



The Great Helmsman and the Generalissimo: A Personal Feud That Endures

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“Mao is sometime Yin sometime Yang, strange man, he has a soft-as-cotton outer layer, but at the same time has sharp needles hiding inside...I do not think he could achieve anything. At the end he will be crushed inside my palm.”

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

Backdrop

Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there has been a buzz about a similar adventure that could be undertaken by China on Taiwan. It is surmised that if Russia could unilaterally launch an invasion to achieve its goals, China could do the same. After all, the power differential between the aggressor and the invaded is similar in both cases.

The relations between China and Taiwan have remained tumultuous for the past seven decades. The origins of this relationship can, however, be traced to the personal animosities between two individuals. This feud has determined the fate of the entire Chinese people for the past one hundred years and continues to do so.

Dr Sun Yat-sen and his Goumindang (Kuomintang/Nationalists) party successfully ended the Qing Dynasty through the 1911 Xinhai revolution and established a provisional coalition government in China in 1912. However, there were many competing interests and power centres that persisted. Dr Sun lasted barely two months at the helm and was replaced by Yuan Shikai, a warlord. However, Sun's commitment to nation

building generated a deep respect among intellectuals in the cities.

Proteges of Sun Yat-sen

In 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed in Shanghai with 50 members. 28-year-old Mao Tse-tung was one of the founding members. The CCP was formed with generous Soviet funding through the Comintern after the Bolsheviks had gained access to state coffers in 1917. For the first six years of its history, the CCP aligned itself with the Guomindang as the organised left wing of a nationalist movement.

In 1924, the Nationalists and the Communists formed the (first) United Front, to jointly fight against warlords who were a major menace in China then. This cooperation was initiated at the behest of Dr Sun Yat-sen. The CCP was only three years old in 1924, whereas the Nationalists were a much larger organisation. The Communists continue to venerate Dr Sun Yat-sen till today for his generosity in accommodating the CCP in those early days. In fact, he remains the only historical figure to be commonly revered by Mao and Chiang Kai-shek.

After Dr Sun's death in 1925, many factions emerged among the Nationalists, and by 1926, Chiang Kai-shek became the leader of the most powerful faction. Chiang was educated in a military school in Japan on scholarship and hailed from a rural background. After Dr Sun's death, Chiang married the sister of Dr Sun's widow and thus claimed greater legitimacy to the legacy of Dr Sun. He divorced his previous wife and embraced Christianity to fulfill the preconditions set by his future mother-in-law, the Soong matriarch.

The Soong family was to be the focal point of every major decision made in modern Chinese history. A Communist saying has it that among the three Soong sisters, one loved power (Mei-ling, the youngest, married to Chiang Kai-shek), one loved money (Ai-ling, the eldest, married to a tycoon HH Kung) and one loved China (Qing-ling, married to Sun Yat-sen).¹

The White Terror

The death of Dr Sun Yat-sen and consequent rise of Chiang Kai-shek effectively ended the bonhomie between the Nationalists and the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek was deeply suspicious of the Communists and launched a vicious purge against them in 1927 in Shanghai during the Northern Expedition.² Many Communists were publicly shot dead. The Communists took evasive action by establishing secret cells in cities or establishing bases in rural areas, which ensured that the CCP was not entirely wiped-out during Chiang's purges. The Communists lost an estimated 15000 of their 25000 cadres during the 1927 purges.

Mao was also on the hit list of Guomindang assassination squads, although he was not yet the undisputed leader of the

CCP. Mao's second wife was beheaded by the Nationalists in Changsha in 1930.³

His two sons lived as street urchins for some time in Shanghai during this period. The 1927 purges were to spell permanent animosity between the two parties and mark Chiang Kai-shek as the *bête noire* of the Communists. The purges would be one of the galvanising pretexts for Mao in succeeding years. Chiang on the other hand was convinced that the Japanese were a skin wound, whereas the Communists were a 'disease of the heart'.⁴

Under immense pressure from Chiang's purges, the Communists undertook a long trek from the Southeast of China to the Northwest. Over a one-year period from 1934-35, the Communists moved to Yan'an which was out of reach of Chiang's forces. In between they claim to have battled weather, terrain and Chiang's forces in equal measure, making the Long March an event of heroic proportions in the annals of CCP history. It was during the Long March that Mao cemented his position as the supreme leader of the CCP.

