

Low Intensity Conflict in Indian Context

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"Historians like to give names to various eras, ours can only be called the Age of Low Intensity Conflict."

-- Wall Street Journal

INTRODUCTION

World Wars have dropped out of the market. The price-tag attached to them is far too hefty. Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) are the runaway best sellers today. They are all the rage. Cheap, accessible even to the poorest and the least powerful segments of the society and yet effective; they have the potential to produce even more dramatic results than a World War, given adequate time. The present times are as surely the age of LIC as they are the age of electronics. Since the end of the Second World War, 192 LICs have broken out all over the World, according to data compiled by the authors. The human community spawns LIC at the astonishing rate of one every two months. One does not have to be much of a crystal-ball gazer to see that as the world whizzes into the 21st century, the frequency of LIC would have increased even further. Newspaper headlines attest to this every day.

In the seventies, LIC represented 80 percent of all wars. In the eighties, this percentage shot up to 90. Given the politico-military realities, this swing from high-middle intensity conflict to LIC, is likely to continue. With the spectres of mutual assured destruction and the nuclear winter haunting the mankind nuclear conflicts or high-medium intensity conflicts which hold out the threat of exacerbating into nuclear conflicts have virtually become non-options. LIC, instead, seems to offer a more sensible and cost-effective solution to many a politico-social, territorial or ideological problems. Improved means of communication (including mass communications), availability of light weight sophisticated weapons; heightened aspiration of people the world over and a compulsive urge experienced by some ethnic and religious groups to aggressively assert their independent identity are the factors that combine to make LIC both desirable and possible; and even inevitable, given the human predilection for combat.

While, for most, the term LIC evokes the pictures of the 'killing fields' variety of swamps, jungles, paddy-fields and a semiclad, foot bare, poorly armed people taking on a mighty, well-organised military force, in reality the

term encompasses a broad spectrum of conflict from terrorist campaigns to limited wars. No country, no political system and no race is immune to this form of conflict and practically every nation in the world has had a taste - or worse - of it.

Strangely, the growth of LIC has outstripped the response of established regimes or socio-political system at whom they are aimed. Most of a modern army's capabilities are tailored and honed to meet the challenge of middle-to-high intensity conflict in which the risk is the highest, should a war start, but the possibility of it occurring is minimal. On the other hand, the possibility of an Army getting involved in a LIC is very high and yet the Army's capabilities to meet this challenge are none too impressive. Paradoxically, despite the general consensus that LIC represents the most persistent threat, there is a general reluctance to evolve appropriate strategy, doctrine and tactics to meet it. This paradox has been experienced by most nations and some have tried to break out of it in their own way. USA have raised a special force called the National Security Guard to combat internal uprisings. Israel has its special units.

In the Indian context, we have a similar problem. Though the Armed Forces are primarily structured, equipped and trained to meet foreign aggression, they have been used with greater - and ever-increasing - frequency to assist civil authorities in restoring the law of the land which is their secondary role and for which they are not adequately geared. Since Independence we have faced many LIC situations, yet policy development, strategic planning, force design, equipment acquisition, doctrine and training in the Army have tended to focus exclusively on major conventional wars. The plethora of para-military forces and the police that we have in this country, too do not have adequate capability to meet the threat posed by insurgents, secessionists and the like. So how should we get over this asymmetry? Should we, like the USA and Israel, raise a separate force to deal with Internal Security threats? Or should our Armed Forces be structured and trained to meet all kinds of threat right across the spectrum from high intensity combat to LIC? These are some of the questions which have been dogging the minds of serious military thinkers in our country for some time now. To find effective answers to them - and quickly - is imperative in the interest of our body politic. How competently we do this may well decide whether this great democracy of ours sinks or swims.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to identify shortcomings in existing set up in India to deal with LIC and suggest organisational changes keeping in mind whole spectrum of national security.

NATURE AND THEORY OF LIC

INTRODUCTION

Largest industry in the world today is arms industry doing business in billions of dollars a year. The economy of some of the developed countries depends upon it. While, a conflict of the magnitude of World War is ruled out due to nuclear deterrent and costs in terms of human lives and economic resources, the developed countries, to keep their arms industry running, create or keep the conflicts going by proxy in various parts of the world. It is said though debatable that interested developed nations spend approximately ten per cent of their earnings a year through clandestine means to sow the seeds of suspicion and mutual distrust within and between Third World countries.

