

China's National Security and the Security Apparatus*
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Abstract

At the Third Plenum of the 18th Communist Party Congress from November 9-12, 2013 China's new leadership that took over in late 2012 announced the formation of a new National Security Commission, apart from reorganising the economic sector of the country. These two issues – reorganising China's policy structures into two main modularised priority entities in economic and security domains – are expected to last at least till the next decade and beyond. In early 2014, it was announced that the new leader Xi Jinping will head this Commission, in addition to his duties as General Secretary of the Communist Party, President of the republic, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Apart from consolidation of Xi Jinping with this new post, the debate about this new institution itself puts the issue of national security once again to the fore in China today. This is in the light of innumerable challenges to the leadership ranging from internal to external at a time when China is poised to be the largest economy in the world by the next decade. This article looks at the national security issues that are affecting China today and the responsive apparatus in place, and the efforts made by the leadership recently to cope with such challenges.

Introduction

China's national security considerations in the recent period are varied in nature and indicate to their diversification in both military and non-military aspects.¹ National security in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is in many ways different from most other countries. National security is of utmost importance to the country's leadership given its mandate drawn from the Communist Party (CCP) and State Constitutions. In China's set-up, the armed forces (the People's Liberation Army – PLA) – including the paramilitary forces (the People's Armed Police Force-PAPF) – also occupy a special place as they contributed to bringing the CCP to power in 1949. With 80-odd million cadres electing the leadership at the national, provincial and at other levels, political stability and security remain the watchwords. National security of China also encompasses domestic stability including at the political, ethnic, economic and other related levels and also ways to counter any external intervention.² It includes ways to counter other countries as well in case of a territorial dispute with neighbours or based on the China's leadership's current threat assessment. Broadly, then China's national security encompasses both domestic and external dimensions, and includes subjects such as internal control mechanisms, foreign policy, economic, information and other subjects.³

Geo-political Context

China's national security is linked to the country's geo-political settings, issues inherited from the past, links to the periphery especially, as these are linked to the sovereignty issues and connections of the ethnic minorities with neighbouring regions, perceptions of the leadership on the emerging threats and intentions. China's geo-political context had to an extent influenced the country's security aspects, in addition to the leadership's changing perceptions and the ways to tackle such challenges. Briefly, the geographical context had resulted in several trials and tribulations for various Chinese dynasties - such as the debilitating attacks from the North from Mongolia, resulting in the powers-that-be constructing the Great Wall (although not built in one decade or even a century but under different periods). The geographical context had also partly cushioned China from outside influences after the peripheries where the ethnic minorities willy-nilly accepted the overall Chinese rule.⁴ Also, it was only once that the Chinese historically thought of venturing out on the high seas during the Ming Dynasty and indicates the continental mindset during the historical period. Since the reform programme was launched in the late 1970s, the PRC is in the process of going beyond its borders and also to the high seas with implications not only for India but to other countries as well. The current context of China can be summarised as follows:-

- (a) Two-thirds of China's territory is populated by the 55 minorities; hence the imperative of preventing any prospect of 'split' in the Five China's (Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria and Greater Han China) and the official emphasis on the 'Unity of Motherland.'
- (b) The Opium Wars of 1842 and 1856, and the 1894 defeat in the Sino-Japanese war exposed China's vulnerability in the maritime domain. China's current maritime trade is nearly 70 per cent of its gross domestic product; hence the leadership's emphasis on securing her maritime interests.
- (c) Imperatives of Globalisation resulting in dependence on expansion of trade, investments, resources supply and connectivity with neighbours.⁵

While the above have contributed in shaping the geo-political imperatives of current China, the following could be broadly identified as having significant influence on the Chinese leadership:-

- (a) Sovereignty and territorial disputes with 14 land neighbours and 6 maritime neighbours – land borders mostly resolved, except with India and Bhutan while maritime disputes have become volatile.
- (b) Ethnic connections with the neighbourhood – Mongols (with pan-Mongolian connections to Outer Mongolia), Uighurs (present from Turkey to Central Asian neighbours of China), Tibetans (with links to Nepal, Bhutan and India), Dai and others across the peripheries along the Southeast Asian region.
- (c) Assertion for geo-political space by China is part of a complex competition with several contending actors and has both regional and global dimensions.
- (d) Imperatives of development and rise of China – Comprehensive National Power; global access to natural resources, markets, investments, trade etc.⁶

Yet, the leadership of China, till about the reforms were launched, consciously avoided explicitly articulating the national interests as the left ideological trend continued till the passing away of first generation of leaders. Indeed, Yan Xuetong points out that the 12th CCP Congress in 1982 for the first time in the history of the PRC had specifically mentioned 'national interests.'⁷ The national interests of China which have a bearing on the foreign and security policies as well as domestic determinants for the foreseeable future, include the following, according to the then State Councillor Dai Bingguo's July 28, 2009 statement on China's core interests:-⁸

- (a) Maintenance of its fundamental system and state security.
- (b) Protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- (c) Stable development of the economy and society.

Yan Xuetong suggested that China's national interests should also include : international environment, national power, the level of technology and subjective understanding of the world.

In the current post-Cold War environment, Yan suggested certain new phenomenon should be factored in, including:-

- (a) Militarily peaceful but economically intensely competitive.
- (b) International economic environment including export of products, technology, labour, investments and tourism etc.
- (c) Security environment seeks to avoid war.
- (d) Political interests emphasise complete sovereignty.
- (e) Cultural interests.

Overall, according to Yan, China's objectives include:-

- (a) Short-term - core interests of the state.
- (b) Medium term - economic development.
- (c) Long-term - ideology (socialism/independence).

To protect these interests, China's leadership had made several efforts including in the diplomatic, military and security policies in the past and had been preparing for the future to tackle challenges to its perceived security interests, both domestic as well as external. Thus, several of the wars that China waged with its neighbours are related to the territorial disputes including with India in 1962, the then Soviet Union in 1969 and Vietnam in 1979; while its entry into the Korean War in the early 1950s was to protect its perceived peripheral security; and on Taiwan in the two crises of 1958 and 1995-96 as part of its claim on Taiwan. It is likely that in future, China will further consolidate its position on its perceived geo-political interests. These are likely to include the following:-

- (a) Ways and means to expand the natural geographical barriers of the heartland (Han China which includes one-third of densely populated Han Chinese in the central and eastern parts of the country) and thereby; control and dominate the frontier regions (two-third of China's landmass, mainly populated by ethnic minorities of Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, etc. and beyond into Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia and the Korean Peninsula in the land frontiers through the Western Development Programme and,
- (b) Make concerted entry into the maritime domains in East and South China Seas to finally execute its two ocean strategy of control of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.⁹

To pursue the above, China has been following several policies in the diplomatic, political, strategic, economic and military domains and achieving many of the above goals. China also has to ward off challenges to the Han unity reflected in globalisation, migration and 'mass incident' protests by advocating neo-Confucianism, harmonious society, etc. In addition, since the ethnic minorities are dispersed (Uighurs from Turkey to Central Asia; Tibetans in India, Nepal, Bhutan, Dai people in South East Asia, Mongols in Mongolia, Koreans across the Northeast and Korean peninsula), China has to exert diplomatic pressures on the neighbouring countries and bind them within the 'One China' and 'three evils' (i.e., opposing separatism, extremism and splittism) discourse. While major challenges for China in the recent historical period came from the seas (the debilitating Opium Wars of 1842 and 1856), today China is overcoming the 'century of humiliation' and building a potent 'blue water' navy.

Towards north and northwest, China had always faced challenges to its national security from Russia, Mongolia and Central Asian Republics in the continental domain. While traditionally, China considered Mongolia as a part of the Chinese empire - given the background of the Yuan and Qing dynasties - after the Soviet Union declared Outer Mongolia as a republic, China came to terms with the existence of Mongolia since the 1940s, although the CCP quickly established the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region even before the formation of the PRC. One main consideration behind Chinese efforts to secure and stabilise borders with Mongolia is to avoid any suspicions and tensions between the two sides given the historical nature of their relations. Specifically, given the equations between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia over a period of time, the security of Inner Mongolia is uppermost for the Chinese leadership. Cross-border movements suffered as both sides entered into a cold war following the Soviet skirmishes with China in the 1960s through 1980s. While Mongolia is sparsely populated (with less than 3 million), Inner Mongolia, on the other hand has more than 20 million inhabitants. Any generation of common identities between the two could pose concerns for the Chinese leadership. China is wary of the Mongolian Democratic Party's stance on "Greater Mongolia" agenda of "Uniting the Three Mongolias" [of Mongols in Mongolia, Inner Mongolia (in China) and Mongolian Buryatskaya (in

Russia)].¹⁰ When a call for forming “Inner Mongolian People’s Party” was made at Princeton University in March 1997, China’s concerns increased. To curb such pan-Mongolian nationalist movements, China is said to have followed a policy of expanding economic contacts with Mongolia, in addition to tying down the latter with legal guarantees and multilateral processes, and counter-terrorism efforts.¹¹

As a part of this strategy, China has insisted that Mongolia denounce “three evils” issue [viz., separatism, extremism and splittism]. This is a legal strategy that China started coinciding with the September 11 events in the USA. This is a strategy to counter challenges to China from groups in Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. The Mongolian leaders today have announced their support to the Chinese position on “splittist” phenomenon and oppose Inner Mongolian splinter groups position on nationalism.

To create more concrete stakes and bring about stability between the two regions, China has initiated annual economic cooperation meetings between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia. Specific areas of cooperation were identified in these meetings and both sides resolved to focus on mining, ports and transportation networks with a majority of such work initiated by the Chinese side. Baotou Steel, for instance has plans for extensive mining operations in Mongolia. As a part of this effort, railway networks are also being strengthened. On connectivity, China launched several programmes of roads and railways. One such project was launched in 2007 to connect Mongolia to a sea port in China. Three phases of railway lines have commenced between Inner Mongolia, Mongolia and Russia. These include:-

- (a) 487-km long railway line from Xinqiu (Fuxin City in Liaoning Province) to Bayan Ul in northern Inner Mongolia at a cost of \$790 million and to be completed by 2010. This line is to handle 12 million tonnes of coal in three to five years and 25 million tonnes in five to ten years and 35 million tonnes in 15 years
- (b) 230 km long line from Bayan Ul northward to Zhuengadabuqi Port, on the border of Mongolia.
- (c) The third section would stretch northward to Choibalsan City in Mongolia, where it would join the railway to Russia’s Borzja.

Further, towards the western regions of the country, controlling ethnic unrest in Xinjiang is another primary concern for China in its interactions with the Central Asian Republics as pan-Turkic movements spread throughout these regions. As a sovereignty and territorial-integrity related issue in China’s foreign policy, issues related to Xinjiang garner high priority for the country. This has also, in the post-9/11 global consensus, taken the form of countering terrorism in the region. Inter-linked to this phenomenon is the urge to control drug-trafficking routes in the Afghan-Central Asian Region as it was reported in the last decade that drug cultivation, export and seizures have increased, including in China.

With Central Asia, China borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 1999 all these disputes were resolved. With Kazakhstan, China’s disputed area amounted to about 944 sq km across the 1,700 km border. With a reported 57: 43 percent (i.e., 57 percent to Kazakhstan and 43 percent to China) formula a border deal was signed. Kyrgyzstan – China have a border dispute over 1,110 km. This was also resolved in 1999 but negotiations may reopen as no demarcation on the 150,000 hectares of land was made. China-Tajikistan resolved the land dispute over 400 km of border.¹²

While these disputes were resolved, some uncertainty prevails. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, several deputies of Kyrgyzstan Legislative Assembly called for the annulment of the border agreements signed with China in 1996 and 1999 that ceded Kyrgyz territory to China. It was reported that the transcript of the agreement details, tape recordings of the session, etc could not be traced in Bishkek. Consequently, the Kyrgyz government proposed to the Chinese government that the process of demarcation of the border be postponed. Nevertheless, on the whole, China’s border with these Central Asian states is relatively tranquil. China was also able to transform regional dynamics by engaging with the region in geo-energy politics and geo-economic integration.

While China had been able to relatively stabilise its western borders through a series of diplomatic and military measures (including “Peace Mission” counter-terrorism exercises with Central Asia and Russia), security challenges to the country remain unabated. While Taiwan had been identified as number one security challenge to the country since 1949, recent period saw a re-configuration in the country’s security challenges. China’s national security since the 2012 White Paper on National Defence was issued emphasised on countering “three evils” which broadly suggest challenges for China in Xinjiang and Tibet. The white paper termed these as the “biggest challenge” to the country. [See Appendix for the changing security discourse between 1995-2012]. This white paper, released on April 16, 2013 is China’s eighth white paper on defence with passages on national security environment and efforts made by China to counter these. The main purpose of this paper is to convey to the world China’s intentions, security perceptions and military capabilities to counter these challenges, enhance the country’s transparency as it became the second largest economy in the world; and broadly to drive out any negative image of the country in the international community. The previous seven white papers have reflected on these as well; and the current one continues to inform the international community about China’s perspectives on the security situation at the global and regional levels. The main thrust of this white paper is to suggest that the PLA is itching to go far away from China’s landmass to protect and expand China’s objectives and interests abroad.

The distinctive features of this paper, in comparison to the previous ones of this genre, include a self-declaratory announcement that China will play a significant role internationally “commensurate with China’s international standing” (after this phrase was inserted in the November 2012, 18th Party Congress of the CCP which brought in the new leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang), critique of United States rebalancing postures in the Asia-Pacific (in the light of the debates in the Obama-1 Administration), elaborations for the first time on conventional force structures and personnel, military exercises, unambiguous positions to carry forward pan-theatre military capabilities (even overseas operations such as the Chinese military conducted in Egypt and Libya), “joint[ly] safeguard the security of the international SLOC” (in the Gulf of Aden), a new task for the PLA of “safeguarding the peaceful labour of the Chinese people”; and finally the resolve to construct river projects across Yarlung Zangpo river in Tibet.¹³

This paper reiterated the country's independent foreign policy [See Appendix]; while it stated that the PLA will wage a local war under informationisation, and opposed to neo-interventionism, hegemony and power politics [generally attributed by China to the US], the naval and air forces as "strategic" forces (in addition to the traditional roles of the Second Artillery) and the like.

In this context, China views incidents related to the Uighur activism in Xinjiang and elsewhere as incidents of terrorism. To counter these, China had adopted several strategies. With the Central Asian Republics and Russia, China had conducted Peace Mission exercises annually with mainly counter-terrorism as the scenarios. China also conducted such counter-terrorism missions, of different magnitudes, with the US, the UK, France, Pakistan, India and others. It had participated in the post-September 11 global coalition on counter-terrorism in intelligence sharing, curbing illegal financial flows and the UN mandated missions. While China focused on this issue mainly in the continental spheres – especially in its western regions, it is also aware of the maritime dimensions of terrorism. Indeed, terrorism could also pose serious challenges to SLOC attacks on oil and gas tankers, blowing up of ports or hostage taking incidents.¹⁴

After the reform programme was initiated since the late 1970s, smuggling of goods to and from China increased substantially. Smuggled items include art relics, counterfeit currency and identity cards, cigarettes, drug and human trafficking, ivory, money laundering and small arms. Complicating the curbing of these activities is the rampant corruption among the ranks of the local customs, police and the military forces that are seen as abetting such crimes. In this context, the cases of Yang Kaiqing, a former truck driver in the army, General Ji Shengde (son of General Ji Pengfei) in the notorious multi-billion Yuanhua smuggling syndicate, involvement of triads and others can be cited.¹⁵

China intends to reform its domestic legislation and security apparatus. Countering piracy, drug trafficking, smuggling, terror-related incidents etc. are now being tackled by the Ministry of Public Security. It has an estimated 50 patrol boats and 2,000 mobile patrol teams in the coastal regions to counter piracy. Also, roles were assigned to the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Land and Resources and local governments. In addition, the China Maritime Safety Administration pitches in with counter-piracy combat missions. However, it was felt that these forces were inadequate to deal with the vast maritime territory. ¹⁶ In March 2013, China established a National Oceanic Administration by merging four maritime units - including the coast guard, organisation related to fisheries and anti-smuggling forces – for effective law enforcement duties.¹⁷

National Security Apparatus

For a country that identifies sharply its enemies and friends the security apparatus should be all-encompassing and effective with swift coordination among the constituent units. However, while the PRC inherited and gradually reformed the security apparatus over decades, the organisational set-up still needed to be updated. The security challenges have also become more diversified and complicated in the recent period with non-traditional security challenges mushrooming. The traditional institutional responses have been found quite inadequate to tackle these challenges and the old institutional structures needed to be reformed in the recent period.

While the PLA (and its predecessor Red Army of Workers and Peasants from 1927) helped the CCP to win battles against the Nationalist Kuomintang Party, establish and consolidate internally the PRC since 1949, it had acquired on the whole external missions of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even though many a time the PLA was directed to counter internal enemies of the CCP, its main missions remained external. To respond to the internal security challenges China had set up the Peoples Armed Police Force (PAPF) on June 19, 1982 with military and security missions.¹⁸ Broadly, its duties include protecting national security, life and property, curbing sabotage, defending social security, guarding installations, border and coastal defence, fire fighting, traffic, water conservation, power, gold mining, forest and transportation, etc. During peace time, the Ministry of Public Security exercises jurisdiction since 1987 over this force while in war time the Central Military Commission (CMC) exercises control for battlefield security, counter-infiltration duties etc.¹⁹ The August 2009 law of China provided the PAPF with legal powers to intervene to maintain law and order in the country. The PAPF has more than 1.5 million troops including 14 mobile divisions with about 100,000 forces for law and order and other duties. The force has been modernising to counter the new security challenges to the country; viz, "three evils". To enhance internal security mechanisms, in 2011, the budget for the PAPF was raised to over US \$95 billion, a figure higher than the allocations for the defence of the country. This allocation continued to rise recently. In 2013, the PAPF received \$123 billion in allocations (in comparison to \$115 billion for the military).²⁰

The late 2013 announcement of National Security Commission [NSC] indicates a rethinking and re-evaluation of the existing security apparatus in China in addressing security challenges, specifically on the inability of the current system to address crisis management aspects.²¹ President Xi Jinping was named the chairman of the National Security Commission, while Premier Li Keqiang and the speaker of the Parliament Zhang Deqiang were named as the vice chairmen of the NSC.²² As a Communist Party Central Committee body, answerable to the Politburo and its Standing Committee, it will be "making overall plans and coordinating major issues and major work concerning national security" according to an official statement. Further, its responsibilities include "construction of the rule of law system concerning state security, research, resolving major issues of national security, setting principles and policies, as well as stipulating and implementing strategies".²³ According to President Xi, "the variety of predictable and unpredictable risks have been increasing remarkably, and the system has not yet met the needs of safeguarding national security... Establishing a national security commission to strengthen the unified leadership of the state security work is an urgent need".²⁴

According to Senior Colonel Gong Fangbin of the National Defence University, the NSC will tackle five threats, including "unconventional security threats" such as countering extremist forces, ideological challenges to the culture posed by western nations, cyber security, etc.²⁵ While the Central Military Commission is to handle traditional security issues, the newly formed NSC is to address largely the non-traditional security challenges.²⁶ According to Li Wei of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations –

"...the [NSC] committee is an organisation that has the power to coordinate different government organs at the

highest level in response to a major emergency crisis and incidents which pose threats to the national security... China desperately needs an organisation like the state security committee to develop long-term national strategies to tackle the problem from its roots.²⁷

In practice, this new commission appears to be taking over some of the responsibilities already assigned to other organisations hitherto fore, not only to enhance the command system but also the responsive mechanisms.²⁸ One of the main high level apparatus in China had been the Small Leading Groups under the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members – the highest in China’s hierarchy of decision-making. Seven such Groups exist today under each of the seven PBSC members. As outlined by Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, these Groups discuss, sort out and take decisions on major walks of life of China. The following seven thus are significant in China:–

- (a) **Foreign Affairs Group.** Chaired by the General Secretary of the CCP/Premier of the State Council; includes members from Vice-Premier/State Councilor [Cabinet rank above the ministers]; International Liaison Department; defence, foreign, commerce and culture ministries; the party’s central Foreign Affairs Office, the party’s central news office, and General Staff Department of the PLA.
- (b) **State Security Group.** Chaired by General Secretary; PBSC member in charge of state security and public-security affairs, the senior military intelligence officer, and representatives from the State Council offices on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao affairs.
- (c) **Overseas Propaganda Group.** Consists of the heads of the party’s Propaganda and United Front Work Departments and the leaders of the party’s central news office, Xinhua, People’s Daily and the Ministry of Culture.
- (d) **Taiwan Affairs Group.** Chaired by General Secretary; PBSC members on Taiwan; coordinates the Taiwan-related work of the Ministry of State Security, the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, the PLA General Staff’s intelligence department, and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait.
- (e) **Hong Kong & Macao Affairs Group.**
- (f) **Finance & Economics Group.** Chaired by General Secretary/Premier.
- (g) **Energy Group.** Established in 2006 ; Chaired by Premier.²⁹

Next to this level after the Politburo are several National Leading Groups under the ministries. Thus the newly formed National Security Commission is likely to draw from the Foreign Affairs, State Security and Energy Groups advice, expertise and possibly, even the personnel in future.³⁰

Conclusion

China today is in the midst of a fundamental shift from the inherited security apparatus to that of forming new structures to cope up with the veritable challenges being faced by the country in the security field. The new leadership, under Xi Jinping since 2012, clearly understands that new circumstances need new institutional responses, although centralisation of powers under Xi is also one of the considerations in this effort. Clearly, the new leadership finds the recent spate of incidents at Tiananmen Square (Beijing) in October 2013, Taiyuan (Shanxi Province) in November 2013 and in Xinjiang – in addition to the popular protests across the countryside – as complicated to tackle with the old institutional mechanisms. The newly formed NSC is supposed to amalgamate many of the agencies, personnel and doctrines to the current conditions into a modularised mechanism. The NSC is also to be geared to tackle security challenges which have cross-border linkages at a time when China is linked up with these regions as it keeps raising its comprehensive national power indicators. Yet, while the new leadership in China has woken up to these challenges, it appears that some of these challenges are related to political legitimacy issues of representation and the CCP rule. With global financial crisis impacting on the growth rates and exports, resulting in unemployment, the CCP rule is expected to face more turbulence in the coming future. This is where the limitations of the security apparatuses of China will be exposed.