It has also been suggested that Chiang had numerous opportunities to destroy Communist columns but he let them pass. Chiang then had other distractions, due to the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931. The Japanese were on Chinese soil and were a more imminent threat than the Communists who could be dealt with later. In July 1937, the Japanese triggered the Marco Polo Bridge incident to launch their campaign to invade the remainder of China.

Resistance to the Japanese engaged most of Chiang's resources and time in the late 1930s. This distraction was used by Mao to consolidate Communist forces and of their organisation in the areas under him around

Yan'an. The two parties did align briefly in 1937 to jointly fight against the Japanese. But Mao let the Nationalists do all the fighting while the Communists conserved their combat power.

Stalin's Machinations

The Soviets were significant players in the internal politics of China in those times. The Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) wielded control over the CCP, and its Commissar was the arbiter of factional feuds. The CCP effectively acted under orders from Moscow. But Stalin recognised the power differential between the two parties and maintained cordial relations with Chiang Kai-shek. Since the entry of Japan into Manchuria in 1931, Stalin was apprehensive of a likely Japanese attack on the Soviet far-East. When Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern pact in 1936, the prospect of being hemmed in by two adversaries became real. Stalin's goal was to use China to steer Japan away from the Soviet Union by dragging the Japanese into the vast interior of China and bogging them down there. Since Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the Chinese Government and possessed the resources to resist the Japanese, he humoured Chiang, all the while retaining control of the CCP.

A favourite method in Stalin's bag of tricks was to invite the children of foreign leaders' for schooling and then hold them hostage in exchange for geopolitical concessions. Chiang's son – Chiang Ching-kuo was held hostage for nine years in the Soviet Union. He had been sent to Moscow in 1925 as a teenager to study during the First United Front. Stalin sent him to work in a steel factory in the Ural mountains after the Nationalists attacked the CCP in 1927. It is believed that Stalin prevailed on Chiang to go slow on his attacks on the Communists during the Long March (1934-35) in exchange for sparing the life of his son.⁵ By 1937, a war between Japan and China was imminent. Stalin was egging Chiang to resist the Japanese and the return of Chiang Ching-kuo and his Russian wife in 1937 was a goodwill measure towards this end.

Chiang had become sterile through contracting venereal diseases several times and he had adopted another son. But Ching-kuo was the only blood heir and remained closest to his heart. Chiang Kai-shek was steeped in Chinese tradition, in which the central concern was to have an heir. To fail to carry on the family line was regarded as a disgrace, the greatest hurt that one could inflict on one's parents and ancestors whose dead souls could then never rest in peace.⁶




Image 1: The protagonists of the Xi'an Incident: Seated L to R, Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hucheng and Chiang Kai-shek.

In another event known as the 'Xi'an Incident', Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped and held hostage for 12 days when he visited Xi'an for a meeting in December 1936. The kidnapping was done by Chang Hsueh-liang, the 'Young Marshal', a warlord in Shaanxi province who had placed his domain under Chiang's central government. The Young Marshal harboured a desire to supplant Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of China, which was exploited by Mao to nudge him to kidnap Chiang on a visit to the Young Marshal's capital. After the kidnap, Mao urged the Young Marshal to kill Chiang, but by then Stalin's disapproval of this action became known and the Young Marshal developed cold feet. He apologised to Chiang and accompanied him back to Nanjing.⁷ The Xi'an incident led to the formation of the Second United Front in 1937.

Courting the Yanks

During World War II, it was clear that the Soviets supported the CCP. Chiang, therefore, decided to court the Americans. His conduit with the Americans was his third wife, Soong Mei-ling also known as Madame Chiang, the sister-in-law of Dr Sun Yat-sen. She spoke English fluently owing to an American education and was a Christian. American cooperation turned into generous military funding after Pearl Harbour. By 1943, the Japanese juggernaut had rolled into Southern China, forcing the Nationalist Government to move their capital from Nanjing to Chongqing in the hinterland. Cut off from routes of supply by sea, the Nationalists were supported by the Americans by air from airfields in Upper Assam and then by construction of the Stilwell Road from Ledo to Yunnan.

