination with the US in the Asia-Pacific Region, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Afghanistan. We should aim to leverage our regional and global relations to dissuade or weaken this collusion. China being a permanent member of the UNSC, and a greater economy, is better placed in the global political and economic structure. It would be possible to neutralise this Chinese advantage to some extent if and when India is admitted to the UNSC.

Military Confrontational Strategy

As stated earlier, India's national aim is to achieve economic development without compromising its security and strategic autonomy. It would wish to avoid a war. But we all know that there are limits to diplomacy.⁹ While continuing with cooperative strategy and measures, therefore, our military strategy should be to possess a level of military capacity, capability and 'escalation dominance', which acts as a 'deterrent' against Pakistan, and 'dissuasion' against China.

To some extent, the nuclear deterrence and our capability with long range weapon systems will itself act as a war preventive deterrent and/or dissuasion. And if a conflict does take place, it would be desirable to apply the limited war concept and limit the war in space, in duration, and in its intensity.¹⁰ The limited war concept also implies that diplomatic channels be kept open, and government to government communication uncluttered. The communications through direct and indirect channels, and tacitly by actions manifest on the ground, would help condition the adversary. At the higher level of a conflict, an early conflict termination would be desirable for both. Localised conflicts are easier to terminate. A face saving is easier because the resources committed are less, and prestige is not staked inordinately. The limited war concept would also ensure that the NFU of the nuclear doctrine holds. Restricting the conflict to one or more theatres (Ladakh theatre, the Central theatre, Sikkim theatre, and the McMahon Line theatre) may localise the conflict. In a sense, this concept avoids the worst penalties of war to adversaries on both sides.

Limiting a conventional war also requires a certain level of 'escalation dominance'. This can be achieved horizontally as well as vertically. Horizontally, it could mean opening other land border(s) like the Chumbi Valley and the maritime front, where we have some strategic advantage. Vertically, it implies stepping up the ladder-with high

calibre conventional weapons, air power, missile strikes, and readiness to use nuclear weapons. Since there is excessive disparity on the land border, we may also consider using naval capabilities to interdict Chinese shipping on the sea lanes near the Malacca Straits and the Arabian Sea. Needless to say, the air power will play a decisive role in any future conflict; hence it would be prudent for India to build a credible capability in aerospace domain and demonstrate its resolve to use the same in a future conflict scenario.

What is important is that we do need to improve our military capacity; with greater focus on cyber, space, C4I and special operations capabilities; and rail, road infrastructure development on both fronts, which would enable force mobilisation with minimum delay. I also recommend three additional, more important efforts to improve military capacity. These are : -

- (a) The need to improve intelligence gathering in Tibet and China. This is a serious limitation and can significantly affect the performance of the Armed Forces on the Northern front.
- (b) A unitary control in border management. Operational command and control of para military forces deployed on the LC/LAC (disputed border belts) should be entrusted to one agency and one ministry.
- (c) A comprehensive operational doctrine for asymmetric war, with special emphasis on the use of Special Forces, against Chinese military adventurism. It is necessary because the desired level of our war preparedness will take years to materialise.

The Siachen Dispute

Many people in India and Pakistan think that Siachen is a 'low hanging fruit' amongst India - Pakistan disputes. They are keen on withdrawal of Indian troops from the Saltoro Ridge. No doubt, in the initial stages, occupation of Siachen, apart from a military effort of Herculean proportions, involved considerable loss of lives and financial drain. The sacrifices made by the Army and Air Force personnel on account of harsh terrain, extreme climate and enemy actions can never be forgotten. But over the years, with experience and ever improving technology, it has been possible to overcome terrain and sustenance problems substantially. Technological advancements in future can be expected to further offset these difficulties. Should India forego its strategic advantage due to cost-benefit ratio analyses? Or, because not a blade of grass grows in the area! If that is to be believed then why has India put up its flag at Gangotri in South Pole?

Conclusion

The China - Pakistan strategic embrace is not likely to change in the near future. We know that a central feature of Chinese strategy is to persist with a policy of no-compromise on core issues, and to try and win a war without having to fight a battle. Ambiguity with a smile is characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.

China continues to delay delineation of the LAC and to resolve the boundary dispute. It is now becoming shrill on claiming Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese strategic presence in the POK, particularly in the Northern areas of Gilgit - Baltistan, which had been accepted by them as a disputed area in 1963-64, is yet another provocative joint venture. Pragmatism demands that we do all that we can to contain our differences with China and prevent a two-front war situation. We can continue to build economic links which have made impressive strides, and separate our bilateral differences from the global issues on which we can work together to mutual advantage.

At the end of the day, India's ability to deal with its external security challenges will be determined by its own comprehensive national will, and tangible power in its economic and military spheres. While forging partnerships with other nations, India must build its own strength. This itself would act as a restraint on China - Pakistan muscle-flexing.

Endnotes

1. When stringent export controls by the Western countries had made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and uranium enriching equipment from elsewhere, the US then ignored the China-Pakistan nuclear proliferation nexus, to the point of covering it up in the AQ Khan's case, when India was most affected.
2. Under a 1991 agreement, permissible under the revised 1992 NSG guidelines. In early 2010, Pakistan ratified an inter-governmental agreement with China, which provided for Chinese funding of the reactors to the extent of 82 per cent.
3. Hussein Haqqani once said, "For China, Pakistan is low cost secondary deterrent to India while for Pakistan, China is a high value guarantor of security against India." According to Zardari, "Pakistan is a force-multiplier for China".
4. The atmosphere prior to signing of this Treaty was dominated by the US policy announcements to help India to 'become a major world power in the 21st century'.
5. In fact this is how India - China relations are panning out currently; at bilateral as well as multilateral levels.
6. Such relations are also necessary to be able to create 'distance' and cracks in the China - Pakistan collusion.
7. "India and China relations today are becoming autonomous and inclusive, moving beyond the orthodox bilateral context. Both are important powers in the current global political and economic structure. They are the two largest economies after the US and have a major impact and influence in the evolving global order. Both are attached to a range of multilateral mechanisms and bodies at regional, cross-continental and global levels, which helps them to establish new layers of engagement and power politics. The emerging layers of power politics do take the scope of their relationship far beyond the purview of bilateralism." Dr Jagannath Panda in Review Essay, Strategic Analysis, 2014.

8. Create a condition like two boxers getting into a clinch
9. Admiral JC Wylie in his papers 'Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power' stated (a) 'Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war', and (b) 'we cannot predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves.' It has seldom been possible to forecast the time, the place, the scope, the intensity, and the general tenor of a conflict
10. On October 18, 2014, the Prime Minister in the Commanders' Conference said, "Beyond the immediate, we are facing a future where security challenges will be less predictable; situations will evolve and change swiftly; and, technological changes will make responses more difficult to keep pace with. The threats may be known, but the enemy may be invisible. Domination of cyber space will become increasingly important. Control of space may become as critical as that of land, air and sea. Full scale wars may become rare, but force will remain an instrument of deterrence and influencing behaviour, and the duration of conflicts will be shorter."

*This is a slightly edited version of the text of the 30th National Security Lecture 2014 delivered by General VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) at USI on 03 Dec 2014 with Shri Arun Shourie in the Chair.

@General VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) was commissioned into the 3 SIKH LI in Jun 1959 and later commanded 10 SIKH LI. He rose to be the Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army from 01 Oct 1997 to 30 Sep 2000 and held that position during the Kargil War of 1999. He was concurrently the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee from 01 Jan 1999 to 30 Sep 2000.

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Building Turkish-Indian Cooperation Amidst a World in Turmoil*

HE Dr Burak Akçapar@

Unlike Winston Churchill's faulty predictions India has grown into a robust nation since Independence amassing significant power and influence. Amongst its long list of achievements India's democratic institutions and secularism hold particular place. Turks and Indians living in secular states with democratic institutions may not realise the role of the institutions when peacefully fulfilling their daily chores. For those who have yet to come under the protection of democratic and secular institutions the challenges are of different nature. The fact of the matter is that within any State citizens are ultimately in the same boat. The good governance in any State is a common concern to all its citizens, as we see in West Asia, to the entire region and beyond. Robust military capability may provide the ultimate assurance against external threats. However, democratic and secular institutions, incorporating accountability, the rule of law, separation of "religion and state", individual human rights, economic freedoms and protection of free enterprise enable good governance and thus ensure peace and prosperity at home. One may even argue that, since the external environment and the internal peace and prosperity are related, a good foreign and security policy is the one that also promotes good governance in its neighbourhood. Turkey's grand strategy is constructed upon the premise that international legitimacy, economic interdependence, respect for human rights, pursuing a sustainable environmental policy and harmony among people belonging to different religious and ethnic origins stand as the most important tools in building lasting peace, stability and prosperity.

Turkey is spending time, resources and energy to contribute towards, not only benefit from, a positive evolution of the regional and global order. In the words of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu:

"Rejecting a reactionary foreign policy approach, Turkey develops its positions on regional and international issues with careful consideration of its own conditions. More than anything else, Turkey's stance reflects its historical depth, geographical positioning and rich legacy in international affairs. We believe that those who fail to understand the flow of history and do not position themselves in the world accordingly will be overtaken by the rapid pace of events and will end up paying a heavy price for it. Therefore, we formulate our policies through a solid and rational judgment of the long-term historical trends and an understanding of where we are situated in the greater trajectory of world history."

Turkey's active engagement with the world at large has already transformed the one and only pluralistic democracy in the Muslim World into a rising donor country and an active player in a multiplicity of regions and global matters including in economic and humanitarian issues. As Turkey takes on the Chairmanship of the G-20 in 2015 she will strive to bridge the gap between the wealthy and not so wealthy nations cohabiting egregiously in a globalised world. Having hosted the Least Developed Countries forum in 2011, Turkey will next host the first ever World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. Being on the right side of history motivates Turkey and compels her to take principled stances and pursue proactive policies. The challenge to implement principled stances and proactive and active policies is nowhere greater than in West Asia or the Middle East.

The Middle East and North Africa have entered a new era of transformation which is based on the legitimate aspirations of the people to enjoy democracy, human rights and better living standards. The same has raised rightful expectations regarding the future of the region. The "Arab Spring" essentially entails the establishment of political systems which respect the will of the people. Since the revolution in Tunisia, Turkey's value-based approach and emphasis on democracy and popular legitimacy have underpinned her policy toward the uprisings in the Middle East.

First and foremost, Turkey decided to support the people who rise to demand such basic rights as freedom of expression and other political freedoms. Turkey's chief concern was to sustain the deep and dear friendship we established with the people and to not trade these ties for temporary balance of power calculations. Secondly, Ankara emphasised that the transition towards stable and legitimate democratic political structures can only be achieved via a balance between security and freedom. Thirdly, Turkey believed that there is no contradiction between our emphasis on democratic demands, which in some cases required us to confront repressive regimes. Fourthly, Turkey expressed her opposition to foreign intervention because this region's future has to be decided by its people. Last but not the least, Turks proclaimed that they considered all peoples of the region as their eternal brothers irrespective of their background and saw it as their duty to dampen sectarian tensions provoked by some irresponsible actors.

Recent political developments and the rising security threats have led many observers around the world to question the future of the "Arab Spring". The emergence of political systems based on the free will of people involves challenges and comprehensive and far reaching transformations which require long term efforts. There is a very strong possibility that in the long run democratic turn may well be irreversible despite short term ups and downs. It is most certainly needed and desirable.

The current situation in Syria and Iraq demands particular focus. The growing extremism in Syria and Iraq constitutes a serious threat to the security and stability in the region and beyond. While confronting risks and threats presented by the extremist groups, it is important not to lose the focus on the root cause of this problem.

The Syrian regime bears the sole responsibility for the current chaos, instability and devastation in Syria. Taking advantage of the inaction of the international community and in fact with the active support of a limited set of some of its actors, Syria continues to oppress the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people with its increasing violence, including heavy bombardments, indiscriminate killings and even use of chemical weapons. It is the only regime that has fired no less than four hundred ballistic missiles against the cities and people it purports to represent and govern. Its policies based on sectarianism and ethnic divisions trigger further instabilities and threats in the wider region. It is because of such policies that al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham (DAESH) [which also called itself ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or IS (Islamic State)] and other extremist groups have gained ground in Syria and Iraq.

The developments in Iraq underline the need to develop a more comprehensive strategy in confronting the deteriorating situation in Syria. Recently, this issue has been on the agenda as a result of DAESH's siege of Kobani. DAESH has become an imminent and clear danger threatening our borders. This has turned into a national security issue for Turkey. Turkey has mobilised its resources to address the humanitarian situation arising from the above.

The fight in Kobani carries the risk of deflecting the attention from the real problem which is the overall situation in Syria, created and sustained by the policies of Damascus. The determined support by a couple of international actors to the regime hampers the prospect for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Airstrikes against DAESH would not be sufficient by themselves and instead need to be construed as a component of a comprehensive and integrated strategy. To start with, without No Fly Zones/Safe Areas, it will not be possible to prevent large scale refugee movements. The central point of a comprehensive and integrated strategy in Syria should be the implementation of zones that are protected from the regime's tyranny. The solutions to the humanitarian crisis must be found within the borders of Syria and strict implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 2139 and 2165 must be observed.

Ultimately, the future constitutional structure of the new Syria can only be decided by a parliament created by free and fair elections. Thus, a genuine political transformation on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué and the legitimate expectations of Syrian people continues to be our main objective. Therefore, Turkey has supported the calls for the formation of a transitional government with full executive powers. Naturally, the opposition to the regime is needed for genuine political resolution. The Coalition has successfully transformed itself into a credible alternative to the Assad regime but needs strong support. We should bolster and intensify our support to the Coalition.

While dealing with ISIL and extremism, there is also the other side of the spectrum. Hezbollah and other foreign militia from various countries fighting on the side of the regime against the people commit the same crimes. These groups do not belong to Syria and must withdraw from Syria immediately.

Turkey increasingly feels the strain of the current state of chaos and instability at her doorstep. Turkish citizens living along the border are being constantly terrorised by the ongoing clashes in northern Syria. So far we have lost 82 lives, many in terrorist attacks traced to Damascus. Turkey's commitment to humanitarian aid is clearly demonstrated by facts: Turkey is host to more than 1,600,000 Syrians, and has spent over US \$4 billion to meet their humanitarian needs. Most recently, more than 160,000 Syrians fleeing DAESH have sought refuge in Turkey over a single week. To put it into perspective, this number is close to the number of Syrians that all of Europe has taken in during the last three and a half years of the conflict in Syria. Turkey has put in significant resources to accommodate this new and massive influx by building additional shelters and providing humanitarian assistance.

