

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



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Building Military Capability, Developing New Partnerships and Protecting National Interests in an Uncertain World Order

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- Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

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- Shri PS Raghavan, IFS (Retd)

- Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd)

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OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2019

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USI LATEST PUBLICATION DURING 2019

Pub Code	Title of Book & Name of Author	Price(Rs)	Year
M-1/2019	"An Appraisal of The PLA's Training for Integrated Joint Operations – India's Actions, Response and Counter-Strategy" By Col Nihar Kuanr	295	2019
Op-1/2019	"Kashmir Valley Politics : Alignments and Re-alignments" By Prof Kashi Nath Pandita	150	2019
R-98	"Modern Information Warfare – Operations, Doctrine and Force Structures" By Col Anurag Dwivedi M/s Pentagon Press	995	2019
R-99	"STRATEGIC YEAR BOOK 2019" Edited by Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Maj Gen BK Sharma, AVSM,SM & Bar (Retd) and Dr Roshan Khanijo	1850	2019
R-100	"Tibet : When the Gods Spoke - India Tibet Relations 1947-1962, Part -3" By Claude Arpi	1650	2019
R-101	"CHINA-PAKISTAN MILITARY NEXUS : Implications for India" by Lt Gen PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) & Gp Capt Sharad Tewari, VM (Retd) M/s Pentagon Press	1295	2019
R-102	"Pakistan's Internal Security Challenges and the Army's Ability to Overcome Them" By Brig Shamaan Chodha	995	2019
R-103	"China's Strategic Behaviour" By Brig Sanjeev Chauhan M/s Pentagon Press	995	2019
CAFHR-38	"For The Honour of My House : The Contribution of the Indian Princely States to the First World War (War and Military Culture in South Asia, 1757-1947 No-10)" By Tony McClenaghan Publisher: Helion & Company; Publication City/Country: Solihull, United Kingdom.	US \$49.95	2019
CAFHR-39	"The Indian Army in World War I - 1914-1918" By Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd) M/s Manohar Publishers & Distributors	1595	2019
CAFHR-40	"RIDING THE WIND – THE STORY OF ONE OF INDIA'S GREATEST TEST PILOTS" By Wg Cdr P Ashoka (Retd)	850	2019
CAFHR-41	"Distant Battlefields – The Indian Army in the Second World War" by Harry Fecitt MBE TD	2495	2019
CAFHR-42	"THE KARGIL VICTORY BATTLES FROM PEAK TO PEAK" By Col SC Tyagi (Retd) M/s Speaking Tiger Publishing Pvt Ltd	299	2019
NSS-65	"Evolving Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region- Challenges and Prospects" Edited by Cdr Subhasish Sarangi	850	2019
A-1/2019	"China's Strategic Deterrence" By Col Anshuman Narang M/s Pentagon Press	2995	2019

*Available at USI of India

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(i)

**UNITED
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for

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in the art, science and
literature
of National Security
in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular*

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
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Auditorium	28,000	18,000	3,500	3,500	5,000
Seminar Room-1	15,000	10,000	2,500	2,500	3,000
Seminar Room-2	8,000	5,000	2,000	2,000	1,500
Seminar Room-3	5,000	3,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
Seminar Room-4	8,000	5,000	1,500	1,500	2,000
Seminar Room-5	10,000	6,000	2,500	2,500	2,500
Seminar Room-6	4,500	3,000	1,500	1,500	1,500

RATE OF SUBSCRIPTION FOR USI JOURNAL

The USI Journal has been digitised and can be accessed at www.usiofindia.org. Dispatch of hard copies to the members has been discontinued, however, Formation Headquarters, Units, Messes, Libraries and individuals can subscribe to the USI Journal at the rates as under:-

- (a) Single copy - Rs 300/- plus Rs 40/- postal/ packing charges
- (b) Yearly subscription - Rs 1100/- plus Rs 160/- postal/ (four issues) packing charges
- (c) There is no life time subscription, however, 20 years subscription can be subscribed for Rs 20,000/- including postal charges.

Editor

USI CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

1. The USI conducts correspondence courses for DSSC – Army and Navy, DSTSC (Army) Entrance Examinations and Promotion Examinations Parts B and D.
2. The Courses have been remodelled to make it more interactive and the admission procedure has been simplified to make it user friendly.
3. Membership of the USI is mandatory to join any correspondence course.
4. Schedule of Correspondence Courses 2019-20.

Courses	Commencement of Course	Date of Exam	Cost All Subjects	Cost Per Subject
(a) DSSC (Army)	3 rd Week of Nov 2019. Registration Open for 2020	Sep 2020	Rs 8000/-	Rs 2400/- for Tac B Rs 1800/- each for MH & CA Rs 1500/- for SMT Rs 1300/- for Tac A Rs 1200/- for Adm & ML
(b) DSSC (Navy)	1 st Week of Jan 2020	Jul 2020	–	Rs 1500/- for Paper-1
(c) Part B	2 nd Week of Dec 2019. Registration Open for 2020	10Jun2020 to 31Jul2020	Rs 3000/-	Rs 1000/- each for Tac, CA & MH Rs 800/- each for Adm & ML
(d) Part D	1 st Week of Apr 2020. Registration Open for 2020	Nov 2020	Rs 4000/-	Rs 1200/- each for Tac, CA & MH Rs 1000/- each for Adm and ML

5. **Contact Programmes.** Three contact programmes for DSSC/Army-2020 have been planned. Dates are : **22-27 Jun 2020, 06-11 Jul 2020 and 20-25 Jul 2020.** Separate test papers will be set for each programme. Fees – Rs 6000/- per contact programme.
6. Correspondence courses for Special to Corps subjects are not conducted.
7. **Mode of Payment.** Local/multiplicity cheque or bank draft payable at New Delhi in favour of *Director USI of India* or cash or Bank Transfer.
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1400 PM to 1600 PM }
11. Telephones : Chief Instructor - 20862325
Course Section - 20862318
12. Prospectus and Form : Available on Website and from Course Section.

MEMBERSHIP FEES

	Entrance	Subscription	Total
Life Membership (20 Years)			
Armed Forces	3000	9000	12000
Civilian	3000	12000	15000
Ordinary Membership^c			
Armed Forces	1000	3000	4000
Civilian	1000	4000	5000
Associate Membership^c	3000	5000	8000
Course Membership	900	600	1500

See USI website : www.usiofindia.org for details and form

^c(For 3 years commencing 01 Apr)
(One Year for One course only)

ARTICLES FOR USI JOURNAL

1. USI welcomes original articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. **Articles should preferably not exceed 2,500 words.** Along with the article, the author should forward abstract of the article not exceeding ten per cent of the total words. These should be forwarded in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a CD/DVD as a Word document. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternatively, articles may be sent through e-mail on dde@usiofindia.org. The author should render a certificate that the article has neither been previously published in print or online, nor has it been offered to any other agency for publication. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations.
2. It is mandatory that the author furnishes complete details of the book/journal referred to in the article as end notes. This should include full name of the writer of article/book referred to, title of book/article, journal in which published (in case of articles); issue details, and page numbers. A guide to writing endnotes is given on the next page. Besides endnotes, if the author so desires, a bibliography may also be included, though not mandatory.
3. The article should be in Aerial Font (preferably), size 12 and English (U.K.). Avoid use of symbols like %, & and so on. The date style should be 24 October 1970. Abbreviations if any, should be used in their expanded form the first time and indicated in brackets.
4. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers are advised to follow the prevailing Services instructions for publications of their articles.
5. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his/her article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

GUIDE TO WRITING ENDNOTES

1. Endnotes are notes added to the main body of a paper or an article, in which the author directs readers to sources referred to or to add extra comments of his or her own. Endnotes are placed at the end of the paper/article. A superscript number (1,2,3,4.....) at the end of the sentence signals the reader to look for the corresponding endnote at the end of the article. The endnotes should be numbered consecutively, starting from '1'. Citations should include the author's name, title of the book (in italics), publishing information (in parenthesis) and pages consulted, all separated by commas. For example :-
 - ¹ Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy : A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style*, (Oxford University Press, London, 1988), p. 45.
 - ² Lina Bolzoni and Pietro Corsi, *The Culture Memory*, (Bologna : Societa editrice il Mulino, 1992), p. 45.
2. Use of *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, and *loc. cit.*
Ibid. refers to the immediate preceding reference; *op. cit.* refers to the prior reference by the same author and *loc. cit.* is used instead of *op. cit.* when reference is made to a work previously cited and to the same page in that work. For example :-
 - ⁴ R Poirer, *Learning Physics*, (Academic, New York, 1993), p.4.
 - ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.
 - ⁶ T Eliot, *Astrophysics*, (Springer, Berlin, 1989), p. 141.
 - ⁷ R Millan, *Art of Latin Grammar*, (Academic, New York, 1997), p.23.
 - ⁸ Eliot, *op. cit.*, p.148.
 - ⁹ Eliot, *loc. cit.*
3. Where websites have been used to access information, the complete web address of the website should be cited, followed by the date the website was accessed by the author. For example :-
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1497degama.html>. Accessed on 06 January 2016.

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter Ending December 2019

During this period a total of 28 new books have been added. Details of the new books are available on USI Website.

Research Projects

Members interested in undertaking research projects may submit research proposals to USI (CS3 / CAFHR). At present, six chairs have been instituted in CS3; namely, Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair, Admiral RD Katari Chair, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair, Prof DS Kothari DRDO Chair, Ministry of External Affairs Chair, Flying Officer Amandeep Singh Gill Chair and two Chairs in CAFHR namely; Maharana Pratap Chair and Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair. Copies of the Rules for Award of Fellowship Grants and Conduct of Research are available on the USI Website.

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Full Page	Rs. 2,500/-	Rs. 12,000
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Half Page	Rs. 1,500/-	Rs. 12,000
Four Consecutive Half Pages	Rs. 5,000/-	Rs. 44,000

New USI Members

During the period Oct – Dec 2019, 08 registered as New Life Members; 01 Ordinary Member renewed membership and 43 registered as new Ordinary Members.

Course Members

During Oct-Dec 2019, 99 Officers registered for Course Membership.

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NOTE

The views expressed in the Journal are the opinions of the contributors and the Editor, and are not necessarily official views or those of the USI Council.

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Director's Page

By the time this issue of the USI Journal reaches you, I would have stepped down as Director after exactly eleven years at the helm of this great, unique institution which is unparalleled in its scope, reach and expertise. I was sanguine that with the support of the “elders” and “well wishers” of the Institution, I would be able to build on the strong foundations and achieve the vision laid out in the “USI-A 2020 Vision” document that was approved by the Council in Jan 2005.

The USI is a membership based institution and our members are our greatest asset. During the last decade over 3,500 Life Members were enrolled. We need the support of the Services and our Members to encourage our officers to join the Institution. The Council has approved a new category of Life Members called “Special Member Civilian” whose tenure is capped at 10 years. Adequate checks and balances have been built in to safeguard the interests of the Institution.

The USI – Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) and the USI – Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (CS3) which were set up in the year 2000 and 2005 respectively have during the last decade covered new ground nationally and internationally. While the many faceted new activities have been spelt out in the Annual Reports of the President of the Council, I would like to highlight a few over here too.

To honour the sacrifice of Indian servicemen during WWI, the CAFHR conceptualized and executed the plans for the construction of the Indian Great War Memorial at Villers-Guislain, France. The onsite work was supervised by Sqn Ldr Rana Chhina and Maj Gen PK Goswami. The memorial was inaugurated by Shri Venkaiah Naidu, Hon’ble Vice President of India on 10 Nov 2018. I had the proud privilege to represent the Institution at the Inaugural ceremonies. The CAFHR also successfully spearheaded the “India and the Great War Centenary Commemoration Project” during the period 2014-2018 and as part of this, conducted activities in India and abroad. It is to Sqn Ldr Rana Chhina’s credit that he also assisted the Bangladesh National Museum to reorganize and

renovate its permanent exhibition galleries relating to the 1971 War of Liberation. The CAFHR also curated “Travelling Exhibitions” on India and the Great War which travelled to 18 different locations across France and Belgium during Aug-Nov 2018. The CAFHR also conducted “Staff Rides” on the Chhamb Battles of 1965-1971 at Kachreal, Jammu in collaboration with the Directorate General of Military Operations. The CAFHR also commenced a community engagement programme “India Remembers” in 2016. As part of this, we also mooted the proposal that the Marigold flower join the Poppy as an Indian symbol of Rememberance. The CAFHR and the National Army Museum (NAM), UK, collaborated to organise the first Military Museum Curator’s Course in New Delhi; which was extremely well received. This course was the first among the list of activities planned under the British-Indian Military Heritage Partnership signed between USI and NAM. The CAFHR has now been designated the nodal agency for the USI 150th Anniversary Celebrations. Ideas, suggestions and help from our members to make the events memorable would be most welcome.

The CS3 continued its efforts to expand the range of activities in various domains. It undertook important Net Assessment projects for the HQ IDS and the National Security Council Secretariat. The CS3 also conducted Strategic Games and panel discussions at the National Defence College, the Services War Colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, the National Police Academy, the RIS Singapore and the National Defence College, Oman. It also conducted the Core Programme at the Naval War College. The CS3 received a large number of foreign delegations and also conducted customised programmes for military officers, DRDO scientists and interns from various universities. The internship programmes for under-graduate and post-graduate students that we conduct twice a year are extremely popular. The USI has signed numerous MOUs with international institutions and conducts joint programmes with them, the latest being a joint book project with the Sichuan University, China and the Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Nigeria. Our bilateral interactions in Afghanistan, China, Vietnam etc are conducted annually. We had commenced holding an international seminar on the Indo-Pacific region in Nov 2009 and the eleventh edition of this seminar was hosted by us in

Nov 2019. These seminars attract experts from around the world. The proceedings of the seminar are published as a book annually, the one published in 2019 was titled “Evolving Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region – Challenges and Prospects.” Needless to say, the CS3 continues to focus on quality research and it is a matter of pride for us that all our research scholars whether on “study leave” with us or those holding “Chairs of Excellence” have researched and published high quality single author books. We continue to encourage our scholars and interns to write for our “Strategic Perspectives” and “Blog” which are available on our digital webpage. The USI has a very robust international engagement programme and our scholars and experts have participated at events in USA, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Vietnam, Israel, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Norway, Jordan etc. During the last decade over 100 scholars/experts have represented the USI abroad and their presentations were extremely well received.

It is a matter of great pride for us that during the period 2009 to 2019 we published 166 books/monographs on a diverse range of subjects. We will continue to encourage research leading to publication of books in the years ahead.

Despite the books and monographs published by our researchers, we found a general reluctance on the part of thinkers and domain experts to articulate their perceptions on strategic issues or help formulate long term strategic views. To contribute to evolution and dissemination of strategic thought we decided to bring out an “Annual Strategic Year Book.” The CS3 took on this project and the first issue was published in the year 2016 and we have since published four annual issues each one of which was received extremely well. Soon the “Strategic Year Book 2020” will be published.

The Course Section continues to do yeoman service by helping officers in their professional advancement through correspondence courses for promotion and competitive examinations. Regularly conducted ‘contact programmes’, where participants are put through mock examinations, are highly

subscribed. In addition, on request from Army formations, we also conduct lectures at various stations. The Chief Instructor has also reached out through Skype to address officers. During the period 2009 to 2019 a total of 23,330 officers subscribed to the various courses conducted. The Chief Instructor and his dedicated team need to be complimented and supported in all their endeavours.

The USI had set up the USI-Centre for UN Peacekeeping in Dec 2000 and nurtured it for 14 years, during which period it established a name for itself as a Centre of Excellence. To enlarge our contribution on policy, doctrinal and strategic issues, the USI became founding member of three international organisations viz The Challenges Forum, the Peace Capacities Network and Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON). Similarly our interaction with the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre continues and Maj Gen SB Asthana, CI, is the USI member on their Advisory Board. We have been actively associated with EPON, where Lt Gen Abhijit Guha participated in research projects in the UN missions AMISOM and MONUSCO and Maj Gen Asthana participated in the meetings and seminars in Washington DC and New York in Nov 2019. The USI had also hosted a three member delegation of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations comprising of Mr Jose-Ramos Horta, Nobel Laureate and former President of Timor-Leste and Chair of the Panel, Ms Ameerah Haq, Vice Chair of the Panel and Lt Gen Abhijit Guha, a distinguished Blue Beret and member of the USI and member of the Panel. The interaction with the Panel was followed up by the USI sending its recommendations for consideration by the Horta Panel. The USI continues to be active in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities and is extremely well networked with international institutions. We could consider hosting an international peacekeeping / peacebuilding Seminar as part of the 150th Anniversary Celebrations, should we get support from the Services and the MEA.

Our Library with over 69,000 books is a storehouse of knowledge and archival material. We have added over 7,500 books during the last decade but unfortunately the Library remains under-utilized. The USI Journal continues to provide members with a forum to express their views and keep abreast of developments

in the field of security, defence strategy and international relations. In keeping with contemporary trends and to make our humble contribution to the environment, the Journal has been digitized since January 2017.

We also broke new ground by venturing into the field of "glacier studies" and "solar power". To highlight the importance of our glaciers, we initiated a project to fix the snouts of some important glaciers. During the period 2010 to 2012 we sent out small teams led by Col KS Dhami (Retd) and supported by the Army to Gangotri and Siachen in 2010, Kolahoi in 2011, and Baspa and Bara Shigri in 2012. As far as the solar power project is concerned, we are the first institution to install roof top solar panels for power generation. The generation capacity of the solar power plant is 270 KW. The project, which will be commissioned shortly, will result in an annual saving of approximately Rs. 20 lakhs.

It has been an honour and a privilege to have served the USI and its members. In departing, I would like to pay tribute to the dedication and commitment of the staff of the Institution, who by their dedicated hard work, made my task so much easier. I would like to particularly acknowledge the sterling contributions of Maj Gen YK Gera, Col VK Singh, Maj Gen PJS Sandhu, Lt Gen Chander Prakash, Maj Gen BK Sharma, Maj Gen SB Asthana, Maj Gen PK Goswami, Brig MS Chowdhury, Lt Col BS Verma and Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina and core team of Distinguished Fellows and Senior Research Fellows comprising Lt Gen GS Katoch, Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, Maj Gen RPS Bhaduria, Brig Narender Kumar, Gp Capt Sharad Tewari and Dr Roshan Khanijo who worked tirelessly to bring up the name of our institution. I would be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge the contribution of Residency Resorts to the USI, so ably led by late Gen Gurinder Singh, late Admiral Chopra and Shri Sudhir Kapoor. The camaraderie and the commitment of the entire USI team is truly our strength.

Whereas all the subordinate staff in the various sections contributed in considerable measure to the effective functioning of the Institution, I would like to make a special mention of Sudesh Kumar, Nk PP Singh and Rodas who have served the USI round the clock. I must place on record my compliments to Savita Saluja, who as my Personal Assistant served with devotion and dedication.

The years I have spent as Director of the Institution have been very satisfying and rewarding. Whatever I have achieved was due to the support of the Service Chiefs, Council Members, "elders and well wishers" of the Institution and the totally dedicated team that we have at the USI. It has indeed been an honour to have been the Director and I will treasure the memories of my tenure here.

In the end I would like to wish Maj Gen BK Sharma, Deputy Director (Research) good luck and success in all his endeavours as the next Director of the USI. He will continue to have my unqualified support in all that he does for our Institution.

Thank you, one and all, and my best wishes for a Happy New Year.

Jai Hind,

Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Director USI

Editorial

1. The article titled “Building Capability, Developing New Partnerships and Protecting National Interests in an uncertain World Order” authored by Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) former Chief of the Naval Staff is the lead article in the current issue of the USI Journal. The USA is the sole super power in the world. However, there is competition between China and US. It is difficult to say as to how exactly things will shape up, but it is likely to move from unipolar to multipolar world order. While geopolitical rivalry and quest for dominance is an ongoing process, it is for the first time that India is placed astride the centre stage of this power competition. Given the arterial trade and energy routes passing through the region, unhindered flow of maritime trade through the Indo-Pacific Region assumes significance in economic terms. It is here that India has a role to play in shaping the global economic and security paradigms. There is renewed interest from the world powers to engage with India as the strategic need to preserve peace, promote stability and maintain security across the Indo Pacific Region as a global imperative. In military terms, we need to build deterrence, protect our sovereignty and maintain a credible presence in areas of our interest. For building military capability we need to invest in developing futuristic technologies and achieve self reliance in military hardware production. Partnering with like minded countries would play a key role. Issue based convergence appears to be the norm. We need to cultivate and enthuse new partners. Protecting our core national interests would want us to keep pace with the changing times, adapt to evolving geo-strategic canvas and anticipate change and prepare for it.

2. The article titled “Iran and the Turmoil in West Asia” authored by Shri Sanjay Singh, IFS (Retd) focuses on tension in and around the Persian Gulf. The author is of the view that if conflict involves Iran also, it would be devastating for the region and harmful for the global economy. With the reimposition of US sanctions, Iran is no longer keeping nuclear development programme on hold. With tense atmosphere, situation can spiral out of control causing tremendous damage. From Indian perspective, peace and stability in the region are very important. Presence of over eight million Indians in the

Gulf Region contribute substantially to the Indian economy. India imports oil from the Region to meet most of her energy requirement. Removal of sanctions on Iran would be in Indian interest. For countering threat emanating from Pakistan-Afghanistan terrorist elements, Iran shares Indian objective. Iran provides India a conduit for outreach to Central Asia through Chabahar port and further link with International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to facilitate trade. India should join proactively in efforts promoting peace in the Region.

3. The article titled “Emerging Geo-Political Trends in the Indo-Pacific : Implications and Way Ahead” by Major General Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd) makes interesting reading. There is a shift in maritime trade from the Atlantic and the Pacific towards the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR). Xi Jinping sees it as an opportunity for China to occupy the vacuum within the Indo-Pacific due to USA’s strategic retreat. China has clubbed the existing and planned infrastructure projects under the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” to gain geopolitical space in Asia. The objective appears to be a phased commercial penetration through these projects and sell a short term ‘economic dream’ to the nations on its periphery. These projects do not appear to be viable due to high rate of commercial interest and are likely to cause financial hardship and debt trap. Through this venture China hopes to gain geopolitical space necessary for China to become a ‘Great Power’ by 2050. The emerging powers of the Region including India need to utilise this window of opportunity to provide alternative economic model to assist small nations to ensure stability in the Region. The Article provides an analysis of the US and China strategies. India needs to be cautious and guard her national interests.

4. The article titled “India’s Strategic Calculus : Reconciling Strategic Autonomy vis-à-vis Engagement with Great Powers” authored by Shri PS Raghavan, IFS (Retd) has brought out that a post Cold War world order is in the making as the sole super power shares the global stage with multiple states with varying influence and national inspirations. India’s effort is to maximize her political and economic space. This includes developing vibrant India-US strategic partnership, while preserving relationship with Russia from the decades of the Cold War. India needs a

combination of domestic capability building and external partnerships to manage contradictory pulls and strategic cooperation and competition with China. Relations with US, Russia, Europe, Japan and Australia are also important for success of this effort. India's strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region seeks to promote bilateral and multilateral partnerships to attain the objective of multi-polar world order. The author has suggested that template for relations with great powers should be akin to joint venture, where partners cooperate for mutual benefit in areas of convergence and yet are free to form other partnerships to pursue their interests, as long as they do not impact core interests of joint venture partners. This could be the basis of India's relations with US and Russia.

5. The article titled "Space the Next Frontier: Opportunities and Challenges for India" authored by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd) is futuristic in nature. Space warfare may take place in outer space. It includes attacking objects in space from the Earth or from other space platforms. International treaties to regulate conflicts in space and limit installation of space and nuclear weapon systems are already in place. China has acquired effective space capability. India has also been slowly building its capability. Space assets will act as force multipliers and play a vital role in formulation of strategies. Space-based systems have enabled improvement in acquisition and accuracy of military intelligence, thus enhancing capability and fire power. India needs a permanent space station. India is among the top six space powers in the world. Space appears to be the future for all military actions.

Current issue of the journal has 12 articles in all. These make interesting reading. Review of the following books has been published in this Journal :-

- (a) K File : The Conspiracy of Silence.
By Bashir Assad.
Reviewed by Lt Gen Ghanshyam Singh Katoch, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd).
- (b) India the Future of South Asia : Rise of the New Power of Peace.
By Karan Kharab.
Reviewed by Maj Gen Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd).

- (c) Crisscrossing Paths : Through Sorrow, Joy, Departure, Reunion.
By William Hawke.
Reviewed by Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd).
- (d) Bugle Calls : A Life in the Indian Army.
By Lt Col Naresh Rastogi (Retd) and Shri Kiran Doshi, IFS (Retd)
Reviewed by Lt Gen YM Bammi (Retd).
- (e) The Forgotten Few: The Indian Air Force in World War II.
By KS Nair.
Reviewed by Gp Capt Sharad Tewari, VM (Retd).
- (f) Major Tom's War.
By Vee Walker,
Reviewed by Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd).

Major General Y K Gera (Retd)

Building Military Capability, Developing New Partnerships and Protecting National Interests in an Uncertain World Order

Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)[®]

Introduction

The strategic need for nations to protect and promote their national interest in a changing world order has been the centre piece of global strategic discourse for some time. Linked to this aspect of national interest is the need to build military capability to prepare for the array of security challenges that lie ahead and also developing new partnerships, as the global order shifts from a unipolar model to a multipolar one. There is little dispute over the assertion that the world today is characterised by multi-layered and multi-faceted diversity from political, demographic, economic, environmental and strategic viewpoints. These issues are important from strategic perspective largely because it seems that the world is in another period of historical transition. It would be a fair assumption that we are living through a period of 'strategic uncertainty'.

Review of the Global Order

A perfectly stable world order is a rare thing.¹ As a matter of fact, in search for parallels to today's world, scholars and practitioners have looked as far as ancient Greece, where the rise of a new power resulted in war between Athens and Sparta. The global order which we live in today is widely believed to have been built in the aftermath of World War II. This order consisted of two parallel orders for most of its history.² One grew out of the Cold War between the United States and the then Soviet Union; and the other was the liberal order, which used aid and trade to strengthen

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ties and fostered respect for the rule of law both, within and between countries.

The New Normal

The present competition between China and the United States is a new twist to an old story. Until the onset of the nineteenth century, China was by far the world's largest economy, with an estimated 40 per cent share of global GDP³. Then it entered a long decline, and around the same time the United States was born and began its long ascent to global dominance. Both countries have dominated the world, each has its own strengths and weaknesses and, for the first time, each confronts the other as near peer.⁴ We can be confident that the game will continue as the world moves from an earlier unipolar or bipolar order to a multipolar one.

Important to have 'The Long View'

There is a need to maintain a 'long view' and not be overly influenced by short-term changes. This is particularly important since there may be a tendency to view developments over the last few years as a sign of eclipse of a so called 'stable world order'⁵, but that would be a mistake. Although the recent challenges should not be underestimated, it is important to recognise that they are closer to the rule than the exception. Great power rivalry has been the driver of history, but we have to protect our core interests too. The power diffusion which we are witnessing is not a new or unique phenomenon. But at the same time, we will need to brace ourselves for the diverse array of strategic challenges which lie ahead. Many of these would have direct bearing on the national as well as regional security calculus.

We need to accurately assess as to where does India fit into this 'new normal'? The present phase is different from earlier ones. While geopolitical rivalry and the quest for global dominance may have been a '*signature phenomenon*' of the entire modern era, it is probably for the first time that we are sitting astride the centre-stage of this power competition – that of the Indo-Pacific. The 21st century has witnessed an eastward shift in the locus of global geopolitics and economic power play.⁶ In the recent past, the idea of Indo Pacific has gained immense importance in international geopolitics. Given the arterial trade and energy routes originating

and passing through the region, several major players are making long-term investments to protect their energy interests hinging on this region. As an example to highlight the region's growing geostrategic importance, it is interesting to note that about 80 per cent of the trade originating from here is actually extra-regional. Unhindered flow of maritime trade through Indo Pacific Region thus assumes tremendous significance for the entire world. Further, in pure economic terms, the Indo Pacific Region contributes about 60 per cent of global GDP and is home to four of the top ten economies⁷ of the world.

In military context, the region is home to ten largest standing armies⁸ in the world.... and seven of the top ten countries in terms of global military expenditure⁹. The rising military power of the region has come to complicate the security calculus in many ways. The geo-strategic eminence of the Indo Pacific Region is here to stay. In the foreseeable future, the region would play a pivotal role in shaping the global economic and security paradigms. It is here that India has a definitive role to play in shaping the future world order. There is a renewed interest from the world to engage with India in this region, as the strategic need to preserve peace, promote stability and maintain security across Indo Pacific is no longer a regional necessity, but indeed a global imperative. It is this feature which makes the present times different from earlier ones, especially from an Indian perspective. We have the opportunity to play a central role in the primary theatre of geo-strategic competition

Opportunities for India

This 'uncertain' world order affects India in profound ways. The challenges which it brings along are well known, but there is also the critical need to seize the strategic opportunities which these tectonic shifts offer. These opportunities cover the entire spectrum of global interactions, most prominent of them being in the economic, trade, technological and military domains. The growing stature and clout of India affords us the unique moment in history to play a major role in shaping the collective future of the world. Given the fact that by 2024 India is estimated to be a five trillion dollar economy¹⁰, it is but natural that we would have to assume a leadership role in global affairs, the signs of which are already on the horizon. We are better positioned to influence the new global and regional institutions¹¹ that are being created. The attributes of

our strong economy, robust governance and superior military provide us the prospect of reserving our seats on the table which nurtures and shapes the global future.