When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, both sides tried to move into the areas vacated by

the Japanese. Chiang was recognised as the leader of the Nationalist Government. The Republic of China was bestowed a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Internally however, the balance of power within China had changed significantly. Over the past decade, the Communists had consolidated their organisation into a tightly knit one steeped in Communist ideology. They had not fought the Japanese and were fresh for the battles to follow. The Communists also had generous Soviet support, now that Chiang had befriended the Americans and had fallen foul of the Soviets. Towards the end of World War, the Soviets had captured Mongolia and Manchuria and bequeathed some parts to Mao, complete with the factories constructed by the Japanese.

Chiang Kai-shek continued to run the Nationalist government from Nanjing while the Civil War raged in the hinterland. In 1948, a U-shaped line appeared on Chinese maps around most of the South China Sea comprising eleven dashes. In 1953, two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin were dropped, as part of a deal with the Communist Party of Vietnam, giving us the 'nine-dash line' of today's South China Sea dispute. The CCP's claims in this dispute are conveniently based on Kuomintang maps, notwithstanding their vilification of every other principle that the Nationalists stood for. In fact, the island of Taiwan was not even regarded as part of China by the CCP in its declaration of war with Japan in 1941.⁸

1949 – The Watershed Year

The Generalissimo and the Great Helmsman met for the last time in person at Chongqing in August-October 1945. The meeting was arranged at the behest of the American envoy. They had earlier met once each in 1924

and in 1926. The 1945 meeting was their third. Both sides were polite to each other. While making hollow promises to Chiang over the following weeks until October - including recognising the Nationalist Party as the legitimate ruling party of China - Mao used this time to consolidate his forces in Manchuria before commencing the Civil War in November 1945.⁹

In contrast, Chiang's forces had undertaken the bulk of the fighting against the Japanese since 1937 and suffered large casualties. Despite generous American materiel support, the Nationalists were demoralised by 1945. To make matters worse, Chiang underestimated the Communists and deployed his forces piecemeal. Over the next four years, the Communists expanded areas under their control. By 1949, the Nationalists were in



Image 2: Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung at their last meeting in Chongqing in 1945.

full retreat. In many places, the psychological ascendancy of the Communists was so great that Nationalist troops surrendered en masse as garrisons with their American or Japanese weapons and trained crews. This further tipped the military balance in favour of the Communists.

Sensing the tide of the Civil War, Chiang ordered the transshipment of gold and major Chinese historical artefacts from all parts of China into Taiwan in 1948. These included about 20 percent of the best artefacts from the Forbidden City in Beijing. In later years, Taiwan was to point out at its possession of these historical artefacts in museums across Taiwan to claim that Taiwan was the true inheritor of Chinese historical legacy and that, therefore, it is the true China. Between

1947 and 1949, the PLA registered military successes far beyond Mao's expectations, so much so that he revised the PLA's targets from an original figure of liberating nine provinces to 17 provinces by 1949.¹⁰ Chiang abandoned mainland China and fled to Taiwan in early 1949. That year, Nationalist forces were literally pushed into the sea and holed up in offshore islands such as Hainan and Quemoy which were difficult objectives for the largely ground-based PLA of that time. The capture of islands required amphibious operations involving naval assets and coordinated air support. The People's War Doctrine of Mao was singularly inapplicable for amphibious operations. 70,000 Nationalist troops evacuated from Hainan on the orders of Chiang Kai-shek

paving the way for its occupation by CCP forces on 01 May 1949.¹¹

The National Flag of the People's Republic of China was inaugurated from Tiananmen Square on 01 October 1949. The largest star represented the leadership of the CCP over the four classes of Chinese people depicted by four small stars. One of these classes was the 'Nationalist Capitalist' who had fled to Taiwan. Thus began the PRC's claim to Taiwan as its renegade province, the reunification of which remains the unfinished agenda of the CCP to this day.

