

Key to Confidence Building in South Asia : Fostering Military-to-Military Links

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South Asia is widely believed by the international strategic community to be the region most likely to witness advertent or inadvertent nuclear war. Averting such a cataclysm is, therefore, high on the agenda of many countries, especially the United States of America. Despite their spotty record in the subcontinent, the preferred means remain Confidence Building Measures of the type successful in the East-West context, which presume to prevent "total" war between States with little in common.

It is the contention of this article that these presumptions do not apply to India and Pakistan, which share religion, history, ethnicity, language and culture and have waged deliberately controlled and limited wars and, hence, that the CBMs tried out so far are inappropriate; that, what is needed is a better understanding of the subcontinental milieu and of the peculiar quality of wars it has spawned; and that, the cultural and military insecurities at the heart of the India-Pakistan conflict are best dealt with by cobbling together a military reassurance system based on social links between the armies of the two countries.

Notwithstanding the present troubled state of bilateral relations, the time may be right for such ties. The military in Pakistan dominates that country. Its counterpart in India has over the years become so marginalized (in the decisionmaking process) that contacts between the two sets of armed forces are unlikely to occasion dread, as it once did, in the minds of the Indian civilian authority.¹ But first there is a need to understand the core nature of India-Pakistan warfighting before the proper confidence-building measures can be conceived.

VERY CIVIL WARS

Actually, the two States have fought very civil wars characterized by so much restraint and fellow-feeling as to raise the question whether the infrequent

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fracas they have engaged in can reasonably be labelled wars as we know them. And, if history is anything to go by, will the India-Pakistan "Wars" of the future be any different? Needless to say, even these gentlemanly spats may be too much for an international system under strain to stomach and hence ways have to be found to minimize tension and to keep the troubles from boiling over into hostilities. So, there is need to rethink just what is involved here and what requires to be done to prevent these albeit low level conflicts.

The problem between India and Pakistan is one of over-familiarity. It has bred mutual contempt, but also fear and loathing particularly in the Pakistani mind, eventuating in differences with India being made to fit the hoary Hindu-Muslim social interactional paradigm. But the unarguable sharing of cultural space by the two nations has imposed its own curious constraints on the conduct of conflict, notwithstanding Kenneth Waltz's claim that "the fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones are fought within areas populated by highly similar people whose affairs are closely knit."² A distinguished Indian General has described wars in South Asia as "communal riots with tanks". He was closer to the truth than most military analysts reckon.

If wars are seen as a means for States to settle their differences by violence, then they are distinct from riots occurring within disturbed polities only in the degree to which the objectives are defined, in the greater lethality of the means of violence, and in the extent of human and material damage.

Now consider the nature of wars the two countries have fought to appreciate how closely they resemble riots and how unlike almost any other conflict in the post-Second World War period, they have been. These wars, like riots, were characterised chiefly by their short duration, sharp and sudden breakout of violence followed by its abrupt subsidence and end to hostilities, territorial localization of conflict, fairly rapid restoration of the *status quo ante*, and in the scale of things, relatively few casualties and little collateral damage to out-of-area people and property.

The riots in the aftermath of the Partition of British India in 1947 took the heaviest toll in human lives—some 800,000 civilian dead. The three Indo-Pak wars since have been fairly "non violent" affairs, with the countries losing a total of 20,000 military personnel but few civilians. The low rate of military fatalities is surprising considering that the wars featured some of the biggest tank battles since the British Eighth Army clashed with Rommel's Afrikakorps in the Maghreb. Heavy masses of armour and infantry partook of intense slug-fests on the Punjab plains and the Thar Desert³ but with little lasting damage.

Further, strategic bombing and air raids on populated cities were scrupulously avoided by both sides. Tactical air forces over the battlefield airspace were active. But, in the 1965 War in the Rann of Kutch, even these tactical combat sorties were forsaken by, what amounted to, a private understanding between the opposing air force chiefs acting with their respective government's blessings!⁴ Besides, the principally counter-force doctrine underlying the Indian and Pakistani military actions meant that only equipments deployed in the border belts were targeted. This ensured that damage to the social infrastructure as a result of War was minimal and the cost to the two countries, other than in attrited war material, slight.

To look at each of the wars a little more closely, the combined human losses in the 1947-48 War restricted to the 500 miles or so of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir totalled 2,000 dead from both the sides. The 1965 War fought over the entire length of the border in the west (approximately 1,500 miles, i.e., three times the length of the front in the previous operations) in the Indian provinces of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Kashmir, accounted for 7,000 dead. (The then East Pakistan, incidentally, was left untouched by the Indian forces surrounding that province.)

The last war, in 1971, encompassing an additional 1,500 miles of the border in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) with a six-fold increase in the war frontage from 22 years before, resulted in a total of 11,000 military casualties on both sides. The longer list of casualties in this India-Pakistan encounter was because of the Bangladesh guerrilla forces, like the Mukti Bahini.

To put things in perspective, the loss of 20,000 uniformed personnel in the three wars nearly equals the number of civilian (including police) and military dead (18,000) in communal rioting and other disturbances in India and Pakistan in the period 1983-1992. Indeed, the fatalities in the 1965 War which, by all accounts, was the hardest fought, does not greatly exceed the toll of 5,000 military men in ethnic and communal clashes in the subcontinent in the last decade.

Compare these figures for the personnel losses with those in the Arab-Israeli wars: 8,000 dead following the partition of Palestine in 1948 and 16,000 dead in the 1973 Yom Kippur War⁵. Or, to take another fratricidal conflict—the American Civil War: there were 51,000 dead and wounded out of the 168,000 men (75,000 Confederate, and 93,000 Unionist) committed in just one battle lasting three days, at Gettysburg in early July 1863, i.e., a loss of a third of all troops committed to action. In the South Asian wars, human attrition has amounted to a fraction of one percent of deployed strengths.

The meagre level of war deaths aside, other things also indicate that conflict in South Asia is of a generically different variety. For instance, disputed territory captured in war has been expeditiously and unconditionally restored. This is unlike wars in the Middle East, for example, where Israel has used captured territory to leverage Arab "moderation". The Indian government, on the other hand, despite strong opposition by the military, promptly returned to Pakistan the strategic Haji Pir salient in the Pir Panjal Range of mountains in Kashmir captured in the 1965 War, which was in Pakistani hands since 1948. Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, took this decision at the Tashkent Summit in order not to destabilize the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan.⁶

Again, after the 1971 operations, as the absolute victor with some 93,000 Pakistani prisoners-of-war India could, with support of international law, have imposed its version of peace, forcing Pakistan to accept, for instance, the LoC in Kashmir as the international boundary, but it did not.

The contained nature of South Asian wars is also evidenced in other factors. The duration of war a country fights is a function of resource availability and political will. In South Asia, the Indian government's generally conservative expenditure policies and defensive security mindset have dovetailed with the fact of resource scarcity. The result is an informal official policy to build up capabilities for only short wars. The Pakistan armed forces, given their prominent role in national life, are in a position to sequester a larger proportion of public funds for defence.⁷ But faced with a much smaller resource base, the monies tasked for use by the Pakistani military nevertheless remains limited.

Restricted funds have forced the two major South Asian countries to prioritise their expenditure programs. The payroll liability of the employment-generating, labour-intensive Indian and Pakistani militaries is necessarily top priority followed by acquisition programmes for the three Services. Thus, some 50-55 per cent of the Indian Defence budget is expended on Payroll & Allowances". After subtracting monies set aside for defence science and industry, that leaves less than 40 per cent of the budget for the acquisition programmes, maintenance spares and for the replenishment of "military stores".⁸ In this situation, the build-up of war wastage reserve and warstock (of arms and ammunition, capital equipment, POL-petroleum, oil and lubricants, etc.) is accorded the lowest priority.⁹

This is the case for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy as well and, if a *speculative* analysis were done of the Pakistani defence budget (because, unlike in India, no detailed breakup is published for legislative scrutiny by Islamabad), a similar spending pattern will be seen to accrue for the Pakistan armed forces also.

Small reserves of war material dictate the length of time the forces can fight. The Indian and Pakistani war plans are accordingly designed around this hard fact of life⁹. Typically, the two countries have holdings of war wastage reserve and warstock to enable operations at "intense" rates for only two weeks and at "normal" rates of material expenditure for no more than 30 days.