Protecting National Interests

India's core interest centres around protecting our national interests in this uncertain world order, which forms the nucleus of all our future endeavours. The '*one and only*' driving factor of all our present and future endeavours will be '*National Interests*'. In fact, every measure that we initiate should have this facet at its very core. Safeguarding and promoting these interests would require a '*wholeship*' approach. Every arm of the government - be it finance, foreign policy, defence, trade, commerce, or technology - will have to work in unison to keep India's national interests safe and secure in these '*contested times*'. While each enabler supports our national interests in myriad ways, a secure internal and external security environment, provided by the military and other agencies, facilitates sustained growth and development of the nation. Be it on land, in the air or on the maritime theatre, a benign environment is a catalyst for national progress. Speaking in pure military terms, this will require building deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, protecting our sovereignty, in all domains, as well as maintaining a credible presence in all areas of interest. Here, two aspects would merit consideration towards gearing for the future.

Firstly, it would be important for us to '*anticipate change*' and do it well. Change in the colours and shades of warfare will have to be accurately anticipated alongwith our response mechanisms. The times ahead are going to be different from the past. The rapidity with which events may escalate into full-blown conflicts cannot be overemphasised. As we have seen during the *Balakot* strike, in February 2019, a decisive, swift and calibrated response can lead to significant strategic gains. Therefore, our institutional capacity to anticipate changes across theatres would need to be of a very high order. This may also require a relook at our structures and processes, followed by corresponding recalibration, to keep pace with changing times.

Secondly, we would need to have an '*over-the-horizon approach*' towards our military capability building. Investments in developing futuristic technologies and achieving self-reliance in defence production should be high on priority list. While a lot has

been achieved in this area over the past few years, sustained efforts from all stakeholders including government, military, public sector undertakings, R&D organisations and private sector, including the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), would be essential to pursue this line of effort. In fact, achieving 'Self Reliance in Defence Production', particularly in the field of niche technologies, should be a *national mission*.

As we progress along this vision, partnering with like-minded countries would play a key role, since both, the aspects of anticipating change and capability building, would prosper well when followed through a collaborative route. One important lesson, in this era of multi-polarity, is the growing relevance of regional balances and constellations. In this era, '*issue based convergence*' seems to be the new norm, in order to balance converging and conflicting interests. That means differences with a partner on certain issues should not obviate the scope of our mutual cooperation in other avenues.

We cannot afford to be flat-footed by dogma, prejudices or obsolete theories. When we look to the world, we would need to have an open-minded approach which allows us to pursue different approaches with different partners. For example, while we may *increase the tempo* of our engagements with certain long-cherished partners, we may also need to *manage* our relationships with others. At the same time, we will also need to '*cultivate and enthuse*' new partners. And, therefore, '*one-size-fits all*' approach may not serve our purpose in the coming times. It is important that every partnership, both existing and those on the anvil, is optimally leveraged for 'mutual growth'.

Distilling these thoughts into the military aspect, there are several opportunities for India to engage with the world, particularly in the aspect of capability and capacity building. With our robust defence structures, supported by credible multi-domain proficiency, we are very well placed to play a central role in pursuing government's foreign policy initiatives through military-to-military engagements. Several important policy initiatives have been introduced over the past few years, which have collectively enabled greater military interactions with partner states.

Promoting National Interests and Building Military Capability through Partnerships

In this era of intertwined interests and challenges, it is imperative that we look at '*leveraging military partnerships*' as an essential enabler for pursing and promoting national security objectives. These partnerships not only offer us an array of tangible benefits ranging from operational to capability building, but most importantly they also allow us to *hedge against the diverse security concerns* which pose serious challenges to the collective security. Some of our trusted military partnerships have contributed towards protecting our national interests as under:-

(a) *Foundational security agreements* enable significant sharing of resources and information in pursuance of respective national security interests. For example, the landmark conclusion of Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), in 2018, allows utilisation of US based encryption technology for communication instead of using the commercial communication technology. Similarly, dedicated logistics sharing agreements, like Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), allow us to mutually benefit through optimal utilisation of each other's logistics facilities covered under the provisions of the agreement. Another example is the Helicopter Operations from Ships other Than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) arrangement which Indian Navy signed in 2018. This enables the Indian Naval helicopters to land on the decks of the ships of over 50 Navies and Coast Guards, significantly enhancing operational interoperability between countries.¹²

(b) Military engagements can also contribute towards new capability building initiatives, particularly as *joint developmental projects*, on advanced technologies. *Brahmos* offers one such shining example where a trusted military partnership translated into a tangible technological product, available to both countries. Similarly, our collaboration with Israel on such projects also substantiates this argument.

(c) Important *military acquisitions* also benefit from direct government-to-government (G2G) agreements. In our context, Navy's multi role helicopters, Air Force's *Rafale* fighters and Army's AK 203 Assault Rifles have all been possible because of robust inter-governmental partnerships.¹³

(d) Another important contribution of military partnerships is its role in enhancing the regional security environment. The *Indian Ocean Naval Symposium* (IONS), an initiative of the Indian Navy, started as a regional maritime security initiative in 2008. IONS, within a short span of 10 years, has evolved into a leading maritime organisation of the Indian Ocean Region, with 24 members and 8 observer states.¹⁴ The forum today not only addresses regional and even sub-regional issues but also focuses on important security disciplines such as Maritime Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Information Sharing and Interoperability.¹⁵

(e) The cyber domain's emergence as the fifth theatre of war warrants us to look at this aspect with serious thought and focus. The cyber domain today has transcended national boundaries, acquiring a hybrid and trans-national character. It poses serious security challenges to law enforcement agencies, including those of legal jurisdictions, authorities, penalties etc. Any effective mechanism to monitor this domain would warrant a multi-lateral initiative, further highlighting the need for trusted partnerships.

Way Ahead

There are *three essential ingredients* for developing our military capability, and nurturing partnerships, as an enabler for protecting our national interests. By charting a course around these three waypoints, we would be able to better prepare for the future.

Firstly, '*Optimisation of Resources*' should be high on our collective agenda. Given the diverse nature of socio-economic challenges which the country faces, resource availability to meet the nation's security needs would continue to be a challenge. Also, given the fact that capability building and force sustenance are expensive propositions, we will need to look at innovative measures to enhance sharing of our resources. It is prudent that every rupee committed towards building the military should give the nation manifold returns and for that, the Services would have to institutionally address the issue of optimisation. In this regard, much progress has been made in recent years with establishment of Joint Logistics Nodes and Joint Training Institutions, which were raised with the primary aim of optimising public expenditure. A lot

can still be done once the Armed Forces accord it the required impetus. The appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would be able to drive this further.

Second aspect is the need to focus efforts on achieving '*Self Reliance in Defence Production*', particularly in the field of core technologies involving weapons, sensors and propulsion systems. It is important to note that self-reliance in defence production provides a country with immense flexibility to commit resources in a calibrated manner, and to modify and customise the deliverables to the requirements of the times. In other words, it gives us '*Strategic Independence*'. In its absence, our dependence on external factors would continue limiting our strategic choices in the future.

And lastly, we must work towards leveraging our partnerships for *enhancing interoperability* between the militaries of the region; this should be one of our key military priorities. Given the dynamic and diverse nature of challenges which the region faces, it would be imperative to maintain a high degree of military-to-military cooperation. Along with enhanced interoperability, there is a strong need to focus efforts on establishing '*robust*', '*reliable*' and '*real-time*' information sharing mechanisms with partner states. This aspect assumes special significance, given the speed at which local security threats can assume a national, regional or even global character. Information sharing, therefore, is not only essential but in fact, foundational to defending collective security interests.

Here, an example is the Information Fusion Centre (IFC-IOR) of the Indian Navy, which was commissioned in December 2018, to further our commitment towards achieving collective maritime security in the IOR. Given the facility's significant potential in enhancing the security quotient of the entire IOR, twenty countries and one multi-national construct are already partnering the initiative, making it a one-point convergence centre for the entire IOR's maritime activity. This collaborative initiative highlights the tangible gains derived out of trusted partnerships.

Conclusion

The deterioration to a world order can set in motion trends that spell catastrophe. What we are seeing today resembles the mid nineteenth century in important ways¹⁶, but I strongly believe that

the world is not yet on the edge to a systemic crisis. It is upon those in policy making to make sure that a crisis never materialises, be it as an outcome of competing interests, hyper nationalism or even as a cumulative effect of climate change. Even in an uncertain world, our collective endeavour should be to aim for a '*certain future*'. Protecting our core national interests would warrant us to keep pace with the changing times, adapt to the evolving geo-strategic canvas and, most importantly, *anticipate change* and prepare for it.

Building inclusive partnerships is an essential pre-requisite to shape a positive national future for 'global good'. With deep-rooted mutual trust and confidence, a calmer future awaits us. In this regard, the Honourable Prime Minister's mantra of 5 'S', which elaborates the view of *Samman (Respect)*, *Samvaad (Dialogue)*, *Sahyog (Cooperation)*, *Shanti (Peace)* and *Samriddhi (Prosperity)*¹⁷, aptly indicates our resolve to engage with the world for a shared future. In this quest, developing new partnerships in the region and beyond, with like-minded partners can only be an 'influence for good', both for internal as well as regional security dynamics. How we garner strength from our collaborative partnerships, and bind together, would remain fundamentally important in maintaining the strategic equilibrium of our national security environment. The future of the global order hinges on collaborative efforts and India has a pivotal role to play in it.

Endnotes

¹ Richard Haas, 'How a World Order Ends', *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 99, Jan/ Feb 2019.

² *Ibid.*

³ Stephen Kotkin, 'Realist World', *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 97, Number 4, July/ August 2018.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, '*Liberal World*', *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 97, Number 4, July/ August 2018.

⁶ Sircar, Saranya. Concept note on 'The Indo-Pacific: Political, Security and Economic Dimensions', available at https://www.jfindia.org.in/jf/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Concept_Note_for_Young_Scholars_Conference_2019_on_Indo-Pacific.pdf

⁷ Top ten economies of the World, in descending order are US (1), China (2), Japan (3), Germany (4), UK (5), France (6), India (7), Italy (8), Brazil (9) and Canada (10); source IMF 2018, available at <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-economies-in-2018>

⁸ Largest standing armies, in descending order are China (1), India (2), US (3), North Korea (4), Russia (5), Pakistan (6), South Korea (7), Iran (8), Vietnam (9) and Egypt (10); source World Atlas, available at <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/29-largest-armies-in-the-world.html>

⁹ SIPRI Fact Sheet of May 2018 for 2017: US (1), China (2), Saudi Arabia (3), Russia (4), India (5), France (6), UK (7), Japan (8), Germany (9) and South Korea (10), available at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf

¹⁰ Remarks of Shri Arun Jaitley, then Finance Minister, GoI. Published in The Economic Times dated 06 April 2019.

¹¹ Alluding to institutions such as G20, BRICS, Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, New Development Bank etc.

¹² DAWFS Input – 30 May 2019.

¹³ DNP Input – 29 May 2019.

¹⁴ DFC Input – 29 May 2019.

¹⁵ DFC Input – 29 May 2019.

¹⁶ Richard Haas, 'How a World Order Ends, Foreign Affairs, Volume 99, Jan/ Feb 2019.

¹⁷ *Ibid*

Iran and the turmoil in West Asia

Shri Sanjay Singh, IFS (Retd)®

Abstract

Tension in and around the Persian Gulf is on the rise and any conflict involving Iran would be devastating for the region and harmful for the global economy. Economic sanctions imposed by the US on Iran have inflicted considerable damage to its economy. These sanctions came into full force in May 2019 and coincidentally, since then the region has been witnessing attacks on the energy sector through damage to maritime transportation and onshore assets. These attacks, some of which have been highly sophisticated, and the lack of effective US response has led to considerable reassessment. With the re-imposition of US sanctions, Iran is also no longer keeping its nuclear development programme on hold. While Iran may generally not confront the US directly, it may create considerable difficulties for other Gulf states. In the vitiated atmosphere that exists in the region, accidents can occur leading to the situation spiralling out of control and causing enormous harm globally. Priority should be accorded to avoiding any conflict in the Gulf. Iran can withstand the sanctions and deal with internal dissent. Nevertheless, with a view to find a way out, President Rouhani unveiled the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) in the UN in September 2019. President Macron of France too has made considerable efforts to launch confidence-building interactions between Iran and the US. Given that peace and stability in the Gulf region are in its strategic interest, India should play a proactive role, along with other like-minded countries, to promote this.

®Shri Sanjay Singh, IFS (Retd) joined Indian Foreign Service in 1976. He retired as Secretary (East) in April 2013. He had a number of coveted assignments during his service including India's Ambassador to Iran.

Introduction

The conflicts in the West Asian region reflect the deepening divide between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Iran and other GCC members, especially UAE and Bahrain. They are also indicative of the growing confrontation between Iran and the US and Israel. Tension in and around the Persian Gulf is on the rise and any direct conflict between Iran and the others would be devastating for the region and harmful for the global economy. Priority should be accorded to avoid any such conflict in the Gulf. India should play a proactive role, along with other like-minded countries, in reducing the potential for a region-wide conflagration given that peace and stability in the Gulf is in its strategic interest.

In particular, the confrontation between Iran and the US has now become extremely destabilising for the Gulf. While the US has not yet fired a shot at Iran, the economic sanctions it has imposed on Iran amount to nothing less than an assault on the Iranian nation. The Iranian economy, according to IMF, is expected to contract by a record 9.5 per cent in 2019, its worst performance since 1984, when it was in the midst of its war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

In May 2018, the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the P5+1 deal with Iran, of which it was the main architect. The agreement on this deal had been reached in July 2015 under President Obama. In November 2018, the US reimposed the sanctions on Iran that had been lifted or waived under the JCPOA. While Iran has been under some level of US sanctions since 1979, it is the US recourse to secondary sanctions that hurts Iran the most, as it prevents other countries from maintaining normal economic relations with it. The secondary sanctions came into force in November 2018 with profound consequences for Iran's energy and banking sectors. US waivers on the application of the sanctions to countries like China, India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, etc. ended in May 2019. Since then Iranian oil imports have fallen from a peak of 2.8 mbd to 1 mbd today. In addition, the US has since also applied sanctions on Iran's petrochemical and gold sectors, as well as on Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and Foreign Minister Zarif.

A curious coincidence has been that since the beginning of May 2019 the region has been witnessing attacks on the energy sector through damage to maritime transportation and onshore production assets. On 12 May 2019, there was a sabotage attack on 4 ships off Fujairah just outside the straits of Hormuz. The US and its Gulf allies pointed in Iran's direction as the source of the attack. Such finger pointing became the pattern in respect of the incidents that followed, without any overt action against Iran barring the ratcheting up of sanctions.

Just a day later, on 13 May 2019, the Yemen's Houthi group, who are battling the Saudis and Saudi-supported forces in Yemen, attacked two oil pumping stations on the 1000 km long Saudi East-West pipeline with missiles. Again, on 12 June 2019 two oil tankers were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. This put paid to the mediation mission of Japanese Prime Minister Abe who was visiting Tehran on 12 June 2019 immediately after the G-20 summit in Tokyo, presumably with the implicit acquiescence of President Trump. The Iranians were perhaps signalling that they had no intention of bolstering President Trump's image as he embarks on his re-election campaign and had no interest in engaging with the US unless the sanctions on Iran were lifted. Since President Trump is not seen as being friendly, Iran's actions may also be designed to hinder his campaign.

On 20 June 2019, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shot down a United States Global Hawk surveillance drone with a surface-to-air missile over the Straits of Hormuz. While initially President Trump made some belligerent noises, ultimately, he took no action barring putting some more sanctions on Iran. Again, Iran perhaps read the tea leaves correctly, that President Trump would not take any action that might provoke tit-for-tat hostilities and detract from his re-election prospects.

The reciprocal seizure of oil tankers followed. The first seizure was by the British of the Iranian-flagged tanker Grace I or Adrian Darya I on 04 July 2019 off Gibraltar, followed by the Iranians of British-flagged Stena Impero on 19 July 2019 in the Persian Gulf. The British blinked first and Adrian Darya I was released on 19 July 2019 and Stena impero by Iran on 27 September 2019..

On 17 August 2019, the Saudi Shaybah Oil Field on the boundary with Abu Dhabi, some 1000 km from Yemen, came

under a drone attack claimed by the Houthis. Finally, on 14 September, there was a concerted missile and drone attack in Saudi Arabia on Abqaiq, the world's largest oil processing facility (5.7 mbd) and the giant Khuras oilfield, causing a disruption of 60 per cent of Saudi and 5 per cent of global oil production, leading to a temporary oil price surge of 20 per cent. While the Houthis claimed ownership of this attack, the US and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran.

This precision attack eluded the Saudi air defences built up at considerable expense. The Saudis who have spent US \$ 65-80 billion per annum (pa) on defence in recent years, mainly on US weaponry including the Patriot system, were unable to counter the drone and missile attack. The US and Israel were, till then, the only powers in the region known to possess such a capability. These attacks heralded the rise of another power in the region which also possessed the highly technical capabilities to design, produce and use weapons for precision strikes. The sense of impunity felt by Israel and those under US protection is no longer sustainable. While President Trump proclaimed that the US was 'cocked and ready', he did not take any action saying that he would do so only at the request of Saudi Arabia.

This attack, and the subsequent lack of US response to it and earlier to the drone attack, has concentrated minds in the region and led to considerable recalibration. US allies in the region would also have paid close attention to the US abandonment of the Syrian Kurds and drawn the necessary lessons from it.

While Iran spends only around \$13 billion pa on defence, it has developed some cutting-edge capabilities including cyber capability. This was underscored by the reported cyber-attack, allegedly by Iran, on Saudi Aramco's facilities earlier in 2012. Iran also possesses the Russian S-300 air defence system. Interestingly, just after the attack on Saudi ARAMCO facilities, President Putin (with Presidents Rouhani of Iran and Erdogan of Turkey by his side) suggested tongue in cheek that Saudi Arabia should purchase the Russian S-400 system for better security. Turkey, a NATO member, is buying the S-400 system much to the annoyance of the US.

The P5+1-Iran Nuclear deal had curbed Iran from continuing to develop its nuclear capabilities. With the US pulling out of the

deal and reapplying broad-spectrum sanctions, the nuclear deal could only be kept alive if the other five countries, especially the European powers, could help Iran to continue its economic engagement with the rest of the world and continue selling its oil abroad. The Europeans did put together the INSTEX mechanism to help Iran trade despite sanctions. But this came so late, with such limited utility and with so many conditions unacceptable to Iran, that it decided to reject it.

The European inability to help Iran tide over US sanctions removed the rationale for Iran to keep its nuclear development programme on hold. Iran has begun reprocessing at an accelerating pace and by July 2019 had exceeded the 300 kg limit placed by JCPOA on it to accumulate enriched Uranium as well as the 3.67 per cent enrichment threshold and is now enriching up to 4.5 per cent. It has restarted development of the faster IR8 machines, and in November 2019 began work once again at the Fordo underground reprocessing facility.

While Israel had railed against the nuclear deal, its breakdown will add to its insecurity. The earlier interference in Iraq by the US and the West as well as GCC countries and then later in Syria, created the conditions for Iran to expand its influence in the two countries. This has resulted in bringing Iranian armed presence nearer to Israel's borders. IRGC and the Hezbollah cadres are now positioned in South West Syria off the Golan heights, much closer to Israel and perhaps armed with precision weapons. Should Iran develop WMD capability, it would pose a mortal danger to Israel.

While Iran's economy has been severely affected by the US sanctions its activities around the region have not diminished. The strengthening Shia crescent through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon is evidence of its growing influence. Iran has been quick to grasp opportunities as they have developed in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. These opportunities have arisen partly due to the interventions of the US and others, which disturbed the political balance in these countries. However, the recent disturbances in Lebanon and Iraq indicate a push-back against the growing Iranian influence.

In pursuit of its policy to expand its influence in the Levant and the Gulf, Iran has developed considerable equities in the region, including among the Shia populations in the Arabian Peninsula.

Iranian cooperation will be required to address conflicts in each of these countries. Unless this is sought, and this will require Iran's terms to be discussed and met, Iran may remain a spoiler.

The ratcheting up of the US pressure on Iran, both military and economic, has not been helpful. An Iran under pressure of sanctions is not likely to be a rational interlocutor. The more pressure on Iran, the more it will lash out to relieve it. While Iran may generally not confront the US directly, unlike what it did through the shooting down of the drone, it may create considerable difficulties for other Gulf states through its proxies, such as the Houthi Missile attack on Saudi oil installations.

The tensions between US and Iran are a major cause for concern. Iran is playing a cat and mouse game with the US, taking care to not provoke it beyond a point. But if Iran continues to harm the interests of the US and its regional Allies, and its actions cross the red line that the US has drawn for itself, there could be massive retaliation. As only the US knows where its red line is, this adds considerably to the uncertainty in the region.

Other major countries with a presence in the region need to try and maintain some degree of beneficial interactions with Iran so that they are in a position to counsel restraint. This would help in strengthening the position of the moderate elements in Iran. President Macron of France tried to break the ice between the US and Iran this August by inviting Iranian Foreign Minister (FM) Zarif to Biarritz while the G-7 summit was being held. This, however, did not help in launching confidence-building interactions as the Americans ignored the gesture.

President Macron followed up by floating a proposal to set up a US \$15 bn fund, around 50 per cent of the annual revenues accruing to Iran from oil sales, to allow Iran to resume trading. This had two purposes: firstly to help Iran tide over problems created by oil sales lost due to American sanctions and secondly to induce Iran to remain compliant with the 2015 nuclear accord. But the Americans shot this proposal down as well. Brian Hook, the US special representative for Iran said that the US is committed to maintaining extreme pressure on Iran. It is possible that President Trump is looking for a 'Grand Bargain' covering issues beyond the nuclear deal, such as curbs on Iran's missile development as well

as its activities around the region that are inimical to the interests of the US and its allies. If he could achieve this, it would be a major feather in his cap. The Iranians, however, seem to be in no mood to do him this favour.

Iran boasts modern infrastructure, a developed industrial base and considerable acumen in science and technology. It has developed space and nuclear capacities. It is manufacturing drones and missiles with the capacity for precision attacks. Iran's agricultural sector provides it food security and its resources, energy security. It has the 2nd largest gas reserves and 4th largest oil reserves in the world. With these resources, Iran can withstand the harshest of sanctions. Given its current economic difficulties, Iran will experience disturbances such as the one recently, related to the hike in fuel prices. However, the governing regime is capable of dealing with such internal dissent.

Nevertheless, the Government of Iran, given the economic difficulties it is encountering, seems to be keen to find a way out of this situation without losing face. With this in view, President Rouhani and FM Zarif have been promoting the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) which President Rouhani unveiled in the UNGA in September 2019. HOPE proposes inclusive dialogue to promote sector-wise cooperation between the Gulf states as confidence-building-measures(CBMs).

Separately, in early October there were reports that mediation by President Macron in New York had led to Presidents Trump and Rouhani agreeing to a four-point arrangement as a basis for relaunching negotiations between the US and Iran. This entailed Iran pledging not to acquire nuclear weapons and fully complying with its nuclear obligations and commitments and negotiating a long-term framework for its nuclear activities. Iran was also to refrain from developing its missile programme, curb any aggression in the region and work to promote peace. In return the United States would lift all the sanctions re-imposed since 2017 on Iran and its ability to export oil. The proposal did not take off, with Iran insisting on the US first lifting the sanctions unilaterally, before any negotiations took place and the US rejecting this.

In the vitiated atmosphere that exists in the region, there is a high probability that accidents can occur leading to the situation

spiralling out of control and causing enormous harm globally. The danger is evident to countries in the region as well to other countries involved. It is this realisation that creates the conditions to launch efforts towards promoting a region-wide inclusive dialogue to put in place CBMs that build peace and stability. Proposals such as 'HOPE' and the French Initiative and similar ideas need to be given serious consideration.

An immediate need is for an initiative to be put in place to ensure free and safe passage in the Gulf. This will be in the interest of all Gulf nations and the health of the global economy. In order to encourage Iranian acquiescence to the arrangement, the US would need to relax its sanctions and to continue providing specific waivers to countries for oil purchases from Iran. These steps would help in creating conditions to put CBMs in place and promote peace and stability in the Gulf and the wider West Asian region.

From the Indian perspective, peace and stability in the Gulf region are of strategic interest, given its significant economic engagement with the region, the presence of over eight million Indians in the region and its dependence on the region for its energy security. The CBMs being contemplated and steps to dilute and eventually remove the sanctions on Iran would be in Indian interest. Iran is a major source of oil for India, it shares the objective of countering the threat from terrorist elements emanating from Pakistan-Afghanistan and provides a conduit for India's outreach to Central Asia for which the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) are major facilitators. However, the relationship between India and Iran is complicated by Iran's confrontations with other important Indian partners - the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Israel and at times Iran's own destabilising behaviour in the region. The stability of the region which is a primary Indian objective could also be affected by Iran's nuclear and missile development activities. It is nevertheless important that India exercises its autonomy with regard to its relations with Iran, in order to be able to influence its behaviour, as well as preserve its economic and political space. India's approach towards Iran should continue to be fashioned in a pragmatic manner that serves Indian interests. For this peace in the region is essential. India would be well advised to join proactively in efforts towards this objective.

Emerging Geo-Political Trends in the Indo-Pacific: Implications and Way Ahead

Major General Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd)®

Abstract

The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) is witnessing a major flux in the geo-political and geo-strategic spheres as there is a gradual shift in the maritime trade centre of gravity towards IPR from the Atlantic and the Pacific Regions. With the West and the USA perceived to be in a strategic retreat, it opens a window of opportunity in the region for a geo-strategic reconstruct. China, the resident major power, is keen to seize this opportunity to gain influence in the region. Xi Jinping sees this geo-political flux as an opportunity for China to assert itself within the Indo-Pacific. Towards that end, he has clubbed the existing infrastructure projects, and added a few, under the much touted 'Belt Road Initiative (BRI)' with the aim of gaining geopolitical space in Asia.

The article provides an analysis of the US and the Chinese strategies and the emerging trends for the Indo-Pacific and their implications for India and the way ahead.

Introduction

The IPR is on the cusp of a major shift in the geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic spheres in its favour. It is witnessing a gradual shift in the maritime trade centre of gravity towards it from the Atlantic and the Pacific Regions and the rise of a revanchist China. Leading scholars have termed this phase as the 'Age of Strategic Uncertainties'. While China is keen to be recognised as a major power at the global stage, it still has not reached the level to be able to compete with the USA in all domains.

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It remains a major regional power in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Western Pacific, South East Asia, and to some extent in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Concurrently, it is slowly expanding its influence in Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, South Pacific islands, Latin America and the Caribbean under the overarching umbrella of its BRI.

However, challenges abound due to its slowing economy, neo-mercantile predatory economic strategies and the debilitating trade war with USA. Xi Jinping considers this period of strategic uncertainties as a window of opportunity for China to take the lead on the global stage. This window is also perceived as small due to the challenge it faces with the rise of India and the coming together of like-minded liberal democracies of the region, supported by the western powers, which could be its counter balance. China has not, and cannot, deviate from this goal since it also serves as an effective tool for diverting attention from its internal instabilities through jingo nationalism.

Thus, while China may seem to be accommodative with other powers in the region, it would only be marking time to regain its Shi (strategic configuration of power) to push for its domination of the IPR. China lays a lot of faith in its ancient wisdom and sincerely believes in the concept of the Middle Kingdom, which was ordained as a mandate from heaven to rule. The current flux in the global order is now seen as a mandate from heaven for it to rule the world; it perceives that the Shi is now flowing in China's favour.

Asia needs vast investments for development of infrastructure, energy sector, communication and water needs. As per the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Report of 23 February 2017, Asia needs an investment of around US\$ 26 tn by 2030 for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹ It is this vacuum that China is targeting in a focussed approach, to use its geo-economic strength, to gain influence and space through its BRI. For the moment, the Hong Kong turmoil, world focus on Xinjiang correction camps, US–China trade war, economic slowdown and a marked slowdown in the BRI; all seem to have pushed China on the back foot. Concurrently, the rise of many bilateral and multilateral partnerships by likeminded liberal democracies in the region,

supported by the US, present fresh challenges to the Chinese narrative for economic development in the IPR. This article looks at the following:-

- (a) US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
- (b) Chinese Strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
- (c) Emerging Trends and Implications for India.

US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific

For USA, IOR had long been a place for victualling and for linking the Atlantic with the Pacific. These are the two regions where the US and its companies have major investments, apart from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The deployment of its forces, in these areas², provides a clear evidence of its interests in the region. However, the threat and competition posed by a rising and revanchist China pushing for its own influence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean Regions led to a review of the US Foreign Policy in 2011, under the Obama Administration, with its 'Pivot to Asia'³, which was essentially dealing with the Asia Pacific, more of an 'East Asia Strategy' to counter China. At that time, the Chinese influence strategy, through geo-economics in the IOR, had not been unveiled.

The Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), the first part of the BRI, was unveiled by Xi Jinping on 07 September 2013, in his speech at Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University.⁴ He next unveiled the second part, the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), during his speech to the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013.⁵ This fundamentally changed the geo-strategic and geo-political dynamics of the region. China subsequently clubbed the two as One Belt One Road (OBOR – Yi Dai Yi Lu), later rechristened as the BRI.

