

## BOOK REVIEWS

GANDHI AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: MAHATMA IN INDIAN POLITICS 1928—34

by JUDITH M. BROWN

(Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977),

pp 414. Price £15.50

**T**HIS is a research study prepared by a scholar whose authority on the subject is well illustrated by her previous publication, entitled "Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915—1922". As the detailed bibliography of the book shows, the author has gone through a vast mass of source material spread over three continents—in New Delhi, London, Manchester, Canterbury, Oxford, and Canberra,—and tried out some of her ideas in several universities of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Returning from Africa in 1915, Gandhi joined the Indian politics to become its leader in no time. The period, 1928—34, covered by the book under review, witnessed Gandhi's reassertion of authority in Congress during 1928—1934, after his apparent self-withdrawal from the thick of Indian politics in 1922, and also repetition of the same phenomenon of abnegation of party politics after 1934. This covers certain important political developments on the Indian scene—the Salt Satyagraha and the Civil Disobedience Movement, the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, and the Round Table Conference. It is difficult for any person, especially for a foreigner, to assess the role of an enigmatic personality like Gandhi, "Who claimed to be governed by religious commitment, who was hailed as a Mahatma, but who traded in the doubtful currency of politics". But to Gandhi there was no inconsistency in his behaviour. As a 'karmayogi' of Arjuna's type it was his 'dharma' to launch a political struggle to emancipate India. Gandhi introduced a novel type of weapon in political struggle in the form of mass 'Satyagraha' or Civil Disobedience. The author has rightly said that "Gandhi's role and standing in Indian politics were extraordinary phenomena when seen

against the barriers to continental leadership created by regional and social divisions and the limited development of mass media." The author has shown how Gandhi played his all-India role to enable the Congress to develop as a national party free from regional and communal pulls. His Civil Disobedience movement served as a tool to reinforce his party's continental role. The author has said perceptively: "The absence of any internal constraint of aspiration to a political career through office in Congress or the governmental structures gave the Mahatma a flexibility which paradoxically was vital in enabling his continued political importance in a period of rapid change".

This is a masterly study of an important phase of our political struggle against the foreign rulers, and anyone interested in Gandhi or Indian history of the present century will surely find this book stimulating.

—BC

#### ARMS, MEN AND MILITARY BUDGETS: ISSUES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979

By FRANCIS P. HOEBER, DAVID B. KASSING AND WILLIAM SCHNEIDER JR.

(Published by Crane, Russak and Company, Inc. New York, 1978), pp 157. Price \$5.95

**T**HIS volume is the third annual survey comparing military strengths between the United States and the Soviet Union. Published by the National Strategy Information Centre in New York—a well-known hardliner group in the United States—its central purpose is disingenuously mentioned in the preface itself: "...for many years the United States has been investing a dangerously inadequate proportion of its resources in national defence, when measured against the massive Soviet buildup in all branches of its military establishment". It is, consequently, hoped that this publication would engender greater debate on "the inadequacy of the present defence effort."

Need we add that the anti-Soviet pressure groups in Congress, academia and arms manufacturing firms would welcome this analysis. The Pentagon could hardly complain, either. In the American

system of governance, the role of pressure groups, with access to the media, is completely out of proportion to their size. This book would, therefore, advance the interests of those Americans who gain from U.S.-Soviet tensions and the arms race, despite assertions that it seeks to strengthen American resolve, and enhance defence preparedness.

The authors point out obtaining American deficiencies in separate chapters devoted to Strategic Forces, Army and Air Force, and Navy and Marine Forces. Trends in U.S. and Soviet defence expenditures are analysed, before the study's main recommendations and conclusions are drawn.

The major chapter on Strategic Forces by Francis P. Hoeber concedes that the Soviet Union has reached nuclear parity with the United States. The familiar argument is, then, made that the Soviet Union seeks nuclear superiority, since it believes a nuclear war is "thinkable" and "winnable". The SALT agreements merely codify the Soviet drive towards nuclear superiority, rather than moderate the superpower nuclear competition. The equally familiar argument is also made that the Soviet advantage in throw-weight, derived from heavy-land based missiles, would overwhelm the America land-based forces. As regards the greater accuracy of American missiles it is argued that the Soviets would soon reach these accuracies; similarly, warhead numbers, which presently favour the United States, would level off as the Soviets MIRV their missiles. The Soviet civic defence programme is highlighted as affecting assured U.S. second-strike capability; it is, however, difficult to visualise how the Soviet Union could survive the radiation following an all-out nuclear war.