Thus, the war in September 1965 lasted 22 days and ended in an impasse when Pakistani supplies were down to five days' war-making capability and Indian stores amounted to a residual seven days' reserve, forcing the two countries to agree on a ceasefire. The 1971 War ended in fewer than 13 days with the surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. India's one other war, with China in 1962, was over within three weeks and ended in an Indian rout in part because with the Indian Army focussed exclusively on the Pakistani threat, mountain warfighting was entirely neglected and neither forces nor supplies were available in any strength on the north-eastern border.¹⁰

With both India and Pakistan on a short supply leash owing to the scarcity of financial resources, supplier-country policies, and the absence of political will to "fight to the death", the operational plans of their respective armed forces in effect amount to fighting until the ammo' lasts or an UN-arranged ceasefire materializes, whichever comes first! Moreover, because the belt of land on either side of the border (especially in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab) is heavily defended, criss-crossed with ostensibly agricultural use-canalns that also double up as effective tank traps and DCB (Ditch-cum-Bund)-type of earthen work fortifications, the deepest penetration by either country in the short and intense wars has never exceeded 80 to 100 miles.

But building up of stamina to fight long wars by allocating larger funds for replenishment spares and the war reserve is possible if the militaries so desire. It requires changing the end-use of the scarce funds. The armed forces in military-dominated Pakistan should have no difficulty in deciding that a larger portion of the defence budget ought to be tasked for this purpose. In India too, the army, navy and air force have the final say, other than in major capital acquisitions, in how each Service wants to spend its tranche of the defence budget. (The total amount is divided roughly in the ratio 1:2:4 for the Navy, Air Force and Army.) Significantly, this end-use switch is not made.

This pattern of Indian defence expenditure, for instance, while not immutable in theory, has remained fairly stable over the last 20-odd years, notwithstanding changes in the relative size of defence allocations. Thus, even as the defence expenditure as proportion of the total central government expenditure fluctuated between a high of 22.73 per cent in 1971-72 (the year

of the last India-Pakistan War) and a low of 14.45 per cent in 1991-92, the shares of the defence budget disbursed separately for the wage bill, maintenance stores/war reserve and for modernization and acquisitions, remained largely unchanged. (Defence expenditure as proportion of the central government expenditure averaged 38 per cent in Pakistan.)

Nor have the Indian economic reforms leading to higher economic growth rates and a corresponding curtailment of public spending mostly in the public sector industries, for instance, resulted in bigger defence budgets or different defence expenditure priorities. The annual defence share of the Gross Domestic Product has actually subsided from the 3.12 per cent - 3.89 per cent range in the 1970s and most of the 1980s, and the high of slightly over 4 per cent achieved for a couple of years, 1986-88, to 2.95 per cent in 1991-92 and 2.75 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 when the country's economic policies had undergone a seachange.¹¹

In fact, there is greater pressure on the Government of India to increase social welfare spending as a means of stilling public criticism about the economic reforms and the steady dismantling of the socialist state apparatus. Short of a debacle in war sourced to the endemic shortages induced by the current stockpiling policies and norms, the Indian Armed Services are unlikely to enjoy long duration warfighting capability that comes from a marked increase in the war reserve.

Finally, South Asians fight war by rote. General Moshe Dayan dismissed the subcontinental mode of warfare with his famous remark that the two sides fight textbook fashion "using the same textbook"! But the element of predictability in the Indian and Pakistani methods has the virtue of limiting damage while infusing pride in fighting with gusto what the militaries in the two countries believe to be "classical" wars. Over time there has developed a distinct India-Pakistan battlefield etiquette stressing chivalry and "good, clean fighting", something which was absent in India's war with China in 1962.

REASONS FOR CONTROLLED WARS

An important reason for the controlled nature of subcontinental wars, ones in which both sides routinely pull their punches lies elsewhere, in a specific geocultural reality of South Asia that has become a mutual deterrence feature inhibiting the extension of wars into civilian areas and of limiting the extent of damage and hence of force that can be used. Taken together, these inhibitions result in the unwillingness to strike deep with land or air forces, which would entail an unacceptable enlargement of the battle zone.

This feature is the size and the demographic distribution of the Muslim community inside India, which influences both conventional and nuclear military calculations of the two countries.¹² There was no large scale exchange of populations other than in Punjab when British India was divided. While non-Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces that became Pakistan fled from their homes and into India, the bulk of the Indian Muslims, who were living all over the country, stayed on until now when they number some 160-180 million and comprise 15-20 percent of the population and have grown into the largest Muslim community in the world outside of Indonesia. Their numbers have increased threefold since 1947, most of this growth registering in traditionally Muslim rural and urban pockets.

The sizable Muslim concentration within India has had contradictory results. It has, for instance, rendered Indian Muslims more vulnerable, making it easy to target them during riots. But, it has also beefed up their political clout because of the extant "vote bank" politics in India. This last has meant that no government in New Delhi (including one headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party reflecting rightwing Hindu opinion) can long survive without paying heed to the Indian Muslim sentiment, which among other things, opposes a too forceful prosecution of wars against Pakistan (in part because of the Indian Muslims' kith and kin in that country). That is electoral arithmetic.¹³

The down-side for Pakistan of the marked growth of the Muslim population in India and its increasing role in the Indian polity is that with the steady integration of the Muslim community — larger than the Pakistani population — into the Indian mainstream the "two nation" theory undergirding Pakistan's *raison d'etat* is weakened as are its claims on Kashmir. These developments have further fueled its feelings of insecurity. Moreover, the "Fifth Column" - potential of this community, never very large to begin with because of the guilt feelings and defensiveness induced by Partition, is eroding. Thus, the RDX-bombings in Bombay in February 1993, while alerting the Indian Government to this danger, convinced the Indian Muslims to abjure such activity for fear of losing the political gains already made. It prompted the Bombay Muslims, for example, to help the police apprehend the culprits.

Moreover, the Bangladesh War, the long years of martial law, the ongoing sectarian violence, the growing troubles the *mohajirs* (Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan) are facing in the Sind province and in Karachi in particular, and the socio-political instability generally have led to a disillusionment among the Indian Muslims not only with Pakistan but with the kind of separatist politics that spawned that country¹⁴. It has also strengthened the Indian Muslims' resolve to assimilate. This last is seen in the increasingly bigger involvement by Muslims over the years in state and federal elections in India.

And, it has counter-deterred the Pakistani military from disrupting life and societal cohesion and destroying the Indian public's morale by extending wars into vulnerable civilian and industrial areas inside India because, quite apart from the fear of inviting unacceptable damage that the larger, more powerful Indian forces are capable of inflicting, and of killing Indian Muslims and destroying their property in bombing raids and thereby incurring the wrath of the *mohajir* community, there is the graver apprehension of setting off pogroms and reprisals against Muslims in India and the unpredictable consequences these might have for Pakistan itself.

In the event, it is hard not to conclude that India-Pakistan wars are less conflicts between sovereign countries bent on fatally injuring each other than an internationalized version of a family quarrel usually triggered by the minority Muslim (read:Pakistani) grievance or frustration and the majoritarian (Hindu, Indian) desire to mete out, what is regarded even by many influential Pakistanis as, a hard ear-tweaking—exemplary punishment for an egregiously misbehaving “younger brother”¹⁴.

The reticence against waging all-out war exhibited by India and Pakistan has, over the last two decades, resulted in something akin to mutual confidence that the other side will not start a war even of the staple variety the two countries have got used to fighting. In this respect, George Quester's musings about the nuclear weapons situation in South Asia is relevant as well for the conventional military predicament facing India and Pakistan. Given the palpably greater alarm about the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programmes in Western government and arms control/non-proliferation circles than in the subcontinent itself, he asks: “Have we outsiders all been missing something about the ways in which Indians and Pakistanis *can understand and trust each other*, on this particular question of whether nuclear weapons, once developed, will be used?”¹⁶

War in South Asia may not be all that onerous, but the tensions and frictions endemic to the region have nevertheless to be dealt with. Before thinking about the sort of thing that might work here, let us first examine what has not so far worked and why.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

‘Confidence-building’ in the post Cold War era has become a touchstone of international crisis diplomacy. It is premised on a series of small measures that are expected cumulatively to produce the quota of goodwill, and mutual trust and confidence necessary for States in conflict to achieve normal relations and genuine peace. This process is believed to stretch across the Conflict

Avoidance Measures-Confidence (and Security) Building Measures-peace continuum.¹⁷

That is the theory. In practice, Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) have tended in certain regions to become an end in themselves and, other than superficially, not moderated the confrontational posture and attitude of the two sides. This was true of the East-West face-off in the years leading to the fruition of the Helsinki peace process and (assuming it is any kind of model for South Asia) characterizes the India-Pakistan relations as well.