Appendix

China’s White Papers on National Defence, 1995-2013

White Paper	Verbatim remarks on national security/defence
November 1995	China’s national defence policy is defensive in nature. Its basic goals are to consolidate national defence, resist foreign aggression, defend the nation’s sovereignty over its land, sea and air as well as its maritime rights and interests, and safeguard national unity and security.
July 1998	Military factors still occupy an important position in state security.... Defending the motherland, resisting aggression, safeguarding unity and opposing split are the starting point and underpinning of China’s defense policy.
October 2000	China’s fundamental interests lie in its domestic development and stability, the peace and prosperity of its surrounding regions, and the establishment and maintenance of a new regional security order based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
	Strengthening national defense is a strategic task in China’s modernisation drive, and a key guarantee for

- December 2002 safeguarding China's security and unity and building a well-off society in an all-round way.... The fundamental basis for the formulation of China's national defense policy is China's national interests. It primarily includes: safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security; upholding economic development as the central task and unremittingly enhancing the overall national strength; adhering to and improving the socialist system; maintaining and promoting social stability and harmony; and striving for an international environment of lasting peace and a favorable climate in China's periphery.
- December 2004 The military factor plays a greater role in international configuration and national security.... China's national security environment in this pluralistic, diversified and interdependent world has on the whole improved, but new challenges keep cropping up. The vicious rise of the "Taiwan independence" forces, the technological gap resulting from RMA, the risks and challenges caused by the development of the trends toward economic globalisation, and the prolonged existence of unipolarity vis-a-vis multipolarity - all these will have a major impact on China's security.... The main tasks of China's national defence are to step up modernisation of its national defence and its armed forces, to safeguard national security and unity, and to ensure the smooth process of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way.
- December 2006 The growing interconnections between domestic and international factors and interconnected traditional and non-traditional factors have made maintaining national security a more challenging task.... China persists in continuing its peaceful development road. Balancing developments in both domestic and international situations, it is well prepared to respond to complexities in the international security environment.
- 2008 (issued in January 2009) China's security situation has improved steadily. China's overall national strength has increased substantially, its people's living standards have kept improving, the society remains stable and unified, and the capability for upholding national security has been further enhanced.... China is still confronted with long-term, complicated, and diverse security threats and challenges.... China is encountering many new circumstances and new issues in maintaining social stability. Separatist forces working for "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" pose threats to China's unity and security.
- 2010 (issued in March 2011) China is still in the period of important strategic opportunities for its development, and the overall security environment for it remains favourable.... China is meanwhile confronted by more diverse and complex security challenges. China has vast territories and territorial seas. It is in a critical phase of the building of a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way. Therefore, it faces heavy demands in safeguarding national security.
- 2012 (issued in April 2013) China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests. Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser. On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighbouring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation, and Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. The threats posed by "three forces; namely, terrorism, separatism and extremism, are on the rise.... Responding to China's core security needs, the diversified employment of the armed forces aims to maintain peace, contain crises and win wars; safeguard border, coastal and territorial air security; strengthen combat-readiness and warfighting-oriented exercises and drills; readily respond to and resolutely deter any provocative action which undermines China's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; and firmly safeguard China's core national interests.

Source : White Papers issued by the State Council and published at the official website : China.org.cn (various)

Endnotes

1. Some Chinese take national security to the period 1840 and is linked to the discourse of "century of humiliation" of China since the Opium Wars. See Chen Ou, "The Characteristics of China's National Security" *Journal of Politics and Law* Vol. 4, No. 1; March 2011 accessed at
2. Linda Jacobson argued that China's leaders focus currently is on domestic stability rather than on foreign policy. See "China's Foreign Policy Dilemma" Lowy Institute February 2013 accessed at
3. See David L. Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy" *The China Quarterly* No. 110 (June 1987) pp. 276-304; David Shambaugh, "China's 'Quiet Diplomacy': The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party," *China: An International Journal* 5, No. 1 (March 2007) pp. 26-54; David Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think-Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," *The China Quarterly* No. 171 (September 2002) pp. 575-596; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "China's Foreign- and Security-policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao" *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* vol. 3 (2009) pp. 63-97; Sun Yun, "Chinese National Security Decision-Making: Processes and Challenges" *The Brookings Institution* May 2013 accessed at
4. For instance, Pan Zhiping argued that China's various dynasties efforts to expand imperial rule to the peripheries have not encountered much opposition by the neighbouring empires and specifically in Xinjiang this led to the consolidation of China's rule historically. See "Xinjiang de dixiang zhengzhi yu guojia anquan - lishi yu xianzhaung de kaocha" [Xinjiang's Geo-politics and national security - investigating history and the present] *China's Border land History and Geography Studies* Vol. 13 No. 3 (September 2003) pp. 57-67
5. See "The Geopolitics of China: A Great Power Enclosed" *Stratfor* March 25, 2012 accessed at This duality of

geo-politics of opportunities and challenges were identified by Zhang Wenmu, "Zhongguo diyuan zhengzhi de tedian ji qi biandong guilu" [Changes in the characteristics and law of China's geopolitics] Daipingyang Xuebao Vol. 21 No. 1 (January 2013) Part One pp. 1-8

6. "The Geopolitics of China: A Great Power Enclosed" Stratfor March 25, 2012 accessed at
7. Yan Xuetong, Analysis of China's National Interests accessed at
8. See Dai Wei, "A clear signal of 'core interests' to the world" China Daily August 2, 2010 accessed at ; Xiao Qiang, "Dai Bingguo: The Core Interests of the People's Republic of China" China Digital Times August 7, 2009 accessed at While the core interests meant initially Tibet and Taiwan aspects, later, China's leaders started including South China Sea and Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands as well in these interests. For instance, China's foreign ministry spokesman stated on April 26, 2013 that "The Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it's China's core interest." cited by Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick and Craig Murray "China's "Core Interests" and the East China Sea" May 10, 2013 accessed at . See also, "China's declaration of key interests misinterpreted" Beijing Review, August 26, 2013 accessed at
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Bridging the Gap - Balancing Personal Aspirations and Service Requirements in the Armed Forces*

Commander Sunil Dogra@

Introduction

Personal aspirations are one of the most important factors that drive human beings to excel in any field. They change with times and grow stronger each day. A child at the threshold of adolescence aspires for a good life, name, fame and recognition in the society. After finding a suitable job, his aspirations gain momentum and they become more focussed. Now he wants to grow more at a personal level and strive even harder to meet his material as well as aspirational needs. The middle years bring in mixed fortunes and the aspirations keep varying. In later years he still nurtures his aspirations but they change to the level of self actualisation. At no point in time, a person is devoid of aspirations.

Over the years, the value system of our society has changed. The all-round flow of information brought in by the information age has brought a paradigm shift in the aspirations of our people. A common man, irrespective of his financial/social status is aware of the concept of fine and luxurious living - which hitherto was limited only to a few rich and famous people. Needless to say that he too yearns for a more fulfilling life which he feels is attainable with an extra effort, while he is young. Fulfillment of this aspiration entails quick success and climb to the top. But this arduous climb has its own share of casualties as it is able to accommodate only a few people at the top - leaving behind many disillusioned and bewildered souls at the half way mark.

A young man is a reflection of the civil society from which he comes. Once he adorns the military uniform, his aspirations start taking a definite shape. Now, he is at the threshold of a career where he wants to find the wings that would help him achieve his aspirations and turn his dreams into reality. However, the pyramidal structure of the Armed Forces cannot accommodate all the aspirants and some of them are superseded on the way up the ladder and many officers have to make a difficult choice whether to make an honourable exit from the Service or to stay on regardless of the ignominy of being superseded. A few officers take the difficult path of starting afresh in the civil world to seek success in an alternate career. Some lose their way and slide down into a life of anonymity. A few others stay on to serve till the age of superannuation - suffering remorse while serving in innocuous appointments, inspite of their professional qualifications. The officers who cannot reconcile to the reality of supersession, irrespective of the rank at which they get superseded, take the extreme step of seeking justice outside the military legal framework, to seek higher promotions in the Services.

Personal Aspirations of Officers

The Armed Forces provide an attractive and respectable career prospects at a very young age and are able to attract the best of the youth to join as officers. These men join the Services through a stringent selection process; followed by strenuous training, promise of a demanding life, steep pyramidal structure and a decent pay package. The very fact that a young man comes through a stringent Services Selection Board, followed by rigorous training as a Service officer, is a testimony of the quality of his character and professional competence. Does all this make him believe that he is as 'good as anybody else'? The answer is 'Yes', because the Armed Forces actually need only the best officers to lead their men - often against very heavy odds.

The initial years of service in the Armed Forces are full of adventure and very satisfying experiences. The closely nurtured feelings of patriotism, regimental spirit, honour and pride in uniform along with early recognition in society, keeps a young officer motivated to deliver his best to the organisation. The challenging task of leading his men in battle in most trying and difficult circumstances, often endangering his own life as also the lives of the men he leads, inculcates in him the feeling that he is second to none. Personal aspirations are confined to the task at hand and upholding the regimental spirit, heritage and honour. This selfless service ethos builds-up his self esteem and pride over the years and earns him a good reputation.

Later, in service career, numerous factors start playing on the mind of a young officer. His aspirations no longer remain confined to his own self; because expectations of his parents, wife, children and the society also begin to dictate his performance and destiny. As he begins to understand the Services ethos better, he wants to 'do well'. Unfortunately doing well in the Armed Forces involves climbing up the ladder with more 'Brass' on the shoulders. This is when some young officers become desperate to achieve higher ranks because of their misconception that they deserve it more than anyone else. Success, they feel would bring in more opulence for the family, higher privileges for himself, and increased respect and recognition in the society.

With a strenuous life and the ever existing prospect of being superseded, an officer in the Indian Armed Forces faces uncertainty at a very early stage in life. With limited promotion avenues, increasing family responsibilities, no alternate career opportunities; an apathetic political and bureaucratic set-up and the trials and tribulations of life in the Services, an officer is forced to take unusual measures to stay in the competition for promotions. Timely promotions not only provide more perks but also enable him to serve for a longer period. When despite his best efforts an officer is unable to pass through the narrow window of promotion avenues, he feels it is his right to seek justice through civil courts. This is also because of the anxieties caused by non availability of appropriate employment opportunities to officers on premature retirement in their early fifties.¹

Satisfying Personal Aspirations of Officers

Satisfaction of personal aspirations should not be limited to promotions only; hence creating more vacancies in higher ranks can never be an everlasting solution. The organisational and command structure of the Armed Forces needs to be kept intact and the authority inherent in a particular rank should not be diluted with more number of higher ranks. In view of the above, personal aspirations of officers need to be reviewed holistically, without tampering with the basic

foundation and structure of the Armed Forces. We need to adopt a three pronged strategy which involves:-

- (a) **Putting own House in Order.** Firstly, introducing objective and transparent promotions which ensure that only professionally competent officers attain the next higher rank at every stage – with no tolerance of sycophancy, favouritism and personal considerations. This would deter officers from going to the civil courts as they get to know the fact that promotions in the Armed Forces are strictly on merit. There are many other measures that could be instituted in-house to keep the officers motivated – despite their losing out on promotions.
- (b) **Sensitising the Government and Bureaucracy.** Secondly, the Government and the bureaucracy need to be more sensitive to the personal aspirations of the Armed Forces officers. An honourable exit with suitable re-employment for superseded officers would go a long way in not only reducing the number of civil court cases but would also attract bright young men to adorn the military uniform; thereby, reducing the alarming shortages that the Defence Services face in the Officer Cadre.
- (c) **Recognition in the Society at Large.** Thirdly, a career in the Armed Forces is more demanding, both physically and mentally. There is a need to make a concerted effort to seek better recognition and appreciation of the sacrifices the soldiers are required to make while performing their duties.

In-House Measures

Transparency in Promotions.

- (a) Most of the dissatisfaction among officers in the Armed Forces is due to inconsistency in promotions. The promotion policies and procedures followed in the Services are always shrouded in mystery with little or no transparency. An officer who is made to believe that he is generally doing well is shocked when he suddenly comes to know that he has not made it to the next rank. This is perhaps the main reason for his discontentment. The very basic Indian psyche of being 'good to one and all', does not permit the 'reporting officers' to counsel an officer being reported upon that he lacks certain qualities for the higher rank. Even when officers are formally counselled by the reporting officers, most of them fail to call a spade a spade. This results in a feeling amongst officers that since his superior had never apprised him that he lacks in certain qualities, he is a fit candidate for the next rank. The reporting officers, therefore, need to be more honest and straightforward in their approach while assessing an officer's potential for promotion and must apprise such officers in no uncertain terms why they consider a particular officer unfit for the higher rank. Merely writing adverse remarks in the confidential reports (CR) creates a sense of betrayal and a false belief that makes an officer overestimate his capabilities.
- (b) The next level at which transparency needs to be instituted is the promotion boards. There is a need to have a more objective assessment with little or no subjectivity. The objective assessment could be based on various factors and must not be heavily 'CR dependent'. It must cater for the officer's performance in various courses, decorations, awards, type of billets the officer has served and personal attributes recorded in the CR.
- (c) Bringing in more transparency in promotions would ensure that officers who are not fit for next higher rank and are made aware of their inadequacies, can plan an alternate career option at an early stage in life rather than be left stranded in their forties. This would greatly enhance the satisfaction levels amongst the officer cadre and would also give a boost to the image of the Armed Forces as a caring organisation.

Restoring Self Esteem. Ironically, officers when superseded are considered a burden on the organisation and downgraded to not so challenging assignments. This trend is even more damaging to the self esteem of an officer. The fact of the matter is that superseded officers are more conscientious in fulfilling their responsibilities because they want to prove a point and are seen to put in extra effort in discharge of their duties. But despite this, the prevalent thought process precludes such officers from being appointed to challenging assignments. Services can gain a lot by appointing officers based on their capabilities, experience, attitude and professional qualification. This would go a long way in restoring the self esteem of officers.

Preparing Officers for a Second Career. Most of the officers are ill prepared to find a suitable job when they quit the Services because they are not suitably qualified to take senior management positions in the corporate sector. The officers must be encouraged to pursue higher studies whilst in Service to ensure smooth transition to a second career. Indian National Defence University (INDU), which is now being set up should begin to conduct courses which can be offered to those officers who are unlikely to move up in the Service career.

Pro-Active Placement Cells. We need to infuse fresh blood into the existing placement cells of the Services. The placement cells need to be managed on the lines of the 'top eight' Business Schools and Engineering Colleges. We have a highly talented and experienced pool of officers who leave Services every year but there are no takers. Their market value needs to be worked upon, on the same lines as the civil world to ensure that our officers are absorbed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) as well as in the Corporate Sector. An indifferent approach coupled with insensitivity to their needs has resulted in many officers remaining unemployed after premature retirement from Service.

Spirituality at Work Place. Galen and West noted (in 1995) that growing number of companies are setting off on spiritual journeys to create a sense of meaning and purpose at work and a connection between the company and its people.² The Services also need to introduce the concept of spirituality at work place, not only to address the issue of the officers going to civil courts but also to cultivate a healthy relationship between the organisation and its human resources (HR). There are numerous thoughts, feelings and aspirations that occupy the mind of a Serving officer and there is an urgent need to fill the void created by unfulfilled aspirations. Spiritualism is a tool to prevent anxiety, envy, insecurity and even feeling of remorse and guilt, and act as a catalyst to improve employee-employer relationship within the Services.

A Sensitive Government

The disparities in promotion pattern and status of a defence officer vis-à-vis his civilian counterparts are glaring and have been debated and written about extensively and forgotten.³ Is it not a matter of great national importance that every Government in this Country irrespective of its ideology, finds the Armed Forces ‘an instrument of last resort’ on issues related from internal turmoil to providing succour to people affected by natural calamities. But no one in this Country has ever found time to address issues which address the legitimate concerns of the Services. There is an urgent need to restore the honour and pride of officers to not only bring them at par but to provide them an edge vis-à-vis the civil services on account of hazards of military service in matters like promotion, pay and allowances and other facilities. It is important to address the anomalies which are apparent and are severely affecting the morale of the Armed Forces officers.

It is ironical that a disciplined, trained and well educated armed forces officer does not find any takers in other Government organisations when he decides to quit after being overlooked for promotion in the Services. Despite all the inherent shortcomings in our system of governance, there is hardly any effort to absorb retired Defence Services officers in other Government organisations. Once an officer decides to take premature retirement at a young age, he is left to fend for himself and look for alternate employment in the Corporate Sector, where he has to start afresh. If the Government provides alternate employment to retired Defence Services officers, it would go a long way in providing the Country a pool of experienced officers to help in providing clean and transparent governance. However, there is a general indifference towards the Armed Forces which has resulted in overlooking the talent and capabilities of the retired Defence Services officers.

Recognition in the Society

In the 20 years after 1991 i.e. since economic liberalisation and globalisation, attractiveness of the military as a career option has dropped. A public survey in 1995, to gauge the popularity of a military career, revealed that among the career choices, “the armed forces rank at the bottom”.⁴ The youth today is striving for financially lucrative careers at a young age – which in their perception is not possible in the Armed Forces.

A military officer commanded a distinct place in the Indian society a couple of decades back and it was considered a singular honour when a young man from any family was commissioned into the Indian Armed Forces. There was an aura that surrounded a military officer and the rare sight of a soldier in the civvy street gave a sense of security to an onlooker. The troops marching through the villages at night during various exercises in border areas gave the village folk a sense of assurance that ‘all is well’. Every young boy was inspired to adorn the uniform of the Indian Armed Forces.

But it is not so any more. A young boy keeps a career in the Armed Forces as his last choice i.e. after he has exhausted all his options. Parents want their children to join the Civil Services or to become doctors, engineers, or to join the corporate sector. A career in such professions brings in a hefty pay package, more respect and prosperity for the family. Even the prospects of finding a suitable bride are brighter. So, where does that leave a military officer? The answer is that after serving 20 odd years in uniform he cannot even identify himself with the roots from where he started his military career and finds himself at crossroads with a dead end staring at him in all directions.

Recent incidents of corruption and other incidents related to the Defence Services, although not pardonable by any stretch of imagination, should not be overplayed in the media and elsewhere. Services have an in-house system of investigation; and this system is competent in finding facts as well as punishing the guilty. Furthermore, there are many stakeholders whose main aim is to demean the Services and create an adverse image of the Services. Such tendencies need to be curbed, to enhance the image of our Services in the civil society.

News of Service personnel approaching civil courts for justice and media hype on scams related to Defence Services depicts officers in poor light. Immediate remedial measures need to be instituted to prevent such aberrations. A more positive image of the Armed Forces needs to be created in the civil society and an officer in uniform ought to be seen as an honest, straightforward and efficient individual. For every scandal that is reported in the media there are hundreds of heroic deeds representing valour, sacrifice and bravery of our officers that go unreported. The Public Relations Organisation of the Services must be more pro-active to build a positive image in a society where media plays a key role in the formation of public opinion.

Balancing Personal Aspirations and Service Requirements

A Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices Markandey Katju and TS Thakur had expressed their concern by observing that “Armed Forces are disciplined, that is the reason why they do not protest or hold violent rallies. But they are returning medals in thousands and some have even burnt their artificial limbs in protest.” It identified lack of grievance redressal mechanism as the key reason. They even drew attention to Chanakya’s advice to Chandragupta as the king to take good care of the army since it was crucial for the security of his kingdom.⁵

These observations are an indicator to the extent of damage that has already been done to the Armed Forces in India. A serving officer will never protest in public, because the inherent military value system prevents him from doing so. But the protests by

ex-servicemen on issues ranging from unresolved anomalies from previous pay commissions (rank pay – 4th CPC), pensions, disability pensions to re-employment, reflect the cumulative effect of unfulfilled aspirations whilst they were in Service and after retirement. Do we need to do more for the personnel of the Armed Forces? Are their ways and means to meet the aspirations of Service officers whilst keeping the Service requirements in the forefront? The answer is an emphatic ‘yes’, provided a sincere effort is made by those who matter.

‘Service comes first always and every time’ and there is no doubt that the Armed Forces require officers with vision, charisma, intelligence and initiative to carry-out the most challenging and honourable task of defending our Country. There is a need to have energetic leaders at the higher echelons of power in the Armed Forces and there

should be no compromise when it comes to the issue of promoting the right man to the right job. But those who get left out on promotions, due to whatever reasons, also need to be accommodated – not in terms of higher promotions, but definitely in terms of pay, perks, allowances and recognition in the society. These officers need to be provided the requisite avenues to keep them motivated through measures like rehabilitation courses, foreign assignments, command appointments and recognition in terms of honours and awards. Civil society, media and political leaders can play a pivotal role in ensuring recognition and respect for the Service officers. The Armed Forces in particular and the Country in general will undoubtedly gain a lot if the personal aspirations of this group of officers, who form a large chunk at the middle level, are fulfilled.

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Command Challenges at Unit Level

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Introduction

Reams have been written on this subject and a number of 'leadership models' have been suggested. This heady mixture of definitions, theories and models is beguiling and intriguing by its sheer variety. It may not be within the scope of this topic to burrow deep in to the intricacies of research of command. However, while trying to identify the parameters for effective command in the 21st Century, one has to first objectively locate the key factor, which matters the most for evaluating the leader. The essence of military leadership is obtaining positive results for the organisation. It is the process of identifying and planning goals and achieving them through followers by providing direction and motivation.

Taking charge and establishing yourself as the commander is not something that can be imposed on an organisation. It is a shared process; a process which involves the commander, his subordinates, and his superiors. Taking charge of a unit is often described as winning the trust, confidence, and respect of superiors and subordinates alike. It requires mastery of the tactical, technical, administrative and leadership aspects of the job to establish the leader.¹

Environmental Changes that are Impacting Command

Macro-environmental Changes

Perhaps the single greatest difference to the environment affecting command philosophies, is that both leader and 'led' are increasingly reflecting a diverging set of values and beliefs, to those traditionally held by the Indian Army. In the last 20 years, there have been dynamic political, economic, socio-cultural and technological changes within society and, as a result, society is more 'permissive,' with the emphasis now on individual rights rather than responsibility towards the community or traditional organisations such as Armed Forces.

Therefore, the greatest challenge facing the Indian Army is that today's young officers and soldiers may simply not be willing to accept the traditional command principles of the past. The power to make life or death decisions over subordinates runs contrary to the increasing emphasis on the rights of the individual, expressed by the society from which recruits are drawn.²

What is Changing?

"Change is the only constant" is a cliché but it is important to identify the factors which are changing to emerge as challenges before the military leadership of tomorrow. These are as under:-

- (a) **Nature of Manpower.** The Indian Armed Forces have an unblemished tradition of voluntary recruitment for men and selection for officers. The officers have been 'leaders' and the men 'followers' in the classical sense.³
 - (i) **Officer Cadre.** The typical youngster vying for a career as an officer in the Services today predominantly comes from a middle class background, probably after exhausting options of other lucrative careers. Nevertheless, most young men who join the officer cadre today are better qualified, ambitious, competitive and calculative than their seniors who joined decades ago.
 - (ii) **Rank and File.** The effects of societal and economic transformation of our nation can be most vividly seen in the comparison of recruitment of the past and present. The typical recruit of yesteryears hailed from a rural milieu with an average academic qualification of matriculation. Most hopefuls today are the educated unemployed youth who turn towards military for acquiring early financial and social security with an average educational qualification of 10+2. The fact to be noted is that the average recruit of today is decently educated, aware, ambitious, often more conscious of his rights than obligations.
- (b) **Societal Transformation.** The Armed Forces are awakening to the reality that more the nation develops socially and economically; less will be the quality of manpower that they will attract. The deep penetration of the electronic media and their frequent indulgence in sensational reporting has insured that the romanticism surrounding military life has been demolished only to bare the hazards of combat.
- (c) **Advancement in Technology.** Today's age is described as the age of information Technology (IT), microchips, lasers and satellite applications. Information is regarded as the fifth dimension of warfare after land, sea, air and space.
- (d) **Nature of Warfare.** There is a general consensus that the nature of warfare in the 21st Century will become increasingly complex. Within 50 years, from an era of face-to-face (visual range) combat we have come to the age of nuclear ballistic missiles, 'smart' bombs, drones and cruise missiles. Moreover, myriad groups with vested interests and even nation states are resorting to innovative and unconventional methods of warfare described by terms like Low Intensity Conflict, Proxy War, Low Intensity Maritime Operations, Asymmetric Warfare and so on.⁴

Challenges for a Commanding Officer at Unit Level

Organisational Level Shortcomings

Hierarchical Barriers. In spite of the inherent value of multiple perspectives and feedback, perceptions about the potentially adverse impact of follower feedback on command authority have, in large measure, blocked the introduction of formal subordinate feedback systems and open dialogue in organisations. Participation in decision-making by junior

officers not only allows them to become part of the solution to problems, but also presents opportunities to develop their own leadership and command skills.