Preventing the illegal transportation of logistics and manpower across Turkish-Syrian border is a key priority. Turkey is taking necessary measures against the activities of the extremist groups to defend her territory and citizens. However, transnational threats require efficient international cooperation which is currently rather weak. This is what makes the above threats ultimately resilient and stand as the hallmark of the many challenges confronting not only the Middle East but also various other hotspots around the world.

Times change and regions once known for intractable disputes may become centrepieces of peace and prosperity. A century ago Turkish nation was attacked by European imperial armies. The Çanakkale (Gallipoli) Peninsula, which saw one of the bloodiest battles that changed the course of the first global war and the path of history 99 years ago, has today become the scene of friendship in which the people who lost their forefathers in these battles gather to send out the most powerful message of peace to the world.

It must be our common aspiration that the constructive understanding displayed by the fighting parties with messages of peace and friendship despite war conditions in the Çanakkale land battles, which are described as the last gentlemen's battle by many historians, be adopted today around the world. The annual Commemoration Ceremonies take place with an unflinching emotional intensity every year in this historical land where tens of thousands of fallen soldiers from various parts of the world were buried next to each other. We are hoping that a top level delegation from India would take part in the centennial commemoration events in Turkey.

Many Indian soldiers died needlessly in this imperial war either on Imperial British or the Turkish side and are buried in Turkey. The Indian soldiers were only there because the British Empire entered the war against the Ottomans. Many of the Indian soldiers did not even know they were fighting against the Turks until it was too late and many deserted to Turkish ranks once they found out. The war had no public support at home. Masses in India were rallying in support of the Turkish forces, collecting funds and sending them to Turkey. The Ottoman forces included Indian volunteers who bravely fought to resist an imperial invasion. When India remembers rightly its fallen sons it should give equal homage and respect to those who died as part of the Ottoman Army. This was not India's war by any stretch of imagination. It was one which in fact the Indian people were against. The Government of India in 1914 was the Imperial government and matters of high politics such as diplomacy or national defence were outright beyond the Indian reach except as soldiers following orders. Jawaharlal Nehru was to famously criticise, in turn, the Indian Civil Service of the times 'as neither Indian, nor civil, nor a service'. We have been taking and we will always take very good care of the Indian soldiers buried in Turkey whether as part of British Imperial or Turkish forces. In 1934, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic and the hero of Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wrote a tribute to those killed at Gallipoli:

"Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives... You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side now here in this country of ours... you, the mothers, who sent their sons from faraway countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well."

This is the spirit with which we remember and take care of the fallen soldiers. There are also thousands of Turkish soldiers who were brought to prisoner camps in India and died there in captivity. We have been building

cemeteries for them. One in Sumerpur in Rajasthan needs urgent attention and is awaiting permission from India. The Turkish government has also asked for permission to erect a memorial in Delhi that would symbolise eternal peace between Turkey and India.

Turkey is aware and pleased that her friend India is taking firm steps forward to be a global power with its growing economy, huge market, military power, outstanding knowledge in space technology and informatics, rich human resources and deep-rooted historical and cultural heritage. It is of course customary to argue that there is further potential in bilateral relations but in the case of the Turkish-Indian relationship the statement is unquestionably accurate.

The founding document of our relationship is the 1951 Treaty of Friendship which stipulates that there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries. It must be a telling fact that independent India's first cultural cooperation agreement was also concluded with Turkey. The leaders of the independence movement, including but not limited to Gandhiji and Nehru, were ardent supporters of a strong relationship with Turkey. It is time that the two countries come up with a restatement of their joint will to build on the 1951 Treaty of Friendship and quickly develop a more robust and intensive relationship than ever before.

Turkey and India need a new statement that would acknowledge similar visions, values and ideals, namely; promotion of peace, stability, prosperity based on democratic values and commitment to rule of law, human rights, pluralism, open society and sustainable development; remember with heartfelt gratitude the assistance peoples of the two countries extended to each other in their most difficult times; welcome the increase in people to people contacts and business sector cooperation while looking forward to further developing their economic relations; commit to further develop their friendly relations on their own merits; acknowledge that today's complex challenges require a more structured, comprehensive and intensified practice of consultation and cooperation; aim at enhancing practical cooperation between the two countries on issues of common interest.

The two friendly countries must decide on a number of actionable items in the immediate future, including particularly mutually intensifying visits of Heads of State and Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Ministers including those in charge of Commerce, Culture, Tourism, Energy, Internal Affairs, Transport and Communications, Agriculture, Health, Education, Science and Technology; promoting contacts between the two Parliaments; broadening the consultations between the Ministries to include global and regional issues of mutual interest, including but not limited to Central Asia, West Asia, Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Africa, fight against organised crime and terrorism as well as arms control.

Turkey and India need to consult frequently and cooperate in the areas of food security, connectivity, transport, logistics and communications, information technology, sustainable development and environment. The Istanbul Process on Afghanistan already provides an important platform for regional cooperation, including between Turkey and India, and that needs to be jointly emphasised and promoted.

However, the most pressing need is in increasing the air connectivity between the two countries in order to facilitate tourism, business and economic as well as cultural interaction and cooperation. Concluding a new trade agreement would also be necessary in order to develop commercial ties. Although bilateral relations are below their full potential, the fact is that a leap forward is achievable and would require only a minor push. In this context, it is imperative that the communication and interaction between the political leaderships in both countries be intensified.

In the last eleven years no Indian Prime Minister has visited Turkey. I am hoping that the Honourable Prime Minister of India would visit Turkey next year not only on the occasion of the G-20 Summit that Turkey would host towards the end of 2015 but also earlier on a bilateral occasion. In turn, I also hope that the Turkish side, upon India's invitation of course, would take the initiative to break the unnecessary cycle of 15 years for a visit at the Presidential level.

The fact of the matter is that the Turkish-Indian relationship holds strategic value that is yet to be fully explored, identified and tapped. That is the very task that awaits those of us who have assumed responsibilities in political, bureaucratic and intellectual domains. I may be the 20th Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey in India, but our diplomatic relations were established as early as the 16th Century AD. Turkish-Indian cultural and historic ties are deeply entrenched and the potential of our cooperation is immense. Building a robust Turkey-India friendship is one responsibility that we should not forfeit. It is one response we can give to the enduring challenges of our day and age in a world where history far from being finished has instead come to a precipice.

*Text of the talk delivered by **HE Dr Burak Akçapar** at USI on 27 Oct 2014 with Shri Sanjay Singh, IFS (Retd) in Chair.

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Engaging China : Need to Mind the Imperatives

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Background

Rapid rise of People's Republic of China (PRC) is being claimed to be peaceful by its leadership although with a caveat; "there will be consequences in case China's core interests are jeopardised." With accretion of PRC's Comprehensive National Power (CNP), its national aims stand redefined. China seeks strategic space and sphere of influence to recast the regional environment on its terms, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

While delving on 'Managing the Rise of Great Powers', Randall L Schweller has noted that pecking order of the nations is subject to continuous change.¹ As per Paul Kennedy, "due to uneven rate of growth, marked by technological and organisational breakthrough, the relative strength of nations has never been constant. The moot point has been whether the rise or process of transformation was smooth or turbulent".²

After the Fifth Generation leadership in Beijing assumed power last year, there have been visible signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in the region. In the recent past, series of incidents in the South China Sea involving China, over the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands with Japan and oil exploration sites in the Gulf of Tonking with Vietnam are cases in point. PLA troops have been reportedly transgressing in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh frequently. The extent and degree of influence of a rising power is felt more in the neighbourhood than the distant lands. India's interface with rapidly rising China will be impacted by key imperatives which have overarching bearing in regulating the engagement process.

Salient Imperatives

Strategic Culture

The Chinese strategic culture is essentially based on the philosophy of 'Centrality'; signifying the notion of Chinese supremacy and its rightful place in the global hierarchy. Zhong Guo (Middle Kingdom) implies 'universal centre'- an ascendant power, known to seek deference from the smaller neighbours. The Communist leadership's obsession to emerge as the sole superpower is aimed at realising the aspirations of the Chinese people as a superior race and restoring the past grandeur. Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' experiment in the late 1950's and Deng's initiation of reforms in the late 1970's, were aimed to overtake the West.

Quoting Coates in his book "China and India - Great Powers", Mohan Malik highlights that as per the Chinese statecraft, there is no such thing as friendly and foreign powers. "All states are either hostile or subordinate. While India, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam fall in the first category; North Korea and Pakistan constitute the second one. Whereas allies are to be protected, hostile nations ought to be taught a befitting lesson".³ (It was India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979).

The PRC strategists believe that China is more secure if neighbouring states are weak. It may be recalled, when China was internally strong, it was able to ensure peaceful periphery. Its imperial policy was to subdue neighbourhood and adjacent lands. During the Ming Dynasty era towards mid of the last millennium, the Chinese had effectively dominated the sea routes in the Indian Ocean to facilitate trade. China's border management and future power projection strategies continue to be influenced by its ancient statecraft.

As per David Shambaugh, an internationally recognised authority on contemporary China, the Chinese traditions of statecraft include constantly shifting tactical alignments, balance of power, manipulation while maintaining autonomy, personalisation of external relations, propensity towards militarily punitive actions, escalating patterns of conflict management and use of propaganda and myth to legitimise Chinese identity.⁴ China has successively exploited the differences between the US, Japan and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region to its advantage.

PRC is uncomfortable with any peer competitor. Marginalising Japan and containing India is in consonance with the Chinese strategic thought. India's efforts to seek strategic autonomy and attempts to achieve parity with China through combination of economic, diplomatic and military means will be effectively resisted by Beijing. A strong India does not favourably serve Chinese strategic interests. Beijing is opposed to India's bid to gain membership to the Security Council as well as other global forums. In case India is able to achieve impressive growth over the next couple of decades, intense competition with China would be inevitable, leading to potential confrontation and even conflict. Asymmetric equation between the two could be a major source of tension, as sphere of influence will overlap both in Asia and Africa.

Political System and Leadership

As per Chinese ancient belief and philosophical idea, mandate to rule comes from heaven. It does not require that a legitimate ruler be of noble birth. Hence dynasties were founded by people of common lineage. Times of poverty and natural disasters were taken as signs that 'heaven' considered the incumbent ruler unjust and need for replacement. Post 1949, the Chinese Communist leadership has projected itself as the heir to China's imperial legacy. It came to power to undo the "Century of Humiliation" (1841-1949) and restore Chinese supremacy, by putting to end old order, wherein the Western imperialist and Japanese plundered, exploited and subdued the Chinese nation.

The Communist Party of China (CCP) has ruled the country for last six and a half decades with People's Liberation Army (PLA) as its pillar. One party based centralised authoritarian political system and flat structure endows the Communist leadership with enormous power. Single leader as head of the Party, PLA and Government along with a small nucleus - 'Standing Committee of Politburo' facilitates speedy decision making and execution. While Mao and Deng were known to be the paramount leaders, Jiang and Hu were referred to as the 'Core'.

Xi Jinping currently at the helm took over the baton in 2013 to lead the nation for a decade, till 2022. He moved fast to consolidate his grip over power and emerged as an undisputed leader. A pragmatic person, Xi's rise followed a difficult flight path. As per Mr Lee Kuan Yew, former PM of Singapore, "Xi is in Nelson Mandela class of persons, with enormous emotional stability, who does not allow personal suffering to affect his judgement".⁵

Xi has chalked out an elaborate road map to keep China's rise on track. He has conceptualised a 'China's Dream' - "making people wealthy and nation strong", which also entails recovery of all the claimed territories. He has the onus to successfully steer PRC past the 'Second Stage of Modernisation', adhering to the 2020 timeline. This will mark a grand finale of his inning and a befitting achievement, which will make him a rightful claimant to be in the league of Mao or Deng.

National Aims and Objectives

Historically, China has been hypersensitive to its borders, both from North and eastern sea board; according highest priority to territorial integrity. Traditionally, its relations with neighbours have been marked by hostility. Since the late days of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese diplomacy has given overriding priority to the economic activity to drive the national development. So was the case during Mao's time. As a sequel to the initiation of 'four modernisations' in 1979, China's prime focus has been on economic growth.

Today, China is externally formidable but internally fragile, as its major vulnerabilities are more at home than outside. Beijing is extremely sensitive with regards to Tibet and Xinjiang. PRC aspires to emerge as a developed nation by the mid of this century and considers peaceful periphery as an essential prerequisite. It's declared national objectives are Stability, Sovereignty and Modernity, in the given order.

'Stability' implies continued rule of the CCP and avoiding any type of unrest (luan). Due to rampant corruption in the party ranks coupled with the liberalisation of economy, the clout of the CCP is gradually on the wane. Instead, the Communist leadership is now increasingly relying on nationalism as a tool to bind the society and employing it as an effective weapon to whip the public sentiments against the adversaries.

'Sovereignty' is synonymous with territorial integrity and autonomy. It also entails integration of all the claimed territories with the mainland including Taiwan, disputed island territories in South China Sea as also Arunachal Pradesh (referred to as South Tibet). These also figure prominently in the list of China's core national interests.

'Modernity' entails continued economic development and ushering prosperity for good of the masses. The Communist Party can continue to stay in power only if the country maintains steady economic growth and effectively safeguards national interests. Or else, it faces the prospects of being eased out, marking an end of mandate to rule. The national objectives remain sacrosanct, changes in the leadership notwithstanding.

Engagement - The Way Ahead

Given the ongoing dramatic geostrategic shift in the emerging global order, India has to redefine and recalibrate its role. Political fence sitting approach is passé; action oriented diplomacy is the call of time. It is evident that prevailing regional geostrategic architecture is tipped more in the favour of competition than partnership, between the two neighbouring giants. This mandates India to formulate long term strategy to deal with China.

India's policy of engagement with China must aim to minimise the possibility of conflict, without jeopardising its stated position and compromising the national interests. India should be forthright in stating its concerns rather than adopting an ambiguous approach. Policy of appeasement, often propagated by the foreign policy mandarins in South Block should be ruthlessly curbed. As per Winston Churchill, "appeasement from weakness and fear is alike, futile and fatal; while from the position of strength is magnanimous and noble". China respects strength (li) and despises the weak.

