

# U.S.I. JOURNAL

**INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS**

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### *USI National Security Lecture 2017*

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| Future of Nation State Concept in the Era of Global Interdependence: Options for India in Indo-Pacific | - Major General Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd)           |
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| Coming – Chinese Tide in the India Ocean   | - Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) |

**OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2017**

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| **R-86   | "Strategic Vision 2030 : Security and Development of<br>Andaman & Nicobar Islands"<br>By Air Marshal PK Roy, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd)<br>& Cmde Aspi Cawasji, NM, VSM (Retd) | 850        | 2017 |

\*\* Available from Vij Books

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
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**Editor**

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1. Members are welcome to forward original articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. **Articles should preferably not exceed 2,500 words.** These should be forwarded in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a CD/DVD as a Word document. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternatively, articles may be sent through e-mail on [dde@usiofindia.org](mailto:dde@usiofindia.org). The author should render a certificate that the article has neither been published in print or online, nor has it been offered to any other agency for publication. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations.
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3. Abbreviations if any, should be used in their expanded form the first time and indicated in brackets.
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5. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his/her article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

## GUIDE TO WRITING ENDNOTES

1. Endnotes are notes added to the main body of a paper or an article, in which the author directs readers to sources referred to or to add extra comments of his or her own. Endnotes are placed at the end of the paper/article. A superscript number (<sup>1,2,3,4,.....</sup>) at the end of the sentence signals the reader to look for the corresponding endnote at the end of the article. The endnotes should be numbered consecutively, starting from '1'. Citations should include the author's name, title of the book (in italics), publishing information (in parenthesis) and pages consulted, all separated by commas. For example :-

<sup>1</sup> Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy : A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style*, (Oxford University Press, London, 1988), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Lina Bolzoni and Pietro Corsi, *The Culture Memory*, (Bologna : Societa editrice il Mulino, 1992), p. 45.

2. Use of *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, and *loc. cit.*

*Ibid.* refers to the immediate preceding reference; *op. cit.* refers to the prior reference by the same author and *loc. cit.* is used instead of *op. cit.* when reference is made to a work previously cited and to the same page in that work. For example :-

<sup>4</sup> R Poirer, *Learning Physics*, (Academic, New York, 1993), p.4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> T Eliot, *Astrophysics*, (Springer, Berlin, 1989), p. 141.

<sup>7</sup> R Millan, *Art of Latin Grammar*, (Academic, New York, 1997), p.23.

<sup>8</sup> Eliot, *op. cit.*, p.148.

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3. Where websites have been used to access information, the complete web address of the website should be cited, followed by the date the website was accessed by the author. For example :-

<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1497degama.html>.  
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During this period a total of 41 new books have been added. Details of the new book are available on USI Website.

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Members interested in undertaking research projects may submit research proposals to USI (CS3 / CAFHR). At present, six chairs have been instituted in CS3; namely, Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair, Admiral RD Katari Chair, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair, Prof DS Kothari DRDO Chair, Ministry of External Affairs Chair, Flying Officer Amandeep Singh Gill Chair and two Chairs in CAFHR namely; Maharana Pratap Chair and Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair. Copies of the Rules for Award of Fellowship Grants and Conduct of Research are available on the USI Website.

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### **New USI Members**

During the period 01 Oct – Dec 2017, 28 registered as New Life Members ; 03 Ordinary Members renewed their membership and 11 registered as new Ordinary Members.

### **Course Members**

During the same period, 128 Officers registered for Course Membership.



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## NOTE

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## **From Director's Desk**

**Dear Members,**

1. The end of the year is a time for introspection, reflection and contemplation for us at the USI. I have great satisfaction in assuring you that, in spite of our limited resources in manpower and finances, we have been able to keep pace with developments taking place nationally and internationally. Whatever we have achieved during the year was possible due to the support we received from the Service Chiefs, who are our Vice-Patrons, Council Members, members of various Boards of Management and senior members of the Institution. The Report of the President of the USI Council for 2017, which is available on the USI website, gives an idea of the multi-faceted activities that we carried out.

2. The Col Pyara Lal Memorial Library is a repository of remarkable reference material and we added 735 books to it this year. The USI Journal, which has been digitised since January 2017, continues to provide members with a forum to express views and keep abreast with developments related to strategy, national security and international relations. The articles from its archives continue to be sought out by the scholars and researchers from all over the world. With online access, the Journal now has a global appeal.

3. The Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation under the able guidance of Maj Gen BK Sharma, AVSM, SM\*\* (Retd), Deputy Director Research, has created a niche for itself in the field of Net Assessment and formulating long-term strategic thought. The focus of the Centre continues to be on quality research, conduct of strategic gaming exercises, scholar presentations, publication of books and its outreach programmes at the national and international levels. Its internship programmes have gained tremendous popularity. The Centre signed four Memorandums of Understanding this year including those with the Army War College, USA and the Centre for Military Research and Monitoring, Kabul, Afghanistan. The annual international security seminar which was held for the ninth consecutive year attracted participants from twelve countries. During the year three strategic gaming exercises, two for the National Defence College and one for the Army War College, as well as seven strategic workshops for foreign diplomats attending

courses at the Foreign Service Institute were conducted. The two editions of the Strategic Year Book published in 2016 and 2017 received wide acclaim and we are in the process of bringing out the 2018 Edition of the Strategic Year Book.

4. The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR), under the stewardship of Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina, MBE has proactively continued its efforts to highlight the role played by the Indian Armed Forces during the First World War. This year the CAFHR was associated with conceptualising the Dehradun Literary Festival and the Chandigarh Military Literature Festival. The USI also participated in both the events. During the year, the CAFHR also undertook the Bangladesh Liberation War Museum Project and a Indo-Belgium Project under which a joint exhibition was held at the Manekshaw Centre during the visit of the King and Queen of Belgium in November 2017. The CAFHR has also undertaken a project to build an Indian Armed Forces Memorial in France for which land has been gifted by the people of France in the village of Villers – Guislain. The plans for the memorial were unveiled at an impressive ceremony on 02 Dec 2017 by the Mayor of Villers – Guislain which was attended by Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina, Secretary CAFHR. It is a matter of great pride that Sqn Ldr Chhina was earlier awarded the “MBE” by the British Government and now the “Officer of the Order of Leopold” by the Belgian Government for his efforts in promoting a better understanding between the people of our two countries.

5. Like the previous years, the course section under Maj Gen SB Asthana, SM, VSM (Retd) is continuing to do excellent work towards the professional advancement of the serving officers and helping them prepare for their promotion examinations and for the DSSC/TSOC entrance examinations. The results achieved this year too were outstanding. The Chief Instructor and the team of dedicated serving and retired officers deserve commendation for the yeoman service that they are rendering.

6. The UN Cell of the USI which was established last year under the guidance of Lt Gen Chander Prakash, SM, VSM (Retd), Deputy Director and Editor, with the objective of addressing the policy and doctrinal issues of UN Peacekeeping is functioning very well. Our partnership with the Challenges Forum, Sweden and the Peace Capacities Network, Norway continues to be strong

and our participation in national and international events is increasing. We are partnering with “UN Women” to conduct an International Integrated Training Programme on “Mainstreaming Gender in UN Peacekeeping to End Conflict Related Sexual Violence.”

7. Major General PK Goswami, VSM (Retd), Deputy Director (Administration) and his team from the Administrative Branch have worked silently and tirelessly to support all the activities undertaken by the USI. I would like to take this opportunity to record my appreciation for the team for their utmost dedication and the excellent work done by them.

8. I would also like to acknowledge the excellent services provided by the Residency Resorts to the members, visitors and delegations. I commend the staff of Residency Resorts for their efficiency, politeness and thank them for the excellent services being provided by them.

9. Finally, I thank the esteemed members of the USI, who have been actively participating in activities organised by our prestigious Institution in the year gone by. It gives us great pleasure and satisfaction when we have good participation especially from the serving community at events organised by us. The attendance is of mutual benefit. I urge members to spread a word around about the activities planned by us and encourage others to also attend. We also welcome attendance by others who are not members of the USI.

10. May I request you to regularly access and browse the USI Website: [www.usiofindia.org](http://www.usiofindia.org) to keep yourself updated on activities conducted /planned. We greatly value suggestions and feedback. Should there be any, they could be conveyed to the Deputy Director and Editor by email or post. We also look forward to meeting and interacting with you in person whenever you come to the USI.

11. The staff of USI and I wish you and your families “A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR” and we pray for your happiness and good health in the coming year.

With best wishes,

Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)  
Director USI

## Editorial

The subject for 33<sup>rd</sup> National Security Lecture for this year was 'Media as a Force Multiplier for National Security'. Dr Sanjaya Baru, former Media Adviser to the Prime Minister of India, currently the Secretary General of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Senior Distinguished Fellow of the United Service Institution of India (USI) delivered the lecture. General Bipin Rawat, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC, Chief of the Army Staff attended the lecture as the Guest of Honour. Dr Sanjaya Baru covered a wide canvas of issues that included – political and business context in which the media operates, the changing nature of media itself, relationship between media and national interests, and the role of strategic communications and media strategy for the government as a whole. The message from the lecture was quite clear i.e. "the media today is an extremely competitive business enterprise with diverse ownership and readership and there is a fundamental change in the objectives of the media. Therefore, only elite consensus can ensure that it acts as a force multiplier for national security". He acknowledged the balanced coverage by the Indian media during the Doklam standoff which gave space to the government, the Armed Forces and diplomacy to work together and made the Indian government's position strong.

The term "Indo-Pacific" in place of the "Asia-Pacific" of late has been of much talk both in the diplomatic as well the security circles across the globe. Indo-Pacific includes South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Recently, the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, talked of the need to support a "free, open and thriving Indo-Pacific". He described the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a "single strategic arena", with India and the United States as "bookends" within this region. It seems that the American intent is to elevate India to the status of a rising global superpower that is able to contain China. It is, thus, evident that India no longer can be excluded from any over-arching reckoning in the Indo-Pacific, be it economic or security related. Shri Yogendra Kumar, IFS (Retd) in the article 'Indo-Pacific Developments and Future Challenges' has carried out an analyse of the major strategic developments in

the region and highlighted the prevailing tensions and challenges that are likely to spill over to the Indian Ocean Region from both the sides i.e. the South China Sea and the Mediterranean.

The next article is on the 'Future of Nation State Concept in the Era of Global Interdependence: Options for India in the Indo-Pacific' by Major General Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd). The author argues that the current World Order is in a state of flux and the emerging World Order is tending towards multi-polarity wherein the Middle Powers and Rising Powers, in particular the smaller States of the Global South due to the nature of global interdependence, need to remain vigilant so that their core national interests are protected. The author makes a case for a regional multilateral federal structure among the States in the Indo-Pacific so that there is better inter-connectivity, social and economic cohesion in this region. In the author's reckoning such a scenario provides an opportunity for this Regional Structure to be a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific.

The strategic and economic significance of the western Indo-Pacific Region is continuously growing. The western Indo-Pacific incorporates some of the busiest sea lanes in the world. The statistics of the trade and oil flow through this Region are testimony to this fact. The trade has surged especially with the rise of Asian powers like China and India. The rise in commerce has created political and strategic interests along with some concerns. With the rise of China and its assertive maritime behaviour, some of these interests would be under threat. Shri Asoke Kumar Mukerji, IFS (Retd), in the next article "India: The 'Western Beacon' of the Indo-Pacific Region", post the reference by the US Secretary of States to India as the "Western Beacon" of the Indo-Pacific views it is an opportunity for India to pursue her core national interests in the western Indo-Pacific Region, and he also underlines the importance of building peace, security and prosperity in a holistic manner. In this regard, he highlights the requirement to have an interface between the security and policy structures of the United States and India.

China has embarked on a massive expansion of its Navy to extend its global reach. She, in the last few years has built up



naval capacity, bases and relationships in the Indian Ocean Region, and is poised to become a pre-eminent maritime power in the Region. Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean has touched a new high in recent months. The PLA-N's growing area of operations in this region places it in direct competition to India's defined interests. However, some analysts are of the view that the PLA-N and its current force structure is aimed at securing the South China Sea and East China Sea, which it claims as its territories and is embattled in a bitter dispute with neighbouring countries as well as the US. Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) in the next article 'Coming - Chinese Tide in the Indian Ocean' has carried out analysis of various reports, in particular those emanating from the Chinese media related to the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, and has concluded that there is little doubt that China is embarking on a path to militarise the Indian Ocean Region akin to the South China Sea.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 19th Party Congress, a twice per decade event, in Beijing from 18 – 25 Oct 2017, to set the party's national policy goals and elect its top leadership. At this Congress, President Xi Jinping cemented his status and elevated his thoughts on governance to a new level with their inclusion in the Party Constitution. Xi Jinping announced that China has entered a "new era" in establishing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The words "new" and "innovation" featured quite prominently in his discourse. Xi stated that "The Chinese nation ... has stood up, grown rich, and become strong – and it now embraces the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation ... It will be an era that sees China moving closer to centre stage and making greater contributions to mankind". These words need to be taken in all their seriousness. The next article 'Nineteenth Party National Conference: Xi Sets Course for Ushering China into New Era' by Major General GG Dwivedi, SM, VSM & Bar, Ph D (Retd) brings out that for the long term survival of "one party system", China to sustain its fast pace of growth is an inescapable imperative; not to mention the challenges it faces. Some of the implications in this regard have been vividly brought out.

Traditionally bilateral relations between India and Afghanistan have been strong and friendly. Having committed a US \$2.3 billion



aid programme, India is one of the largest donors to Afghanistan, investing in the economy, humanitarian aid, education, development, construction and electrical projects. India has financed and built Afghanistan's Parliament, helped to rebuild the hydroelectric Salma Dam in western Herat province. India has also built a 133-mile highway linking Afghanistan to Iran. Afghan diplomats, administrators and soldiers come to India for professional training. There is a positive perception of India's role in Afghanistan. The next article 'India's Growing Presence in Afghanistan: Manifestation of its Soft Power and Diplomacy' by Shri Gaurav Dixit brings out that stability in Afghanistan is crucial to its national interest and is reflective of its core values and belief in non-interference and non-coercion. The author views that India's soft power policies, with subtle elements of hard power (termed as smart power) have had a positive impact and are effective.

National Cadet Corps (NCC) which had started with just 20,000 cadets in 1948 today has a strength of around 13 lakh cadets. NCC was raised on 15 July 1948 based on the National Cadet Corps Act of 1948 with the objective to make up for the shortage in the Army. It was given an inter-service make-over in 1950 when the Air Wing was added, followed by the Naval Wing in 1952. During Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the 1971 War, NCC cadets were second line of defence. They assisted the ordnance factories in supplying arms and ammunition, and were also employed as patrol parties to capture enemy paratroopers. The NCC cadets also worked hand in hand with the Civil Defence authorities and actively took part in rescue works and traffic control. The aims of NCC, as spelt out in 1988, are to develop discipline, character and brotherhood, the spirit of adventure and ideals of selfless service amongst young citizens. It also aims to enlighten leadership qualities among the youth who will serve the Nation regardless of which career they choose. Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht, AVSM, VSM and Bar (Retd) in the next article 'National Cadet Corps – The Silent Contributor to Nation Building and National Security' makes a case for harnessing of the youth power of the largest uniformed organisation of the world for Nation Building and National Security and makes some useful recommendations on enhancing NCC's effectiveness.

The last article in this Issue is on 'Decision Dilemmas in UN Peacekeeping' by Lieutenant Colonel RR Laddha. Notwithstanding the authorisation of robust mandates by the UN Security Council and well defined Rules of Engagement, the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations remains a grey area. At the tactical level it always raises decision dilemmas as the UN peacekeepers operate on a cardinal principle of "Do No Harm" and collateral damage is not acceptable. The red line between what a peacekeeper is required to 'do and not do' is very thin. The author in this article has done a case study of four incidents in South Sudan and brought out the challenges with respect to identification of target, judging hostile intent, pre-emptive self-defence and also protection of men of armed group seeking protection at the UN bases. On many occasions the UN peacekeepers have been blamed for inaction. The author views that 'it is better to be blamed for action than inaction' as 'peacekeeping is not a soldier's job but only a soldier can do it'.

Read on .....

## **Indian Armed Forces Memorial – France**

A project to build an Indian Armed Forces Memorial in France is being undertaken by the USI CAFHR as a part of the India and the Great War centenary commemoration project. It consists of the Indian National Emblem of the Ashoka Lions in bronze and is the second such overseas national memorial in the world, highlighting the sacrifice of Indian servicemen in the cause of world peace.

The suggestion of a suitable memorial was mooted by senior USI members and land for the memorial has since been gifted by the people of France in the village of Villers-Guislain on the site of the battlefield of Cambrai where Indian cavalry regiments were heavily involved in Nov/Dec 1917. Lance Dafadar Gobind Singh, 28th Light Cavalry, attached to 2nd Lancers, won the Victoria Cross for his death defying feats of gallantry close to the site on 01 Dec 1917.

On 02 Dec 2017, at an impressive ceremony attended by representatives of the USI and the Indian Embassy in France, the plans for the Memorial were formally unveiled. The ceremony was organised by Mr Gérard Allart, Mayor of Villers-Guislain and was supported by the Embassy of India in France. It was attended by over 300 people including young school children, veterans and local residents along with representatives of the USI and the Indian Embassy. In a moving ceremony, the French school children commemorated the role of the Indian soldiers on the Western Front during World War I by singing and playing the Indian National Anthem. The enthusiasm and dedication of all involved was most commendable.

During the ceremony, the Mayor recalled the supreme sacrifice, valour and dedication of the Indian soldiers who had fought for the freedom of France a century ago. He lamented the fact that despite heavy casualties there was not a single Indian grave or memorial in the area, as none of the bodies of those brave soldiers could be recovered from the battlefields. He stated

that it was incumbent upon the present and future generations to never forget this sacrifice.

In addressing the gathering Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina, MBE (Retd), Secretary USI CAFHR expressed his gratitude to the people of France for their magnificent gesture and expressed the hope that the memorial would serve not only to honour the memory of those brave Indian soldiers, sailors and airmen who fell in the line of duty but would also be a permanent reminder of the strong ties that exist between the two nations.

The Memorial is planned to be inaugurated on 29 Sep 2018, on the day the village was liberated from the Germans a 100 years ago.



**Photograph of the ceremony held in France on 02 Dec 2017**



**French children commemorating the role of  
Indian soldiers at the ceremony**

## **Media as a Force Multiplier for National Security**

**Dr Sanjaya Baru®**

**G**eneral PK Singh, General Bipin Rawat, Excellences, ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be back at this podium at USI once again and it is always a pleasure to address the distinguished audience here. My interest in the interface between media and national security was actually a product of my membership of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) between 1999 and 2001 when I was the Editor of Financial Express and, therefore, very closely connected to the media. As a member of NSAB I had the opportunity, during the Kargil War, to interact with National Security Adviser (NSA), who at that time was the late Shri Brijesh Mishra, as well as several senior leaders of the Armed Forces. It is that experience that really got me interested in the role of the media as an instrument of national security. What I would say today may be a bit dated as I have been out of the media for six to seven years, and the media in India has changed considerably since then. In my time there was no social media which is now so very important. I must also apologise to some of you who may have been at the National Defence College (NDC) earlier last year when I spoke for the first time on this subject and a lot of what I say today may be a repetition of what I had said then because in many ways the issues are the same. My talk will cover four issues – one is the political and business context in which the media operates; second, the changing nature of media itself; third, the relationship between media and national interest or national security and lastly, the role of strategic communication and media strategy, not just for the Armed Forces but for the Government as a whole.

The most important change in the nature of the Indian media in the post-Independence period has been that the business and

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®This is an edited version of the 33<sup>rd</sup> National Security Lecture delivered at USI on 06 Dec 2017 by **Dr Sanjaya Baru**, former Media Adviser to the Prime Minister of India. He has also served as the Editor of the Business Standard, Chief Editor of The Financial Express and Associate Editor of The Economic Times and The Times of India. Presently, he is Secretary-General at Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) since 01 Sep 2017.

the political context in which the media today operates is fundamentally different from the context in which it was operating between 1947 and 1977 – the first thirty years after Independence. It was a period of general political consensus, what sociologists call the elite consensus, on a variety of national security issues. Just to give you an example, as a school going kid at the time of 1965 War, the government had decided that everybody would stand up when the national anthem would be played at the end of a movie. That was the first time that the playing of national anthem in movie theatres had begun. Nobody objected and everybody stood up; there was no Supreme Court or the judiciary asking you to do so. It was a natural thing that everybody stood up for the national anthem. This was because there was a certain 'elite consensus' that this was the way you expressed solidarity with the Nation and the Armed Forces at that time. Today, we see that when a similar decision is announced, there is criticism in the media and within the political class; and what it reflects is what I call as the breakdown of 'elite consensus'.