Need for More Effective Performance Evaluation. The persistence of command climate problems is due, in part, to insufficient and ineffective performance evaluation. While trends in productivity provide some indications about command climate, so many additional factors affect productivity that climate alone is not a reliable measure. The Army needs to consider defining, assessing, and reporting organisational effectiveness in terms of mission accomplishment (reliability, quality, efficiency, etc.) and organisational growth (team cohesion, trust in leadership, morale, and commitment, etc.).⁵

Individual Level Shortcomings

Commander's Self-Awareness. Self-awareness is defined as the ability to assess abilities and determine strengths and weaknesses in an operational environment, and learn how to sustain strengths and correct weaknesses. In other words, a Commanding Officer must be self-aware, knowing self and how to lead self so he can know and therefore lead others.⁶

Need for Improving Reinforcement. Command climate problems persist, in part, because the emphasis placed on a Commanding Officer's ability to develop an effective organisation and to create a healthy unit, pales by comparison to the priority placed on assessing his individual performance in terms of mission accomplishment. A Commanding Officer's developmental aptitude is measured best by those being developed, and best revealed by the overall effectiveness of the organisation.

The Interaction of Commanding Officer and Unit

The Army puts a premium on operational experience, as learning by doing is a hallmark of the military profession. There is insufficient feedback from higher to lower and lower to higher. Open dialogue is necessary for the growth of individuals and the organisation as a whole. Leaders, themselves, also have a large role in guiding their own professional development. Self-development is poorly operationalised in the Army, and it includes looking inward at one's own behaviour, and focusing on ways to improve the climate of the organisation.⁷

Stress factors in the Army

There are the classical stress management approaches, mainly directed at leadership, unit cohesion, identification of external stressors and general morale boosting measures. It is widely accepted that soldiers have different physical abilities and that training and assignment has to take this into account. In practice, however too little attention is still paid to the problem of the personal mental resistance. It's known that people, due to their particular genetics, life experience and sensitivities react to stress in different ways, at different times towards different stressors. Physical experiences are more universal than the mental stress and thus easier to extrapolate from personal experience to those of fellow-soldiers.⁸

Meeting the Challenges

A New Approach

To date, the military style of command training (and doctrine) has often focused on 'hard' skills such as planning, organising and directing, all within an impersonal hierarchical structure. However, current thinking (from both the corporate world and academia) is now shifting towards an increase in the importance of 'soft' skills such as communication and motivation. To undergo the necessary transformation in command philosophies and, therefore, to provide the relevant training, Commanding Officers will now have to accept the feasibility of working alliances with subordinates who question old practices and propose new solutions, and to think of the link between them, as essential as the link between strategy and operations.⁹

Meeting the Challenges

How will the Commanding Officer navigate his way towards the ultimate objective – success in mission? What measures can he take to address the issues being thrown up by the changing environment? Some measures are enumerated in succeeding paragraphs.

Managing Technology. Contrary to what some people believe, technological innovations will not reduce the importance of initiative at subordinate levels but increase it. In our context, the dominance of technology in the anticipated nature of warfare will be gradual, and few key areas that need attention are:-

(a) **Training.** Repeated exposure of officers and men to technological advancements related to their profession could help in smooth assimilation. Induction of state of the art simulators and training aids (like computer aided instruction packages) at academies, regimental centres and professional schools has to be a continuous process to ensure that training is as realistic and current.

(b) **Assimilation.** Already modern day advancements in military technology are trickling down to the end user in the Armed Forces. Equipments like global positioning system (GPS) sets, night vision devices, radars, digital communication sets, satellite receivers, personal protection equipment and so on have reached the man in the field. The onus of educating their men about the correct use, retention and preventive maintenance lies with the unit level leaders.

Developing Human Resource. A military force is said to be only as good as the leadership. At the same time, the days of 'follow me' are neither over nor will they ever be, as long as human beings are involved in warfare. There have been enough instances of friendly fire, desertion, refusal, indiscipline and stress related problems in conflicts. American

troops involved in Iraq is a vivid example of this truth. Let us try to identify the scope for developing human resource for the 21st century Indian Army. The areas are:-

- (a) **Addressing Aspirations.** As seen earlier, entrants at all stages, be it officer or soldiers, are better educated and well informed as compared to those of yesteryears. Rising awareness and education has increased aspirations and expectations. Soldiers today look beyond pay, food, the Patiala peg and a bedroll. Men are becoming increasingly perceptive about dignity and self esteem. Commanding Officers will have to consciously do away with unsoldierly tasks and mundane employment of men.¹⁰
- (b) **Altering Attitudes.** An attitudinal shift is required at two levels, with the first being from the senior leadership. It pertains to enhanced empowerment of Commanding Officers, especially those involved in combat related command assignments. The same allowance of space should also extend to administration and logistics related decision making which affects the morale of men. The second attitudinal shift relates to Commanding Officers and their relationship with the men. They need to view their men as repositories of rich experience and involve them in the scheme of things. This process already exists to some extent in many organisations but needs to be strengthened.
- (c) **Regaining the Advantage.** It has been a tradition in our forces to ensure 'institutional welfare', which means fulfilling all basic needs of the serving personnel in order to derive benefit from the resultant high motivation levels. Somewhere down the years, this tradition, handed over from the British days has been diluted. Commanding Officers will have to involve themselves actively to ensure that the levels of morale and motivation in their men remain high. They will have to come up with new ideas and solutions to reassure their men about their identity as members of an honourable profession.¹¹

Specific Anti Stress Measures

It is more realistic to continuously assess and select people according to their actual stress state than to dream of a 'one for all' solution to the stress problem. Two of the most important issues in stress management at unit level for a commanding officer are continuous stress detection and its prevention.¹² These are explained below :-

- (a) **Continuous Stress Detection.** Stress detection is a continuous problem for a unit, and it can be done on three levels in the unit:-
 - (i) **Buddy level.** Usually it's the friends and comrades who notice changes in an individual's mood and behaviour first. They have to be trained to mention their observations to the hierarchy.
 - (ii) **JCOs and NCOs level.** The junior leaders know their troops and can easily spot deficiencies. It helps to explain to them what to look for : changes of mood and/or behaviour, and to get them to report their observations in time to their Commanding Officer.
 - (iii) **Command level.** An experienced commander usually picks up things fast. It helps if command organises formal "stress-briefings" and explains to the staff the importance of mentioning, in time, deviation of mood or behaviour that they observe around them.
- (b) **Continuous Stress Prevention.** The armed forces have the advantage of being well organised and a structured organisation. This allows them to work preventively on the individual and on the unit level as under :-
 - (i) At individual level. The most difficult of propositions but in the long term the most promising new approach is the systematic 'relaxation' training of individuals. After identifying each individual's stress level, different relaxation techniques are possible, such as sports, gymnastics, yoga and meditation.
 - (ii) **At unit level.**
 - (aa) Keep the happenings in the unit transparent, along with the pros and cons of different procedures followed.
 - (ab) The Armed Forces, and often each regiment, have their own rituals like parades, religious functions, badakhana etc. These rituals soothe the mind and create a feeling of belonging.
 - (ac) Always keep the mind and body of soldiers occupied positively. It is at empty moments that people start to brood and imagine stressful events.
 - (ad) A healthy balance of 'rest & recreation' goes a long way in keeping the stress under control.

Command Philosophy

The most important and sacred responsibility entrusted to an officer of the Indian Armed Forces is the privilege of commanding a unit. Commanding soldiers and being charged with the responsibility of their professional development, and possibly their lives, is a big trust, and the soldiers understand this fact. No organisation can progress without this framework and, this forms the command philosophy - a framework which guides the commanding officers to operate in all environments. For any command philosophy to work, it must stand on its own merits, easily understood by all, and it must be the basic leadership standards which guide the organisation. The Commanding Officer must always keep in mind the importance of establishing high yet realistic standards which are met. The "four pillars" of command philosophy are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.¹³

Leadership Style

The old axiom, “Lead by Example”, will always serve you well. Commanders are constantly being scrutinised by others, especially their subordinates. They cannot have different standards for the troops, JCOs/NCOs and the officers. Effective two-way communication is essential to any organisation’s success. It is essential to make subordinates feel part of the team by keeping them informed and involved. Commanding Officers who identify with their troops and the unit will have a better appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of the unit.

Training

Commanding Officers must take an innovative approach to training while still concentrating on the basic soldier’s skills and battle drills at all levels. Training must be meticulously planned, innovative and challenging in its approach, and should be oriented to accomplish mission oriented tasks. It goes without saying that physical fitness is paramount to a successful training programme, as physical fitness is one of the greatest force multipliers on the battlefield. Good, challenging, realistic training promotes harmony and teamwork. A unit which possesses the confidence to execute their mission under any conditions, has competent leadership, and has exerted itself in training, will survive on the battlefield.¹⁴

Maintenance

Maintenance, property accountability and resource management must be integrated into combat operations by the Commanding Officers. Well trained operators and supervisors who know how to conduct ‘before’, ‘during’, and ‘after operations’ checks and services on equipment, are the foundation to any effective maintenance programme. A sound maintenance programme is a direct result of properly trained operators and direct leader interest and supervision. The best trained and best led unit in the Army will still fail, if the equipment will not support them in war.

Caring

Caring for soldiers for a Commanding Officer is ensuring that they know and perform their duties, possess discipline of high standards, and are trained well enough to accomplish the mission while ensuring their survivability on the battlefield. It also means to ensure they are provided the best leadership possible and that they are recognised for their efforts and rewarded. The maintenance of fighting edge and a high degree of combat readiness are the main challenges and these are directly linked to soldiers’ morale. It is the chain of command’s responsibility to assist in the resolution of soldier’s personal and family problems. Caring for soldiers begins the day they join the unit and an effective commander must understand this fact.

Conclusion

The work place is changing at a rapid pace, greatly influenced by shifting societal trends, technology and globalisation. These trends cannot be treated as separate issues; their interdependent effects will continue to exert powerful influences on the Armed Forces, its culture and how command is viewed and practised. Therefore, proactively adapting command philosophies to meet these challenges will enhance the overall effectiveness of the Army. Transformation of the Indian Army in the 21st century cannot occur without a command climate which ensures that the Army as an organisation is combat ready and effective. Effective command climate will not take root until effective measures and accountability are imposed.¹¹

The best leadership will not generate followers; it will generate other leaders. Thus, the main objective of an effective and successful commander will be to produce change, often dramatically and when highly needed. Commanders must transform people and organisations by defining and articulating a clear vision, and implementing effective strategies that inspire others by enabling them to reach their full potential.¹⁵

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Introduction

As Myanmar takes faltering steps towards democracy, a greater challenge confronts this nation emerging from years of military rule and international isolation – finding solution to the insurgencies simmering in the non-Burman areas since decades. While the results of this national reconciliation in Myanmar are crucial for this ethnically diverse country, they are equally important for India as the insurgent groups operating in northeast India have deep linkages with the ethnic armies of Myanmar which provide them with refuge, training and weapons. Reconciliation shall enable the Naypyidaw to administer these insurgency ravaged border areas effectively, thus reducing the drug-trafficking and illegal cross-border movement all along the 1643 kms unfenced border with India. Already devoid of bases in Bhutan and Bangladesh, improvement in the internal security situation in Myanmar leading to shift in focus of the Myanmar Army, also called Tatmadaw, from its borders with Thailand and China to its border with India, shall herald the beginning of the end for the insurgent groups operating in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland. But first, a solution has to be found.

A Fractured Nation

Myanmar is a diverse land. There are 135 recognised ethnic minorities which comprise one-third of the population. These minorities occupy about half of the total land area of Myanmar of 676,577 sq kms, mostly in the forested border areas and the remote mountains rich in jade, timber, gold and poppy. The entire population has been grouped into eight major national ethnic races viz; Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine and Shan. Among these, the Barmars (or Burmans) which populate the inland plains constitute 68 per cent of the total population, and are the dominant race occupying key positions in the government, military and economy. While the Burmans are Buddhists, the ethnic minorities are generally not, with majority of them being Baptist Christians. During the British rule, the then Burma was administrated separately as ‘Burma Proper’ dominated by Burmans and the ‘Frontier Areas’ populated by ethnic minorities. The exclusion of ethnic minorities from political power fuelled insurgencies even before the Union Jack was lowered in Rangoon.

The efforts of General Aung San led to the historic Panglong Agreement in 1947 wherein the representatives of the government and the Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic minorities reached a consensus. This agreement promised complete autonomy to the frontier regions after Independence in return for their support for the formation of the Union of Burma. The ethnic minorities also had the option of seceding from the Union 10 years after Independence. However, Aung San was tragically assassinated in July 1947 and these promises faded away. Soon a cocktail of communist ideology, instatement of Buddhism as the official religion and marginalisation of minorities led to numerous insurgencies blooming after Independence in January 1948.

The conflict was first initiated in 1948 by the China supported Burma Communist Party, some elements of the People’s Volunteer Organisation, and members of two army battalions. In January 1949, the predominately Christian Karens, organised under Karen National Defence Organisation began fighting for an autonomous Karen state ‘Kawthoolei’ in the eastern part. The other minorities like Chins and Kachins, both inhabiting the areas contiguous to the Indo-Myanmar border also rebelled, inviting heavy military response. Things worsened when the military junta institutionalised a unitary state with a new constitution in 1974 which no longer guaranteed the ethnic autonomy granted at Independence. Later, the junta signed a few ceasefires in 1994. They did not last very long. Some of the ethnic armies, who had signed the 1994 ceasefire, started rearming themselves after the Myanmar Army asked them to assimilate with the Border Guarding Forces (BGF) and come directly under junta’s rule. Except for few small groups, none of the ethnic armies agreed, leading to conflict escalation. The 2008 Constitution formalised the military-dominated centralised power structure leaving only negligible power to Myanmar’s seven divisions and seven ethnic states. The ethnic armies refused to accept the 2010 elections as legitimate and fighting intensified.¹

The Myanmar Connection

India shares border with Kachin State, Sagaing Division and Chin State. In Myanmar, ethnic minority populated provinces are called states while Burman populated provinces are called divisions. The perpetual civil war in Myanmar is deeply entwined with the conflicts in India’s northeast. The Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups who migrated from Myanmar in the last century are settled along the border areas in Assam, Manipur and Mizoram in significant numbers. These groups share ethnicity in Myanmar where borders are unfenced and hardly administered by Naypyidaw. The Nagas who are also spread on both sides of the border treat the International Border (IB) with same disdain as the Pashtuns treat the Durand Line. It was a 140 strong ‘China Group’, led by Th Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu and SS Khaplang who on their return from China opposed the Shillong Accord and launched National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) from bases inside Myanmar. From 1988 onwards, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) started sending its cadres for military training to Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Myanmar. In May 1990, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), along with NSCN(K) and ULFA floated a pan-Mongoloid coalition called the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front to wage a “united struggle for the independence of Indo-Burma”.

Manipuri insurgent groups like UNLF and People Liberation Army (PLA) and smaller groups of Kukis and Zomis have established camps in Sagaing Division, Kachin State and Chin State. ULFA, National Development Front of Bodoland (NDFB), PLA and UNLF also utilise NSCN(K) camps in Sagaing Division for shelter and training. Meanwhile, NSCN(IM) has allied itself with the KIA and Chin National Liberation Army to facilitate arms smuggling. All these insurgent groups obtain weapons from clandestine sources on the Sino-Myanmar border. Some of these weapons originate in China’s Yunnan province while others are made in gun factories in areas in northeastern Myanmar. The largest rebel group of Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), due to their close ties with China, act as a broker for Chinese-produced arms as well as sell weapons from their arms factory near Panghsang. ULFA’s army chief, Pares

Barua is believed to be taking shelter at Taka in Myanmar along with a large number of cadres. Taka is a PLA base near Chindwin River.

Prelude to Reconciliation

A national reconciliation first requires the guns to fall silent. Therefore, Myanmar government is attempting a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) covering all ethnic rebel groups. The NCA shall allow ethnic armed groups to travel freely without weapons across demarcation lines and across the country. The NCA will also allow these groups to establish liaison offices where necessary and enable humanitarian actors to deliver assistance in conflict areas.² Towards this end, the Myanmar government has signed various agreements with the ethnic armies. The 25,000 strong UWSA was the first to sign ceasefire agreement with the civilian government in 2011. The Wa Hills are a part of Shan State and the UWSA is demanding a separate state for the ethnic Wa people. However, this ceasefire is uneasy and UWSA continues to acquire weapons and advanced equipment like helicopters, armoured vehicles and man-portable air defence systems. All these weapons are acquired from China which is wary of losing its dominant role in Myanmar to the West and is keen to retain its leverage.³

The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government in January 2012. However, sporadic clashes still continue between the RCSS' military wing - the 6,000 strong Shan State Army-South and the Myanmar Army.⁴ Another Shan group, the Shan State Army-North has received support from UWSA which fears that it shall be next targeted by the Myanmar Army if KIA is militarily defeated. After fighting for six decades, the Karen National Union and its military arm, the 7000 strong Karen National Liberation Army signed an agreement with the Government in January 2012, though clashes still persist. The Karenni Nationalities Progressive Party and the Government signed a peace deal in June 2012 which is being adhered to. However, the five-point agreement with the Arakan Liberation Party signed in April 2012 has seen more violations than compliance. The Chin National Front (CNF) and its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), were founded in the late 1980s to fight for the political rights of the Chins. It is active along the Indo-Myanmar border and they regularly cross this porous border. The CNF signed a peace deal in January 2012, the New Mon State Party in February 2012, and the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation in August 2012. The Pa-O (also known as Pa-Oh) are an ethnic group in Myanmar, comprising approximately 600,000 people.

KIA was founded in 1961 and is the second largest armed group with 10,000 rebels. Sporadic fighting continues in the Kachin Hills which lie opposite eastern districts of Arunachal Pradesh. Early 2013 saw heavy fighting between the Myanmar Army and the KIA near Lajayang including use of fighter planes, helicopter gunships and artillery by Myanmar Army. This makes Kachins the only major ethnic group that has not reached a truce. But just short of a ceasefire, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the Government signed an agreement on May 30, 2013 to reduce violence by instituting a monitoring mechanism to avoid the escalation. After this agreement, UN was allowed to deliver aid to displaced persons in KIA controlled areas. The war in Kachin State has forced more than 80,000 people to flee their homes.⁵

Myanmar Nagas Turn Inwards

Nagas are one of the 135 recognised ethnic minorities in Myanmar. The political consciousness created by NSCN, assisted by a common religion, pulled the Myanmar Nagas into the ongoing conflict in India. Later, the chimera of Greater Nagaland or Nagalim shrewdly crafted by NSCN (IM) kept them in this intractable conflict. The NSCN (K) chief, SS Khaplang is a Hemi Naga from Myanmar and the NSCN (K) has an approximate strength of 1000 armed cadres in Myanmar.⁶ Their involvement in Nagaland shall reduce as the Myanmar Nagas are looking inwards to where they belong and make peace. On April 9, 2012, the Myanmar Government representative, the Sagaing region minister for security and border affairs Colonel Kyi Naing signed a five-point ceasefire agreement with NSCN(K) representative Y Wangtin Naga, a Konyak Naga from Mon district of Nagaland. It was a rare event of an Indian insurgent group signing an agreement with a foreign government. This ceasefire agreement paves way for autonomy to the NSCN (K) in three districts of Myanmar: Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun of Sagaing Division. NSCN (K) is allowed to open a sub-office in Hkamti district and the agreement provides for its cadres to move 'unarmed' across Myanmar. The Nagas are indeed thinking long-term. The 2008 Myanmar Constitution provides for the grouping together of Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun in a Naga self-administrative zone, which indicates that the autonomy deal is a part of a comprehensive deal by Naypyidaw. NSCN (K) is now likely to focus on Myanmar, making it easier for the Indian Government to sign a peace deal with NSCN (IM).

Reconciliation Process

In November 2013, for the first time in the history of Myanmar, the Government and leaders of 20 ethnic groups met at Myitkyina to find a solution. Apart from the presence of almost all major ethnic groups, the meeting was significant for being attended by Vijay Nambiar, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, and by Wang Ying Fan, China's representative. The only significant absentees were the UWSA, NSCN (K) and Kuki National Organisation. The government has also set up Myanmar Peace Centre, a Government appointed body to coordinate peace efforts. However, difference of opinion and the no-war-no-peace with the Kachins ensured that a roadmap for reconciliation is not yet in sight despite the efforts of Government's chief peace negotiator Aung Min. In February 2011, about 12 rebel ethnic groups including Kachin, Shan, Karen, Mon, Karenni, Pa-O and Chin formed themselves in an alliance named United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) for better negotiations and to project a united front. But the UNFC does not represent all ethnic groups, the UWSA being the most prominent non-member.⁷

The main demand of UNFC is federalism and rewriting the 2008 Constitution. The UNFC has also made it clear that the peace process cannot move forward until Kachins reach an accord. The ethnic groups presented an 11-point proposal which included the establishment of a federal army. On the other hand, the Government insists that the ethnic groups accept in-principle the 2008 Constitution which formed basis for the November 2010 elections and the election of Thein Sein government. The Government also insists that the rebel armies must transform themselves into political parties, participate in elections and thereafter suggest constitutional changes through parliamentary

processes. This is a non-starter for the ethnic groups. The UNFC maintains that the Government must fulfill the promise of the 1947 Panglong Agreement to establish a federal union with internal autonomy for ethnic minority groups.

Obstacles to Peace

There are many obstacles to the transition of Myanmar into a federal union of empowered ethnic states. The Burman dominated Myanmar Army, which has fought ethnic insurgencies for decades, views itself as the sole protector of the country's territorial integrity. The generals feel that federalism may eventually lead to balkanisation of Myanmar. A renewal of large-scale fighting will severely damage the prospects of economic growth in Myanmar and convince many generals who are uncertain of President Thein Sein's reform agenda that democracy only leads to chaos.⁸ But the ethnic groups maintain that the Panglong Agreement and the 1947 Constitution legitimises their cause and the right to self-determination. They want to replace the 2008 Constitution based over-centralised structure by federalism and regional autonomy. For decades, these political demands had been dealt militarily resulting in constant civil war. As a result, over 150,000 refugees have been forced to take shelter in neighbouring countries.⁹ This includes about 100,000 Chin refugees in Mizoram.

As long as people continue to die because of their religion or ethnicity, it is nearly impossible for non-state actors to change their perceptions of the Government.¹⁰ Even the change of the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 was controversial as Myanmar is the historical name of the majority Burman race. The ethnic minorities also feel that the new flag as prescribed by the 2008 Constitution is another indicator of their exclusion as the stars on the old flag represented the ethnic minorities while one star in the new flag represents only Burmans.¹¹ The Government has also been misusing ceasefire as a substitute for political changes. Previously, Myanmar government had signed ceasefire agreements with 17 ethnic armed groups between 1989 and 1997 wherein the armed groups were allowed to retain their arms and their territory in return for a ceasefire. This did not bring peace. Long ceasefire between KIA and the Government saw vast amounts of timber, jade and precious minerals being smuggled to China by the rebel leaders. Such nominal ceasefires, allowing the rebel groups to indulge in rampant exploitation of natural resources, sees a spurt in opium trade and loss of popular support for the group. When the agreement breaks, the fighting resumes and the locals again rally. The situation returns to where it was, less large tracts of denuded hills, increased poverty and prosperous rebel leaders.