With the ongoing process of engagement, India should buy time to build its CNP. Highest priority must be accorded to enhance the defence preparedness in the North East, integrating the process with the economic development of the region. Chinese model in Tibet and Xinjiang could be suitably modified and adopted. While major face off with China is unlikely in the near future, given its compulsion to sustain economic growth, skirmishes cannot be ruled out. Fighting and dialogue as concurrent activities (yi bian dan yi bian da) is inherent in the PLA Doctrine of 'Limited War'. This demands effective border management and ability to initiate timely calibrated responses in the event of a showdown.

Current initiatives by the Indian Government in developing and strengthening strategic partnerships both in the immediate and extended neighbourhood are steps in the right direction. These will help in balancing the Chinese forays in our backyard. The Communist leadership is adept in thwarting any multilateral/bilateral initiatives by its adversaries, through strategic counter moves. It will do its best to neutralise India's bonhomie with Asia-Pacific states, through politico-economic overtures.

Economic cooperation stands out as one of the arenas of convergence where the Chinese are keen to invest in a big way. However, current bilateral trade scenario is seriously flawed. India is primarily a raw material supplier and net importer of finished goods, with wide trade deficit. This needs to be corrected. India must press for gaining access to the Chinese markets and levelling off the adverse balance of payment issue.

India's engagement with China should be less on rhetoric and more on realism. The Chinese leaders and spokesperson often resort to clichés like - "the two neighbours sharing common rivers and mountains, with less than one per cent of the time period marked with hostile relations". However, when it comes to negotiations and brass tags, they are extremely hardnosed. PLA's aggressive posturing in Chumar sector in mid-September 2014, while President Xi was in India was rather intriguing, in the light of his statement on the eve of his visit; "Furthering strategic partnership with India is my historic mission". This amply illustrates the point.

The Chinese leadership lays no timelines to resolve the vexed issues, often preferring to leave these to posterity. On the other hand, our leaders have penchant to make history during their tenures. Border issue is an example as Mr Nehru wanted it to be resolved during his time. Half a century later, there is hardly any movement forward and unlikely to be in the immediate future, because PRC perceives the border dispute as part of the larger Tibet issue. Lingering the problem serves Beijing's strategic interests.

Finally, there is a glaring trust deficit between India and China, given the past bitterness. The Communist leadership has not done enough to assuage India's concerns. However, President Xi Jinping has the persona to change the setting. Will he be prepared to navigate through the 'Yellow Lines'- the geostrategic imperatives; only time will tell! As India scales up its engagement with the PRC, it must move forward with pragmatism, in a sure footed manner, fully mindful of the ground realities.

Endnotes

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Is the US Presence in East Asia Good for Regional Stability?

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Introduction

In 1972, US President Richard Nixon made an historic visit to China, effectively welcoming China to the Western world and beginning the process of normalising relations between China and the US. Then, in 1979, the rise to power of reformist Deng Xiaoping saw the gradual opening of the Chinese market, including to foreign direct investment. Together, Chinese market liberalisation and US-China rapprochement set the course for what has been an extremely productive and mutually-beneficial relationship.

Economic interdependence between the two nations is the most striking aspect of their current relationship. However, China's growth since 1972 has been startling; economically, diplomatically and especially militarily. The relationship between the US and China is now extremely important for the peace and stability of East Asia, which both nations openly acknowledge.¹ Nevertheless, as China looks to expand its influence, it brings challenges to regional security, as recent incidents in the South and East China Seas have demonstrated.

This paper examines the critical question of the extent to which America's presence in the region affects regional stability, and China's rising prominence. It analyses the role and effect of America's presence in East Asia, including through the use of Amitav Acharya's model for regional security.² It concludes that despite both positive and negative aspects, the continuing US presence has been and ultimately continues to be a positively stabilising influence from which the whole East Asian region has benefitted.

US presence in East Asia

The military relationship between the US and Japan is the foundation of the US security presence in East Asia. The US maintains the largest of its overseas Asia-Pacific military forces in Japan. In 1983, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone pledged to make Japan an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' for the US military against the Soviet Union.³

Since the end of the Cold War, the continuing US military presence in Japan could appear confronting to China, if not threatening, especially when the US military presence in South Korea and Guam is also considered. So what effect does this presence have on regional stability? If one measure of stability is growth and prosperity, then it could be argued that stability through the US presence has been very positive.

Indeed, notwithstanding the occasional sabre rattling by North Korea, East Asia has been relatively peaceful since the brief clash between China and Vietnam in 1979. There has been no actual conflict between East Asian states and none of the major powers has resorted to the use of military force in any serious way.⁴ Hugh White argues that the US primacy in East Asia has prevented the more powerful nations from excessive bullying of the less powerful, and has also prevented the creation of strategic blocs.⁵

With a so-called 'hub-and-spoke' series of alliances with Japan, Republic of Korea, The Philippines, Thailand and Australia, an extensive military presence and by facilitating unimpeded markets for the region's trade, the US has been comprehensively engaged in the region's security and prosperity, to the extent that:

It is doubtful whether Japan, South Korea, or any of the countries in Southeast Asia would have experienced such rapid economic growth and undertaken political transition without their participation in this US-led liberal hegemonic order.⁶

Ironically, perhaps the nation that has benefitted most from the US presence in the region is China, with Hillary Clinton noting in late 2011 that 'China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain'.⁷ Similarly, Hugh White has noted that it was America's normalisation of relations that paved the way for China - along with the rest of East Asia - to join the US-led economic order, and that it was America that supported the entry of China into the World Trade Organisation in 2001.⁸

However, arguably one of the greatest stabilising factors that the US presence has on the region, including in respect to China, is the 'Japan-US Security Treaty' developed in the aftermath of World War II. The Treaty is essentially an American guarantee for Japan's security and, while some may see that it subordinates Japan to the US presence in East Asia, it has allowed Japan to focus on rebuilding its post-war economy without the need to enter an arms race against China. Japan's strongly-pacifist constitution also places significant restriction on its ability to build or acquire offensive or power-projection capabilities, which similarly has resulted in Japan's reliance on the US to augment its otherwise impressive military.

The substantial US military presence in Japan may well unsettle the Chinese leadership, however several of the alternatives would likely be even less palatable. Since the 1980s, Japan has possessed the world's second or third largest economy, as well as the technology and industrial know-how to develop nuclear weapons. While it has not acquired such weapons, an otherwise heavily-armed, strategically-independent Japan would be significantly more unsettling for China than the potential adversary it faces now, especially over territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Indeed, given the restraining influence of the US-Japan alliance on Japan - and the stabilising effect that an ongoing US military presence has had on the whole region - it seems reasonable to assume that China would actually be supportive of the US role in Northeast Asia, notwithstanding that it might be loath to admit it.⁹

There are, of course, negative aspects to the presence of the US in East Asia for China, and which China would argue are destabilising, related to the ongoing and escalating territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and with The Philippines over parts of the Spratly Islands. In both cases, as the disputing parties turn to the US for diplomatic support and military backing through their alliances with the US, China presumably believes they are emboldened by the US assurances regarding its treaty commitments.¹⁰ Writing about the

US pivot, You Ji recently remarked:

In a way, the US tightening of pressure on Beijing [in the form of the US pivot to East Asia] is behind 'envelope-pushing' by some regional countries for practical gains in sovereignty disputes with China before the [altered balance of power] ... becomes 'unchallengeable'.¹¹

Regardless of the US pivot, it is questionable whether China's power will eventually become 'unchallengeable' on a region-wide basis. However, the US pivot – if successfully implemented – would likely make it even more problematic for the strategic balance of power between the US and China to shift irrevocably in China's favour. Hence, while it might be concluded that the US presence in East Asia has largely been a positive stabilising influence to date, China's assessment of a fully-implemented US pivot may not be so benign.

In 2001, and writing primarily with the issue of Taiwanese reunification in mind, Thomas Christensen articulated what he believed to be perceptions within the Chinese leadership regarding the circumstances under which China might challenge the US forces in the Asian region, even where China's forces are militarily weaker. Key among those circumstances, in his view, is a situation where China feels it has been 'driven into a corner' on an issue that is perceived to be a threat to China's core interests or endangers the existence of the regime.¹² Some would argue that this perception appears no less relevant today, particularly in relation to the US pivot.

The general consensus on Chinese perceptions of the US pivot is that it would largely be regarded as 'an attempt to stifle and contain China and prevent it from playing its rightful role in the region'.¹³ Ely Ratner notes that:

Chinese analysts perceive US policies ... paint an ominous picture of US intentions. [These include] strengthening US security ties with treaty allies ... deepening relations with emerging powers ... increasing US engagement with ASEAN-centred institutions; announcing US national interests in the South China Sea; supporting the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement; re-engaging Burma; and deploying a rotational presence of US Marines to Darwin. Chinese thinkers view these actions as undermining China's security and increasingly believe the unifying rationale ... is to constrain China's rise.¹⁴

Understandably, the US official position differs. In 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasised the broad, strategic objectives of the pivot, noting the importance of locking in a 'substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region'.¹⁵ Yet despite the intention of making the pivot a broad effort for engendering regional security and prosperity, China has generally only seen the pivot in military terms, as an attempt to contain China and as the main cause of regional instability.¹⁶

Some would argue that China's perceptions of the pivot are perhaps not unreasonable, given the high visibility and reporting of its military aspects. Others might argue that China is being unnecessarily paranoid, and that it suits China's leadership to portray the pivot (and US intentions) as a threat to the return of China to its rightful place in the regional and global order. Others would be sceptical of the assertions by the US President and senior White House officials that the pivot is not just about China, largely ignoring the region-wide prospective benefits articulated by Hillary Clinton in relation to trade and economics, as well as other important issues such as the pivot's potential curb on nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia.¹⁷

Certainly, the list of pivot-related actions cited by Ely Ratner appears over-stated and somewhat inflammatory. With the exception of its support for a Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which currently does not include China (nor a number of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region), all the other US actions were already underway before the pivot was announced, suggesting the 'ominous picture of US intentions' should actually be based on a perception of changing emphasis rather than new initiatives.

In essence, other than its recent assertiveness over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, which was already evident before the announcement of the pivot, China's reaction appears to be a mix of irritated comment and rhetoric in support of its contention that China's resurgence on the world stage is being frustrated by the US. Apart from that, the pivot does not appear to have caused any significant, measurable instability in East Asia.

Regional Order in East Asia

In assessing the regional security order in East Asia, it is useful to draw on the methodology developed by Amitav Acharya. He developed an interpretive framework, which he termed the 'consociational security order', for analysing the impact of the rise of China on the Asian security order, defining the term as:

A [consociational security order] is a mutual accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves each group's relative autonomy and prevents the hegemony of any particular group/s.¹⁸

Acharya's thesis is that four key drivers will determine stability in East Asia: balance of power (defensive realism), multilateralism, economic interdependence, and elite restraint, arguing that where these four drivers are met, stability is most likely.¹⁹

In relation to the balance of power between the US and China, which is the element most obvious and most popular in current security analyses, the overall consensus is that the US is now, and will remain for some time to come, the stronger military power.²⁰ However, Acharya notes that balance of power should refer to multiple balances of power, not just security. Ikenberry similarly notes that East Asia is divided by the two spheres, economics and security, with China the dominant economic power and the US the dominant security power.²¹ Comparing the two holistically in terms of combined military, security and diplomatic capabilities would likely show the US ahead, particularly in a global context, although most would agree that the difference is narrowing in the Asia-Pacific region. It could be concluded, therefore, that there exists a reasonable balance between the two at least in the context of the East Asian region.

In relation to multilateralism, Acharya notes that forums such as the East Asia Summit, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum are important because they engender an open and collective approach to managing regional issues, including economic development, security, disaster response and environmental sustainability. Importantly, while both China and the US are members of the key forums, no single participant leads them and this promotes consensual rule and decision making.²² The US and China are also strengthening their military links through the participation of Chinese observers in multilateral and multi-national military exercises, such as Cobra Gold (a joint US/Thailand exercise), while in 2014, China is expected to participate in RIMPAC, the largest international maritime exercise in the Pacific rim.

In terms of economic interdependence, the hypothesis is that increased dependence drives rational behaviour between states by assuming that each will recognise that the cost of confrontation comes as much from lost trade opportunity as it does from military action.²³ In direct contrast to the power rivalry of the Cold War, the economic interdependence between the US and China is astounding. In 2013, two-way trade was valued at US\$562 billion, China was the US's third largest export market, and China held the largest proportion of foreign-owned US national debt.²⁴ You Ji notes that 'today, Sino-US economic interdependence has so deepened that there is no easy way for Washington to pressure China militarily'.²⁵ Given that the US is China's largest export market, the same can reasonably be said about China.

Acharya's fourth driver refers to the restraint exercised by states in respect of the rights and interests of others, including weaker ones. The commitment comes not from altruism but from an understanding of the attendant risks to political stability without restraint. At first glance, this might seem to be the weakest element of regional stability, noting the apparent assertiveness of Chinese forces in the South and East China Seas or, conversely, the action of US carrier groups sailing through the Taiwan Strait during times of tension. However, another view is that both the US and China demonstrate considerable restraint in their commitment to bodies such as the World Trade Organisation, APEC and the UN. Ikenberry notes that China is rising during a period when international institutions are more developed and more prolific than ever, and that China is increasingly 'working within rather than outside this liberal international order',²⁶ while the US is one of the world's foremost proponents of states adhering to the international system.

Conclusion

On balance, the US presence in East Asia appears to have been positive for regional stability, evidenced in particular by the collective prosperity achieved in East Asia since the China-US rapprochement of 1972, as well as the absence of major power wars since 1979. However, the announced US pivot of 2011 is perhaps somewhat more problematic. On the one hand, it has been openly welcomed by many countries in the region, and appears not to be causing any significantly adverse reaction. But there is some evidence to suggest the US pivot is emboldening certain regional states to 'envelope push' their bilateral disputes with China. There is also a view that China's growing power will ultimately require more strategic space than what Beijing perceives may be achievable under the constraints imposed by the pivot.²⁷

Certainly, the spectacular rise of China seems to have caused a number of regional states to 'hedge' strategically by giving at least tacit support to a continuing US presence, as noted by Henry Kissinger:

Even those Asian states that are not members of alliances with the United States seek the reassurance of an American political presence in the region and of American Forces in nearby seas as the guarantor of the world to which they have become accustomed. Their approach was expressed by a senior Indonesian official to an American counterpart: 'Don't leave us, but don't make us choose.'²⁸

This latent tension and strategic rivalry clearly has the potential to undermine the stability of the region. Nevertheless, an appropriate regional order – based on a viable framework for regional security – may be able to successfully mitigate the adverse consequences of any such tension. Encouragingly, Acharya's regional security methodology suggests that the relationship between China and the US meets the conditions for a 'consociational security order', implying that the key drivers for stability in East Asia are already in place and that any tension between China and the US will be manageable for the foreseeable future.