The media today has become far more competitive and far more diverse in its ownership, and readership. It reflects the enormous diversity both, in the nature of our political class and the nature of the business class. We saw this diversity emerging in the 1980s, essentially after the emergency. Several things unfolded in the politics of the country; the emergence of regionalism in politics, caste based parties and religion based politics – all of this is the phenomenon of late 1970s and 1980s. Eighties was a decade of tremendous social tension but it was also a decade of flowering of the Indian media – the emergence of large corporate interests in the media, the emergence of corporate investments in media and a fundamental change in the nature of media. This political change and the change in the nature of media happened over a decade and by the beginning of the nineties we were dealing with a completely different scenario - both in terms of the politics of the country and structure and nature of media.

The media, no longer by the end of the early nineties was seen as the Fourth Estate. The traditional way in which the media is viewed in democracies is that it is a part of the democratic system – the executive, the judiciary, the legislature and the media as the Fourth Estate. That role of the media as the Fourth Estate ended in the nineties when the media became increasingly a



business. People invested in the media in order to earn profit – whether in print or television or even radio. In the early nineties, private radio came up. So the transition that happened in the Indian media, economic policies and politics of the country, resulted in the transformation of the media being seen as the Fourth Estate – as an institution of larger civil society under the State – into another business enterprise. ‘You are successful if you get money’ – that was the basis on which media was judged. Second thing that happened, essentially in the nineties and thereafter, was tremendous proliferation of the media. It was partly because of rising literacy levels, because of which the Indian language media became increasingly important.

I remember when I joined the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in 2004, I went and called on one of my distinguished predecessors, Shri HY Sharada Prasad who was the Media and Information Adviser to Mrs Indira Gandhi for over 15 years, and he told me that he used to deal with only five Editors - Times of India, Hindustan Times, Statesman, The Indian Express and The Hindu and nobody else; and that if he could manage and influence them, the media was taken care of. In 2004, I was already dealing with dozens of not only English media but also scores of Indian language print and television media. The numbers are quite staggering. If you see the total number of registered newspapers by 2016, it is over one lakh ten thousand. In English language alone there are ten thousand registered newspapers. This huge proliferation of media means that the ability of the institutions of the State to be able to influence the message going through the media becomes weaker and weaker. Earlier when it was a highly concentrated ownership and very few components of the media mattered, it was possible for the institutions of the State to deal with the media. So not only do you have a breakdown of complete consensus, and also the emergence of business interests in the media, but you also have an enormous proliferation of the media. All these taken together, create an environment in which it becomes increasingly difficult for any institution to manage the media.

In my judgment, today we have complete anarchy. There is a view in some sections that the media is highly controlled; that the ruling party or the government of the day controls the media. This is utterly wrong. If you look at the country as a whole, the Indian language television and the Indian language print media, it



seems implausible that anybody can control this media. Ours is one of the most free democracies in the world in which the ability to shape the opinion within the media is not in one person's or any one political party's hands. Now, with that kind of proliferation of the media, if you had elite consensus on any basic issues of national security and national interest, foreign policy, social policy, then at least through that consensus we could have preserved some consensus within the media. Nations are created and nationalism sustained when the people who think alike, go to the similar kinds of education institutions, grow up in similar social environment and with similar kinds of social attitudes etc. But, when you have the kind of anarchy and diversity that we have in our country; the kind of complete business orientation that we have, I cannot imagine that any one institution or individual would be in a position to control the media. So, actually we have a situation today where the ability for organised messaging through the media is virtually non-existent and this opinion of mine would be contrary to the view of a lot of people who imagine that we have a highly controlled media.

One of the challenges of the institutions of the State and media management is that is no clear definition of the 'Right to Freedom of Expression'. Article 19 (1) (a) guarantees the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. It is this Article under which the media operates and exercises its intellectual freedom. But Article 19 (2) states that nothing in Sub Clause 1 (A) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said Sub-Clause in the interest of (a) the sovereignty and integrity of India, (b) the security of the State, (c) friendly relations with foreign States, (d) public order, decency and morality, and (e) or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement one affects. Now how does one define any of these? How does one decide what is against the sovereignty and integrity of the State of India? What act of an individual, newspaper or television channel would violate this? And who decides? Generally we all know but, specifically how do you define this? What act short of actually undertaking subversive activity, terrorist activity or inciting the Armed Forces would define an act against the State? Regarding friendly relations with foreign States, which are these friendly States? There are 140 odd

countries, if Indian media criticises China, as it happened during Doklam standoff, do we arrest media persons because they are harming Indo-China relations? Obviously not, because the media is serving the Indian national interests. But the Chinese say that it's our media that is spoiling the India-China bilateral relations. So who decides what are friendly relations with a foreign State? Can Indian media criticise Donald Trump? Does criticising Donald Trump amount to harming friendly relations with a foreign State? Public order, decency or morality – who decides what is morality? If a person wears inappropriate clothes in a conservative part of the country is he/she liable to be arrested under this clause? Or a portrayal of these kinds of photographs banned from publication?

So the point I am trying to make is that we have not very clearly defined what is freedom of expression; what is the legitimate way of expressing freedom of expression and what is illegitimate; what is against the national interest and what is acceptable. It is because of this lack of clarity in the basic constitutional framework that a lot of litigation happen and some people get away with a lot of things because it is up to the judge to interpret each of these clauses. A number of times when media transgresses what many of us would regard as the bounds of national interest, there is no legal basis to control the media. So adding to what I have said in terms of lack of elite consensus, proliferation of media, role of business interest in media, we also have a lack of clarity in the legal framework. So, all these factors complicate the way in which someone, who is responsible for dealing with the media in the interest of the nation and national security, has to operate.

One of the questions that I was often asked when I was in the PMO was – Do we have a media strategy in the government? I discovered soon enough that we don't. There is nobody in the government who has been charged with the responsibility of evolving a communication strategy for the Indian Government and for the Indian State. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is alone handling various issues about publications and licenses etc. and about the day to day public communication of what the government is doing. But, there is no institution that has the responsibility for strategic communication. I remember my friend, Commodore Uday Bhaskar, once writing a note when I was in the PMO suggesting that we should have a STRATCOM Division

within the government and that the strategic communication should be developed as a professional field of activity. I think when Shri Shivshankar Menon was the NSA, he pushed this idea, but I don't think the idea that, somebody should be charged with the mission of developing a strategy for the government and implement it, went very far.

Let me cite you three examples of the importance of a strategic communication. First is an example from the Kargil War. When the Kargil conflict began, I was the Editor of the Financial Express and also a member of the NSAB. The NSA that time, Shri Brijesh Mishra, took the decision to request the NSAB, which was being chaired at that time by Shri K Subramaniam, to create a small group that would advise the NSA on a daily basis. The task was to monitor on a daily basis what was happening and deliberate on different ideas which were then put up to the NSA. My job was to monitor the media and give ideas on media management. One idea that I had suggested and was implemented was that instead of the Army spokesperson briefing the media, the External Affairs spokesperson who was also in the Defence Ministry, late Shri Raminder Singh Jassal should be asked to do this, for the reason that MEA personnel were well trained in dealing with the media. Some of you would recall Raminder's daily briefings to the media. It was an extremely important intervention in the public discourse because public opinion was being shaped by the media. It was the first time that media had ended up in the zone of conflict. It became very important for the government to control the media messaging and this was a good example of a successful media management, except for criticism of Ms Barkha Dutt's coverage at that time, by and large it was a successful management of way the MEA, MoD and Army Headquarters worked together and prepared a daily media brief. It was a successful case of strategic communication during the War.

The complete opposite was the attack in Mumbai on 26 Nov 2008. It was not war but a near war-like situation, with the city under siege by trained personnel from the enemy territory. Various security agencies were involved in dealing with that situation. But, there was complete chaos as far as media management was concerned. So, you contrast Kargil to Mumbai; the way in which the government responded in both the cases in terms of strategic

communication, Mumbai 26/11 was a complete failure of media strategy. In fact, there was no strategy. There were multiple actors, both from the Centre and the State, there were multiple messages going out and the enemy benefited from that. But on a positive side, I would say that, in the recent Doklam episode, in my view as a person from outside, what impressed me was the fact that there seemed to be some consistency in the Indian media. For the first time the Chinese were not in a position to say that the Indian media is inciting the government, which was one of the criticisms they had during the Depsang standoff and were pushing the government to take decisions which according to them were not sustainable. During Doklam, the Indian media was very balanced in their coverage, giving space to the Government, the Armed Forces and Diplomacy to work together and in a manner in which at the end of the day our position got stronger in that engagement. I would be very happy to learn from someone who was within the system if there was strategy, coordination and management of the messaging. Doklam is an example of successful strategic communication.

I would like to say just two more things before I conclude. If you ask me, "Is media a force multiplier for the national security?" Unfortunately my message would not be very optimistic. What I am saying is that in the absence of an elite consensus, the context of extreme commercialisation of the media, the huge diversity of the media, inability or the incompetence of the governmental system to deal with it etc. I don't see a strategy for using media as a force multiplier for national security. There are episodic examples of some successful handling of certain situations; but overall I don't see any strategy because I don't see an institution charged with this responsibility, which would be the institution of the government that would actually develop a national strategic communication plan. But going forward, I would say that there is some recognition of this, both in the private sector and in the media. There is a flurry of activity; recently Zee TV launched an international news channel called WION, where I see some focus on projecting the Indian view point, internationally. But at home, I do not see any such consensus within the media on what is in the interest of the nation. Is the constant telecasting of news about terrorism in the national interest? It is this basic question we have to ask ourselves. Every day we talk about terrorism and India-Pakistan relations. Is this

India's biggest national security challenge? I draw your attention to the speeches of several of the Indian Prime Ministers who have said that India's biggest national security challenge is from China. Is there recognition of this in the media? As Secretary General of a Business Chamber today, I can tell you that it is Indian media that is constantly projecting terrorism as the biggest challenge and this is not in the interest of the Indian business. Who would invest in a country where media projects terrorism as the biggest problem? The investors would always prefer countries with a safe domestic environment. It is not in our national interest to suggest that national security is under threat on a daily basis through the media; because it is not. India is capable of handling the security challenges it faces externally, be it from China or Pakistan or anywhere else. Our security challenges at home are law and order, extremism, violence against women etc. When there is conflict, of course then border becomes the focus; but on a daily basis I cannot accept the view that India's biggest security challenge is terrorism.

If our economy doesn't grow at the rate of 8, 9 or 10 per cent over the next 20 years, our influence in Asia will wane. The power today no longer flows from the barrel of the gun. It flows from the bank balance. It is economic power of a country that today is the only currency in the world. The fact is that the total defence budget of the US is more than that of the defence budget of the next nine powers including China and Russia. But today, the US is being challenged in the market with China. We are being challenged in market space. As a person in this field, I can tell you that the biggest challenge for India is industrialisation. For the last 25 years we have been saying that our share of manufacturing should be increased from 16 per cent of GDP to 25 per cent of GDP. It has not moved, it remains at 16 per cent. Therefore, we need to understand the issues related to the national interests in a holistic manner and the nature of the beast that Indian media is and the complex dynamics of both the Indian State and the media.

Thank you.

# Indo-Pacific: Developments and Future Challenges

Shri Yogendra Kumar, IFS (Retd)<sup>®</sup>

## Introduction

The 'Indo-Pacific' is essentially the area of US Pacific Command's (PACOM) responsibilities. The region has also been variously referred to as 'Asia-Pacific' and 'Indo-Asia-Pacific'; basically, these expressions also cover PACOM's area of responsibility even as these include the continental landmass which the security system created by the US is envisaged to cover. The use of 'Indo' reflects a certain envisaged role for India in the US perspective in enforcing its security system in the region.

However, from the Indian point of view, it is worth noting that PACOM's area of responsibility, whilst covering most of the Pacific Ocean, does not cover the entire Indian Ocean where a line stretching from the India-Pakistan coastal boundary separates it from that of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). Again, in terms of India's maritime security priorities, one can think of five sub- regions; namely, western Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf as well as the Bab-el-Mandeb, eastern Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, East China Sea and Western Pacific up to Guam.

One needs to be conscious of these sub-regions because of their own dynamics and regional governance mechanisms which may overlap but are not inter-locked. Each of these sub-regions has its own power relationship with the 'local' and 'resident' powers. Whilst the security challenges may be similar, they do not have identical drivers for these dynamics which are mostly rooted in regional geopolitics. Amongst the enduring challenges driving the sub-regional geopolitics are, climate change, oceanic degradation,

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jihadist terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, human trafficking and state/sub-regional fragility. These challenges are serious with shortening time horizons which could gravely undermine any effort, national or multi-lateral, to develop a regional security order as they can only be handled on a collaborative, multinational basis with a certain sense of urgency. However, the sub-regional characteristics have another potent but variable driver in the form of an intensifying and increasingly volatile regional and global power contestation manifesting in accumulation of hard power capabilities for deployment of compellence diplomacy. This contestation manifests itself in military buildup, especially naval including submarine platforms, missiles (often nuclear capable) and offensive cyber capability. Oceanic chokepoints are part of the grand strategies of many stakeholder countries and the blocking of these chokepoints is the key element in such planning.

### **Major Strategic Developments in the Indo-Pacific**

**Chinese Geopolitical Ambitions.** China's assertive behaviour, as witnessed in recent times, is the hallmark of its growing global ambitions with their regional implications. Its geopolitical ambitions seek to shape the *status quo* by pursuing its 'Belt-and-Road-Initiative' (BRI) and the 'Maritime Silk Road' (MSR) programmes. The Chinese assertiveness is especially evident in the development of infrastructure activities in the Spratly and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea which can rapidly alter the regional balance of power should the leadership desires so. Also, the Chinese grand strategy to break out of the so-called 'First Island Chain' to counter US's containment strategy vis-à-vis China is being implemented through acquisition of requisite military capability with potential for friction in the foreseeable future. The latest Chinese military strategy, published in May 2015, envisages an expeditionary capability for the Chinese Navy for purposes of power projection in various parts of the world where China has developed strategic stakes. The Indo-Pacific ramifications of China's growing geopolitical ambitions partly, on account of the strongly nationalistic platform of the current Chinese President Xi Jinping for his domestic political consolidation finds elaboration in the subsequent paragraphs.

**Stronger Japanese Leadership.** The current Japanese leadership, represented by Prime Minister Abe, is also drawing up on a

nationalistic core as it aims to counterbalance China. It is strengthening the country's naval and coast guard capabilities. The on-going dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is resulting in nearly daily confrontation between Chinese vessels and the Japanese Coast Guard as well as the respective Air Forces. Japan is also facing the heat in the escalating crisis on the Korean peninsula. It is, therefore, taking a harder position on the nuclear and missile plans of North Korea; it is already in the range of this capability. On 29 August 2017, North Korea, threatening to launch missiles around Guam, 'tested' its *Hwasong 12* missile which flew over Japan as it broke into three pieces before falling into the sea; with a very short warning time, Japan's northern prefectures observed air-defence drills at the local community level.

**South Korean Leadership's Conciliatory Policy.** South Korea's current leadership, under the newly elected President Moon Jae-in, is following a conciliatory policy towards North Korea, aware that any conflagration in the Korean peninsula would affect it catastrophically. It is also the target of Chinese sanctions over the recent deployment of Terminal High Multitube Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile batteries. Although President Moon had expressed strong reservations about them during the Presidential election campaign and immediately thereafter; faced with growing military tension on the peninsula, he has taken steps to complete the entire deployment of these missile batteries despite Chinese and Russian opposition because of their potential capability to undermine the latter's nuclear deterrence systems. Notwithstanding, it is taking a position on the Korean crisis which is more moderate than that of the US and Japan.

**Australian Ambivalence.** The Australian Prime Minister Turnbull has taken a strong anti-Chinese stance, as evident in the recent Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, which also evoked a strong response from Chinese media. However, the extent of translation of this rhetoric into capability sufficient to put strategic pressure on China still remains to be seen. Australian White Paper (February 2016) shows a certain ambivalence towards China which was also evident in granting, in November 2015, of the 99-year lease on the Darwin Port to the Chinese company 'Land Bridge' (with direct ties to the Chinese Army) with the clearance of the Australian Ministry of Defence, but without consultation with the US which is



to use this port for rotating troops and stationing other military assets as part of its 'rebalance' stance vis-à-vis China. This decision drew a sharp retort from the US President himself.

**The Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).** ASEAN-created strategic framework is shaky and the earlier euphoria about it being in the 'driving seat' in shaping of the security architecture in South-East and East Asia seems to be over. The extensive economic ties between the countries of the region and China make it difficult to have a strong anti-China stance which would have prevented the weakening of the cohesion of the organisation. There has been low-key approach to the Spratly issue despite favourable arbitration panel judgement in the case brought up by the Philippines under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result of this judgement, there has been accelerated activity for the adoption of the framework for negotiating a Code of Conduct. The Chinese Foreign Minister said at the August ASEAN meetings in Manila that the negotiations may start if "outside parties" would not cause a major disruption following the summit-level meeting in November 2017. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Manila joint communiqué mentioned, in a somewhat stronger language, that land reclamations have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions may undermine the peace and stability of the region. A factor affecting the regional stability in the ASEAN region are the domestic developments in some of them; the domestic challenges with intra-ASEAN ramifications range from the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the conduct of military operations against Abu Sayyaf in Marawi city (Philippines), and the growing trend of jihadist terrorism in Indonesia, Malaysia and the insurgency conditions in the southern region of Thailand.

#### **New US Administration.**

- (a) A major strategic development is the advent of the US administration under President Trump. Despite his taking a stronger stance towards North Korea and China, the conflicting signals emanating from the administration at different levels, including the President himself and his key ministers, have created an atmosphere of uncertainty. Having declared the end of the policy of 'strategic patience' on North Korea, the implementation of this policy has only added to further

uncertainty as to the US intentions and the capacity to do so. President Trump's approach to policy issues, domestic or foreign, is transactional and is characterised by an eagerness to claim victory due to his domestic pressures. There is no sign that the US is willing to change its strategic stance in the Far East and Southeast Asia inherited from the previous administration but there is still no clarity, given the conflicting signals, about the ability of the US to restore strategic balance in the region to reassure its traditional allies. For the US President, the trade relations with both South Korea as well as China are being used as bargaining chips to resolve the Korean crisis but this approach seems to have only increased the level of distrust with these key countries on which the President must depend to resolve the crisis. After initial pause in the US Navy's 'Freedom of Navigation Operations' (FONOPs) in the South China Sea due to the Chinese sensitivities, these have now been resumed raising the prospect for further encounters between the US and the Chinese Navies and Air Force.

(b) President Trump claimed early victory when he suggested that North Korea did not carry out a nuclear test under US pressure when the North Korean President had accelerated missile launching activities after President Trump assumed office. Thereafter, his strong language about readiness to inflict "fire and fury", in the event of North Korea firing missiles around Guam, created an uneasy stalemate with US President and the North Korean President both claiming victory. Yet, each act of escalation on the Korean peninsula has led to frequent conversations between the US and the Chinese Presidents; US President and Japanese Prime Minister; US and South Korean Presidents and the South Korean President and the Japanese Prime Minister. Most recently, Chinese and Russian interactions have intensified and Russian President Putin has been directly engaging with the Japanese and the South Korean leaders. In parallel, there has been the US, Japanese and South Korean military mobilisation as there has been on the part of the Russian as well as the Chinese. Although each escalation by the North Korean President, determinedly pursuing his nuclear (latest being the detonation of a "hydrogen" bomb) and missile programmes to bring the

US mainland in their range, has brought out the fissures amongst the allies and tensions amongst the adversaries, the US is pressing hard for ever stronger sanctions against North Korea whilst building up the military capabilities around the Korean peninsula. This mobilisation is also suggestively aimed at China, including its vastly expanded military infrastructure in the Spratly and the Paracel Islands, accompanied by economic pressure in the form of sanctions against Chinese firms and thorough investigation of its intellectual property rights violations. The initial bonhomie between the US and the Chinese Presidents seems to have ended although the two leaders remain in contact with each other as the situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to be volatile. The US has also announced sales of weapons (missiles and torpedoes), worth USD 1.4 billion to Taiwan. The potential for instability in this region will have serious implications for India as well.