At the prescriptive level, Hoeber suggests that the decision not to produce the B-1 bomber or Minuteman III should be reserved. Cruise missiles in all its modes, MX, and Trident submarines should be produced in adequate numbers. Missile accuracies should be produced in adequate numbers. Missile accuracies should be improved by developing the Mark 12-A warhead. Further, R&D should be stepped up for improving ABM capabilities; civil defence and air defence schemes must be implemented; anti-satellite defences and high energy technologies investigated. In fact, there is hardly any feasible measure which is neglected.

The fallacies in these processes of argumentation are numerous. First, nuclear deterrence rests upon the strategic Triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers; hence a deficiency, even if credible, in land-based missiles—one leg of the Triad—does not radically alter the nuclear balance or the fabric of

nuclear deterrence. Second, the different geo-strategic situation of the two superpowers needs appreciation. The United States, whilst pursuing its traditional maritime strategy, undertook a balanced development of its Triadic forces. Being a continental land-mass the Soviet Union, however, laid emphasis on its land-based forces. Third, the history of military technological developments within the nuclear arms race clearly establishes an American lead in innovative skills, which the Soviets have sought to neutralise by greater stress on numbers. Any thesis, therefore, that the Soviets are moving towards strategic superiority is incomprehensible. All that can be said is that nuclear developments in the two superpowers being different, equivalence in each sector is a chimerical pursuit.

With regard to the Navy and Marine Corps, David B. Kassing points out that the U.S. naval role envisages both sea control and power projection. The Soviet Union lays emphasis on operations against shore facilities and "sea denial"—especially across the Atlantic. However, Kassing fairly acknowledges the major Soviet disadvantage in having dispersed fleets located in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Arctic and Pacific Oceans: the Soviet Navy must also pass through choke points to reach the oceans, adding to their vulnerability. Besides, the Soviets lack port facilities in other countries, their submarines are noisy, their ships are limited in range, habitability and shore projection capabilities, diversity of weapon systems reduces ammunition reserves and firepower and so on.

Kassing concludes that the Soviet Navy has a nuclear orientation, and its nuclear missile armed submarines serve to preserve the second-strike capability. Its general-purpose forces have considerable potential for inflicting the damage on U.S. Navy/merchantmen in a conflict. But, on balance, its many inherent disadvantages, reveal that the Soviets would ultimately lose the naval battle. This is a fair assessment. Kassing takes note of the growing naval capability of developing countries. He credits them with greater offensive capabilities. Nevertheless, he asserts that the U.S. Navy, with its tactical air arm, could easily overwhelm these fledgling navies.

The author is firmly in favour of aircraft carriers, appreciating their multi-role capabilities. In fact, he estimates that large ships are more cost-effective than smaller ships to position sea-based aircraft. Larger ships are, further, more survivable, and could provide reconnaissance and communications facilities, should satellite communications systems get disrupted in a conflict. On the prescriptive side, it is suggested that the United States might take advantage of the geographic constraints on the Soviet Navy, and procures counter-

vailing systems against Soviet air and missile antiship strength. These include surveillance and early warning systems, apart from air and missile defence systems.

William Schneider's chapter on Army and Air Forces makes clear that the only theatre where the United States envisages deployment of these forces is West Europe, and to counter a possible Soviet attack. Attention is drawn to the new Soviet doctrine of "daring thrust", which involves shifting tactical manoeuvre from the division to the regiment; reliance on "meeting" or "encounter" engagement—bypassing prepared defensive positions and engaging rear forces moved up as reinforcements—and, launching the offensive along numerous axes, rather than a few major axes. The Soviets have, consequently, initiated major changes in their land forces, tactical air forces, field air defences, and command and control arrangements. Taking the Soviet weaponry inductions into account, Schneider believes that the United States should upgrade its field air defences, procure major weaponry units for the conventional armoury, and the neutron bomb/short-range nuclear missiles for the nuclear armoury. Interestingly enough, growing personnel costs are adversely commented upon, which are reducing the outlays available for military R&D and procurement.

The major conclusion is that reductions in defence expenditure, proposed by the Carter Administration over the FY 1978-82 Five-Year Defence Plan period, would substantially degrade U.S. capabilities. The Soviet Union utilises between 12 to 14% of its G.N.P. on defence and its annual expenditures is some 25% over U.S. defence expenditures. The manner of estimating Soviet defence expenditure is beset with numerous difficulties, but these are somewhat conveniently ignored to support the general thesis that U.S. spending on strategic forces should increase by \$10 bn each year, and on General Purpose Forces by around \$10 bn to \$20 bn annually.

This, indeed, is the main purpose of the book—create the intellectual rationale for larger defence outlays by the United States. Apart from sustaining this central purpose, the book is of some value to those interested in making comparisons of military strengths, and studying the methodologies available for such exercises.

PRC

## MODERNIZING THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE: WHY AND HOW

BY ALTON H. QUANBECK AND ARCHIE L. WOOD

(Published by Brookings Institution, Washington, 1976), pp 116.  
Price \$ 2.95.