Endnotes

1. See Henry A Kissinger, 'The Future of US-Chinese Relations: conflict is a choice, not a necessity', Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, available at <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-a-kissinger/the-future-of-us-chinese-relations>> accessed 23 April 2014. Kissinger notes that the joint statement at the end of President Hu Jintao's January 2011 visit to the US said 'the United States ... welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs ... [while] China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region'.
2. Amitav Acharya, 'Power or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order', International Studies Quarterly, June 2013, pp. 1-16. For the purposes of this paper, stability is taken to exist where there is no, or perhaps very low, risk to sovereignty, noting also that stability in international relations theory is often defined with respect to 'balance-of-power' realism. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', in R Wolfrum, (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011, pp. 1-2.
3. Martin Fackler, 'Japan's Elder Statesman is Silent No Longer', The New York Times, 29 January 2010, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30nakasone.html?_r=0>, accessed 24 April 2014.
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6. Takashi Inoguchi and G John Ikenberry, 'Introduction, The Troubled Triangle: economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan and China', in Takashi Inoguchi and G John Ikenberry (eds.), *The Troubled Triangle: economic and security concerns for the United States, Japan and China*, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2013, p. 3.
7. Hillary Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, No. 189, p. 59.
8. White, *The China Choice*, p. 14.
9. G John Ikenberry, 'East Asia and International Order: hegemony, balance, and consent in the shaping of East Asian regional order', in Inoguchi and Ikenberry, *The Troubled Triangle*, p. 21.
10. Professor Shi Yinong, director of the Center for American Studies at Renmin University in Beijing, is quoted as saying 'the joint missile defense system objectively encourages Japan to keep an aggressive position in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, which sends China a very negative message. Japan would not have been so aggressive without the support and actions of the US', in Ely Ratner, 'Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 2013, p. 25.
11. You Ji, 'US Pivot to Asia and China's Strategic Dilemma and Response', National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) Joint Research Series No. 9, NIDS: Tokyo, 2013, p. 143, available at <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series9/pdf/11.pdf> accessed 25 April 2014.
12. Thomas J. Christensen, 'Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's rise and challenges for US security policy', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001, pp. 5-44.
13. Evans JR Revere, 'The United States and Japan in East Asia: challenges and prospects for the alliance', *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2013, p. 194.
14. Ratner, 'Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China', p. 23.
15. Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', p. 57.
16. Revere, 'The United States and Japan in East Asia', p. 10, and Ratner, 'Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China', p. 21.
17. Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', p. 57.
18. For a detailed explanation of Acharya's 'consociational security order', see Amitav Acharya, 'Power or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order', *International Studies Quarterly*, June 2013, p. 1.
19. Acharya, 'Power or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order', pp. 2-4.
20. An article in a Taiwanese newspaper, quoting China commentator Dennis Blasko, contends that China is at least 20-30 years away from matching the US military capability: 'PLA still 30 years behind the US, says expert', *Want China Times*, 30 September 2013, available at <<http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&id=20130930000068>> accessed 29 April 2014. Acharya believes the US is likely to 'remain for a long time, the pre-eminent military power in Asia': Acharya, 'Power or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order', p. 10.
21. Ikenberry, 'East Asia and International Order', p. 14.
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23. For a detailed discussion on economic interdependence, see White, *The China Choice*, pp. 53-6.
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25. Ji, 'US Pivot to Asia and China's Strategic Dilemma and Response', p. 151 and Gerald L. Curtis, 'Getting the Triangle Straight: China, Japan, and the United States in an era of change', *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 174.
26. Ikenberry, 'East Asia and International Order', p. 27.
27. Ji, 'US Pivot to Asia and China's Strategic Dilemma and Response', p. 163.
28. Kissinger, 'The Future of US-Chinese Relations'.

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A Report on the Fifth Xiangshan Forum held at Beijing from 20 - 22 Nov 2014
Major General BK Sharma, AVSM, SM and Bar (Retd)@

Introduction

I recently had an opportunity to participate in the 5th Xiangshan Forum at Beijing organised by the China Association of Military Science (CAMS). I presented a perspective on, 'Post 2014 Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects' and participated in a panel discussion organised by the CCTV international English news channel. The CAMS is the leading think tank of China, closely associated with the Central Military Commission (CMC) and administrated by the PLA Academy of Military Science. Air Force General Liu Chengjun, a member of the CMC, is the President of the CAMS. It deals with high-level policy research and has academic relations with 60 think tanks and research agencies in more than 20 countries. The Xiangshan Forum, being organised by the CAMS since 2006, is an important platform for dialogues on Asia-Pacific security and defence. It is held biennially at Beijing and attended by hundreds of strategic experts from all over the world.

This year, the 5th Xiangshan Forum was upgraded to a top-level 'track one and a half' security and defence forum. This event was attended by Mr Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, General Chang Wanquan, the defence minister of China, Mr Lui Zhemin, Vice Foreign Minister of China, defence ministers from Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Singapore, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Maldives, Deputy Defence Minister of Iran and some service chiefs and high ranking military officers from other countries. Besides, there was participation by some former defence ministers, foreign ministers, national security advisers and many heads of think tanks and eminent academicians from across the globe. Lieutenant General Anwar Hussain, the Quartermaster General, represented Bangladesh, whereas Lieutenant General Mohd Asif, Director General Joint Staff Headquarters and Ambassador Ayub Arif, President Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, represented Pakistan. From India, P Rajeshwari, senior fellow from the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi participated as observer. There were no presentations by the delegates from other South Asian countries at the main forum. China seeks to upgrade this Forum to the level of Shangri-La Dialogue, organised annually by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) at Singapore. China views Shangri-La Dialogue as a West driven initiative, with focus on reiteration of stated government positions and less of a platform for the cross-fertilisation of ideas.

Theme and Structure of 5th Xiangshan Forum

The 5th Xiangshan Forum was themed on 'Win-Win through Cooperation: Building an Asia Community of Shared Destiny' addressing the topics of regional security architecture, maritime security and counterterrorism operations, in light of the changes in the current Asia-Pacific security situation. The sessions were organised as under:-

- (a) **Session 1.** Chinese Armed Forces and Security in Asia-Pacific Region.
- (b) **Session 2.** Regional Security Architecture: Current Status and Prospects.
- (c) **Session 3.** Regional Perspectives on Asia-Pacific Security.

The participants were divided into three panels as under :-

- (a) **Panel 1.** Regional Security Architecture: Current Status and Prospects.
 - (i) **Session 1.** Regional Perspectives on Asia-Pacific Security.
 - (ii) **Session 2.** Challenges in the Current Regional Security Architecture.
 - (iii) **Session 3.** Approaches to a Better Regional Security Architecture.
- (b) **Panel 2.** Regional Maritime Security: Cooperation and Challenges.
 - (i) **Session 1.** Managing Maritime Disputes in the Asia-Pacific.
 - (ii) **Session 2.** Enhancing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures.
 - (iii) **Session 3.** Strengthening Non-Traditional Maritime Security Cooperation.
- (c) **Panel 3.** Regional Terrorism: Trends and Counter-Measures.
 - (i) **Session 1.** New Challenges of Terrorism in Asia.
 - (ii) **Session 2.** Afghanistan after 2014.
 - (iii) **Session 3.** Cooperation on Counterterrorism in the Central Asia and the Middle East.

Impressions and Observations

The Defence Minister of China, in his keynote speech, emphasised the need to simultaneously develop economic and military power as two key determinants of comprehensive national power. He alluded to five reasons to accelerate building of strong national defence and armed forces as under :-

- (a) China has been a victim of colonial aggression in the past. Present day China believes in the adage, "we should not rely on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him". Therefore, military modernisation of China should continue unabated.

- (b) The historical mission of China's national reunification, securing of borders and stability in the Asian-Pacific region demand strong military capability.
- (c) China needs to bridge the capability gap in the military modernisation vis-à-vis other major powers by undertaking revolution in military affairs (RMA) with the Chinese characteristics, based on mechanisation and informationalisation.
- (d) A strong military is necessary for China's reform, development, sustained economic growth and expanding overseas interests.
- (e) Enhanced military capability is an imperative to participate in international efforts to combat non-traditional military threats, protect Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), fight terrorism and render humanitarian assistance inside and outside China.

He further dwelt upon the 'New Asian Security Concept', enunciated by President Xi Jinping, during the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in May 2014 at Shanghai. The so-called 'New Security' concept envisages a combined security based on shared destiny, shared interests and shared benefits. The PLA together with other Asian militaries will be the main custodian of Asia's security in a 'win-win' paradigm. The Defence Minister mentioned the following initiatives undertaken by China to promote security in Asia:-

- (a) China has exercised restraint in dealing with border disputes and has strengthened mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, viz. setting up 64 border defence force meeting points, 2000 meetings with neighbouring countries and implementation of Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) with India. In terms of naval cooperation, China has conducted 16 joint patrols in the Beibu Gulf, is exploring the possibility of opening a defence hotline with the ASEAN countries and has signed two Memoranda of Understanding with the US Department of Defence on notification of major military activities, air and maritime safety measures and other confidence-building measures.
- (b) In order to promote Asia-Pacific defence and security cooperation, China has established consultative dialogue mechanisms with 26 countries and conducted more than 80 joint military exercises or training sessions with more than 50 countries. China's defence authorities play active role in multilateral security mechanisms, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the ASEAN Regional Forum, Xiangshan Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus.
- (c) Since 2002, the Chinese military has undertaken 39 international emergency humanitarian assistance operations, dispatched 18 naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia, escorted 6,000 Chinese and foreign ships and contributed 27,000 peacekeeping troops for UNPK, sent 300 doctors to cope with the Ebola outbreak in West-Asia. China has built Ebola holding-centre in Sierra Leone and a 100-bed Ebola treatment centre in Liberia.
- (d) China's military has helped the armed forces of developing countries in capacity building for national security. Since 2003, China has trained more than 30,000 military personnel for over 130 countries with no political strings attached. The defence minister highlighted the need to strengthen dispute-management mechanisms to improve ability to cope with crises in Asia-Pacific. He proposed strengthening of defence exchanges and cooperation to bolster strategic mutual trust by way of promoting military-to-military contacts and multi-tiered cooperation. The new Asian security architecture should transcend Cold War mentality and foster an inclusive security framework in sync with new geopolitical realities and the spirit of 'win-win' paradigm.

The Vice Foreign Minister of China elucidated a wide range of initiatives and proposals for regional cooperation such as the Silk Road Economic Belt, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the Asian Security Concept and a community of shared destiny in Asia-Pacific. He enunciated the need for building these pillars on the following lines:-

- (a) To develop a community of shared interests. The spirit of cooperation should be strengthened by good use of the ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) frameworks to shape an East Asian Economic Community.
- (b) Community of shared responsibility should be developed by fostering mutual understanding, trust and jointness in promoting regional peace and stability.
- (c) Create a community of culture and people. He described security and economy as two wheels of the Asian community connected by the spokes of people-to-people exchanges.
- (d) The concept of 'New Asian Security' should be based on common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, encompassing traditional and non-traditional fields. The new regional security outlook should uphold the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', good neighbourly relations, respect for historical facts, international law and spirit of joint development in disputed areas. He quoted Sino-Indian BDCA as a good example of conflict avoidance. He stated that negotiation to settle maritime dispute with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in South China Sea would commence in 2015. China is discussing implementation of Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and Code of Conduct (COC) and related confidence-building measures with other stakeholders. He did not favour involvement of outside powers (the USA) in regional disputes. He hoped that China and the US would sincerely strive to build a 'New Model of Great Power Relations' that would entail no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and 'win-win' cooperation. Other initiatives to foster trust should include adoption of Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), notification of major military activities, drafting of rules for air and maritime safety and cyberspace and outer space. In regard to China - Japan relations, he hoped that progress would be made on the basis of recently concluded 'Four-Point Principle Agreement'. He underscored the need for resumption of talks on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. On Afghanistan, he stated that China was committed to implementation of the Beijing declaration, made at the 4th Foreign Ministerial

Conference, hosted in Oct 2014.

(e) He highlighted the importance of the SCO, ARF, ADMM-Plus and proposed that inter-linkages between these organisations ought to be developed.

Notably, the speakers from most of the participating countries supported China's concept on the New Asian Security Architecture. Speakers from ASEAN countries were veiled in their criticism of 'nine-dashes line' claim and China's assertiveness in dealing with the issue. Although the speaker from Japan asserted his country's claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, but he favoured a negotiated settlement of the dispute. The representative from the Philippines echoed similar views. The only exception to this trend of kowtowing was the US Admiral Gary Roughead (Retd), the former Chief of Naval Operations, and commander of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, who strongly argued in favour of formation of alliances in Asia-Pacific to balance China.

Jehadi terrorism, rise of ISIS and resurgence of Taliban-Al Qaeda were perceived by all as serious threats to humanitarian security. However, there was no clarity on how to address these on a collective basis. China is in the process of drafting a new counter-terrorism law that would mandate PLA to undertake counter-terrorist operations. China would avoid deploying its troops abroad, UN peacekeeping being the only exception. The Post 2014 scenario in Afghanistan was deliberated upon with focus on critical uncertainties and transformational challenges and prospects.

The panelist from Pakistan presented a pessimistic view of security scenario in Afghanistan and portrayed Pakistan as the main victim of terrorism in the region. He lauded Pakistan's role in combating terrorism but was reticent on how to undertake coordinated operations against jihadi network on both sides of the Durand Line.

The Afghan speaker showed hope and optimism and urged for the continued engagement by the US and international community in Afghanistan. Russian speaker mainly focused on the failures of the US in Afghanistan and rather blamed the Afghans for their dire state of affairs. In my presentation, I flagged the challenges of building Afghan economy, political transformation and capacity building of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) followed by the prospects of Afghanistan emerging as a land bridge between Central Asia and South Asia in terms of fructification of energy and transportation corridors.