Myanmar has a long tradition of political Buddhism. This Buddhism, as captured on TV cameras of monks leading protests, has been closely associated with nationalism because of its roots in the struggle against British colonial rule in the last century. This leaves little room for the religious minorities.¹² It is particularly true for the minorities like the Rohingya Muslims which are not recognised as ethnic minority, leading to identity crisis. The violence against Rohingyas has led to demonstrations in India and possibly the bomb blasts at Bodh Gaya. Further, this classification of 135 ethnic minorities is itself flawed and is described as a divide-and-rule policy by the community leaders. In Kachin State, where community leaders have made efforts to unite tribe and linguistic groups, the Government has divided them into nearly a dozen different groups, of which most are accurately described as sub-tribes, clans and extended families. A more realistic estimate would put the number of distinct ethnic groups in Myanmar at between 20 and 30.¹³

Way Forward

The ethnic minorities of Myanmar do not want secession. In fact, their demands have now diluted to limited autonomy and special privileges for indigenous population to promote development. But first, Myanmar requires a new Constitution. The Union of Burma was established after an agreement was reached for autonomy to the frontier people. The denial of this political right to the frontier people, now called ethnic minorities, has been the *casus belli* for six decades. The amendment to the 2008 Constitution would allow states to choose their own chief ministers who are currently appointed by the central leaders. The right to choose their own chief executive will motivate the people to participate in elections.¹⁴ An amended Constitution is also necessary for Suu Kyi to be eligible for President as the present constitution specifies that anyone whose spouse or children are foreign citizens are ineligible for the post of President. The Government needs to withdraw the Myanmar Army from the ethnic minority territories and grant them autonomy. The ethnic armies are unlikely to surrender their arms unless convinced that the Government is sincere about equality of rights and autonomy. Myanmar shall assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in early 2014. At this juncture, it is important to amend the Constitution and the Myanmar Parliament has formed a 109-member committee in July 2013 to review the Constitution.

Conclusion

The democratic transition in Myanmar shall be incomplete without the ethnic minorities. Narrowing the trust deficit is the biggest challenge for the reformist Thein Sein. A nation-wide ceasefire in 2014 shall be a major victory for peace. The efforts of Myanmar to usher democracy and peace have been met halfway by the European Union and the USA by partially lifting sanctions. While China has not made its position clear apart from the intention to retain a key role, the reconciliation in Myanmar shall be a very positive development for India. It shall rob the Indian insurgent groups of sanctuaries in Myanmar, reduce drug trafficking and make Myanmar conducive for increased trade and investment; thus also giving a boost to India's 'Look East Policy'. There are great expectations from Aung San Suu Kyi, the demure daughter of the great Burmese hero General Aung San who was assassinated when she was only two years old. She has been raised with a strong sense of her father's unfinished legacy resulting from non-adherence to the decisions of 1947 Panglong Conference. Suu Kyi has hinted at convening a conference to discuss minority issues with representation from the Government as well as the ethnic minorities; perhaps a second Panglong Conference to finalise a grand reconciliation. It is yet to be seen whether she will play a Mandela for Myanmar or not.

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Introduction

The impending North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) withdrawal from Afghanistan against the backdrop of Taliban ascendancy and Karzai's recalcitrance bodes ill for South Asia's security. While the jury is out regarding the achievements of NATO's campaign in Afghanistan, India's security is likely to be gravely affected by its consequences. In the past, India had subjugated its security interests in Afghanistan to the requirements of a US more interested in Pakistani support. Now with both Afghanistan and Pakistan destabilising, India faces a security conundrum with no easy solutions in sight.

India's Engagement in Afghanistan

Indo - Afghan Relations. India, with links to Afghanistan dating to the Kushan Empire (1st century CE), has long been popular with the Afghans as a source of cultural and economic wealth. Since 1947, common enmity with Pakistan was a strong driver in relations resulting in Pakistani insecurity. More recently the Taliban, encouraged by Pakistan, sent many Afghans for jihad in Kashmir to avenge India's acceptance of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan.¹ India responded by supporting the Northern Alliance which later contributed to the NATO victory over the Taliban in 2001. Thereafter, however, NATO marginalised India to assuage Pakistan and restricted its role. India continued to engage Afghanistan in the social, educational and economic fields, emerging as Afghanistan's sixth largest donor.² It invested in major infrastructural projects including the Pul-i-Khumri power line, the Salma dam power project, construction of the Parliament and reconstruction of the Delaram-Zaranj road. It even committed to a six billion investment in the Hajigak iron ore mine. It also provided many educational scholarships and training to bureaucrats and military officers.³ While this generosity has generated considerable goodwill amongst the Afghans, it has not resulted in strategic leverage, leading to India's likely isolation on Afghanistan in the post NATO dispensation.

India's Objectives in Afghanistan. India's likely political objectives are to ensure a friendly regime in Kabul and reduce security threats to India; limit Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan; enable free access to Central Asia through Afghanistan and protect its economic investments. Its important economic objectives include developing Afghanistan as a market, investment destination and as a source for natural resources. It also wants to implement the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project which could potentially transform regional energy dynamics.⁴ India can achieve these objectives only by ensuring the containment of the Taliban.

India's Limitations. India's greatest constraint is poor access to Afghanistan and the problematic compulsions of transit through Pakistan and Iran. While India is denied access by Pakistan for historical reasons, the approach through Chabahar Port in Iran has been hostage to the US-Iran tensions. Another problem is India's lack of credibility among the Pashtun groups who form the Taliban due to India's historical proximity to the Northern Alliance. The lack of the means and the will to militarily address the Taliban also has reduced India's leverage in Afghanistan.

Key Factors Affecting India's Policy

American Pressure. As NATO operations expanded into the 'counter-insurgency' phase, Pakistan's criticality grew manifold both for logistics and to supposedly contain the Taliban. Pakistan effectively leveraged this influence to pressurise the US into limiting Indian involvement in Afghanistan, accusing India of backing the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baluch separatists. India meekly accepted this subaltern role and was sidelined both in the existing security arrangements and in the post withdrawal dispensation negotiations. Since India had always advocated no compromise with the Taliban, it now stands isolated as the US seeks a face-saving exit from Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Internal Dynamics. India fears that the radicalisation of Pakistan would lead to increased Pakistani support for the Kashmiri insurgency and terrorism in India. With its focus on economic growth India is loath to get mired in a conflict with Pakistan. Assuming that an overt security posture in Afghanistan would provoke radicals into more violence against India, it limited its involvement.⁵ Whether this strategy will actually succeed and ensure peace between Pakistan and India now appears doubtful.

Relations with Iran. India has depended on Iran for access to Afghanistan. After 9/11, India and Iran agreed to develop a route from Chabahar Port in Iran to Delaram in Afghanistan via Zaranj, to bypass Pakistan.⁶ This was to form part of the larger International North - South Transit Corridor (INSTC) linking India to Central Asia, Russia and Europe. Though India constructed the Zaranj - Delaram road at a cost of hundred million dollars, the port project fell victim to Iran-US tensions. Improving Iran-US relations and the prospect of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, have given fresh impetus to this project.⁷

Afghanistan Post 2014 - A Bleak Prognosis

Contours of Withdrawal. Notwithstanding Karzai's recalcitrance⁸ and the US threats⁹, Afghans hope that sufficient NATO forces would remain to ensure security. Given the blood and treasure the US has already committed, it is unlikely that it would allow Afghanistan to collapse and become a terrorist haven again. Reports indicate that a force of eight to twelve thousand is being contemplated for assisting the Afghan National Army (ANA).¹⁰ Presently, however, notwithstanding assurances from other Afghan leaders, future security dynamics remain volatile.

Political Scenario. The elections in 2014 may witness the electorate splitting along ethnic lines with the minority Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks as well as long dormant groups like the Hezb-e-Islami, Jamaat-e-Islami and Junbeshi-e-Mili seeking power to counter the Taliban. Karzai may resign but is likely to back a member of his Popalzai clan for president. Overall, the competition between the Afghan National Front (ANF) and the National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA) as well the power brokers from Western and Northern Afghanistan, is likely to generate instability in an already

fractured country.

Fall-out of the Saudi-Iran Proxy War. The growing Sunni-Shia schism in the Islamic world, characterised by covert Saudi-Iran strategic competition, is likely to have major fall-out in Afghanistan. The Saudi-Iran proxy war in Iraq, Syria and Yemen has currency in Afghanistan too as both countries have traditionally backed opposing sectarian groups. The growing chill in Saudi - US ties and improving Iran-US relations may well drive the Saudis deeper into the Taliban's fold. With both Iran and Pakistan, a traditional Saudi ally with powerful Wahabbist radical groups, bordering Afghanistan, the supply of materiel to sustain a long and bloody conflict is assured.

Security Scenario. Given the Taliban's success over the NATO, it is likely to seek power in Kabul militarily; notwithstanding, any deal it signs in 2014. While residual NATO support to Afghanistan may hinder this campaign, without substantial external assistance, the Taliban's success is highly probable. If Iraq, where the insurgency had been largely neutralised prior to the US withdrawal, is an example of how invaded countries fare post the withdrawal of NATO; the prognosis for Afghanistan, where the Taliban holds the edge, is extremely grim.¹¹ Post 2014, Afghanistan is likely to decline into an unstable, ethnically divided cauldron with the Taliban controlling the Pashtun dominated South and East while the Hazaras, Tajik and Uzbek consolidate with their militias in the North and West. The most ominous fall-out of this scenario however is that for the first time since the British rule, radical militant Pashtuns would control both sides of the Durand Line and the areas which constitute the Pashtun 'homeland', a scenario which is replete with dangerous ramifications for Pakistan.

Implications for Pakistan

Blowback from Afghanistan. Once the Taliban consolidate around the Durand Line, the TTP and anti-state Pakistani groups are likely to intensify their violence against the state. Even ISI sponsored groups, like the Haqqani Network, may not stay true as the Pakistani Army discovered when one of its generals, who espoused the Taliban cause, himself was assassinated.¹² Pashtun control over the Durand Line is likely to generate a violent campaign for the union of all Pashtun areas divided for the past hundred and twenty years. Since the Pashtuns are integral to Pakistani society and serve in large numbers in the Army, such a campaign has the potential to spark off a civil war leading to secession or separation from Pakistan on the Kurdistan model.¹³ Thus, when NATO intervened in Afghanistan it was only that country which was affected but now in 2014 as it withdraws, nuclear armed Pakistan too faces implosion.

Radicalisation, Ethnic and Sectarian Violence. Pakistan's present predicament is the result of radicalisation of its society begun by Zia. The State, including the military, is unwilling to act against radical groups who have gained popular support by their opposition to the US and its drone strikes. The diffidence of the state has caused people to lose faith in its ability to protect them and has led to every section of society clamouring for peace with the TTP, despite the latter's proclaimed agenda of sharia. Military campaigns in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan have generated intense resentment against the Punjabi dominated state exacerbating fissiparous violence. Weak central rule has led to a dramatic increase in violence in Baluchistan; and calls for a separate Mohajir state in Sindh.¹⁴ Poor security has also led hard line Sunni groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to escalate sectarian violence against Shias especially, among ethnic minorities like the Hazara. Thus Pakistan faces an existential challenge; and even the Pakistan Army, the one force which could unify the country, may find it difficult to prevent a collapse. The scenario of Afghanistan and Pakistan disintegrating violently along ethnic and sectarian lines into unstable provinces ruled by radical Islamic regimes, cannot be ruled out and has catastrophic consequences for India and the world.

Conclusion: Implications for India

The truest barometer of the fall-out from Afghanistan's security situation on India is the intensity of the Kashmiri insurgency: violence in Kashmir peaked after Taliban success in 1995, ebbed after the NATO captured Afghanistan in 2001 and showed a worrying increase in 2013, as the NATO drawdown began.¹⁵ The cease-fire between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir too nearly broke in 2013 for the first time since it was signed in 2003, with nearly ninety six violations by Pakistan alone.¹⁶ Thus with the growing influence in Pakistan of radical groups, many with origins in the Kashmiri struggle, peace with India becomes difficult. Post 2014 these groups, supported by the Taliban buoyed by the 'defeat' of a second super power in three decades, are likely to resuscitate the Kashmiri insurgency. For a beleaguered Pakistan a jihad in Kashmir is not entirely unwelcome as it would enable the state and the military to make common cause with the radicals and unify the people behind the state. The Pakistan military may assume, from past Indian strategic behaviour, that its nuclear umbrella would provide deterrence from Indian retribution. Therein lies the danger, as since the Mumbai attack, the Indian public's tolerance for terrorism from Pakistan and the political space for peace may have reduced considerably, setting the stage for retaliation escalating into a larger conflict with a nuclear backdrop, the contours of which may be unpredictable. If India is to prosper and avoid war, it needs to ensure its security by containing the threat from Af-Pak. The Taliban need to be stymied in Afghanistan by strengthening all anti-Taliban forces especially the Afghan Government. To achieve this, India needs to cooperate with affected countries, especially the US and Iran. Only a proactive diplomatic campaign matched by commensurate security commitments would contain the Taliban. As US dependence on Pakistan reduces, greater congruence with India on Afghanistan would emerge.¹⁷ In case India chooses to play a larger part in the US 'pivot' to Asia, the synergy would increase. This would be critical if the Taliban renege on any peace agreement signed prior to the NATO withdrawal, a distinct possibility. The rapprochement between Iran and the West too, offers India new opportunities to push for a multilateral strategy in Afghanistan. China, with great influence over Pakistan, is another unlikely partner whose interests match India's in Afghanistan.¹⁸ Given its stakes India should be prepared to commit fully to the Afghans as half-hearted diplomatic manoeuvres, vacillation over military support to Afghanistan and pandering to the US and Pakistani sensibilities may not guarantee India's security in the long term.

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Introduction

Today, computers control much of our civilian as well as military infrastructure, including communications, power systems, banking and healthcare. The Internet provides nearly universal interconnectivity of computer networks, with no distinction being made between civilian and military uses. It has the capacity to carry data across the countries, continents and oceans of the world. The Internet has expanded rapidly at a global scale and has been the most powerful technological revolution known in the history of mankind. In just 18 months, between December 2010 and June 2012, the number of individuals actively using the Internet increased from an estimated 36 million to more than 2.4 billion. There has also been a phenomenal growth in military reliance on computer systems. This has introduced a “fifth” domain in which wars may be fought, besides the conventional domains of land, sea, air and space. Given the increasing reliance on information systems in general and access to the Internet in particular, critical military and civil infrastructure is growing more and more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Some have even likened the potential of cyber weapons to inflict damage to that of nuclear weapons.

Cyber warfare, unlike nuclear warfare, is not just the province of the industrial nation-state. Terrorist groups, whether state-sponsored or independent, domestic or international, as well as organised crime syndicates and individuals, are equipped with cyber technologies with which they can launch cyber attacks. The potential of cyber capabilities to cause serious harm to an adversary is no longer theoretical. During the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly gained unauthorised access to a Soviet computer to install a malicious code, called a logic bomb, which the CIA subsequently used to destroy a Soviet natural gas pipeline in 1982. An expertly conducted cyber attack could destroy a nation’s economy and deprive much of its population of basic services, including electricity, water, sanitation, and health. Cyber attacks and cyber warfare undoubtedly present new and difficult legal problems.

Cyber Warfare

Cyber activities can span from cyber crime to cyber espionage to cyber terrorism and all the way to cyber attacks and cyber warfare. The term cyber warfare refers to warfare conducted in cyberspace through cyber means and methods. Warfare is commonly understood as the conduct of military hostilities in situations of armed conflict. Cyber attacks comprise efforts to alter, disrupt or destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them. They may vary in terms of target (military versus civilian, public versus private), effect (minor versus major, direct versus indirect), and duration (temporary versus long-term).

Cyberspace is a global domain consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. It is the only domain which is entirely man-made. It is created, maintained, owned and operated collectively by public and private stakeholders across the globe and changes constantly in response to technological innovation. It is not subject to geopolitical or natural boundaries, and is readily accessible to governments, non-state organisations, private enterprises and individuals alike.

Cyber Warfare and the Use of Force

The most important source of the body of law, i.e., jus ad bellum, which governs the “use of force” by States in their international relations, is the UN Charter.¹ Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The “use of force” constitutes an internationally wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of the State, and also allows the victim State to take counter-measures against the perpetrator. The Charter allows for two exceptions to this prohibition; the right to self-defence in case of an armed attack as well as the use of force authorised by the UN Security Council. A state-sponsored cyber operation would qualify as a use of force against another State and may also trigger an international armed conflict. A cyber operation amounting to an armed attack would permit the attacked state to exercise its inherent right to self-defence. However, a cyber operation that merely causes inconvenience or irritation would not qualify as use of force.

Action in Self-defence

A State that is the target of a cyber operation which is equivalent to an armed attack may exercise its inherent right of self-defence. Whether a cyber operation qualifies as an armed attack depends on its scale and effects. It would be immaterial whether the cyber attack is against a military target or civilian objects. It would be considered an attack against the State. However, a cyber attack on any civilian infrastructure cannot be considered an armed attack. Though there are no agreements on what is critical infrastructure, the UN General Assembly (A/RES/58/199 of 23 December 2003) has recognised that “each country will determine its own critical information infrastructure”. The UK, the US and Australia include agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defence industrial base, information and telecommunication, energy, transportation (aviation, maritime and surface), banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal system among critical infrastructure. However, this is not conclusive; any system related to a State’s economic prosperity, public safety and national defence would constitute a critical infrastructure.

The action of a State in self-defence against a cyber attack must meet the requirements of necessity, proportionality and immediacy. This means the use of force is the last resort, only if the matter cannot be settled by peaceful means. Further, there is an obligation to identify the author and verify that the cyber attack was not accidental. The same rules apply to cyber capabilities as to traditional kinetic weapons. A State could also resort to

anticipatory self-defence against an imminent attack through conventional means.

Cyber Attack: Legal Obligations

The 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP-I) to the Geneva Convention illustrates the principle of distinction to protect civilians during armed conflict. Under this principle, parties to an armed conflict must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military targets on the other. Under AP-I civilians and civilian objects cannot be targets of attack. The treaty bars belligerents from rendering useless those objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, agricultural crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works. Further, the States must never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. In the conduct of military operations, belligerents have the duty (i) to exercise constant care to minimise the loss of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects; (ii) to protect the natural environment and protect works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as dams and nuclear power plants; and (iii) not to undertake attacks that have the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.

In planning a cyber attack, military commanders must comply with the principle of distinction as well as proportionality. There are a few situations where the principle of distinction could be easily applied to cyber attacks, such as when the target is a military air traffic control system and the attack causes a troop transport to crash. If properly executed, the result of the cyber strike would be the same as a conventional bombing. However, often it may be nearly impossible to distinguish between combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, civilians engaged in a continuous combat function, and protected civilians in the context of cyber attacks. The obligation of legal review of new weapons, means or methods of warfare are contained in Article 36 of AP-I. These obligations are a part of customary international law² and applicable to cyber weapons too.

Non-international Armed Conflict

Sophisticated non-State actors can also launch severe cyber attacks against the government, affecting the economy and communication. Non-State actors committing cyber crime and economic cyber espionage do pose serious threats; however, till date there are no reports of highly devastating cyber attacks launched by non-State actors against a State. With technical advancement and the proliferation of malware tools; or with support from a technically advanced State, the possibility of non-State actors carrying out sophisticated cyber operations cannot be dismissed. For instance, hijacking of drones by insurgents in future conflicts cannot be ruled out. Some students in Texas recently managed to take a ship completely off-course (off Italy) by interfering with GPS signals.³

The Status of Cyber Warriors

Cyber warriors could be classified into four major categories; namely, combatants, contractors and civilian employees of the armed forces, *levee en masse*, and civilians. Cyber operations are generally carried out by highly specialised personnel. To the extent that they are members of the armed forces of a belligerent State, their status, rights and obligations are no different from those of traditional combatants. According to the laws of war, the armed forces of a belligerent State comprise all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that State for the conduct of its subordinates. This broad and functional concept of armed forces includes essentially all armed actors belonging to a belligerent State and showing a sufficient degree of military organisation.

In the last two decades, belligerent States have increasingly employed private contractors and civilian employees to perform a variety of functions traditionally performed by military personnel. This includes the support, preparation and conduct of cyber operations. As long as such personnel assume functions not amounting to direct participation in hostilities, they remain civilians. In case they are formally embedded in the armed forces in an armed conflict, they would be *de facto* irregular members of the armed forces and entitled to prisoner of war status in case of capture.

The concept of a *levee en masse* is that during the initial invasion, the civilian population of unoccupied territory can spontaneously 'take up arms against the invading army' in order to forestall an occupation. The mobilisation of a *levee en masse* is patriotic zeal coupled with the initiative of the citizen-soldier under emergency until the enemy has been defeated or repelled. The law of war recognises the concept and protects those who participate in a war and 'carry their arms openly' by granting them combatant status under the Geneva Convention of 1949. While this category of persons has become ever less relevant in traditional warfare, it may well come to be of practical importance in cyber warfare. In cyber warfare, territory is neither invaded nor occupied, which may significantly prolong the period during which a *levee en masse* can operate. Also, cyber space provides an ideal environment for the instigation and non-hierarchical coordination of spontaneous, collective and unorganised cyber defence action by great numbers of "hacktivists". The only problem foreseen in this case is that in the context of cyber space, how would the requirement of "carrying their arms openly" be interpreted?

Under the laws of war, civilian means all persons who are neither members of the armed forces of a State or non-State party to an armed conflict, nor participants in a *levee en masse*. As civilians, they are entitled to protection against the dangers arising from military operations and against attack. In cyber warfare, this category is likely to include most non-State hackers not belonging to the armed forces. If and for such time as their operations amount to direct participation in hostilities, civilians lose their protection and may be directly attacked as if they were combatants. They do not benefit from immunity from prosecution for lawful acts of war and, therefore, can be punished by their captor for any violation of national law.

Tallinn Manual

One of the problems with cyber warfare is the lack of uniformity in concepts, definitions, rules, policy and law. In many instances, not only is uniformity lacking, but there is simply a void. As a result, there is no general international consensus on how to treat cyber warfare. Attempts have been made, however, to create concepts, definitions, rules,

policy and law regarding cyber warfare. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare has been prepared by experts working with the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE), an institute based in Tallinn, Estonia, that assists NATO with technical and legal issues associated with cyber warfare. The Manual, released in 2013, is particularly concerned with *jus in bello* (the law of war) and *jus ad bellum* (the set of rules to be consulted before engaging in war) and does not deal with cyber crime in general or cyber terrorism. It is intended as a reference for legal advisers for government agencies.

The Manual consists of 95 rules reflecting customary international law and has been adopted unanimously by an International Group of Experts. It defines a cyber attack as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.” The definition makes it clear that a cyber attack is an act of violence either against a person or object and that the focus is on the consequences and not the initiating act itself. Thus, the consequences of a cyber attack must generate some violence to some person or property. Therefore, it is not the act itself, but rather the subsequent consequences thereof that matter. The Manual has been criticised for being “an exercise of academic debate, restating what has been the practice, but failing to address the central issues raised by the emerging technical landscape.” Developing international law for cyber warfare is a complex challenge and will take many nations coming to an agreement over a substantial period of years.⁴ It is not possible to base it on some basic and fundamental concepts, definitions and rules created by some influential countries, especially when it relates to the safety and security of a State.

The Future

Governments as well as industries have established both formal and informal mechanisms for countering rapidly increasing cyber threats and operations. More than 100 militaries in the world have dedicated cyber-attackers and defenders and have built some kind of cyber military units. These include the establishment of the US Cyber Command, China’s People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department’s 3rd Department, Iranian Sun-Army and Cyber Army, Israel’s Unit 8200, and the Russian Federal Security Service’s 16th Directorate. India may soon have an independent Cyber Command to protect the nation’s cyber domain and vital infrastructure.