### **The Indian Ocean Region**

(a) The Indian Ocean waters are, by large, placid although beset by a large spectrum of challenges, both 'traditional' security issues as well as 'non-traditional' security issues. These are likely to be aggravated on account of the tensions of the adjacent waters spilling over into the Indian Ocean from both sides, i.e. the South China Sea and the Mediterranean. Tensions can arise if the nature of Chinese Navy's entry into the Indian Ocean is such as to disturb the existing balance of power. The sensitivities of countries to protect Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) are likely to grow in the absence of any ground rules for them.

(b) Although the Bay of Bengal region is less touched by the rivalries elsewhere, with maritime boundaries amongst the littorals having been settled, the geopolitics in the region is quickening in the wake of the opening of Myanmar to the outer world and, following the Doklam stand-off, of the possibility of an India-China maritime contestation developing there. India-Bangladesh maritime boundary delimitation has opened the opportunity for greater bilateral maritime cooperation. The Chinese expanding footprint is evident in the BRI and MSR in this region. There is an ongoing discussion

on the 'Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar' (BCIM) mechanism envisaging considerable infrastructure in this area, including port development and SEZs. Besides Sittwe in Myanmar, several others are operational with Chinese involvement, namely, Kyupkyu, Dawei, and Hambantota. The Chinese pipeline to Kyupkyu is already operational. As Myanmar is opening up, there is the presence of other big powers as well including the US, Japan etc. India is also pursuing its policy of building the infrastructure, for military use, in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Another notable nascent feature, in the Bay of Bengal region, is the acquisition of submarines by littoral countries like Bangladesh and Thailand (sourced from China) or the intention to purchase (on the part of Myanmar).

(c) The Chinese 'MSR' activities are in evidence in Sri Lanka, Pakistan (Gwadar), Maldives, Iran (Chabahar), Djibouti and the East African littoral. The Gulf regional and the wider Middle Eastern orders are experiencing considerable uncertainty which also has a critical maritime dimension. The various regional governance mechanisms, already in place for the last several years, lack capacity to address the entire spectrum of challenges mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. As these developments have significant potential balance-of-power dimension with an existential aspect, India would have to find its own strategic approach given that the previous fault lines in the Gulf region are widening. India-Pakistan relations remain perennially fraught and there is also the growing sea-based threat to India with the Pakistani decision to acquire eight submarines from China. The declared Pakistani policy of placing its nuclear weapons on its sea-based platforms not only poses a balance-of-power complexity for India but also a larger global threat of these weapons becoming 'loose nukes at sea; if we recall near-success operation by Al Qaeda to capture *PNS Zulfikar* (in 2014). India's stakes could not be higher in the unfolding events in the Gulf region involving Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, UAE, Qatar et cetera.

(d) The unfolding situation has been summed up in the 'Strategic Survey 2016: The Annual review of the Affairs', IISS, London, where it says in its opening lines, "the underpinnings of geopolitics have splintered so much in the

past year that the foundations of global order appear alarmingly weak. The strategic earthquakes have created a situation in which world leaders are in a constant state of crisis control.”<sup>1</sup>

### **Future Challenges**

In the different sub-regions outlined above, the common nature of the problems being faced is quite manifest. Yet, the degree of their aggravation and trajectory of development is specific to each individual sub-region. In East Asia and Southeast Asia, the tension could not have been higher for a variety of reasons, including the perceived uncertainty of the US policy towards the region. Whilst US relations with North Korea are witnessing increased tension, the uncertainty in the relationships between US-China, US-Japan and US-South Korea is quite considerable and that increasing brinkmanship between the players can serve as a flashpoint if some aggravation is not properly handled. In the South China Sea, the massive expansion of the existing infrastructure in the Chinese controlled land features can invite stronger US involvement and greater regional instability.

The regional governance mechanisms have become weaker, and there is no agreed ground rule for navigation where the issue of freedom of navigation and overflight is a subject of constant international discourse. These have implications also for the management of common challenges, such as climate change, maritime security and oceanic degradation. Neutralising these challenges cannot wait any longer as they can potentially destabilise the existing maritime order in the Indo-Pacific.

The situation in the Indian Ocean Region provides a window of opportunity for a more stable maritime order even as the challenges to it are constantly growing in the traditional security as well as non-traditional security domains. The capacity enhancement of the various governance mechanisms, such as, IORA, IONS, BIMSTEC et cetera demands urgent attention. The relatively stable maritime order in the Indian Ocean provides the opportunity for better exploitation of the ‘Blue Economy’ potential for India. The Bay of Bengal regional situation is easier from India’s point of view, given the presence of friendly foreign navies of the littoral countries. However, this may change after India also carries out maritime cooperation activities to enhance maritime domain

awareness as well as coordinated patrols with friendly navies; this still needs to be scaled up. India also carries out active naval diplomacy by hosting the 'MILAN' exercises as well as the 'Malabar Exercise' with the participation of US and Japan taking place alternately in the Western Pacific and the Bay of Bengal. The Gulf as well as the Bab-el- Mandeb regions remain tense due to growing regional tensions and conflicts in the Middle East. In this region beset with widening ethnic and denominational fault lines, the Indian diplomacy has to be more nuanced because its interests do not fall four-square with those of the US on account of divergent approaches despite agreement on shared challenges in the region.

**Endnote**

<sup>1</sup> Strategic Survey 2016 : The Annual Review of World Affairs, IISS, London, September 2016, p.9.

# Future of Nation State Concept in the Era of Global Interdependence: Options for India in the Indo-Pacific

Major General Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd)<sup>®</sup>

## Introduction

The extant World Order is in a state of flux in this 'Age of Strategic Uncertainties', with the US in strategic retrenchment and the European Union (EU) in an economic slowdown and internal dissonance. In this vacuum a rising, revanchist China seeks to gain more geo-strategic and geo-political space using geo-economic coercion to achieve its phase one of the Chinese Dream – a unipolar Asia within a multi-polar world. China reckons that the '*Shi*', i.e. the 'Strategic Construct of Power', is now flowing in its favour but it opines that this window is narrowing as other Middle and Rising Powers (like India, Japan, Russia, etc.) exert their own '*Shi*' to carve out their respective space in Asia.<sup>1</sup>

The recent events and trends show that the emerging World Order is tending towards multi-polarity leading to another period of jousting due to the 'balance of power'. However, the world today is very different from the previous centuries wherein such a change was preceded by a bloody carnage from a clash of arms – the '*Thucydides Trap*'.<sup>2</sup> The Cold War and globalisation since the fall of Soviet Union, and interdependence that has resulted from it, makes a clash of arms less economically viable between these powers (the North). This has led to creation of spheres of influence amongst the semi-peripheral states and smaller countries (the South) through regime change, geo-strategic compulsion or geo-economic coercion by the North, leading to 'small wars, terrorism and other such upheavals. In this flux come other Middle and Rising Powers with their own national interests to guard and expand their influence creating a combustible environment.

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This compels the review of the extant narrative of sovereign nation states, as this has not protected the South from being able to exercise their sovereign autonomous right to protect their national interests, due to the geo-strategic and geo-economic coercion by the 'Core' and 'Peripheral' powers (North). With the world in transition, and tending towards multi-polarity, there is a need to relook at the Westphalian construct of the nation state concept in the present era of global interdependence, to ensure that the South does not suffer, should the North get into an '*Economic Thucydides Trap*'.

This article aims to look at this aspect and revisit the federative and confederative principles to suggest a model for the extant International Institutions to be able to provide a balance, buttressed by a general union as subjected to some central political control; a move towards multilateralism or regional multilateralism. It would analyse the level at which such union and control would function better and the degree to which the 'sovereignty' needs to be ceded (if any) to such Institutions, leading to a balance of '*Sovereign Regional Power*' that would ensure an era of reduced strife and increased prosperity across regions and the world. It would ensure a better balance for the *Semi-Peripheral States with the Peripheral States and the Core*, thereby ensuring a balanced covariance of rewards to all. It would examine India's options, within this construct, in the Indo-Pacific region for better stability, security and economic prosperity.

### **Sovereignty and Nation-States**

Sovereignty is the full right and power of a governing body over itself, without any interference from outside sources or bodies. In political theory, sovereignty is a substantive term designating supreme authority over some polity.<sup>3</sup> The concept of absolute, unlimited sovereignty was denuded by the growth of democracy that imposed important limitations upon the power of the sovereign and of the ruling classes. The interdependence of states has further restricted the principle that 'might is right' in international affairs. Citizens and policymakers generally have recognised that there can be no peace without law and that there can be no law without some limitations on sovereignty.

The genesis of sovereign nation states can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years'



War.<sup>4</sup> The traditional view of the Westphalian system is that the Peace of Westphalia was an agreement to respect the principle of territorial integrity. In the Westphalian system, the national interests and goals of States (and later nation-states) were widely assumed to go beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States became the primary institutional agents in an interstate system of relations. The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts to impose supranational authority on European states, and led to the concept of balance of power to maintain peace and stability. Yet, as early as 1760 it was noted that such balance of power, however operated, merely preserved the States and would not guarantee peace. To be lasting, such balance needed to be buttressed by a general union subjected to a central political control.<sup>5</sup> The subsequent wars – The Seven Years War, Napoleonic Wars, Franco-German War and the two World Wars are some examples of the failure of this system.

A State is, specifically, a political and geopolitical entity, while a nation is a cultural and ethnic one. The term “nation-state” implies that the two coincide, in that a State has chosen to adopt and endorse a specific cultural group as associated with it. The concept of a nation-state can be compared and contrasted with that of the multinational state, city-state, empire, confederation, and other state formations with which it may overlap. The key distinction is the identification of a people with a polity in the nation-state. Thus, a nation state meets the following criteria:-


- (a) A defined territory;
- (b) A permanent population;
- (c) A government; and
- (d) A capacity to enter into relations with other states.<sup>6</sup>

### **Global Interdependence and Covariance of Rewards**

The remarkable events of recent times have given substance to the idea that the world is in a new age of international relations. The spread of ‘Globalisation’ has resulted in a much more integrated ‘Global Interdependence’, that has resulted in the use of geo-economic coercion and geo-strategic compulsions to gain strategic space, and a declining use of conventional full scale war. Nonetheless, it still has perpetuated ‘Small Wars’, insurgencies,

terrorism and asymmetric wars. As such, this interdependence is not balanced and skewed heavily in favour of the 'Core and the Peripheral' States, being more strong economically, as compared to the 'Semi-peripheral or smaller' States, some of whom have borne this brunt (West Asia) since the Cold War.

Two countries are considered economically interdependent if any change in one causes a predictable change in the other. If the change affects both in a like manner it is termed as positive interdependence or having a 'positive covariance of rewards'. If the effect on both is diametrically opposite it is termed as 'negative covariance of rewards'. Strong positive interdependence tends to support solidarity, while negative tends to prompt conflict; weak interdependence tends to make but little difference either way.<sup>7</sup> Figure below explains this diagrammatically.



This global economic interdependence will invariably lead to a clash of 'perceived' national interests, leading to the economic coercion of the Global South as many of these are resource rich and depend upon the demand from the North for their economic survival.

The international institutions established by the 'society of nations' (UNO) is propounding/deemed to support contradictory principles – sovereignty of States *versus* such geo-economic coercion that it cannot prevent, and the equality of States *versus* the special privileges of the P-5 (geo-strategically and geo-politically) and the G-7 (geo-economically and geo-politically). The lack of capability to enforce the rules / decisions it ratifies leaves the South at the mercy of the North. The skewed covariance of rewards in favour of the North, leads to the geo-strategic and geo-economic coercion of the South, or economic imperialism.

While earlier there were one or two players in this game of geo-strategic or geo-economic coercion (Cold War and thereafter), with the rise of other powers in this "age of strategic uncertainties", the South would face multiple such challenges. The impact of 'Cold War' biases is still extant, in the manner in which the US, West and their allies deal with the other countries, resulting in the South being forced into strategic and economic coercion due to the instabilities created by this 'Balance of Power / Economic Power' and unfair trade agreements forced upon them. In Asia, Sri Lanka and Myanmar are facing geo-economic crunch with respect to China, while elsewhere the Middle East is facing upheaval due to military interventions for regime change, by the USA – strategic coercion.

Ever since '*Pax Romana*', such geo-strategic and geo-economic coercions have only led to penury of the vassal states (Global South), rise of new powers and a clash of arms (Thucydides' Trap) resulting in the change of guard. Be it '*Pax Britannica*' or '*Pax America*', the Thucydides Trap has only spread chaos, bloodshed and strife. Is the world then ready for a new version of '*Pax Sinica*' and '*Pax Americana*'?

The world is at the threshold of a new dawn and needs a fresh breath of air, akin to the Westphalian Treaty of 1648, but going beyond it, to usher in an era of tranquillity and balance.

### **The Federative and Confederative Principles**

The federal principle has been applied to integrate state polities since the classical days of Roman Empire. It has proved its ability to solve integration problems of legally and politically autonomous communities that, in order to confront mutual challenges and

problems, face the necessity to become a new entity without losing their own political and legal identity (examples, USA and Great Britain).<sup>8</sup> While within the 'State' it was found feasible, amongst States it was found to be incompatible in that era of mutually exclusive sovereign States.

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the idea of federation amongst sovereign states was no longer feasible even to avoid conflicts. The primacy of perceived national interests over any mutual accommodation precluded the formation of any institution based on rigid federative principles. As tensions between States grew, the need for 'détente' became more urgent than ever. Thus, was born a system embodying a type of international association requiring merely voluntary co-ordination of measures to prevent conflict – based on confederative principles. Such structures tend to provide frameworks within which international relations are conducted on the basis of power politics.<sup>9</sup> Both, the League of Nations and the UNO, have failed to deliver due to this phenomenon. This ideology of 'harmony of interests', which subsumes the UNO decisions is out of tune when applied to interactions between developed and underdeveloped countries. It serves to promote and favours the position of the powerful, the P-5 and G-7, and is not in sync with the changed geo-political scenario of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

This leads on to the dilemma, what next? The prospect is best explained by the most self-conscious apostle of realism - Hans Joachim Morgenthau. He placed little hope in the ability of devices like balance of power, international law or force of world opinion to maintain peace. Permanent peace, he held, was dependent on a 'World State', which however had to be preceded by a 'World Community'. In effect the sovereignty of nation states has ceased to be relevant in the environment of global interdependence.

However, with the 'concept of sovereignty' so deeply engraved in the psyche of the polity of the nations, a jump to world community would not likely succeed and would be short lived. World has progressed by surrendering some degree of sovereignty at every level since millennia – family to clan to tribe to principalities / city states/ kingdoms to sovereign states to empires and colonies (wherein the colonised society was deprived completely) to present

day nation-states. At every level, each entity did surrender some degree of its sovereignty for the larger good of the expanding society(ies).

### **Regional Multilateral Federation**

The nations of the region need to come together to form a 'Regional Multilateral Federal Structure', wherein each nation surrenders some economic, diplomatic, political, defence and socio-political sovereignty for the larger interest of the region. It would interlink the region as one entity, for any outside State to enter into any agreement with, thereby providing it security in numbers. The region would have economic, commercial, infrastructural, socio-political, socio-economic and security architectures that would be interconnected, without losing their overall political identity that would enable and strengthen them to better face the challenges of geo-economic coercion and geo-strategic compulsions. For it to be successful, it would need to include at least two rising powers, who would need to sacrifice that much more for the larger good of the region and to maintain a balance. The major powers should not be part of such a regional construct, since it would unbalance the structure.

The emergence of such regional blocs around the world would provide for a more stable environment ensuring reduced strife and increased prosperity – a 'Balance of Sovereign Regional Power'. Development of domestic economic strength, trade and commerce, integrated infrastructure development and connectivity with socio-political and socio-economic cohesion would inhibit conflicts and increase incentives for regional prosperity.

The major issues of economics, commerce, energy, security, environment and diplomacy that impact the region should be co-ordinated by this regional federation, and the rest can be left to the respective nation / member states. Such regional federations across the globe would be better able to achieve stability and order and maintain geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic balance to a large extent. Multilateral trading would now be done between the regions, or between the regions and the North, rather than individual countries, thus ensuring that the interests of the smaller nations are better protected.

Expansion makes a negotiation more complex. Any controlled enlargement as a means of finding a trade-off and any exclusion of an essential negotiant is likely to worsen conflict.<sup>10</sup> All such eventualities could be overcome by this proposed system. Such a system is more likely to facilitate order at the global level since agreements / decisions can be more easily negotiated and its implementation overseen.

### **Options for India in the Indo-Pacific**

This provides space for India, Singapore and Indonesia to form a regional coalition of the like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. Such a coalition should provide an alternate geo-economic and geo-commerce model and facilitate economic activities, security, trade, intelligence exchanges, military capacity building, technology sharing, agenda setting for regional forums and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. It would be a truly 'win-win' situation for all countries of the Indo-Pacific region.

There is a need for 'phased adaptive' approach to achieve this. The first step could be a 'Coalition of Middle Powers', with other likeminded powers, to provide the smaller nations support from 'geo-economic blackmail'. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, being revived by Japan could also be considered in this regard, as also the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Such a coalition needs to provide an alternate narrative for the economic and infrastructure growth of the region leading to better inter-connectivity and social cohesion.

The 'Indo-Pacific Regional Forum', with the broad regional economic, political, diplomatic and security architecture could follow later. The guiding principles would remain the same wherein the system should facilitate economic growth, stability and peace by integrating the following :-

- (a) Maintaining an integrated infrastructure and energy grid to facilitate economic integration.
- (b) Maintaining a common integrated domestic base for economic, socio-economic and socio-political strength.
- (c) Maintaining an integrated geo-political and geo-strategic balance.

(d) Better managing the open International Trade and Multilateral regimes.

It would lead to multi-polarity within Asia, act as a succor to the smaller nations and ensure that rule of international law, good governance, equality, transparency and economic prosperity for all is ensured within the region. Such an association would be able to ensure stability, peace and prosperity within the region. The foundation of the association or coalition should not be based just on countering any country's rise but for stability and prosperity, only then would it be self-sustaining and long lasting.

### **Conclusion**

The 'Age of Strategic Uncertainties' brings with it the opportunity for lateral thinking to evolve a new system of World Order for the present to transition to. A World Order that would provide stability and security where the rule of law is perceived to be fair and just to all, whether be it the core, semi-periphery or the peripheral States. The Westphalian concept of the 'Sovereign Nation State' appears to have outlived its utility in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century environment of global interdependence. Hence, the need to look beyond for a new dawn and a fresh breath of air – akin to the Westphalian Treaty, to usher in an era of some tranquility and balance.

The 'Middle Powers' of Asia must utilise this opportunity to form an 'Indo-Pacific Regional Forum/Federal Structure', to assist the small nations and ensure peace and stability within this region. The time is now for these 'Middle Powers' of Asia to seize the initiative. It could be the forerunner for the emergence of such regional blocs around the world that would provide for a more stable environment ensuring reduced strife and increased prosperity – a 'Balance of Sovereign Regional Power'. It is just the beginning – a step towards what Morgenthau had visualised as a World Community. It will not occur overnight, nor in a hundred days, or even a thousand. But to quote the late John F Kennedy – Let us begin.

### **Endnotes**

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# India: The “Western Beacon” of the Indo-Pacific Region

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## Background

In a major policy statement before his visit to India in October 2017, Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State of the United States of America, said *“The Indo-Pacific, including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and the nations that surround them, will be the most consequential part of the globe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Home to more than 3 billion people, this region is the focal point of the world’s energy and trade routes. Forty per cent of the world’s oil supply crisscrosses the Indian Ocean every day, through critical points of transit like the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz. The US and India, with our shared goals of peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture, must serve as the Eastern and Western beacons of the Indo-Pacific, as the port and starboard lights between which the region can reach its greatest and best potential.”*<sup>1</sup>

The reference by Secretary Tillerson to India as the “Western beacon” of the Indo-Pacific highlights the opportunity for India to pursue its core national interests in the western Indo-Pacific within the proposed overall architecture of peace, security and socio-economic development in the region. For this purpose, it is necessary to demarcate the outline of the western Indo-Pacific Region and identify India’s interests in it.

Taking Secretary Tillerson’s approach of looking at a map of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the western Indo-Pacific Region would begin from the eastern-most maritime boundary of India, where a distance of about 100 kilometers separates India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands from Sumatra in Indonesia. From this point, the western Indo-Pacific region would extend all the way across the Indian Ocean to the eastern littoral of Africa, from South Africa northwards to the Red Sea. Along the northern littoral

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of the western Indo-Pacific region are located the countries of the Gulf, Iran, South Asia and the ASEAN countries of Myanmar, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore.