GEO-POLITICAL SCENARIO

A nation can be termed a 'power' (regional or super), provided it has four main ingredients - sound economy, political stability, technical/scientific strength and military power. Due to balkanisation and impaired economy, Soviet Union has given way to its reduced entity, Russia. We have moved from symmetrical bi-polar world to a more polycentric global arrangement. USA has emerged as a military class of its own. Those concerned, that unbalanced military power is inclined by its nature to be unhealthy, will be relieved that fiscal imperatives are already bearing upon US military establishment. Japan is now judged on several criteria to be world's foremost economy. Europe too is making somewhat elephantine progress, not just economically but towards a degree of identity which would become national, subject to evolution of new German dimensions. We see that the new so called world order is fraught with uncertainty and the leit motif is going to be complexity laden with potential for disaster.

The newly independent former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and their riches are new battle grounds for dominance in the Islamic World. At stake is not only influence over 50 - 60 million Muslims, but also Tadzhikistan's enriched uranium, Uzbekistan's gold and silk, Turkmenistan's natural gas, Azerbaijan's oil and Kazakhstan's oil and nuclear weapons. Several Arab countries are vying for influence in Central Asia-particularly Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya. But the real competition is between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Pakistan turning its back on South Asia for identification with a large vibrant bloc of Islamic countries, rich in resources and endowed with nuclear weapons could well be on the cards.

This is likely to give boost to Pakistan's nuclear programme. Already six tactical nuclear weapons are reported missing from Kazakhstan, India would have to play a far more diplomatic role in Central Asia alongwith readiness on the part of businessmen to take full advantage of markets of the republics. It is in India's interest that Central Asian republics remain active members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and do not break away to form a political or economic block with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Recent happenings in Afghanistan assume significance - with pro Pakistan Mujhadeen Groups calling the shots in governance of the country. India would have to do some tight rope balancing in dealing with the new rulers of Afghanistan.

MEANING OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Limited war, insurrection, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, intervention and peace keeping operations are names given to LIC. LIC is interpreted differently by developing and developed countries. There is very subtle difference between insurgency and guerrilla warfare or revolutionary warfare on the one hand and the limited war, low cost war or LIC on the other. One merges into another. A terrorist activity in the initial stages may grow into subversion and end up as full fledged insurgency movement with popular support of the people and tacit help of a foreign power. The LIC environment present a dilemma, the threat is neither perceptible nor unambiguous.

LIC AS INTERPRETED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

LIC is armed conflict for political purposes short of combat between regularly organised forces. LIC is also interpreted as use of force to protect national interests and support allies. They takes shape of intervention like the US involvement in Panama and Granada, and peace keeping which could be under the aegis of UN or when called upon by legitimately constituted Government.

LIC IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

LIC deals with suppressing internal subversion, insurrection, civil disturbance and disobedience, insurgency and guerrilla warfare. These internal uprisings may be with or without the overt or covert support of a foreign country. LIC would also encompass short but intense border conflicts between neighbours.

LIC - DEFINITION

It can be defined as a limited politico - military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, psychological or military objectives. It is often

protracted and fermented by diplomatic, economic and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Success in LIC depends upon subordinating military operations to political objectives. Gaining and maintaining public support is more important in LIC than tactics and terrain. Conventional military operations seldom succeed in LIC.

TERRORISM

An act or threat of an act aimed to create extreme anxiety and fear in a target group larger than immediate victim with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to political, religious or administrative demands of perpetrators.

SUBVERSION

All measures, short of use of armed forces taken by a section of people to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they otherwise would not do. Methods used are political and economic pressures, strikes, protest marches, propaganda with or without small scale violence, for purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of population into giving support.