The Turning Point – The Korean War

In January 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson spelt out a Defensive Perimeter which included Philippines and Japan but excluded Korea and Formosa. Having witnessed the rout of Chiang Kai-shek's forces and their large-scale defections during the four year-long Civil War, the Americans held a dim view of the Nationalists' capability to repel a Communist invasion of Taiwan. The Americans opined that investing any further resources on Chiang was counterproductive,



Image 3: An artist's rendition of 01 October 1949 at Tiananmen Square. Mme Sun Yat-sen / Soong Qing-ling stood beside Mao on the Tiananmen Gate. She was the sister-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek. Second among the Soong sisters, she died in 1981, a few months after finally becoming a member of the CCP

because many American weapons had already landed in Communist hands. In effect, the US had abandoned Formosa to the Communists and predicted that it would fall before the end of 1950.¹²

On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists had no intention of settling down in Taiwan forever. For the first few years after 1949, they imagined Taiwan as a temporary staging base from which they would launch a campaign to recapture the Chinese mainland. Indeed, a Taiwanese invasion of mainland China – rather than

the reverse – was considered more probable until 1950 because a viable Navy and Air Force existed for the purpose under the Nationalists. When the Americans launched Operation Chromite during the Korean War in September 1950, the task assigned to the Seventh Fleet was to place itself in the Taiwan Straits to ensure that Chiang Kai-shek would not use the Korean War as a pretext to invade mainland China, an action that could provoke the entry of the Chinese - or the Soviets - on the side of the North Koreans.¹³

However, the Chinese did eventually enter the Korean War a few days later. This decision of Mao was to have far-reaching ramifications on the future of Sino-Taiwan relations.

The Chinese entry into the Korean War in November 1950 decisively tipped the scales of that campaign in favour of the Communists. The march of UN forces upto the Yalu turned into a full-scale humiliating retreat until both sides consolidated around the 38th Parallel. The intelligence failure was embarrassing to the US as was the performance of its modern Army against a *third world peasant Army* which only had experience in guerilla warfare. The Chinese emerged from the war with a high standing in the developing world for having stood up to the Americans. It also received a generous supply of Soviet weapon systems for equipping its fledgling Air Force and Army. The two-year long protracted negotiations further frustrated the Americans and hardened their dislike for the Chinese.

It was thus that President Harry Truman announced that Taiwanese independence was of paramount importance to the Americans in the Western Pacific and that the US would not allow a Chinese invasion of Taiwan to succeed. The Communist invasion of Taiwan that was originally planned for the winter of 1949 was initially postponed to 1950 and then to mid-1951.¹⁴ The American involvement in the Korean War and its final outcome effectively prevented the capture of Taiwan by Mao. 48 countries signed a Treaty in San Francisco in September 1951 which contained a clause stating that *Taiwan's international status was yet to be decided*, thereby undermining the 1943 Cairo and 1945 Potsdam Declarations (which stated that Taiwan would revert to China after the Japanese were defeated).

That status quo has remained ever since.

The Taiwan Strait Crises

American resolve to this commitment was tested at Taiwan's offshore possessions in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1955 and in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 at the Jinmen group. In both cases, Mao had given clear instructions to PLA commanders that only Taiwanese forces were to be targeted. American aircraft and ships were not to be engaged and American casualties were to be avoided at all costs. The two Strait Crises ended in favour of the Taiwanese, considering that the offshore islands remained under Taiwanese possession.

In a case of curious political signalling that defied all military logic, Mao openly announced that the Jinmen would be fired upon by PLA artillery on odd-numbered days and spared on even-number days. This pattern of shelling continued for the next two decades, from 25 October 1958 to 01 January 1979, making it the longest sustained artillery shelling in world military history.

The threat of an American nuclear attack lurked for the decade of the 1950s. Though Mao had publicly stated that an atom bomb was a 'paper tiger', there is evidence that Mao was deterred from undertaking any further adventures that may antagonise the Americans – chief among them the invasion of Taiwan.

Chiang Kai-shek never gave up the prospect of recapturing mainland China. A top-secret plan called Project *Guoguang* /Project National Glory was aimed at exploiting China's weakness during the Great Leap Forward of 1960s which Chiang saw as a crisis opportunity. The Americans opposed the idea and had their Military Advisory Group members conduct reconnaissance of Chiang's launch pads to ensure that no offensive action was undertaken by Taiwan.

It was only after Chiang's death that Taiwan shifted its focus towards modernising and defending Taiwan instead of preparing to take back China.¹⁵

During a Presidential election in Taiwan in 1996, it appeared that Taiwan would bid for independence and make a break from the One China Policy. An angry China responded by launching missiles close to Taiwanese waters and preparing for a mock-up invasion. In response to this Chinese belligerence and to honour the Taiwan Relations Act, President Bill Clinton sent two carrier groups into the Taiwan theatre which forced the Chinese to back off. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrated American resolve to defend Taiwan. The Chinese on the other hand resolved to overcome the prevailing military asymmetry with the US at some point in the future to prevent a recurrence of 1996.