### **Trade and Energy Routes**

Secretary Tillerson's enumeration of the core characteristics of the Indo-Pacific region emphasises its energy and trade routes. The statistics for trade and energy flows through the western Indo-Pacific illustrate the significance of this region for India.

Trade accounts for 22 per cent of India's GDP. The biggest trading partner of India to the West is the European Union (EU), which accounts for 17.6 per cent of India's global exports and 11.3 per cent of India's global imports. India's second largest export destination is the United States of America, accounting for 16.1 per cent of its global exports, and 5.7 per cent of its global imports. In third place is the United Arab Emirates, accounting for 11.5 per cent of India's global exports, and 5.4 per cent of its global imports.<sup>2</sup> All this merchandise trade is transported across the sea lanes of the western Indo-Pacific region, underscoring the critical importance of these trade routes for India's growing economy.

India is a major importer of energy from West Asia. Saudi Arabia and Iraq supplied 58 per cent of India's total oil imports of 3.9 million barrels a day in 2015. The bulk of this oil is received by ports located on India's west coast. In 2015, India, the world's fourth largest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) importer, received 62 per cent of its LNG from Qatar. Both oil and LNG imports by India depend solely on the trade routes traversing the western Indo-Pacific region.<sup>3</sup>

Although in his prepared statement, Secretary Tillerson mentioned two "critical points of transit", the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, the western Indo-Pacific region has a third "choke point" which is relevant for India's interests in ensuring freedom of navigation as well. This is the Bab-el-Mandeb, the 35-kilometer wide strait leading from the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

The Bab-el-Mandeb sea route transports the bulk of trade between India and countries located to the West of the Suez Canal, including the EU and the United States.<sup>4</sup> This waterway is

shared between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as Somalia (because of Somalia’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden). Of these three, Yemen has been destabilised by its war with a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia;<sup>5</sup> Djibouti hosts naval bases of the United States, France and China;<sup>6</sup> while Eritrea is under United Nations sanctions.<sup>7</sup> The inherent volatility of this area needs the focussed engagement of the Indo-Pacific Project to sustain peace and stability in the region.

### **Connectivity in the Western Indo-Pacific**

Though not seen as being of “critical” importance, the role played by major transit ports in the western Indo-Pacific area to promote connectivity with the land-locked states above the region’s northern littoral need to be included in discussions between India and the United States. Such connectivity is designed to overcome current barriers by Pakistan to closer overland interaction between the region’s largest economy with Afghanistan and Central Asia, both of which are priorities for India’s strategic policy. Two such transit trade ports are Chabahar and Bandar Abbas in Iran, located on the northern littoral of the western Indo-Pacific region.

### **Countering Piracy in the Western Indo-Pacific**

India’s ability to contribute in a substantive manner to peace, security and freedom of navigation in the western Indo-Pacific region, based on the rule of international law applicable to the maritime domain, is illustrated by its participation in the international effort to contain piracy off the coast of Somalia. On 16 Dec 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a United States-drafted Resolution (1851) authorising an “international cooperation mechanism” to counter the threat posed to shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia by pirates.<sup>8</sup>

The Security Council Resolution was designed to uphold the rule of law as codified by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas or UNCLOS. It is worth emphasising that India as a state party to UNCLOS has consistently upheld the application of UNCLOS in the maritime domain. This was most recently demonstrated when India accepted a verdict from an UNCLOS tribunal awarding 76 per cent of territory disputed in its maritime boundary with Bangladesh in July 2014.<sup>9</sup>

UN Security Council Resolution 1851 resulted in the Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia or CGPCS being set up as a group of interested and affected nations, industry associations and multilateral agencies to take pro-active steps for checking piracy in the Indian Ocean region. India has been an active participant in the CGPCS, along with US-led Combined Maritime Forces, the EU, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea.

Piracy disrupted shipping along the SLOCs in the western Indo-Pacific. It also impacted the almost 22,000 ships calling on and leaving Indian ports, passing through the High-Risk Area (HRA), drawn at the Indian Ocean area west of 78 degrees E longitude, which had to pay an additional premium to insurance companies, most of whom were based outside India. According to estimates, India paid around US\$1.3 billion during the period 2010-2016 because of this premium, called the Additional War Risk Premium (AWRP).

To protect Indian ships and Indian citizens employed in seafaring duties, the Indian Navy commenced anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from 23 Oct 2008. In addition to escorting Indian-flagged ships, ships of other countries have also been escorted by the Indian Navy. More than 25 Indian Navy ships are deployed for patrolling, escorting ships and in anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. To maintain the high degree of alertness in the region, around 19 coastal security operations and exercises have been undertaken by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard in 2016 alone.<sup>10</sup>

### **The New Indo-Pacific Bilateral Dialogue Mechanism**

India's description as the "Western beacon" of the Indo-Pacific implies its participation on an equal footing when it comes to decision-making on "peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture" in the region.<sup>11</sup> In the first instance, this requires an interface between the security and policy structures of the United States and India on the western Indo-Pacific, especially in respect of the waterways of the Bab-el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. Such an interface will enable both countries to understand and accommodate each other's core interests with respect to both the trade and energy routes of the western Indo-Pacific, as well as their bilateral engagement with the littoral countries of this region.

This must be the core agenda of the new “2-by-2 ministerial dialogue” established in August 2017 by the leaders of India and the United States to enhance “peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific region”.<sup>12</sup>

At the heart of the western Indo-Pacific region lie the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, the North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The United States has designated its Central Command as the structure to deal with this area’s peace and security.<sup>13</sup> The fact that three of the top advisors to President Donald Trump of the US have served in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) (Defence Secretary General John Mattis,<sup>14</sup> Chief of Staff in the White House General John Kelly,<sup>15</sup> and National Security Adviser Lieutenant General HR McMaster<sup>16</sup>) will play a critical role in this context.

Ultimately, for existing US security structures in the Indo-Pacific to become effective contributors to the shared interests of India and the US in the western Indo-Pacific region, the coalescing of the US Pacific Command or PACOM,<sup>17</sup> the US CENTCOM, as well as US AFRICOM,<sup>18</sup> which also deals with the eastern seaboard of Africa, at both operations and policy-making levels, would need to be considered in the framework of the ambitious Indo-Pacific Project.

From the Indian side, engagement in the newly launched “dialogue” mechanism on the Indo-Pacific region should include, apart from the traditional central ministries of external affairs and defence, operational Indian entities tasked with providing security in the western Indo-Pacific region. These include India’s national security structures, in addition to its four Naval Commands<sup>19</sup> and the Indian Coast Guard,<sup>20</sup> which has been significantly upgraded following the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks launched from the maritime domain.

### **Countering Terrorism in the Western Indo-Pacific**

The Mumbai terrorist attacks of 26 Nov 2008 focussed on a major concern of India related to protecting its national security and economic interests from terrorist threats originating in the western Indo-Pacific region. In the trial of one of the Pakistani terrorists produced before the Indian judicial structure, it was established that these attacks on Mumbai were orchestrated from Pakistan.

These attacks took the lives of 166 innocent persons, of which 137 were Indian nationals, and the rest were from 16 other countries, including the US, Israel, Germany, Australia, Canada, France, and the UK. Hundreds of innocent persons were injured by 10 terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) of Pakistan, handled by operatives of the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI.<sup>21</sup> For the first time, cyber technology was used for executing the terrorist attack through Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP).

India's pursuit of effective counter-terrorism measures will contribute to the resilience of the Indo-Pacific Project, and contribute to countering the terrorist threat to US interests in Afghanistan and the wider western Indo-Pacific region.<sup>22</sup> In this context, the new dialogue mechanism will be critical to ensure that the Indo-Pacific Project addresses some of the ambiguities arising from the conflicting security interests of the US as far as countering terrorism in India and Pakistan is concerned. The most relevant illustration of this ambiguity is the David Headley case.<sup>23</sup>

### **Peace and Stability in the Gulf**

Peace and stability across the western Indo-Pacific region is a major objective of Indian strategic policy for other reasons as well. One of the most important aspects of India's interest in the region is the stability of the Gulf economies. These countries, especially those belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman), host approximately eight million Indian nationals, who are employed in the energy-driven economies of the region. Indian nationals in the GCC remit annually about US\$ 38 billion directly into the Indian household economy. It is, therefore, in India's interest to work actively within the western Indo-Pacific region to ensure the stability of these economies, so that the significant contributions made by the Indian diaspora are maintained, and the GCC countries continue to prosper.<sup>24</sup>

This perspective should be integrated into the new dialogue mechanism between India and the US on the Indo-Pacific. Diplomatic initiatives within this framework could be conceptualised for bringing the armed conflict in Yemen to an end, as well as for bridging the growing political polarisation between Qatar and several of its GCC neighbours. The objective would be to ensure recognition of India's core interests in the welfare of millions of its



citizens, the inward flow of remittances to the Indian economy, an assured stability of India’s trade and energy flows, as an integral part of the Indo-Pacific Project.

### **Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)**

India’s awareness of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, especially the areas demarcated as the western Indo-Pacific earlier in this article, has been articulated forcefully at the highest level ever since the new government took office in India in May 2014. During his visit to Mauritius on 12 Mar 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised that India sought a future for Indian Ocean that lived up to the name of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region. Five priorities are the core of SAGAR:-

- (a) India’s role as a net security provider in the western Indo-Pacific region. This would involve both safeguarding India’s territory, including its islands, as well as securing the larger Indian Ocean Region.
- (b) Active engagement with friendly countries in the western Indo-Pacific region. India would continue to enhance the maritime security capacities and economic resilience of these countries.
- (c) Developing a network of cooperation to take effective collective action for advancing peace and security in the region. Such a network would be instrumental in creating a mutual understanding of, and response to, challenges from the maritime domain.
- (d) A more integrated and cooperative focus on the future of the western Indo-Pacific, which would enhance the prospects for the sustainable development of all countries in the region. This would include sectors such as trade, tourism and investment; infrastructure development; marine science and technology; sustainable fisheries; protection of marine environment; and, overall development of ocean or Blue Economy.
- (e) The primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the western Indo-Pacific region would be on those “who live in this region”. India would continue its engagement with other nations which had strong interests

and stakes in this region through dialogue, visits, exercises, capacity building and economic partnership.<sup>25</sup>

## Conclusion

India's perspective on the western Indo-Pacific region underscores the importance of building peace, security and prosperity in the region in a holistic manner. Using this region as a frame of reference, India has signaled its willingness to engage with other stakeholders by contributing its views and resources, through an atmosphere of trust and transparency, respecting the principles and provisions of International Law. To effectively address the challenges and opportunities inherent in the Indo-Pacific initiative, the ground realities in both the littoral and maritime domains of the region must be taken into account.

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# Coming – Chinese Tide in the Indian Ocean

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## **Background**

China has demonstrated its strategic ambitions for the Indian Ocean and 'Oceans at Large' through activities in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Baltic Sea. Naturally China is concerned about safety of its Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean, which has some 60,000 ships transiting annually (most heavily trafficked sea routes) carrying two-third of global oil shipments, one-third of bulk cargo and half the container traffic of the world. But it is China's militarisation of Western Pacific, similar intent in IOR, disregard to international laws and norms that cause concern. All media in China is state-controlled, reflects government view, and is optimised for information warfare. China fakes some 488 million social media posts annually.<sup>1</sup> China supports North Korea despite sanctions, tacitly supports Pakistani terrorism, has threatened India on the Doklam standoff, and creates deliberate ambiguity. Wang Wenli, senior official in China's Foreign Ministry officially stated that Bhutan acknowledges Doklam area does not belong to it; a claim Bhutan immediately denied.<sup>2</sup> China also says it had informed India about constructing a road in Doklam, which is untrue.

## **Western Pacific**

China claims nearly all of the sea, which is believed to sit atop vast oil and gas deposits and through which USD \$5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes. Its sweeping claims overlap with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, as well as Taiwan. Tensions continue to mount in Western Pacific with China egging North Korea to target US base in Guam. China, under Deng Xiaoping, decided to transfer nuclear technology to the Communists

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and Muslims in Third World based on the strategy that if the West started getting nuked by these countries without Chinese fingerprints, it would be good for China.<sup>3</sup> That is how North Korea and Pakistan became nuclear-armed and China continues to support North Korea. But the US's resolve of military action against North Korea possibly doesn't suit China at this time because tensions help China divert attention from further militarisation of South China Sea (SCS). That is why President Xi has personally urged President Trump to exercise restraint in North Korea.<sup>4</sup> Satellite images show that China continues to expand artificial islands in disputed SCS despite stating it stopped doing so in mid-2015; militarisation activities of turning reefs in the Spratly and Paracel chains into islands, installing military aircraft and missile systems on them continues unabated.<sup>5</sup> Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister told reporters on sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila on 07 Aug 2017 that Beijing completed its SCS reclamation activities two years ago. But Beijing continues to reclaim land farther north, in the Paracel Islands. Since 2015, China has dredged a new harbour, added 10 hectares land on Tree Island in the Paracels, recently completed a new helipad and installed wind turbines and photovoltaic solar arrays there. At this ASEAN Forum meet, the ASEAN bloc released a diluted joint statement on the dispute that failed to mention the arbitration by the UN-backed tribunal ruling last year in favour of the Philippines that discarded China's territorial claims being without legal basis.<sup>6</sup> But the Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte has decided not to use the verdict to pressure China in return for billions of dollars worth of investments and aid, even as Vietnam expressed concerns about further land reclamations in SCS without naming Beijing.

July 2017, witnessed downturn in Vietnam-China relations when China threatened to attack Vietnam if Spain's Repsol continued oil drilling in Block 136-03 in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone that China claims as disputed.<sup>7</sup> General Fan Changlong, Deputy Chairman of China's CMC visited Madrid in June 2017 to raise Repsol's drilling activities, then flew to Hanoi to ask Vietnam to halt oil and gas exploration. On 15 Jul 2017, Vietnam directed Repsol to suspend oil drilling in Block 136-03 in the South China Sea. According to BBC, Vietnam informed Repsol executives that "China had threatened to attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands if the drilling did not stop".<sup>8</sup> Following the HD

981 crisis in mid-2014, 61 retired senior Vietnamese officials had called on their leadership to take legal action against China, exit China's orbit and abandon the policy of no foreign alliances, no foreign bases, and no use of Vietnam to harm the interests of a third country. Early this year, Vietnam signed its largest gas exploration contract with ExxonMobil to develop the Blue Whale project and Vietnam lifted restrictions on exploration in Block 136-03. In July, China publicly protested when Vietnam extended India's ONGC's lease in Block 128 in the South China Sea. China's focus with reference to Block 136-03 increased when it was recently discovered as a major oilfield, as disclosed by Repsol. The ASEAN bloc cannot go beyond exerting diplomatic pressure, however, China's threat to use force against the Philippines and Vietnam has major ramifications for not only energy security in these two countries but also raises risks for foreign oil companies operating in the SCS. Most significantly, blatantly snubbing the United Nations and the international community at large, China is establishing two Chinese-controlled international maritime courts to provide China's interpretation of maritime law and reinforce its illegal claims.<sup>9</sup>

### **China in Indian Ocean**

In mid-2014, an article in the China Daily stated China plans to build 18 bases in the IOR, outlining a blueprint for the establishment of 18 Chinese "Overseas Strategic Support Bases", also recommending three specific categories: fueling and material supply bases for peacetime (like Djibouti, Aden and Salalah); relatively fixed supply bases for warship berthing, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and the naval staff ashore rest (Seychelles); and, fully functional centres for replenishment, rest and large warship weapons maintenance (like Gwadar in Pakistan). China immediately denied such plans and the article was taken off. A second article on the same subject then appeared in the China Daily Mail on 22 Nov 2014 quoting Sri Lankan sources.<sup>10</sup> This article brought out the following: China plans to build 18 "naval bases" in the Indian Ocean including Sri Lanka (Hambantota); China also plans to build naval bases in Pakistan and Myanmar; in Namibia, China plans to build naval supply base at Walvis Bay. The report also quoted Chinese media as saying that China hopes to build 18 to 19 overseas strategic supply bases in Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Seychelles,



Madagascar and other parts of Indian Ocean, that these ports will be supply, berth and maintenance bases, and they will be different from the American type of bases, without specifying the difference. In July 2017, China unveiled a massive ship described “magic island maker”; named ‘Tian Kun Hao’, the ship is capable of digging 6,000 cubic metre per hour, equivalent of three standard swimming pools.<sup>11</sup> That this would be used in the Indian Ocean is obvious.

In a massive strategic gain for China, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port was officially transferred to China for 99 years by Sri Lanka in July 2017. Sri Lanka took this step to service the debt on the loan it took from Exim Bank of China to build the port (for the USD 1.5 billion Hambantota Port, 85 per cent of the finances came as loan from China’s Exim Bank, at an interest rate of 6.5 per cent), the repayment amounting to SL Rs 9.1 billion (USD 60 million) annually. China’s Merchants Ports Holdings Company Ltd, which also has the contract for Colombo Port, got charge of the operations under a USD 1.12 billion deal with 70 per cent stakes. First phase of Hambantota development commencing 2011 cost USD 650 million but by December 2016 instead of being able to adhere to the debt repayment schedule, the cumulative losses rose to over USD 3 billion. This is just the beginning of the debt trap that Sri Lanka may find difficult to recover from. Interestingly, it is dawning on Pakistanis that China’s friendship runs one way – in China’s favour.<sup>12</sup> Even Pakistani scholars are talking of how China has debt-tapped Sri Lanka and are fearful of same happening to Pakistan because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).<sup>13</sup>

With regard to the CPEC and related Chinese projects in Pakistan, Chinese exports to Pakistan surged by 30 per cent in first half of 2016 while Pakistani exports to China dropped by 8 per cent.<sup>14</sup> Pakistani authorities are blaming trade barriers put by Beijing on Pakistani goods and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that is tilted against Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan’s current account deficit rose 121 per cent (Jul 2016-Feb 2017). Pakistan is heading for a current account deficit as a percentage of GDP almost double that of India. With the Chinese company expected to invest additional USD 600 million to make the Hambantota port operational, the Sri Lankan Government is confident they would be able to repay the loan; but look at what is happening in Pakistan where Pakistan’s

current account deficit must also be viewed given the billions of dollars of investment promised by China, but Pakistan received only USD 1.3 billion in that period. So, is the CPEC largely being financed by intra-Chinese transfers or 'debt'? Pakistan will have to pay USD 90 billion back to China over 30 years for the CPEC and this doesn't include cumulative debt interest in case of default. Pakistani writers and traders are already raising voices about gains of CPEC going solely to Beijing aside from China's cultural invasion. CPEC is starting with loans but may eventually get converted into equity.

Gwadar gives China immense strategic advantage because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. China has already positioned naval troops in Djibouti and plans deploying People's Liberation Army (Navy) (PLAN) to 'safeguard' Gwadar. Not only has China engaged in ports development in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but Chinese economic ties with Africa and the concomitant rise in its naval profile across the IOR have also been conspicuous. The magnitude of investments like in Sri Lanka (Colombo and Hambantota) knowing fully well the economy of the concerned countries, pay back is aimed to be retrieved in strategic terms. Chinese nuclear submarines and warships do not dock at berths of Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) in Colombo mandated to accommodate military vessels but instead at the Colombo South Container Terminal (CSCT), a deep-water facility built, controlled and run by China through an aid project; CSCT is also a 'Chinese enclave' within a Sri Lankan administered harbour, the berthing itself being a violation of protocol. Same thing will happen to Hambantota despite assurances that it would not be used for military purposes. Similarly, in Maldives, China's Integrated Development Project rides on huge concessional loans and aid financing; loans are on such a high rate of interest that Male will default unless given a waiver. So the waiver will come with a strategic price - in exchange to 'control' over maritime projects as done in Sri Lanka.

China recently commissioned its second Aircraft Carrier, is building another six and her nuclear submarines and warships have been crisscrossing the IOR. China plans to deploy two Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) in the IOR for the time being. That by itself is not worrying given the size and needs of China; however, what is of great concern is the increasingly aggressive attitude of China,

it expanding territorial claims in some 23 countries while sharing borders with only 14, and flouting of international laws and norms.<sup>15</sup> China's recent intrusion in the Doklam Plateau has forced a small and peaceful nation like Bhutan to issue it a demarche, watched by the whole world.