INSURGENCY AND INTERNAL SECURITY

It is use of armed force by a section of people against the Government for the purpose mentioned above. Subversion and insurgency can take place at the same time and either or both may be supported by a foreign power providing the impetus. This should not be mixed up with Internal Security (IS) operations which are disorders not aimed to overthrow the Government or even at forcing it to do something which it does not want to do. These are activities against a particular act of the Government or non Government body. Insurgency uses force, subversion, and other forms of pressure.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The guerrilla activity is open yet clandestine. They are for liberation of an area through conflict with the State. The size of force is initially small but develops into large units depending upon success. Their targets are mainly armed security forces. They operate both in rural and urban environment. The guerrilla respects the rules of conflict.

PEACE KEEPING

Peace keeping aims at preventing fight between two groups of people by using non warlike methods. UNO is the main authority for sanctioning peace keeping. However, forces can be sent through bilateral treaties too,

like despatch of IPKF to Sri Lanka and Maldives. UN forces have undertaken numerous peace keeping tasks eg in Congo, Cyprus, Kashmir, Vietnam, Egypt, Israel-Syria border, Namibia, Costa Rica and now in Yugoslavia and Cambodia.

LIMITED WAR

Whereas in past wars, the military commander was given an objective to achieve and told to get on with the task, in the present limited wars, the objective must be carefully evaluated by the head of the Government to prevent escalation into a general war. The political objective has to be kept so clearly in mind, that the military commander is now an executive agent, removed from the real source of decision and power. Postulates of a limited war are:-

- (a) Limited in scope, objectives and force levles. It is confined to a limited geographical area.
- (b) The aim of limited war is never 'total war' or victory'.
- (c) Operations are controlled.
- (d) National survival is not at stake.
- (e) Acceptable price in terms of operations/casualties, political effect and degree of escalation.

LOCAL WARS

Local wars have clear strategic aim. They combine political economic and diplomatic means, in consonance with which they achieve military aims with active operations. The local wars are generally fought in all dimensions eg on land, sea and in air. Local wars must bear relationship with national and military power. Local wars generally aim at delivering quick and decisive blow and then let the diplomatic/political channels handle the situation.

LIC IN INDIAN CONTEXT

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND : PRE INDEPENDENCE

Our history is replete with examples of LICs. To quote an anecdote from epic Mahabhatta, King Ashwathama told his Army Chief Duripur Karve, "You can't fight them because they have a huge army - but definitely you can terrorise them by selective killings". The prophecies made by sages are now coming out to be more or less true. Girish Bihari apprises us about

the dialogue between Sukhdev and Parikshit, the son of Abhimanyu in Shrimad Bhagwad Mohapurana as, "Wicked citizens will dominate the earth and people will suffer from hunger and other miseries and worries. The poor will not get justice and rulers will become robbers. Man will live by pointless violence, deceit etc and poverty will be the sole criterion for deciding the guilty. Such social conditions will form ideal ground for guerrilla warfare".

The struggle for independence from the alien rulers - the Mughals or the Britishers - produced in the country a rich harvest of heroes who sacrificed their lives so that the country could be free and independent. Shivaji, who mastered and practised the art of guerrilla warfare is a household name in the country. Rana Pratap, Ranjit Singh and Suraj Mal adopted different techniques to throw the Mughals out of India, Rani Laxmi Bai and Tipu Sultan fought individual battles against the then mighty 'British'.

While fight against foreign rulers was on, the rajas and maharajas fought amongst themselves on various petty personal issues. The British followed policy of 'divide and rule'. The introduction of Zamindari system, issuing honorific ranks and titles like Talukdar, Subedar, Rai Bahadur etc by them created a clan which was hated by the public at large. Large scale conversions by the invading kings created problems of identity within the religion of birth. It is a fact that the converts are more fanatics. The religious fanatics, over the period have resorted to mounting religious fervors and this disease continues to plague our society even today.

POST INDEPENDENCE

With attainment of independence, it was assumed that days of violence and conflicts were over. But it remained an illusion only. Before departing, the English gave princely states option to join Union of India/Pakistan or remain independent. Some ambitious rulers opted for the latter option. It was to the credit of Iron-man Sardar Patel, who united and brought all these states under India, willingly or under coercion/threat. Insurgency started in India in the 1950s but terrorism and misguided sub nationalism has raised its ugly head on a larger scale since early eighties. To contain terrorism and insurgency conditions in certain parts of the country, the Government had to increase strength of Central Police Organisations (CPO) and Para Military Forces (PMF) which resulted in substantial increase in their budget from Rs 429 crores in 1981 to over Rs 2000 crores in 1992/93.