On 01 June 2019, the US Department of Defence (DoD) released its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.⁶ This followed its National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2017⁷ and the National Defence Strategy on 19 January 2018⁸. The NSS identified China and Russia as the main challengers to American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.⁹ The NSS pitches for an America First policy and identifies four vital national interests:-

- (a) Protect American people, the homeland and American way of life.
- (b) Promote American prosperity.
- (c) Preserve peace through strength and ensure that the regions of the world are not dominated by one power.
- (d) Advance American influence, globally.¹⁰

The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report stresses on preparedness, partnerships and promoting a networked region.¹¹ The whole thrust of the report is based on robust physical dominance of the region. The crux of the problem faced by the countries in the region is that the USA views the IPR as one that is extending from the West Coast of India till the West Coast of USA.¹² In short, US perceives only the Eastern Indian Ocean to be under its Indo-Pacific construct (Refer Figure 1 below), based on the area of responsibility of its recently rechristened Indo-Pacific Command.¹³

Therein lies the catch since the bulk of the Indian Ocean (Western) is out of purview of its Indo-Pacific strategy. The balance Indian Ocean portion is divided under its Central and Africa Commands (Refer Figure 2 below). However, the rest of the world views the Indo Pacific as the region extending from the East Coast of Africa till the West Coast of USA (Refer Figure 3 below). It is this dichotomy that needs to be addressed by the USA to ensure that its strategy can be synchronous with those of its allies and partners.

The USA has also enacted Better Utilisation of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act 2018¹⁴, which was signed by the President on 05 October 2018,¹⁵ and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) 2018¹⁶, signed by the President on 31 December 2018, to counter China's increasing geo-economic push. But it has yet to gain any traction, since the money earmarked for these are very small as compared to the Chinese commitments under its BRI. The US private sector may not be as amenable to large investments in the region since the profits may not be either forthcoming soon or in the scale desired.

Thus, to effectively develop an alternate narrative to the BRI, USA needs allies and partners to jointly work towards a successful

liberal and democratic narrative as an option for the countries of the region to meet their development and growth needs in all domains. This entails a capability to finely balance the competing core interests of all allies and partners – the first being the definition of the term Indo-Pacific itself. It also needs to ensure that the interests of the companies investing in the region are met to some extent. A start has been made by India and Japan under the Asia – Africa Growth Corridor, launched on 25 May 2017.¹⁷ USA and other like-minded powers should consider expanding this structure by joining and supporting it.

Chinese Strategy for the Indo-Pacific

China under Xi is determined to show the developing and the under-developed nations that a contrarian model to the Western narrative, of liberal, transparent democracy, exists for economic and overall growth – autocratic socialism with Chinese characteristics. Xi Jinping showcased the same during his speech to the 19th Congress in October 2017 and in his New Year speech to the nation, wherein he stated that socialism with Chinese characteristics could be the path for developing nations to follow to achieve modernisation. It sees a great opportunity of expanding its sphere of influence in Asia, Oceania and Africa, amongst the global South, where it could sell this narrative to the smaller, under-developed nations, and so realise its 'Dream'.

The 'China Dream' was enunciated in a book by Col Liu Ming Fu, "China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Era", where he argues that China should displace the US as world leader. As early as 1923-24, Dr Sun Yat Sen had laid out the vision for China to eventually surpass USA.¹⁸ His advice was to learn from the USA and the West to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. The *strategic continuum* since Deng Xiaoping created the strong foundation for Xi Jinping to be able to take an aggressive posture in global affairs.

Xi Jinping appears to view the coming decades as 'strategic opportunity' for China to establish a 'Pax Sinica' in Asia – the fruition of phase one of the China Dream and the great rejuvenation of the nation, though he has given some new timelines during the 19th Congress¹⁹ on the route to his China Dream, at some variance to the previous timelines, of the 'Two Hundreds'²⁰.




Figure 1 : US Perception of Indian Ocean under its Indo-Pacific construct

UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY




Figure 2 : Area of Responsibility of US Unified Combatant Commands




Figure 3 : Global Perception of the Indo-Pacific (Less USA)

A strong message is resonating from China under Xi that it is ready to assume leadership in the International Order. However, there is a push back by the US and the West against the Chinese opaque and predatory economic outreach lacking reciprocity. The US-China trade war could also be seen in this light. Concurrently, the smaller nations are also forcing China to review the terms and conditions of the BRI agreements; the Chinese arm-twisting of Sri Lanka to take control of the Hambantotta port, Pakistan's surrender of Gwadar port, and consequent loss of sovereignty over those pieces of territory has forced a rethink amongst these nations to avoid such an eventuality.

Despite this, and a steady economic slowdown since around 2013, China still possesses the heft and will aggressively push to achieve its Dream of national rejuvenation. It has followed a strategy of slowly gaining control of a major portion of the economy of many small countries, by setting up its industries, investing in mining and other natural resources and direct investments in its economic structures – a strategy of invest, acquire and dominate. To lower their guard, China acts in the open, hiding its true intentions, under the guise of common economic activities. Once the dependence on its investments reaches over double digit of the country's GDP, it gets the necessary leverage to ensure that they follow China's lead and abide by its decisions. This is its main strategy for gaining geopolitical space in Asia under what it terms as the Neighbourhood Diplomacy through the infrastructure projects of BRI. The projects under BRI have been selected by China purely for its own long to medium term geo-strategic gains and are usually not economically viable for the host country – as seen in the case of Hambantotta port and CPEC projects.

This strategy aims to ensure that the accumulated gain would radically alter the geo-economic and geo-commercial balance in the Indo-Pacific in its favour. It would attempt to restrict space for competing nations in the region and continue with its creeping assertiveness on strategic territorial space based on specious historical claims.

Towards that end, it appears to be utilising its doctrine of Unrestricted Warfare (URW) to denude the Comprehensive National Power (CNP) of the developing nations of the region, thereby making it easier to coerce and integrate them with China.

Concurrently, within the region it is also applying the concepts of its ancient game of 'Wei Qi' or Go - an 'encirclement game'. This game, along with the URW, aptly sums up their strategy and operational art. The game entails 'multiple battles' over a wide front, while concurrently 'balancing the need to expand' with the need to 'build protective clusters'²¹, built on specious claims that it aggressively attempts to dominate.

It does this by employing what the experts have termed as 'grey zone' warfare. On the continental front it implies sending its soldiers as civilians, either as herders or as fishermen as the first line, supported by the border defence units as the second line and the main PLA ground forces as the third line. On the maritime front it has created two more navies – the Coast Guard and the Maritime Militia, its second and third sea force. The Maritime Militia, under the garb of fishing trawlers form the first line of defence, supported by the Chinese Coast Guard as the second line with the PLA navy as the third line. Since the extant international rules of engagement do not cover such operations, it becomes difficult for nations to calibrate their responses effectively.

China is investing heavily in development of ports in the IOR. It has termed these as nodes in the Science of Military Strategy 2103, published by its Academy of Military Sciences²². Based on the geo-strategic and geo-political dynamics in the medium to long term, selected nodes would be converted to Overseas Strategic Strong Points (OSSPs) for effective forward deployment, victualling of its forces (like it has done in Djibouti and Gwadar). The Chinese prefer to call their overseas military bases OSSPs²³, since the term 'overseas military base' has the baggage of western imperialism.

According to it an expansion of the geographic scope of naval operations, based on the strategic tasks that the 2015²⁴ and 2019²⁵ Defence White Papers have laid down for the PLA, requires the establishment of replenishment points and various forms of limited force presence. OSSPs fulfil these demands and would support the military's long-range projection capabilities by effectively shortening resupply intervals and expanding the range of support for Chinese forces operating abroad. The artificial islands that China has militarised in the South China Sea (SCS) also fall in this category, along with the Paracel Islands and the Scarborough

Shoals. Some of these ports, secured at a later point in time by its Marines (like in Djibouti and Gwadar), would allow China to expand its outreach along the Maritime Silk Route (MSR). It would group a set of OSSPs to control various regions of the Indo-Pacific, viz., East China Sea and Yellow Sea, South China Sea, Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, Eastern Indian Ocean and Western Indian Ocean, and Southern Pacific. This appears to be the overall strategy of controlling its neighbourhood, thereby constraining US in the Indo-Pacific and India's security in the Indian Ocean.

For China, its geo-economic strategy precedes its military strategy, wherein the economic squeeze that would be feasible in the middle to long term would provide it the geo-political and geo-strategic influence. The debt-equity swap provides it the opportunity to take control of the OSSPs. The military follows thereafter. This is at a stark variation to the strategies that US and the West has been following in the region.

Emerging Trends and Implications for India

To counter China's geo-economic strategy, India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2019 to protect its farmers, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), dairy and manufacturing sector, pharmaceutical, steel and chemical industries²⁶ from being overrun by cheap Chinese goods without any reciprocal entry for India into Chinese markets. The events unfolding in the RCEP negotiations indicate that China is slowly achieving its economic stranglehold over most of ASEAN nations, thereby inhibiting them from moving away from Chinese interests. Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, however, appear to be hedging for the moment, awaiting US strategy to fully unfold in the region, before taking a hard stance.

Chinese foothold in India's economy is tenuous at present but is slowly expanding by investing in technological start-ups and unicorns (like Paytm etc.), thereby enabling it to achieve disproportionate impact in the long run.²⁷ India and these companies need to understand the medium to long term risks that the country would face if due diligence is not paid to deny a back door influence and data loss to China. That said, the emerging trends show two possible scenarios in the near to medium term:-

- (a) A *bipolar Indo-Pacific*, with China and its core vassal states²⁸ on one side and the US, with like-minded partners, on the other;
- (b) A *loose multi-polar Indo-Pacific*, with China and its vassal states competing with US and a few partners, while the other emerging powers in the region would attempt to retain strategic autonomy by hedging, in order to protect their respective national interests.

The second trend is evolving at present, but could change depending on how USA and the West calibrate their strategies. Concurrently, Russia is also evolving its own strategy for the region, wherein it recognises that Greater Eurasia and the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans do form part of a common space. The same was evident in the joint statement issued by Russia and India after the fifth Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), held in Vladivostok in the first week of September 2019, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the Chief Guest.²⁹ Thus, Russia could also be seen as another emerging player in the region, which would also be keen to protect its core interests, especially in its Far East where it feels economically and demographically threatened by the Chinese.

For India, this presents a challenge for securing its core interests in the region. As such it would prefer to hedge for the moment, under the rubric of strategic autonomy. Hence, while it has a Russia-India-China forum, it also has a Japan-Australia-India forum, a Quad – with USA, Japan and Australia, informal dialogue at the apex level with China – Wuhan Spirit and Chennai Connect etc. India faces a clear present and long term threat from China in multiple domains, be it at the geo-political, geo-strategic or geo-economic levels.

A rising, liberal, democratic India is perceived as a direct challenge to China's narrative of socialism with Chinese characteristics being the path for other developing countries in Afro-Asia to follow and achieve modernisation. It provides an alternate model for development, a model that does not subsume the host country's economy with it but ensures inclusive growth.

The vast geopolitical trust that India enjoys within these regions should be built upon to create a free and open Indo-Pacific. Also

work with like – minded emerging powers of the region (including Russia) and with USA and the West to create a forum, which would provide the alternate geo-economic and geo-commerce model for the IPR and facilitate economic activities, security, trade, intelligence exchanges, military capacity building, technology sharing, agenda setting for regional forums and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. The overarching security architecture could be based on an expanded QUAD to encompass some more likeminded nations of the region. This architecture could also serve as the ‘net security provider’ within the IPR. This would lead to the scenario of a loose multi-polarity in the region and act as succour to the smaller nations ensuring that rule of international law, good governance, equality, transparency and economic prosperity for all is ensured. The foundation of the association or coalition would not be based just on countering any country’s narrative of geo-economic squeeze, but for stability and prosperity of Indo-Pacific, thereby making itself sustaining and long lasting. However, China would also be pushing its model aggressively, especially amongst nations where it has an economic stranglehold, thereby leading in the medium term to a bipolar region. Such a scenario, which would be debilitating for the region, with fault lines running through it, could be avoided if the alternate narrative succeeds and gains optimal traction.

India also needs to ensure that it secures itself comprehensively from external threats and internal dissonance. It needs to move fast on creating a modern integrated military, with a responsive restructured Higher Defence Organisation, concurrently with a restructured comprehensive Internal Security architecture. The recent announcement by the Prime Minister of creating a ‘Chief of Defence Staff’ (CDS), during his speech on 15 August 2019, is a welcome step. However, the duties and responsibilities of the CDS and a restructured Ministry of Defence (MoD) incorporating the Services also need to be addressed. There is a need for a bipartisan approach towards socio-political, socio-economic and socio-religious security, to ensure there is no internal dissonance that enemies could exploit. A similar approach is needed to ensure that India is secure from multi-domain threats that would be utilised to target the country and weaken its CNP.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping sees the current geo-political flux as an opportunity for China to assert itself within the Indo-Pacific and occupy the vacuum due to USA's strategic retrenchment. Towards that end, he has clubbed the existing infrastructure projects, and added a few, under the much touted 'BRI', with the aim of gaining geopolitical space in Asia.

This is centred on a phased commercial penetration through infrastructure projects and selling a short term 'economic dream' to the underprivileged nations on its periphery. Such commercial penetration is the precursor to the 'strategic equity', squeezed out from these nations due to the debt trap caused by these unviable projects, thereby gaining political, diplomatic and geopolitical space needed to achieve the China Dream of becoming a 'Great Power' by 2050 – *a unipolar Asia centred around China*. However, the past seems to have come to haunt the Chinese. Having given loans to these small nations at market rates for unviable projects, the countries are facing debt crises and are not amenable to China's arm twisting as yet.

The emerging powers of the region, supported by USA and the West, need to utilise this opportunity to provide an alternate narrative / economic model to assist the small nations and ensure peace and stability within this region. It needs to be responsive and ensure that only economically viable projects are undertaken and not the unviable projects that China had been pushing within the region to enable its geo-economic squeeze for strategic equity.

At the same time, India needs to revamp its internal and external security architectures and follow a bi-partisan approach to socio-political, socio-economic and socio-religious issues to curb internal dissonance. India and the other likeminded emerging powers of the region need to seize the initiative. This strategic window, due to the current geo-political and geo-economic flux, is small post which it would find increasingly difficult to maintain a multi-polar Indo-Pacific.

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35TH National Security Lecture 2019

India's Strategic Calculus: Reconciling Strategic Autonomy vis-à-vis Engagement with Great Powers

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Abstract

We live in a world in which a post-cold war order is still in the making, as the sole super power shares the global stage with multiple state actors of varying weights, jostling for space to assert their national aspirations.

In this complex environment, India's foreign policy seeks to maximise India's political and economic space to further its global ambitions. This includes sustaining the vibrant India-US strategic partnership, forged since the early 2000's, even while preserving the traditionally strong relationship with Russia from the decades of the Cold War. A comprehensive partnership has also been developed with China, though recent differences have somewhat dimmed its intensity. India needs a combination of domestic capacity building and external partnerships to reconcile the contradictory pulls of strategic cooperation and competition with China. Relations with the US, Russia, Japan and Europe are also elements of this effort. India's multilateral activism in G-20, BRICS and SCO serve to enhance its room for manoeuvre in the dynamics of the US, Russia, China triangle. India's strategy in the India-Pacific seeks to promote bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral partnerships in search for a cooperative and sustainable architecture in the region that promotes objective of a multi-polar order.

It has been suggested that in today's global environment, which is not conducive to alliances,

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the template for relations with great powers should resemble that of a joint venture, in which partners cooperate for mutual benefit in areas of their convergence, but are free to form other partnerships to pursue other interests, as long as they do not impact on the core interests of the joint venture partners. This could be the basis of sustainable relations with both the US and Russia.

Just a few days ago, a distinguished diplomat and a perceptive strategic analyst, who is also our External Affairs Minister (EAM), brought out the complexities of the global environment in a masterly exposition of India's foreign policy perspectives. I will draw freely from the insights that he provided in that lecture. I have to put in a standard disclaimer. The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) is an advisory body outside the government. Hence, all that I say should not be taken as government policy.

An example of how India is dealing with the complexities of international relations was in two virtually back-to-back meetings that Prime Minister Modi had on the margins of the G20 summit in November 2018. One was with the leaders of Japan and the US. The other was a Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. Each of India's interlocutors in one trilateral has difficult relations with each of its interlocutors in the other. The US-Russia standoff is arguably worse than even during the Cold War. The US and China are in the midst of a trade war and a technology war. Japan has a long-standing border dispute with Russia over a Pacific Ocean island chain. The China-Japan regional rivalry is of even longer standing. The fact that India's participation in one trilateral did not prejudice the successful outcome of the other indicates the value that each participant in the two summits attaches to its relationship with India and the shared objectives within its trilateral.

These seemingly contradictory alignments are manifestations of a post-Cold War world order still in the making, as the sole superpower shares the global stage with multiple state actors of varying weights, jostling for space to assert their national aspirations. This environment, as the EAM said in his speech, forces us to look beyond the dogmas of the past and adjust to the realities of the present.

The decade after the Cold War has been described as a unipolar moment. The Soviet Union disintegrated and Russia was

in political, economic and social disarray. Europe was coming to terms with the addition of Eastern and Central European countries to the democratic fold. China was going through its economic liberalization and recovering from the external impact of its handling of the Tiananmen Square protests. India was facing economic difficulties, domestic political uncertainties and a reset of its external engagement.

We did three things right during this period. We launched (though probably a decade later than we should have) an economic liberalization programme, riding the crest of the ICT revolution. We signalled a stronger defence posture by declaring our nuclear weapons status. And we energetically set about widening our network of international relations, while preserving our traditional relationships.

The most remarkable transformation of India's external engagement was in the India-US partnership, emerging from the frictions of the Cold War years and the more recent shadow of US-led sanctions after our nuclear tests of 1998. In 2000, the US saw in India a large market and a major arms importer, whose ambitious nuclear power expansion plans were of interest to the US nuclear power industry. On its part, India grasped the opportunity of partnership with the sole superpower in trade, investment, technologies, education and culture. The US desire to enter India's lucrative arms market matched India's desire to diversify its defence acquisitions from a Russian near-monopoly, and to access a wider range of sophisticated military technologies.

The strategic underpinning to this burgeoning relationship was a complementary understanding of the evolving situation in our region. As it recognized the challenge to its global supremacy from a rising China, the US saw merit in strengthening relations with a strong, democratic country in the region. It was this strategic perspective that led the high priest of the global non-proliferation regime to literally steamroll the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to open up civil nuclear cooperation with India. Senior Bush Administration officials openly stated this at the time. Though (like the US) careful not to project the partnership in terms of "balancing" China, India shared the premise on which US said it would support enhancement of India's military power in its region. It is important to keep this long-term strategic picture in mind, even as we argue about GSP, tariffs, H1B and Afghanistan in the immediate-term.

Indian diplomacy ensured that this rapid advance in India-US relations did not undermine long-standing relations with Russia, which flowed from traditional Indo-Soviet relations. A new strategic partnership was declared, after President Putin assumed office in 2000. A shared desire for multipolarity created convergences of political outlook. Defence cooperation expanded in range and depth, with Indian acquisitions of major weapons platforms and joint work on developing others. The India-Russia joint venture Brahmos, set up to manufacture anti-ship missiles designed in Russia, has since developed missiles for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Russian collaboration on the Kudankulam nuclear power plant commenced in 2002, even when India was under sanctions for its 1998 nuclear tests, by resurrecting a 1988 Indo-Soviet agreement.

Side by side with the strategic partnerships with the US and Russia, new strides were made, in the early 2000s, in India-China relations. The agreements of the 1990s, on maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas, reflected an understanding that bilateral relations could develop on a separate track from efforts to resolve differences over the boundary. Both these tracks were advanced during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003. The leaders of the two countries appointed Special Representatives to bring a political perspective to resolution of differences on the boundary. This initiative produced some immediate results: in 2005, the Special Representatives reached an agreement on the political parameters for a boundary settlement, which included an important provision that the two sides "shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas". The reference was obviously to Arunachal Pradesh, though the Chinese chose to understand it differently a few years later. This period saw rapid growth in trade, investment, cultural and educational cooperation between the two countries. China rapidly rose to becoming India's largest trade partner, as its consumer and industrial products flooded the Indian market.

At the turn of this century, Europe also sought to emerge from the shadow of the US to find an independent space in a multipolar post-Cold War order. Strange as it may seem in the context of Brexit, UK joined France and Germany to promote European integration and to support the European agenda adopted in Lisbon in 2000, which sought to transform EU into "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world"

by 2010. They endorsed a robust Common Security and Defence policy, envisaging military integration and a military force to promote European interests even beyond Europe. Taken together, these initiatives constituted a manifesto for European unity and autonomy. These perspectives were discussed in great detail in the strategic dialogues that first France (already in 1998, barely months after our nuclear tests) and then Germany and UK, established with India.

This delicate equilibrium of India's engagement with the US, Russia, China and Europe, was disturbed by changes in the global landscape after 2008.

The Russia-US relationship deteriorated progressively, with developments in Ukraine leading to the "annexation" of Crimea by Russia (or its reunification with Russia, if you accept the Russian version) in 2014. Western efforts to isolate Russia included its exclusion from the G8 and virtually all dialogue mechanisms with the US and its allies. Economic sanctions against Russia progressively expanded in scope and bite, as allegations of Russian transgressions of international law covered other areas and geographies, culminating in the charge of meddling in the 2016 US Presidential elections. We saw US-Russia military confrontation, through their proxies, in the civil war in Syria, and mutual recriminations on Afghanistan.

Worsening US-Russia relations propelled Russia and China to a closer partnership. Their engagement had surged after the settlement of their long-standing boundary disputes in the early 2000s, and in response to their complementary interests: China's demand for Russian natural resources and modern military equipment, and Russia's demand for attractively-priced Chinese consumer products. But alienation from the West pushed Russia into a tighter embrace of China than their history of strategic rivalry should have permitted. Russian transfers of sophisticated military technologies to China increased and hydrocarbons links were strengthened. Massive joint military exercises have been organized, to develop interoperability protocols under war conditions. China occupied some of the economic space created in Russia by Western sanctions.

The 2003 Iraq war divided Europe politically even before the European Union enlargement in 2004. The enlargement itself, and

the Eurozone crisis, created new economic and cultural fault lines. The ambitious Lisbon Agenda was replaced in 2010 by a more modest “Europe 2020” strategy for growth and employment. The EU’s security and defence policy was re-integrated into the NATO framework. The EU’s multipolar moment was, in a sense, put on hold, while it engaged with its internal divisions, of which the Brexit vote was a symptom. This led to what the EAM delicately described as Europe’s “political agnosticism” towards the global geopolitical flux.

The financial crisis of 2008 set the stage for a larger Chinese presence on the global economic scene, with corresponding political clout. Its assertiveness in its region was manifested in unilateral enforcement of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and aggressive actions against countries that it deemed to have hurt its national interests. Mongolia, Japan and South Korea have (among others) borne the brunt of such actions. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is (in addition to its domestic economic drivers) an expression of China’s ambition to expand its economic and geopolitical footprint, beyond its region to South, Southeast and Central Asia and further to Europe. Its maritime leg is meant to extend China’s economic (and potentially naval) reach across the Indian Ocean, from Thailand and Myanmar to Djibouti and Kenya on the African coast. This has obvious strategic implications for India, which I will shortly discuss.

This period saw a dilution of the quality of our dialogue with China. The Special Representatives’ meetings ceased to make substantive progress on the boundary and, as I have mentioned, there was some regression. The articulation of the Chinese claim to Arunachal Pradesh increased in stridency and, from about 2011, China started issuing stapled visas to visitors from that state. It had earlier (around 2009) already started the practice of issuing stapled visas to residents of J&K. China’s inclusion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in BRI became a major bilateral irritant. The three month-long standoff between Indian and Chinese troops near the India-Bhutan-China trijunction in 2017, marked a low point in recent relations.

The External Affairs Minister has said that during this period, “the American trumpet sounded increasingly uncertain”. Put more explicitly, China’s assertive actions, as well as the global ambition signalled by the BRI, went largely unchallenged, beyond symbolic statements and gestures, by a US Administration more engrossed

in the challenges in Afghanistan and the new quagmire in Syria. Our dialogue with the US also flagged somewhat. The consular issue that unnecessarily muddied bilateral waters in 2013 was a symptom of this.

The advent of the Trump Administration brought a new vigour to the relationship. Among its highlights was the reassertion of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic priority for the US. This brought the India-US relationship back to one of its major premises established in the early 2000s.

The Indo-Pacific is a region of overlapping, intersecting or competing great power interests, which are intimately intertwined with India's economic and security interests. I will deal first with the Indo-Pacific as defined by ASEAN and the West – from the east coast of India to the US Pacific seaboard. The security and strategic issues in the western Indo Pacific are different and require different approaches from an Indian perspective.

The Indo-Pacific has rightly replaced the Cold War construct of the Asia Pacific, which defined a region from ASEAN, Northeast and East Asia to the US west coast. That was a geopolitical construct, involving a US security umbrella over its allies in the region, against a Soviet communist threat. China, after its rapprochement with the US in 1972, was more or less neutral. This framework is obviously unsustainable today for many reasons. The economic and military rise of China is one. The Russia-China strategic partnership is another. Further, political and economic interlinkages between countries of the region have blurred the divides of the Cold War. So, just tweaking this obsolete architecture will not achieve much; we need a new, multipolar security architecture.

Even after the Cold War, India was excluded from dialogue forums of the region. APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), which was created in 1989, still does not include India. India was admitted to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) only in 2006, ten years after its inception.

This exclusion of India had no objective justification. It is Asia's second largest country, with a population of 1.3 billion and an economy of \$2.6 trillion. It is strategically located on the region's maritime corridor, which carries the bulk of global trade to and

from the so-called Asia Pacific. India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands chain reaches the mouth of the Malacca Straits. India's exclusion from the region's economic and security deliberations, therefore, distorted the balance in those deliberations. The Indo-Pacific concept corrects this anomaly.

Our immediate concern of course is the protection of our 7500 km coastline. The Indian Ocean carries about 90 percent of our foreign trade, including most of our energy supplies. Foreign trade constitutes over 40 percent of India's GDP. The marine resources of the ocean make an important contribution to the economies of the littoral states. Arms, narcotics and human trafficking need counter measures. Let us also not forget that the worst terrorist attack on India came from the sea (Mumbai, 26/11). Strengthening of the Indian Navy is, therefore, primarily justified by its responsibility for India's defence of its maritime domain.

Looking beyond this, our larger economic and security interests dictate against domination of this region by any country. China's unilateral assertion of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, its coercive actions against countries for bilateral grievances and the geopolitical implications of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have aroused concerns on this score, which India has publicly articulated on various occasions. They drive India's efforts for a sustainable security architecture in the region that establishes an equilibrium of interests and aspirations.

These include strengthening of internal economic, technological and defence capacities, but also bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral initiatives to achieve mutual understanding on the elements of an open, inclusive, rules-based order. Other countries in the region also have to develop the requisite military and economic capacities to promote this equilibrium. It is a reality of geopolitics that extreme asymmetries of strength are destabilizing, however well-intentioned the stronger sides are. This is the fundamental principle in the search for a multipolar world order; it is equally applicable in the search for a multipolar Indo-Pacific order.

India's efforts are reflected in its "Act East" policy, strengthening partnerships in the region. Bonds are being strengthened with ASEAN, Japan, Korea, Australia and others, based on convergent perspectives. The unique presence of the

heads of all 10 ASEAN countries in New Delhi, celebrating India's Republic Day and 25 years of India-ASEAN dialogue (2018), showed the importance they attach to India's presence in the region. Fresh momentum has recently been imparted to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) (including Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand) to strengthen cooperation for connectivity and maritime security in this enclave of the Indo-Pacific, which stretches from the Malacca straits to India's east coast. There are regular capacity-building joint exercises with other navies, including the India-US-Japan "Malabar" exercise.

The most high-profile plurilateral dialogue is undoubtedly the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of India, US, Japan and Australia (Quad), which was recently upgraded from the level of officials to that of Ministers. Amidst the hype, it is important to recognize what the Quad is and what it is not. The Quad is not a strategy; it is a search for a strategy, based on some shared interests. It is not a closed club or a starting point of an arc of democracy encircling China. Even less is it an alliance. The broad objectives of its participants are political equilibrium and a sustainable security architecture, but there are differing perspectives about the definition of these terms and the paths to achieve them. The American definition of a Free and Open Indo Pacific is articulated in the US Administration's strategy documents: promote respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations, large and small; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment ... adherence to international rules and norms, including freedom of navigation and overflight. Prime Minister Modi spelt out his vision for the Indo-Pacific in almost identical terms [reciprocal] in his Shangri La address in Singapore in June 2018. The PM's approach was welcomed as statesman-like, while the American formulation has been received with some trepidation, even by some of its allies, because it was framed in the context of a "geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions" and promised a lethal, resilient, agile and combat-effective Indo-Pacific force posture. In short, therefore, the Quad and other multilateral initiatives in the region have to reconcile the nuances of individual interests and constraints of countries in the region.

The effort to draw Russia into a dialogue on the Indo Pacific was furthered during Prime Minister Modi's Vladivostok visit in

September. Russia has regarded the Indo-Pacific construct as an American ploy to draw India into an alliance. Our high-level dialogue seeks to correct this misconception. As a Pacific naval power, Russia could be an active, independent participant in the effort for an Indo-Pacific security architecture. It ties in with President Putin's vision for a Greater Eurasia, which an influential Russian think tank describes as a community of nations in "a web of ties, institutions and balances", without hegemony of any one power.