EAST-WEST

To discover the difference between these two regional contexts and why the CBMs worked in one and have not so far impacted in the other, let us examine the NATO-Warsaw Pact case first. The situation in Europe became amenable to the CAM-CBM process only after the opposing blocs had first attained, what an official Soviet document called "a rough military balance"¹⁸, whence a sense of security obtained all round and member countries became more willing to consider a system of durable peace.

This state of grace was reached because it was preceded by long years of military build-up on both sides which eventuated in parity, something formally acknowledged in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The CBM-provisions of this Act also stabilized force strengths and codified acceptable military behaviour, setting the stage for the conventional and nuclear arms limitation accords and later, the arms reduction talks.¹⁹

The success of CBMs in Europe has been attributed to the existence of several "preconditions", some "contextual"--"shared history, cultural affinities and religious ties" and institutions on either side dealing with security matters, etc., others "processual", namely, the ongoing dialogues for economic and political cooperation preparing the ground for mutually beneficial military understandings."²⁰ These, it is argued, resulted in a great "potential for accommodation, despite the important ideological and other differences dividing the two blocs".²¹

Individual European countries forming the two blocs, moreover, had their basic insecurities dealt with in the most direct manner possible: an over-sufficiency of alliance forces and of military wherewithal to deal with every conceivable conventional and nuclear war contingency. It helped rid the regimes in these States of their residual insecurity.

But, the most important "precondition" that pushed the European CBM process along was the fact that no outstanding territorial disputes were involved. Both the sides had formally accepted the division of the continent along the line negotiated at the 1945 Yalta Summit—they were, as far as territory went, supporters of the status quo.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

In South Asia, two of the three sets of preconditions responsible for the success of CBMs in Europe, do not exist. The disagreement between India and Pakistan is in the main concerned with disputed territory. Partition transformed an internal political problem between the Hindus and Muslims into an international territorial dispute between States. With Pakistan making Kashmir the lynchpin of its India policy, the basis for a *modus vivendi* based on the acceptance of extant boundaries is missing.²²

Worse, Pakistan's comparatively small size and modest military resources have proved unequal to the task of forcefully separating Kashmir from India. Islamabad has sought to correct this imbalance in power by acquiring military heft by association. It allied with the US in the Cold War in the hope that massive American arms transfers would follow. These never materialized, contingent as they were on the larger US policy of being attentive to Indian concerns. Being a potentially significant Soviet ally in the region, India was deemed by Washington as too important to alienate and push deeper into Moscow's embrace.²³

Pakistan next turned to China, but found itself furthering Chinese interests more than it did its own. Thus, while Beijing has been liberal in arms and military technology transfers (including reportedly the design for a workable nuclear weapon) to Pakistan to divide and distract India and the erstwhile Soviet Union's strategic efforts, which centrally helped Beijing, it refrained from opening a second front against India during the Indo-Pakistan hostilities and urged caution in Islamabad.²⁴ With the US and Chinese regional policies not being particularly supportive of Pakistan, the latter has been forced to act far more pragmatically vis a vis India than its sometimes heated rhetoric would suggest.²⁵ Still, the circumspection exercised by Islamabad has not translated into willingness to compromise, which is of the essence in confidence building.

One of the biggest obstacles to successful CBMs in South Asia is the asymmetry of power²⁶ between India and Pakistan—something neither country can do much about. The worst effect of this differential and Pakistan's consequent feelings of insecurity is that the third, useful "contextual precondition", which in Europe helped root CBMs, counts for little in the

region. Indeed, shared geocultural traits, like language and religion, social structure and values, ethnicity and historical experience, governmental ethos and the organization of the police and the military, have proved more a bane than a blessing for confidence-building.

It has ensured that a communalist demonology—the bedrock of the campaign by the Muslim League Party for the creation of a “separate homeland” for the Muslims of the subcontinent during India’s Freedom struggle—continues to shape Pakistan’s strategic thinking. What Pakistan apparently fears is not so much the Indian threat as the “Hindu” threat, in that this is how Islamabad rationalizes and justifies its security preoccupation with India. In the event, New Delhi’s intentions as a result of this as well as the other factors alluded to above, have always been interpreted by Islamabad in terms of the alleged majoritarian “Hindu” impulse to quash the Indian Muslim community and, by extension, to threaten Pakistan’s survival. Not surprisingly, the Pakistan military’s mindset as well as operational and force planning is based wholly on this concept of the threat.²⁷

With the Pakistani model of bilateral relations with India being, in effect, a derivative of the sometimes tense and always uneasy ties between the majority Hindu community and the largest minority community—which happens to be Muslim—New Delhi too is forced for domestic policy reasons to deal with Pakistan on the same terms. (This is not to say that Indian policymakers would do anything different on their own, but that they are politically unable to explore alternative, more imaginative, ways of dealing with Pakistan even if so inclined.)

Thus, the sense of insecurity of Pakistan vis a vis India is a virtual mirror image of the sense of insecurity that many Indian Muslims feel residing in “Hindu” India.²⁸ The worsening correlation of forces in the subcontinent has seemingly pushed the Pakistani strategic elites—principally, the senior echelons of the military and the civil services—to see nuclear weapons as the only credible means to deter India and to rely on one-self for security.²⁹

Reaching the nuclear weapons threshold has not, however, altered the asymmetry of power. Nor, has it made Pakistan feel secure and confident enough to permit bridge-building through the medium of trade and commerce or to promote people-to-people contacts by easing visa restrictions and freeing the two-way traffic in books and newspapers, etc. Islamabad has repeatedly stated that it wants the Kashmir issue settled first before it allows a more naturally intimate relationship to develop with India.

What the “Bomb in the basement” has, however, done other than

providing a minimum deterrence capability vis a vis India and the psychological comfort thereof, is to apparently enhance Pakistan's international status albeit as a nuclear spoiler and, consequently, leverage in its relations with the West, principally the United States. It has also offered political parties an issue to score points off each other.³⁰ And, in its relations with India, it has perhaps emboldened Islamabad to pursue a low-risk strategy of supporting the insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir.³¹ Further, it has persuaded Pakistan to keep the border in this province "alive" by engaging in almost daily artillery duels and exchange of sniper fire across the Line of Control.

Islamabad's calculation is that without direct evidence of Pakistan's continuously contesting the "Indian occupation" of Kashmir by opting for low level military actions (to complement its support for the unconventional war) it will weaken its case on Kashmir and the *de facto* border along the LoC could, in time, gain international recognition as the *de jure* boundary. (The Indian solution is for freezing the Line of Control into the international boundary.)

The policy of insurgency support is touted as low-risk and low-cost and as an efficient means of "draining" Indian military manpower and material resources. But it also presumes that the domestic situation within Pakistan is strong and stable enough to defeat any Indian attempts at reciprocating in kind. Or, even if the situation in Sindh and elsewhere is explosive, that India will goodnaturedly resist the temptation covertly to assist in a bad situation becoming worse. These presumptions are wrong. The fact is in the unconventional warfare field too, India would appear to have the edge.