In reference to Afghanistan's implications for India, it emerged that the Unity Government had made a policy choice to invest in a triangular Pakistan-Afghanistan-China relationship. President Ghani, in his foreign policy prioritisation, has put Afghanistan's neighbouring countries on top, followed by Islamic countries, US/NATO, other Asian countries and international organisations. The nature of bilateral agreements signed by the new Afghan Government with China and Afghanistan, suggest that relations with India are being accorded lower priority at this point in time. In my discussions with top Afghan participants, I was given to understand that one of the reasons for this shift in Afghanistan's policy towards India was the perceived lack of initiative and will on the part of Indians to help ANSF at critical junctures. Nonetheless, they assured that India continued to enjoy considerable support from within the new political dispensation that advocated close relations with India vis-à-vis Pakistan or China.

The 5th Xiangshan Forum was given wide publicity by the Chinese media and its international CCTV channel. Besides live coverage of the event, the electronic media conducted vigorous interaction with foreign participants. The grand media finale was in the form of a special programme hosted by China's CCTV English news channel, 'Dialogue Special: New Security Outlook in Asia'. The panel comprised participants from China, the USA, Russia, Malaysia and India. CCTV was particularly keen on having an Indian voice, hence they invited me to participate in this prestigious 45-minute long programme that has a viewership of nearly 85 million people across the globe. The discussion devolved around, on China's new Asian security vision, implications of China's military rise, role of major players in Asian security and measures for building a new Asian Security Architecture. The media event was meticulously planned with a view to disseminate the theme of the 5th Xiangshan Forum to the wider international community.

During the panel discussion, I clearly brought out the vital role that India will play in the geopolitical and security arena in Asia as a major power and a responsible stakeholder. The dominant position of India as an important player in the economic and security architecture was amply highlighted.

Having participated in Beijing in the 4th Xiangshan Forum in Nov 2012, in the 2nd International Symposium in Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in May 2014 and interacted with the visiting Chinese delegations, one could see a perceptible shift in China's policy from that of maintaining a lower profile to that of a high-profile striving global power for a prominent role in reshaping the geopolitical and strategic landscape of Asia.

Conclusion

Participation in the 5th Xiangshan Forum was highly useful in gaining insight into the Chinese thinking on Asian security issues; understand perspectives of foreign participants and to articulate India's position and interests in the evolving geopolitical milieu. It was heartening to note that a buoyant India under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi inspires hope and confidence in the international community and that Indian views on geostrategic issues resonate well with the audience. India being at the cusp of its strategic destiny, the Government of India should encourage proactive participation in such events at the official and think tank levels.

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The Rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the 21st Century

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)@

Introduction

The latest development of Islamic fundamentalism took place in mid 2014 in Iraq, when a group of Sunni soldiers of the Iraqi army revolted and disarmed all their Shia soldiers, took them to a remote spot on the banks of the Tigris river, dug a mass grave for them and after lining them beside the grave opened fire on them killing about 400 odd personnel. As the hapless disarmed Shia soldiers were shot, they fell into the readymade mass grave. Luckily, one of the disarmed Shia soldiers, Ali Hussain Khadim was hit by a bullet, which did not kill him. He however fell into the mass grave dug for the Shia soldiers. Sensibly he kept his wits about him and lay wounded among the dead and dying Shia soldiers, but acted as if he was dead. After the horrifying mass murder of more than 400 Shia soldiers by their brother Sunni soldiers, the merciless murderers of their brother soldiers left the mass grave. After the murderous Sunni soldiers had left the area, and the coast was clear, Ali Hussain Khadim managed to crawl out of the mass grave and through a nullah reached the bank of the Tigris River nearby. From there he managed to drag himself to a Shia house some distance away and with their help managed to escape to a Shia dominated area and narrate his horrifying tale. Khadim was in Camp Speicher when the United States trained officers fled. He left the camp with about 200 Shia soldiers in civil dress. They had not gone far, when they ran into an ISIS convoy that rounded them up and took them to a camp in Tikrit, which became a killing ground.

This was the bloody mark of the birth of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Earlier the Sunni soldiers of the Iraqi army had revolted and captured tanks and light, medium and heavy weapons and formed a group calling themselves the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

At the top of the organisation was the self declared leader of the group, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, a radical Chief Executive of sorts, who handpicked many of his deputies from among the men he had met while a prisoner in the United States custody at the Camp Bucca detention centre a decade ago. He had a preference for military men and so his leadership team included many officers from Saddam Hussain's disbanded army. They included former Iraqi officers like Fadl al Hayali, the top deputy for Iraq who once served Saddam Hussain as a Lieutenant Colonel, who now heads the ISIS Military Council. Its leaders augment traditional military skills with terrorist techniques refined through years of fighting United States' troops, while also having local knowledge and contacts. ISIS is in effect a hybrid of terrorists and an army. ISIS burst into local consciousness in June 2014, when its fighters seized Mosul. The Iraqi army melted away and Baghdadi declared a Caliphate or Islamic State that erased borders and imposed Taliban like rule over large territory.

Roots of the Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

The ISIS with its small core of jihadists was able to seize so much non-jihadist Sunni territory in Syria and Iraq almost overnight, not because most Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis suddenly bought into the Islamist narrative of ISIS's self appointed Caliph. Most Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis do not want to marry off their daughters to a bearded Chechen fanatic and more than a few of them pray five times a day and like to wash it down with a good scotch. They have embraced or resigned themselves to ISIS because they were systematically abused by the pro Shiite, pro Iranian regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria and Prime Minister Nuri Kamal-al Maliki in Iraq and because they see ISIS as a vehicle to revive Sunni nationalism and end Shiite oppression.¹

The challenge the United States faces in Iraq is trying to defeat ISIS in tacit alliance with Syria and Iran, whose local Shiite allies are doing a lot of the fighting in Iraq and Syria. Iran is seen by many Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis as the colonial power dominating Iraq to keep it weak.

Obsessed With Jihadism and 9/11, Are We Now Doing the Bidding of Iran and Syria in Iraq?

What would have happened had ISIS not engaged in barbarism and declared - "We are the Islamic State. We represent the interests of the Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis, who have been brutalised by Persian directed regimes of Damascus and Baghdad. Our goal is to secure the interests of Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. We want an autonomous Sunnistan in Iraq, just like the Kurds have a Kurdistan with our own cut of Iraq oil wealth." ISIS's magazine, Dabiq recently published an article, "Reflections on the final Crusade", which argued that the United States' war against ISIS only serves the interests of the enemies of the United States - Iran and Russia. It quotes strategists of the United States as a warning that Iran has created a Shia belt from Tehran through Baghdad to Beirut, a threat much greater than ISIS. Why did the ISIS then behead five (so far) western hostages? They did this because they want to draw the United States into another crusade against the Muslims. ISIS needs to be contained before it destabilises islands of decency like Jordan, Kurdistan and Lebanon. But destroying it? That will be hard, because it is not just riding on some jihadist Caliphate fantasy, but on deep Sunni nationalist grievances. Separating the two is the best way to defeat the ISIS, but the only way to separate mainstream Sunnis from jihadists is for mainstream Sunnis and Shiites to share power, to build a healthy inter-dependency from what is now an unhealthy one. Are there any chances of that happening? Regrettably very low.²

In the background of all the cruel killing and maiming people in the name of religion, and the harsh treatment of men and women in the name of religion, here is a refreshing interlude from the heart of Islamic country. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a modern country in the heart of the Islamic Middle East. This rich country has a modern outlook. It also has, as a result of its progressive outlook, a modern Air Force with the latest fighter aircraft. And surprises of surprises its Air Force have lady pilots flying these combat jet fighter planes. Major Mariam al Mansouri flew in the first wave of the United States led attacks on targets of the ISIS in Syria! It is a striking image combining empowered Muslim Women, in an Arab fight back against jihadi extremism by the small but very modern Gulf State of the United Arab Emirates(UAE). Operating from the Al Dafrah air base in the desert south of Abu Dhabi, Major Mansur and other Emirate Air Force pilots have flown more combat sorties than any of the other Arab participants-Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and Qatar in the United States' campaign to destroy the ISIS.³

The Emirates has woven itself into the fabric of the United States defence strategy. UAE forces serve in Afghanistan. In August, the United Arab Emirates aircraft based in Egypt bombed Islamist targets in Libya. Its F-AE/F Desert Falcon aircraft are even more advanced than those in service with the United States.⁴

The Plan in Iraq to Counter the ISIS

Iraqi security forces, led by the United States air power and hundreds of advisers are planning to mount a major spring offensive against the Islamic State fighters. The goal is to break the ISIS occupation in northern and western Iraq and re-establish the Iraqi Government's control over Mosul and other population centres, as well as the country's major roads and its border with Syria by the end of 2015.

Iraqi and Kurdish forces have made inroads in recent weeks in securing territory threatened or captured by the ISIS, including the Rabia border crossing with Syria, the oil refinery in Baiji, North of Baghdad, the northern town of Zumar and Jurf-al-Sakhar, southwest of Baghdad. The major push which is being devised with the help of the United States military planners will require training three new Iraqi divisions, more than 20,000 troops over the coming months. The basic strategy calls for attacking fighters from the ISIS with a goal of isolating them in major strongholds like Mosul. That could enable Iraqi troops, Kurdish Peshmerga units and fighters who have been recruited from Sunni tribes to take on a weakened foe that has been cut off from its supply lines and reinforcements from Syria, subject to the United States air strikes. A task force headed by a Lieutenant General will be based in Kuwait with a Major General in Baghdad that will supervise the hundreds of United States advisers and trainers working with the Iraqi forces. As the push to train Iraq's military gathers momentum the United States footprint is likely to expand from Baghdad and Erbil to additional outposts including Al Assad Air base in Iraq's embattled Anbar province in the West and possibly Taji, 20 miles North of Baghdad. The effort to rebuild Iraq's fighting capabilities faces hurdles including the risk that the ISIS will use the intervening months to entrench in western Iraq and carry out more killings.⁵

The extremists of the ISIS appeared unstoppable after their sudden blitz through Iraq this summer. Today roughly a third of Iraq is dotted by active battle fronts with instances of fighting and occasional IS victories. However the groups' momentum appears to be stalling. The international airstrike campaign against the IS has clearly played a role in slowing its advance. The air strikes have been helpful, but several other factors are important. ISIS thrives in poor Sunni Arab areas. Neglect of Sunni areas in Iraq during the tenure of the Shia Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al Maliki gave them an opportunity for the jihadists. ISIS can only expand in areas where it can enter into partnerships with the local Sunni population. It is in Iraq when the local coalition forces began bombing in August that the IS had lost most ground in recent weeks. Iraqi government units, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, Shiite militias have taken back the area of Zumar in the North and Jurf-al Sakhar South of Baghdad. For the first time since the jihadists seized Mosul and much of northwest Iraq in June, an Iraqi military vehicle can drive from Baghdad to Erbil in the North on the highway. Last month IS seized the town of Hit and has since been killing people of the Abu Nisar tribe, three hundred of whom were reportedly killed. The IS is still entrenched in Anbar province. Because of Iraq's sectarian dynamics, the Government cannot send Shiite forces to fight in Anbar province. The result is that the IS is still entrenched there.⁶

Conclusion

From the time the IS broke into the headlines of international news, and stories of horrifying beheadings and mass killings were the daily headlines from the Middle East, the situation has steadily improved in Iraq. Though the United States refused to send troops on the ground, its aerial strikes has made an impact and limited deployment of troops by the Iraqi army has controlled the situation and reversed the advance of the IS. The situation in Iraq is likely to be controlled soon.

The situation in Syria is a little different and there are many complicating and competing narratives. The United States and its allies are not sure who are the enemies and which party needs to be supported and to what extent. The beheading of Western journalists and aid workers has generated additional domestic pressures on the leaders to act. A grand strategy to deal with the emerging situation is still missing. The situation in Syria will continue to stretch the military and diplomatic dilemmas of the United States and its allies in the foreseeable future.

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A Perspective on India-Tajikistan Strategic Partnership

Shri Raj Kumar Sharma@

Introduction

Tajikistan is a landlocked country in Central Asia. It shares 1206 km of porous border with Afghanistan in south, 414 km border with China in east, 870 km with Kyrgyzstan in north-east and 1161 km border with Uzbekistan in north-west.¹ Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) is separated from Tajikistan by a narrow strip (varying between 16 km to 65 km in width) called 'Wakhan Corridor' running through Afghanistan. India sees the Central Asian Republics (CARs) as its 'near abroad' or 'extended neighbourhood'. Since PoK is an integral part of India, Tajikistan is the nearest Central Asian neighbour to India. Tajikistan has strategic importance for India due to its proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan, PoK and Jammu and Kashmir. If there is any radical presence in Tajikistan, this could have spillover effects on PoK and Jammu and Kashmir as well. The spillover effect is likely to be extended in other CARs as well, since Tajikistan is geographically a gateway to Central Asia. Hence, Tajikistan remains critical for peace and stability in Central and South Asia.

India-Tajikistan Strategic Relations

India-Tajikistan relations are rooted in ancient history and culture. Present day Tajikistan was part of ancient Persian and Kushan empires which had close cultural ties with India². There are also ethnic and linguistic similarities between the two countries. As Tajikistan became an independent country after dissolution of former Soviet Union, India opened its embassy in Dushanbe in May 1994 while Tajikistan opened its consulate in Delhi in 2003. It was later upgraded to a full-fledged embassy in 2006.

India and Tajikistan share similar concerns about extremism and terrorism which threaten these two secular and multi-ethnic states. Events in Afghanistan and Pakistan have security implications for both the countries. Tajikistan shares long porous border with Afghanistan. If Afghanistan falls to radical elements, Tajikistan would be the next target which will have spillover effects over other CARs too. Likewise, radical influence in Afghanistan does not bode well for India, as it will threaten Indian investments in Afghanistan and also will increase cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

India and Tajikistan have been conscious of these aspects and started to strategically cooperate in early 1990s. President of Tajikistan, Emomoli Rakhmanov, during his first Indian visit in 1995 stated in 'Declaration for Further Developing Friendly Relations between the Republic of India and Republic of Tajikistan', the need for these two multi-ethnic pluralist states to cooperate actively to preserve their state structures from threats of terrorism. He had also stressed the need for India's role in the Afghan peace process.³

India-Tajikistan strategic cooperation attained new heights when Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996. Northern Alliance (NA) led by Ahmed Shah Massoud was fighting against the Taliban and it received assistance from India, Tajikistan, Russia, Iran and Turkey. India also built a hospital at Farkhor near Tajikistan's southern border with Afghanistan to treat injured fighters of the NA.⁴

The high level bilateral exchanges have been a major feature of India-Tajikistan relations. The President of Tajikistan, Emomoli Rakhmanov, during his 2001 India visit fully supported India's claim for a permanent membership of the UN Security Council while the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpeyee described joint Tajik-India action as a 'stabilising factor' for the region.⁵ Defence cooperation between India and Tajikistan was taken to a new level when both the countries signed a bilateral Defence Agreement in 2002. The volatile situation in Afghanistan seemed to have been one of the main reasons for this development. The US had launched its 'War on Terrorism' in Afghanistan after the 9 Sep 2001 terrorist attack and there were fears that the radicals could try to find a safe haven in Central Asia or even in PoK, which would impact security situation in India and Tajikistan.