There are varying opinions on how to tackle the issue of cyber warfare. While few are in favour of an international convention, others have opposed efforts to create a new treaty and have argued that the current laws of war can be applied to cyber warfare by analogy. It is clear, however, that States must develop a cyber warfare doctrine (CWD) to regulate the use of cyber weapons in war. India has been a major target of cyber attacks and the frequency and intensity of such attacks is increasing. There have been numerous incidents of sensitive government and military computers being attacked by unknown entities and information being stolen. India should be prepared for a cyber attack and stand ready to launch a counter-offensive. We must find answers to issues such as what activities must be undertaken in the case of a cyber attack against our nuclear power plants; what would be the appropriate response in the case of such an attack; and the attack threshold that would constitute an act of war. The CWD must be based on our current legal doctrine and precedents.

Conclusion

Compared to the weapons that threatened States in the past, modern technology has made the tools of cyber warfare cheap, readily available and easily obtainable. Legal norms are emerging in cyber warfare, but many questions about what is legal and what is not in this “fifth domain of warfare” need to be answered. The implication of future cyber warfare is uncertain. Cyber weapons, while targeting military objectives, may also attack civilian objects such as railways, air traffic, hospitals, and power plants, causing massive collateral damage and civilian casualties. In addition to the legal regulation of cyber warfare, cyber espionage, theft of intellectual property, and a wide variety of criminal activities in cyberspace pose real and serious threats to all States, as well as the corporate world and private individuals. An adequate response to issues related with cyber crimes requires national and international measures. It is important that States be aware not only of their legal duty to examine whether new weapons and methods employed in cyber warfare would be compatible with their obligations under existing laws of war, but also of their moral responsibility towards generations to come.

Endnotes

1. *Jus ad bellum* is the Latin term for the law governing the resort to force i.e. when a State may use force within the constraints of the UN Charter framework and traditional legal principles. The modern *jus ad bellum* has its origins in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and the UN Charter.
2. The customary international law requirement for legal review of a weapon to ensure its use will be lawful in conflict stems from the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets and the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. These international instruments address the issue of whether a weapon causes superfluous injury in violation of the laws and customs of warfare. Additionally, in 1996, the International Court of Justice confirmed this customary international law status in its Nuclear Weapons Opinion.
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
Ser	Country	Qty	Remarks
(a)	Australia	4	In addition, Australia constructed two OHP class Frigates. However, 2 have sunk, leaving 4 in inventory
(b)	Turkey	9	Eight + one for spares
(c)1	2 Egypt	4	
(d)	Bahrain	1	
(e)	Poland	2	
(f)	Pakistan	1	
	Total	21	

In addition, Australia, Spain and Taiwan have indigenously built OHP frigates under Transfer of Technology (ToT) from the US as tabulated below:-

Ser	Country	Qty
(a)	Australia	2
(b)	Spain	6
(c)	Taiwan	8

The US Navy had 26 OHP Class Frigates in its inventory in 2012.8 USS Boone, the oldest OHP class ship in service, was commissioned in May 1982 and USS Ingraham, the last ship of this class in service was commissioned in Aug 1989. The weapon package on board these ships included 1 ×OTO Melara Gun Mount and 2 × Triple torpedo Launcher Tubes. These ships are capable of carrying 2 × SH-60B helicopters.9

Sale of USS McInerney to Pakistan. Pakistan had requested US for transfer of OHP Class ships in 2006/07 to facilitate active participation in Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) as part of Global War on Terror (GWOT). The US president had approved 'hot transfer' of USS McInerney, the second ship in the OHP Class (1979 vintage), to Pakistan on 27 Sep 2008. The transfer was under the Excess Defence Article (EDA) arrangement and free of cost. The ship was commissioned as PNS Alamgir on 31 Aug 2010 and was inducted into Pak Navy on 21 May 2011 post arrival in Pakistan.10



Subsequent Developments. In early 2010, Pakistan had requested US for 'Cold Transfer' of two more OHP frigates - USS George Philip (FFG-12) and USS Sides (FFG-14) from the four available. Later, the then Pak CNS, Admiral Noman Bashir, raised the issue of request for a total of eight such ships during discussions with the then US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead on 18 Mar 2010 and the then US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, on 22 Mar 2010. However, no progress was made due to deterioration in bilateral relationship.

Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2012. The US Naval Vessel Transfer Act 2012 was passed by the House of Representatives on 31 Dec 2012.11 The Act authorises the US President to transfer ten OHP Frigates to foreign countries under section 516 of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as grant or sale. These ten frigates were subsequently transferred to various countries during 2013-14 but none to Pakistan.12 This possibly indicated the increased strain in the US - Pak relations. The move was also a signal to assuage concerns raised by India over arms transfers to Pakistan, while cementing the increased USN -Indian Navy cooperation. Pakistan Navy was hopeful of hot transfer of at least two OHP frigates in 2013. To reinforce the utility of OHP class frigate, PN had exploited PNS Almagir (ex-USS McInerney), extensively in 2012 by deploying the ship regularly for CMCP and anti-piracy operations. Further, to highlight the shortage of platforms for coalition tasking, Pakistan Navy had deployed only one ship for a combined CMCP and anti-piracy deployment in end Dec 2012.

Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013.13 The new draft US Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 was approved by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 14 Nov 2013. The Act is presently pending for Approval by the US Congress. As per the Act, 11 OHP Frigates will be transferred to countries as below14 :-

Country	Qty	Remarks
Pakistan	3	Gratis
Mexico	2	Gratis
Thailand	2	Gratis
Taiwan	4	Sale

Rights and Privileges of Pakistan Navy Being Foreign Military Supply (FMS) Customer. PN as FMS customer has following rights/ privileges¹⁵ :-

- (a) An FMS Programme allows a customer to purchase defence articles, services, and training, as well as design and construction services from The US Government on 'no profit' and 'no loss' basis.
- (b) FMS customer upon acquisition of major equipment such as an OHP frigate will have access from Department of Defence (DoD) stock if available based on priority basis and in case of non availability same are purchased through Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) on much cheaper rates. The US Government purchases the items based on cumulative requirement for their Armed Forces and 120 FMS customers on open bidding and prices quoted are very low. This procurement can be done through FMS cases i.e. Defined Order cases for Significant Military Equipment which is called FMSO-I, Blanket Order cases for spares (follow on support) called FMSO-II case and Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSA). A CLSSA is an arrangement designed to provide responsive follow on support for the US produced military hardware possessed by a foreign country.
- (c) FMS customer can acquire major equipment and spares from Excess Defence Articles (EDA) free of cost from the US after Congressional approval.
- (d) FMS Customers are allowed to participate in the contract negotiation process between the US and vendors.
- (e) Pakistan Navy can ask for amendments or modifications such as addition/ deletion of equipment during the course of materialisation of an Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) by submitting a Letter of Request for LOA.
- (f) FMS customer can request for sole source vendor by justifying the sole source requirement and foregoing the competitive process due to outstanding relationship and services of the vendor with the customer.
- (g) FMS customer can request for waiver of non-recurring cost (NRC) due financial hardship of the country and same is granted by Director DSCA based on justification provided by the customer.
- (h) Total Package Approach (TPA), Insurance, Warranty and submission of Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR) within SDR's timeframe (one year from date of shipment or billed) is provided by the US to FMS customer.

US Security Assistance to Pak (5-year Plan). US Secretary of Navy, Raymond Edwin Mabus visited Pakistan on 18 Nov 2013. US Secretary was on a two-day visit to Pakistan and also met the Pak CNS and visited the Joint Staff HQs in Chaklala. During the meeting of the US - Pak Defence Consultative Group (DCG) held from 23-26 Nov 2013 in Washington, the US is likely to provide security assistance to Pakistan to help it build counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism capabilities under a joint five-year plan developed by the two countries. The US - Pak DCG meeting has given a final shape to the five-year security assistance plan.¹⁶ The plan focuses on supplying military hardware that the US would be providing to Pakistan under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF). It is part of this decision that the Obama Administration informed the Congress of a number of appropriations related to security assistance to Pakistan, which totalled about USD 1.4 billion in military assistance of which USD 425 million was meant for Pakistan counter-insurgency and capabilities fund (PCCF) and the rest about USD 1 billion was in FMF.¹⁷ In addition, the notifications included roughly USD 260 million of civilian assistance, of which USD 230 million was focused on energy programmes for Pakistan and USD 30 million was the State Department funding for civilian police programmes. In September, the US also released to Pakistan USD 322 million as a reimbursement for Coalition Support Fund. Officials from Pakistan and the US have identified seven broad capabilities of security assistance cooperation, as follows¹⁸ :-

- (a) Night Vision.
- (b) Precision Strike.
- (c) Counter Improvised Explosive Devices.
- (d) Survivability.
- (e) Border Security.
- (f) Communications.
- (g) Maritime Operations/Maritime Abilities.

Transfer to Pakistan. As per the 5 Year Security Assistance Plan, the US is to support enhancement of Pakistan's Maritime ability. Towards this end, the US has agreed to transfer three OHP class frigates to Pakistan, on gratis basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act, one each in fiscal years 2014, 2015 and 2016.¹⁹ The particulars of the vessels are as follows:-

Ser	Vessel Name	Pennant No	Date of Commission
(a)	USS Klakring	FFG 42	20 Aug 83

(b)	USS De Wert	FFG 45	19 Nov 83
(c)	USS Robert G Bradley	FFG 49	30 Jun 84



USS Klakring USS De Wert USS Robert G Bradley

Thorns in US-Pak Defence Cooperation

The ongoing regional transition and internal political changes have resulted in the US - Pak relations not being normalised to the desired level. Despite the declaration of the US Administration that Pakistan is vital partner against Al Qaida, no significant movement is forthcoming either diplomatically or militarily till recently. The issue of drones and covert support to Taliban in Afghanistan are prominent concerns and divergent issues. The other related issues are the trade relations and resumption of negotiations on bilateral investment treaty; both the nations want improvements in economic relations but are not finding common grounds to make any head way. Similarly, the subject of civilian nuclear deal with Pakistan is not being discussed at the moment because of lack of incentives on both sides. The most discouraging indication between the two countries is the public image, with only 11 per cent of Pakistanis viewing the US positively and a similar figure in the US too (where Pakistan is viewed as supporting Taliban and Al Qaida).

Conclusion

The recent diplomatic bonhomie exhibited between the US and Pakistan is slowly manifesting into robust military relationship as expected by Pakistan. This is evident from the US not reserving for Pakistan any of the OHP frigates earmarked for transfer to friendly countries in 2013; but has placed three ships in transfer list for 2014.

Pakistan being a major regional power, Pakistan Navy considers its ambition to control events in North Arabian Sea as legitimate. Towards this, it has an ambitious ship acquisition/building plan. Shattered national economy, does not support Pak Navy's growth plan as desired. In the interim, the deficiencies are made good by acquiring used platforms to fulfil current day needs. The OHP class frigates are an ideal platform for displaying Pakistan's Flag in global initiatives like the Anti-Piracy Deployment and CMCP. Further, the benefits that accrue to Pakistan as a FMS customer are formidable. In the present scenario, the likely recourse for Pakistan would be to increase cooperation with the US. Towards this end, Pakistan is likely to strongly submit its case with the US Government for an additional transfer of four more OHP frigates post 2016. Once fructified, Pakistan Navy will have eight used US OHP class ships, which could be considered adequate to meet its operational commitments; and thus will be able to bridge its capability deficiency in the immediate future.

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Introduction

The studies have shown that the Indian constitutional history dates back to the 4th and 3rd centuries BC. And but for the two major treatises in the field of polity and administration, viz. the Mahabharat and the Arthashastra, the other accounts about the ancient history are skeletal. The primary reason for the lack of chronological records in the service administration emerges to be the innumerable invasions into the country, during which most of the literary records were destroyed. But what eventually has remained after the invasions is, that, which was passed by the word of mouth, from generation to generation. This kind of destruction of the pristine records did not affect the southern parts of India as much as it did the northern and the central India. The records of the 'vedic invasion of the southern India', the manuscripts of the works composed by the inimitable sage Agastya, recorded on palm leaves are still believed to be preserved in the temple of Palani, Tanjore and the National Museum, Chennai.¹ The historical depth of the constitutional provisions is thus evident from their legal profoundness.

Constitutional Provisions

The elaborate provisions in part XIV of the Constitution indicate the great importance that the constitutional framers attached to the services. Titled as "Services under the Union and the States", the chapter lays down the guidelines for framing rules with regard to the conditions and the administration of the services. ² The defence forces have, however, been excluded from Part XIV and subjected to special laws. Hence the rules of administration for the defence personnel are understood in the manner they appear in their respective legislations.

Before Independence, the rules of administrative and quasi judicial adjudication in the defence forces were seen in conformity to the Articles of War. Perusal of the Manual of Military Law, 1922 reveals that the foundation for the law of the defence forces lay in the East India Company Mutiny Act, 1754. Under the statutory sanction of enactments of 1754 and 1813, a military code was framed by each presidency. The Act of 1833 for the first time provided a common code for the native armies of India. This was later repealed by the Acts of 1845, 1861 and 1869. The amalgamation of the three native armies in 1895 necessitated amendments in the Indian Articles of War particularly with regard to the conditions of service. Hence a bill was drafted consolidating the existing law and passed into an Act as the "Indian Army Act, 1911."³

Post-Independence, the Act of 1911 was found to be unduly harsh and inadequate as it was prepared in a colonial setting though many of its provisions were borrowed from the statutes applicable to the British Forces. With the changed environment, the pleasure powers of the Governor General also were to be now replaced by that of the President. Hence with a view 'to consolidate and amend the law relating to the government of the regular Army', the Army Act, 1950 came into force for the new Indian Republic.⁴ Correspondingly, the Air Force Act, 1950 and later the Navy Act, 1957 were also enacted.⁵

Customs of Service

The customs of service intertwined with the Indian ethnicity had been a factor in the law of service in the defence forces. Due to the fascination of the British with military ethnography the defence service law nestled in tradition and then transited to the Statute. The Statutory law of services remained fixed to the English and the American law and procedures as the concept of the due process clause of the US discreetly found its way into the Indian administrative jurisprudence which had otherwise been so far dominated by the principles of common law. The evolutionary trends are noticed in the fields of justiciability of the Doctrine of Pleasure, recording of reasons, interpretation of restrictions on fundamental rights, scope of judicial review in trial proceedings under the defence services legislations, conditions of service and the scope of service privileges vis-à-vis the responsibilities of command. Though thousands of nautical miles apart, the underlying thought between India, the UK, and the US on this aspect was interestingly similar. The comparative study of the three systems reveals more similarities than differences.

Defence Forces - the Constitutional Status : Self Regulating Safeguards

The main factor which distinguishes the service in the defence forces from that of the civil organisations albeit the government, and makes a case for special law are their terms and conditions which encompass the rules of recruitment and commission. The most characteristic feature of these provisions governing the services is thus the provisions themselves. For instance, appearance of the words, "subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder" suggest the manner in which the power under the provision is regulated by the provision itself. The hallmark of these provisions is thus the self-regulating safeguards contained in the provisions themselves. This in fact leaves no room for arbitrary exercise of power at any level. Coupled with this is the ever vigilant judiciary of India. The exercise of power under the law of services is in fact tested on the grounds of 'legality', 'rationality' and procedural 'propriety'. This is termed as the golden rule of the administrative law.

Impact of Constitutional Provisions on the Defence Forces

Employment in the defence forces is a public service. The personnel of the defence forces in India like their civilian counterparts enjoy the privilege of the continuous and uninterrupted service in the colours, governed not only by the legislations but also by customs and conventions of the services. For their overall allegiance to the Union, Article 52 of the Constitution of India declares, "There shall be a President of India". Article 53 vests the executive power of the Union and the resultant supreme command of the three forces in the President who thus holds a special status vis-à-vis their personnel, in as much as, the President enjoys the absolute power of appointment and removal in respect of all the three services which he exercises with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

The Principal Doctrines Relating to the Services

The service in the defence forces is much influenced by the doctrines propounded by the Supreme Court. The constitutional doctrines relevant to the defence forces are three viz., the doctrine of Presidential pleasure, the doctrine of continuous officiation and the doctrine of principles of natural justice.

The Doctrine of Presidential Pleasure. Chapter XIV of the Constitution is the repository of this doctrine. Studied under the adage, *duranto bene placito* (during the pleasure).⁶ This encompasses all government servants as well as the personnel of the defence forces of the Union and provides that every person subject to the Act holds office during the pleasure of the President. Study of the role of the Chief Executive vis-à-vis his servants, reveals a relationship of master and servant in which the major decisive factor is 'conduct'. The contract of service can be terminated by the master unilaterally if the servant is guilty of misconduct, or conduct which is inconsistent with his duties as a servant. "The rule of conduct is transcendent law", declared the Manusmriti.⁷ The peculiarity of pleasure in respect of the Defence personnel is in its exercise as it remains beyond any subjection unlike the pleasure of the Crown in England which is subject to the Parliamentary control.

Doctrine of Continuous Officiation. The expression 'services' is generally associated with the defence forces. Though rarely occurring, 'officiation' in a specific appointment is an incidence of service which affects the tenure aspect of service intimately. This part of the service jurisprudence draws its legal authority from the provisions of the Part III of the Constitution principally from Article 16 thereof which guarantees an equality of opportunity in matters of employment. The courts developed this new doctrine therefrom known as the Doctrine of Continuous Officiation in a case in the year 1967.⁸ The words and expressions 'ad-hoc' and 'fortuitous' appear alongside. The service under the government thus presupposes a continuous, elongated officiation for a specified term determined by the rules on recruitment creating a vested right in the favour of the holder of office which is specific and gender neutral. Chanda Kochhar termed this state of affairs as the "gender neutral meritocracy", applicable to appointees and promotes alike in temporary and permanent posts.⁹

The Doctrine of the 'Principles of Natural Justice'. Adherence to the principles of 'Natural Justice' is fundamental to all adjudications. This is another Constitutional guarantee against arbitrary exercise of power. Two doctrines are generally found to influence administrative decisions viz., the doctrine of "Audi Alteram Partem" i.e., no one ought to be condemned unheard¹⁰ and the doctrine of "Nemo debet bis vexari" i.e., a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence.¹¹ The corollary deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule was that "he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right will not have done what is right" or as is now expressed "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done". These two rules and their corollary are neither new nor were they the discovery of English judges but were recognised in many civilizations over many centuries.

It is well established both in England and in India that the principles of natural justice yield to and change with the exigencies of different situations which are not alike. The Supreme Court in a case held, "Parliament has the power to restrict or abrogate any of the rights conferred by Part III in their application to members of the Armed Forces so as to ensure proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline amongst them."¹²

The Right to Equality under Article 14

Article 14 of the Constitution applies not only to discriminatory class legislation but also to arbitrary or discriminatory State action. Violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination, and where discrimination is the result of a State action, it is a violation of Article 14. Therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14 for which the courts are empowered to issue appropriate writs and rectify the anomalies so created.

Courts as the Final Arbiter

For the evolution of the defence services jurisprudence and the reformatory trend in service administration, the juridical litany owes it to the Supreme Court of India which held that, "This Court is the final arbiter in interpreting the Constitution, declares what the law is."¹³ No aspect of the defence justice has been left untouched by the Apex Court. Whether it has been the necessity to record reasons¹⁴ or it was the justiciability of the Presidential pleasure¹⁵ or the system of appeal in the armed forces.¹⁶ The court gave to the jurists some interesting expressions like appeal from 'Caesar to the Caesar's wife'¹⁷ and at the same time upheld the military pride when it said, "Army is always on alert for repelling external aggression and suppressing internal disorder so that the peace loving citizens enjoy a social order based on rule of law; the same cannot be denied to the protectors of this order."¹⁸

Procedural Justice and the Responsibility of Command

It is a fact that a soldier spends major part of his life away from the public glare, many times in highly isolated locations. As a result, he is not exposed to the uncertainties of the outside world in the same measure as his civilian counterpart. When seen from the high point of equitability, it imposes an onerous duty on the commanders to ensure that while dispensing justice, the best interest of the soldier is kept in mind. Though the Statutory provisions have been designed to take care of this aspect, yet his lack of knowledge of it should not cause any prejudice during the course of justice.

Maintenance of Discipline is the Prime Concern of the Forces. Discipline has always been of prime importance to the defence forces. This is evident from the ethos which runs through them. For instance, the Chetwode oath or the Simonidean compositions are integral to the service in whatever state. Adherence to law is viewed as natural and its violation an exception. Compliance of law and procedure is generally seen as a natural concomitant of defence administration. Its violation too is rare, incidental and usually inadvertent.

Conclusion

Justice as Per the Rule of Law. Justice is the be all and end all of all systems. Due process which literally means a constitutional guarantee of fair procedure is found integral to the defence system of justice and administration. The perusal of the legal provisions generally covering these aspects reveal the following:-

- (a) Provision for hearing of charge, recording of evidence, cross examination, defence and opportunity for rebuttal etc;
- (b) Provision for the show cause notice, including an adequate formulation of the subject and issues involved in the case;
- (c) Application of mind by the competent military, naval or the air force authority to the facts of each case separately before the issue of show cause;
- (d) Provisions for opportunity to submit reply in defence to the show cause;
- (e) Application of mind by the army, naval or the air force authority to the reply of the delinquent; and finally,
- (f) The decision based only upon the evidence tested on the anvil of cross-examination.

As the above are essential for justice as per the rule of law, the principles of natural justice, due process and fair play are a part and parcel of system of judicial administration in the defence forces and thus in tune with the constitution.

Author's Note : The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are that of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement.

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
Command.

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India and the Great War : India Office Records and Private Papers relating to the First World War, 1914-1918

John O'Brien@

Over one million Indians served in the Indian Armed Forces as part of Britain's war effort during the First World War, with the Indian Army seeing action in most of the major theatres of the conflict. The main focus of India's military contribution was on the Western Front in France and Belgium, as well as in Mesopotamia, but smaller forces also served in East Africa, Gallipoli, Egypt and Palestine. The Indian contribution to the First World War is documented in the India Office Records, the vast archive of the British administration of India, which is kept at the British Library in London. Files relating to the conflict are spread over several of the principal series of official records.



As might be expected, the Military Department records contain files relating to many aspects of India's military effort in the War, including the hospitals for injured Indian soldiers in Brighton and the South Coast of England, Muslim cemeteries in England, the treatment of Indian Prisoners of War (PsW) in Germany and Turkey, and the conflict in Mesopotamia. There are also over 1,800 volumes of War Diaries containing information on the management of India's military effort at a very detailed level.