**W**HEN President Carter of the United States announced on 30 June 77 his decision to abandon the production of the B-1 supersonic strategic bomber in favour of the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) it was to say the least a most unexpected decision. Carter gave three reasons for his decision, firstly that the cruise missile is in itself an effective weapon, secondly that the USAF Boeing B-52 Gs and Hs armed with cruise missile would be effective into the 1980s and thirdly that the triad of SLBM, ICBM and the cruise missile armed B-52s would give the USA "an effective, flexible strategic force with capability fully sufficient for national defence". This decision has generated heated controversy both from those who support the B-1 and those who do not. There are supporters of the B-1 in the USAF, the Pentagon, the US Congress and the industry.

The decision not to produce the B1 is not irrevocable. This is evident from the fact that although the \$1500 million production programme for the first five series Rockwell B1 has been deleted from the 1978 defence budget, the R&D activity by the Rockwell International, the manufacturers of the B 1, will continue to operate with \$ 443 million funding in 1978\*. Giving reasons for this President Carter has said that the existing B-1 development programme will continue in order to provide a technological data bases "in the unlikely event" of the cruise missile running into technical problems or relations with the Soviet Union deteriorating to the point at which a strategic bomber in the B1 class again becomes necessary.\*\*

So far three B-1s prototypes have flown and a fourth which is under manufacture was expected to fly in early 1979, three production B1s under construction are now likely to be scrapped. A total of over \$ 20 billion has already been spent on the B-1 programme. After so much commitment by the Ford administration what were the reasons which led to this unexpected decision and

\*Inter Avia 8/1977

\*\*Flight International 9 July 77.

which some responsible aviation thinkers feel will have pleased the Russians, because it does not demand the cancellation of the Soviet bomber BACKFIRE as a reciprocal gesture.\*\* Some observers feel that this decision will confer upon the Soviets an unfair advantage. The editorial in 'Air Force' Aug 77 voices this concern when it states that the decision has been widely interpreted as an either/or case—the B1 or the cruise missile—whereas the cruise missile carrying capability of the B1 has long been foremost consideration in justifying the (B-1) programme. "The critical and over-riding need to penetrate Soviet defences has yet to be addressed definitively. Launch vehicles standing off miles from the Soviet perimeter, even though armed with the best of cruise missile yet to be perfected, cannot fill this long felt need".

In this context a study carried out by the BROOKINGS INSTITUTION of Washington has come to our notice. This study is entitled "MODERNISING THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE" by ALTON H. QUANBECK and ARCHIE L. WOOD. @ It is quite possible that this and other such studies may have been responsible for influencing the US decision against the B-1 bomber. In order to understand the reasons which have led to such a major shift in strategic doctrine, the above study assumes importance.

This book provides a fund of useful information on the US bomber forces, the reason for their needs and their tasks, their existing state and replacement programmes and cost, examines the pre-launch survivability of the bomber and its capability to penetrate into Soviet air defences, and analyses alternate means of meeting the threat which are the sea launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the air launched cruise missile (ALCM). Before the treatment of these crucial questions, the book outlines the origin of the US bomber force, examines the justification for retaining them, discusses the role of the bomber in relation to other US strategic offensive forces, the arms control possibilities, and comparative cost analysis and ultimately recommends a course of action. A brief review of these aspects is outlined in subsequent paragraphs

#### BOMBER FORCE

The authors estimate that the current US bomber force under the Joint Soviet-American statement on strategic Arms Limitation

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Washington D.C. 20036

Prince \$2.95

signed on 24 Nov 1974 at Vladivostock could comprise of 270 B-52 G/H, 80 B52 D/F and 75 FB-111. These are held as 5 squadrons of B-52 D/F, 18 squadrons of B-52 G/H and 4 squadrons of KC-135 tanker force to provide air-to-air refuelling, each squadron with 15 aircraft. There are 23 primary bases in the USA of the Strategic Air Command, each SAC base having 1 bomber and 1 tanker squadron. In addition there are 70 military and civil air bases for dispersion. 40% of the bomber and tanker force has been kept on ground alert but since 1975, this has been reduced to 30%. The ratio of aircraft to crew is 1 : 3. During early 60s, 1/8 of the bomber force was kept on airborne alert and half the force on 15 minute alert. Presently the airborne alert is less than that in 1960. A B-52 squadron has 1100 officers and enlisted men and at the monthly flying rate of 45 hrs for each B52, the direct operating cost for a squadron of B52s is about \$40 million annually. The indirect operating cost has been estimated to be nearly equal to the direct operating cost. The current cost of maintaining the US bomber force is \$6 billion annually and accounts for 35% of all expenditure on strategic arms. About 25% of nuclear weapons in the strategic arsenal of USA are carried by the bomber force.