Under the 2002 Defence Agreement, India also upgraded the Soviet era airfield at Ayni, 15 km from Dushanbe costing around USD 70 million. India also conducted its first overseas military exercise with Tajikistan in 2003 to strengthen its counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism capacity. To further strengthen the bilateral ties, Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpeyee visited Tajikistan in November 2003. The joint statement issued after Vajpeyee's meeting with Rakhmanov made a reference to the steady progress in defence exchanges between the two countries and their intent to further intensify these relations.⁶ Another important feature was that both countries agreed to establish a Joint Working Group on counter-terrorism and also signed an extradition treaty. India also agreed to assist in building a highway that would give Tajikistan a link and access to Chabahar port in Iran through friendly areas of Afghanistan.⁷

Former Indian President Pratibha Devisingh Patil had paid a state visit to Tajikistan in Sept 2009 while Indian Vice President, Hamid Ansari visited Tajikistan in April 2013. Tajikistan remains at the forefront of India's 'Connect Central Asia' policy. This policy seeks to intensify India's links with the CARs by helping them in areas like agriculture, health, education, banking and information and technology. Keeping in view their convergence of strategic interests, India and Tajikistan elevated their bilateral relations to the level of long term strategic partnership in 2012, when President of Tajikistan was on his 5th official visit to India. This partnership will encompass cooperation in political, economic, education, health, defence, counter-terrorism, science and technology, culture and tourism. Both the countries also said in the joint statement that terrorism was a threat to global peace and security and condemned those who supported terrorism. They also underscored that those who aid, abet and shelter terrorists are as guilty of acts of terrorism as the actual perpetrators. This shows that Tajikistan does not support Pakistan's state sponsored terrorism aimed against India. More importantly, Tajikistan remains neutral on Kashmir issue, treating it as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan.⁸

India focuses on 'capacity building' approach in its defence relations with Tajikistan. Due to increasing radicalisation in Pakistan, volatile situation in Afghanistan and the proposed US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan

this year, security situation could be at risk in both India and Tajikistan. Stability in Afghanistan remains critical for stability in Tajikistan which further ensures peace and stability in Central Asia. Taliban linked terror groups like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan pose a threat to Tajikistan. Information sharing, material support and joint exercises are another component of India's efforts to strengthen Tajikistan's defence capability. India is helping Tajikistan in building an effective air force, as India upgraded the Ayni airfield in 2010. India has gifted military uniforms, jeeps and trucks, two Mi-8 helicopters along with spare parts and consumables to Tajikistan.⁹ India is also providing free training to large number of Tajik military cadets and young officers at various defence training institutes in India.¹⁰ In 2013, India also airlifted a military hospital, with doctors, paramedics and equipment to establish the "India-Tajik Friendship Hospital" in southern Tajikistan. The 50-bed hospital will treat both military as well as civilian people.¹¹

Pakistan Factor in India-Tajikistan Relations

Pakistan had close security relations with the US during the Cold War era, due to which Soviet Union-Pakistan relations remained in a state of rivalry. Further, Soviet Union had close strategic relations with India which also distanced it from Pakistan. Hence, despite being closely located to Central Asia, Pakistan could not have much presence in Central Asia during the Soviet days. However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia became important for Pakistan's security.

The disintegration of Soviet Union opened several opportunities for Pakistan in Central Asia as it could think of materialising its dream of forming an Islamic commonwealth in the region. Political elites in Pakistan envisioned forming a Muslim security belt from Turkey to Pakistan having CARs as the buckle. This was to provide Pakistan strategic depth and new allies for supporting its interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.¹² However, leaving aside the initial phase of euphoria, the Central Asians have not responded to the Islam based overtures of Pakistan. This is because the Central Asian countries have a secular outlook, have Sufi influence and nomadic psyche which do not favour any fundamental tendency. Pakistan and Taliban backed Mujahideen had fought alongside the opposition forces during the civil war (1992-1997) in Tajikistan. This period coincided with Taliban rule in Afghanistan and Pakistan tried to extend its strategic depth in Central Asia by having a favourable government in Tajikistan as well. However, its plans could not fructify.

In the wake of India's growing strategic relations with Tajikistan, especially post 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, Pakistan has been trying to break new grounds with Tajikistan. Indian involvement at the Ayni airbase had raised concerns in Pakistan's security community, as they feared it could be used against them. Growing Indian presence in Afghanistan and Tajikistan is seen by Pakistan as Indian efforts to encircle it from the West. It was due to India's increasing presence in Central Asia that former President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf had said that India ought to stay away from the region in a national television address after the US launched its 'War on Terrorism' in October 2001.¹³ He is also believed to have raised the issue of Indian military 'presence' in Tajikistan while meeting his Tajik counterpart Emamoli Rakhmanov in 2003 at Almaty.¹⁴ Pakistan was so much concerned about the issue that Tajikistan's Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov had to pay a special visit to Pakistan in January 2004 to allay its fears.

There has been exchange of high level visits between Tajikistan and Pakistan recently. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif visited Tajikistan in June 2014. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, former Chief of Army Staff visited Tajikistan in August 2013. Before that, former President Asif Ali Zardari had visited Tajikistan in 2009 and 2012. Kayani's Tajikistan visit highlighted Pakistan's 'strategic push' to Pakistan's Central Asia policy. However, no substantial security cooperation has come out of these visits. It must be mentioned that Pakistan's policy in Central Asia remains unchanged, though it is talking more about trade and cultural relations now than it did before. It pursues a dual policy in the region. On one hand, it talks about cooperation on terrorism while on the other; it uses terrorist groups as a 'bargaining chip' to extend its influence in the region.

With the proposed US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan this year, Pakistan is looking to re-energise its Central Asian policy. It is banking on China for securing its place as a permanent member whenever the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is expanded. Pakistan is also looking forward to provide the landlocked CARs access to sea through its Gwadar port. This seems to rival Indian attempts to provide Tajikistan access to Iran's Chabahar port via Afghanistan. The connecting route will be Chabahar-Kabul-Kunduz-Badakhshan.¹⁵ Despite Pakistan's efforts to have a robust policy in Central Asia, it must be mentioned that the Central Asian countries (especially Tajikistan) remain wary because of its support for radical elements.

Conclusion

Due to volatile situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, India and Tajikistan are finding 'strategic convergence' of interests. This is evident from the recently held Afghanistan-Tajikistan-India trilateral meeting in August 2014 bringing together senior academic, former and serving officials from the three countries to explore possible areas of cooperation. A stable, independent, democratic and totally de-Talibanised Afghanistan is in the mutual interests of India and Tajikistan. However, the reality remains that future of Afghanistan is uncertain in the wake of US-NATO withdrawal from the country this year while the Taliban remains still a force to reckon with. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and recent announcement by Al Qaeda about forming its new branch in Indian subcontinent could encourage radical elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This will not be in interests of India and Tajikistan as it will impact their internal security situation. These developments necessitate close strategic cooperation between India and Tajikistan which are natural partners in their quest for developing their secular, plural and democratic polities. Drug trafficking and proliferation of small arms are the other mutual concerns that the two countries share.

While strategic aspects of India-Tajikistan relations seem to be moving ahead, there is need to uplift economic relations. Tajikistan is making a transition from a state controlled economy to a market economy and requires financial assistance in areas like education, health, food security and infrastructure development. The total trade between the two countries stood at USD 55 million in 2013. This figure is below the potential and the two countries can cooperate in tourism, hydroelectricity and uranium trade. Mutual trade is also hampered by lack of direct connectivity between the two countries. However, once projects like International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) are completed, this

hurdle too will be overcome. India's image of a secular democracy echoes well with the peace loving Central Asians than the radical image of Pakistan. India enjoys a positive public opinion and has much more to offer to these countries as compared to Pakistan in areas like pharmaceuticals, information technology and military know how. The CARs follow a multi-vector foreign policy which seeks to avoid too much dependence on a single country. Hence, they will encourage more Indian presence in Central Asia to balance China and Pakistan in the region.

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Introduction

Manipur is at cross-roads of conflict and peace. In this small beautiful state on the easternmost fringes of India, while the Manipuri sportspersons like MC Mary Kom are making a mark in international boxing and Manipuri students are finding home, acceptance and employment in urban jungles of India, the state continues to be marked by contradictions. On one hand, there is a perceptible decline in violence and increased surrenders; on the other hand the ethnic divides remain sharp, extortion continues unabated and no political solution is in sight in spite of few Meitei insurgent groups joining the peace process. The Nagas of Manipur continue to look towards Nagaland for solutions and solace; the Kukis have renewed their demand for a separate state and the Meitei insurgent groups have adopted the low-cost-high-visibility option of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks to keep the insurgency simmering. This sharply contrasts with the rest of the North East India wherein even the hardcore insurgent groups like NSCN (IM) and ULFA are in negotiations. The disillusioned insurgents in Manipur are yet to be convinced about the light at the end of the tunnel. In the absence of viable alternatives, they continue their half-hearted 'struggle' and resort to status-quo of ethnic demands, imagined homelands and easy money. The futility of insurgency is clear but not the alternatives.

Highway 39

Highway 39: Journeys through a Fractured Land was a 2012 book by Sudeep Chakravarti. It documented the conflicts and ethnic divides interwoven with the lives of people on this highway from Golaghat in Assam to Imphal in Manipur. Most of this national highway was later renamed as NH 102. Recently, the NH 102 has been renamed as Asian Highway (AH) 1. The cosmetic renaming continues while the people along this highway continue to face same violence, illegal taxation and fear. In November 2012, an 8,000 km long ASEAN Car Rally from Yogyakarta in Indonesia to Guwahati took place on this highway while a 14 hours bus service between Imphal and Mandalay is scheduled to commence from October 2014 to showcase this new link in India's 'Look East' policy. At places, glossy green boards proclaiming AH 1 have been planted to signify this supposed Indian highway to the markets of Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. Au contraire, even the inter-state trade on this road is disrupted by blockades demanding Kuki statehood to the arrest of corrupt officials or shifting of examination dates by student bodies. Violence on AH 1 is also regular. On March 11, 2014, the Meitei insurgents ambushed a security forces (SF) convoy near Laibi in Chandel district, killing two soldiers.

No More Kangleipak

The Naga and Kuki groups were the first to come to negotiation table. But for the first time since Meitei insurgency began in late 1960s, a few Meitei groups came over ground in 2013. On 04 February 2013, a total of 45 cadres of United Peoples Party of Kangleipak (UPPK) abandoned their camp in Tamu sub-division of Myanmar and crossed over. This included four women cadres, large number of sophisticated weapons and a Toyota SUV. UPPK was sharing this camp in Myanmar with Manipur Naga Revolutionary Front and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation of Assam.¹ UPPK later signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government on 24 May 2013 which was followed by MoUs being signed with three more insurgent groups (one Meitei and two Kuki): Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)-Nongdreinkhomba, Kuki National Liberation Front and the Kuki Revolutionary Party on 09 September 2013.

UPPK was a member of the Coordination Committee (Corcom) comprising of People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), PREPAK (Pro), KCP, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Revolutionary People's Front (RPF).² The homecoming of UPPK was a major blow to the unity of Corcom and first cracks have appeared in this formidable grouping of Meitei insurgent groups. However, UPPK and the other surrendered groups are not very large. The three largest and dominant insurgent groups - UNLF, People's Liberation Army (PLA) with its political wing RPF and PREPAK have not shown any inclination for peace. Official sources state that more than 30 militant groups from both the hills and the valley have entered the peace process since 2008.³ However, the much-needed impetus to peace process shall be provided when UNLF, PLA or PREPAK join the bandwagon.

A lot depends on Rajkumar Meghen, the chairman of UNLF who is in jail and has been repeatedly approached for commencing peace talks. Dubbed as 'Royal Rebel' due to his lineage from the royal family, Meghen alias RK Sanayaima had floated UNLF in 1964 to fight for a sovereign Manipur ruled by the Meiteis. He is the great grandson of Bir Tikendrajit, Manipur's ruler who was hanged by British in 1891 for rebelling against the Raj and in whose honour a street in the embassy-lined Chanakyapuri has been named.⁴ As the present Okram Ibobi Singh led Congress government is in its third consecutive term, there is hardly any political space in Manipur for the Meitei rebels who want to substitute AK-47s for political power except for Meghen who a la Pu Laldenga can hope for public life if he persuades the group to surrender.

UNLF also has financial muscle too to risk a political transition. A probe carried out by the National Investigation Agency in January 2012 had discovered that the UNLF earned around INR 1.5 billion between 2007 and 2010 through extortion. The fall of either UNLF or PLA - the two hardcore groups shall be the beginning of the end of insurgency in Manipur. PLA, named and modeled on the lines of the Chinese Army after the rebels were highly impressed with PLA during their training at Lhasa, has remained united since 1978 unlike the other groups which have seen factionalism. The PLA has also succeeded in establishing social networks that are not only spread across the community it claims to represent, the Meiteis, but also across other smaller ethnic communities in Manipur.⁵

Three States

As there are three major ethnic groups in Manipur, the insurgency is also divided into insurgent groups of Meiteis, Nagas and Kukis. While the Meitei insurgents' prime objective is to free their pre-British territorial boundary from so-called "Indian occupation", the Naga insurgents of Manipur support the demand of sovereign 'Nagalim' (Greater Nagaland) comprising of Nagaland along with the Naga majority areas of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and

Myanmar. The Kukis on the other hand support the demand of separate Kukiland for which Kukis (specifically Chins) of Myanmar are also fighting. Manipur is dominated by the Meiteis - a distinct ethnic group of mostly Vaishnavite Hindus, concentrated in the fertile Imphal Valley spread over 790 square kms. The heavily populated Imphal Valley constitutes 58.79 per cent of the state's population (mostly Meiteis) but only occupy 10 per cent of its area, leading to accusation of the neglect of the largely Naga and Kuki inhabited hill districts of Manipur which contain 41 per cent of the population and covers 90 per cent of the area of Manipur. The Meiteis with 40 out of 60 seats in the State Assembly also dominate the political landscape, pushing the other communities to fringes of political power.