Then again, the Pakistani belief that helping Kashmiri secessionists will under no circumstances trigger inter-State hostilities, may also be erroneous. Provocative firing across the LoC and support for the Kashmiri militants could precipitate a war if the larger Indian armed forces decided to give "hot pursuit" or to preempt what the Indian GHQ (General Head Quarters) believed, on any given day, to be preparations by Pakistan for a surprise attack in strength along the Kashmir front (as happened with the latter's Operation Gibraltar which triggered the 1965 India-Pakistan War). This is a real danger.³²

India's stance, a mix of exasperation and punitive mindedness' has only stoked Pakistan's worst fears. In the main, New Delhi has failed to address Pakistan's security concerns in objective terms, and exacerbated the latter's anxieties by its longstanding policy of simultaneously modernizing the Indian armed forces with little concern about how the Pakistanis perceived this. Much worse, India has consistently questioned Pakistan's need for armaments and tried diplomatically to scuttle weapon sales the latter considered essential for

national security.³³ This would suggest to Islamabad both that India is out not only to undermine its security but, by questioning its sovereign imperative to obtain military equipments of whatever quality, in whatever numbers and from whatever source, to impugn Pakistan's sovereign status. It strengthens the Pakistani conviction that India is unreconciled to Partition and that its long term plans hinge on "undoing" it.³⁴

With the border issue remaining unsettled Pakistan, the smaller, politically more unstable, economically weaker and militarily more vulnerable State is discovering that in the post-Cold War era, reliable allies and sources of advanced military wherewithal are more difficult to obtain.³⁵ Its sense of isolation and insecurity, therefore, grows and is becoming harder to alleviate. It has resulted in that country digging in its heels (on the nuclear weapons issue, for instance) and in dangerously raising the stake in Kashmir.³⁶

UNRIPE FOR PEACE?

Richard Haass claims that the preconditions for a peaceful resolution of conflict anytime soon are absent in the subcontinent.³⁷ While there is a strong under-current of desire for "normalization" of relations among the two peoples, the bulk of the strategic elites are not convinced and the governments are neither strong enough to weather criticism of a "sellout" nor weak enough to be pressured into a negotiated settlement. Kashmir, Moreover, has been termed "non-negotiable" by both the parties. And, finally, New Delhi and Islamabad do not agree on the negotiating track—the former insists on the purely bilateral mode (enjoined by the Simla Agreement), the latter seeks talks under UN, OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) or American aegis.

In this milieu, confidence building activity becomes a counter-intuitive exercise, a process of making paper promises. Even this is jeopardized by subcontinental politics.³⁸ No surprise then that these measures tend to be cosmetic deals which usefully fill up diplomatic space, time and effort and cover up for the lack of substantive progress. The immediate returns in negotiating such accords is that it appears to further the peace process without actually doing so and thus deflects diplomatic pressures from powerful countries, like the US, which believe in the "constructive" role of CBMs to "reduce tensions" and to prevent an inadvertent "triggering of a larger conflict", and who mistake the fact of India and Pakistan agreeing on the usual CBMs for their taking giant strides towards peace.³⁹

That leaves the Indian and the Pakistani military establishments—the pivotal players in making CBMs successful and direct beneficiaries of the wider "fire-breaks" and the like -- free to ignore them as and when it is expedient.⁴⁰

This begs the question: Why do India and Pakistan find it hard to comply with international commitments they make vide the agreements on confidence-building? The answer lies in the extreme familiarity breeding certainty that the other side will not interpret non-compliance or miscompliance of every provision in the agreement as an act of bad faith, leading to an irretrievable breakdown in relations or worse. Thus, CBMs become levers of politico-military gamesmanship and violations of CBM-provisions a means to gauge the level of military readiness, the type of response and the reaction-time of the adversary.

The less countries in conflict claim to have intimate knowledge of each other and the less they are culturally proximal (which leads them to subsume such knowledge), the more inclined they may be to stick to both the letter and the spirit of the agreements they sign, because they cannot with any certitude predict the other's reaction to treaty violations. Under the circumstances, risk is avoided by the strictest legal interpretation of every point in any bilateral agreement. It is revealing that India and Pakistan seem to have no trouble or hesitation in complying with bilateral and international agreements they have signed with other countries.

FIGURING OUT WHAT WILL WORK

If the routine CBMs are ineffectual and there remains a core dispute between India and Pakistan, what will work to reduce the risk of war? It would help if the Pakistan armed forces redefined their mission and reoriented their task. This may be more easily achieved than is ordinarily imagined, because it means following the lead given by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and by that country's first martial law government headed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

Jinnah, for example, conceived of Pakistan's foreign and military policy mission solely in terms of the security of the subcontinent and, more specifically, of the defence of India. Soon after independence, for instance, Governor-General Jinnah dispatched a memorandum to Washington asking for a two billion dollar loan expressly to strengthen the buffer state he presided over. The memorandum warned that if Pakistan owing to "the proximity and vulnerability...to Russia... yielded" to the "external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility."⁴¹

To the extent that Jinnah communalized the military's role, he did so in benign terms of "the Hindus" guarding the approaches from the West and the South and of "Muslim India" the North-Western border. Additionally, he repeatedly stressed "the vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign States to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers

both on land and sea against aggression." Ayub Khan for his part mooted a joint defence pact with India as late as 1962.⁴² Pakistan's return to these first principles of the country's defence, could be legitimated by reference to Jinnah and Ayub's pronouncements.

This change, moreover, can be effected because of the marked improvement in Pakistan's military strength relative to India over the last 20 years, a change made possible by a surprisingly non-reactive Indian policy. Thus, notwithstanding the frequent expressions of alarm by the Indian Foreign Office and the prodding by the Indian Armed Services, New Delhi has not responded to the beefing up of the Pakistani military capabilities. The Main Battle Tanks in the Pakistan Army and in the Indian Army today are in the ratio of 1:1.74, a vast improvement by Pakistan over the 1:2.28 ratio obtaining in the years astride the 1971 War, when that country, inclusive of what is now Bangladesh, was nearly one and a half times its present size. The ratio of combat aircraft has likewise changed from 1:3.25 to 1:1.86 and for capital ships from 1:4.67 to 1:2.78, all these changes favouring Pakistan.⁴³

The extant orders-of-battle may be presumed to represent the force strength and the force quality that each country believes is adequate to deter without alarming the other and provide the basis for change in the outlook of the armed forces in India and Pakistan, permitting them to adopt "strategies of reassurance".⁴⁴ More on this later.

Kashmir will remain the outstanding unresolved issue. But the insurgents are in a no-win situation and gradually the rebellion is bound to wind down owing to the sustained pressure by the Indian Army and the growing fatigue of the Kashmiri people. Once the situation in this State settles down, Islamabad can, without "loss of face", put the Kashmir issue on the back-burner without in any way surrendering what it perceives to be its "rights". There is a regional parallel. The thaw in Sino-Indian relations is proceeding on the basis that the touchy territorial issue concerning the Chinese occupied Indian Aksai Chin can await resolution at a more propitious time. And that in the mean while, the two countries can proceed to better relations on other fronts. But, in the case of India and Pakistan they can go further in the main because the militaries in these two countries are cut from the same cloth and, ironically, because they are unequally placed in their respective societies.

FOSTERING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LINKS

It is obvious that in the distribution of power in the two countries, the Pakistan Army is in a position to set not only the military but also the national agenda and the Indian armed services to only carry out the orders of the

civilian government. This may explain the more belligerent and even militaristic tenor of Pakistani policy generally and why its Armed Services seemingly have a vested interest in contesting the territorial status quo and in keeping the Indian threat alive.

But military-to-military ties, crucial for good India-Pakistan relations and for peace in the subcontinent, are realizable precisely because of this asymmetric situation. Pakistan is a military-dominated society. In the 49 years of independent existence, it has had a martial law government for 22 years and partial military rule for an additional three years (from 1985 to 1988 when General Zia ul-Haq was President and Chief of the Army Staff, but a civilian prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, "ran" the government). In Pakistan the Army is the decision making loop⁴⁵ in matters regarding national security; what it wants it gets, notwithstanding democratically-elected governments in Islamabad since 1989.

In India, in contrast, the armed forces are not part of the government, have no role to play in the decision making pertaining to defence other than in an advisory capacity. In fact, they can do little else except take their chances with the heavily bureaucratized system of decision-making dominated by the permanent civil service.⁴⁶

This brings us to the crucial question: If the returns on a policy of confrontation are so different, what is the incentive for the Pakistani military, to engage in genuine confidence-building or to seek a mutual reassurance regime? Let us attempt an answer.

The foregoing discussion has shown that (i) neither New Delhi nor Islamabad really wants war, (ii) Pakistan has more than adequate conventional and (threshold) nuclear military capabilities to have denatured the threat posed by India, enough in any case to permit a stable deterrence system to operate in South Asia, and (iii) such a deterrence system (variously labelled as non-weaponized, opaque, recessed, etc.) is acceptable to New Delhi. This combined with, firstly, the consistently low-key Indian policies in support of the status quo and, secondly, the fundamentalist Islamic turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran, the Gulf and Central Asia as well as at home in tandem with the seemingly uncontrollable ethnic clashes and internal disorder, may gradually compel the Pakistani armed forces to reform their threat perceptions.