The mainstay of the US bomber force is the B-52 G/H Boeing Superfortress, which are expected to remain structurally sound into the 1990s. They are equipped to carry 4 nuclear bombs and 20 short range air-launched missiles (SRAM) or cruise missiles or armed decoys. The B52 G/H are under-going modernisation of their ECM system at a cost of about \$ 350 million. These aircraft are fitted with quick start accessories to improve pre-launch survivability and have electro-optical viewing system (TV) to improve low altitude performance by providing a view of outside and forward of the aircraft when the cockpit is hooded to protect the crew from bright flashes created by nuclear explosions. The latest version B-52 H has a range of 12,500 miles in unrefuelled flight. Thus the B-52 G/H appear capable of performing all the desired roles of a manned strategic bomber force, subject to the uncertainty about their vulnerability to surprise attacks while they are on ground alert and to Soviet air defences.

The FB-111 is the strategic bomber version of the F-111 variable geometry fighter bomber produced by General Dynamics, can carry a payload of 6 SRAM over a range of 4100 miles and has a top speed of M 2.5 at high altitude. The FB-111 is expected to be operational upto 1990.

**B-1**

The B1 is based upon a 1962 design concept for an advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA). The first prototype of the B-1 flew in 1975. The B-1 was designed to carry a maximum of 24 SRAM in three rotary launchers, and had a normal unrefuelled range of about 6100 miles. The B1 was provided with terrain following radar to enable it to fly at 100 ft at a speed of 400 kts, its maximum speed at high altitude being M 2.2. It was estimated that the B-1 would cost over \$ 100 million each. The B-1 was to be introduced into the force structure in 1981 and a total of 244 aircraft were planned to be built.

**TANKER FORCE**

The KC-135 Strato-tanker is a development of the Boeing 707 and over 700 of such aircraft have been built and used since 1956 for air-to-air refuelling of the SAC bombers. One tanker can transfer 120,000 lbs of fuel, refuelling one bomber at a time. A tanker squadron requires half the personnel of a B-52 squadron and each aircraft flies at a rate of 35 hrs monthly. The overall operating cost of a tanker squadron has been estimated the same as for a bomber squadron.

**AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE**

The authors have carried out a study of the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) its lightweight turbofan engine, its navigation system known as TERCOM (Terrain contour matching) having an accuracy of the order of 0.1 nautical mile (600 ft) circular error probable (probably at ranges of upto 1500 miles) and its procurement cost of approximately \$500,000 per missile (in 1976 prices). The development of the ALCM since 1967-68, the views of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the plans to arm the B52s and the B-1 bomber with these missiles have also been reviewed. It is interesting to note that the first flight of the missile had been scheduled for 1978 and for deployment on B52 (now that the B-1 is no longer to be produced) in early 198's. The procurement annual costs of the launching platforms (the FB-111, the B52 and the B-1), the tanker the cruise missile based on an annual force structure upto 1985 has been given and include direct and indirect operating costs. This chapter makes very interesting reading for anyone dealing with planning of a force and weapon system structure.

**BOMBER SURVIVABILITY**

The rest of the book deals with the crucial question of bomber survivability both in the pre-launch phase against attacks by Soviet

missiles and during the bomber penetration of Soviet air defences in order to reach within range of targets to be able to launch the ALCM. The chapter on pre-launch survivability of the US bomber force is a fascinating analysis of the ground and airborne alert system in force and the quantum of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs (Submarine launched ballistic missile) their flight time against US continental targets and the US bomber force reaction time, based upon the warning systems available and alerts and dispersion of force and bases. The book comes to the conclusion that the US bomber force can maintain a high level of pre-launch survivability of depressed trajectory SLBMs and long range submarine launched cruise missiles are excluded and even if such threats were to become evident, steps could be taken to protect the bomber force. In the chapter on penetration of Soviet air defences by US bomber force the authors have first examined the extent of Soviet air defences by fighters and SAM assuming that the Soviets do not deploy an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) force to protect the air defences. The analysis assumes that the US bombers must attack "through" Soviet air defences because of the limited range of present-day ALCMs. The US strategic bomber penetration of Soviet airspace in a nuclear war, has been calculated as 85% with an attrition rate of 1 to 1.5%. It concludes that current Soviet air defences have little capability at low altitudes to intercept bombers or subsonic cruise missiles and have no capability to intercept SRAM (short range attack missiles) which are nuclear armed supersonic missiles (Mach 2.5) delivered from the parent bomber at ranges of upto 100 miles in a high altitude semi-ballistic profile and of 35 miles at low altitude.

The study concludes that there is no reason to produce the B-1 bomber as the effectiveness of the current US bomber force equipped to carry stand-off air launched cruise missiles, is adequate against Soviet targets.