India's engagement with China on the Indo Pacific has to factor in the reality of strong trade and investment relations and shared perspectives in the RIC, BRICS and G20 on issues ranging from democratization of the global economic architecture to sovereignty and strategic autonomy. An intimate political and economic engagement with China also characterises the situation of most other countries in the region. This, together with China's military and economic dominance of the region, means that the search for an Indo-Pacific security architecture should not seek to contain or confront China. This explains the cautious response by countries of the region to the US discourse on a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The situation, therefore, is that discussions on the Indo Pacific are work in progress. The achievement so far is the acceptance of the term, as a geographical expression, by nearly all countries of the region. The difficult part is to broaden the canvas of concrete cooperation initiatives, based on shared interests and concerns. This was the spirit of Prime Minister Modi's Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative, which he unveiled at the recent East Asia Summit, and which has not received the public attention it merits. It suggests collaborative work to safeguard the oceans; enhance maritime security; preserve marine resources; share resources fairly; reduce disaster risk; enhance S&T cooperation; and promote mutually beneficial trade and maritime transport. He suggested that one or two countries could take the lead in coordinating cooperation in each of these verticals.

In the longer-term, conditions have to be created to draw China into meaningful discussions for an open and inclusive security architecture. For this to happen, the present turbulence in the US-Russia-China equations has to give way to a level of pragmatic accommodation between them.

Looking westwards, India's economic, energy and consular interests in West Asia are well-known. One of the less-acknowledged foreign policy achievements of the Modi government is the cementing of links in the region, across its religious, sectarian and political divides. High-level political exchanges with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Qatar and Israel illustrate this point, with Israel becoming an important defence partner. It has effectively demolished the Pakistani myth of the region being a natural extension of its Islamic constituency. There is a much better understanding today of the nature and sources of terrorism that India encounters. Security and defence cooperation have been established. Economic links are acquiring new dimensions.

West Asia also offers a potentially significant trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The shortest land route through Pakistan is closed, for obvious political and security reasons. The multimodal International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), through the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar to Afghanistan, Central Asia (and beyond to Russia and northern Europe) could be an economic and strategic game-changer in many ways. It offers not only India, but also the rest of Asia a shorter route to these countries than the sea route and a safer route than via Pakistan. Whereas China's BRI opens up these countries to Chinese goods and services, INSTC would open them to all of Asia. The catch, of course, is that US sanctions against Iran will make construction of the required infrastructure difficult. There are however points for negotiation with the US on this. If, as the US has been saying, its problem is not with Iran, but with its present leadership, it should see the long-term strategic advantage of opening a direct route to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan, and to Central Asia, bypassing Russia, with the additional bonus of offering an alternative to BRI.

The corridor would further India's strategic objectives in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO's relevance to India lies in geography, economics and geopolitics. Its members – Russia, China and four Central Asian countries – occupy a huge landmass adjacent to India's extended neighbourhood. With Pakistan joining the Organization and Afghanistan and Iran knocking on its doors, the logic of India's membership becomes stronger. It is in India's interest to be aware of the Russia-China dynamics in

this strategically important space. India has to carve out a political and economic space for itself in Central Asia, alongside Russia's role as net security provider and China's dominating economic presence. The Central Asian countries would welcome India breaking into this Russia-China duopoly.

India has strengthened partnerships with the littoral countries of the western Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Rim Association, over half of whose 22 member states are in this region, offers a platform for such cooperation. In 2015, Prime Minister Modi announced a partnership programme, SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), involving cooperative efforts for capacity building and security. The India-Japan initiative for an Asia Africa Growth Corridor seeks to promote connectivity, infrastructure and development in the Indian Ocean.

Returning to India-US relations beyond the Indo-Pacific, the strategic partnership has strengthened remarkably over the last decade, notwithstanding the occasional wrinkles. Trade and investment have grown significantly, though still far short of the potential. Defence cooperation has surged; American arms sales to India have risen steeply from near nothing in 2008 to US\$ 18 billion in 2018. Trade tariffs, GSP, H1B are issues that will either see a breakthrough or ways will be found around them. The one potential sticking point, though, is the US legislation, CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) that envisages sanctions against any entity that enters into "significant" defence transactions with Russia. Starting out as a measure to "punish" Russia for its alleged meddling in the 2016 Presidential elections, the eventual legislation provides for punishing Russia's partners by denying them access to US markets. India's intention to acquire the air defence system S-400 has come into the crosshairs of CAATSA.

This pressure does not take into account the specificities of India's defence requirements, which have three elements. One is diversification of the sources of defence acquisition, which commenced from the early 2000s. The surge in imports from the US has been mentioned. France and Israel have also become significant defence partners.

The second is synchronizing weapons acquisitions with progressive indigenization. The fact that India is among the world's

top importers of arms is not a matter of pride. The government has clearly articulated a policy of accelerating indigenization, encouraging our industry to develop technologies and manufacture systems.

The third element is most important. To increase indigenization without degrading defence capability, India has to leverage its position as a major importer to secure the maximum possible technology sharing from its suppliers – not just licencing of production. India has not done this very well so far, but our Make in India initiative seeks to remedy this.

It is this autonomy of action that CAATSA abridges – to choose defence platforms best suited to India's defence requirements, and to secure them on the best available technology transfer terms. US officials have said at Congressional hearings that the intention of CAATSA is to wean countries away from arms dependence on Russia and to get them to buy more arms from the US instead. In the case of India, this is pushing an open door, but pushing it too suddenly and too hard. Indian diplomacy has to convey effectively that the carrot of technology transfer would work better than the stick of sanctions.

In the context of differences in expectations of the relationship in India and the US, a Task Force of the US Council for Foreign Relations on India-US relations made some interesting observations (2015). Commenting that the US has traditionally been most comfortable with alliance partners, the report suggested that the US should look at relations with India as a joint venture. As I understand it, this would be a model in which the partners secure mutual benefit from areas of their convergence, but are free to form other partnerships to pursue other interests, as long as they do not impact on the core interests of the joint venture partner.

This is an ideal template for relations in a multipolar world. Today's global environment is not conducive to alliances. The ideological congruences and external threats (or at least the perception of them) that cemented alliances during the Cold War cannot be replicated now. Countries seeking multipolarity cannot have a congruence of interests with any one country. Perceptions of existential threats vary widely, even among strategic partners. The periodically recurring problems within NATO are evidence of this.

In the case of India-US relations, the main elements of this “joint venture” are self-evident. There are important shared interests: democratic ideals, defence and economic cooperation, and convergent perspectives on the Indo-Pacific. India’s diversification of defence acquisitions will continue to benefit US companies; it can be accelerated by more emphasis on technology sharing than military sales. India needs the autonomy to shape its relations with other countries in response to the realities in its neighbourhood. This would meet the US objective of a strong, democratic India as a partner.

A similar template would apply to Russia. The diversification of India’s external engagement has diluted the Cold War exclusivity of the relationship, but geo-economics and geopolitics create important convergences. We have a shared interest in a multipolar world order. In BRICS, SCO and G20, we make common cause for democratization of the global economic and financial architecture. We share some non-Western – as distinct from anti-Western – perspectives on global developments. Defence remains a major area of cooperation; after all the diversification of the past two decades, about 60-70 per cent of weapons and equipment in our Armed Forces are still of Russian or Soviet origin. It is also true that, as of now, Russia has been more forthcoming to share sophisticated military technologies with India than other countries. Energy is a major area of cooperation: from the Russian collaboration for nuclear power plants in India to the mutual investments in the hydrocarbons sector. Natural resource-rich Russia has much to offer to resource-hungry India in terms of trade and investment opportunities. The Eurasian Economic Union offers a mutually beneficial FTA opportunity that does not have the issues we found in the RCEP.

At the same time, we may not see eye to eye with Russia on some of its actions with Pakistan or Afghanistan and worry about the implications of some aspects of the Russia-China partnership. But frequent meetings between PM Modi and President Putin have ensured that core interests have been protected. An example was Russia’s dissociation from the Chinese initiative for a discussion in the UNSC on India’s recent decisions on Jammu and Kashmir. Russia announced publicly that its Foreign Minister had told his Pakistani counterpart that India’s actions were within the framework

of the Indian constitution and Pakistan should resolve its issues with India bilaterally.

Europe has traditionally been a geopolitical “balancer” between the US and Russia. It has a strong Atlantic alliance, but also has to engage with Russia as a proximate power, a major energy source and a significant economic partner. Trans-Atlantic frictions and internal preoccupations have somewhat diluted this role in recent years. Brexit is symptomatic of forces opposing European political and economic integration (hence limiting the scope for a unified foreign policy strategy). For many of these reasons, India-EU relations slackened in recent years. But the EU has launched an initiative to re-energize it. If it can once again capture the unified energy of two decades ago, there would be many convergences of perspectives with India on international developments.

The effort to retain strategic autonomy of foreign policy involves give and take across sectors. Securing US understanding of India’s defence cooperation with Russia or connectivity links through Iran may need meeting US political and economic interests elsewhere. The diversification of India’s defence acquisitions away from Russia has to be compensated by broadening the base of India-Russia economic cooperation, to ensure continued strong mutual stakes in that partnership. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy needs a blend of military interactions, connectivity projects, development cooperation and diplomatic initiatives – all of them in bilateral and multilateral formats. A multi-pronged approach has to be developed to protect India’s developmental interests, in the face of the sharpening US-China divide on the roll-out of fifth-generation (5G) communications technologies. An effective foreign policy needs sensitivity to such cross-linkages and an all of government approach to deal with them. This, I have to say, is still work in progress.

And finally, it is often said that Indian strategic thinking is still stunted by a sentimental attachment to nonalignment. The fact is that nonalignment was a Cold War concept, in a bipolar environment, designed to retain room for manoeuvre (not equidistance) between two politico-military blocs. As a concept, therefore, it lost relevance with the end of the Cold War, though it continues to be used as a *mantra* in various forums. The successor to nonalignment in a post-Cold War situation has been given many names, but each seems to have a negative connotation for one

group or another. Strategic autonomy is one, multi-alignment is another. The External Affairs Minister said in his lecture that multi-alignment sounds vigorous, but appears opportunistic, whereas India seeks strategic convergence from its relationships, rather than tactical convenience. The bottom line is that our engagement with major powers should further our fundamental national objective of advancing national prosperity and global influence, and that is the thrust of our foreign policy.

Space the Next Frontier: Opportunities and Challenges for India

Air Marshal Anil Chopra PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd)[®]

Abstract

Over 8,000 satellites, or manmade objects, have been launched till date with nearly 5,000, belonging to 50 countries, still in orbit and nearly half of those are actually operational. Spacecraft have done soft or hard landings on or done flybys of many terrestrial bodies within the solar system, including on Asteroids and Comets. American and Chinese private space companies are part of the ultimate goal of enabling people to live on other planets. Space warfare is combat that may take place in outer space. It includes attacking objects in space from the Earth, or from another space platform. Till date, no actual war has ever taken place in space, though a number of tests and demonstrations have been performed. International treaties are in place that regulate conflicts in space and limit the installation of space weapon systems, especially nuclear. Major powers have space warfare organisational structures. Many countries have developed and tested space weapon systems ranging from anti-satellite missiles, Railguns, and very small highly mobile satellites nimble enough to manoeuvre around and interact with other orbiting objects to sabotage, hijack, or simply collide with them. Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) would include lasers, linear particle accelerators, or plasma based weaponry. With an eye on growing space capabilities of China, India has been slowly building its capabilities in space. India has tested its anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems and achieved many other key milestones pertaining to

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space, including the demonstration of India's anti-satellite (ASAT) capability and establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA). The thin line dividing the earth's atmosphere and space is fast shrinking with more platforms transiting between earth and terrestrial locations. Is India prepared and what is its road map ahead is a subject being debated among military and scientific community.

Introduction

The world has come a long way since 'Sputnik 1', when a launch mass of 83.6 kg was put in a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) by Soviet Union on 04 October 1957. The satellite's unanticipated success shocked the Americans and triggered a strategic space race, which was an important component of the Cold War. The launch was the beginning of a new era of political, military, technological, and scientific developments. More than 8,000 satellites or manmade objects have been launched since then. Nearly 5,000, belonging to 50 countries, are still in orbit and nearly half of those are actually operational. As on 26 July 2019, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has launched 297 satellites belonging to 33 countries. Around 50 Indian satellites are currently in orbit.

Spacecraft have landed on or done flybys of many terrestrial bodies within the solar system. Landings, hard or soft, include on Earth's Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, and Moons of Mars and Saturn. Jupiter and Saturn being gas planets have no hard surface to "land", so spacecraft disintegrated on entering the atmosphere. Landings have also been achieved on Asteroids and Comets. Founded in 2002, American private company SpaceX designs, manufactures and launches advanced rockets and spacecraft, with the ultimate goal of enabling people to live on other planets. They have planned a landing mission to Mars with cargo and crew around 2024.

With an eye on growing space capabilities of China, India has been slowly building its capabilities in space. India has tested its ABM defence systems and achieved many other key milestones pertaining to space, including the demonstration of India's ASAT capability and the establishment of the new tri-service Defence

Space Agency (DSA). The first table-top joint war game called “IndSpaceEx” was held in July 2019.¹ Run by the military and the space scientists, it was a logical next step. The moon landing by Chandrayaan 2 was close and should succeed next time. The thin line dividing the earth’s atmosphere and space is fast shrinking with more platforms transiting between earth and terrestrial locations.

Space: By Definition

In very simple terms, ‘Space’ is the vast 3-dimensional region that begins where the earth’s atmosphere thins down considerably.² Space is usually thought to begin at the lowest altitude at which satellites can maintain orbits for a reasonable time without falling into the atmosphere. This is approximately 160 kilometres (100 miles) above the surface. The two separate entities are considered as a single-domain for activities of launching, guidance and control of vehicles that travel in both entities.

Space Warfare

Space warfare is combat that takes place in outer space. It includes attacking objects in space from the Earth, or from another space platform. Till date, no actual war has ever taken place in space, though a number of tests and demonstrations have been performed. International treaties are in place that regulate conflicts in space and limit the installation of space weapon systems, especially nuclear. Major powers have space warfare organisational structures, such as US Air Force Space Command, Russian Aerospace Forces, and India’s DSA. China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF or SSF) handles cyber, space and electronic warfare.

Space Weaponry

Space weapon systems range from simple ground and space-based anti-satellite missiles. Railguns have been developed and orbital mines are contenders. Since most satellites are electronics technology intensive, and are used for surveillance, communications and positioning systems, for tactical advantages, these could be jammed through electronic warfare. The United States (US), and others, are also considering highly mobile satellites called “microsats”³ (25 cu ft), and “picosats” (1 cubic foot), nimble enough to manoeuvre around and interact with other orbiting objects

to sabotage, hijack, or simply collide with them. The US and Russia had toyed with the idea of kinetic bombardment from orbiting platforms, launching non-explosive projectiles dropped onto hardened targets from LEO. A high velocity direct hit would presumably destroy it. A 'sensor' satellite would identify target and a nearby 'armed' satellite would de-orbit a long needle-like tungsten dart with a small rocket motor.

DEWs would include lasers, linear particle accelerators or plasma based weaponry. Acceleration of charged particles in a stream towards a target at extremely high velocities could cause immense damage. Lasers are already being used in terrestrial warfare. The DEWs are more practical and more effective in a vacuum (i.e. space) than in the Earth's atmosphere. Chemical lasers project missile, killing energy nearly 3,000 kilometres away and could be put into space to intercept Ballistic Missiles.

Complexities of Space Warfare

Space warfare is likely to be conducted at far greater distances and speeds than terrestrial combat. The vast distances involved pose difficult challenges for targeting and tracking, as even light requires a few seconds to traverse ranges measured in hundreds of thousands of kilometres. Geostationary satellites move at a speed of 3.07 km/s, and objects in LEO move at up to 8 km/s. Tracking of military satellites, with inbuilt defensive measures like inclination changes among others, will not be so easy. Error of even a fraction of a degree in the firing solution could result in a miss by thousands of kilometres. The interceptor would have to pre-determine the point of impact while compensating for the satellite's lateral movement and the time for the interceptor to climb and move.

A projectile from a railgun, recently tested by the US Navy⁴, took many hours to reach a far off space target. Global Positioning System (GPS) and communication satellites orbit at much higher altitudes of 20,000 to 36,000 km, putting them out of range of solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The constellation of many GPS satellites provides redundancy where at least four satellites can be received in six orbital planes at any one time, so an attacker would need to disable at least six satellites to disrupt the network. Also, at large distances targets remain relatively small. The International Space Station (ISS), currently the largest artificial

object in Earth orbit, measures slightly over 100 m at its largest span.⁵

Any DEW would require large amount of electric power. Currently the lithium batteries and photovoltaic modules have limitations and may not be practical for powering effective lasers, particle beams, and railguns in space. Anti-satellite attacks, especially those involving kinetic vehicles can add to the space debris and interfere with future space activity. The Chinese ASAT test in January 2007 caused more than 40,000 new chunks of debris⁶ with a diameter larger than one centimetre. The PRC is now reportedly developing “soft-kill” techniques such as jamming and vision kills that do not generate much debris. Since 2017, the United States Air Force (USAF) has run an annual military exercise, called “Space Flag”, which involves a red team simulating attacks on US satellites.

Ground Based Space Weapons

Use of high altitude nuclear explosions to destroy satellites, through damage caused by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) on electronic equipment, was considered. During tests in 1962⁷, the EMP from a 1.4 Mt warhead detonated over the Pacific, damaged three satellites and also disrupted power transmission and communications across the Pacific. Boeing AGM-69 Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), carried on a modified F-15 Eagle, was successfully tested in September 1985 targeting a satellite orbiting at 555 km. In February 2008, US Navy fired a standard ABM to act as an ASAT weapon to destroy an ageing hydrazine laden US satellite. Russia has reportedly restarted development of a prototype laser system ‘Sokol Exhelon’.⁸ Israel’s Arrow 3 (Hetz 3) ABM, with exo-atmospheric interception capability, became operational in January 2017 to intercept ballistic missiles during the space-flight portion of their trajectory. In January 2007, China successfully destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite in polar orbit, at an altitude of about 865 km, using a kinetic warhead of SC-19 ASAT missile. The warhead destroyed the satellite in a head-on collision at an extremely high relative velocity. In May 2013, the Chinese government announced the launch of a suborbital rocket carrying a scientific payload to study the upper ionosphere. US government suspects it as the first test of a new ground-based ASAT system. The NASA space plane X-37⁹, now with US Department of Defence (DoD) is akin to a space version of

Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle and its employability is evolving. US National Missile Defence (NMD) programme is designed to intercept incoming warheads at a very high altitude where the interceptor travels into space for interception. In June 2019, China became the third country to launch a satellite using Long March 11 rocket that lifted off from a floating launch pad in the Yellow Sea.¹⁰

Indian ASAT Test

On 27 March 2019, India destroyed a “live satellite” in LEO. The interceptor struck a test satellite at an altitude of 283 km, 168 seconds after launch. The system was developed by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). With this test, India became the fourth nation with ASAT missile capabilities. As per DRDO, the missile was capable of shooting down enemy targets moving at a speed of 10 km per second, at an altitude as high as 1200 km.¹¹ However, in order to minimise the threat of debris, the interception was performed against an object moving at 7.4 km per second at an altitude below 300 km. It gave India a great capability for a possible war in space.

Anti-Space Weaponisation Treaties

During the Cold War, to avoid extending the threat of nuclear weapons to space, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prevented detonating nuclear devices in space. The Moon and other celestial bodies were to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and astronauts were to be treated as envoys of mankind. However, by then, both the US and the Soviet Union had performed several high altitude nuclear explosions in space. India had signed and ratified the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. In 1981, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) proposed a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty¹², to preserve space for peaceful uses by prohibiting the use of space weapons. The Treaty would prevent any nation from gaining a military advantage in outer space. China and the US prevented consensus. The proposed Space Preservation Treaty of 2006 against all space weapons, and 2008 Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, was vetoed by USA, despite the Treaty explicitly affirming a State’s inherent right of self-defence. In December 2014, UNGA passed two resolutions on preventing an arms race in outer space, both of which were opposed by USA among a few others.

Indian Launch and Satellite Capabilities

ISRO currently uses the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). ISRO and Airports Authority of India (AAI) have implemented the GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) project as a Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) for the Indian airspace. Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), NavIC is an independent regional navigation satellite system being developed by India and will have eleven satellites. It is designed to provide position information service to users in India as well as the region extending up to 1500 km. In January 2014, ISRO successfully used an indigenous cryogenic engine on GSLV-D5 to launch GSAT-14. ISRO sent one lunar orbiter 'Chandrayaan-1' on 22 October 2008, and a Mars orbiter mission which successfully entered Mars orbit on 24 September 2014, making India the first nation to succeed on its first attempt. ISRO, thus, became the fourth space agency in the world as well as the first in Asia to successfully reach Mars orbit. On 15 February 2017, ISRO launched 104 satellites using a single rocket, PSLV C-37, and created a world record. ISRO launched its heaviest rocket, GSLV-Mk III, on 5 June 2017 and placed a communications satellite GSAT-19 in orbit. With this launch, ISRO became capable of launching 4 ton heavy satellites. India will send its first manned mission to space by December 2021 says ISRO Chief Kailasavadivoo Sivan. India plans an orbiter to Venus, 'Shukrayaan-1' in 2023.

Indian Military Application Satellites

Military off-shoots of India's peaceful space programme include remote sensing satellites of Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) series. India today has 15 operational IRS satellites. All these are placed in polar sun-synchronous orbit and provide data in a variety of spatial, spectral and temporal resolutions. India also commercially offers images with one metre resolution. Radar Imaging Satellite 2 (RISAT-2) has synthetic aperture radar (SAR) from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). It has a day-night, all-weather monitoring capability with one metre resolution. The Cartosat-2 carries a state-of-the-art panchromatic (PAN) camera that takes black and white pictures of the earth in the visible region of the electromagnetic spectrum. The data from the satellite is used for detailed mapping and Geographical Information System (GIS). Cartosat-2A is a

dedicated satellite for the Indian Armed Forces. Because of high agility, it can be steered to facilitate imaging of any area more frequently. India now has 13 satellites with military applications. GSAT-6 is the second strategic satellite mainly for use by the armed forces for quality and secure communications. Indian Navy uses GSAT-7 for real-time communications among its warships, submarines, aircraft and land systems. GSAT-7A, 'angry bird', an advanced military communications satellite exclusively for the Indian Air Force (IAF) was launched in December 2018.¹³ It can enhance network-centric warfare capabilities by interlinking with IAF ground radar network and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. GSAT-7A will also be used by Indian Army Aviation Corps.

South Asian Aerospace Realities

Elon Musk says he's a big fan of what China is doing in space. Musk is CEO of space exploration company SpaceX, which faces growing competition from China which is pumping huge money into space. The first Chinese manned spaceflight was in 2003. In January 2007, China became the first Asian military-space power to perform an ASAT test. ASAT technologies are a critical part of the Chinese space programme. China has successfully performed soft landing of a rover on the moon, including the only ones to land on the dark side. China has long term ambitions to exploit Earth-Moon space for industrial development. China plans to bring a habitable space station Tiangong 2 online by 2022 and put Chinese astronauts on the moon in mid-2020s. They also have Mars lander mission coming up. Chinese space programme is linked to the nation's efforts at developing advanced military technology. China launched 'DAMPE'¹⁴, the most capable dark matter explorer to date, in 2015 and world's first quantum communication satellite 'QUESS'¹⁵ in 2016. China is averaging 20 space missions a year. China's BeiDou Global Satellite Navigation System with 26 satellites in orbit started to provide global services on 27 December 2018.

Pakistan's Karachi based Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) is more of a bureaucratic agency with little to show as end products. It is a part of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) of Pakistani Armed Forces under control of Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Pakistan's very fledgling space programme has Chinese support and stamp. Pakistan takes

Chinese support for satellite launch. They have also joined the Chinese satellite navigation system Beidou.

Space Strategy Ahead

Noted strategist Giulio Douhet had said, "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur". When Britain dominated the seas it ruled the world. The Americans have been leaders of the free world ever since they gained superiority in the air. Now the dominating position will belong to those who gain supremacy in outer space. The Sino-US dynamics will drive the other major powers to act to preserve and enhance their security and national power interests. Space assets will act as the force multipliers and will play a vital role in the formulation and implementation of strategies. The entire National Security Complex would have to be reorganised and restructured keeping in mind this reality. The role of space-based Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets, complemented by ground based Space Spatial Awareness (SSA) components, will be critical. India is one among the top six space powers in the world along with USA, Russia, China, European Space Agency (ESA), and Japan.

With space having emerged as the fourth medium for military operations, the IAF had brought out its blueprint titled 'Defence Space Vision 2020'. DSA will work on furthering joint space strategy. The Defence Space Satellite Centre (DSSC) works closely with ISRO. Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC).and DSSC will report to DSA. A new agency, called the Defence Space Research Agency (DSRO), has been created for evolving space warfare weapon systems and technologies. Greater space presence requires capability to launch heavy satellites, increase number of launches per year, have ability to launch satellites at short notice, position high accuracy sensors, have advanced electronic and cyber capabilities, and develop kinetic and non-kinetic means to defend India's assets and interests in space.

India has developed all the building blocks necessary to integrate an anti-satellite weapon to neutralise hostile satellites in low earth and polar orbits. India needs early warning satellites to

monitor ICBM launches and even tactical airspace as an important military asset. Ground/space based lasers to disable enemy satellites or destroy/upgrade attacking ICBM as part of ASAT capability. There is also a need to develop DEWs. India, one-day, needs a permanent space station. The space-based systems have enabled dramatic improvement in military and intelligence operations, thus enhancing its capability, accuracy and fire power. In the not so distant future, wars will again be fought like we read in Indian Epics. Space is the future for all action and capabilities, the real force multiplier. India is doing well. Time to invest more and prepare is now.

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India-China: Reimagining ‘New Era of Cooperation’ Strategic Imperatives

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Abstract

Given the divergent national interests and complex outstanding issues between India and China, ‘one on one’ informal summits format adopted by PM Modi and President Xi has definitely contributed towards keeping the bilateral relations on track. The first such summit was held at Wuhan in China on 27-28 April 2018. Its key outcome was putting in place a process of bilateralism to facilitate strategic communication at the highest level and building mutual trust – ‘Wuhan Spirit’. The summit also sought to provide ‘strategic guidance’ to the respective militaries to enhance cooperation for effective border management.

The second summit was held on 11-12 October 2019 at Mamallapuram, with focus on restoration of ‘Wuhan Spirit’, revamping the process of strategic communication and lending impetus to the mechanism of strategic guidance. President Xi laid down ‘100 year plan’ to rejuvenate the relations between two neighbours, signifying incremental approach to narrow the existing divide. He made six specific proposals seeking both sides to correctly view each other’s development and enhance mutual trust.

Relations between Delhi and Beijing transcend bilateral bounds and have strategic significance with far reaching ramifications. Real challenge for the two is to keep contentious issues at bay and yet, enlarge the area of cooperation. Informal dialogue between the top leaders offers an excellent platform

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to this end. While reimagining 'new era of cooperation', India must be forth right in safeguarding its national objectives as Chinese are ardent practitioners of realpolitik.

Introduction

Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping, the two powerful leaders, engaging each other at informal 'one on one' summits to reinvigorate India-China ties has set a new norm of freewheeling dialogue. The venue of first informal summit, held on 27-28 April 2018, was Wuhan; a historical city where unrest to unseat the last imperial.

Qing Dynasty started in 1911. The main outcome of this summit was setting up a process of bilateralism and building mutual trust – 'Wuhan Spirit'. The second informal summit was held after one and half years, on 11-12 October 2019 at Mamallapuram, again a city of historic significance. The thrust was to consolidate upon the gains of the previous summit and explore new avenues of cooperation. The third informal summit is slated to take place in China sometime during next year, for which Mr Xi extended the invite to Mr Modi when the two met during the recently concluded BRICS Summit in Brazil.¹

Given the diverse cultures, divergent national interests and complexities of outstanding issues between the two giant neighbours, innovative format of informal dialogue has certainly contributed towards keeping the bilateral relations on track. The mechanism of strategic guidance and its implementation on the ground by the two sides obviated differences from turning into disputes. As the rising powers, scope of relations between Delhi and Beijing transcends the bilateral bounds as these have strategic significance with far reaching global implications. This article undertakes an in depth review of the Mamallapuram Summit and prospects of reimagining 'new era of cooperation' in the times ahead.

Wuhan to Mamallapuram: Reimagining 'New Era of Cooperation'

Circumstances which led to the Wuhan Summit could be largely attributed to the outcome of strategic review undertaken by

President Xi to further his 'China Dream' (Zhong Meng) which envisions 'prosperous and powerful China'- a 'great modern Socialist Country' by mid of the century.² People's Republic of China (PRC) has always opposed the global security system based on American alliances and partnerships. Beijing is earnestly pursuing its grand design of shaping China centric world order. To this end, China has undertaken series of initiatives to set up alternate multilateral structures including Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Asia Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China's future global architecture envisages bipolar world and unipolar Asia. As per Xi's strategic calculus, in the coming decades while China and USA will be the competing powers, India and Japan will be other important players, both in its neighbourhood. Throughout its history, China has coerced her neighbours to acquiesce; it prospered when the emperor was strong and periphery was peaceful. Conducive periphery, therefore, is vital for PRC to pursue its grand design. Hence, passive Japan alongside marginalised India lacking in capability and political will to pose any challenge to China suits Communist leadership. Beijing is also fundamentally opposed to the very idea of 'Indo-Pacific'. It is inimical to Quad (America, Japan, Australia, and India grouping), and at no cost will condescend to the idea gaining currency. In the ancient times, its emperors dealt with the adversaries by pitching 'one barbarian against the other'.³ Doklam stand-off in 2017 also acted as a trigger for China to review its India policy.