This compulsion will become severe if the political situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate and the State itself starts to unravel owing to mass disaffection, sectarian violence, and separatist feelings aided and abetted by the "drug and Kalashnikov" mafias. Then, the allure of the composite

subcontinental culture may begin to draw a collapsing Pakistani polity into India. The best guarantee to contain these centripetal societal forces would be for the Pakistan military to cement links with its Indian counterpart, by giving the latter a real stake in the continuance of Pakistan as a militarily strong buffer of the kind that Jinnah had in mind. In a *Gottterdammerung* -type of scenario, this last will not only increase the Indian military's reluctance to intervene but also strengthen the Indian government's will to resist the popular demand for "interfering" in Pakistan's internal affairs that could veer from bad to worse.

This military-to-military bond is predicated on small steps that actually promote social interaction between the Indian and Pakistani militaries and act as placebos which in making each feel good about itself also generate good feelings about the other. These innocuous understandings differ in form and content from the traditional CBMs in that the former do not directly relate to either military's capabilities, but which could in time coax a less combative attitude. This may be accomplished in two stages. The first, foundation-laying stage (dealt with here) would involve refamiliarizing the two militaries with their shared history and common socio-cultural milieu and Service ethos by stressing a dialogue at the level of the basic fighting unit of the two armies—the regiment. In the follow-up stage, properly configured CBMs could deal with the operational and dispositional aspects of the two militaries.

The structure of the Indian and Pakistan Armies revolves around the regiment. The bulk of the infantry and armoured regiments have a long history which can be traced to wars, under British leadership, in the subcontinent to establish the Raj and in distant trouble spots (including Persia and the Gulf in the 19th Century, China during the Opium War and the Boxer Rebellion, France, Palestine and Mesopotamia in the First World War, and Italy, North Africa, Eritrea and South-East Asia in the Second World War) on behalf of Empire. When Partition came, the regiments were assigned to India or to Pakistan on the basis of whether the majority of the battalions in the infantry regiment or of squadrons in the armoured regiment were predominantly Hindu/Sikh or Muslim.

This had the effect of tearing up old regiments and reconstituting them in alien surroundings. These new units still owe their elan and identity, rituals and traditions to the old pre-Partition regiments. A program to allow researchers and officers on official trips or privately organized sabbaticals from both sides to visit and experience the peculiar milieus of the parent regiment, will flesh out the histories of new regiment⁴⁷, and would be hugely welcomed.

Another such program could involve exchanges of visits to hallowed

battle sites, like Seringapatnam and Assaye where Col. Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) led the East India Company forces composed of "native" regiments, many of whom "went" to Pakistan. Or, on the other side, trips to Waziristan, Gujrat, Chillianwala and Chitral (as in "raising the siege of"), where many Indian regiments experienced their "finest hour".

An equally inoffensive scheme could involve the exchange of military bands, which have a pride of place in regimental life in the subcontinent. Playing long-remembered martial tunes at formal and informal functions will at once bring back memories of joint actions fought by the British Indian Army and subliminally cement feelings of comradeship. Inter-regimental sports tournaments were a staple of military life in the pre-Partition India. These could in some small ways be revived. Joint rafting and mountaineering expeditions could be launched in undisputed parts of the Himalayas and the Himalayan headwaters.

"Regular exchanges of visits by military officers at all levels may assist the process of perpetuating or renewing a modicum of mutual understanding and even trust", conclude two American analysts. This, they maintain, will help the younger officer corps to better appreciate "the common background that tended to ease tensions and promote understanding even during crisis and conflict."⁴⁸ After all, it was the senior Indian and Pakistani officers from the same or proximal graduating "batches" of the military academies (first Sandhurst in Britain and later Dehradun in India) who in facing each other on the battlefield, set the tone for the quality of gentlemanliness which characterizes India-Pakistan wars. A scheme for these retired officers from both countries to partake of "batch" and unit reunions, and of regimental "raising days" will reaffirm the common heritage and allow them to communicate to their serving juniors the essence of this past and, by so doing, to prepare the ground for better relations between the militaries in time to come.

These are "social" programmes that neither military can find objectionable because they will eventually firm up the regimental backbone of the two Armies, without hurting the renowned fighting qualities of the Indian and the Pakistani soldier⁴⁹. Cross-border inter-regimental ties, moreover, will create understanding about each other's ways of thinking and hence promote mutual confidence during crises and reassure general staffs on both sides. It may eventuate in the proposed second stage when more substantive developments, like agreement to limit arms acquisitions, establishment of risk reduction centres and a region-wide early warning system first proposed in the Joint Defence Proposal by Pakistan Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1959,⁵⁰ could be negotiated with the militaries' consent and active participation.

The Indian Services' inclinations are apparent. They seem to desire a reorientation of their threat perspective to meet new challenges in the post-Cold War world. So much so, that a former Indian Army Chief of Staff has even called for sharing with Pakistan "nuclear and missile technology" and to "cooperate in all other spheres, to lessen the impact" of technology-denial regimes like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Missile Technology Control Regime⁵¹.

The subtext of the military-to-military linkages is the commonality in their Standard Operating Procedures, enabling the two militaries to communicate with each other in the nuanced as well as the substantive sense. It helped the Pakistani Chief of Staff of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), for instance, "handle" the Indian Army contingent in Somalia with great finesse indicating the ease with which the two militaries may be able to get along. It could be the basis for an immediate innovation which will go far in relaxing the conditions on the ground: Regular meetings between the two Army Chiefs; personal rapport between them would prevent the sometimes testy situation on the ground from getting out of hand⁵². Such meetings could also be regularized for the Indian and Pakistani Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff.

Once the militaries get to directly dealing with each other, the most discernible effect will be on Pakistani politicians who, taking their cue from the military, tend to be vociferously anti-India. There will be an almost immediate moderation of rhetoric resulting, consequentially in the two governments becoming more accommodating and conciliatory. This is likely to pave the way for a negotiated settlement of all outstanding disputes not excluding Kashmir.

Linking the armed forces of India and Pakistan in the above ways will not in any way undermine their separate and distinct identities or blunt their soldierly motivation. Nor will it hurt either country's national interests. But they will be more effective CBMs and provide the building blocks for a strong regime of mutual military reassurance.

A MILITARY REASSURANCE REGIME

Military Reassurance Measures (MRMs) primarily involve the military. With their focus on the ways to devalue military confrontation by reducing mutual hostility and mistrust, and by correcting misperceptions, MRMs seek gradually to create a vested interest for the armed forces of both countries in an Indo-Pakistani *rapprochement*. Because Pakistani politicians follow the military's lead, this will help move the politics of that country away from its anti-India orientation.

Based on the historical record of successful conflict amelioration techniques, Janice Gross Stein has formulated four reassurance strategies she believes will work in most conflict situations and have to do with the "exercise of restraint, the creation of norms of competition, the making of irrevocable commitments, and [with] regime-building".⁵³ Military-to-military socialization will hugely facilitate the accrual of assurance from these strategies.

RESTRAINT

Restraint in speech and gestures, in many respects, is the hardest thing to realize in India-Pakistan relations because it requires the leaders in the two countries to empathize with each other's predicament.⁵⁴ This they are obviated from doing because much of the bilateral relations are conducted at the level of accusations and allegations (in recent times over Kashmir), and bombast and competitive rhetoric pitched at the domestic audience. The premium is on creating *frisson*, sounding tough and otherwise making it politically as difficult as possible for the other government at home and abroad. Predictably, the leadership in Pakistan, the weaker, more unsettled State in the conflictual dyad, tends to be more jingoistic and prone to sabre-rattling.

Then again, when it actually comes down to the point of war or of serious repercussions as a result of such policies the two governments have shown commendable restraint in actions. They have proven themselves adept at defusing crisis using every possible means, including outside help (like, for instance, the American assistance in accessing sensitive information by both countries in the 1990 crisis).