On the other hand, the Meiteis resent the Manipur Government Land Revenue Act, 1960 which granted absolute land rights of the hills to the tribals. As per the legislation, the majority Meiteis cannot buy land in the hills where land ownership rights are held by the village headmen whereas the tribals can buy land in the Imphal Valley. They also resent the reservations enjoyed by the Nagas and Kukis as scheduled tribes (ST) and have recently demanded ST for Meiteis. The rise of Naga nationalism inspired both awe and fear in the Meiteis. They initially emulated it to raise statehood demand for Manipur and then to protect its territorial integrity by posing its own movements as counter guarantee against usurping of territory by the Nagas. The neglect of the State by the Centre, influence of Naga and Kuki insurgencies and the porous borders with Myanmar gave rise to a number of Meitei insurgent groups from mid-1960s onwards who are still fighting while the Naga and Kuki groups are in ceasefire or Secession of Operations (SoO).

Nagas - Ethnicity First

The Naga tribes of Manipur - mainly Maos, Marams, Poumais, Thangkuls and Zemis have been long part of Manipur's landscape. They were also frequently in conflict with the British. Consequently, British made buffer regions between Nagaland, Manipur and Assam by forcing the Kukis to migrate and settle in areas bordering Naga regions as a 'punishment' for the Kuki revolt against British in 1917-18. The rise of Naga insurgency and the increased political consciousness among the various Naga tribes led to the Naga dominated hill districts of Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Senapati and Chandel looking towards the Nagaland for political solutions.

On 26 October 2012, the United Naga Council, the main apex body of the Nagas in Manipur asserted that a peaceful parting of the Nagas in Manipur and the Meiteis as good neighbours, was the only way to avert a catastrophic situation that would arise out of the prolonged 'forced union of the two'.⁶ The divide has been compounded by the Meiteis who have neglected the hill districts in terms of development and employment opportunities. This neglect has hardened the positions in Manipur and widened the gap between the two communities. Thomas Friedman had famously commented on Middle East that "when it came to Jews and Palestinians there were no accidents, only acts of war."⁷ Similar situation exists in Manipur where relatively minor incidents like misbehaviour with Manipuri actress Momoka at a song competition at Chandel on 18 December 2012 by Self Styled Lieutenant Colonel Livingstone of NSCN (IM) flared into a bitter ethnic dispute resulting in blockades and counter-blockades.

Demanding Kukiland

Comparing the demands of Nagas and Kukis, it is often said that Nagas have cultural diversity but enjoy political unity while Kukis have cultural unity but political diversity. The emergence of the Kuki-Chin-Mizo communities on a common political platform was gradual. The armed struggle of these Kuki-Chin tribes in Manipur is attributed to the consolidation and strengthening of Nagas. The flashpoint of the Kuki militancy has direct relationship with NSCN(IM) serving quit notice to the Kukis from the Naga dominated areas in the early 1990s. The bloody ethnic clash between the Nagas and the Kukis in 1993 resulted in formation of armed groups for the Kukis. However, apart from occasional arms snatching from demoralised Manipur Rifles personnel, the Kukis were never the formidable insurgents. They did not engage the Army and the Assam Rifles in bloody confrontations. From August 2005 onwards, they quickly signed various SoO agreements - first with the Army and then with the Government.

Today, the Kuki insurgents groups in Manipur are grouped under two umbrella organisations - Kuki National Organisation and United Peoples' Front. These organisations, along with the Kuki State Demand Committee (KSDC) support the calls for a separate Kuki nation as an autonomous State called Kukiland or Zelengam, under the Constitution of India. KSDC's proposed 'Kuki state' map covers the whole of Churachandpur and Chandel districts, Sadar Hills in Senapati and large chunks of land in Tamenglong and Ukhrul.⁸ The idea of a Kuki state comprising areas which the Nagas are claiming to be part of their Greater Nagalim, while the Meiteis as well as the Central Government are committed to protecting the territorial integrity of Manipur, is contradictory. Any division of Manipur shall push the Meiteis towards violence. United Committee Manipur, an apex body of the Meiteis, on 18 October 2012, categorically stated that it would demand 'pre-merger status' of Manipur if the ongoing political dialogue between NSCN (IM) and the Government disturbed the unity or territorial integrity of Manipur in any way.⁹

Search for Solutions

The search for solutions in Manipur is required on three fronts. Resolving ethnic differences and ensuring fair representation to the three main ethnic groups, ensuring early settlement of the Naga issue which is closely intertwined with the conflict in Manipur and ceding some political space to the Meitei insurgents who come home to peace. Unlike in Nagaland where all the NSCN factions claim to be true representatives of the Nagas, the rivalries between the Meitei insurgent groups are minor. This is due to the fact that unlike the Nagas and Kukis, the Meiteis are not divided on tribal lines. The Corcom also binds them together. While this unity makes it difficult for counter-insurgency operations; on positive side, any political settlement can be consensually arrived and implemented. Today, the state government is firmly entrenched while the insurgents are negating their influence by meaningless violence. This incentivises the State Government for status-quo.

The talks for a negotiated political settlement with the surrendered Meitei and Kuki groups are yet to begin. As secession or division of the State is not an option - the State Government has few things to offer other than New Delhi sponsored rehabilitation packages consisting of a stipend of Rs 4,000 per month, vocational training and some assistance in finding jobs. This hardly excites the rank and file of the insurgent groups who were recruited on

revolutionary slogans and great expectations. The insurgent groups are also skeptical of the public following they may hypothetically command once the weapons are no longer with them. They are reluctant to change tracks because their bases in Myanmar are intact and the extortion business is flourishing as the Centre pumps in more money for various schemes in Manipur. Further, a Meitei dominated Manipur government is not interested in moving beyond SoO with the Kuki groups – it has no political concessions to offer and hence the peace talks with the Kuki groups have not commenced. This political stalemate has resulted in these groups resorting to increased extortion. The final sufferer is the population which ends up paying more and benefiting less from developmental funds.

The peace talks with NSCN (IM) are going nowhere in spite the Naga group moderating their demands. The Nagas of Manipur as well as the Meitei insurgent groups are watching the negotiations with the Naga groups for positive indications. The NSCN (IM) is the most formidable insurgent group which had fostered other groups and is well armed – if they are not able to make headway with their key demands, the comparatively localised Meitei groups stand no chance. But the Meitei groups cannot go against the overall trend of peace talks in the North East and lose their share of any future political pie. This may ultimately prompt them in getting into ceasefire or SoO to run their extortion empires with minimal risk of military action by SF, something akin to Nagaland. This is no solution, only white-collar insurgency.

Another issue of concern is the premature demands for removal of AFSPA for diverting attention away from the real issues. In August 2004, the AFSPA was withdrawn by the Manipur Government from parts of Imphal in response to protests over the alleged killing of Thangjam Manorama Devi by SF. The State Government acted unilaterally, despite reservations expressed by the Central Government. Later, commenting on the issue, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that, “AFSPA was enforced in Manipur by an explicit decision of the Government of Manipur and hence they have a right to modify their decision”.¹⁰ However, the removal of AFSPA from seven assembly constituencies of Imphal has converted this area into a haven for insurgents who are able to carry out unabated extortion, fabricate bombs and coordinate operations. This has prevented the SF to exercise adequate pressure on the insurgents to compel them towards the negotiation table.

Conclusion

Years of counter-insurgency effort by the Army and the Assam Rifles, agitational fatigue and the overall trend towards peace talks in the North East have together led to a fading of a deep-rooted insurgency. A search for solutions has begun but the solutions are no longer military. The ethnic fault lines in Manipur have to be bridged, economic opportunities created, surrendered insurgents meaningfully rehabilitated and the hardliner groups holding out in Myanmar are to be brought to mainstream. The people are eager for change. Imphal saw its first international flight on 21 November 2013 when Golden Myanmar Airlines flight landed at Tuliha Airport from Mandalay, carrying 189 Myanmar citizens.¹¹ The voter turnout in the April 2014 Parliamentary elections was over 71 per cent. The disenchanted insurgents are not surrendering for monthly stipends from the Government – they were earning more as gun-wielding insurgents. They want the root causes of insurgency – lack of development and dignity; and the competing ethnic demands to be addressed, besides a toehold in political space for acceptance by people. India’s ‘Look East’ policy cannot commence from New Delhi and terminate at Kolkata – it has to move further East and engage the Manipuris before it can set its eyes on the emerging markets of Myanmar. Indeed, our external affairs minister emphasised an ‘Act East Policy’ during her Vietnam visit in August 2014. A peaceful Manipur can become dream Indian gateway to ASEAN.

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@Colonel Shailender Arya was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery in Dec 1998. He was the winner of USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2006 (Group B), runner up in 2007 Competition (Group B), winner in 2008 Competition (Group B) and runner up in 2011 Competition (Group A). The officer has served in a UN mission in Sudan and has had more than one tenure in the northeast in counter-insurgency environment. Presently, he is commanding an artillery unit.

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Emerging Energy Challenges in the Indian Navy and Response Strategies

Commander Kapil Narula@

Introduction

The Indian Navy (IN) is completely dependent on petroleum products for operation of its ships, submarines and aircraft which has resulted in an ever increasing energy bill for the IN. Extensive use of energy, directly, by combustion of fuel in ships and indirectly, by use of electricity in dockyards also leads to Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, causing irreversible environmental damage. Diminishing global fossil fuel reserves, sustained increase in the real price of oil along with its accompanying volatility, and India's increased oil import dependency is of critical concern to India. In 1990, India imported only 37 per cent of its oil demand. However, oil imports were expected to reach 2.7 million barrel/day (mb/d) or 75 per cent of demand in 2012, and 6.8 md/d or 92 per cent in 2035.¹ But the strategically most significant impact of this excessive dependence on oil is the lack of suitable energy alternatives, in the immediate future for the IN. Coupled with this is the long lead time necessary for the introduction and adoption of new technologies, which makes the emerging energy challenges, a major cause of concern for the IN.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to identify the emerging energy and environmental challenges for the IN as also to highlight IN's recent bid to adopt 'Green Initiatives' with a view to chart the response strategies in order to overcome the emerging challenges.

Emerging Energy Challenges

There are three major emerging energy challenges for the IN:-

- (a) The burden of increasing energy expenditure;
- (b) The environmental aspects of unrestricted energy usage and;
- (c) The growing risk associated with fossil fuel dependence.

The Burden of Increasing Energy Expenditure

Table 1 shows the break-up of the Indian Navy's revenue budget into expenditure on stores and under other revenue subheads which includes works, pay and allowances, transport, refit and other miscellaneous expenses. The naval stores budget which accounts for procurement of various spares, new machinery and fuel has grown from INR 2,967 crores in 2008-09 to an estimated INR 4,527 crores in 2013-14.

Table 1 : Break-up of Revenue Budget²

Year	Total	Stores (INR Crores)	All others
2008-09	7949	2967	4982
2009-10	9587	2957	6630
2010-11	10145	3437	6708
2011-12*	12146	4251	7894
2012-13*	12548	4391	8156
2013-14*	12934	4527	8407

*** Breakup for these years are estimates³**

A detailed analysis of the IN's stores budget (after segregating the amount spent on fuel and other spares) reveals that the expenditure on fuel for the IN is increasing at a rapid pace. This increase can be explained as follows. The expenditure on fuel is a function of the quantity of the fuel consumed and the price of fuel. Assuming that the total quantity of fuel consumed by the IN remains the same over the years, the total expenditure will still continue to increase due to increase in international price of crude oil. The increase in the market price⁴ of diesel is shown in real and nominal terms (indexed to 01 Apr 2007) in Figure 1.



Figure 1 : Real and Nominal Price of Diesel 5

The real price of diesel shows an approximate increase of 22 per cent from 01 Apr 2008 to 01 Apr 2013. As this price increase is in real terms (over and above the inflation rate), rising crude oil prices leads to an increase in the

share of expenditure on fuel, as a percentage of stores.

This increasing fuel expenditure is placing an additional stress on the already stretched revenue budget for the IN. Further, the percentage expended on energy is likely to increase in the coming years due to additional number of operational platforms (including INS Vikramaditya) and likely increase in their deployment. Hence, it is evident that energy expenditure as a percentage of stores are bound to rise further, leaving lesser room for the procurement of other store items such as critical machinery spares.

The Environmental Aspects of Unrestricted Energy Usage

Environmental Sustainability is gaining significant attention and is becoming increasingly relevant in today's world. Apart from actual burning of fuel which emits Green House Gases (GHG), inadequate measures for controlling emissions and unsafe disposal of used by-products of fuel also increases the environmental footprint of ships. Apart from emissions from direct burning of fuel onboard ships, emissions from burning of fossil fuels (for conversion to electricity) will also have to be accounted for by the IN.

In order to lower the environmental footprint of shipping, efforts have been made in the commercial shipping industry. International Maritime Organisation (IMO), on 15 July 2011, adopted a new chapter to MARPOL Annexure VI (Chapter 4, Regulations on energy efficiency of ships) which is aimed at improving the energy efficiency and reducing GHG from international shipping. These measures, which have been enforced from 01 January 2013, are now mandatory and comprise Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) (which is applicable to new ships) and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) (which is applicable to all ships). It is expected that implementing EEDI will continuously improve the energy efficiency of a ship, thereby reducing oil consumption and achieving lower CO2 emissions. On the other hand, the SEEMP which is a management tool will assist the crew in managing and thereby lowering the energy consumption onboard ships.

While these guidelines may not be applicable to naval ships by law, implementation of measures similar to EEDI and SEEMP will definitely benefit the IN by reducing the energy consumption and emissions, in the long term. However, the challenge is to implement these measures onboard naval ships in the face of stringent performance criteria. The limited technical expertise in this area, a general lack of understanding of the need for making design changes, and the unavailability of equipment which meet the technical specifications is a major hurdle in attaining this goal. Lowering the environmental impact of ships at sea and at harbour, without lowering the operational readiness of the IN, therefore presents a significant challenge to the IN.