It will be evident from the above summary that the book "Modernising the Strategic Bomber Force" by Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood of Brookings Institution is a study of great significance which could be considered as an item of essential addition not only to Air Force Planning and operational departments but to Air Force Stations and squadrons as a model for force-weapon-target planning considerations and calculations.

VMB

## FROM APES TO WARLORDS 1904-46

By SALLY ZUCKERMAN

(Published by Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978), pp. 447. Price £ 8.50

**L**ORD Zuckerman's autobiography is the recounting of an unusual life: a "full life" which he has obviously enjoyed. Starting with a South African childhood, a medical degree, though he never practised medicine, he rose to be the Chief Scientific Officer to the British Government. During World War II he was one of the fore-runners of the scientific tribe which has since then grown vastly, all over the world. Most of the book deals with the war years and he has little to say in this book of the post war period. What strikes one is the catholicity of outlook, the wide interests in people and things. And what a vast canvas is covered. His portrayal of almost all the famous air marshals of the Second World War is excellent. So too the academic world of the era just before the War, especially that pertaining to biology and zoology.

Although a lot of the book is taken up with ups and downs of battles between the "Air Barons" and the controversy over the bombing policy, the main point which comes out is the necessity to look at the means of waging warfare in a dispassionate "almost a biological manner". The professional soldier, sailor or airman is not normally so detached in his outlook. The effect of munitions on the enemy depends on a large number of factors, his mental attitude not the least. The serviceman often rightly stresses the psychological effect far greater than does the clinical scientist. As has been said rightly, warfare is very much a "matter of the spirit". On the other hand, with the changes which came about in World War II and which have continued at an unimaginably rapid pace thereafter, there is much to be said for having a "tame scientist" in the commander's pocket who can be let loose to ferret out the essence from a mass of seemingly unconnected detail; on the battlefield from damage inflicted on material and man, in his laboratory (and now based on computer data), and relay and process it back to the Commander for understanding the concept, redesigning the weapon and later for its employment. The tactical as also the strategic usage of weapons is the field of the Commander, but his results could be all the more effective, if he is prepared to use the scientist's assistance.

It is interesting to note that in World War II Britain used its intellectual manpower for the first time for assistance to warfare as

a whole. In a typically British manner "it grew like Topsy". Churchill had Prof Linderman (The Prof) advising him on these matters from the days he was still in the wilderness. From accounts now published of research carried out in such diverse fields as cryptography, the running of agents, radio intercepts and so on, as also the better known results of scientific research leading to the production of radar, it is obvious that Britain gathered a real harvest from the effort of its intellectual community although possibly it was but a "random harvest".

Solly Znckerman's main contention is that far better results could have been obtained had all this effort been channelised more purposefully. Being a scientist and an active one at that, he realises fully that scientists cannot be dragooned into set grooves so dear to the heart of the serviceman and even more so, the bureaucrat. Immediately after the war he went back to his chair in Birmingham University of Anthropology, but continued his associations with a large number on the Government Committees for scientific research. At the same time, he realises that until the Services and especially their Heads, have been exposed to the capability of the trained scientists, they are unable to make full use of them for war or, for that matter, peace. What he pleads for, therefore, is a companionable marriage of the Services and the scientific community for a more efficient projection of war. "I was to learn that the military trappings of the past and the interests by which they are sustained, do not necessarily relate to the political realities of today".

We do continue with the British system with some of our scientists associated with Defence as well as other Government agencies viz the Electronics Commission. On the other hand, it is for consideration whether we have tapped our scientific corpus enough; or alternatively, are they so enshrined in their ivory towers that they are unable to get down to the realities facing those who have to execute policies, be they soldiers or statesmen. The author says "Like others, I now have my doubts whether scientists, who had rightly been lauded for what they had done to win the war, have since lived up to what was expected of them, and to the promise which was theirs".

At the same time, with the emphasis now given to science in the training of our officers since World War II, will they be capable of making use of the scientist for the conduct of war at the national level? In our case it will be not only the Service Officer, but the senior civilians working in our Ministries who will have to be enlightened enough for the total employment of the national effort

for national defence. Afterall, as Clemence said "war is too complex to be left only to the soldiers". And yet, at the same time, we should remember that Defence is not merely the sum of the Army, Navy or the Air Force or the multiplication of the effort of men, tanks, ships and aircraft, but encompasses much more; the nation as a whole from which spring the Armed Forces, the industrial infrastructure and last but not the least the top echelons of Government who only can enunciate national policies, of which the articulation of the national will to win, is possibly its most important aspect.

Although a long book, 372 pages, with detailed appendices, it is easy reading. For those connected with armaments and the higher directions of war in general, it is a must.