China has been referring to the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China, relating to Sikkim and Tibet, with the express purpose of creating ambiguity; the Convention having been drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t'ai, the manchu amban from Lhasa, without consulting the Government of Tibet.<sup>16</sup> The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 were never recognised by Tibet. Eventually London dealt directly with Tibet, sent the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and opened the doors to organise the tripartite Shimla Convention in 1914, with British India, Tibet and China sitting on equal footing. Now Beijing speaks of 'renegotiating' the 1890 Convention implying that 'equal' treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Shimla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914, be scrapped – India would then have no more border with Tibet in the Northeast.<sup>17</sup> As significantly, the survey of the 'tri-junction', which is at Batang La following the watershed principle, was done several decades after the 1890 Convention was signed.<sup>18</sup> No way China can justify 'fixing' the tri-junction at 'Gipmochi' by quoting this 'unequal' treaty, when nobody knew where this place 'Gipmochi' was.

### **India-China Cooperation**

Opening China's South Sea Fleet base in the coastal city of Zhanjiang to a group of Indian journalists for the first time in August 2017, Captain Liang Tianjun, Deputy Chief of General Office of Special Security Forces said, "It is my opinion, China and India can make joint contributions to the safety and security of the Indian Ocean."<sup>19</sup> Liang also talked of growing forays of the Chinese warships and submarines into the Indian Ocean, where China for the first time established a naval base at Djibouti, explaining that it will act as a logistics centre and support anti-piracy, UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions, and provide a 'resting place' for Chinese Navy personnel. He then went on to state that China's military is defensive in nature and not

offensive, China will never intrude other countries and the like, and that China would not be obstructed by other countries. However, no one is under the illusion that while Djibouti, Gwadar and Hambantota are PLAN's well-planned military bases, other would follow soon. Under the ongoing reorganisation, PLA will increase the numbers of other services including the Navy and missile forces. Both Navy and the missile forces were expected to get the lion's share of the annual defence budget which last year amounted to USD152 billion, second only to the US.

China and India working jointly in Indian Ocean needs to be viewed in the backdrop of the China-Pakistan anti-India alliance doing everything possible to limit India's strategic space and destabilise India internally, including Chinese claims on Arunachal and deliberate mischief in our Northeast. This is despite China reaping USD 60 billion annually from the India-China bilateral trade. China needs to realise that continued combative engagement with India will likely harm her own economic interests. India is no pushover and can't be subdued, much that China may want. At the same time, there is enough scope for cooperation provided China deals with India on 'equal' basis.

### **Conclusion**

There is little doubt that China plans to militarise the IOR akin to the SCS. It has its nuclear talons well poised in North Korea and Pakistan in the Indo-Pacific, and it is the Chinese actions that are likely to lead to conflict in the Indian Ocean. Already concerns are high and there is little point in China building amusing perceptions that "India and Australia are not compatible". Western scholars are painting scenarios of future India-China naval war but given the dynamics of the Indian Ocean, such conflict will certainly draw in multi-national forces.<sup>20</sup> As it is, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) also aiming to replace the Dollar with the Yuan, will likely generate plenty heat. Hopefully, better sense will prevail and China's territorial ambitions will not take the Indian Ocean towards conflict.

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# Nineteenth Party National Congress : Xi Sets Course for Ushering China into New Era

**Major General GG Dwivedi, SM, VSM and Bar, PhD (Retd)®**

## **Background**

**T**he Communist Party Convention, which is twice-a-decade event, is of immense political significance in People's Republic of China (PRC). It is during the course of this Convention that the National Congress, symbolic body of Communist Party of China (CPC), ratifies key decisions made behind the closed doors by Party's top brass. These include changes in the apex leadership structure, review of past achievements, amendments to Party Constitution and realigning future direction. The Nineteenth National Congress of CPC was held from 18-25 October 2017 at the 'Great Hall of People' in Beijing. It was attended by 2287 delegates, elected from amongst 89 million Party members.<sup>1</sup> Incidentally, the First Party Congress was held in Shanghai from 23-31 July 1921. Then 13 delegates had participated while the Party membership was barely 50.

As per the ancient Chinese belief, it is the 'mandate of heaven' (*tianming*), the divine source of authority that grants an individual right to rule.<sup>2</sup> Based on Confucian idea, it ensured dynastic succession, where power and not the lineage mattered. The tradition continued to be observed by various emperors as also politicians till the demise of last Qing Dynasty in 1911, marking the end of feudal monarchy system. Post Chinese Communist revolution in 1949, collective 'Generational Leadership' model was instituted to rule the nation.

The 'First Generation' CPC leaders were revolutionaries - People's Liberation Army (PLA) Veterans, namely Zhou Enlai, Zhu

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De, Chen Yi, led by Mao Zedong. To propel China into the league of industrialised nations, Mao came up with an innovative idea of adopting labour intensive approach. It involved setting up backyard furnaces in the rural areas to produce steel to catch up with the West. Perceived to be 'Great Leap Forward' (1958-60), the initiative turned out to be a disaster, leading to serious famine, killing millions of people. To retain his popularity and defang the opponents, Mao launched 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-76), which again proved to be a fiasco, causing serious economic turbulence. Over a period of time, Mao emerged as an autocrat. His ideology; 'Mao's Thoughts', a political theory which propagated 'collectivism in a classless society', encapsulated in famous 'red book' was enshrined in the Party Constitution.<sup>3</sup>

Deng Xiaoping, a PLA Veteran assumed the 'Second Generation' leadership post Mao's death. There was a brief spell of power struggle as Mao had left no successor. Deng did away with most Mao's practices in 1978. His guiding ideology was 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', focussed on economic growth by easing government hold on the means of production.<sup>4</sup> It entailed reforming agriculture by de-collectivising of farms. To unleash entrepreneurial spirit, Deng pushed for restructuring the industrial sector by allowing privatisation of small scale enterprises and, thereafter, opening of Chinese economy to foreign investors. It was a clear departure from 'class struggle' enunciated by Mao. During Deng's regime, while the general standard of living improved, the inequality gap widened too.

Jiang Zemin emerged as the core of the 'Third Generation' leadership after Deng's demise in 1997 and pursued collective style of leadership. He officially adopted market economy and reformed 'state owned enterprises'. His 'three represents' ideology, (*san ge daibiao*) propagated that the CPC should be the representative of advance social forces (to drive economic growth), culture and core interests of the Chinese society.<sup>5</sup> Jiang believed in *status quo* and was averse to the idea of bold reforms. Jiang's successor Hu Jintao, as the head of 'Fourth Generation' leadership laid emphasis on reforming social security. He introduced the concept of 'scientific development and harmonious society'.<sup>6</sup>

For the 'Fifth Generation' Leadership, Xi was selected as a consensus candidate. On assuming power in 2012, he moved

fast. Xi systematically consolidated position by strengthening hold on Party and PLA (twin pillars of power in China's political structure) by virtue of triple titles; Secretary General of CCP, Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC) the highest military body and President of People's Republic.

Given the menace of corruption that had got deeply engrained in the Party culture, Xi unleashed an unbridled campaign to clean up the system. This involved targeting both the low ranking bureaucrats, referred to as flies, to the highest level officials referred to as tigers. As a result, 278,000 persons have been implicated in the anti-corruption drive including 440 high ranking officials holding ministerial or higher positions in the government, both civil and military.<sup>7</sup> Some of the stalwarts against whom disciplinary action had been initiated are; Zhou Yongkang – former member of the apex political body, Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and Bo Xilai – member Politburo and Party Secretary Chongqing. Besides, two senior most PLA Generals – Guo Boxing and Xu Caihu, Vice Chairmen of Central Military Commission (CMC) too faced corruption charges. The anti-corruption campaign has also proved handy in purging the political rivals.

According high priority to defence modernisation, President Xi initiated path breaking military reforms. The rationale was twofold; firstly to prepare defence forces for their future role and secondly, maintain Party's firm control over the PLA. On 30 October 2014 at Gutian, a small town in Fujian Province, President Xi reiterated; "PLA remains Party's Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters"; exactly repeating what Mao had said eight and half decades back.<sup>8</sup> The reforms process started in 2013 with the establishment of National Security Commission, with Xi as the Chairman. As a sequel to the reorganisation of CMC, President as the 'Commander in Chief' exercises direct operational control over the military through the 'Joint Operational Center'. By ordering series of reshuffles in the top military ranks, Xi ensured that his loyalists occupied the key positions.

### **Nineteenth Party National Congress – Xi Sets Course**

The Party Congresses are primarily about leadership, political vision and ideology. As brought out above, President Xi had worked assiduously during his first five year term to gain control of all levers of power. Nineteenth Party Congress was only a culmination

of the power play wherein Xi further entrenched his position. By cementing CPC's absolute authority and enshrining of "Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics" in the Party constitution as guiding principle makes Xi China's most powerful leader, in the league of Mao.<sup>9</sup> His eponymous political ideology proposes an alternate to liberal democracy around which CPC coalesces. Here on, any criticism of Xi policies will be deemed as an attack on the Communist Party itself.

In a clear departure from the Party's well established tradition being followed over last two decades, PSC did not choose 'Sixth Generation' leader as successor to be groomed to take over from Xi when he completes his second five year term. Hence, it is apparent that Xi is set to continue well beyond 2022, by seeking third term, which will mean setting a new precedence. Interestingly, two probable contenders; Hu Chunhua (Party Chief of Guangdong Province) and Chen Miner (Party Head of Chongqing City), Xi's protégé did not make to the PSC; a mandatory requirement for the incumbent Party Secretary General.

It is evident that for the long term survival of 'one party system', it is an inescapable imperative that China sustains its fast pace of growth. This demands deft management of socio-economic transformation while excluding political reforms to avoid internal instability. Xi's focus is on revival of CPC to improve the state governance. To achieve this, new generation of competent people are being inducted into the Party. Enforcing 'rule of law' is high on Xi's agenda which implies strengthening the institutional mechanism, while idea of independent judiciary remains elusive. To navigate through the above paradoxes is a tall order for the Communist leadership.

Xi has unfolded 'China Dream' (*fluxing*) which envisions powerful and prosperous China. It aims at national rejuvenation, besides encouraging people to seek fulfilment beyond material wealth. While presenting his report during the opening session of the recent Party Congress, Xi rolled out his grand design. It referred to China, entering a 'New Era' marked by social contradictions. He has propounded policy of 'striving for achievements' (*fanfa youwei*), while advocating a greater Chinese leadership role in the world affairs. This marks an obvious departure from Deng's strategy

being followed implicitly for last over two decades, which professed China to 'maintain low profile and bid for time' till it completes peaceful rise.

To translate 'China Dream' into reality, Xi has outlined 'twin centenary objectives'; to become 'fully modern' economy and society by 2035 and acquire 'great power' status by 2050, timed with the centenary foundation of the PRC.<sup>10</sup> Xi's vision envisages China to be a key player in shaping new world order with Chinese characteristics and regain its past grandeur; rightful place in the global polity.

### **Implications**

Today, the global order is in flux. Three key players – the US, Russia and China are in the fray to shape it in consonance with their respective national interests. Given President Trump's 'Doctrine of Uncertainty', the USA is in a state of ambiguity regarding its global role. Russia, under President Putin is still in delusion of Cold War symmetry. It seems to be heading for a major political crisis.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, President Xi has articulated a clear vision and long term strategy on China's future role.

During marathon recital at the Party Congress opening session on 18 October, Xi stated that 'no country alone can address the many challenges facing mankind and no country can retreat into isolation'. His envisioned architecture of great power interface is based on parity in US-China relations. Xi also reiterated China's rejection of 'Cold War political mentality'. Now as a paramount leader, he is expected to pursue proactive diplomacy in restructuring the international systems, whose underlying rules will be increasingly framed by China.

With the US yielding strategic space in pursuit of Trump's 'America First' policy coupled with eroding credibility of Western leadership, Xi has projected himself as the flag bearer of globalisation and trade liberalisation. At Davos World Economic Forum 2017, Xi strongly batted for globalised economy. Over the last five years, new institutions like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have been established. Concurrently, major projects like the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) have been launched. These initiatives have been termed as the "community of common destiny"; extension of neighbour

centric 'periphery policy' enunciated in 2013. Such measures will facilitate China to leverage its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in pursuit of revised strategic objectives.

In his recent Congress speech, Xi had stated that China would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue but will not compromise on national sovereignty. He has begun his second term by exhorting over two million strong China's military to be combat ready by focussing on how to win wars. China's official stated position on the integration of claimed territories does not discount use of force as an option. For India, China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well, given the past record. 1962 War, standoffs in 1967 and 1987 occurred during Mao and Deng rule. Recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have all taken place during Xi's time. India will have to be prepared to counter growing Chinese assertiveness.<sup>12</sup>

Today, Xi rides the Dragon which is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is well aware of the consequences should his policies go awry. As political reforms are not on Xi's agenda, it is economic growth that is the key to translate Xi's China dream into reality. There is skepticism about the sustainability of China's current economic model, given signs of slowing down. Therefore, some tough reforms are inevitable in the future which are likely to lead to social turbulence.

While beginning his first five years term, Xi had stated that to forge iron, you ought to be strong. Hence, he went about systematically to grab power and pushed through the process of consolidation ruthlessly, making himself unassailable. Xi envisions China to be a beacon of stability and prosperity following an alternate path, defying the Western model. Ironically, Chinese leadership's oft-touted claim of peaceful rise is not in sync with actions. As per eminent scholar Graham Allison, the founder of Harvard Belfer Center, greatest challenge facing the globe is China's rise. In his latest book *"Destined for War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap"*, he has stated that only through moderation and imaginative diplomacy can the conflict situation be avoided.<sup>13</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Xi joins the league of Mao and Deng while he does not belong to the tribe. Being smart and compared to the likes of Nelson Mandela

by no lesser person than late statesman Lee Kuan Yew, he is not likely to commit the same mistakes as his predecessors. Xi is in quest of legacy as a great reformer. To this end, he has unfolded a grand design and set the course to usher China into a 'new era' and acquire superpower status in coming three decades. It's a tough call fraught with high risks; but a price Xi is willing to pay to secure his ordained place in the history.

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# India's Growing Presence in Afghanistan: Manifestation of its Soft Power and Diplomacy

Shri Gaurav Dixit®

## Introduction

The great game played out in Afghanistan has complex and intricate geostrategic dynamics, which invariably have been a factor for multiple internal and external players shaping, constraining or affecting diplomatic, political and military policies of the region. The great game has not only interested global powers but has also attracted powerful regional players to create a sphere of influence in the country. Various countries, depending on their goals, perspective, degree of influence, and foreign policy objectives have adopted different sets of policies in the region. The Afghanistan problem has turned out to be the outcome of the competing interests of many countries. The complexity of the great game has often forced regional and global players to shape and reshape their approach.

Two countries, India and Pakistan, important players and critical determinants of the outcome of the ongoing war in Afghanistan have adopted more or less uniform but dissimilar policy in Afghanistan, often forcing some countries to change or modify their policy.

Trump's new policy in South Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular is perhaps the best example of the changing nature of engagement that has been induced by the intricacies of the geopolitical factors in the region. Trump's new South Asia policy suggests the end of illusion about Pakistan among the policy makers in Washington. Unlike, Barrack Obama's 2009 policy for the region in which he had shown trust in Pakistan by declaring that the future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbour, Pakistan, and calling on Islamabad to "demonstrate its commitment to rooting out Al-Qaeda and the violent extremists

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within its borders”, Trump appears to have realised Pakistan’s double game in Afghanistan. The realisation has come from the fact that nothing has changed for good and in fact things have worsened in last eight years.

Similarly, there is a substantial shift in China’s foreign policy. Initially, China was reluctant to interfere in Afghanistan affairs; however the growing influence of the US and India has forced China to reformulate its policy. It now actively participates in Afghan peace processes and other strategically crucial activities along with Russia, Iran and Pakistan.

For India, stability in Afghanistan is always crucial to its national interest. Its policy, however, remains reflective of its core values and belief system of non-interference and non-coercion. With regard to the dynamics, its complexities and multiple internal and external factors, it is imperative to understand India’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan, the factors shaping the uniformity and the possible changes.

### **India Banking Upon Its Policy of Soft Power and Economic Aid**

India has been able to maintain strong ties with Afghanistan based on not only historical and cultural links but also strong strategic ties it has built over the years. The core of India’s foreign policy has been manifestation of its soft power, with notable historical elements of prefiguration. It has expanded its soft power with policy of providing economic incentives to Afghanistan in an assimilative manner rather than coercive manner. Above all, the role India is playing in Afghanistan is substantially different from the role played by other major regional and global powers, and its involvement goes beyond just government to government relations.

Relations between the two countries became stronger after the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan, recognising the ancient ties which have existed between the two countries, signed Treaty of Friendship in 1950. India’s involvement in Afghanistan was initially marked by technical assistance in various fields, beyond which it could do little. The lack of geographic access and the absence of economic instruments severely limited India’s ability to play any credible role.<sup>1</sup>

During the Taliban era, particularly during 1997-1999, India was among the top 35 aid donors contributing to the assistance programmes for Afghans. In 2001, after the Taliban government fell, the then Indian Foreign Minister Mr Jaswant Singh flew to Kabul to welcome the new government, not packed with arms or food but crammed with tapes of Bollywood movies and music, which were quickly distributed across the city.<sup>2</sup> India's involvement in Afghanistan noticeably was one of caution and restraint evolving from uncertainty over various issues.

The two primary issues that initially shaped Indian interests and strategies in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban government were : impact of extraordinary US military presence in Afghanistan on their strategic interest and strategic involvement of Pakistan in the war against terrorism. India saw US's military presence close to its border both as empowering and limiting.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Pakistan's presence as crucial partner of the international forces against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was a matter of concern for India. For India, it was a matter of a promoter of extremism and terrorism becoming a critical partner against fundamentalism – a fallible paradox of geostrategic calculation of the US in 2001. India despite its geopolitical and territorial limitations continued supporting Afghanistan in public health, small-scale industries, and education.

However, Indo-Afghan historical ties got a boost after the two countries signed Strategic Partnership in 2011. India, by 2011 was fast turning into economic powerhouse and was rapidly expanding its imprint across the globe. Its growing economic and diplomatic mark helped it to put its core concerns and interests across as a powerful nation involved in South Asia. India is now taken more seriously than it was taken a decade back.

India expanded its footprint in the region by supporting various pro-people initiatives. India's investment in the region now encompasses wide variety of activities including helping to train Afghan civil servants, diplomats and police; rebuilding of air links; investment in agricultural developments; building infrastructure power plants and investing in health and education sectors.

In the field of education alone India is the favourite destination for the Afghan students. The impact of Indian education system is easily perceptible as Indian cities such as New Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore and Bhubaneswar attract thousands of Afghan

youth for higher studies. There are more than 16,000 students from Afghanistan studying in India. It has nearly tripled in the last five years (the number of Afghan students were nearly 5500 in 2011). Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), an autonomous body under administrative control of Ministry of External Affairs, provides a total of 1000 scholarships to Afghan nationals to pursue undergraduate, postgraduate and PhD courses through Indian universities.

Similarly, the Indian Government understands the need for good medical facilities for a country ravaged by conflict. India is favourite destination for those seeking quality medical services at affordable rate. In 2015, Bangladeshis and Afghans accounted for 34 per cent of foreign patients, the maximum share, primarily due to their own poor healthcare infrastructure and close proximity to India.<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Narendra Modi's announcement that immediate medical visas at home will be issued to patients from South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries has substantially increased the number of patients coming from Afghanistan.

Of late, the Indian Government has understood the importance of promoting its image of soft power through effective utilisation of tools like economic incentives and public diplomacy. For the last one decade India has consistently used the various components of soft power to further its national interest in Afghanistan. Last year, India had taken up 116 High Impact Community Development Projects in 31 provinces of Afghanistan. Recently, it has inaugurated the Afghan-India Friendship Dam, earlier known as Salma Dam. This highlights the kind of role India is playing in Afghanistan.

The operationalisation of the Chabahar Port, as an alternative inland transit route to Afghanistan via Iran is perfect manifestation of India's growing commitment to continue with its development work in Afghanistan despite hurdles. It also illustrates India's willingness to engage with various stakeholders in order to promote India's economic engagement with Afghanistan. The alternative trade route is crucial for Indo-Afghan trade, ever since Pakistan, in order to deprive India of any strategic gain in Afghanistan, denied India direct land route gateway, the shortest and the most economical one for India through Pakistan to enter Afghanistan and Central Asia. This makes the achievement unique, particularly,

in the context of changing contours of conflict in the region; its geo-political impact and India's continuous strategic and diplomatic endeavor to counter it.