One of the most interesting series of records is the reports of the Censor of Indian Mails in France, with appended extracts from some of the letters written or received by Indian soldiers fighting in France. The extracts from the letters vividly illustrate the fear and trauma experienced by the soldiers, as well as their observations on the surroundings in which they found themselves, whether that be the trenches on the Western Front or a hospital in Brighton. Naubat Khan of the 107th Pioneers fighting in France wrote to his brother expressing the utter destruction he had witnessed 'The righteous God has sent down a calamity, it is the destruction of the Indians by a Flood'¹, while Gyan Singh stationed at the Indian Artillery Depot in England described the formidable German military machine 'The German is very strong. His ships sail the clouds and drop shells from the sky; his mines dig up the earth, and his hidden craft strike below the sea. Bombs and blinding acid are thrown from his trenches which are only 100 or 50 yards from ours. He has countless machine guns which kill the whole firing line when in attack. When he attacks we kill his men. The dead lie in heaps.'² Bachetar Singh, recovering from his wounds in the Indian Hospital in Brighton, struggled to describe the war to a friend in India 'How can I describe this war? It is like a furnace in which everything becomes ashes on both sides. When will Ishwar (God) have mercy so that this furnace will be stopped.', but reported favourably on the treatment Indians received in France and England from local people 'Those of the wounded who cannot walk are taken out in the evening in a motor car and are taken out every day. All the people of England and France treat us with respect and are very polite when they meet us.'³

There are some fascinating files on the treatment of Indian PsW who had been captured by German or Turkish forces. In one file, three wounded Indian soldiers gave statements recounting their experiences of being wounded and captured in France and in Germany. One of the soldiers, Ram Nath Singh of the 9th Bhopal Infantry, described how he came to meet the Kaiser who was visiting the hospital in Germany where he was being treated!⁴ In the same file is a letter from Jemadar Pirzag Singh of the 2nd Lancers, who had been taken prisoner in December 1917, and was being held at the PsW camp at Freiburg in Germany. Writing to the Indian Soldiers Fund, he requested that he be sent a new uniform, listing the articles of clothing he needed, with his measurements. He even drew a sketch of the tunic, carefully pointing out that the length of tunic for the Indian cavalry was greater than for the Infantry, coming to about two inches above the knee.⁵ The Secretary of the Fund forwarded his letter to the India Office with a request that he be sent a suitable supply of uniform.

The Military Department records contain many files relating to the campaign in Mesopotamia, including a report on the ill-fated defence of Kut-al-Amarah under Major General Charles Townshend, from the 3rd December 1915 to 29th April 1916, when the British Indian forces surrendered to the Turks.⁶ The India Office Military Department received the report of Lord Justice Younger's committee which investigated the harsh treatment Indian PsW subsequently received at the hands of their Turkish captors.⁷ There is also a file containing despatches on later operations in Mesopotamia, with recommendations for awards for bravery, and a book of maps of the military operations between the 12th December 1916 and 31st March 1917.⁸

Responsibility for overseeing India's foreign policy and frontier affairs, and for British relations with the Indian Princely States, rested with the Political & Secret Department of the India Office. As a result, the records of that department contain files on the wider aspects of the War, such as the Arab revolt, the future of Constantinople, German propaganda efforts in the Middle East, the progress of the War in Egypt, Palestine and Syria, Anglo-French relations in

the Near East, and the 1919 Peace Conference.

A series of memoranda prepared variously by the India Office, the Foreign Office of the UK Government, and by the Government of India, contain many interesting memoranda relating to the wider political aspects of the First World War and its aftermath. For instance, there is an India Office note from the 3rd November 1918 on the disposal of conquered territories in Mesopotamia and East Africa⁹, and a synopsis by the Foreign Office from the 6th February 1918 on the UK obligations to its allies and others.¹⁰

The significance of the events in Mesopotamia to India was spelled out in the first paragraph of the India Office note on the disposal of conquered territories: 'The conquered territory in which India has the largest and most direct interest is Mesopotamia. As is well known, India has been mainly instrumental in the conquest of this region. The majority of the troops employed were Indian; the expedition has throughout been based upon India; and the civil administration of the occupied districts has from the first been carried on under the guidance and inspiration of the Indian Government'.¹¹ Not surprisingly then, there is a substantial number of files in the Political Department's subject and annual files relating to Mesopotamia for the period during and immediately after the War. Approximately 635 files cover a wide range of subjects dealing with the war in Mesopotamia and the subsequent administration of the country up to the early 1920s.

The many financial aspects of the war effort are documented in a collection of 191 files in the India Office Financial Department. There are files on war expenditure, accounting arrangements, pay and pensions, the provision of funds to the Indian Expeditionary Forces, the cost of stores and equipment, and reparations. One file states, in response to a question in the House of Commons regarding the war expenditure incurred by the Indian Empire, that the war expenditure of the Government of India up to the 31st March 1919 could be taken at about £127,800,000 (around £2,710,638,000 in today's money), with Indian Princes and others contributing cash sums amounting to £2,100,000 (or around £44,541,000 today) in addition to placing further sums at the disposal of the Government of India for the purchase of horses, cars and vans, ambulances, comforts for the troops, etc.¹²

Trade and the flow of commodities were dealt with by the India Office Economic Department. The files for the years 1914 to 1918 deal mainly with trading with the enemy and hostile firms in India, the prohibition or limitation of the export of commodities from India (such as jute, manganese, cotton, rice, hides, oilseeds, etc.) and the restriction of enemies' supplies, enemy ships in neutral ports and their crews, contraband of war, sequestration of enemy property in India, enemy aliens, and imports from neutral countries. One file on pilgrim traffic during the War contains telegrams and correspondence on the subject of the threat to supplies being sent from India to Jeddah being seized by Turkish forces, and the safety of pilgrims travelling from India. Telegrams between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy discuss the possibility of prohibiting pilgrim traffic from India during 1915.¹³ These files still await detailed cataloguing, but are accessible to researchers via contemporary registers and indexes.

The records of the British Residency at Aden contain two collections relating to the First World War.¹⁴ Among the 149 files, there are files on psw, captured and enemy ships, Red Sea trade and trading with the enemy, enemy property, censorship, and arrangements for peace celebrations.

Complementing the government records are a number of significant private paper collections which contain papers relating to many aspects of the First World War. These include the papers of the Indian Soldiers Fund, which was established to provide comforts and clothing for Indian troops and prisoners of war in France and Mesopotamia during the War,¹⁵ and the papers of Sir Walter Lawrence, an eminent member of the Indian Civil Service who served as Commissioner for sick and wounded Indian soldiers in France and England from 1914 to 1916.¹⁶

There is also an attractive collection of illustrated war propaganda newspapers, *Satya Vani*, *Jangi Akhbar* and other titles, produced by the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Information and printed by the Illustrated London News in various Indian and Asian languages for distribution throughout India, the Middle East, North Africa, the Far East, and to Indians overseas and Indian troops.¹⁷

Both British and Indian politicians and leaders are represented in the Private Papers in relation to the First World War. Lord Curzon, former Viceroy of India, was a member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet, and his papers contain his correspondence relating to the War, diaries of visits he made to the Western Front, speeches he gave, as well as papers relating to the War Cabinet, Air Board and Shipping Control Committee, Ireland, Foreign affairs, as Leader of the House of Lords, and a series of maps.¹⁸ From the Indian perspective, there is a file of papers relating to Indian involvement in the First World War. This includes a letter, dated 14th August 1914, signed by Gandhi and other Indians residing in London offering their services, papers relating to the Indian Expeditionary Force and the Indian Field Ambulance Training Corps, and a copy of *Akbar-i-Jung*, an Urdu newspaper for Indian soldiers serving in Europe.¹⁹

The German perspective is also represented in a collection of letters from Count Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Chancellor from 1909 to 1917, to various Indian Princes, encouraging opposition to British rule in India and advocating the German view of the First World War, with supplementary papers relating to the German Mission in Kabul.²⁰

A selection of 75 files from the India Office Records has been digitised for the Europeana 1914-1918 project, along with the illustrated war propaganda newspapers and the Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg papers from the India Office Private Papers. The project is a free online resource which brings together original wartime documents, films and stories from 20 countries across Europe: <http://www.europeana1914-1918.eu/en> .

Note

The India Office Records are the documentary archives of the London end of the administration of British India, comprising the records of the East India Company (1600-1858), Board of Control (1784-1858), India Office (1858-1947), Burma Office (1937-1948), and a number of related British agencies overseas which were officially linked with one or

other of the four main bodies. The focus of the India Office Records is in the territories now included in India, Pakistan, Burma and Bangladesh and their administration before 1947, amounting to around 9 miles of shelves of material consisting of volumes, files and boxes of papers, including approximately 70,000 volumes of official publications.

The India Office Private Papers comprise about 300 major collections and over 3000 smaller deposits of papers relating primarily to the British experience in India. Though often including papers similar to or complementing the much more extensive official archives of the India Office Records, the Private Papers are distinguished from the Records by their provenance from private sources.

Endnotes

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Indian Troops in World War I – Arrival at Marseilles*

In the end of September 1914, first units of the Indian Army arrived at Marseilles, France. Brigadier Sir John Smyth, Baronet, VC, MC, who was then a captain with the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, now 2nd Battalion The Sikh Regiment (and later Secretary and Editor of USI from 01 Apr 1926-31 Mar 1929) described their arrival as under :-

“The 15th Sikhs were among the first Indian troops to arrive in France and the excitement and enthusiasm were tremendous. The men, none of whom had ever been out of India before, were rather dazed as we marched through the street to our camp. The ranks were soon broken by the cheering crowds and one could just see the heads of the men bobbing about amid an excited sea of French faces. The railing round our camp was black with people all day long. The Sikh is a cleanly person and gets under a pump at every opportunity no matter how cold the weather or the water. After the dusty march they took down their hair and beards and set about having a good wash. This absolutely brought the house down and there were delighted shrieks of “Voila les femmes Indiennes.” All these attentions became rather embarrassing after a time and we were glad when we moved to Orleans where we were supposed to undergo a period of training and acclimatisation.”

In their hasty departure from India our troops had departed with what they possessed. Sir John Smyth goes on to record :

“It was now October and starting to get chilly. But we were still only clad in our thin Indian drill uniforms. There was a great shortage of uniforms at home and we had to go all through that bitter winter in our drill.”

*The above is excerpted from an article “To Honour a Past” by Lieutenant General MS Shergill, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), published in USI Journal Vol. CXXXV, No 560, Apr-Jun 2005.

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Indian Artillery in World War I

Major General Rajendra Prakash, VSM (Retd)@

“ They sends us along where the roads are,
but mostly we goes where they ain ‘t:
We’d climb up the side of a sign-post,
an’ trust to the stick o’ the paint:
We’ve chivied the Naga an’ Looshai;
we’ve given the Afreedemen fits,
For we fancies ourselves at two thousand,
we guns that are built ur two bits -- ”
(From “Screw Guns” by Rudyard Kipling, 1890)

Part 1 - Background

Introduction

The artillery of the British-Indian Army between 1858 and end of World War 1 (and beyond till 1935), consisted only of the Indian Mountain Artillery and latter’s history during this war can be taken to constitute the history of the Indian Artillery during that titanic struggle. Between 1880s and 1970s, the mountain guns in service evolved in design from ‘2.5 inch rifled muzzle loading (RML) gun’ (Kipling’s ‘Screw Gun’) to ‘3.7 inch howitzer’, but with the gun barrel always in “two bits’, so as to form a load, viable for a large and sturdy Mountain Artillery mule to carry in rough terrain. On coming into action, the two portions of the gun-barrel were screwed together by a threaded collar and a ‘junction nut’, and hence the mountain gun was known as the “Screw Gun”, be it a ‘2.5 inch RML’ (1879-1916), a ‘10 pounder’ (1901-18), a ‘2.75 inch breach loading gun’ (1914-19) or finally a ‘3.7 inch howitzer’ (1915-1970s).

Genesis of Mountain Artillery

Since mobility on the battlefield is essential for success in land combat, moving guns over country impassable for wheels must have been a problem ever since guns were invented. In India, in the 3rd Battle of Panipat (1761), Ahmed Shah Abdali’s Afghan army used its mobile light artillery to good effect - zamburaks, jazails, gajals and shutarnals carried atop elephants, camels or horse-back figure prominently in battle accounts. Then, there are records of ‘coolie’ transportation of guns as far back as 1772, during East India Company’s Bhutan Expedition, while Gurkha battalions in Assam (precursors of today’s Assam Rifles) kept using this mode till early 20th Century. This apart, use of elephants, bullocks, ponies and camels, has been made at many times and in many climes. But the 19th Century solution to this problem really came from Spain, famous for their mules. The efficiency and endurance of the sturdy mule, combined with an intelligent and often endearing nature provided the mountain artillery with a faithful servant for well over a century. It is sure-footed and no other animal can compare with it for carrying a heavy load in rough and precipitous terrain. It is not too fussy about its rations provided it gets good water, and it needs minimal care.

The first mountain battery as such came into being in the British Army in 1813, during Napoleonic Wars, when Duke of Wellington’s army reached Pyrenees in Spain and artillery support was badly needed. Two half-brigades (later termed a battery) of three 3-pounders each, carried on pack-saddled mules did good service there for the duration of that war. However, Capt JB Beckhouse of Bengal Horse Artillery can be considered to be the ‘Father’ of the Indian Mountain Artillery, after he formed a Native Mountain Train of six 3-pounder guns for service in Afghanistan in 1840, with guns carried on pack-mules and by mule-draft.

A Tradition of Excellence

Throughout their history, the reputation of the Mountain Batteries of the British-Indian Army was enhanced by the fact that they were exclusively officered by the very best the British Royal Artillery (RA) had to offer. Such talented men competed to join because a tour in an Indian Mountain Battery, unlike other branches of artillery, virtually guaranteed seeing active service. Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) (formerly known as Native Officers and today as JCOs) and other ranks were all Indian and the best available, and also of large build and stature, as the relatively small number of batteries and their role as the only Indian artillery meant that there was always a surplus of volunteers, and this in turn meant that only the highest quality of recruit was accepted.

The mountain gunners’ boast was that they could go anywhere, where a man and a mule could put a foot. It was a remarkable sight to see a good mountain battery coming into ‘crash’ action. What would appear to the uninitiated eye to be a disorderly assembly of mules and soldiers would suddenly stream into position, there would be a brief pause with much exertion and the heaving of lumps of metal and in a minute or two, the animals would be led off at a run leaving six or four sturdy guns with their detachments kneeling smartly round them. On the line of march, Mountain Gunners always out-marched the Infantry, keeping up a steady clip of up to four and a half miles per hour, mile after mile and day after day.

Indian Artillery, Pre-World War I

Artillery in India, employed in battle from 14th Century onwards (including the three battles of Panipat, in 1526, 1556 and 1761), seems to have no direct lineal link with the Artillery arm of post-1947 Indian Army, except perhaps some very tenuous connection through those old State Forces batteries, which remain on the order of battle (orbat) of the Indian Army today. Artillery support to the armies of East India Company (the forebears of modern Indian Army) was provided in early days, by guns landed from sailing war-ships and manned by naval ratings. However, by 1857, each of the three Presidency Armies had its own complement of well organised batteries, horse, field, siege, Indian and European, properly equipped and trained, the largest being the Bengal Artillery.

After the events of 1857, the British in India decided to disband and abolish the artillery arm of the Army in India, as the Indian gunners played a very prominent role in the so called 'Mutiny' and Indians were no more to be trusted with this potent weapon of war for next 77 years (1858-1935). However, an exception was made in case of six batteries of the old East India Company which were retained on the orbat, post-1858, manned by Indians and commanded by RA officers. These units were found from those portions of the Army in India which were considered not to have been 'infected' by the 'Mutiny'- two "Oohmdes" batteries of the Bombay Presidency Army and four batteries of the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force (PIFFER), latter being an adjunct of the Army in India but initially raised more or less as private armies, by enterprising military-cum- administrative officers who 'settled' Punjab and Hazara after the downfall of the Sikh Kingdom in 1849. These six (in order of raising, but using 1939 titles) were, two 'Bombay Foot Artillery batteries, viz, 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery [raised in 1827, and thus the oldest and senior-most unit of the Indian Artillery today] and 6 (Jacob's) Mountain Battery [raised in 1843]; then four PIFFER batteries, ie, 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (FF) [raised in 1849 from the remnants of the Khalsa Army's horse artillery], 1 Royal (Kohat) Mountain Battery (FF) [raised in 1851, again from the soldiers of the disbanded Sikh Army], 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (FF) [also raised in 1851] and 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (FF) [raised in 1853]. Bombay, Derajat and Hazara Batteries remain in the Indian Army today, while the other three are in the Pakistan Army.

Initially formed in varying and changing configurations as light and field artillery, by 1876, all these batteries had been organised on 'mountain' basis and ceased to draw their guns (ie, pull the guns on wheels, in draft) and henceforth the guns were carried on sturdy and strong mules [the mule artillery (MA)] and at times even by elephants or porters (coolies).

By 1886, when 7 (Bengal) and 8 (Lahore) Mountain Batteries were raised, the original six had seen much active service during 30 years since the 'Mutiny', mainly on the NW Frontier and Afghanistan, but also in Burma and Abyssinia. All the eight mountain batteries were back on the NW Frontier by 1897, and remained there till the outbreak of World War I, except for a foray by 8 (Lahore) Mountain Battery to Somaliland in 1901-04. However, before the outbreak of World War I, four more batteries had been added to the orbat, ie, 9 (Murree) in 1898, 10 (Abbottabad) in 1900, 11 (Poonch) and 12 (Dehradun) Mountain Batteries in 1907, the former two seeing active service in East Africa, Aden and Tibet, before 1914.

In 1914, apart from the six batteries inherited from the East India Company and six raised after 1858, there were two other mountain artillery elements on the Indian scene; firstly, eight or nine British mountain batteries of the RA, with British Gunners from the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA), but some with Indian mule-leaders (drivers MA). The other element was the Indian State Forces units, some of those with impressive service record, which were not a part of the Indian Mountain Artillery, but participated in many Imperial wars, over the years. These State Forces units were No 1 and No 2, J&K Mountain Batteries (raised in 1840s, which saw much service on the Frontier and in the two World Wars), Gwalior Mountain Battery (raised in 1865) and Bikaner Bijay Battery (initially raised in 1906 as camel pack artillery).

Further narrative confines itself to the Indian Mountain Artillery proper during World War 1, and also excludes operations on the NW Frontier of India during 1914-18. As the British-Indian Army reorganised itself many times between 1858 and 1947, battery designations/titles used are of 1939, for ease of comprehension.

Part 2 - Indian (Mountain) Artillery in World War I

Indian Army in World War I

Before the commencement of hostilities in 1914, Indian Army was operationally organised mainly in two main Army Commands - the Northern Command stretched from NW Frontier to Bengal, with five divisions and three 'loose' cavalry brigades, while Southern Army Command was responsible from Baluchistan to South India, with four divisions, some 'loose' brigades, as also overseas responsibilities for Burma and Aden. With a total Army strength of 240,000, there were 39 cavalry regiments, 138 infantry battalions, twelve batteries of mountain artillery, three Sapper regiments and administrative troops. 1.3 million Indians volunteered to serve during this war and Indian Army remained the largest volunteer army in the world. The contribution of India to the Allied war effort can be judged from these figures - 1 million Indian troops served overseas, 700,000 in Mesopotamia alone, a total of 74,187 dead (about 62,000 overseas), 67,000 wounded and 13 Victoria Crosses won (8 Indians and 5 by their British officers).

As a part of its Imperial service commitment during World War 1, Indian Army sent out six Indian Expeditionary Forces (designated from 'A' to 'G'). Force 'A' (four divisions, formed into two corps) fought on the Western Front on continental Europe from September, 1914 till infantry divisions were withdrawn to more familiar clime of Egypt in October, 1915 and cavalry divisions in March, 1918, having sustained about 9000 casualties against a strength of 130,000. Forces 'B' and 'C' (about two divisions in strength) fought in German East Africa from November, 1914 till November, 1918, with varying fortunes. Force 'D' the largest expeditionary force with up to eight Indian infantry and one cavalry division fought in Mesopotamia from November, 1914 till the end of the War, with a tally of over 89,000 casualties (including over 37,000 dead) and about 13,500 missing, apart from extreme privations like starvation. Force 'E' operated in Palestine, initially with two cavalry divisions transferred from France in March, 1918, plus an Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade of State forces lancers and was later boosted up with about five divisions

worth of Indian troops. About two divisions (Plus) forming Force 'F' operated in Egypt from 1914 to 1916 to defend the Suez Canal, till these were diverted to other fronts by 1916. Lastly, Force 'G' comprising an infantry brigade only, reinforced Gallipoli front and fought there from April, 1915 till withdrawal eight months later, suffering about 1350 dead and 3,400 wounded. This apart, Indian Army was kept busy on the NW Frontier fighting the tribals, and on Baluchistan and Persian frontier guarding against the infiltration and machinations of German agents. A small foray was made by 19th Punjabi's into Russian Transcaspia in 1918 to help in anti-Bolshevik activities there.

Indian Mountain Artillery

At the outbreak of World War I in July, 1914, six of the mountain batteries out of twelve were grouped under 1st, 5th and 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigades (two batteries each), a battery each in Burma and Hong Kong and four in NWFP. During 1914-18, seventeen new mountain batteries were raised and added to the orbit of the Indian Army (a total of 29 batteries) all officered by British RA officers as before. Of these, ten were reduced or amalgamated within a few years of conclusion of the war.

1 Royal (Kohat) (FF) and 6 (Jacobs) Mountain Batteries were the only Indian Artillery which fought in the European Theatre (Gallipoli in Turkey), being in support of Australian and New Zealand Corps (ANZAC), while the rest of the Indian Artillery operated in the other theatres of war, ie, East Africa, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Persia, apart from the their old beat of NW Frontier. Indian Mountain Artillery was then the only artillery which the Indian Army had possessed for 56 years (1858 - 1914), the other artillery in India during this period being the RA (including RGA, who manned the British mountain batteries also, as distinct from Indian mountain batteries).

Egypt and Gallipoli

After the outbreak of the War on 28 July, 1914, 7th Indian Mountain Artillery (IMA) Brigade comprising 1 Royal (Kohat) Mountain Battery (FF) and 6 (Jacob's) Mountain Battery were the first of the IMA to move overseas, sailing from Karachi in September, 1914. Next six months were spent in Suez, deployed in defence of the Canal against the Turks, who had allied themselves with Germany and declared war against the Allies, in November.

Early in 1915, with a stalemate on the Western Front in Europe, a plan was conceived by the Allies (basically a brainchild of Winston Churchill, then the First Lord of Admiralty) to capture Constantinople, the capital of Turkish Empire as a diversion to relieve German pressure on Russian allies in Caucasus, as also to discourage any German attempt to secure an outlet via Turkey, towards the Persian Gulf and India. After an unsuccessful naval attack in March to force a passage, it was decided to land an expeditionary force on the Gallipoli peninsula on the European side of the Dardanelles Straits, capture the capital city and allow the fleet to get through to Bosphorus and then to the Black Sea. The Gallipoli Campaign took place between 25 April 1915 and 9 January 1916. After the naval operation, an amphibious landing was undertaken on the Gallipoli peninsula, but after eight months of fierce and staunch resistance by the Turks, the land campaign also failed with many casualties on both sides, and the Allied invasion force was withdrawn to Egypt.

7 IMA Brigade joined the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) under Lieutenant General W Birdwood (later Field Marshal and C-in-C, India, 1925) on the Aegean Island of Mudros in April, 1915 and then on to assault on the Anzac Beach in support of ANZAC. Kohat and Jacob's Batteries fought alongside the ANZAC throughout this harrowing campaign, providing invaluable artillery support to them right from Anzac Beach landings on 25 April to the withdrawal from there on 18/19 December, 1915, Jacob's Battery being the last artillery unit to leave the beach-head. (As customary for the British military historians, this 'evacuation' also has been described as a "masterpiece of organisation"!). They were heavily engaged under continuous fire, day in and day out for eight months, but continued to provide dependable artillery support to the Australians and the New Zealanders as good Gunners should.