Single most important factor responsible for destabilisation has been the creation of States on linguistic basis for vested interests. This gave rise to regionalism and factionalism rather than nationalism. There is a need to identify the threat, marginalise it and solve it politically before it gets out of hands.

COUNTER MEASURES TO COMBAT LIC

We should see LIC in our country in the context of global phenomenon. Violence is becoming a means of airing regional aspirations. Insurgencies in our country have come to fore in a big way since the Punjab and J&K problems started. The ultras of North Eastern States, Naxalites and Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), had not concerned Delhi as much as the antinational elements (ANEs) of Punjab and the J&K. It is due to latters' geographical and strategic location with a hostile neighbour across the border. Terrorism and insurgencies are cancerous in growth and we must find measures to eradicate them.

COMBATING AT NATIONAL LEVEL

The origin of most of our problems lies at slow pace of economic development thus not being able to fulfil local aspirations of the masses. Further, ever increasing population is causing constant stress on our system which effects quality of day to day life. We need to arrive at a national consensus on how to combat effects of above factors which form root causes of terrorism and insurgency. These issues cannot be resolved by police action alone. The intelligentsia should educate masses that fissiparous ideas propagated by some parties would add on to misery of common man, rather than throwing up a positive solution. The need of the hour is to identify forces of secessionism and initiate action to combat it. In a democracy the fight against anti-national activities is an issue above local or party policies. The problems of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam are national problems which can be resolved politically, after a favourable congenial atmosphere has been created by security forces. Other peripheral issues of GNLF and Jharkhand are watching from the fence, awaiting a catalyst to develop them into full-fledged LICs.

ROLE OF MEDIA

The media represents a critical factor in LIC environment. The political nature of LIC creates an unforgiving environment. Every move of security forces is observed by a news media served by instant satellite communication. In the past, a commander might violate a law or two with impunity as long as the battle was won. Not so today, a thoughtless violation of law or policy can turn an otherwise successful operation into a disastrous news event. On the other hand, insurgency movements would have little meaning without media coverage. The ultras have a vested interest in publicity since their cause as also their deeds are given quantum jump through publicity. They magnify their exploits through massive media coverage. According to a media

expert "The media is terrorist's best friend. A terrorist act by itself is nothing, publicity is all".

In a democratic society like ours, what should be the role of media in curbing/reducing anti national activities. It is recommended that Government should not impose censorship for that would force the ultras to escalate violence in order to attract more attention. The press should report objectively and accurately. There should be no blowups and exaggerated stories. Media under the patronage of 'Press Council of India' should develop code of conduct and understand their responsibility towards society and nation.

INTELLIGENCE

Another aspect that merits consideration in combating insurgencies is improvement in obtaining intelligence about the insurgents. Sun Tzu, in his 'Art of War' about 200 BC said "know your enemy and you can win a hundred battles." Our intelligence gathering agencies have always been found wanting in their outputs. The first requirement is to centralise all intelligence agencies under one head in the area of counter insurgency and low intensity operations. The second is to equip them with a network of computers and communication. The intelligence agencies should establish a computer surveillance bank, which would enable instant information to be passed to concerned forces. Photos, fingerprints and all other details can be flashed into a local screen within seconds. This will be a little expensive experiment to begin with and may not readily get the approval due to vested interests. But this will ultimately prove to be very effective weapon to combat insurgencies in the country. Similarly, forces fighting insurgencies must be equipped with modern communication equipment to enable them to pass information quickly.