Rapprochement

Chinese strategic calculus was to change after the death of Stalin in 1953. Mao no longer felt the need to be beholden to Stalin's successors and this quickly deteriorated Sino-Soviet relations. Unable to handle two fronts simultaneously, Mao decided to mend relations with the Americans to counterbalance the Soviet threat. The rapprochement with the Americans was to happen in 1972 under President Nixon.

The PRC also replaced the ROC at China's seat on the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 1971 under UN Resolution 2758. The status of Taiwan was left undecided under this UN Resolution. But as China's influence at the UN grew, it ramped up efforts to rewrite Taiwan's status in the 1900s and 2000s, at the same time as the island's democratisation.¹⁶

The Chinese succeeded in getting the Americans to commit to the One-China policy, meaning that Taiwan was a part of China. However, the US did not waver on its commitment to Taiwanese independence which was codified in the form of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979

Domestic Polity in Taiwan

Internally, Chiang Kai-shek established an autocracy in order to prevent Communist spies from destabilising Taiwan. The Cai Xiaogan Spy scandal of 1950 revealed that the CCP had infiltrated Taiwan's government at very high levels.¹⁷ The Soviets had taught the CCP the benefits of infiltrating various organisations. Many secret agents were planted in the Nationalist Party in the early 1920s. When Chiang split from the Communists in 1927, a large number of these secret agents stayed on as 'sleepers' to be activated at the appropriate time. For the next twenty years and more, these sleeper agents were able to give Mao crucial intelligence and were often in a position to have substantial influence on policy, as many had risen very high in the Nationalist system. These agents were able to play a gigantic role in helping deliver China to Mao.¹⁸ Stung by this realisation in 1949, Chiang launched massive purges in Taiwan to weed out Communist sympathisers who could cause further damage. The prospect of defections and infiltration has been a persistent factor in Sino-Taiwan relations.

The resulting purges caused Taiwan turning into a police state paranoid with the threat of fifth columnists who were working undercover for the PRC. At the same time, Taiwan was transformed into a thriving economic structure. The Taiwanese semiconductor industry began in 1974 and has dominated some key segments of the

global industry since then. Its dominance in this domain is often used towards geopolitical ends of Taiwan and is referred to as the 'Silicon Shield'.¹⁹

Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, aged 88. Mao followed him the following year aged 84. Mao's successors – until Xi Jinping – adopted a benign strategy towards Taiwan. Deng propounded the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy for Hong Kong and Macau in the 1990s. The policy was meant as a possible alternative for Taiwanese to reunite with the mainland under a similar arrangement. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao went further to improve cross Strait relations by increasing the economic embrace between the two countries. Coastal provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang actively sought Taiwanese investment for their provinces. Xi Jinping was the Governor of Fujian province from 2000-2002 and had served in the province since 1985. In 2010, there were as many as 270 weekly flights between China and Taiwan, and it appeared that a military conflict between the two was becoming an improbability.

Domestic politics of Taiwan have contributed in no small measure to the hardening of Chinese stance towards Taiwan. While the Kuomintang Party was the CCP's archenemy, by the late 1990s, it had emerged as the primary proponent for reunification with the mainland under the pan-Blue Coalition. The Kuomintang still dreams of restoring Chiang Kai-shek's mortal remains to his ancestral home in Zhejiang province. From 2008 to 2016, the Kuomintang's Ma Ying-jeou served as President of Taiwan. His tenure was marked with warm relations with China. He met Xi Jinping in November 2015 at Singapore where both addressed each other as *Xiansheng* - 'mister'.

The other side of the political divide is represented by the pan-Green Coalition which stands for Taiwanese independence. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the largest member of the pan-Green Coalition which has support of 31.1 percent of the population. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP was elected President. The CCP has since been on a warpath, employing its geopolitical muscle to deny Taiwan access to UN agencies such as the WHO and reducing to a handful the number of countries that continue diplomatic relations with Taiwan, mostly Central and South American states - none of which are major economic or military powers. The economic interaction has been wound down by both sides during the Sino-US trade war when Taiwan restricted semiconductor supplies to Huawei. A 2021 survey in Taiwan revealed that 67.9 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese, 1.8 percent as Chinese and 27.9 percent as both.²⁰

Conclusion

The hair-raising missile launches in response to US Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit this year have brought cross-strait relations into global limelight. But its origins can be traced back to two claimants of Sun Yat-sen's political legacy.