Two reasons may be adduced for the success of this twin-forked policy. One, because restraint in actions is better communicated between, and intentions better read by, parties on the same cultural wavelength. And, secondly, because the militaries have acceded to tension-reducing actions. Thus, in the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, for example, India pared the size of units tasked for a massive war exercise even as Pakistan retained the bulk of its counter forces opposite the strategically critical Indian sector in northern Punjab and Jammu (in Kashmir)⁵⁵. Formal relations between the two sets of armed forces will aid in the process of routinizing restraint.

NORMS OF COMPETITION

Two countries contesting a well-defined geocultural space as India and Pakistan happen to do are by the differing nature of their polities, set on a collision course. Combined with the differential in power, this has led to India's forceful delineation of spheres of influence at Pakistan's expense. On

South Asia's periphery looking in, Pakistan, seeking to consolidate its presence by assertive military and diplomatic policies, finds itself at a disadvantage because India has won international approval for its role as the regional policeman, latterly in helping contain the Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka and in suppressing an attempted coup in the Maldives.

Worse, Islamabad finds that Iran and the Central Asian Republics are more mindful of India's size and military, diplomatic and economic heft than they are impressed by Pakistan's geographic proximity or its Islamic identity.⁵⁶ This has increasingly frustrated Pakistan, which finds itself unable to compete with Iran and Turkey for the allegiance of the tier of newly surfaced Islamic States to Russia's south and deadended by India in South Asia. This fencing in of its legitimate ambitions only sharpens Pakistan's anti-India hostility and exacerbates that country's paranoia. Indeed, India seems to have successfully restricted Pakistan's aspirations to the traditional opening Islamabad has always enjoyed with the coastal States in the Persian Gulf and prevented the enlargement of its sphere of influence, which Pakistan's "frontline" role during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan once promised it.

However, Pakistan's internationalist aspirations have found an outlet in the UN peacekeeping missions. As the country deploying the largest contingent in difficult multilateral missions in Somalia and Bosnia, Pakistan has built up a lot of goodwill. India too sent a brigade sized-contingent to Somalia, and the two countries had a complementary role.

Such peacekeeping is a healthy form of military competition, pushing the Indian and Pakistani armed forces into joint operations to maintain international peace. The more the two countries participate in such missions, the greater will be the opportunities to judge each other in the field, rid themselves of stereotyped images of the 'enemy' and to lay down mutually acceptable norms for peacekeeping conduct in the future. In time, each country will acquire sufficient confidence about the other's capabilities and intentions for India to concede Pakistan a role as partner in peacekeeping even within the South Asian region, and for Pakistan to feel comfortable in joining India to advance the collective subcontinental security interests.

IRREVOCABLE COMMITMENT

In deterrence theory, a firm commitment by the status quo power often signals benign intentions to the challenger who "anticipates great cost both from the perpetuation of the status quo and a resort to force" and who by making a like commitment indicates the willingness to reduce the cost of the status quo.⁵⁷

The precedent here is the 1991 agreement between the two countries not to launch surprise attacks against designated nuclear installations of the other. It has permitted Pakistan to breathe easier, particularly because the possibility of India "doing an Osiraq" had haunted that country's strategists since the early 1980s when the Kahuta uranium centrifuge enrichment facility was being built. It has contributed to stable deterrence in South Asia.

The ultimate irrevocable commitment may well be the telescoping of the longstanding Indian offer of a Treaty of Friendship and Pakistan's counter-offer of a Non-aggression Pact, to come up with a mutually acceptable umbrella agreement.⁵⁸ Such a document could, in turn, generate accords and agreements dealing with specific security issues, like the redeployment of troops from the Siachen Glacier, the demarcation of the Sir Creek and the settlement of the Wular Barrage dispute, joint border patrols and joint border monitoring, ban on coded radio traffic, notification of conventional and nuclear military accidents, expanded and upgraded "hotlines" and further restrictions on manoeuvres and war exercises.⁵⁹ Again, military-to-military ties will further this process.

LIMITED SECURITY REGIMES

The confidence-building measures of the kind agreed upon by India and Pakistan since the Karachi Agreement of 1949 dealing with border security taken in *toto* amount to a limited security regime. But, as has been discussed earlier, the success of many of these CBMs has been reserved for times when there was no crisis, which devalues not merely the individual measure but also sows doubt about the confidence-building process as a whole.

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which began operating in 1949 as a result of India referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN, monitored military activity on either side of the border, informing each country about changes in the military dispositions of the other along the Line of Control. UNMOGIP'S activity constituted a limited security regime of sorts because it reassured Pakistan, and may have even led to India's dropping guard enough, at least, to permit massive Pakistani infiltration of "raiders" into Kashmir, which triggered the 1965 War. But India's claim that the 1972 Simla Accord (signed in the wake of the 1971 War which begat Bangladesh) supercedes UNMOGIP has made it defunct on the Indian side.⁶⁰

A replacement security regime may, however, be falling into place owing to the US-India and US-Pakistan joint military exercises underway. According to this scheme, the US armed forces separately engage with military units from India and Pakistan on a periodic basis. There is no formal undertaking by the US as the common player to divulge information it has gleaned about the

Indian military capabilities to Pakistan or about the Pakistani military prowess to India. But, US officials say, that in the natural course of sharing experiences and drawing lessons from the joint training exercises, faulty reading of intentions and of threats and wrong assessments of capabilities of one side by the other will be sought to be allayed.⁶¹ But such information will have greater credibility if the two militaries have their own independent institutional channels of communication.

RECAP

CBMs don't solve problems. At best they can be of marginal assistance to tackle core issues. In South Asia the need is for milieu-specific confidence-building solutions and these will have to involve the military establishments more directly in the peace process. Especially so in the case of the Pakistan armed forces who can decide both the form and the content of the country's policies vis-a-vis India. If, further, such involvement is cemented by forging military-to-military links, then the foundations will have been laid for a lasting mutual military reassurance system in the subcontinent.

But it is precisely these relations and ways to go about mending them that have so far been paid scant attention in South Asia and especially in the West where thinking on CBMs for this region is premised less on the military and cultural reality than on a sense of alarm about "ancient conflicts ...between Hindus and Muslims" turning nuclear.⁶² An overlooked aspect of the subcontinental military reality is that it revolves around Mess rituals and regimental traditions, *durbars* and *bara-khanas*,⁶³ and unit reunions and the social complexities of the (military) cantonment life. And CBMs which build on this reality would at once be timely, appropriate and effective in seeding mutual trust and in preventing war by miscalculation or design.

Programmes for military-to-military socializing which solidify the regimental structure without hurting the fighting qualities of the troops, would be irresistible to the Indian and the Pakistani Armed Services, and could initiate the process of normalization of bilateral relations. Good military-to-military relations could be the centre-piece of a strong system of mutual military reassurance, of a host of meaningful confidence and security-building measures and of enduring peace in the region.

At the very least, the MRMs will amount to a limited security regime, ensuring that not every little wrinkle in the foreign and defence policies of one State is perceived as hurting the interests of the other State. Getting the armies of India and Pakistan to believe in peace and in each other is the only certain way to rid the national security policy circles in the region of their "zero sum game" mentality.