REHABILITATION

Hardcore terrorists are normally composed of unemployed or under-employed persons who build up a feeling of resentment against the system for not having given them what they think is their due. Dismissed or discharged members of armed and PMF who are trained in combat are susceptible to allurement by the anti national elements. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to examine feasibility of some kind of rehabilitation plan even for such members of our forces who are wasted out. The Government should also find measures to provide more job facilities to the youth so that they are not sucked into anti-national movements. One of the options to combat insurgency is to help insurgents opt out of the movement. An ultra may have a genuine change of heart or see the error of his philosophy but there is little

he can do to take a different path. Youthful revolutionary zeal tends to fade with marriage and middle age and evaporate with the futility of always being at odds with authorities and for ever on the run. If he leaves or attempts to leave the group, he is regarded as a traitor and his lot is certain death. The government should exploit this aspect and take appropriate steps to protect, help and rehabilitate such ultras who genuinely wish to opt out of their movements.

SECURITY FORCES (SF)

The executive instrument to fight low intensity operations is country's security and police forces and there is considerable scope for increasing efficiency in most of them. Over a period, a number of Police and PMF have mushroomed with the same or nearly similar tasks. No clear cut division of responsibility exists. The study will try to analyse each police/PMF and find out its present/envisaged role in the whole ambit of security.

Though from strict legal sense, only PMF in the Indian Union are Assam Rifles and Rashtriya Rifles, we have a number of CPOs which are called, PMF, like BSF and CRPF. The police and PMF strength of the Indian Union alongwith their roles as per *MILITARY BALANCE 1991-92* is as follows:-

- (a) *Police*. Each State has its own police for law and order. Besides, States also have armed/auxiliary police. Home Guards and Village Volunteer Force are maintained by some frontline States. Strength of provincial armed constabulary is approximately 2,50,000.
- (b) *CPO/PMF*.
 - (i) *Special Services Group (SSG)*. It was raised to provide security to VVIPs. Its strength is approximately 800 to 1000.
 - (ii) *National Security Guard (NSG)*. It comprises of some 5,000 personnel. The force was raised in 1984. Its main task is anti terrorism and contingency deployment force. It comprises elements of Army, CRPF and SSG. It also carries out VIP security duties.
 - (iii) *Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)*. It has a strength of approximately 14,000 personnel. It was raised to man border with Tibet. Its commandos are being employed for VIP security and special missions.
 - (iv) *Border Security Force (BSF)*. This force raised in December 1965 to guard International Border against Pakistan (both West

and East) has some 90,000 personnel in 100 battalions. Additional battalions are likely to be raised. They have small arms, light artillery and their own transport and liaison air support. The force is also being used for internal security.

(v) *Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)*. This force has a strength of 90,000 (reserve 2,50,000) in 100 battalions. Their main task is IS duties and to act as first line reserve to Army during war.

(vi) *Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)*. It is meant for protection of industrial complexes and its strength is approximately 70,000.

(vii) *Assam Rifles (AR)*. It has approximately 32 battalions with a strength of nearly 40,000.

The forces at sub-para (b) above are maintained and controlled by the Union Home Ministry. Whenever CPO/PMF are given to States, the latter bear their expenses for the duration of their stay within the State. Besides the above forces, Railways also maintain Railway Protection Force (RPF) for protection of its property. In addition, we have 2,000 strong Coast Guards. Despite corrective measures, the CPO forces have NOT been able to contain LIC along the border areas. A need was felt to raise a force to primarily look after the rear area security. Rashtriya Rifles came into being with additional tasks of counter insurgency operations, maintenance of law and order and aid to civil authorities. This was at best a half hearted effort. Taking the long term perspective into view, there is a need to amalgamate CPO and PMF and moulding them into cohesive forces.

WHAT AILS CPO

Over a period, Government has been raising/expanding CPO and PMF to meet short term goals. Police forces have been accorded 410 per cent fiscal increase in a decade is a case in point. In fact India may be the only country in the world which is economically so poor and yet is affording the luxury of having a large variety of CPO. The forces have been expanded under successive periodic crises situations, whereas reduced force levels with greater efficiency and better training could have been more cost effective. Even after funding so many forces, the Army has been repeatedly pressed into action for domestic duties that really should be the charter of duties of CPO. It could be that if the States called CPO, they have to pay for their deployment, but in the case of Army, no such payment is envisaged. Reputation of police is bad and even the CPO are being bracketed with local police. The CPO would have given a better account of themselves in case some of the units were only

equipped and trained for countering insurgents and terrorists. In a recent article in 'Hindustan Times' Mr Ved Marwah, a senior police officer admitted it in no uncertain terms. Some of the other major drawbacks in our CPO are:-