Between them, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong dominated China for half a century. They were born six years apart, the former in 1887 and Mao in 1893 – and died within seventeen months of each other. Both came from country villages and from families that rose above the rural landscape. Each had a deep love for his mother, though Mao's hatred for his father was far greater than Chiang's for his. Both had a Confucian childhood, studying the classics whose filial principles would remain with them through

their lives. In their teenage, they were put into arranged marriages with women older to them whom they soon discarded. Each abandoned a subsequent spouse and ended married to politically ambitious younger women. The sons of both were sent for schooling to Moscow, but Stalin saw them as potential hostages to be used at an opportune moment. Both retained the accent of their home provinces – and both suffered from constipation.²¹ Both had simple tastes and little regard for money. Each saw himself as a teacher for the nation, the embodiment of what China should be, fighting his way to the top against political opponents of greater seniority, pursuing an often-lonely path but convinced of his righteousness. Each stood at the top of an organisation structured on military lines in which party, state and army came together under his command. Deeply Sino-centric, they both believed in the power of the will. Most unfortunately, neither recoiled from a huge expenditure of human life in pursuit of his own personal ambition.

If fate were to have dealt differently with either of them, the lives of millions of Chinese

people would have turned out very differently. Had the Nationalists not killed Mao's wife, had the Young Marshal not stopped Chiang from decimating Mao's Army or if Mao had succeeded in killing Chiang in Xi'an in 1936, or if Mao had not plunged into the Korean War, a completely different modern history of China would have panned out. But that has not come to pass. Instead, the disputes that arose out of their rivalry continue to haunt the world today.

The most prominent among these involves the lives of 23 million residents of a nation that goes by four different names. *Taiwan* is a neutral geographical name; *Formosa* was the post-colonial name in Portuguese; *Republic of China* an official, yet mostly erased, name of the country; and *Chinese Taipei* an ambiguous moniker used in some specific international contexts such as sporting events.²²

The Generalissimo and the Great Helmsman could not wish each other away during their lifetimes. Neither can their descendants in Taiwan and China afford that luxury in the 21st Century.

End Notes

- 1 Jonathan Fenby, 'Generalissimo: Chang Kai-shek and the China He Lost', Simon & Schuster, 2003, Kindle Edition, loc.3198. Their brother, TV Soong, was the finance minister for the Nationalist Government. After 1949, only Qing-ling stayed in China, the rest of the family having aligned with Chiang Kai-shek. A Hong Kong film covering the life of the Soong family 'The Soong Sisters' was released in 1997 and is available on YouTube.
- 2 Jeanne-Marie Gescher, '*Becoming China- The Story Behind the State*', Bloomsbury Publishers, 2017, Kindle Edition, loc.5955.
- 3 Jung Chang, Jon Halliday, '*Mao – the Unknown Story*', Vintage Books, 2007, Kindle Edition, loc.1678.
- 4 Jonathan Fenby, op.cit., loc.3999.
- 5 John Keay, '*China – A History*', Harper Press, 2009, Kindle Edition, loc.9837.
- 6 Jung Chang, Jon Halliday, op.cit., loc.3465. While in captivity in Russia in 1935, Chiang Ching-kuo married a Russian girl, Faina Vakhreva, a technician at the steel plant he was working, who accompanied him to China on his release and remained faithful to her husband and her adopted homeland. She was the First Lady of Taiwan from 1978-88.
- 7 Jonathan Fenby, op.cit., loc.288. The Young Marshal was held in house arrest by Chiang and his successors for 55 years where he was both detained and protected. He was released and died in Hawaii in 2001, aged 100 having outlived Mao and Chiang by more than a decade.
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- 18 Jung Chang, Jon Halliday, op.cit., loc.2759.
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- 22 Chen Tzu-hsuan, '*What's in a name? Between "Chinese Taipei" and "Taiwan": The contested terrain of sport nationalism in Taiwan*', International Review for the Sociology of Sport, June 2020, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342041138>, accessed on 05 August 2022.

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