From Indian perspective too, definite need was felt to recast China policy in the wake of fast changing global geo political milieu, necessitating rebalancing of relationship. Incremental process and sustained dialogue has been the main feature of engagement between Delhi and Beijing since the past four decades. It is astute diplomatic initiative to leverage 'Modi-Xi' personal chemistry so as to reduce prevailing tension and explore new vistas of cooperation through informal meetings.

Significant outcome of 'Wuhan Summit' was to reset bilateral relations through periodic dialogue between the top leadership and facilitate 'strategic communication' at the highest level. Concurrently, it also sought to provide 'strategic guidance' to the respective militaries, facilitate building mutual trust and understanding, so as

to enhance cooperation for effective management of borders. Agreement to work jointly on an economic project in Afghanistan was an important initiative, which could be a future format for such cooperation in the third country.

The second informal summit was held on 11-12 October 2019 at Mamallapuram, an ancient township which had trade and cultural links with Chinese Guangzhou port city during Pallava - Tang Dynasties, during latter half of first millennium.⁴ Eighteen months period between the two informal summits was buffeted by numerous irritants. Beijing's deepening relations with Islamabad coupled with its statements related to Kashmir, signifying change in its policy, were major dampeners. China continued with routine incursions by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On trade also, where India has deficit of around US \$ 53 bn, China continued to play hardball.

Mamallapuram Summit, although formally announced at the eleventh hour, was indicative of restoring the 'Wuhan Spirit'. Main focus of the informal dialogue was on consolidation and revamping the process of strategic communication, as also providing impetus to the mechanism of strategic guidance. There was earnest effort on both sides to rebalance the bilateral ties. The contentious issues, like the Jammu and Kashmir and military exercise 'Him Vijay' in Arunachal Pradesh, were off the table. There was a clear message about the intent of two leaders to maintain high level engagement process and, as responsible powers, resolve the existing differences through dialogue.

In consonance with the Chinese sense of time wherein hands of clock tick by centuries and decades, President Xi laid down a '100 year plan' to rejuvenate the relations between the two neighbours. "We must hold the rudder and steer the course of China India relations", stated Xi.⁵ It signified a balanced and incremental approach over a prolonged period to narrow the existing divide and overcome trust deficit. President Xi made six specific proposals which in essence seek both sides to correctly view each other's development and enhance mutual trust to gradually improve understanding from a long term perspective.⁶ While strategic communication will ensure proper handling of sensitive issues, improved exchanges of military and security personnel will dispel doubts. The proposals also suggest increased 'people to people' contact and enhanced cooperation between two countries in the international, regional and multi-lateral forums.

Strategic Imperatives

President Xi ranks among the most powerful world leaders of the day. His squeezing time for informal meetings, in a heavily packed diplomatic calendar, may appear to be a rare phenomenon; yet, there is a sound rationale behind it. Xi has jettisoned the collective leadership model and amended the constitution to become the life-long President.⁷ Therefore, he is well aware that the onus of China's rejuvenation and its emergence as superpower rests entirely on him. In case he fails to succeed, China could plunge into chaos.

PRC's core national objectives are 'stability, sovereignty and modernity'.⁸ While 'stability' implies unchallenged authority of Communist Party of China (CPC), 'sovereignty', besides strategic autonomy, entails unification of all claimed territories with motherland, which includes Taiwan, disputed islands in East and South China Sea besides Arunachal Pradesh (Xizang-South Tibet). 'Modernity' signifies development and economic progress critical to the survival of the Communist regime. Presently, China's main security concerns are internal and Communist leadership is very sensitive regarding developments in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

Xi realises that hostile India does not augur well for China's peaceful rise. To avoid India pivoting towards US-Japan axis, Beijing may be willing to yield tactical space to Delhi in view of its larger strategic interests. His '100 year' plan seeks to manage contentious issues till China achieves great power status by mid of the century. Xi's approach is in sync with Deng Xiao's philosophy, "what can't be resolved should be left to the next generation".

Therefore, any significant progress on the border dispute is unlikely even in the distant future, more so given the prevailing asymmetry in the power differential due to China's rapid rise. Moreover, its resolution is not in China's interest as it will entail trade off and also erode Beijing's ability to exert pressure on Delhi by escalating tension astride the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at will. Nonetheless, better border management mechanism and robust defence diplomacy will ensure tranquility along the LAC.

To address the issue of India's prevailing trade deficit, President Xi proposed ministerial level economic and trade dialogue mechanism for joint manufacturing, besides alignment of economic

strategies. As China's industry is in the wake of transition to high-tech spectrum by 2025, shift of low-tech manufacturing to India will be in China's interest.

China's strategic culture lays great emphasis on 'configuration of power'.⁹ In Chinese statecraft, nations are either hostile or subordinate. While allies are to be protected at all cost (case in point-Pakistan and North Korea), hostile nations ought to be taught befitting lesson and marginalised. China will continue to deepen its engagement with nations of South Asia to keep India neutralised. BRI is Xi's grand initiative to further China's strategic interests through geo-economics route. It aims to extend China's outreach and gain multiple accesses to Indian Ocean. After all, Beijing cannot stake claim to be a superpower if it remains politically isolated and confined to Western Pacific.

From the Indian perspective, PM Modi has made earnest efforts, since coming to power in 2014, to project India as regional power and vie for greater role in the global affairs. His grand design to make India an important stake holder in Indo-Pacific and engage China on equal terms defies Xi's strategic computation. While strengthening strategic partnership with USA, India has ensured continued engagement with China. Delhi needs to undertake a strategic review of its long term objectives, factoring both global and regional imperatives. Pragmatic China policy is needed to ensure strategic equilibrium in the region. This can be achieved only if India is able to achieve rapid pace of economic growth and scale up 'Comprehensive National Power (CNP)' to narrow down the existing gap vis-à-vis China.

As per former PM of Australia Kevin Rudd, President Xi is a man of extra ordinary intellect with a well-defined world view.¹⁰ He has a clear vision of establishing China centric global order by employing both hard and soft power. Beijing considers South Asia and Indian Ocean as region of immense strategic significance. China has developed close economic and military relations with most of India's neighbours. Beijing seeks to neutralise Delhi politically and diplomatically so that it can pursue its national interests, disregarding India's concerns. Immediately after Mamallapuram Summit, President Xi paid a day long visit to Nepal to upgrade Beijing-Kathmandu ties by pledging to boost economic cooperation and enhancing connectivity. Feasibility study of trans-

Himalayan railway line project linking Xigaze to Kathmandu is expected to commence soon.¹¹

India and China are in different camps, given their divergent visions and conflicting national interests. From series of stand offs over last couple of years including Doklam, Depsang and Demchok, Xi would have realised that Mao's rationale of using force to negotiate with India has out lived its validity. Instead 'soft sell' approach by way of informal summits may offer better option. The real challenge for both sides is to keep the major contentious issues at bay and enlarge the scope of cooperation in the areas of convergence through sustained engagement. While reimagining 'new era of cooperation', India must be forth right in expressing its concerns and not hesitate from taking a tough call in pursuit of its national objectives as Chinese are 'hard-nosed' practitioners of realpolitik.

Endnotes

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Use Of Technology Including Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Robotics to Enhance War Winning Capability

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Abstract

The paper starts with a section which briefly outlines the operating environment the Army is likely to operate in, emphasising the aspects of enhanced mobility, lethality and small enemy fighting groups of a nation state or trans-border terrorists or hybrid of the two.

In the next section, there is a brief expose on the evolution of network centricity and a listing of the military relevant new age technologies that are emerging.

The paper goes on to examine the objective and capability enhancements that will be required to thwart the enemy designs on the battlefield, counter use of emerging technologies, present adversaries with multiple dilemmas and beat the enemy. The five capability enhancement areas are - situational awareness, physical and cognitive load, sustainability, mobility and manoeuvre, protection of the force and common control.

The next section identifies relevant segments of technology, formed by combination of earlier listed technologies, to achieve the identified enhancements required. These segments are – Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Robotics, common controls and secure data communications. The need for evolving a simultaneous conceptual framework is also covered briefly.

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The paper lays down short, medium and long term time lines and spells out some of the recommended activities in each phase. A cycle of ideate, research, test, accept / reject, centre of excellence (CoE), productise is introduced that obliquely refers to Make in India. Importance of innovation and creative thinking leading to productisation is emphasised.

In the last section, an attempt is made to identify major stake holders from army, academia and industry to take the concept forward in a collaborative, inclusive and adaptive manner by instituting regulation, control and execution layers. A recommendation to set up multi domain joint interest groups under this mandate is made.

Crystal Gazing

Future operations, in the Indian context, will be titrated not only by the environmental realities and disruptive technologies but also by national aspirations of becoming a global super power - both economically as well as militarily. Therefore, the current typically linear battlefield will be replaced by a 360 degree view with heavy information overloads. Strategic military aims will be achieved by Joint Operations, with increasing emphasis on Air Force and Navy for long range strategic effect with consequent decrease in probability of large scale traditional ground operations.

We will see army employed in swift, highly mobile and extremely lethal battles / operations for territorial integrity and force projection - both against traditional enemies and increasingly against cross border terrorists in operations other than war. Army is likely to restructure and employ modular, but dispersed, highly mobile and extremely lethal groups using technology to the hilt, while still being prepared for large size formation operations. Anti-cross border terrorist operations and Special Forces operations will be the flavour even in peace time. We will witness weaponised Information Communication Technology Electronics and Cyber (ICTEC) increasingly being employed in battle. A new dimension of communication networks becoming platforms of delivery using information as ammunition will quickly emerge. Data, information and derived cognitive wisdom therefrom, will become synonymous with military terminologies and will be increasingly used by war

fighters to beat the enemy in ever shortening time dimension and expanding space dimension. Consequentially there will be concerted efforts to increase the teeth elements and decrease the tail to the extent possible, retaining / enhancing operational efficiencies by use of technology. Increasing sensitivity to keep human casualties to the minimum will be discernible and technology will provide a better assurance than what is currently available.

New Age Technologies that will affect the Military

The importance and relevance of ICTEC technology and its derivatives was understood almost a decade ago when military started espousing Net Centric Warfare (NCW). However, the prerequisites of a connected environment has taken time to fructify and it is only now since the last few years that a canopy cover of standards-based networks / combination of interoperable networks and compatible devices are increasingly making an advent into the war fighters domain. Structured and unstructured data being generated by connected devices, platforms and organisations is now being made available for processing. No doubt NCW will follow once doctrines, policies, common platforms are clearly defined and implemented. In any case we are now not only getting digitized but also digitalised, which sets the space for rapid induction of new technologies for effect.

In the current context, there is a plethora of technologies that have emerged on the academic, commercial and industrial scenario that hold great potential for the military. We do find islands of use within military even now, but need to look at their utilisation more holistically so that the disruption caused by these technologies is positive rather than negative. Some of the relevant new age disruptive technologies / applications are listed below :

- (a) Artificial Intelligence (AI).
- (b) Deep Learning (DL).
- (c) Machine Learning (ML).
- (d) Augmented Reality (AR).
- (e) Virtual Reality (VR).
- (f) Deep Fakes.

- (g) Facial Recognition, Image Enhancement and other Digital Signal Processing applications (DSP).
- (h) Robotics. One major task will be to conduct dangerous and dirty tasks.
- (i) Internet of Things (IOT) / Internet of Everything (IOE).
- (j) Autonomous Systems / Vehicles and Automation.
- (k) Drones.
- (l) Cloud Technologies and Virtualisation.
- (m) Social Media.
- (n) Big Data, Data Analytics and Data Visualisation.
- (o) Swarm Technologies.
- (p) Smart Ammunitions.

Each of the above technology can be easily explained standalone one at a time and applications in military will be clearly discernible. However, the permutations and combinations of these have deadly and far reaching implications which require detailed in depth deliberations to fathom. These combinations, if integrated by our military into future organisations in a well thought out roadmap to overmatch the enemy's / adversary's capabilities, may well provide multiple options that become the instruments that will prevail greatly for the supremacy of our war fighters in the emerging multi domain battle environment.

The principle of Collaborative, Adaptive and Inclusive (CIA) will need to be applied for not only jointness but also Human Machine combinations. This will reduce the number of soldiers in harm's way, increase decision making speed in critical operations and in performing tasks / undertaking options considered impossible or too risky for humans to undertake.

Capability Enhancements

Our adversaries will tend to avoid our strong points, disrupt our capabilities, utilise technical advantages and expand the battlefield beyond the physical domain. We will have to modify our doctrines and concepts duly incorporating technology to face emerging challenges. The broad improvements / enhancements that will be

desirable are listed below:-

- (a) Accelerated speed of action on the battlefield (including joint operations as against coordinated operations).
- (b) Means to counter increased use of emerging technologies by the adversary, particularly cross border terrorist groups.
- (c) Present adversaries with multiple dilemmas in complex contested environments resulting in multiple options to operate across multiple domains and to beat the enemy in the required dimensions.

There will be a complex interplay of humans and technology to improve our war winning potential in the future. Therefore, insertion and use of technology should be with a clear aim towards this objective. It would, therefore, be incumbent on us to judiciously identify military parameters in the light of emerging technologies and then study how military parameters can be enhanced / augmented to refine and improve military operations against our adversaries in the envisaged operating environment. Therefore, there is a need to look at some of the military capability objectives that need to be augmented by emerging technology. These capability objectives are listed below.

- (a) **Increase Situational Awareness.** By providing a persistent and deep look over wide areas including those where manned systems cannot go. This will increase standoff distances, survivability and reaction times.
- (b) **Reduce the Soldiers Physical and Cognitive Load.** Reduction in physical load can be achieved by using autonomous ground and air systems, thereby improving endurance, speed and effectiveness. Sensor based collection, processing and disseminating prioritized information reduces information overload, mental fatigue and improves decision making. These measures also reduce signatures of all types thus improving effectiveness.
- (c) **Improve Sustainability.** By enhancing logistic redistribution, throughput and efficiency. Use of unmanned autonomous vehicles, air unmanned systems which do not rely on helicopters or ac and other autonomous blended and modular capabilities will not only reduce use of personnel but

are capable of moving logistics to most remote but urgent points and create logistic distribution options. However, lead vehicle, communication vehicle and recovery vehicle may not be autonomous and may continue to be manned in a convoy of autonomous vehicles.

(d) **Facilitate Mobility and Manoeuvre.** The enemy's aim will always be to impede and thwart movement and reach of our surveillance elements and fighting forces by placing obstacles and area denial tactics / systems. The enemy will also attempt to engage our ground forces early and at longer distances. Use of effective new age technology combinations can not only extend own depth of operations and overcome obstacles, but also provide kinetic and non-kinetic responses to the enemy.

(e) **Increase Protection of the Force.** These technologies in suitable combinations will provide greater standoff distances from enemy forces, long range weapons and hazardous situations, thus reducing risk to soldiers.

(f) **Common Control.** A single software platform to control multiple formulas of technologies like robots, Decision Support System (DSS) etc. This will be discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Relevant Segments of Technology

To achieve capability enhancements mentioned above, four major segments of technology can be identified. Each segment may contain multiple basic blocks of the technologies listed earlier. These segments are – autonomous systems, artificial intelligence – and common control and their induction will have to be suitably spread / phased out over the entire spectrum of the induction roadmap. These technical segments are amplified in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

(a) **Autonomous Systems.** This will be a combination of robotic hardware empowered by AI, ML, DL, IOT and automation. The degree of automation given will depend on the operating environment, mission and risks involved. Level of autonomy will dictate mission duration, increased depth of operations and stand off distances. The sequential introduction

may start from remote controlled systems, smart systems, semi-autonomous and finally fully autonomous systems with optional human manning and /or human insertion before permitting decision making and human veto.

(b) **AI.** It is the ability of machines to take near human logical decisions / perform tasks based on patterns, learnings (like ML, DL), fuzzy logic. It will, along with robotics and IOT, take over or aid in many data intensive tasks thus leading to simplified human decision making. Operationally AI will aid in defining mission parameters, terrain analysis, identifying indications / warnings, countering enemy narratives / propaganda, supporting DSS, enabling blended use of manned and unmanned systems and simplify any function where speed, information overload and synchronisation may impede human decision making.

(c) **Common Control.** It is a software-based system of systems that controls and maximises multiple systems employed in the operating environment. It is primarily a controller that reduces deployment of soldiers and reduces the physical and cognitive load on the controller by reducing need for data sharing, encryption, multiple displays, communication equipment etc. It will necessarily require to be standards based with common protocols and converged technology. Publication and adherence to the laid down standards will be mandatory for operational / technical / interoperability / financial reasons, innovation integration, and to support modularity for diverse applications, payloads and scenarios.

(d) **Critical Aspects.** Those that can hamper or enhance resilience of mission critical communications, secure data links across the electromagnetic spectrum as well as cyberspace and ensure deep cyber protection under all conditions and situations.

Broadly speaking, priority should be given to aspects that can help in situational awareness and reduce the soldier's physical and cognitive load. This can be followed by logistic sustainment and automated semi-autonomous convoys. This autonomy technology can then be modularly introduced to unmanned combat vehicles.

Needless to say, simultaneously there must be an evolution in concepts, doctrines and policies to adopt these technologies optimally. Logically the low hanging fruit can be catered for in ensuing annual budgets while the midterm and long-term insertions will require R&D efforts and hence separate budgets.

Recommended Time Lines and Action

The above-mentioned enhancements / capabilities will take time to develop / procure and introduce. These require significant resources and must, therefore, be prioritised. In the interim, once a road map is clearly defined and accepted, there will be a need to seize and utilize technological opportunities leading to the identified goal.

The entire road map can be divided into three phases – Short Term (first to fifth year), Mid Term (sixth to fifteenth year) and Long Term (sixteenth to twenty fifth year). Some of the actions that can be undertaken in each phase are listed below:

(a) Short Term.

- o Improve tactical situational awareness for foot soldiers at tactical levels.
- o Reduce physical payload carried manpack.
- o Improve logistic resupply with automated ground supply.
- o Improve route clearance and IED destruction using semi-autonomous robots.
- o Introduce soldier borne sensors.
- o Integrate autonomous systems into combined arms manoeuvre.
- o Convoys will be composed of autonomous vehicles interspersed with manned critical vehicles.
- o This period will also be used to mature concepts, doctrines, policies, procedures and to lay down a clear roadmap with defined budgets.

(b) Mid Term.

- o Focus on human machine collaboration.
- o Advancements to what was done in the Short term phase.

- o Introduce swarming.
- o Introduction of unmanned combat vehicle into mechanised units.
- o Automated convoy operations.
- o Advanced but light payloads.
- o Deep persistent stare to improve real time situational awareness at the next level.
- o Will require soldiers to be trained in new data management techniques, tactics and procedures to improve semi-autonomous / autonomous ISR.
- o Swarming robots with AI insertions will provide redundant communications, navigation and a collaborative small mobile robot based sensor network.
- o Medium sized autonomous robots will be introduced to take on the soldier loads.
- o The robots will be interchangeably used to deliver different payloads like sensors, communication base stations and munitions.
- o Introduction of lighter exoskeletal personnel protection armour and innovative firepower.
- o Robotic systems will be introduced for medium level cargo handling as well as casualty evacuation, thus reducing use of manned helicopters.
- o Optionally manned semi-automated combat vehicles with advanced features will be another area of introduction.
- o Research in AI and new age technologies / applications will achieve better autonomous robots, both in air and on ground and firmly integrated into the common control, though they may not yet be fully autonomous.

(c) Long Term.

- o By now research efforts, duly incorporating lessons learnt during previous phases, would be maturing. Those

items accepted for introduction post trials in Centres of Excellence would be productised. These would replace the short term and midterm insertions.

- o Human manipulations of autonomous systems may now reduce to a trickle thus freeing soldiers to do actions where human decisions and actions are required utilising the multiple options now being thrown up by the AI engines and robots.
- o Entire mission logistics and situational awareness will by now be automated on a common control.
- o Technologies will enable manned and autonomous system teaming using sensors, communications, AI and data handling to ensure dominance over the enemy in time and space as per operational plans.
- o Options considered unviable by humans alone will now be possible using these constructs.
- o Secure and redundant communications at all times will, however, be a prerequisite.

In all phases as a continuum, there obviously will be a premium on innovation, creative thinking and conversion of new ideas into valued outcomes. Technology will be an enabler to innovative problem solving of operational and tactical issues which will lead to development of new doctrines and concepts. The cycle of ideate, R&D in (DRDO) laboratories / DST / Commercial laboratories, try out in a CoE, discard or take on for productization and introduction will be very prominent in ensuing years, especially with emphasis on Make in India.

Stake Holders

It is, therefore, critical that agencies like Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Director General Perspective Planning (DGPP), Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), Director General of Signals (DGSIGS), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) / other labs (including private) and academia work in tandem to understand emerging operational concepts, technologies and lay down a collaborative, inclusive and adaptive roadmap for gainfully laying down a prioritised roadmap, governing and regulating it to ensure that each component delivers what it is

best in delivering. There will be a need to set up regulated and governed Joint Interest Groups (JIGs) between military, academia and industry at appropriate technical levels to help user requirements draw maximum benefit of emerging technologies and be a win – win situation for all concerned. This approach will help productise and deliver Indianised physical elements (AI based Robots) as discussed and also ensure simultaneous and inclusive introduction of new doctrines, concepts and policies. Human Capital Management (HCM) policy changes and constructs will have to ensure that appropriately skilled manpower is concurrently available to the Army in the envisaged time frame to effectively use the constructs of new doctrines and technologies effectively and gainfully. Simultaneously, appropriate inputs can be obtained / given to Air Force and Navy so that Tri Service joint operations can also be facilitated.

“The India-Pakistan Question” and China

Shri Asoke Kumar Mukerji, IFS (Retd)®

Abstract

The initiative taken by China to revive discussions on “The India-Pakistan Question”, which had been lying dormant on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since December 1971, has potentially significant implications for India. This article looks at the details of “The India-Pakistan Question”, including the manner in which the UNSC twisted India’s complaint against Pakistani aggression on India’s territory in Jammu and Kashmir to broaden the scope to apply the “two-nation theory” on the basis of which the United Kingdom had partitioned British India and re-opened the accession of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. The UNSC acknowledged that its resolutions failed to be implemented due to the inability of the Security Council to vacate the Pakistani aggression on India.

China (represented permanently in the UNSC by the Republic of China (ROC) till October 1971) was party to UNSC resolutions on “The India-Pakistan Question”. China did not adopt an activist role in drafting these resolutions between January 1948 to October 1971. After the unseating of the ROC from the UNSC and its replacement by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1971, an assertive China tried to use “The India-Pakistan Question” to counter India’s actions during the December 1971 India-Pakistan war which led to the independence of Bangladesh. The PRC cast its first veto against the admission of Bangladesh to the UN in August 1972.

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UNSC resolutions on this issue were overtaken by the bilateral treaty signed between India and Pakistan at Simla in July 1972. China's latest diplomatic initiative on this subject goes against five decades of inactivity of the UNSC on "The India-Pakistan Question". It presages China's attempt to use her permanent membership of the UNSC to exploit "The India-Pakistan Question" as a negotiating tactic to retain Chinese occupation of India's territory in Jammu and Kashmir.

Introduction

“**T**he India-Pakistan Question” was first placed on the UNSC’s agenda on 22 January 1948.¹ The UNSC discussed this issue with diminishing frequency until 1971. Following the signing of the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan in July 1972, the UNSC did not hold any meeting on this subject till August 2019.

China’s initiative to convene a UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting on “The India-Pakistan Question” on 16 August 2019² is a significant indicator of changing perceptions that impact directly on India’s foreign and security policies. In this context, it is useful to survey China’s role in the UNSC resolutions on “The India-Pakistan Question”.

Background

At the Washington Conference on 01 January 1942, 26 participating “Allied” countries (including China and India) issued the “Declaration by United Nations”.³ The Declaration endorsed the principles and objectives of the 1941 Atlantic Charter between the United States and United Kingdom, including the outline of an “international postwar system”. This launched the process to create the modern United Nations.

In the period between January 1942 and June 1945, when the UN Charter was negotiated and adopted at the San Francisco Conference, India and the Republic of China (ROC) cooperated within the broad framework of the “Declaration by United Nations”. In the area of coordinated military action, for example, Ramgarh (in Jharkhand) was used by the United States⁴ to train almost 50,000 soldiers of the ROC’s Army who fought in the China-Burma-India theatre in Asia between 1942-1944.⁵

China and the UN Security Council

The ROC's primary objective in participating in the UN process was to gain international recognition as an international power. The Dumbarton Oaks meetings⁶ between October 1943 and February 1945 provided the ROC with a platform to secure this objective in the political sphere. At the Cairo Conference of 1943,⁷ the ROC secured its objectives including the consolidation of its territories occupied by Japan after the war.

In February 1945, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union met at Yalta to agree on the veto rights of the permanent members of the proposed Security Council of the United Nations for any substantive decisions by the UNSC. Both the ROC and France, which did not participate at the Yalta Conference, acquired the veto, as well as the right to be self-selected without election as permanent members of the UN Security Council.⁸ The delegation of China at the San Francisco Conference included a representative of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Dong Biwu.⁹

India's Complaint to the UNSC, 1948

"On 1 January 1948, the Government of India reported to the Security Council details of a situation existing between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the North-West, were drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which, having acceded to the Dominion of India and the Government of India has declared it to be part of India. The Government of India considered the giving of this assistance by Pakistan to be an act of aggression against India, and likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, since in self-defence India might be compelled to enter Pakistan territory in order to take military action against the invaders."¹⁰

India's complaint was brought under Article 35 of the UN Charter and focused on Pakistan's "act of aggression against India". At no stage did India refer to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir which was being attacked as being in "dispute". As India clarified in the UNSC, "the act of accession of Jammu and Kashmir

to India was an international act, the legality of which, however, was beyond challenge and not in question and which involved no issue of international peace and security. The only issue of the latter kind was the aggression committed by Pakistan.”¹¹

The UNSC Resolutions

Between January 1948 and December 1971, the UNSC adopted 17 resolutions on “The India-Pakistan Question” and endorsed the 1949 Karachi Agreement which established a cease-fire line agreed to by India and Pakistan, to be monitored by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The ROC was permanently represented in the UNSC meetings when all these resolutions were adopted.

The Period from 1948 to 1952

The first set of eight UNSC resolutions expanded the scope of India’s original complaint significantly (at the instigation of the United Kingdom) to bring in the “two-nation theory” which created Pakistan. The idea of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir grew out of this expanded scope. However, the “insurmountable” difficulties in vacating Pakistan’s aggression (through “demilitarization”) overtook the idea of any plebiscite.

UNSCR 38: On 6 January 1948 the UNSC invited both India and Pakistan to present their case. On 15 January 1948, Pakistan responded by expanding scope of the issue to include Junagadh and the treatment of Muslims in India. On 17 January 1948 the UNSC adopted its first resolution on this issue, calling on both India and Pakistan to refrain from escalating the situation on the ground. It asked both governments to report any “material change” of the situation on the ground.

The ROC voted in favour of adopting the resolution. The Soviet Union and Ukrainian SSR abstained on this vote.¹²

UNSCR 39: At the recommendation of United Kingdom, the President of the UNSC (Belgium) was authorized to directly deal with two parties to find solution by 20 January 1948. On 20 January 1948 Pakistan again requested that the scope of the issue be expanded to include Junagadh and the treatment of Muslims in India. The Security Council adopted its second resolution on this issue on 20 January 1948. The resolution established a fact-finding

UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) of three members (one nominated by India, other nominated by Pakistan, and a third designated by the Indian and Pakistani nominees) to visit the ground in respect of "the situation in Jammu and Kashmir State". The Commission was empowered to take decisions by a majority vote.¹³

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution, while the Soviet Union and Ukraine SSR abstained.

UNSCR 47: On 21 April 1948, the UNSC adopted its third resolution on what it had decided to call "The India-Pakistan Question" on 22 January 1948 without consulting India. The resolution sought to restore peace and noted that both India and Pakistan desired that accession of Jammu and Kashmir to either India or Pakistan should be decided through a democratic plebiscite after withdrawal of Pakistani and Pakistan backed persons "not normally resident" in the State. The resolution Increased the number of the Commission to five (Czechoslovakia nominated by India, Argentina nominated by Pakistan, Belgium, Colombia), who were joined by the United States (appointed by President due to failure of Czechoslovakia and Argentina to designate a third member).¹⁴

The ROC joined Belgium, Canada, Colombia, United Kingdom and United States in voting in favour of this resolution.

UNSCR 51: On 3 June 1948 the UNSC adopted its fourth resolution on this issue. This exhorted the UNCIP to visit the areas of where the conflict between India and Pakistan was taking place and reaffirmed its support for work of Commission.¹⁵

The ROC abstained on this resolution, along with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine SSR.

When India objected through a letter to the UNSC for mandating the Commission to look at issues not related to the Jammu and Kashmir Question, the ROC persuaded the UNSC to convey to India that "what the Security Council did...was to tell the Commission to go ahead, to deal first with the Kashmir question, and then, when it deemed it appropriate, to study and report on the other three questions raised by the delegation of Pakistan"¹⁶ (in Pakistan's letter of 15 January 1948, as reflected in Section D of UNSCR 39, regarding Junagadh and the treatment of Muslims in India).

UNSCR 80: On 14 March 1950, India was present in the UNSC discussion on “The India-Pakistan Question” for the first time as a newly elected non-permanent member. The Council adopted its fifth resolution on the issue. This terminated the mandate of the UNCIP and called on India and Pakistan to execute a programme of demilitarization in the Jammu and Kashmir state. Subsequently, a UN Representative for India and Pakistan (Sir Owen Dixon) was appointed by the UNSC.¹⁷

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution, along with seven other members of the Council. India and Yugoslavia abstained.