The rise of India as a soft power has for very long emerged independently of the government policies. As aptly suggested by Mr Shashi Tharoor, former Union Minister of State of External Affairs, *"Soft power, in other words, is created partly by governments, and partly despite governments; partly by deliberate action, partly by accident"*.<sup>5</sup> Yoga and Indian movies have created a huge impact in the Third World countries without much promotion by the government. In Afghanistan, Indian movies and soap operas have long been popular, which is slowly being replaced by Turkish movies and Television serials.<sup>6</sup> There is still a large section of society dedicated to Indian dramas propagating Indian societal and cultural values of diversity and pluralism.

All these soft power strategies, promoted by government or independent of its influence, have enormous influence in Afghanistan and great potential to connect people of both the countries, irrespective of the religious and geographical distance.<sup>7</sup>

### **Can India Replace its Soft Power with Hard Power in Afghanistan?**

Indian soft power strategy has often been questioned and censured by analysts both in India and abroad. The attacks on the Indian Embassy and the Indian projects in Afghanistan are seen as a failure of Indian policy of employing its soft power policy; often considered as India's weakness to deploy hard power of military and economic coercion. Critics often question India's lack of interest in military assignments in Afghanistan. However, such criticism misses a critical point of India's geographical and strategic limitation for military engagement; above all, the kind of negative impact it can have on India's relations with the government and the society of Afghanistan.

The best case study for India's failed attempt to use its hard power has been deployment of forces in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan case study is the ideal case study of alienating not only the government of Sri Lanka but the two dominant communities – Tamils and Sinhalese.

Moreover, Indian Government understands that soft power in terms of political and cultural values alone cannot succeed. Therefore, it is employing a blend of soft power and subtle elements of hard power, with a strong focus on soft India.<sup>8</sup> It understands that hard and soft power cannot be an alternate to each other rather a combination of two in a non-coercive, cooptive manner, often termed as smart power, can be the right strategy in Afghanistan. The elements of smart power are certainly different from the conventional meaning of hard power, and it hardly reflects India's aggressive approach associated with elements of hard power.

The most definitive example of this has been India's assistance to Afghanistan with a fair amount of non-lethal military equipment. Last year, four MI 25 attack helicopters were given to Afghanistan. Afghanistan, however, has long list of weapons and equipment that they would like from India. India, till now has not agreed to all of Afghanistan's demands.

The recent military aid is seen by many analysts as a change in India's policy towards Afghanistan. It might appear logical to assume that the recent engagement at military level is a change of strategy from soft power to hard power. However, it would be an erroneous understanding of the Indian capacity and capability and its core tools of foreign policy. The military engagement beyond helping with non-lethal weapons and training Afghan forces might provoke more retribution from Pakistan and its allies, which could be counter-productive to India's long term goals in the region. Nevertheless, India's aversion to provide lethal weapons and declining the US proposal of sending Indian boots in Afghanistan clearly illustrates that assistance of non-lethal weapon is merely extension of its smart power policy; and it has not made any structural change in its foreign policy.

### **Conclusion**

India's smooth engagement with Afghanistan, both at government and societal level for nearly last two decades, suggest that India has been able to implement effectively its soft power policies. Through its cultural and political values, economic incentives and rigorous diplomacy, India has been able to convince the international community of its importance in the region. President Trump's new South Asia policy, where he appreciated India's important

contributions to stability in Afghanistan and wanted India to help the US more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development, is demonstrative of the fact that India's 'soft power' approach is being well received. The overall developments in the last two decades also hints at India's capability of negotiating and formulating its own foreign policy, at least developmental policy without the political interventions of powers like the Saudis, Russia and the USA. Even its adversaries are not indisposed to its contribution to the overall development of Afghanistan.

A lot has been written on the issue of India's presence in Afghanistan - some claiming it to be India's entry into great game of Afghanistan; this at best should be considered as an overambitious interpretation of the ground reality. Notwithstanding the fact that India has achieved a strong hold in the region, it would be too early to term it as India's entry into the great game. In fact, the kind of developmental work undertaken by India hardly suggests that it even wants to be part of the great game as other countries are playing. India's success in the region has been carved out by different instruments of foreign policy which unlike the tools of hard policy adopted by other players of the great game has long term positive impact and grounded in the roots of peace and stability. In fact India's success could be a perfect example for other countries to emulate in Afghanistan. India has the potential to be a strategically leading player in Afghanistan, without adversely risking the stability of the region.

The changing dynamics, the change of policies of major global powers, the rising political instability, the engulfing violence, and the resurgence of extremists in Afghanistan have not altered India's policy; instead they have strengthened India's approach towards the region. This is perhaps the first step that could help India become a long term player without being a contestant of great game.

### Endnotes

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# National Cadet Corps – The Silent Contributor to Nation Building and National Security

Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht,  
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## Introduction

India as a nation, and more importantly the Indian economy, in recent years has certainly started looking up. While a lot has been achieved, a lot more remains to be done as well. Even after seven decades of Independence, many are still deprived of a life of dignity. A humungous development deficit is staring at us in our face. The predicament is compounded by the precarious security situation prevailing in large swathes of our country. The question of greater national dignity merits reflection.

An aspect which stands in our favour in the days to come is our demographic dividend. As is well known, 65 per cent of our population is under the age of 35. This generation has to be empowered to rewrite India's success story. The empowerment process must not only include imparting employable skills but also life skills to transform them into young and dynamic leaders.

National Cadet Corps (NCC), the largest uniformed volunteer organisation in the world, is committed in the business of youth empowerment and is ideally suited to help the nation realise its demographic dividend, thereby making significant contributions to nation building. The military orientation of its training curriculum would also ensure handsome dividends in the security domain.

## Nation and Nation Building

**Concept of a Nation.** When the purists contest that India is not a nation in the classical sense, they are alluding to the diverse and pluralistic character of our nation. The word nation is derived from the Latin word 'natio' which means 'people'. It is generally believed

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that the 'people' constituting a nation must preferably be united by descent, race, language, culture, customs, religion etc. If this was solely true, then India would fail to make the cut to be called a nation by more than a mile. Ernest Renan went ahead to call a nation 'large scale solidarity'.<sup>1</sup> When we talk of the Indian nation, we are identifying it by its geographic and political construct. The many differences (or potential fault-lines) which are intrinsic to our nation highlight the salience of national integration and the need to promote a secular outlook among the citizens. Fostering an abiding sentiment of unity in diversity beyond the cliché should be central to the nation building exercise for India. Here, NCC acts as a major building block.

**Concept of Nation Building.** In the words of Jeremi Suri, a Professor at Lyndon B Johnson School of Public Affairs in the USA, "Nation building is an effort to build institutions and practices that allow a people to govern themselves in peaceful and prosperous ways."<sup>2</sup> Among the principles of nation building, Jeremi Suri lists five. He opines that nation building concerns and involves 'people', particularly young people, who would drive the change. Rest of the principles relate to partnerships, processes, problem solving and sense of purpose behind processes.

### **NCC as an Instrument of Nation Building**

#### **Harnessing the Youth Power**

**A Perception Profile of Young India.** An informal survey reveals that the younger generation, although certainly more technology savvy, tends to be materialistic in its outlook and is not inclined towards scholarly pursuits, research and innovation. Motivating the youth to be the engines of change is largely a challenge. If the young people are encouraged to associate themselves with organisations like NCC, perhaps it would play a major role in influencing their mindsets. Dr APJ Abdul Kalam in his address to cadets on 04 Nov 2004 at New Delhi had famously stated, "...in my view, two years NCC training must be made compulsory for all eligible students....at the school or college level".<sup>3</sup> Not many would know that for a brief spell in 1963, NCC training was made compulsory for all college students. Owing to budgetary and establishment constraints, the scheme was subsequently withdrawn in 1968.

**The Future Citizenry.** The whole essence of NCC lies in investment towards the future citizenry of our nation. The NCC harnesses the fountainhead of youthful energy through its aims and objectives and stringently implement range of activities. Over 70 per cent of effort is dedicated to leadership training. The objective of development of character, comradeship, discipline, secular outlook, spirit of adventure and ideal of selfless service in every cadet lies at the bulls eye. Each cadet adopts recently introduced (2017) Cadet Commandments (12 in number), each aimed at being a role model citizen. The tenth commandment directs all cadets to be citizens with gender sensitivity, secular outlook devoid of regional biases.

#### **Footprint – Service to the Socially Deprived**

National Cadet Corps from its modest beginnings on 15 Jul 1948 by an Act of Parliament with a subscriber base of 20,000 cadets, today, boasts of a strength of 14 lakh cadets. NCC has a pan-Indian presence covering 16,288 institutions in 703 out of 716 districts of the country. The 8000-plus institutions, which are waitlisted, bear testimony to its popularity. Only untouched districts lie in extreme remote areas or newly carved districts in Manipur and Telangana. What is heartening is that most of NCC's subscription is from the government educational institutions and economically modest households (nearly 80 percent of cadet population) and takes pride in helping this section of the society realise its aspirations, thereby contributing towards equality and development. One may argue that the 15 lakh sanctioned strength of NCC only benefits miniscule proportion of the eligible/target population. Be that as it may, each cadet must be seen as an agent or a catalyst, who in turn, within his sphere of influence i.e. his family, friends and neighbourhood would cast his spell and hence the overall impact of NCC becomes much larger. Going by an estimate of each cadet touching ten others, the target population influenced by NCC exceeds one crore.

#### **National Integration – The Spirit of 'Ubuntu'**

This forms the very basic theme of NCC curriculum. Activities conducted within a state or at the interstate level derive inspiration for the spirit of *Ubuntu* (The South African proverb where 'I am because we are' is the essence of community living). 'Solidarity,

Integration and Dignity' form the focal points of cadet orientation and dispensation.

This is achieved through centrally conducted camps e.g. National Integration Camps including Special Integration Camps held in extremities of the country – deserts, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep Island, Ladakh etc. with pan India participation. Adventure and cultural interface is intrinsic to all these activities.

### **National Projection – Overseas**

Youth exchange programmes are in place with eleven countries. These lie in our immediate neighbourhood – Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives, extended neighbourhood and beyond – Singapore, Central Asian Republics, Vietnam and Russia. In many cases Memorandums of Understanding exist and in other cases there is regular reciprocal participation. Cadets invariably perform with flying colours in all domains - physical prowess, confidence levels, cultural acumen or nationalist spirit.

### **Women Empowerment**

Many social evils still prevail in modern Indian society that resist the forward march of its women folk. India is ranked 29<sup>th</sup> among 146 countries across the globe on the basis of Gender Inequality Index. Driven by inclusion of women empowerment as one of the eight Millennium Development Goals, NCC has contributed significantly to this cause. Women empowerment has taken a boost with girl cadets reaching a strength of over 4.5 lac (30 per cent) despite social barriers and establishment inadequacies. Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir (Valley), Odisha and Rajasthan have received additional focus. This will indeed be a major contribution towards development goals for our society.

### **The Social Service and Community Development Charter**

NCC's contribution in the field of social and community service is particularly laudable. NCC is one of the mainstays in popularising yoga, promoting cleanliness and spreading digital awareness in the country – a fact which has been acknowledged by the Prime Minister's Office. NCC enters into a 'partnership' with lead ministries and agencies to support the 'processes' related to a few selected themes of contemporary relevance in the field of environment,

health and social issues. Annually, NCC is credited with planting over one lakh saplings and donating more than 50,000 units of blood. NCC institutions and units adopt villages, *bastis*, old age homes, orphanages, parks and public places, which then become a focal point for their social work. Social service and community development activities conducted by NCC take the form of proactive action, rallies, awareness drives, marathons, *nukkad nataks* etc. These activities encourage cadets to take on voluntary work within their communities and neighbourhood to make a humble but no less significant contribution towards nation building.

### **Command and Control Drives Nationalist Agenda**

Management of NCC encompasses all 29 States and seven Union Territories through a Headquarters located at New Delhi and 17 Directorates, at the state level, with further subdivision of units and controlling Headquarters. The entire profile is tri-service in composition. Overall control is exercised by the Ministry of Defence at the centre and at the state level largely by the Education Department. The entire infrastructure, establishment and budgetary provisions are shared by the Centre and States. Although the larger share is supported by the Centre, States do carry substantial share of responsibility making them equal stakeholders. State support is a prerequisite for support by the Centre. Nature of command and control of the whole structure too thus drives a nationalist agenda.

### **NCC and National Security**

If there is any organisation which is ideally suited to contribute in the security domain beyond the traditional security forces, it is the NCC. Acknowledging this, NCC was called out for national service during all the three major wars, viz; 1962, 1965 and 1971. During the 1965 War an extraordinary gazette notification of 09 Sep 1965, outlined the war time duties of Associate NCC Officers (primarily teachers/lecturers trained in NCC role) and NCC cadets above 17 years of age. In 1965, NCC cadets were specifically trained for their war time role in a 'Be Prepared' scheme.

Senior cadets were deployed, in the rear areas in a supportive and augmentation role. They performed or assisted in civil defence tasks, security of installations, maintenance of essential services, enforcement of blackouts, refugee management, casualty

evacuation, traffic control, manning of signal exchanges, augmentation of the workforce in ordnance factories, hospitals, post and telegraph offices and logistic installations, care of families of the martyrs, blood donation, fund mobilisation etc. Cadet Sergeant Pratap Singh was awarded Ashoka Chakra Class III (Shaurya Chakra) for his valiant act during the 1965 War.

While present rules, owing to security and safety considerations, prohibit the employment of cadets in the war zone, it is only a matter of foregone conclusion that in any future war NCC would be called out by invoking national emergency provisions. Cadets with a little bit of reorientation will deliver. NCC provides a ready reserve pool of trained manpower to explore the possibilities of TAisation of the Armed Forces and staffing of mobilisation plan units. New age threats like Cyber Warfare and Information Warfare as also the high technology nature of the future battlefield require specialised skills in the conflict zone. NCC is suited to re-role itself to filling in this capability void.

In its expansion plans, NCC has recently made a conscious decision to enhance its presence in areas vulnerable from the security standpoint, i.e. areas affected by Left Wing Extremism (LWE), insurgencies and the coastal areas. NCC has made much headway in such areas in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in particular. In Bastar and Sukma, cadets have participated in annual camps as well. Coastal areas are also well covered. NCC, for the first time has set foot in Anini village (eastern-most village on Indo-Tibetan border in Arunachal Pradesh) in 2017. In most locations in LWE areas, only NCC activities are conducted without the presence of Security Forces. NCC's ethos and curriculum will ensure that cadets from these areas will not take to weapons in the future. From the border areas such as forward most villages (dhanis) of Barmer/Jaisalmer, NCC has facilitated induction of cadets into Armed Forces as also entry into the Civil Services.

One of the three aims laid down for NCC is to provide a suitable environment to motivate youth to take up a career in the Armed Forces. NCC syllabus and work culture to that extent is largely military oriented. There are vacancies reserved for NCC cadets with certain certification in all training academies including female cadets. Nearly 70 per cent of authorised vacancies are subscribed. Amongst the men, nearly 10 per cent recruitment for



the Army and 5-6 per cent for Air Force and Navy comprise NCC cadets. Given the large base of eligible candidature, these numbers are substantial. These personnel make outstanding soldiers.

### **The Way Forward - Enhancing Organisational Effectiveness**

**Expansion Plan.** Present establishment of NCC is of 1979 vintage and is inadequate to affect an optimal performance. Any further expansion of cadets strength must be accompanied by review of manpower of both combatants, civilian staff, and other factors. In the present scenario, it is just not feasible to make NCC training compulsory in institutions even with acceptance of diluted standards.

**Manpower Management.** Sheen of NCC lies in efficacious delivery. Combatants subjected to Army/Navy/Air Force Act remain the basic pillar of NCC. Any modifications to manpower profile must take this into account. Quality Officers and Associate NCC Officers (ANOs) are the other pillars. Work parameters of NCC staff are rather stringent in terms of responsibility and timings. Dilution in manpower profile has direct bearing on efficacy, in fact exponentially. It is pertinent to mention that each NCC unit covers, on an average, 30-35 institutions spread over 100 kms or more, extending to excess of 200 kms in remote areas.

**Support Staff for Girl Cadets.** Enhancement of the number of girl cadets serves the national cause of women empowerment, particularly of weaker sections. The support staff (i.e. Girl Cadet Instructors and Women NCC Officers) merit quantity upgrade.

**Infrastructure and Budgetary Provisions.** NCC provisions comprise a composite fixture with regard to infrastructure and budgetary provisions between the Centre and the States. Share of each is fixed by norms and governing rules. Compliance is the key. Existing inadequacies must be eradicated.

**Finish School for NCC.** A number of NCC cadets come from weaker sections of society (nearly 80 percent). It is desirable to establish Zonal Finishing Schools for ex-NCC cadets that enable them to qualify in 'beyond entry level' assignments. Corporate Social Responsibility of various corporate houses of repute may be co-opted as well.

**Synergising Youth Organisations.** All youth organisations such as National Service Scheme (NSS), Nehru Yuvak Kendra



Sangathan (NYKS) and NCC in particular must synergise efforts to each chosen cause. Implementation should be coordinated on ground at the district level under state and central authorities with accountability. Silo existence must cease.

**Incentivisation of NCC.** Educational institutions need to harmonise academic curriculum/calendar with NCC curriculum/calendar. Further, some incentives in terms of bonus awards (academics) and reservations in job assignments in uniformed services will act as great motivators for the cadets.

### **Conclusion**

NCC in many ways is a 'silent revolution' committed to the empowerment of youth and is making invaluable contributions towards nation building and in the field of security in all its manifestations. While the NCC curriculum is wholesome and well-structured and is reviewed periodically to keep it contemporary, there may be issues of deliverance which are largely dependent on the competence and motivation of the faculty or trainers and the presence of requisite enablers (budgetary support, infrastructure, establishment, incentives etc.). For NCC to succeed in its noble mission, it needs the unwavering support of all the stakeholders – the Centre and the State governments, the Armed Forces, the educational institutions, parents, guardians and the cadets. The motto of NCC 'Unity and Discipline' could not have been more apt. It flags two vital issues of contemporary concern. A united and disciplined citizenry would be central to realisation of India's dreams to emerge as a secure and prosperous nation.

### **Endnotes**

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# Decision Dilemma in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Lieutenant Colonel RR Laddha®

## Introduction

United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has clear and unambiguous Rules of Engagement (ROE) delineating the parameters within which force may be used by military while executing its mandated tasks. Its application may, however differ from situation to situation depending on availability of credible information at that point in time and number of intangibles like perception of the commander in location, his assessment of the situation, risk taking ability, knowledge of previous incidents and his judgment. While ROE attempt to cover most situations theoretically, their appropriate application to a situation depends on the military personnel on the scene. An analysis of past incidents in South Sudan and case studies highlight a key issue – decision dilemma in application of ROE.

While there can be no ambiguity in actions during a hostile act, however, situations involving hostile intent are often tricky as these require accurate assessment, fine judgment and reactions thereof. The following decision dilemmas are discussed in succeeding paragraphs:-

- (a) Judging hostile intent.
- (b) Use of level of force.
- (c) Pre-emptive self defence.
- (d) Identification of target.
- (e) Protection to armed men of known organised forces in UN bases.

The following past incidents have been used as examples:-

- (a) Attack on Temporary Operating Base (TOB) Akobo on 19 Dec 2013.

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- (b) Events leading to forced extraction of Long Duration Patrol (LDP) to Yuai on 20 Dec 2013.
- (c) Malakal incident of 17-18 Feb 2016.
- (d) Juba crisis of 08-12 Jul 2016.