- (a) *Top Heavy and Duplicate Organisations.* Proliferation of CPO forces does not always achieve the laid down aims. On the other hand, the overheads get increased with little addition in overall working hands to execute the task. Due to parochialism, myopic vision and 'one-upmanship', the equipment procured for the force is 'state of art' but does not match with existing inventory and separate training establishments lead to duplication and are not cost effective to national exchequer.
- (b) *Fiscal Mismanagement.* The country is paying almost double the cost of maintaining CPO. Deployment of these forces copywise is faulty. Companies are sucked in piece-meal. Each company, being away from its Headquarters in most cases, its personnel are entitled TA/DA which is more than their basic emoluments. Hence Government is indirectly paying two times for maintaining the same force.
- (c) *Training.* Though there has been some improvement, CPO forces are still not armed and trained to fight LIC. They have separate training centres thereby lacking standardisation apart from proliferation of establishments.
- (d) *Poor Leadership.* Poor leadership and lack of motivation account for their dismal performance.
- (e) *Corruption.* Corruption has eroded credibility of police with the masses. This serves the cause of ANEs.
- (f) *Political Interference.* Interference in the functioning of police force by same politicians make the police inefficient and ineffective.
- (g) *Media and Public.* The media and public is always against police force due to their tarred reputation. Seldom does media applaud police.
- (h) *Local Influence.* Kith and kin of policemen and even some of their deserters are in the ranks of ultras and ANE. The fear of liquidation of their family members or their own self hang heavily on their minds.

The above weaknesses clearly bring out that the police system has loopholes and is not serving its laid down role. On the other hand, the country

is paying through its nose to maintain such a large force. There are variety of forces with the same or similar type of tasks. They can be aptly equated to the famous saying of 'too many cooks spoil the broth'. Seeing the prevailing security environment in the country, a clear cut division of responsibility and employment of all the combat power with the Indian Union is called for. Basically, security forces are required for the following contingencies :-

- (a) *Law and Order.* To solve dacoities, thefts, local law and order problems, combat unrests, local movements and internal security not along border.
- (b) *Security of International Border (IB) and Combating LIC.* Manning of IB, rear area security, internal security and LIC along the border states.
- (c) *Local Wars and External Aggression.* To combat external aggression, the whole nation has to prepare and contribute its mite.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Political nature of LIC has prevented development of an effective capability to combat LIC. However there is a capability to protect national security interests in higher intensity conventional conflicts where military objectives are paramount, but this capability cannot cope with the political warfare of LIC. Having understood the weaknesses of the present system in India as also the force levels available, an endeavour has been made to recommend a viable and clearly demarcated structure which would be able to tackle both external and internal threats.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Strategy to deal with insurgency/anti-national activity/LIC at national level is recommended as follows :-

- (a) Closed society experiment seems to have met global rejection. People want certain degree of political determination. Any envisaged solution should take into account political aspirations of the people. Decentralisation of power and devolution of authority may be best counter to combat a secessionist movement in a democratic society.
- (b) It is ingrained human aspiration to improve ones lot. All citizens basically want peace as prosperity can come with only congenial atmosphere. Local administration can be toned up to develop economy,

enhance educational opportunities and improve living conditions. It requires honesty, sense of purpose and commitment and above all nationalistic feelings.

(c) Identify the problem in totality and find solution politically even if it requires dialogue with ANE. It is better to have a debate on such issues to take views of national political parties and public at large to win their confidence and support. Emerging problems should be foreseen and nipped in the bud. Fertile areas for insurgency should be kept under surveillance. Local problems can lead to national disaster, if not identified and checked in time.

(d) Anti social elements in the garb of insurgents take advantage of the situation. They alongwith selfish and ambitious insurgents must be eliminated.

(e) The affected population should be weaned away by countering terrorist propaganda and psychological operations. Government should not only be honest in solving the problem but execute its implementation in all seriousness.

(f) Break or reduce the physical nexus between insurgent and foreign support, if any, by intense military and para military activities on the border, ie attempt to seal the border effectively.