UNSCR 91: On 30 March 1951, the UNSC adopted its sixth resolution on the issue, proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom. It acknowledged the report of the UN Representative for India and Pakistan, Sir Owen Dixon, which conveyed that without agreement on demilitarization, the proposed plebiscite could not take place in Jammu and Kashmir “State”. The resolution accepted the resignation of Sir Owen Dixon and decided to appoint his successor.

Significantly, the resolution also took note of the proposal of 27 October 1950 to convene a constituent assembly in Jammu and Kashmir made by the “All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference”, and affirmed that such a constituent assembly would not substitute for the “will of the people” through a plebiscite.¹⁸ Frank P. Graham was appointed subsequently to replace Sir Owen Dixon. On 29 May 1951, India conveyed to the President of the UNSC that the proposed constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir “is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in its way”.¹⁹

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution, while India, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union abstained.

UNSCR 96: On 10 November 1951, the UNSC adopted its seventh resolution on the issue, which took note of Frank P. Graham’s report on the need for demilitarization before taking up the plebiscite and asking him to report within 6 weeks the results of his continued efforts.²⁰ The report of the UN Representative dated 18 December 1951 was considered by the UNSC on 17 January 1952 (by which date India had left the UNSC on completion of her two-year term on 31 December 1951). In its

decision dated 31 January 1952 the UNSC referred to the UN Representative's report of "almost unsurmountable obstacles" for demilitarization in Jammu and Kashmir and extended his term by two more months to implement his mandate.

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution, while India and the Soviet Union abstained.

UNSCR 98: On 23 December 1952, the UNSC adopted its eighth resolution on the issue, asking both India and Pakistan to make extra efforts to agree on demilitarization in Jammu and Kashmir. It took note of the reports of the UN Representative dated 22 April 1952 and 16 September 1952, which proposed a 12-point plan for demilitarization, and called on India and Pakistan to "enter into immediate negotiations" to implement this plan.²¹ Following the adoption of the resolution, the UN Representative met India and Pakistan in February 1953 in Geneva. This meeting ended on 19 February 1953 with the conclusion "in agreement with the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan" that "there was no ground left" to continue the meeting.

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution, with only the Soviet Union abstaining.

During the Year 1957

A second set of three UNSC resolutions were adopted in response to the decision on 15 February 1954 of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir to ratify the accession of the State to India. The Constitution of the State was adopted on 17 November 1956, coming into effect on 26 January 1957.

UNSCR 122: Adopted on 22 January 1957, it reflected the majority view of the UNSC that any action by the constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir would not "constitute a disposition" of the State according to the "will of the people" through a plebiscite.²²

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution with the other 9 members of the UNSC. The Soviet Union was the only country to abstain.

UNSCR 123: The UNSC mandated Sweden as its President on 21 February 1957 to consult with India and Pakistan proposals "likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute".²³

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution with nine other countries of the UNSC. The Soviet Union was the only country to abstain.

UNSCR 126: Sweden had nominated Mr Gunnar Jarring to implement the mandate of UNSCR 123. The UNSC adopted a resolution on 2 December 1957 accepting the Jarring Report and asking India and Pakistan to act to implement previous resolutions on the holding of a plebiscite after demilitarization.²⁴

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution with nine other countries of the UNSC. The Soviet Union was the only country to abstain.

Special Status” of Jammu and Kashmir

On 16 January 1964, Pakistan asked the President of the UNSC to convene an “immediate meeting” of the UNSC to discuss India’s steps to “destroy the special status” of Jammu and Kashmir. Although India rejected this narrative, the UNSC agreed to meet on “The India-Pakistan Question” from 3 February 1964. The Council met six times on the issue till 18 May 1964. India reiterated that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India could not be reopened by Pakistan, as “legally or constitutionally the whole of Kashmir had become an integral part of India when the Ruler of Kashmir had executed the Instrument of Accession to India, and the Governor-General of India had accepted the Instrument.” At the end of this protracted debate, the outcome remained inconclusive in the UNSC.

1965 War

On 5 August 1965, Pakistan initiated an armed conflict to wrest Jammu and Kashmir militarily from India. Pakistan’s violation of the 1949 Cease-Fire Line initiated action by the UNSC, which adopted 5 resolutions on “The India-Pakistan Question”. The UNSC decision on an arms embargo forced Pakistan to the negotiating table. Both sides agreed to the Soviet Union as a mediator. Talks to bring the conflict to an end were held at Tashkent in January 1966.²⁵

UNSCR 209: On 04 September 1965, the UNSC adopted its 12th resolution on “The India-Pakistan Question”. It called for an immediate cease-fire and for cooperation with the UN Military

Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to supervise the observance of the cease-fire.²⁶

The ROC joined all other members of the UNSC in adopting this resolution unanimously.

UNSCR 210: The failure to heed UNSCR 209 led to the UNSC adopting its 13th resolution on "The India-Pakistan Question" on 06 September 1965. This mandated strengthening UNMOGIP to bring about a cease-fire.²⁷

The ROC joined all other members of the UNSC in adopting this resolution unanimously.

UNSCR 211: On 20 September 1965, after receiving the report of the UN Secretary General, the UNSC adopted its 14th resolution on "The India-Pakistan Question". Both India and Pakistan addressed the UNSC. The resolution reiterated the demand for a cease fire and suggested that India and Pakistan use a third party as provided under Article 33 of the UN Charter to resolve their dispute.²⁸

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution, in which Jordan was the only UNSC member to abstain.

UNSCR 214: On 22 September 1965, the UNSC was informed by its President that a cease fire had been agreed to by India and Pakistan. However, since the cease fire did not hold, the UNSC adopted its 15th resolution on "The India-Pakistan Question" on 27 September 1965 asking both countries to honour the cease fire.²⁹

The ROC joined the other members of the UNSC in adopting this resolution unanimously.

UNSCR 215: On 5 November 1965, the UNSC adopted its 16th resolution on "The India-Pakistan Question". The resolution called on both countries to honour their commitment to cease fire and asked them to meet with the representative of the UN Secretary General to formulate an agreed plan for the cease fire.³⁰

The ROC voted in favour of this resolution. The Soviet Union and Jordan abstained.

The Year 1971

Between 1965 and 1971, “The India-Pakistan Question” did not feature in any meeting of the UNSC. The PRC replaced the ROC as the representative of China in the UN on 25 October 1971, in a UNGA vote supported by India.

At the meeting of the UNSC on 4 December 1971 during the India-Pakistan war, the PRC said that “India, using the question of East Pakistan, had committed armed aggression” against Pakistan and asked the Security Council to “condemn this act of aggression and to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all armed forces of India from Pakistan.”³¹

China continued with its aggressive pro-Pakistan and anti-Bangladesh policy in the UNSC on 5 December 1971. China adopted a strong position to reject the participation of any representative of “Bangladesh” in the discussions in the UNSC.³² The deadlock in the UNSC on adopting any decision through a resolution continued until India conveyed to the UNSC President on 16 December 1971 that India had announced a cease fire following the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh.

UNSCR 307: This was the background to the eventual adoption of the UNSC’s 17th resolution on “The India-Pakistan Question” on 21 December 1971. The resolution focuses on the cessation of hostilities in Bangladesh and calls for the treatment of the Pakistani soldiers taken prisoner under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while asking India and Pakistan to “respect the cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir” supervised by UNMOGIP.³³

The PRC voted in favour of adopting the resolution. The Soviet Union and Poland abstained.

India, invited to participate in the meeting of the UNSC, informed the Council that in “order to avoid the repetition of such incidents, India proposed to discuss and settle with Pakistan certain necessary adjustments in the cease-fire line so that it would become more stable, rational and viable.”

The Simla Agreement, 1972

India’s statement to the UNSC was followed up by the negotiation and signing of the bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan (Simla

Agreement) of 02 July 1972. The Simla Agreement is registered in the UN Treaty Database under Article 102 of the UN Charter and is invokable “before any organ of the United Nations”.³⁴ Effectively, the treaty subsumes earlier UNSC resolutions on “The India-Pakistan Question”.

Conclusion

At the heart of China’s diplomatic initiative is its interest in keeping possession of Indian territory occupied by it in Aksai China in the 1950s, and the Shaksgam Valley and other territory ceded from Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir to China under the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement.³⁵ China’s efforts to revive “The India-Pakistan Question” in the UNSC in August 2019 need to be seen in this perspective. China would have to contend with the fact that its initiative of 16 August 2019 did not get traction among the other 14 members of the UNSC, who refused to even authorize a public account for the media after their closed-door meeting. However, as a permanent member of the UNSC, China is now placed to use “The India-Pakistan Question” at a time and manner of its choice to conduct its bilateral diplomacy with India. Only India’s success in reforming the UNSC will remove this option for China.

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Vietnam Defence Cooperation and National Security during Renovation (Doi Moi) Period

Major General Hong Quan NGUYEN®

Abstract

Defence cooperation is an important part of the overall peace measures, contributing to improvement in national security. There have been a number of books and essays highlighting achievements of defence cooperation, but scope for achieving more comprehensive security is there. Through analysis, this article focuses on contribution of defence cooperation with neighbouring countries and some major powers towards Vietnam's national security during the Renovation (Doi Moi) period.

Keywords: defence cooperation; national security; security belt; border; general patrol;

Introduction

Vietnam made efforts to promote defence cooperation with neighbouring countries as well as some of the major powers during the Doi Moi period¹. World order is undergoing a lot of turbulence with countries carrying out strategic rebalance to retain relevance and their perceived rightful place in the comity of nations to meet their national objectives and aspirations. Efforts made for defence cooperation and achievements in improving Vietnam's national security are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Cooperation Between Vietnam and China

Immediately after normalising relations with China, cooperation between Vietnam and China's Ministries of Defence helped in quick recovery. Since 2010, the two defence ministries have held vice-ministerial level dialogues, conducted joint patrols in the area of

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Gulf of Tonkin, established a communication channel between the two Navies and organised meetings of Commanders of border zones. The two sides signed Cooperation Protocol in October 2003. Through cooperation and confidence building measures, the two Armies succeeded in converting international borders into borders of peace, stability and friendship. The two sides have been cooperating in organising training, exchange of information and procurement of specialised equipment. Naval joint patrols are carried out twice a year in the area of Gulf of Tonkin. Joint exercises for search and rescue at sea are also organised. Border guards conduct joint patrols along land borders, settle border violations and prevent crimes.

There exists a maritime sovereignty dispute. Vietnam's Ministry of Defence frankly talks to the Chinese about sovereignty over the South China Sea and need to refrain from complicating matters and facilitating settlement peacefully. However, China has not abandoned its attempt to monopolise South China Sea and repeatedly violates sovereign rights over Vietnam's territorial waters and islands.

Vietnam - Laos Relations

Vietnam has improved relations with Laos. Cooperation with Lao People's Army through comprehensive implementation of annual protocol between the two countries has been enhanced. The focus is on improvement in technical information, training of personnel, treatment of wounded soldiers; searching and handing over mortal remains of Vietnamese martyrs who made supreme sacrifice of life during the War in Laos. Vietnam - Laos special defence relations are very important for Vietnam's national security. During the period of Doi Moi, Vietnam - Laos solidarity resulted in considerable mutual benefits. The two sides cooperated in training Laotian military cadres, educational institutions and agencies; while contributing positively to build emotional attachment and solidarity between the people of the two countries.

Through defence cooperation, Vietnam helped Laos to strengthen its national defence capabilities. Better military hardware and timely completion of military projects with help from Vietnam improved fighting capability of Laos Army. In response, the Lao Armed Forces prevented outside armed groups from violating Laos territory to create trouble in Vietnam. Laos helped Vietnam in protection of her western flank.

Vietnam - Cambodia Relations

In order to stabilise the Southwestern border, Vietnam promoted defence cooperation with Cambodia. In August 2002, Vietnam and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Army of Cambodia signed cooperation agreement. Vietnam helped Cambodian Armed Forces by repair of ships and boats and conducted training in the field of search and location. Cambodian Armed Forces have been helping Vietnam in locating and sending mortal remains of those who made the supreme sacrifice of life during War in Cambodia.

The Vietnam military regions and the Border Guard force closely coordinate with the Cambodian Army to promptly solve problems that arise; enhance information exchange; prevent destructive activities of Viet Tan group and cross-border activities to include illegal smuggling and forest resources exploitation. The Vietnam Border Guards closely cooperate with Department of Public Security of Ministry of Home Affairs and the Royal Army officials in Cambodia to minimise criminal offences; undesirable activities and illegal trespassing. Since 2005, the two navies carry out joint patrolling in contiguous waters and maintain harmonious relations. Hundreds of Cambodian senior military officers have been trained in Vietnam. Every year, Vietnam medical units treat about 70 senior Cambodian military officers. Many medical teams visit and treat free-of-charge thousands of Cambodian people. Through defence cooperation, the two sides ensure solidarity and friendship and good relations.

Intra-ASEAN Cooperation

Vietnam has been exchanging military delegations and receiving naval vessels of ASEAN countries. It contributes to strengthening foreign investment and economic development. Defence cooperation with ASEAN countries has made an important contribution to protect national interests of Vietnam. Vietnam actively advocates central role for ASEAN at various forums. In Vietnam's perception, ASEAN facilitates cooperation among ASEAN member countries and contributes to collective security and economic development.

Partnership with the United States of America (US)

The Ministry of Defence of Vietnam is actively interacting with American hierarchy to accept moral responsibility and help in

mitigating the ill effects of war. Efforts are being made through defence cooperation to improve bilateral relations to the level of comprehensive partnership. Vietnam is actively cooperating with the US for taking anti-terrorist measures and participates in International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme; promotes cooperation in other fields such as:

- (a) Defence Cooperation Agreement (9/2011).
- (b) Statement of Common Vision on Bilateral Defence Relations (June 2015).
- (c) Memorandum of Defence Cooperation between the two countries.
- (d) In July 2015, Vietnam adopted the action plan for cooperation in the field of United Nations Peace Keeping operations.

Taking advantage of the US assistance, Vietnam gradually improved its capacity to protect maritime sovereignty; expanded intelligence cooperation and security. Defence cooperation has led to removal of embargo on supply of lethal weapons to Vietnam by the US. Besides, Vietnam takes advantage of the US humanitarian assistance, projects being carried in difficult areas². Official visits of defence ministers of the two countries on reciprocal basis has facilitated better understanding and cooperation between the two countries.

Vietnam - Russia Relations

Vietnam is importing military hardware from Russia. In certain cases transfer of technology is part of the contract. This is helping in enhancing operational capability of Vietnam Armed Forces. Defence cooperation is an essential part of Vietnam-Russia strategic partnership.

Defence Cooperation with India

In 10 years of strategic partnership, Vietnam and India have made great progress. Both countries share a common perception of conventional and non-traditional threats and security challenges. The objective of the Vietnam-India Defence and Strategic partnership is to promote peace and stability in the region.

Conclusion

Since Vietnam entered the Doi Moi period, defence cooperation has actively implemented the guidelines laid down and has obtained very important results, contributing to creating a protective belt; improving relations with world's leading countries and political centres; contributing to maintaining a favourable international environment, promoting socio-economic development; promoting national security and expanding international cooperation.

Endnotes

1 "Renovation" (Doi Moi) is the name given to the economic reforms initiated in Vietnam in 1986 with the goal of creating a "socialist-oriented market economy". The term "Doi Moi" itself is a general term with wide use in the Vietnamese language. However, the Doi Moi Policy (Chính sách Đổi Mới) refers specifically to these reforms. The communist government adopted a command economy at its inception. Under the command economy, the central government decided output targets and prices, input supplies, domestic wholesale and retail trade, and international trade; the state was aiming at creating a vertically integrated economy where there was no commercial contact among individual production units horizontally. In the agricultural sector, the government formed cooperatives in three stages; production solidarity groups, lower-level cooperatives where land and equipment were shared, and higher-level cooperatives in which a system of workpoints determined distribution of all income. However, the command economy was abolished by the late 1980s following the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

2 This project has been built in Thua Thien Hue (8 clinics) province, Quang Tri province (1 primary school, 2 centres for handicapped children and 1 clinic), Quang Nam province (1 flood management centre), Da Nang City (1 primary school), Nghe An province (1 primary school), Lai Chau province (1 clinic) each project ranges in size from 50,000 to 300,000 USD. Before 2010, the Ministry of Defence of Vietnam allowed USPACOM to implement the "Angel of the Pacific" programme, focusing on common medical treatment for the people. Since 2011, Vietnam has allowed USPACOM to implement the "Pacific Solidarity" programme in place of the Angel of Pacific in Ha Tinh province, focusing on basic construction and upgrading of schools and clinics on a large scale, using less contractors and more military personnel.

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Political Warfare: An Emerging Threat to Nation States

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Abstract

Political warfare is emerging as a preferred tool to fight modern wars. It provides deniability and scope to turn social, political and religious fault-lines into belligerent forces to fight from within. The collapse of regimes, and even states, is a possibility. However, it is difficult to predict the end state or outcome of the war. To fight and defend against such a threat, there is a need for heavy investment in intelligence operations. Best defence is to make institutions of governance and civil society so robust that they do not succumb to the directed attacks by multiple agents of political warfare.

Introduction

During the World War I and II, Japan, Germany, France and even the Great Britain were reduced to rubble but rose from ruins and regained their lost glory. The reason for rapid rise was that the history, culture and nationalism could not be destroyed by bombs, rockets and big armies. If nations and societies lose heritage, nationalism, history and culture then it becomes near impossible for the people to reconstruct their nations to earlier glory. It is near impossible today to alter national boundaries by use of military power, however, political warfare has the potential to alter national boundaries, affect regime change and reduce the nations to chaotic fragmented states. It is imperative for the security establishments to understand the lethality of political warfare. Strong armies are unusable force as response option to political warfare; however, Special Forces, cyber, information, electronic and psychological warfare do play an important role in political warfare. The United States (US) and Europe used political warfare as the main tool to break Soviet Union and with the same strategy they

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dismantled Yugoslavia few years later. The first war where people fought with each other for their own identity and perceived regional or racial nationalism was Yugoslavia. This was a classic case of hybrid and grey zone conflict preceded by political warfare. In Yugoslavia, the seed was sown in the minds of the people of different nationalities that Yugoslavia was an artificial country brought together by force and by subjugation of ethnic minorities by Serbs.

Understanding of Political Warfare

In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.¹ In a more precise manner, political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives.² Political warfare consists of the intentional use of one or more of the implements of power—diplomatic/political, information/cyber, military/intelligence, and economic—to affect the political composition or decision making in a state.³ Political warfare involves developing political alliance for resistance against the political establishment in power and “white” propaganda to undermine the credibility of the ruling party. It also consists of covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements to subvert institutions of governance, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.⁴

Political warfare often is conducted in the shadows.⁵ Political warfare involves some of the elements of grey-zone operations and hybrid warfare, which include activities such as subversion, foreign interference and utilisation of Special Forces. These measures are provocative and escalating but still designed to be non-kinetic and non-lethal.⁶ The visible faces of political warfare are proxies- benign and friendly political parties, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), disaffected ethnic groups, and civil society organisations that appear independent but are actually backed, if not controlled, by states from behind the scenes—or else quasi-government agencies and even corporations.⁷ British East India Company was a perfect example of political warfare that gained access to the Princely Indian States as partners, but slowly colonised entire India. The advantage of political war, as it manifests today, is deniability and chance of giving creditability if it is initiated through domestic credible entities. Political warfare is a potent and

nuanced warfare; it would require collaboration of diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) institutions of the state to target an adversary. It must have a strong and convincing theme around which a false narrative can be weaved. Today the US, Russia and China are pursuing this warfare far more vigorously than any other country. Venezuela and Iran are targets of the US lethal political war. Liberal democracies also use foreign aid as a means of achieving their political objectives.⁸ Economic sanctions are one of the tools of political warfare to shape the behaviour of a nation that is not falling in line.

Muddling with the Notion of Nation State. Russia's current disinformation model is premised on the concept of a "firehose of falsehood"—repetitive, fast paced, continuous, high-volume information attacks from a variety of sources.⁹ The aim is to muddle the notion of truth or objectivity, blur the line between fact and falsehood, and sow confusion among the public¹⁰ against constitutionally elected governments. In fact, digital manipulation of sound, images, or videos to impersonate someone or make it appear that a person or organisation did something¹¹ is fast becoming a potent tool of political warfare to create trust deficit between people and the state. Such exploitation of technology to manufacture reality, for creation of dissonance among the public, can create unsustainable environment for local governments to function. Larger aim of such a strategy is to disrupt the governance, destroy the democratic institutions of the state and disempower civil society to trigger instability. The overall objective is to weaken the "notion of nation state" and disengage people with the state.

Radicalisation: A Potent Tool of Political Warfare. Radicalisation and altering of perception of the people, or an ethnic community, by use of worldwide network of cultural, informational, and influence operations, backed by material support and religious discourse, is also part of the political warfare. The religious tourism, funding of clerics and creation of infrastructure to spread an ideology that can be used to shape perception of the people, with a view to create disaffection with the state, is also part of shaping strategy of the political war.

Lethal Modern Political War

Political war in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, popularly known as 'Arab Spring', had gone terribly wrong; as a result Libya,

Yemen and Syria have all collapsed into civil wars.¹² Libya, Syria and Yemen may never be same again because the objective of the war was to create conditions for regime change but it led to destruction of states. Tunisia was the only state that stayed the course of its political transition¹³ primarily due to its robust institutions. Egypt is struggling to regain balance and continues to remain politically unstable. In fact, Tunisia's civil society institutions were far stronger and created conditions for the noble minded civil society leaders to develop consensus among the rival political leaders to end political anarchy and re-establish a democratic regime with popular support of the people. The new generation political war has reached the homes and streets and citizens have turned foot soldiers.

Monopoly of the State over Warfare is Diminishing. The spectrum of conflict is changing, state on state wars are becoming expensive and unaffordable due to lethality and destructive nature of modern wars. The question is, are we returning to pre-Westphalian forms of warfare, where it is ambiguous to understand, whom do they fight, why do they fight, how do they fight and 'what they fight for'? This is the warfare that is likely to dominate the next few decades. The modern wars have grey zone, hybrid, political and even conventional elements embedded in it. There are states, super empowered autonomous institutions, NGOs, criminals and non-state actors (stand alone or supported by states) that could join to fight a war to achieve their respective objectives. As a result, the monopoly of the state over warfare is slowly diminishing and non-state actors are in a position to create a scenario where states appear to be at war with their own subjects. During the contemporary period, the war is played out at two levels – a trial of strength on the physical level, and a clash of wills on the psychological level.¹⁴ In the modern paradigm, the primary objective to wage a war is to bleed nations for prolonged period, stunt growth and regime change by creating unsustainable conditions on the ground for the democratic institutions to function. Jihadists have made it possible to fight this war in the name of religion and ideology with a promise to return to the golden era.

Political Warfare Exploits Space between War and Peace. The Cold War was a 45-year-long grey zone struggle, in which the West succeeded in checking the spread of communism and ultimately witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union¹⁵ without

direct military confrontation or firing a bullet. It is important to understand that, "space between war and peace is not empty"¹⁶ and if it is allowed to be kept without being controlled or monitored, adversaries will engage, through irregular forces and primary agents of political warfare. In fact, political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace.¹⁷ The lethal political warfare has the potential to exploit the space between war and peace to turn streets into battlegrounds, and citizens as warriors, with an aim to erode institutions of governance. It has the potential to create disaffection among the citizens, ability to create political dissonance that could lead to uncontrolled chaos on the streets and thereby, provoking states to fight their own people. The emerging contours of conflict have the potential to make a state collapse from within, not in decades but in a matter of few years and months. Most significant aspect of new wars is that there are tools that are able to convert everything to belligerent so as to create scenarios or likelihood of escalation of conflict. Political warfare enables hybrid and grey zone conflicts and is not a replacement for conventional or sub-conventional wars. Political warfare can achieve desired objectives at lower cost; however, the end state remains unpredictable.

Van Guard for Irregular and Unrestricted Warfare. Political warfare is now becoming a van guard for irregular and unrestricted war and therefore, there is a need to develop a deeper understanding and conceptualisation of evolving political warfare. One must keep it in view that political warfare targets democratic institutions, governance, economic sphere and public conscience. Political warfare is lethal and unpredictable, can spiral out of control of the initiators, and the outcome can be completely unexpected. World has witnessed what happened in West Asia and even China is facing a dilemma on how to handle prolonged political unrest in Hong Kong that could emerge as a platform for initiating political warfare against China. Biggest threat to China today is not from military aggression or economic strangulation by West, but from the sophisticated political warfare that can trigger uncontrolled chaos.

Non-state Actors Flourish Post State/Societal Eruption. In fact, once the political warfare causes fragmentation of societies and states on ethnic, political and ideological lines, non-state actors find space to gain foot hold in a chaotic environment. There are

also tendencies among the religious and political agents of the political warfare to spiral out of control and become autonomous to achieve their own religious or political objectives. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Taliban and Al Qaeda are the by-product of political warfare. These terror organisations have gone astray after having been part of political warfare in the initial stages along with their allies/partners. Therefore, allies and stakeholders could clash if their interests are not aligned post eruption of states and societies.

Pakistan's Political Warfare against India

Pakistan is making serious attempts to unleash political warfare to create political, communal and economic instability in India. There was a deliberate attempt, by the proxies and corroborators, to discredit entire democratic process of India by questioning the credibility of the Election Commission and the electronic voting system. Similarly, if functioning of financial institutes and banking system is discredited, it can lead to collapse of economy and financial viability of a state. Political warfare thrives when fictions are converted into facts by bringing on board gullible political parties, NGOs, media, and even self-acclaimed independent international agencies. Political warfare enables hybrid and conventional wars to achieve objectives at lower cost. Kashmir is witnessing a very sophisticated political warfare, where endeavour is made to discredit the institutions of governance. Election boycott and projection of complete lockdown, or forced shut down under coercion, are some of the facets of ongoing political war in the Valley.

Mechanism to Fightback Political Warfare

Political warfare requires heavy investment in intelligence to detect it at an early stage of manifestation. The governments must strengthen institutions of governance, to make them robust and credible, which are able to deflect repeated attacks through the tools of political warfare. One must be mindful that there are multiple tools of directing political warfare and an adversary will not use same tool time and again, and will surprise by opening different fronts to achieve success. The situation also requires democratic nations to develop the capacity to react proportionately to achieve a deterrent effect. This can be achieved through the development of specifically crafted practical "grey-zone" response option – which doesn't mean engaging in retaliatory subversion, but instead utilising

the value-based argument, amongst other tactics, to win the narrative war.¹⁸

The political warfare is directed to manipulate perception of the people and institutions of governance. Therefore, developing citizens as warriors to expose false narrative by adversaries is one of the best ways to fight back. Cyber spear and cyber shield is another potent offensive and defensive tool to fight political warfare. Cyber spear must be used to decode impersonation, voice modulation, expose falsehood and discredit the aggressor for falsehood. Cyber shield is imperative to prevent hacking of systems and putting up impenetrable fire walls. Non-state actors can conduct political warfare with unprecedented reach because they are faceless and amorphous, thus use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to decode the identity of the non-state actors and their place of origin is imperative. The information arena is an increasingly important battleground, where perceptions of success can be determinative.¹⁹ Ethnic and religious harmony act as shield against political warfare.

There is a need for a strategy to fight political warfare. It requires the institutions of democracy: credible political system that is able to give stable governance, political leaders capable of delivery of governance, a bureaucracy capable of implementing that governance, and civil society groups able to provide support and stability to those institutions.²⁰ In nutshell, political war can be dealt with effectively by whole of government approach. To formulate a doctrine and concept of operations, it is important to develop understanding of this new age warfare.

The military component that should be spearheading the response to political warfare is Special Operation Forces, cyber and information warriors. The role of military is vital for countering and launching political warfare. First on the ground, in a target country, ideally should be Special Forces to coordinate and galvanise public support and once the stage is set, thereafter, cyber and information warriors, and intelligence wings of Special Forces must oversee coordination and direction of operations. This warfare may be whole of the government approach but the operations must be executed with utmost secrecy. During the initial stage of the operations, activities must appear benign and over exposure or over-reaction could compromise response or

retribution. The only way India can make Pakistan pay for the price of cross border terrorism is political warfare. In fact, it may be a monumental mistake to attempt to wrest Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK) militarily, however, there is a window of opportunity to not only make Pakistan pay the price for its cross border terrorism but also make it unsustainable for it to hold on to POJK.

Conclusion

Political warfare can generate unintended consequences which can, at times, spiral into major challenge for the adversaries. Two important characteristics of political war are; one that it is difficult to predict when this war begins and when it terminates; second that it is ethical denunciation²¹ of formal rules of war. War is a contest of wills, and the digital information age has created a scenario in which political warfare is only going to become more lethal and amorphous. Increasingly it will be about a contest of narratives below the threshold of war.²² Key to succeed is to deny exposed flanks or fractured society and to maintain deniability and surprise while targeting an adversary. Offence is the best option to deter the adversary and thus, conceptualisation and deeper understanding of political warfare is essential.

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Russia - China Partnership: Cooperation or Competition?