In a brief narrative, it is not possible to relate the story of each action of the Indian Mountain Gunners on Anzac beach and beyond, during eight months of fierce fighting, but sustained gallantry, fortitude and professionalism of the men and their RA officers is evident from the farewell message sent by the GOC, ANZAC to their Brigade Commander, in January, 1916 - "I want to thank you, both your batteries, and all your officers and men for the really magnificent work they have done for us during the months when, I am glad to say, we were all together at ANZAC, what a high regard the Australian troops have for your two batteries, and I am delighted this is the case, for they have thoroughly deserved their high reputation ". Illustrative of the combat performance of the Indian Mountain Gunners (Sikhs and Punjabi Mussalmans) in the Gallipoli Campaign (Kohat and Jacob's, both batteries now serving in Pakistan Army) are these figures - killed, 11 + 12 = 23 (including 2 officers), wounded, 134 + 144 = 278 (including 5 officers), mules MA killed, 35 + 27 = 62, mules MA wounded, 119 + 93 = 212, ammunition expended, 12,248 + 9135 = 21,383 rounds and over 60 gallantry and battle-field awards. Both the batteries, bear eight battle honours each for Gallipoli Campaign (today, Indian Artillery is given 'theatre honours', battle honours being reserved for the Infantry and the Armoured Corps only).

German East Africa

German East Africa was a colony of Imperial Germany, which came into existence in 1880s and included, what were Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi. After World War 1, Britain and Belgium apportioned the territory between themselves, till it came under the League of Nations mandate in 1922 and eventually formed the mainland portion of Tanzania in 1960s.

The story of German East Africa in World War 1 is essentially the history of the colony's military commander, Colonel (later General) Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, a vibrant and great military leader and brilliant trainer of troops. Von Lettow-Vorbeck's plan for the war was quite simple; knowing that East Africa would only be a side-show, he determined to tie down as many British troops as he could, and to keep them away from the Western Front, and in this way to contribute to Germany's eventual victory. Starting with about 260 Germans and 2,500 well trained and motivated Askaris (indigenous African soldiers) he harried the forces of the British Empire during all the four years of war, tying down with his band of 3,500 Europeans and 12,000 Askaris and porters, a British / Imperial army 40,000 strong, which

was at times commanded by the former Boer commanders, Lieutenant Generals Jan Smuts (later Field Marshal and Prime Minister of South Africa) and Van Deventer. One of his greatest victories was at the Battle of Tanga (3-5 November 1914), where von Lettow-Vorbeck beat a British force more than eight times the size of his own. His guerrilla campaign compelled Britain to commit significant resources to a minor colonial theatre throughout the war and inflicted upwards of 10,000 casualties. Eventually weight of numbers, especially after forces coming from the Belgian Congo had attacked from the West (battle of Tabora) and dwindling supplies forced von Lettow-Vorbeck to abandon the colony. He withdrew into Portuguese Mozambique, then into British Northern Rhodesia where he agreed to a ceasefire three days after the end of the war, only on receiving news of the armistice between the warring nations. His was the only German force during the War to have invaded a British territory and the only one, not to have been defeated in open combat.

On the British side, the combat in East Africa was basically a war of endurance in a vast terrain of great heat, humidity, unhealthy malarial climate, alternating seasons of heavy rains and drought, with mosquitoes, ticks, jiggers making life perpetually miserable for humans, and tse tse fly making it deadly for horses and artillery mules. As an example, 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (FF) lost 948 artillery mules to disease during two years and only 11 in action, while 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (FF) lost 75 per cent of its animals in one month. For humans, malaria and shortage of rations were persistent themes. With an agile, elusive and hard-hitting enemy, inured to hardships and deprivations of this country, which varied from open parkland' bush to dense forest or water-less desert, it was a war of movement and attrition, albeit constrained by a lack of roads.

Indian Mountain Artillery was in support of the two Indian Expeditionary Forces inducted in the theatre, and tasked to "secure the safety of British East Africa by occupying Tanga and Kilimanjaro". These units were 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery from September, 1914 till January, 1918, 8 (Lahore) Mountain Battery from October, 1914 till end of 1917, 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (FF) from December, 1916 till November, 1918 and 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (FF) from April, 1917 till the war ended. No 1 J&K Mountain Battery also served very meritoriously in this theatre from December, 1916 to February, 1918. These batteries were continuously engaged in small and big actions during these long years, providing constant and reliable artillery support to infantry, resorting to many expedients and devices to keep doing so. The intensity of operations and degree of hardship undergone is illustrated by the case of great-hearted Lahore Battery, which had to be withdrawn to India to refit and recoup after it had worn itself out, with two years of unending toil; starvation and disease, with men weak, anaemic, and unfit.

Ten honour titles awarded to the Batteries, casualties incurred and numerous individual battle awards indicate the fine contribution of the Indian Mountain Artillery to the success of this arduous and long campaign in German East Africa during World War I.

Mesopotamia and Persia

In the vast arena of strife in World War I, the extensive territories of the weak and crumbling Ottoman Empire and its outliers attracted much geo-political interest from Britain and its European allies. As the War drew towards its close, the Czarist Russia also began to crack-up and its Southern periphery became an extension of Middle East in turmoil. During this period, various local, national and international factors and causes created or attracted armed intervention by Britain and allies in the various portions of (then) Turkish territories all over, some of such interventions carrying over or even commencing after the end of the World War 1 in November, 1918; such as, operations in Kurdistan, Iraq (known as Mesopotamia till 1922) and NW Frontier of India, after the Armistice in November, 1918 are not touched upon here.

Armed intervention by Allies in Mesopotamia ostensibly was to protect their vital oil fields opened there under British auspices in 1901, with a pipeline leading to Abadan in Shatt-al-Arab. The war in Mesopotamia lasted for four years from November, 1914 to November, 1918, till after the Armistice. After some initial successes, the campaign suffered setbacks in November, 1915 at Ctesiphon and forces withdrew to Kut-al-Amara, where Lieutenant General Townshend was besieged by Turks and eventually surrendered to them in April, 1916 with about 13,000 troops, mostly Indian (50 per cent of captured Indians died in Turkish captivity). By early March, 1917 a British-Indian Army force of a cavalry division and seven infantry divisions went on the offensive, capturing Baghdad by March, 1918 and took the surrender of Turkish forces by October.

This four year war, with all its campaigns and battles was fought mostly by about 700,000 Indian troops, with a total of over 89,000 casualties (dead and wounded).

3 (Peshawar) and 10 (Abbottabad) Mountain batteries were the first Indian Gunners to join the fray in Mesopotamia and had done their bit in the battles for Basra, Shaiba and Tigris till 1916, when they returned to India and thereafter were in action on the NW Frontier. 1 (Kohat) and 6 (Jacob's) Mountain Batteries refitted and recouped in Egypt after the withdrawal from Gallipoli and joined the fray in Mesopotamia, continuing there till the Armistice in November, 1918, Jacob's having a record of continuous service overseas for five and a half years. 5 (Bombay), 10 (Abbottabad), 11 (Dehradun), newly raised 14 (Rajputana), 15 (Jhelum) and 16 (Zhob) Mountain Batteries entered this theatre in 1918 and were in action in various battles in Mesopotamia.

Apart from operations in Mesopotamia, an offshoot of the campaign in Middle East was invasion of Persia, a series of engagements in northern Persian Azerbaijan and Western Persia between the British and the Russian Empires against the Ottomans, beginning in December 1914 and ending with the Armistice of Mudros on 30, October, 1918. The Russian operations were halted by the Russian Revolution on February 23, 1917 when the Russian Caucasus Army was replaced with Armenian units and an Allied force named Dunsterforce. 1 (Kohat), 6 (Jacob's), 11 (Dehradun), 15 (Jhelum) and 16 (Zhob) Mountain Batteries took part in prolonged but desultory operations in Persia, from time to time.

These nine batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery garnered 19 battle honours and titles for their gallant and devoted services during the war years in Mesopotamia and Persia.

Sinai and Palestine

Fighting in this campaign began in January, 1915 when German-led Ottoman forces invaded Sinai Peninsula, a part of British Protectorate of Egypt, with the aim of capturing the Suez Canal. By October, 1917 the stalemate in Sinai was broken by General Allenby's capture of Beersheba and thereafter he commenced his offensive cavalry operations in depth, culminating in capture of Aleppo and Damascus, and Armistice on 30 October, 1918. This campaign had the momentous outcome of ending the Ottoman Empire, mandates for Britain and France in the Middle East and creation of new nations then and subsequently - Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon.

Two Indian cavalry divisions were transferred from France in 1918, for service in Palestine, to form Indian Expeditionary Force 'E'. They were joined by the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, formed by three regiments of lancers from the princely states of Mysore, Hyderabad, and Jodhpur followed by two infantry divisions from Mesopotamia. At the same time, 36 of Indian army battalions were sent to reinforce four British infantry divisions already in Palestine.

The Indian Artillery which supported General Allenby's mobile operations in Palestine were the 9 (Murree), 12 (Poonch) and 19 (Maymyo) Mountain Batteries, and they earned nine battle honours/titles for their services in Palestine, including "Megiddo" and "Nablus".

Conclusion

This narrative briefly highlights the important contributions of the Indian Mountain Artillery (which virtually constituted 'Indian Artillery' at that point of time) towards the war effort of the British Empire during World War 1. In earlier times, territories won or lost in a war constituted some sort of a measure of military success or defeat, but this is no more so in the more complex modern world, where geopolitics is a more potent determinant of territorial configurations, than military prowess. Perhaps in long retrospect, the figures of war dead and wounded, as also military honours and awards won by the fighting soldier could be some sort of an indicator of the professional competence, fighting spirit and battle prowess of an army.

The Indian Army fought in all the theatres of war in World War 1; ie, France and Gallipoli in Europe, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia and Palestine in the Middle East and in East Africa. Well over a million (about 1,300,000) Indians served overseas, 700,000 of them in Mesopotamia alone, and in all, the Indian Army suffered about 142,000 casualties (including over 74,000 dead, about 62,000 of them overseas) during this war. As to Indian Artillery, all the twelve old batteries existing in 1914, continuously fought in this long war, in all theatres of operations (except the Western Front in France, where no Indian Artillery seems to have gone with the Expeditionary Force 'A'). In addition, three of the mountain batteries raised after commencement of war went into action overseas, the other war-time raisings being deployed on the NW Frontier or held in India as reserves and reinforcements. Some of the fifteen mountain batteries which fought overseas, saw action in more than two theatres of operations. Records of dead and wounded suffered by the mountain batteries during the war are not readily available, but it would be fair to assume that these formed a slice of foregoing figures for the Indian Army, proportionate to the strength of the Gunners taking part in these operations. Full records of individual gallantry awards to Gunners are also not readily available (which in any case were very selective for the "natives" in the British Empire of those days), but it is on record that these fifteen small units of Indian Mountain Artillery won 32 battle and theatre honours and titles fighting overseas, while five were given for operations in NW Frontier and Baluchistan during 1914-18, attesting to the fighting qualities, gallantry and battle efficiency of this small arm of the large Indian Army, then.

Today, one can well wonder as to what was the motivation for these million plus Indians to undergo the danger, death, injury and prolonged privations of this war - loyalty to an impersonal King Emperor, George the Fifth, in far distant England and to an alien Union Jack, or an instinctive reaction to a call to arms in a traditionally martial culture, imbued with a sense of honour, "izzat-o-iqbal" and a sense of duty towards the Authority and towards (then subjugated) Nation, or even to earn a living and find an occupation? There is no doubt that after the trauma of 1857, the next 57 years leading to 1914 saw an ethos ruling the officer-man relationship in the British-Indian Army, different from the one which had prevailed in East India Company's armies by mid-19th Century. The British officer closely identified himself with his men, tried his best to understand and to an extent share their culture and mores and thus engendered mutual feelings of respect, camaraderie and loyalty. This relationship, cultivated over long years and the inherent notions of honour and "izzat" prevailing in India of 100 years ago may well have been the prime motivators for the massive mobilisation of war effort in India of 1914-18, with some leavening perhaps of other prevailing factors. In aftermath of the Great War, the province of Punjab, which had provided the major portion of the fighting strength for this War, certainly gained much from the British administration in India, in material terms.

In recognition of the services of the Indian Mountain Artillery in the Great War, the title "Royal" was conferred on 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (Frontier Force) by the King-Emperor on

31 January, 1922 and they became entitled to proudly wear the "Royal Rassi" on the right shoulder, when in uniform. (The whole of the "Regiment of Indian Artillery" became" Royal Indian

Artillery" in October, 1945, in recognition of its sterling services in World War II).

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The author has extensively referred to invaluable, but somewhat discursive and meandering "The History of Indian Mountain Artillery"; by Brig-Gen CAL Graham (Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1957) as also the more 'snappy' "India's Army" by Maj Donovan Jackson (Sampson Low & Marston, London, 1940), along with very sketchy (at least for years prior to 1918) "History of the Regiment of Artillery, Indian Army" (Palit & Dutt, Dehradun, 1971).' Wikipedia on the Internet has been a useful and interesting source of arcane information but contains frequent internal contradictions in its varied manifestations. The author is grateful for the information culled from all these sources, while writing this

article.

@Major General Rajendra Prakash, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery in December 1950. He commanded 14 Infantry Division (1979-82) and retired in August 1983 from UP Area.

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**India and the Great War 1914-18 : International Conference
05-07 March 2014 - A Report**

Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd)@

The India and the Great War international conference held at the USI from 05-07 March 2014 marked the successful start to the USI's four-year long programme to commemorate the centenary of the conflict. One of the stated aims of the project is to examine and highlight not only the role of Indian soldiers but also the impact that the conflict had on Indian society, culture and politics. To this end, the papers presented at the conference were representative of the diverse range of subjects that the project aims to engage with in the coming four years. The 17 speakers who presented papers at the conference came from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Belgium and of course, India. They discussed India's role in the Great War from a wide variety of perspectives. The audience at the conference largely comprised USI members, serving officers, diplomats, political dignitaries, representatives from other think tanks, scholars, media persons and academics, students, including some NCC cadets.

The conference was successfully concluded and has generated considerable interest both within the country and internationally as well. The papers were well received by all who attended and the presence of the Hon'ble Vice President of India, Shri M Hamid Ansari who delivered the Inaugural Address, Foreign Secretary Smt Sujatha Singh who presided over the concluding Valedictory Session, and Field Marshal Sir John Chapple GCB, CBE, DL, who gave the Keynote Speech and attended all the sessions, further added value and significance to the event. The presence of a large number of eminent and distinguished individuals in the audience added greatly to the proceedings of the conference. This event has, therefore, effectively kick-started the USI-MEA India and the Great War Centenary Commemoration Project and has set a positive tone for all activities planned over the coming years.

The conference also provided an opportunity for USI members to interact with the scholars and discuss a host of issues on the sidelines. A small exhibition of interesting artefacts, photographs and documents was organised by Professor KC Yadav, Director of the Haryana Academy of History and Culture. The exhibition added greatly to the interest generated by the papers and was favourably commented upon by all who saw it.

A one-day "mirror conference" is planned to be held at the "In Flanders Fields" Museum at Ypres, Belgium on 24 Oct 14 as a continuation activity. The conference will conclude with the launch of the USI's Battlefield Guide of the Indian Army on the Western Front 1914-1918. This will be followed by an organised tour of the battlefields on 25 Oct 14. This conference is also slated to coincide with an exhibition of the Indian Army in France in Flanders to be held at the Chateau La Peyrouse in Saint-Venant, France, which was the Headquarters of the Indian Corps in France. These events will be held in collaboration with the "In Flanders Fields" Museum, Ypres, under the umbrella of HERA (Humanities in the European Research Arena). A HERA panel was also organised at the recently concluded USI conference.

Inaugural Address by the Hon'ble Vice President of India,

Shri M Hamid Ansari

I am happy to be here today for the inauguration of the "India and the Great War" Conference organised by the United Service Institution of India. It is the flagship event of the "India and the Great War" Centenary Commemoration Project. I congratulate the USI and MEA for this initiative.

The First World War was a seminal event in modern history. It transformed the global political, economic and social order irreversibly. Its repercussions were felt across the world, including in our country. A century later and with fading memories, it is relevant to recall its military and the politico-diplomatic aspects as also some wider consequences.

The War which began as the third Balkan war rapidly turned into a European war and eventually ensnared countries on almost all the continents of our planet, with battles fought in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Pacific.

In one of his books Henry Kissinger has penned a perceptive chapter on the events leading up to the war. His assessment has a wider relevance. Allow me to cite a passage from it :

"The statesmen of all the major countries had helped construct the diplomatic doomsday machine that made each succeeding crisis progressively more difficult to resolve. The military chiefs had vastly compounded the peril by adding strategic plans which compressed the time available for decision-making. Since the military plans depended on speed and the diplomatic machinery was geared to its traditional leisurely pace, it became impossible to disentangle the crisis under intense time pressure. To make matters worse, the military planners had not adequately explained the implications of their handiwork to their political colleagues. Military planning had, in effect, become autonomous."

The damage caused by the Great War had no parallel in history. In earlier wars, the civilian populations were generally spared. In World War I, the casualties suffered by the civilian population from bombing and the famines and epidemics caused by the war far exceeded those suffered by the armed forces. The War was also unprecedented in terms of resource mobilisation. According to some estimates, the conflict mobilised 65 million troops, claimed around 20 million military and civilian deaths and 21 million wounded. It imposed a heavy cost on the global economy and led to many serious social problems.

The First World War also set new standards in the capability and willingness of human race to inflict extreme violence and pain on their own kind through use of modern weapons of destruction, such as poisonous chemical gas, aircrafts and airships, tanks, U-boats etc.

In political terms, the War brought to an end four great empires - German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and

Ottoman - and transformed the geopolitical landscape of Europe and other parts of the world. One immediate result was the Russian Revolution of 1917. Economically and militarily, Europe was surpassed by the United States, which emerged from the war as a world power.

The post-war Peace Conference held at Versailles and the ensuing treaties were not a result of negotiations between the defeated and the victorious powers but were imposed on the defeated by the victors. They took on, to quote Kissinger again, “a nihilistic character.” These created fertile conditions for future conflicts.

In Asia, Europe and Africa, new states were created out of the former imperial territories of the defeated powers. Their geographical boundaries were at times arbitrary, drawn to serve the interests of dominant European powers. Colonies exchanged hands and areas of influence were mandated amongst the victors.

The unethical and arbitrary sharing of the spoils of war between the victorious powers prepared the ground for some of the most intractable international territorial disputes. These continue to haunt international peace and security to this day, particularly in West Asia and Africa. The American historian, Fritz Stern aptly described the War as “the first calamity of the twentieth century, the calamity from which all other calamities sprang”.

The War germinated the idea of an international organisation of all independent states aimed at the preservation of peace and security and peaceful settlement of international conflicts. The resultant ‘League of Nations’ bound its members ‘not to resort to war.’ Its eventual fate is another story but it did inspire the founding of United Nations in 1945.

The post-war perpetuation of colonial rule and exploitation by the victorious powers, in spite of their professed principles of freedom and democracy, was a wake up call for the nationalist movements in Asia and Africa. Some of the colonies, including India, had supported the war effort expecting to be rewarded with a major move towards independence or at the least self-government. This betrayal transformed the nationalist movements from seeking a more representative self-rule within the colonial framework to demanding complete freedom and independence from colonial yoke. The trend was aggravated by the resentment generated due to forced recruitment of soldiers and labour for war, and the exploitation of resources of the colonies by the imperialist countries.

The Great War marked a watershed in the political history of the freedom movement in the Indian subcontinent. When the war broke out in August 1914, many in our country supported the war effort in its bid to gain Dominion Status. The overwhelming majority of mainstream political opinion was united in the view that if India desired greater responsibility and political autonomy, it must also be willing to share in the burden of imperial defence. This was summed up in Gandhiji’s observation that “If we would improve our status through the help and cooperation of the British, it was our duty to win their help by standing by them in their hour of need.”

The major impact of the First World War, and its aftermath, was the realisation by the Indian nationalist movement that the British were not going to live up to the promises of representative self-rule which they had made during the war. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 disappointed the Indian people who longed for greater constitutional changes in the direction of self-rule. Repressive legislations like the Rowlatt Act rubbed salt on their wounds. A combination of these factors led to a shift in nationalist aspirations from Home Rule under the British Empire, to complete Independence from Britain; an objective which was realised almost three decades later on 15th August 1947.


According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, around 1.1 million Indian personnel were sent overseas on war duties, including to France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Persia and Palestine. Smaller contingents were deployed in Aden, East Africa, Gallipoli and Salonika. Around 60,000 troops from undivided India sacrificed their lives in the War. Over 9,200 decorations were earned, including 11 Victoria Crosses.

Despite this, the story of the Indian Army in the Great War has so far received no separate scrutiny. The Indian story, and it was a substantial one, must therefore be unravelled from amongst the larger official accounts of the War. There are almost no records that preserve the subaltern voice of the Indian rank and file, apart from the fortuitous collection of letters passed down by the Indian censors in France. The various narratives get a human touch by the accounts of a few British officers of the Indian Army, who recount the doings of their men in passing.


Today’s Conference is important and relevant in this context. This impressive and knowledgeable gathering of scholars and soldiers will serve as a good starting point for redressing this glaring gap in our understanding of that period of our history. Your discussions would contribute to a better comprehension of the events which influenced our past and affect our present. I wish you all success in your deliberations.

I thank the organisers for inviting me today.


Jai Hind”




Inaugural Address by the Hon'ble Vice President of India




Director USI introducing Field Marshal Sir Hohn Chapple prior to the Keynote Address




**Replicas of World War I Medals being presented to
the Hon'ble Vice President of India**



A View of the Audience



**Director USI, Foreign Secretary Smt. Sujatha Singh, and
Field Marshal Sir Hojn Chapple share a light moment**



Sitting Row (L to R) :-	Mr Alan Jeffreys, Sqn Ldr RTS China, Mr Andrew Kerr, Capt Ashok Nath , Fd Mshl Sir John Chapple, Amb Sujatha Singh, Lt. Gen P K Singh, Ms Suzanne Bargett, Dr. Prabhjot Parmer, Amb Navtej Sarna.
Standing 1st Row (L To R) :-	Rep Sikh Reg, Mr Dominiek Dendooven, Mr Tom Donovan, Mr Tony McClenaghan, Brig MS Jodha, Lt Cdr Kalesh Mohanan, Dr. Santanu Das, Prof Steven Wiikinson, Rep Sikh Regt.

The Valedictory Address by the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, Smt Sujatha Singh, IFS

Let me begin by saying that I am indeed honoured to be included in this flagship event that brings together scholars and experts from all over the world to examine diverse facets of India’s involvement in the Great War and commemorate the role of over one million Indians who served overseas and 60,000 Indians who laid down their lives in the line of duty. I am grateful to USI and General PK Singh for inviting me to deliver the Valedictory address today.

As we all know, this year marks the centenary, the start of one of the most cataclysmic events in modern world history – the First World War, a war that changed the social and political fabric not just of Europe, but of the entire world, a war that continues to have profound effects today, in the manner in which it shaped countries and their destinies. Many contemporary conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, trace their roots directly to the fallout of the Great War. It also sowed the seeds of another catastrophic war two decades later.

At the time the War broke out, India was still under colonial rule. It is a reflection of the professionalism and discipline of Indian soldiers that despite India’s own struggle against colonialism back home, they fought in different theatres of battle all over the world to share the burden of imperial defence. India contributed immensely to the war effort in terms of both men and material. Her soldiers served with credit and honour in numerous battlefields around the globe: in France and Belgium, in Aden, Arabia, East Africa, Gallipoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Persia and Salonika.