(g) International pressure should be brought on the errant neighbour and coercion by all means including exhibition of force or going in 'hot pursuit', or even limited war. 'Quid-pro-quo' in sectors where the errant neighbour is vulnerable to internal dissensions.

(h) Quick disposal of captured terrorists by imposing fear of deterrent punishment.

(j) Human rights have assumed added leverage world over. Economic aid is getting linked up with human rights violations. Government should not become a party to such violations and should investigate all complaints received through International Amnesty dispassionately.

(k) Self control by media by not giving undue publicity to terrorist activities. No blanket censorship should be imposed by the Government.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

National Level. There is a need for a holistic approach in today's environment as geo-strategic environment and the internal situation in a country keep changing. To take an overall view of national security in the light of external, economic, political and military situations and their linkages with the country's domestic concerns and objectives, in an integrated form with long-term perspective, a National Security Council (NSC) is recommended to be constituted. Attempts have been made in the past also to set up such an organisation, but its implementation has not seen the light of the day. As late as on 24 Aug 1990, the then PM, Mr VP Singh announced in the Lok Sabha, formation of NSC when the war clouds with Pakistan were still hovering. Whether NSC did have regular sittings thereafter or not, we are NOT aware of. There has been a prolonged debate on the relevance of NSC. We endorse its creation but would recommend following composition :-

NSC		
Chairman (Prime Minister)		
Members	Advisory Staff	Secretariat
Defence Minister	Chairman - Joint Chiefs of Staff	National Security Advisor - Member
Home Minister	Chairman - Joint intelligence Committee	Secretary
External Affairs Minister	Cabinet Secretary	
Finance Minister	Defence Secretary Home Secretary Foreign Secretary and any other expert like Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Atomic energy Commission, etc	

SUBJECTS

The NSC to consider the following main subjects :-

- Energy. Space and high technology.
- Counter insurgency, counter terrorism, counter intelligence and combating LIC.
- Neighbouring Countries and Nations of National Interest. Countries which have social communal or regional dimensions.

- (d) World economy and its impact on Indian Economy.
- (e) Foreign and defence policies.
- (f) Smuggling and trafficking in arms, drugs and narcotics and their security implications.

Secretariat. The NSC should have a secretariat which should be headed by Security Advisor. It would consist of officers on deputation from the three Services, Ministries of External Affairs, Home, Defence and Finance. The National Security Advisor would be an eminent person of national status having adequate security background. All conceptual papers relating to security would be initiated by this Secretariat and considered by the Advisory staff. The secretariat could also give USI, IDSA and Jawahar Lal Nehru University specific assignments for solving various long term national security problems. The secretariat would also service Special Advisory Group relating to management during specific crises like hijacking. Special Advisory Group would be formed out of the NSC for solving particular problems.

Responsibility. The NSC would be answerable to CCPA and to Cabinet and through it to Parliament. NSC would meet every quarter to review security environment within and around the country in particular and World in general. During external and internal emergencies, they could meet everyday. However, they would not involve themselves in day to day conduct of battle or emergencies.

RE-STRUCTURING OF CPO AND PMF

LIC along International Border. It is envisaged that manning of international border, LIC along the border states and responsibility of thwarting external aggression are sensitive issues and must be under one agency for better cohesion, potency, exchange of vital information and using all available combat power for restoring normalcy. With that in view, it is recommended that a border guarding force with responsibility to undertake LIC along border states be constituted by amalgamating BSF, Rashtriya Rifles, ITBP and Assam Rifles. This force could be called Rashtriya Rifles and should be organised on regional basis. One proposed set up is given at Appendix attached. This force is recommended to be under Ministry of Defence. It should have a Rajya Raksha Mantri (B), incharge of international border and LIC along border states during peace. On mobilisation, this force would come under Army for rear area security. It should have a Secretary (LIC) as its bureaucratic head.

In order that Army has a viable second line defence as also to keep the Army young, it is recommended that 60% of the recruitment in suggested

Rashtriya Rifles force be ex Army with 40% direct recruitment. The Rashtriya Rifles battalions should be organised and equipped on the same lines as existing Rashtriya Rifles Battalions.