Professor Nirmala Joshi®

Abstract

The huge Eurasian landmass began to attract world attention after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Eurasian landmass is not only a vast storehouse of natural resources and precious minerals, but importantly two potential leading powers; the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China are also located in Eurasia. Today, Eurasia is a witness to ongoing interplay of cooperative and competitive tendencies among the powers. A predominant factor of present day Eurasian politics is the strong partnership between former rivals; Russia and China. The partnership has elicited divergent views both at the official and non-official levels. The article attempts to understand the evolving engagement between Russia and China in terms of cooperation and competition.

Introduction

At the turn of the present century, Eurasia had emerged as a region of geo-strategic and geo-economic significance. The rise of non-traditional security threats during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan and spread of political Islam further added to the complexity. However, the hall mark of new Eurasia is the dual trend of cooperation and competition among nations. Simultaneously, the trend towards globalisation provided a major impetus to economic development and cooperation. A prominent trend is the emerging partnership between two former rivals: the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China. Today, their partnership is a prominent feature of Eurasia and a factor to reckon with the power play of Eurasian politics. Several diverse views have been expressed on the partnership. One school of thought opines that Eurasia is a huge landmass and that both the

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powers are mature to manage their differences as well as cooperation. The cooperative tendency will continue for years ahead. While another school of thought believes that the cooperative tendency is tactical in nature. Both the powers have similar ambition, to play a role in the global order, but presently their ambitions are rooted at the regional level. Their interests and ambitions are aligned as they are not yet independent players. Hence need each other's support. Their goal is to ensure that Eurasia does not come under the influence of the United States (US) and other Western powers. However, as their economies progress; an element of competition is likely to emerge, perhaps in the long run. Here it is worth quoting former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, an astute politician and a keen observer of the Chinese view. In his opinion, 'China will never acquiesce to a status of a status quo power, conflict is not inevitable but competition is'. After all, two huge land powers sharing a lengthy land boundary have witnessed, in the past, periods of accommodation as well as rivalry. In accordance with this line of thinking their interests are likely to diverge at some time in future.

The article argues that Russia and China, though in strong partnership presently but with similar goals, are likely to emerge as competitors for the Eurasian space.

Evolving Partnership

The signing of the border agreement between Russia, China and three Central Asian Republics (CARs) namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1996 was the precursor to the beginning of an upward trajectory in the Russian Chinese relationship. After the conclusion of the border agreement, China brought forward an institutional mechanism; the 'Shanghai Five'. The crux of the agreement was peace, tranquillity and good neighbourliness on the border. A new narrative began to replace the past acrimonious one and projected the beginning of new era of friendship. The agreement on the Shanghai Five was further strengthened in 2001, when it was converted into a regional grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and Uzbekistan was co-opted as its member. The threats posed by religious extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking etc. were becoming highly pernicious; threatening their sovereignty and integrity. Today, the SCO has emerged as an important regional grouping with

Russia and China as its leading actors. The SCO has also opened the way for promoting multilateralism and regional cooperation. The SCO was enlarged in 2017 with India and Pakistan as full members.

In April 1997, at a Summit meeting in Moscow, between President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, a historic Declaration on a multipolar world and the emerging New International Order was signed. A multipolar world, according to that idea, would be stable based on international law and upholding the centrality of the United Nations (UN). In 2001, another milestone was achieved when the two countries signed a twenty year strategic treaty – The Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. The Treaty signified the high compatibility on strategic and geopolitical interests.

In the present decade, both Russia and China have initiated their respective prestigious projects – the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) now referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EEU is an exclusive project and aims to integrate the economies of the post-Soviet space. While the SREB has an inclusive approach and aims to build leverages, and possibly influence, across the Eurasian space. In May 2016, another step on the path of cooperation was taken when the two countries agreed to align their respective projects so as to avoid concerns about overlapping. As a consequence, relations between Russia and China acquired a fundamentally new quality. The distinguishing features are mutual trust, consideration of each other's interests and increasing economic openness.¹

The cooperation has been extended to Afghanistan as part of their prime objective of security and stability in the Eurasian space. The SCO had organised a conference of the Afghan-SCO Contact Group, and efforts at trilateral and quadrilateral levels in quest of peace and stability have been going on. On the issue of Russia's incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014, China extended support to the former. Russia has supported China's 'One China Policy' and Chinese opposition to the US initiated Rebalancing Strategy and the recent developments in the Pacific Ocean Region.

The institutional framework for cooperation in Russian Chinese strategic partnership is strong. They have emerged as a dominant

factor in present day Eurasian politics. Despite the strong trend of cooperation between Russia and China, strains have also appeared in the relationship. These strains are largely geopolitical and economic in nature. For Russia, Eurasia is part of its 'near abroad' or a zone of special interest. It has had historical, security, strategic, economic and cultural linkages for centuries, whereas China's interests are of recent origin. China's initial interest was in overseeing that the separatist minority, the Uyghurs, remained isolated and did not receive support from across the border, besides the wealth of natural resources of the region, especially energy, and the opening of the possibility for an overland transport corridor. What are the areas where divergences could appear?

Differing Perceptions of a Multipolar World

It is ironical that the partnership commenced with an agreement on a multipolar world, and yet differences of perceptions are evident. Possibly, these differences could assume a competitive element in future.

The vision of a multipolar world was laid by former Prime Minister of Russia Yevgeny Primakov. In his conception of a multipolar world three basic principles were essential. One, multipolarity, as a governing principle of international relations, is an active opposition to attempts to establish a unipolar world order. Second, constructive partnership with all countries instead of mobile or permanent coalitions; and third, integration on a voluntary basis within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).²

Russia's view towards multi-polarity holds that the Western dominated Post-Cold War international system has side-lined Russian security interests in its immediate neighbourhood. Hence, in Russian perception, multi-polarity means an international system where power is balanced with a diminished role for the United States and the liberal values it allegedly has imposed on other states.³ Apart from its deep historical, security, strategic, military, economic and cultural interests in Eurasia, the region is extremely rich in natural resources such as energy, uranium, gold, diamonds, iron ore, copper among other vital minerals. In fact, natural resources have been Russia's one of the prime revenue earners.

On the other hand, China recognises that it has benefited from the rules based international order. The process of economic

liberalism and globalisation has facilitated its rapid economic rise over the past thirty years. Therefore, unlike Russia, China's vision of a multipolar world order does not necessarily envision a radical dismantling of the current international system, instead it seeks to reform the system of global governance to increase its role and influence to match its growing economic power and size.⁴

In other words, Russia and China are seeking to establish their respective independent spheres of influence. Such spheres of influence are essential for each to emerge as a centre pole in a multipolar world. The Eurasian space is the key to their emergence as global powers. No doubt their perspectives on Eurasia are divergent but, for the present, the competitive tendency, which is still at a modest level, and cooperation will continue to guide Russia and China on the issue of a multipolar world.

Central Asian Region

The competitive trend between Russia and China is evident in their diversifying significance of Central Asia. For Russia, Central Asia is undoubtedly crucial to its 'Pivot to Asia' strategy. Its two organisations the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a defence integrative organisation (2003) and its EEU have geopolitical motives and Central Asia is of critical importance to both the organisations which would enable Russia to restore its great power status. The EEU is based on Customs Union and in October 2011, President Putin announced the economically integrated Union. In President Putin's view, this sort of an economic Union constituted the basis for a higher level of integration in the Eurasian Union. It would become one of the poles of the contemporary world and would play the role of an effective bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific Region.⁵

For China, geopolitics and domestic state building imperatives are interwoven in its Eurasian pivot. The SREB is China's ambitious mega overland transport corridor project. In September 2013, during a visit to Kazakhstan, President Xi Jinping unveiled his 'Chinese Dreams' of reviving the ancient Silk Road through Central Asia. The very fact that the Chinese dream was unveiled in a Central Asian country signifies the centrality of SREB. The SREB also aims to connect to minerals, energy sources and access to cities, harbours and oceans. In the process, China hopes to create inter-

dependencies with the CARs and, in the long run, enhance its presence, build leverages and promote good neighbourliness and peace in its Western periphery. In this mega effort the role of the CARs is indeed critical.

Russia and China are pursuing their projects with great vigour. They are priorities in their respective foreign policies. What is a matter of concern to Russia is the increasing Chinese footprints in Central Asia. Initially China's economic interaction was through the SCO, though due to lack of proper mechanism, it was on a bilateral basis. Today the interaction has intensified. Russia's bilateral trade volume with the region amounted to US \$ 18.6 billion, compared to China's US \$ 30 billion. Russia's economic problems since 2014 have accelerated its weakening position. China is offering security assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in terms of training and holding bilateral joint military exercises. A recent report claimed that China is building a military base in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province. The report has been denied by China and claims that construction of the base has not yet started. Moreover, the purpose of the facility is for training the Afghan National Security Forces. Nevertheless, if realised then Chinese personnel will be proximate to the Tajik-Afghan border. It does add to Russian uneasiness. Incidentally, Tajikistan is member of CSTO wherein, Russia is a leading member and others are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus.

In view of Russia's weak financial position and adverse impact of the Western imposed sanctions, China is in an advantageous position in Central Asia. There is a view that in the long run Russia will become a toothless former super power surrendering the stage for Beijing to fully assert its influence over Eurasia.⁶ The competitive trend for Central Asia is on display and how it will shape Russia China relations is difficult to predict for now.

As the competition for Central Asian space gathers momentum, the CARs could come under immense pressure from the two neighbouring countries. The CARs are extremely guarded about any compromise of their sovereignty and integrity. They have now consolidated their independence and are not as vulnerable as they were in the early years. However, the question is, will they be able to take care of the pressures that could be exerted in the years ahead?

Eurasia in Russian Perspective

Russia's pivot to Asia focused on the underdeveloped and under populated Eurasian region and the Far East. There are 6.3 million inhabitants in the Far East and face 110 million Chinese in the three provinces of Manchuria on the other side of the once fractious border. Due to lack of economic and regional development in Eurasia, there has been out migration of the people. Paradoxically, migration from across the border is at a rapid pace. President Putin expressed his deep concern at this growing imbalance and acknowledged the failure of Moscow's previous efforts to accelerate regional development. He said, "I do not want to dramatise the situation, but unless we make real efforts soon, even the indigenous population will in several decades from now be speaking in Japanese, Chinese and Korean".⁷

In pursuing regional development, Russia began to expand its base of investors. China, being a neighbour and with strategic partnership with Russia, was the only prominent investor especially in the energy sector. Timber is another area of interest for China. It gets 40 per cent of timber requirement from Eurasia. China, however, is insisting on getting its forestry equipment and its citizens to work in this sector. Besides, China has also shown considerable interest in infrastructure, development, construction of ports including ship building and repairs, processing uncut diamonds, mining of gold etc.

In its quest to diversify the investors and open the region to other potential investors, Russia is offering economic incentives and tax concessions for investment. The geographic expansion of EEU to Greater Eurasia was a change in Russian strategic thinking to attract investment. The widening of the concept reflects the Russian political establishment's acknowledgement that in order to bring economic prosperity to the region a narrowly focused EEU will not be sufficient. The big Asian economic engines must be engaged. Among the countries Russia would like to engage is India. Yuri Trutnev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy for the Russian Far East, said in an interview to TASS, "India is really an important neighbour and we must seriously think about working together. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the Chief Guest at the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok from 4 to 6 September 2019. A slew of agreements were signed in areas of energy, mining, connectivity etc.

Arctic Region

The geographic expansion of the EEU and the opening of Eurasia and the Far East will reduce the present Chinese leading position. However, such a development may not happen soon as investors will shy away due to sanctions. Cooperation will continue with competition also becoming apparent.

A potential area of divergence could emerge in the Arctic Region. Russia has made the Arctic Region a part of its pivot to Asia and is keen to use the economic potential of the region primarily in constructing the Arctic transport route or the Northern Sea Route. Prime Minister Medvedev said Russia's vision for the region as part of its privileged sphere of interest. The Arctic is believed to contain 13 per cent of the world's undiscovered oil and almost 30 per cent of its undiscovered gas, making it a key strategic resource region for Russia. Russian policy has included gaining access to extracting the region's natural resources in part by creating a transportation and communication network along the Arctic coast.⁸

On the other hand, Chinese White Paper on the Arctic has begun to identify itself as a 'near Arctic State'. It views the Arctic ocean as part of global commons and hence the right in respect of scientific research, navigation, over flights, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean.⁹ The competitive element vis-à-vis the Arctic Ocean Region is not as yet prominent as it is in Central Asia and the Far East. It could gain momentum depending on the policies of the two countries.

Conclusion

Russia-China strategic partnership is strong for the present. Both are still not independent players at the global level and need cooperation and support of each other. However, geopolitical compulsions and ambitions could accelerate the competitive element. After all, both were mighty empires of the day and major powers in the subsequent global order. The crux of their divergence is Central Asia. Whether it is the EEU or the SREB priority projects, Central Asia is of critical importance. Their interaction in Central Asia will determine the shape of the partnership. Presently cooperation is the hallmark of the partnership. Their cooperation or competition will also shape the politics of the Eurasian Region.

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The Red Cross and the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict

Mr Claude Arpi®

Abstract

For the Indian nation, the 1962 conflict with China has been one of the most traumatic post-independence events. For more than 3,000 prisoners of war (PoWs), the experience was particularly harrowing.

This article looks at difficult relations between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, the Indian Red Cross (IRC) and the Chinese Red Cross (CRC) Society. The ICRC's archives in Geneva helped to understand the role of the international organization as well as of the two national Red Crosses and their respective governments during the conflict.

China not only refused to officially acknowledge the Geneva Convention of 1949 on PoWs, but also committed several violations in respect of the treatment meted out to captured Indian military personnel.

27 Military officers taken PoWs during operations were taken on a tour of China and repatriated on 04 May 1963.

The rosy picture painted by the Chinese propaganda had actually been a traumatic experience for the Indian PoWs.

Introduction

For the Indian nation, the 1962 conflict with China has been one of the most traumatic post-independence event. For more than 3,000 PoWs, the experience was particularly harrowing.

Mr Claude Arpi was born in France. Since mid-1970s he has been living in India. He has authored books on Tibet, China, and French India. Recently, he published 1962 : The McMahon Saga and Glimpse of Tibetan History.. He regularly writes on Tibet, China and Indo-French relations.. Presently, he is the Director of the Tibetan Pavilion at Auroville, India.

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Still today some veterans who spent several months in the PoW's camps in Tibet, refuse to speak to their families and friends about these dark days. But according to Chinese records, never in the history of warfare have prisoners been treated so well.

Preferential treatment or propaganda?

An account recently published by China¹ tells us: "During the Sino-Indian border war, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) captured more than 3,900 Indian officers and soldiers² (including one brigadier general and 26 officers). In the long-term goal of striving for friendship between the Chinese and Indian people and in accordance with the principle of lenient treatment of prisoners, which had always been upheld by the PLA, the treatment of prisoners of war by the Chinese side had far exceeded the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and many touching deeds had taken place".

I shall cover the Geneva Convention and the role the Red Cross played in getting the PoWs released in several batches in 1962/63 a little later. This article looks at difficult relations between the Indian Red Cross (IRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross ((ICRC) in Geneva with the Chinese authorities represented by their Red Cross Society (CRC). It is often said the winner writes the history, but it is then with a deep distortion: "China released all Indian prisoners of war in a short period of time, playing an important role in winning over rivals, turning enemies into friends and promoting the restoration of friendly relations between the Chinese and Indian peoples," mentioned the Chinese report.

Interestingly, China terms the Sino-Indian border conflict, a 'counter-attack', as if it was India who attacked China in NEFA or Ladakh. "In late October 1962, the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army issued several provisions on the question of prisoners of the invading Indian Army," further explaining that the PLA "emphasised that captive officers and soldiers should not be killed, mistreated or insulted, or tied up and their private property should not be confiscated. The injured should be treated. At the same time, it was also required to take care of the living habits of all prisoners, and to find out the names and army numbers of dead bodies on the battlefield as far as possible,

to bury them properly and to set up signs. Prisoners had to fill in medical records and death certificates signed by military doctors.” These principles were hardly followed.

No Declaration of War

An important legal element needs to be noted; there was no formal declaration of war between China and India. The Chinese said that they called the captured Indian Army personnel ‘captives’ and not ‘PoWs’; the camps were ‘captive shelters’, an euphemism. This was indeed part of the Chinese propaganda.³ The Chinese account does not mention the constant indoctrination sessions to which the Indian jawans and officers were subjected; China just says that meetings were organised to discuss “according to the wishes of the Indian prisoners ...on the right and wrong issues in the Sino-Indian border dispute.” One can guess who was said to be right and who was wrong.

The Chinese described thus the departure of the PoWs from Tibet: “The captured Indian officers and soldiers, carrying clothes and souvenirs from the Chinese side, reluctantly bid farewell to the Chinese personnel. ...the Indian captives in farewell with the Chinese Red Cross staff cheered their arms: ‘Long live the friendship between the Chinese and Indian people!’” The facts were, however, different.

The Role of the Red Cross

Having often heard the distressing accounts of the Indian PoWs, and having been unable to find any records in the Indian archives, I decided to visit the seat of the ICRC in Geneva, Switzerland.

State signatories to the Geneva Convention of 1949 have given the ICRC the mandate to protect all victims of international and internal armed conflicts; this includes soldiers who have been war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants.⁴

During my visit to Geneva, I could consult the ICRC’s archives and reconstitute the role of the international organisation as well as of the two national Red Crosses of India and China during the conflict. I came across a file⁵ containing most of the correspondence with the Indian Red Cross (particularly the IRC’s President,

Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and its General Secretary, Maj Gen CK Lakshmanan)⁶, the Chinese Red Cross ('Honghui' in Chinese), as well as the Indian authorities mainly through Ambassador Amrik S. Mehta, the Indian Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva and Chao Hsing Chih, the Consul General of the People's Republic of China in Geneva.

A Note Verbale

On 28 December 1962, the ICRC handed over a Note Verbale to Chinese Red Cross; it has to be noted that most of the correspondence was carried out in French, but most of the time, official translations were provided to the Indian and Chinese authorities.

Referring to earlier correspondence⁷, the Note gave a summary of the events of October-December 1962. It puts the issue in perspective. "During the fighting which took place in October and November 1962 between Chinese and Indian forces, more than two thousand Indian military personnel were taken prisoners. About 600 wounded and sick were repatriated at the beginning of December 1962.⁸ The Chinese Red Cross has in addition transmitted to the Indian Red Cross the addresses and news of the health of 528 Indian prisoners."

The *Note Verbale* continues: 'The Indian authorities reported that no Chinese prisoner was held by them. On the other hand, on 20 November 1962, they interned about 2,000 civilians of Chinese nationality or origin. Whilst diplomatic relations between the two countries were not broken off, the Indian consular representatives at Lhasa and Shanghai had been recalled.'⁹

Later on, the Chinese Government focused on the fact that war had not been officially declared; diplomatic relations were existing between the two countries and therefore, it was not necessary to involve the ICRC. The contacts between national Red Crosses were sufficient, argued the Chinese.

**Chart 1 : Details of PoWs Released and Under Detention
in early January 1963**

	Wounded PoWs Released	Dead	PoWs Received	Place of Release
05 Dec 1962	64	1		Bomdila
12 Dec 1962	80			Dirang
12 Dec 1962	17			Menchuka
13 Dec 1962	78			Walong
17 Dec 1962	368	11		Dirang
22 Dec 1962			399	
30 Dec 1962	108	1		Jang
30 Dec 1962			733	
	715	13	1132	

The Note gives the chronology of the ICRC's initiatives: "On 23 October 1962, the ICRC offered its services to the ITC on behalf of all the victims of events, including prisoners. On 01 November 1962, it requested the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of India, through the intermediaries of their representatives in Geneva, to take position on the application of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949."

The Note enumerated four conventions as under:-

- 1) The amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (First Convention),
- 2) The amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (Second Convention)
- 3) The treatment of prisoners of war (Third Convention),
- 4) The protection of civilian persons in time of war (Fourth Convention).

The Note reminded Beijing that these Conventions had been ratified by India on 09 November 1950, and by the Chinese People's Republic on 28 December 1956. In accordance with the Conventions, the ICRC requested China for a list of the prisoners

or internees, information on their health as well as the authorisation for a representative of the ICRC to visit them in Tibet.

On 15 November 1962, Communist China was informed that the ICRC had sent André Durand, its Delegate General for Asia to New Delhi to coordinate the release of the PoWs with the IRC and the Indian Government: "The Indian authorities informed [us] that although there had been neither a declaration of war, nor a break-off of diplomatic relations, conditions as laid down by Art. 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions had been met, so that these Conventions were immediately applicable."

The Government of India informed the ICRC delegate that Delhi had given instructions to the Military Command to this effect: "It also requested the ICRC to intervene for the centralisation and the transmission of detailed lists of prisoners, lists of the dead, and all information through the intermediary of the Central Tracing Agency [in Geneva], as well as for visits to camps."

On 19 November 1962, a confirmation was given in writing by Ambassador Mehta that India would adhere to the Geneva Conventions.

The Note to the Chinese government observed: "The Government of India notified the ICRC in particular that, being a Party to the four above-mentioned Conventions, it undertook to put all their provisions faithfully into effect in the conflict which was taking place on the frontiers of India. It counted on the Government of the People's Republic of China doing the same, since it too was a Party to these four Conventions, to obtain with the least possible delay information concerning Indian prisoners, both civilian and military, in Chinese hands."

Though some of the clauses were implemented in the coming months, the Geneva Convention was never officially acknowledged by Beijing.

On 21 November 1962, the position of the Government of India was transmitted to the CRC and the Chinese Government, "to which the International Committee had proposed sending a delegate to Peking [Beijing] to examine all problems connected with application of the Geneva Conventions." Despite repeated reminders to the Chinese government, an ICRC representative was not permitted to visit the PoWs' camps in Tibet. On 28 November 1962, the Chinese Red Cross argued that normal

contacts had been maintained between the Chinese and Indian Governments “on all questions concerning Indian prisoners, and that it had itself established relations in this respect with the IRC, with the result that sending of an ICRC delegate to China was not necessary.”

One of the problems was that Delhi, for its own reasons, systematically refused to take up the issue of the PoWs directly with Beijing though the diplomatic relations were not cut; this considerably delayed the process of releasing the PoWs.

On 02 December 1962, the Indian Red Cross asked for the authorisation for its own delegates to visit the Indian prisoners of war in Chinese hands; this too did not receive a positive response from China. The easiest would have been if the Indian Consul General in Lhasa had been authorised by Beijing to visit the camps, but by 15 December 1962, the Consulate General in Tibet was unnecessarily closed.¹⁰

First PoWs Released

On 05 December 1962, first batch of wounded Indian PoWs was released from Bomdila in NEFA.¹¹ Two weeks later, the IRC, while receiving another batch of Indian wounded soldiers in Dirang, handed over 2,000 parcels of food and clothing for the prisoners. This was a major success for Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Gen Lakshmanan and their team.

Coming back to the Note Verbale, the ICRC reminded Beijing that Third Geneva Convention stipulated that PoWs “have, amongst other things, the right to send capture cards to their families and to the Central Tracing Agency¹² (Art. 70). In addition, the official Information Bureaux which each Party to the conflict is obliged to constitute,” within the shortest possible period to provide information concerning prisoners of war (Art. 122). Finally, it was pointed out that the Convention says that ICRC delegates shall be authorized to visit all places where prisoners of war may be, and to interview them without witnesses (Art. 126).” The ICRC also asked for repatriation ‘within a short space of time’ of all Indian PoWs still in Chinese hands and to inform the Central Tracing Agency organized by the ICRC, of the names of the PoWs André Durand, Swiss national, holder of diplomatic passport was appointed to pay a visit to the PoWs in Tibet.

The Chinese Internees in Deoli

Durand was authorised to visit the Chinese civilians kept for security reasons in Deoli in Rajasthan; the fact that the Indian Government detained these Chinese nationals complicated the release of the PoWs in Tibet. Durand visited Deoli on 12 December 1962. Though he found that the internees were properly treated, Delhi objected to the transmission of his report to the Chinese authorities. The ICRC explained: "The Indian government justified his request by the fact that while the report of Mr. Durand is, as a whole favourable, it nonetheless reveals some shortcomings that China might be tempted to misrepresent to fuel as controversy." It was probably a mistake not to allow the ICRC to send this report to Beijing.

On 04 January 1963, Maj Gen CK Lakshmanan wrote to Gallopin: "You will also be interested to learn that two thousand gift parcels of food and clothing sent by the Chinese Red Cross for the Chinese Civilian internees ...The Chinese Red Cross is being informed of it."

But China, the victor was in a mood to start a controversy.

On 18 February 1963, Han Nien-Lung, the director of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing answered the ICRC by attacking India for the arrest of the Chinese nationals and equating their condition with the Indian PoWs kept in Tibet¹³. It requested the Indian Government "to provide information concerning the unwarrantedly arrested Chinese nationals. The Indian Government is attempting to deprive the Chinese Embassy of its legitimate right and cover up India's crime of persecuting Chinese nationals. The Chinese government absolutely will not agree to this. The Indian authorities cannot by such means cover up their crimes of persecuting overseas Chinese or the facts of lenient treatment of the captured Indian military personnel by the Chinese side."

The Chinese propaganda machinery was working full steam.

Situation in Early 1963

By early January 1963, the Indian Red Cross had received the names of only 1132 PoWs, while 715 wounded prisoners had been released and 13 bodies handed over. The names of more than 2,000 PoWs were still missing. They were 'missing in action'.

On 25 January 1963, R. Gallopin, the ICRC's Executive Director wrote to Maj Gen CK Lakshmanan to draw the IRC's attention to the announcement of China News Agency that 2,156, then 3,350 Indian PoWs were still in Chinese hands, "after the repatriation of some 700 [715] sick and wounded. May we ask if the Indian Red Cross has received sufficient information to tell which of these figures are correct?"

The released figures of the PoWs are, to say the least, confusing, but the over-all number of PoWs of 3,350 was correct (with 2,156 still to be released in February).

On 29 January 1963, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur wrote to Leopold Boissier¹⁴, the IRCR president to say: "a large number of Indian personnel continue to be prisoners in Chinese hands, some for over three months, we hope that the ICRC will wish to remind the Chinese authorities of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and to urge again that a delegate of the ICRC be permitted without further delay to visit the Indian POWs in order to ensure that they are treated in accordance with the Conventions."

Two days later, the IRC received a letter from the CRC which partially answered Geneva's queries: "The captured Indian military men in China are well treated in every respect. They have been given every facility for keeping correspondence with their families, postage of all their letters were paid by the authorities of the Centre for Captured Indian Personnel [a Chinese organisation]."

Finally on 06 February 1963, Boissier decided to write directly to Marshal Chen Yi, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs: "to repeat the appeal to Chinese Government to grant permission for one of ICRC delegates to visit Indian PoWs in China." The name of Andre Durand was again suggested.

At the same time, the IRCR urged again Delhi to officially write to Beijing suggesting that the ICRC should be the intermediary; but for unknown reasons the Nehru's government was reluctant to take up the issue with Beijing. Boissier told the Rajkumari: "In the absence of such notification, it must be feared that the Chinese Government will continue to take advantage of the fact that diplomatic relations not having been broken off, there would be no reason for the ICRC to intervene." The situation was stagnating.

An Answer to Marshal Chen Yi's Cable

On 18 February 1963, an answer came to the cable sent to Marshal Chen Yi: "Since the Sino-Indian border clashes, the Chinese government has all along given good treatment in every respect to the Indian military personnel who were captured in the course of their attacks on the Chinese frontier guards."

Beijing kept repeating that it was India who attacked China; Beijing stated: "the Chinese government have already provided to the Indian government and the ICRC lists of the names, addresses and the state of health of all the captured Indian personnel; assisted these captured personnel in establishing communication with their families and transmitted to them packages sent from India. China has also released on its own initiative the captured wounded and sick Indian military personnel. At present, direct contact is continuing between the CRCS and the ICRC, and questions concerning the captured Indian military personnel should of course be handled directly by the Chinese and Indian sides."

Beijing's conclusion was it was not necessary for the ICRC to take the trouble to visit the prisoners. However; it found most regrettable that the India PoWs "captured in the course of the Chinese frontier guards' counterattacks in self-defence" were equated with the "law-abiding overseas Chinese illegally detained by the Indian authorities."

On 27 February 1963, the IRCR confirmed to Gen Lakshmanan that "the total number of Indian prisoners of war still in Chinese hands is 3,319, excluding 716 wounded and sick who have been repatriated and the 13 bodies returned by the Chinese Red Cross."

Announcement of Release of all PoWs

Finally on 04 April 1963, the CRC officially wrote: "Our government announced on April second its decision to release all Indian military men whom Chinese frontier guards in Tibet and Sinkiang regions captured during their counterattacks in self-defence stop we have contacted indcross [IRC] directly to make arrangements for their repatriation stop thanks for your concern."

The same day, during a meeting, Maunoir, who had been instrumental in putting a constant pressure on the Chinese, diplomatically told Amb AS Mehta: "It must not be ruled out that the insistence of the ICRC on the Chinese government to obtain

permission to visit the Indian PoWs played a role in the decision that the CRC [to release them]." The letter to Chen Yi probably helped to unlock the situation.

The minutes of the above meeting added: "Mr. Mehta shares this opinion, adding that the Indian authorities had made no attempt to obtain this repatriation."

During the following weeks, all the PoWs detained by China would be released in batches as this chart shows.

Conclusion

On 24 February 1964, the Permanent Indian Mission in Geneva issued a Memorandum, pointing out to the Chinese violations of the Geneva Conventions "in respect of the treatment meted out to captured Indian military personnel in their hands. ...The specific articles of the Geneva Conventions 1949, which have been violated by the Government of the People's Republic of China in the treatment of captured Indian army personnel have been evidenced also in the affidavits ...obtained from Indian military personnel following their repatriation."