### **Hostile Intent and Use of Force**

**Use of Force.** ROE authorise use of force including deadly force for protection of civilians against hostile act or hostile intent and the *Rule No 1.7* qualifies it to state, 'to maintain public safety and security within and of UNMISS protection of civilians sites against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury'.<sup>1</sup>

**Events Leading to Juba Crisis.** There were sporadic incidents of clashes between Dinka dominated Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Nuer dominated Sudan People's Liberation Army - in Opposition (SPLA-iO) in Juba in the first week of Jul 2016 that spiraled into a crisis situation. There were also reports of clashes between Internally Displaced People (IDPs) of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) Site and SPLA soldiers, killing of a SPLA-iO officer allegedly by SPLA and clashes at SPLA check post. As a fallout of these incidents, a meeting was called on 08 Jul 16 by the President (a Dinka) at the Presidential Palace at which First Vice President (a Nuer) was also to be present. During this meeting, SPLA and SPLA-iO soldiers deployed near the Presidential Palace exchanged gunfire and soon, the firefight spread to other parts of the capital including in vicinity of PoC Site of UN House (the location of Mission and Force Headquarters).<sup>2</sup>

During this crisis, when firefight broke out between the two sides in close vicinity of the UN House Compound, Force Reserve Company of Indian Battalion Number 2 (INDBATT-2) was tasked to restore adverse situation on the northern perimeter of the PoC Site 1. On 10 Jul 16, one platoon was tasked to reinforce the northern perimeter and plug the breaches in the perimeter.<sup>3</sup>

When attempts by armed men (SPLA-iO personnel) to enter PoC sites were made, it was extremely difficult to judge the intent and the type and level of force to be used.

- (a) **Hostile Intent.** Hostile intent in the ROE is defined as 'the threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is



**Figure 1 : Events of 10 July 16, Juba Crisis**

demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act.’ Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the force could be used. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:-<sup>4</sup>

- (i) The capability and preparedness of the threat.
- (ii) The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
- (iii) Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Responsibility.

(b) **Use of Force.** Use of force is guided by principles of minimum force. Minimum force is defined in the ROE as ‘the minimum degree of authorised force that is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to achieve the authorised objective. Minimum force can also be the use of deadly force, whenever appropriate.’<sup>5</sup> The amount of force, therefore, to be used is required to be judged based on the threat perceptions and a correct assessment of the intent.

(c) On 10 Jul 16, when armed men attempted to enter PoC site in Juba, only unarmed force was used based on the judgment/assessment of following factors:-

- (i) Ethnicity of armed men and that of the IDPs. These were SPLA- iO soldiers (Nuer ethnicity) attempting to enter the PoC site which also had IDPs of Nuer ethnicity, thereby, indicating that their intent was to seek protection themselves rather than to harm the IDPs.
- (ii) The preparedness and body language of these armed men suggested that their intent was to seek protection and safety for themselves. There were no indications of a posture indicating intent to fire.
- (iii) Situational awareness regarding sequence of events as they were unfolding, disposition of warring factions and shifting frontline as witnessed personally by the author at that point in time assisted in establishing the identity of these armed men and led to conclude that they were in fact of SPLA-iO (Nuer Ethnicity)




Figure 2 : Events of 11 July 16, Juba Crisis



(d) On the contrary, the next day i.e. on 11 Jul 16, when SPLA (Dinka ethnicity) were successful in beating back SPLA-iO attacks and iO resistance diminished subsequently, the presence of armed men in close vicinity of PoC site was detrimental to safety of IDPs. Therefore, in anticipation of an attack on the IDPs, the *modus operandi* of physically plugging breaches in perimeter and use of unarmed force was changed to consolidating defensive positions and high state of readiness and preparedness to use armed force. The factor of different ethnicity and historical animosity between Nuer and Dinka was noted and sequence of events and situational awareness indicated an imminent threat. Despite this, armed force was not used because the visible signs of body language of SPLA soldiers opposite the perimeter of PoC site did not suggest intent to fire on the IDPs.<sup>6</sup>

### **Pre-emptive Self Defence**

ROE authorises all commanders to take all necessary and appropriate action for self defence.<sup>7</sup> Self defence is defined as the use of minimum force as is necessary and reasonable to protect oneself, one's unit or other UN personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent.<sup>8</sup> All UN personnel have the authority to exercise the inherent right to self defence. Further, pre-emptive self defence is defined as 'action taken to pre-empt an imminent hostile act, where one has a reasonable belief,<sup>9</sup> supported by credible evidence or information, that an attack is about to be made against oneself, one's unit or other UN personnel.'<sup>10</sup> Dilemma exists with respect to reasonable belief that the adversary is about to commit a hostile act. Armed men, not necessarily of organised forces, are often sighted in the vicinity of UN bases. The following instances are highlighted below:-

(a) On 19 Dec 2013 (see **Box 1**),<sup>11</sup> when armed men (mostly in civilian clothes) closed in towards the UN Base in Akobo (sited within Akobo town), could the attack have been anticipated, is a question mark. Similarly, on 17 Feb 16, SPLA persons were observed patrolling outside the perimeter of Malakal UN Base, who eventually opened fire in support of a section of IDPs of same ethnicity to up the ante during Malakal incident of 17-18 Feb 2016. On both these occasions, pre-emptive self defence could have been used as authorised

**Box 1 : Temporary Operating Base (TOB) Akobo Incident**

**Strength.** One platoon of INDBATT-1 with two Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs). It was planned to be reinforced by two sections on 19 Dec 2013.

**Sequence of Events.**

- **18 Dec.** 36 SPLA (Dinka) soldiers sought protection in TOB due to threat to life from fellow Nuer soldiers in SPLA and Nuer civilians.
- **19 Dec, 1500 Hours.** TOB Commander with two ICVs proceeded for securing helipad for landing of resupply flight. On route in, they were blocked by armed men and civilians. Meanwhile, at 1545 hours, TOB was surrounded by approx. 2000 Nuer. They opened fire and forced entry into the TOB causing two fatal and one non fatal casualty and ransacked the base of arms and ammunition.
- **19 Dec, 1800 Hours.** SPLA reinforcements reached the site and restored situation. Armed groups fled from the site. INDBATT-1 regained control.
- **20 Dec.** TOB extricated.

by ROE supported by credible evidence or information justifying a reasonable belief but only if the commander on ground logically and sensibly concluded that a hostile intent exists. While credible evidence might not have been available on both these occasions, important signs such as change in body language, posture, readiness state, could be better judged, assessed, and corroborated with available information and conclusions drawn by the on-scene commander.

(b) On 11 Jul 16 in Juba (refer **Figure 2**), an attack on PoC site in UN House by SPLA would also have classified as a hostile act on the UN as the platoon was deployed between the SPLA troops and the IDPs. There was a reasonable belief, based on logic and commonsense, that an attack is imminent, thereby, necessitating change of disposition, *modus operandi* and readiness state. The cross fire between SPLA and SPLA-iO did affect UN troops and staff but a visible lack of hostile intent prevented use of force in self defence.




### Identification of Target

ROE insists on requirement of positive identification of hostile elements before opening fire.<sup>12</sup> There are instances when a crowd or mob largely of unarmed men, women and children may include a few armed men in civilian clothes. These are not easily identifiable or identified as they are part of large unruly mob and distinguishing them or specifically targeting them can be extremely difficult. Herein lies the dilemma. Use of force may lead to collateral damage to include unintended loss of life/injury to unarmed persons, while no use of force/a lower level of response may put UN personnel or civilians under protection at greater risk. Two incidents are highlighted below:-

(a) During the Akobo incident of Dec 13 (**Box 1**), as learnt from the After Action Report (AAR) of the incident, force was not used by the platoon because of the presence of women and children in the crowd. The SPLA Battalion in the vicinity of TOB that eventually restored the situation consisted of Nuer soldiers. Opening fire on Nuer crowd of civilians was a cause of possible retaliation from SPLA Battalion, thus putting the UN peacekeepers (only a depleted platoon) in great danger.

(b) In the Malakal incident, clashes erupted between IDPs of different ethnicity (Nuer, Shilluk and Dinka) in PoC site at Malakal UN Base on 17 Feb 16. Initially spears and machetes were used. As fighting intensified, firing and burning of shelters began. On 18 Feb, at about 0130 hrs, Dinka IDPs breached perimeter and approximately 4000-5000 IDPs moved out. Presence of SPLA (Dinka) soldiers along the Eastern perimeter was observed. At about 1130 hrs, 50-100 soldiers moved in through the breach supported by fire support from outside and opened fire (**Figure 3 refers**). Simultaneously the move of Dinka IDPs through the same breach continued. When Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) attempted to intervene, decision of opening fire could not be taken as armed men who were in civilian clothes had mingled with the IDPs, making identification difficult. By the time situation was restored (1545 hrs), heavy casualties had been reported.<sup>13</sup>



**Figure 3 : Malakal Incident of Feb 2016**

Decision making in such scenarios is extremely difficult. No set solutions or rules can be formulated for such situations. Application of graduated response to provide adequate warning as well as deterrence to prevent escalation and avoiding/minimising collateral damage is a matter of fine judgment when an adverse situation develops.

**Box 2 : LDP YUAI**

**Strength.** One platoon plus a Section of INDBATT-2. It was established on 17 Sep 2013.

**Sequence of Events.**

- **18 Dec 13, 1515 Hours.** 15 SPLA (Dinka) soldiers sought protection in LDP base due to threat to life from fellow Nuer soldiers in SPLA and Nuer civilians.
- **18 Dec 13, 1820 Hours.** Approx. 1000 armed youth (Nuer) congregated in market area of which about 200-300 moved towards LDP base and demanded handing over of Dinka soldiers. LDP took all precautionary measures to prevent breach.
- **19 Dec 13.** Situation remained tense. Dinka soldiers were not turned over. Extrication of LDP ordered.
- **20 Dec 13.** LDP extricated by helicopters. Dinka soldiers were evacuated first.

### **Protection to Armed Men of Known Organised Forces in UN Bases**

There have been instances when armed men or defectors from government/organised forces have sought protection in UN bases due to threat to life from opposing factions/ethnic groups. In Akobo and Yuai (**Box 2** above)<sup>14</sup> in Dec 13, these persons were searched and disarmed before providing protection within UN base in accordance with ROE on the subject. However, providing shelter/protection to these men, while upholding the mandate of protection of civilians, compromised the neutral/impartial image of the UN, thereby, placing itself at risk and eventually leading to loss of life of two peacekeepers in Akobo.

The important question that arises is, whether these armed men or persons from government/organised forces, now disarmed, or having come to a UN base for protection unarmed, can be classified as civilians against whom UN Security Council has authorised the use of force? If 'no', why and how can they be identified and separated from authorised civilians? If 'yes', are the implications of compromising the neutrality/impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations factored in which could result in an all-out assault/attack by opposing faction on a UN base; and are UN contingents prepared and equipped in terms of strength, weapons and protection to deal with such eventualities? During the Juba crisis, instructions from General Paul Malong, Chief of General Staff, SPLA to their Commanders in Juba, as per leaked letter in open media, were to engage with the UN forces if UN came in the way of defeating SPLA-iO. Eventually, after the crisis, UN was accused by Government of Republic of South Sudan of sheltering SPLA-iO soldiers, thereby, eroding the faith in the UN.

### **Conclusion**

Accurate assessment of the available inputs is necessary to reduce the dilemmas which occur very often for peacekeepers in the field. This is extremely important as a thin line exists between what a peacekeeper is required to do and not do. In case of a wrong judgment, it would be an arduous task to present credible evidence supporting one's judgment and actions in crisis situations. May be, *it is better to be blamed for action than to be blamed for inaction*. Soldierly has borne the brunt of criticism for far too long. One cannot help that, we have to live with it. After all, it is not without

reason when it is said, *'Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it.'*

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Annex A to Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. A-2.

<sup>2</sup> INDBATT-II After Action Report of Juba Crisis 2016, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Events as observed by the author.

<sup>4</sup> Annex B to Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. B-1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Events as observed by the author.

<sup>7</sup> Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Annex B to Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. B-2.

<sup>9</sup> Reasonable belief is when the commander or an individual logically and sensibly concludes, based on the conditions and circumstances in which he or she finds him or herself that a hostile intent exists. Annex B to Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. B-2.

<sup>10</sup> Annex B to Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. B-2.

<sup>11</sup> INDBATT-I After Action Report of Akobo Incident dated 21 Dec 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Rules of Engagement for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Sep 2014, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> UNMISS FHQ After Action Report of Malakal Incident dated 21 Feb 2016.

<sup>14</sup> INDBATT-II After Action Report of Yuai Incident dated 22 Dec 2013.

## Sideshows of Indian Army in World War I\*

Major General VK Singh (Retd)<sup>®</sup>

This book by Harry Fecitt is a treasure house of information on the actions in which Indian troops took part during World War I. Most of us are aware of the significant contribution of the Indian *sepoys* and *sowars* in famous battles such as Neuve Chapelle and Ypres in France; Kut in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli in Turkey. However, very few know about the role of Indian soldiers in the 'sideshows' in Southern Europe, East, North and West Africa, Middle East, Central Asia and the Far East. Some of the places where these actions took place were Macedonia, the North West Frontier and Baluchistan, China, Somaliland, the Suez Canal, Egypt, Sinai and Palestine; Seistan in East and Bushire in South Persia; British, Portuguese and German East Africa; Transcaspia (present Turkmenistan); German Kamerun in West Africa; Ramadi in Mesopotamia; and the Kuki Rising in Northeast India and Burma.

The Indian involvement in these actions was not limited to soldiers of the regular Indian Army alone. There was a considerable complement of the infantry, in addition to artillery and sappers from the Indian State Forces, some of which also provided camels, mules and porters for carrying loads and evacuating casualties. There were also several volunteer forces, which fought alongside the regular troops, manned artillery as well as machine guns and performed various other duties. A number of Labour Corps were raised in India including a Jail Labour Corps that comprised convicts lodged in various jails who volunteered for the assignment. In addition to Indian and British troops, other Allied troops who took part in the operations in East Africa came from the South African Army and the Kings African Rifles (KAR); from the Australian and New Zealand Corps (ANZACs) and Egypt during the actions on the Suez Canal; and from Japan during the fall of Tsingtao in China. The enemies in these actions were many – Germans,

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\***Sideshows of Indian Army in World War I.** By Harry Fecitt, (New Delhi : Vij Books, 2017), pp..331, Price Rs 1095, ISBN 9789386457240.

<sup>®</sup>**Major General VK Singh** retired from the Indian Army in 2002. He is a well-known military historian. He has published a number of books including 'Through – Saga of the Corps of Signals (2001)', 'Leadership in the Indian Army - Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, (2005)'; History of the Corps of Signals, Volume II (2006).

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Bulgarians, Turks, African Askari (locals recruited by the enemy), Arab irregular troops, Mesopotamian insurgents, Somali, Senussi, Baluchi and Persian tribesmen and Russian Bolsheviks who used Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war.

The book is meticulously researched and details of casualties as well as gallantry awards have been given in almost every operation, along with brief citations. In most cases, these have been written on the spot by an officer who witnessed the action or based on accounts of eye witnesses. The large number of casualties, which includes a number of British officers, is testimony to the fighting spirit and valour of the troops. They did face reverses, but morale did not waver and there were very few cases of cowardice. Fallen comrades were always brought back, even at the risk of more casualties. In most cases, cannons, machine guns and ammunition were also retrieved. In addition to those sustained in action, there were many casualties due to the extreme heat and various insects and flies that affected not only men but animals. The 22<sup>nd</sup> Derajat Mountain Battery had 164 mules when it arrived in East Africa in December 1916. By March 1917, all the mules were dead from Tse-tse fly bites.

There were several examples of old world chivalry. After a fierce battle near Tandmuti Hill in East Africa in August 1917, the 30<sup>th</sup> Punjabis withdrew after sustaining heavy casualties. The Germans over-ran the British advanced field hospital, but respected it. German officers removed quinine from the hospital stores but protected the patients from bayonet wielding German Askari. On 30<sup>th</sup> June 1917 the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry suffered a reverse with very heavy casualties at Lutende in East Africa. Only 55 officers and men reached their base at Naitiwi, leaving behind the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel AL Wilford, DSO. On the following day, the Germans returned the dying Colonel Wilford under a flag of truce along with the severely wounded Subedar Major. A similar instance had occurred in September 1916 when Naik Sanak Gul of 40<sup>th</sup> Pathans was returned with a broken leg during operations along the coast of German East Africa. The Germans often returned wounded prisoners under a flag of truce, to reduce their logistical burden and casualty evacuation problems.

The actions described in the book bring to light several



customs and practices followed during those times by soldiers of various nationalities that would appear strange today.

(a) In February 1917, a column of 50 men of the South Waziristan Militia under the command of Major FL Hughes was attacked by Mahsuds, killing the officer and 20 men. Eleven men were captured and handed over by the Mahsuds to their womenfolk for their 'unpleasant attentions'.

(b) In February 1915, the 2/7<sup>th</sup> Gurkhas embarked on the HMS *Minerva* at Suez for the action at Tor in the Sinai. During the operation, one Gurkha soldier was killed and another wounded. At the insistence of the Captain of HMS *Minerva*, a military funeral was held for the solitary Gurkha soldier, with a guard of honour by the Royal Navy and a party of the Royal Marines firing the salute. All British ships in harbour flew their flags at half mast and a wreath was placed over the grave by men of HMS *Minerva*.

(c) Three *Ghauribardars* and three *Dhooly* Bearers from No. 5 Company, Army Bearer Corps, Mhow, were attached to the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry in German Kamerun in 1915-16.

(d) For the action at Wadi Senab in Egyptian Western Desert in November 1915, two 4-inch guns were manned by the Royal Marines and a six-car detachment was provided by the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division. The Germans also employed naval guns recovered from the sunken cruiser *Konigsberg* manned by naval personnel for the attack on Kibata in East Africa, held by the 129<sup>th</sup> Baluchis.

(e) Indian soldiers had to face racial prejudice from white South African troops in East Africa, who considered the sepoys as having the same standing as 'coolies' and labourers.

This book describes several hitherto unknown actions involving Indian soldiers during World War I. The author deserves the gratitude of military historians as well as lay readers for filling a void and bringing to light the sterling contribution of the Indian soldiers during the Great War.



## Review Article 2

# Women at War: Subhas Chandra Bose and the Rani of Jhansi Regiment\*

Professor KC Yadav®

**M**eticulously chronicled and clearly voiced, this story of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment (RJR) of the Azad Hind Fauj (Indian National Army), during the Second World War, is a product of industry, insight and erudition. The author has visited about half a dozen countries for interviewing the surviving members of the RJR, popularly called Ranis, and others, who were directly or indirectly linked with the Regiment, and collecting relevant material from archives, libraries and private collections there. She has evaluated and used the rich material thus collected with care and dispassion.

The book has, besides a brief introduction and a detailed bibliography, 16 chapters: In Chapter 1, the author tells the interesting story about how she reached her sources; Chapters 2-7 provide background material useful for understanding the complexities and dynamics of the subject; Chapters 8-15, deal with the RJS's birth, mission, recruitment, training, routine life in camp, deployment in Rangoon, Maymyo, retreat from Rangoon and end of the quest; and the last Chapter 16, contains reflections on Bose and RJR.

The RJR was a unique formation, the like of which was perhaps not available then with any country throughout the world. There were, no doubt, fighting women in the UK, Germany, the US and the USSR forces, but they were, as the author recounts, 'not in all female infantry units, and were not sent into battle zones.' Moreover, those fighting women were there mostly for money (salary), defence of their countries or their colonial expansion. But the Ranis were there for none of these. They were there to serve a greater and nobler cause – freedom of their country – India.

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\***Women at War: Subhas Chandra Bose and the Rani of Jhansi Regiment.** By Vera Hilderbrand, (New Delhi : Harper Collins Publishers India, 2017), Price Rs. 499. pp..320, ISBN 9789352640690

®**Professor KC Yadav** is a noted historian and author. He is former Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs, Kurukshetra University, and founder Director of the Haryana Academy of History and Culture.

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This begs a question. Perhaps none of those Ranis (except Lakshmi Swaminathan) had ever seen India. Most of them were also unaware of the developments that were taking place in the national arena there. None of them was either politically active or had served, unlike many of their male counterparts in the INA, in the Army before. How then they joined Army and opted to play with fire, the fire that even seraphs would have feared to face, to attain freedom for India?

The author has given many reasons for this. Of these, three seem important to me: one, collapse of the ruling regimes (British) in the region (Southeast Asia); two, inspiring ambience of patriotic idealism created by the Indian Independence League (IIL) and Subhas Chandra Bose; and three, repugnance against the atrocious colonial rule.

Some Bose's critics, however, think differently: Bose, they say, had blinded those 'young and undeveloped minds' by emotional propagandas to join the RJR. Calling it his 'puppet show', a propaganda tool, 'decoration', etc., they criticise him for putting the lives of the Ranis at risk and jeopardy to satisfy his ego. The present author has put it a shade differently – 'Ever fond of memorable tableaux and re-enactments, Bose may have wanted to stage a dramatic scene in which the Ranis, cast as reincarnations of the original Rani Lakshmi bai, were slaughtered as martyrs on the battlefield' to 'generate an emotional mass movement of outrage and indignation across India and the whole world', as the Jallianwala Bagh massacre did. But he did not get a chance to do that. Most of the relevant evidence the author has given here, and is available today, does not support the surmise, or the above critique.