I understand that this Conference is the first of its kind, bringing together distinguished scholars, each one of them an expert in their respective fields, to discuss and review various aspects of India’s involvement in the Great War in the light of contemporary scholarship. The range of subjects covered is truly impressive; ranging from military aspects of the war to examining the role of the nearly forgotten Indian labour corps, to the repercussions on Indian society and culture, art, literature, film and visual representation as well as the role of the Indian princely states. The

Great War scarred a sweep of nations, with both the victors and the vanquished suffering unprecedented losses of millions of human lives, destruction of vast parts of their economies and lasting damage to their national psyches. Although its impact was felt around the globe, historians and academics tend to view World War-I primarily from the European perspective.

I commend USI and the distinguished scholars who have presented their works at the Conference over the last few days for bringing into focus a narrative from the Indian perspective and from Indian sensitivities to what has hitherto predominantly been a Euro-centric discourse, and I might add, within Europe, an Anglo-centric discourse.

I would like to digress a little here, to give you a perspective from a personal point of view of the various levels at which any narrative of the Great War plays out. I first learnt of the Great War when I was a child; my father read out to me that beautiful poem of John McCrae, "In Flanders Fields" and told me about the millions of men who had died there. The War did not form part of our history curriculum, but I remember learning about it through myriad books about the various theatres in which it was fought - the Middle East, the Somme, Gallipoli. I remember the exceptional BBC series that came on Doordarshan in black & white in the mid-70s, and the film "Oh, what a lovely war!" which brought home like no history book can, the pathos, the tragedy and the utter futility of those years.

Those of us who joined the Foreign Service, have what we call a compulsory foreign language. I chose German. I think my choice was in some way influenced by a sub-conscious desire to see the war years from the other side. My four years in Germany, and more recently my one and a half years as Ambassador, took me beyond the stereotypes one had come across in literature and in comic books. Learning the language and the idiom and looking at World War I through German eyes, including in little villages where the cemeteries are filled with rows of graves of their fallen sons, brought home the pathos even further : this was the side that had lost.

Similarly in postings around the world, one came across monuments, cemeteries and events that drew attention to India's participation in World War I, known mainly to Indians or to only those countries where they had actually fought. As Joint Secretary (West Europe), I signed off every year on our sending two bagpipers every November to the Menin Gate to commemorate our fallen soldiers.

In my posting in Australia as High Commissioner, I got to see yet another aspect. The manner in which the Anzacs commemorate Gallipoli and the pride they take in their soldiers who fought there. It is truly something to be seen to be believed, including the little children who march in the parades and the relatives who wear their grandparents medals with pride. Knowing as I did, about the Indian soldiers who fought in Gallipoli, it was curious for me to see no mention of our soldiers who had fought there or the role that they had played in the Gallipoli campaign. I made it my business to find out more and the stories that I came across were truly fascinating. About Indian Regiments and medical corps that had served at Gallipoli; about the casualties that they incurred which, as a proportion of the men who fought, were one of the highest; of the Australian medic Simpson, who became a legend along with his donkey, which I believe were actually several donkeys, (each time a donkey died, there would be a new donkey), as they fearlessly carried the wounded from the front to the field hospitals and how Simpson used to bed down every night with the Indian contingent. There were other stories too, of how wood was very scarce to come by in Gallipoli but that the Indians always managed to light a fire in the evenings to cook their dal and rotis and that the fragrance of their food and the smoke from their camp fires remained a distinct memory for many Australian soldiers who fought there. The person who told me this story remarked that he could never figure out where they got the wood to light their fires. I think it might have been a bye-product of their donkeys' and an early example of our 'jugaad' spirit. I am not sure how much of this is accurate, but I thought I would tell you for what it was worth. I also learnt that there were Indians who fought on the Turkish side.

In the years that I was there, I was in touch with Delhi to see if we could take part in the Anzac Day ceremonies. It was around this time that I met General PK Singh and found someone even more enthusiastic than I was about commemorating the role of the Indian soldier in every battlefield where he had laid down his life. I told him that we should send two bagpipers to the Anzac Day ceremonies in Australia and see how we can honour the role played by our Indian soldiers at Gallipoli. At some level, we seem to be conflicted about whether we should be commemorating something we did under colonial rule. I hope this Conference will help to acknowledge the role that we played in all theatres. As importantly, Gallipoli strikes a very deep emotional chord in the Australian heart. As a diplomat in the business of building bridges to partners and communities all over the world, it is in our interest to make this particular connection better known in Australia itself. Successive High Commissioners, including I, have done this and the effort continues. I hope it gets to a point where it is part of the national consciousness at the people-to-people level.

To come back to the present Conference, the Ministry of External Affairs is playing a significant role in commemorating the part played by our soldiers in the Great War, through events in India as well as other countries around the world. The USI Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research is our partner in many of these projects; we have drawn up a broad calendar of projects and events across the next four years that will seek to holistically examine, and focus on the oft-forgotten role played by India in the War. The proposed events include participation of contingents of the Indian Armed Forces in commemorative ceremonies in India and countries abroad, publications, research projects, exchange of scholars, exhibitions, enhancing people-to-people contacts, and enabling descendants of distinguished soldiers to attend relevant commemorative ceremonies/events.

I commend the USI for its foresight and vision in preparing for the Great War commemoration activities. This included a panel discussion on 'India and the Great War' held at the Jaipur Literature Festival in January this year. In February, a series of interactions and talks were arranged for a curator from the Royal Pavilion in Brighton which had been used as a hospital for Indian troops wounded in the Western front during the War. In the months and years ahead, several collaborative events in consultation with foreign Governments including France, Belgium, Australia and Israel are also being worked upon.

Our efforts, of which this Conference is an important part, will pay homage to the valour and sacrifice of previous generations of Indian soldiers. I trust we would also bring out the futility of war and the accompanying

carnage that it unleashes.

I would like to propose a companion project to the USI project regarding the memorials to our soldiers in foreign lands; this would be to record the name of each of our soldiers in every country where our fallen soldiers are buried. This would be on the website of each High Commission and Embassy in the countries concerned. MEA would be glad to partner USI in the project.

I hope that through the medium of the Centenary commemorations, we can also reflect of how the events of the past have impacted our present. Through the collaborative nature of commemorative ventures that will take place in concert with partner nations, we hope to bring about a greater understanding of India's role in the War effort at the level of governments, academics, media and most importantly, people.

I warmly felicitate the United Service Institution of India and its Director, General PK Singh for conceiving, organising and successfully putting together this Conference. Let me close with a poem from Sarojini Naidu, the Nightingale of India and the first woman President of the Indian National Congress. The poem, "The Gift of India", captures the sacrifice of India and its fallen soldiers during World War I. She wrote, and I quote :

Is there ought you need that my hands hold?
Rich gifts of raiment or grain or gold?
Lo! I have flung to the East and the West
Priceless treasures torn from my breast,
and yielded the sons of my stricken womb
to the drum-beats of duty, the sabres of doom.
Gathered like pearls in their alien graves
Silent they sleep by the Persian waves,
scattered like shells on Egyptian sands,
they lie with pale brows and brave, broken hands,
strewn like blossoms mowed down by chance
on the blood-brown meadows of Flanders and France.
Can ye measure the grief of the tears I weep
or compass the woe of the watch I keep?
Or the pride that thrills thro' my heart's despair
and the hope that comforts the anguish of prayer?
And the far, sad, glorious vision I see
or the torn red banners of victory?
when the terror and tumult of hate shall cease
and life be refashioned on anvils of peace,
and your love shall offer memorial thanks
to the comrades who fought on the dauntless ranks,
and you honour the deeds of the dauntless ones,
remember the blood of my martyred sons!

Unquote

Thank you and Jai Hind!

Conference Schedule

Day 1 - Wednesday, 5 March 2014

Welcome Address:	Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) Director, USI
Inaugural Address:	Shri M. Hamid Ansari Hon'ble Vice President of India
Keynote Lecture:	Field Marshal Sir John Chapple, GCB, CBE, DL (CGS British Army, 1988-1992)

Session I: The Fighting Fronts

Session Chair: Santanu Das (King's College, London)

Peter Stanley (University of New South Wales, Canberra) : The Indian Army's contribution in the Gallipoli campaign

Dominiek Dendooven (In Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres): Sikhs in the Salient: The Indian Army Corps at Ypres, 1914-15

Tom Donovan (Chattri Memorial Group, Brighton): The Indian Army Corps in France and Flanders in 1914

Day 2 - Thursday, 6 March 2014

Session II: Military Labour and Officer Experience

Session Chair: Peter Stanley (University of New South Wales, Canberra)

Radhika Singha (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi): The ends of war: The Indian Labour Corps in France and lessons for the 'returnee', 1917-1919

Alan Jeffreys (Imperial War Museum, London): The Indian Army officer experience during the First World War

Session III: Indian Army Regiments and the Royal Indian Marine

Session Chair: Tony McClenaghan (Indian Military Historical Society, UK)

Captain Ashok Nath (University of Stockholm, Sweden): A Grand Spectacle - Indian Cavalry and Infantry Regiments of the Great War

Lieutenant Commander Kalesh Mohanan (Indian Navy History Division): Royal Indian Marine in the First World War

Session IV: Repercussions on Indian society and culture

Session Chair: Indivar Kamtekar (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi)

Steven Wilkinson (Yale University, USA): The Great War and its Political Legacies

Anirudh Deshpande (University of Delhi): 'Retrenchment and Demobilisation after the First World War - the case of the Indian armed forces'

Fredrik Petersson (Åbo Akademi University, Finland): Subversive Indian Networks in Berlin and Europe, 1914-18

Day 3 - Friday, 7 March 2014

Session V: Art, literature, poetry, and filmography

Session Chair: Radhika Singha (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi)

Santanu Das (Kings College, London): The Indian Sepoy in the Great War: Words, Images and Objects

Narender Yadav (History Division, MoD, Delhi): Tradition and Folklore in augmenting War efforts in Haryana

Prabhjot Parmar (University of the Fraser Valley, Canada): Sepoys, Scribes and Sahibs: Cultural Representations of Indian Soldiers in the Great War

Screening of Film: Whose Remembrance?

Session VI: Indian State Forces

Session Chair: Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina (Retd) (USI CAFHR, Delhi)

Tony McClenaghan (Indian Military Historical Society, UK): The Maharajas' Contribution to the First World War

Andrew Kerr (UK): 'I can never say enough about the men' - the experiences of a SSO attached to an Indian State Forces battalion in East Africa

Brigadier MS Jodha (Indian Army): A Rajput in France and Palestine: With the Jodhpur Lancers in the Great War

Valedictory Address : **Smt Sujatha Singh, IFS**, Foreign Secretary, Govt of India

Vote of Thanks : **Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina (Retd)** Secretary and Editor, USI-CAFHR

@Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd) is the Secretary and Editor of the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) at USI.

Memoirs of a Prisoner of War : Sino-Indian War 1962

Major JS Rathore (Retd)@

Background

During early 1950s, India championed China's entry into the UNO and the slogan of "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" became popular across the country during the Chinese premier Chou En-lai's visit to India. The relations gradually deteriorated after it was discovered in 1957 that the Chinese had constructed a road through Indian territory in Aksai Chin. On 20 October 1962, the Chinese attacked the Indian positions in the Namka Chu Valley and overwhelmed the defences within a few hours. By the morning of 21 Oct, the Battles of Namka Chu, Tsangdhar and Hathungla were over and 7 Infantry Brigade had ceased to be an effective fighting force.¹ During this disastrous war a large number of Indian troops suffered the misfortune of becoming Chinese Prisoners of War (PsW) who remained in their captivity till 28 May 1963. The author was one amongst them. The narrative that follows is the personal experiences of Major JS Rathore (Retd) in Chinese captivity and was received through his son Colonel HS Rathore, presently posted as Senior Instructor at the School of Artillery, Deolali.

Beginning of the War

McMahon Line was established by the British as the boundary between India and Tibet. Later, after annexing Tibet, China raised questions about McMahon Line being the border between India and China. In erstwhile NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) they laid claim to the Thagla Ridge in the Kameng Frontier Division. Dhola Post established by Assam Rifles in early Jun 1962 acted as the trigger for a chain of events that were to result in a full scale war. To provide security to Dhola Post, India sent a company of 9 PUNJAB. When the Chinese surrounded the Dhola Post on 07 Oct 1962, India reacted by ordering 7 Infantry Brigade comprising 9 PUNJAB, 2 RAJPUT and 1/9 GR to Namka Chu. One troop of 4.2 inch mortars (four mortars) was allotted to provide fire support to the brigade. On 30 Sep 1962, decision to para drop one troop of 17 Parachute Field Regiment (PARA Fd Regt) by air from Agra was taken.²

Induction of F Troop, 17 Parachute Field Regiment

I was posted as a Lance Naik Technical Assistant (TA) at the HQ 52 Battery of 17 PARA Fd Regt. Colonel Manohar Singh, Colonel General Staff (Operations), 4 Infantry Division who had earlier commanded 17 PARA Fd Regt, requested the CO, Lieutenant Colonel RC Butalia to send selected officers and other ranks with the Troop. Captain HS Talwar, Troop Commander of 49 Battery, Second Lieutenant AS Behl, Gun Position Officer of 51 Battery and other personnel were selected as part of the F Troop of 52 Battery. Being a reputed TA, I was also shifted from the Battery HQ to be part of F Troop. Within 12 hours, four guns of F Troop reached the Kheria air base, Agra. On 01 Oct 62, one AN-12 aircraft flew with F Troop comprising two officers, two JCOs and 48 jawans from Kheria air base at Agra to Tejpur air base. Due to bad weather the aircraft could not land at Tejpur. It was diverted to Calcutta but could not land there also. Finally, after three hours we landed at the Amausi airport, Lucknow. Next day, F Troop was flown from Lucknow to Tejpur.

Now the plan was to para drop guns of the F Troop on the Tsangdhar feature (14500 feet) which was also the dropping zone (DZ) for 7 Infantry Brigade. However, due to non-availability of a suitable DZ, troops were ordered to move on foot - the guns and ammunition were planned to be para dropped. F Troop personnel started moving on foot from Tejpur foothills to Tsangdhar. Since we were neither kitted, nor trained for move across snow covered mountains we faced unforeseen problems. Lack of oxygen in high altitude areas resulted in many casualties. Both the JCOs, Troop Havaldar Major and two to three jawans were evacuated to Tejpur. Balance of F Troop personnel reached its designated place on Tsangdhar feature. After two days, ration and stores were para dropped followed by guns and ammunition on the third day. Our jawans did a great job under adverse conditions by recovering three guns and approx 200 rounds of ammunition. One gun barrel was badly damaged as it fell on rocks. Recoil system of one of the guns could not be located. Hence, with three guns and approx 200 rounds of ammunition, F Troop was ready to provide fire support to the brigade. Certain essential requirements for Artillery fire support, which were not available, are given below:-

- (a) No maps of the area of operations were provided. A sketch of the area with certain routes and landmarks marked on it was issued. However, due to snow, the landmarks could not be identified.
- (b) No liaison could be carried out with the Infantry in their defences. The observation post (OP) officer could not reconnoitre his OP position.
- (c) DZ was selected at a distance of 100 m from the gun area. Hence, gun area became an easy target for enemy artillery.
- (d) Only Radio Sets 62 were available for communication which caused a lot of communication problems.
- (e) Troops were ill equipped in terms of weapons, rations and clothing to fight a battle in snow bound high altitude areas.

Inadequate plans and preparations by the Indian Army and complete lack of intelligence about Chinese intentions created serious problems for the Indian troops. On 19 Oct, our OP party was ordered to move forward and marry up with Infantry. Till then, there was no improvement either in radio communications or availability of maps.

The Chinese Offensive

On 20 Oct, from about 0500 hours onwards, the Chinese started shelling our gun area at Tsangdhar. We neither received any orders from our OP for fire support nor could we establish any communication with the other OP officer. At that time an Indian Army helicopter came over our gun area. It was fired upon by a Chinese machine gun, compelling it to return back. We realised that the Chinese machine gun was firing from a nearby position. We tried to locate it with the help of binoculars through the fog surrounding our position. We were surprised to see hundreds of Chinese soldiers around our gun area firing small arms and throwing grenades at us. Two of our soldiers lost their lives and three were badly injured. We had only one bandolier of small arms ammunition with each one of us which was found to be unserviceable. When there was no firing from our side, the Chinese announced through a loudspeaker: "You are surrounded by us so either you surrender or be ready to die". Chinese, with their bayonets on the ready started advancing towards us. Second Lieutenant AS Behl had to take the decision to surrender.

Experiences in Chinese Captivity

After the surrender, a body of Chinese troops surrounded us and took us towards Namka Chu. We had to leave our dead and injured soldiers in the gun area. At that time I regretted the fact that, if we had received correct and timely orders from our OP, we had enough ammunition to cause heavy casualties on the enemy in terms of men and material. Our failure to fire our guns perturbed us very much after our surrender. Chinese took us towards Tibet. On the way we passed through 2 RAJPUT defended area and were horrified to see dead bodies of our soldiers, lying both inside and outside the bunkers. Our defensive positions were totally destroyed. More than 90 per cent of 2 RAJPUT troops had made the supreme sacrifice and the remaining were taken PsW.

We were made to walk across hilly terrain till about midnight on 20 Oct. We were allowed to rest but no food was given to us. On 21 Oct we were taken to a vacated Tibetan village in covered vehicles and reached there in the evening on the same day.

The life as a PW commenced on 22 Oct. The Tibetan village had PsW from 60 Heavy Mortar Battery, 17 PARA Fd Regt, 2 RAJPUT, 9 PUNJAB and the Pioneer Platoon. Prisoners were divided into two categories. One comprised Lance Naiks (L/Nk) to Lieutenant Colonels (Lt Col) and the other only soldiers. We were housed unit-wise in dirty vacated Tibetan mud houses. The responsibility of the cook house for the category of L/Nk to Lt Col was with our unit members. The menu initially was only rice without any vegetable/dal. Water was required to be fetched from a nala which was about a km away. For this three groups (each group comprised four officers, eight JCOs and 20 NCOs) were formed by us. We used to hang water buckets on wooden poles held them between the two of us. This Tibetan village was located on a small hillock. Ration was also carried by us on the issue days. We had only rice to eat. After 15 days, radish as vegetable without any condiments was also started. On some special occasions dry meat of goats/sheep along with purries was given. Water fetched by us was used for bathing and all other requirements. There were no arrangements or means for shaving and cutting hair; hence, all of us grew long beards and hair.

The mud houses were dirty and stinking. Dried hay was spread across on the floor. Each room housed 10 to 12 prisoners. We were given a thin woollen mattress and a quilt as our bedding. Each prisoner was given one blue woollen coat and a pair of pyjamas, one white shirt, canvas shoes and a cap as part of personnel clothing. Two to three times in a week, the Camp Officer used to speak to the PsW. The officer used to speak in Chinese language followed by translation in Hindi and English by an interpreter. Subject of the talks used to be: 'Hindi - Chini Bhai Bhai' and blaming the British and the American governments for being the main cause of the war.

After two months, the wounded soldiers were sent back to India. We wrote letters and sent these through them. This was the first time that we were able to inform our families that we were alive. Earlier, we were declared as PsW by our Government. Prior to that declaration, for about a month or so, our families had mourned for us as we were presumed to have died in the war. The family members and relatives still remained worried and sad. Although we were not tortured as prisoners but life as a PW was a harrowing experience. We were not treated as per the Geneva Conventions for PsW - in fact we did not get even one tenth of the considerations stipulated in it.

26 January 1963 Incident

To mislead the world about the humane treatment being given to PsW, on 26 Jan 1963 the Chinese planned an entertainment and sports programme during day time followed by a Barakhana at night. According to their plan, photographs of the event were to be taken and given to reporters from foreign countries for sending across to India and other countries. Captain HS Talwar called me along with other jawans to inform all other prisoners about the Chinese intent. A few senior officers of the Chinese army were expected to attend the Barakhana. To thwart the Chinese game plan, of deriving propaganda value from the event, I called the jawans of 17 PARA Fd Regt, explained the Chinese intent and told them not to attend the Barakhana. They were also briefed to spread the word to jawans of other units and motivate them not to attend the Barakhana. Our jawans worked with utmost secrecy and ingenuity, and succeeded in motivating one third of the PsW not to attend the Barakhana. The Chinese officers got very agitated and angry because of this incident. They started enquiring from the PsW about the originators of this plot.

On 30 Jan 1963, I was asked to face an inquiry by a Board of Chinese officers. In the Court of Inquiry, I was asked questions which would make me an accused. I told them that I did the right thing by not attending the Barkhana myself and so also the other jawans of 17 PARA Fd Regt. I explained to them that participation in any such function by us on our Republic Day while being PsW would amount to betrayal of our Country and we would not attend any such function in future also. They were also told that since PsW of other units were kept separately, we were unable to meet them, so they must have acted in this manner on their own.

Now, the Chinese officers singled me out for harassment. They started calling me for questioning before lunch and leaving me after the dinner time. This process continued for a week. One day, their interpreter gave me time to meet him at 1800 hours at an isolated house. I reached the designated place in time but the interpreter was not there because he had gone to see a Chinese movie in the open air theatre. He came there after two hours. I had got frustrated by their daily questioning and became very angry. One day I complained to him about my harassment and

frustration. He responded by asserting that I had to obey their orders and went on to utter some derogatory words against our Country. In a fit of rage I pushed him to the ground. On seeing this argument and scuffle, two Chinese soldiers and my PsW friends rushed towards us. They all intervened and the fighting between us was stopped.

Next day at about 1000 hours, their Camp Commander (with two other Chinese officers and the interpreter) came and ordered me to follow them. They took me to a Tibetan Gumpa (temple), which was about 400 metres away from the prison camp. We all sat down on stones. Although I felt strongly that they would not kill me as our names had already been sent to India as PsW in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, I was sure that I would be given some physical punishment. The Chinese Camp Commander, aged about 50 years, was considerate. He said Hindi – Chini Bhai Bhai and was apologetic about the incident of the previous night and for the prolonged harassment meted out to me. He made me and the interpreter to shake hands. The incident was thus resolved amicably for the time being.

Everything went on in a routine manner after the incident. On 28 May 1963, in accordance with an agreement, orders were given for all the PsW to be handed over to India. At that time, 17 PARA Fd Regt was at Ranchi and we were taken there after being handed over to India. Our Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel RC Butalia, officers, JCOs and jawans gave us a warm reception and empathised with us for our sufferings in Chinese captivity.

Treatment on Repatriation

All the repatriated PsW of 17 PARA Fd Regt got a very affectionate and compassionate treatment within the unit. We were given two months leave. In my family and village it was like Holi celebrations. Each and everyone met me with warmth and understanding, and enquired about my harrowing experiences as a PW. On termination of leave we were attached to our respective training centres for screening/inquiry. Those amongst us who were found guilty of divulging security related information and cooperating with the Chinese captors were sent home. My record was found to be 'outstanding'; hence, I was sent back to my unit 17 PARA Field Regiment and continued to serve till my retirement. However, the debacle on the Namka Chu and my subsequent days as a PW have left an indelible impression on me; my greatest regret to this day remains that we were not able to provide any fire support.

Endnotes

1. Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd), USI Journal, Apr-Jun 2013, '1962 - The Battle of Namka Chu and Fall of Tawang' pp 271-289.
2. Palit and Dutt Publishers, Dehra Dun, 'History of the Regiment of Artillery : Indian Army', published by Army Headquarters, New Delhi, pages 185-186.

@Major JS Rathore (Retd) joined 17 PARA Field Regiment as a young soldier in Feb 1957, received Special List Commission on 30 Jun 1978 and retired from service on 30 Jun 1991. He participated in liberation of Goa - 1961, Sino-Indian War - 1962 and India-Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971.

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