FOOTNOTES

1. The governments in New Delhi from the very beginning were wary of too intimate relations between the Indian and Pakistan militaries because of the fear that the former will be infected by the latter's proclivity to intervene in the political life of the country. This fear became palpable with the appointment of V.K.Krishna Menon as the defence minister in the late 1950s, around the time General Ayub Khan staged the *coup d'etat* in Pakistan, and was manifested in the controversy about an alleged coup attempt and the resignation (which was later withdrawn at prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's behest) by the distinguished Indian soldier and Army chief, General K.S. Thimayya. See the account of this episode in S.S.Khera, *India's Defence Problem*, Orient Longmans, Delhi, Calcutta, etc, 1968; pp. 73-74. Khera served as the Principal Defence Secretary, the highest ranking civilian bureaucrat in the Defence Ministry. More recently, there were hints of "civil-military" problems during the 1987 "war that wasn't" begat by the massive Indian Army war exercise, Brasstacks. A former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Secretary for Defence Production, K.S.Subrahmanyam, has written about them. See his "The Simla Pact: Lack of Strategic Thinking", *The Times of India*, April 12, 1995.
2. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, (New York, Oxford, etc., Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 224.
3. For a sharp and succinct view of the India-Pakistan wars by a reputed military historian, see Johan Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, *Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars*, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp.55-56.
4. John S. Sandrock and Michael Maldony, *The History and Future of Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: A Background Paper*, (Macleane, Virginia, prepared by Science Applications International Corporation—SAIC, for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, November 14,1994), fn no.3, p. A-2.
5. All these figures for war deaths in Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1993*, (Washington, D.C., World Priorities Inc., 1993) p.20.
6. See the chapter on the 1965 War in C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India 1964-66: A Life of Truth in Politics*, (New Delhi, Bombay, etc., Oxford University Press, 1994). This is an authoritative biography by a close confidante of the Indian leader.
7. The Pakistani defence spending has averaged 7.02 per cent of GDP in the years 1982-83 to 1992-93. India's defence budget in the same period averaged 3.08 per cent of GDP. See the Tables in Air Commodore (Retd.) Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure", *Asian Strategic Review 1991-92*, (New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1992).
8. Jasjit Singh, "Trends".
9. There is dissatisfaction in the Indian Army with the lack of emphasis on a proper logistic build-up which curtails warfighting in terms of time, space and effort. The Indian officer corps is notoriously tight-lipped about voicing criticism against the establishment they have served, but murmurs are heard. Lt Gen D.V.Kalra (Retd.), for instance, has referred elliptically to the problem by criticizing what he calls "the logistics of defensive posture". See his "Logistics: Life Line of the Army" in *The Indian Defence Review*, New Delhi, Oct 1993, p.90.

10. See the devastating but also the most authoritative account of the Indian debacle against the Chinese in 1962 by Maj Gen D.K. Palit(Retd.), *War in the High Himalayas*, (New Delhi, Lancer Publication, 1992). Gen Palit (then Brigadier) was the Director of Military Operations during the India-China War.
11. See the Tables in Jasjit Singh (Retd.), "Trends"; pp. 54-55, 62-63.
12. General Mirza Aslām Beg, ex-Chief, Pakistan Army recently argued that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be deployed let alone used in the subcontinent by pointing out that both India and Pakistan refrained from attacking each other's civilian populations in their three wars. See "Beg rules out N-option" in *The Times of India*, New Delhi, July13,1995.
13. Consider the Muslim voter clout, for example, in the economically crucial state of Maharashtra. Of the 288 constituencies, only 69 have Muslim populations below 5 per cent. In other words, in the majority of the constituencies, Muslims have a large presence and should they vote en bloc, can decide which party wins. The fact that they did not is attributed by many as the cause of the ruling Congress Party losing in the recent provincial elections. See "The Saffron Resurgence" in *India Today*, March 31,1995. The trend is for even the Hindu "extremist" Parties like the Muslim-baiting Shive Sena to moderate their views once they win elections and acquire power as the Sena-Bharatiya Janata Party alliance has done in the recent State elections both in Maharashtra and in the other western province of Gujarat.
14. See Rafiq Zakaria, *The Struggle within Islam*, (Harmondsworth, UK, Penguin Books, 1988), for a criticism of the evolving Pakistan polity; Mr Zakaria is a former Member of Parliament and moderate Indian Muslim leader from Maharashtra. For an Indian Muslim's disillusionment with Pakistan refer to Sk. Sadar Nayeem, "Why Indian Muslims aren't pro-Pakistan" in *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, June 16,1995.
15. This familial view of India-Pakistan quarrels has been current since Partition. Even that most hawkish of Pakistani Generals, the late Lt Gen A.I. Akram—a close advisor to Gen Zia ul-Haq during the latter's martial law government in the 1980s—regarded Pakistan's troubles with India as those a younger brother typically experiences with the "elder brother" and "head of family" in the South Asian cultural context. See his monograph, *Wage Peace, not War* (Islamabad, Institute of Regional Studies, 1982).
16. *Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India: Stable Deterrent or Proliferation Challenge?* (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 25,1992), p. 21. [Emphasis is mine.]
17. Michael Krepon, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures" in Michael Krepon (Ed.), *A Handbook of Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security* (Washington, D.C., The Henry L. Stimson Centre, 2nd Edition, January 1995), pp. 3-9.
The labelling of measures as "conflict avoidance" or "confidence-building" is fairly arbitrary.
18. Leonard Sullivan, Jr, *Security and Stability in Conventional Forces: Differing Perceptions of the Balance*, (Washington, D.C., The Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, May 1988), p.17.
19. For a synoptic view of the Europe-related CBMs, refer the tabulation of the CBM-"stages" in East-West detente in Cathleen S.Fisher, "The Preconditions of Confidence-building:Lessons from the European Experience" in Krepon (Ed), *Handbook*; pp. 36-39.
20. Krepon (Ed), *Handbook*; p. 29.
21. Krepon (Ed), *Handbook*; pp. 29-31
22. Pakistan's perception of the Kashmir issue as "unfinished" Partition business was trenchantly

rendered by prime minister Benazir Bhutto in an interview with David Frost aired over Pakistan TV, on January 8, 1995. In it she claimed that a Pakistan without Kashmir was a country "balkanised" at birth. For a more detailed analysis of Pakistan's perceived stake in Kashmir, see Meleeha Lodhi, *The External Dimension*, (Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1994). Ms Lodhi is currently the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington, DC.

23. For an analysis of the geopolitical and strategic considerations that went into the making of the clashing Indian and Pakistani security policies and the US South Asia policy, see Bharat Karnad, "India's weak geopolitics and what to do about it" in Bharat Karnad (Ed), *Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond*, (New Delhi, Viking Penguin India, 1994).
24. See Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, "South Asia" in Gerald Segal & William Tow (Eds.) *Chinese Defence Policy* (Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1984). For a more recent appraisal of Sino-Indian relations which emphasizes China's healthy respect for the Indian military's current strength as one reason for its seeking warmer relations with New Delhi, see Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power" in Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon (Eds.) *India's Strategic Future: Regional State of Global Power?* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992).
25. Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy", *Survival* (Summer 1994).
26. Mohammad Jawahar, a Malaysian analyst in discussing the applicability of CBMs outside of European contexts concludes that the asymmetry of power in the Asian context "complicates" confidence-building activity. See his "Implications of the Regional Environment for Regimes of Confidence- and Security-building for Asia and the Pacific" in *Disarmament*, No. 4, 1991, p. 88. India, in the '50s actually followed a policy of self-abnegation in its relations with China, but no such tolerance was shown to Pakistan. The genesis of these policies discussed in Bharat Karnad "India's weak geopolitics".
27. For an articulation of such threat perception by the former Pakistan Army Chief and still an influential in the Pakistani policy circles, see General Mirza Aslam Beg, *Development and Security: Thoughts and Reflections*, (Rawalpindi, A FRIENDS publication, 1994), chapter 12. India's malafides were, from the Pakistani viewpoint, established at the time of Partition when India denied the new State of Pakistan the means to defend itself by not transferring its designated share of the British Indian Army's inventory of equipment stocks and other military stores. This case made by General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retd.), the late President Zia ul-Haq's right hand man and Vice Chief of the Army. See his "The Roots of Conflict in South Asia: A Pakistani perspective" in Karnad (Ed.) *Future Imperilled*.
28. For an account of the fear and insecurity experienced by the Indian Muslim community, see Zakaria, *The Struggle with in Islam*, pp. 259-263
25. See in particular General Mirza Aslam Beg, "Nuclear Programme and Political Ramblings" and Lt Col Muhammad Ashraf Saleem, "Nuclear Deterrence: A Subcontinental Logic" in *Defence Journal*, Karachi, No.11-12, 1993.
30. The former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, now in the opposition has used the "Bomb" issue to embarrass and politically discomfit the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party Government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. See "Nawaz Sharif's bombshell", *India Today*, North American edition, September 15, 1994.
31. A few years ago an American academic, Robert G. Wirsing, was conducted around their respective forward areas in Kashmir by the Indian and Pakistan Armies. See his balanced and dispassionate account of the Pakistani infiltration of and support for insurgents in Indian Kashmir, "Kashmir Conflict: The New Phase" in Charles H. Kennedy (Ed.) *Pakistan 1992*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1993), pp. 148-155.