The fact is this: taking a leaf out of the book of the Indian revolutionaries and the Indian National Congress, Bose had brought in women in the INA movement. He cared more for their safety and honour than his own. Although the Ranis were pressing him hard to send them to the front to fight the enemy, he did not oblige them, because they were not meant to fight there, but inside India. He was almost sure that once they were in Assam and Bengal, with rifles in their hands, 'our countrymen, civilians and sepoys serving in the British Indian Army will come over' and take rifles from them and carry on the fight for their country's freedom. (see

Bose's recruitment speech, 18 July 1943. He was right: didn't that happen in Singapore and in other British colonies nearby? And why it couldn't have happened in India after the fall of Kohima and Imphal where political environment was more conducive than elsewhere?

There are some points that I would like the author to give, if convinced, a second look to. For instance, her use of the word 'cunning' for Mahatma Gandhi. 'Shrewd' would be a better word. Her assessment of Bose borders on the ordinary and lacks the profound insight that she has displayed in dealing with other issues. Then her positing of strained relationship between Bose and Captain Lakshmi 'sometime in the early summer' also needs re-checking in the light of the diary of Lieutenant General Kawabe, C-in-C, Japanese-Burma Area Army, 1943-44, that the author considers an important document, and other sources. Another matter that needs a re-look is her covering of about half-a-dozen-page space with un-cross-examined romantic stuff even after acknowledging that, 'like Captain Lakshmi, most of the Ranis claimed that they had no knowledge of any fraternisation', and 'all the Ranis, agreed that romantic relationships had no place in an army camp'.

These opinion variances, which usually come up in reviews, notwithstanding, Vera Hildebrand's work are of eminent merit and value. It is an authoritative portrait of the Ranis, their diet and dress, training and discipline, dedication and determination, hopes and aspirations, numbers, strengths, weaknesses; in short, everything. I can think of no better words to close the review than the ones the author has closed her book with: 'Their (Ranis') courage, their resolve, their loyalty to the cause and to one another have exemplary relevance for the women's movement today, indeed for the human race.... Despite the failure of their noble ambitions, the Ranis and their leader deserve to be honored for their commitment to the highest of the human aspirations – freedom'.

## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**Jihad and Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power.** *By Aisha Ahmad, (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 303, Price Rs 595.00, ISBN 9780190872656*

This exhaustively researched book provides insights into the Islamist world of Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Islamists consolidating wealth and power are reasoned as: success of business-Islamists alliance juxtaposed over the political-business-cum-mafia pedestal; nexus of Islamist and business elites creating Islamist proto-state albeit jihad waged by Islamists is not limited to creating political order.

The book begins with business tycoons in Peshawar servicing Afghan civil war; rise and remarkable success of Taliban; concurrent government collapse in Somalia; emergence of war-related business elite; and rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Traders and tycoons strategically support Islamists in civil war conditions because (a) Islamic identity increases cooperation, cuts transaction costs and enables access across factional lines, and; (b) Islamist ability to cut business community's security costs. The author narrates how Taliban and ICU established Islamist proto-states using business.

The book describes short-term strategic support to Islamists by business elite and long-term Islamisation of business class culminating in rise of Islamic power. Downfall of Taliban and ICU through international intervention is also covered. Rise of Islamic State in Iraq-Syria with collusion of business, as also financial origins of and ties with local business class of other Islamist groups like AQIS, AQIM, and TTP etc. are described, in addition to Pakistan's support to Taliban. Lower rates of business and security are offered by Islamist groups to oust competing factions but extortion continues against captive business community. Jihadist proto-state thrives in political vacuum with endogenous desire of bringing order.

The concluding observations are an interesting mix: despite Islamist proto-state success in controlling power at home, its future at international level is destined for failure; with jihadist movements springing up in civil wars, the phenomenon appears uncontrollable; international community has failed to effectively eliminate these groups that have multiplied engulfing regions in violence; world

faces a problem it cannot accept and cannot control but this impasse is unsustainable. The author offers new approach to resolve the problem: incentivising the business class, engaging with area experts, and exercising restraint in new interventions in the Muslim world.

The book is recommended to be read by all studying the spread of jihadism since it establishes for the first time the role of business in aggravating the problem. The solution recommended by the author, however, should be seen in backdrop of global powers using Islamists as proxy forces, country like Pakistan using terror as foreign policy and country like China supporting rogue regimes and terrorism generating countries.

**India's Coastal Security: Challenges, Concerns and Way Ahead.** By Brig Hemant Mahajan, YSM (Pune: Madhavi Prakashan, 2017), pp. 336, Price Rs. 600.

The development milestones in Indian coastal security, like many other security issues, were a response to specific attacks. The first effort occurred with the revelation that the explosives used for the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts came by the sea. The second effort was as a part of the border management, based on the recommendations of a Group of Ministers formed post Kargil War. The 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 finally galvanised the Indian establishment to undertake holistic development of coastal security in substantial measure. Nine years into the effort, it is still work in progress and this book is timed to take stock of the jobs completed and those pending.

Coastal security management varies from land border management in three different ways. First, unlike a land border, the jurisdiction going seawards does not change abruptly but is a gradual change as mandated by UN Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). Second, the number of government organisations involved is substantially higher, making co-ordination difficult. Third, there are numerous globally accepted norms, agreements and conventions that have to be complied with in co-ordination with global maritime agencies.

This book has been commissioned under the Maritime Research Fellowship Program of the Maritime Research Centre, Indian Maritime Foundation, Pune. It covers all aspects of coastal

security substantially. The author first narrates the history of the development of coastal security in India. Thereafter, he brings out the threats and challenges in coastal security. In the next chapter, he covers the global maritime environment, external threats and the doctrine and strategy documents of the Indian Navy that are not necessarily directly relevant to coastal security. The chapter dedicated to the Indian Coast Guard has a substantial amount of information about the force including its responsibilities, organisation, capabilities, budget and development plans. One of the chapters covers the tasks assigned to the Marine Police and the present state of the Marine Police in the respective coastal states. The next chapter narrates the status of the coastal security mechanism at the state level in respective coastal states. One of the chapters is dedicated to the Indian Navy and its activities relevant to coastal security. This includes the development of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities and the constabulary role undertaken by the Indian Navy. An overview is provided of all the other agencies involved in coastal security and the tasks being executed by them. The security arrangements for ports and offshore installations are covered next. The security of the island territories is covered in a separate chapter. The multiple intelligence agencies involved and the challenges involved in their co-ordination have been covered. The legal framework that is unique to the coastal/maritime environment is also discussed along with that of private maritime security companies. Finally, the author has undertaken a survey of best practices from agencies abroad. The recommendations of the author are provided at the conclusion of each chapter and summarised in the final chapter.

The book suffers from lack of tight editing and that has resulted in duplication and fragmentation in the narrative. Overall, it is a useful primer of information on all aspects of coastal security.

*Commander Subhasish Sarangi*

**India, Europe and Pakistan.** Edited by Rajendra K Jain, (New Delhi: Knowledge World 2018), pp..291, Price Rs 960, ISBN 9789386288882.

This collection of 13 essays is the product of a seminar held in India in March 2015 with funding from the European Union (EU). Despite the inclusion of India in the title, the bulk of the essays deal with Pakistan from the perspective of EU states.



The predominant theme of the book is that the EU's relations with India and Pakistan are driven by ground realities. Most of the essays look at various aspects of Pakistan's relations with the EU in the context of India's status as an emerging power. Pakistan's domestic and external challenges are highlighted as major factors impacting negatively on the prospects of greater engagement with the EU.

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri's pithily written essay on how the EU has endorsed India's policy of dealing with the Kashmir issue in its bilateral engagement with Pakistan is meticulously researched. The Editor, Rajendra K Jain, has written comprehensively on the interaction between the EU and Pakistan through the prism of Pakistan's attempt to sustain democracy, emphasising the role of its domestic players. The essay by Shanthie D'Souza on NATO and Pakistan is useful for those interested in how bordering states like India should respond to Pakistan's "major non-NATO ally" status. Hartmut Elsenhans' perception of Pakistan is pessimistic, highlighting the pitfalls ahead for Pakistan's policy of exploiting its "geopolitical rent" due to its location in the region. Ajay Darshan Behera, writing on Pakistan at the crossroads, concludes that the current dominance of Pakistan by its military will continue. The focus of EU concerns regarding radicalisation and terrorism emanating from Pakistan are well brought out in the essays by Jean-Luc Racine and Christian Wagner, written from the perspectives of France and Germany.

Stefano Gatto poses an interesting question about the relevance of the EU for Pakistan following China's emergence as a major player in Pakistan's economic development paradigm. Most of the essays see more promise for EU trade and development, rather than political, engagement with Pakistan.

Three of the essays, by BK Krishnamurthy, Sheetal Sharma and Bhaswati Sarkar, deal with the role of the Pakistani diaspora in influencing EU policy to the region. All these essays illustrate the current concerns regarding migration and integration in the EU.

The book is a timely and useful addition for the library.

*Shri Asoke K Mukerji, IFS (Retd)*



**Securing India the Modi Way – Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More.** By Nitin A Gokhale, (Bloomsbury, New Delhi, 2017), pp..226, Price Rs 499, ISBN 9789386643872

The book is a must read for not only the defence and strategic experts, but for all interested in national security, especially the military and foreign policy makers and contributors. There has been a definite shift in the Modi Government's outlook towards national security issues and the way it conducts business. In a first of its kind, Nitin Gokhale analyses the key events in the last three years of the Modi Government which have contributed to a risen and responsible India wherein the nation has asserted its rightful place, especially in the security domain, both external and internal. He has carried out extensive research with obvious access to certain official accounts and detailed interviews with policy makers and executors.

The book details the surgical strikes from the decision of the executive to the execution by the Special Forces, both in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Myanmar. The surgical strikes, especially in PoK, are a game changer at the strategic level. Gokhale, with an easy to understand narrative, describes the strategic implications, the decision to go public, avoiding escalation as also the execution. This should help put to rest the ongoing debate on the conduct of the surgical strikes and the strategic pay offs. It is also the first time that an authentic account of the Pathankot terror attack with the role played by various stakeholders including the NSA, NSG and the *Garuds* has been highlighted, however, the narrative absolves all for the prolonged operations and avoidable casualties suffered. The terror attack has also been compared with similar attacks in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the US Air Base in Afghanistan.

Modi's China policy is aptly discussed and described as "Standing up to China". DOLAM (not Doklam) is for once mentioned with the established and correct name - a sure indicator of the authors on ground feel and knowledge of the terrain and its strategic importance. The Dolam standoff is detailed, from the initiation by the PLA in May 2017 to its peaceful resolution on 28/29 August, covering the essential geopolitical and geostrategic manoeuvring and implications. The India-China relations are also discussed in the backdrop of the Chumar and Depsang intrusions, the SCO and China's three warfares.

In the internal security domain, the book covers the Left Wing Extremism and Jammu and Kashmir. Surprisingly the various internal security challenges in the northeast have been left out, especially any mention of the historic Naga Peace Accord inked by the Modi Government in August 2015.

The author has also analysed the re-engagement with the 'Middle East', harnessing space for defence and securing the cyber domain. Gokhale details the various defence reforms essential for a secure India, from promulgating the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2016, analysing the Government's decision to eventually procure 36 Rafale *vis-a-vis* 126 MMRCA, taking the India-US relations to a different level and signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).

This book is by far one of its kind making for easy but compulsive reading and details PM Modi's approach to national security and foreign policy initiatives, as also style of functioning and decision making. The author has achieved a fine balance by giving out adequate details but remained within the confines of confidentiality that could have jeopardised strategic and operational security.

*Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)*

## RESULTS

### USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 2017

#### GROUP A

**SUBJECT : "ROLE OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES IN STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING - RECLAIMING THE STRATEGIC SPACE".**

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| <b>Winner</b> – | Cdr Pankaj Kumar, IN<br>Defence Services Staff College<br>Locker No 623<br>DSSC Wellington (Nilgiris) Conoor,<br>Tamil Nadu – 643 231<br>Email : cirus1979@gmail.com |
|-----------------|--|

#### GROUP B

**SUBJECT : "MORALS AND ETHICS – HOW TO TEACH, IMBIBE, IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE DESIRED STANDARDS IN THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES".**

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| <b>First</b> –  | Maj Sushant Rai<br>Cadets Training Wing<br>Military College of Telecommunication Engineering<br>C/o 56 APO<br>Email : rai.sushant21@gmail.com                            |
| <b>Second</b> – | Lt Ankush Banerjee, IN<br>Centre of Excellence in Ethics and<br>Behavioural Studies (CELABS)<br>C/o Naval Base<br>Kochi – 682 004<br>Email : banerjee.ankush99@gmail.com |

## **RESULTS**

### **Lieutenant General SL Menezes Memorial Essay Competition 2017**

**SUBJET : THE ESSAY IS ON A TOPIC RELATING TO  
ANY ASPECT OF INDIA'S ROLE IN THE SECOND WORLD  
WAR.**

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| <b>First</b>  | Col Amit Singh Dabas<br>Defence Services Staff College<br>Locker No 58<br>DSSC Wellington (Nilgiris)<br>Tamil Nadu – 643 231<br>Email : visheshbalforever@gmail.com                  |
| <b>Second</b> | Cdr Mohd Sarfaraz Khan, IN<br>Locker No 613, Naval Wing<br>Defence Services Staff College<br>DSSC Wellington (Nilgiris)<br>Tamil Nadu – 643 231<br>Email : sarfrazebrahim2@gmail.com |



|             |   |      |      |
|-------------|---|------|------|
| **NSP-33    | Power is a Dynamic Concept : Challenges to India's Strategic Autonomy in the Coming Decade and How we can Shape the Strategic Environment<br>By Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) | 195  | 2016 |
| **NSP-35    | "Non-Traditional Threats – The Ever Evolving Continuum Implications for India"<br>By Lt Gen Ghanshyam Singh Katoch, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)  | 195  | 2017 |
| **OP-10     | "The 19 <sup>th</sup> Congress and XI's Rise : Implications for India".<br>Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd)  | 125  | 2017 |
| **R-89      | "India China Space Capability – A Comparison".<br>By Col Sanjay Kumar   | 850  | 2017 |
| **R-90      | "PAKISTAN'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS - Giving The Devil More Than His Due?" By Col Inderjit Singh Panjra  | 795  | 2017 |
| **OP-11     | "Kashmir Question at the Security Council"<br>By Prof KN Pandita  | 150  | 2017 |
| **OP-12     | "Hypersonic Vehicles and Their Impact on Military Operations and Strategic Stability"<br>By Dr Roshan Khanijo & Maj Gen (Dr) PK Chakravorty, VSM (Retd)                                     | 150  | 2017 |
| *CAFHR-35   | "India in Flanders Fields" (Coffee Table Book)<br>By Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina, MBE (Retd) and Mr Dominiek Dendooven   | 2000 | 2017 |
| *CAFHR-36   | "India in Flanders Fields" (Booklet)<br>By Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina, MBE (Retd) and Mr Dominiek Dendooven   | 200  | 2017 |
| **OP-1/2016 | Nuclear Security Summit – The Challenge Continues<br>Dr Roshan Khanijo  | 100  | 2016 |
| **OP-2/2016 | Analysis of China's Military Reorganisation<br>Maj Gen BK Sharma, Brig Sandeep Jain & Dr Roshan Khanijo   | 100  | 2016 |
| **OP-3/2016 | "India and United Nations Peace Operations : Security Sector Reform"<br>By Ambassador Asoke Mukerji, IFS (Retd) & Lt Gen Chander Prakash, SM, VSM (Retd)                                    | 100  | 2016 |
| **OP-4/2016 | Does India Need to Review its Nuclear Doctrine?"<br>By Dr Roshan Khanijo  | 100  | 2016 |
| **OP-5/2016 | "India's SCO Membership – Challenges and Opportunities"<br>By Maj Gen BK Sharma, AVSM, SM** (Retd) & Dr Raj Kumar Sharma  | 100  | 2016 |
| **OP-6/2017 | "South China Sea in Retrospect Post Tribunal Verdict"<br>By Cdr MH Rajesh   | 100  | 2017 |
| **OP-7/2017 | "New Threats in the Information Warfare"<br>By Col Anurag Dwivedi   | 100  | 2017 |

\*\* Available from Vij Books

\* Available from USI

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|-------------|--|------|------|
| **OP-8/2017 | "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) :<br>Connecting the Dots"<br>By Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM,AVSM (Retd)                           | 100  | 2017 |
| **NSS-62    | The Indo-Pacific Region – Security Dynamics and Challenges"<br>Edited by Gp Capt Sharad Tewari, VM (Retd) &<br>Dr Roshan Khanijo     | 850  | 2016 |
| CAFHR-32    | "Battle Ground Chhamb - The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971"<br>By Maj Gen AJS Sandhu, VSM (Retd)<br>M/s Manohar Publishers & Distributors | 1395 | 2017 |
| **CAFHR-33  | "Sideshows of the Indian Army in World War-I"<br>By Harry Fecitt, MBE, TD  | 1095 | 2017 |
| M-16/2017   | "Summer 2016 Kashmir Unrest Summation and Analysis"<br>By Prof Kashi Nath Pandita<br>M/s GB Books                                    | 195  | 2017 |
| **R-87      | "Tibet : The Last Months of a Free Nation-India<br>Tibet Relations 1947-1962, Part-1".<br>By Claude Arpi                             | 1295 | 2017 |
| **CAFHR-33  | "Sideshows of the Indian Army in World War-I".<br>By Harry Fecitt, MBE, TD   | 1095 | 2017 |
| **CAFHR-34  | "Indian Recipients of the Military Cross", 2 Volume Set<br>By Sushil Talwar  | 7800 | 2017 |
| **R-88      | "Strategic Stability in South Asia - Challenges and<br>Implications for India",<br>By Col Zubin Bhatnagar                            | 850  | 2017 |
| **NSS-63    | "Strategic Balance in the Indo-Pacific Region :<br>Challenges and Prospects"<br>Edited by Cdr MH Rajesh & Dr Raj Kumar Sharma        | 850  | 2017 |
| **OP-9      | "Nuclear Instability in South Asia : Is Someone<br>Shaping The Narrative?"<br>by Col IS Panjra, SM                                   | 125  | 2017 |

\*\* Available from Vij Books

\* Available from USI



# USI

(Estd. 1870)

## OUR ACTIVITIES

### Library and Reading Room

The library holds over 68,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material. Library was automated in 2002.

### Correspondence Courses

The Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

### USI Journal

The *USI Journal* is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. In an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

### Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation

The Erstwhile Centre for Research and its resources have been merged into the new Centre named as USI Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (USI-CS3) wef 01 January 2005. The Centre aims at conducting detailed and comprehensive enquiry, research and analyses of national and international security related issues, and gaming and simulation of strategic scenarios, to evolve options for wider discussion and consideration.

### USI Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

The Centre was established in 2000 and functioned with USI till Aug 2014, when it moved out of USI premises and was delinked from USI. Its aims were organising workshops, seminars and training capsules for peacekeepers, observers and staff officers – both Indian and foreign. It also oversaw the practical training of Indian contingents. It functioned under a Board of Management headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and worked in close coordination with the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence. In August 2014, CUNPK moved out to the accommodation allotted by the Army HQ.

### Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR)

The Centre was established on 01 Dec 2000 and encourages study and research into the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets such as strategy, tactics, logistics, organisation and socio-economic aspects and their implementation.

### Gold Medal Essay Competitions

Every year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions: one for officers below 10 years of service and the other open to all officers. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

### Lt Gen SL Menezes Memorial Essay Competition

This has been instituted from 2015 on a subject related to Armed Forces Historical Research. The Essay Competition is open to all across the globe.

### Lectures, Discussions and Seminars

A series of lectures, discussions and seminars on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

### MacGregor Medal

This medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.

## MEMBERSHIP

The following are eligible to become members of the Institution :

- Officers of the Armed Forces
- Class I Gazetted Officers of Group 'A' Central Services.
- Any category mentioned above will be eligible even though retired or released from the Service.
- Cadets from the NDA and Cadets from the Service Academies and Midshipmen.

For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, (Opposite Signals Enclave) Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi – 110 057

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