AMS

## WORLD PERSPECTIVE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY

GEORGE A. KOURVETARIS AND BETTY A. DOBRATZ

(Published by Transaction Books, New Brunswick, ED, USA, 1977), pp 294. Price \$14.95.

**T**HIS is an anthology of research articles pertaining to sociology of military institutions and civil-military relations.

The book is divided in three parts. Part I deals with an overview of the state and development of sociology of the military. In Part II the main theme is the professional and organisational perspectives and deals with such subjects as professionalism, recruitment and politics; military professionalism and civil control; trends in military occupational structures and their political implications; technology, organisational culture and recruitment in the British Military Academy; and a comparative perspective in social recruitment and political orientations of the Officer Corps. Part III deals with civil-military relations and includes topics such as military intervention, its causes and effects and cites examples of such intervention in countries like Greece, Brazil and some other developing countries in Asia and Africa.

It is obvious from a detailed study of this book that its themes are based mainly on Western-oriented sociological-political-military environment and the comparative analysis and interpretations from the basis of this thought process.

Of particular interest to our own military researcher and those military officers dealing with policies and plans of recruitment in the Indian Armed Forces, would be the chapters on Trends in Military Occupational Structures and Political Implications and the various tables on the occupational structure of the US Armed Forces. The tables on occupational assignment by grade and years would equally prove interesting and instructive. Another interesting chapter is on Technology, Organisational Culture and Recruitment in the British Military Academy wherein the recruitment pattern of officers is divided under four categories, viz aristocratic, non-aristocratic, artillery/engineers and the technical. It also deals with the system of pattern of selection and commissioning of officers to various regiments etc. Although the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun is modelled on the Sandhurst pattern it must be said that in this day and age where social disparities are dwindling we have perhaps adopted a pragmatic policy of recruitment and of allotment of officer potential to various regiments/corps. The chapter on Selective Socialisation : Airborne Training Status would appear to be more American oriented as their regimental system has no traditional background as that of the British or Indian Armies and therefore, the Airborne corps in the US armed forces structure assumes a special status symbol and significance.

On the chapter on Military Intervention there does not appear to be much validity in the theory expounded or its formula for measuring military intervention based on sound principles to form the basis of a reliable and accurate model. In the table depicting military intervention index scores and ranks for 88 nations, India ranks at 76.5 with a military intervention score of 27.3. This is entirely misleading and without any solid or proven background. Perhaps this misleading rating is due to unprecise understanding of the term "military intervention" by the authors as compared to what we in India would regard as such. Perhaps the authors have in mind our Armed Forces role in "aid to civil power" situation which in our country is treated as a legitimate mission and which in turn has been construed erroneously in the West as military intervention in the country's political affairs.

This is a well compiled reference book on sociology and civil-military relationship—although much of it in the realm of theory. It would be useful for military research scholars and scientific evaluation groups. It is well documented and something the service officer does not come across it often. Written in typical American academic prose this book perhaps would have had a different impact had it been written by British authors in simple but more effective and direct

prose. Nevertheless an interesting and informative anthology which may be used in future for carrying some type of similar studies on sociological-political pertaining to the Indian Armed Forces.

SNA

## THE GENESIS OF THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS' CORPS

By G. TEITLER

(Published by Sage Publications Inc., London, 1977), pp 246.

Price \$13.50 net.

**T**HIS book is part of the Sage series on Armed Forces and Society which analyses the sociological forces that shape the composition and functioning of the defence forces. This particular book has examined how military leadership, which for many centuries was treated as an amateur pursuit, gradually got professionalised.

The professionalisation of naval leadership which took place in Europe during the period 15th through 19th centuries has been analysed in great deal and with considerable insight. The differing paths which the Royal Navy and the continental navies took in their developmental process as well as the interactive roles played by technology and tactics in this sociological process are particularly illuminating. The study of the development of military leadership on land is equally interesting although it has been done much more concisely.

VK

## WAR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By GENERAL ODD BULL

(Published by Leo Cooper, London, 1973), pp 205. Price £6.95.

## THE SINAI BLUNDER

By Major General INDER JIT RIKHYE (Retd.)

(Published by Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., N.D.), pp 240.

Price Rs. 75.00.

**I**T must perhaps be a coincidence that the review of the two books on the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in West Asia, must fall upon a reviewer who was himself an original member of the Indian Army contingent with the UNEF in 1956-57 and was also closely associated with the activities of the Egypt-Israel Mixed

Armistice Commission (EIMAC) of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).

The theme of both the books are more or less identical; both deal with personal and authentic accounts of the operations and trials and tribulations of the UNTSO and the UNEF. While the UNTSO still survives in some form or the other, although its effectiveness has been considerably reduced with the passage of time and the changing political and power equations in West Asia, the UNEF and its successor UNEF II have disappeared from the peace-making scene.