It cited a large number of articles of the Conventions and provided the affidavits of eleven PoWs corroborating these facts¹⁵. The rosy picture painted by the Chinese propaganda had actually been a nightmare for the Indian PoWs.

Chart 2 : Release of PoWs

	Wounded Released	Dead	PoWs Received	PoWs Released	Place of Release
1962 till Dec	715	13	1132	715	See Chart 1
1963 Feb-06			453		
1963 Feb-06			820		
1963 Feb-16		1	915		
1963 Apr-14				144	Bumla
1963 Apr-17				131	Lohit sector
1963 Apr-24				146	Lohit sector
1963 May-04				27	Kunming
1963 May-05				447	Bumla
1963 May-10				450	Bumla
1963 May-15				353	Bumla
1963 May-17				4	Siang
1963 May-17				160	Spanggur
1963 May-20				498	Bumla
1963 May-25				382	Bumla
	715	14	3320	3457	

As can be seen, there are some discrepancies between the figures.

**Chart 3 : List of Captured Indian Officers Handed-Over
in Kunming (China) on 04 May, 1963**

Name	Serial No.	Rank
John Parashram Dalvi	IC 739	Brig Gen
Balwant Singh Ahluwalia	IC 1778	Lt Col
Krishen Kumar Tewari	IC 520	Lt Col
Maha Singh Rikh	IC 2057	Lt Col
Rattan Singh	IC 3414	Lt Col
Gurdial Singh	IC 1880	Maj
Har Phul Singh	IC 1638	Maj
Sharan Singh Sethi	IC 6085	Maj
Dhan Singh Thapa	IC 7990	Maj
Shreekant Sitaram Hasabnis	IC 6233	Maj
Bejoy Mohan Bhattacharjea	IC 1338	Lt Col
KK Chandran	IC 2636	Lt Col
Gurdial Singh	IC 1979	Lt Col
Hasta Bahadur Rai	IC 4053	Maj
John Emanuel Lawrence Brito	IC 4823	Maj
Lahiri Ajit Chandra	IC 9235	Maj
Vinod Kumar Singh	IC 7709	Maj
Vithal Vaikuntha Rajadhyaksha	IC 4864	Maj
Surendra Nath Dar	IC 5441	Maj
Madiah Chiriapandra Nanjappa	IC 9714	Lt Col
Namdevrao Bandoba Jadhav	IC 1339	Lt Col
Babur Singh Thapa	IC 5058	Maj
Bimalanga Chatterji	IC 2262	Maj
Darbara Singh	IC 9741	Maj
Kanwar Jit Singh Grewal	IC 4918	Maj
Nar Bahadur Chand	IC 2215	Maj
Rupendra Singh Virk	IC 8091	Maj

Endnotes

¹ *The Truth About The History of The Sino-Indian Border War*; I am indebted to Sqn Ldr Rana TS Chhina (Retd), Secretary, Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research of the United Service Institution of India for showing a translation of this book.

² As we shall see, the exact figure of PoWs differs according to the sources. The correct figure was probably around 3,300.

³ Even though there was no official declaration of war and diplomatic ties were not severed, during the months following the war, there were only few direct interactions between the Governments of India and China. Probably the Prime Minister felt betrayed and he preferred non-aligned countries to act on behalf of India. On its part, China was keen to negotiate directly. This certainly hampered an early solution of the PoWs' issue.

⁴ The ICRC has today 190 National Societies, including the Indian and Chinese National Red Crosses. The ICRC is an old and highly honoured organization, most widely respected the world over, having been awarded thrice the Nobel Peace Prize in 1917, 1944, and 1963.

⁵ I am grateful to Fabrizio Bensi, the Archivist of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, for his help during my visit.

⁶ Maj Gen Cheruvari Kottieth 'CK' Lakshmanan (5 April 1898 – 3 October 1970) was an Indian sportsman who represented British India in the 1924 Summer Olympics held in Paris, participating in the hurdles race. He served in the Indian Army and subsequently joined the Indian Red Cross Society, first as the Secretary General and later as Director General.

⁷ A letter and memorandum on 02 November 1962 and another letter on 21 November 1962

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⁹ It is not clear if the Indian Consul General in Lhasa was recalled or left on his own. His presence in Lhasa could have made a difference during the following weeks.

¹⁰ There was no logic in the Indian position. Why keep up the diplomatic relations with China, as if nothing had happened and at the same time unilaterally close the Consulate in Lhasa? But a wind of panic was blowing over Delhi during those difficult months and logic was not prevalent.

¹¹ A first batch of 64 Indian PoWs was released on 05 December 1962 at Bomdila. Most of the PoWs had suffered from gunshot wounds. Dr. Ahluwalia headed the Indian Red Cross team which brought back the

wounded men from Bomdila. During a brief function, a speech commending Sino-Indian friendship was read out by Wen Jong-chung, the leader of the Chinese Red Cross team. Interestingly, the whole ceremony was photographed and filmed

¹² Located at 7, Avenue de la Paix in Geneva.

¹³ The civilian internees could not be considered as PoWs.

¹⁴ The ICRC president always calls her 'Princess'.

¹⁵ Unfortunately not available in the file.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

K File: The Conspiracy of Silence. By Bashir Assad, (New Delhi; Vitasta Publishing), Page 237, Price – Rs. 495/-, ISBN: 978-93-86473-69-1

Bashir Assad is a Srinagar based senior journalist from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). As an author he is able to provide a nuanced view from “the other side of the hill”. The book is laid out in 19 unnumbered chapters.

He starts off by addressing the issue of radicalisation and fundamentalism in Kashmir, which has been brought about by Pakistani manipulation of the *mullahs* and organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami. The author explains how and why towering leaders were made irrelevant in Kashmir through political alignments and realignments. Therefore, trying to resolve Kashmir through application of electoral politics is not workable. Bashir Assad argues that the conflict in Kashmir is never going to be resolved unless three stakeholders – the Kashmiris, the Indian State and the political parties in Kashmir get together and negotiate with the militants to reach a solution acceptable to all. The militants will never negotiate if they are in a position of strength and therefore, their degradation militarily is part of the first step.

He delves deep into the transformation of Kashmiri society which now considers pluralism as a foreign imposition and identifies more with Arabic hard-line Islam. Militants in Kashmir identify with global Jihad and all militant groups in Kashmir are ideologically part of it. Therefore, an independent Kashmir is no longer their aim; in line with global Jihad their aim is a Kashmir ruled under Shariah laws.

The concluding chapters deal with the present complexion and psyche of the militancy in Kashmir. Assad states that the current phase of violence is no longer related to achieving *Azadi* and self-determination. The truth is that a radicalised Kashmir has scores of young people ready to die ‘in the glory of Islam’. The author goes on to explain how the Kashmir militancy also has a caste ridden nature where the rich and privileged ultimately fire their guns from the shoulders of the poor.

The language of the book is simple and short chapters give the book the character of a fast paced narrative. The situations

narrated are real life which enables the reader to get immersed in the flavour of insurgency and appreciate the schism which has developed both, in Kashmiri society and the rigidity in the thinking of those who strive to resolve the issue. The title of the book "the conspiracy of silence" alludes to the silence of the educated middle class which "runs with the hares and hunts with the hounds".

The book ends with some ideas for change. These include the reality that the only option to resolve the issue is to talk. Bashir explains this succinctly by quoting John F Kennedy who had said, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate". He also advocates that a mutually acceptable third party (even a NGO) is a must for breaking the logjams for a political settlement without involving foreign state mediators. The book will be valuable to understand the situation in the Vale of Kashmir from the perspective of a 'son of the soil' for a realistic assessment of the chances of strategies being tried out for conflict resolution. The book is well edited with very few 'printer's devils'. The author does not indulge in self-aggrandisement though at times emotionalism does slip through.

Lt Gen Ghanshyam Singh Katoch, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

India - The Future Of South Asia : Rise of the New Power of Peace. Edited by Karan Kharab, (Noida: Turning Point Publishers, 2019) Page 291, Price – Rs. 1195/- ISBN: 978-81-937831-5-3.

This volume is a compilation of interesting articles by established professionals, and thinkers, on the emerging new India under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Undeniably since 2014, there has been a sea change in our internal and external policies. These articles on the future of South Asia cover a wide canvas, much like the indescent patterns in a kaleidoscope. To a perceptive reader, the interplay between seemingly differing points of issue like national security, regional cooperation, national interests, international relations, economy, industry, alliances, pacts, heritage, fault lines, national aspirations, Indo-Pacific and burden of past on carving out an overall grand vision will not be lost. Authors of each article have posted their considered views on various facets germane to the subject.

Some observations or deductions can, however, be contested. A suggestion that weak neighbours impact a country's growth or security is not really true. Equally, poor relationship with our immediate neighbours is a byproduct of inept diplomacy and a patronizing or lackadaisical approach. Liu Zongyi, Advisor to the Chinese Government, in his article is almost visceral and opines that the Doklam standoff reveals "India's strategic ambitions". Zongyi aggressively rails at Narendra Modi for opposing the Maritime Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative. He is disdainful of Indo-Pacific strategy and thinks that India is trying to punch beyond its weight.

Zongyi is quick to call reporting of Chinese incursions across IB/LAC by Indian media as a show of "loss of confidence", quite forgetting the frenzy Chinese official media goes into when any Indian/Vietnamese/Japanese/Philippine sea vessels even enter South China Sea. General Durrani, former National Security Advisor of Pakistan, is a votary of uninterrupted dialogue between India and Pakistan. He also recommends Musharraf's solution for Kashmir. Quick to point out our flaws; he turns a Nelson's eye to the active encouragement given to terrorist groups infiltrating in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Brigadier Bhonsle's suggestion to change thinking in the subcontinent from conflict resolution to conflict transformation and shift to a non-zero-sum approach though refreshing is unlikely to fructify as Pakistan military will not accept civil suzerainty in the near future. The Editor has done a commendable task in getting together views from thinkers of differing genre that is grist to a complex subject like the rise of a nation.

Maj Gen Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

Crisscrossing Paths : Through Sorrow, Joy, Departure, Reunion. By William Hawke (New Delhi : Gyan Publishing House, 2019), Page 310, Price – Rs. 1240/-, ISBN 9788121219662,

A saga of four families, whose lives crisscross each other over the course of one hundred years through grief, joy, separations and reunions, this book is taut and very well written. It begins from the battlefields of the battle of Somme, 01 July 1916 and ends in 2018.

A beautifully woven factual fiction, spreading across Europe, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, Canada and over the high seas across the world it captures the essence of human strengths and frailties, love and sorrow, faith and devotion with an excellent weave of words.

Spread in two Parts over 21 Chapters, it is veritably a 'un-put-downable' read. The first builds the narrative till India's independence, weaving the lives of the four families, while the second follows the life of the main character through his childhood and his life as part of the royal Canadian Navy. The final reunion, for the trip to Dharamsala, where their grandfather spent three years recovering from 'Post Traumatic Stress Disorder' after his traumatic incident during WW I seems nothing short of a miracle.

Much of what is written would be of great interest to the uniformed people, as they would be able to relate to the facts and the fiction woven around it. A must for a libraries.

Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The Bugle Calls : A Life in the Indian Army. *By Lt Col Naresh Rastogi (Retd) and Shri Kiran Doshi, IFS (Retd) (Chennai: Tranquebar Press, 2019), Page 272, Price – Rs. 599/-, ISBN 9789388754484.*

In this book Col Rastogi describes his life from childhood (1930s) to post-retirement (1990s). He gives tribute to Shri K Doshi, IFS (his golfing partner in Noida Golf Club), for inducing and encouraging him to write his experiences of Army life, which he had often narrated to him.

In short 30 chapters spread over 270 pages, the author has covered "How he was induced to join the Army", and his life thereafter, till he sought early retirement in 1970s, started his second career in Nigeria, and finally his present life amongst his old colleagues and friends in Naiad.

Chapters 1 to 3 cover a young boy enjoying games, studies and childhood impressions and experiences, which would remind the readers of their own childhood. The impressions and joy of having a joint family (as was prevailing in India during pre partition

days), the emphasis of his father (an officer in MES) on education (especially English language), traditional values imparted by his mother and other relatives, make very interesting reading.

How in 1953 he joined the Joint Services Wing of the National Defence Academy (then at Clement Town, Dehra Dun), moved to Khadakwasla in 1955, then in 1957 to Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, and got commission into Corps of Signals , are covered in Chapters 4 to 6. He narrates that when asking a porter at Dehra Dun Railway Station to return extra money, how proud he felt on being told by him, "Sahib, now you are an officer ". His experiences and impressions of military life, and emphasis of all training on moulding a young college boy into an "Officer and a Gentleman", ragging (including front rolls, wading through ice cold water streams), and living a Spartan life, will be enjoyed by all readers.

This is how the sounding of Bugle Calls -Revile in the morning and Retreat in the evening, became a part of life of every cadet. This remained with Naresh for life time of soldiering.

Besides interest in sports and academic events, yearnings for friendship with young ladies, learning ball room dancing with male cadet partners, outdoor trips for fishing and hunting, and to Bombay and Poona are covered in a nostalgic manner. These will revive memories of events from the reader's life.

Next few chapters cover the training as a Signals Officer at Mhow, Poona and postings at Lucknow and Rajouri. In these he describes how he developed closeness with his soldiers, built team-spirit and learnt to administer his sub-unit. During this period he also met a charming girl Basanti ,at Lucknow and married her . Educated in IT College, Basanti not only complimented his military life but also became an anchor and source of strength to him. How she encouraged him to do Staff College, shared pangs of separation and other administrative hardships only known to military wives, are covered with interesting antidotes.

Year 1965 saw him being attached with a Brigade earmarked for operations in Khem Karan Sector of Punjab, during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. Next four chapters vividly cover events of the Battle of Khem Karan , as he saw the fighting at Asal Uttar . During this period of War, he worked very closely under Brig D S

Sidhu, a very bold, cool, brave and competent leader. As there was radio silence imposed due to operational reasons, Naresh as Sparrow (Signal's Officer) and Capt Khan , 4 GRENADIERS from Brigade HQs, were often tasked by the Commander to visit forward troops to obtain latest battle situation. They travelled extensively by day and night, from one front line to the other, came under Pakistani artillery fire , and saw the destruction of Pakistani armour and making of "Patton Nagar". The author describes how 4 GRENADIERS under Lt Col Farhad Bhatti held their ground and fought the action. The brave and historic actions of CQMH Abdul Hamid (Awarded PVC Posthumously), who destroyed 3 Pakistani Patton tanks which majorly contributed to destruction of Pakistani armour has been extremely well narrated. Having earned laurels for Victory at Asal Uttar, how the unsuccessful operation of 4 SIKH on 12 September resulted in blame –game, of Brig Sidhu being replaced, and pulling out of the Brigade to another sector. These events saddened Naresh and others, specially the moving –out of the brave and bold commander, have been well covered.

Events of period 1965-1970 have been covered in brief, including change over from Signals to Infantry (8 MADRAS), attending Staff College , and posting to Delhi and Lucknow.

During the 1971 Indo Pak War, the author again saw action, this time on the East Pakistan side, near Bongaigaon. Before the outbreak of hostilities, as 2nd In-Command of his unit , he interacted with Mukti Bahini, saw the safety and comfort of the helpless refugees streaming into India, and conducted visitors and reporters to the border areas. Once the hostilities broke out and his unit was given an offensive task to enter East Pakistan and capture Jassore and then Khulna, he was in the lead of his troops. He narrates how his troops negotiated paddy fields with knee deep water, came under Pak artillery and machinegun fire, and secured villages and buildings, and captured Pakistani soldiers. An eye witness account of surrender of Pakistani troops in Khulna on 17 Dec, their views and attitudes, and reaction of the locals , has been well covered.

Promoted Lt Col soon after the War, he covers his command tenure in Sunderbani, where he had served after Staff College.

How an act of indiscipline by his two soldiers (and his disagreement with higher authorities on the degree of punishment to them), resulted to stunt his otherwise rising career graph. This resulted in his being posted to NCC in Assam, which he felt was an indication that his future was "sealed", thus he took pre-mature retirement.

Soon, a new avenue opened, and he got a job as a Manager in a factory in Nigeria, where Basanti was also offered a teaching assignment. Having spent a few years there (which included travel in Europe and connecting to pen-friends and a 1971 War reporter), Naresh and Basanti returned to India, to settle down in Noida, amongst their old colleagues.

The book is very well written and the author needs to be complimented for writing true events and observations in a simple language, from his heart. He has explained military terms , so as to assist non military readers.

The only shortcoming is, that there are no maps or sketches , hence following places like Teh Pannu, Burki, Asal Uttar, Jessore and Khulna, become difficult. Hence, the narration of events in Chapters of 1965 and 1971 War, is incomplete. It is suggested that this shortcoming be made up in the next print.

The book is recommended for libraries of units of the Armed Forces, Colleges, Clubs and Schools, as it is life-story of a young boy joining and enjoying a career in the Armed Forces, and beyond.

Lt Gen Y M Bamm, (Retd)

Major Tom's War. *By Vee Walker, (London, Kashi House CIC, 2018). Pages 438, Price – Rs.1868/- ISBN 9781911271147.*

Major Tom's War is an intriguing novel that spans the prelude and period of the Great War. The story is set in a chain of locations that include India, England, Wales, Scotland, Belgium, Germany and France. It is a story about war and peace, life and death, love and hate, hope and despair, joy and sorrow, but it is mostly about people and horses and the regiment to which Tom, the main protagonist belonged – the Central India Horse. The characters are memorable and brought to life by the author from the diary of her grandfather, Major Thomas Horatio Westmacott.

The story covers the saga of Indian cavalry units that were forced to fight dismounted in France and Flanders. It is, however, not a chronicle about battles fought by Indian cavalry units but rather about the people who were part of those times – British, French, Indian and German. The story weaves all these protagonists together assisting the reader to be a witness to those interesting times.

The narrative oscillates between the battlefield and family matters back home, between the people of France, who had to undergo the travails of German occupation, and the heroes from among them who fought for freedom from the Germans. It tells about life in the trenches and raids across no man's land where one gets the whiff of the deadly mustard gas that killed and maimed so many of the Allied troops, and of the improvised jam tin bombs that are a tribute to the innovation and imagination of the troops who made them. Hovering in the background are the sowars of the Central India Horse, led by their risaldars and the intrepid Risaldar Amar Singh who, true to his name, survived the war and was awarded an OBI second class with the title of Bahadur.

The description of the conditions under which the Indian Army had to fight in Europe is startlingly clear. Major Tom had kept a diary that describes in minute detail the events that he was involved in and his granddaughter Vee Walker, the author, has brought out a splendid narrative that brings the story alive in a labour of love that resurrects the faces of the characters of more than a hundred years ago.

'Major Tom's War' is a story that commemorates the life and times of a war that has close connections with India and should be read by all who have an interest in history and the part that India played in the Great War.

The story has an intricate plot and takes the reader through the twists and turns not only about the war and the resistance of the French to German occupation, but also of long distance love and romance till the final denouement of the end of the war and the Armistice that brings all the elements of the story to a happy conclusion.

Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)

The Forgotten Few The Indian Air Force in World War II. By KS Nair (Noida: HarperCollins Publishers, 2019) Pages 452, Price Rs. 669/- P-ISBN: 978-93-5357-067-5.

The Second World War remains one of the great markers of world history. Indian participation, the largest contingent from any country involved in the war, brought significant social and political changes within India, including the advent of Independence. And yet, the Indian contribution to the war efforts remains under documented and under recorded. Over 2.5 million Indians served in uniform as part of Allied armed forces during the War and yet, the Indian chapter of this global story is barely known. The Forgotten Few attempts to produce a historical narrative of contribution of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to the Air Force component of the World War-II.

The Indian Air Force was officially established on 8 October 1932. Its first flight, comprised six RAF-trained officers and 19 *Havai Sepoys*, came into being on 01 Apr 1933. The aircraft on inventory were four Westland Wapiti IIA army co-operation biplanes. By June 1938, No. 1 Squadron of IAF attained its full strength, and this remained the sole IAF formation when World War II began. The outbreak of World War II, and the leaning of Japan towards the Axis powers, led to the creation of the IAF as a self-supporting force for the South Eastern Theatre of War. During World War II, the British also realised the important role IAF could play to counter the Japanese aggression and this led to the rapid expansion of the IAF to 10 squadrons. Towards the end of the war, the prefix 'Royal' was granted to the IAF in recognition of its contribution during the war.

This book brings to light the lost stories of some of the Indian aviators of that era, who later built the foundations of the present day IAF, the fourth largest air force in the world. The book covers the period from 1930-39 to 1946-47 in ten chapters and has a foreword by the former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa. The first chapter is dedicated to the early years of aviation in India (1930-39), while the second chapter covers the war in Europe (1939 to 40). The next seven chapters, covering the period from 1941 to 1945, are devoted to the rise of IAF assets and its actions, mainly in the SE theatre of war. The last chapter covers

the post war happenings and actions in Japan and elsewhere in SE Asia.

The book is based on interviews with some of the Indian survivors of World War-II, and material from authentic war diaries. The author, KS Nair is a graduate of IIT Delhi and IIM Bangalore and has been a lifelong student of Indian aviation history.

Overall a brilliant effort, extremely well researched, simply articulated and easy to comprehend. The book exposes the reader to a thrilling and exciting account of the formative history of Indian military aviation, especially the IAF.

Gp Capt Sharad Tewari, VM (Retd)

RESULTS : USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY
COMPETITION 2019

GROUP 'A'

Subject:- Water War – Implications for India

First	05839W Cdr Hitender DSSC, Wellington (Nilgiris)-643231(TN) Email : hitender.chaudhary@gmail.com Mob : 9946808451	Gold Medal, Cash Award of Rs.15,000/- and entry accepted for publication.
Second	IC- 59490W Col Sourabh Chatterji Skinner's Horse (1 Horse), PIN – 912601 C/o 56 APO Email : ms.sourabh_chatterji@rediffmail.com Mob : 8376983381	Cash Award of Rs.10,000/- and entry accepted for publication.

GROUP 'B'

Subject:- Social Media – The New Dimensions of Warfare

First	IC-71205Y Maj Akshat Upadhyay ADGPI,DGMI,B-30, South Block, IHQ of MoD (Army), New Delhi -110011 Email : aksmav12rick@gmail.com	Gold Medal, Cash Award of Rs.15,000/- and entry accepted for publication.
Second	IC- 67907A Lt Col Saurabh Kumar Misra 25 MADRAS, AMS2C, MS-2,MS Branch, IHQ of MoD (Army), New Delhi-110011 Email: saurabhmisra26@gmail.com Mob : 9958364437	Cash Award of Rs.10,000/- and entry accepted for publication.

**RESULT : LT GEN SL MENEZES MEMORIAL
ESSAY COMPETITION 2019**

Subject:- Civil-Military Relations in India Introspection and Reform

First	04569 H Cdr Ranendra Singh Sawan Defence Services Staff College Locker No 66, Wellington (Nilgiris) Tamil Nadu – 643 231 Email : ranendras@yahoo.com rs-sawan1@navy.gov.in	Cash Award of Rs.10,000/-, Certificate and entry accepted for publication.
Second	IC- 67907A Lt Col Saurabh Kumar Misra 25 MADRAS, AMS2C, MS-2,MS Branch, IHQ of MoD (Army), New Delhi-110011 Email:saurabhmisra26@gmail.com Mob : 9958364437	Certificate.

USI COUNCIL MEMBERS

FOR 01 JAN 2020 – 31 DEC 2022

The following officers, names listed in alphabetical order, have been elected to the USI Council for the period 01 Jan 2020 to 31 Dec 2022:-

1	Lt Gen Anil Kumar Ahuja PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & Bar (Retd)
2	Air Mshl Vinod Kumar Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, VrC & Bar (Retd)
3	Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)
4	Lt Gen Sarath Chand, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
5	Brig Rumel Dahiya, SM (Retd)
6	Wg Cdr Umesh Chandra Jha (Retd)
7	Maj Gen Dhruv Chand Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd)
8	Lt Gen GS Katoch, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
9	Lt Gen Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
10	Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
11	Capt Ramiah Rajagopalan, IFS (Retd)
12	Lt Gen Arun Kumar Sahni, PVSM, UYSM, SM, VSM (Retd)
13	Vice Adm Satish Soni, PVSM, AVSM, NM, (Retd)
14	Vice Adm Shekhar Sinha, PVSM, AVSM, NM & Bar (Retd)

USI LATEST PUBLICATION DURING 2018

Pub Code	Title of Book & Name of Author	Price(Rs)	Year
M-1/2018	"US National Security Strategy 2017 – A Critical Analysis" By Lt Gen PK Singh,PVSM,AVSM (Retd), Maj Gen BK Sharma, AVSM,SM (Retd) and Air Cmde (Dr) AS Bahal,VM (Retd)	195	2018
M-2/2018	"Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations – A Raging Debate, and Way Forward for the Indian Armed Forces" by Lt Gen (Dr) RS Panwar, AVSM,SM,VSM (Retd)	225	2018
M-3/2018	"PLA Reforms of XI Jingping in an Era of Assertive Diplomacy – Implications for India" By Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan,AVSM,VSM (Retd)	250	2018
OP-1/2018	"Strategic Continuum of China's Strategic behaviour : Implications for India Post the 19 th Congress of the CPC" By Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM,VSM (Retd)	150	2018
OP-2/2018	"India-China Informal Summit, Inter-Korea Summit : Assessing the Outcomes" By Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM,VSM (Retd)	150	2018
OP-3/2018	"Towards an Effective and Viable Information Warfare (IW) Structure For the Indian Armed Forces" By Lt Gen (Dr) RS Panwar, AVSM,SM,VSM (Retd)	195	2018
OP-4/2018	"A Critical Appraisal of Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Operations" By Col Shaman Chodha	150	2018
R-91	"China's Faultlines – Implications and Lessons" By Brig Sandeep Jain M/s GB Books	995	2018
R-92	"TRAJECTORY OF RED ARMY'S UNMANNED WARFARE" By Mr Anshuman Narang M/s GB Books	1295	2018
R-93	"CHINA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN – ONE OCEAN, MANY STRATEGIES" By Cdr MH Rajesh M/s Pentagon Press	1495	2018
R-94	"STRATEGIC YEAR BOOK 2018" Edited by Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Maj Gen BK Sharma,AVSM,SM & Bar (Retd) and Dr Roshan Khanijo	1495	2018
R-95	"Will Tibet Ever Find Her Soul Again? - India Tibet Relations 1947-1962, Part -2" By Claude Arpi	1550	2018
R-96	"Ground Based Air Defence In India – Challenges and Opportunities" By Lt Gen (Dr) VK Saxena, PVSM,AVSM,VSM (Retd) M/s Pentagon Press	995	2018
R-97	"India-Uzbekistan Partnership in Regional Peace and Stability – Challenges and Prospects" By Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, Dr Batir Tursunov & Mr Gaurav Kumar	795	2018
CAFHR-37	"The Iconic Battle Of Saragarhi – Echoes Of The Frontier" by Brig Karwanjit Singh (Retd) M/s Pentagon Press	995	2018
A-1/2018	"Combating Cyber Threat" By Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	595	2018
A-2/2018	"Dragon De-Mystified : Understanding People's Republic of China" By Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)	795	2018
NSP-36	"Multi-Domain Warfare in the Indian Context" By Lt Gen PR Kumar, PVSM,AVSM,VSM (Retd)	195	2018
NSS-64	"From Contest to Cooperation – A Vision for Shared Prosperity in the Indo-Pacific Region" Edited by Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM,VSM (Retd) & Gp Capt Sharad Tewari, VM (Retd)	850	2018

* Available at USI of India ** Available at M/s Vij Books of India Pvt Ltd

USI

(Estd. 1870)

OUR ACTIVITIES

Library and Reading Room

The library holds over 68,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material. Library was automated in 2002.

Correspondence Courses

The Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

USI Journal

The *USI Journal* is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. In an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation

The Erstwhile Centre for Research and its resources have been merged into the new Centre named as USI Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (USI-CS3) wef 01 January 2005. The Centre aims at conducting detailed and comprehensive enquiry, research and analyses of national and international security related issues, and gaming and simulation of strategic scenarios, to evolve options for wider discussion and consideration.

MEMBERSHIP

The following are eligible to become members of the Institution :

- Officers of the Armed Forces
- Class I Gazetted Officers of Group 'A' Central Services.
- Any category mentioned above will be eligible even though retired or released from the Service.
- Cadets from the NDA and Cadets from the Service Academies and Midshipmen.

For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, (Opposite Signals Enclave) Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi – 110 057

USI Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

The Centre was established in 2000 and functioned with USI till Aug 2014, when it moved out of USI premises and was delinked from USI. Its aims were organising workshops, seminars and training capsules for peace-keepers, observers and staff officers – both Indian and foreign. It also oversaw the practical training of Indian contingents. It functioned under a Board of Management headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and worked in close coordination with the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence. In August 2014, CUNPK moved out to the accommodation allotted by the Army HQ.

Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR)

The Centre was established on 01 Dec 2000 and encourages study and research into the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets such as strategy, tactics, logistics, organisation and socio-economic aspects and their implementation.

Gold Medal Essay Competitions

Every year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions: one for officers below 10 years of service and the other open to all officers. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

Lt Gen SL Menezes Memorial Essay Competition

This has been instituted from 2015 on a subject related to Armed Forces Historical Research. The Essay Competition is open to all across the globe.

Lectures, Discussions and Seminars

A series of lectures, discussions and seminars on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

MacGregor Medal

This medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.