The Growing Risk Associated with Fossil Fuel Dependence

The expenditure on fuel for the IN is budgeted in the beginning of the year based on the current price of fuel and the approximate number of platforms which are available in the year. Based on this budgeting, operational deployments are planned and executed. While, a small deviation in expenditure is acceptable, a large variation in energy expenditure has been observed in the past few years, which impact the entire budgeting and planning process. In such a case it is evident that the IN has to absorb the increase in the expenditure, internally, either through reallocation of funds amongst various revenue sub-heads or has to cut down the sailing of ships to stay within the allotted budget. This financial risk due to the fluctuations in the price of oil supplied to the IN would continue to impact the budgeting and hence is detrimental to the operational planning process in the IN.

Currently, the IN is 100 per cent dependent on refined petroleum products for its platforms such as ships, naval aircraft and submarines. Hence, the IN is extremely vulnerable to the uncertainties and disruptions in oil supply and distribution chain. Hence, IN will have no option but to restrict the usage of its entire fleet in case of an oil crisis. This scenario is a threat to the operational efficiency of the IN and makes it vulnerable to supply side shocks.

The IN is completely dependent on public sector and state owned companies for supply of petroleum products and electricity respectively and there are no fall back options (except for a limited power back- up on batteries and diesel based generators) in case of physical failures in the energy distribution chain which may have serious consequences for the IN. Further, the entire Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) backbone and repair infrastructure in naval dockyards is totally dependent on the civilian electricity grid as a primary source of electricity and is therefore susceptible to physical and cyber attacks, natural disasters and malfunction.

In the face of the evolving energy scenario, energy experts conclude that there is no immediate solution to the growing energy problems and the only rational way out is to reduce the energy consumption, diversify the fuel mix, develop alternate technologies for harnessing renewable sources of energy and undertaking a conscious shift in energy policy to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

Indian Navy's Bid to Adopt 'Green Initiatives'

In order to address the emerging energy and environment challenges, the IN has announced a slew of green initiatives⁶ on the eve of World Environment Day, which was celebrated on

05 June 2014. These initiatives stressed on the need to implement various measures for protecting the environment in various functional domains of the IN. The four domains⁷ across which these initiatives will be implemented are operations, administration, maintenance and infrastructure and community living. Exhaustive guidelines in the form of an 'Energy Conservation Roadmap'⁸ have been drawn up to implement the initiatives and various units and formations of the IN have been directed by the Naval Head Quarters to closely monitor the progress.

Following directives have been issued under the green initiatives:-

- (a) Measuring energy consumption level;

- (b) Incorporating energy efficiency from ab-initio stages in all future acquisition and infrastructure projects;
- (c) Identifying Key Result Areas for infrastructure and community living projects such as green buildings, waste recycling, water conservation and harnessing of renewable energy;
- (d) Conducting awareness drives and programmes on energy conservation and environment protection.

While the initiatives were adopted as 'green initiatives', the intention is clearly to address environmental as well as energy challenges. Hence IN has rightly linked the environmental concerns with the root cause of the problem, which is excessive and suboptimal energy usage and proposes to tackle both issues together. This is also evident in the press release⁹ which stated, "there is a compelling need to optimally utilise energy resources while ensuring that each rupee is stretched to the maximum". While IN's bid to adopt green initiatives is extremely laudable and deserves all appreciation, the issue deserves a deeper analysis.

Response Strategies

Energy Conservation, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (RE) are a triad, which can support the transition to a green IN. While Energy Conservation can be implemented by behavioural and managerial changes, Energy Efficiency is the cheapest, fastest and the surest way to address energy and environmental concerns. Increasing generation of RE at various distributed locations and integrating it with the electricity grid in the regions endowed with alternative energy resources is also a viable solution. This idea has also gained traction due to the falling costs of solar power, which has led to an exponential increase in the installed capacity of solar PV plants in the last couple of years. The above three aspects can, therefore, be applied in various domains in the IN, according to the degree of ease of implementation and availability of technical expertise after carrying out a cost-benefit analysis.

'We cannot reduce what we cannot measure'. Hence the first step towards reducing energy use is to measure energy consumption. This aspect has received specific attention in the present proposal, and a framework to measure energy consumption levels has been initiated, based on which future energy reduction goals would be identified. Although measuring energy use in various facets of operations in the IN is a time-consuming task, which is cost intensive, recording energy usage over time is essential to benchmark energy consumption. This is more so as most of the operations in the IN are tailor-made and do not have one to one correspondence in the commercial industry. Notwithstanding the initial hurdles, once the right technology is in place to monitor energy consumption, the task of recording energy use becomes automatic and yields a large amount of data, which can be analysed both online and offline for implementing an energy management programme effectively.

Energy efficiency, which is driven by advances in technology, is also called as the fifth fuel after coal, oil, natural gas and renewable energy. Energy efficiency is, therefore, the cornerstone of any energy reduction programme. Energy efficiency can be achieved onboard ships by hydrodynamic ship design, incorporating energy efficiency in the design of main propulsion system, selecting optimal sized engines/generators and efficient auxiliary systems such as air conditioning /refrigeration systems onboard ships. In fact, energy efficiency standards are now mandatory in commercial shipping which includes adoption of EEDI (which is applicable to new ships) and the SEEMP (applicable to all ships). Both these measures have been enforced from 01 January 2013.

There will also be the 'easy to implement measures' such as use of energy efficient lighting, installation of automatic power factor correctors, managing peak loads in industrial establishments etc which can be implemented at low cost without much effort. These measures need to be adopted first, as they have short payback time and will reap rich dividends over their entire lifetime. Success in these programmes will also help in streamlining the administrative processes and will impart momentum to implement the remainder of the programme.

Way Ahead

Cost savings, increasing the strategic reach of sea-going platforms (as opposed to mid-sea refuelling), increased operational efficiency, demonstrating environmental stewardship, and developing a robust and resilient energy architecture are a few benefits that will accrue to the IN by adopting the 'Green Initiatives'. While the framework is in place, a lot depends on how effectively these steps will be implemented in the near term. Although energy accounting and accurate monitoring is the key to the success of the programme, capacity building and allocation of financial resources from the existing budget of the IN remains a key challenge, which needs to be addressed for demonstrating long term commitment to the programme.

Though a beginning has been made, the next logical step for the IN is to adopt an integrated energy policy. Such a policy should integrate energy management with demand side reduction with energy efficiency as the cornerstone of the policy. An integrated energy policy will also provide an overarching framework under which, various interrelated energy and environmental issues can be addressed in the future.

Conclusion

Energy is a precious commodity and a key enabler of military combat power, which should, therefore, be considered a strategic resource¹⁰ by the IN. Hence, it is crucial that the risks associated with energy supply disruption should be mitigated by strengthening the energy supply chains and effectively managing the demand of energy. While IN's bid to adopt green initiatives is laudable and deserves appreciation, much more needs to be done to fast track the implementation of these steps which will go a long way in overcoming the energy and environment challenges for the IN. Adopting the 'Green Initiatives' is, therefore, a landmark step which clearly demonstrates that the IN is preparing to tackle energy and environmental challenges head-on, and is on the right path to transition into a navy that is energy conscious and environmentally responsible.

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India and the Great War : Centenary Commemoration Project - An Update



Shri Adil Chhina@

Activities being undertaken as part of the joint USI - MEA 'India and the Great War' centenary commemoration project by the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, peaked during the period under review.

A book discussion coinciding with the launch of Vedica Kant's book *If I die here, who will remember me?* India and the First World War was held in the USI auditorium on 30th September. Another panel discussion on India and the Great War was held at the Khushwant Singh Literature Festival at Kasauli on 11th October with Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd), Secretary USI CAFHR, Brigadier Brian McCall, British Defence Attaché to India and Captain Amarinder Singh. A unique seminar on Remembering World War I and exploring the future of non-violence was held aboard the Belgian Navy Ship 'Leopold I' in Mumbai on 13th October. The panel consisted of Dominiek Dendooven, Squadron Leader Chhina and Prof Shiv Visvanathan.

Various talks on the subject of India's sterling contribution to the war were given in France and Belgium in the last week of October 2014. On 22nd October, the first programme was organised by the Indian Embassy in Brussels at the Royal Museum of Armed Forces and Military History. A large hall lined with displays of World War I uniforms and weapons from various countries made an appropriate setting for the talks. The speakers of the evening were Squadron Leader Rana Chhina (Retd), Mr Dominiek Dendooven and Brigadier MS Jodha. The chief guest of the event was General Gerard Van Caelenberge, Chief of the Belgian Defence Staff.

In the first ever USI event to be held in Europe, a mirror conference of the one held in March at the USI was organised at the 'In Flanders Fields' Museum in close collaboration with King's College, London in Ypres. This conference is part of the EU sponsored Humanities in the European Research Area (HERA) Joint Research Programme, Cultural exchange in a time of global conflict: Colonials, Neutrals and Belligerents during the First World War. It was a two-day event in the small and picturesque town of Ypres that had been destroyed completely a 100 years ago and rebuilt to what it had looked before the war began.



The first day, talks were given by the speakers on various aspects of the war. In the evening, a special Last Post ceremony was conducted for the Indian High Commission at the Menin Gate Memorial. Ambassador Manjeev Puri and Squadron Leader Chhina laid wreaths at the memorial. The next day, the conference participants were taken on a guided bus tour of the Western Front to various spots where the Indian Army had fought. The tour was conducted by Mr Tom Donovan and Mr Simon Doherty authors of the USI - UK sponsored battlefield guide of the Indian Army on the Western Front. The tour ended in a small village where a local French gentleman Mr Dominique Faivre had set up an exhibition on the Indian Army of the Western Front which included a visual exhibition accompanied by artefacts which Mr Favre had collected over the years from the former battle fields in and around the area. At the end of the day, the participants were graciously hosted by the owner of the Chateau La Peyrouse in Saint Venant. The chateau had been the headquarters of the Indian Corps fighting in France and Flanders. On 27th October another talk on the subject was delivered by Squadron Leader Chhina at the Indian Embassy in Paris, France.

The big event of the year for the project was held on 30th October. A joint reception was hosted by the USI

and the British High Commission at the residence of the High Commissioner Sir James Bevan, KCMG. The USI-CAFHR team had painstakingly put together an exhibition at the residence in the lawn area comprising twenty-five large storyboards, which gave visitors a broad overview of the war with striking images gathered from archives across the globe. In addition to the storyboards, the High Commission staff had set up large TV screens around the lawn and on stage which showed footage of Indian troops from the war. The Royal Air Force band was specially flown in and along with the Indian Air Force band played a wide range of music through the evening.

Prior to the main event, a preliminary event was held at 1745 hours at which a total of 31 war diaries were presented by Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Director USI to retired Colonels/senior officers of the descendant regiments that had fought on the Western Front in WW I. These war diaries had been specially printed and bound in full leather with regimental crests embossed in gilt. This was followed by the joint release, by Ambassador Navtej Sarna, representing the Ministry of External Affairs, and the UK Secretary of State for Defence Rt Hon Michael Fallon, MP, of the coffee table book *India and the First World War, 1914-1918* authored by Squadron Leader Rana Chhina, and a battlefield guide book titled *The Indian Corps on the Western Front: A Handbook and Battlefield Guide* by Tom Donovan and Simon Dohortey. The battlefield guide was jointly sponsored by the USI and the UK and will fill a void in the existing literature on the subject. This preliminary event concluded with a vote of thanks given by Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Director USI.

The main event was well received and the crowd in the lawn swelled to about a 1000 guests. Many descendants of WW I veterans attended the event, several of them had flown in from across the country and many of them hailed from small towns and villages. Many descendants were proudly wearing the medals of their ancestors on the right side of their chest. This old tradition/custom to wear the medals of an ancestor on the right side of the chest to honour them at special commemorative events was specially revived for the event. In Europe it is still followed and one can see many descendants, even small children wearing the medals of their forefathers proudly on Remembrance Day ceremonies every year. In India the custom has been largely forgotten, in part because there has been very little public space for the families of veterans to remember and honour their forefathers.

At 1900 hours, the Defence Minister Shri Arun Jaitley arrived with the COAS, General Dalbir Singh, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC. A little later the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Michael Fallon addressed all present where he mentioned that his grandfather, Captain Harold Smith, was part of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and served with the 1st Sappers and Miners, Indian Army. When the war broke out he sailed in 1914 from Mumbai with the Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' to Mesopotamia. Mr Fallon then went on to unveil the six Victoria Cross memorial markers to Indian recipients one by one. The markers, which were designed by Mr Snehanshu Mukherjee and Squadron Leader Chhina consist of a four sided white sandstone block with inscription on all four faces. These will subsequently be installed at an appropriate place in the States from where those six brave men hailed. He then presented Shri Arun Jaitley with a digital drive containing softcopies of all the Indian Army western front War Diaries to be given to the National Archives of India. These war diaries which were held at the UK National Archives had been specially digitised as a part of the Indo - UK centenary commemoration project. Shri Arun Jaitley then made a notable extempore speech in which he highlighted the need to commemorate the sacrifices of Indian soldiers and said that an official history of the Great War in particular and all wars before and after Independence needs to be undertaken in both print and celluloid form. This announcement was greatly welcomed by the assembled guests and the retired military fraternity in particular.

The event was a huge success and while departing, all guests were handed a copy of the coffee table book released earlier in the evening and a specially commissioned graphic novel - *India in World War I; An Illustrated Story* by Major General Ian Cardozo AVSM, SM (Retd) and Rishi Kumar.

A special programme was conducted by the BBC as part of the BBC World Service show *The War that changed the World: India and Imperialism* on 1st November at the India International Centre, New Delhi. The episode was aired on 8 Nov 2014. The programme engaged with the audience and included them in the discussion. Dr Shashi Tharoor also presented his essay on India and World War I on the show. The programme included special inputs and references to the USI's efforts in highlighting India's contribution in WW I.

Finally, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Australia in November and made a trip to the Australian War Memorial where he spoke of Indians and Anzacs fighting shoulder-to-shoulder in Gallipoli in 1915 to highlight the historic ties between the two countries. He also made a presentation of a replica of a First World War trophy belonging to the Sikh Regiment to Australian PM Tony Abbott. The replica has the miniature statue of Jemadar Man Singh of 14 King George's Own Ferozepore Sikhs lobbing a jam-tin grenade at the enemy in Gallipoli. The suggestion to make use of this particularly significant memento was given by USI-CAFHR to the Prime Minister's office which was graciously accepted by them.

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