32. The Indian military believes that any large scale Pakistani operations across the LoC in Kashmir will necessitate India's striking across the international boundary in Punjab and Sind as in 1965. See Maj Gen Afsar Karim (Retd.), *Kashmir: The Troubled Frontiers*, (New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 1994); pp.136-138. Indeed, the committee on foreign affairs of the Pakistan Senate in its July 1995 Report has cautioned the Pakistan Government against precipitating a war with India as an offshoot of its support for the Kashmir insurgency. Plainly, the "non-weaponized nuclear deterrent" presumably in place is not considered capable by the Pakistani Parliament of preventing another conventional military defeat in case of war. See "Panel advice to Pak. Govt. on averting war" in *The Hindu*, New Delhi, July 21,1995.
33. India's opposition to the American sale of arms to Pakistan is of long standing. Lately, it has been protesting the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan, particularly F-16 aircraft. For the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Salman Khurshid's forthright condemnation of any such move, see "India tells US arms transfer to Pak will be unacceptable" in *The Asian Age*, New Delhi, July 13,1995. India has so far also successfully pressured Moscow on this issue. For the latest warning by the foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee, see "India resents Russian attempts to sell weapons to Pak" in *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, May11,1995. In the recent past New Delhi has stopped Russo-Pakistani arms deals preventing, for example, sale on commercial terms of Su-27 fighter aircraft and a large number of T-72 tanks to Pakistan armed forces. See "Arms deal with Pakistan: India forced out Russia" in *The Financial Express*, New Delhi, July 22, 1992.
34. See Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif, "The Roots of Conflict in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective" in Karnad (Ed.) *Future Imperilled*.
35. Consider the heat generated in Pakistan over the Pressler Amendment provisions which prohibit the transfer of some 28 F-16s Islamabad has "paid" for. See "Clinton seeking to pay Pakistanis for blocked arms" in *The New York Times*, April12,1995.
36. Explaining her current hardline on Kashmir, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is on record as saying that she would not repeat the mistake of being conciliatory on Kashmir as she was during her last tenure in office, which she believes cost her her job.
37. *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 27-29.
38. I thank Michael Krepon for this observation about the penalizing of the confidence-building process.
39. CBMs began to be seriously propagated by the US beginning in the 1980s with the success of the East-West confidence building process. See the assessment by a former National Security Council staffer in the Bush White House, Richard Haass, about the applicability of East-West type of CBMs to regional conflicts, in *Conflicts Unending*, pp. 87-88. But Indians and Pakistanis apparently consider these CBMs as a means of pleasing, placating and otherwise keeping the Americans off their backs. The ACDIS Report on the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, for example, concludes that CBMs are "regarded by both the sides as an 'American' issue, i.e., of greater concern to them in their relationship with the United States than because of any utility in their own relationship." *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (Urbana-Champaign, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois), p.13.
40. Michael Krepon, "A Time of Troubles, A Time of Need", Draft Paper, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, DC, 1995; p.8. CBMs, like the hotline between the military operations directorates of the Indian and Pakistan armies have not worked as they were supposed to. In fact, they are often used to deceive by channelling wrong information, when

not actually being shut down in time of tension. This is what happened during the crisis precipitated by the massive Indian Army war exercise in early 1987. Refer the ACDIS Report *Brasstacks and Beyond*.

41. Quoted in Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security Under Zia, 1977-1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991). p 5.
42. For the quotes and an analysis of Jinnah's and subsequently Pakistan's strategic thinking, see Karnad, "India's weak geopolitics", pp. 24-28.
43. The ratios are derived from inventory figures for India and Pakistan in *The Military Balance*, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972-73 and 1994-95).
44. Janice Gross Stein, "Reassurance in International Conflict Management", *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1991.
45. Hasan Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1986* (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1986). For the Military's even more enlarged role in the Pakistani society in the Zia-years, see the essays in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, Westview Press, 1991).
46. For an authoritative description of the Indian organisation and structure of defence decision-making by a former Secretary of National Defence College, see A.L. Venkateswaran, *Defence Organisation in India* (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India). To understand the socio-political and historical basis for the Indian military's readiness after independence to accept civilian overlordship, see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1971), ch. 7.
47. For the best history of the umbilical cord connecting the subcontinental armies to the past and to each other, see John Gaylor, *Sons of John Company: The Indian and Pakistan Armies 1903-91* (New Delhi, Lancer Publications, 1993; first published in 1992 by Spellmount Ltd, UK).
48. Sandroc and Maldony, *The History and Future of Confidence Building in South Asia*, p.13. The larger significance of the personal/regimental links between the Indian and the Pakistan Armies however escaped these American authors (one of them, Sandrock, a former military attache in the New Delhi embassy) who describe "Regular Exchanges of Military Personnel" as only "Additional CBMs for Consideration".
49. The effectiveness of the Indian and Pakistan Armies and the antecedent British Indian Army, lies in the concept of *izzat*—a peculiarly South Asian amalgam of personal honour and self-respect. It is *izzat* that motivates the average Indian or Pakistani soldier unflinchingly to fire on his own people when ordered to do so. The most evocative regiment-based history which treats this concept at some length remains Philip Mason's *A Matter of Honour* (New York, Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1974).
50. Sandrock and Maldony, *The History and Future*, pp.12-16.
51. General K. Sundarji (Retd.) "Indian Military Compulsions" in Bharat Karnad (Ed), *Future Imperilled*, pp. 145-146.
52. The preliminary findings of the ACDIS team which produced the Report *Brasstacks and Beyond* were first discussed in a conference of experts, including many Indian and Pakistani participants in the Brasstacks crisis. At this Meet held in Bellagio, Italy, in September 1994, the Indian Army Chief at the time of the crisis Gen. K.Sundarji confessed that had he had the occasion personally to interact with his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Khalid Muhammad

Arif, before the crisis erupted, he would have been more sensitive to the Pakistan military's concerns; this by way of indicating the value of regular meetings between the Army Chiefs of Staff of the two countries.

[Source: a participant at the Bellagio Conference]

53. Stein, "Reassurance", p. 434.
54. Stein, "Reassurance", p. 436.
55. Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Mallik, Charles H. Kennedy and Robert C., Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, Westview Press, 2nd Edition, 1991), pp. 232-234.
56. President Hashemi Rafsanjani, for instance, has expressed an interest in Iran's having a security relationship with Pakistan, see "Rafsanjani for security ties with Pak", Reuter, in *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, December 17, 1992. But in the larger Iranian geopolitical scheme, it is India's participation he has sought along with China to form what he has called the "axis [of] inter-Asian cooperation" to counter the US-led Western alliance system in that part of the world. See Rafsanjani's interview, *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, September 19, 1993.
57. Stein, "Reassurance", p. 441.
58. See Pran Chopra, "From Mistrust to Cooperation" in Pran Chopra, Mubashir Hasan, Shamsul Haq, Shelton Kodikara and Rishikesh Shaha, *Future of South Asia* (New Delhi, Bombay, etc. Macmillan India Ltd, 1986).
59. Some of these initiatives have been articulated in Sandrock and Maldony, *The History and Future*, pp. 11-16.
60. Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 158-163.
61. The US State Department South Asia Desk officials in a meeting with the Visiting Fellows, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, D.C., January 26, 1995. Indeed, Pakistan is familiar with the American use of such "information sharing". A US Air Force team in 1987 had, for instance, gone to Pakistan to try to convince the Pakistanis to buy the E-2C airborne surveillance and battle control system instead of the E-3A AWACS the Pakistan Air Force was hankering for. For this purpose the Americans related to their Pakistani counterparts the operational experiences of the Israeli and Egyptian air forces, which employ the E-2C. [Source: A US defence official who made the trip.]
62. Barry M. Blechman and Cathleen S. Fisher, "Phase out the Bomb", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1994-95; p. 91. A part of this alarm is probably because of a misreading of the nature of India-Pakistan wars and of the South Asian conflict milieu generally, to wit, Blechman and Fisher's statement: "As weapons proliferate, moreover, the risk of deliberate nuclear use will rise as well. Many potential proliferators are actually engaged in long-standing conflicts of great violence." [The emphasis is mine.]
63. Regimental *durbars* are occasions when the commanding officers hear publicly-voiced grievances of their troops and, where possible, take immediate remedial decisions. *Bara-khana* literally means "big meal" where officers and men of the regiment or unit share in a meal.