General ODD BULL erstwhile Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Air Force, deals in his book with the operations and modus-operandi of the UNTSO. The UNTSO had its origin in the UN Security Council resolution No 23 of April 1948 and which provided for the setting up of an organisation to supervise the armistice between Israel and its Arab neighbours, viz Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The UNTSO's role has been succinctly summed up by General BULL which is "to observe, investigate and report" and which has been accepted by both the contending parties as having been fairly successfully implemented. In this Gen BULL himself has played no insignificant part. He not only appeared to be impartial in his dealing with both the Arabs and the Israelies but in actual fact acted with utmost impartiality. Perhaps he was the only Chief of Staff of the UNTSO unlike some of his predecessors who were more inclined towards the Israeli view-point and hence in broader perspective Western bloc geopolitical attitudes. He understood and appreciated the Arab point of view as well to hold the scales even. The success of the UNTSO during his stewardship therefore must be judged from the fact that he was respected both by the Israelies as well as the Arabs and had their trust and confidence right throughout his long tenure with this organisation. While there has been general cynicism in the UN and amongst its member states, particularly amongst the two power blocs supporting one party or the other, it must be admitted that UNTSO did manage to keep the contending parties away from active hostilities by its impartiality, promptness and finesse with which it handled many explosive issues and truce violations. Gen. BULL recounts the many incidents which would go to illustrate that even minor violations of the Armistice agreement some of them accentuated by the fact the Armistice demarcation line was never well defined on the ground and which could have resulted in major hostilities but which were defused by tact and compromise acceptable to both parties. The role of the UNTSO during the Six-day 1967 war was highly commendable like that of its counterpart the UNEF and both had to undergo some

trumatic experiences during this period. Coincidently both the headquarters of the UNTSO and the UNEF came under direct conflict with the Israelies and for more or less the same reasons trotted out by the Israeli government and the Army. The part played by the UNTSO along the SUEZ Canal and the tremendous problems it faced from both the belligerents in the investigation of truce violations has been described with great accuracy and objectivity by the author.

General Rikhye in his book deals with the operations of the UNEF. This force was set up as the first experiment in the use of a composite military force for UN peace-keeping operations following the SUEZ War but unlike the UNTSO it was authorised by the UN General Council. Unlike the UNTSO, Israel never de jure recognised the UNEF and it was deployed only on Egyptian soil with the government of Egypt exercising its full sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of the UNEF. While the UNEF was successful in maintaining general peace along the Armistice demarcation line between Egypt and Israel (commonly known as the "ditch") and the International frontiers between these two nations, its unfortunate involvement in the Six-day 1967 war was mainly as result of failure of diplomacy at the UN as well as on the part of the power blocs. The Six-day war in the area of operations of the UNEF has been vividly and accurately described by Gen. Rikhye in great detail and objectivity and without any rancour. The role of the UN Secretary General U Thant in accepting President Nasser's ultimatum for the total withdrawal of the UNEF came for a great deal of controversy and criticism but in the final analysis U Thant had no other option than to accede to Egypt's demand in exercise of its sovereign rights. That the UNEF was caught in a pincer between the Israeli and Egyptian armies was inevitable in the pattern of its deployment. The Six-day war also brought the inadequacy of any contingency plans for its orderly withdrawal under such situations mainly due to political and military non-acceptance by one party or the other of help from nations who were outside the pale of conflict directly or indirectly and who were looked upon with undue and unfounded suspicions. In any future deployment of the UN peace-keeping force this factor must receive due consideration.

Both Gens. ODD and Rikhye were professional servicemen. Both had been associated with UN peace-keeping operations for a long time. Both had won the trust and confidence of Israelies and Arabs and both had gone through trumatic experiences during the six-day war, perhaps more so Gen. Rikhye since he had six thousand troops of various nations under his command whose safety

he was responsible for. Yet in spite of the failure of the UNEF his faith in the UN and its peace-keeping efforts has in no way diminished. The same can be said of Gen. BULL also.

Perhaps it would be well to recast our minds on the efficacy of the UN peace-keeping forces now that the emphasis is more on settlement of issues on bilateral basis between nations. The UNCIP in India and Pakistan, the UN forces in Cyprus and now the withdrawal of the UNEF II from Egypt and Lebanon in the wake of Egypt-Israel peace agreement are pointers towards this approach. Yet due tribute must be paid to the UN peace-keeping forces wherever they have been deployed for carrying out a most difficult task creditably and honourably in spite of the pulls and pressures of power block politics and its continuous dependence on financial support from big and small nation members of the UN which could be vetoed or unvetoed on the whims and fancies of member nations at will.