Law and Order. Local police (including armed police) under respective States to be responsible for law and order as hitherto-fore. For quelling internal security situation other than those in border States, Central Government to have one force, namely Central Police Force (CPF) under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). SSG, NSG, CRPF and CISF should comprise this force. For economy, better command and coordination, the organisation should be divided into force and sub force HQ and located region-wise, depending upon threat perceptions. Minimum force to be moved should be a battalion and not company. On permanent move, battalions should change affiliation to new force/sub force HQ and must not retain permanent attachments. CPF to have following tasks:-

- (a) Internal security.
- (b) Anti-hijacking and anti terrorist.
- (c) Protection of industrial complexes.
- (d) Security of VVIPs.

There should not be separate specialist organisations like SSG and NSG but specialist battalions under the CPF. This would save in monolith HQ of these organisations. Specialist battalions would carry out surgical operations and revert to affiliated force HQ.

Following advantages are likely to accrue if the proposed recommendations are accepted:-

- (a) Saving of a large number of manpower as overheads in various existing CPO and PMF would reduce considerably.
- (b) A long term strategy for combating LIC along the international border and within the country can be made, taking into account overall force level.
- (c) The proposed arrangement would be more cohesive, cogent and capable of overcoming all shades of LIC.
- (d) It would reduce frequent call on Army in aid to civil authorities.
- (e) Nation will have a more potent second line defence as considerable percentage of rank and file would be ex Army.

(f) Overall there would be considerable savings in revenue as a result of restructuring of CPO and PMF.

ARMY'S CONTRIBUTION TO LIC

Army is likely to get involved in combating LIC sooner or later. It is recommended that rather than diluting the whole Army in fighting terrorism, a few selected divisions (suggested three) should be converted into light divisions, with provision to re-convert them into normal divisions, on mobilisation. The light divisions are recommended to be composed of three to four infantry brigades with each brigade having three battalions of six rifle companies each. The rifle company should have three platoons of four sections with 9 men in each section. Anti tank weapons need NOT be authorised ab initio but issued on conversion only. These divisions, to be converted from infantry/mountain divisions in peace stations, should be located close to/in the area/likely area of LIC. They should be trained in combating LIC operations.

CONCLUSION

Given its vast diversities of culture, language, ethnic variations and economic developments, India ever since it gained independence has been witnessing sorry spectacle of one hill tribe after another from Eastern and NE India take up arms against the democratically elected and legally constituted Governments. These insurgencies constantly sought achievement of independence by stressing the ethnic character of the tribal regions. This was followed by the Naxalite Movement and the Assam agitation. In early 1990 the Indian Union was fighting on one hand the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents (LTTE) on foreign soil and on the other hand terrorist and secessionists of Punjab and J&K on home ground. The last two are positively aided, abetted and supported by Pakistan, who being the weaker side have chosen easier way of waging war (camouflaged war - to borrow a terminology from Liddell-Hart on India without paying a price for it, in an effort to attain something they cannot otherwise achieve through open conflict. To add to this, LIC operations against ULFA insurgents were conceived and executed. We may have another one on our hands in Tamil Nadu against LTTE and other militant groups operating in Bihar. Even though we have spent millions of rupees in combating LIC operations, we still have not been wholly able to project the image of a great country and great people that we are. Interestingly, the very diversity of the Indian society that stokes the fires of parochialism, regionalism and ethnic chauvinism can act as a serious obstacle to a unified insurgency movement. LIC is a world-wide phenomenon and not restricted to Indian sub continent only, though the concept of LIC in

developed nations vary. We have to evolve a national policy to combat LIC which has come to stay as the warfare of today and tomorrow. The study recommends restructuring of CPO and PMF forces to perform the dual role of combatting LIC in peace time and provide second line of defence during war. It is also suggested that three divisions of the Army be converted into light divisions for LIC operations. And the most important of all, the study recommends the formation of NSC to examine challenges to India's security in internal and external context and to formulate an integrated long term response in military, diplomatic economic and political fields.

Appendix

ORGANISATION OF RASHTRIYA RIFLES