Both the books written by the Generals are most interesting, identical in their views in many respects and brings out one salient point for a serviceman that notwithstanding the military character of a UN peace-keeping force or organisation its in the realm of diplomacy that governs its existence.

These are two absorbing and instructive books and must be read by all service officers. Who knows one day they too may be involved in such peacekeeping ventures and these books will give them a clear insight what goes behind the scenes while understanding such missions.

Finally, the reader will forgive me if I end this review on a personal note. I was the first Indian officer to hold the appointments of Chief of Logistics and Chief of Operations in the UNEF in its formulative years to put it on a sound and effective basis; later as Director of Staff duties at Army Headquarters I was also associated with its liquidation after the SUEZ war. Such is the irony of fate. Yet the role played by the Indian Army units as a part of the UNEF has been one of great achievement and true to its highest standard of military tradition and which has brought great glory to the nation.

SNA

#### AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY ALLIANCES

BY B CHAKRAVORTY

(Published by Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1977), pp. 292. Price Rs 60/-.

**A**USTRALIA in a way is a geo-political oddity; an isolated white nation located along the rim of a yellow and brown continent. Biren Chakravorty's book is a balanced, detached

study of how Australia has been trying to shape its foreign and defence policies reconciling her heritage with her geography.

The book has examined the impress of the Second World War, the Vietnam war and the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation on Australia, as well as the various military alliances of which she is a part. The broad conclusion of the book is that the Australians are slowly recognizing the need to move away from the patron-client relationship with the United States and carve out an independent regional role for their country.

While there can be no doubt on the increased regional activity on the part of Australia, particularly during Gough Whitlam's short tenure as Prime Minister, it does not seem realistic to read into it any diminishing of the country's satellite relationship with the United States. To many outside observers it would seem that Australia is only toeing the US line by interacting with and supporting the westward looking ASEAN countries. The book unfortunately has not carried out an analysis of the structure and mission orientation of the Australian armed forces. If that had been done, it would have shown how much the Australian forces are structured to fight in co-ordination with US forces. As intelligence men say, one can never interpret treaty texts and statements with certainty, but the orientation of the security infrastructure can rarely mislead.

VK

## UNFOUGHT WAR OF 1962: THE NEFA DEBACLE

BY LIEUT COLONEL JR SAIGAL

(Published by Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1979), pp 180.  
Price Rs. 30/-.

**C**OLONEL Saigal has named 'sabotage', as the cause of the NEFA defeat and has thus injected, an element of sensationalism to focus attention—witness the national press running reviews and serialised extracts of the book.

According to the author, India had all the advantages for a win : "highly favourable terrain, superiority of the Indian Army over the Chinese in numbers, weaponry, supply system and quality of troops (all martial classes)", had ample time "for acclimatization to be physically fit and to prepare reasonably good defences", etc. The majority will however agree with General Chaudhuri that "we were woefully underequipped and undertrained for opposition at

heights, particularly for an army like the Chinese". Apparently, the author has got his facts wrong. May be, he did not wish to touch on the reasons for the army thus left 'under-equipped' and 'under-trained'. There is also, the theory of 'sabotage' and the influence of the proverbial 'foreign hands' to be invoked which is better done with India holding the advantage. Colonel Saigal on the other hand, probably missed the point that it may be alright for a politician to hint at 'sabotage' and 'foreign hands' but for a military historian, even a budding one at that has to be careful about his facts, lest, he allows albeit unwittingly, to wriggle out unnoticed what the great President Radhakrishnan calls—"we have been negligent and credulous". In other words, history should not be bending backwards to refurbish the tarnished image of fallen heroes.

The chapters on 'Growth of the Indian Army' and 'On Human Relations...' mainly deal about the officer cadre—the system is traced which had failed to evolve after independence resulting in degeneration and the predictable gutless and amateurish performance of the senior officers in 1962. The book also contains at various places a number of omissions and commissions alleged to have been committed by both junior and senior officers—named and unnamed (but identifiable) which have nothing to do with NEFA or 'security'. Whether true or false, these accusations hardly fit in with the format of a campaign study in the manner put across.

Now about the campaign proper, one would expect from the title of the book that the author knows what he is going to write about : a battle that should have been fought and not given up. It is not so. His inadequate knowledge about the happenings at the front and lack of grasp of the overall picture are soon disclosed, in making his claim to the title for his book, an empty one. The book lost its objectivity when the author started tinkering with the history of the time and glossed over the much involved origin of the NEFA battle which might have made it an unlikely proposition to be fought and won in isolation—same as, mere induction of troops independent of other factors may not tilt the balance in ones favour.

To sum up, a book which lends itself to be wrongly used with its half truths and, offered scapegoats, as balm to salve the Nation's eternal wound—the defeat of '62.

BMB